The strategic effect of debt in dynamic price competition with fluctuating demand

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Dateien:
Aufrufstatistik

URI: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18834
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47380
Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Date: 2002
Source: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät ; 250
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Preiswettbewerb , Kapitalstruktur , Kollusion
Other Keywords:
capital structure , dynamic competition , collusion
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by limited liability. In contrast to its advantageous commitment value in short-run competition, leverage reduces profits from infinite interaction. Contrasting uncorrelated shocks with a cyclical demand development, we show that in the first case optimal pricing is anticyclical. With demand cycles, it is anticyclical only if equity holders place a low value on future profits, but procyclical otherwise. In both cases, the cyclicity of prices increases with the debt level. Contrary to traditional wisdom, a lower degree of homogeneity may raise profits of leveraged firms.

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