Depoliticizing the politicized?
The effects of the EU’s civil society funding in the context of hegemonic struggles in Turkey

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Preface

I began studying Turkey and its relations to the European Union when I was a master student in European Studies at the University of Amsterdam in 2008. Since then, classmates, colleagues, family and friends have asked me “why Turkey”? They wondered what this had to do with me and how I was going to study Turkey without knowing Turkish. Not surprisingly, learning Turkish has been a long and challenging path, but I found it obvious what Turkey had to do with me. For once, I was very idealistic about the EU’s enlargements and I wanted to study the EU’s accession policies. In my view, Turkey was supposed to become a member next since it had such long history of cooperation with the EU and would contribute to a pluralistic union. But in Germany, where I grew up and had studied, conservative politicians and parts of the public opposed Turkey’s membership candidacy on the base of what I found to be populist arguments. This had to do with the fact that more than one million people with Turkish migration background and more than three million Muslims live in Germany. The German debate revealed how little Germans knew about Turkey and with how little they thought about their German-Turkish neighbors. As in other European countries, Turkey’s membership perspective was also opposed on the grounds that Turkey did not belong to Europe, neither geographically or religiously. I wanted to counter the xenophobic and exclusionary sentiments of this debate and get to know Turkey better myself.

I probably would not have picked up the topic if I had not met people supporting my interest, such as Mechtild Rothe, former member and vice-president of the European Parliament, who was very engaged in the solution of the Cyprus conflict, and Dr. Daniela Obradovic who provided so much valuable input and help supervising my MA thesis. During my first longer stay in Turkey in 2009, I was an intern at the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) which has strongly supported Turkey’s EU accession. There, I started to wonder how much influence the IKV and other civil society organization had on Turkey’s accession and democratization process. Since then my research focus has stayed largely the same but my specific research question has changed over time. I have learned so much about Turkey’s diverse civil society and being in Turkey right after the Gezi protests was so inspiring and exciting. Although in this dissertation I take a critical look at what Turkey’s human rights organizations do, I have great respect for what they are trying to accomplish. I am still in favor of Turkey’s EU accession but I have come to find it more important that the marginalized groups in Turkey profit from this process. Moreover, I have become much more critical of the EU’s foreign (and internal) policies as the discussions in my dissertation show. In my view, the EU is still the future but I feel more ambiguous than ever about the EU’s role in the world and its emancipatory potential.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFCU</td>
<td>Central Finance and Contracts Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYD</td>
<td>Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (Helsinki Yurtaşlar Derneği)</td>
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<tr>
<td>İHD</td>
<td>Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği)</td>
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<tr>
<td>İHOP</td>
<td>İnsan Hakları Platformu (Human Rights Platform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kader</td>
<td>Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates (Kadın Adayları Derneği)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAGED</td>
<td>Capacity Development Association (Kapasite Geliştirme Derneği)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamer</td>
<td>Women’s Center Foundation (Kadın Merkezi Vakfı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAOS-GL</td>
<td>Chaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research Association (Kaos Gey ve Lezbiyen Araştırmalar Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>lesbians, gays, bi- and transsexuals or –gender people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazlumder</td>
<td>Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METU</td>
<td>Middle East Technical University Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mor Çatı</td>
<td>Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınakı Vakfı)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mülteci-Der</td>
<td>Association for Solidarity with Refugees (Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGDD</td>
<td>Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışma Derneği; ASAM)

SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Spod  Social Policies, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Studies Association (Sosyal Politikalar Cinsiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği)

STGM  Civil Society Development Center (Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi)
TASCO  Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations
TESEV  Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı)
TÜHV  Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı)
TÜSİAD  Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği)
UN  United Nations
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
YÖK  Higher Education Council of Turkey (Yükseköğretim Kurulu)
Chapter 1

On EU democracy promotion, the question of depoliticization, and the case of Turkey

The Gezi events will have an impact on helping civil society empowerment (....) There is a vibrant civil society, but it is also an active one; daring to speak out and also daring to act.¹

1.1. Introduction

During the last days of May 2013 thousands of people joined the protestors that had at first come out to demonstrate against the plans of Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) to destroy Gezi Park, a park in the middle of the European center of Istanbul, for another shopping mall. They protested against the violent crackdown of the first demonstrations by the police and even more so against the governing party and its increasingly conservative as well as neo-liberal policies. The so-called Gezi protests became a symbol for Turkey’s civil society. In the European Union (EU) politicians and societies alike praised the demonstrations as proof for a “vibrant civil society” (Yinanç 2013).

The EU as other international organizations places a great deal of hope in civil society within the EU as well as in non-EU countries. Internally, the EU counts on civil society organizations (CSOs) – such as environmental groups or industrial lobby organizations – to provide their knowledge and opinions on specific topics when drafting and implementing policies. Moreover, the EU assumes that civil society is a central element of democracy. Any state undergoing the process of democratic transformation needs to allow for civil society groups to exist and be active. Within democratic states civil society is supposed to monitor the state, demand political change and/or take care of people in need by giving them social support. The EU regularly criticizes third states for discriminating against CSOs and activists such as the sentencing of Pussy Riot in Russia (European Union 2012). In the eyes of the EU any restriction on CSOs or activists is a violation of human rights. Civil society is imagined as the ‘good’ other. When we think of civil society, we usually think of civil society being different than the state; being better, more innovative, freer and more democratic. At the same time citizens’ trust in state institutions and politics in democracies is declining. Politicians are accused of following their self-interest and not being competent enough (for instance see Hay 2007). While “we hate politics” (Hay 2007) we love civil society (to overstate the matter). Civil society represents the opposite:

¹ Jean Maurice Ripert, head of the European Commission in Turkey, quoted in Yinanç (2013)
altruism and solidarity, knowledge and expertise, transparency. As a consequence democracies have transferred originally state tasks to CSOs such as providing social services as well as taking part in legislative processes. Governing increasingly takes place in the sphere of civil society (Foucault et al. 2008: 295).

Although citizens, academics, and politicians criticize this “neo-liberal” development – a critique I will engage with later – civil society generally seems to be a ‘good’ thing for democracies. Based on this premise, the EU provides financial funds to CSOs across the world. The EU’s most important instrument for direct civil society support is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights (EIDHR) which provides funding for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in all regions of the world and aims to contribute to democracy and human rights (European Commission 2015). Yet, it seems that there are many different, but overlapping forms of civil society. Civil society means social movements, charity, community groups as well as business organizations or environmental groups (Kaldor 2003a). The EIDHR has a narrow definition of civil society. It gives support to human rights organizations. Because the EU cannot give money to every organization, the EU selects them on the base of project proposals. The criteria on which the EU chooses the CSOs are common in other areas where funds are granted as well. At the center is the idea that citizens have to set their own goals and self-evaluate their work. For instance, at the universities, departments are encouraged or obliged to evaluate their teaching as well as their research output and make these results transparent in order to become ‘better’. Anyone who has applied for money from other organizations for research projects, summer schools, or other events is familiar with project applications and funding procedures. Similarly, CSO have to draft a project plan including goals, ways to achieve them and to measure them, and suggest a cost-efficient budget. Afterwards, they have to write a report that proves the effectiveness of the project and documents the costs. While many international organizations employ similar types of procedures, the EU is often said to have the highest demands for transparency and accountability as I will discuss later. Borrowing from Michel Foucault (1991: 92; 2008: 220–232), other authors such as Milja Kurki (2011a), Katharyne Mitchell (2006), William Walters and Jens H. Haahr (2005) argue that these instruments and procedures of transparency, performance and accountability are an integral part of neo-liberal governmentality. In short, in neo-liberal governmentality economic rationalities dominate every part of life (Foucault et al. 2008: 226; Lemke 2001: 200); thus civil society has to act like a company. Kurki (2011a) analyzes the EIDHR program documents and finds underlying “economic rationalities”.

What does this mean for civil society, more specifically for the CSOs applying for and receiving funds? Have CSOs always worked this way? Or has applying for EU funds changed the organizations?

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2 I will use the terms CSO and NGO interchangeably.
Many scholars assume that project based work makes CSOs less grassroots, less honest, and to some extent less ‘good’. Kurki (2011b: 362) puts forward that the EU “has arguably already shifted the practices of some NGO actors, such as political foundations, toward developing more depoliticized and non-ideological (lobby) positions”. The EIDHR makes CSOs into entrepreneurs and service providers and ultimately depoliticizes them (Kurki 2011a: 362). Overall, the intervention of the EU depoliticized civil society. Under these circumstances political change and emancipation seems unlikely. However, is this really the case? What does depoliticization and what does politicization mean? Kurki analyzes the EIDHR documents but does not assess the effects of the EIDHR on specific CSOs. Moreover, just as in other EU foreign policies the domestic context of the EU’s policies influences the effects. I suggest that the proposed depoliticizing effects are dependent on a specific political context.

Here, the case of Turkey is particularly interesting. Firstly, Turkey and the EU have had relations since the 1960s. In 1999 Turkey became a candidate for EU membership and since 2005 Turkey and the EU are negotiating the chapters of the EU acquis communautaire. To facilitate compliance with the acquis and further democratization, the EU has given funding to Turkish CSOs since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2002 the AKP came into power. The government strongly supported Turkey’s EU accession process and passed a significant number of democratic reforms in the middle of the 2000s. It is the first time that a Muslim party has stayed in government and was not overthrown by a military coup. The first decade of the 2000s has thus been a very interesting time in Turkish politics. However, since 2008 the AKP government has consolidated its power and has promoted increasingly conservative policies combined with an authoritarian style of governing. While the beginning of the AKP’s time in government created a more open and liberal political climate, the second half was characterized by less pluralist debates. Along with the domestic developments, Turkey is seen to be less interested in EU membership (for instance see Diez and Mühlenhoff 2014).

