

University of Tübingen
Working Papers in
Economics and Finance

No. 114

Capacity precommitment, communication, and
collusive pricing. Theoretical benchmark and
experimental evidence

by

Werner Güth, Manfred Stadler, Alexandra Zaby



Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing. Theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

Werner Güth*, Manfred Stadler**, and Alexandra Zaby***

November 2018

Abstract

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms have an incentive to coordinate on higher prices. The experimental data reveals that such intra-play communication after capacity but before price choices has a collusive effect only for capacity levels exceeding these thresholds. Subjects with high capacities generally choose higher prices when they have the possibility to communicate. Asymmetry in capacity choices decreases the truthfulness of price messages as well as the probability to coordinate on the same price.

Keywords: Capacity-then-price competition, excessive capacities, cheap talk, intra-play communication, collusion, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C72, C91, L1

* Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali (LUISS), Viale Romania 32, I-00197 Roma, Italy; Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Straße 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany. e-mail: gueth@coll.mpg.de.

** University of Tübingen, School of Economics and Business Administration, Nauklerstraße 47, D-72074 Tübingen, Germany. e-mail: manfred.stadler@uni-tuebingen.de.

*** University of Tübingen, School of Economics and Business Administration, Nauklerstraße 47, D-72074 Tübingen, Germany. e-mail: alexandra.zaby@uni-tuebingen.de.

1 Introduction

Experimental studies of the capacity-then-price-setting game (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983) frequently report capacity choices above the predicted levels (see, e.g., Muren, 2000; Anderhub et al., 2003; Le Coq and Sturluson, 2012). But even for excessive capacities subjects might nevertheless finally choose equilibrium prices. Our aim is to identify possible implications of ‘non-excessive’ and ‘excessive’ capacities for price competition. Capacities are said to be ‘non-excessive’ when they result in pure-strategy price equilibria and ‘excessive’ when only mixed-strategy price equilibria exist. While non-excessive capacities and the resulting pure-strategy price equilibria lead to identical price choices, excessive capacity choices, which lead to mixed-strategy price equilibria, are asymmetric.

Non-binding price messages, in our setup sent after capacity but before price choices, may allow subjects to coordinate on higher prices (see, e.g., Charness, 2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 2004, Fonseca and Normann, 2012). While cheap talk price announcements do not matter theoretically, their empirical effect is ambiguous. In light of the debate for more price transparency, the effect of price announcements thus requires further investigation. Usually price transparency is supposed to reduce information asymmetries for consumers. However, at the same time price announcements also inform firms about their competitors’ prices. Without restrictions, e.g. regarding the frequency of possible price adjustments, firms can easily adjust their prices in reaction to competitors’ price setting behavior.

Price transparency is targeted, e.g., by internet platforms comparing prices for the same good across different online shops. However, price transparency may also be institutionally implemented. In Germany, for example, a price transparency platform for gasoline stations was introduced by the German Antitrust Agency in 2013. Since then, all stations selling more than 1,000 m^3 per year have to report price changes to the transparency platform within five minutes.¹ By making this price data openly accessible for consumers (and competitors) the Agency hoped to intensify price competition. Critics, however, fear that the platform will induce collusion in form of high prices (see, e.g., OECD, 2001). Earlier studies reveal that gasoline markets are prone to collusion (see, e.g., Borenstein and Shepard, 1998). By analyzing price adjustments following the collapse of a gasoline cartel in Québec, Clark and Houde (2014) identify a substantial effect of collusion on gasoline prices. Thus, it remains an open question whether price transparency does not trigger collusion instead of price competition. In the literature collusion is often measured by how far sellers’ profits exceed the competitive level. In our more complex setup, we simply measure ‘collusion’ by the increase of sales prices from no communication at all to mutual price messages.

To capture the effect of price announcements on actual prices, we implement a capacity-then-price-setting game by allowing firms to send price messages after capacity but before price choices. This “intra-play” communication is obviously relevant in many markets. In case of the gasoline example, firms first install capacities via their number of stations, filling pumps, and the size of their underground fuel tanks, which can be publicly observed and thus serve as precommitment. For given and known capacities, competitors then charge gasoline prices. Due to the price transparency platform, firms have to report prices but can nevertheless change them unrestrictedly and frequently. Thus, this kind of frequent price announcements can be interpreted as non-binding price messages and, hence, as cheap talk.

Cheap talk price messages are very much debated. While Aumann (1990) conjectures that cheap talk does not affect behavior, Farrell and Rabin (1996) suppose that it increases effi-

¹§47k GWB, which became effective on March 29th, 2013, regulates the market observation for motor fuels, where the statutory regulation, as published in Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2013 Teil I Nr. 15, defines details such as the exact timing of price messages and who has to report them. Actual price changes have to be reported within five minutes after taking effect.

ciency. Experimental evidence strongly supports the latter view (for a survey, see Crawford, 1998). In case of multiple equilibria Charness (2000), for example, finds that participants coordinate on the more efficient equilibrium via cheap talk. We experimentally implement numerical price announcements (see the related study of Harrington et al., 2016) which are non-binding. This differs from free-format communication as studied, e.g., by Kimbrough et al. (2008), Houser and Xiao (2011) or Moellers et al. (2002) but simplifies the analysis of the truthfulness of messages.

Experimental evidence on communication and collusion distinguishes costly versus free communication (see Andersson and Wengström, 2007) as well as the possibility (not) to punish cheating (see Cooper and Kühn, 2014). Fonseca and Normann (2012) analyze the interplay of communication and collusion, taking into account the impact of market structure, and find that collusive price coordination is easier, the lower the number of firms competing in a market. Andersson and Wengström (2012) introduce intra-play communication *additionally* to pre-play communication and find that it reduces the credibility of pre-play messages and thereby their positive effect on cooperation.

We contribute to this literature by explicitly analyzing a setting where capacity installation costs are sunk and firms are free to collude in prices. Instead of the commonly employed pre-play communication, we implement intra-play communication only. This allows us to analyze the effect of prior (capacity) choices on the effectiveness of communication as a trigger for collusive pricing. As capacity choices in the experiment are often asymmetric, this allows us to investigate the effect of asymmetry on communication and competition. Further, our experimental treatments introduce the possibility of price announcements either to subjects with prior competition experience, or to subjects without prior competition experience, i.e., we study the differential effects of communication with respect to experience. We let participants interact repeatedly in constant pairs only for four rounds what one can consider a worst-case scenario for observing collusion, as collusion only evolves as an equilibrium outcome in infinite-horizon games. Note, however, that each round involves successive decisions, i.e., we implement repeated play of repeated games with a short horizon but multiple decisions in each round. Building on the findings of Fonseca and Normann (2012), we consider duopoly markets, thereby providing a best-case scenario for collusion with respect to the market's structure.

