Metonymy

Unity in diversity*

Peter Koch
University of Tübingen

The range of phenomena labelled as "metonymy" is so multifarious that it may seem impossible to reduce all these phenomena to a common semantic denominator. In accordance with many traditional and modern accounts in the fields of rhetoric and linguistics, this article reconstructs metonymy as a linguistic effect upon the content of a given form, based on a figure/ground effect along the contiguity relations within a given frame and generated by pragmatic processes. Thanks to these criteria, we are able to demonstrate the internal diversity as well as the fundamental unity of metonymy with respect to numerous aspects of language (innovation and conventionality, paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimension, linguistic subsystems like grammar, lexicon, etc., different levels of conceptual abstraction, concept and referent, speaker and hearer activities, principle of relevance) and to put metonymy in its right place by distinguishing it from linguistic effects based on other conceptual, especially taxonomic, relations and from other contiguity-based effects.

*Je donne entre les especes de Tropes, la premiere place à la Metonymie, parce que c'est le Trop le plus étendu, & qui comprend soûts luy plusieurs autres especes (Bernard Lamy, De l’Art de Parler, Paris 1676).*
consider repeatedly whether we should exclude certain phenomena from the realm of metonymy.

However, I am convinced that most, though not all, of the multifarious phenomena subsumed under the label “metonymy” form a unity and that many traditional and modern accounts of this unity converge in one point. In the following, I first will try to sketch this unitary understanding of “metonymy” (Section 2) and then point out that the indisputable heterogeneity of the corresponding range of phenomena is not chaotic, but can be systematised along different dimensions (Sections 3–5). Measuring this pluridimensionality (cf. also Radden and Kövecses 1999:21–44) will enable us to determine more accurately the true range of “metonymy” (Section 6).

2. Metonymy as a figure/ground effect within frames

2.1 Contiguity, frame, and figure/ground effect

The earliest definition of “metonymy” (Rhetorica ad Herennium 4, 32, 43 = Rhetorica ad Herennium 1894:337) already makes use of the notion of “near and close”. The relation of closeness clearly corresponds to what would later be termed “contiguity” by associationist philosophers and psychologists (a relation identified long before by Aristotle in his De memoria et reminiscencia 451b: 18–22 = Aristotle 1975:300). The rhetorical and the associationist currents of thinking were integrated for the first time by Roudet, who defined metonymy as a type of semantic change “résultant d’une association par contiguïté entre les idées” (1921:690). The importance of “semantic contiguity” as underlying metonymy was confirmed by Jakobson (1956) on the synchronic level and by Ullmann (1962:218–220) on the diachronic level.1

Whereas contiguity is presented from a more or less structuralist perspective as a linguistic relation between signifés of words (Jakobson 1956; Ullmann 1962; also Dubois et al. 1970:106ff.), a cognitive approach should conceive of it rather as a conceptual/perceptual relation.2 In my view, contiguity is the relation existing between elements of a prototypical conceptual/perceptual frame or between the frame as a whole and each of its elements (cf. Koch 1999a:145–149). I use the term “frame” here in a very general sense, comprising also “scene”, “scenario”, “script” etc.3 Of course, elements of a frame can, in turn, constitute (sub-)frames.

In Cognitive Semantics the notion of “frame” has turned out to be particularly fertile with respect to processes of “perspectivisation” and “windowing of attention” (cf. Fillmore 1977; Dirven et al. 1982; Talmy 1996; Ungerer and Schmid 1996:205–249). One can speak of “processes of perspectivisation within frames” from two totally different semiotic points of view. On the one hand, we can raise the onomasiological question of how different perspectives of a frame are expressed linguistically. For the COMMERCIAL EVENT frame, for example, we have English verbalisations such as the following:


On the other hand, we can raise the semasiological problem if different senses of a given linguistic expression correspond to different perspectives within the same frame. It is in this sense that “perspectivisation” has been related to metonymy (cf. Taylor 1995:90, 107ff., 125ff.).4 Since frames are to be considered conceptual/perceptual gestalts,5 we can easily explicate this semasiological understanding of perspectivisation in terms of gestalt theory and, more specifically, in terms of “figure/ground” effects. In the visual realm, this can be illustrated by the traditional example of Figure 1, where we perceive either four black squares (= FIGURE) on a white ground or, alternatively, a white cross (= FIGURE) on a black ground:

![Figure 1](image)

Similarly, with respect to a prototypical frame PURSUING AND TRYING TO CATCH AN ANIMAL THAT RUNS AWAY, the French verb chasser can highlight either the aspect of TRYING TO CATCH (2a) or, alternatively, the aspect of MAKING RUN AWAY (2b) (cf. Meillet 1905/6: 259; Jongen 1985:131ff.; Koch 1991:296):

2. a. Nous irons chasser du gibier.
   We will go to hunt game.
   b. Nous avons chassé les chiens de notre cuisine.
   We chased the dogs from our kitchen.

Thus, the metonymic relation between these two senses of Fr. chasser can be described in terms of a figure/ground effect along the contiguity relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fr. chasser</th>
<th>... TRY TO CATCH</th>
<th>... MAKE RUN AWAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sense A</td>
<td>(2a) Nous irons chasser du giber.</td>
<td>figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sense B</td>
<td>(2b) Nous avons chassé les chiens de notre cuisine.</td>
<td>&gt; ground</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2 A basic definition of metonymy

Though convinced of the unity of metonymy, one still has to cope with the apparent heterogeneity of so-called “metonyms” or “metonymic effects”. Nevertheless, it seems useful to systematise different dimensions of this heterogeneity and then to determine for each dimension separately the applicability of the unitary understanding of metonymy sketched in 2.1. In order to detect several of these dimensions (some of which will be well known, whereas others may be new to the reader), we can begin with the following provisional definition:

1. **Metonymy is**
   i. a **linguistic effect** upon the content of a given form,
   ii. based on a **figure/ground effect** with respect to cognitive frames and contiguity relations,
   iii. and generated by **pragmatic processes**.

This definition truly reflects the interest for metonymy shown by different disciplines as “linguistic semantics” (i); see below Section 3), “cognitive sciences” (ii); see below Section 4), “rhetoric, literary studies”, and “pragmatics” (iii); as for the pragmatic aspects, see below Section 5).

### 3. Metonymy as a linguistic effect

If metonymy is considered to be “a linguistic effect upon the content of a given form” (3-i) above), this implies a variable element (the content) and an invariable element (the form). Of course, the invariability of the form can be only of a relative nature. Thus, in example (4), illustrating a metonymic change of content from (a) to (b), the form actually undergoes a dramatic sound change.

4. a. Clat. tremere to tremble
   b. OfFr. criembre, ModFr. craindre [kaːnɛdʁ] to fear

Since reconstructing diachronic continuities and affiliations always presupposes elaboration and interpretation of individual synchronic data (cf. Koch and Steinkrüger: in press; Koch: in press c), the invariance of a linguistic form through diachrony is an idealisation. It is only on the basis of such an idealisation that the semasiologist observes a metonymic effect as a linguistic effect that concerns the content level exclusively.

Linguistic effects can be further differentiated according to essentials of human language. In the present context, the following aspects have to be considered:

5. **Human language**
   i. is characterised by the dialectics between conventional rules and individual speech events: *innovations* always emerge in individual speech events, whereas real language change is a matter of *conventionalisation*;
   ii. has a **paradigmatic** and a **syntagmatic** dimension;
   iii. has several **subsystems** (phonology, grammar, lexicon, etc.).

From these points, we can determine three essential problems concerning metonymy as a linguistic effect: “innovation” vs. “conventionality” of metonyms (3.1); “syntagmatic explicitness” of metonyms (3.2); linguistic subsystems concerned by metonyms (3.3). Surely, one could question in any case the statement that metonymy is a linguistic effect. This will be discussed further in 6.1.
3.1 Innovation vs. conventionality

If, according to (5–i), human language is characterised by the dialectics between individual speech events and conventional rules, we have to distinguish between two types of effects that are both frequently subsumed under “metonymy”.

To begin with, there are metonymic ad hoc effects that occur spontaneously in discourse. I had the opportunity to personally observe an effect of this kind: As my professional work threatened to cause me to neglect our family life, my wife and I agreed to set aside one day per week for the family (Saturday or Sunday, as a rule). We called it jour fixe (6a). On that day, together with our little boy, we would take a trip, go for a walk, or go sightseeing. Time went by, and our son was getting to the age when boys begin to be bored by promenades or sightseeing with their parents. One day when we announced once again our jour fixe, he protested: “Och nein, bitte keinen jour fixe!” “Oh no, no jour fixe, please!” He clearly had affected a totally individual metonymic innovation (6b) with respect to our (personal) adults’ sense of jour fixe.

