Three-Person Envy Games. Experimental Evidence and a Stylized Model

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Show simple item record Bäker, Agnes Güth, Werner Pull, Kerstin Stadler, Manfred 2015-02-10T07:34:47Z 2015-02-10T07:34:47Z 2015-02-10
dc.identifier.other 426081072 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and thus – being the residual claimant – defines his own payoff. While in the dictator variant of the envy game, responder and dummy can only refuse their own shares, in the ultimatum variant, the responder can accept or reject the allocator’s choice with rejection leading to zero payoffs for all three players. Comparing symmetric and asymmetric agreement payoffs for responder and dummy shows that equality concerns are significantly context-dependent: allocators are willing to leave more money on the table when universal equality can be achieved than when only partial equality is at stake. Similarly, equality seeking of responders is most prominent when universal equality is possible. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri ttp:// de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Experiment de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Envy games en
dc.subject.other experimental economics en
dc.title Three-Person Envy Games. Experimental Evidence and a Stylized Model en
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 79 de_DE


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