We find that prior (asymmetric) capacity choices as well as prior competition experience play a substantial role for the effect of communication: the possibility to communicate increases prices only if capacities are sufficiently high; asymmetry in capacities makes coordinating on the same price more difficult and further reduces the truthfulness of price messages. However, with excessive capacities asymmetry leads to higher prices.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the theoretical benchmark solution of the game. Section 3 presents the experimental setup. Section 4 describes and statistically analyzes the experimental data. Section 5 concludes.

2 The theoretical benchmark

We focus on the two-stage capacity-price game of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where we specified the market demand function as

$$D(p) = \alpha - p$$

with $\alpha > 0$ indicating the market size. Two firms $i = 1, 2$ produce a homogeneous good

at unit costs

$$c_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } q_i \leq \bar{q}_i \\ \infty & \text{if } q_i > \bar{q}_i, \end{cases}$$

where q_i denotes production and \bar{q}_i denotes firms' binding capacities. When rationing occurs, the efficient rationing rule is applied, i.e., the firm-specific demand functions are

$$D_i(p_i) = \begin{cases} D(p_i) - \bar{q}_j & \text{if } p_i \geq p_j \\ D(p_i) & \text{if } p_i < p_j, \end{cases}$$

where $i, j = 1, 2, i \neq j$. The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage with observable capacities \bar{q}_i , the market clearing prices

$$p_i = p^* = \alpha - \bar{q}_i - \bar{q}_j \quad (1)$$

constitute an equilibrium in pure price strategies if a firm's unilateral price deviation above p^* does not increase its profit $\tilde{\pi}^i = p_i(\alpha - p_i - \bar{q}_j)$. The resulting condition $\partial \tilde{\pi}^i / \partial p_i \Big|_{p_i=p^*} = \alpha - 2p^* - \bar{q}_j = -\alpha + 2\bar{q}_i + \bar{q}_j \leq 0$ defines the set S of non-excessive capacity pairs,

$$S = \{(\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2) : \bar{q}_i \geq 0 \text{ and } \alpha - 2\bar{q}_i - \bar{q}_j \geq 0 \text{ for } i, j = 1, 2; i \neq j\}.$$

In Figure 1, area 1 covers this set of non-excessive capacities leading to pure-strategy price equilibria.²




Figure 1: Areas of non-excessive and excessive capacities of firms

Equations (1) leads us to state

Hypothesis A1 *With non-excessive capacities (area 1), larger capacities of firms induce lower prices.*

²Note that non-excessive capacity pairs do not only include lower but also higher capacities than predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium when there are positive capacity installing costs. We nevertheless denote all capacity constellations in area 1 as 'non-excessive' because they are sufficiently low to exclude mixed-strategy pricing.

In the case of excessive capacities such that $(\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2) \notin S$ but $\bar{q}_1 < \alpha$ or $\bar{q}_2 < \alpha$ (area 2 in Figure 1), only price equilibria in mixed strategies exist. We restrict our analysis to the case of $\bar{q}_2 \leq \bar{q}_1 \leq \alpha/2$ in order to concentrate on only one type of mixed-strategy price equilibria for given capacities satisfying $\alpha - 2\bar{q}_1 \leq \bar{q}_2$.³ For such capacity pairs, firms 1 and 2 randomize prices according to the cumulative distribution functions

$$F_1(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{q}_2 - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 \bar{q}_2 / (4\bar{q}_1 p)}{p - \alpha + \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2}, & \frac{(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1} \leq p < \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \\ 1, & p = \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \end{cases}$$

$$F_2(p) = \frac{\bar{q}_1 - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 / (4p)}{p - \alpha + \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2}, \quad \frac{(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1} \leq p \leq \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2}. \quad (2)$$

These distribution functions result as an extension of the symmetric solution derived by Levitan and Shubik (1972) and as a numerical solution of the more general Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) setup. Our use of a linear market demand function allows us to specify the lower and upper limits of the price support in terms of the capacities \bar{q}_1 and \bar{q}_2 as well as the market size parameter α . In the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the price-setting subgame, each firm charges prices according to the continuous and strictly increasing distribution functions $F_1(p)$ and $F_2(p)$ over the coincident interval $[p, \bar{p}]$, where $p \equiv (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 / (4\bar{q}_2)$ and $\bar{p} = (\alpha - \bar{q}_2) / 2$, except that firm 1 charges the uppermost price \bar{p} with a positive (atomistic) probability. Otherwise it holds that $F_2(p) = (\bar{q}_1 / \bar{q}_2) F_1(p)$. The distribution functions are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Price distributions for the parameter values $\alpha = 200$, $\bar{q}_1 = 100$, $\bar{q}_2 = 80$

The effects of the excess capacities on the mixed pricing strategies can be seen from Equations (2). An increase in \bar{q}_1 shifts the lower limit of the price support p to the left. An increase in \bar{q}_2 shifts both the lower and the upper limit of the price support to the left. Therefore, according to Hypothesis A1, we can state

³The complete solution for all combinations of capacities (\bar{q}_1, \bar{q}_2) leading to price equilibria in mixed strategies can be found in the appendix.

Hypothesis A2 *With excessive capacities (area 2), larger capacities of firms (on average) induce lower prices.*

Since $F_2(p) \geq F_1(p)$ for all $p \in [\underline{p}, \bar{p}]$, firm 1's pricing strategy stochastically dominates the strategy of firm 2. Because firm 1 has the bigger capacity ($\bar{q}_2 < \bar{q}_1$), firm 2 is more at risk of being undersold. As a consequence, firm 1 behaves less aggressive in its mixed price-setting strategy. This leads us to

Hypothesis B *With asymmetric excessive capacities, the firms with the bigger capacities (on average) charge lower prices.*

The ratio (\bar{q}_1/\bar{q}_2) indicates the degree of asymmetry in capacities. However, more asymmetry can be generated by an increasing capacity \bar{q}_1 or by a decreasing capacity \bar{q}_2 . Therefore, the effect of asymmetry depends on how it is caused. If it is caused by an increase in \bar{q}_1 , the prices decline on average. If it is caused by a decrease in \bar{q}_2 , the prices increase on average. This leads to

Hypothesis C *More asymmetry in excessive capacities (on average) increases prices if it is caused by an extension of the bigger capacity. It (on average) decreases prices if it is caused by a reduction of the smaller capacity.*

In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, firms do not install excessive capacities. Instead, anticipating the price-setting behavior in Equation (1), in the first stage they maximize their reduced-form profit functions

$$\pi^i = (\alpha - \bar{q}_i - \bar{q}_j - c_K)\bar{q}_i, \quad i = 1, 2; \quad i \neq j.$$

with respect to their capacities, where c_K denotes the constant unit cost of installing capacities. The symmetric equilibrium capacities $\bar{q}_i = q^C = (\alpha - c_K)/3$, $i = 1, 2$, are located on the dashed line in area 1 of Figure 1 and imply the Cournot prices

$$p_i = p^C = (\alpha + 2c_K)/3, \quad i = 1, 2. \quad (3)$$

Our experimental parameters $\alpha = 200$ and $c_K = 80$ imply subgame perfect equilibrium capacities $q^C = 40$, and prices $p^C = 120$.

