Contracting Institutions and Firm Boundaries

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Dateien:
Aufrufstatistik

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10900/77796
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-777964
http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-19196
Dokumentart: Aufsatz
Date: 2017-09-07
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 100
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Economics
Other Keywords:
firm boundaries
contracting institutions
firm-level analysis
property-rights theory
relationship-specificity
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

Contractual frictions are widely known to shape firm boundaries. But do better contracting institutions, which reduce these frictions, induce firms to be more or less deeply integrated? This paper provides a large-scale investigation of this question using a unique micro dataset of ownership shares across half a million firm pairs worldwide. We uncover strong evidence that better contracting institutions in subsidiaries’ countries favor deeper integration, particularly in relationship-specific industries. We formally show that these findings can be explained by a generalized Property-Rights Theory of the firm featuring partial ownership, while they are at odds with the canonical Transaction-Cost Theory.

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