Collective incentives reduce over-exploitation of social information in unconstrained human groups

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Collective incentives reduce over-exploitation of social information in unconstrained human groups

Author: Deffner, Dominik; Mezey, David; Kahl, Benjamin; Schakowski, Alexander; Romanczuk, Pawel; Wu, Charley M.; Kurvers, Ralf H. J. M.
Tübinger Autor(en):
Wu, Charley
Published in: Nature Communications (2024), Bd. 15, H. 1
Verlagsangabe: Berlin : Nature Portfolio
Language: English
Full text: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-47010-3
ISSN: 2041-1723
DDC Classifikation: 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics
Dokumentart: Article
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