In both stages of the game, firms can increase their profits by colluding. If they were able to coordinate capacities $\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2 = (\alpha - c_K)/2$ and charge the monopoly prices $p_i = p^M = (\alpha + c_K)/2$, $i = 1, 2$, they would equally share monopoly profits. This case of perfect collusion implies symmetric capacities $\bar{q}^M = 30$ and prices $p^M = 140$.

Of course, collusion is not an equilibrium outcome of the two-stage but one-period (or finitely repeated) game. As prior experimental results also show that collusion prevails only in infinite horizon settings (see, e.g., Fonseca and Normann, 2012), we do not expect perfect collusion to arise in our finite horizon experiment. However, our setting allows to consider collusion in the second stage of price setting. If irreversible capacity decisions are already made and installation cost are sunk, for *low* capacity levels ($\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2 < \alpha/2$) collusive prices coincide with second-stage equilibrium prices (1). For *high* capacity levels ($\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2 \geq \alpha/2$) firms are better off by setting the collusive prices $p_i = p^K = \alpha/2$, $i = 1, 2$. Such collusive pricing is profit-enhancing even if production remains below the capacity limits. The parameter values used in our experiment define the cutoff value for low capacity levels as $\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2 = 100$. In case of higher capacity levels collusive prices are $p^K = 100$. We are interested in whether and how such collusion in prices is driven by prior capacity decisions. According to our benchmark results, incentives to collude in prices exist only in case of high capacity levels. Therefore we state

Hypothesis D *In case of high capacity levels, firms have an incentive to collude in prices (only-price collusion).*

Hypothesis E *In case of low capacity levels, firms have no incentive to collude.*

In Figure 3 the downward sloping dashed line marks the cutoff for low capacity levels, $\bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2 = \alpha/2$. All capacity combinations below this line (area 1a) imply that collusive and equilibrium prices in the last stage of the game coincide. We denote these capacity combinations as ‘low capacity levels.’ Capacity combinations above the dashed line (areas 1b and 2) imply that prices are higher than equilibrium prices. We denote these capacity combinations as ‘high capacity levels.’ Thus, all capacity pairs leading to price equilibria in mixed strategies due to excessive capacities (area 2), qualify as high capacity levels for which only-price collusion leads to higher than equilibrium prices.




Figure 3: Areas of non-excessive and excessive capacities as well as high and low capacity levels of firms

The fact that collusion is not an equilibrium outcome continues to hold if price messages after capacity decisions are possible. Non-binding messages are cheap talk and do not alter the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

However, in contrast to the theoretical model, experimental evidence (see, e.g., Anderson and Wengström, 2007; Fonseca and Normann, 2012) suggests that such communication simplifies collusion. In combination with our results regarding capacity thresholds, the possibility of sending non-binding price messages should lead to increasing prices in case of high capacity levels only—whereas price messages should have no effect in case of low capacity levels as firms have no incentive to collude on higher prices in this case.

This suggests two within-subjects conditions, one *with* and one *without* price messages. In our experiment, subjects either interacted first without and then with communication or in reverse order, i.e., the sequence of the two within-subjects conditions was varied between

subjects. While the former sequence captures introducing price transparency platforms, i.e., price announcements with adjustment possibilities, the latter represents the reverse institutional change, namely abolishing a price transparency platform.

3 Experimental design

We experimentally implement the first-capacity-then-price-setting game with two institutional conditions, M and N . In condition M , after capacity choices are made and observed, subjects simultaneously send price messages and finally set prices.⁴ Although we will refer to (cheap talk) price messages as communication, we readily acknowledge that less restricted communication may imply much stronger effects (see, e.g., Xiao and Houser (2009)). In condition N , subjects cannot send such price messages. As anticipating behavior in later stages is cognitively demanding, we allow participants to become experienced by playing multiple rounds.

Our analysis of intra-play communication yields many pairs of capacity constellations but fewer pairs of average capacity constellations by the repeatedly interacting partners. It will, however, be illustrated below that there exists large volatility in the (average) capacity pairs of the same partners. Thus when having to actually choose prices with or without previous exchange of price messages the interacting parties usually confront very different decision tasks what justifies to view their choices of announced and chosen prices rather independent in spite of repeated interactions and rematching.

The sequence of conditions is varied between subjects leading to the two sequence treatments $M \rightarrow N$ and $N \rightarrow M$. Both treatments, $M \rightarrow N$ and $N \rightarrow M$, are implemented as finitely repeated games with subjects being aware of the finite number of rounds. Following Selten and Stoecker (1986) subjects repeat this basic game with random strangers matching across games, based on matching groups of four subjects which remain constant throughout one condition.⁵ One interacts with a new partner in three successive four-round games in each condition. Altogether subjects played 24 rounds, three four-round games in condition M and three four-round games in condition N .

One may view the $N \rightarrow M$ -treatment as the more typical one: firms, which have experienced probably fierce competition, may want to improve their lot by trying to coordinate collusive pricing. But also the $M \rightarrow N$ -treatment has field relevance: markets with collusive tactics, as captured by the M -condition, often attract the attention of the antitrust authorities which might forbid price messages, an institutional change captured by the $M \rightarrow N$ -treatment. From the viewpoint of antitrust policy both treatments together allow to investigate whether tolerating sellers' attempts to price coordination has (ir)reversible implications: sellers, used to coordinate, will in all likelihood try to maintain former higher prices rather than switch to competitive pricing with their previous collusion partners. Of course, condition M of treatment $N \rightarrow M$ differs from condition M of treatment $M \rightarrow N$. Common findings for both M -conditions – as well as for both N -conditions – therefore render them as rather robust.

