COMMUNITY POLICING
Comparative Aspects of Community Oriented Police Work

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The function of police officers has become more complex and expansive in course of time. Policing is a highly professional and difficult business (Home Office 1988). This is recognized by practitioners, scholars, and the general public. Equally, it is obvious that police has more tasks than crime fighting. Functions like "peacekeeping", "order maintenance", or "service provision" represent a large part of the police work (Flanagan 1985).

In contrary to theoretical and political discussion on police and police function and to lots of studies in foreign countries (Reiner/Shapland 1987), empirical police research was very rare in West-Germany.

Police in Germany is - like in other countries - an unspecified agency, used by citizens for various purposes which exceed by far the very specified duties named in the German Law. Unlike other Police Forces, German police doesn't have any discretionary power in criminal cases. Every offense noticed by or brought to the notice of a police officer must be registered and prosecuted. The state attorney only may dismiss cases and use discretionary power. Nevertheless, reality is different. One result of our evaluation of patrol police diaries was, that the German police officers make use of some kind of "informal discretionary power". In neighborhood disputes, family conflicts and minor offenses (for example damage of property), police officers on shift use their possibilities of discretionary decisions in everyday conflicts. They use techniques like immediate conflict solution, and take immediate actions to help people in everyday conflicts.

In many cases the police has to function as a coordinator for the administration of damages, usually required by the insurance company. Police also is supposed to deal with situations of threatening, nuisance and to settle neighborhood conflicts and domestic disputes. Further on, police plays an important role in the settlement of conflicts with road traffic and in the redress of various molestations (disturbances, brawls). In these fields their work is relatively effective and efficient. But these services have only partly to do with their legal task. In the field of prosecution, however, police work is rather ineffective. From German and foreign studies and research we learned that the police clears up less than 10% of all crimes with unknown offenders (Kinsey et al. 1986; Steffen 1990). In all other cases, the victim provides the police with the name and sometimes even the person (e.g. shoplifting) of the suspect.

By taking this fact into account, every German detective clears up some four to ten cases each year, which results in costs of more than 20,000 German Marks (for salary only) for one case cleared by detectives themselves. Thus to raise the clearance rate by only one percent, costs of 250 million German Marks for detectives only will arise (this figure as the following are for Germany within the old borders - without the former GDR) - keeping in mind, that only a few more police officers have no impact on the clearance rate, which is determined by a lot of different factors (Stein 1992). Furthermore, the patrol police and the justice system (prosecutors, judges) will increase their costs. To bring those cases to court and to convict the offenders, costs of some 400 million German Marks per year may arise. All in all, a one percent higher clearance rate could cost about 1.000 million German Marks per year.

The number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants is often mentioned as 1:400 and is a very important point in the political discussion. In reality and if we ask, how many patrol police offi-
cers are "on the street" at a given moment, the number is 1:20,000. This is due to training, illness, the shift systems and other factors. Therefore, to ask for just one police officer more on the street, you need all in all 14 officers, which will cost (in Germany) some 1,000,000 (one million) Marks.

Our studies in Germany showed, that the average patrol police officer arrests an offender every one and a half month (not shoplifting and faredodging; but bicycle theft, drug possession, illegal foreigners asking for asylum, slight bodily injury, fraud by not paying bills in pubs or restaurants etc.). The chance for a police officer to come across a real crime is very low (Feltes 1989). We do not have figures on that for Germany, but the calculation by the American President's Commission on Crime, that a patrolling officer on a busy street might hope to come across a street robbery in progress once every fourteen years, might be true for Germany as well, as the calculation by the British Home Office, that a police officer in London could expect to pass within 100 yards of a burglary in progress roughly once in every eight years (Home Office 1988).

Of the two functions of police, namely to keep up law and order, in reality the "order"-function plays the dominant role. But in public, media and political discussions, the "law"-function is always pushed in the foreground, esp. in connection with violent demonstrations, terrorism or criminal acts against foreigners. Especially the use of the police force in the context of demonstrations led to great frustration among German police officers and to discontentment with their profession, younger police officers being essentially more discontented than older ones (Feltes/Hermann 1987; Feltes 1990). One reason for this may be, that in the daily routine of a police officer the aspect of "helping others" can be realized less and lesser nowadays, although for nearly all police officers this aspect was once crucial for their choice of vocation. As service functions predominate in the everyday routine of police, citizens are increasingly confronted with discontented police officers who, moreover, often come from different neighborhoods and social classes than the citizen himself.

Structural changes in the police apparatus (centralization e.g.) have effected that a police officer nowadays only rarely works in the area in which he or she lives. Furthermore, police officers are often transferred to other cities after their training.

Roughly estimated, there are about 10 million patrol dispatches per year in the (old) F.R.Germany. This means, that each police officer has to run one to two dispatches per shift, or, per car, some three actions per shift.

The major part of the everyday routine of the German police is represented by different types of accidents, events and offenses in connection with road traffic. The rate ranges between 25% and almost 60% in different cities. "Real crimes", i.e. patrol dispatches on the grounds of a supposed or actual offence are rather exceptional (between 16% and 28%). Brawls and quarrels are to a similar extent the cause for action (up to 25%) as help and assistance in different ways (e.g. drunken and helpless persons). Here again we have about the same results as the study by the Home Office (Home Office 1988), by Hanak for Vienna (Hanak 1991) and by Steffen for Bavaria (Steffen/Polz 1991).

All in all, two different tendencies can be observed: On the one hand the demand for help or intervention by the police has risen permanently up to the beginning of the 80's and is now rising again. The rise of the criminal offenses, registered by the police, is only partly responsible for this, but the readiness and/or capability of the citizens to settle conflicts by means of communication has decreased. Victims are less ready and capable of helping themselves. Official authorities are increasingly called in to clear and settle conflicts. Even the rise of registered offenses can be explained by this phenomenon - at least partly. On the other hand, the police is less and lesser capable of accomplishing this task of keeping up order and settling conflicts adequately.
and for the benefit of the victims concerned.
To view the social reaction against crime as a police monopoly is obviously untrue, as Jock Young pointed out. Public opinion and informal social control have the central role, not only in defining what is crime, but also in maintaining social order (Young 1987).
As a result of that, the aim of a rational policy in policing must be to increase the activities in those fields, where
a) police work is rather effective and
b) police work is really necessary for an orderly functioning of our society.
The first aspect is true for the everyday police work in terms of service and order maintenance, the second aspect stresses topics like organized crime, economic crime, drug crime etc.
As we could show, police officers themselves are eager to help other people. But the changes of the structure of police work and police apparatus and political decisions complicate the police officers' job unnecessarily. Now citizens call the police to solve very different problems more often than in earlier times. Victims call the police in order to find an institution and people in this institution who are able to help them and to support them emotionally (mostly) and (sometimes) financially.
Just to put a few more police officers on the street has no impact on both the crime rate and the clearance rate, which is determined by a lot of different factors, not to be influenced by the police itself.
The situation in Germany as in other countries shows, that we do need the police in a lot of everyday situations, in which the citizens rely on the police. But the police is less and lesser able to cope with the very different and difficult task of policing a modern, complex society.
Community policing as a solution for the problems mentioned above was discussed in different counties since the beginning of the eighties. To bring this discussion to Germany and to find special solutions for different european countries, an International Symposium was organized at the Institute of Criminology in Heidelberg. The results of the symposium are published in this volume of the series of "Empirische Polizeiforschung" (Empirical Studies on Police Research).
A project like organizing such an symposium and publishing the results is not done alone or without the support of those whose activities one observes or are published in that book. A lot of people "behind the scene" helped to prepare the symposium and the book. Special thanks go to Theresa Reiter from the "Internationales Wissenschaftsforum" in Heidelberg for the organizational assistance and the kindness of their staff; to Maria Botz, who typed parts of the manuscript; to Martin Wiedemann, who assisted in proof reading; and to most of the authors for delivering their papers already prepared for publishing. Finally, the Stiftung Universität Heidelberg helped to publish the proceedings with a special grant.

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Community Policing - Some Remarks

Dieter Dölling

The following articles were presented at an International Symposium on Community Policing, which was organized by Thomas Feltes and myself and held at the Internationales Wissenschaftsforum of the University of Heidelberg in September 1992 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Institute of Criminology. The idea of the symposium was to summarize and to actualize the discussion on the concept of Community Policing and to consider the actual situation in some Eastern European countries. The idea of Community Policing had also been discussed during the World Congress of Criminology, which was held in Hamburg in 1988 and the results of this discussion were published (Feltes/Rebscher 1990).

Focussing on the problems concerning the transferring of Community Policing to European countries (and this was one of the aims of the symposium), we must realize, that a lot of different aspects and arguments should be noted.

First, as Hans-Jürgen Kerner points out in his article, the possibilities of crime-prevention are limited and this is true for all forms of crime prevention. Society has to accept a certain level of crime and this level of crime may be higher in a free society than it is in a totalitarian one. Community Policing is not a key to the solution of all problems of policing. For instance, the problems of organized crime, white collar crime and environmental crime cannot be solved by means of Community Policing. Tackling these problems requires effective professional police organizations and measures, and for the implementation of these organizational structures and police activities processes of planning are necessary, as being described by Edwin Kube.

On the other hand, Community Policing may help us in certain respects to improve police performance concerning the handling of everyday offenses and the maintaining of public order. There are hints that decentralization of the police and the allocation of more responsibility to local police force areas make it easier to handle these problems of everyday police work. Moreover, the police should take citizens' perceptions serious, ask citizens what they think about the local problems regarding crime and social order, and include the citizens in the process of policing. It is clear, that the police cannot solve the problems of crime control on their own. As Joachim Jäger argues, the police is not "the Savior of the Nation". The whole society is responsible for the damming up of crime. Consequently the citizens should be involved in the process of policing.

It cannot be expected that Community Policing will reduce the crime rate immediately. But - as Jack Greene points out - there are some reasons to assume that Community Policing could have some other positive effects, in particular a reduction of fear of crime, an increase of the citizens' confidence in the police, an improvement of the relations between the police and the citizens, an improved police officer job satisfaction and stimulations of solutions to community problems. These improvements of the climate, in which crime control and order maintenance take place, and of the culture of a community may - in the long run - lead to a reduction of the crime rate. And there may be another positive effect. Community Policing makes the citizens think about the problems of the community and encourage them to cooperate in solving those problems. This is a

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chance to increase the integration of the citizens who constitute a community and to build or to rebuild social structures in that community. I suppose, there is a correlation between the degree of integration within a community and the crime rate. There are structural and economic causes of crime, which cannot be controlled by the police. But there may be some other factors which could be relevant for the commitment of offenses and which can be influenced by the police and the local community.

On the other hand there are considerable implementation weaknesses. Trevor Bennet describes this. Some of the reasons for implementation failures are located within the police organization itself, for instance the resistance of lower ranking officers, which can be traced to forms of police subculture. But there may also be external reasons. What is the community, Community Policing is dealing with? Richard V. Ericson, Kevin D. Haggerty and Kevin D. Carriere depict a society which is constituted by bureaucratic institutions, their communication technologies and the growth in surveillance. In this "late modern risk society" there is no place for the improvement of concrete local face-to-face relationships, because face-to-face relationships have vanished. Community Policing itself becomes a technology, the technology of communicating on security, of security counselling and security management.

On the other hand, in some areas there may be - as Manfred Proske points out - intact communities which do not need Community Policing, because traditional policing works quite well. The implementation of Community Policing in these communities might create more problems than it would solve.

So let us look for the community which fits into the concept of Community Policing. The community addressed by Community Policing is a community which has considerable crime problems and problems of social order, but, on the other hand, has a substance of common values and beliefs, which can be a basis for cooperation and partnership in policing, and, in which personal relations are not completely transformed into institutional and technological systems. It may be doubtful, whether these communities can be found in modern Western societies. Community Policing is a collective approach and we seem to live in an era of individualization. But I think there are many communities with the sociological and socio-ethical basis of successful implementation of Community Policing, although it is extremely difficult to develop structures which give all parts of the community the opportunity to participate in Community Policing.

Furthermore there is the problem of the legitimization of decision-making in Community Policing models. Community Policing could have the consequence of a broadening of the police role, the police being responsible not only for the investigation of crimes, but also for public welfare, appropriate housing, education and numerous other municipal problems. The police officer becomes a social engineer. At this point, the limits of Community Policing are reached. This has been shown by István Sziklinger. Community Policing should not be a means to circumvent the responsibilities in a democratic and constitutional state. The democratic institutions of legislation and self-government have to set up the political priorities in a process of open discussion according to the rules of the constitution. And the decisions of legislation and self-government must be enforced by an administration which is controlled by the law and by independent courts. I think these are the indispensable essentials of a state governed by the rule of law.

But the law does not completely determine what the police has to do in a given situation. Law enforcement is - as Jack Greene points out - selective. And this is especially true for crime prevention. So Community Policing is a way to design police work within the frame of the law. But this does not mean that the police becomes a super-administration responsible for all affairs within a community. As Christian Eliaerts, Els Enhus and T. van den Broeck note in their paper,
the role of the police should be delimited. When the police - in cooperation with the community - have identified certain social problems, they may inform the self-government and the local administration, and they may suggest solutions, but the solutions must be realized by the citizens themselves or by the social services, not by the police. Without this limiting of the police's responsibility the danger arises that Community Policing changes into a police community, that would mean into a community dominated by the police. But if these limits are respected, Community Policing would be a chance to improve police performance and I think that we should try to implement forms of Community Policing in Germany and other European countries.
Crime Prevention and the Role of the Police - An Analytical Framework

Hans-Jürgen Kerner

1. Introductory Remarks / Hypotheses on the Limits of Preventive Endeavors

Crime prevention is ranking very high on the official police agenda. Preventing child or youths delinquency and adult crime is considered to be a primordial aim of modern police work. It is taken for granted that the police are but one factor in a more complex State and societal task. Following a medical analogy, common sense tells us, in addition, that preventing an illness is better than curing it. The police are, so to speak, good doctors, and specialists in detecting the first signs of (future) more or less severe illnesses.

When turning from the rather general top level police authorities' statements, and looking at the operational level, one can easily find examples of police programs that are related to prevention. They are, however, normally not integrated in everyday police work of frontline police officers. They are, instead, just added to that work and performed resp. offered by specially appointed, sometimes also specially trained policemen.

On the German agenda one can point e.g. at the following endeavors:
- the traffic police school liaison officer;
- the local CID-citizen advisory boards or bureaus regarding improvement of locks, the armoring of windows, and other kinds of modern viz. recent security technology;
- the nation-wide "Kriminalpolizeiliches Vorbeugungsprogramm" (criminal police crime prophylaxis program) being mass-media oriented in substance, and aiming at making the people aware of and sensitive for certain crime dangers resp. victimization risks.

The fact that large parts of prevention oriented endeavors are so far belonging to police authorities' programs indicates a difficulty scholars in different countries already were pointing at quite often and explicitly: On the middle ranks and in particular on the front level, i.e. among the police on the beat, practitioners seem not to be convinced that prevention as such will be worth-while.

For many of them "true policing" is characterized by chasing criminals, detecting the yet unknown perpetrators of reported criminal acts, arresting culprits on the spot, questioning and searching suspects, controlling dangerous places, checking cars whether or not they may have been stolen, and the like! Taking all this kind of orientation together one may conclude that so far policing crime and criminals is meant to be engaged in concrete situations: such as asking for a quick answer if not solution, dealing with discrete events having their manifest history and being caused by a few discernable individual persons already known to the responsible officers or at least soon to be figured out by routinized tactical procedures.

Seen from this point of view, good repressive work may automatically bear preventive vigor. Also patrol work earns its core sense from the practitioners hope if not deep conviction that concrete crimes can be met and concrete culprits can be caught upon committing or shortly after the commission of offenses. Prevention, again, quasi occurs as a by-product. Prevention does not need to be separately conceived of or even formally organized.

In repressive work "success" can be realized and seen immediately. How high a percentage of all situations (=cases) dealt with by an individual officer are to be considered "successful" in order to help avoiding frustration is, however, a matter of personal reality management.

In preventive work as performed apart from routine policing there seems to be nothing concrete...
in the beginning. One has "problems" defined by police authorities themselves or by outside agencies, authorities or even pressure groups. The proclaimed aims of a preventive task may sound good or reasonable at first sight but, nevertheless, they remain rather general or sometimes even vague for the practitioners' mind when he or she tries to figure out what to do directly and why it should be done in a certain way. Last but not least: Is there any method of figuring out lest really measuring concrete results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness?

Those attitudes will not easily be changed since they are embedded in a long lasting traditional police culture, and enforced by everyday experience in concrete policing, being usually organized in a manner that remunerates traditional behavior and custom.

Scholars and high officials alike nowadays know that one has to be cautious about "success" through repression of crime and criminals. But I think the limits of crime prevention, classical style, are not yet always acknowledged in equal clarity. Policemen at the front line may stick at some kind of false consciousness. However, their reluctance to accept prevention is pointing at a real problem.

I shall try to address this problem by breaking down the topic of my presentation into six focal areas. I can present but a sketch in order not to overdraw the time and space limit.

Let us begin with three strongly interrelated hypotheses. These are negative ones in order to direct our minds to the question whether at all, and, if yes, how far-reaching an empirical evidence we have at hand to falsify them.

Hypothesis 1 = The police do not have immediate access to offenses and offenders.

Hypothesis 2 = The police do not effectively control crime-prone individuals and/or criminogenic structures and situations.

Hypothesis 3 = Crime prevention cannot be reached at with typical police resources and methods.

2. Crime type analysis: grades of (in)accessibility for the police

The term "accessibility" encompasses the whole set of basic conditions defining a situation where "crime" (however defined) occurs. Those situations may be either principally or often at least practically shaped in a way that makes them insulated from third party knowledge. In other cases the social-psychological structure of the environment where crimes are committed guarantees that private knowledge will by no means be shared with law enforcement agencies or agents.

Again in other cases offenders known as such to all people concerned may nevertheless escape formal law enforcement or criminal justice procedures due to different grades of so-called enforcement immunity or at least practical impunity. Up to now I am not aware of any elaborated system that tries to restructure the many crime types police have to deal with in terms of their accessibility for either repressive or direct preventive efforts. Those efforts may be aimed at situations, objects, or persons alike, depending upon the nature of the problem the legal label is trying to catch by specific dimension.

At this point I would only like to look at the dimensions that have to be taken into consideration. Insofar as getting access to (potential and actual) acts and actors implies chances to prevent crimes in planning and/or offenses already conceived of, "preventability" depends on many facets of a complex web. In many if not in most cases the rather negative edge of the dimension will prevail.
Scheme: "Preventability" of Crime Types - Main Dimensions

- "Visibility" of the act
- "Detectability" of the act
- "Reportability" of the act
- "Controllability" of the situation (viz. the act, the person)
- "Deteractivity" of the (potential) actor(s)
- "Permeability" of the crime generating structure
- "Accountability" of the "real" culprit (particularly in the case of so-called background actors)
- "Flexibility" of the illegal market structure
- "Rentability" of the investment in the "protection market"
- "Replicability" of experiments having been successful on first sight in lowering or even doing away with a certain offense type at certain places.

When ordering substantive types of behavior/organization lying behind legal crime types one easily can detect that the situation is not at ease for the police. Many acts are not visible at all since being committed in private or in other circumstances where third parties do not have access. Street crimes are highly visible acts by definition but this will not automatically imply that police will arrive on time to arrest the culprit(s).

In the case of more or less invisible offenses the police depend on either detective work or the willingness of bystanders or other informed people to report the act. There are only few occasions where offenders with a bit of experience must really fear to get caught by the one or the other method. As those actors have learned on different situations, the police authorities' resources do not enable them to deal with more than a thin percentage of cases in real detective work. Witnesses on the other hand are often unwilling to report the event to the police, be it out of mistrust against the police, be it out of other more rational reasons like avoiding time and energy consuming endeavors that eventually will not pay off when compared with the loss caused by the offense itself.

Many offenses occur in social-psychological situations that are in general "crime prone" or "crime producing". Nevertheless the single and concrete act will normally be unforeseeable. It may happen after a randomly aggregated combination of very specific circumstances driving one particular person to acting out whereas others will not be touched by the situational impact. So the police had to stay on the spot around the clock if they would like to prevent any "dangerous combination" for any person at any time. Take bars, playgrounds, drug selling places in towns, and hotel lobbies as illustrating examples of the very divergent necessities for real "control". In the case of public bars (altercations, fights, fencing etc.) or children's playgrounds (sex offenders -) the situation is principally open to control; except very concrete information of the type that "something is already going on" or that "several offenses happened already here during the last two weeks" one has, however, to bear in mind that crime is in statistical terms a very seldom event. Plain cloth officers then might sit in the bar for three months before something relevant will happen. They would not "control" that place in the core sense of the word. With regard to the other examples police presence may perhaps alter the situation in the sense that cautious offenders will abstain from talking about crime or from committing it just there. Controlling one place may imply nothing but displacement of the problem to another place or region when and insofar the police do not have a clear impression of who the suspected person is.

So one can continue to discuss the other items of the scheme, and one always will detect a lot of
"impediments" against direct and effective preventive work.

3. Prevention through repression?
But what about the crime-preventive capacity of law enforcement? Do we have evidence that traditional incidence based law enforcement work respectively "crime fighting" can falsify the above stated hypotheses? Taking research results of different states together on may conclude that there is a bit but not much of such evidence.

As regards common crime police are dependent upon victim or bystander notification. From offenses recorded for the German Uniform Crime Reports (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik) about 80 to 90 per cent, as research shows, were reported to the police by others. In other words: Only about 10 to 20 per cent were due to pro-active police work.

The clearance rate (whether low or relatively high in a given State) is mostly predetermined by the circumstances of the immediate situation when or where crime occurs. In some cases, like department store theft, the detection of the act regularly implies the detection of the actor. In other cases, like theft from cars in large parking lots of soccer stations, the act normally will be detected when the actor is already far away with the proceeds. Other examples can easily be imagined.

Research on the success of true detective work, e.g. regarding robbery or burglary, came out with the result that approximately 4 or at the maximum 10 per cent of those cases that are not already to be cleared by situational cues may be cleared in addition by independently gained police evidence.

Quickening police response after notification of a crime may also be of rather limited value. Experiments with rapid response calls show that only a few more crimes can be solved, partly due to the simple fact that victims do wait a sometimes remarkable period of time before they decide to call the police.

However: Perhaps police response will deeply influence the overall opinion people will get from and express about the police.

4. Prevention through police patrol?
If repression has to be considered with care: Is there at least evidence that patrolling can falsify the leading hypotheses?

Police patrol work was for decades highly esteemed in all police (and other law enforcement) circles. Experience seemed to back up the common sense notion that via patrol procedures police authorities can best get control of the field and so far influence the crime situation. At least in West European States this idea probably seems still nowadays vivid among rank and file police officers. The personal evidence due to many contacts on the beat seems so clear that no further discussion is expected.

As regards random patrol, recent examples of precise crimino-geographic analysis convincingly show that crime is really what mathematical experts call a "statistically seldom event". For perpetrators the risk may be 1 in 100 or 200 that a police car will come by just when they are engaged in the committing of the offense. For victims and the general public patrol cars tend to "disappear" out of the everyday perception if police are following the time schedule of the "objective risk". That means many citizens are already or still asleep when a typical property crime occurs. But breaking and entering (burglary) may also be committed at day-time when the owner of the flat or of the house is away; so he or she will normally not realize whether or not patrol cars or foot patrol were underway but he or she will be interested to find out whether the police coming to the victim will develop helpful arrangements to overcome the psychological stress and
to regain the lost objects. On the other hand: If police cars are driving around when nearly all citizens will have a realistic chance to see them, then it must be a time sequence where normally no offender would dare to act anyway. So far the results of repeated scholarly endeavors on patrolling (beginning with the famous Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment) may not to be seen as highly astonishing: After many control procedures it is clear that quality and quantity of crime events will more or less remain stable. People also tend to uphold their pre-conceived construction of reality: eventually they "see" no change in the crime situation irrespective of whether or not they saw more police cars than before the experiment took place. So patrol work will normally not heavily contribute to crime prevention in objective terms, even if the police are investing twice or threefold more resources as they normally are used to deploy. But what about the subjective dimension? It is structurally important since the "definition of the situation" people select largely determines how they will behave in the future. So far we could conclude from the experimental results that citizens may slowly develop more trust in the police and may reduce their fear of crime. This development, then, can indirectly lead, in the long range, to more objectively ascertainable preventive effects, since if people are inclined to redefine the or their definition of the situation they probably will also, at least partly, act upon the new definition. The altered behavior eventually should influence e.g. the publicly visible community life, and so help to change the generalized perception of what "community reality" is all about. In so far as potential offenders are members of that community or at least living nearby, and therefore more "feeling" than cognitive realizing the changes, the chance will very finally be enhanced that the number of crimes committed will begin to decline. To a certain extent this idea belongs to social psychological concepts focalized in the so-called Thomas-theorem: "If men define situations as real they will become real in their consequences".

The whole process, however, is a very complex one, dependent on many interrelated causal chains. This is why no one was hitherto capable to develop clear cut models of prevention enabling scholars and/or practitioners to implement routinized activities with a predictable grade of continuous real life success. All in all one should seriously bear in mind that a large part of prevention oriented attitudes is influenced by what I like to characterize as "symbolic presence" of the police in the public sphere:

Police definitively can not be present at all locations all the time, and citizens are normally perfectly aware of this fact. They are, however, concerned about developments in the direction that one could no more be sure that the police will show up in due course of time if needed in the concrete case, be it after an emergency call, be it along particular events in the community where "everyone" (but the police) is convinced that "obviously" police should have done something. This "doing something" pertains to a highly important general psychological phenomenon: People are as afraid of enduring uncertainty in objectively dangerous or in subjectively menacing or even in only ambiguous situations as they are afraid of events where no causal explanation can be "developed" that helps them to "understand" what happened and why. Even the strangest ideas will have a good chance to get accepted: They are better than nothing since they help to overcome the so-called human "horror vacui". This parallels results of research pertaining to police reaction after being called by victims of breaking and entering or burglary offenses. Future thrust or mistrust in the police on the part of the crime victims seems not to be heavily influenced by the objective result i.e. whether or not the police eventually could clear up the case and arrest the offender. Instead, people are intensively feeling a necessity to be acknowledged as victims of crime. If police officers are coming to the home, listening carefully to the victims story and complaints, calming down emotions etc., in other words: if they are showing concern about the victims material and psychological damage than they provide "real" help for the client even if they
know and make it explicitly clear to the client that there will eventually be no real help in their own terms of police effectiveness. Criminologists sometimes drew another parallel. They were pointing at the firebrigade. Nobody expects them to prevent all fires, and many people will not even be aware of their actual useful engagement in making private homes, public buildings, and industrial plants as secure and fire resistant as possible. When a dangerous fire is actually developing, again nobody expects the firebrigade to save the building totally in every case. It would be fine, of course, if they could save a house to nearly hundred per cent. It would be accepted, of course, if the fire was already destroying to much substance of a house so that nothing remained for the brigade but to preserve the neighboring buildings. And so on: the firebrigade will be trusted so long and in so far as they try their best and as they hold people convinced about their commitment. "Ringing the fire bell" or using more modern noise producing equipment when driving to the spot may and surely will be necessary in many cases in order to avoid traffic fatalities. But such kind of behavior has, in addition, a remarkable symbolic value: It reassures the population about the "good order" of public regulations in that domain. Seen from this perspective, symbolic presence of the police means surely more than "public relations" without substantial backup in real life situations. It is a kind of surplus value not to be gained by manipulative advertisement campaigns and the like. It will, instead, automatically arise out of organizational police structures and behavioral routines that are publicly visible for people concerned as indicators for basic order maintenance and at least some shelter against crime.

5. Prevention with regard to endemic criminogenic structures

Turning to another dimension of prevention one may ask whether or not the police can successfully influence crime embedded in local or regional habitats. Is there evidence that the above hypotheses can be falsified?

There are several examples sometimes closely related to each other in certain regions but, from the analytical point of view, they can be treated as separate entities. The term "endemic" signifies the fact that different types of crimes, irrespective of their being remarkable in themselves, are performed by offenders deeply immersed into the "normal" neighborhood or city life. Endemic crime alleviating or instigating structures are then those forming an integral part of the social fabric.

Traditional structures are mostly connected with modern urbanization as such, represented by the urban crime "milieu" with prostitution, pimping, x-rated films, sex-shops, fencing of all kind, mixed with more or less harmless (other) forms of night entertainment.

Other structures seem to be the consequence of social fragmentation if not breakdown, often related to class or ethnic tensions along the scale of "zoned" urban wealth vs. decline, represented by e.g. the spread of territorial bound adventurous or dangerous youth gangs.

Another type belongs to the forms of social marginalization of dropouts respectively of subcultures engaged in seeking not (yet) accepted new (mind altering) pleasures, represented e.g. by local drug scenes.

The most appalling and often threatening endemic structure is that of "culturally inherited" mentalities, life styles and strong quasi-feudal social bonds as represented by traditional ethnically bound mafia-type surroundings and connections.

It seems perfectly clear already after short evaluative consideration of societal conditions: The police can not alter the social fabric. They may be in the position of moderating small parts of the complex social web and, by doing so, hopefully causing movements in other parts of the web structure that eventually will lead to an improvement. Normally even the most modern police measures will have only limited success in combatting endemic structures. They can not direct but only influence the situation, and much work will stick on the surface of problems. Nearly all
dimensions of preventability are so to speak negatively determined. Classical policing helps monitoring the epiphenomena. By picking out single offenses to be dealt with or by chasing particular (as a rule lower ranking) offenders the police will demonstrate that they are not inclined to leave the "field" to their counterparts. Quite often police-underworld relationships are characterized by a certain symbiotic quality in that each party does very well know the other's strength and weaknesses and is dependent on a certain co-operation. The official authorities' propaganda for the general public then might be the "eradication" of the milieu or the vigorous "war" on organized crime etc. etc.: The real message as sent to the milieu itself by the decodable modes and manners of everyday contacts and (sometimes) law enforcement is that of tolerating the business as long as proliferation is avoided.

If the police try to infiltrate the structures they need various methods of covered or undercover action. Even then, success is far from being secured. The strategy of undercover action has its genuine limits. It either brings the police officers if not the whole authorities in closer connection with the whole particular social fabric: that will enhance, in the long run, the named symbiotic relationships. Or it will heighten the danger that the police may get functionalized by one of the factions of the "criminal game" in order to execute e.g. a pre-conceived plan to remove another faction as competitor from the illegal market. The undercover agent then discovers what his informers prepared deliberately to be discovered. And the police force will eventually execute what the organized criminals like them to do in their own best interests. Another counterproductive effect of milieu-oriented law enforcement may be that it contributes to the strengthening of shadow economy capacities and capabilities. If the police remove the run-of-the-mill competitors either on the demand or on the supply side of the illegal market they contribute to the improvement of the remaining parts of the business. The rising risks lead for those that still dare to act to rising marginal values for the offered illegal goods and services. The improved proceeds of crime enable them to invest e.g. more money and other resources than before in precautionary measures of different kind.

In states, regions or cities where structures of organized crime exist that are worth to be labeled as "Mafia" or "Cosa Nostra" police work may be hampered from the beginning due to the peculiar circumstance that is typical for "real" organized crime: Its dense relationships with legitimate business and politics!

Trusting only in the police for making prevention effective would then be false a concept. The details need further clarification. Even more critical the general situation seems to be with regard to phenomena that are significative for the late 20th century highly industrialized or post-industrial states and societies. That means the upcoming of modern crime structures representing a more or less perfect "mimicry" of legitimate business or businesslike behavior. These structures may still rely to a certain extent on ethnic relations but they must not necessarily do so. They form part of a development that John Mack and myself, when working for the Council of Europe coordinated research fellowship on European Organized Crime in the late sixties, tentatively called "crime industry". Different forms have to be discerned. I shall name only a few e.g. the multi-national professionally organized crime subcultures having the closest relations with classical crime milieus. Or the internationally operating drug-trust or so-called "Cartels". Or the manyfold variations of transnational corporate crime where large firms from the legitimate business are more than superficially involved. Due to a lot of power elements and possibilities to directly interact with the state machinery they earn a high degree of law enforcement immunity and criminal impunity that makes it extremely difficult for detectives and other enforcers to get through the "shield of legality".

The evidence we got so far in many countries seems to indicate that our leading hypotheses will
largely stand falsification endeavors. Preventability is at odds due to an intricate complex of
- minimal accessibility,
- maximal economic (and not just personal) dynamics,
- extreme similarity with legal/legitimate market methods and customs.

The problem of controlling the so-called money laundering aptly shows that the "underworld" has got a remarkable number of "upperworld" allies claiming that their business will become endangered by improved law enforcement methods viz. possibilities, eventually leading to disastrous consequences for the whole economy. Special police forces or squads nevertheless will have their tasks also in the future to contain those modern crimes.

6. Policing the community
After tackling some modern forms of crime one can turn back again to traditional crime since I guess that those "classical offenses" will by no means drastically diminish lest fade away in the near future. Theft, breaking and entering, wounding, robbery, insulting, rape, homicide and other offenses already dealt with in the archaic holy books are important "everyday common offenses" centrally contributing to citizens' feelings of concern, fear, and frustration. This is why they actually do and also in the future will constantly require the bulk of rank and file officers work in "clearing" or "solving" crimes. They hitherto and surely also during the next decades belong, due to their contextual peculiarities, to the other central police task of keeping peace and order in the community.

Since the whole Heidelberg symposium will deal intensively and extensively with that matter I shall restrain myself here to point at the concepts that are nowadays being discussed worldwide and are surely worthwhile to be researched in further detail during the coming decade:
- the promise of crime analysis as contextual scheme,
- the promise of situational crime prevention,
- the promise of new geographic/ecological analyses like the "hot spot" concept,
- the promise of a person centered instead of an incident-based approach in police intelligence work,
- the complex of community policing as integrating - inter alia - the following components:
  * taking citizens' perceptions and concerns serious
  * reducing fear of crime by caring also for incivilities
  * activating other local authorities
  * activating citizen organizations and self help
  * avoiding pure impression management.

If we take all this into consideration we can conclude: Crime Prevention is related to all dimensions of State and society. It can not be successfully conceived of by concentrating uniquely on one artificially separated aspect. The most simplistic procedure would be to trust in the technocratic solution alone. The most dangerous concept is that of a "war on crime" since a war needs a distinct and discernable enemy (from without). But many fundamental crime (causation) problems are nothing but the other side of the coin i.e. the (partly inevitable) by-product of the basic structures of the given State and society, in particular of the condition and the developmental stage of the whole socio-economic field. Prevention, analyzed from this perspective, may help to monitor and carefully moderate unwanted consequences of planned results or accepted side-benefits. The police could, apart from their rather restricted genuine field of activity, to a wide extent serve as "detectors" of problems due to their daily contact with many parts of the population. Those problems could and should actively and publicly (if not sometimes drastically) be delegated or transferred to other actors in State and society that are nearer to the sources of pri-
mary socialization, mutual exchange, and informal social control.

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Community Policing: A Model for Local Governments
Heike Gramckow and Joan Jacoby

1. Background

In the early 1980's, the outlines of a new direction for policing, know as "community policing", began to emerge and take root throughout the United States and many other countries, such as Germany, New Zealand, Great Britain, and, Canada. Since then interest in community policing has grown rapidly and police in many jurisdictions have developed and implemented some form of community policing. Many of its features were widely supported by the public and the media. Officers were freed to engage in proactive crime prevention (Skolnick and Bayley 1988). Police operations were more visible, increasing police accountability to the public (Kelling 1988). Operations were decentralized to meet the needs of various neighborhoods and constituencies. Citizens were encouraged to take more initiative in preventing crimes and became partners with police, improving relations between the police and the public.

Evidence from field experiments in Houston (Brown 1988), Newark (Kelling et al. 1981; Pate et al. 1986) and Baltimore (Pate and Annan 1989) tested the theory that closer ties between the police and the citizens of the community, especially in the form of door-to-door contact and foot patrols, raise levels of citizen satisfaction with police services, improve the quality of community life, and lower the levels of fear of crime. Other "problem oriented" policing programs have concentrated on controlling drug trafficking through intensive interaction with the community (Spelman and Eck 1987; Uchida et al 1992). The appealing idea of extensive community involvement or citizen input into policing decisions has been widely promoted by police and academics as today's approach to public policing (Goldstein 1987; Bayley and Skolnick 1986).

Although the goals of this new form of policing are accepted by many jurisdictions, their implementation has taken various forms and approaches. The term community policing has been used to describe programs that range from aggressive order maintenance, community crime prevention, problem-solving, and a host of police-community-relations strategies (Mastrofski 1992:23). For example, in Baltimore County, MD, a Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement program (COPE) was developed in 1982 to fight fear of crime by using a specially trained police unit to interact with the citizens (Taft 1986). In Newport News, VA, a Problem Oriented Policing program (POP) shifted the entire department to a style of policing that emphasizes problem-solving over the traditional reactive models (Eck and Spelman 1987).

The different approaches to community policing taken by these departments have generated a considerable body of descriptive literature reporting mixed results (Rosenbaum 1986; Green and Taylor 1988; Skogan 1990). The lack of consensus on what community oriented policing actually can achieve is due, in part, to the variety of forms community policing takes, and the different interpretations of what constitutes community policing. Because most jurisdictions have developed their own individual programs with varying goals, a final judgment about the value of community policing is hard to come by.

The first studies undertaken for existing programs provide some insight in how far community policing has come, and what it has been able to achieve so far. It is apparent that community policing is still quite often misunderstood and often in its infancy. Nevertheless, the popularity of these programs is increasing, and local governments contemplating community oriented policing or even thinking of extending it to other agencies can learn a lot from these experiences. They
provide some insight in the benefits of community policing and the struggles an agency has to go through when implementing a community oriented policing strategy.

2. What is Community Policing?
Community oriented policing is...
- A guiding philosophy - not a single, static program.
- A philosophy responsive to the needs of the community.
- A philosophy that guides the entire police department.
- A different type of professionalism in policing.

This question has not yet been answered satisfactorily, and probably never will. However, there are two basic activities that are common to all community policing programs: (1) they establish strong links between police and communities to coordinate law enforcement with other services affecting the neighborhood's quality of life; and (2) they increase the ability of law enforcement to identify, analyze, and respond to community problems in systematic ways.

How these activities are structured and implemented as a community policing program is difficult to describe. No single definition of a program exists that states policy and goals, identifies the procedures to be followed, and assigns staff and resources to implement them. Rather, there are a variety of ideological, programmatic, or pragmatic interpretations of the concept. Accordingly, the current development of community oriented policing, as the new reform model of urban policing, has taken many forms which follow very different policies. They can range from designated community specialists, special units within the department, such as community crime prevention units, special operations within the department that target specific areas for community policing or a total department philosophy that is applied citywide.

In Madison, Wisconsin, a department-wide, community policing effort is underway, initially concentrating on an experimental police district. A team management concept has been established to test the effect of decentralization in this experimental district that has storefront police stations and permanently assigned officers.

Police in Houston, Texas, use neighborhood storefronts and patrol-initiated community activities in an experimental police district.

In New York City, a long-range community policing effort has begun with a single model precinct.

In South Seattle a formal police-community partnership has proved successful and will be implemented citywide.

