Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

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Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Author: Gueth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra K.
Tübinger Autor(en):
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Zaby, Alexandra
Published in: German Economic Review (2017), Bd. 18, H. 4, S. 444-467
Verlagsangabe: Wiley
Language: English
Full text: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12112
ISSN: 1468-0475
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Dokumentart: Article
Note: vgl auch: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 90 http://hdl.handle.net/10900/69470
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