Abstract:
Elections serve a dual function; they are the ultimate expression of democracy and a tool for political representation and accountability. The conduct of an election is therefore used as a yardstick to measure democracy. It is puzzling that the EAC and the ECOWAS parliaments do not have elections, yet claim to be institutions of representation, with the ability to conduct accountability and promote democracy. Furthermore, most parliaments in Africa exist in an environment of declining democratic performance, increased military coups, and continued scholarly pessimism on the ability of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) to contribute meaningfully to the quest for democracy, making the research question ineluctable.
Existing literature on international parliamentary institutions offers theoretical explanations for their creation, especially debates on institutional learning, adaptation, and diffusion. Rational institutionalist theories on the other hand struggle to explain why African states continue to establish democratic institutions but remain undemocratic. Rational institutionalists argue that institutions are created to solve functional problems struggle to explain the continued creation of parliaments in Africa and the corresponding decline in democratic rankings. Further, they posit that there is little evidence to address how the parliaments that have been created and imbued with the normative mandate of accountability conduct accountability.
Literature on democratic deficit establishes a link between election of parliaments and accountability. This has led to scholarly euphoria for accountability particularly focusing on the European Parliament and its’ efforts; unfortunately, because they do not have elections, regional parliaments in Africa are yet to benefit from this enthusiasm. This thesis contributes an original empirical argument and confirms theoretical preposition on international parliamentary institutions and the nature of delegation. In assessing the interaction between multi-level governance and supranational delegation, the thesis answers how the two regional parliaments provide accountability without election. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods of research, I find that despite the challenges posed by multi-level governance, the blame game occasion on overlapping competencies due to increased actorness, and the obvious information asymmetry associated with supranational delegation. Both parliaments use a variety of tools to promote accountability and to enhance their performance. The thesis recommends a reduction in MLG coupled with enhanced interaction with domestic state machinery for accountability.
Additionally, the effect of the regional parliaments on democracy will be felt and will solve the democracy conundrum.