Newark, New Jersey, and Flint, Michigan, Edmonton, Alberta, and Oakland, California were among the first to initiate foot patrol programs to fight crime and reduce fear of crime.

In general a distinction has been made between problem oriented policing (POP) and community oriented policing (COP). COP generally has been associated with increased citizen participation in policing by giving them more voice and responsibility, a concept which results in the police reacting to the community demands. POP is identified with an active police force that identifies persistent problems and their underlying causes and finds solutions to these problems.

COP and POP actually define two ends of a single problem-oriented strategy that involves the community and police to different degrees. Making a distinction may be problematic, since both strategies might be needed to properly address a jurisdictions needs and problems. However, Police agencies have been cautioned against implementing both strategies at once to avoid overwhelming the agency (Mastrofski 1990).

The form and variation of community policing developed should fit the environment and the problems facing a jurisdiction. Nevertheless, caution should guide the development and implementation steps. Starting with one strategy in a well defined area is a wise decision as long as it
is the beginning of a long term process that will finally lead to a new way of policing for the whole force.
The forms and strategies community oriented policing uses will always vary among the different jurisdictions because community policing is not a single program but a policing philosophy that guides the whole department, that shapes the agency's organization, management, and work with the community and its "clients".

3. Why is Community Policing so popular?
Community policing is promising because it builds working relationships with citizens resulting in:
- improved delivery of police service
- improved police/community relations
- mutual resolution of identifiable problems

Many police agencies and local governments around the world have reached a critical point in their response to social unrest and crime. They can no longer adhere to traditional forms because the world is changing rapidly and quite often is in an upheaval (Inkster 1991). Large-scale migrations are bringing people of different races, cultures and languages into closer contact with each other, making enormous demands on their tolerance. Increasing numbers of immigrants from the Third World and Eastern Europe are moving to cities in affluent Western countries that already harbor the majority of that country's population along with most of its problems. At the same time many of these Western counties are faced with uncertain economies, overburdened social and public services, and declining educational standards. There are widening class divisions, more broken families, home- and hopelessness, growing anger among the disadvantaged, and a rise in violent crime.

The traditional delivery of police and public services, has frustrated citizens and officers alike. There exists a widespread assumption that police and other government agencies are too detached from the community's problems, that they are too remote and distant to be able to effectively impact on the problems the citizens experience. The same frustrations can also be found among police. Patrol officers and those who actually work face to face with the citizens on a daily basis often feel that their work is not given enough appreciation and respect.

A community oriented strategy broadens the definition of an agency's function. It includes order maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving, and provision of services, as well as other activities (Kelling and Moore 1988). Community oriented policing and government services seem to be a promising strategy to address the rapidly shifting needs in today's societies.

Community policing can better address problems and concerns of the community because it is a proactive, decentralized approach with strong commitment to crime prevention, reducing crime, disorder and fear of crime. By involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis, it leads to higher police visibility and long-term relationships between officers and the community which develop trust and cooperation among residents. It also requires a different police attitude.

These new ways of interaction establish a new agency image of helping instead of controlling. They change the perception of police, creating a more positive picture of police work and better acceptance by the community. The decentralization increases citizen support and shared responsibilities generally provide the officer with greater job satisfaction, also leading to better internal relationships.

4. What are the effects of Community Policing to date?
Effects of Community Policing:
- Initial increase in reported crimes
- Reduce fear of crime
- Increased citizen confidence and sense of empowerment
- Increased job satisfaction for police
- Decrease in targeted crimes

Because jurisdictions, programs and goals vary considerably it is difficult to make assumptions about the transferability of success to other jurisdictions. Nevertheless some encouraging results can be reported.

Community oriented policing yields different indicators of success. First, this type of policing creates the appearance that crime is rising. Because a large number of crimes is usually not reported to police, they are not entered into official statistics. Later, when a department begins to identify problems, citizens' reports of crimes that previously had seldom been reported increase. As citizen confidence in police grows additional requests for help will come (Guyot 1991). Victimization surveys may be used to discern actual crime trends.

Some researchers have concluded from foot patrol studies that this form of community policing can reduce fear of crime, increase citizen satisfaction, and even reduce crime itself (Police Foundation 1981; Pate and Skogan 1985; Trojanowicz 1982; Hornick et al. 1989. Reiss 1985). The police department in Newport News, VA. enlisted the cooperation of shelters for battered women, judges, mental health professionals, educators, ministers and newspaper editors to a Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Emergencies (PRIDE) program. A variety of police responses, such as referral to counseling, obtaining court orders for protection, and forcing spouses to undergo treatment instead of spending time in jail, were developed. The number of domestic murders dropped considerable under the program while during the same time other murder rates even increased (Guyot 1991).

Research and evaluation efforts currently funded by National Institute of Justice, should shed new light on these issues and produce a more complete body of knowledge about the internal program aspects of community policing. It even may be that in the end, evaluations find that the impact of community policing on crime is negligible and conclude that the success of community policing can (and should) be judged solely by the public's acceptance and satisfaction, and its belief that neighborhoods are made safer by this type of involvement.

5. What is needed to implement Community Policing?
Factors for Implementation:
- Department's vision of itself
- Goals and objectives
- Building community cooperation
- Decentralization of functions and decisions
- Participatory administration
- Accountability
- Training and recruitment programs
- Costs offset by other agencies

Because Community Policing is a philosophy and not a static program there really exists no manual that describes step by step how to implement community policing. However, there are certain points that need to be considered to ease the process of such a complex institutional change, and to overcome resistance and criticism.

The first step in moving toward community policing is developing a vision of where the agency should go. Based on the jurisdictions characteristics and needs goals and objectives for the future
should be identified. It has be understood that law continues to be the major legitimating basis of the police function, however, it does not direct police powers, rather it becomes one tool among others, such as community support and involvement.

Building community cooperation is not an easy task. Willingness and trust within the community does not happen over night but has to be earned. Enlisting the help of strong community leaders, and engaging existing community organizations, schools, churches and private business is essential.

Decentralization of decision-making is inherent in community policing. Involving the line officer in diagnosing and responding to community problems shifts operational and tactical decision-making to the lower levels of an organization. Also, to ensure effective use of local knowledge and close interaction with local communities, a geographically defined organization is needed. The creation of neighborhood police stations, such as storefronts or precinct stations, and the assignment of officers to beats are examples.

Community policing requires a different administrative style that is based on power-sharing and encourages officer initiative. However, it also has to develop different mechanisms to assure police accountability. A question often asked it what kind of police officer is needed for community oriented policing? Officer recruitment, training and socialization should concentrate on developing the officers' awareness that they are a part of the community, building pride in serving the community, revitalizing the tradition of broad services. Training should have a stronger emphasis on developing problem-solving skills, such as family crisis intervention. Special efforts in re-training will also be needed and new hires should reflect the ethnic diversity of the community. Officers who are creative problem solvers, have the ability to work in partnerships and possess the flexibility to apply non-traditional solutions to community problems are the type needed. The costs of community policing are another central issue. City governments and municipal officials are increasingly reluctant to appropriate more money for police services. If community policing is used only as an add-on to otherwise traditional police services, the increased costs will have to be justified by either increased citizen satisfaction or reduced crime; both of which are usually not easily achieved on a short-term basis. However, if community policing is approached as a guiding philosophy for the whole department, and is successful in attracting community support and assistance from other public and private service providers, most of the costs, both initial and long term can be avoided.

Introducing a community oriented strategy to policing requires fundamental changes in the organizations culture. This is bound to take considerable time especially because of the unusual strength of police cultures and their great resistance to change (Sparrow 1988). Like most other innovations, they need support from superior executives. Resistance to change can be expected, and circumvention techniques have to be developed. Front-end planning is required, and considerable training is needed to develop the problem-solving capability the officers need. All this takes time. Introducing community policing in Houston, for example, extended over a 5-year period, and it is unclear at this time if the intended changes have been achieved and are stable.

6. How does community policing affect the local government?
Community policing can
- Increase calls for services and change arrest patterns
- Increase the use of citations, misdemeanors and ordinance violations
- Change the nature, volume and priority of cases for prosecution
- Change the workload of civil, criminal, and municipal courts
- Increase use of fines, community services, and restitution
- Increase need for dispute resolution, diversion, treatment, and intermediate sanctions
- Increase the workload of regulatory agencies
- Shift priorities for other public services ranging from trash collection, to zoning, medical services and economic development

Despite all the interest in community policing, our vision has rarely extended beyond the organizational boundaries of police agencies to its interfaces with other local government agencies. Scant attention has been given to the examination of how the different forms of community policing and the changed emphasis from crime control to prevention and community services have affected the rest of the criminal justice system, civil courts and other city services, such as trash collection, street lights, public housing agencies, etc..

While some police chiefs and other agency heads have been at least skeptical about an innovation that decreases central power and exposes the individual officer to the influence of community groups with sometimes contradictory interests (Weisburg and Hardyman 1987), many prosecutors, public defenders and judges are intrigued by the benefits that community based law enforcement programs appear to present. Community policing provides them with an opportunity to strengthen public relations; to educate the public about areas of criminal justice largely unknown to them; and, to foster a closer working relationship between their agency, the police, local business communities, schools, and civic organizations. Nevertheless, it also requires adjustment of procedures and policies.

At this point, it is not possible to state whether or not there is an impact on other agencies due to community policing, where the impacts occur, and to what extent. Similarly, it is not possible to recommend strategies and tactics that should be considered or adopted by the courts and criminal justice agencies that will enhance the mission of community policing. A grant awarded by the National Institute of Justice to the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies to study the impact of community policing on other parts of the criminal justice system will help us understand some of these interrelationships.

Even if a jurisdiction starts the community oriented strategy within the limits of a police department, inevitably, other public agencies are effected by it. In Seattle for example, the Seattle Housing Authority worked closely with the police to evict tenants dealing in drugs. This soon increased resident manager involvement in controlling drug-related crime and in community cleanup programs. Other city agencies were also urged to solve community public safety problems such as poor lighting in the parks.

The publication, Footprints, from the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University provides brief reports about the activities in some jurisdictions which describe, or allude, to criminal justice system responses. For example, in one issue recognition was given to the "community courts" and the Brooklyn Community Prosecution Program established to support the goals of the city's New York Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) (McLanus, 1992). Of particular interest is the observation from the Executive Assistant to the District Attorney, Albert Teichman, who stated that without the cooperation of the judiciary, the Community Prosecution Program could topple. "We have to make sure that an Assistant DA in one trial zone won't be sent out by a judge to try a case in another trial zone. This would completely change the system" (McLanus, 1992:16).

Some insight into the rationale for decentralization is provided by prosecutors who claim that this type of organization provides more flexible case management; improved training opportunities for new attorneys and support staff; and a different sense of case "ownership" arising from belonging to and being a part of the community where they work. Adopting a decentralized, neighborhood sensitive, organization, gives them a better understanding of their own work and its impact on the environment in which they are working (Hynes 1992; Tumin 1990).

The philosophy that guides police departments in working with the community to raise the level
of citizen and community involvement in crime prevention activities to solve drug-related problems in neighborhoods and to enhance the level of community security can also lead prosecutors (Hynes 1992). Community oriented prosecution can be an innovative approach to the responsibilities of the District Attorney, not just a different way of handling more traditional prosecution functions. It can enhance the role of the prosecutor's office to better incorporate and coordinate new strategies such as expanding traditional law enforcement, participate or guide problem solving efforts in the community, and act as defender of community institutions (Tumin 1990).

Other criminal courts have also adopted a more proactive stance with respect to working with the community. Judge George Nicola's approach to Expedited Drug Case Management in Middlesex County, NJ, for example, relied heavily on the community's support and willingness to supervise probationers, monitor court-ordered activities, develop alternative responses to incarceration, provide education and job opportunities for convicted offenders (Jacoby et al. 1992).

City and county managers often embrace the concept of community policing as a means for providing better and more effective police services; gaining timely information about the needs for services; and, allocating resources more efficiently. By actively supporting these efforts, they are better able to communicate with the community, improve working relationships and supplement their resources through voluntary services to support city and county management, training workshops and newsletters about community policing have been developed by the International City and County Management Association (ICMA).

All these examples show how community policing influences other agencies or how they participated in these efforts. However, all this occurs at a time when government agencies are looking to develop similar strategies to improve planning for the future, streamline their services and to provide citizens with better access to improved services without overburdening their finances. Even though they do not label their own activities community oriented, they share many goals with community policing.

7. The future of Community Policing
The popularity of community policing is still growing. The incentive to adopt this approach in the US was recently boosted by the announcement of the Department of Justice's "Weed and Seed" initiative. Operating initially in 16 cities and 3 pilot sites, with an expansion in the planning stages, this strategy views community policing as the "bridge" between the two components of the program, weed and seed. Law enforcement agencies are expected to work closely with the residents of the community to develop solutions to the problems of violent and drug-related crime. After the weeding process, the police will work closely with social service agencies, the private sector and the community to prevent crime and violence from reoccurring.

Community policing has the potential to positively change officers' attitudes towards their work, to improve perceptions and attitudes in parts of the community, positively impact on fear of crime and reduce certain crime rates there is a lot of incentive for police agencies to develop similar strategies for their jurisdiction. Community policing also has the potential to improve government services in general, because it streamlines services to meet existing needs, and thereby may reduce costs as a result, this strategy is bound to find advocates in many government agencies. These strategies place police priority on providing public service to the people; they develop natural partners in democratic societies.

If community policing is approached cautiously, well planned, based on a comprehensive on-going needs assessment, and the establishment of multi-agency, public, private and business partnerships that are linked to an on-going evaluation and monitoring process few arguments speak against this concept of public services for the future, except the most powerful one - tradition.
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General Overview: Community Policing


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Community Policing as Communications Policing

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1. Introduction

In this paper we argue that community policing is best understood as the policing of communications about risk and security in late modern society. We initially criticize research that constructs a binary opposition between the rhetoric and reality of community policing. We take the view that community policing models do not represent pre-existing realities or interests, but rather constitute realities and interests. Community policing models not only inform but form police practices. Rhetoric and practices are entwined, and they must be analyzed as such in order to appreciate the directions in which the police are moving.

We proceed by defining community in terms of the ways in which people communicate. In early modern and modern societies, community involved communications that included sharing, tradition, quality face-to-face relationships, and local organization with a sense of immediacy and direct results. Late modern society consists of institutions organized in relation to fear, risk assessment and the provision of security. These institutions - for example, insurance companies, social security agencies, and regulatory agencies - refigure the community into communications about risk in every conceivable aspect of life. Indeed, late modern society has become a risk society. Communications about risk have the opposite qualities to those enumerated above. For example, they involve relationships that are not face-to-face, but rather are between absent others connected by electronic media that transmit and record their transactions impersonally. These transactions offer no sense of immediacy or direct action, nor are they tied to a given place. Community becomes constituted by institutional methodologies for communicating risk management and security provision.

The community policing model rationalizes the changed roles of the police in late modern society. It is in the context of being part of the communications circuitry of other security institutions that community policing turns out to be communications policing. Community policing is a discourse for finding ways to improve connections with the communications circuitry of other security institutions: to respond to their knowledge needs routinely, to provide them with expert advice, and to help them manage their security arrangements. Responsibility for crime is shifted to other institutions. At the same time police responsibility to help these other institutions broadens to include many risks and security responses in addition to crime and its regulation. Constituted as problem-solvers, the police become professional diagnosticians of every security problem imaginable, and provide treatment directly or through referral to specialists in other security institutions. They also develop ongoing managerial relationships with other institutions to help them assess and distribute their risks more ably.

In giving up some responsibilities for crime and taking on other responsibilities for risk assessment and security provision, the police are placed at the fulcrum of the communications network. From this position they participate actively in the making of communities. They help to make communities by, for example, participating in the construction of public issues and suitable enemies; proactively mobilizing others to address those issues the police themselves have constructed; and, representing themselves as a model organization through sophisticated publicity.
campaigns and architectural forms. We conclude by suggesting that while community policing discourse is ongoing, it articulates late modern developments that are a fait accompli. Community policing is an effort to mediate and appropriate what has occurred and to adjust police organization accordingly. A number of likely developments are pointed to. As knowledge demands proliferate, the police acquire more communications technologies, which only increases their accessibility and enhances the demand for knowledge in an amplifying spiral. Hence, the police not only fail to divest themselves of some of their "modern" technological trappings, they are driven by technology to an even greater degree. Community policing is increasingly associated with various forms of inequality and conflict: among groups and institutions with varying influence over their programmes; in fostering private policing options that some can afford more than others; and, in supporting insurance schemes that favour some over others. While the police are becoming more accessible for knowledge relevant to myriad forms of risk assessment and security provision, they are also becoming less accessible in terms of responsibility for individual decisions. Community policing defuses accountability into the communications circuitry of security institutions, and it is therefore increasingly difficult to attribute responsibility for decisions in a given case. Communications policing is the result.

2. Community Policing
Modern social institutions require models for organizing and reforming their activities. These models are never static. They change in accordance with the mentalities and sensibilities of an institution's culture as it interacts with other cultures.

The police institution has been modelled in terms of militarism (order maintenance), legalism (law officers), professionalism (public servants) and communitarianism (community agents). The prevailing model is communitarianism, which includes the admonition that the police should no longer be militaristic, legalistic or professional in the "old" ("modern") bureaucratic style. Rather, the police should be agents of consensus - making communities cooperative and bearers of a sense of tradition - through close working relationships with community members that help them to provide for their own security.

Critical analysts typically read the models of social institutions as ideologies and forms of rhetoric that are separate from reality. As ideologies and rhetoric, models conceal what is really going on. They thereby help to legitimate practices that are in some way unpalatable or offensive to the mentalities and sensibilities of constituents.

Analysts have repeatedly read community policing in these terms. For example, a recent book on the subject is titled Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality (Greene and Mastrofski 1988), as if rhetoric and reality are mutually exclusive or in binary opposition. Contributors to this collection make claims that community policing is more rhetoric than reality (Bayley 1988), that it is yet another example of "police strategies aimed at shaping and manipulating public opinion" (Manning 1988, 40), and that it is "an important new source of institutional legitimation" (Murphy 1988a, 179).

Many critical analysts believe that the community policing model mystifies or covers up police use of coercive force, which they regard as the essence of policing. For example, Waddington asserts that "Community policing is a romantic delusion, not for the 'world we have lost', but for one we never had. It harks back to a harmonious idyll, where the police were everyone's friend. It was never thus, and it is unlikely that it ever will be" (Waddington 1984, 95; see also Klockars 1988; Mastrofski 1988). Waddington then asserts his belief that the police exist to contain violence and the potential for violence in society. He adds that the police therefore need the
authority to intervene with force in emergencies and models such as community policing help to give them that authority. Similarly Klockars (1988) regards community policing as an ideology of "concealment and circumlocution." Following Bittner (1970), Klockars sees the essence of policing in state monopoly on legitimate use of force within a political territory. Thus Klockars explains the fall of previous models - militarism, legalism and professionalism - in terms of their inability to make more palatable the fact that the police are essentially there to be violent when necessary. Since Klockars only sees models as efforts to cover the "when necessary" legitimation of police violence, "community policing' is best understood as the latest in a fairly long tradition of circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate police distribution of nonnegotiable coercive force" (Klockars 1988, 240).

Such analyses do not address the ways in which truths are mobilized rhetorically to constitute political realities of community, crime and control. Instead of analyzing community policing as rhetoric or reality, rhetoric and reality should be seen as mutually constitutive components in processes of political representation (Gusfield 1981, 1989). That is, community policing is a discourse: the institutional communication of meaning via speech, writing, significant objects and signifying practices (Macdonnel 1986; Valverde 1990, 1991). Community policing discourse does not merely represent pre-linguistic realities, nor does it serve prediscursive interests of any institution in a simple way. As a mediating practice, community policing is constitutive of realities and interests. It is entwined with the social, cultural and spatial relations that provide the context for how the police think, feel, speak, write, dress, design their police stations, mobilize and so on. Thus community police actions and things in their environment are simultaneously real, interested and linguistic, "elements of a discourse that...transcends and makes redundant the usual distinction between language and reality" (Valverde 1990, 71), and between knowledge and ideology (Foucault 1980, esp 118).

As a discourse, community policing organizes and channels thought and action at every level, from official statements of police policy to everyday practices on the street. Community policing is not only an expression of preferred values but a way of embedding them in practice. As Giddens (1991, 150) observes, "appeals to traditional symbols or practices can themselves be reflexively organized and are then part of an internally referential set of social relations rather than standing opposed to it".

Returning to Klockars (1988), it is evident that his separation of ideology and practice blinds him to the politics of truth in policing. For example, Klockars fails to appreciate that police efforts to monopolize force are enmeshed with the various models of policing and the mechanisms they urge. The monopolization of force is an achievement of bureaucracy and its mechanisms of militarism, legalism, professionalism and accountability to the community (Dandeker 1990, 66; Giddens 1990, 59). The police, like the state itself, have no essence. They are coercive, militaristic, legalistic, professional, community-oriented, and much more. These various models not only inform but form police practices.

Academic writing on community policing reveals that it is a discourse as defined above. Consider the following statement by Trojanowicz and Carter (1988). On the one hand they emphasize that community policing is a philosophy or sensibility rather than a specific tactic or practice. On the other hand, as they proceed to articulate the community policing philosophy, they do so in the language of strategic practices and tactical manoeuvres.

A philosophy and not a specific tactic, community policing is a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and, by extension, fear of crime, by intensely involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis, so that residents will develop trust to cooperate with police by providing information and assistance to achieve three crucial goals. Community policing employs a variety of tactics
ranging from park and walk to foot patrol, to immerse the officer in the community, to encourage a two-way information flow so that the residents become the officer's eyes and ears on the streets helping to set departmental priorities and policies. In addition, the officer then carries this information back to the rest of the department so that problems can be solved and the quality of life improved...The community policing officer acts as a uniformed armed presence to deter crime, but equally as important, he or she also takes action with citizen assistance to resolve problems before they erupt as crime (ibid, 17).

In subsequent sections of this paper we analyze how the narratives and practices of community policing are entwined with narratives on the police and crime generally. We are not arguing that the discourse does not conceal and legitimate relations of domination, and therefore fails to function as ideology. It does do these things, but it also accomplishes much more. It does not simply uphold pre-ordained privileged interests, but constitutes a range of interests in myriad ways. Furthermore, we are not claiming that the discourse of community policing does not function as rhetoric. Community policing has rhetorical features and forces, but only in the context of the objects and practices of policing. To paraphrase Valverde (1990, 67), rhetoric, which studies how different images and meanings are juxtaposed and organized, organizes police and community relations as well as spoken and written sentences.

3. Community as Communications
Community policing has come to the forefront during a period when communities themselves are being transformed. With communities undergoing basic change, the discourses of major social institutions, including the police, also change to articulate with and contribute to what is happening. While the details of this process are addressed in the next section, it is important to provide an overview of what is happening to experiences and conceptions of community in late modern society.

The ideal of community is based on conceptions of how people interact and communicate. Traditionally, community is communications that involve sharing (communion) among people who hold things in common and have a sense of common identities and traditions (communitas). Community is communications that foster quality human relationships, especially ongoing face-to-face communications that are of special significance and express commitment. Community is communications that occur in a particular locality, and that offer a sense of immediacy and empowerment to take direct action over matters of immediate concern. Community is communications that make people feel a part of things through positive empathy rather than negative fears. Community is communications that offer "boosterism". Community expresses positive sentiments about collective outcomes. It is an "hurrah word" (Bay 1981) that is used to celebrate certain forms of organization. "Unlike all other terms of social organization (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems never to be used unfavorably, and never to be given any positive or opposing distinguishing term" (Williams 1983, 76).

Writers such as Waddington (1984), Klockars (1988) and Mastrofski (1988) are correct in their observation that most community policing literature conceives the community in these terms. We can add that the community policing literature treats community interests as natural, objective and prediscursive, not as an historical manifestation of institutional intervention. Furthermore, the literature fails to problematize communications, except in terms of giving a voice to consumers of security products so that their perceptions of risk can be made part of the calculations of how the police will approach their task environment (e.g. Winkel 1991). Community in late modern society is different. It is constituted by bureaucratic institutions and
their communications media. These institutions and media fundamentally transform community as communications that involve sharing, tradition, quality human relationships, and local spatial arrangements.

Late modern institutions are increasingly organized in terms of fear, risk assessment and the provision of security. Security is multifaceted and includes for example security of territory (e.g. safe streets, secure premises), of the environment (e.g. healthy natural environment, safe products), of life course (e.g. social security, private insurance), and of identities (e.g. protection of national and ethnic identities in multicultural societies). Late modern institutions are so driven by the production and distribution of knowledge for risk assessment and security provision that it has become reasonable to suggest that they constitute a "risk society" (Beck 1992a, 1992b; Giddens 1990, 1991). "The concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both lay actors and technical specialists organize the world...the future is continually drawn into the present by means of reflexive organization of knowledge environments" (Giddens 1991, 3). Resources are increasingly expended on risk and security expertise, so that there are "large tracts of security in daily activity purchased by abstract systems" (ibid, 114) and "the intrusion of abstract systems into day-to-day life, coupled with the dynamic nature of knowledge, means that awareness of risks seeps into the actions of almost everyone" (ibid, 112). With risk and security as the dominant cultural template, the risk society envisages itself as a vast system of insurance (Ewald 1991, 210), a "generalizable technology for rationalizing societies" (Defert 1991, 215) and selves in everyday life.

To be driven by risk is to be driven by both emotional (sensibilities) and cognitive (mentalities) knowledge. The risk society is therefore a surveillance society, where surveillance is conceived not in terms of "undercover" and "spy" connotations (Marx 1988), but rather as the routine production of knowledge about (monitoring), and supervision of (compliance), subject populations. The growth in surveillance is linked to key features of modernity (Giddens 1985, 1990, 1991; Dandeker 1990). Surveillance has grown in the context of the state's power needs, especially the need for centralized control of the means of violence (police and modern bureaucracies); and, the need for social administration regarding the distribution of goods and services (e.g. corporate and financial market regulation) and the well being of populations (e.g. health, welfare and education bureaucracies).

While surveillance grows with the bureaucracies of policing and social administration, and with the increased volume and complexity of their administrative tasks, it also proliferates because of advances in communication media. "The age of bureaucracy is also the era of the information society" (Dandeker 1990, 2) in which "the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge" (Foucault 1977, 217). Communications media become "informers" (Marx 1988, 208ff), allowing surveillance to transcend physical barriers and time and therefore to be more intensive and extensive; to operate invisibly while providing visibility; and, to foster subjects' participation in their own monitoring (self-policing), sometimes involuntarily.

Surveillance also grows with the growth in and reliance on professional experts, and the increased division of knowledge and labour among professions. Professions are driven to carve out new specializations, to commodify their expertise in mass marketed products, and to refine mechanisms of self-regulation, all of which foster more surveillance within and among professional groups (Abbott 1988).

The components of modernity specified above also yield greater demands for rights. These demands are expressed in terms of myriad identities created by bureaucratic mechanisms (Dandeker 1990; Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991). That is, it is bureaucracies devoted to particular population categories - to the poor, the old, the young, the uneducated, the homeless, the men-
tally handicapped, the physically handicapped - that not only construct the particular population as worthy of assistance but also champion legal protections to "guarantee" their security. Formal legal rationality spirals, and in turn creates a demand for more surveillance.

The components of modernity specified also create greater opportunity for deception and foster distrust. Distrust is then another source of growth in surveillance. Surveillance technologies proliferate in the workplace (Marx 1988), entertainment place (Shearing and Stenning 1984; Van Maanen 1991a, 1991b), marketplace (Reiss 1984) and at home (Wilson 1988). Distrust becomes an endemic feature of societies built on risk management (Short 1990; Stehr and Ericson 1992). The late modern community is constituted by bureaucratic security institutions and their surveillance media. The modern community was traditionally distinct from relationships of society and its institutions. Now late modern security institutions constitute, absorb and even extinguish traditional communities. Indeed the more security institutions, including law and police, the less community as conceived traditionally (Black 1976).

Community as sharing and tradition recedes "the more thoroughly reflexivity, coupled to expert systems, penetrates the core of everyday life" (Giddens 1991, 206-207). Community as quality, committed, trusting, face-to-face relationships gives way to community as relationships between absent others connected by electronic media that record and transmit their transactions impersonally. Community as a locality where things take place with a sense of immediacy and direct action gives way to a community of institutions that cease to offer an affinity of place. Transactions mediated by institutional technologies offer no sense of immediacy and direct action, only the routine production of knowledge for instrumental transactions and risk assessment. Experiencing transactions based on interests and having "no sense of place" (Meyrowitz 1985), community members have less to celebrate and community boosterism rings hollow. That is, it is recognized by everyone as sheer boosterism, as effusing praise for a sharing, traditional, committed, local community that does not fit with the everyday experience of a community of bureaucratic security institutions that lack reciprocity, tradition, and commitment to local communities.

In the risk society "community" becomes reconstituted as an approach to risk management and security provision dictated by dominant institutions. "Community" solutions are not peculiar to police or criminal justice, they are everywhere. The "community solution...is...a specialized regime of environmental intervention designed to contain high local concentrations of risk" (Gordon 1991, 46). The direct tasks of risk assessment and security provision are left to the "community" institutions with a stake in the matter, while state agencies increasingly avoid confrontation by posing as "advisors, resource persons and friends" (Lasch 1980, 182). There is a decentralization of state security operations, resulting in "a pluralization of the centre, enabling the problems of the state to rebound back on to society, so that society is implicated in the task of resolving them, where previously the state was expected to hand down an answer for society's needs" (Donzelot 1991, 178). State legal and scientific expertise become mechanisms for deciding how to delegate matters in dispute and to distribute risks in a just manner.

The police are constituted as community agents in these terms: that is, as knowledge brokers, experts and risk managers on behalf of other security institutions. The police are communicators within a society constituted by communications circuitry among security institutions. Community policing seeks to rationalize this changed role for police in late modern society. Community policing turns out to be communications policing among security institutions.

4. Communications Policing
4.1. Communicating Security

An institution and its professional members have weak claims to jurisdiction over a problem if they are inefficient, or if their work is difficult to measure in efficiency terms (Abbott 1988, 45-
In face of inadequate efficiency criteria, inadequate data on efficiency, and data suggesting their inefficiency, the police have been giving up some jurisdiction over crime control. Hence community policing models include a declared shift in responsibility for crime control to other organizations and institutions. Crime is no longer police property (Christie 1977), but "the joint property of the community as 'client' as well as the local agency delivering public security services.

Underlying this partnership principle is the core assumption that the level of crime, disorder and fearfulness in a community is closely related to the level of public participation in policing" (Leighton 1991, 487; see also Skolnick and Bayley 1988, 4-5).

Crime is to be diverted into other institutional mechanisms of control and resolution (Clarke 1987, 387) or, better still, handled in the first instance within other institutions so that the police are no more than "a catalyst, involving people in efforts to police themselves" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, 16). The process involved is documented in O'Malley's (1991) analysis of how the Australian police are involved with the insurance industry through neighborhood watch schemes. Mainly funded by the insurance industry, neighborhood watch schemes are distribution centres for security lessons and technologies, and for the selling of insurance. They allow the simultaneous promotion of insurance and of the police as partners in security.

Not only does neighborhood watch proselytize the conception of security in which insurance is embedded, but the promotional material, literature, warning signs and advertising of the program are everywhere and always carried out under the sponsoring insurance company's logo. Thus, because the insurers and the state police are incorporated as co-promoters, the program offers priceless attractions for insurers, for police distribution of neighborhood watch brochures and related material involves them in distributing advertising material at the same time as presenting an authoritative identification of the burglary problem as immediate and massive... By identifying crime with a direct threat to the mass of householders, by bringing this threat down to the local level through the presentation of local statistics, news and illustrations of crime, and by creating at least the illusion of popular participation at the local level, neighborhood watch has re-established a police presence in the communal void left by the withdrawal of the beat police officer... The police forces' alliance with the insurance industry in this project, especially (but not only) in promoting neighborhood watch, has greatly strengthened tendencies toward "community" policing practices. The insurance companies, in their turn, have moved themselves into a prominent place in law and order politics and practices, and into overt alliance with the police (ibid, 182, 184-5, 186).

This shift in the locus of responsibility for crime represents nothing new. Community policing discourse accounts for the ways in which the police have always dealt with crime. Victimization surveys and studies of corporate crime instruct that the vast majority of crime is handled exclusively within other institutions without calling the police. Police decision-making studies have documented that even when the police are called, as often as not they decide to deal with crime through mechanisms other than the criminal law institution (Ericson 1982). Moreover, not much of a police officer's time is taken up by officially-processed crime in any case. In Canada a police officer on average records one indictable crime occurrence a week, makes one indictable crime arrest every three weeks and secures one indictable crime conviction every nine months (McMahon 1992). Even in New York City, which has an extraordinarily high crime rate, officers spend an extraordinarily low proportion of their time dealing with crime and capturing criminals. Walsh (1986) found that among 156 patrol officers assigned to a high crime area in New York, 40% did not make a single felony arrest in a year, and 69% made no more than three felony ar-
rests in a year.

Community policing replaces an emphasis on crime with an emphasis on communicating security among other institutions. The police-as-communicators are to function as knowledge brokers, security advisors, and risk managers in collaboration with other social institutions. "Community-based policing thus recognizes that the purpose of policing is more than law enforcement and crime control, but that the police also have a mandate to maintain social order, security, peace and good government. Anything that threatens these objectives, whether it is a criminal or more general problem area, is a legitimate police problem" (Murphy and Muir 1985, 85).

This broad remit for security in all of its manifestations and institutional forms is inscribed in the recently revised police act in Ontario, which opens with the principles of "The need to ensure the safety and security of all persons and property in Ontario" and "The need for co-operation between the providers of police services and the communities they serve" (Ontario, 1990). A Canadian federal government document stresses that community policing entails "a fundamental re-orientation from a narrow focus on crime-fighting through rapid response (after-the-fact reactive), to a broad focus on community security and protection through joint-problem solving and collaboration (before-the-fact-proactive policing)" (Solicitor General 1991, 13). Reactive policing is thereby reconstituted at the institutional level, with the police responding to and in turn shaping the knowledge requirements of other institutions in order to assist these institutions in providing security to the special populations for whom they are responsible. Proactive policing is reconstituted as "promoting security" wherever and whenever possible (Sparrow 1988, 1).

In this context, accounts of community policing give particular emphasis to the role of the police as information workers on behalf of others. A summary of the community foot patrol officer's duties in Flint, Michigan is illustrative:

- analyzing the neighborhood crime patterns and reporting the actual crime problems confronting individuals who live in target areas
- conduct public education programs
- confer with residents and businesses regarding problems relative to the police department, city government, and the criminal justice and governmental agencies
- gather and contribute helpful information to the Flint Police Department concerning social problems
- maintain a high degree of contact with the existing citizen action groups operating within the neighborhoods and involving them in planning, designing, and evaluating neighborhood crime prevention programs
- patrol streets to strengthen lines of communication
- attend neighborhood block clubs and services as a resource person
- attend School Advisory Council meetings
- inspect residential and business premises and make recommendations to improve physical security
- prepare written crime prevention material for community newsletters (Trojanowicz et al. 1982, 21-2; see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1992; Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Farrell 1988, esp 79).

Again this shift in focus to the police as knowledge workers and expert advisors on security represents nothing new. In face of the varieties of security work they perform, and their lack of involvement in the solution of most crimes, the police have always served as counsellors and advisors on security. A quarter of a century ago, Cumming, Cumming and Edell (1965) found that one-half of all calls to the police addressed personal problems, another one-third addressed problems of property risk such as automobile accidents, and that the typical police response was some combination of referral to other agencies, advice and "cooling out" complainants (See also Punch 1979, Ericson 1982). In a secondary analysis of British Crime Survey data, Skogan (1990b, 9) reports that the activity occupying most police time with citizens is the exchange of information: either citizens giving police non-crime related information (16%) or asking police for information (23%). Reporting crime accounted for only 18% of reasons for contacting the
police. Murphy's (1988b, 407) study of a community policing initiative in Toronto discovered that what was accomplished was continuous with what the police were already engaged in: "Evidence that the Toronto police force already allocates police resources on the basis of citizen demand and that police officers are aware of significant neighborhood policing problems and concerns indicates that even conventional policing is, to some extent, citizen- and community-based."

What community policing does articulate is the changing police role in late modern society. Community policing is a story of changing social institutions and social relations, in which communications with particular types of institutions - for example, church, local political machine, local ethnic organization - are giving way to communications with security institutions driven by the need for knowledge that will help them construct problems, assess risks, and manage the special populations they are responsible for. As Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, 20) recognize, "the foot patrol officer of the past had a different environmental context and different informal resources like the extended family, churches and ethnic organizations. Present community policing officers must rely on formal private and public agencies. Thus the need to be a neighborhood diagnostician and link to community agencies." It is the relation to formal private and public agencies that is changing the nature of police knowledge work in the areas of knowledge brokerage, security advice, and security management.

4.2. Knowledge Brokers
External institutions place enormous demands for knowledge on the police. Police organizations are therefore "knowledge intensive". For example the Toronto police department works with a total of 350 different operational forms, while the Royal Canadian Mounted police use approximately 2,000 different operational forms! When the police decide to take formal action, the bulk of their time is devoted to reporting the matter in the forms and formats of other institutions. Shadgeett (1990) describes a patrol officer's investigation of an automobile accident and impaired driving charge. The officer was required to spend three hours filling out 16 different forms in relation to this investigation, thereby serving the knowledge needs of police, court, motor vehicle compliance, health and insurance bureaucracies. Police detectives are also first and foremost knowledge brokers, since they spend most of their time working within the established formats and forms of bureaucratic "paper" (Ericson 1981; Manning 1988, 41; Miyazawa 1992).

This knowledge brokerage function on behalf of other institutions is de-skilled work. That is, the police officer is placed in the position of having to think, act and report within criteria framed by the expert systems of other institutions (Altheide 1985, 224, 245-47; Ericson, forthcoming). The sensibility of this work is captured in Skolnick and Bayley's (1986, 125) description of policing in Denver:

The occupational world of the police officer is that of the hourly worker rather than of self-directing professionals.... They live in a tightly supervised, formalistic environment. They are constantly checking what they do against set rules. Perhaps the most telling item of equipment patrol officers carry is a small bottle of "white-out," which is used for correcting errors in the reports they write, fitting them exactly to the form demanded by the department. "Who's got the white-out?" is heard more often in patrol circles than, "Let's be careful out there."

As we show in the next section, community policing enhances the professionalism of the police by constituting them as problem-solvers and expert advisors using abstract knowledge of security. However, community policing also addresses the fact that the routinized knowledge demands of other security institutions will continue to occupy a great deal of police time. For ex-
ample, in a major policy document on community policing in Canada, Normandeau and Leighton (1990, 45) state that "much of the success of policing depends on how well its personnel operate as information managers who engage in "interactive policing" by routinely exchanging information on a reciprocal basis with the community members through formal contacts and informal networks". The community policing response to the external demand for routine knowledge is to embrace communication technologies that will hopefully prevent the occupation of knowledge brokerage from becoming a preoccupation (see especially Sparrow 1991). "Community policing is not antitechnology... The community policing officer is like the base of a funnel, using information filtered down from various "hi-tech" sources and providing information upward generated from his/her neighborhood beat" (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, 20).