(6) a. jour fixe
day reserved for the family
b. jour fixe
day of boring promenades and sightseeing

Ad hoc metonymies like this are opposed to metonymic effects that occur between different senses of certain polysemous lexemes:

(7) a. Engl. child
offspring, descendant (diachronically, the original sense; cf. BDE, s.v.)
b. Engl. child
very young person

While in cases like (6) the metonymic sense (b) is an innovation generated ad hoc in discourse, in cases like (7) the metonymic sense (b) has already been lexicalised, i.e. conventionalised (or habitualised), ready for being activated in discourse at any time. Ad hoc metonymy, as a “trope”, has always been a topic of rhetoric. Metonymic change (and polysemy), on the other hand, is investigated by historical semantics, even in those cases where the original non-metonymic sense has eventually disappeared and remains a purely “archeological” background (cf. (4), where the sense ‘tremble’ is no more present in French).

Despite all these differences, the underlying cognitive relation and the corresponding figure/ground effect is in both cases fundamentally the same: in (6) it is a contiguity family day—boring promenade day based on the prototypical experiential frame weekend day of a young boy; in (7) it is a contiguity based on the fact that in certain experiential frames we prototypically conceive of a very young person in terms of descendence (and also, to some degree, vice versa).

From a diachronic point of view, the two phenomena are intimately related. Ad hoc metonymies — if they are “successful”, which is not necessarily the case (cf. (6)) — ultimately can induce metonymic changes that lead to metonymic polysemies like (7). Metonymic polysemies, in turn, are generally the result of conventionalised ad hoc metonymies in discourse.9 (This distinction does not apply, however, to metonymies of type C in 4.3.; see note 23)

Terminologically speaking, we should insist on the fundamental cognitive unity of all metonymic effects, without neglecting the crucial difference between innovative and conventionalised effects. Accordingly, we would have to distinguish “(ad hoc) metonymy”, involving an ad hoc figure/ground effect, from “metonymic change” and “metonymic polysemy”, involving a conventionalised figure/ground effect.10 In the following, for the sake of terminological convenience, I will nevertheless subsume, “(ad hoc) metonymy”, “metonymic change”, and “metonymic polysemy” under the general label of “metonymy” tout court.

3.2 Syntagmatic explicitness

According to (5–ii), human language has a paradigmatic and a syntagmatic dimension. The former concerns the essence of metonymy itself, since the metonymic use of a linguistic element totally changes its position within the paradigm of which it is a part (normally cutting across lexical fields, linguistic subsystems in the sense of 3.3., etc.). In contrast to this, the syntagmatic dimension allows interesting modulations of the metonymic effect — an insight that, to my knowledge, most scholars have not yet accounted for.

At this point, we discover an interesting analogy with metaphor, the functioning of which also varies largely depending on the syntagmatic environment. We can distinguish at least the following “syntagmatic” types of metaphors:

(8) Explicit metaphor in praesentia:
Partir, c’est mourir un peu.
To depart is to die a little.

9...
3.3 Linguistic subsystems concerned

According to (5-i), human language has several subsystems that can be involved in metonymies. Since metonymy is an effect acting on whole linguistic signs that encompass an expression face (called here "form") and a content face, the phonological subsystem is never of immediate concern to metonymies.\(^{14}\)

The traditional examples of metonymy are lexical, but this does not mean that metonymic effects are alien to grammar or even to pragmatics or the discourse level. Rather, we have to distinguish:

1. speech act metonymies,
2. metonymies as transitions between speech acts and the lexicon,
3. metonymies at the level of discourse semantics,
4. purely lexical metonymies,
5. lexical metonymies with grammatical implications,
6. metonymies as transitions between lexicon and grammatical metaphor,
7. metonymies within grammar.

1. For about three decades, indirect speech acts have been a controversial issue (cf. e.g. Searle 1975; Levinson 1983:263–276; Sperber and Wilson 1995:243ff.). Be this as it may, it is striking that (pragmatic) frames seem to play an important role in this realm. According to Searle, one element of a directive speech act “frame” or “scenario” (as we could express it in cognitive terms) is the preparatory condition that the hearer H is able to perform the action A requested by the speaker S. Consequently, by asking for the validity of this preparatory condition, S can perform, through a figure/ground effect, the intended directive speech act:

\[\text{(14)} \text{Engl. Can you help me?} \]
\[\text{Help me!}\]

So, these and similar cases, concerning various speech act types and their respective conditions, can be considered as “speech act metonymies” (cf. Taylor 1995:157; Thornburg and Panther 1997; Panther and Thornburg 1999; Gibbs 1999:72ff.; cf. also the considerations in Schiffrin 1979:259ff.).

2. A totally different kind of “speech act metonymies” underlies the emergence of performative verbs. This can be exemplified by the verb Lat. mandare:

\[\text{(15) a. Lat. Tibi mando ut hunc nuntium statim Marco amico deferas.} \]
\[\text{[ORDER]} \]
\[\text{I entrust you to deliver this news at once to my friend Marcus.}\]

\[\text{b. Lat. mandare} \]
\[\text{to order}\]
In the propositional content of a speech act of order, Latin speakers became accustomed to frequently choosing the non-performative verb *mandare* (b), where the subject expresses the instigator. From the diachronic point of view, the metonymy goes from part to whole in (16) and from whole to part in (17). Whereas the causative sense of (16b) does not yet belong to Standard German usage, the causative sense of (17b) is primary (close < OFr. *clore* to make close).

Other kinds of lexical metonymies with grammatical implications are "auto-conversions" (see below 4.2.) and locative alternations or so-called "swarm alternations" (cf. e.g. Fillmore 1968: 391; Anderson 1971; Koch and Rosengren 1996; Walterte 1998: 67-74).

6. On the semantic level, grammaticalisation processes have been explained in terms of "semantic bleaching" or "generalisation" (e.g. Lehmann 1995: 126-129; Bybee et al. 1994: 289-293) and of metaphor (e.g. Heine et al. 1991: 45ff.; Stolz 1994; Keller 1995: 230-239). Much more rarely, metonymy has been taken into account (Brinton 1988: 102, 111, 114, 236; Heine et al. 1991: 61-64; Traugott and König 1991: 210-213; above all, Hopper and Traugott 1993: 75-93, with critical remarks on the relevance of bleaching and metaphor). As Detges could demonstrate on the basis of different grammaticalisation processes (leading to futures, perfects, adverbs, and negations), metonymy is one, or perhaps the central, process in grammaticalisation (cf. Detges 1998, 1999, 2000; Detges and Walterte 1999). In frames of human action, for instance, there is a strong contiguity between intention and future. By a figure/ground effect between these two elements of the respective frames, a modal lexical item, as MEngl. willen in (18a), can shift to an expression form for the future and become totally grammaticalised, as in (18b) where Peter surely did not want to deny Jesus!

7. Fascinated by grammaticalisation, recent linguistic research has in general neglected semantic change within grammar (or has even incorporated it into a particular conception of grammaticalisation). Upon closer inspection, it seems that intragrammatical semantic change is subject largely to the same regularities.
as lexical semantic change. Just as there are lexical metonymies (see above 3.3.4.), there are also intragrammatical metonymies. Take, for instance, the relationship between the temporal function of the French \textit{imparfait} (19a) and its modal, counterfactual function (19b):

\begin{enumerate}
\item Fr. \textit{Michel avait assez d’argent.}  
\textit{Michael had enough money.}
\item Fr. \textit{Si Michel avait assez d’argent, il achèterait une voiture.}  
If Michael had enough money, he would buy a car.
\end{enumerate}

From a form expressing \textit{past} like (19a) and implying present-time non-factuality, a figure/ground effect may lead to a form expressing present-time counterfactuality within the same frame. Since the French \textit{imparfait} is already totally grammaticalised as a tense, its modal function in (19b) has to be viewed as the result of an intragrammatical metonymy (with parallels in several other languages: cf. Taylor 1995:149–152).

Other examples of the (rather common) phenomenon of grammatical metonymy are the emergence of epistemic futures (cf. Bybee et al. 1991:22–32, without a metonymic interpretation, however), reanalyses in already grammaticalised reflexive constructions (cf. Detges and Waltereit 1999), and \textit{effect} for \textit{cause} metonymies in English grammar (cf. Panther and Thornburg 2000).

4. Metonymy as based on a cognitive relation

We have considered metonymy to be “based on a figure/ground effect with respect to cognitive frames and contiguity relations” ((3-i)). This implies a further series of differentiations:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The cognitive relation of contiguity
\begin{enumerate}
\item can be grasped on different \textit{levels of abstraction};
\item has to be allocated with respect to \textit{frames} and thereby distinguished from other cognitive relations;
\item has to be defined with respect to entities involved in the process of semiosis (especially \textit{concept} and \textit{referent});
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

From these points, we can determine three essential problems concerning metonymy as based on a cognitive relation (4.1–4.3.).