The first experimental task is to choose a capacity level between 0 and 100. Parameter values for capacities in the experimental design were set such that $\bar{q}_1 \leq \alpha/2$ and $\bar{q}_2 \leq \alpha/2$, implying that capacity choices are restricted to areas 1 and 2 in Figure 1. After capacity choices are made and revealed (and price messages were sent in the M condition) subjects

⁴Price messaging was exogenously enforced but sending an empty message was possible. Only 62 of 1536 price messages (4.04%) were 'empty.'

⁵Matching groups, of which participants were kept uninformed, were newly formed when moving from the first to the second condition.

set a price between 0 and 200. Choices and outcomes are revealed to subjects after each round.

Written instructions were read aloud at the beginning of the experiment. The instructions for the second phase (the within-subject variation) were handed out and read aloud after the first phase (12 rounds). In treatments $N \rightarrow M$ no hint was given that later on it will be possible to communicate. We included control questions and trial rounds at the beginning of each session. In all treatments starting with condition M , price messages were included in the trial rounds as well.

Payoffs were calculated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), converted into euros at a given and known exchange rate (10,000 ECU = 1 euro). Besides a show-up fee of 15 euros, subjects received the payoffs of ten randomly drawn rounds (five from each of the two conditions) as well as the reward for answering the postexperimental questionnaire on risk tolerance (Holt and Laury, 2002).⁶ The experiment was programmed in *z-tree* (see Fischbacher, 2007). We ran two sessions with 32 subjects for each treatment, all German university students. On average, sessions lasted about 80 minutes and payments amounted, on average, to 17.70 euros, ranging from 15 to 20.10 euros (including the show-up fee).

4 Experimental results

The benchmark predictions, based on the numerical parameters, predict price equilibria with pure strategies for non-excessive capacities (area 1 in Figure 1) and mixed strategies for excessive capacities (area 2 in Figure 1). In the experiment, 72.5% of all 1,534 capacity-pairs lie within area 1, whereas 27.5% lie within area 2.⁷ Most of these capacity choices exceed the equilibrium value of $\bar{q} = q^C = 40$: 72.1% are higher, 17.9% lower, whereas 10% of all capacity choices correspond to the theoretical benchmark. Concerning capacity-price collusion, capacity choices in the experiment exceed its predicted value of $\bar{q} = 30$ quite substantially. However, there remains the possibility of only-price collusion which distinguishes low and high capacity levels. In the experiment, 64.7% of all capacity choices qualify as low and 35.3% as high capacity levels. Figure 4 shows all capacity pairs chosen in the experiment where the black line depicts the cutoff between low and high capacity levels.

Depicting mean values of the capacity choices made by all pairs across all 24 periods reveals that the degree of asymmetry in capacity choices does not substantially vary over time, see Figure 5. In this figure the upper solid line represents the mean values of the bigger capacity choices across pairs whereas the lower dashed line represents the mean values of the smaller capacity choices across pairs. Average asymmetry in capacity choices remains substantial over time. We therefore will check for effects of asymmetry on communication and competition in our subsequent analyses.

Hypotheses D and E predict that collusive pricing is subject to high capacity levels, i.e., we should see significantly different price choices for high versus low capacity levels. Table 1 displays mean price choices distinguishing between low and high capacity levels. A Wilcoxon matched-pair signed rank (WSR) test finds that mean prices for low versus high capacity levels significantly differ ($p < 0.0001$).

⁶Pilot sessions showed that some participants accumulated substantial losses which they could either pay out-of-pocket or work off by clerical work post-experimentally (counting the frequency of the letter “t” in a given text).

⁷Altogether the experiment gave us $24 \cdot 64 = 1,536$ capacity pairs. However, due to choices of zero capacities, we dropped 2 capacity pairs from the data.

Figure 4: Capacity choices




Figure 5: Capacity choices over time





Figure 6: Price choices and messages over time



Treatment	$N \rightarrow M$	$M \rightarrow N$
Low capacity levels	114.35 (1.10)	112.64 (1.09)
High capacity levels	92.72 (0.49)	94.38 (0.54)

Table 1: Mean values (standard errors) of price choices for high (low) capacity levels

Price choices further vary across conditions M and N, treatments $M \rightarrow N$ and $N \rightarrow M$, and over time, see Figure 6. This figure depicts mean values of paired price choices, i.e., the mean of the higher prices across all pairs (upper black solid line) as opposed to the mean of the lower prices across all pairs (lower grey solid line). The dashed lines in Figure 6 display the corresponding price messages. Comparing the higher and lower prices across treatments we find that they are significantly different from each other (Mann Whitney test (MW), $p < 0.0001$ for the higher, $p < 0.01$ for the lower prices). This finding highlights that it is crucial whether subjects experience price competition before they have the possibility to communicate, or not. Thus, ‘competition experience’ is a factor we need to take into account in our subsequent analyses.

Concerning price messages Figure 6 illustrates that announced prices are generally untruthful. In fact, testing the statistical difference between the distribution of announced and chosen prices confirms this (WSR test, $p < 0.0001$). The possibility to communicate nevertheless has a substantial effect on price choices: in treatment $N \rightarrow M$ mean prices move from 96.9 without communication to 102.35 with communication, whereas in treatment $M \rightarrow N$ mean prices with communication amount to 103.36 and decrease to 99.55 without communication. In both cases, the difference in prices with and without communication is statistically

significant (WSR test, $p < 0.0001$).

Hypotheses A1 and A2 predict that prices decrease in capacities. We thus test how own capacity choice, \bar{q}_{own} , and the capacity choice of the other, \bar{q}_{other} , affect price choices. To control for possible endgame effects, we include a dummy for the final round of repeated interaction with the same partner, $fRound$ (round 4 of 4). We further control for experience by including the number of games a subject has played in total (varying from 1 to 6). In this and all subsequent estimations standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Estimation results are reported in Table 2.

