Abstract:
This study addresses a paradigmatic debate in contemporary political science: the discussion about the relative importance of institutional and structural constraints against the political agenda (even if it is an internationally agreed one), and the choice or decision making possibilities political actors have, plus the institutional channels that exist to express these decisions. In other words, the research seeks a pattern oriented to explain the possibilities of reforming the state, and the institutional reactions presented by the legislative. The enquiry suggests that aside from a number of investigations done to explain the turbulent decades when structural adjustments took place, the role of the legislative (in passing or stopping many of these reforms) in the presidentialist democracies of Latin America has been enormously and continuously overlooked, because among other reasons, of its supposed weakness.
In the case of Latin American presidentialist democracies, the historic tradition of the strong president together with a light parliamentary figure, developed throughout a continuous set of interactions and led to a great paradox: unequal powers cannot control each other despite being normatively conceived as mutual veto actors. The legislative, so asymmetrically equipped in the several constitutions of the region, could not perform its other main function aside from legislating, that is, the control of the executive power and its decisions. This being said, a deliberate focus on the legislative powers in Latin America, brings out to light structural and functional constraints that do have a determinant and radical effect in the outcome of policy production. Despite being a seemingly historically and functionally weakened power in comparison to the executive it ought to observe and control, legislatives can apply a number of legal and extra legal resources to make their weight distinguishable in political negotiations.
The approval of any privatization initiative implies a deliberate involvement, so foreseen in the constitutions of the region, of parliament majorities plus willing executives. Privatization meant during the 1980’s and the 1990’s, a complete policy innovation that required a new legal and regulative corpus both in Argentina and Venezuela and a synchronization of the executive-legislative aims and purposes to produce it. Interestingly, the idea of selling public industries to private investors represented a contradiction to the existing legal frame of a state and a society based on a state-led development model for over 50 years. The so-called decentralized administration, namely, the state owned enterprises had forged a complete conception of the state and the political forces. Under these circumstances, the reform program, to be able to take off, had to manage to become an institutionally common idea for diverse political forces and social sectors. The roots of the former inward development model had diverse depths in the constitutional and institutional design of the two countries chosen for this study, but in both cases it was mature and well ingrained at the time when Pérez and Ménem started to apply reforms: in Argentina throughout the decades after the war, and in Venezuela, most strongly after the 70’s and Pérez's bizarre proposition of the Gran Venezuela.