4.1 Level of abstraction

Literally speaking, “contiguity” means ‘spatial closeness’. In this strict sense, contiguity would fit only cases of metonymy like (21):

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. Fr. \textit{riv(i)ere}
\textit{bank, shore}
\item b. ModFr. \textit{rivière}
\textit{river}
\end{enumerate}

In fact, the terms “metonymy” and/or “contiguity” have been used in rhetorical, psychological, and linguistic tradition (cf. 2.1.) in a much broader sense. Thus, it seems sound to strip the term “contiguity” of its literal (spatial) limitation and to apply it to all kinds of experiential links within and with respect to frames (cf. Koch 1999a:145f.). Nevertheless, traditional and even modern treatments of metonymy continue to display (partly varying) inventories of “real”, “logical”, etc., relations involved in metonymies (cf. e.g. Fontanier 1977:79–86; Lausberg 1973: § 568; Bredin 1984:48; Bonhomme 1987:60–70; Blank 1997:230–235, 1999a:176–178; Waltereit 1998:19–22; Radden and Kövecses 1999:29–44; Nerlich, Clarke and Tod 1999:363f.; Seto 1999:98–113):

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}

There are three problems with these kinds of typologies. First, they are never exhaustive (to which types of relation are we to assign, for instance, the clearly metonymic cases (7) and (19)?). Second, the types of underlying relations are not really discrete (does (12), for instance, correspond to \textit{agent–instrument/controller–controlled} or rather to \textit{agent–object} or even to \textit{possessor–possessed}?). Third, the relations can be defined at different levels of abstraction. Radden and Kövecses (1999:38f.), for instance, subsume under the type \textit{effect–cause relations as state/event–thing/person/state causing it, emotion–cause of emotion, mental/physical state–object/person causing it, physical/behavioral effect–emotion causing it, etc.} On the other hand, Blank (1997:249–253, 1999a:178–184), focussing on the fundamental conceptual distinction between static “frames” (in a narrow sense) and dynamic
"scenarios", puts forward the two very general relations of co-presence and succession that are suitable for integrating all possible types of contiguity.

All in all, the relations mentioned above (and other similar ones) are convenient formulas that help us to spell out, at a higher or lower level of abstraction according to (20-i), the very general relation of contiguity that encompasses them all. They correspond to different possible types of relations within frames and, therefore, are all susceptible to the figure/ground effect constituting metonymy (we shall have to return, however, to the type part—whole in 4.2.).

4.2 Contiguity and frames

In 2.1., I defined metonymy as "the relation existing between elements of a ... frame or between the frame as a whole and each of its elements". This definition already suggests that the connections between contiguities and frames are subject to variation. Therefore, according to (20-ii), the relation of contiguity has to be allocated somewhat more precisely with respect to frames.

Let us start with the simplest constellation: contiguity as the relation between two reference points X ↔ Y, which are elements of a given frame F (Figure 2). This has been the basis of the figure/ground effect for many of the examples given so far: (2), (4), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (18), (19), and (21).

![Figure 2](image)

Figure 2.

We can modify the constellation of Figure 2 in two directions. On the one hand, we can reduce the autonomy of X and Y with respect to F (we will come back to this issue in Section 4.3 on the occasion of example (33) and of Figure 2b). On the other hand, we can modify Figure 2 by imagining that X and Y are not totally distinct but are overlapping or interwoven in some way (Figures 2a1 and 2a2). As long as X and Y are more or less on a par, they correspond to divergent perspectives on what is partly the same cognitive "material" within frame F (Figure 2a1, with mutual overlapping of X and Y):

![Figure 2a1](image)

Figure 2a1.


(22) a. Fr. La société immobilière a loué cet appartement à un étudiant.
The realty company let this apartment to a student.

b. Fr. L'étudiant a loué cet appartement à une société immobilière.
The student rented this apartment from a realty company.

Exactly as in the examples (1a/b), we are faced here with the phenomenon of perspectivisation within a given frame, but whereas in (1a/b) this is a synchronic, merely onomasiological problem, (22a/b) also point out a diachronic, semasiological problem. Indeed, Fr. louer, whose primary meaning was the one exemplified in (22a) (< Lat. locare 'to set, to place; to let'), developed the new sense 'to rent' of (22b) that involves a change of perspective within the same frame. Certainly, auto-conversion is a figure/ground effect and, thus, a kind of metonymy, but a rather complex one: first, because of the overlapping of figure and ground;17 second, because it is a lexical metonymy with grammatical implications, namely "valency alternation" (3.3.5.).18 As reanalysis frequently implies a metonymic process (cf. Waltereit 1999; Detges and Waltereit 1999; see also 5.1 below), it is not surprising that auto-conversions of type (22a/b) are probably triggered by reanalyses of structures focussing on a sort of conceptual and valencial pivot, which is the RENTED OBJECT (cf. Waltereit 1998:77–79):

(22) c. Fr. Appartement à louer.
Apartment to let/to rent.

The constellation of Figure 2a1 is not entirely restricted to verbal auto-conversions. It also occurs, for instance, in the two senses of the French noun hôte, expressing two complementary roles in the frame of hospitality (23); and it may perhaps solve the mystery of the two apparently contrary senses of the Latin adjective altus (24), that in reality correspond to two different perspectives on potentially the same great spatial extension (cf. Blank 1997:279):
(23) a. Fr. hôte
host
b. Fr. hôtes
guest

(24) a. Lat. altus
high
b. Lat. alta
deep

If we radicalise the constellation of Figure 2a, we can imagine that one of the two reference points/perspectives (X) becomes coextensive with the whole frame (F = X), whereas Y remains an element of F, as represented in Figure 2a:

Figure 2a.

This corresponds, for instance, to the PART–WHOLE and the WHOLE–PART metonymies already listed in 4.1. These are illustrated by verbs in (16) and (17). While it seems difficult to find adjectival examples, there is no lack of nouns, as, for instance:

(25) a. AncGr. pūs, podōs > ModGr. pōbi 'foot'

b. ModGr. pōbi also 'leg'

[with many parallels in other languages]

In rhetorical tradition, tropes involving PART–WHOLE relations have been also subsumed under "synecdoche". But this latter descriptive category has proved to be extremely heterogeneous, comprising also semantic-cognitive effects based on relations like SPECIES–GENUS, SINGULAR–PLURAL, and possibly others (cf. Lausberg 1973: §§ 572–577). Yet, there is overwhelming evidence that "synecdoche" as a cover term for SPECIES–GENUS as well as PART–WHOLE effects is untenable. Actually, it is necessary to make a strict distinction between the two cognitive modules represented in Figure 3a and 3b:

Module 3a represents the two possible “taxonomic” relations, SPECIES–GENUS and SPECIES–SPECIES; module 3b represents the two possible (contiguity) relations within frames, ELEMENT–FRAME and ELEMENT–ELEMENT, that we can call “engnymic” (cf. Koch 1998:121, in press b). “Taxonomy” is concerned with the conceptualisation of reality in categories, on different levels of abstraction, while “engnymy” has to do with the conceptualisation of reality in experiential wholes, independently of levels of abstraction (cf. also Seto’s 1999 distinction between C-relations and E-relations).10 Taxonomic processes are due to effects of abstraction (extensions SPECIES → GENUS), of concretising (restrictions GENUS → SPECIES), or of similarity (SPECIES → SPECIES), whereas engnymic processes (metonymies) are due to figure/ground effects (ELEMENT → ELEMENT, according to Figures 2 and 2a; or ELEMENT → FRAME and FRAME → ELEMENT, according to Figure 2a). “Partonomies” (or “meronomies”: cf. Cruse 1986) are clearly one type of ELEMENT–FRAME relations according to the engnymic module 3b and therefore do not have anything to do with the taxonomic module 3a. The relation of “inclusion” evoked by Meyer (1993: 166–172) in order to save the unity of traditional synecdoche (PART–WHOLE effects being a zone of overlapping between synecdochical inclusion and metonymical contiguity) is misleading, because the conceptualisation of taxonomic relations in terms of “inclusion” (and their representation by Euler diagrams) is merely a scholars’ partonomic metaphor that has no relevance to the everyday consciousness of speakers (cf. also Seto 1999:94).


This choice is not only theoretically satisfying, but also more practicable, because the line between PART–WHOLE relations and other contiguity relations cannot always be easily drawn (cf. Le Guern 1973: 29; Meyer 1993:95, II: 171f.; Koch 1999a: 154; Seto 1999: 96): Is the bank a place near the river or is it part of
a frame river (cf. (21))? Is a garment part of a frame person or not? Is the material wood part of a stick or not? Is the counter part of the public house or is it only located therein? etc. Regardless of our answers to these questions, all these relations are potential bases for metonymic figure/ground effects.  

