Problems for Moral Debunkers

Abstract

Debunking arguments are arguments of the form "You just believe that because...". They seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by showing it to have a dubious genealogy. While such genealogical arguments have traditionally been dismissed as committing the genetic fallacy, they are currently experiencing a renaissance in analytic philosophy. In moral philosophy in particular, debunking arguments, relying on findings from empirical moral psychology, have been used to challenge different moral and meta-ethical views. This dissertation explores the merits and prospects of such empirically informed debunking arguments. It engages with three contemporary moral debunking arguments, which are based on empirical findings from experimental ethics, evolutionary biology, social psychology and neuroscience. The principal finding of this inquiry is that debunking arguments have more skeptical implications than has been realized.

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