The strategic effect of debt in dynamic price competition with fluctuating demand

DSpace Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor Universität <Tübingen> / Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar de_DE
dc.contributor.author Neubecker, Leslie de_DE
dc.date.accessioned 2005-08-16 de_DE
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-18T10:02:12Z
dc.date.available 2005-08-16 de_DE
dc.date.available 2014-03-18T10:02:12Z
dc.date.issued 2002 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 120461846 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18834 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47380
dc.description.abstract This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by limited liability. In contrast to its advantageous commitment value in short-run competition, leverage reduces profits from infinite interaction. Contrasting uncorrelated shocks with a cyclical demand development, we show that in the first case optimal pricing is anticyclical. With demand cycles, it is anticyclical only if equity holders place a low value on future profits, but procyclical otherwise. In both cases, the cyclicity of prices increases with the debt level. Contrary to traditional wisdom, a lower degree of homogeneity may raise profits of leveraged firms. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Preiswettbewerb , Kapitalstruktur , Kollusion de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other capital structure , dynamic competition , collusion en
dc.title The strategic effect of debt in dynamic price competition with fluctuating demand en
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE
utue.opus.id 1883 de_DE
utue.opus.portal wiwidisk de_DE
utue.opus.portalzaehlung 250.00000 de_DE
utue.publikation.source Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät ; 250 de_DE
utue.publikation.reihenname Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag de_DE
utue.publikation.zsausgabe 250
utue.publikation.erstkatid 2136475-8

Dateien:

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record