4.3 Concept and referent

We defined contiguity as a "cognitive relation". However, since metonymy is an effect concerning linguistic signs, we have to specify its semiotic impact ((20-iii)). As content counterparts of a linguistic form, there are three entities that ought to be distinguished on the semantic side of semiosis (cf. Raible 1983:5, and see above note 2):

1. the **signifié** (a virtual linguistic entity that together with the form, i.e., the **signifiant**, forms the linguistic sign);
2. the conceptual **designatum** expressed (a virtual extralinguistic entity);
3. the referent the linguistic sign refers to (an actual, individual extralinguistic entity).

Even if one considers the distinction between the linguistic **signifié** and the extralinguistic concept to be indispensable, metonymy can still not be accounted for in terms of relations between **signifiés** (cf. above note 2 and Koch 1996a, 1996b, 1998:115–125, 1999a:144f.). As metonymy activates extralinguistic knowledge of the speakers, it is clearly based on contiguity relations between conceptual **designata**. The third entity involved in semiosis, the actual, individual referent, seems to be included in metonymic processes only insofar as it is subsumed under a concept in whose contiguity and frame properties it participates.

Nevertheless, despite the conceptual nature of contiguities, the entity "referent" is not totally indifferent to metonymic processes. In (12), for instance, the conceptual figure/ground effect with respect to **buses** is necessarily accompanied by a shift from one (class of) referent(s) to a totally distinct (class of) referent(s). In contrast to this, the examples presented under (26) and (27), which are sometimes discussed under the heading "metonymy", do not necessarily imply any shift of reference with respect to the "literal" (holistic) reading of **Paul** and **dog**, respectively:

(26) Engl. **Paul is tanned.** [sc. **Paul's skin**]

(27) Engl. **The dog bit the cat.** [sc. **the dog's teeth**]

According to Langacker (1987:271–274, 1993:29–35), predications like these do not involve anything other than a restricted "active zone" of the global referent of **Paul, the dog** etc. Now, as Kleiber (1991, 1999:99f., 124, 142–146) demonstrated, certain characteristics of certain parts are able to characterise the whole. Accordingly, the normal way to refer to these (salient) parts/active zones is to choose a form referring literally to the whole, without any real shift of reference. Kleiber calls this principle **métonymie intégrée**.

Thus, we have to posit a first important distinction between "referent-sensitive" processes as in (12) and "non-referent-sensitive" processes as in (26) and (27). (Referent-sensitivity corresponds to area /2/ in Figure 4 below.)

A second important distinction can be gathered from the two following well-known examples:

(28) Engl. **His native tongue is German.** [sc. **language**]

(29) Engl. **The ham sandwich is getting restless at Table 20.** [sc. the customer who ordered a ham sandwich]

Both **tongue** (28) and **ham sandwich** (29) undergo a shift of reference in comparison to their respective "literal" meaning and are therefore "referent-sensitive" (= area /2/ in Figure 4 below).

In (28), however, the shift of reference is only a by-product of a more important fact: the figure/ground effect opened up by **tongue** constitutes a particular lexical-conceptual solution to express the concept **language**. It once started as an **ad hoc** metonymy that was then lexicalised in a metonymic change, leading to today's metonymic polysemy of **tongue** (see 3.1 above). Even if it had never been lexicalised, it would always be potentially relevant for the lexicon of English. In this sense, we can denominate metonymies like (28) as "concept-oriented" (= area /3/ in Figure 4 below).

In contrast to this, the conceptual figure/ground effect achieved in (29) serves only the purpose of finding an expedient form that guarantees accessibility of the intended referent in a given discourse. Therefore, metonymies of the **ham sandwich** type are not just "referent-sensitive", but also "referent-oriented" (type C within area /2/ in Figure 4 below; **buses** in (12) belongs to the same type). In these cases, the distinction between **ad hoc** metonymy and metonymic polysemy does not apply.  

Within a given context and on the basis of relevant frame knowledge, a referent-oriented metonymy is always possible, and the problem of lexicalising, for instance, **ham sandwich** as a conceptual solution for **customer who ordered a ham sandwich or bus for bus driver** does not even arise. To put it more precisely, referent-oriented metonymies simply
represent one type of referring expressions that assure textual coherence (cf. Brown and Yule 1983:212f.). They do not pertain at all to the realm of the lexicon, but to discourse semantics (see above 3.3.3.; cf. Coseriu 1981:16f.). This can be shown especially by explicit metonymies in praesentia (cf. 3.2., example (11)) that are, in addition, referent-oriented, such as in the famous French example:

(30) (in a restaurant)
Fr. C'est vous, la tête de veau? — Non, la tête de veau, c'est ma femme, moi je suis le porc.
(very literally) It's you, the calf's head? — No, the calf's head, that's my wife. I am the pork.

In the first and in the third sentence of (30), the two relata of the metonymic relation are a noun phrase containing a lexical element as the source expression (tête de veau, porc) and a deictic element as the target expression (vous, moi). The deictic character of the target expression alone proves that this kind of metonymy, although motivated by a "hidden" conceptual figure/ground effect (dish—customer), is not concept-oriented, but only impinges on the referential qualities of the noun phrases involved. Even in the second sentence of (30), the target expression ma femme is not chosen because of the conceptual qualities of femme, but because of the referential qualities of the whole noun phrase (due to a hidden conceptual figure/ground effect dish—customer and not to an overt figure/ground effect calf’s head—wife!). If explicit metonymies in praesentia like those presented in (30) are clearly referent-oriented with respect to the (explicit) target expression, semi-explicit metonymies in absentia like those presented in (12) and (29) are also referent-oriented with respect to the (implicit) target.

Referent-oriented metonymies only occur in nouns (or noun phrases), whereas concept-oriented metonymies can be found in lexemes belonging to different parts of speech (noun (11), (21), (23), (25), (28); verb (2), (4), (15), (16), (17), (22), (31); adjective (24); verb + noun (13)), in grammaticalisation (18), in intragrammatical semantic change (19), in entire speech acts (14); etc. (for the special case (6)/(7) see below). Thus, in the valency environment of verbs, we absolutely have to distinguish between referent-oriented metonymies like (12) and (29) that only concern the nouns inserted on the discourse level, and concept-oriented metonymies like (31a/b) that concern the polysemous verb itself and its participant roles (cf. the distinction between "insertional level" and "role level" in Waltereit 1998:55f., 1999:234–236).24

(31) a. Engl. The waiter served the ham sandwich.
   [role: served dish]
   b. Engl. The waiter served the customer.
   [role: served person]

In 2.1. we started from the conceptual figure/ground effect as an essential for metonymy. Now, we have seen that the relevance of concepts, but also of referents to metonymy has to be specified and differentiated. Since all these criteria do not totally coincide, it seems more reasonable to define, within a realm of contiguity-based effects on invariant linguistic forms (Figure 4), a central standard type of metonymy (area A), fulfilling the three criteria /1/ figure/ground effect, /2/ "referent-sensitivity" and /3/ "concept-orientation". The ham sandwich type (area C) is less central, because it displays not only just referent-sensitivity /2/, but also referent-orientation that is opposed to concept-orientation /3/). Due to the figure/ground effect /1/, it still can be regarded as a case of metonymy. In contrast to this, the cases of so-called métonymie intégrée ((26), (27) = area E) definitely have to be excluded from the realm of metonymy.
(cf. also Waltereit 1998:31–33). They are not referent-sensitive /2/, as we saw above. They do not raise a truly lexical problem and are therefore not concept-oriented (non-/3/; it would be inconceivable, for instance, that dog could be understood as a new lexical solution for dog’s teeth). Last but not least, they are characterised by the phenomenon of “active-zones”, which is certainly contiguity-based (frame-based), but only constitutes a “silent” by-product of reference and thus simply does not involve a real figure/ground effect (non-/1/; in contrast to this, the ham sandwich type C truly depends on a figure/ground effect /1/).

Within the area of contiguity-based effects on invariant forms, the figure/ground effect /1/ actually seems to be criterial for metonymy. This is confirmed by the difference between two further types B and D, which are both non-referent-sensitive, but concept-oriented /3/, while only B implies a real figure/ground effect /1/.

Let us begin with type D, a contiguity-based effect that has been studied intensively in recent years:


The conceptual effect from book in (32a) to book in (32b), is not referent-sensitive (cf. the referential interlacement of (a) and (b) in (c)). According to Croft (1993:349f.), cases like this one should not be included in the realm of metonymy. If this is a case of non-referent-sensitivity (and a fortiori of non-referent-orientation), the shift from (32a) BOOK AS A TOME TO (32b) BOOK AS A TEXT is yet clearly concept-oriented. Cruse (1996) denominates conceptual variants of this kind as different semantic “facets” of the same word. Semantic differentiations in terms of facets are “deeper” than mere contextual variation, but “shallower” than real (metonymic) polysemy of type A. The problem with facets is that, on the one hand, they tend to proliferate depending on the contexts the word is inserted in, and that, on the other hand, they do not have to be differentiatied at all27 (which happens only exceptionally with type A polysemies) in many rather common contexts, as, for example, in (32d):


Kleiber (1999:87–101) has convincingly demonstrated that type D is open to a treatment somewhat analogous to type E (certain “active zones” of a whole are able to characterise that whole). So, there is neither referent-sensitivity /2/ nor a figure/ground effect /1/. The difference between type D and type E resides in the fact that the former is concept-oriented, as we saw above (33/; cf. Figure 4).

