Path dependence without deliberation - an excercise model connecting rationality and evolution -

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Aufrufstatistik

URI: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18264
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47349
Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Date: 2004
Source: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät ; 282
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Other Keywords:
Evolutionary Game Theory
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices ar made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependance, i.e. of the two "shadows".

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