Secondly, while the EU has a very positive image of civil society, Turkey’s public and politicians have been extremely skeptical of CSOs which they accuse to have a political agenda. For instance, the first Turkish human rights organization was a CSO working on Kurdish rights. It emerged in the 1990s when Kurds faced extreme oppression, and so did the CSO (Plagemann 2000). Similar to Muslim parties, NGOs that were Kurdish, Muslim or groups fighting for the rights of lesbians, gays, bi- and transsexuals or –genders (LGBT) have been threatened to be closed (Ataman 2011). The public is suspicious of organizations receiving external funding assuming the CSOs follow an external agenda. Moreover, they accuse NGOs to just be in it for the money. The AKP – having experienced similar discrimination by the Turkish secular state – has been more open to civil society especially in the first five years of the party’s term in government.
Thirdly, during the Gezi park protests in 2013 a different form of civil society took to the streets of Istanbul and other Turkish cities demanding more rights and democratic change. Many protesters came from the liberal spectrum to which human rights NGOs belong too. Nevertheless, the demonstrators were very heterogeneous including different types of secularists, communists such as secular and Muslim ones, different forms of liberals also including secular and Muslim liberals. NGOs funded by the EU were largely supportive of the protests although they did not publicly express their position. They opened their doors to demonstrators, provided them with food and medical treatment, and documented any violence against protesters. Moreover, many of the CSOs’ members took part in the demonstrations as private persons. Although many protesters I have spoken to are frustrated with how politics continued, they say that they experienced a new solidarity between very different groups of society during the protests and this experience will stay with them. It remains to be seen how much the protest days influenced civil society and political debates in Turkey. However, it raises the question how CSOs funded by the EU are situated in this movement and which role did the EU policies play in these events. Did the EU contribute to these events, did it rather prevent a social street movement from happening before, or was it completely irrelevant?

Fourthly, while in the beginning of Turkey’s EU accession process, many scholars identified an EU influence on domestic politics (for instance see Diez et al. 2005; Kubicek 2005; Müftüler Bağ 2005; Sarigil 2007; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003), authors studying Turkey have increasingly argued that in the end Europeanization mostly depended on domestic politics and the rationalities of domestic political actors (Alpan and Diez 2014; Yilmaz and Soyaltın 2014). While many academic papers still try to see some connection between the EU and changes in Turkey, at most conferences the panels on Turkey come to the conclusion that only domestic factors matter for democratic change. Most contributions in a special issue of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies edited by Başak Alpan and Thomas Diez on Europeanization in Turkey (2014) still assign an influence to the EU but try to focus on the interaction of the domestic and the EU level to account for developments in Turkey. Similarly I argue that the EU’s funding of civil society in Turkey indeed influences the NGOs and the political struggles over human rights issues in Turkey. I will assign an active role to the NGOs in this process and show that the effects are not necessarily the ones expected.

Overall, Turkey is an especially interesting country for such an analysis. I will argue that despite a decreasing credibility of Turkey’s EU membership perspective the financial support for civil society in Turkey influences civil society and domestic political struggles. However, I will show that the strongly politicized context shapes the effects of funding. For instance, EU funding has a different influence on an organization that is considered to be illegitimate by Turkish society or politics than for one that defends accepted positions. I am interested in the time period between 2002 and 2013
since most funding began in the beginning of the 2000s and this is the time when the AKP came into
government and has stayed there until the end of my study period.

Thus I will answer the following research question in the following chapters: *(How) did EU civil society funding (de)politize the work of rights-based civil society organizations in the context of hegemonic struggles in Turkey between 2002 and 2013?*

My research question includes the option that EU funding does not depoliticize the work of CSOs at all as well as the possibility that it actually (further) politicizes their work. I will argue that the EU transfers neo-liberal rationalities alongside liberal rationalities to human rights CSOs in Turkey. Moreover, whether and how the rationalities depoliticize the issues of CSOs, and whether and how they resist the neo-liberal rationalities depends on the domestic context, namely the discursive struggles they are engaged in.

In order to answer my question I introduce the theoretical underpinnings of my endeavor in the second chapter. I first describe what depoliticization means in the literature by using insights from political economists and then I define how I understand it. I argue that in terms of the EU’s history, neo-liberal governmentality is not that new and more ambiguous than suggested by the literature on civil society and governmentality. In fact the EU has always been about technical and apolitical decision-making with the intention to overcome and avoid polarization on a war-torn continent. In the main part of my theoretical chapter, I introduce Foucault’s ideas on governmentality – differentiating between liberal and neo-liberal governmentality – and lay out how neo-liberal governmentality is assumed to depoliticize civil society. I further suggest that we understand the domestic context as discursive struggles over hegemony following Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2014).

In the third chapter, I describe my research design and how I will analyze the depoliticizing effects in the Turkish context. Firstly, I clarify how I analyze governmentality in the EU’s civil society programs, defining which EU documents I select to analyze and how I identify governmentality. Secondly, I illustrate how I analyze the context of the NGOs in Turkey. I will choose four human rights areas – women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and migrants’ rights – based on the criterion of significance for the Turkish political debates and for Turkey’s human rights organizations. I will give an account of how I select the newspaper articles I study and how I identify hegemonic discursive positions in the media discourses. In the last part of the chapter, I describe how I analyze the effects of the EU’s civil society funding. To do this I first have to select CSOs and therefore I explain how I choose the organizations to be studied. Then, I will illustrate how I detect instances of depoliticization in my material which will be any texts and discursive representations of the CSOs’ work on their homepages and in all
other material I have found about them and their projects. I further include interviews I conducted with people working or volunteering at the organizations. I also lay out how I conducted the interviews, which questions I asked and how I use the interview statements in my analysis.

In the fourth chapter, I analyze the documents of the EU’s civil society programs – mainly the EIDHR – arguing that they put forward an ambiguous, however not surprising, concept of civil society. The EU’s constitution of civil society is based on both liberal and neo-liberal rationalities. Here, I will first focus on the representation of civil society as part of liberal governmentality – thus the representation of civil society as holding economic, social and legal rights and as being a check on the state. In a second step, I analyze the EU documents for the constitution of civil society as part of neo-liberal governmentality – namely as having to be empowered, being a provider of social services and a participant in policy-making, and using technologies of visibility and performance. In addition to the general program documents I include the specific documents and calls for Turkey.

In the fifth chapter, I go on to analyze the hegemonic struggles in the public discourse over the specific issues the CSOs selected are engaged in, namely women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and refugee rights during my study period. Here I show that in every field different discursive splits occurred. In the debate on headscarves, liberal and Muslim-conservative groups of society shared the same discursive position. In the debate on the right of abortion these discursive groups were divided again and Kemalist and more liberal groups were on the same side. The debate on LGBT rights has been even more complex as here originally LGBT individuals were extremely marginalized and invisible from political struggles. During the first decade of the new millennium however there have been supportive discourses from left liberal, Kurdish as well as Muslim discourses. Kurdish rights have always been at the center of Turkey’s political struggles. The AKP government is the first government to recognize Kurdish rights and to negotiate with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan; PKK). Here, Muslim, Kurdish and liberals share a similar discursive position whereas the Kemalists and nationalists largely oppose any pro-Kurdish discourses. The debate on the rights of migrants has been very different; in fact it has largely been non-existent. Whereas there was not much discussion on migrants’ rights in the early 2000s, a consensus could be reached at the end of the first decade including all discourses.

In the sixth chapter, I will analyze the discourses and activities of Turkish CSOs funded by the EU in light of the analysis of the domestic context. I structure my analysis according to the four different fields – women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and migrants’ rights. These four bigger sections I divide by analyzing each single organization. To have a complete picture of the NGO, I first focus on the general work of the CSOs and then continue to analyze the EU funded projects done by the organization. For both, I analyze mainly documents and any forms of representations I find on their
websites as well as documents I received from the organization, also including interviews with their representatives. I will look for liberal as well as neo-liberal rationalities. To identify depoliticization I will search for the triggers of depoliticization and the expected effects as suggested in the theoretical and methodological chapter.

I will show that the organizations funded by the EU increasingly used technologies of visibility and performance and aimed to empower people in their projects, while at the same they politicized their issues by monitoring and lobbying. Moreover, the EU did not make NGOs in Turkey to service providers or co-opted partners of government. The effects vary in the different issue areas. Although the EU did not constitute CSOs as providers of social services, in all areas NGOs provided services to vulnerable groups because the state never assumed the responsibility to do so. In the area of Kurdish rights, torture committed by the Turkish security services made it necessary for NGOs to provide medical treatment and psychological and legal services. NGOs in the area of women’s and Kurdish rights aimed to empower individuals in their EU funded projects, instead of focusing on the reasons for their marginalization. CSOs in all fields used technologies of visibility and performance to run EU projects. However it was mostly LGBT groups that incorporated them into their daily work. Yet, they increased their legitimacy this way and thus were able to put their issues on the agenda in the first place. At the same time, CSOs were hardly included in policy-making, except for migration NGOs which took part in drafting the first migration law in Turkey. Migration NGOs worked in the most depoliticized manner while women’s, LGBT and Kurdish rights group continuously monitored human rights and lobbied for their rights.

Besides NGOs funded by the EU I include two organizations that rejected EU grants in order to shed light on the reasons for and consequences of resisting EU funding. As I describe in the methodology chapter, they are both known and respected by the other CSOs studied but they denied funds for political reasons. In addition, I analyze large-scale civil society projects funded by the EU at the end of the decade to show that the EU has increasingly focused on the inclusion of civil society in policy-making processes. However, so far this has been largely unsuccessful due to the skepticism of Turkish politicians towards civil society.