Types D and E have in common their indifference to diachronic processes (the distinction between *ad hoc* metonymy and metonymic polysemy in the sense of 3.1. does not apply).

What about our examples (6) *jour fixe* and (7) *child* (that are of the same kind as in this context)? At first glance, they seem to belong to facet type D. Indeed, *child* is not referent-sensitive /2/, as is shown by (33c). If it is non-referent-sensitive (and a fortiori non-referent-oriented), it is still clearly concept-oriented /3/; it is susceptible to a conceptual shift from (33a) *descendant* to (33b) *very young person.*

(33) a. Engl. *Although being well advanced in years, John and Mary had a child after all.*
   b. Engl. *John and Mary treated their child like an adult.*
   c. Engl. *Although being well advanced in years, John and Mary had a child after all. They treated it like an adult.*

However, *child* is a typical example of a metonymic change. Diachronically, its first sense corresponds to (33a); the posterior sense to (33b). This is a non-negligible difference with respect to type D, which is immune to diachronic processes. So, we have to posit for (6) and (7) a separate type B (cf. Figure 4) characterised by a real figure/ground effect /1/ that potentially brings about metonymic change (in the case of the *ad hoc* metonymy (6) this has not been accomplished in the final analysis; in the case of (7) it has). We can grasp the peculiarity of type B thanks to a variant of the model represented in Figure 2. If one reduces the autonomy of X and Y with respect to F, there remains only one reference point constituting itself a whole frame (F). Indeed, non-referent-sensitivity (non-/2/ in Figure 4) implies that the reference point is frame F itself so that the figure/ground effect concerns different conceptual aspects Ax and Ay of this frame that are coextensive with it:

![Figure 2b](image)

In the present case, *descendant* (33a) would correspond, for example, to Ax and *very young person* (33b) to Ay.
An important principle governing metonymic change and polysemy is one called “inductive generalisation” by Dik (1977): contiguity relations hold only for salient, prototypical members of the conceptual categories involved, but the metonymic process generalises them to these categories as wholes (cf. Geeraerts 1997:68ff.; Koch 1995a: 40f., 1999a:150ff.). This applies, of course, to type A. The contiguity between language and tongue, for instance, does not imply that language is always and only realised by means of the tongue (if we think of written language or of the other organs of articulation). The principle of inductive generalisation applies to type B in an even more radical sense. As this type is non-referent-sensitive, the (classes of) referents of, say, child (7) in the two metonymically related senses are potentially identical. But in reality, the extensions of the categories corresponding to the concepts descendant and very young person overlap only in the most salient and prototypical case: notwithstanding that we are used to conceiving of a very young person as the descendant of somebody, we can also view an older person as someone’s descendant and we can consider a young person independently of his/her lineage. Therefore, the lexicalisation of the metonymic sense of child presupposes inductive generalisation. These extensional prototypicality effects are unknown to type D, although it is equally non-referent-sensitive. Whether we have in mind book as a tome of book as a text, the extension of the category is always identical. 28

Another feature that clearly distinguishes type B from types C and E (and probably D, as well) and that associates it with type A is the fact that it is not confined to nouns (as in (6), (7), and (34)), but can be realised also in other parts of speech (as in (35) and (36)). 29

(34) a. MEngl. boor
peasant
b. ModEngl. boor
course or awkward person

(35) a. Germ. billig
appropriate
b. Germ billig
cheap
c. Germ. billig
worthless [two metonymic steps (a) > (b) > (c)]

(36) a. Engl. There is a book on the table. [LOCATION]

All in all, metonymy is to be considered a prototypical notion, as represented in Figure 4. Type A, combining all three criteria /1/, /2/, and /3/, is the central instance of metonymy, whereas type B, lacking /2/, and type C, lacking /3/, are less central. Since the figure/ground effect /1/ is absolutely compulsory, types D and E have to be excluded from the realm of metonymy (crosshatched area in Figure 4). 30

5. Metonymy as generated by pragmatic processes

We have considered metonymy to be “generated by pragmatic processes” ((3-iii)). Actually, the respective figure/ground effects are exploited or simply occur depending on different speakers’ or hearers’ intentions, needs, or reactions. Here, we have to take into account at least the following aspects:

(37) Metonymies
i. can be induced by speakers vs. by hearers;
ii. vary in their relation to Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) principle of relevance.

From these points, we can determine two essential problems with regard to metonymy as generated by pragmatic processes (5.1-5.2.).

5.1 Metonymies: speaker-induced vs. hearer-induced

The millenary interest of rhetoricians and poets in metonymy as a “trope” suggests that it is always a device of linguistic expression chosen by speakers. In fact, this view is valid for many metonymies. Let us take just three of the examples already cited (that in other respects are very different from each other). The speaker who created the metonymy (16b) Germ. verstummen ‘to silence’ was searching for an expedient expression and conceptualisation for the action he referred to; he could just as well have chosen the already existing, but awkward construction zum Verstummen bringen. The speaker who uses the metonymy (29) Engl. ham sandwich avails himself of a means of reference that works very well — but only — in a strong institutional context. The speaker who once invented the speech act metonymy of the type (14) Engl. Can you help me? had particular pragmatic motives (to which we will come back in 5.2.) for verbalising the speech act in an indirect manner instead of choosing the direct form Help me! Thus, in all these and in many other cases, the figure/ground effect is a speaker’s choice.
In the context of grammaticalisation theory, a specific kind of metonymic processes has been described as “pragmatic strengthening” or “conventionalization of conversational implicatures/inferences” (Traugott and König 1991: 195ff.; see above, note 16). This procedure can be exemplified by the semantic change that has occurred to the English conjunction since, whose original meaning was temporal (38a): According to the conceptual pattern post hoc ergo propter hoc, Engl. since, in certain cases, underwent a figure/ground effect temporal → causal (38b) and, thus, developed a causal meaning (38c).31

(38) a. Engl. I have done quite a bit of writing since we last met. (temporal)
b. Engl. Since Susan left him, John has been very miserable. (temporal → causal)
c. Engl. Since you are not coming with me, I will have to go alone. (causal)

In pragmatic strengthening, too, it is the speaker who produces implicatures (and the hearer has to find out the relevance of what is said for what is meant; as for relevance, see 5.2.).

Yet metonymies are not necessarily induced by speakers. In the case of (6) jour fixe ‘day of boring promenades and sightseeing’, it is the son who has interpreted the form heard in the context of the frame weekend day (and who uses it accordingly in Och nein, bitte keinen jour fixe!). This type of metonymy is obviously induced by the hearer, who is confronted with an utterance of his interlocutor in a given setting. He apprehends the overall pragmatic sense of the utterance exactly as it is meant by the speaker, but reconstructs the conceptual meaning of one of its elements via a figure/ground effect with respect to the speaker’s view, without, however, affecting the general pragmatic sense (cf. Koch 1999a: 155f.). He then in turn, as a speaker, applies the metonymy in one of his own utterances.

That this is not mere fancy is shown, for instance, by the lexical change of Span. pregón (example (39a) vs. (39c); cf. Blank 1997: 246, 252), which can be illustrated by a passage from an authentic historical text: In (39b), OSpan. pregón can still express the concept HERALD, but notwithstanding the overall sense of the utterance, it also could have highlighted the contiguous concept ANNOUNCEMENT within the same frame.

