Contracting Institutions and Firm Integration Around the World

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10900/116319
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-1163193
http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-57694
Dokumentart: Article
Date: 2021-06-15
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics ; No. 148
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Economics
Other Keywords:
firm integration
contracting institutions
multinational firms
Property-Rights Theory
ownership shares
License: http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en
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Abstract:

Firm integration is fundamentally shaped by contractual frictions. But do better contracting institutions, reducing these frictions, induce firms to be more or less deeply integrated? To address this question, this paper exploits unique micro data on ownership shares across more than 200,000 firm pairs worldwide, including domestic and cross-border ownership links. We uncover a new stylized fact: Firms choose higher ownership shares in subsidiaries located in countries with better contracting institutions. We develop a Property-Rights Theory of the multinational firm featuring partial ownership that rationalizes this pattern and guides our econometric analysis. The estimations demonstrate that better contracting institutions favor deeper integration, in particular in relationship-specific industries.

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