In my last chapter, I will summarize the findings of chapter six restating my argument that the EU’s civil society funding made CSOs use technologies of visibility and performance, and transferred the idea of empowering individuals to emancipate themselves from their underprivileged situation. I put forward that in the area of women’s rights – which are more established – this had stronger depoliticizing effects than in the area of LGBT rights. Moreover, in the areas of women’s, LGBT and Kurdish rights CSOs continued to monitor human rights violations and lobbied for their rights and thus brought them on the political agenda. Further, service provision was not encouraged by the EU.
While the EU aimed to include CSOs in political decision-making processes, this has largely been unsuccessful.

In the second part of my conclusion, I will discuss what I found out about the relation between neo-liberal governmentality and (de) politicization. Here I will especially consider the question whether and how EU funding could have had different effects, and what things would look like without funding. I will further focus on the ambiguity of neo-liberal governmentality and the dialectical character of politicization and depoliticization in more detail. My analysis will show that sometimes depoliticization enables politicization. I will also raise the question whether liberal governmentality is always politicizing and thus the better choice. Further, I will give some suggestions on how to change the EU’s civil society policies in light of these findings.

In the third part of the concluding chapter, I will link the EU’s democracy promotion policies to the EU’s larger role in international relations and its own integration project. On the international stage, the EU has tried to act as a normative power but has not been consistent. However, this does not mean its foreign policy was insignificant; in contrast it partly triggered crises such as in the Ukraine. In regard to its civil society funding, the EU tried to reach marginalized groups but the EU’s funding requirements makes it impossible to include the most marginalized civil society actors. Although the EU continuously stresses the equal relationship between the EU and its partners, it fails to give equal importance to discourses and ideas in third countries. On the inside, neo-liberal technologies and supposedly “apolitical” policy-making is at least equally important. The EU’s handling of the Eurozone crisis was presented as being without alternatives. European integration in itself was a neo-liberal economic project that was not contested. It appears that the depoliticization of the EU project led to an extreme form of politicization from the side of far right parties who “securitize” immigration or indebted EU countries.

Last but not least, I will highlight what my findings mean for Turkey and its relations to the EU also in light of the Gezi park protests and Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian-style government. First of all, I will recap the democratic development of Turkey as well as its setbacks since the start of the accession negotiations. I conclude that the EU influenced Turkey in terms of institutional as well as societal changes. Last, I will discuss whether the EU’s civil society funding has contributed to the Gezi protests in any way. Here my answer will be as mixed as the results of my analysis. In some instances, the EU’s policies increased the legitimacy and self-confidence of civil society which made it easier for them to go to the streets. In other instances, project work rather distracted organizations from organizing political protests. In any case, CSOs are more visible in public debates and work differently – partly in a more depoliticized way and partly more engaged in political struggles. These organizations are less marginalized. Although the Gezi protests were violently crushed by the police,
it is unlikely that CSOs in the area of LGBT or Kurdish right will face as much discrimination again as they used to before the AKP came into government. However, this also calls for more politicization in some areas in order to be more visible.

My analysis builds on the specific argument that the EU’s civil society funding depoliticizes CSOs and their work as Kurki raised it in her article on the governmentality of the EIDHR (2011a). Yet, she is not the first to argue that governmentality depoliticizes civil society (see Amoore and Langley 2004; Ferguson 1990; Jaeger 2007). In the following, I will introduce her argument and findings and discuss how I will specify and investigate her argument. In a next step, I will define central concepts of democracy promotion and specifically civil society funding as one instrument of democracy promotion. Further, I will discuss the work on the EU’s civils society funding in Turkey and point out how I will contribute to this literature.

1.2. The argument on EU civil society funding, governmentality and depoliticization
Kurki’s article on the EIDHR (2011a) is part of a bigger research project (2013) on the democracy promotion practices of international organizations around the world. She analyzes the different conceptions of democracy that underlie the policies of several funding bodies such as the United Nations (UN), national states and agencies. Her project includes various kinds of democracy promotion practices such as election assistance or civil society funding. Kurki looks at the EIDHR to investigate an instrument that gives direct support for civil society organizations and argues that the EIDHR is based on neo-liberal governmentality with which the “European Union has sought to depoliticize its democracy promotion” (Kurki 2011a: 351). Although the author describes this as one major contribution of the approach, she does not go into detail about how the EIDHR depoliticizes civil society.

Analyzing EIDHR documents Kurki shows that the EIDHR is based on neo-liberal rationalities as part of neo-liberal governmentality in a Foucauldian sense. She identifies the economic market rationalities and the constitution of the individual as a self-entrepreneur (Kurki 2011a: 353–354) in the objectives and the calls for proposals of the EIDHR. She demonstrates that the governmentality perspective focuses on how economic rationalities shape individuals and every sphere of life. Individuals are made to use their freedom in a self-entrepreneurial way. These economic individuals can be managed within the sphere of civil society (Kurki 2011a: 353–354). In the EIDHR documents civil society is constituted as a sphere of freedom in which CSOs are expected to defend this freedom
in the most effective way: “An ideal CSO, too, is seen as self-reliant, risk-taker, entrepreneur, and innovator, who has no need for dependency relations with funders or state support and who take responsibility for finding and adapting themselves to the market opportunities” (Kurki 2011a: 357). The EU attempts to enable CSOs by increasing their capacities. One of Kurki’s main point is that the EIDHR’s governmentality constitutes CSOs as something in opposition to the state as the state is seen to be limiting its freedoms (Kurki 2011a: 357). Following this suspicion of the state, the EU encourages CSOs to defend their freedoms, support democratizations, independent from the state, be a check on the state, project-managers and providers of social services (Kurki 2011a: 357–358). Employing this strategy, Kurki argues, the EU “has arguably already shifted the practices of some NGO actors, such as political foundations, toward developing more depoliticized and non-ideological (lobby) positions” (Kurki 2011a: 362). Kurki suggests that the EIDHR influences CSOs in the way they work and in their political positions, ultimately depoliticizing both.

When discussing EU democracy promotion critical approaches such as Kurki’s are exceptional. While literature on development aid has investigated the effects of funding NGOs based on neo-liberal rationalities (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Paley 2002; Pearce and Eade 2000), the consequences of neo-liberal governmentality in democracy promotion policies for NGOs have largely been ignored. I will build on Kurki’s argument but suggest that it needs specification in two instances.

Firstly, although Kurki’s book (2013) includes a wide range of comprehensive concepts of democracy and analyzes how these concepts are present in democracy promotion across the world, her analysis of the EIDHR is simplifying. The EIDHR (2011a) is clearly described as an instrument based on a neo-liberal idea of democracy and thus embedded in neo-liberal governmentality. Here, Kurki subsumes too much under the concept of neo-liberal governmentality and assumes its effect of depoliticization too easily. An example of this is how Kurki links the argument of civil society being responsible for controlling the state as well as providing services usually provided for by the state. The notions of civil society as service providers and as opposition to government are rather contradictory than consistent. Within neo-liberal governmentality CSOs become a partner of the state and take over some of its functions such as providing social services to the marginalized while the state has retreated from these tasks. However, the EU’s governmentality produces some space for diverging practices of CSOs. NGOs that control or check the government have been central to a traditional liberal idea of state and civil society as she herself states (Kurki 2013: 113). Moreover, CSOs that monitor government practices are hardly apolitical. Especially in non-consolidated democracies, where the EIDHR promotes CSOs, monitoring is very political as it criticizes governmental practices.
Similar to Kurki but referring to the context of global civil society and global governance, Hans-Martin Jaeger (2007) argues that global liberal governmentality constituted CSOs as self-managers. The “human security” and the “social development” discourse made the individual responsible to act and self-empower her- or himself instead of putting issues of marginalization on the political agenda. Even though Jaeger mentions that resistance is possible within Foucault’s notion of governmentality, his analysis largely ignores instances of resistance. He further suggests that any political participation of NGOs on the global arena such as in the form of campaigning is ultimately contributing to a depoliticization because it is done from inside the system – here he draws on Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation (Jaeger 2007: 260; 263-272). I will argue however that it is too easy to discount every NGO activity as depoliticizing. Instead, civil society is much more ambiguous as Louise Amoore and Paul Langley (2004) point out. Taking issue with the generally positive liberal notion of civil society, they discuss how global civil society has become integral to a liberal governmentality reproducing a neo-liberal global order, how it is exclusionary and has produced exclusions and repressions itself (Amoore and Langley 2004: 90). However, they acknowledge that global civil society leaves space for contestation: “Organisations may simultaneously appear to offer coping mechanisms for dealing with globalisation (…), while also offering a substantive critique of the structures of global finance and production” and even separating “their role in service-delivery from their advocacy work” (Amoore and Langley 2004: 102). It is these ambiguities that as I argue the literature does not take into account as much as it should when making an argument for the depoliticizing effect of neo-liberal governmentality on civil society.

Secondly and moreover, the debate on governmentality and the depoliticization of civil society lacks empirical examples that show the depoliticizing effects in concrete cases. Kurki analyzes the EU documents but she does not analyze the effects of governmentality on CSOs funded by the EIDHR. Thus, we do not know how governmentality actually influences CSOs and we do not know how the domestic context of CSOs influences the effects of civil society funding. Although the underlying principles of democracy promotion resemble those of other EU politics, EU democracy promotion represents an intervention in a different context with its own political struggles. In many societies – such as in Turkey – civil society does not enjoy much freedom and is already accused of being political from the star. In this context the EU’s governmentality is likely to have ambiguous effects. To understand the (depoliticizing) effects of EU civil society support one must look at specific cases.