(39) a. (Lat. praeco
herald >)
OSpan. pregón
herald

b. OSpan. Por Castilla oyendo van los pregones...
(Poema del Mio Cid, 287, cit. DCECH, s.v. pregón)
All over Castile you are hearing the herals/the announcements.
c. O/ModSpan. pregón
announcement

More precisely, we are dealing here with processes of reanalysis. Waltereit (1999) and Detges and Waltereit (1999) point out that reanalysis, first of all, is a hearer-induced, primarily semantic process on the basis of an invariant sound chain referring to an invariant state of affairs and, secondly, that it frequently implies a metonymic figure/ground effect. Conversely, we could claim that all hearer-induced metonymies are a sort of reanalysis. Since Detges and Waltereit established that rebracketing and category relabelling in the sense of Langacker (1977: 58) are not criterial for reanalysis, this notion can be applied not only to grammar, but also to lexical units, as in (6) and (39b). Our example (22c) shows, by the way, a reanalysis having the form of a hearer-induced lexical metonymy with grammatical implications (according to 3.3.5.).32

Note that the distinction between “speaker-induced” and “hearer-induced” exclusively aims at metonymic innovations generated ad hoc in discourse (in the sense of 3.1.). In cases like (16b) or (29) the first step of metonymic innovation has to be taken by a speaker S1 (Figure 5a), who has good reasons to use Germ. verstummen or Engl. ham sandwich “differently” (we will see in 5.2. what these reasons can be like). In (16b), the innovating speaker chose Germ. verstummen in order to express a concept that neither he/she nor — supposedly — anyone else in the speech community had ever before expressed just by this word. In (29), the innovating speaker chose Engl. ham sandwich in order to refer to a referent that neither he/she nor — supposedly — anyone else in the speech community had ever before referred to just with these words. In contrast, in cases like (6) or (39b), the first step of reanalysis clearly has to be taken by a hearer H1 (Figure 5b), since in the given context no speaker S1 would have any reason to use jour fixe or Span. pregón with anything but its conventional meaning (and in the case of (6) jour fixe, the son’s innovation never spread beyond stage S1 → H2).

We have to distinguish these different procedures of “inducing” metonymies from the subsequent procedures of adoption, spread, and conventionalisation that ratify the metonymic change (see 3.1. and note 8). Although these latter procedures cannot be analysed here in detail,33 we are now able to outline a “pragmatic punctuation” of two fundamental types of metonymic change with respect to their first stages:
speaker-induced metonymy:

\[ S_1 \rightarrow H_1 = S_1 \rightarrow H_1 = S_1 \rightarrow \cdots \]

Figure 5a.

hearer-induced metonymy (reanalysis):

\[ S_1 \rightarrow [H_1 = S_1] \rightarrow H_2 = S_1 \rightarrow \cdots \]

Figure 5b.

In order to begin to spread in the speech community, an innovation always has to pass through a hearer \( H_1 \) (being at the same time a speaker \( S_2 \) who circulates the innovation). The difference between the two pragmatic types of change resides in the fact that with speaker-induced metonymy (Figure 5a) the source of innovation is speaker \( S_1 \) addressing hearer \( H_1 \), whereas with hearer-induced metonymy (Figure 5b) the innovation is not intended at all by \( S_1 \) and only starts with \( H_1 \)'s reanalysis.34

5.2 Metonymy and the principle of relevance

It is illuminating to study the different ways ad hoc metonymies function with respect to Sperber and Wilson's (1995) well-known communicative principle of relevance.35 Relevance theory describes an utterance as an interpretation of a thought of the speaker's. According to Sperber and Wilson, figurative speech, just like looseness of expression, is characterised by the fact that "the propositional form of the utterance differs from that of the thought interpreted", so that the hearer "can proceed on the assumption that these two propositional forms have some identifiable logical and contextual implications in common" (1995: 235). Obviously, this analysis does not apply to hearer-induced metonymies (Figure 5b), but only to speaker-induced metonymies, as defined in 5.1. (Figure 5a). In order to cover the whole range of metonymy, we inevitably have to enlarge the range of pragmatic procedures accounting for figurative speech according to Sperber and Wilson and to introduce the difference (or not) between the propositional form of the utterance and the thought interpreted as a fundamental criterion for a pragmatic sub-classification of metonymies.

In the case of hearer-induced metonymies (Figure 5b), the propositional form of the utterance does not differ from that of the thought of speaker \( S_1 \), (at least as to the linguistic elements concerned by the metonymy). Hearer \( H_1 \) chooses for the critical element a conceptual interpretation that beyond the figure/ground effect is consistent with the pragmatic overall sense and with the relevance imputed to the utterance of \( S_1 \). The metonymic interpretation of the critical element, however, is not commanded by relevance. This type of metonymy, then, is simply compatible with the principle of relevance — no more and no less.

In the case of speaker-induced metonymies, the propositional form of the utterance differs from that of the thought of speaker \( S_1 \) (at least as to the linguistic element concerned by the metonymy). Thanks to the guarantee of relevance, hearer \( H_1 \) infers for the critical element the conceptual interpretation corresponding to the thought of speaker \( S_1 \), but differing, via a figure/ground effect, from the propositional form of \( S_1 \)'s utterance. In this case, the metonymic interpretation of the critical element is triggered by \( S_1 \) and properly commanded by relevance.

Certain speaker-induced metonymies need repair and, indeed, are repairable, thanks to the "guarantee of relevance" (1995: 50) that enables hearer \( H_1 \) to counterbalance the figure/ground effect.

A first type is represented by referent-oriented metonymies, as (12) the buses or (29) the ham sandwich (type C in Figure 4, which is necessarily speaker-induced). Here, speaker \( S_1 \) solves, above all, a referential task relying on the guarantee of relevance.

A second type recovers part of the concept-oriented metonymies (types A and B in Figure 4), where speaker \( S_1 \) solves, above all, a lexical conceptualisation task relying on the guarantee of relevance. Depending on the intervention — or not — of further pragmatic problems on the part of \( S_1 \), we can distinguish two subtypes. First, the conceptualisation task can be confined to a merely lexical problem: there may be imprecise conceptualisations ((23) hôte, (25) poêl), preferences for "expedient" solutions ((16) verstuumen, (17) close, (24) altus, (31) serve), salience effects ((28) tongue), lexical gaps, etc. Second, the conceptualisation task is accomplished under the pressure of additional pragmatic constraints as taboos ((13) wash my hands), politeness ((14) Can you help me?), etc. (For the bases of all these and other motivations, cf. Blank 1997: 345–405, 1999b; Brown and Levinson 1987; Allan and Burridge 1991).

But there still remains a separate group of speaker-induced, concept-oriented metonymies (types A and B) that are not intended to be repaired by \( H_1 \) in the name of relevance: ((4) craindre, (11) power, (18) wilen, (34) boor, (35a/b) billig). In these cases, the figure/ground effect produces expressiveness (cf. also Mair 1992; Koch and Oesterreicher 1996; Geeraerts 1997: 104–106; Blank
6. The realm of metonymy

We have circumscribed the realm of metonymy, defining it as a linguistic effect upon the content of a given form, based on a figure/ground effect within conceptual frames and generated by pragmatic processes. This definition allowed us to observe the linguistic, conceptual, referential, and pragmatic modulations of the figure/ground effect and to demonstrate, thereby, the wide range and the unity in diversity of metonymy. On the other hand, the figure/ground effect allowed us, within the realm of contiguity-based effects on invariant linguistic forms, to definitively exclude from metonymy certain “active zone” phenomena (types D and E in Figure 4).

From the point of view of Figure 4, metonymy seems to constitute a (central) prototypically structured subtype of contiguity-based effects on invariant linguistic forms. But this circumscription raises two further questions:

1. Must there always be a linguistic form of expression in metonymies? (6.1.)
2. Does this expression always have to be invariant in all respects? (6.2.)

6.1 Metonymy as a linguistic phenomenon

It has been claimed that metonymies occur in and between different “ontological”, i.e., semiotic, realms (Radden and Kövecses 1999:23–29). Example (40), for instance, would represent a “metonymic” relation between a linguistic form and a concept that is at the base of any linguistic sign. (41) would represent a “metonymic” relation between a concept and a referent that underlies the referential function of any linguistic sign.

(40) form Fr. arbre — concept TREE
(41) concept TREE — referent that is a tree

According to Gibbs (1999:66), “people think in metonymy”, and he posits “metonymic models of thinking”, which would presuppose “metonymic relations” between concepts, as for example:

I think that all these considerations overextend the notion of “metonymy”. When we ascertained in (3–ii) that metonymy is based on contiguity relations, this implies that metonymy is not identical with contiguity. The latter is a static relation, whereas the former is a dynamic linguistic process.

Without any doubt, (40)–(42) exemplify relations of contiguity. Linguistic signs develop from a habitualised contiguity between a form and a concept (40). Yet, according to Keller (1995:160–180) the emergence of signs (symbolification) pertains to a very deep semiotic layer that is logically and genetically prior to metonymisation. We should not call both processes “metonymy”, even if we assign contiguity an important role in symbolification, and this all the more as only one relatum of the contiguity relation in symbolification is conceptual in nature. Obviously, similar problems arise for (41), even if we are willing to admit that a concept (expressed by a linguistic form) stands in a relation of contiguity to a referent.

As for (42), concepts (or sub-frames) belonging to the same frame are undeniably contiguous. But, as Radden and Kövecses (1999:27) put it cautiously, “it is not clear at the moment if the form of a category [i.e., the significant] is required in order to perform the metonymic shift or if this metonymy can also operate at the purely conceptual level.” The same problem has arisen for metaphor (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:4, and the critical remarks in Koch 1994:213). Though underlining the conceptual basis of metonymy, we should acknowledge the linguistic nature of the metonymical process as a whole. This is supported especially by the considerations in Section 3 and, furthermore, by the fact that contiguities do not automatically lead to metonymies (cf. types D and E in Figure 4).

