Forbearance lending and soft budget constraints in a model of multiple heterogeneous bank financing

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URI: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-22497
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47485
Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Date: 2006
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Bank
Other Keywords:
Coordination Failure , Global Games , Asymmetric Information , Forbearance Lending , Soft Budget Constraints
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

Empirical evidence suggests that banks often engage in refinancing of intrinsically insolvent debtors instead of writing off their non-performing loans. Such forbearance lending may induce soft budget constraints for the debtors, as it diminishes their incentives to thwart default. This paper introduces a model of coordination failure to analyze how a relationship bank affects the incidence of forbearance lending and soft budget constraints by signaling its credit decision to other creditors. We find that the relationship bank's signaling ability enhances its incentives to engage in forbearance lending and influences the conditions under which debtors face soft budget constraints.

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