Variable	Overall		$N \rightarrow M$		$M \rightarrow N$	
	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
\bar{q}_{own}	-0.447***	(0.025)	-0.462***	(0.034)	-0.433***	(0.037)
\bar{q}_{other}	-0.229***	(0.024)	-0.274***	(0.032)	-0.185***	(0.034)
$fRound$	-2.224***	(0.732)	-2.525***	(0.965)	-1.858*	(1.114)
$Game$	0.289	(0.269)	0.572	(0.374)	0.036	(0.384)
Constant	136.932***	(2.470)	142.853***	(3.845)	135.019***	(3.791)
Observations	3068		1534		1534	
R ²	0.238		0.285		0.201	
Significance levels : * 10% ** 5% *** 1%						
Standard errors clustered at pair level						

Table 2: Effect of capacities on price choices

Table 2 displays a significantly negative effect for both capacity choices as well as for $fRound$ for the collapsed data as well as for both treatments separately. These estimation results corroborate the negative relationship proposed by Hypotheses A1 and A2 and confirm the relationship suggested by the descriptive evidence. As both capacities are mutually revealed before subjects set their prices, the negative relation does not only hold for the own but also for the other's capacity, although the sensitivity to the own capacity is about twice as large. We state

Result A *Higher own as well as other's capacities lead to lower prices.*

Hypotheses B and C predict that asymmetry in capacity choices affects prices only for excessive capacities: while the subject with the bigger capacity within a pair is expected to chose the lower price, the degree of asymmetry is expected to either decrease or increase prices. To capture asymmetry we calculate the relative difference in capacity choices, \bar{q}_{asym} , as the absolute difference between a pair's capacities weighted by the higher capacity. Whether a subject has the bigger capacity within a pair is reflected by the dummy variable \bar{q}_{big} . We test how asymmetry affects price choices controlling for the sum of capacities (\bar{q}_{sum}), the possibility to communicate (M), endgame effects ($fRound$), and experience ($game$). Table 3 reports estimation results for competition experienced subjects (treatment $N \rightarrow M$).

Variable	Non-excessive capacities		Excessive capacities	
	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
\bar{q}_{sum}	-0.584***	(0.033)	-0.052	(0.035)
\bar{q}_{big}	-6.309***	(0.923)	-3.222**	(1.246)
\bar{q}_{asym}	3.100	(2.664)	7.979*	(4.719)
M	1.099	(0.996)	3.836***	(1.410)
$fRound$	-1.433	(0.911)	-4.970***	(1.138)
$Game$	0.745**	(0.312)	-0.675*	(0.406)
Constant	158.624***	(3.946)	97.669***	(5.906)
Observations	2224		844	
R ²	0.27		0.053	
Significance levels : * 10% ** 5% *** 1%				
Standard errors clustered at the pair level				

Table 3: Effect of asymmetry on price choices

We find that for non-excessive capacities the overall sum of capacities (\bar{q}_{sum}) and the dummy indicating whether a subject chose the bigger capacity (\bar{q}_{big}) have a significantly negative effect on prices, whereas experience ($game$) leads to significantly higher prices. For excessive capacities the dummy indicating whether a subject chose the bigger capacity (\bar{q}_{big}), experience ($game$), and endgame effects ($fRound$) negatively affect prices, whereas a higher degree of asymmetry (\bar{q}_{asym}) and communication (M) lead to significantly higher prices.

Hypotheses B and C predict effects of asymmetry only in case of excessive capacities. Our results reveal that—due to the high number of asymmetric capacity choices in the experiment—having the bigger capacity within a pair leads subjects to chose a lower price, irrespectively of whether capacities are excessive or not. Subjects’ individual choices thus differ significantly with respect to the asymmetry within a pair. We state

Result B *Asymmetry in capacities within a pair leads the subject with the bigger capacity to choose a lower price.*

The overall degree of asymmetry affects prices only in case of excessive capacities, as predicted. Following Hypothesis C this suggests that asymmetry is caused by a ceteris paribus increase of the bigger capacity within a pair. We state

Result C *Asymmetry in capacities overall increases prices in case of excessive capacity levels.*

Hypotheses D and E predict price collusion in case of high, but no effect in case of low capacity levels. In a first step we compare prices without non-binding price messages (condition N) with the prices predicted by the benchmark. In case of *low capacity levels* there is no incentive to collude and the prediction is that subjects choose the equilibrium price according to Equation (1). In case of *high capacity levels* subjects have an incentive to collude and the predicted collusive price is $p^K = 100$. As results differ across treatments (see Table 1), we report them for competition experienced and unexperienced subjects separately.

In case of **competition experienced subjects** the average price for *high capacity levels* is 90.79 in condition N and 94.92 in condition M , whereas the collusive price is 100. Chosen and collusive prices differ significantly (WSR test, $p < 0.0001$). For *low capacity levels* the average price in condition N is 113.10 whereas the average equilibrium price is 122.14.⁸ Calculating optimal prices for every capacity pair finds that distributions of chosen and optimal

⁸We derive this number by calculating the optimal price for every capacity pair by inserting capacity choices into Equation (1) and then computing the mean of these collusive prices.

prices significantly differ (WSR test, $p < 0.0001$). Average prices in condition M amount to 115.32 whereas the average equilibrium price is 119.24. Calculating equilibrium prices for every capacity pair in condition M finds the distributions of chosen and equilibrium prices significantly different from each other (WSR-test, $p < 0.0001$). Although we observe too low prices with respect to the benchmark predictions for all capacity levels, the difference between average chosen and collusive/equilibrium prices is smaller in condition M as compared to condition N . Thus, communication may serve as an instrument to increase prices in case of competition experienced subjects.

Conducting the same exercise when non-binding price messages are introduced to subjects **without prior competition experience** ($M \rightarrow N$) reveals a somewhat different picture. For *low capacity levels* the average price of 115.56 in condition N is significantly different from the average equilibrium price calculated as 121.29 (WSR-test $p < 0.0001$). In condition M the average price is 108.68 and differs significantly from the average equilibrium price of 120.29 (WSR-test $p < 0.0001$). There is also no effect in case of *high capacity levels*: average chosen prices in condition N are 93.51 and 95.10 in condition M and both differ significantly from the collusive price 100 (WSR-test, $p < 0.0001$).

In the benchmark the term “collusion” does not only describe a situation where prices increase above the competitive level, but additionally implicates that firms coordinate on the same price. In the experimental data only 13.7% of chosen price pairs are identical, i.e., collusion in the sense of price coordination is rather rare. Nevertheless, to identify the role of communication for price coordination, we estimate a probit model with dummy variable *same* as dependent variable taking unit value whenever chosen prices are identical. We estimate the effect of communication as well as of the asymmetry of capacity choices (\bar{q}_{asym}) on *same* controlling for whether the sum of capacities within a pair qualifies as high (*CapSumHigh*), endgame effects (*fRound*) and experience (*game*). Estimation results are reported in Table 4.