This considered, our cognitive conception of metonymy nevertheless remains compatible with the traditional conception implying the existence of a linguistic form undergoing metonymy.

6.2 Metonymy and the invariant linguistic form

If we insist on the existence of a linguistic form in metonymy, this presupposes invariance of the respective form. At the beginning of Section 3, we already resolved the (purely external) problem of sound change. But there are morphological aspects to be considered, too. What about cases like (43), for example?
(43) a. Engl. They ate fish.
   b. Engl. They will fish salmon.

They are repeatedly categorised as metonymies (cf. e.g. Dirven 1999; Gibbs 1999:65; Nerlich et al. 1999:272ff.; Radden and Kövecses 1999:36). Surely, there is a clear contiguity relation between the concepts fish and to fish, but strictly speaking, the two forms fish and (to) fish are not identical on the morphological level, because they belong to two different word classes. Normally, we would speak of “conversion” in such a case. A somewhat similar problem is found in the following example in a slightly more complicated form (cf. Koch 1999c):

(44) a. Ital. pera
    pear

   b. Ital. pero
    pear tree

There is an obvious contiguity relation between pear and pear tree. Due to a morphological process, namely gender change, the phonological and morphological shape of the two Italian words is not totally identical, but the lexeme is the same. Shall we call this metonymy? Fundamentally, the same problem arises, in an even more radical form, in the following examples of suffixation and composition:

(45) a. Fr. ferme
    farm

   b. Fr. fermier
    farmer

(46) a. Germ. Brief
    letter

   b. Germ. Briefmarken
    stamp

We could cite analogous examples for number change, prefixation, idioms etc. Beyond any doubt, contiguity relations are the cognitive basis not only of rhetorical effects, referential effects and semantic change, as demonstrated throughout this paper, but also of many lexical processes like (43)–(46) involving a morpho-lexical change of form (cf. Koch 1999a:157–159, in press a and b). Either we have to subsume all this under the label of “metonymy” (a solution perceptible in Schiffrin 1979), or we have to restrict metonymy to contiguity-based effects on a linguistic form that is really invariant, i.e., we have to exclude phenomena like those in (43)–(46).

In view of the figure/ground effect that has turned out to be central for metonymy, this is not a purely terminological issue: ceteris puribus, it is only the conceptual perspectivisation that changes in metonymy. Therefore, we should stick to the criterion of total morpho-lexical invariance of linguistic form and choose the more restrictive solution that agrees with the traditional conception of “metonymy”. The examples in (43)–(46) are contiguity-based, but not “metonymies”.40 This decision certainly does not prevent us from exploring the relations between metonymy and other contiguity-based phenomena, but it puts metonymy in its right place.

Notes

* I express my gratitude to Keith Myrick for the stylistic revision of this paper.

** I owe the knowledge of this quotation to my late colleague Brigitte Schieben-Lange.


2. Even if the notion of “contiguity” sometimes appears in the cognitive literature (cf. e.g. Taylor 1995;122; Croft 1993:347; Ungerer and Schmid 1996:115f.; Radden and Kövecses 1999:19), it is generally not systematically exploited. — As for the necessary distinction between linguistic significations of words and concepts, cf. Koch (1996a:223f., 226–231, 1996b) (unfortunately, this distinction is widely unknown or is questioned by the mainstream of Cognitive Semantics: cf. e.g. Haiman 1980; Taylor 1999:18–25; cf. also the critical outline in Blank in press a: Section 3).

3. Cf. Minsky (1975); Fillmore (1975, 1985); Schank and Abelson (1977); Tannen (1978); Barsalou (1992). — In this context, I avoid the term “domain”, because it is often used to denote contiguity-based frames as well as taxonomic hierarchies in an undifferentiated manner (cf. Koch 1999a:152f.; cf. also below, Figure 3a/b). I also avoid the ambiguous term “idealized cognitive model” (ICM), proposed by Lakoff (1987) and taken up by Panther and Radden (1999:9) and Radden and Kövecses (1999); cf. the critical remarks in Koch (1996a:234 note 28), concerning its use for metaphor.

4. In a more informal way, the relevance of frames to metonymy has been evoked by Pritz (1998:45f.).

5. For the basic notions of gestalt theory, cf. e.g. Wertheimer (1922/23); Köhler (1947); Metzger (1986).

6. Cognitive semanticists have repeatedly insisted on the fact that metonymies, as opposed to metaphors (see below note 13), function within one experiential frame, domain (matrix), etc.: cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:39f.); Lakoff (1987:288); Croft (1993:345–348); Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000).
7. Note that the notions "figure" and "ground" have been exploited in Cognitive Linguistics in several rather different ways. The present application to frames, continguities, and metonymy should not be confused with other applications, like those delineated, for instance, in Ungerer and Schmid (1996:156–200).

8. For the distinction between (ad hoc) "innovation" and "change" (by adoption), cf. Coseriu (1958:44–46).


10. Speaking of "conventionalised figure/ground effects" makes sense, because metonymic polysemy is a kind of motivation. Once an existing metonymic figure/ground effect fades away, we get pure homonymy (cf. Blank 2000:17ff.): e.g. Germ. Flieg 'fly', hence 'peasant' (first metonymic step), hence 'boor, lout' (second metonymic step; cf. example (34) below); due to the disappearance of the intermediate sense, this is today perceived to be homonymy.

11. Cf. especially Pirazzini (1997:34–40); cf. also Brooke-Rose (1958:26–67, 149–152); Searle (1979:118); Prandi (1992:127–134); Koch (1994:210ff.). A more fine-grained classification of metaphors is possible, for example with respect to the Aristotelian analogue equation A:B = C:D; whose elements can be realised syntagmatically in varying number (in (8), we have only A and C).

12. This very radical type of metonymy seems to be rather rare, and, due to its predicative form, it is easily confused with the corresponding type of metaphor. However, (11) does not mean that knowledge is conceived of as power, but that knowledge provides power, which is a contiguity relation within a frame, say, society (knowledge enables people to occupy central positions in a society, to influence political decisions, etc.). Other metonymies in præsentia are utterances like Palestine is Arafat (frame Palestine: Arafat is the most salient person with respect to this frame) or Time is money (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:7 present time is money as a conceptual metaphor, citing examples like You're wasting my time. This gadget will save you hours). I think that this interpretation is quite possible (time is conceived of as money), but clearly different from the frame-based figure/ground effect underlying the sense of the everyday dictum "Time is money" (which explicitly presents time and money as belonging to the same frame business (working hours have to be paid, wasting time costs money; money can buy manpower in order to save time, etc.): time "costs" money.


14. Effects of phonetic erosion and shrinking, as they occur in processes of grammaticalisation (see 3.3.6 below), are only a by-product of semantic processes, including metonymy (cf. Detges and Waltieri 1999).

15. As for part/whole metonymies see 4.2 below.

16. "Pragmatic strengthening" and "conventionalisation of conversational implicatures", as described especially by Traugott and König (1991), are unmistakably metonymies (cf. also Taylor 1995:152; Koch 1999:155ff.; see also 5.1 below).

17. Though verbalising basically the same number of participants, (22a) and (22b) already display a different internal figure/ground gradation: in (22a) it is the LANDLORD (la société immobilière) that is highlighted as an AGENT, in (22b), it is the TENANT (l'étudiant); in (22a) it is the TENANT that is facultative (cf. La société immobilière a loué cet appartement), in (22d) it is the LANDLORD (l'étudiant a loué cet appartement); etc. Therefore, the metonymical figure/ground effect of auto-conversion consists in the reversal of a complex figure/ground gradation. Blank (1997:278) speaks of "internal metonymy".

18. Due to the verb-inherent phenomenon of valency, the complexity of auto-conversion is reflected in a reversal of grammatical valency: the LANDLORD is expressed as a subject in (22a) and as an indirect object in (22b) — and vice versa for the TENANT.

19. However, note that Seto's (1999) C-relations correspond only to GENUS–SPECIES, whereas E-relations cover FRAME–ELEMENT as well as ELEMENT–ELEMENT. The necessity of integrating, in a symmetrical way, species–species into the taxonomic module is also supported by the existence of co-hyponymous transfers (see note 20).


21. In rhetorical tradition, the PART–WHOLE process seems to have been just the most constant component in varying characterisations of "synecdoche" (cf. Meyer 1953/95, I: 74ff.). So, if one wants to maintain the label "synecdoche" for the PART–WHOLE subtype of metonymy, a new term for SPECIES–GENUS processes has to be found. In contrast to this, Nerlich and Clarke (1999) restrict the term "synecdoche" just to SPECIES–GENUS processes.

