Intrafirm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition

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Dateien:
Aufrufstatistik

URI: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-57360
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47864
Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Date: 2011
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 14
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Interner Wettbewerb
Other Keywords:
Agency theory , Strategic interfirm competition , Revenue sharing
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for the agents, higher equilibrium effort levels and higher agent utility, but lower profits for the firms. The winners from antitrust policy are thus not only the consumers but also the agents employed by the competing firms.

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