Variable	treatment $M \rightarrow N$		treatment $N \rightarrow M$	
	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
\bar{q}_{own}	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.009**	(0.004)
\bar{q}_{other}	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.009**	(0.004)
<i>CapSumHigh</i>	0.246*	(0.141)	0.353	(0.236)
M	-0.093	(0.168)	0.770**	(0.315)
\bar{q}_{asym}	-0.777***	(0.202)	-1.821***	(0.341)
<i>fRound</i>	0.100	(0.093)	0.045	(0.117)
<i>Game</i>	0.005	(0.053)	-0.160	(0.098)
Constant	-0.809**	(0.317)	0.188	(0.400)
Observations	1534		1534	
Log-likelihood	-517.39		-534.375	
Significance levels : * 10% ** 5% *** 1%				
Standard errors clustered at the pair level				

Table 4: Effect of communication and asymmetry on price coordination

In both treatments the asymmetry of capacity choices decreases the probability that subjects manage to coordinate on the same price. For competition experienced subjects communication increases the probability that a pair coordinates price choices. For subjects without competition experience the probability of coordinating on the same price is higher when the sum of capacities is high. Own and other’s capacity have a very small significantly negative effect only for competition experienced subjects.

Given that “true” collusion—in the sense that subjects coordinate on the same higher than competitive price—is rare, we next investigate whether subjects attempt to increase prices (if not to the collusive level) if capacity levels are high. Descriptive evidence reported earlier suggests that competition experienced subjects use the possibility to communicate to increase prices. Our next step is to investigate this finding by estimating the effect of communication (M), asymmetry (\bar{q}_{big}), and experience ($game$) on price choices. Asymmetry is hereby captured by the dummy \bar{q}_{big} indicating whether, out of a pair, a subject has the bigger capacity because this allows us to test whether there is a specific effect of communication in combination with asymmetry by including an interaction term between both dummy variables ($\bar{q}_{big} * M$). Further, we control for possible endgame effects ($fRound$) as well as for competition experience ($compExp$) and experience in playing the $game$. Table 5 reports estimation results.

Variable	low capacity levels		high capacity levels	
	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
\bar{q}_{own}	-1.056***	(0.095)	-0.182***	(0.031)
\bar{q}_{other}	-0.385***	(0.095)	-0.125***	(0.030)
\bar{q}_{big}	3.054	(2.697)	-1.762	(1.284)
M	-0.759	(2.261)	3.310***	(1.128)
$\bar{q}_{big}^* M$	-0.215	(2.860)	-0.544	(1.455)
$CompExp$	2.156	(1.515)	-1.417	(0.914)
$fRound$	-1.450	(1.708)	-2.664***	(0.685)
$Game$	1.829***	(0.430)	-0.178	(0.275)
Constant	161.992***	(6.881)	113.902***	(2.679)
Observations	1084		1984	
R ²	0.238		0.078	
Significance levels : * 10% ** 5% *** 1%				
Standard errors clustered at the pair level				

Table 5: Effect of communication on price choices

Estimation results support and extend our descriptive findings: if capacity levels are high, communication significantly increases price choices, irrespectively of the competition experience subjects have. Further, besides the negative effect of own and other’s capacities on prices we find that experience in playing the game increases prices for low capacity levels, whereas endgame effects decrease prices for high capacity levels. We state

Result D *Communication leads to higher prices if capacity levels are high.*

Estimation results for low capacity levels (see Table 5, column I) support Hypothesis E proposing that communication does not increase prices for low capacity levels.

Result E *Communication has no effect if capacity levels are low.*

This substantial role of communication is somewhat surprising if one recalls the difference between average announced as opposed to chosen prices visible in Figure 6. To investigate what affects the ‘truthfulness’ of communication we exploit the simplicity of the implemented numerical form of messages and calculate the difference between announced and chosen price as an indicator for truthfulness. The *lower* this difference is, the *more truthful* is a message. We estimate the effect of capacity choices (\bar{q}_{own} , \bar{q}_{other}), whether the cutoff for high capacities is met ($CapSumHigh$), and asymmetry (\bar{q}_{asym}) on truthfulness controlling for

competition experience (*compExp*), experience in playing the game (*game*), and endgame effects (*fRound*). Estimation results are reported in Table 6.

Variable	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
\bar{q}_{own}	0.295***	(0.066)
\bar{q}_{other}	0.291***	(0.064)
<i>CapSumHigh</i>	-3.437	(2.931)
<i>CompExp</i>	-15.219***	(5.050)
\bar{q}_{asym}	15.028***	(4.348)
<i>fRound</i>	3.505**	(1.383)
<i>Game</i>	1.500	(1.499)
Constant	-6.192	(6.691)
Observations	1474	
R ²	0.115	
Significance levels : * 10% ** 5% *** 1%		
Standard errors clustered at the pair level		

Table 6: Truthfulness of price messages

While higher own and other’s capacity, asymmetry of capacity choices as well as endgame effects decrease the truthfulness of price messages, competition experience substantially increases the truthfulness of messages. Thus, if subjects are familiar with the basic market mechanisms, they communicate prices more truthfully.

Given the crucial role of high versus low capacity levels for price choices, the question arises whether subjects’ capacity decisions are driven by their individual risk attitudes. To test this we use the risk attitudes derived from the post-experimental questionnaire. The variable *RISK* thereby reflects a subject’s individual risk aversion: as *RISK* increases, risk aversion increases. We test whether capacity choices are affected by risk aversion controlling for the effects of communication (*M*), competition experience (*compExp*), experience (*game*), and endgame effects (*fRound*). Estimation results are reported in Table 7.

Variable	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
<i>RISK</i>	-0.930**	(0.377)
<i>M</i>	1.271	(1.215)
<i>CompExp</i>	0.970	(1.211)
<i>fRound</i>	-1.075	(0.735)
<i>Game</i>	-1.784***	(0.367)
Constant	65.645***	(2.837)
Observations	2781	
R ²	0.029	
Significance levels : * 10% ** 5% *** 1%		
Standard errors clustered at the pair level		

Table 7: Effect of risk attitude on capacity choices

Risk aversion as well as experience significantly reduce the individually chosen capacity. However, the incentive to set higher prices is not driven by individual, but by the sum of a pair’s capacity choices. Therefore, we next estimate the effect of risk aversion on the

probability that the cutoff for high capacities is met. For this we calculate the average risk aversion ($RISKavg$) for every pair and estimate a probit model where the probability that the cutoff for high capacities is met is explained by average risk aversion ($RISKavg$) and communication (M) controlling for competition experience ($compExp$), experience in playing the ($game$) and endgame effects ($fRound$).

Variable	Coeff.	(Std. Err.)
$RISKavg$	-0.035	(0.027)
M	0.024	(0.083)
$CompExp$	0.175**	(0.083)
$fRound$	-0.024	(0.057)
$Game$	-0.099***	(0.025)
Constant	0.844***	(0.209)
Observations	2781	
Log-likelihood	-1774.142	
Significance levels :	* 10%	** 5% *** 1%
Standard errors clustered at the pair level		

Table 8: Effect of risk attitude on the probability that the cutoff for high capacities is met

Competition experience positively affects the probability that the sum of capacities is high whereas experience in playing the repeated game has a negative effect. Average risk aversion shows no significant effect. Thus, while individual risk aversion does significantly affect individual capacity choices, the effect is not strong enough to carry over to the sum of a pair’s capacity choices.