22. The figure/ground account dispenses us from radical solutions like the reduction of all contiguity relations to PART–WHOLE/WHOLE–PART relations, proposed in Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000:115ff.).

23. According to Blank (2000:25), "non-lexicalised polysemy" of this type "follows a discourse rule which is restricted to a very specific discourse type and which is only applicable to a limited number of contexts. No doubt, this type of metonymies is determined by 'text' or 'discourse traditions' (in the sense of Schäfflen-Lange 1983; Oesterreicher 1997; Koch 1997a) rather than by particular languages, and it is linked to cultural communities rather than to linguistic communities. For the reason discussed below, I would not even speak of "(lexical) polysemy"."

24. It is open to question, however, whether "role" metonymies really arise diachronically from "insertional" metonymies, as Waltier (1998:55ff.) suggests.

25. The criterion of invarianz is important, as we saw at the beginning of Section 3. We will have to return to this matter in 6.2.

26. Taylor (1995:125) expressly relates this type of examples to perspectivisation within a frame.

27. Pustejovsky's proposal in terms of a Cartesian type (1995:90–95) represents a purely descriptive device for constructing meta-entries. The role of frames, continguities, and figure/ground effects is not really elucidated. See also note 30 below.
28. In summary, we can say, from the referential point of view, that, firstly, with type A, the extensions of the two concepts involved are, of course, totally disjunct, secondly, with type B, the respective extensions overlap and, thirdly, with type D, they are totally congruent.

29. Note that in a case like (35) or (36), the "non-referent-sensitivity" typical of type B does not concern the reference qualities of the adjective or verb, but those of the accompanying head noun or verbal participants.

30. The systematics represented in Figure 4 also reveals the insufficiency of Pustejovsky's explanation in terms of "qualia structure" (1995: 31f., 85–104; see also above note 27), that describes in the same way, for instance, cases of type A (e.g., Engl. lamb, fig) and cases of type D (e.g., Engl. door, window). — A further type of contiguity-based effect (e.g., My ex-husband is parked on the upper deck. He is taking the bus today) has been analysed as metonymy in noun phrases (Nunberg 1978) or, alternatively, as metonymy in the predicate (1) (Nunberg 1995). The latter solution has been criticised, for example, by Klein (1999: 112–148), who treats this type according to the principles of metonymy intégrée and of "active zones" (which would correspond to our non-metonymic type E in Figure 4), and by Panther and Radden (1999: 10f.), who insist on the metonymic character of the noun phrase (which would correspond to our type C), explaining its anaphoric behavior by the principle human over non-human. Cf. also Waltereit (1998: 56–58).


32. Further examples of hearer-induced metonymies are: (2), (7), (15), (21), and (35b/c). The status of example (19) in this respect is still in need of investigation. The phenomenon of "implication" that Warren (1992: 51–72, 101; 1998) explicitly distinguishes from metonymy probably coincides with hearer-induced metonymies of type B in Figure 4. In my opinion, these "implications" can nevertheless be regarded as metonymies, because the criterion of the figure/ground effect (that they fulfill) is more decisive for metonymy than those of speaker-induction and of referential-sensitivity (see 5.3 above).


34. It would be interesting to check, beyond metonymy, whether and how the two pragmatic types of lexical change represented in Figures 5a and 5b match different associative-conceptual types of lexical change, as systematised in Blank (1997: 357–344, and in press b). No doubt, metaphors are always speaker-induced, whereas popular etymologies, as reanalyses, are necessarily hearer-induced (cf. also Detges and Waltereit 1999). But what about, for instance, taxonomic types of change, as extension (widening) and restriction (narrowing) of meaning?

35. A different issue would be the functioning of (lexicalised) metonymic polysemy (as defined in 3.1) with respect to the principle of relevance. This problem, however, is not specific to metonymy and falls within the range of a general study of disambiguation on the basis of relevance theory (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1995: 168ff., 183–191, 204–208).

36. Whereas Grice (1975) develops his co-operative principle into nine maxims (one of which is the maxim of relation/relevance), according to Sperber and Wilson "all the maxims can be reduced to a single well-defined maxim of relevance" (1995: 257 note 27; cf. also especially Sperber and Wilson 1981). Despite the amendments presented in the following, the principle of relevance in this fundamental sense seems, in fact, to be sufficient and central to our pragmatic understanding of different types of metonymic innovation.

37. As is well known, linguistic expressiveness tends to erode over the course of time. Interestingly, Detges and Waltereit (1999) point out that the inevitable loss of expressiveness is due to a kind of reanalysis on the part of the hearer.

38. When dealing with (speaker-induced) tropes, Sperber and Wilson pay special attention to literary metaphors (but they claim that the same holds for metonymies): "A good creative metaphor is precisely one in which a variety of contextual effects can be retained and understood as weakly implicated by the speaker. [...] The result is a quite complex picture, for which the hearer has to take a large part of the responsibility, but the discovery of which has been triggered by the writer" (1995: 236f).

39. However, as underlined in 5.3, the linguistic sign itself consists of a form (signifiant) and a signifié.

40. This fact implies, by the way, that contiguity cannot be defined by metonymy, but only the other way round.

References


About the author

Peter Koch is professor of Romance Linguistics at the University of Tübingen (Germany). His main topics of research are: cognitive and historical semantics, valency theory, and orality and literacy. Book publications: *Verb *- Valenz *- Verfugung* (Heidelberg 1981); *Gesprochene Sprache in der Rumänien* (Tübingen 1990, with Wulf Oesterreicher). Editor of several volumes, among others: *Historical Semantics and Cognition* (Berlin/New York 1999, with Andreas Blank).

Guidelines for Contributors

1. AUTHORS are invited to initially submit an abstract of their contribution preferably via email to both editors. (On request, prospective authors will be sent a document template (MS Word, current version) by one of the editors.)

2. MANUSCRIPT submissions should be accompanied by a biographical note (50-75 words), an abstract (100–150 words) and the author(s) full name and address.

3. Manuscripts may be submitted as email attachments if they do not contain unusual fonts. Otherwise two hard copies should be sent to both editorial addresses. Upon acceptance the author will be requested to submit the final version as email attachment or on disk, saved in a standard word processing format and in ASCII, and two hard copies of the text.

4. Papers should be reasonably divided into SECTIONS and, if necessary, sub-sections.

5. Contributions should be in English. Spelling should be either British or American English consistently throughout. If not written by a native speaker of English it is advisable to have the paper checked by a native speaker.

6. Line drawings (FIGURES) and photographs (PLATES) should be submitted in camera-ready form or as TIFF or EPS files accompanied by a hard copy. They should be numbered consecutively, with appropriate captions. Reference to any Figures or Plates should be made in the main text and their desired position should be indicated on the printout.

7. TABLES should be numbered consecutively and provided with appropriate captions. They should be referred to in the main text and their desired position should be indicated on the printout.

8. QUOTATIONS should be given in double quotation marks. Quotations longer than 4 lines should be indented with a blank line above and below the quoted text.

9. EXAMPLES should be numbered with Arabic numerals in parentheses and set apart from the main body of the text with a blank line above and below. Examples from languages other than Modern English should appear in italics with a translation in single quotes immediately below each such example. If required, a word-by-word gloss (without quotes) may be provided between the example phrase and the translation.

10. FOOTNOTES should be kept to a minimum. They should be numbered consecutively throughout the text in square brackets or superscript. They should be listed in a section 'Notes' following the main text. The notes should not contain reference material if this can be absorbed in the text and list of references.

11. REFERENCES in the text should be as precise as possible, giving page references where necessary; for example: (Brinton 1996: 37). All references in the text should appear in the list of references.

12. The REFERENCES should follow the Notes. References should be listed (1) alphabetically and (2) chronologically. Names of journals should be given in full with page references. Please pay special attention to the use of capitals, italics and punctuation marks given in the following examples:

Books


Articles in book/journal


13. Authors are kindly requested to check their manuscripts very carefully before submission in order to avoid delays and extra costs at the proof stage. Page proofs will be sent to the (first) author and must be corrected and returned within ten days of receipt. Any author's alterations other than typographical corrections in the page proofs may be charged to the author at the publisher's discretion.

14. Authors of main articles will receive 30 offprints of their contribution and a complimentary copy of the issue. (In the case of multiple authors, the offprints will be sent to the first named author.)

15. Manuscripts and all editorial correspondence should be sent to the Editors:

Andreas H. Jucker, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Institut für Anglistik, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10 B, D-35394 Giessen, Germany. andreas.jucker@anglistik.uni-giessen.de and Irma Taavitsainen, University of Helsinki, Department of English, Box 4 (Yliopistonkatu 3), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland. irma.taavitsainen@helsinki.fi