Collective incentives reduce over-exploitation of social information in unconstrained human groups

dc.contributor.author	Wu, Charley
dc.date.accessioned	2024-09-11T12:19:21Z
dc.date.available	2024-09-11T12:19:21Z
dc.date.issued	2024
dc.identifier.issn	2041-1723
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10900/157326
dc.language.iso	en	de_DE
dc.publisher	Berlin : Nature Portfolio	de_DE
dc.relation.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-47010-3	de_DE
dc.subject.ddc	500	de_DE
dc.title	Collective incentives reduce over-exploitation of social information in unconstrained human groups	de_DE
dc.type	Article	de_DE
utue.quellen.id	20240422000000_00163
utue.personen.roh	Deffner, Dominik
utue.personen.roh	Mezey, David
utue.personen.roh	Kahl, Benjamin
utue.personen.roh	Schakowski, Alexander
utue.personen.roh	Romanczuk, Pawel
utue.personen.roh	Wu, Charley M.
utue.personen.roh	Kurvers, Ralf H. J. M.
dcterms.isPartOf.ZSTitelID	Nature Communications	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Issue	1	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Volume	15	de_DE