The introduction of computer technologies to ease the paper burden intensifies the tight formatting of the work and de-skills it even more. The more routinized the work becomes the greater the tendency to treat it as peripheral to community policing as problem-solving by professional police officers. Thus community police discourse stresses the need to turn over some knowledge brokerage functions to para-professionals or clerks. For example, an operational manual on community policing prepared by the Ontario Solicitor General (1992) for police departments in the province advises that the police should adopt problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 1990) and be less concerned about individual occurrences. Toward that end, police departments must not only institutionalize ways of becoming expert advisors on security to other institutions, they must at the same time develop differential response to occurrences. Differential response includes trying to avoid response to every call for service immediately by prioritizing calls; scheduling appointments; handling reports over the telephone using clerks; making immediate referrals to other agencies; requiring complainants to mail in reports; and deciding not to respond at all.

4.3. Security Experts
Community policing recognizes the police as experts, counsellors and advisors on security to other institutions. In Canada in particular, there is a tradition of deference to authority and belief in the strong state (Friedenberg 1980), and this translates into deference to the police as experts on security. As Forcese (1992, 63) observes, "Canadians have tended to delegate unqualified responsibility to police as experts, as they have to other occupational sectors such as teachers, professors and physicians, without attempting to comprehend the full nature of this role".

Community policing constitutes the police as professional experts because they possess abstract knowledge about security that is valuable to others. Professions are somewhat "exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases" (Abbott 1988, 8). Professions define themselves and their legitimate jurisdiction in terms of control of abstract knowledge, and of the practical technologies and techniques abstract knowledge generates. Abstraction allows ongoing redefinition and defence of problems and tasks, and the securing of new tasks. "The organizational formalities of professions are meaningless unless we understand their context. The context always relates back to the power of the professions' knowledge systems, their abstracting ability to define old problems in new ways. Abstraction enables survival (ibid, 30)".

Community policing understands the broad remit of the police to engage in the professional work of diagnosis, treatment and inference (ibid, chap 2). This is exemplified in "problem-oriented policing," which has the police focusing on underlying causes of problems in their diagnosis and treatment; and, stresses cooperation with other professions and institutions as sources of expertise and as collaborators in finding solutions (Eck and Spelman 1987; Trojanowicz and Carter 1988; Goldstein 1990; Toch and Grant 1991). The diagnostic remit is wide indeed, covering no less than "poverty, unemployment, poor education and work skills, inadequate housing, poor
health and other underlying causes of crime" (Leighton 1991, 494-5). The treatment mandate is therefore also expansive, covering, for example, police participation in urban planning, environmental design, compliance of social service agencies, and lobbying for changes to legislation (Goldstein 1990).

Part of the treatment mandate of community policing professionals is to serve as clinician-like counsellors about security. Following the "broken windows" thesis (Wilson and Kelling 1982), the particular focus is on creating a sensibility of security by reducing fear of threats or dangers regardless of the epidemiology of threatening incidents (Clarke 1987; Moore, Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988; Skogan 1990b). Community policing professionals are akin to clinical psychologists, who help people to alter their spoiled individual identities and to renew their commitment to the institutional routines of daily life (Abbott 1988; Giddens 1991; Bauman 1992). The police as clinicians do the same thing with spoiled collective identities. As Moore, Trojanowicz and Kelling (1988, 4) observe pithily, "the police operate on the surface of social life." This includes counselling about community identity problems and how to provide ontological security through making things appear better. "Though the logic sounds convoluted, community policing's impact on fear of crime may also be more important in making people feel safe than would any police effort that targets crime directly... Community Policing's ability to reduce the disorder that makes neighborhoods inviting targets for crime not only offers the hope of making these places safe but it also makes these people feel safer, which is equally important in enhancing their overall quality of life" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, 158-159).

This effort to commodify a secure lifestyle extends to the community police professional's role as an advisor on security products. "The recommendations range from home target hardening (locks, strengthening doors etc.) to street and business design" (Moore, Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988, 10). Within this range there is also, for example, regular advice communicated via the mass media, at schools, and at community meetings on the best time and place for activities, and on what to wear and how to appear (Voumvakis and Ericson 1984). In giving such advice the community police professional becomes a key endorser and promoter of security products in a society absorbed by the commodification of security (Spitzer 1987; O'Malley 1991).

Clearly the community police officer as expert, counsellor and advisor is more professional than ever. Analogies to the medical profession abound. "The police officer is to government as the general practitioner is to the entire medical establishment" (Goldstein 1990, 106; see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, esp 35-8). The medical professional analogy is especially apt because the medical general practitioner is like the police officer in being constituted by expert systems of external institutions. While these systems de-skill many aspects of the professional's work, they are also reliant upon his or her diagnostic, treatment and abstraction capabilities (Ericson, forthcoming; Castel 1991). Moreover, if the police, like the doctor, simply emphasize what they do for their clients, their professionalism is taken for granted and the "professional" model is not required as ideology.

Community policing also enhances police professionalism by fostering communications and alliances among professions. Civilianization is encouraged (Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Leighton 1991), which entails hiring people from various professions for specialist positions without requiring them to have prior police training or experience. These professionals - lawyers, computer experts, behavioural consultants, public relations specialists, etc. - not only heighten the professional ethos internally, they foster professional alliances externally. Police officers with higher degrees are also being recruited, and officers in-service are encouraged to qualify as professionals in various fields, which again encourages outside professional affinities and alliances.

4.4. Security Managers
A third major component of communications policing is police participation in the management of security arrangements of others. Expertise and advice are not just given on a demand basis or in response to a particular instance of victimization, they are also engrained in ongoing relationships similar to those that exist between regulatory agencies and organizations from whom they seek compliance (e.g. Hawkins 1984; Friedland 1990). In keeping with other compliance law enforcers the police promote and manage self-regulation and self-security among organizations by helping them to develop their own expertise and surveillance technologies to police themselves (Reiss 1984, 34; Braithwaite and Fisse 1987). In problem-solving policing (eg Goldstein 1990, 115-119) the police participate in community organizations and institutions to help them solve their own problems; to elicit conformity with laws and regulations that are not comprehended adequately; to warn about vulnerability to victimization and help enhance security; to demonstrate how people unwittingly contribute to their own security problems; to mobilize other agencies in addressing a problem; and, to work out the division of labour between the police and other security agencies.

Community police operatives are involved in three inter-related aspects of compliance. First, they are complaint managers who respond to grievances about the operations of other security institutions. Each officer is an "ombudsman, the person who receives complaints and has the knowledge, contacts, and ability to pressure other public and private agencies to provide needed services" (Goldstein 1987, 19; see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueyroux 1990, 16). Second, the officer is an inspector of activities in other organizations. Survey research and other systematic data collection methods are employed (Toch and Grant 1991). Special units are created to inspect, for example, schools, public transit, halfway houses for disadvantaged groups, and hospitals (Skolnick and Bayley 1986). Similar to private security operatives who drop "snowflakes" (notices about insecure property) on the desks of offending employees (Shearing and Stenning 1982), in Detroit "officers go door to door, block by block, offering to make security inspections and enrolling people in various watches. If people aren't at home, officers leave Courtesy Security Awareness "tickets" that list points of vulnerability... Residents are invited to make appointments for personal security surveys" (Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 59). Third, the police serve as advocates for others who need better legal or technological resources to meet their security needs. They pressure government "agencies to carry out existing responsibilities or to invest new resources in an area. They may push for changes in the policies of other government agencies or advocate legislation that would enable police to deal more effectively with a problem that clearly warrants arrest and prosecution" (Goldstein 1987, 17; see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueyroux 1990; Toch and Grant 1991). In turn community organizations become advocates for police, for example supporting their requests for increased budgets and changes in law and policy (Fleissner et al., 1991, 61-2).

5. Making Communities
The involvement of police in helping to secure the activities of other organizations and institutions suggests that their role is no less than one of making communities.

The police make communities through communications in public culture. One way in which people in late modern society are able to express community sentiments is in and through the police as symbols of community. The police stand for the community and symbolize it. There is nothing new about this role, especially in Canada where the "Mounties" have always stood for the constitutional concerns of "peace, order and good government" (Walden, 1982). The mass media institution in particular joins with the police in articulating preferred versions and visions of community order as morality, procedure and hierarchy (Reiner 1985, chap 5; Ericson 1989; Carriere and Ericson 1989; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1991; Sparks 1992). As stressed previously, the sym-
bolizations of community policing articulate with practices, in this case police efforts to organize and mobilize the community, and to be the mortar that seals the cracks in the institutional infrastructure of late modern society.

The basis upon which the police make communities is communal concern about threats and dangers, expressed metaphorically in accounts of "the war on crime," "the war on drugs," and so on. As Nietzsche (1914) remarked, danger is the mother of morality. Communities define themselves by finding "suitable enemies" (Christie, 1986), and by busying themselves with efforts to eradicate or rehabilitate those they despise. Thus community policing makes communities by promoting interest in security against deviants in their midst. With community policing "we begin viewing community through the prism of issues, which, in essence, constitute the most urgent kind of community of interest. Within any given geographical area, the issues that provide the police with the unifying principle necessary to allow them access to the community so that they can most efficiently do their job are crime, disorder and fear of crime" (Trojanowicz and Moore 1988, 13).

A range of proactive tactics are urged to define suitable enemies and solve the problems they create. These tactics include aggressive harassment. For example, in a recent text on problem-solving policing, Toch and Grant (1991, 272-3) exhibit the General Schwartzkopf approach to community policing.

Harassing dealers becomes a way of encouraging self-regeneration in drug-infested communities. This goal can be an end in itself, but can also advance more traditional goals by inspiring community members to enlist in the war against drugs. The following hypothetical examples of composite interventions show how these goals can be accomplished.

An eight-man team, the HAND (Harass Your Neighborhood Dealer) Unit, is established by the Midcity Police Department. This group is composed of officers who are lifetime weight lifters, have belts in Karate and ride motorcycles. Their assignment is to advertise their presence in a flamboyant manner wherever drugs are sold. The officers park in front of crack houses or sit on their stoop and issue citations, such as for littering or trespassing, when a customer appears. The officers also videotape dealers and customers, and chase reluctant tapees on their cycles. If officers enter a dealer's premises, they do so riding their motorcycles. If a subject resists, an officer wrestles him to the ground while the officers partners distribute candy to neighborhood children who come to watch.

The creation of communal identity through declarations of war on enemies represents nothing new. That was, for example, the essence of the American Declaration of Independence (White 1984, 231-40), and has been at the centre of American public culture ever since (in the case of the war on drugs see Scheingold 1990; McGaw 1991). Community policing is to create a positive community self-concept in the context of fear, apathy, alienation and crumbling infrastructures. In some circumstances the police may be the only sign of community, of something-in-common, that is left to hold things together. "In our often anomic urban society the transcendent identity of many city dwellers is that of crime victim. Their neighbors may be the very people they fear. In such circumstances police departments can facilitate, even create, a sense of community where one either did not previously exist or was faintly imprinted" (Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 214)

In most contexts the police are not left entirely on their own to make communities. As emphasized earlier, they foster collaborative relationships with other institutions to manufacture positive images, networks and cooperation (Ghezzi 1983; Carriere and Ericson 1989; O'Malley
However, there is no doubt that the police are the fulcrum of community-making efforts, the most pervasive and persuasive institution for creating, shaping and changing the quality of life. "The values of a community's "informal" systems of social control are thought to be embedded in neighborhood associations, businesses, industry, churches, and civic groups. Where these organizations do not exist, community policing programs endeavour to create them, as they provide a democratic beacon to police action in the future" (Mastrofski 1988, 51).

Another "beacon" of what community policing stands for is the architecture of police stations. Police station architecture is as much a part of the discourse of community policing as is a police officer providing advice on security to a local retail business association or dropping Courtesy Security Awareness tickets on the doorsteps of neighborhood residents. Consider the following description of a police station built in a suburb of Toronto in the early 1980s. At the time the police station was built this jurisdiction had a comparatively low crime rate. With a population of about 400,000 the jurisdiction averaged fewer than five murders a year, and the majority of its murders occurred in domestic settings. Moreover, this police station was built at a time when models of community policing were being fostered (e.g. Task Force 1974).

The basic idea is to control the movement of everyone who approaches and enters the building. The movement of policemen will be controlled by computer access cards. There are eighteen security doors, and only some cards will be programmed for all of them. All entries will be recorded - with card number, date and time - and entries that are unauthorized will trigger an alarm.

If an intruder still gains entry despite cameras outside that can pan, zoom and tilt by remote control, he will find himself in a square corridor looking into full-length security mirrors and more steel-encased tamper-proof cameras. Controlling and monitoring all these cameras and other items, such as electronic door hinges that signal when a door has failed to shut automatically, will be specially trained civilians working 24 hours a day. They will sit in front of a large console with a graphic of an entire building, lights signalling exits and entries, and TV monitors for the 18 security cameras. Certain top-security areas also have sonic intrusion alarms, and the entire outside of the building is lit by high-intensity sodium lights. The windows are all strip, ribbon windows, their double glass tilted at a 45-degree angle to deflect bullets and stones and placed seven feet above ground so they need not be draped. Besides, they are reflective, to make viewing impossible even if apartment buildings are erected around the structure (Kashmeri 1981).

This police station is an icon of community in late modern society (see also Davis 1990, chap 4). It offers at once a discourse of security and insecurity. It is designed not only with an eye on an untrustworthy public that must be kept at a distance, but also with a view that police officers themselves are only trustworthy at some times and in some places. While it signifies acceptance of certain forms of security expertise as the best way to feel progressive, it also stands for future acceptance, indeed institutionalization, of hostility, distrust and insecurity. This police station is a prime example of what Foucault (1988) termed "the scandal of rationality" in security provision. Typical of modern rational systems of security, it is also irrational and signifies insecurity. There have been more recent efforts to design police stations that articulate with the community policing model. These stations feature an inviting public entrance and a "community room". For example, a new headquarters building for the Metropolitan Toronto Police includes an aesthetically-pleasing small museum as part of its large entrance area. Passers-by are enticed into this museum area by a large display window similar to the type used in up-market department stores. Some new divisional police stations in Ontario are highlighted by a "community room" that is
available for use by any legitimate organization. Whereas community groups would have previously met in churches, schools, and town halls, they are now encouraged to meet in the police station as the centre of the community. The role of this community room as a communications room - as a beacon that beckons all - was indicated to us in interview with an architect who helped design one.

It jutted out from the main police reception area. It is quite physically removed from the station. We used glass brick for that. One of the reasons for that was because you could leave the lights on in that room and there would be a constant glow. We knew that the room would be sitting empty a great deal of the time. If we just had traditional windows then people passing by would see this unused room. And even when it was in use the people inside would probably close the blinds. With the glass brick we can leave the lights on all the time and you don't know whether or not people are using it. This lighted room becomes a symbol for the community and the symbolism works 24-hours-a-day.

Apart from a user-friendly entrance and the comforting canopy of a meeting room, the community policing station retains some of the environmental design and electronic technology features of the suburban Toronto station described above. For example, a promotional brochure of a firm of architects specializing in community policing stations points to a number of security features including, "a wiretap facility; a separate medium-security corridor for young offenders; audio monitoring in cells;...[and] electronic keypad-controls on each entrance at grade." In late modern society, community policing is only able to offer a discourse that centres on communications technology and security.

Station architecture is one way in which the police represent themselves as an institution for the community to emulate. It is part of a broader program of showing community members that they can do better if only they model themselves through the narratives and practices of the police. This is one theme in American police television serials that became popular along with community policing. In American cities characterized by decaying infrastructures, and inefficient, unjust and corrupt bureaucracies, the police somehow manage to be the least worst bureaucracy and to get the job done (Gitlin 1985, Fiske 1987; Ericson 1991; Sparks 1992). For example, Gitlin (1985, 312-13) observes that Hill Street Blues speaks to a larger cultural scene, stretching across political positions, that the major government institutions - education, welfare, health - and the cities as a whole, simply do not work... People suffer, and the institutions authorized to redress that suffering fail in their stated purpose. What is left is a creative coping that honours both the suffering and the failure of a society now seemingly beyond remedy, one in which a change in the social structure seems out of the question.

In community policing discourse it is the police who are at the forefront of creative coping and therefore of creating communities. The language of catalytic chemistry highlights their imputed expertise in this regard. "In regard to community policing increasing the power of the police, it is about time that police be the catalyst in helping people get what they deserve from inefficient bureaucracies. When police give people the service they deserve, then the people will begin demanding similar efficiency from other agencies" (Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, 19). Thus the police are to be a powerful proactive force in making community organizations better. Late modern community chemistry requires "patrol officers providing catalytic assistance and expert advice to the formation of neighborhood associations" (Trojanowicz et al. 1982, 10) where none existed previously. This entails a "we know best" approach to selling the police as the foremost institution in the community. "The bulk of communication is from the police to the
citizen, explaining and selling prepackaged strategies devised without the particular neighborhood and its residents' preferences in mind... Co-production in practice means citizens doing what the police think is best" (Mastrofski 1988, 52, 56; see also Murphy 1988a, 184; Carriere and Ericson 1989; for an opposing viewpoint, see Trojanowicz and Carter 1988).

6. Conclusions
Late modern society, constituted by bureaucratic institutions, has fundamentally changed communities as interpersonal communications that involve sharing, tradition, quality face-to-face relationships and local spatial arrangements. Communities are now composed by institutional communications that provide surveillance for risk assessment and security provision regarding territory, environment, life course and identity. The police are communicators within a society constituted by communications circuitry among myriad security institutions. Community policing is communications policing, a discourse for finding better ways to connect with the communications circuitry of other security institutions: to be reactive to their knowledge needs; to provide them with expert advice; and, to help them manage their security arrangements.

The discourse of community policing rationalizes the changed role of the police in late modern society. While the discourse is ongoing, it was prompted at a time when the wider social changes it articulates were a fait accompli. The discourse of community policing is thus an after-the-fact effort to mediate and appropriate what has occurred and to adjust police organization accordingly. In this respect too it is no different than other "community" discourses in late modern society, such as the discourse of community corrections or decarceration which was prompted at a time when decarceration was an accomplished fact (McMahon 1992).

Regardless of jurisdiction, community policing literature focuses on the need for new forms of police organization in face of the failure of the reactive response-to-individual-calls-for-service model to offer personal service and to control crime adequately. However, the literature generally ignores the fact that individual calls for service have always been about many things in addition to crime reporting and control. Indeed, it is arguable that the reactive calls for service model offered a great deal in the way of personal service through face-to-face interaction. When you called for police help about a wide range of troubles, the officer was there in person as a counselor, guide and friend (Cumming, Cumming and Edell 1965; Punch 1979; Ericson 1982; Skogan 1990b). This approach was in keeping with community as interpersonal communications that respected tradition, quality face-to-face transactions, and local space and sense of immediacy. The increased use of alternatives to dispatching an officer under community policing models - referral to other agencies, recording complaints over the telephone or by mail-ins, etc - means that the police are not made inter-personally available when most needed personally. It is a sign that police communications are increasingly extra-situational, not face-to-face, and impersonal.

The changing forms of police organization and communication do not signal a decline in reactive policing, however, only a shift in what is being reacted to. The police are now reacting more in terms of the knowledge demands of other institutions. Reactive policing occurs increasingly at the institutional level, according to institutional dictates. Other institutions - state, national and international governments, multi-national insurance companies, mass media etc. - operate according to knowledge requirements and interest criteria that have no respect for local community boundaries, sense of place and immediacy.

Given wider trends in late modern risk society (Giddens 1990, 1991; Poster 1990; Beck 1992a, 1992b; Stehr and Ericson 1992), knowledge demands on the police from other institutions will only increase. The police response will be to acquire more communications technology, not to divest themselves of their technological trappings as some have suggested. The more communications technology, the greater the capacity for knowledge production, but also the greater the
capacity for others to access police knowledge and demand more. The police will become the prisoners of technology even more. There is no escape from spiralling institutional knowledge demands and communications technologies for managing them. Community policing discourse simply enhances reliance on communications technologies to provide the police with better connections to the communications circuitry of other security institutions (cf. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, esp. 20-1; Toch and Grant 1991, esp. 75).

Community policing offers boosterism, a feel-good politics in the vein of quality-of-life advertising. It does so by associating "community" with other hurrah words such as "progress" and "democracy." The suggestion is that now, at last, through the police, things will get better and be more egalitarian (e.g. Trojanowicz and Carter 1988, 18; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, 33). This boosterism rings hollow. It is likely that few people identify with it because most people sense that the community as interpersonal communications of sharing and helping in a locality with immediacy is dissolving and that inequality is intensifying.

The institutions that mediate community policing are themselves unequal in terms of membership, participation and influence. "These mediating institutions are not microcosms of the neighborhoods they are alleged to represent (Bohm 1984, 451). They, like all social institutions, are heavily influenced by the distribution of power, status and wealth within their domain. Even in these voluntary associations, where membership rules are not restrictive, participation is skewed to those of higher socioeconomic status, married, and homeowners with children (Rosenbaum 1987, 108)" (Mastrofski 1988, 51).

Community policing is also associated with more explicit socioeconomic inequality. Community boosterism based on threats, fear and the urge for security is used as a vehicle for defending property values. Two solitudes are created, one for the better off symbolic workers, wired to the global, who can pay for better security provision, the other for the poor service workers and unemployed (Reich 1991, 42-4). "Security" becomes a positional good defined by income access to private 'protective services' and membership in some hardened residential enclave or restricted suburb" (Davis 1990, 224; see also Spitzer 1987; Manning 1988).

The security of identities is also not assured by community policing. For example Mastrofski (1988, 50) describes an area in New York in which Italian and Jewish groups joined forces in fending off incursions from Blacks. This effort at excluding a threatening group arguably enhanced the consensus and feeling of togetherness among the Italians and Jews, but police contributions to this effort would have "made them party to bigotry" (ibid). In other words, facing areas with plural identities, any move by the police to support some will inevitably exclude and create inequality for others.

There is also inequality in the institutional system for distributing risks that community policing participates in. Community policing is part of a wider trend in the risk society away from prevention per se to the just distribution of risks. The just distribution of risk (shared risk) becomes more important than prevention (less risk), elimination (no risk) or punishing the morally culpable person. As part of this shift in the risk society, every institution adopts the template of insurance (Ewald 1991; Defert 1991), including the police. Thus in community policing discourse we find statements such as the following. "If a police department's management were strongly committed to reducing the problems it must handle, it might operate like an insurance company that, for monetary reasons, is constantly working to reduce its losses. It would have the equivalent of the researchers who study the conditions that contribute to insurance claims and the underwriters who constantly review clients" (Goldstein 1990, 73). The problem with the institution of insurance is that it cannot manage the just distribution of risks and therefore also contributes to inequality in some areas. There is a differential ability to purchase different forms of insurance, whether offered by the state as social security or health insurance, or offered by the private sector.
as property or life course insurance. Inequality is formed around insured and uninsured populations, those who the underwriters favour and those they exclude.

It is increasingly difficult to find the locus of accountability to even seek justice in late modern institutions. In the communication circuits of risk management and security provision, there is no single institution or person above the system as the manager. Accountability becomes embedded in the institutional networks and is diffused. Individual agency, and therefore the ability to attribute responsibility, recedes. The community as interpersonal communications with a defined locus and immediate reaction from responsible agents dissipates. The community as institutional communications without a sense of place nor direct reaction from accountable agents emerges. Communications policing is the result.

We end where Huxley began his novel, Brave New World. Huxley opens his novel with the observation of "A squat grey building of only thirty-four stories. Over the main entrance... a shield, (with) the World State's motto, Community, Identity, Stability."

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Community Policing in the United States: Historical Roots, Present Practices and Future Requirements

Jack R. Greene

1. Community Policing Roots in the Historical Past

The American police seem to have been in a constant state of reform since their organized inception in the mid-1800s. Current reform efforts, variously labeled community and problem-oriented policing, are but the continuation of a reform process which began many years ago. While there are those who would argue that community policing is merely the current circumlocution in the mystification of the police role (See Klockars 1988 and Manning 1977), others would point to significant, and often humane, reforms among the 17,000 or so police departments in the United States over the past century (See Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy 1990; Goldstein 1990). Among others, these reforms include the general reduction in police use of excessive force and greater police civility and accountability.

Despite such progress, the American police, like many other police throughout the world, remain relatively distant from their public, resist public inspection and oversight, and react to public safety situations, as opposed to preventing them. The posture and practices of the American police have slowly evolved over the past 150 years. The legacy of the past is visible in modern-day policing, sometimes supporting police reform, sometimes detracting from it.

This essay focuses on the development of ideas, programs and initiatives by the American police over the past 100 years or so, each of which contributes to the current emphasis on community and problem-oriented policing. Any informed discussion of community or problem-oriented policing in the US must begin with a review of the historical roots of such reforms. Without such a review, we may, as historians have told us, fall into the trap of repeating a history we have not fully appreciated.

1.1. Police Reform - The Focus and Rate of Change

Police reform in the US has been sporadic and unevenly paced. It has often not learned from the mistakes of the past. During the many reform eras which have characterized the American police experience, the object of reform has varied as has the rate of change. At times this has resulted in conflicting and offsetting changes being attempted simultaneously. The consequence of these uneven changes has been to limit the effectiveness of the desired reforms. By-and-large, most police agencies in the US remain organized and provide a style of policing reminiscent of bygone eras. Police are largely reactive, militarily organized, rule burdened, and internally focused.

Recent attempts to reform the US police through community or problem-oriented policing have challenged the police to become more facile, organizationally, individually, and from the perspective of treating neighborhood problems. Such facility has not been characteristic of American policing in the past for many reasons.

Early police reforms sought to depoliticize the American police, generally through the introduction of structural and procedural control at the organizational level. One by-product of these efforts was highly centralized police bureaucracies, many of which remain today (See Bittner 1970). These bureaucratic structures, which have become infamous for their inflexibility, often militate against change by their very nature. Later reforms focused on internal organizational efficiency through improved selection, training and "professionalism", leading to the develop-
ment of a professional police ideology. The aim of latest wave of reform - community policing - is a clearer community context for police actions.

The focus of police service in the US has also undergone calls for change. In bygone era of American policing, crime and its suppression, was the central target of effort. Today, while crime remains a major police concern, fear of crime and the public’s abandonment of public places has risen in status as a primary police focus. This shift in emphasis has not always been well received by the police or the public. Police traditionalists fear losing the raison d’etat of American policing - crime fighting. Community-oriented approaches to policing are often seen by traditionalists as "soft on crime", thereby eliciting their resistance to these programs. Similarly segments of the general population, either through fear of criminal victimization, or political views about social control, often support a "get tough on crime" ideology, which is often cast as in opposition to community-based policing efforts. The long-term success of community or problem-oriented policing will, no doubt, hinge in part on the role cast for the police in the 21st century, and in resolving the perceived conflict between crime control and community facilitation as central roles of the police.

These reforms are not in-and-of themselves self-supporting. That is, police administrative controls often conflict with "professional" and/or "community" control. Community input does not always fit well with the police interpretation of "professional" status, and the independent decision-making thought to append to that status. And, current reforms aimed at community or problem-oriented policing have generally ignored the corruption control aims of many police bureaucracies. The often conflicting goals of police reform in the US, whether at the organizational, individual or environmental level, have resulted in a diminution in the amount of change actually produced. And, despite current reform agendas, police bureaucracies, police service delivery systems and police officers remain resistant to fundamental changes in policing systems in the US.

1.2. Searching for Community - The Roots of Current Trends in US Policing

In many respects the American police have always been in search of community attachment. Borrowing some intellectual heritage from their British counterparts, the American police were originally conceived as an extension of self and civic policing (Banton 1964; Berkley 1969). But, unlike their continental counterparts in Western Europe, the American police were formed primarily as local institutions, often with close and pernicious ties to either political elites or political machines (See Fogelson 1977; Miller 1975). Captured by political elites and urban "bossism" politics of the 19th century, the American police did not enjoy widespread community approval. Additionally, the American political system, founded on the premise of controlling the intrusive-ness of government, had great ambivalence about organized police forces. From the founding of the US in the late 1700s until the mid-1800s, policing was not formal, not organized, and certainly not intrusive. Rather than having the national character of many European police forces of the era, policing in the US had a distinctive local character, which remains today. This character is the manifestation of an underlying American premise that formal social control should be defined and enacted through locally controlled municipal agencies. The local character of American policing assured the founders that the police would be responsive to local rather than regional or national political interests. Similarly, localism insured variation in enforcement patterns and in policing services, consistent with the fragmented and selected development of the US legal system (Walker 1977). Today the US has approximately 17,000 municipal police agencies; most are very small - from 1 to 5 persons. The size and distribution of American police agencies further complicates the development of a collective identity among the US police, and hence the adoption of a combined-oriented role for the American police.
Moreover, most Americans at the time did not condone the idea of a police organized along military lines. Rather, while the police eventually were afforded uniforms and badges, their supervision remained intensely civil. Today most police chiefs in the US are appointed and serve at the pleasure of the local mayor or city council. This local political accountability has been a cornerstone of American policing, often inhibiting the development of a national police consciousness, or consistency in police administrative practice.

Finally, the American police service was originally cast as a reactive force, not as a preventive or interdicting force. Consistent with a mistrust of the extension of state sanction into private affairs, America's police were to provide assistance on request, not to proactively intervene in the lives of the community. The political intention of the founding of the American police was to create a system driven by citizen control; in practicality control was more likely provided by narrow political interests, not broad communal interests.

The police of the late 19th and early 20th century were unlikely to be seen as extensions of "the community". More often, they were viewed by citizens as extensions of corrupt politicians or as criminal enterprises (Haller 1976). While charged with enforcing the law, the early American police were not often lawful - the law was neither a means nor an end for the police. Rather, the law was often selectively invoked for political, administrative or corrupt purposes. Police training, if it existed at all, was tactically, not legally based. Internal supervision was poor, and court supervision of police actions was non-existent. For all purposes the police were the law, while they were rarely legal.

As a result, making the police law abiding was a major target of early police reform movements in the United States. A lawless police, or a police beholden to partisan political interests, it was argued, could not serve the public interest. Political progressives sought to change the police in fundamental ways to wrest them from their partisan political masters.

Reform of the American police at this time was often concerned with distancing the police from their corrupting influence - the community - as opposed to developing a closer working harmony between the police and those policed which characterizes the reform efforts of today. Recognizing that corruption can only be sustained if it has support in the wider community, most police reformers in the late 1800s and early 1900s sought to control in detailed ways the actions of the police. Such control further distanced the police from the community because police engagement of the community was often seen as the invitation to political corruption. To be a good police officer, then, was to remain distant from the public.

Reformers had the police adopt several strategies to distance themselves from the communities they policed. They embraced a strict, if not mock, interpretation of military bureaucracy and a strong "professional" ideology.

Their attachment to bureaucratic rigour was meant to shift police allegiance from those external to the police organization (politicians and the community) to those possessing formal organizational authority (police chiefs). Command and control systems, the strict gradation of organizational authority, the division of work and responsibility through specialization, and rigid adherence to rules and regulations were seen as methods for disciplining and controlling the American police.

These systems, practices and policies remain intact in most American police agencies today, attesting to their institutional impact. The latent consequences of these "controls" were to fragment police work, reduce individual attachment to work and the work place, and create inflexible organizational structures. As interchangeable "soldiers", the American police became uniform but uniformly ineffective.

The ideology of professionalism proved useful in resolving the apparent conflict between police and the communities from which the police came. That is, the police in the US and elsewhere
have often come from the very strata of society that are the focus of police efforts. Controlling the lower classes was, and remains, a major police responsibility (Center for Research on Criminal Justice 1977). Progressives in the early 1900s believed that by adopting a "professional" ideology the police could free themselves from their class origins by enforcing a class-neutral law. Such mystification proved successful in separating the police from the very communities from whence they came. Together, bureaucracy and ideology were formidable reform tools, wresting the police from the throes of political and social class partisanship. The 20th century "professional era" of policing marks a major departure from political policing as it had become in the later part of the 19th century (Kelling and Moore 1988). By adopting a "professional" gloss, the American police sought to, at once disentangle themselves from political partisanship and to align their occupational interests with the ideal of administrative efficiency.

Crime reporting, radio communications, command and control systems, and the like created the "illusion" of self-determination and the corollary of administrative control of the police (See Manning 1977). Standard setting and uniformity in policies, procedures and practices, provided at least the illusion of control and a good defense against community, particularly minority community, complaints of selective enforcement. Consistent with a strong American penchant for "equal justice", such administrative and professional control at least symbolically assured a civil police (See Davis 1975 on control of police discretion). Current police reforms emphasizing police agency accreditation can tie their intellectual heritage to this reform era as well (See Mastrofski 1986). Today, many American police agencies are seeking external validation - validation stemming from adherence to "acceptable standards of practice", set of course by the profession of policing itself. The legacy of police reform which focused on dividing the police from those who would use the police toward their own ends, while successful in separating the American police from crass politics, remains a major obstacle to implementing "community-oriented" policing on a wide scale basis.

Over the years a certain wariness has conditioned a boundary between the police and the community. Advocates for community and problem-oriented approaches to policing have not generally recognized that the police and the community may place limits on the acceptability of close and intimate relations (See Manning 1988). Moreover, the dynamics of police and community toleration for one another remain unexplored. Nevertheless, programs seeking to change the nature of police and community interactions must account for this historical premise of policing which sought different ends - the separation of the police from their immediate corrupting influences - the community. Police oversight bodies in the US have more often been shaped and charged with controlling police misdeeds, rather than facilitating the "co-production" of public safety sought in current police reforms (Walker 1985).

1.3. Challenges to Police Legitimacy

Toward the 1960s, the administrative efficiency and professional demeanour which characterized the American police for nearly 40 years came under sharp and persistent attack. The American police were confronted with the convergence of the Civil Rights Movement, anti-Vietnam protests, and the rise of a youthful counter culture. Together, these forces were to reshape American politics and the American police in the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for current community and problem-oriented efforts.

In the 1960s, the very legitimacy of government was challenged, and the most visible arm of executive government - the police - often bore the brunt of these attacks. The police, as a social, political and administrative institution were placed under great public scrutiny. The police were
criticized for responding, and for failing to respond, to a series of national social crisis. In enforcing the "status quo", the American police were again politicized by the urban crises of the 1960s. Institutionally, the police found themselves lacking a significant constituent, criticized by liberals and conservatives alike for their handling of urban unrest, and in an inhospitable social and political environment.

In subsequent years, police methods were subjected to more clinical and critical analysis than ever before, and the police were found lacking. Police tactical changes as well as community relations programs that emerged from this "crisis of legitimacy" were to greatly shape current thinking and practice in community and problem-oriented policing.

This era created an opportunity for legitimizing police officer and community input into policy and decision-making. Whereas the previous era of policing had focused on tightening the administrative apparatus of the police and evoking "professional" symbols, the 1960s and 1970s in American policing were to become known as "experimental" years - a time for assessing old and tired practices, and at least tentatively implementing new ones.

The conflictual nature of this era focused public attention on the outcomes rather than the process of police services. Quality versus quantity distinctions were being made, and police "ownership" of communities began to emerge, if only for a brief time period.

The police too were changing. Major hiring efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s introduced a new generation of people to policing. The federal government through the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1967, and its subsequent revisions, provided government assistance for police education and training for over a decade. A fledgling police research effort was also greatly expanded during this period. The police institution in America was being recast, sometimes as the result of a "quiet revolution" (Kelling, 1988), sometimes not so quietly.

Early studies of the American police in the 1950s and 1960s did not necessarily support a benign view of the public law enforcement or of its agents (Reiss 1971). More often, the police were found: to use excessive violence toward personal ends (Westley 1953; Bittner 1970); to punish non-respect with arrest (Black 1980); to be socially and politically cynical (Neiderhoffer 1967); and to be rooted in local customs and traditions (Wilson 1968), despite years of reform effort. Later studies in the 1970s suggested that the preventive capacity of the police was largely mythical (Kelling et.al. 1974), that rapid response was largely ineffective (Pate et al. 1976a, 1976b), and that detective work was largely overrated, generally by detectives themselves (Greenwood et al. 1977).

Whereas the police of the past were simply corrupt, modern-day police, as known at that time, were also inefficient and ineffective. To change policing was to change both police organizations and police service delivery. Such changes, briefly initiated in the 1970s, were to have profound effects on rethinking and changing police emphases in the late 1980s and into the 1990s.

Team policing was to become a major "reform" vehicle during this era. The intellectual and programmatic links between team policing of the 1970s and community policing of the 1980s are quite straightforward. Team policing sought to redesign the relationships between the police and those policed by: 1) creating police accountability within geographic areas; 2) decentralizing police bureaucracies to improve service delivery; and, 3) creating a forum for police officers and community residents to interact in constructive ways to increase public safety in neighborhoods. Team policing became a rallying point for the US police to shed their military bureaucracies and soften their professional aloofness. It also became a rallying point for community input and police officer maturation.

Unfortunately, team policing was defeated by the police themselves. Police supervisors were perhaps the most resistant to this change - they saw themselves as loosing power and authority under this arrangement. Police officers not involved in these "police experiments" also contrib-
uted to the demise of team policing - they were generally jealous that other officers received special attention in their association with these specialized and highly publicized units. Initial team policing programs began in Dayton, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; New York City and Syracuse, New York; Holyoke, Massachusetts; and Los Angeles and Richmond, California (Sherman, Milton and Kelly 1973). A later team policing program was conducted in Cincinnati, Ohio (Schwartz and Clarren 1977). Most were seen as "demonstration" programs, a label which unfortunately destined them to failure (Greene 1989a). Despite the enthusiasm which team policing created within American police circles in the 1970s, it is rarely seen as having a major impact on the institution of policing in the US. While team policing programs "failed" to reform the police bureaucracies or the ideology of professionalism, they provided a glimpse of what policing might become - a vision shared in the renewed interests of community and problem-oriented policing programs of today.