5 Concluding remarks

Most experimental studies of cheap-talk communication implement more or less liberal coordination devices before participants decide. In our experimental investigation with price messages, participants first choose capacity levels, and can then exchange only numerical price messages before finally choosing the actual sales prices (intra-play communication). In spite of the collusion-unfriendly rather short finite time horizon of interacting with the same partner, communication has a differential effect which is mainly driven by prior capacity choices and competition experience. In a nutshell, communication leads to higher prices if the cutoff for high capacities is met or if subjects are competition experienced. Asymmetry in capacity choices also increases prices if capacities are excessive, but reduces price coordination as well as the reliability of price messages.

By varying within subjects the order of conditions with and without price messages, we experimentally analyzed the institutional change of introducing, respectively abolishing price messages. As often, such an institutional change is not reversible: after fierce competition without price messages, participants increase prices for all capacity levels when allowed to communicate. The finding that introducing price messages after a phase of competition triggers higher prices even for low capacities, is a warning against such institutional reforms which include the implementation of a price transparency platform allowing for frequent price changes (as for Germany for fuel prices announced by gas stations). Although customers may welcome more price transparency, its “dark side” is its possible collusive effect, especially for high capacity levels.

From an industrial economics perspective our study illustrates that the innovative idea of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to justify quantity competition à la Cournot via first capacity then price competition allows for new and hopefully informative studies of communication differing from usual “pre-play communication” in theoretical and experimental explorations. Our results illustrate that “intra-play communication” can yield new and interesting insights. So far the literature only introduces intra-play communication *additionally* to pre-play communication what reduces the credibility of pre-play messages. Our results add to these findings of intra-play communication that its differential effects depend on subjects’ experience as well as on their past decisions: due to past choices firms may face asymmetric incentives when deciding what to communicate. The degree of asymmetry drives the truthfulness of communicated messages and decreases the probability of successful price coordination. Decision experience as well as choices made before announcing pricing intentions thus significantly influence the effects of communication on competition.

Appendix

A. The complete solution of price equilibria in mixed strategies, depending on excessive capacities

Depending on the capacity precommitments, we have to distinguish three cases. First, if $(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 \leq 4\bar{q}_1(\alpha - \bar{q}_1)$ and $2\bar{q}_1 - \alpha \leq \bar{q}_2$, firms randomize according to the distributions

$$F_1(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{q}_2 - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 \bar{q}_2 / (4\bar{q}_1 p)}{p - \alpha + \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2}, & \frac{(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1} \leq p < \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \\ 1, & p = \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \end{cases}$$

$$F_2(p) = \frac{\bar{q}_1 - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 / (4p)}{p - \alpha + \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2}, \quad \frac{(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1} \leq p \leq \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} .$$

Second, if $(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 \leq 4\bar{q}_1(\alpha - \bar{q}_1)$ and $\bar{q}_2 \leq 2\bar{q}_1 - \alpha$, firms randomize according to

$$F_1(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{q}_2 - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 \bar{q}_2 / (4\bar{q}_1 p)}{p - \alpha + \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2}, & \frac{(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1} \leq p \leq \alpha - \bar{q}_1 \\ \frac{4\bar{q}_1 p - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1 p}, & \alpha - \bar{q}_1 \leq p < \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \\ 1, & p = \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \end{cases}$$

$$F_2(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{q}_1 - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 / (4p)}{p - \alpha + \bar{q}_1 + \bar{q}_2}, & \frac{(\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2}{4\bar{q}_1} \leq p \leq \alpha - \bar{q}_1 \\ \frac{\alpha - p - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 / (4p)}{\bar{q}_2}, & \alpha - \bar{q}_1 \leq p \leq \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \end{cases} .$$

Finally, if $4\bar{q}_1(\alpha - \bar{q}_1) \leq (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2$, firms randomize according to

$$F_1(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{2p - \alpha + \sqrt{2\bar{q}_2 - \bar{q}_2^2}}{2p}, & \frac{\alpha - \sqrt{2\bar{q}_2 - \bar{q}_2^2}}{2} \leq p < \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \\ 1, & p = \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} \end{cases}$$

$$F_2(p) = \frac{\alpha - p - (\alpha - \bar{q}_2)^2 / (4p)}{\bar{q}_2}, \quad \frac{\alpha - \sqrt{2\bar{q}_2 - \bar{q}_2^2}}{2} \leq p \leq \frac{\alpha - \bar{q}_2}{2} .$$

B. Instructions

General information

Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and turn off your mobile phones. Please read the instructions carefully and note that they are identical for each participant. During the experiment it is forbidden to talk to other participants. In case you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment as well as from any payment.

You will receive 15 euros for participating in this experiment. The participation fee and any additional amount of money you will earn during the experiment will be paid out to you privately in cash at the end of the session. No other participant will know how much you earned. All monetary amounts in the experiment will be given in ECU (experimental currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs will be converted into Euro using the following exchange rate:

$$10.000 \text{ ECU} = 1 \text{ euro}$$

Procedure of the experiment

The experiment consists of 2 parts with 12 rounds each. In each part you will make decisions at three stages. One stage consists of four rounds. You receive the instructions for the second part after finishing the 12 rounds of part 1.

At the end of the experiment, 5 rounds of each part will be randomly selected to determine your payment. You will receive the sum of your payoffs you have earned in 10 rounds. Your total payment will be composed of the participation fee of 15 Euro and the amounts you earned in the 10 randomly selected rounds.

If you suffer a loss in the 10 selected rounds, you can pay it in cash or balance it by completing additional tasks at the end of the experiment. Please note that these additional tasks can only be used to compensate for possible losses, but not to increase your earnings. Additionally, you will receive a payment for one task from the questionnaire part. Hence, you will receive the participation fee and payment for the questionnaire part in any case.

Introduction

In this experiment you take the role of a manager in a company. You decide how many units of a good your company should produce. This amount specifies the capacity of your company. Afterwards, you choose the selling price for the produced good. Your company has a competing company which produces the same good. You compete against the other company in four rounds. Afterwards, another competitor will be randomly assigned to you. You will not be informed about the other manager's identity.

