Worker Compensation Schemes and Product Market Competition

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Show simple item record Stadler, Manfred 2020-01-24T09:53:14Z 2020-01-24T09:53:14Z 2020-01-24
dc.identifier.other 1688473432 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract We analyze product market competition between firm owners where the risk-neutral workers decide on their efforts and, thereby, on the output levels. Various worker compensation schemes are compared: a piece-rate compensation scheme as a benchmark when workers’ output performance is verifiable, and a contest-based as well as a tournament-based compensation scheme when it is only verifiable who the best performing worker is. According to optimal designs, all the considered compensation contracts lead to an equal market outcome. Therefore, it depends decisively on the relative costs of organizing a monitoring device, a contest, or a tournament whether the one or the other compensation scheme should be implemented. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Akkordlohn , Wettbewerb de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other worker compensation schemes en
dc.subject.other piece rates en
dc.subject.other contests en
dc.subject.other tournaments en
dc.subject.other product market competition en
dc.title Worker Compensation Schemes and Product Market Competition en
dc.type Aufsatz de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.opus.portal utwpbusinesseco de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics ; No. 128 de_DE


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