Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

dc.contributor.author	Stadler, Manfred
dc.date.accessioned	2020-09-29T07:03:49Z
dc.date.available	2020-09-29T07:03:49Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.identifier.issn	1432-1270
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10900/107302
dc.language.iso	en	de_DE
dc.publisher	Springer Heidelberg	de_DE
dc.relation.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00718-0	de_DE
dc.subject.ddc	300	de_DE
dc.subject.ddc	330	de_DE
dc.subject.ddc	510	de_DE
dc.title	Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence	de_DE
dc.type	Article	de_DE
utue.quellen.id	20200715072417_01129
utue.publikation.seiten	495-524	de_DE
utue.personen.roh	Gueth, Werner
utue.personen.roh	Stadler, Manfred
utue.personen.roh	Zaby, Alexandra
dcterms.isPartOf.ZSTitelID	International Journal of Game Theory	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Volume	49	de_DE
utue.fakultaet	06 Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät	de_DE