1.4. Present Day Manifestations
Most recently police and community interaction programs have been couched in terms of police and community "co-production" of crime control and public safety services (Skolnick and Bayley 1986). These programs have emphasized the consensual nature of citizen-government relations; the collaborative role of citizens and the police in crime prevention, social control and order maintenance; as well as the respective responsibilities of each (police and community). Police storefront offices have opened in many urban cities and the ability of the police to reach the community has generally been greatly enhanced in the past decade. These programs, coupled with a return to foot patrol in many cities, have resulted in the belief among some that the fundamental strategy of the police is changing (Kelling and Moore 1988). That strategy emphasizes "community" as the central attachment for the American police.
In virtually every proposal to move the police toward a community or problem-focused mode of operation there has been a corresponding claim to decentralize authority and de-specialize the police (Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Alpert and Dunham 1988; Goldstein 1990; Trojanowicz and Bucceroux 1990; Sparrow et al. 1990), so as to break the grip that the traditional control-centered police bureaucracy has on policing.
Widespread structural reform, however, has remained illusive; even today few cities have embraced community or problem-oriented policing as an organizationally inclusive strategy. Rather, most treat community or problem-oriented policing as either an organizational specialty or as a "demonstration" or "experimental" program. San Diego, California has embraced the concept of problem-oriented policing as a city-wide effort, and the New York City Police Department has similarly sought to revamp policing in that city using community oriented approaches. Madison, Wisconsin has embarked for several years on a "quality management" approach with a strong emphasis in decentralized authority and decision-making and greater community activation (Cooper and Lobitz 1991). Several other US cities are either experimenting or elaborating on these community focused programs.
Community or problem-oriented policing has also received support from the analysis of crime and programs aimed at preventing crime. In the early 1980s several studies of community social control and community activation for crime prevention suggested that: 1) communities feared crime more than they responded to victimization; 2) crime victimization and fear were often inversely related; and, 3) the police were a major determinant of the level of fear of crime in any given neighborhood (Wycoff, et al. 1985, 1985a, 1985b). Further, it was argued, that community decay was the precursor to criminal invasion, suggesting that the police had a responsibility for securing communities which were in physical and social decline (Wilson and Kelling 1968). Police attention to neighborhood "quality of life" was to be-
come a major shift in defining the American police.
Since the mid-1980s community and problem-oriented policing has received a heightened level of attention by police policy makers and academics (For example, see: Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Eck and Spelman 1987; Alpert and Dunham 1988; Greene and Mastrofski 1988; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990; Sparrow et al. 1990; Goldstein 1990; Freidmman 1992; Weisburd and Uchida, forthcoming). Among its many definitions, community policing has been variously labeled as "foot patrol" (Trojanowicz 1983, 1986), as a fear of crime reduction strategy (Wycoff et al. 1985, 1985a, 1985b; Cordner 1986), as a crime prevention strategy (Kelling 1987), as a method to improve police officer job satisfaction (Hayeslip and Cordner 1987), as a problem-solving process (Cordner 1985; Eck and Spelman 1987; Goldstein 1990), as a process for greater police and community consultation and sharing of information and values (Wetheritt 1983; Manning 1984; Alpert and Dunham 1988), as a method for changing the organizational and service delivery structures of the police (Manning 1984; Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Alpert and Dunham 1989; Goldstein 1990), and as a "reform" movement (Bayley 1988; Mastrofski 1988).
While there are several oftentimes overlapping themes in the definitions of community or problem-oriented policing, the central tendency is to define community policing in terms of organizational strategy, internal police reform, and greater civic accountability.

2. Common Elements of Community Policing Efforts in the US
Common elements of community policing programs include a redefinition of the police role; greater reciprocity in police and community relations; area decentralization of police services and command; and some form of civilianization (Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Goldstein 1979, 1987). Each of these changes is viewed as a necessary condition to realizing greater police accountability to the community.
Role re-definition seeks to remove the police from narrow and traditional definitions of policing as crime fighting, to broader role definitions which view the police as problem-solvers and community advocates. Reciprocity in police and community relations seeks to redress past practices of police talking "to" and not "with" the communities they are expected to serve, and to make the police more law-abiding (Mastrofski and Greene, forthcoming).
Decentralization of service and command seeks to bring the service "close to the customer", so that citizens and line-level police officers can have input into defining the services to be produced, and in evaluating the quality and effectiveness of the services delivered (Greene 1989a). Finally, civilianization refers to the process of employing greater numbers of non-police personnel to work within the police bureaucracy, in part, to increase cost efficiencies, and, in part, to infiltrate and weaken the "blue-thin line" mentality often separating the police from the community.
Community and problem-oriented policing programs have sprung up all over the United States in the past 5 years. Built on early fear reduction programs conducted in Newark, New Jersey (Pate et al. 1985) and Houston, Texas (Pate et al. 1986), as well as foot patrol program carried out in Flint, Michigan (Trojanowicz 1986), Oakland, California (Reiss 1985), New York City (Ward 1985), and Boston, Massachusetts (Bowers and Hirsch 1986), among others, the newest of the community and problem-oriented policing programs are particularly focused on changing the style of policing within any given city (See Alpert and Dunham 1989), and reducing the call-for-service dependence of the public on the police (See Eck and Spelman 1987; Goldstein 1990).
Claims and counter claims notwithstanding, it is perhaps too early in this stage of development to understand the full impact of community policing on police organizations and on the relationships between the police and the public. However, many of the projects underway report favorable results, although much of the research surrounding these interventions remains anecdotal.
The general findings of these various studies have suggested that the police have some effect on perceptions of crime, if not on crime itself. Fear of crime is apparently affected by greater public visibility of the police, and programs which bring the police into greater interaction with the citizenry typically produce assessments of reduced fear of crime. Police officer job satisfaction appears greatly enhanced when the police are engaged in some form of community or problem-oriented policing (Greene 1989b; Greene and Decker 1989; Hayslip and Cordner 1987). Other projects have examined the capacity of the police, working with the community, to produce innovative solutions to persistent community problems. Work conducted in New York City (Ward 1985; Farrell 1988), Houston, Texas (Wycoff et al. 1985a, 1985b), Madison, Wisconsin (See Goldstein 1990), Baltimore, Maryland (Cordner 1985) and Newport News, Virginia (Eck and Spelman 1987) has suggested that such “innovative solutions” can be produced, when the police seek to address "problems" rather than simply continuing to respond to calls for police service. That is, there is evidence to suggest that the police, institutionally and individually, must become proactive community-problem solvers, thereby reducing the magnitude and impact of incipient community problems, while at the same time improving community trust of the police.

Such a recognition has shifted the original premise of the American police as a reactive organization of community control, to a facilitative organization for community support. In a few of the projects where there is community-focused data, such as the one in Miami, Florida (Alpert and Dunham 1988, 1989), it is clear that police sensitivity to community norms, and conversancy with community expectations is, at once a longstanding complaint in minority communities, and an occupational prerequisite if the police are to become truly "community oriented". In San Diego, California, a program to actively involve police officers in "understanding" the communities they policed produced positive police officer attitudinal results (Boydston and Sherry 1975). In Baltimore, a problem-oriented approach to policing has resulted in improved police officer job satisfaction, and strengthening of the officer orientation toward resolving community problems (Hayslip and Cordner 1987). In Philadelphia, a community-police educational program, focused on communications and police-community problem solving, has demonstrated positive attitudinal results among participating police officers as well (Greene 1989a; Greene and Decker 1989). Collectively, then, police officer affective attachments to, and understanding of, the community have been enhanced in certain cities, as have officer role definitions as a result of police and community programs.

Recently, there is evidence of a paradigmatic shift in policing. This shift appears to be moving away from the traditional "closed mindedness" of law enforcement bureaucracies toward a more participatory model of public safety. In certain cities, this change is thought to affect the entire style of policing (See Brown 1991; Williams, Greene and Bergman 1991). In other, if not most, cities such changes have yet to be realized. Nonetheless, there is optimism that such efforts are afoot, albeit in selected police departments.

3. Community Policing - In Search of a Future
Reform in any complex legal, bureaucratic and administrative system, such as the American police, is not an easy undertaking. The roots of police ideology and practice run deep, as do public perceptions and expectations for its police. To become a successful reform, American policing will need to pursue four interrelated goals, detailed below, for this reform called "community-policing".

3.1. Establishing a Community Role in Social Control
First, the police as a social control institution must come to recognize the central role which
communities play in social control. Much of the literature on community policing emphasizes the need to make the community safer through the active participation of neighborhood residents and business persons in public safety activities. But this goal is illusive. Countless studies have suggested that mobilizing communities in their own defense is more complicated than first appearances might suggest (See for example, Greenberg et al. 1982 and 1985; Davis et al. 1991; and, Rosenbaum 1986).

Whether the police will be able to organize dysfunctional communities in their own self-defense is unknown, and may place a great burden on the role of policing in neighborhoods (Greene 1989). Informal social control occurs through an admixture of economic, educational, cultural, religious and family-based institutions, each of which form community and personal identities. It is not at all clear that a single formal social control organization such as the police can activate such informal social control mechanisms. Nonetheless, American policing, and policing in other Western countries, is moving toward this social activation function and will need to become aware of how to organize communities with varying levels of social organization and cohesion for social control purposes.

3.2. Defining the Police Officers' Role In Community Policing

Perhaps just as difficult is a second objective for community policing - that of involving line-level police personnel more directly in solving community problems which are believed to lead to crime and social disorder. The police have not, and are currently not trained as community social diagnosticians. Rather, they are trained more technically to make limited interventions into complex social problems. While much of the "problem-solving" activities of the American police have captured public attention, most of these "analyses" are post-hoc explanations of police behaviour - anecdotal at their best, and embellished at their worst. Moreover, whether these efforts are aimed toward solving police as opposed to community problems remains unclear in most of these analyses.

Related to the above, it is not clear whether the police can or should become the agency of community problem solving. Collectively, the police role changes anticipated through various forms of community and problem-oriented policing are at minimum significant, and at their maximum revolutionary.

Whereas the police of the past were reactive, prescriptive and normative, dominated by their attachment to the criminal law and insensitive to underlying community problems or alternative forms of social control, the role proposed for the 21th century police officer is proactive, analytic, reflective and charged with - among other things - mobilizing, activating and organizing the community. Such a role will have a profound impact on the relationships between the police and those policed, and between the government and those governed.

In addition to fundamental changes in the police role suggested by community and problem-oriented approaches are issues of the social responsibility of the police for a wide array of public safety related services and the level of the social intervention anticipated of the police (see, for example Mastrofski 1988). It would appear that the police in community and problem-oriented approaches are becoming "responsible" for government, as well as police service. That is, one underlying rationale for these sweeping changes in police functioning is the significant and apparent overlap of many government services on issues of crime, fear of crime and social disorder. On the matter of level of social intervention, it is also presumed that given the proximity of the police to their clients, they have a level and point of social intervention that other social service agencies lack. That is, given that the police are the most visible, public place oriented service in municipal government, it is often assumed the police have broad-based public support for broadening their role as described above. Whether this support is real or rhetorical remains to be seen.
Communities will differ in the depths of their social problems, the level of social organization, their tolerance (or lack thereof) of official actions and in their ability to assimilate and use the organizing efforts of the police. The circumstances under which this will happen are not well understood, yet will greatly condition the "success" of this reform effort.

It is suggested that matters of sanitation, public welfare, street maintenance, the presence of homeless shelters and/or homeless people, appropriate drug and sex education and numerous other municipal services impinge on public safety, and of course they do. Absent the provision of these public-safety services crime, fear of crime and social decay confound police activities to stem these problems.

In dealing with the linkages between government social service provision in general, and police services in particular, the American police are, or have been, juxtaposed between the public and many other government services. This is a delicate position for the police, lest they be criticized for their own inefficiencies as well as those of other agencies, thereby losing their external credibility. And, if this positioning of the police is a hedge toward civic complaints, in the form of the police pointing out the inefficiencies of other governmental functions, the police will no doubt lose (in the short term, at least) their internal credibility, and any positive relations they may have with other social service agencies.

3.3. Improving System of Police Service Delivery

For community policing to become accepted, attention must be focused on improving the system of police service delivery by improving planning and making more rational the delivery of police services. Police departments in the US and throughout the world have not been well known for their capacity to develop and/or implement long-range strategic plans. All too often tactical, short-term objectives have consumed much of the time and focus of police managers. There are several reasons for this lack of strategic initiative.

Many police agencies do not collect or process information in a way that can inform strategic issues. Day-to-day police tactical information needs often result in the time-bound use of information. Information which might inform strategic processes is often not collected or not central to conventional police information systems (e.g., 911 emergency radio systems or computer-aided dispatch systems). Information sharing is not commonplace in most US police agencies. Instead, street-level, and indeed management-level, information is often viewed as private information; not to be shared with others (Bittner 1970; Rubenstein 1973).

The absence of a strategic emphasis in US policing can also be traced to shifting internal organizational coalitions which have resulted in overt power struggles within many of these departments. The oftentimes strict interpretation of military reporting lines, over attachment to the privilege of rank and position, and the unfortunate practice of sternly defending administrative prerogatives, have created major conflicts within police agencies. Simply put, the weight of many police bureaucracies has dulled initiative and strategic thinking.

Recently, several studies have highlighted the need for analytic and long-term thinking as an essential condition to implementing community or problem-oriented policing. Studies focused on "hot spots" (Sherman et al. 1989) suggests that communities differentially consume police services. By analyzing consumption patterns, it is argued, police resources can be targeted to reducing "troubled locations". Moreover, workload analyses of calls for police service have suggested that the police can work "smarter" by managing workload through differential responses (Sherman 1987; McEwen et al. 1984). These analytic improvements are being made in many American police departments with the general result of freeing police resources to proactively address community public safety problems.
3.4. Improving Police and Community Relations
A goal of most if not all community policing efforts in the US is to produce better police and community relations. Whereas in the past such improvements were ends in-and-of themselves, current reforms should consider such "effects" as by-products of the services received and evaluated by the local community. That is, good police and community relations should be viewed as the result of good police service, not as a separate product to be produced by some specialized unit within police departments.

4. The Renewal of American Policing
These rather lofty objectives for the police under a community-based policing model can only be realized when several strategic issues have been settled. These strategic issues relate to restructuring both the internal and external climate of police organizations.

A major and yet unrealized strategy for the American police is focused on institutional reform, through organizational renewal. This organizational renewal will require that police organizations shift organizations from their functional emphasis (e.g. patrol, investigations, community relations, specialized units and the like) to a product orientation which emphasizes results like increased public safety, reduced criminality and violence, or reducing fear of crime. This is no small feat. It will require the equivalent investment that retooling industry required in the 1970s and 1980s, and that product redefinition required in the 1980s and 1990s. Few if any police systems throughout the world have focused on such issues. More importantly the fragmented nature of American policing, most particularly the fragmentate nature of funding for police services, are not likely to produce the necessary changes in institutional framework which has been characteristic of reform in industrial settings.

Tied to institutional renewal is personnel renewal. Personnel renewal means improving police training in social service delivery, problem solving and analytic thinking, while at the same time giving police officers the necessary authority to accomplish these activities. As previously indicated police training in America, and in many other police systems, is currently fixated on technique and not context. The police must become social and community clinicians. Clinically-based training for the police is not well developed, and must be improved if the new social roles ascribed of the police are to be realized.

Additionally, the authority under which the American police labour inhibits their social facilitation role. Much of what the police do is managing people, as opposed to managing crime (Wilson 1968; Greene and Klockars 1991). To achieve results with such a workload, the police need to have the necessary authorities to provide community-based services. This is a complicated matter. Can the police assume authorities beyond the criminal code? Will such increases of police authority be consistent with American values of legal system separation? These questions must be addressed prior to enhancing the scope and breadth of authority among the American police. A strategic issue that remains unresolved in current reform efforts is community renewal and the police role in that effort. Community renewal refers to improving community cohesion as a first line of defense against crime and disorder problems. Crime and disorder problems occur in community settings; normally those settings where less formal mechanisms of social control have failed. How, then, are the police to rekindle that informal social control in community settings.

5. Essential Police Agency Actions to Implement Community Policing
The lessons from American community and problem-oriented policing efforts provide illumination on the antecedents to effective implementation of these organizational, personnel and service
delivery reforms. Police agencies, in order to effectively implement community and problem-oriented policing, must engage in six essential actions, each of which contributes directly to the police department's capacity to sustain the changes in role, function and organization implied by community and problem-oriented policing. To accomplish the ends of community and problem-oriented policing, police departments must:

1) Decentralize authority and increase areal accountability for police services to improve "ownership" for local police services;

2) Improve police agency analytic systems to shift from record keeping and incident counting to problem identification and problem analysis;

3) Revamp the service ideals which undergird the organizational culture of policing, e.g. changing the symbols, language and service/customer philosophies of the police agency itself;

4) Provide community access and legitimate input into local police policy-making by opening up the decision-making of the police agency to citizen participation and review;

5) Provide police personnel within the department with a sense of attachment to policy-making and an active role in local decision-making affecting police service delivery in those persons' sphere of influence; and,

6) Stress and implement systems for quality assurance, the maintenance of organizational and personal integrity, and the fair and equitable treatment of citizens.

Taken together these necessary actions contribute to the organizational, personnel and community renewal previously described. They are so interrelated that piecemeal attempts to implement these changes in police department settings have generally slowed and often thwarted the changes sought (For a discussion of holistic versus piecemeal change in policing, see Wycoff and Kelling 1978).

6. Concluding Remark
So what is community policing in the US? It is thinking about what services the police agency is currently providing (and why) and what services (and why) should be provided in the future. It is self-assessing, and introspective, while at the same time external and predictive of environmental change.

Community policing and problem-solving is providing a forum for questioning old assumptions about the effectiveness of police practices, and for introducing new measures for public service in general and the police in particular. Community policing and problem-solving are qualitative in nature focusing on impact and effect, rather than on the traditional public sector obsession with the quantification of effort. This philosophy and strategy considers problems, their resolution and the long-term effects of such intervention on the community, and the police service delivery system.

7. References


Introducing Community Policing in the Los Angeles Police Department

Malcolm W. Klein

The big-city police have always done more than just enforce the law, keep the peace and serve the public. They have also decided which laws to enforce, whose peace to keep, and which public to serve (Fogelson 1977).

1. Introduction
My purpose today is to amplify the foregoing comment by Fogelson by using a very concrete, complex, and exacting test of the capacity of a traditional police organization to re-orient itself toward community policing. In July of this year, the long-term chief of the Los Angeles Police department was succeeded by an outside candidate. The former chief was a traditionalist who saw the department as "the thin blue line" between the decent citizenry and "the dark side." The new chief comes with a reputation for introducing community policing into Philadelphia, a department with the same traditionalist reputation in its recent past. The context for the change is the community uproar over the police beating of motorist Rodney King, with its subsequent aftermath of the trial and acquittal of the police assailants and the resultant riots which exploded across much of Los Angeles.
If a transfer of the value system and practices of community policing can be accomplished in the L.A.P.D., there is reason to believe it can happen anywhere. Let me set the stage by providing some background.

2. Police Departments in the U.S.
There are almost two thousand five hundred cities in the U.S. with a population of 10,000 or more. The vast majority of each of these maintain their own, independent police departments. The total of all types of American enforcement agencies - local police, sheriffs, state police, and special police - is listed currently at just under 17,000, a truly staggering figure (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1992). While federal and state governments provide minimum standards for training and practice, there is of course a great variety of implementation determined by local officials. A nationwide reorientation in policing style is dependent on thousands of local responses, not on one national directorate nor even 50 state directorates. Change will be slow, episodic, sporadic, regionalized, and politicized. The impact of change in a major department, a beacon shining out above the others, is not to be overlooked in such a situation. Thus, in the U.S., community policing advocates remind us of the cases of Houston and New York and the influence of Lee Brown who has run both of those big city departments.
Certainly, for many decades, the major thrust of improvement in U.S. police departments has been to professionalize them. This professionalization has many facets, but at a minimum includes higher educational and training standards, more efficient management practices and development and application of modern technologies in communications, transportation, investigation, and weaponry. An almost inevitable by-product of this thrust has been the increasing physical and emotional separation of the police force from its service clients. Community policing, with as little sacrifice as possible to professionalization, seeks to reduce this separation.

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Indeed, the official newspaper of the LAPD's police union is titled, Thin Blue Line.
Following the Rodney King episode, a special investigative commission was established. It made a number of recommendations for police reform in Los Angeles, giving special attention to the introduction of community policing (Christopher Commission 1992). The response of the old chief was to claim that LAPD already had community policing, so what was the fuss all about? Such a response was possible because there is so much ambiguity about the meaning of this phrase "community policing." Some years earlier, LAPD had experimented with a decentralized process called "team policing;" assigning teams of officers to small districts, locating them in local offices rather than police stations, and encouraging them to immerse themselves in the local community instead of merely patrolling the communities in the distanced comfort of their patrol cars. It was a start toward community policing, but soon abandoned due to officer resistance and budget cuts. "Team policing" received little internal department support, and even less management protection in the face of competing priorities.

Thereafter, the department implemented a variety of projects - neighborhood watch, project identification, special gang patrol operations, drug intervention programs designed to "recapture" communities from organized drug dealing groups, school drug prevention programs - all of which involved having officers reach out into the community in various ways. Thus the LAPD could report that it was doing "community policing." This is what I refer to as the weak version, in which the program direction and resource allocations of police services are initiated by, determined by, and concluded by the department. The community voice is minimal. The spirit remains that of traditional police control and autonomy.

The nature of the strong version is suggested in a recent interview with Commissioner Lee Brown in New York:

People who say that community policing is more expensive say that because they look at it as a program, as contrasted to a philosophy of policing. I view community policing not as a program, but, rather, as the way you deliver police services, as a management philosophy: How does management act? I view it as an operational philosophy: What do we do on the streets of our city? We define community policing here in New York as a partnership between the police and the law-abiding citizens to prevent crime; to arrest those who choose to violate the law; to solve recurring problems where we tend to go back to the same places over and over again; and to evaluate the results of our efforts. The whole objective is to improve the quality of life in the neighborhoods throughout our city. (Law Enforcement News 1992, 10).

Notice in this quote that the emphasis is not so much on specific practices as on an attitude toward policing functions. There is much room for local variations in implementation. In the unique situation of New York, Brown suggests one, flexible variation:

We've done something in New York City that to my knowledge has not been done in the history of American policing. We have created in each of our 75 precincts what we call Precinct Management Teams. Those teams include the precinct commander as well as other key personnel at the precinct, but also includes civilians. Our district general manager, our precinct committee council president - they also serve on that Precinct Management Team. That team has the responsibility of identifying the problems and establishing priorities and developing strategies to solve the problems, using police and other resources. Then they
come back and determine the effectiveness of the strategy. Once the problem has been resolved or significantly improved, we add another problem to that list. So our ability to solve problems also becomes a criterion of evaluation. (Law Enforcement News 1992, 11)

George Kelling (1988), reflecting on the outcome of a series of seminars at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, has suggested that the spirit suggested in these quotes by Lee Brown now constitutes a "quiet revolution" in American policing. "Increasingly," he notes, "police departments are looking for means to evaluate themselves or their contribution to the quality of neighborhood life, not just crime statistics. Are such activities the business of policing? In a crescendo, police are answering yes" (1988, pg 1). If so, it is a major departure from Fogelson's comment quoted at the beginning of this paper.

4. Los Angeles as a Host City

Furthermore, it is 3,000 miles from Harvard to downtown Los Angeles. At Parker Center, the headquarters building of the LAPD, evaluation of police success is as likely to be measured in terms of the morale of the "troops" as it is in terms of crime reduction or community satisfaction. One should note that in Houston, Texas, the host city for Lee Brown's first major experiment with community policing, his departure has been followed by a retreat toward traditionalism. The president of the Police Officers' Association in Houston now notes with obvious pride, "Morale hasn't been this good in many, many years. Officers are out there working and they're enjoying working. They have confidence in the mayor (who has increased their overtime pay, M.K.) and they have confidence in this chief" (emphases added). This same official noted that recent changes (away from community policing) had "helped ease the public perception that the police department had gone soft on crime" (Law Enforcement News 1992, 8). In other words, we would do well to remember that a pendulum swings in two directions.

Many decades ago, the Los Angeles Police Department had a well-deserved reputation as one of America's most corrupt. It made deals with politicians and crooks, businessmen and strike breakers, news reporters and Hollywood writers. It swung back and forth between insiders and reformers as chief so commonly that one could hardly know which was which (Shaw 1992). Finally, in 1950, another reform chief took office who set the trajectory for the next 40 years. William H. Parker was an ultra-conservative militarist who defined in practice the essence of the internally-oriented, "new breed," high technology, impersonal, crime-fighting police organization that came to symbolize professional policing. He was succeeded over time by a series of look-alike chiefs who emanated from Parker's own command structure and cemented the value system and operational procedures of this modern force. Indeed, the just-retired chief, Daryl Gates, was Parker's official driver. In the true spirit of his mentor, he explained his choice of experimental areas for introduction of his version of community policing by saying that he "took into account only operational considerations" (Chavez 1992). This led to the exclusion of inner-city, primarily black populated areas. Only LAPD could come up with such criteria, in the face of the Christopher Commission report and its findings on police relations in the black community.

Still, a start has again been made. Seven, or slightly fewer than half of the LAPD districts, will attempt to develop the first elements of community policing. More officers will spend more of their time out in the open, connecting directly with district residents. Community councils will be formed to discuss directions that should be taken. Commanders will be on the lookout for officers described in this research observer's field notes:

... this job gives [him] a lot of time and flexibility for his true love, community
policing. All [team] members are assigned a location. His is an apartment com-plex on ... Street with lots of kids, drug sales, safety problems and he's been working for the last three months with the residents, property managers, city agencies, etc. to get it cleaned up. He feels he's had a lot of success; it's labor inten-sive but he likes spending his time this way. [Field notes, 6/11/92]

How many such officers will we find? At a meeting of a law enforcement committee considering our experimental, joint police/community project on gang intervention, the term community policiing was being used in the "weak version" - police getting residents to assist them in their op-erations. When I explained the implications of the "strong version," that enforcement agencies would have to give up some of their autonomy and give resource allocation determination to community residents, the meeting broke up. I've not been invited back.

What are the barriers to success for the new LAPD chief and his chance to institutionalize com-munity policing? It's a formidable list.

1. The department's "new breed" mentality, tied emotionally among the troops to their prior leadership.

2. Limited resources, increasingly limited by a deepening recession, wherein new priorities will lack support given to the old; e.g., rapid deployment, specialty teams.

3. LAPD's historically derived but still embedded fear that community connections breed temptation, non-universalism, and corruption.

4. A racially under-represented force called upon to immerse itself in antagonistic black, Hispanic, and Asian communities.

5. A city that, for many decades, has been used to letting the police deal with social control issues; this is a country that similarly has given up on informal social control in favor of tax supported institutional control systems.

6. A city which, more than most, has not developed cohesive neighborhoods, or self-perceived communities. So ambiguous is the word "community" in Los Angeles that a deputy chief told me in late spring 1965, "We know the community is fully supportive of the department." Less than four months later, the infamous Watts Riots tempted me to return to inquire just what community he had in mind. In the interest of maintaining good research rapport, I decided not to do so.

Still, community policing requires a willing police force and an existing host community willing itself to become a decision making entity. If the police overcome their own obstacles to surrendering autonomy, the other side must be willing - and able - to share the decision making process and the responsibilities for social control. It is not clear that the LAPD can let go; it is not clear that Los Angeles can take hold.

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Measuring Police Performance: Evaluation of the Dutch police

Maurits Kruissink

1. Introduction
The Research and Documentation Center of the Dutch Ministry of Justice is developing a model for the measurement of police performance (Terlouw and Wiebrens 1991; Wiebrens, Kruissink and Terlouw 1992; Kruissink and Terlouw 1992). In this paper, first the RDC performance model is presented, together with empirical data. It has to be considered only as a first step, since the measurement of police performance is very complex and problematic. Secondly, some of the major problems in the measurement of police performance are mentioned and shortcomings of the RDC model are discussed. Finally, the intended revision of the RDC model is outlined.
The model is designed, bearing in mind the reorganization of the Dutch police, which will be completed in April 1993. The now existing 148 municipal police forces and 17 State police districts will then be integrated into 25 regional forces and one national force. The function of the latter will be to support the regional forces. With the reorganization, a new system of financing the police will be introduced. The existing system of 'input financing' (a fixed grant) will be replaced by a combination of 'input financing' and 'output financing' (performance based award). Output financing requires insight into the performance of police forces. Aside from that, authorities like the office of public prosecution and (regional) government also need more insight into police performance. The model can be used to compare regions and in a few years it will be used in practice for the 'output financing' system. At the same time the model can be used within a region to compare the various districts.

2. The RDC police performance model, a first step
Underlying the model are two starting points. The first one, called 'steering at a distance' or 'hands off management', defines the responsibilities and expected roles of the various authorities, according to their place in the hierarchy. Steering at a distance (Kruissink and Wiebrens 1992) is characterized by the so-called principal-agent relationship. What the police should do, to what effect and what the police priorities are, is decided by the principals. They set the police agenda. The main principals are the police departments (the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office), local and regional administration and public prosecution. The chiefs of regional police forces are responsible for the output of the police and for the management of the police force. The kind of information on police performance that is required, depends upon the level in the hierarchy. The lower the level, the more detailed the information has to be.
The second starting point is the well-known input-throughput-output-effect sequence. Input is the total number of hours per year for a police force (the manpower a force has available). Throughput is what happens inside the police organization. Output is divided into products ('hard output') and services ('soft output'). Products are countable and measurable; these consist of solved cases, fines, permit applications etc. The effect of hard output is a rather vague and diffuse whole. For example, putting a few notorious burglars behind bars might result in a decrease of burglary. In the long run a high

This project is carried out in cooperation with two colleagues from the Research and Documentation Centre (RDC) of the Ministry of Justice: Caspar Wiebrens and Gert-Jan Terlouw.

For the organization of the Dutch police, see Wiebrens (1990).
clearance rate might even have a general preventive effect, resulting in diminishing crime rates. In the RDC model the effects of hard output are left outside of consideration. Police services however, are less concrete than the products. Services comprise activities like patrols, prevention advice etc. Counting/measuring these is more difficult than counting cleared cases and other products. That is why in the RDC model in its actual form, police services are measured by the effects they have.

2.1. Measuring hard output/products
Performance measurement implies that a connection between output and input is made. For example how many cases are cleared per 100 dollars or per hour? So, a possibility is to multiply all recorded cases with the average time needed to solve these cases. In this way it would be possible to calculate the time spent on output (read: solved cases) per police force and to express this as a percentage of the input (total hours available per force). However, this percentage is not a perfect indicator of hard output performance or productivity, because police forces necessarily do have to spend time on administering crimes and incidents reported to them. And in one force much more crime is reported than in another. In other words, forces differ with respect to workload. These differences in workload between forces have to be taken into account in performance measurement. With that, our assumption is that forces with a relatively high workload can realize relatively fewer cleared cases due to preoccupation with administration, and that forces with a relatively low workload should be able to realize more solved cases and other products/hard output.

We applied the model to empirical data from 14 municipal forces, using data from the 1989 administration. The administration delivered the number of cleared-up crimes, fines etc. per force in 1989. In order to construct a performance indicator we first calculated ‘in-time’ and ‘out-time’. ‘In-time’ is the time necessary to administer a crime or incident without delivering a final product like an arrest or fine. ‘Out-time’ is the time necessary to deliver a final product with regard to an incident or crime, after administering the crime or incident. Each category within the police administrations can be multiplied with its appropriate in-time and out-time (provided the case has been solved). After calculating the total in-time per force, the 14 forces were split up into three workload categories (relatively high, middle and low workload) by relating the total in-time to the total time available per force (in fact the input). Next, the total out-time per force is calculated and related to the sum of total in-time and out-time per force. This also led to a threefold classification (forces which spend relatively much, average and few time on effectively clearing up crimes).

The results of these calculations are shown in a so-called performance matrix. The horizontal axis of the matrix shows the division into three workload categories, the vertical axis represents the classification into three out-time categories. Each of the 14 police forces can be placed into one of the nine resulting cells (see figure 1). The matrix scales forces according to hard output performance while taking the workload in account.

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A standard time is defined as the time in worker hours necessary to handle an incident (burglary, shoplifting etc) completely. In the dutch 1988 reallocation research standard times for administrating and clearing up 26 categories of crimes.

In-time + out-time = standard time.
As stated before, we assume that forces with a high workload have relatively little time left for producing hard output (clearing up crimes, arresting suspects etc.). Therefore, we expect these forces to be placed in the left bottom cell (C1). On the other hand, forces with a relatively low workload can spend relatively more time on hard output. Consequently we expect these forces to be placed in the right upper cell (A3). Forces with an average workload can be expected to achieve an average output (cell B). So, the diagonal from bottom left to upper right (C1-B2-A3) represents the expected position of forces. Six of our 14 forces are positioned on this diagonal: forces N, D, F, G, H and I. These police forces perform as might be expected.

Exceptional forces are those which are positioned above the diagonal (in cells A1, A2 or B1: these forces perform better than expected) and those which have a position under the diagonal (in cells B3, C2 or C3: these forces show a performance which is less than expected). Only one force turns out to be performing better than expected. That is force A, which scores 'high' on hard output while it is confronted with a medium workload. Four forces show less than expected performances on hard output, considering their workload. These are the forces L, M, J and K.

It is very important to note that in this case the expected performance is based on a calculated average. Other positions in the matrix, for example above the diagonal, may be chosen as a norm as well. However, setting the norm is a matter of policy and not of research.

2.2. Measuring soft output/services
This performance matrix represents police achievement in an incomplete way, as it only covers police products or hard output. It does not cover the other type of police output, services or soft output.

In our model the performance with regard to services is evaluated by the effects of services. The effects of services are measured by means of standardized local crime surveys (Van Dijk 1991). To get information on the service performance of the 14 forces which appeared in the preceding part of this paper, data of 14 standardized local crime surveys were used. Scores for five effects were calculated: 1) public judgement of general police performance, 2) judgement of police availability, 3) willingness to notify the police, 4) victimization rates and 5) feelings of fear of crime.

Next, to construct one indicator of soft output performance, these data were processed in a rather rough way. One could even say 'quick and dirty'. The scores per effect were split into three categories, summed over the five effects and again split up into three categories: high, medium and low. Accordingly, it is possible to classify the 14 forces with respect to the effects of services into one of the three categories (figure 2).

Finally, a complete picture of the 14 forces, representing both products (hard output) and services (soft output) is built. In order to realize this, the product performance matrix (see figure 1) had to be reduced to a threefold order of rank as well: forces which perform better than expected (average), forces which perform as expected and forces which perform less than expected. Figure 3 might clarify this step.

The final matrix, providing insight into both product performance and service performance, results from merging both classifications into one matrix. The horizontal axis represents the performance of forces with regard to the effects of services, the vertical axis represents the performance on products (see figure 4). As with the product performance matrix, we assume that a position on the bottom left - upper right diagonal (C1-B2-A3) is an average, expected score. Forces above the diagonal perform better than other forces on both hard and soft output. They invest
rather a lot of time in clearing up crimes etc., while the services to the public are effective. Forces located under the diagonal spend relatively little time on clearing up crimes etc., while the public does not rate their services favorably.

As can be seen, the forces B and J perform the worst. They perform less than average with respect to products and also show low scores on services. The forces K and L also have low scores regarding the products, but realize medium service performance. Force N has an average product performance, but shows a less than average service performance. Three forces which have a less than expected product performance, (C, E and M), perform better than average with regard to services. The forces F, G and M realize medium scores on both service and product performance. Three forces achieve better scores than expected: forces D, I and A.

3. Future prospects, revision of the model
The previous section outlined the RDC model in a nutshell. As stated in the introduction, it is only a first step. Any performance model is confronted with numerous problems and limitations, and so is the RDC model. In general, the major problems in police performance concern the following.

- The goals of policing are very broad and vague, for example order maintenance, crime prevention etc. These goals are too unspecified to measure. Analyzing the activities of the police instead, will be no solution. Policing includes a very large number of varied activities, which would result in a (too) large number of indicators. Moreover, some police activities never appear in any registration. Performance measurement should concentrate on sub-goals of policing, finding indicators that reflect those sub-goals. As long as there is no consensus about what police should do, the choice of sub-goals and indicators is a tricky one.

- The relation between sub-goals (effects) and police activities is very complex. One activity may lead to several outcomes. For example, a policeman who is regulating traffic might at the same time be working on crime prevention and improving the contact with the public. On the contrary, several activities can lead to one effect. For example, patrol might have the effect of reducing burglary but a campaign directed towards better locks and other techno-preventive measures can have the same result.

- When finally some effects are being measured, it is hard to assess the contribution of the police, because it is impossible to isolate the impact of policing on the community. The activity of the police is only one factor, other institutions, environmental or social circumstances (among others demographic factors or unemployment), influence society as well. At least they influence those aspects of society we are using for the measurement of police performance, for example feelings of fear of crime or crime rates. It might be expected that a region where retired people are over-represented will score relatively high concerning feelings of uncertainty. Cities with lots of pubs and cinema's etc. will show higher crime rates than other cities. As Ostrom (1973) wrote: "A perplexing problem in conceptualizing the output of a police department is that while its activities contribute to the security of the community, it is never the sole contributor to this state of affairs".

- Finally, of course there are problems with the collection of valid and reliable data on police activity and effectiveness.

Several authors have written more elaborate discussions on these matters, see: Ostrom (1973); Whitaker et al (1982); Sinclair and Miller (1984), Southgate (1985); Chatterton (1987); Horton
and Smith (1988); Carter (1989).

Some of the problems mentioned above, will never be solved. Consequently, it is an illusion to think it is possible to develop a 100% reliable and valid performance model. Yet we are convinced that it is possible to construct a model that gives at least a good approximation of police performance and differences in performance in regions, enabling a justified comparison.

As stated before, the RDC model has to be considered as a first step. In the near future it will be revised. The major shortcoming of the model in its actual form is that only two performance indicators are generated. One indicator concerns hard output and the other soft output, which in combination result in a performance matrix (see figure 4). At first this seemed attractive because of its simplicity, but at the same time this is doing no justice to the complexity and variety of policing. Moreover, there is another problem. This concerns the question if it is fair and reasonable to give the same weight to the various aspects of service activities? And on what grounds can we decide upon the weights to be used?

Instead of the two measures for hard and soft output, we intend to construct performance profiles, consisting of scales representing performance with respect to various aspects of policing. An example of what such a profile might look like, can be seen in figure 5.

Figure 5: Performance Profile, example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cleared</th>
<th>rate</th>
<th>property crime</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>-----------------------------</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>feelings of safety</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim. property crime</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judgement general performance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willingness to report crime</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willingness preventive measures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the matrix the profile enables comparison of forces, with the advantage that a more detailed comparison can be made. Several aspects of policing can be considered distinctly.

The use of a profile has some other advantages. As mentioned before, in the RDC model the data on soft police output were processed in a rather rough way. (They were cut into three and just summed). The fact that the aspects of soft output differ in nature (consisting of facts (victimization), perceptions, attitudes, evaluations) was neglected. Likewise, it was not accounted for that some of these concepts will be correlated and consequently are (partly) redundant. Presenting the different aspects of policing as distinct features in a profile, while at the same time redundant aspects are skipped or combined, means an improvement in the measurement and thinking about soft output performance. Moreover, the problem of how to weigh the different aspects of service performance is solved.

Moreover, with the use of profiles the opportunity is created to present more detailed information than just statements of the kind that their force is performing badly with respect to ‘soft output'. The principals at the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office might perhaps be satisfied with superficial information like that, they are only expected to ‘steer at a distance'. But the police chiefs will not be satisfied, they need more specific information. They have to know on what aspects their force is doing a good or a bad job, in order to know where changes are required.

As with the performance matrix, it is possible to calculate expected (average) scale-positions or set certain positions to be strived for. To take social or environmental circumstances into account (i.e. unemployment or junkies) it will be possible to adjust the expected positions, in other words to set other norms.

At the moment we are awaiting the data of standardized local crime surveys carried out in 10 of
the 25 police regions. Besides, we are implementing the model in one police region (the region Rijnmond, which includes Rotterdam), comparing the 12 districts. Based on the experiences in the Rotterdam region, the data of the 10 crime surveys as well as literature and ‘good thinking’ we intend to revise and refine the RDC model.

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1. Planning and Strategy
According to certain critics police mainly intervene in crises situations in their capacity as a law enforcement body and they concentrate on individual case management rather than developing an overall concept. Their working day is dominated by coping with current issues and problems. The more interesting it is to describe police planning and strategy. First of all, these terms have to be defined.

