A critical comparison of migration policies: Entry fee versus quota

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dc.contributor.author Stark, Oded
dc.contributor.author Byra, Lukasz
dc.contributor.author Casarico, Alessandra
dc.contributor.author Uebelmesser, Silke
dc.date.accessioned 2017-06-07T05:43:38Z
dc.date.available 2017-06-07T05:43:38Z
dc.date.issued 2017-06-07
dc.identifier.other 489487424 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/76534
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-765344 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-17936
dc.description.abstract We ask which migration policy a developed country will choose when its objective is to attain the optimal skill composition of the country’s workforce, and when the policy menu consists of an entry fee and a quota. We compare these two policies under the assumptions that individuals are heterogeneous in their skill level as well as in their skill type, and that individuals of one skill type, say “scientists,” confer a positive externality on overall productivity whereas individuals of the other skill type, say “managers,” do not confer such an externality. We find that a uniform entry fee encourages self-selection such that the migrants are only or mostly highly skilled managers. The (near) absence of migrant scientists has a negative effect on the productivity of the country’s workforce. Under a quota: the migrants are (a) only averagely skilled managers if the productivity externality generated by the scientists is weak, or (b) only averagely skilled scientists if the productivity externality generated by the scientists is strong. In (a), a uniform entry fee is preferable to a quota. In (b), a quota is preferable to a uniform entry fee. If, however, the entry fee for scientists is sufficiently below the entry fee for managers, then migrants will be only or mostly highly skilled scientists, rendering a differentiated entry fee preferable to a quota even when the productivity externality is strong. Instituting a differentiated fee comes, though, at a cost: the fee revenue is not as high as it will be when migrants are only or mostly managers. We conclude that if maximizing the revenue from the entry fee is not the primary objective of the developed country, then a differentiated entry fee is the preferred policy. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Einwanderungspolitik de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other International migration en
dc.subject.other A quota en
dc.subject.other A uniform entry fee en
dc.subject.other A differentiated entry fee en
dc.subject.other Heterogeneous human capital en
dc.subject.other Optimal skill composition of the developed country’s workforce en
dc.subject.other Total factor productivity en
dc.title A critical comparison of migration policies: Entry fee versus quota en
dc.type Aufsatz de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 99 de_DE

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