Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

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dc.contributor.author Klempt, Charlotte
dc.contributor.author Pull, Kerstin
dc.contributor.author Stadler, Manfred
dc.date.accessioned 2017-03-20T07:16:19Z
dc.date.available 2017-03-20T07:16:19Z
dc.date.issued 2017-03-20
dc.identifier.other 485661853 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/75189
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-751891 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-16591
dc.description.abstract Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers' hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Wirtschaftstheorie de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Bargaining en
dc.subject.other Information en
dc.subject.other Experimental Games en
dc.title Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study en
dc.type Aufsatz de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 97 de_DE

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