To summarize, based on Kurki’s work I suggest analyzing EU civil society support taking the ambiguities of (the EU’s) governmentality as well as the domestic context of CSOs funded into account. Yet, to understand the consequences we must first know what is meant by democracy promotion.
1.3. What is EU democracy promotion?
The promotion of democracy in other countries is a much disputed and increasingly used and studied practice. My dissertation topic focuses on the democracy promotion of the EU in non-EU-member states in the form of civil society funding. In the following, I will introduce the central concepts of EU democracy promotion. The first part includes a discussion of different instruments used in EU democracy promotion. Then I discuss how democracy promotion and my analysis relate to the debate on the EU being a normative power.

1.3.1. The idea of democracy promotion
Political leaders all over the world as well as international organizations such as the EU and the UN have increasingly referred to the idea and goal of promoting democracy in other parts of the world since the 1990s. But what is democracy promotion? Michèle Knodt and Annette Jünemann (2007: 16) refer to democracy promotion as

“all strategies and instruments which are intended to contribute to a democratization or democratic consolidation of a third country, regardless of whether the strategies or instruments are carried out by a single state, a supranational/international organization, or by private actors”.

A special issue edited by Jan Orbie and Anne Wetzel (2011) on the substance of EU democracy promotion shows that democracy promotion includes observing elections, supporting political and civil rights, horizontal accountability, strengthening stateness and civil society as well as fostering socio-economic development to different extents. Yet, often it is not clear what is meant by democracy promotion. Many authors first look at how democracy promotion came about to understand what it is. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (2000) as well as Harry Blair (1997) give a good introduction into the topic. The United States (US) was one of the first established democracies to give democracy assistance in form of financial support to non-democratic countries or states in transition for “democratizing” programs implemented by US state agencies such as the Agency for International Development (USAID) and US financed NGOs. International organizations followed such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OECD) (Ottaway and Carothers 2000: 4–5; Blair 1997: 23). Ottaway and Carothers name two reasons for the emergence of democracy promotion practices. On the one hand, the democratization wave in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s brought existing democracies in the position to support new democratic openings. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War eliminated old ideological conflicts and thus influencing third political systems became more legitimate (Ottaway and Carothers 2000: 7–8). The authors differentiate three phases of democracy promotion of which the first was characterized by observing and supporting elections. During the
second phase beginning in the middle of the 1990s, international donors attempted to reform state institutions of respective countries. Only in the third phase, donors started to support civil society assuming it to be crucial for democratization. Since then civil society funding has become one of the most important forms of democracy promotion (Ottaway and Carothers 2000: 6).

Nowadays, the US and Europe agree on the importance of democracy promotion (Magen and McFaul 2009a: 1–5). Richard Youngs (2001) describes that in the EU democracy promotion policies came about in the 1990s because of the third wave of democratization and the collapse of the East European communist regimes. Then, western democracies realized that the new democracies were not consolidated yet and that there were still many authoritarian regimes especially in the Middle East. He also adds that the end of the Cold War made it possible for the EU to put pressure on former pro-western autocratic governments. In November 1991, the Development Council Resolution stated the EU’s commitment to democracy promotion. The following Maastricht Treaty “mainstreamed” the policy into the EU’s foreign policy. Whereas before the focus was mostly on human rights, now foreign policy was extended to the concern about democracy in non-EU countries (Youngs 2001: 1–2).

Many scholars compare EU and US approaches to democracy promotion as they assume them to be different (Magen and McFaul 2009a: 15–16). Generally, as Amichai Magen and Michael A. McFaul and the contributors to their volume (2009b) found out, the differences between both are not as big as expected. Instead there was rather a consensus between the EU and the US on democracy promotion. Some differences did appear though. Crucial for the EU’s democracy promotion policies is that the EU bases democracy promotion on the concept of deepening relations with its neighbors and possible enlargement. To a large extent the EU’s policies in democratization stem from enlargement policies which include democratic conditionality for candidates. Nowadays the EU does not offer membership to every neighbor but still develops new forms of neighborhood relations with the bordering regions based on the idea of “fuzzy” EU borders (Magen and McFaul 2009a: 22). US democracy promotion on the other hand is shaped by an American ideal of democracy and clear borders. In addition, the US is still considered to be a hegemon that is willing to employ coercive and military measures in contrast to the EU that is only expected to use cooperative means (Magen and McFaul 2009a: 20–24). As in other cases of interventions in third countries (Chandler 2015), the EU’s democracy promotion increasingly aims to include local actors and be aware of local contexts. This often means to involve civil society actors.
1.3.2. Instruments of EU democracy promotion

**Bottom-up or top-down**

When differentiating between American and European strategies and when discussing democracy promotion in general, many authors ask whether democracy promoters employ a bottom-up or a top-down strategy and whether one of them proves to be more successful. Bottom-up democracy promoters give support in form of funding to civil society actors hoping that they achieve democratization from “below” reaching to the level of politics. Top-down approaches grant direct support to the level of the state or political society assuming that institutional or political reforms lead to democratization (Magen and McFaul 2009a: 15–16). However, I am now only interested in the EU’s democracy promotion strategies.

Most literature relates the EU’s democracy promotion policies to bottom-up practices (Gillespie 2004; Youngs 2001). The EU prefers funding human rights organizations over employing pressure and conditionality on third governments as this could create conflicts. However, the organizations funded might be weak and do not pose any serious threat to democratic regimes (Gillespie 2004: 7). Vicky Reynaert (2011) reasons for the Mediterranea that this was because NGOs that applied for funding did not have stronger agendas as it was too dangerous for them.

**Positive or negative**

Authors further differentiate between positive and negative instruments of democracy promotion. This is equally a question of whether democracy promotion policies are directed at the level of political or civil society. Negative or coercive instruments refer to the punishment of governments not acting in accordance to democratic principles. They include posing sanctions on the respective regime and international isolation. As Youngs (2001) suggests, negative instruments are not considered to be a good tool for democracy promotion because the international isolation of states might provoke a “backlash” counterproductive for a democratic opening. In addition, negative instruments are always selective and never completely fair. Negative measures such as sanctions or even military intervention\(^3\) are only accepted when a country is in a situation of crisis, when domestic actors ask for international support and a regime is about to collapse (Youngs 2001: 21–23).

Much more widespread are positive approaches. In non-democratic states opposition groups or the creation of space for opposition can be supported. In transition democracies institutions can be strengthened. Supporting civil society is also a positive approach. However, in authoritarian countries bottom-up approaches such as funding NGOs are difficult as the regimes hardly allow civil society funding (Youngs 2001: 23–35). In addition, the diplomatic acknowledgment of a state,\(^3\)

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\(^3\) An example would be the military intervention in Libya in 2011.
support of regional cooperation, capacity building and political dialogue are forms of positive democracy promotion (Jünemann and Knodt 2007: 18–19).

**Conditionality**

Negative and positive instruments often come with conditionality. Especially positive conditionality is very popular in the relations with EU membership candidates such as the East European states or Turkey. In this case, the EU sets conditions that need to be met by candidate countries to become EU member one day. The incentive or the so-called carrot is EU membership. The Copenhagen Criteria – including stable democratic institutions, a functioning market economy and the ability to adopt the Community acquis – are the most obvious form of political conditionality. They state the conditions that have to be fulfilled for the opening of accession negotiations between the EU and respective country (Tocci 2007: 12–13). The credibility of the membership perspective (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008) as well as the calculation of costs versus rewards (Tocci 2005) influence whether states comply. According to Nathalie Tocci (2007: 14), conditionality sometimes creates opportunity structures on the domestic level for actions that would not have been possible without it. This does not only apply to agreements but also to supporting specific actors for instance with financial aid. By giving funds to CSOs or rhetorically favoring political parties, the EU potentially empowers these actors (Tocci 2007: 14). EU policies might also “enable” different parties in strengthening their power in discourse by providing a point of reference. Then, actors are able to refer to the EU agenda and EU norms when defending their position (Diez et al. 2008: 27). Although Tocci (2007) and Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter (2008) refer to the impact of EU integration on conflicts, these ways of influence are similarly at work in democracy promotion practices.

Although the EU’s democracy promotion relies much more on positive conditionality, negative conditionality exists as well. Some negative instruments such as sanctions are also characterized by negative conditionality. Negative conditionality punishes or sanctions human rights violations (Fierro 2003). Tocci (2007) argues that the EU was reluctant to use sanctions because the purpose of agreements with other countries including human rights clauses often was neither human rights nor democracy but usually free trade, and political and societal dialogue (Tocci 2007: 11–12; Fierro 2003: 189). Tocci (2007: 11) contests the notion that human right clauses represented conditionality because “[t]he ‘human rights clause’ in EU association agreements has been used as a means to upgrade human rights and democracy into acceptable subjects of political dialogue, rather than a vehicle to exert ex post conditionality on third party-countries”.

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**Ex post or ex ante**

In addition to differentiating between positive and negative conditionality, the literature makes a difference between ex ante and ex post conditionality. Elena Fierro (2003) studying the EU’s promotion of human rights – not the same as democracy promotion but yet very similar and partly overlapping – identifies conditionality as the main instrument used for human rights promotion. She differentiates between ex ante and ex post conditionality. Ex ante conditionality refers to the formulation of conditions before setting-up a relationship between the EU and a third country. However, often the EU included human rights clauses in agreements after a certain relationship such as membership candidacy was decided already, thus ex-post (Fierro 2003: 89–99).

Table 1 summarizes the different instruments for democracy promotion. I am mostly interested in the first column (highlighted in blue). Civil society funding and support is clearly a bottom-up instrument which is ex ante and positive according to the definitions introduced above.

