Does cooperation in manufacturing foster tacit collusion?

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dc.contributor Universität <Tübingen> / Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar de_DE Neubecker, Leslie de_DE 2005-08-10 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:02:11Z 2005-08-10 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:02:11Z 2003 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 119478870 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordination of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms intensify cooperation and produce in a joint plant, this profit is still higher due to lower investment costs. Since firms return to competition after a defection from the collusive agreement, a high competitive profit implies a weak punishment. Collusion is thus more difficult, the closer firms cooperate in manufacturing. Moreover, given competition or collusion in the market, joint production yields the highest profit and welfare. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Produktion de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Kollusion de_DE
dc.subject.other Manufacturing , Cooperative production , Dynamic competition , Collusion en
dc.title Does cooperation in manufacturing foster tacit collusion? en
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE 1871 de_DE
utue.opus.portal wiwidisk de_DE
utue.opus.portalzaehlung 261.00000 de_DE
utue.publikation.source Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät ; 261 de_DE


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