Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information Theoretical and Experimental Results for the “Acquiring-a-Company” Game

DSpace Repository


Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Date: 2014
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 69
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Unternehmenskauf
Other Keywords:
acquisition of firms , disclosure of private information , experimental economics
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
Show full item record


Based on the “acquiring-a-company” game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)