**Table 1: Overview of the instruments of the EU’s democracy promotion policies as discussed in the literature**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>EX ANTE</th>
<th>EX POST</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>BOTTOM-UP</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOP-DOWN</strong></td>
<td><strong>BOTTOM-UP</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSITIVE</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOP-DOWN</strong></td>
<td><strong>BOTTOM-UP</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding of civil society</td>
<td>diplomatic acknowledgement</td>
<td>awarding organizations or individuals for their work e.g. EU Sakharov Prize</td>
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<tr>
<td>dialogue with civil society (forums, inter-linkages)</td>
<td>Regional cooperation</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
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<tr>
<td>supporting political parties</td>
<td>Political dialogue</td>
<td>Good-governance projects</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promising rewards by e.g. human rights clauses</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEGATIVE</strong></td>
<td>diplomatic pressure</td>
<td>sanctions on organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>exclusion from funding of specific kinds of civil society groups</td>
<td>Threatening of sanctions or punishment (e.g. human rights clauses)</td>
<td>Listing of organizations as terrorist groups</td>
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**1.3.3. The EU’s interest and norms in democracy promotion: the EU as a normative power?**

I intend to analyze the nature and the effects of civil society funding as a means of the EU’s democracy promotion. More specifically, I ask whether and how the EU’s policies depoliticize CSOs. This question and more so its answer is linked to the debate about what kind of actor the EU is in international relations. The debate largely centers around the question whether the EU is a normative power or not (see Duchêne 1972, 1973; Manners 2002). Promoting democracy is one way for the EU to yield its so-called “normative power”. In fact, democracy and human rights are two of the five European norms identified by Ian Manners to be central to the EU’s normative power: peace,
liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (Manners 2002: 242). The idea that Europe is distinctively different from other “powers” in international relations was introduced by François Duchêne in 1972. He argues that Europe acted as a “civilian power” during the Cold War because it did not rely on military means any longer (Duchêne 1972, 1973). Hedley Bull later challenges this view by arguing that military means were indeed necessary for Europe to promote norms (Bull 1982; Manners 2002). This idea of Europe “civilizing” international relations is taken up by Hanns W. Maull (2005: 780–781) who put forward that a “civilian power” transforms the anarchy of interstate relations in accordance to its “own, democratic, domestic politics” and eventually also uses military means to do so.

The idea of civilizing the world and transforming it into a peaceful and democratic one is closely linked to democratic peace theory which has been criticized for being essentially hegemonic. For instance, democratic peace theory constructed a center and a periphery of which the latter has to change to become more like the center. This blurs the constitutive relations between both – such as for instance “the centrality, (...) of arms exports to many Western economies” (Bilgin and Morton 2004: 175). Moreover, the democratic peace is criticized for being a capitalist peace at the expense of the so-called periphery. Democratic states still go to war against non-democracies to extend the zones of liberal democracies (Barkawi and Laffey 1999).

Diez’s (2013) suggestion to understand normative power as hegemony recognizes that normative power and its norms are problematic. Moreover, the Gramscian notion of hegemony allows us to see to see that the content of the EU’s power is contested not only by states but also by social actors. There are constant struggles over what the norms should be. Moreover, the concept of hegemony integrates interests. In hegemony interests and ideas are linked. Although many scholars recognize that the EU pursues both norms and interest, they mostly present it as a divide. Most authors do not recognize the contested nature of norms and interests and argue that the EU in the end favored security interests in its democracy promotion policies (for instance see Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Pace 2009; Seeberg 2009).

My approach to democracy promotion investigates the problematic nature and effects of civil society funding. It engages with the question of whether civil society funding is neo-liberal and whether this has emancipatory or rather disempowering consequences for civil society. Moreover, I will show that the EU’s policies are not as unambiguous and uncontested as often suggested; instead different conceptions of civil society are present. At the end of my dissertation I will discuss what the results of my analysis mean for the question of what kind of actor the EU is in international relations. Studying these ambiguous effects is especially promising in the case of Turkey which I will introduce now.
1.4. The EU’s civil society funding and the case of Turkey
Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999 and started negotiations with the EU in 2005. EU funding has been an important financial resource for CSOs in Turkey (Altan-Olcay and Icduygu 2012: 169). Although civil society has developed in Turkey and the new Law on Association of 2004 reduced restrictions and possibilities for state intervention (Altan-Olcay and Icduygu 2012: 167), Turkish politics and society see civil society with skepticism. CSOs have been politicized by politics and society lacking trust in civil society. Turkey is expected to consolidate its democracy with the help of the EU accession process. Thus, much of the academic literature is interested in the effects of the EU accession process on Turkey’s democratization. I will here focus on the research published on civil society in the context of Turkey-EU relations, yet relating it to publications on other cases of EU civil society support such as the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern European countries. I will discuss the literature and argue that it would benefit from an analysis of the consequences of the EU’s specific liberal and neo-liberal conceptions of democracy and civil society.

The literature on EU-Turkey relations and civil society in Turkey focuses on two aspects: on the one hand the influence of the EU accession processes on civil society in terms of being able to contribute to democratization in Turkey and on the other hand the influence of EU funding on the organizations as such. My analysis will in a sense touch both aspects as I am interested in the effects of EU funding on CSOs and the consequences for their political struggles.

Similarly, the concept of Europeanization is relevant for both questions. Since Turkey was granted candidate status for EU membership, academics have studied what they refer to as “Europeanization”, a concept that was first used in the 1990s to study democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. While in the beginning Europeanization referred to democratic transformation within member states, scholars studying EU enlargement used it to analyze policy changes in candidate countries (Alpan and Diez 2014: 2–3). The contributions to the special issue of South European Society and Politics (Diez et al. 2005) on the EU and civil society in Turkey analyze the “Europeanization” or “EU-ization” of Turkish civil society. In the introductory article, Diez, Apostolos Aognantopoulos and Alper Kaliber (2005) differentiate between four forms of Europeanization: policy-Europeanization, political Europeanization, societal Europeanization, and discursive Europeanization. The first two are rather institutional in character. Policy Europeanization refers to the influence of EU integration on domestic policies and political Europeanization means the impact of EU integration on political processes. Societal Europeanization and discursive Europeanization come from a social constructivist theoretical background. Societal Europeanization refers to a change of identities incorporating ideas of European identity. Discursive Europeanization means that domestic discourses
make references to European ideas, actors or institutions (Diez et al. 2005: 3–7)\(^4\). Thus, the Europeanization literature generally assumes that there is an influence of the EU on the domestic level although most authors stress the impact of domestic factors as well.

For instance, studying the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey, Tocci (2005) and Göksel and Güneş (2005) argue that CSOs profited from the EU integration process because it increased their legitimacy. Civil society actors were able to refer to the EU to strengthen their positions and credibility in pushing for reforms. Although Tocci (2005) considers the EU to be rather a “trigger” than an “anchor” for reform, she also suggests that Turkish domestic actors such as CSOs were strengthened by the EU process. Bahar Rumelili (2005) makes a related point when she argues that EU accession enabled much more cooperation between Greece and Turkey as supporters of Greek-Turkish cooperation could use the EU as a credible reference point which made their claims more legitimate. Paul Kubicek (2005: 370–374) also argues that the EU accession process was a “trigger” for reform. Turkish population was rather led by material incentives than by democratic norms when implementing democratic reforms. However, many organizations emerged as a reaction to the EU accession process and to the earthquake in 1999 (Kubicek 2005: 376)\(^5\). Since the 1990s especially business organizations such as TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) and the İKV (Economic Development Foundation) have been strong supporters for democratic reforms and EU accession (also see Altinay 2005). But also many human rights organizations such as the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği; İHD) were strengthened by the EU accession process. Turkey’s candidacy supported their argumentation by making it possible for them to refer to the accession process and European norms. Kubicek (2005: 368–370) argues that the various EU programs implemented in Turkey, including the EIDHR, helped NGOs to argue and pursue their objectives. In 2004, the Law on Associations was passed under EU pressure considerably reducing state interference in civil society activities (Kubicek 2005: 370). Similar effects were found in Eastern and Central European countries that became a member in 2004 (Börzel 2010). For instance, Imogen Sudbery (2010) finds that women’s organizations in Poland were able to use the EU as a reference point in their discourses.

The Europeanization literature studies the effects of the EU accession process on the domestic level. A newer strand of Europeanization research focuses on studying the influence of the domestic actors and discourses on Europeanization from the bottom-up instead of top-down (Alpan and Diez 2014). However, the Europeanization literature as such hardly scrutinizes the foundations of the EU’s

\(^4\) However, as Kaliber (2014) points out Europeanization does not have to mean EU-ization but Europeanization includes the influence of broader or different conceptions of Europe.

\(^5\) The importance of the earthquake for Turkey’s politics as well as civil society was stressed before by Kubicek (2002) as well as by Soli Özel (2003).
policies and the reasons for limited success. Yet, between 2010 and 2015 several in-depth studies of the effects of the EU’s civil society policy on Turkey appeared stressing the mismatch between the specific liberal assumptions of EU civil society programs and the domestic context of the EU’s intervention. Özge Zihnioğlu argues that “the EU civil society policy in Turkey fails because of the neo-Tocquevillian premises framing this policy” (Zihnioğlu 2013b: 383). Relying on interviews with Turkish CSOs she demonstrates that Turkish CSOs do not share the EU’s understanding of being a force for democratization and institutional reform and spreading support for the EU. She analyzes the success of the EU’s policy by looking at whether these organizations face less pressure and discrimination and whether NGOs and their supporters have become more positive towards the EU. In both cases she does not find any support for these effects (Zihnioğlu 2013b: 391–393, 2013a: 50–85). The author assigns this failure on the one hand to a lack of organizational capacities of CSOs which only enabled a few CSOs to apply for funding and conduct projects and on the other hand to their own involvement in ideological struggles – points that are made in regard to Europeanization and civil society in Central and Eastern European countries as well (see Börzel 2010). Often CSOs are linked to political actors or supported a specific political ideology (Zihnioğlu 2013b: 393–396, 2013a: 86–97). Although Zihnioğlu focuses on the effects of the EU’s policy in terms of impact on democratization and support for EU accession, she also finds that EU funding potentially increases conflicts within CSOs and their supporters because many citizens oppose EU funding or EU accession (Zihnioğlu 2013b: 393).