In this context, planning is understood as a specific problem-solving process. Unlike reactive conduct, it is anticipative and takes place in a simplified model of future situations in which decisions have to be made (Stümper 1979, 2; Berdt/Tautorat 1990, 1).

Accordingly, planning in organizations is the attempt to establish the framework for decision-making (i.e. organizational structure) and the task-orientated decision-making process (e.g. police search measures) on a rational basis. When looking at the different phases of the decision-making process, planning means collection of information, identification of targets, development and selection of alternative programs and measures, implementation of programs and measures and evaluation of success.

Strategy is a particular plan of action. Unlike tactics, a strategy is made up of more global steps to achieve the desired target. It is a functional approach towards the identified target (Chandler 1962; Klink/Kordus 1986, 22; Schäfer 1976, 345). As far as police is concerned, a distinction can be made between crime-orientated, topic-orientated and regional strategies. Others differentiate between planning and operative criminal strategy (Schuster 1988, 11). Crime-orientated strategies concern areas of crime (e.g. illicit traffic in stolen vehicles), topic-orientated strategies are inter-sectional (e.g. plans to improve crime-scene work) and regional strategies are criminal geographically-oriented limited concepts.

2. Areas of Police Planning
First of all, the framework of the police decision-making process has to be planned. This involves in particular personnel (e.g. personnel planning), finance (e.g. medium-term financial planning), equipment (e.g. introduction of electronic data-processing hardware) or the organizational structure. However, police can influence these factors in some degree only to a limited extent. Some aspects of organizational structure will be dealt with now by way of example.

2.1. Organizational Structure
Police organizational planning should increasingly be carried out on the basis of criminal geographical delimitations (e.g. distinctions have to be made between local and temporal aspects of crime density, offender mobility, offender residence density). The conventional areas of responsibility as well as the conventional assignment of personnel and tasks stand in the way of a successful performance of tasks (Herold 1969, 81; 1970, 33; 1977, 293).

2.1.1. Spatial Delimitation
Police must better adapt their forms of spatial organization to the scope of action of the offenders (Ruppert 1973, 251; Rupperecht 1974, 483; Schwind 1976, 115,183,350). The areas of spatial

Abteilungspräsident, Bundeskriminalamt, Wiesbaden
organization have to be delimited in such a way that they represent a mirror image of the usual scope of action of the offenders.

It is important that each area forming a criminal geographical unit has only one police management agency assigned to it. Decentralized agencies have to be delimited in such a way that parts belonging together are not split up. If possible, the boundary lines should run through areas where hardly any operations are carried out.

At this time, attempts are being made to observe this principle in the reorganization of police forces in the federal states (Polizei-Führungsakademie 1991).

2.1.2. Police Density
The assignment of manpower to various police districts depends on the number of inhabitants of the police district, the population density, the size of the district, the economic structure, the number of criminal offenses and road traffic accidents, the number of registered motor vehicles, the length of the road network, the existence of certain institutions (e.g. constitutional bodies of the state and the federal states, airports, nuclear power stations). Other factors that have to be considered are the additional special tasks assigned to police authorities such as specialized agencies to fight white-collar crimes, mobile operational teams to combat most serious forms of crime etc. It is hoped that factors such as the mere number of criminal offenses registered by the police or the overall clear-up rates will become more and more irrelevant when it comes to assigning manpower.

2.1.3. Organization of Tasks
For any organization the question of how to organize the tasks to be performed is a fundamental one. For example, it would be possible to establish a police force to ward off dangers with an organization of its own besides the police force dealing with investigations and search measures.

Even if these proposals for profound changes are rejected for a variety of reasons (e.g. for the close links between solving a crime and conviction of the offender as far as information is concerned on the one hand and the warding off of dangers on the other hand), the problem of organization of tasks is still to be dealt with.

For instance, in the federal state of Hesse a working group has recently developed proposals on how to improve crime control (Meerfeld in: Polizei-Führungsakademie 1991). The group studied mass crime and street crime, multi offenders and/or career criminals as well as structures of organized crime. According to the model developed by the group any law enforcement agencies engaged in the immediate performance of tasks are concentrated in one integrated department. It is suggested that the persons in charge of local agencies should have an overall responsibility for their area, i.e. they should be responsible for crime control as well as for public safety and order.

In addition to this, there would be specialist directorates with specific tasks from both areas of responsibility, i.e. investigating forces, operational groups and traffic police. Cases of mass crime should be dealt with by the same officer on the spot and without delay from the very beginning - reporting the offence - until they are passed on to another authority. To achieve this, investigative teams have to be established on a decentralized basis with flexible working hours (7 am to 7 pm).

The conventional investigating forces are united with agencies also performing inter-sectional

Regrettably, the 1974 Program for Internal Security in the FRG postulates that the boundaries of local and regional authorities have to be observed in principle.
tasks, e.g. identification service. An incident room is to be established to identify series of crimes and focal points and to collect and to compile up-to-date information required for decision-making by those in charge as well as for case management. Furthermore, special operational units are to be set up to monitor and to fight street crime. As far as the suppression of organized crime is concerned, provisions have been made within the organizational structure of to ensure person-related investigations instead of crime-related investigations only. Pilot projects carried out in Hesse have proven to be a positive development of performance of tasks by police. Attempts are now being made to develop an overall concept for the whole federal state. Similar reform projects are also in progress in the federal states of Northrhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate.

2.2. Information Gathering

As compared with other state institutions, police have developed and in part implemented a variety of systems to collect and to transfer information (Kube/Aprill 1980, 14; Köhler 1991, 249). For example, INPOL, the Police Information System, which is currently being reorganized by a project group assisted by external advisers. In addition to this, a specialist commission has designed a new information system called PIAD (Police Information and Analysis Service) on the basis of research findings and current information technology to replace the conventional police reporting system. The latter had been created on the assumption that through an exchange of information on criminal offenses, suspects and modi operandi etc. further crimes could be solved, series of crimes and focal points could be identified and enforcement strategies could be implemented quickly and in a target-orientated way.

Other police card files and data collections have become more and more difficult to handle. For example, the Bundeskriminalamt's fingerprint collection containing more than 3 million fingerprint sheets can be searched automatically, but so far fingerprint formulas have still been established in the conventional way. Bearing in mind that several hundred thousand formulas have to be established per year, this has become an insoluble task. At the moment, AFIS - the Automatic Fingerprint Identification System - is being implemented. It works on the basis of a method developed by the French company Morpho. It was found that these radical changes also required supporting measures as far as personnel was concerned. New and adequate working places had to be made available for several dozen specialized staff which also involved training of these employees for their new jobs.

Traditional criminalistic is characterized by information gathering in reaction to a specific crime and by a strict crime-orientated approach. However, identifying the structure of organized crime (OC), infiltrating them and, if possible, eliminating them, requires efficient information, in particular within the crime scenes. This also applies to crime prevention. This approach calls for new suppression and prevention strategies and tactics within the frameworks of existing laws. According to Walter, who describes the situation in Frankfurt (Walter 1992, 365), information on criminal scenes could be obtained from the following sources:

- electronic media and print media to which everybody has access - internal sources, i.e. crime reports, statements by witnesses and defendants, criminal records, wiretaps, intelligence from surveillance operations, but also observations and information gathered by officers on the beat, reports, radio messages, situation reports on organized crime compiled by other agencies, etc.
- external sources, i.e. the judicial authorities, other authorities and institutions (customs, tax inspectors, etc.)
- confidential and undercover sources, i.e. informants, cooperating individuals, undercover agents.
The flow of information has to be described and channeled to guarantee a systematic collection of the above-described intelligence. This means:

- daily situation reports have to be compiled by all the organizational units of the police department to gather internal information
- permanent meetings on "Organized Crime" have to take place involving police, judicial authorities, customs, tax inspectors and other authorities
- an Organized Crime Coordination Centre is set up to obtain information from sources accessible to everybody but also from confidential and undercover sources.

According to the Frankfurt concept, in any police force officers (i.e. uniformed police and detectives) are named as points of contact as far as organized crime is concerned. Moreover, condensed presentations on organized crime issues shall help staff at any level of uniformed police and detective police to familiarize themselves with the problem. New concepts have to be developed on how to deal with cooperating individuals. Finally, a computer-assisted collection, evaluation and classification of organized-crime related information have been established.

Another strategic approach to gathering of information are scientific electronic data processing methods of pattern recognition. For example, FISH (Forensic Science Information System Handwriting) produces a hit list of possible identifications for an incriminating handwriting from the pool of handwriting samples. The system has meanwhile also been adopted by the US Secret Service and by the Dutch police.

Another important means is the operations computer called ELR (Einsatzleitrechner) which facilitates the decision-making process in that the required information is available within seconds and in that operations can be expedited and documented.

Within the framework of information strategies, planning means above all the development and implementation of new technologies and information systems. Elements of planning information systems are, for instance, analysis of the requirements/user components, definition of data basis/data structure, system functions, development of dialogue designs, data security.

2.3. Target Planning

Police target plans describe planned future conditions of the relationship between the police and environment or the police itself including certain subsystems (e.g. a planned police management system). Within the framework of target planning, special importance is attached to structuring the relationship between the target elements (i.e. in the sense of solving conflicts of goals, setting priorities, developing target hierarchies).

Police target planning in the sense of concepts on how to eliminate deficits and how to identify requirements may range from creating models for the police to formulating targets in details. Due to the federal structure of Germany, the harmonization and agreement on targets is very important. This process takes place in various bodies with representatives from the state and from the federal states, e.g. AK II, AG Kripo, UALEX, etc. Target and task planning have to be seen together and also in relation to budget and financial planning for which they form a dynamic, but solid basis. Organizations always run the risk of simply carrying on with well-established systems. In general, claims for funds are put forward in budget and financial planning, which are late not made available to the expected extent in the budget as such due to spending cuts. As a rule, these cuts concern tasks without background, i.e. specific target and task plans have not yet been developed.

The most comprehensive and fundamental police target planning in the sense of a strategic concept which also serves as a link with criminal politics, is the "Program for Internal Security in the Federal Republic of Germany". In this program the Ministers and Senators of the Interior of the
Federal Government and of the Federal States define as central targets the protection of the indi-
vidual against crime and the protection of the state institutions and the democratic system. From
these targets conclusions and intentions are derived concerning
- organization and responsibilities
- personnel and equipment
- main tasks and cooperation
of the police and intelligence service in order to guarantee internal security. The program also
contains statements on the essential basic conditions for crime control such as a need for legisla-
tive action or cross-border cooperation in Europe.
The program was amended in 1974. This shows that essential parts of the program are still up-to-
date and that there has been no need for further amendments since. Accordingly, the program
meets the requirements of a strategy concept which has to be valid for a longer period of time if
it is regarded as a guideline. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that no changes have been made since
1974, one may assume that recent attempts have failed to make all political decision-makers
agree on necessary updates of the program. There are in fact statements in the program which
need updating and amending. Here it becomes clear how difficult it is to make ministers and
senators from 11 - now 16 - federal states agree on joint guidelines. Some time ago, the Confer-
ence of Ministers of the Interior has decided to revise the program. However, there have hardly
been any attempts to put this into action so far.
Looking critically at the guidelines set in the program for crime control one will find that the
strategy has been successful. Important targets have been achieved as a whole or in part. For ex-
ample, the integration of uniformed police and detective police, which is optimised in the men-
tioned models for reorganization, the concerted further training and specialist training or the
creation of specialist agencies such as the one to control organized crime. The Program for Inter-
nal Security thus forms the basis for crime-orientated and topic-orientated strategies.

2.4. Program and Strategy Planning
Programs developed with the help of planning methods may be milestones in making the police
system more modern and efficient. This concerns above all crime prevention and crime control
programs, but also internal management philosophies such as the Bundeskriminalamt's orienta-
tion program.
Programs appealing to the system environment of the police would be a question of developing
crime-orientated strategies, whereas internal concepts appeal to the corporate identity of the po-
lice. The Bundeskriminalamt's orientation program contains, inter alia, statements on corporate
identity, guidelines for action and targets and strategies of the Bundeskriminalamt. Special em-
phasis is placed on investigations and the Bundes-kriminalamt's main function as a central ser-
vice agency (e.g. special training programs).
A variety of short-term plans by the police concern operative and tactical action. In this field,
above all, emergency calls and their operation-orientated analysis constitute a considerable part
of the planning.
To illustrate the strategy planning a crime-orientated strategy is described: The majority of the
conventional approaches to controlling terrorist crimes is oriented towards the offenders and
their periphery. However, under the new concept - K 106 - it is hoped to arrest offenders in that
potential victims and their social surroundings are included into the strategy. Strategy planners
assume that terrorists spend a lot of time on spying out their victims way of life prior to commit-
ting their attacks. This has been confirmed by analyses of most recent attacks. To spy out their
potential victims, the terrorists had to establish undercover contacts with them.
And this is where the strategic concept comes in. It has been developed to make sure that under-
cover contacts and checks come to notice of the authorities. In this way it is hoped to obtain information about future terrorists attacks well in advance and to take appropriate action to prevent them.

When developing complex programs, there is also a need for inter-departmental and often overall social planning. A typical example for this is the National Drug Law Enforcement Plan. Any relevant social institutions were invited to discuss the planning concept developed above all by the Federal Ministries of the Interior and Health. The objective was to create a plan containing promising strategies to control drug abuse and drug-related crime which would be supported in essence by all those involved.

The National Drug Law Enforcement Plan proclaims that any personnel available for drug law enforcement should be concentrated and that additional resources should be made available to control drug-related crime. In this context, the so-called source-and-transit-country strategy was born to stop the illegal importation of drugs from these countries. In advancing the defence line, the root of all evil is to be fought in these countries in conjunction with the local authorities. The Plan also contains drug substitution programs for drug-producing countries as well as training and equipment aid for drug law enforcement officers from the source-and-transit countries. In addition to this, drug liaison officers are stationed in these countries. At the moment the Bundeskriminalamt has 32 drug liaison officers stationed in 22 different countries.

Meanwhile, Western Europe has become a uniform drug market. The instrument of "controlled deliveries" has been implemented to intercept drug couriers, which are replaced easily, but also to eliminate logistics in the target country by obtaining information on recipients of large consignments. Numerous attempts have also been made by various working groups involved in inter-governmental cooperation at EC level or at the Council of Europe to harmonize laws and to make them more effective (e.g. Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Legislation) and to improve law enforcement strategies. However, some experts and bodies have stated meanwhile that this harmonization should only concern the penalty (Rausch 1991, 115).

It is hoped that Europol - a team headed by Germany has recently started in Strasbourg to build up the organization - will optimize drug law enforcement. The European Drug Law Enforcement Plan adopted by the European Council in Rome on 14.12.90 could be a strategic guideline for Europol (in the first phase for EDU - European Drugs Unit).

2.5. Implementation Planning
Once a decision has been made as a result of a problem-solving process - possibly reached with the help of planning techniques (e.g. benefit-value analyses, benefit-cost analyses) - and been authorized within the organization, the question of implementation planning arises.

There are provisions made for assisting implementation planning, e.g. police regulation 384.1 to carry out instant and concerted police searches including alarm lists. Special techniques, such as network planning, may - according to the tasks having to be performed - assist in an efficient implementation of complex projects. However, as far as investigative proceedings are concerned, where the police action depends on the conduct of others to a large extent, network planning should only be set up, if it can be adapted to the needs of the police.

2.6. Evaluation of Success
A problem often overlooked in practice is the evaluation of success, particularly the one of special programs. For instance, it would be possible to evaluate new training programs by comparing them with future assessments of officers with a different educational background in order to make program changes later on in the interest of optimization. However, special importance should be attached to evaluating programs with immediate external effect, e.g. prevention models in drug misuse. It has become an established practice to "measure" (Kube/Koch 1992, 76) efficiency by quoting figures from crime statistics. To use a metaphor - the shots are counted, but not the hits.

Regrettably, in police practice, planning is often seen as a limited and unique process which leads to a plan and/or a programm being developed. Planners seldom look into the effects and the reasons for deviations from the planned target. On the contrary, should new problems arise, the old stock-taking is repeated and a new plan is developed on the basis of the stock-taking, or the old one is changed.

3. Conclusions
The knowledge gained from experience could be optimised by means of an evaluation of success and could then be used for future decision-making. For this reason, research work into implementation should be carried out, for instance as far as the new criminal offence of the so-called extended forfeiture of assets (proceeds of crime) is concerned, and the anticipated Investigating Proceeds of Crime Legislation should be included into the accompanying evaluation process. Police will only be in a position to respond to the challenging tasks of the future, if they follow the principle of well-planned action with a strategic element.

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Community Policing in Germany

Joachim Jäger

1. Community Policing: a term which needs to be precised
This international symposium - the occasion, the chosen main topic, the expertise of attending delegates and the current situation in the Federal Republic of Germany seem to set the appropriate background to meet with the adequate attention of the responsible decision-making bodies in our country.
Theory and practical approaches of 'community policing' must be identified as having been almost unknown tools in Germany so far. To begin with the term 'community policing' itself, there is more guessing about it than any precise picture. We must, however, admit that the combination of these two words alone does not sufficiently express what is in fact meant by it.
Policing never happens in a vacuum, it always interacts with the community and is aimed at the closest possible contact. Above all in totalitarian systems, this relationship can be misused as an instrument of exerting control and repression as perfectly as possible. The underlying police philosophy of the 'policing' concept therefore is the essential factor.
The word 'community' as well is all but unambiguous. It can be interpreted as either an administrative or a territorial unit. What we are referring to, is the social entity in a specific geographical location; it might be a clearly defined homogeneous neighborhood. Once again, some more precision is helpful. This social entity consists of many different sections of the community according to age, ethnicity, political orientation, social status etc.. The majority of people in a residential area can belong to those 'left behind in our society' (underprivileged), groups which are affected by rather a high potential for conflicts and - on the other hand - a low potential for resolving their difficulties. It must be considered that under such circumstances we are faced with a constantly changing community, with changing needs and expectations. This is probably the most important challenge to the approach of 'policing together with the community' as I would like to precise.

2. "Policing together with the Community" in Germany
In the Federal Republic of Germany, police is the matter of the different Federal States, the Länder. The regional governments have different police philosophies; police managers and officers through the ranks have no uniform professional self-understanding. This is why - apart from law-and-order thinking - we face quite different concepts about the police role. These contrasting views result in the organization or in individual police officers contributing with their practical experience, know-how and the possibilities of the police to providing a service to either the community or to individual sections of the community, thus contributing to problem solving, reduction of danger or fear and to crime prevention. There is sufficient proof of such commendable efforts, and successful examples exist. These have had a positive impact on both the organizational structure and the police philosophy in the past. Decentralization, close community relations, service function - these features are found as early as in the well-known Japanese KOBAN-system, which was introduced in Japan at the end of the
19th century according to the recommendation of the German Polizeihauptmann Wilhelm Höhn (Kühne/Miyazawa 1979, 131). This system has worked there until today. It is, however, doubtful whether such a system could be introduced into nowadays's Western societies and, if this approach should be taken into consideration at all. Under this approach, we have not noticed any elements of 'policing together with the community', since the State does not only determine the police philosophy and training contents, but also allocation of police resources and the points of main effort.

Consequences are noticeable anywhere, as long as, on one hand, minor administrative offenses are strictly prosecuted - whereas - at the same time - major accident-prone or high crime areas are ignored. In my view, the reason is that the responsible bodies are either not capable of or not willing to identify the causes, conditions and circumstances of crime, and therefore declare crime prevention as being too costly or useless. In this context, we have to notice a disregard of criminology and its findings, which finally results into pleading for more severe laws, police reinforcement, deployment of police special units etc.. Sometimes, a misinterpretation of the citizens' expectations as voters might play a certain role, as well.

The State whose decision-making bodies are not capable of setting an end to this position, is rightly looked upon as a synonym for repression. This is all the more true since the international comparison reveals that not only a re-thinking process has taken place, but furthermore different models of crime prevention that have been successfully run.

Coming to the end in this chapter, I should conclude that in Germany a practical approach of 'policing together with the community' has not existed so far.

3. Kommunale Kriminalpolitik

Let me now turn your attention to the model of 'Kommunale Kriminalpolitik' (Jäger 1992, 62) which has been developed during the last 15 years resulting from the advancement of geography of crime, and which we attempt to put into practice at the Schleswig-Holstein Crime Prevention Council.

The fundamental assumption of this model is that the majority of factors contributing to the existence of crime are closely linked to local circumstances. The majority of crime is committed by local offenders who have been socialised in this very residential area. Local victims provide the majority of chances for perpetrators to commit crime. Social control, too, as a criminogenic factor has specific local features. These factors resulting into diverse types of offenses are at the same time the starting points for promising measures of crime prevention, and they must be blocked at their places of origin.

As a matter of fact, focussing on the origin of crime puts various responsibilities - apart from police - into the centre of interest. It becomes obvious that crime prevention without inter-agency communication and co-operation is of no impact at all.

When we refer to crime politics in this particular context, i.e. at the lowest administrative level, we have some good reason to do so. The fundamental understanding is that crime politics go beyond the hitherto traditional thinking, that is to say the reform of penal and criminal procedure law. Politicians at all levels bear responsibility for their citizens' safety as being one fundamental aspect of their quality of life. Politicians are expected and urgently requested to take the corresponding initiatives and to provide support on a permanent basis.

In the Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein we could achieve a certain level of sensibility in this

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As an exception could be mentioned the close police cooperation with the local administration and community in the preparatory phase of a demonstration.
respect. A number of Crime Prevention Councils has been set up at the grassroots level. They have already been involved in topic-related project groups under local crime prevention activities. Now as ever we are convinced that a local inter-agency co-operation which is focused on specific types of offenses will contribute to reducing delinquency.

One matter which renders these pioneer activities in Schleswig-Holstein more difficult is that until today no crime prevention forum exists at the national level. Responsibilities of a German Crime Prevention Council are quite obvious: Basically, the evaluation and multiplication of existing know-how and practical experience are most essential. Pilot projects have to be run and evaluated. Crime prevention impulses, co-ordination and concentration of methods plus counselling at all levels are expected with an increasing impatience - and this is not only the case in the new Federal States which are indeed faced with difficult situations. There is an urgent need for methodological training and concepts aimed at problem-solving on the bottom. Every day delinquency produces a multitude of individual victims in our country. John A. Calhoun, Executive Director of the National Crime Prevention Council (USA), mentioned another possible victim, which we might be faced with when neglecting a systematic implementation and development of crime prevention: death of society.

4. The police role

Criticism of the police role in crime prevention has turned out both in literature and during this symposium. Therefore I will limit myself to a few key words: over protection, abuse for repressive purposes, data protection, overall responsibility, police as saviour of the nation. This must not be deepened anymore; I should rather like to deal with some prevention aspects within the organization.

Without any doubt the police have an influence onto the level of violence not only in individual interactions but as well in society on the whole. Being aware of this, communication and conflict-handling training courses have been run and have proved successful. A number of Federal States has organised such courses for several years already. Distinct efforts are made to avoid violent escalation of a given interaction and to de-emphasize macho values. Let me add another aspect to this view. In my understanding, the police must be capable of handling in an exemplary manner a dichotomy: on the one hand, a society needs condemnation of criminal acts, and society has to counter such acts for the sake of its own safety and survival. On the other hand, our view of a human being requires empathy with the offender as an individual. In that context, police professionalism means that the officer has to fortify himself against dismay and overreaction. Considering all these aspects we must, however, bear in mind that the police hold the State monopoly of using power and that they are obliged to enforce as ultima ratio the law as one of our major civilization achievements under the fundamental constitutional principle of proportionality.

I should like to come back to the police role in crime prevention. In the police, activities of such a nature that the population is counselled on crime prevention have tradition. Besides, the police have constantly given relevant impulses both in specialized literature (Kube 1987; Polizei-Führungsakademie 1988) and in practical police work to underline that prevention must be considered as an overall community responsibility and that the corresponding consequences must be drawn. Apparently until today, such impulses have been necessary in Germany, and this is true for the model of Kommunale Kriminalpolitik as well. Furthermore, it has become obvious that police officers through the ranks are welcome to act as advisers and that the organization is used as a pressure group. Cases have come to my attention where the police manager has been the one and only person giving impulses for the implementation and where he had to overcome a variety of difficulties in his own organization, too.
Besides the mentioned responsibilities the police are - under our model - limited to the role of advisers and suppliers of information. (In this particular case we deal with aggregated data which do not touch the right to informational self-determination.) In my view, the professional competence of police officers results among other aspects from the fact that criminology, unlike in any other profession, has a particular position throughout all the different police training phases. Inter-agency co-operation therefore requires substantial efforts to co-ordinate and/or complement curricula.

Let me once again mention the data: we are well aware of the limited expressiveness of police crime statistics and therefore support the scheme of having regional criminological analyses set up by external scientists, thus providing a solid and reasonable fundament for planning local prevention schemes (Junger-Tas/Rütting/Wilzing 1987, 5).

The probably most essential role which the police have to play under our model might be the identification of a minimum consensus about community life standards in co-operation with local representatives. In this context, 'The Positive Policing Charter for the Borough of Newham/London' (copy of document attached to this paper) seems exemplary to me. Before I draw my final conclusions let me point out one thing to you: The model of 'Kommunale Kriminalpolitik' would have been misunderstood in those cases where it may result in a dominant police role.

5. Conclusions
We have experienced Rostock, Newcastle and Mantes-La-Jolie. What else must happen before a re-thinking process starts?
Extensive preparatory work has been undertaken paving the way for a systematic implementation and development of crime prevention, and remarkable prototypes from practical work are existing. Now it is our responsibility to require an honest declaration of the political will to assign crime prevention its appropriate value including the corresponding allocation of resources.
In order to ensure a European and world-wide communication and co-operation, Germany needs a central coordinating body. In my view, therefore, the Federation should be responsible for setting up a German Crime Prevention Council. Our legal system provides sufficient possibilities for the appropriate construction of such a body. It is most essential, however, that the competence for the issue of guiding principles lies with an inter-agency body as advisory panel or board of trustees. At the same time, a foundation by German Industry and Trade to support crime prevention should be created, thus providing additional funds for promotion and development, pilot projects and their subsequent evaluation.
Several indications exist that this very moment is advantageous to initiate the barely needed re-thinking process in crime politics - a big chance and challenge to this symposium.

Newham Council's Positive Policing Programme has three priorities:

- promoting police accountability to local people
- improving community safety
- promoting local residents' awareness of their rights.

The Positive Policing Charter sets out local people's expectations for policing in Newham in the 1990s. It sets down basic tenets for policing in the Borough.
1. The Positive Policing Charter
1.1. All residents have the right to an equal policing service!
All Newham Communities are entitled to expect the police to recognise and respond to their policing needs. Different groups have different policing requirements but each has the right to equality of treatment and consideration. Racial harassment, violence against women, child abuse - all reflect differing needs. Care must be taken to ensure all these needs are met in the policing of the Borough.

1.2. Local people have the right to a say in how their area is policed!
Local residents are generally concerned about policing and community safety problems which exist in their particular area. Local people have the right to be consulted at all stages of the development of policing policy and have an active part to play in determining the standard and quality of policing their areas receive. Priorities for policing will vary from area to area. Regular, organised, local consultations between the police and residents are essential.

1.3. People are the first priority!
All crime is serious but tackling crime against people must take first priority. Crime against people - be it assault or harassment - is the source of most public concern. It causes fear especially in the most vulnerable sections of the community. Fear of being a victim of crime is not an irrational myth - it is a real, live, daily concern based on people's experiences. Giving priority to people rather than property may not reduce overall crime figures but it will tackle those crimes which cause people most concern.

1.4. Preventing crime is better than reacting to crime!
It makes sense to take all possible steps to prevent crime occurring rather than having to deal with its consequences after it happens. A greater proportion of police resources need to be directed at crime prevention. Increasing the number of beat officers is a priority for improving crime prevention and meeting the wishes of local residents.

1.5. Providing support for victims of crime!
Support and help are necessities for victims of crime. Too often victims feel the police take too long to respond to calls or that after initial attendance there is little or no further contact. Giving advice and assistance to victims, keeping them informed of how their cases are progressing and improving response times are all priorities for policing in Newham.

1.6. Ensuring that all people are treated with dignity and courtesy!
Dissatisfaction with the way in which the police have conducted an investigation or treated victims or people in stations is all too common an occurrence. Local people, irrespective of how they come into contact with the police, are entitled to expect to be treated with respect, courtesy and dignity.

1.7. Improving the quality of policing in Newham!
Newham Council believes the police are a public service funded by local people. This places an obligation on the police to strive to improve the quality of the service they provide for local people.
Improving the quality of policing includes:
- providing a cost effective police service which gives value for money
- winning public confidence by ensuring the code of professional conduct is maintained and applied
1.8. Providing sufficient resources to police Newham!
Policing resources must be commensurate to the needs of the Borough so that a satisfactory standard of police service can be provided. A shortage of resources makes it even more essential that local people are consulted on how available resources are to be applied. Newham Council is committed to winning sufficient policing resources from Government to ensure the expectations of local people are met.
The Positive Policing Charter highlights the policing style which will take Newham into the 1990s and help build a safer, better Borough for local residents. It is right and proper for local people to set down the basic ways in which they wish to see policing carried out.

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Community Policing in Britain

Trevor Bennett

1. Introduction
It is not very common for senior police officers in Britain to say that what they are doing is community policing. Nevertheless, there are signs that the British police are moving towards a more community-oriented style of policing.

The main vehicle for change has been an influential document published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) called the ACPO Strategic Policy Document (ACPO 1990) which has offered a directive to police chiefs to develop the idea of 'quality of service' and to view the public as their 'customers' (including people arrested). The main emphasis of this directive has been to promote a general reappraisal of operational policing and a reassessment of the role of the police.

The reluctance of the police to refer to these developments as community policing is understandable in the British context. There is an awareness in Britain that we have been down this road before. It was argued that the 'golden age' of policing before the introduction of motor vehicles and hand-held radios was the original form of community policing (Weatheritt 1983). We were encouraged to believe that Unit Beat Policing which superseded the fixed-point system of foot patrols was a more modern version of community policing (Weatheritt 1983), and John Alderson as Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall told us that he had devised and implemented community policing in his force area during the latter part of the 1970's (Alderson 1978). There is also a concern among police in Britain of adopting yet another policing slogan as a means of declaring to others that what they are doing is something new.

Nevertheless, the development of the concept of community policing can be helpful if it provides a means of understanding and explaining current policing methods.

I shall discuss briefly the concept of community policing and the extent to which it can be usefully applied to recent developments in British policing. The first section considers the philosophy and practice of community policing in a general context and the second section considers the philosophy and practice of community policing as it applies specifically to Britain.

2. What is Community Policing?
2.1. Introduction
In order to comment on the state of community policing in Britain it is necessary to consider the kind of programme which qualifies as a community policing programme. This requires something to be said about the nature of community policing philosophy and practice.

2.2. Philosophy
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux make a useful distinction in their book on community policing between a philosophy, strategy, and tactic (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). Community policing is viewed as a philosophy based, according to Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, on the concept of police officers and private citizens working together to help solve community problems. They also state:

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The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop a new relationship with the law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities, and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990:5).

Community policing is viewed as a strategy and tactic in much the same way as the terms are used in their original military sense. Strategies are described as plans for organising manpower before contact has been made with the enemy (in this case the public) and tactics are described as plans for utilising manpower once contact with the enemy (or public) has been made. This conceptualization is similar to that offered by Skolnick and Bayley who argue that it is not the programme per se that qualifies for the term community policing, but the theory behind the programme (Skolnick and Bayley 1987). They provide as an example of this distinction the difference between implementing foot patrol for economic reasons and implementing foot patrol to enhance community contact.

This distinction gives primary importance to the community policing philosophy as it is the philosophy which defines the essential characteristics of community policing. Hence, what kind of policing philosophy is a community policing philosophy?

The quotation by Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux provides a useful lead in defining the philosophy in terms of the nature of the relationship between the police and the public. Is there anything more that has been said about this relation in the literature?

Statements made in the literature about the nature of the relationship between the police and the public fall into three main groups.

The first group refer to abstract and somewhat evangelical notions of something 'good' about the relationship. Some writers talk about a 'closer harmony' between the police and the public (Green and Mastrofski 1988). Alderson (1983) refers to the police and the community working towards 'the common good'. Morris and Heal (1981) refer to the idea of 'breaking down the barriers' separating the community and the police.

The second group of statements refer more specifically to a relationship whereby the police and the community work together to achieve common goals. Morris and Heal (1981) use the popular term in Britain at the moment of a 'partnership' between the police and the community. They also refer to the idea of 'sharing responsibility' for the control of crime between the police and the community. Skolnick and Bayley (1987) refer to the equally popular term in the United States of the police involving the community as 'co-producers' of public safety and order.

The third group of statements refer to a relationship between the police and the public which includes the police taking account of the wishes and concerns of the community. There are a number of ways mentioned in the literature in which the police can take account of the wishes and concerns of the community.

It can mean that the police listen to the community in order to improve the quality police service without necessarily affecting operational policing policy (e.g. improving reactive policing) (see Wasserman and Moore 1988). It can mean that the police listen to the public as a means of determining policing priorities and operational policy (Goldstein 1987). It can also mean that the police listen to the public within a formal systems of local accountability in order to account for their actions (Skolnick and Bayley 1987).

The description of the key elements of a community policing philosophy noted above provides only a rough guide as to what this philosophy might be.

However, in practice it would be difficult to identify with any precision the nature of a policing philosophy behind the implementation of a particular programme.

Taken to its limits it would require an analysis of police belief systems and subcultures before identifying with confidence that a particular programme was a community policing programme.
Hence, it is probably unnecessary to be any more precise about the nature of the philosophy than has already been attempted. This would mean that a workable definition of a community policing philosophy might include the following basic elements: a belief or intention that the police should work with the public whenever possible in solving local problems and a belief that they should take account of the wishes of the public in defining and evaluating operational policing policy.

2.3. Practice
The argument that a community policing programme is based on a community policing philosophy generates difficulties in identifying community policing programmes in practice. Even using the relatively simple definition of a community policing philosophy described above it would be necessary to determine whether local forces implementing these programmes really thought this way.

In practice it is rarely possible to state that a particular programme is based on a particular belief system. This suggests that it is necessary to identify community policing programmes on the basis of some other criteria.

One approach which has been used in the literature is to identify the type of programme most frequently cited in the literature as a community policing programme. This approach was adopted by Skolnick and Bayley (1987) who reviewed a large number of programmes around the world and identified four main programme elements which were most frequently identified as community policing programmes. Using this method they listed community-based crime prevention, reorientation of patrol strategies, increased accountability to the public, and decentralization of command as the basic forms of community policing (Skolnick and Bayley 1987).

The method used by Skolnick and Bayley provides a useful summary of the main forms of community policing in practice but it does not help to make decisions about specific programmes. In order to comment on the nature of community policing in Britain it is necessary to devise some way of deciding what is and what is not a community policing programme.

The reasons for entering into this discussion relate to the problems to be addressed in presenting the findings of own survey of community policing programmes in Britain. When the police are asked to list all community policing programmes operating in their force areas they collectively provide a very large numbers of programmes. It is necessary, therefore, to make a decision about which of these programmes are to be defined as constituting community policing programmes and which are not.

Another approach which is perhaps more practicable is to identify programmes as community policing programmes on the basis of certain criteria. It has already been noted that it is not usually feasible to identify the kind of belief system which predated a programme. It would be possible, however, to identify other criteria which were more easily measurable to determine whether for practical purposes a particular programme should be defined as a community policing programme.

This approach was adopted by Ekblom (1986) who identified a large number of community policing programmes on the grounds that they were proactive and might in some way benefit the local community. The programmes listed using this method included: community constables, community liaison officers, crime analysis, youth programmes, schools liaison, police shops, community surveys, inter-agency approaches and police consultative committees.

This approach is helpful in generating the idea that policing programmes can be listed in terms of certain criteria. However, some additional thought is needed in deciding on the nature of the criteria to be used in selecting the programme.
3. Current forms of Community Policing in Britain

3.1. Introduction

In the remainder of this paper I shall consider the state of community policing philosophy and practice in Britain. In order to do this I shall work within the decisions made above concerning the nature of a community policing philosophy and the need to identify measurable criteria to make practical decisions about whether policing programmes are community policing programmes.

3.2. Policing philosophy

Over the last two years there has been a radical reappraisal of policing philosophy and the role of the police. The main outward sign of this developments is the publication of two important reports.

The first of these, the Operational Police Review (The Joint Consultative Committee 1990), presented the results of a police survey conducted by representatives of the three police staff associations into the current state of policing. The main proposition contained in the report was that drives for greater efficiency within the police service had led to an erosion of service-styled policing. The report noted that in order to maintain traditional (meaning community oriented) policing functions it was necessary to develop new measures of police performance which reflected the qualitative dimensions of policing and public satisfaction with the police service.

The second document, the ACPO Strategic Policy Document (ACPO 1990) considered the findings of the Operational Policing Review and made recommendations. The document reported that public dissatisfaction with the police reported in the most recent British Crime Survey (Mayhew, Elliott, and Dowds 1989) stemmed largely from inappropriate and outdated policing styles and poor service delivery.

The report made a number of recommendations including a recommendation to devise a statement of common purpose and values for the police service nationally. It suggested that this statement should encompass what was now regarded to be the most important functions of the police service to 'protect, help and reassure the community', to 'be compassionate, courteous and patient', and to, 'strive to reduce the fears of the public'. The report recommended that attention should be paid to the wishes of individual communities and steps should be taken to ensure that police action reflected public concern and priorities.

The report was distributed to every chief constables with the directive to take steps to implement the spirit of the report in their police force area. The report had the backing of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Home Office and was taken seriously by chief officers. Most forces have now begun to devise plans to evaluate police performance through local crime surveys and through police activity surveys with the view of improving the quality of policing at the local level.

3.3. Policing practice

I shall report on the current state of community policing practice in Britain in two ways. First I shall present the findings of my own national survey of community policing concerning the total number of programmes implemented. Second I shall examine in more detail selected programmes and consider what is currently known about their effectiveness.

3.3.1. The national survey of community-oriented policing

The national survey of community-oriented policing was conducted between 1989 and 1990 in all police forces in England and Wales (with the exception of 3 of the 43 forces who failed to cooperate) (Bennett and Lupton 1990).
A self-administered questionnaire was distributed to each division (or other local section) with the request to provide details of all community-oriented policing programmes currently operating in their division. The survey produced almost 2,000 individual programmes which were then analyzed and categorized in the way shown in the table in the appendices.

The table can be viewed as a summary of the programme types identified by the police when asked to list community policing in their area. The table shows that the police identified a large number of programme types as being operational at the time of the survey in 1989-1990. It also shows that the police identified a large number of programmes which can be described as policing strategies or tactics.

The strategies can be divided into those which concern broad organizational structures and those which concern individual programmes concerning the deployment of small groups of officers. The tactics can be divided into those which involve community liaison or involvement and those which involve the delivery of crime prevention.

In addition to strategies and tactics the police also identified a number of 'indirect measures' which comprised one or more elements of a policing programme and 'support measures' which comprised methods for releasing officers for community policing duties.

The table provides a list of categories of programmes identified by the police as being community oriented. In order to proceed with the analysis it would have to be decided independently whether all of these programme types should be included under the heading of a community policing programme.

