The Tragedy of the Common Holdings. Coordination Strategies and Product Market Competition

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10900/129902
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-1299028
http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-71264
Dokumentart: Aufsatz
Date: 2022-08-03
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics ; No. 154
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Other Keywords:
Manager compensation
common holdings
shareholder coordination
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

We study quantity and price competition in heterogeneous triopoly markets where two firms are commonly owned by institutional shareholders, whereas the third firm is owned by independent shareholders. With such a mixed ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate their firms’ behavior. If direct coordination of the operational decisions is prevented by antitrust authorities, delegation to managers enables indirect coordination via the designs of the manager compensation contracts. Compared to direct owner collusion, this more sophisticated type of indirect collusion leads to a lower loss of social welfare in the mode of quantity competition, but to a higher loss of welfare in the mode of price competition. In general, owner coordination via the management compensation contracts is detrimental to welfare: the tragedy of common holdings.

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