Markus Ketola (2013) makes a similar argument in his book suggesting that the EU’s concept of civil society is based on liberal democratic principles and does not match the reality of Turkey’s CSOs. The Turkish context contributes to unpredictable effects of EU civil society funding. The EU conceptualizes civil society to be “instrumental” for democratic reforms as well as defending “universal values”. Yet, in Turkey the work of NGOs is influenced by various factors. For instance, a large number of CSOs oppose EU funding as an external intervention (Ketola 2013: 58–81). In addition, even if they want to and are able to acquire funds, the effects of funds lack behind the EU’s expectations. While NGOs are able to push for democratic reforms, they are hardly able to develop close relations with political institutions (Ketola 2013: 82–108). According to Ketola (2013: 133–156), EU funding intensified the divisions between different parts of civil society.

The arguments raised by Zihnioğlu and Ketola relate to the debate on the EU’s funding in the Mediterranean. Here the main point of criticism is that the funding programs exclude Muslim NGOs which also speaks for a specific “western” liberal idea of democracy and civil society. Many authors argue that this shows that the EU rather followed security interests in the region (Jünemann 2002; Pace 2009; Roy 2005; Youngs 2001). Jude Howell (2006: 123) suggests that it is especially since 9/11
that international institutions have become more skeptical about giving funding to Islamic civil society groups.

Although scholars discuss the liberal nature of EU civil society programs for Turkey, the literature does not point to the underlying neo-liberal rationalities – which Kurki (2011a) makes visible for the EIDHR – and their consequences. For the countries of the Mediterranean Reynaert (2011) puts forward that the EU does not aim at promoting human rights per se but rather at supporting the creation of a market-based economy. Reynaert argues that the neo-liberal nature of the EU’s democracy promotion is constituted by a triangular formation of state, civil society and the market. Yet in the end the EU’s policies favor the market. As a result political and economic equality are enhanced but individual liberties lack behind. In regard to the EIDHR she makes two interesting points. Firstly, while the EIDHR supported mainly human rights organization such as women’s rights groups, it did not fund organizations or projects that worked on more controversial topics such as freedom of association and participation. Secondly, the EIDHR increasingly gave funding to projects fighting corruption which shows that the EU is more interested in the functioning of a free market economy. She concludes that the EU has a neo-liberal view on the state and civil society and focuses on creating a market economy, making it difficult to achieve rights. These EU policies contributed to people’s dissatisfaction which triggered the protest in the Arab countries in 2011 (Reynaert 2011: 632–635).

Ketola’s (2013), Zihnioğlu’s (2013a) and Reynaert’s (2011) studies are important because they assess and question how the EU’s civil society programs are designed. They point to their liberal and neo-liberal nature. However – to simplify their arguments – while Reynaert (2011) just as Kurki (2011a) is mostly interested in how the EU conceptualizes democracy, civil society and the market, Ketola (2013) and Zihnioğlu (2013a) especially point out how Turkey’s civil society does not match the EU’s concepts and how this is an obstacle to the goal of CSOs contributing to democracy. Yet, they ignore that the liberal and neo-liberal character of the EU programs have an effect on CSOs funded. The EU and the CSOs are not completely independent spheres. Instead, they are both struggling over what democracy and civil society mean, and CSOs are confronted with the EU’s discourse and its funding requirements while the EU is confronted with the CSOs’ reactions.

Other scholars (Kuzmanovic 2010; Ergun 2010) indeed analyze how NGOs in Turkey change due to EU funding. Ayça Ergun’s (2010) study of more than 60 Turkish NGOs reveals that EU funds have transformed the way organizations works. To be eligible for EU funding, NGOs have to conform to EU standards. This also means that they have to do develop projects with which they can apply. This leads to a “‘professionalization’ of civil society, causing voluntary work to lose its importance and grassroots participation to be greatly weakened” (Ergun 2010: 514; also see Altan-Olçay and
Icduyg\(\text{u}\) 2012: 169). Daniella Kuzmanovic (2010) adds another more positive point to the effects of project culture. Her research shows that Turkish NGOs – traditionally very divided and competitive – start to work together in projects: “This is not to say that traditional cleavages has lost significance, it is rather to say that new spaces for civic activism has opened up where the prominence of such cleavages can under particular circumstances recede to the background” (Kuzmanovic 2010: 434). Yet, NGO activists blame other organizations to be less sincere when accepting funds. Representatives of Kemalist, Islamist as well as right-wing nationalists criticize the EU for imposing a western civil society culture with neo-imperialist intentions (Kuzmanovic 2010: 436–441). Kuzmanovic calls on researchers and donors to consider that external funding potentially changes the political culture of a third country (Kuzmanovic 2010). Both analyses direct our attention to how NGOs change due to pressure from donors. However, they do not investigate how some CSOs resist these pressure and moreover what the consequences of these changes are for their political struggles.

The questions of how the EU’s civil society policy is designed and how its intervention in the Turkish context plays out have to be thought together. CSOs are active agents in this process but they are not free from EU influence. The governmentality approach makes it possible to investigate the consequences of specific discourses on subjects. It suggests that neo-liberal governmentality depoliticizes CSOs and the issues they work on. In this dissertation, I analyze whether and how the EU’s civil society programs depoliticize civil society in Turkey integrating an analysis of the EU’s policies and the domestic context of CSOs. I am less interested in whether EU civil society funding contributed to democratization, rather whether it enabled marginalized discourses to enter political struggles, thus a pluralization of debates (Diez and Mühlenhoff 2014). While Ketola (2013) and Zihnioğlu (2013a) mainly rely on interviews with CSO representatives, I will triangulate my results including a detailed analysis of the NGO homepages and any NGO documents available.

Restating my research question I ask:

*(How) did EU civil society funding *(de)*politicize the work of rights-based civil society organizations in the context of hegemonic struggles in Turkey between 2002 and 2013?*

The research question thus consists of three sub-questions that I will answer in the following order:

1. *On which rationalities are the EU civil society programs based?*
2. *In which discursive context has EU civil society funding taken place in Turkey? Within which discursive struggles are the CSOs funded situated?*
(3) How did EU civil society funding influence Turkish CSOs – did it depoliticize or politicize their issues?

I ask what does civil society funding do with a special focus on whether and how CSOs depoliticize with funding in a specific domestic context. To do this, I will first discuss how the literature links governmentality to depoliticization.
Chapter 2

(De)politicization, (neo-)liberal governmentality, and hegemonic struggles
Kurki’s (2011a) depoliticization argument seems especially interesting when applied to the case of Turkey, a democratizing EU membership candidate in which CSOs struggle to be a legitimate actor and rights issues are highly contested as I will show in chapter five. In the following, I will introduce the theoretical framework of my analysis of EU civil society funding in Turkey. First, I will tackle the question of what depoliticization actually is. I discuss how depoliticization is defined by other scholars and how I will understand the concept. I will further make the point that the governmentality of the EU’s civil society policies has to be seen in the context of the EU as such. This makes us understand how what the EU does on the outside is connected to what the EU does on the inside and how tensions between liberal and neo-liberal ideas shape both. Next, I will introduce the governmentality approach, describing both liberal as well as neo-liberal governmentality, and suggest how neo-liberal governmentality is expected to have depoliticizing effects. To be able to integrate the Turkish context, I finish this chapter with my theoretical understanding of domestic discursive struggles in which civil society acts.

I will begin with defining what is understood as depoliticization in the literature and how I will use it. The literature on governmentality hardly discusses what it actually means by depoliticization, and it does not relate to the general debate on depoliticization in the discipline of International Political Economy. I will use this debate and incorporate Kurki’s and Jaeger’s arguments to develop an understanding of depoliticization.

2.1. What is depoliticization? – looking for definitions
Kurki (2011a) uses the notion of depoliticization by equating apolitical with non-ideological. She first claims that the EU tried to avoid any “normative, political, and ideological nature” in its democracy promotion policy (Kurki 2011a: 351). Later, she argues that the EIDHR made NGOs pursue more “depoliticized and non-ideological (lobby) positions” (Kurki 2011a: 362). In her book (2013), she is interested in the “ways in which depoliticization and hegemonic ‘liberal’ consensus-building is affecting the ideological premises of the foundations’ work” (Kurki 2013: 182). She studies the self-perceptions of NGOs. In her interviews she finds out that some organization feel pressured to use less ideological language and focus less on political activities than they used to (Kurki 2013: 183–184).
However, is this depoliticization? To get closer to an understanding of what it could mean I now discuss how the notion of depoliticization has been used by others. Based on this, I develop a definition of depoliticization as I see it in the governmentality literature on civil society and depoliticization.

The depoliticization argument was first made in the discipline of (International) Political Economy which traditionally focuses on governments and their depoliticizing strategies. Peter Burnham argues in 2001 that the government of Tony Blair pursued a politics of depoliticization. He defines depoliticization to be “the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making” (Burnham 2001: 128, emphasis in original). According to him, the “placing at one remove” is a governmental strategy to “offload responsibility for the consequences of unpopular government policies” (Burnham 2001: 131). In the case of the Labour government this happened in three ways: Firstly, the government handed responsibilities over to supposedly non-political bodies such as the Central Bank (Burnham 2001: 137). Secondly, the Blair government introduced indicators to “increase the accountability, transparency and external validation of policy” (Burnham 2001: 141, emphasis in original). Thirdly, it has been part of the depoliticization strategy to adopt rules that appear binding and non-changeable (Burnham 2001: 142). The central point is that these three steps removed issues from political decision-making.