It would appear that the strong candidate programmes are those which involve operational strategies and tactics. The indirect measures and support measures are more appropriately regarded as important parts of a community policing programme rather than as programmes in their own right.

The strong candidate programmes within the category of operational strategies and tactics are those which directly involve the public. This would include all of the comprehensive and specific strategies and those operational tactics involving the general public or the community. The operational tactics involving public service departments or businesses might also be better viewed as important parts of a community policing programme rather than as programmes in their own right.

The table is presented to provide a summary of the kinds of programmes operating in Britain at the time of the survey. The main task of the next section is to talk about a small number of these programmes in more detail.

3.3.2. Selected community-oriented programmes
3.3.2.1. Area-based foot patrols (operational)

Area-based foot patrols are more commonly referred to as community constables. In some senses community constables have always been the backbone of community policing in Britain. Nevertheless, until recently little was known about them or the way in which they operated.

One basic fact which has only recently come to light is the number of community constables. The only information available before this time was that published by a small number of forces in their annual reports or the results of small research studies. (Data held by HMIC were not available to the public until recently.)

A survey conducted in the Metropolitan Police District (MPD) in 1982 by the Policy Studies Institute showed that 5 per cent of all officers up to the rank of inspector (and about 10 per cent of all home beat and relief constables combined) being allocated to home beat duties (Smith 1983).
My own survey of Metropolitan Police District conducted in 1990 showed that approximately 13 per cent of all home beat and relief constables combined were allocated to these duties suggesting a small increase in the use of these officers since 1982 (Bennett and Lupton 1990). It was estimated from data collected by HMIC and from my own survey of all forces that about 10,000 officers were allocated to community constable duties in England and Wales in 1989 out of a total of 50,000 operational patrol constables. The survey also showed that the use of community constables was widespread with all forces allocating at least some officers to these duties.

Nevertheless, there were a number of other findings which suggested that the community constable scheme was not operating as effectively as might be hoped. The proportion of officers allocated to community constable duties was quite low (less than 20 per cent of operational constables) (Bennett and Lupton 1990). Community constables reported that they were withdrawn from their duties to conduct other duties about 20 per cent of their working time. The research also showed that community constables spent on average in excess of one-third of their duty time inside the station and in some forces this rose to more than 50 per cent. Less than ten per cent of their total duty time was spent on community contacts or preventive or other proactive work (Bennett and Lupton 1990; 1992).

Similar findings have emerged from other studies. An earlier study conducted in England and Wales showed that officers were withdrawn from community constable duties about one-fifth of their working time (Brown and Iles 1985). The remainder of the time was spent largely on general duties inside the station. Less than 14 per cent of duty time was spent on community involvement.

3.3.2.2. Area-based policing (decentralization)

Area-based policing is a phrase used here to describe the use of decentralised policing units with independent command.

Decentralization has always been a feature of police organization in Britain as a result of policing rural areas and the use of fairly autonomous sub-divisions operating from police stations in large urban areas to provide local services when the central command unit is some distance away.

However, decentralization has now become an active policy in some police forces not only for administrative convenience but also to improve the quality of policing in local areas. Throughout the last decade there have been small policing experiments involving local command units.

In the early 1980's the Metropolitan Police ran a number of pilot programmes referred to under the general heading of 'neighborhood policing' (see Irving et al. 1989). The development of the programme experienced a set back following the publication of the official evaluation of the experiment which drew attention to important implementation difficulties.

Interest in area-based policing returned towards the end of the decade following the decision by the chief constable of Surrey Constabulary to launch forcewide what was referred to as 'total geographic policing'. This comprised the application of sector policing to every sector in the police force area. The programme is currently being evaluated internally and to date no independent information is available on its effectiveness.

By the end of the decade the national review of community-oriented patrol strategies and tactics revealed that at least a quarter of police forces in England and Wales were operating some kind of area-based policing.

The most recent development has been the decision by the Metropolitan Police to implement what they refer to as 'sector policing' forcewide by the Spring of 1993 (West, 1992). Sector polic-
ing involves the partition of police divisions (the smallest autonomous policing unit in the MPD) into two or more policing sectors each headed by a sector inspector with responsibility for identifying and tackling local sector problems (Metropolitan Police 1992).

There are only a few independent evaluations of area-based policing in Britain. The system of neighborhood policing introduced in London in 1983 was evaluated by the British Police Foundation which showed important implementation weaknesses and little evidence of outcome effectiveness (Irving et al. 1989) Another evaluation of area-based policing in a provincial police force area also showed substantial implementation failure as a result of resistance and subversion from lower ranking officers (Chatterton 1991). Anecdotal evidence from officers working in the Surrey Constabulary indicate that there were problems with implementing 'total geographic policing' and dissatisfaction among lower ranking officers who felt that they had insufficient manpower to police their areas effectively.

3.3.2.3. Police-public contact strategies
The category of police-public contact strategies refers to police programmes designed to increase public contact. Defined in this way this category might encompass the community constable scheme and various local patrol initiatives which might incidentally bring the police and the public in greater contact in the course of solving problems or pursuing other aims. Instead, the category is used here to refer to programmes specifically designed to bring the police and the public together as an end in itself. The main programmes which fall under this heading are police shops or surgeries and contact patrols.

There has been little research conducted on police-public contact strategies in Britain. The main sources of information about these schemes which I can refer to derive from my own research. The national survey of community-oriented policing found that over half the forces in England and Wales reported operating a police surgery at the time of the survey (see Bennett and Lupton 1990). Police surgeries differ from police shops as they are open to the public for just a few hours a week. Members of the public may visit the surgery at set times during the week to speak to a local police officer about local problems. The officer would then do whatever could be done to deal with the problem. There is no published research on the effectiveness of police surgeries. Anecdotal evidence from police officers operating these schemes suggests that they are under used by the public.

The national survey also found that just under half of all forces operated some kind of police shop. These provided more permanent facilities to the public and remained open for a large proportion of the day. There is no research evidence on the effectiveness of these schemes in Britain.

The final programme in this section is referred to as contact patrols. The national survey showed that there were very few forces operating contact patrols of the kind which have been adopted by police forces in the United States.

The main forms of contact patrols operating in Britain were two schemes which were part of an experiment which I designed and evaluated in collaboration with two police forces in Britain. The aim of the evaluation was to replicate an evaluation conducted by the American Police Foundation of citizen contact patrols in Newark and Houston in the United States. The North American evaluation found that the programme was effective in reducing crime and residents' fear of crime (Pate et al. 1986).

The Metropolitan Police and West Midlands Police agreed to implement a contact patrols programme in their force areas. The programmes involved police officers knocking on the doors of local residents and asking them if there were any problems in the area which they would like to tell the police about. The results of the evaluation showed that the programme had little effect on
crime or reporting rates or fear of crime (Bennett 1991). Nevertheless, the results showed a substantial and statistically significant improvement in public satisfaction with the police.

3.3.2.4. Other patrol strategies
The results of the national review also showed a number of innovative programmes involving changes in patrol strategies which were defined by the police as being community-oriented in their design. I shall mention in this section just one of these strategies which is rarely discussed in the literature.

When the police are asked to identify community policing programmes they usually include a large number of initiatives involving small patrol teams. These are included in the table in the appendices under the heading of local units. These could be divided into four subtypes depending on whether the officers were dedicated (permanently attached) or temporary (short periods of attachment) and whether the unit was generalist (full police service) or specialist (specific problem oriented).

The category of dedicated team enlisted to solve a specific problem comprise the traditional police squad. This type of unit is most frequently associated with law enforcement policing and is sometimes cited as a form of policing to be replaced by community policing. Nevertheless, there appears to be no reason why dedicated squads should not be part of community policing if they fulfil the conditions defined above. (In particular it would have to be shown that the problems identified by the squad were also those identified by the community). Almost all forces reported that they used dedicated squads to deal with community problems.

The dedicated team enlisted to provide a full police service in an area is a slightly different programme to the dedicated squad. A team of this kind might be used to provide a permanent presence in a particular location such as a shopping area or a housing estate. Their terms of reference might be to police the area in all respects within their ability. About half of the police forces included in the national survey recorded using teams of this kind.

The third type of patrol team can be referred to as the problem-oriented patrol which is given the task of patrolling a specific location with the view to preventing a particular kind of problem. The team differs from the dedicated squad in that officers are not permanently attached to the team which is constructed from available officers when the need arises. Nearly all forces reported using problem-oriented patrols when necessary.

The fourth type of patrol team can be referred to as the general purpose patrol. This comprises non-permanent officers who are grouped at a point in time to police a location and to provide a full police service. Just under half of forces reported using patrol teams of this kind.

There are no independent evaluations to my knowledge of the effectiveness of small police teams (excluding the North American research on team policing which concerns larger units and is more comparable with geographic policing).

3.3.2.5. Community involvement and consultation
Since the riots in London in the early 1980's and the subsequent Scarman Report (1986) into the causes of the riots all police forces have operated some kind of system of local consultation and accountability.

The report by Lord Scarman into the disorders in Brixton in 1981 concluded that the riots represented an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police as a result of the adoption of policing methods which did not command the support of the local community. In particular, he placed some of the blame on the shoulders of the police for policing without local consent which he argued was a vital ingredient to effective policing in a democratic society (Morgan 1985).
Following Lord Scarman's recommendations the broad principles of the report were incorporated into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) which made it a statutory requirement for each police force area to obtain the views of local people about matters concerning the policing of the area and to obtain their cooperation in preventing crime. This has been interpreted in practice as the establishment of police consultative committees in each police force area.

The major research on police consultative committees (PCCs) in England and Wales has been conducted by Morgan (1986). Morgan concluded that all police force areas were abiding by the statutory requirements of the 1984 Act. Nevertheless, in other respects the method of consultation was not working well. He found that PCC members were not fully representative of their local communities in the sense that they were disproportionate male, middle class, middle aged, and involved in community affairs. The meetings tended to be dominated by the police who directed the discussion along the lines identified by them. Policing priorities or use of resources were rarely questioned by PCC members who tended to sympathetic rather than critical of the police.

3.3.2.6. Community crime prevention
The final form of community policing considered in this review is the involvement of the police with the community in crime prevention.

Community crime prevention can take many forms and can involve crime prevention panels, neighborhood watch, citizen patrols, security surveys, and multi-agency approaches. In this section I shall comment only on the development of neighborhood watch (NW).

The most recent figures suggest that there are over 90,000 NW schemes in England and Wales (McConville and Shepherd 1992).

The results of the third British Crime Survey (BCS) showed that 90% of the population of England and Wales had heard of NW (Mayhew, Elliott and Dowds 1989). The authors of the report estimated that at the beginning of 1988 14% of households in England and Wales were members of a NW scheme covering approximately two and a half million households (Mayhew, Elliott and Dowds 1989). The BCS report also noted that two-thirds of respondents not currently members of a NW scheme reported that they would be willing to join one if one were set up in their area.

The most recent BCS report showed marked regional differences in the coverage of NW schemes throughout the country. Schemes were most common in 'affluent suburban areas' and 'high status non-family areas'. Conversely, schemes were least common on 'less well-off council estates' and in 'poor quality, older terraced housing' areas.

High coverage areas tended to have lower burglary risks and low coverage areas tended to have higher burglary risks (with some anomalies in this trend). This latter finding gives some support to the argument that NW is most frequently found in areas which need it least (although the statement is only true when 'need' is interpreted narrowly to refer to burglary rate).

The results of the detailed study of two neighborhood watch schemes in London showed that the programmes had no impact on victimization rates and there was no change in reporting rates or police clear-up rates. There were some positive findings relating to public attitudes including one finding of a reduction in fear of property crime.

The research concluded that the lack of programme impact was a result (at least in part) of programme failure and a weak programme design which resulted in limited public involvement in it. Apart from attending the launch meeting and perhaps displaying a neighborhood watch sticker in their windows local residents took little further active part in the scheme. The police found it difficult to service the increasing number of neighborhood watch schemes in their area and little extra manpower or other resources were made available to conduct this task. Little encourage-
ment was given to the public (beyond the initial launch meeting) to participate in policing their area and few residents said that they looked out for anything suspicious or reported anything suspicious to the police.

4. Conclusion
There are a number of general observations which arise from this brief review of the current state of community policing in Britain.

In the last few years there has been a clear statement (albeit implicit) from the police that they intend to pursue a community-oriented style of policing. There is substantial evidence that the police no longer see themselves solely as a law-enforcement agency but instead are beginning to see themselves as a public service similar to other public services (ACPO 1990). They also recognise that they must be judged on the quality of police service and that they need public support to legitimate their actions.

The review has also shown that policing in Britain is not wholly reactive. Instead, the national survey has shown that there is currently operating a large number of proactive and innovative policing programmes designed specifically to reduce the incidence of crime and other problems. A more detailed analysis of the operation of specific types of programme generates less encouraging findings. Independent evaluations of specific community-oriented policing programmes have tended to show that the programmes often experience implementation failure and achieve limited outcome benefits.

What lessons are to be learned from these conclusions?
First, it would appear that future developments in community policing need to address directly implementation failure and in particular the issue of resistance among lower ranking officers.

Many of the reasons for resistance to change among the lower ranks can be traced to the police subculture (Holdaway 1983; 1989; Chatterton 1989). Goldstein (1990), for example, noted that police subculture is a product of a wide range of factors associated with the essential nature of the police job, including the threat of physical danger. He argues that for any change in policing style to succeed it must reduce rather than increase the tensions of practical policing which generate and sustain the subculture.

Second, it is important that senior officers are knowledgeable about the practical realities of the more innovative programmes and the problems that they are likely to face. It is likely that the more innovative the programme (and the greater its distance from traditional law-enforcement policing) the less information that there will be for senior managers to draw upon.

Third, there appears to be problems associated with developing a partnerships between the police and the community. The research on police-community consultation arrangements shows that for a number of reasons the community do not provide an effective input into policing even when given the opportunity to do so. The research on neighborhood watch also shows that the public are reluctant or unable to make much of an impact in policing their areas or in helping the police to do it for them. Similar evidence can be found on the effectiveness of police surgeries which tend to be poorly supported by the public. It is possible that some of the apparent reluctance of the public to become more fully involved in policing is a product of the nature of the arrangements that are currently being made. There is some evidence from the research on contact patrols that it is easier to get the police to go to the public than to get the public to go to the police (Bennett 1989). Fourth, there also appear to be problems associated with management and planning. It is likely that police managers are less experienced in implementing community-oriented policing programmes than law-enforcement programmes and, as a result, fail to provide the appropriate machinery for effective implementation. The development of community policing programmes will require further changes to management processes including the development of appropriate
police training, methods of performance review, effective, relevant, and useful management information, and management styles including (perhaps) greater involvement of the junior ranks in management decisions.

Fifth, it would seem wise to consider more fully the theoretical underpinning of community policing and to consider what precisely community policing aims to achieve and in what way it hope to achieve it. Attempts by the police to pursue imprecise and intangible goals will almost certainly lead to failure.

References


Table (Source: Adopted from Bennett and Lupton 1990)
Community Policing Programmes
Identified in the National Review of Community-Orientied Policing

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<th>Comprehensive Organizational Strategies</th>
<th>Multi-Agency Approaches</th>
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<td>Victim Support</td>
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Community Crime /Problem Prevention

General Public
- Crime Prevention Panels
- Neighborhood Watch
- Citizen Patrols
- Crime Stoppers
- Community Education/Awareness
- Crime Prevention Advice/Campaigns
- Security Surveys
- Multi-Agency Approaches

Indirect Measures
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Support Measures
- Additional Officers
- Civilianization
- Administrative Support Units
- Special Constabulary Volunteers
Community Policing in Ireland - Political and Historical Aspects

Sean Aylward

"The Irish are a very fair people sir, they never speak well of one another" - Dr. Johnson.

I propose in this paper to put the current consensual style of policing in Ireland into its historical and political context. My colleagues will expand into the specifics of current policy in policing neighbourhoods (Deputy Commissioner O'Reilly) and the treatment of offenders in the community (Probation Service Head, Martin Tansey). I apologise in advance for the necessarily snapshot and personal nature of the summation of our history and current position which follows.

1. Ireland up to 1916
For seven centuries - up to seventy years ago - law enforcement in Ireland was associated with the most repressive aspects of foreign rule - from England. This historical experience influences Irish attitudes to authority to this day. The 7,000 strong police force in Ireland - The Royal Irish Constabulary - from its foundation in 1836 - was essentially an armed garrison/gendarmerie whose main responsibility was to ensure continued British Rule in the country. Maintaining law and order and protecting life and property was a high but secondary priority for this service. It inherited the functions of the Revenue Police, made inquiries on behalf of departments of state, collected agricultural statistics, enforced the fishery laws and performed a variety of duties under the laws relating to food and drugs, weights and measures, explosives and petroleum. Members of the force also acted as enumerators at the censuses of population. Most recruits came from the Irish cottier/small farmer/labourer class. Despite this background they were heavily involved in evictions of tenant farmers in the late 1800's; a period of bitter memory.

2. Ireland Since The Rising
In 1916, a failed and at the time highly unpopular armed uprising took place in Dublin, "The Easter Rising". It was followed by many executions which changed the political climate radically. A constitutional and armed insurrection followed throughout Ireland over the period 1918 -1921. RIC Barracks were the main targets. These were attacked and burnt and many of their occupants were shot by the insurgents. This sporadic guerrilla war aroused international attention with particularly negative newspaper coverage of the retaliatory violence committed by the British Forces. It culminated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed in Downing Street, London, in December 1921. This Treaty ultimately resulted in the achievement of self government for three quarters of the land area and two thirds of the population of the country. The northern part of the country, which was dominated by citizens of Protestant religion, retained its allegiance to the U.K.

The former Irish police force - the RIC - was disbanded and pensioned off on 30 August 1922 subsequent to the establishment of the Irish Free State. Its Northern members became the RUC - Royal Ulster Constabulary - which is the police force in that jurisdiction to this day. I hasten to add that this force has greatly modernised itself in latter years even if its name is unchanged. Very few members of the old RIC were retained in the new Irish police force, the Garda Siochana - literally "Keepers of the Peace" - though some transferred to the Northern Ireland ser-

Department of Justice, Ireland. The views contained in this paper are personal to its author and do not purport to represent the position of the Irish authorities.
vice. The RIC men were for the most part, tired and war-weary, too closely associated with the "ancien régime" and glad to accept early pensions. Furthermore, "realpolitik" meant that places had to be found for the generation which had led the War of Independence. Thus one generation of "ploughboys" replaced another as our policemen under native government. More was to change than the colour of their uniforms however.

3. The Civil War and the Decision Not to Arm the Police
The new Irish Government was plunged into a bitter, fratricidal civil war from June 1922 to December 1923. Many old scores and grudges were paid off during the Civil War. Almost 4,000 Irish people were killed or injured and far more property was destroyed or damaged during this short period than during the three years of the War of Independence. The Civil War occurred because a significant element of the Irish body politic rejected the Anglo-Irish Treaty. They refused to accept the accord because it partitioned the country and imposed formal obligations of loyalty on the new Irish Free State in terms of allegiance to the British Crown, to British foreign policy and its Exchequer. 70 years later, it is hard to fathom the full venom which gripped the protagonists in the Civil War. A long struggle, based on high ideals, in which they had all taken part, had ended with an accord which met their aspirations to a significant extent. Whatever else is obscure about the Civil War there is no doubt as to its tragic dimensions.

Despite the fact that a vicious civil war was commencing, the new Irish Government decided from the very outset that the Garda Síochána should not just be 2,000 less in number than their predecessors but should also be an unarmed force. This was a difficult decision which was perhaps to cost the lives of several Irish police officers over the civil war period and since. I should stress here that the Detective Branch of the Irish Police has, again from the outset, been an armed plain clothes service representing approximately 10% of the service. The police force, aside from Special Branch, played virtually no part in the civil war. Its membership did their best to maintain the peace and law and order in a very lawless period. They emerged almost unscathed from this fratricidal struggle and with an enhanced status due to their perceived political neutrality over the Treaty.

After the decision that the Police should be unarmed the next important decision was that the force should be a single national service, fulfilling all police functions including responsibility for national security and social control as well as traditional law enforcement work throughout the state. Our Department files show that the police leadership, in the person of General O'Duffy, its Commissioner for most of its first decade, was very unhappy about this decision that the force should be unarmed. My colleague, Deputy Commissioner O'Reilly, who has studied the period, has informed me that General Michael Collins, the great leader of the War of Independence was also highly sceptical about this decision. He did not think that an unarmed police force of any size could maintain order in the country. Happily the General was wrong.

4. The Relationship between Government and Police
Before independence, the Irish capital, Dublin, had a separate police force, the "Dublin Metropolitan Police" which was a uniformed and largely unarmed service. This accorded with the city's historical "garrison town" status. This force was headed by a police Commissioner of equal status to the Commissioner of the RIC who was responsible for policing the rest of the country. In 1925 these separate services were formally merged through the passage of the "Garda Síochána Police Forces Amalgamation Act 1925."

That Act also provided that the top echelon of the Garda Síochána, the Commissioner ranks, should be appointed by Government - a provision which is in force to this day. It was also provided by regulation from the outset that police officers could play no active or direct part in party
politics (Garda Siochana Disciplinary Regulations 1926). Generally speaking, the Garda Siochana has effectively remained outside the political domain to this day. The promotion regulations in force since the 1920's have tended to re-inforce the independence of the service, on the ground, over the years. In effect these regulations ensured that promotion through the ranks from Sergeant to Inspector, Superintendent and Chief Superintendent up to the 7 Commissioner ranks would be a competitive process based on written examinations and internal interview boards. The Commissioner ranks meet in conclave to decide who to nominate to Government to fill any vacancy in their ranks.

5. The Department of Justice Role
Where, you might ask, does the Department of Justice come in, in regard to the administration of the policing function? The Minister and Department of Justice have the power and responsibility to provide for the finances and, by regulation, the general administration of the Garda Siochana. The Minister also has effectively a reserved power in regard to the distribution of the force. Section 6 of the Garda Siochana Act provides "The Garda Siochana shall be distributed and stationed in such manner as the Minister shall direct". After 6 years' service in the Justice Department I would characterise our main powers vis-a-vis the Garda Siochana in a single phrase - "the power of the purse." This is a marginal power as wages account for more than 90% of our expenditure on the Gardai. We have never been involved in decision making in relation to individual law enforcement actions taken by the Gardai, the handling of crime incidents, arrests and prosecutions by members of the force. The independence from political interference in the law enforcement process has been reinforced by the independence of the Irish Judiciary, which is written into our 1937 Constitution, and through the establishment, in 1974, of the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions.

6. Main Preoccupations with Law Enforcement since 1922
In 1986 a National Archives Act was passed in Ireland. It enabled Government to release to historians files covering the period up to 1963 held in all State bodies. Only material likely to cause "danger or distress to living individuals" can be held back. In the case of the Department of Justice over 30,000 files have been released. The vast bulk of them relate to policing our society over the 1922-1962 period. The majority of these files were "cleared" by my Division of the Department for release to the National Archives. I was struck in reviewing the files we released by the episodic nature of political interest in the Garda Siochana. Crime events, murders to be specific, always generated enquiries from and reports to the Department. Other crime events like burglary, riots, street offences and the like would appear to have generated little or no public or political interest.
Social control nonetheless appears to have been a major preoccupation of Government. Throughout the period files of some considerable bulk were generated on enforcement of pub opening hours, trade union agitation, political radicalism of the far left and agrarian and agricultural disputes. There was also major interest in monitoring and containing the politically inspired terrorist movement, the I.R.A., which was based on a small element of the defeated anti-Treaty forces. The group, which numbered several thousand young men, had dwindled down to a few hundred by the early 1960's. The post Civil War I.R.A. has never accepted the legitimacy of the Dublin Government but their main focus has always been the apparatus of the Northern Ireland State. The experience by its 30% (1/2m) catholic minority of official discrimination and economic inequality between 1922 and 1969, fundamentally provided the I.R.A. with its "causus belli" and its recruits over the period.

In the Second World War period and in the late 1950's internment was introduced North and
South. This process involved holding hundreds of mostly young men in custody without trial at a time when there was a perception that they represented a public danger. The post 1969 era in Northern Ireland and Northern Ireland related terrorism today hardly require description or analysis for this audience. The terrorist threat has for obvious reasons remained the major law enforcement concern in Ireland throughout the past 70 years. This factor and the homogenous character of the Southern population: over 90% white, caucasian and catholic has kept community policing concerns in the background until very recently. Aside from its power of the purse the Justice Department has always had a role in regard to representing the Government in negotiating with the Police Unions. From a feeble start in the 1960's those unions are now a major political force in the country. There has been a major growth in the status of our police in the community and their confidence in that status, since the 60's. In the early years the police force was highly dispersed. Every village had a police station staffed by 2-3 men. Motor transport was virtually non existent.

7. The Conformist Culture
"The culture places great value on conformity and respectability and yet the Irish tend towards eccentricity. Their history is full of rebels and fighters and yet they tend to be compliant and accepting of authoritarian structures"
"Irish Families", Monica Mc Goldrick, Family Institute of New Jersey.

Irish crime (non political) statistics showed phenomenally low rates of offending up to the mid-1960's (our crime figures are still low by European standards). Factors influencing historically low rates of offending included the generally low level of wealth and the highly dispersed distribution of the population. Larcenies aside, every single major crime event, especially murders, generated huge newspaper headlines right up to the 1970's. From the 20's up to the present day, detection of the perpetrators of serious non-terrorist crime has been consistently very high. In a small society this is hardly surprising. The big change I discern is the growth in urban crime from the early 1970's and the growth in public concern about such crime particularly burglaries and assaults.

Policing is now a demand driven service world-wide. Ireland, thanks to its new urban crime problems, is no exception. Police education and training are now the subjects of considerable public interest. The voters are now demanding a large, visible police presence on the streets. This demand is influenced by traditional concerns about law and order and the fact that we are now becoming a highly urbanised society. High formal levels of unemployment and a higher propensity to street disturbances, burglaries and offences against the person all influence the demand for more Garda activity. We also have proportionately one of the highest youth populations in Western Europe with all that implies for rates of offending.

8. The Current Political Parameters of Irish Policing
Preserving our democracy, protecting the citizen and his property remain the key Garda and Department of Justice preoccupations and objectives. There has been a general consensus between the key actors in this process, politicians, police officers and bureaucrats over the past 70 years. The increasing sophistication of our police officers and our electorate and the recent perceptible increase in crime levels and crime concerns have implications for the relationship between those actors which we are still working out.

Until the 1960's there was very little emphasis in our jurisprudence on the rights of suspects/accused. Our Supreme Court has however in recent decades, taken a very strong line in this respect. We now have a powerful police complaints authority (established 1987) and a very active legal community. Substantial civil actions are from time to time taken successfully against
our police, for instance for the use of excessive force. These developments have necessarily ac-
celerated the process of professionalisation in the Garda Siochana.

9. Law Enforcers in a Homogenous Society

"Ireland is so small a society that it is almost literally true that everyone of any consequence
knows everyone else of consequence ....
Ireland seems especially small because the Irish are such chronic gossips. No secret is kept, no
reputation is safe".
The Garda Siochana is one of our largest public services after schools and health services. Police
numbers today stand at 11,000 with over 600 civilian clerical staff. We have 1 police officer for
every 320 people. Roughly 33% of the members are stationed in Dublin, 44% are stationed in
other Urban Centres, and 23% are based in small stations in the villages of rural Ireland.
Ireland's police force remains very representative in character. The members live among the peo-
ple they serve. In a small country, even a rapidly urbanising one, everyone knows a police offi-
cer. We have yet to encounter any substantial or widespread hostility to the Gardai even among
the people in large public housing projects where there are regular police confrontations with
local youth.
The persisting homogeneity of society in our jurisdiction is one of the accidents of history. For
2,000 years we were a distinct people but without control over our own affairs. We have only
"enjoyed" that privilege for less than 3/4 of a century. However harmonious our society in exter-
nal appearances we still have the conflict between "haves" and "have nots" like every modern
country. However, the level of conflict in this jurisdiction remains low and the Irish police enjoy
a higher level of esteem and goodwill from the public than most of their sister services in
Europe.
Community Policing in Ireland - Policing Neighbourhoods

Martin N. Tansey

Ireland in the late nineteen fifties was closing down penal institutions as the prison population was on the decline with less than three hundred in custody and about one hundred juveniles on probation orders. Courts did not use the probation order for persons of sixteen years and over. Sadly, the position is very different today with a prison population of two thousand two hundred and fifty and a further four hundred persons on temporary release from custody due to overcrowding. Three thousand five hundred persons are on probation orders, deferment of sentence supervision and community service orders. All but one hundred of these are sixteen years and over.

Police and people in communities who have been affected by crime believe that community based sanctions are ineffectual and that imprisonment is the only effective sanction. Imprisonment used as a last resort sanction can be effective but the recidivism rate in our prison population is over seventy per cent.

Probation by tradition has been seen as working exclusively with offenders who the courts decided should remain in the community.

The service in recent years recognised the need to review its policies and to set new objectives which are

(i) to reduce re-offending;
(ii) to work in partnership with other agencies in the criminal justice system;
(iii) to engage local community groups in this work;
(iv) to undertake research on the effectiveness of community based programmes.

A number of projects were designed and are undertaken in partnership with community police (Gardai) and representatives of the local community.

Officers in probation teams target some of those in socially disadvantaged communities, particularly young people, with low self-esteem and poor social skills, those who leave the education system, those involved in substance abuse and crime, those who are rejected by all the social and vocational training agencies and those who are alienated and often rejected by their families. They are also the prime targets for the "alternative society" to hold "court" and impose their own "justice".

Those involved in partnership arrangements recognise that initial programmes for such high risk alienated young people do not respond to early intervention by community police (Gardai) or probation officers. Outreach programmes are developed with workers engaged to undertake the primary task of slowly dissolving some of the alien attitudes and feelings towards authority and in particular towards the police (Gardai).

Experience has shown that as the projects develop with this kind of approach they greatly improve the positive interaction between police, probation officers and the group. Outward bound activities, such as hill climbing, orienteering and, above all, in-group discussion, further enhance this new understanding. The projects serve a number of functions apart from improved relations with the police and probation officers. They represent an investment by the group of high risk young people (offenders) in their community as well as dissuading younger members from becoming involved in anti-social activity e.g. applying graffiti and engaging in other defacements.

Probation and Welfare Service Ireland. This presentation is made on a personal basis and does not necessarily represent the official views of policies of the service.
of the environment as well as joy-riding and other types of crime. The indications to date are encouraging but more time is required to assess the longer term impact of the work. The task is difficult and requires much painstaking work by the outreach workers in all of the projects. There is a need for understanding among the partners that failures occur and community reaction may be negative, but traditional methods of working in the criminal justice system have not brought about change for the better in long established disadvantaged inner city communities.

The aforementioned strategies and developments are of interest to the Judiciary. Some of its members have visited projects and engaged in discussions with groups of young offenders, others have become active in management committees of the Inter-agency Partnership. The learning process for all has been slow and gradual and often painful with different perspectives emerging but there is a recognition by all that these developments deal with the symptoms of a larger problem related to powerlessness, unemployment and poverty within disadvantaged communities. Young people in those communities will continue to inflict violence on members of the public. Police, in particular, may be accused that the "softly softly" method is not the right approach but, in time, communities will come to recognise that their protection is best achieved with the police in their midst, working with them and for them. Prisons and places of detention as constituted at present are not very successful in rehabilitating offenders and they create an environment which may assist offenders in becoming more violent.

Trainee police now spend four weeks on placement with probation officers working in the community. They also have the opportunity of visiting prisons and places of detention. Finally, the Probation Service must always be active in developing preventative programmes with the other agencies but above all it must act as catalyst to improve the quality of life for both the victim and the perpetrator within the community.

The development of Community Policing initiatives in Ireland

Thomas J. O'Reilly

Policing in Ireland has always relied heavily on a recognition of a consensus in law enforcement - an acceptance in the part of the community that the success of policing depended as much on the community itself as it does on the police. This dates from the foundation of the State in 1922 and is supported by two factors - the police are generally unarmed and therefore not perceived as a threatening force, and the Garda Siochana was, and is, the state security service and, consequently, it is in its own interests to maintain a close relationship between it and the community. This relationship had never been formalised in any structured way until, in 1984, it was decided to express the relationship as part of the Force's policy. With this objective the Neighbourhood Watch movement was introduced in urban areas. As you know Neighbourhood Watch has as its aim an improvement in crime prevention through encouraging citizens to watch out for each other's property and to "harden" household defences against criminal attack. In order to ensure success a successful scheme requires a constant, clear and frequently invoked partnership with the local police commander. The citizens and their representatives must be able to discuss problems of the area in some formal fashion with their local police commander. In practice this proved difficult for some police commanders. Gradually, however, both parties developed a consciousness of the interdependence of each in terms of crime detection and prevention, and of the importance of the community itself realising that its quality of life, as expressed in the presence or absence of crime and disorder, depended to a large extent on its own attitudes. The movement was

Deputy Commissioner, Garda Siochana, Ireland
seen therefore as a vehicle for a formal relationship between local police commanders and the citizens they serve. Neighbourhood Watch committees became the link to the citizens. In rural areas a project called "Community Alert" was set up. While this was aimed primarily at the care of old people living in remote areas the net result was the same.

Following these projects, in 1986, the Neighbourhood Garda programme was established. In this the police officer is given responsibility for an area. The area has, as far as is practicable, a homogeneity; it is a physical neighbourhood, it is of a size capable of being "managed" by the police officer who is either on foot or mobile depending on the nature of the area. Some areas are quite large and the police officer has a small car to take him around; others are small and are traversed on foot. Some have more than one officer assigned to the area and this has been found effective and indeed necessary in those areas where the problem is primarily a public order one; areas usually or predominantly consisting of public housing projects and characterised by considerable unemployment and deprivation.

The Garda is expected to make the area his or her "own". He becomes the primary police presence. He develops a close relationship with the community through attending meetings, visiting households and addressing children in schools. He attends himself to chronic problems which are usually ones of minor disorder, for example, young people drinking publicly in groups. Other problems he handles by means of the other resources available to him, for instance, the Divisional drug unit. In effect he is the neighbourhood's "chief of police". He is the focus of their interest and the centre of their attention in helping them to make their community a better place in which to live.

The impetus to the change in policy of the 1984/85 period was provided by a number of factors, some of which had been developing over a period of time. First of all we saw an increase in crime. We found over the years that no matter what we did, no matter what new activities we engaged in, no matter how many extra police officers we recruited, and we almost doubled the national Force from 1970 to 1985, crime kept rising inexorably. Therefore we began to come to the conclusion that the rise in crime had little to do with police activity and that basic crime figures are dependent more on something other than police activity.

The second important factor which caused us to look anew at what we were doing was the redefinition of rights under the Constitution by the Irish Supreme Court in the 1960s. Up to that point in time the Constitution and the rights expressed under the constitution were seen as statements of good intent, objectives to go towards; an expression of how things might be in an ideal society. The 1960 Supreme Court changed all that. From then on the rights enshrined in the Constitution were real and could not be transgressed except at one's peril. The Constitution laid down the rules of the game and if the smallest rule was transgressed, the penalty had to be paid. This removed, at one blow, very many of the practices, and very many of the "rights" which the police had, or believed they had, in dealing with criminals, in making arrests and in interviewing people.

Thirdly, there was a changed perception by the public of what was acceptable in terms of the use of force. Television has played a large part in this matter. In today's world we see this very clearly. Governments of totalitarian states who might wish to do so do not use the same repressive methods as they might have done 50 or 60 years ago, because such actions can be instantly seen by everybody across the world. In terms of policing, Western European and American public opinion will not tolerate a use of force in the suppression of public disorder which was not only traditional but also acceptable to the general public. Now, such methods are too brutal to be acceptable to most people.

Fourthly, there was the cost of response. Crime rates were rising in Ireland, not because of anything the police could not or would not do, but because of the breakdown of the traditional meth-
ods of social control, the influence of the church and the influence of the family. Because crime rates were rising the demand on the police to respond to the rising crime meant more and more resources being put into the technology of response; bigger, better and more police cars, flashing lights, sirens; encouraging an expectation that this is what they ought to have. Helped by television they wanted more of it and this in turn pressurised the police into providing more. And so we got an ever increasing spiral of reaction. But while this was happening the public also wanted reassurance - they wanted to see their friendly neighbourhood policeman; they wanted to see the policeman on the beat. Resources did not permit of providing for the increasing demand for immediate response and at the same time for the demand for foot patrol, at least not in proportions which would be likely to make a serious impact on crime, especially street crime.

But perhaps the most important reason why we needed to take stock as it were, to ask ourselves where we were going, was that deriving from the historical background. We have an organisation which was centrally controlled and nationally organised, with a very simple structure. There were no formal communication links with the citizens whom we were supposed to serve. The force is not accountable to local authorities nor was it subject in any real way to local influences. To a degree our organisation regarded the citizens as people who had to accept what we did because we knew better and who were not entitled to an input into how we did it.

Finally, but most importantly, the purpose of police was redefined. We had been all taught that the first purpose of police was the prevention and detection of crime and the prevention of nuisances and abuses in public places. In a radical review of training, a special committee established by Government redefined the role of police in society. And as an expression of our attitudes today, I could do no better than to read for you that definition:

The police in Ireland exists

(a) to provide services within a legal framework and in accordance with the social values and aspirations of a democratic society in order to help the community;

   (i) to protect life and property, by guarding, patrolling and anticipating danger not only from criminal acts, but also from those acts which are natural, accidental or unintentional;

   (ii) to safeguard the liberties of the individual and preserve the public peace by seeking to create and maintain conditions under which people may go about their lawful affairs undisturbed and protected from harmful and dangerous conduct;

   (iii) to prevent crime and to seek, identify and eliminate the cause of crime;

   (iv) to detect offenders if crime is committed.

(b) to encourage and advise the community on how to protect their persons and property from criminal behaviour.

(c) to provide guidance and assistance:

   (i) in helping young people to achieve social maturity;

   (ii) in cases of tragedy, or family and/or other personal crisis.

This definition is perhaps the most important aspect of our drive towards a better police/public relationship. The perception by citizens of their position in a free society is changing and the police perception of its own role must change too. We too are conscious of this and are anxious to play our part in the development of police philosophy for the coming decades.
Community Policing in Belgium

Christian Eliaerts, Els Enhus, Tom van den Broeck

1. Overview of the Belgian Police Structure and Functions

Belgium has three regular police forces: the constabulary (or municipal police), the State Police (Gendarmerie), and the judicial police (attached to the Public Prosecutor -Police Judicare).

1.1. The municipal police
Belgium is divided into 589 municipalities which are vested with wide powers. In principal each municipality has its own local police force. Command, control and financing of the constabulary lies almost entirely in the hands of the municipalities. Local police forces are charged with both administrative-preventive and judicial-repressive tasks within their municipality. In Belgium there are about 16,000 constables who are spread very unequally over the country. 62% of all constables are working in a city of more than 50,000 inhabitants which represent only 6,8% of all municipalities.

Because of the autonomous nature of the 589 municipalities, large disparities in policing occur, principally as a result of inequalities in police budgets.
Disparities include:

a) variety in force size: ranging from the one-man business to the largest police force, with 2,000 constables.
b) differences in organizational structure
c) differing degrees of availability: only 88 of the 589 police stations remain open 24 Hs a day.
As a result there are wide disparities in efficiency and quality of police work and often insufficient man-power (the 'critical mass') to ensure minimal local police assistance.

