Coordination Failure in Capacity-then-Price-Setting Games

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Aufrufstatistik

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10900/85583
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-855837
http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-26973
Dokumentart: Aufsatz
Date: 2019-01-14
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 116
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Economics
Other Keywords:
capacity-then-price competition
loss avoidance
path dependence
sequentiality of decisions
intra-play communication
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

In capacity-then-price-setting games, soft capacity constraints are planned sales amounts where producing above capacity is possible but more costly. While the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts equal prices, experimental evidence often reveals price discrepancies. This failure to coordinate on equal prices can imply losses, especially when serving demand is obligatory. We compare coordination failure with efficient rationing as well as with compulsory serving of demand, and additionally allow for simultaneous and sequential capacity choices. These treatments lead to a varying severity of the threat of losses. Our experimental results show that (possible) coordination failure affects behavior through two channels: via anticipating as well as via reacting to a loss. While capacities increase in anticipation of losses, prices increase when anticipating losses but decrease after experiencing losses. Coordination failures are more probable after subjects experienced a loss.

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