Hay (2007) includes this notion but takes a different approach and develops a three stage model of depoliticization. He argues that depoliticization is the cause of widespread political frustration. To come to a definition of depoliticization, he first defines what he counts as political participation. His second and third types of political participation include the role of civil society and are of relevance for the question of this thesis. According to Hay, civil society can participate politically by putting new issues on the agenda of governments. Thus, they politicize issues by moving an issue to the sphere of government. However, he also counts civil society activities that are not directed at formal politics as a form of political participation. This includes so-called new forms of political participation such as the boycott of specific companies (Hay 2007: 73–76). Hay defines depoliticization thus also as the removal of an issue from a specific sphere, but depoliticization is not restricted to the removal of an issue from the governmental sphere. He identifies three levels of depoliticization with the first one being the removal of an issue from the sphere of government to the public sphere, the next one being its removal from the public to the private sphere, and the third one being its removal from private to the sphere of necessity. Only the last step represents a full depoliticization in Hay’s model (2007: 80; 82-87).

Amoore and Langley (2004: 101) and Lipschutz (2005: 205) put forward a similar argument about the repoliticizing nature of neo-liberal governmentality suggesting that the rationalities of
governmentality politicize individuals by placing responsibility on them. Barbara Cruikshank (1999: 6) argues against any claim of depoliticization as self-government would politicize the private. At the same time, she rather makes the point that this form of governing is still highly political even though it might move things into the private.

Jaeger (2007: 262–263) on the contrary restricts politicization to the governmental level, in his case the global governance level. He largely denies the possibility for repoliticization at the individual level as suggested by Amoore and Langley (2004) and Lipschutz (2005) as CSOs always had to rely on a discourse that resonated with the global discourse of governmentality. Ultimately the individuals had to challenge the broader discourse to repoliticize (Jaeger 2007: 263). His definition of depoliticization is based on a governmentality perspective and appears to be closer to Burnham (2001) than to Hay (2007):

“With the help of global civil society, governmentality simultaneously suffuses and dissimates sovereignty, supplementing and partly displacing law and force as the chief instrument of government. It transforms political issues into technical and managerial problems, thereby removing them from the sphere of political decision-making and fundamental contention” (Jaeger 2007: 260).

Jaeger, similar to Kurki (2011a), stresses that governmentality turns political problems into technical ones. For him this depoliticizes issues. According to Jaeger (2007), depoliticization includes a more discursive notion of lacking contestation as well as a more institutional notion of the absence from the political decision-making sphere. It appears that Kurki’s notion of depoliticization is closest to Jaeger’s as she also stresses the notion of technical management and its consequences for the relation between civil society and the state (Kurki 2013: 182–184).

Hence, the literature on depoliticization and governmentality argues that the removal of issues from the political sphere happens through turning political issues into technical issues. This does not mean that this is not political in itself but it implies that it removes the ‘political’ from an issue. Flinders and Wood stated that “(...) few scholars associate depoliticisation with the removal of politics; and many associate it with the denial of politics or the imposition of a specific (and highly politicised) model of statecraft” (Flinders and Wood 2014: 136). The literature says that depoliticization is both the removal and denial of the political.

My discussion shows that the depoliticization argument made by Kurki and Jaeger refers to a pretty narrow definition of the political; one that does not include the so-called new forms of political participation that aim to change individuals’ behavior as suggested by Hay (2007: 73–76) in its third mode of political participation. It only includes the second type of political participation in which civil society tries to put a new issue on the political agenda. Civil society has to contest issues and in some
way refer to the level of political decision-making. Then, civil society is politicizing issues. When the issues of CSOs have turned into technical problems, they are removed from the political arena and thus cannot be contested on the base of different political ideas or ideologies. Thus, they are depoliticized. The latter is assumed to happen through governmentality. I will argue that even following this rather narrow definition of politics, the EU's governmentality creates more ambiguous effects and not all count as depoliticization. This is partly due to the ambiguities within the EU governmentality and its context as such – as I will discuss now – and partly due to the character of intervention in a third context as I will discuss later.

2.2. The ambiguities of neo-liberal governmentality and depoliticization

2.2.1. The EU context: neo-functionalism, economic and legal liberalism, or neo-liberal governmentality

The debate on the dominance of technical decision-making in the EU is older than the neo-liberal governmentality literature would suggest. In fact, from the very beginning the EU integration project has been shaped by the idea of rational and technical politics. This was not termed governmentality but neo-functionalism. As Lene Hansen and Michael C. Williams (1999) argue the neo-functionalist logic of EU practices are often assumed to be responsible for the lack of legitimacy of the EU among the public precisely because it depoliticized EU integration.

Neo-functionalism is regarded to be best suited to explain the continuing integration of the EU by pointing to functional needs. According to neo-functionalism the EU integrated economic policies to deal with the economic interrelations of states. Afterwards societal groups redirected their demands to the EU level expecting more efficiency dealing with their issues. As a consequence, more and more political integration became necessary leading to the political spillover (Haas 1958). In a sense neo-functionalism assumes a process that is predetermined and thus apolitical. Further, “[f]unctionalism often assumed that legitimacy would follow the efficient work of experts, bureaucrats and pioneering leaders” (Hansen and Williams 1999: 235). Thus, EU integration has come about without democratic consent but only based on a non-stoppable “apolitical process” (Hansen and Williams 1999: 235).

Ultimately, the argument made by the authors is about how the neo-functionalist claim is depoliticizing EU integration. The legitimacy of such policy-making has been questioned. Daniela Obradovic (1996) for instance argues that the EU missed a myth that creates a sense of identity. The functionalist logic that is based on ideas of efficiency and rationality lacked the myth that was
necessary to build legitimacy. Hansen and Williams criticize this argument by suggesting that the neo-functionalist logic was itself based on the myth of modernity. The myth of modernity is linked to ideas of rationality and progress. Economic and technical efficiency are the key to progress (Hansen and Williams 1999: 240–244). The myth of modernity makes itself appear a-mystical and thus apolitical: “(...) the true power of the modernist, rationalist discourse is to depoliticize its object: it literally locates it outside of which that can be made the object of contention and thus the field of the political” (Hansen and Williams 1999: 244–245). While the discourse depoliticizes integration, “the creation of rationalized spheres seen as separate from the politics of myth and identity” is a political move of “liberal modernity” however (Hansen and Williams 1999: 246). A political ideology in fact informs this move. In addition, Hansen and Williams point to two important ambiguities of the depoliticization move. Firstly, the depoliticization of the EU has not been entirely successful as the discussions over the missing legitimacy or missing myth of the EU have shown. Depoliticization may (re)politicize an issue when it is resisted (Hansen and Williams 1999: 245). At the same time, resistance to something means to acknowledge the existence of what you oppose (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 125). Secondly, the often suggested alternatives to the myth of rationality are not unproblematic either. Previous literature suggested that the EU needed some kind of identity. This identity could either be developed along a European nation-state building, thus it needed similar political structures; or it needed a common myth, a common history and values as a ground. Both ideas equate the EU with a nation state and imply the exclusion of some other (see Diez 2005). Especially the second one is fairly essentialist even though it recognizes that such a common myth is not to be found. From this point of view, the myth of modernity might have been the smaller evil in light of Europe’s nationalist past and compared to an EU based on something close to a national identity at the expense of others. Ole Wæver (1996; 1998) suggests that Europe’s “Other” was indeed Europe’s past and Europe tried to secure itself from that past. However, Stefan Borg (2013) argues that the EU discursively constructs itself as nothing less than a modern state resting on the ambiguity of claiming to have particular as well as universal values at the same time. This underlines the EU’s tensions between being something different than and similar to a nation state.

The debate about the nature of the EU shows how the idea of technical management in promoting liberal values is an integral part of the EU. While the EU attempts to be different and more open than a nation state, it depoliticizes EU politics however. This depoliticization is likely to have contributed to the political frustration and the reemergence of nationalism in European countries.

Similarly, Owen Parker and Ben Rosamond (2013) argue that the EU’s normative power was constituted by economic liberalism or what they call “market cosmopolitanism”. Referring to liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, theories of integration that stress the economic
rationalities as a driving force, the authors draw on Foucault's lecture on economic liberalism to demonstrate how economic rationalities constitute the EU and how they conflict with legal liberal norms that are constitutive as well. European economic integration was based on a model of ordo-liberalism as Foucault as well as others identified it in Germany. Thus the state is increasingly supervised by the market. Indeed, referring to post-Second-World War Germany Foucault claims that here the goal was to create an alternative to the nationalist state conception. Equally, EU integration was driven by the idea to promote and ensure prosperity and peace in Europe after two world wars. The EU’s integration project tried to combine economic liberalism with legal liberalism in order to create and keep a peaceful order in Europe. Parker and Rosamond argue that market cosmopolitanism was the foundation of normative power Europe and its characteristics including the idea of non-discrimination and human rights as well as the inclusion of civil society in a deliberative form of democracy (Parker and Rosamond 2013: 238–239). It is this combination of legal and economic liberalism that constitutes the EU’s identity and creates an ambiguity and tension between on the one hand the dominance of the market creating inequalities and the importance of human rights and civil society demanding social and economic equality.

What Parker and Rosamond refer to – although surprisingly not explicitly mentioning it – is Foucault’s notion of governmentality. They show how the governmentality paradigm helps to understand the ambiguities of the neo-functionalist logic. Walters and Haahr (2005) provide a similar, yet more differentiated account of how Europe is governed by explicitly using the governmentality concept. In fact, they take up the argument first that the EU’s policies are shaped by specific rationalities as part of governmentality. Their book gives a comprehensive account of how the EU has been governed from the start up until today. They demonstrate that the EU has not been governed by the same rationalities since its beginning. Rather, they show how governmentality evolved and changed over time.

