Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare

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dc.contributor.author Stark, Oded
dc.contributor.author Budzinski, Wiktor
dc.contributor.author Kosiorowski, Grzegorz
dc.date.accessioned 2019-05-20T07:04:08Z
dc.date.available 2019-05-20T07:04:08Z
dc.date.issued 2019-05-20
dc.identifier.other 1665918357 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/88789
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-887896 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-30173
dc.description.abstract We use queuing-related behavior as an instrument for assessing the social appeal of alternative cultural norms. Specifically, we study the behavior of rational and sophisticated individuals who stand in a given queue waiting to be served, and who, in order to speed up the process, consider switching to another queue. We look at two regimes that govern the possible order in which the individuals stand should they switch to the other queue: a regime in which cultural convention, social norms, and basic notions of fairness require that the order in the initial queue is preserved, and a regime without such cultural inhibitions, in which case the order in the other queue is random, with each configuration or sequence being equally likely. We seek to find out whether in these two regimes the aggregate of the behaviors of self-interested individuals adds up to the social optimum defined as the shortest possible total waiting time. To do this, we draw on a Nash Equilibrium setting. We find that in the case of the preserved order, the equilibrium outcomes are always socially optimal. However, in the case of the random order, unless the number of individuals is small, the equilibrium outcomes are not socially optimal. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Entscheidungsprozess de_DE
dc.subject.classification Sozialhilfe de_DE
dc.subject.classification Nash-Gleichgewicht de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Decision processes en
dc.subject.other Queuing en
dc.subject.other Nash Equilibrium en
dc.subject.other Social customs en
dc.subject.other Social welfare en
dc.title Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare en
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 120 de_DE


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