1.2. The State Police (Gendarmerie)
In addition to the local police forces, Belgium has a State Police force (the Gendarmerie) with about 15,500 officers. This police force has a pyramidal military hierarchy, is centralized and has an independent management. It consists of:

a) central headquarters, with centralized national services;

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In general the majority of Belgian municipalities are small. For 570 municipalities data have been collected and related to the number of constables (source: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Algemene Rijkspolitie, Studiedienst, Morfologische gegevens van de politiediensten).

Table 1: Belgian municipalities and number of constables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Number of Municipalities</th>
<th>Number of Constables</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-10,000</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1.042</td>
<td>6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-50,000</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>4.909</td>
<td>31,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 +</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9.728</td>
<td>62,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>15,679</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) territorial operational services: 52 districts composed of 431 brigades which perform 24 hr a day service on a rotational basis.

The State Police was until recently a part of the army and was managed and financed by three different ministries: the Ministry of the Interior, the Justice Department, and the Ministry of Defence. In January of this year, the force was demilitarized and put under the joint supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice.

Due to the unique combination of autonomous central management and political dependence on various departments, the State Police was capable of:

a) playing these departments off against each other and thus obtaining major grants and other benefits. Their budget is autonomously managed.

Over the years the State Police became a major independent power center with its own priorities. Since the beginning of the century it moved, under pressure from the national authorities, more and more to the tasks of maintaining order and political information providing. Only since the eighties has a reorientation towards more judicial tasks been taking place.

Moreover, even during a period of scandals in the early eighties, the State Police never suffered a budget cut.

b) evolving to a fairly modernized, motorized, centralized and specialized police force like most other post-war western police forces. The failure of these policies in other countries is well documented in the international literature. The Belgian State Police is no exception to this rule. Alienation of the State Police from the community is one result of this policy. Because the constabulary never fully adopted these policies, they did not suffer their failure on the same scale as the State Police.

1.3. The Judicial Police Force

This force numbers about 1400 officers and is supervised and managed by the Public Prosecutor's departments. There are 22 territorial brigades, and one national brigade especially created to fight serious crime, terrorism and banditry. In contrast with the previously mentioned police forces, they carry out repressive tasks only. Repressive missions for all forces are always controlled by the public prosecutor's department. On the other hand, administrative tasks are supervised by the local authority for the constabulary and by the two national ministries mentioned above for the State Police.

1.4. As a result

As a result Belgium has a fairly high police density of 1 officer for every 302 inhabitants. This ratio should suffice to ensure an efficient law enforcement policy.

Nevertheless, the picture is that of a fragmented police with scattering of effort, budget, manpower, etc. Until 1991 even the elementary morphological knowledge of existing and available services and resources, especially for the municipal police, were totally absent. Above all mutual rivalry ('police war') and lack of co-ordination led to problems. To solve these problems one would expect measures to be taken to assign each force well defined and appropriate tasks. On the contrary, clear-cut tasks and functional and territorial delimitations have never been determined for any of the three regular services. In fact a real police policy was absent until the middle of the eighties.

2. Recent Developments in Belgian Police Policy

2.1. Introduction: the long way to police reform

Obviously, solutions had to be sought. However, rather than a thorough re-evaluation of the police organization and assignments, efforts were concentrated on resolving the 'guerre des polices'
with the related political battles and disputes about the control on and competence over the three regular police services.
The well known horrible killings of the so called 'tueurs de brabant' terrorist 'communist' attacks and the day of shame at the Heizel stadium, all in 1985, sadly illustrated the intolerable mess that the Belgian police was in.
On top of this, several cases of corruption and abuse of power by divisions of the State Police were exposed. Not surprisingly public opinion was alarmed.
The situation highlighted the fact that Belgian politicians, Members of Parliament in particular, were almost totally ignorant of police matters. As a result three parliamentary investigation committees were established in an attempt to shed some light on the problems the police was confronted with. All three committees agreed on the shortcomings mentioned before, namely:
- no policing policy and in general no criminal policy had ever been elaborated in Belgium : thus again no objectives, no mission statement or job description had ever been made ;
- the State Police being by far the most important police force worked almost autonomously and uncontrolled and swallowed most of the police budget. The constabulary as well as the judicial police got the short end of the stick.
- to prevent the decline of the constabulary in particular, there was an urgent need for re-evaluation and reform. The M.P.'s pleaded for the beat-constable as a corner stone of local security management. Simply because he is a well known authority figure in his neighborhood he is able to detect problems and misconduct early and as such ensures the best local crime prevention.
In addition, an internal police audit was carried out by Team Consult, a private firm. It proposed a radical change in the shape of a unitary police force. The main mission of this unitary force consists of reducing fear of crime by focusing on effective crime-fighting. The final outcome of policing should be "the production of security". In the end, their idea of security was more about the well-worn concept of 'community relations or public relations' than a form of community policing. However, what this meant for the daily police duties was not established.
Conclusion:
Community policing ideas were for the most part absent in discussions about the reform of the Belgian police forces. Priority was given to politically important reforms of authority and control over the police forces and administrative structures. Less attention was paid to (the basic question of) the mission and the task of a police force in a democratic society.

2.2. The "Whitsuntide plan" of 1990: a new era in Belgian Police History?
In 1987 the new Minister of the Interior, Louis Tobback, promised to bring change. He kept his word and, backed by the government, as part of a new plan, the so called "Pinksterplan" or "Whitsuntide plan" on security policy, he made several proposals concerning police reforms. The most important of which were:
    a) revaluation of the police function especially for the municipal police. His plan envisages this force as the cornerstone for community based local policing, with the two remaining forces as complementary. The latter should be oriented to the more specialized and national police tasks;
    b) demilitarization of the State Police and transfer of its supervision to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice;
    c) increasing police availability, especially that of the municipal police, if necessary by fusion of several municipal forces, and creating in this way police forces working in zones. This plan is

The State Police appears to oppose this plan.
receiving a lot of resistance from the local police forces and authorities;
d) better co-ordination and co-operation between the police forces by mutual agreement and task
distribution. The Minister gave some guidelines for this purpose which encountered much mutual
distrust and problems in practice;
e) better co-ordination and tuning of administrative, police and prosecution policy (the so called
‘vijfhoeksoverleg’/pentagonal deliberation);
f) for the first time a general law on the police function was made, which provides at least an in-
dication and orientation of the different police tasks;
g) a law on the control on the three regular police forces and the Intelligence Service and a law
on private policing;
h) more funds and promotion for projects on crime prevention focused on the fight against petty
crime. In this regard, the police mission should be shifted from a mainly reactive approach to-
wards more proactive policing;
i) the establishment of systematically collected data on police manpower, budgets, and equip-
ment in the three police forces. The elaboration of integrated police statistics in order to increase
co-ordination and to create possibilities for crime analysis.
Indeed, winds of change seem to be blowing from the Ministry of the Interior, and although
problems were already encountered, the Cabinet seems to be sticking to their task. New measures
are under way.

2.3. National options for the future
It is important to point out the influence of the elections of the 24th of November 1991 which
were a real catastrophe for the Belgian majority parties. All of them lost a significant number of
votes. These votes went to a protest party "Rossem" and the extreme right party "Vlaams Blok"
and their French counterpart "Front National". The results unexpectedly thwarted the plans de-
veloped by the former legislation.
The comments upon these developments were quite similar: "the people have lost their confi-
dence in the traditional politicians, the gap between them is continuing to grow". After several
months a new government of Christian Democrats and Socialists was formed. Their program is
focused on "a contract with the citizen" and has as a main objective restoration of peoples' confi-
dence in the political establishment while countering the rapid rise of the extreme right parties.
An improvement in the relations of the community with the police is seen as one of the major
means of restoring confidence. As in most other countries, research (organized and financed by
the Ministry of the Interior only since 1986) made clear that the police had lost contact with the
community. The recent riots in the city of Brussels (1991-1992) showed the lack of confidence of
minority groups in the police. The newly created government believes that an improvement in
the quality of all public services is one way to restore confidence in the political leaders. Since
the police is one of the most frequently encountered symbols of the political system, they should
be the first to change their daily working methods and improve the quality of police work.

2.3.1. "Safety contracts"
In the month of May 1992 the government presented its plans for the revaluation and reorienta-
tion of the local police. For the first time in Belgian police history we find the term "Community
Policing" mentioned in an official document, namely in one of the plans called "veiligheids-
contracten" (contracts for safety). The principle of such contracts is a commitment from both the
municipality and the Ministry of the Interior.
The contract stipulates which initiatives will be taken by the municipality in exchange for finan-
cial support from the Ministry. The contracts shall be for a five year period and shall be evalu-
ated on their effectiveness by scientific research. Their main objective is an amelioration of the quality of police work. The Ministry of the Interior developed a model contract but every proposal from the municipality and police is negotiable. This means that the government did not provide any criterion to judge whether an initiative is improving the quality of police work. Because the autonomy of the municipality is a very sensitive political issue the national government prefers not to be overly direct in this matter.

Another important reason is the conviction of the policy makers that each local entity has its own particular problems which cannot be solved at the national level. The level on which policy should be made is the municipality. It is their task to solve local problems and to work out strategies and services to provide long term solutions.

In the model contract, eight different kinds of initiatives are proposed. One of these concerns initiatives which "are responding to the essential criteria put forward in the community policing philosophy". This means that "they should, as much as possible, take into account the problems and needs of the people in their local situation". The text proposes to give this task to a neighborhood constable who first has to foster participation of the people in solving the problems of their neighborhood. A rise in informal social control will then be the logical outcome. The presence of the neighborhood constable in his sector will reduce the fear of crime and create a kind of solidarity between the people.

2.4. Conclusions
These developments seem quite promising for the Belgian police who have had, until now, no explicit policy decisions or guidance to orient the daily functioning of the police. Meanwhile we are skeptical about the short term developments in Belgium. We see a real "battery" of initiatives to be realized in a very short time span. Much too often we encounter a major lack of knowledge amongst both police chiefs and local politicians about police literature, research and evaluations. The police and the political institutions are only now starting to think about police work. The total changes in organization and mentality needed to implement community policing cannot be expected in a short time span.

While reading the national plans concerning the "safety policy" to be followed, one can not escape the impression that the national politicians try to rectify in one year the lack of real policy towards the police in the past years. A great variety of initiatives will be taken in the near future. It is much too early to evaluate all these efforts, but it is already clear that we cannot speak of coherent, well thought-out changes in the policy towards the police. Only the future can tell us how this story will end...

3. Are there any Changes on the Field?
3.1. The state of the art of innovative policing
Because of the lack of policy in Belgium and the great pressure on the police forces caused by highly publicized scandals and problems, some of the most prominent police chiefs started local experiments, often inspired on those found in America, England and the Netherlands. Most often the objectives were to improve dialogue with the community and to attempt to be more responsive to community needs. At present the experiments in Belgium range from neighborhood watch to team policing. In fact nearly all the experiments take place in local police forces (municipal police) in the Flemish part of the country. The State Police (gendarmerie) recently created a


In the Flemish part of Belgium middle-sized and large forces are more frequently found than in the French part
think-thank at the highest level of the organization to think through projects to "produce a qualitatively improved security product". In practice, the police chiefs are given more responsibility so that the currently centralized policy of the State Police can become more decentralized in the future.

Most of the projects within the local police date from the beginning of the 80s. They use the following strategies:
- neighborhood watch (Gent, Kontich)
- neighborhood constables (Antwerp)
- a specialized 'social patrol' (Antwerp)
- team policing (Genk, Mechelen)
- project surveillance (Brussels, the gendarmerie)
- foot patrol (Genk, Antwerp, Brussels, Liège, Gent, et.al.)

Very few of the above-mentioned projects are still in place. Often they have been created by the individual initiative of a senior police officer and are seen by the other members of the police force as a luxury rather than real necessity. Since the middle of the 80s most big cities in Belgium found themselves in a very difficult financial situation. The government refused to take over the debt repayments and obliged the cities to reform their budgets. This development commonly led to freezes and cut-backs in the police budgets. The police authorities, not always convinced by the results of the experiments, are not very motivated in times of shortage, to continue the current experiments while working on the reorganization of their police force. Again it is much too early to make prognosis for the future since the reorganizations in the major forces are now underway. The plans and results of this process do not appear to be very promising.

More recently experiments have been started in middle-sized cities. They often try to solve very particular local problems such as youth gangs, drug dealing, mega discotheques etc... (St. Niklaas, Lier, Genk, Mechelen).

The above-mentioned experiments are usually carried out on a very small scale, and only a few have been evaluated. To our knowledge none of the existing experiments led to a total organizational change. Only a few police officers or sometimes one specialized service is involved in the process of regaining contact with the public. When we compare the objectives we can delineate three types of projects: projects promoting better contact with the public, those attempting to move from incident-handling to problem-solving and those aiming to restore control over certain neighborhoods.

The objective of most of these experiments is very frequently that of image building, or public relations. By reducing the hostility of the people towards the police they will be more likely to report crimes. Some of the projects are set up in order to regain some neighborhoods where the police have lost control. The strategy used is most often the imposition of a police presence in low status neighborhoods by way of unexpected identity cards controls. Only 2 projects based on the team policing strategy try to work more on the basis of problem-solving.

We may say that the idea of getting the police back to the people is now gaining more and more of the country. To start up a community policing project, a critical minimum is one prerequisite.

Police force reorganisation in one of the larger Belgian cities is currently being studied by the Department of Criminology of the Free University of Brussels.

For a study of the neighbourhood police see Hendrieckx, Enhus, Eliaerts, 1988 ; Eliaerts, 1990.

This strategy is more frequently found in the working of the State Police (the gendarmerie).
support in Belgium. The idea, which is essential to community policing philosophy, that "police officers and private citizens should work together in creative ways to help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and neighborhood decay" (Trojanowicz, Bucqueroux, 1990, 5) has yet to penetrate Belgian thinking about policing.

3.2. Research
3.2.1. Introduction
Since new ways of policing are being encouraged by the national policy makers and in the field there is a increased interest in community policing, it is relevant to confront this evolution with Belgian research findings and to make some prognoses for a not-so-distant future wherein a new vision, a new style and new working methods will be needed. In other words, we can ask ourselves what kind of resistance, problems and bottlenecks might be encountered when a new way of policing is implemented based on a community policing philosophy.

The community policing approach implies at first a change in the definition of the police's role in society; this redefinition consequently has an important impact on the tasks to be performed and the organizational structure wherein this new vision can be optimized. In the following part we will comment on the changes needed on three distinct but interdependent levels and give indications of possible problems and bottle-necks. We will use the results of three research projects; a research on the relation of the police with the public carried out in 1987; a research on the handling of demands from the public carried out in 1990 and the preliminary results of an ongoing research on the organizational structure of the police and its changing capacity towards community policing. All of these projects were funded by the Ministry of the Interior and carried out in forces of the municipal police by the School of Criminology of the Free University of Brussels (Eliaerts, Enhus, Hendrieckx, 1989; Eliaerts, Enhus, Senden, 1991; Eliaerts, Enhus, Van den Broeck, 1992)

3.2.2. Visions on policing
Rather than looking at the vision of the police chiefs we studied the implicit ideas constables use while handling the demands of the public.
In the organization we found informal priorities, made by the police officers themselves. These are visible in the handling of the problems. Some of them are very routinely and superficially treated, while others receive a great deal of attention and time. The constables themselves emphasize some aspects of police work.

As was the case in other countries studied, Belgian police give absolute informal priority to problems related to crimes. Most officers agree on the importance of fighting ongoing crime, and see this task as the primary police task. Even though they see traffic regulation as a police task, no

A first part of this research focused on the appreciation, knowledge and visions on police and the police organisation by the public. It was completed by participant observation in municipal police forces and focused on the time spent to the different police tasks, the initiation of those tasks etc...

We paid attention to the time spent on police activities, the initiation of the demands, the ways of handling those demands (priorities, customs, etc.).

There is no consensus on the importance of fighting petty crime.

When a crime has already occurred, constables often see the handling of such a case as boring and burdensome. They have to interrogate witnesses, control the damage, and fill in the necessary paper work, etc...
priority is given to it. Only when time is left will they proactive handle those problems. When we look at the demands to be classified as "environmental problems" it is clear that again police officers do not see these as "real" police work. But we noticed that the police sometimes gives them priority under the pressure of the mayor and the people. A lot of these problems are minor disturbances of the social and environmental climate and an experienced officer knows that they can form the basis for drawn-out neighborhood tensions. They (mostly) prefer to solve the problems by mediation or to track down the perpetrator(s). Tasks which require a more service-orientated approach are often seen as "unreal" police work.

The police's treatment of problems varies with the nature of the problem and is heavily dependent on external circumstances. Police discretion in the handling of certain problems is very wide, while in others the tactics and strategies are nearly standardized. For police activities which make use of preconceived forms, the discretion is much smaller than in others. Especially for problems concerning areas of safety, traffic and interpersonal conflicts, a wide variety of handling strategies is possible. It is more or less surprising to observe that constables operating in these domains try to standardize their actions. In order to reduce the uncertainty of the outcome of police actions, constables frequently refer to formerly undertaken actions or to the stories circulating within the organization about the way similar problems were handled. We got the impression that a set of norms and values provided by the existing police culture guide the daily actions of the police officer. Police actions are, in other words, not only individual choices but also contain a structural component. It is rather a product of the group of police officers than a strictly individual characteristic.

3.2.3. Police tasks
While implementing community policing a reorientation of police tasks is necessary. This implies giving of priorities to certain tasks and decisions and the repulsion of "unreal" police tasks. The working together of police and public is only to be realized when the police organization is not overburdened by work.

The studied police activities show a wide variety of problems, and demands to be handled. Of all the interventions we registered, 16.4% were initiated by the police, and 83.6% were a reaction to a request of the public or local and judicial authorities. While comparing the time spent on proactive interventions versus reactive interventions, we see that only 11.5% of the whole time budget was spent on proactive police activities.

Of all the reactive interventions the population was responsible for 36.6% of all the demands, the authorities for 63.4%. The time spent on demands from the public represents 55.2% of the time budget, on those from the authorities 44.8%. The handling of demands from the public is, in other words, a very time consuming activity. The administrative work generated by the local and other authorities burdens the organization not so much by the time spent on them but by the number of different activities which they generate. In total 54.8% of all registered activities can be classified as administrative, but the time spent on them absorbs 28% of the entire time budget.

The proactive capacity of the studied police forces is thus limited. To our opinion the implementation of community policing needs a repulsion or standardizing of a lot of tasks asked by the national, judicial and local authorities (especially the administrative ones).

However, changes in this kind of tasks seem not so evident. Daily police work is shaped by rules and procedures. The pronounced attachment to orthodox execution of these is remarkably present in Belgian police work. The accomplishment of paper-work replaces the original mission. We were struck by the fact that so many officers prefer and even insist on written and double-checked rules and procedures.

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This means:
- paper-work is given priority over verbal communication and deliberation
- quality of work is also measured by the amount of paper consumed
- law enforcement 'by the book' and written in the book is more rewarding than order maintenance and broad social interest.
In the end superiors must manage their corps relying on paper instead of presence at and knowledge of daily practice. Work is committed primarily to the development and control of rules and procedures; no time is left for real management, crime analysis or policy plans.

3.2.4. The organizational structure
Only 39 police forces work in cities, the others operate in small towns and villages. The scale of a police force is often too small to implement community policing with success. A critical minimum of manpower is a prerequisite to ensure quality in the handling of problems.
In the larger forces the organizational structure is often an obstacle to change. Most of them are organized and controlled in a very hierarchic and bureaucratic way.
All too often people are hardly aware of their own position in the organization. Appreciation is lacking, which in turn generates suspicion and indifference. This situation is partly due to lack of effective communication.
Community policing assumes broad interest and thus wide internal communication and deliberation within the organizational framework. Communication between the special branches and the rank and file officers is infrequent and is usually limited to one-way traffic. Communication channels are often used for other purposes and become overly burdened.
In addition, every level interprets the orders from above and translates them to the next lower rank. Orders from top management are in this respect altered by lower management for its own benefit. Rank and file officers in possession of wide discretionary powers create their own street level policy.
As a result, a clear job description is absent: everyone has his own and ignores other's.
In consequence, the average form of policing is highly reactive. Organizational structures suffocate initiatives by too many procedures, rules and centralized control. Organizational culture promotes and rewards reactive policing. Responding to incidents is given priority over solving problems. Thus an enormous range of opportunities, interests and possibilities on a street level are left aside because of the internal culture and organizational, often hierarchical opposition.
Since rank and file officers are trained, evaluated and get promoted by these traditional rules and procedures, they probably will stick to them. Moreover, asking people to change what they have been doing for ages can be problematic. The 'older' generation is still trained for restrictive execution of rules and procedures. Due to the promotion by seniority system it takes a very long time to replace the older generation.
New psychological and personality selection procedures have only very recently been introduced. Thus manpower which has an open mind to organizational change is still scarce. Changes will not easily take hold in a hostile climate. Probably things will revert to business as usual.
To conclude, we can say that actual management is incompatible with a community policing philosophy and is certainly in contradiction with measures of decentralization and deconcentration. Clear objectives on behalf of the job description in particular and the mission statement of the organization in general are still missing.

4. Conclusion: What is the Status of Community Policing in Belgium?
4.1. Previous and current police policy in Belgium.
Until 1980 the working of the different police forces in Belgium was a problem for a few policy
makers. When subsequent scandals broke out, however, police matters became an important political issue. Certainly up to 1985, the heated discussions in parliament dealt with the political problems of command and control. The problems of organizational management in general and of job description in particular were given little attention.

The problems the policy makers had to face were not minor. The persistent absence of any form of management, and the wide disparity of command and control, has promoted the growth of three independent and even competing police forces. Moreover, the absence of clear and coherent policing objectives resulted in a lack of internal guidance which in turn led to several scandals.

In addition, these problems also appeared on the level of job description and execution. Neither job descriptions nor a mission statement have ever been clearly formulated. Too much 'unreal' police work demanded by local or judicial authorities had to be done. All three police forces (but the State Police in particular) were almost fully oriented to the age-old concept of traditional 'crime-fighting'. Reality, however, was different and consequently the other more social or problem-solving aspects of police work were neglected. Obviously, a community policing philosophy was completely absent at that time.

The new policy created and stimulated by the Ministry of the Interior and reluctantly followed by the Justice Department clearly meant some change. Nevertheless, all hope is placed on better co-ordination and co-operation. Briefly, three slogans are promoted: modernization, professionalisation, and repositioning of the three police forces. But until now, the basic competencies, missions and structures of the three regular police forces have not been changed.

We admit that serious efforts are being made, especially by the Ministry of the Interior, to promote and execute a new police policy. However, a clear statement on the role of the police is still absent. Although community policing is being promoted as part of the proper answer to policing problems in Belgium, this doesn't mean that everything has been worked out. A coherent and well balanced view on community policing is still missing. In addition, we have to stress that actually we witness a top-down approach in the implementing of community policing. To overcome the opposition of certain local forces or authorities, the government works with financial incentives (cfr. safety-contracts). It remains to be seen if durable changes in mentality can be achieved with such a policy.

This leads us to the next question: What about police practice? Has practice dealt with community policing ideas and how have they been accomplished?

4.2. Police practice and innovative projects
Several innovative experiments were undertaken, some of which are still in progress. Their scale is often small, and only very few have been evaluated. Until now, none of the experiments implied an important organizational change.

None of them has a clear description of goals and working methods and certainly none has an answer to the role of the police in a presumably 'democratic' and rapidly changing society.

More specifically, research shows that several problems and bottle-necks appear when innovative ideas have to be put into practice in the local police forces.

a. the daily working practice of police is far removed from the concepts used in community policing:
   - the police work principally in a reactive way;
   - they are overwhelmed by administrative tasks initiated both by the local and national authorities;
   - because of a total lack of formal priorities in police tasks, police officers themselves define in an informal way the content of their work;
- police officers define their tasks mainly as the fighting of crime and the maintenance of peace; tasks which require a more service-oriented approach are often seen as non-essential; - the orientation towards certain aspects of police work is heavily supported by the police culture.

b. some structural elements and organizational characteristics hinder those forces prepared to implement community policing.

- the local police often lack the critical manpower to carry out community policing; often they do not have access to the appropriate equipment; local authorities sometimes appear apathetic and lack knowledge about the problems of their police;
- the selection procedures and training of police officers have only recently been improved; the newly trained police officers form a minority in the forces and are only recently entering the organization;
- there are not enough institutions which organize police schooling (refresher courses) on a permanent basis, and only a few forces correct this deficit in an informal way;
- the organization is highly hierarchical and bureaucratic;
- senior officers become overwhelmed with often ridiculous paper-work and are thus prevented from getting on with any serious management;
- internal communication is of a very low quality;
- daily police work is shaped by rules and procedures, frequently the accomplishment of paperwork replaces the original mission;
- criteria used to judge the quality of work are completely absent; officers get promoted on the basis of seniority.

In summary we can say that actual management and structures are incompatible with a community policing philosophy.

4.3. Is community policing a solution for all these problems?

All these problems and bottle-necks indicate that the police forces in Belgium are not yet ready to implement community policing in a generalized way. Too many changes have to occur within the police organizations to be optimistic. However, changing the police is, in our view, not sufficient to create a situation in which a new way of policing can break through. Other conditions also have to be fulfilled.

First of all, the role of the police in the society should be delineated clearly. It is obvious that a shift from reactive to problem oriented policing does not mean that the police is responsible for finding solutions to all the structural problems that occur in society. Besides, as our survey of public opinion showed, people only want to get involved with the police when they themselves need them. They fear the interference of the police in their daily life and see frequently a service-oriented approach as threatening (Eliaerts, et.al., 1987). This leads to a questioning of the concept of community policing. How far can a service and problem oriented police force go in its attempt to solve problems created by the shortcomings of national or local policy? How threatening is a police force close to the people? How to reach a consensus about priorities in police work for a community, which in fact consists of a wide economical, cultural and religious variety of men and women? Moreover, policing implies social control; community policing is still social control and not welfare work. Nevertheless, we think that community policing as a philosophy, an attitude (surely to be defined in a more precise way), implies at least a kind of policing that can be accepted - and in certain circumstances in trust be demanded - by the population. Misuse of the concept of community policing as a kind of "undercover operation" for extending social control over well-known groups within the population is certainly not excluded.

Secondly, community policing, in our mind, supposes a multi-agency approach: a shared responsibility of all societal institutions, welfare organizations, political authorities, the public and the
police. Here too, the role of each actor in the production of security has to be clearly defined. In other words, it should be clear that the police is only one of the partners in the field of safety and that only through collective efforts solutions can be worked out. This means also that a network of social services is to be provided, and that the members of these organizations should be prepared to work in one way or another with the police. Because of the differences in objectives of the potential partners this does not seem to be so easy.

References
Community Policing in Austria

Manfred Proske

If one wants to discuss the phenomenological aspect of the subject, one is confronted by the difficulty, that extensive community policing programs are existent in the United States and in Great Britain, but not in Austria. The reasons for the non-existence of such programs are various. From my point of view the main cause is that in Austria there are practically no local police forces under community control. The maintenance of the public peace, order and security is under federal legislation and execution. There may be a few exceptions to this rule, however, which are of no importance to this topic. Matters of police are, therefore, carried out by the federal government. For that reason Austrian police forces are federal authorities subordinated to the Austrian Home Office (Bundesministerium für Inneres). In Austria the police are organized in a centralistic manner. This form of organization has remained unchanged even by the new Security Police Act (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz 1991). This structure of centralized command does not support the development of community policing programs. Another reason may be that there are many small communities in Austria with an intact social control.

In spite of all this, there are public services in Austria, that partially correspond to community policing programs, but these services only remain components of an extensive community policing program. In the following I will talk about this.

First of all the Austrian Home Office has taken steps with the primary aim to improve the confidence of the public in police work, to alleviate community fear, to ameliorate police contact with the public and to advise the public in crime prevention methods (Öffentliche Sicherheit Nr.1/2; 1987,2).

In 1977 "public contact-officers" (Kontaktbeamte) were first established at the Bundespolizeidirektion Wien and later in all police headquarters of all larger cities. These officers try to get into contact with the public, for instance by visiting single citizens, youth-clubs or older people´s homes. Together with the local authorities these officers offer non-bureaucratic help and advice.

Special "youth contact-officers" (Jugendkontaktbeamte) were introduced at all police headquarters situated in urban areas (Bundespolizeidirektionen) in 1984. These specially trained officers are used for official duties with juvenile persons and at events with mainly young participants. This measure is to improve the younger citizens’ confidence in police work.

At the police headquarters in all larger cities a crime prevention facility (Kriminalpolizeilicher Beratungsdienst) was established in 1974 to give advice in various crime prevention matters such as the protection of property, modern security installations, precautionary measures when being abroad and how to deal with certain groups of persons. Advice is given by lectures, inserts in mass media and leaflets. This crime prevention service has had a lot of positive response in the public, because of its good and extensive work. Since 1983 foot patrol activities have been increased to intensify the visual presence of the police forces in the public. This measure was taken to give a stronger sense of security to the public and to diminish crime-fear.

It is hardly possible to evaluate these measures. Especially it cannot be said that crime rates
have been diminished. It is a fact, however, that between 1973 and 1989, if the polls are correct, the reputation of the police forces in the public has risen slightly (Öffentliche Sicherheit Nr. 9, 1989, 9). In 1989 41% of the interviewees declared that the police forces were taking good care of public security. In 1973 only 39% had been of this opinion. The number of interviewees who replied that the police were not taking good care of public security dropped from 1973 to 1989 from 23% to 19%. It has to be mentioned that the group of persons over 50 years thinks best about the police work. On the other hand young people do not think so well about the police forces.

One must criticize in this context that as a result of budget cuts quite a number of police stations were closed or will be closed in the near future. This concerns mainly stations at small villages. There is a trend in Austria - in contrast to the mini-stations known by community policing programs - towards bigger units, i.e. bigger police stations. Public protest against the closing of rural police stations must not be neglected.

There is another police strategy in course of development: to release the police from legal duties which can also be done by other persons, especially by private, non-official individuals. Police effectiveness in crime control shall be improved by these measures. The enormous increase of individual road traffic made the control over parking space necessary in many Austrian cities. This means that parking a car on ground open to the public is limited to a certain space of time and dependent on the payment of a parking fee. Controlling this is a duty of the police which cannot be performed, since the police is understaffed. So a number of Austrian cities and communities have transferred the task of controlling parking grounds to private guarding companies. The fees to be paid to these companies are more than compensated by the earnings from parking-fees and fines increasing due to more effective control. So the city of Graz with about 240,000 inhabitants expects about 100 million ATS earnings from parking-fees and fines in the first year after transferring parking-space control to a private company. The fee for the company is about 15 million ATS. The control of parking-space by police forces made 20 million ATS a year.

Other cities plan to transfer the securing of the way to and from schools, which is managed by the police forces now, to private companies. But also the police themselves respectively the Home Office, plan to get rid of some tasks and transfer these to private institutions. Presupposed is that such institutions can do the job more cost-saving while maintaining the same standard of security.

At the moment a bill is in preparation called "Flughafensicherheitsgesetz" that provides transferring the control of persons and luggage at airports - especially the Vienna airport - partially to private institutions. Unnecessary to say that the airport company will have to pay the costs which will of course have to be paid by the passengers in the end (Sicherheitsschilling) (Öffentliche Sicherheit Nr. 1/2, 1992, 25). Transferring police duties to private institutions aroused discussion whether and under which conditions it is permitted by law to do so. For the constitution of the Republic of Austria provides that in principle sovereign acts (Akte der Hoheitsverwaltung) are to be carried out by organs of the republic or other regional administration bodies, not by privates. The opinion of most legal scholars is that privates may only give auxiliary support, which will cut down the possibilities of private institutions (Öhlinger 1992, 144).

There are no neighborhood-watch programs in Austria initiated by the police, either. I think that such programs would meet with disapproval in the public. This feeling of resentment against snoopers may rise from unpleasant memories of times of the "Third Reich" when neighborhood watching as a police strategy was misused.
Regrettably there is also very little willingness of neighbors to report to the police e.g. the suspicion of child battering or child abuse.

On the other hand beginnings of neighborhood defence can be noticed. Parents’ councils organizing escorts to protect their children on their way to and from school from the hazards of traffic or other perils. Communities in houses deciding to keep the door locked and to install a two way intercom. Owners of family houses organizing with neighboring house owners the observation of the house while they are absent on holiday. Private individuals roaming through pubs at night to check whether the laws for the protection of children and young people are kept.

These manifestations, however, are not initiated by the police or are a form of cooperation between police and the public. These manifestations are more likely reactions to a real or supposed failure of the police forces.

Besides the centralistic command and organization of the police, which I mentioned at the beginning, a reason for the lacking of extensive Community Policing programs in Austria may also be seen in the very conservative image of the relationship between the police and the public: The police are the producer of security, the citizen its consumer. Rising crime-rates and falling clearance rates which have been noticed in Austria especially since 1987 give persistently rise to the call in the public for more police officers. So a billion ATS shall be spent in 1993 for more police staff (Sicherheitsmilliarde). To give up the illusion that more police staff will produce more security will be necessary. For budgetary reasons will not allow the boundless increase of police staff. So I am quite sure that sooner or later a change in police strategy will be necessary and community policing will gain ground also in Austria.

References

Community Policing in Japan - Formal and Informal Aspects

Tadashi Moriyama

Before analyzing community policing in Japan, we should first take into account the current situation concerning the background of crime and delinquency in this country. We must also take into account the structure of Japanese society in order to understand the significance of community policing a little better, since both of these elements have enormous influence on its organization and policy.

1. The Current Situation of Crime in Japan

According to official criminal statistics, Japan experienced a new peak in the number of reported crimes in 1989. However, the total number of Penal Code Offenses which were reported to the police was 1.6 million (excluding traffic offenses). This showed a decrease of 40 thousand cases, representing a decline of 2 per cent over the previous year. The composition of the offenses was as follows: larceny 88 per cent and fraud and embezzlement 3 per cent for each crime, which means that crime in Japan is, for the most part, made up of petty offenses. Furthermore, most offenders of larceny were under twenty year's of age (62 per cent) and the crimes committed mostly consisted of bicycle- and motorbike-thefts and shop-lifting.

Generally speaking, there are comparatively very few violent or heinous crimes committed in Japan and that includes homicide, robbery, bodily harm and assault. There were only 1,200 homicides, 1,600 robberies (resulting in 23 deaths, 671 cases of bodily harm and 81 rapes). Another problem is negligent driving which composes 26 per cent of all penal code offenses. Every year traffic offenses amount to roughly 600 thousand causing the death of 12 thousand people.

It is generally acknowledged by Western scholars, that Japan has a very low crime rate and an excellent law enforcement system and, as a result, a very high clearance rate: in fact, with regard to the offenses reported, such as thefts, burglaries, robberies and homicides, Japan has the lowest number out of all the developed countries. For example, comparing the 1988 figures with those of the US Japan had, as far as homicide is concerned, less than one twelfth of the numbers of crimes reported, one sixth of the crime rate and more than 1.2 times the clearance rate. Of course, it would be far too simple, and indeed dangerous, to make such comparisons, since the crime situation in Japan depends very much upon its culture, social control and existing laws.

Nowadays, however, another dilemma must be faced, and that is the problem of foreign offenders. Since Japan is rapidly acquiring an international society, there is an increase in the number of crimes being committed by foreigners. In 1980, the number of foreign visitors, excluding those with a permanent residence status, those with no resident status and US forces' personnel stationed in Japan, was 1.3 million, but in 1988, the figure rose to 2.4 million.

During 1980, the number of visitors who were arrested was 800, but in 1988, the figure was already around 3,000. The offenses had the following characteristics: the number of offenders

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from Asian countries increased remarkably, the number of offenses committed by international criminal groups increased and the criminal groups expanded in scale and covered a larger area. In the categories of crimes that were committed, there was a marked increase in larceny, homicides and robberies involving foreign laborers (see The White Paper on the Police for 1989, the National Police Agency, Government of Japan, p. 47). Even where the behavior of visitors, who are mostly illegal immigrants, does not violate Japan's criminal law, the local people living in the same area do not always understand the outsiders, which leads to a gradual increase in disputes between the local population and the visitors, especially in the suburbs of Tokyo where the latter are employed.

In addition to the above problem, there is as much juvenile delinquency, though petty, as in other developed countries. Therefore, community policing in Japan should be considered in this light.

2. The Double Standard that Exists in Japanese Society

With respect to the background and contributing factors as to why there is less crime in Japan - Japanese criminologists have never completely analyzed them - the saying goes: "Sound people wouldn't ask themselves why they are sound". However, it is useful for us to try to analyze this phenomena as well as it is for foreign criminologists. Furthermore, we need to seek this "something" which deters crime, in other words, the social control of crime. I think this "something" could be the key which could be of help in solving the riddle of the Japanese crime situation.

Primarily, this "something" could very well be the unity of race in Japan. However, as foreign criminologists often point out, our society is not always free from racial problems, although, in general, most Japanese regard themselves as being of the same race, i.e., blood-related brothers and sisters. We often say: "You and I belong to the same ancestor". Essentially, you can call it a homogeneous society, since it has the same values, customs, traditions and culture. Therefore, in daily life, in our neighborhood we intervene into the sphere of others like parents, brothers, sisters or relatives. And by nature our government or society as a whole has a tendency to intervene. This can be called "paternalistic".

Paternalism, of course, could function well in a particular situation, but generally runs the risk of falling into abuse: too much intervention might at worst lead to the infringement of human rights. But by and large, and most notably in rural areas, people help each other, involving families, relatives, parents, school children, students, workers and neighbors. A solution-oriented society has been voluntarily formed in the history of our society, which is why you can observe a kind of "Gemeinschaft" everywhere in Japan. However, once a member of a family commits a wrong, the local community and all the people who knew him or his family rush to condemn, not only the culprit, but also his relatives. His family may be forced to refrain from communicating with anyone of the neighborhood or, the worst, may even have to quit their job and the children to leave their school. It is often said that there used to be "murahachibu", which means ostracism, and even today this phenomena still persists. So it is the family that brings unconscious pressure on a member of the family not to break the law.

Secondly, the Japanese society has been partially influenced by ideas from the Continent of Asia and in particular, Confucianism which advocates filial piety to one's own parents. This doctrine is expressed in the Article "patricide/matricide" in Criminal Law (although in 1972 the Japanese Supreme Court declared that this Article was unconstitutional because of its too severe punishment but not because of inequality). The idea of filial piety, on the other hand, means that people should not bring dishonor on their family, especially their parents. Even Japanese children are already told not to disagree with their parents or besmirch their parents'
name, as in the Japanese expression "one must not attach mud to one's parents' faces". In other words, the behavior of even one member of the family influences the relationship towards their neighbors.

As it is generally known, schools and companies in Japan form the same microcosms as the family. Members are controlled by the same rigid discipline, i.e., not to bring disgrace on, or besmirch the name of, the school or company. Even though an employee has the legal right to continue to work in an organization, if he violates the unwritten rules of it, he will, in practice, be ostracized by his colleagues or the company, resulting in him having to leave. Since most Japanese companies have a tradition of life-time employment, a person who is forced to resign is bound to suffer serious damage to his and his family's lifestyle. I think that in the Japanese society such informal criticism is just as severe as formal legal punishment.

