Strategic Delegation in Price Competition

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dc.contributor.author Güth, Werner de_DE
dc.contributor.author Pull, Kerstin de_DE
dc.contributor.author Stadler, Manfred de_DE
dc.date.accessioned 2012-08-01 de_DE
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-18T10:04:02Z
dc.date.available 2012-08-01 de_DE
dc.date.available 2014-03-18T10:04:02Z
dc.date.issued 2012 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 369421795 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-63740 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47957
dc.description.abstract We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms’ surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Delegation de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Strategic delegation , Agency theory , Revenue sharing en
dc.title Strategic Delegation in Price Competition en
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE
utue.opus.id 6374 de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 43 de_DE

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