In each round of the experiment, you will first make decisions about the capacity, followed by decisions about the price. At the beginning of each round, you and the company you are competing with will decide about your capacity simultaneously and independently of each other. The capacity corresponds to the amount of goods that your company is planning to produce in this round. Every capacity unit costs a fixed amount. After your capacity decision, you will be informed about the capacity decision of your competing company. Afterwards, both companies choose their selling price for their good at the same time. The company with the lower price gets the chance to sell its produced amount first. The company

with the higher price can sell something only if the preferred company has produced too little to sell something to every interested customer. If the prices are equal, the customers are distributed to both companies equally (if the number of customers is odd, it will be rounded to the next higher even number). In any case, both companies have to pay their production costs. This holds even if they have not sold anything.

Definition of the experiment - Part 1

The experiment consists of 2 parts which are divided in 3 stages. At the beginning of each stage, the groups of two companies are assigned by chance and anew.

One stage consists of four rounds in which you interact with the same competing company. The procedure is as follows:

1. Both companies choose a capacity between 0 and 100 at the same time. The costs are 80 ECU for each capacity unit.
2. The capacity decisions are announced.
3. Both companies choose a price between 0 and 200 for the produced good at the same time.
4. The chosen prices are announced, the produced goods are sold and both companies come to know their earnings or losses and the ones of the other company.

The demand of your produced good complies with your chosen price: The more expensive the good, the less it is bought.

The number of customers for the produced good is computed by the software and depends on price p . It equals the amount $200-p$. This means that the number of customers declines with a rising price.

Your payment is composed of your revenues minus your production costs. For every sold good you receive the chosen price and pay production costs for every produced unit. The amount you sell depends on whether your price is lower, higher or equal to the price of the other company in your group:

- a) Your price is lower.

In this case you first get the chance to sell your produced amount. For every unit sold you receive your price p . If an amount M is requested, you earn $p \cdot M$. From this you have to subtract the production costs of 80 ECU per produced unit. If the requested amount M exceeds your capacity, the other company can sell something at its higher price. This will work if interested customers remain that are ready to pay the higher price.

- b) Your price is higher.

In this case you only sell something if the other company has produced too little. If there are remaining customers who are ready to buy at the higher price, they will buy from you. For every unit sold you receive the chosen price. Even if you sell nothing or less than you have produced you have to pay all the production costs at the amount of $80 \cdot \text{your capacity}$.

- c) Both prices are equal.

In this case both companies can each sell to one half of the customers. Even if you sell less than you have produced you have to pay all the production costs.

Therefore, your payment can be summarized as follows:

Your price*sold amount - 80*your capacity

Please note that the production costs of 80*your capacity also arise even if you sell nothing or less than you produced in one round.

You will receive instructions for part 2 at the end of stage 1.

Before part 1 of the experiment begins, we ask you to answer a few control questions to help you understand the rules of the experiment. This is followed by one practice round, so that you can become familiar with the structure of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Instructions for part 2

Part 2 also consists of three stages. At the beginning of each stage the groups of two companies are chosen randomly.

Afterwards, there will be 4 rounds in each stage. The process of these rounds only differs from the rounds in part 1 insofar that the companies can tell the other company the price they will determine before choosing a price. This statement is not binding, e.g., the actual decision can be different from the price which was told.

If you have any questions about part 2, please raise your hand.

References

- Anderhub, V.; Güth, W.; Kamecke, U. and Normann, H.-T., 2003, 'Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets,' *Experimental Economics*, 6, pp. 27-52.
- Andersson, O. and Wengström, E., 2007, 'Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies,' *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 109, pp. 321-339.
- Andersson, O. and Wengström, E., 2012, 'Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-Stage Games,' *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 81, pp. 207-219.
- Aumann, R., 1990, 'Nash-Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing,' In: Gabszewicz, J.; Richard, J.F. and Wolsey, L. (eds.), *Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation*, pp. 201-206, (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
- Borenstein, S. and Shepard, A., 1996, 'Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,' *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 27, pp. 429-451.
- Charness G., 2000, 'Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture,' *Games and Economic Behavior*, 33, pp. 177-194.
- Charness, G. and Grosskopf, B., 2004, 'What Makes Cheap Talk Effective? Experimental Evidence,' *Economics Letters*, 83, pp. 383-389.
- Clark, R. and Houde, J.-F., 2014, 'The Effect of Explicit Communication on Pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel,' *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, 62, pp. 191-228.
- Cooper, D.J. and Kühn, K.U., 2014, 'Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion,' *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 6, pp. 247-278.
- Crawford, V., 1998, 'A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk,' *Journal of Economic Theory*, 78, pp. 286-298.
- Farrell, J. and Rabin, M., 1996, 'Cheap Talk,' *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10, pp. 103-118.
- Fischbacher, U., 2007, 'Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments,' *Experimental Economics*, 10, pp. 171-178.
- Fonseca, M.A. and Normann, H.T., 2012, 'Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion—the Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments,' *European Economic Review*, 56, pp. 1759-1772.
- Harrington Jr, J.E., Gonzalez, R.H. and Kujal, P., 2016, 'The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings,' *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 128, pp. 251-264.
- Holt, C.A. and Laury, S.K., 2002, 'Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects,' *American Economic Review*, 92, pp. 1644-1655.
- Houser, D. and Xiao, E., 2011, 'Classification of Natural Language Messages Using a Coordination Game,' *Experimental Economics*, 14, pp. 1-14.

- Kimbrough, E.O., Smith, V., and Wilson, B., 2008, 'Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade,' *American Economic Review*, 98, pp. 1009-1039.
- Kreps, D. M. and Scheinkman, J. A., 1983, 'Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes,' *Bell Journal of Economics*, 14, pp. 326-337.
- Levitan, R. and Shubik, M., 1972, 'Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,' *International Economic Review*, 13, pp. 111-122.
- Le Coq, C. and Sturluson, J. T., 2012, 'Does Opponents' Experience Matter? Experimental Evidence from a Quantity Precommitment Game,' *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 84, pp. 265-277.
- Moellers, C., Normann, H.-T., and Snyder, C.M., 2017, 'Communication in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence,' *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 50, pp. 214-258.
- Muren, A., 2000, 'Quantity Precommitment in an Experimental Oligopoly Market,' *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 41, pp. 147-157.
- OECD Policy Roundtable on price transparency 2001, DAF/CLP(2001)22.
- Selten, R. and Stoecker, R., 1986, 'End Behaviour in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames. A Learning Theory Approach,' *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 7, pp. 47-70.
- Xiao, E. and Houser, D., 2009, 'Avoiding the Sharp Tongue: Anticipated Written Messages Promote Fair Economic Exchange,' *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 30, pp. 393-404.