You may have a suspicion that even today, Japan is not yet a democratic country. However, there is an increasing number of young people who freely show indifference to the tradition and custom of respecting their parents or superiors. This is a kind of current social phenomenon and the mass media refers to such individuals as "Shinjinrui", which means "a new species of humanity". Older people are particularly embarrassed and do not know how to deal with this element of the younger generation, since they seem to be étrangers, who have their own standards of behavior. Furthermore, even in Japan, individualism is rapidly growing among well-educated people who think that too much intervention leads to the infringement of human rights. Thus, the breakthrough concerning consciousness for human relationships seems to be proceeding gradually in our society. As a result, the social control which has, by tradition, functioned in deterring crime and delinquency, could be predicted to be weakened in the near future.

3. The Formal Aspects of Policing

Going back to community policing in Japan, we will see that it is divided into two aspects - formal and informal, as follows:

Needless to say, formal control implies policing by the police force, their main activity being the police patrol. Basically, patrol police in Japan operates from small simple police stations called "Koban", the meaning of which is the place where the police changes for their shift of duty. It is interesting to note that the "Koban" system was originally established roughly one hundred year's ago under the advice of a German policeman, a certain Mr. Höhn, who visited Japan in an effort to improve the Japanese police system. In exchange, in recent years Germany has introduced the "Koban System", imitating the Japanese model (see H. Kaneko, 1983).

There are two kinds of Kobans, the first which is the smaller of the two called "Hasshusho", and a residential one called "Chuzaisho". They do not only function as a base for patrol activities, but are also the contact point between the police and the public. Kobans are set up in about 15,000 locations throughout Japan, each Koban serving 8,000 members of the population. Out of a total number of 220,000 policemen and -women in Japan, 23 per cent of this number operate from Kobans which are distributed throughout the country.

"Hasshusho" are mainly set up in urban areas. If you visit the city center of Tokyo, you will usually recognize them in front of railway stations or on street corners. On the other hand, "Chuzaisho" are usually located in the countryside, for example, farming areas, mountain areas and fishing villages, in short, away from the cities. In principle, the patrol officer lives with his family at the "Chuzaisho", where his wife is usually appointed a part-time assistant officer who helps him in his daily work. In this way, his family as a whole works in the local community.
Policemen in Japan are referred to by the community they operate in as "Omawari-san", which means a person going around the community. In fact, patrol activity is conducted by making the rounds of the assigned area on foot, by bicycle or by radio car. Generally speaking, until recent times the status of the policeman, together with that of school teachers, was comparatively high, and, accordingly, they were respected by the community. The more remote the location where the police works and lives, the greater the respect he is shown. A typical type of policeman working in the countryside is usually very cautious and prudent, but also kind and friendly. Very often the officer's father and grandfather had been policemen, too.

Through his patrolling, the policeman is able to gain accurate knowledge of the topography and natural features of the area under his jurisdiction. Usually, the officers at "Chuzaisho" visit homes and places of work in an effort to solicit the opinions and views of the community residents concerning the activities of the police, and, in return, the officers provide the residents with information which they consider important for preventing crimes and accidents.

One American criminologist maintained that "The American policeman is a fireman, whereas the Japanese policeman is a postman", because a postman goes around in the community every day, even though there is no mail to deliver (David Bailey, 1976). Furthermore, a Japanese policeman is like a counsellor, because he sometimes deals with daily affairs of people in the community not always concerning crime. By doing so, he may well, unconsciously, prevent future crimes. Very often he works on his off-duty day without receiving any payment.

However, nowadays even in the countryside, people begin to resent to this sort of intervention by the policeman and by their neighbors. At the same time, the policeman himself is sometimes unwilling to take so much care of the community and the everyday communication, which may become a burden for him. In some cases, the officer is also inadequately equipped to cope with everyday community affairs. Police work inevitably leads to a business-like approach since now in the police force another problem is emerging. Once, high morale and strict discipline was the order of the day and this prevented comparatively inferior officers from criticizing the agency as a whole. Additionally, the local police tried to encourage individual officers to strive for higher attainment, leading to the "window dressing" of clearance rate statistics. It was often suggested that, since each officer has a "quota" of cases or arrests they should deal with, they tend to include excessive numbers of minor cases such as non-delinquency or traffic violations. Moreover, some people maintain that the police should not be under obligation to achieve such high scores regarding the collection of fines, especially for traffic offenses. As a result, the people in the local community have less trust in the work of the police.

Recently, the bureau in charge of this section has tried to change this situation by proposing new programs including an improvement of the promotion system of officers and the abandonment of the meaningless competition concerning the various activities among the local police agencies. Moreover, with regard to community work, some improvements have been made, because the frequent changes in the shifting of the police officers in the Koban had been an obstacle to the better functioning of the communication between the people in the community and the ability of the officers in the Koban to solve the arising problems by themselves. In short, police agencies are pretty much aware of the crisis that exists in community work.

It is now recognized that the Koban system has been adopted or is going to be adopted by other countries, but I think that its problems as such should be considered. The success of the
Koban system in other countries will depend upon the network, but also on the personality and the qualities of the police officers involved. Furthermore, their sense of hard work and dedication is also a very important element in the Koban system, since the officer's work is fundamentally based upon a 24 hour routine covering of community affairs as a whole.

4. The Informal Aspect of Policing

Then how about the informal aspect of policing? Our policing in the community has traditionally rested upon the "Neighborhood Watch". Neighborhood Watch, which has been adopted by many Western societies, had already existed in Japanese communities, in other words, Japan has, in a sense, taken the lead. However, Neighborhood Watch in Japan had emerged spontaneously from community dwellers and, bearing this in mind, it cannot be compared to the Western version. The Japanese system consists of a tightly bound kinship among neighbors of a community, including families, relatives, colleagues and school teachers, who know each other very well. When a stranger entered the community, his behavior was observed by members throughout his stay. This system had been commonly used by governments since the Edo Era, roughly 300 years ago. For example, at that time, the government had forced the people to form "Goningumi", which meant that a team of neighbors from five households was formed in order to maintain the severe tax collecting system. If one member of the five families violated the tax rules prescribed by the government, the members of the other households all had to bear the responsibility for the violation. In addition, they had the same responsibility for observing crime as for the violation of tax-payment. This system was in use until the end of the Second World War.

However, Japan is now proceeding towards a democratic state and the organization of neighborhoods is usually administered by people who are not members of the government. Therefore, if we talk about community policing being carried out under the auspices of the people, we should refer to the unconscious and invisible crime prevention schemes as being referred to below.

Here are two examples which do not always function as policing, but, for the most part, function well: "Chonaikai", with a traditional history and "PTA" organizations developed after the Second World War.

"Chonaikai" got its name after The Second World War, but in reality and content it was developed from the previously organized "Tonarigumi" or "Goningumi" for neighbors, although "Chonaikai" is not as politically-oriented as they had been. "Chonaikai" has now become leisure-oriented and includes comprehensive activities from the care of children, the clearing-up of rubbish abandoned in the streets by neighbors, patrolling at night-time and social services to joining flower festivals, travelling, fishing contests and holding carnivals under the auspices of other organizations.

Generally speaking, the community organization of crime prevention, called "Bohan Kyokaï", is closely related to "Chonaikai", because they have mostly common members. Therefore, you might well say that "Chonaikai" has various kinds of subordinate organizations. "Chonaikai" has a network which covers the whole of Japan. In other words, crime prevention organizations can be seen everywhere in Japan. "Chonaikai" has a deterrent function for crime and delinquency, and originally, its members intervened in each other's affairs with the result that their children were carefully looked after. The Japanese rely more on their neighbors than they do on their relatives. It is a Japanese saying that the neighbor next door is more indispensable than relatives living far away.

Secondly, we have to take a look at the organization of the PTA in Japan, although it is probably not necessary to explain the meaning, since it originated in the United States after
the Second World War. It consists of parents of children and school teachers (Parents and Teachers Association, PTA). Naturally, there are social links between them, but in Japan an organization of all younger members concerned with the same school has emerged, which can be compared with the "Chonaikai". They discuss current matters and act inside the territory of the school district. Traditionally, the status of school teachers is relatively high. They were respected not only by the parents, but also by the neighbors: the teachers used to take care of the children even after their school working hours or outside of the premises of the school. So, in effect, teachers would be the leaders in the community concerned, not only during their working life, but also after their retirement. For example, at night they kept an eye on the children who were likely to go astray and counselled them accordingly. In fact, most of the suspect or wayward children would be re-introduced into society thanks to the help and advice of the teachers. In those days, the PTA organization in collaboration with members of the community was a solution-oriented body helping to solve problems and deterring delinquency. Undoubtedly, it can still play an important role in preventing children from breaking the law.

However, as I mentioned above, the Japanese society is changing with the emphasis being placed on individualism and with an attitude of non-intervention. Even where traditional organizations in the community still exist, the younger generation or families with double incomes tend to keep them at a respectful distance in order to avoid trouble. As a result, it is difficult to keep track of strangers or intruders in a community, especially in new housing projects where people are not aware of their neighbors living nearby or even next door, which is a situation that would never have existed two decades ago. Thus, it seems as if the human relationships among neighbors, with the exception of the old central parts such as in Tokyo or in Kyoto, as well as most rural areas, have diminished in Japan. "Chonaikai" is now a leisure center for old people, so that its original function aimed at controlling peoples' behavior has vanished.

Likewise, the same change has taken place in the PTA organization. In fact, the traditional respect shown for the teachers is now at a crisis, partly because parents are better educated and they don't feel ill at ease in the presence of teachers and partly because the control by formal agencies for teachers has been gradually stronger. Currently, the PTA organization has become a place of conflict between teachers and parents as clashes between students and teachers take place in schools. It is a certain fact that most teachers would call the police if trouble began, particularly in private schools, where the reputation for order is paramount. In short, the PTA in general ceases to function as it did at its inception, although this depends on the area concerned.

It is not my intention to imply that this phenomenon will automatically lead to an increase in crime and delinquency in Japan. However, bearing in mind that traditional social control has helped to maintain the low crime rate until now, I think we can expect a great influence from the weakened control on the volume of crime and delinquency.

5. The New Type of Community Policing Needed in Japan

Historically, we have had many organizations concerned with community policing in Japan, mostly of which were established at the initiative of formal agencies and are still more or less associated with them. The existing organizations include, for example, "Bohan Kyoukai" (Crime Prevention Association), "Kotsu Anzen Kyokai" (Traffic Safety Association), "Shonen Hodo Inkai" (Juvenile Guidance Committee), "Shonen Keisatsu Haha no Kai", (Association of Police and Mothers of Juveniles) and "Kankyo Joka Suishin Kyogikai" (Conference on Promotion of Environmental Purification), all of which keep close relationships with
the local police agencies. In general, most of the senior members of these organizations come from the police force, i.e. these organizations provide a second occupation for retired police officers. Accordingly, the policy is rather police-oriented than community-oriented. This has a negative effect, partly because the people in the community traditionally follow the activities of these organizations obediently and partly because they are generally indifferent towards them. I think it will be necessary to organize, or rather, re-organize new social links between the younger generation and the police, not only for the purpose of preventing crime, but also for the multi-purpose of including sports events and ways to enjoy leisure time. In short, we cannot expect people to participate only in community policing, since the level of interest in the problem of crime is low.

As already having been pointed out, however, it's interesting to note that, when a member of a family is in a crisis situation the other members fully participate in crime prevention measures. This happens in contrast to the negative attitude usually shown, simply because the fear of crime is evident. It is usual for them to conduct this by themselves in order not having to co-operate with the formal agencies, for example, the police. This approach was especially obvious a few years ago in Tokyo, when people were forced to defend their children after a series of kidnapping. There seems to be a great contrast between this situation and the traditional activity of crime prevention, since the former is self-defence-oriented but the latter is state-oriented. The lessons from the former should be that, whenever there is a fear of crime, people are eager to participate in any crime preventive action.

Like other developed countries, Japan has serious problems regarding drug abuse, juvenile delinquency and organized crime. However, they do not directly concern the general public or affect their daily lives, so we do not need any further organization for urban crime such as burglary, theft, robbery or vandalism to be established in the immediate future. In the future, when the kinship and family bonds will be weakened in a given family relatives and neighbors, who used to deter crime and delinquency, will undoubtedly face the same problems that Western societies have faced: a need for alternative policing contrary to formal policing which, recently, seems to be getting a little too formal and less efficient in Japan. Besides, the police force in Japan gradually seems to be losing the confidence and support of the people. Especially, whenever traffic police officers deal arrogantly with traffic violators, the police, as a whole, gives cause to distrust among the general public. According to a public opinion poll, the police force were depicted as one of the worst formal agencies.

6. Questions Concerning European Experiences

Finally, I would like to indicate some of the difficulties concerning the development of community policing in some European countries, and propose some solutions drawn from the Japanese way of dealing with this problem. I feel that some Western crime prevention policy-makers seem to concentrate far too much on the so-called "situational crime prevention strategy" (see A.E. Bottoms, no). If they abandoned "social crime prevention", it would lead to the increase of the malfunctioning of community policing which should really be based on fundamental relationships between human beings in society as a whole.

My queries concerning the current situation in Europe on the topic of community policing are as follows:

- How to rebuild a sense of community among the population? By and large, people in Western societies are thought to keep their life-style based on individualism. If so, why does it seem that they are not interested in the cohesion of the community or willing to organize a community? Furthermore, where an ethnic group shares very little consensus concerning the values, it is more difficult to organize a community.
Would people accept the mutual intervention from community neighbors or by the police force in exchange for some more security? According to the Japanese experience, the more successful community policing is, the more frequently people will intervene with each other. If a neighbor leaves his home, you take care of it during his absence. Sometimes a police officer will visit your home even though nothing is wrong, although such police work might disturb your daily life.

How can the local police force acquire the trust of the people in the community after it has almost diminished? In some Western countries, the relationship between the police force and the public is not favorable. Therefore, before promoting community policing in a case like this, an improvement in this relationship is needed. Would this be possible?

In a society, where social classes are divided and community policing is promoted, we are afraid that the fear of crime between middle-class and lower-class neighborhoods would expand. Generally speaking, the area where more positive results would be obtained is a comparatively wealthy area. It is also rather problematic as to how community policing could be implemented without confusion. The success achieved in Japan depends upon the singularity and unity of race who share the same values, customs and traditions.

As noted above, can the professional dedication and sense of duty of the police officer be guaranteed? To some extent, a sense of devotion to the community would often be needed, where community policing shall be successful.

References

Civic Militia and Police in the Republic of Poland

Andrzej Gaberle

Political and economic changes which took place in Poland during the years 1989-1991 included also law and order maintenance and crime prevention agencies. The change of the official name of the police force from Civic Militia (Milicja Obywatelska - MO), to Police constitutes only symbolic, although by no means the most important dimension of these changes. They included also internal changes, decisive for different ways, means and scope of the activities of these agencies in socialist states and currently. Of no lesser importance are changes in the public perception of former militia and current police, what constitutes important factor contributing to the efficiency of these agencies. This paper deals with the mentioned above changes.

1. Character and Tasks of Militia and Police
Legal provisions defining tasks of the Civic Militia stressed first of all the protection of the state's security and public order, then only mentioning the duty to protect citizens lives and property (Civic Militia's Officers Service Act 1959; Minister of Internal Affairs and His Subordinate Agencies Act 1983). This ranking order was by no means an accidental one. Article 21 of the Act of January 31st 1959 stated openly that "(militias') officers should be characterized by full loyalty towards the (communist) party and the people's government", which meant that the militia constituted an agency primarily created to protect the political system and the communist party's interests. It was not even attempted to hide these facts. Quite on the contrary, it was constantly underlined that militia was not apolitical. Since the Civic Militia constituted a tool of terrorizing the society, which overwhelmingly refused to accept the socialist system, it was organized according to paramilitary rules. This found expression in rules of military discipline which governed its functioning and a system of military ranks identical with army's ones. Also riot police units were organized in the way similar to military organization (companies, platoons, squads).

Police's tasks are defined in a quite different manner (Police Act 1990). The law mentions citizens' security protection in the first place. Additionally provisions giving a political and paramilitary character to the former militia were eliminated. As one of the examples of these internal changes a return to the rank system which was used by the Polish police before World War II may serve. Also analytical departments systematically gathering data regarding the crime problem and other pathological phenomena were created and paramilitary riot police units dissolved.

2. Structure and Organization of Militia and Police
Regarding the organization the Civic Militia was strictly connected with the political police known as Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB - Security Service). Although militia and Security Service constituted two separate hierarchies, all militia units had a duty to support the Security Service in its actions. Such duty existed even for the traffic police, which controlled drivers at random under the very often used pretext of routine checks.

During the seventies and eighties riot police units and special civil organizations strictly connected with the militia (the so-called Civic Militia's Voluntary Reserve) were significantly
developed and enlarged. Members of the latter were used not only to maintain order during sports events, open air concerts or other public gatherings, but some of them also cooperated with the political police and were spying regularly upon their neighbors.

In the year of 1990 the police was separated from those agencies, who's task the protection of constitutional order and state's security should be (State Security Agency Act 1990). It means that the political police, which maintained surveillance over the oppositional groups and collected information about citizens and their political opinions, was dissolved. Also the Civic Militia's Voluntary Reserve and most of the riot police units were dissolved. Only some units being used to sustain order during sports events or religious ceremonies, as well as anti-terrorist commandos, remained.

There have been no major changes in the territorial organization of the police recently. All police units are subordinated to the Main Police Headquarters with the seat in Warsaw. In every woiwodship (district) there are woiwodship police headquarters and every woiwodship consists of a few police regions with regional police headquarters, divided respectively into police precincts and stations. Basic units of the structure of the police forces are constituted by region and precinct. Stations are only organized in places, which require increased police presence, and, therefore, may be organized only temporarily.

3. The Town Guard

The 1990 Police Act contains provisions, which make it possible to organize special order maintenance units called town guard, an institution unknown earlier in Poland. They may be organized by town mayors and city presidents in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Tasks and structure of these units are defined by the agency, which calls them into being, and they may only perform administrative functions. As a result of this there are some differences between the town guards existing in many Polish towns and cities. To illustrate how such units, of what is sometimes called "local police", are organised and how they operate, I will use an example of Cracow, where the Town Guard has been called into being by the City's President Ordinance from March 23rd 1991.

The Town Guard in Cracow is subordinated to the City's President, who nominates its command. He commands the guard and represents it in all contacts with state and other self-government agencies. Cracow's Town Guard may perform its duties on the territory of the city and is financed by the city (commune).

The sphere of activities and duties of the Town Guard are the following:
- to participate in all activities aimed at protecting citizens lives, health and property, particularly in cases of damage to public utilities, natural calamities and transportation of dangerous substances,
- to keep order and peace in public places,
- to control legality of the activities which require permission or license; for example construction, trade services and similar,
- to control the owners, administrators and janitors of houses and other real estates with respect to the compliance with sanitation standards, repairs and similar,
- to protect the seats of City Council and City Government.

To execute these duties Town Guard officers have the right:
- to require from all persons to identify themselves (to present their personal ID card),
- to carry out searches on luggage, freight and also persons in case there is reasonable suspicion that the law was broken,
- to detain for a short period of time necessary to call other proper agencies (e.g. the police), persons who, obviously, pose direct danger to human life or health or citizens.
property,
- to fine perpetrators of certain transgressions and to file complaints against such perpetrators in transgression boards,
- to remove falsely parking cars at the owners costs, to warn, also in writing, people disturbing public order lowering sanitation standards in public places.

The Town Guard in Cracow cooperates with the police. In particular:
- they stay in constant contact and exchange information on anything that poses threat to public order or sanitation standards in public places,
- they cooperate in maintaining order and securing evidence in places where crimes or transgressions were committed,
- they cooperate in all activities aimed at the maintenance of public order.

Cooperation of the Town Guard with the police is particularly necessary in Cracow, because guards have no right to stop cars and other vehicles. It must be mentioned that Cracow has very complicated traffic regulations: the entire city, especially the Old City, is divided into zones with different accessibility for different vehicles, zones closed for traffic included. As a result violations of these regulations are very common. In such situation police and guards together control cars, because only the police has the right to issue tickets. One more manifestation of the cooperation between police and Town Guard in Cracow is the fact that Guard officers are trained by the police. Guards are also under Cracow's Police Command supervision.

Currently there are about 150 officers employed in the Cracow Town Guard. About 30% of them have university education. Because of the relatively small number of officers their activities are limited almost exclusively to the Old City and other downtown areas. But there are plans to create additional Town Guard stations in other areas of the city and to furnish them with appropriate communications equipment, computers included. The main purpose of these plans is to improve Town Guard effectiveness, mainly in prosecuting traffic violations and car thefts. To realize these plans the number of Town Guard officers should increase up to about 600 persons.


There was almost no research conducted on the public attitudes towards the Civic Militia, mainly because of two reasons. First of all, the authorities in the People's Republic of Poland knew perfectly well about negative attitudes of the majority of the population towards the militia, which was used as a tool serving to support and maintain communist rule. In such situation the government was not interested in public disclosures about these facts. Secondly, many scholars were reluctant to conduct such research, just to avoid eventual suspicions that they would somehow cooperate with the militia. In only one survey ever conducted, which touched these problems and was published, respondents were asked to choose one of the six following occupations with the purpose of recommending it to someone seeking a job: taxi-driver, coal-miner, police constable, engine-driver, non-commissioned officer in the army and electrician.

Only 11.3% had chosen the police constable, whereas no less than 57.0% would have dissuaded from such a choice, mainly because of the militia's bad reputation (Laskus and Maroszek 1978, 9). Respondents, having been asked why other people would choose a job in the militia, usually (78.1%) indicated some sort of personal gain, like for example: they would want to have power over others - 27.0%, they would have good income and many other advantages in everyday life - 22.3%, they would not have a chance to get any other job - 26.5%. Quite seldom (28.6%) motives, such as for example having a useful and responsible occupa-
tion (Laskus and Maroszek 1978, 11), were indicated. Results of this survey seem to confirm a hypothesis that only a small percentage of the population represented positive attitudes towards the militia and that unequivocally negative opinions dominated in Poland at that time. This situation changed during the years 1989-1992. But due to the fact that public opinion surveys in Poland after 1989 were conducted according to different standards, comparisons are very problematic. In a nationwide survey regarding confidence in public institutions which was conducted in March, April and May 1991 police rated third, only behind the military and the Catholic Church (58% to 64% of positive evaluations in three consecutive pools) (See Gazeta Wyborcza 1991). In considering that police rated better than president, government and the trade union "Solidarnosc", one must note that these results show a significant change in public attitudes towards the police. This change was also confirmed by the results of a research conducted among the citizens of Cracow in 1992, where 50% of the interviewees evaluated police positively and only 10% negatively (Lubinska 1992).

It does not mean though that police officers enjoy high prestige. A research on the prestige hierarchy of selected professions conducted in 1991 shows that the policeman's profession received 58 of 100 possible, which means a position somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy (the highest position, university professor, scored 83, the lowest, street salesman, 27) (See Polityka 1991).

5. Evaluation of Militia and Police with Respect to their Effectiveness as Crime Control Agencies.

Approval and acceptance of the police force by the population are of great significance for cooperation of citizens with the police. Also very important in this respect are citizens opinions about effectiveness of police work and actions in apprehending and prosecuting criminals.

In this respect the Civic Militia usually scored rather poorly. Research regarding these problems and having been conducted on the nationwide sample showed that, although on the one hand 44.0% of the respondents evaluated the militia's efficiency in a positive way, on the other 38.9% expressed a negative opinion justifying it with poor organization of work within the militia and the lack of a sense of duty on the side of the constables (Laskus 1980, 32). In spite of this respondents rather positively evaluated the militia's ability to apprehend criminals. 59.1% of them said that the militia would apprehend all or at least a great majority of offenders, and only 8.3% said that the Militia would only be able to do it rarely (Laskus 1980, 35). One must assume that this pattern of answering resulted from an enormous propaganda effort in the mass media. State TV and newspapers, which were fully controlled by the communist party, never missed an opportunity to underline that the Civic Militia had scored great triumphs in the "war on crime" and ever better protects citizens security. Very interesting results regarding the problems mentioned above have been obtained in a recent survey conducted among the citizens of Cracow earlier this year. The respondents were asked whether in their opinion currently the police, or the militia four or five years ago, were more efficient in apprehending criminals. 31.8% expressed their conviction that the police were much worse in this respect than the Militia had used to be, 16.8% had not observed any difference, and the remaining had no opinion (Lubinska 1992). Additionally, the decisive majority of the respondents (ca. 80% of them) not only supported the granting of greater financial and other means to the police, but also of greater powers in order to make their work more efficient. A confrontation of these results with the generally positive attitudes towards the police leads to one important conclusion: it was the depoliticizing of the police, but not its efficiency in crime control, which mostly contributed to its improved public image. Effi-
ciency of the police is not perceived as particularly high, but people recognize that it is necessary to create conditions which will improve the quality of the police's performance. Here one has also to consider the influence exerted by the mass media. The lifting of censorship and strict state controls over TV, radio and press resulted in news coverage and opinions emphasizing growing crime rates and growing helplessness of the police. Such a situation may influence low opinions about police performance and efficiency.

6. Final Remarks
This paper presents certain problems relating to the differences between the militia and the police in an only very sketchy way. The main reason for this is not only the relative scarcity of data and materials on this topic, but also the author's conviction that a synthetic approach sometimes gives a much better picture than a very detailed presentation. The Author also refrained from presenting some other problems like, for example, the militia's and police's role in the investigation of crimes and the apprehension of criminals, participation in the criminal process included. These problems require separate subject matter inquiries and a separate discussion, too. The necessity to reform the Civic Militia and to transform it into a completely different kind of state agency also required changes in personnel and the verification of cadres. Such a verification was conducted during the years 1989-1990 and resulted in discharges for almost all officers of the former political police (Security Service) and about 30% of other employees of the former militia. This move contributed to the boosting public confidence in the police, but on the other hand it meant the dismissal of many competent and experienced officers, undoubtedly resulting in diminished efficiency of policing. However, since the police is unable to function efficiently without public confidence, those verifications were necessary. A separate issue concerns equipment which the Polish Police has at its disposal. It must be underlined that within the former militia the political police and the riot units had been well equipped and financed, whereas the regular "criminal" police and the traffic police had usually been neglected. Due to this nowadays the Polish Police has too few good patrol cars, only poor communication networks, no efficient computers and many other similar problems. The economic crisis of the country makes it very difficult to finance necessary purchases. There are also very limited possibilities to provide the required training for police officers. Therefore, a very strong tendency appeared to develop a variety of local police forces, not going to be financed from the central budget, but from the resources of the local communities. It is necessary to stress, however, that closer ties with western Europe and prospects for an eventual membership in the European Community require cooperation with the police forces of the western countries, which also means the need to match their standard of training and equipment. International cooperation on these fields can not be limited to the local level only. So the development of the local police forces may solve only some problems. It is most important to increase efforts to improve police's image in society, as it constitutes a basic precondition for an effective cooperation between citizens and the police. To do this it is necessary to know what the police should do, what it thinks it should do and what average people think it should do. To obtain answers to this questions information is required which may only be provided by systematic and detailed research. Until now, such data have not been available in Poland.

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"Community policing is a romantic delusion, not for the "world we have lost", but for one we never had. It harks back to a harmonious idyll, where the police were everyone's friend. It was never thus, and it is unlikely that it ever will be" (Waddington, Norton (ed.) 1986, 95).

These words of P.A.J. Waddington reveal something about the controversies attached to the concept of community policing. If we refer to some other authors, we will find that the idea is surrounded by idyllic perceptions of society and police. I can quote among others A.C. Germann who wrote that "well-educated, highly motivated, friendly appearing public service officer, public welfare officer, human affairs officer, public safety officer - whatever name be used - should replace the repressively oriented and frightening policeman" who could serve at the same time the contradictory interests of different layers and groups of society (Germann 1969, 95)

Community policing is, therefore, a very controversial concept. On one hand there are certain advantages concerning public acceptance and support for law enforcement. On the other, we can see an intrusion into civil society which should be protected against state authority. One can, of course, approach the problem from the aspect of police efficiency as well. In this context community policing is an answer to the declining performance of law enforcement and to the failure of the quantitative and technical attempts to improve it (Irving 1991). I share the view according to which community policing is, before all, a response to the increasing problems of public security by getting closer to the very roots of tensions and causes of antisocial behaviour. Consequently, police will either have more sympathy towards those representing the "problematic" or even "dangerous" groups of society, or they become more rigid dealing with social problems by using law enforcement methods and techniques. None of them is desirable as to my opinion.

There is another very important point to be made for the evaluation of community policing. That is the place and role of police within the framework of state organization. Apart from some radical concepts police can be viewed as an integral subsystem of the state apparatus. In this respect they fulfill the duty of enforcing legal rules made, at least sanctioned by state. If so, one can rightfully put the question regarding to the particular causes of treating police differently from other spheres of exercising public authority. In other words: If there is a general structure in a democratic society for expressing and realizing people's will, why should we apply other organizational and normative solutions to one element of it although the latter being inseparable from the functions of the whole. There is a Parliament for representing people in matters of national interest and self-governments (local authorities) for reflecting and solving problems of local communities. Therefore, the establishment of a real community-based police means for me first of all making them accountable to the above mentioned elected bodies. That is, in respect of duties of national or even international importance to the Parliament (e.g. terrorism, organized crime etc.); in matters of local public security to the self-governments of the municipalities, respectively of the counties. Otherwise there would be no internally consistent basis for exercising state power. Of course, one could object, giving much power to local politicians in using armed bodies might be dangerous. But, I am convinced, giving control to politicians over centralized structures of enforcement without
any counterbalance is much more dangerous. It is erroneous, however, to search for impartiality between the extremes of centralization and decentralization. The effective guarantees are to be found in judicial oversight. Thus, prevention of corruption must not be made dependent upon subordination of police. If you place the source and support of community based police outside the said representative structure, you will find that police initiated "partnership" will lead inevitably to the dominance of police norms and values within the framework of police-society consultations. Police perception of socio-legal problems is, however, substantially different not only from that of society at large but also from other representatives of state power and implementation of law. This is a platitude in sociology dealing with police (Skolnick 1975; Westley 1970; Reiner 1985, 111)

Having said that I must confess that I am sceptical about community policing in general while not denying the need for more effective relationship between police and society. I agree with the assumption that this is the right direction towards improving public security. But I am also stressing that the contribution of police to the whole situation is very modest. Therefore, you can gain very little by giving more power to police. On the other hand much harm might be caused by confusing state functions by e.g. rendering police a social agency.

My thesis is that police and community relations must be improved without shifting the position of law enforcement towards social work. Proactive engagement should not be excluded from police functions but it should be restricted by law and accountability to elected bodies. Going along the way back from an actual infringement to the social roots police should have less and less coercive powers and decreasing possibility to touch basic rights. Being law enforcement the determinant factor within the scope of police activities crime prevention outside the proper sphere and social assistance can only be perceived as secondary, supplementary components of police work. Quantitative analyses suggesting that the opposite would be true are not convincing. If you take the example of the military you will find that there is a big difference between the basic destination and the actual activities. It does not affect the role of the army and it would be wrong to say that the most important duty of the military would be not to defend the country in a possible war.

All the reservations expressed concerning community policing relate to any well-established democracy. Before evaluating the problem as it applies to the former socialist states and especially to Hungary one has to look at the broader context of the particular issue.

First of all, I have to emphasize, that society in these countries proceeds toward disintegration. Gaps between social classes, layers, national and other minority groups grow. The Socialist-party state destroyed much of the self-organizing capacity of civil society and attempted to replace it by vertically structured system of social control. The nucleus of the party hierarchy stood on the top of the whole establishment. State and legal authority was exercised by a formally more or less separate bureaucracy, judicial body and representative organs. At the same time some fields of paramount political importance remained under direct control of the party. Along with defence and foreign affairs you can find among them policing. Police, in Hungary including intelligence services, were commanded from above without any substantial possibility to challenge their performance by members of the public. Legal regulation and supervision played little role in influencing police practice. Needless to go into details, we can conclude that police used to be one of the major subsystems of the political power targeted to resist any uncontrolled developments within society and to convey party authority to the everyday life of citizens.

These basic premises, in my opinion, exclude the introduction of community policing. First of all, because there is no solid community providing natural basis for this kind of activities. Secondly, for the very structure and internal mechanism of police has not substantially
changed since the fall of communism. Therefore it would be more than dangerous to vest any proactive power in the existing police organization. It is not hopeless to expect restrictions in the field of party political influence on police. But, for purposes of shaping a democratic society it is also undesirable that police substitute direct political values with their "professional" set of norms.

Rejecting the implementation of community policing does not mean, however, that "fire-brigade" or military type law enforcement would be the ideal solution for the increasing public security problems. The spreading values of community policing should also remind us the shortcomings and disadvantages of the quantitative and technical approach.

What should, after all, be done? According to my view we have to part with the traditional assumption concerning direct interdependence between police and public security. Security aspect should be an integral component of all kinds of decisions made by representative bodies and even by the bureaucracy. Focusing on the organizational problems one has to realize that there are many players on the scene of maintaining order. Private companies, voluntary citizens' groups and state agencies are interested in safeguarding peaceful life in different fields. Local self-governments could better coordinate among them than public police. Some ideas and solutions of community policing should be transferred to local crime prevention controlled by organs of self-governments. These entities could better harmonize the activities of different units of the state apparatus together with NGO-s, respecting the legal status of all the participants, of course. Thus, local self-governments could not only transmit police interests to social assistance agencies but also on the reverse, to improve police understanding of social problems in their complexity. On national level coordination should be done by Parliament and government.

Because of diverging values and interests in society police must be governed by the most consolidated institution serving that purpose and that is law. Of course, nature of maintaining public security requires flexibility, therefore discretion cannot be excluded. But discretion also could and should be adapted to basic constitutional and legal principles, values. This is up to the judiciary exercising oversight upon different aspects of police work.

All this is not to say that police should refrain from helping the community. Public relations including dissemination of security-related information continues to be an essential part of police work. But discharging that duty police have to reveal their actual role. Community also assists the police by providing adequate background for law enforcement. Neighborhood watch schemes and other voluntary-based activities are very helpful, too. The optimal cooperation is, however, to be based on a clear-cut awareness of partly diverging, partly mutual interests.

Western Europe and North America have made significant steps toward community policing. It is of paramount importance for all responsible officials and academics in our region to study the results of this law enforcement philosophy.

After the mostly theoretical considerations I turn now to the descriptive part of my presentation. As community policing ideas are often made with a reference to the past we should have a short retrospection into Hungarian policing.

The goal of the creation of a national, professional police force was set in the time of the Civil Revolution and War of Independence against Habsburg Monarchy in 1848-49. After suppressing this revolutionary and national movement arbitrary law enforcement of the Austrian Empire was reintroduced.

A historical compromise made in 1867 promoted the development of independent Hungarian police. The Act of 1872 on the capital provided a state police force for Budapest. The particular legal basis and framework for its activities was set up by the Act of 1881 on Budapest
State Police. It is worth mentioning that the government enclosed to the draft a description of the Viennese and Metropolitan London Police Departments. In the same year another Act established the Hungarian Gendarmerie for rural law enforcement. Thus, a French style structure emerged in our country. Cities went on with their own forces until 1919 when they have been nationalized and merged with Budapest Police. Smaller municipalities still had the possibility to maintain separate police but for financial reasons most of them could not afford it. In 1945 Gendarmerie was abolished and condemned because of collaborating with the Nazis. Responsibilities have been taken over by the centralized national police including political intelligence.

Isolation from society and the military-type structure of police resulted in much tension and hatred between community and law enforcement during the time of socialism in Hungary. Being aware of the antidemocratic character of the said establishment the opposition almost unanimously called for "blowing up" the old structure and giving control over police to the local self-governments (local authorities) before the free elections in 1990. Just before the elections a scandal exploded and concluded in some changes with the aim of guaranteeing separation of police from politics. One of them was the division of ministry and police involving the prohibition for the minister of the interior to issue instructions concerning particular cases. He is, however, entitled to give normative instructions and regulations. The other significant step was taking out the organs of state security (intelligence) from the body of law enforcement.

These amendments brought really substantial changes into political control of police. One could expect further steps toward a democratic system of law enforcement after forming the new government. But this did not happen. As soon as the governmental coalition came to power the minister realized that under circumstances of rising criminality and worsening public security it would be better to go on with the centralized police instead of undertaking the risks of local political influence on law enforcement. Thus, no radical restructuring was provided in the concepts and draft codes on police elaborated by the ministry bureaucracy. Of course, decentralization is not identical with community policing. Along with emphasizing the need for one national police attempts have been made to demilitarize the law enforcement apparatus. Community policing was not to be introduced but policemen should have been moved closer to the citizen. This kind of "bürgernahe" police remained the ideal type until October 1990. That time a new shocking experience challenged the prevailing image of police of the government.

The cabinet decided to increase petrol prices very sharply. Taxi drivers protested against the decision by blocking the major junctions, bridges and ports of entry. Practically all traffic, consequently the life in the country became paralyzed. Interestingly, most of the officers fraternized with those picketing and some chiefs of police including the Budapest Commissioner spoke out for "non intervention". Thus, police really got closer to the citizen but at the same time the distance between them and the government grew substantially. One has to add that there was no real chance of solving the social crisis by using the police. Their capacity was too little to deal with the problem. The workers' militia had been abolished, military intervention was restricted by the constitution.

Having drawn the lessons, the government removed the minister of the interior and Mr. Péter Boross was appointed to the post. He decided that this time we needed first of all strengthening the police in all aspects (manpower, techniques etc.) Accepting his proposal, Parliament voted for financing 3000 additional police.

The Police Bill is now before the legislation containing no major changes in the structure but giving back the direct command, with some exceptions, to the minister. One has to keep in
mind, however, that the Act must be passed by qualified majority (2/3 of members present). That means, the liberal opposition also has a say in shaping the structure of police. They have a much better position in local self-governments. Therefore, while objecting the reinforcement of ministerial powers they push the system towards more local control. Despite the said governmental policies there are some trends which show the interest of the communities in determining the conditions of public security and even willingness in participation.

Realizing the failure of the official law enforcement apparatus voluntary-based self-defence groups have been formed throughout the country. Now, there are several hundreds of them, generally calling themselves "civil guards". Basically these organizations fulfill their duties in the capacity of citizens collectively exercising the rights for crime prevention. Some of them resemble Neighborhood Watch, while others are closer to Guardian Angels. One can also reveal sometimes vigilante tendencies in the activities of several groups. After overcoming some initial tensions and misunderstanding the relation between civil guards and state police became reconciled. Another factor showing the community attitude towards keeping order and police is the result of a series of public opinion surveys with the conclusion of improving public-police relations on municipal level and no substantial changes in the basically negative evaluation of the police as a whole by the population.

It is also worth mentioning that many local governments expressed readiness to assist in maintaining local police, though having no competence for control.

Summarizing, my thesis is that at the time being the question is not whether we should implement community based policing. The first step to be made is to create firm legal basis for law enforcement activities. However, the present hierarchy being substitute for regulation, fitting police into the general structure of state and law would inevitably lead to substantial decentralization and thus to a closer police-community relationship. I must emphasize, though, that this is my evaluation and not the policy of the government.

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