Board Directors’ Preferences: What are Good Aggregation Rules?

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Show simple item record Duran, Mihael de_DE 2013-07-03 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:04:12Z 2013-07-03 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:04:12Z 2013 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 385259174 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract I analyze how boards of directors with heterogeneous preferences can affect the information shared with the CEO with the help of a cheap-talk model that allows for large groups of receivers. This paper provides new insights on how heterogeneity of boards can change the way of communication between the board and the CEO, related to different ways of decision making. My model gives some insights how heterogeneous preferences can have an impact on how communication between CEO and the board of directors takes place. I also indicate how coalition forming in the boardroom can be influenced by director’s and CEO’s perferences. Finnaly this model gives a possible answer why board of directors hetreogeneity differs even for shareholder representatives if there are any empoyees on the board. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Vorstand de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Board of directors , Cheap talk , Director’s preferences , Heterogeneity , Multiple audiences en
dc.title Board Directors’ Preferences: What are Good Aggregation Rules? en
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE 6904 de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 57 de_DE


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