Endogenous Price Leadership - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

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Dateien:
Aufrufstatistik

URI: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-72073
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/48042
Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Date: 2014
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 68
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Preisführerschaft
Other Keywords:
price leadership , majority voting , bidding , experimental economics
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the residual demand. As price leaders, firms with different marginal costs induce different prices. We compare two mechanisms to determine the price leader, majority voting and competitive bidding. According to the experimental data at least experienced price leaders with lower marginal costs choose higher prices. In the bidding treatment, compensation payments to the price leader crowd in efficiency concerns.

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