Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

dc.contributor.author	Klempt, Charlotte
dc.contributor.author	Pull, Kerstin
dc.contributor.author	Stadler, Manfred
dc.date.accessioned	2020-06-29T13:44:05Z
dc.date.available	2020-06-29T13:44:05Z
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.identifier.issn	1468-0475
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10900/101968
dc.language.iso	en	de_DE
dc.publisher	Wiley	de_DE
dc.relation.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12138	de_DE
dc.subject.ddc	330	de_DE
dc.title	Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study	de_DE
dc.type	Article	de_DE
utue.quellen.id	20190926111821_02925
utue.publikation.seiten	29-51	de_DE
utue.personen.roh	Klempt, Charlotte
utue.personen.roh	Pull, Kerstin
utue.personen.roh	Stadler, Manfred
dcterms.isPartOf.ZSTitelID	German Economic Review	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Issue	1	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Volume	20	de_DE