In line with Hansen and Williams (2004), Walters and Haahr argue that in the beginning European integration was shaped by the idea of expertise governing. Jean Monnet stressed the need for rational and technical decision-making by experts and elites, what the authors call “High Modernism” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 23–28): “European integration was not to be achieved through explicitly political approaches but behind the public’s back, albeit assuming a ‘permissive consensus’ concerning the validity of its goals” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 27). “High Modernism” introduced the rationality of making things visible through standardization, measurement, and balance sheets (Walters and Haahr 2005: 31–33). This created an “anti-political” subjectivity (Walters and Haahr 2005: 28; emphasis in original). Thus cooperation, consensus-making and elitist expertise was at the center of governing. With the Common Market Walters and Haahr see the advent of a

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slightly changed form of governmentality – one that rests mostly on freedom as a tool for government (Walters and Haahr 2005: 43–44). The Common Market constitutes individuals as bearers of rights, but always in relations to their economic and social activities. However, these rights only come with the self-responsibility as an economic subject (Walters and Haahr 2005: 45–48). Within the Common Market the EU had to regulate to ensure competition – a thought based on “Ordo-liberalism” which assumes that the market is and has to be artificially constructed (Walters and Haahr 2005: 49–52).

The authors argue that the EU has partly moved from “Ordo-liberalism” towards “Advanced Liberalism” or what one could call neo-liberalism in its way to govern. They give the example of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) introduced in 2000 by the Lisbon Treaty (Walters and Haahr 2005: 114). Here, governing is done at an even “greater distance” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 134) putting most responsibilities on individuals. Whereas “High Modernism” relied on experts, “Advanced Liberalism” relies on the capabilities, responsibility and self-management of society or rather its individuals. The logic of performance, enterprise and self-optimization dominates all parts of life (Walters and Haahr 2005: 119–120). Governing aims to use the resources of society and thus for instance involves NGOs and companies in consultation processes and public-private partnerships (Walters and Haahr 2005: 121). In the age of expertise, committees were only there as a means to persuade society of technical decisions in a “paternalistic” relationship (Walters and Haahr 2005: 83). In the age of “Advanced Liberalism” society is to make decisions for their own-wellbeing and the wellbeing of society. However, the need to make governing visible as well as measurable stays and even intensifies. Quantified targets, the formulation of objectives, benchmarking, indicators are the base on which Europe governs and individuals govern themselves (Walters and Haahr 2005: 122–126). Individuals are constituted as participants in public-private consultations or as self-responsible individuals to be empowered:

“And just as the ‘technologies of citizenship’ actively construct individuals as active citizens, conscientious consumers, or members of self-managing communities and organizations, the ‘technologies of involvement’ of the OMC construct the involved parties as active participants in common projects, as co-constructors of the ‘European economy’” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 123–124)

All resources to govern are expected to be found in the social sphere, outside the sphere of government (Walters and Haahr 2005: 123). Everyone is supposed to strive for self-improvement to achieve an utopian goal of becoming a “knowledge based economy” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 133).

Walters and Haahr (2005) use the governmentality lens to show how rationalities have slightly changed over time in European governing: There has been a move from the governing through elitist experts towards a governing through individuals and society. Whereas governing is done at an increasing distance, governing continues to be based on the ideas of rationality, measurability and
progress. Further, all governmentalities – be it one shaped by “High Modernism”, “Ordo-liberalism”, or “Advanced Liberalism” – appear to share an apolitical nature: decision-making that is not subject to political contestation but driven by supposedly rational and economic reasons. Although the authors do not heavily focus on this, they also place the turn to rational decision-making its historical context affirming that European integration aimed to overcome “conditions of scarcity, tradition and conflict towards a more modern political culture of stable liberal democracy and personal achievement” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 21).

The previous discussion shows how economic rationalities have shaped the EU from its start, yet in ambiguous ways in relation to ideas of legal liberalism. It should not come as a surprise that the rationalist and economic logic has not only constituted the EU's internal policies but also shapes its external ones (Parker and Rosamond 2013). Frederica Bicchi (2006) argued that the EU’s foreign policy – in her example the EMP – is shaped by how the EU does things inside the EU. As peace and prosperity were the goals of the European integration project, they have also become the objective of EU foreign policies. Similarly, the tensions between economic and legal liberalism are central to the EU’s democracy promotion which ultimately tries to export its peace and prosperity project by relying on economic rationalities.

For the case of the EU's foreign policy, Michael Merlingen (2007) shows how the EU's form of governing produces some form of normal that might ultimately exclude others. He argues that the EU’s police mission in Bosnia subordinates and orientalizes the local(s) by imposing a technical and bureaucratic way of governing. He expresses the ambiguity of normative power Europe by famously quoting Foucault's statement that “not everything is bad, but everything is dangerous”. Even though Merlingen does not make use of Foucault’s notion of governmentality, he focuses on Foucault’s notion of power and his discussion on how what is normal and what is abnormal is constructed. These notions are the base of governmentality which only works through power that creates ‘normal’ ways of doing things. Beste İşleyen (2014) argues in a similar manner showing how the EU’s twinning instrument constituted subjects according to neo-liberal rationalities in Tunisia and Egypt. Both analyses demonstrate how useful the concept of governmentality is to analyze EU foreign policy. However, they both undervalue the ambiguities of governmentality.

In sum, the EU context of EU democracy promotion itself carries tensions between depoliticizing and repoliticizing rationalities by stressing both economic and legal liberalism. The picture is further complicated by the evolution of different forms of economic liberalisms and thus rationalities. These rationalities are reflected in most EU policies including the EU’s civil society funding. Following Foucault (Foucault et al. 2008) and Walters and Haahr (2005) I use the notion of (neo-)liberal governmentality, a concept that points to the ideas of modernity, progress and
rationalization as well as to the ambiguities discussed above – much more than assumed by previous literature as I will discuss in the next part.

2.2.2. (Neo-)liberal governmentality and depoliticization

On governing and mentalities
Foucault introduces the concept of governmentality in his lectures on the “The Birth of Biopolitics” at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979 (Foucault et al. 2008). Foucault describes how a certain form of government developed since the sixteenth century. The idea of the state as the sovereign increasingly faded away. Instead states started to govern relying on wide strategies and rationalities, through governmentality (Hindess 1996: 106–113). Foucault wants to show how government is not a simple question of one sovereign exercising top-down power any longer: “(...) one could say that power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions” (Foucault 1982: 793). The target of modern governmentality is the population which “was constituted as an object of order” by science, thus by a specific form of knowledge (Guzzini 2012: 22). Foucault is interested in the relations between the state and the individual but his considerations extend to civil society. Yet, government is not confined to the state but includes all institutions and structures of the population (Hindess 1996: 111–112). Governing is increasingly characterized by a diffusion of power in rather non-hierarchical ways. The concept of govern-mentality stresses that governing is shaped by specific mentalities. It refers to (self)conduct that is guided by specific mentalities or rationalities (Dean 1999: 11). Foucault defines governmentality as

“[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 1991: 102).

Hence, the target, the knowledge as well as the techniques are central features of governmentality. Within governmentality the target of governing is the population, but the population becomes an active part of governing, depending on the rationalities of governing in different ways. Liberal types of governmentality aim to empower individuals to govern themselves. It includes both the governing of the self and the governing of others: “In this respect too, successful government of others is often thought to depend on the ability of those others to govern themselves, and it must therefore aim to secure the conditions under which they are enabled to do so” (Hindess 1996: 105). Government is not only political but more broadly refers to the “conduct of conduct” in general (Dean 1999: 35). Governmentality as a concept helps to analyze the thoughts that shape forms of government and
how these constitute the subjects of government. Governmentality creates certain subjectivities and reaches to every area of life. Government is always a form of transferring a specific kind of “economy” to individuals. “Economy” here refers to a way of “managing individuals, goods and wealth (...)” (Foucault 1991: 92).

How the individuals are supposed to govern depends on the mentalities or most often called the rationalities of government, thus a specific kind of knowledge (Dean 1999: 31). Through what Foucault called “productive” power people come to perceive their role as constituted by the governmentality. It is this assumption that governmentality “‘governs’ individuals by making them conceptualise the world in specific ways and regard certain forms of action appropriate” (Diez 2000) that differentiates governmentality from the concept of governance. Whereas governance is different from government only with regard to the assumption that government does not always have to be hierarchical, governmentality stresses the structural effects (Diez 2000). Governmental power is productive in the sense that it creates certain subjectivities of individuals and civil society. Its discourse makes some behavior “normal” and others less possible (Lipschutz 2005).

Power here means power in knowledge. It is only power over someone in the sense that it “is made operable through the liberties of those over whom it is exercised” (Dean 1999: 47). This power is based on a specific form of knowledge which provides the rationalities for governing. For instance, in neo-liberal governmentality governing is informed by neo-liberal ideas. I will turn to different forms of governmentality in the next section.

However, the different forms of governmentality exercise power but never coercion. Power coexists with liberty (Foucault 1982: 790). Moreover, there can only be relationships of power where there is freedom. In general, power is available to everyone and can be exercised over anyone. Because freedom is a condition for power relations, power is never deterministic (Foucault 1982). In a relation between an object and a subject of power, the freedom of the subject might be very small; yet there is always some freedom to choose as long as one is able to think. Mitchell Dean gives the example of a prisoner who is tortured. The victim of torture still has the “capacity of thinking” and can decide whether to speak, lie or tell the truth – even though her space of freedom is very small (Dean 1999: 14–15). The individual’s behavior is often seen as the result of coercive power, where in fact it is the result of the production of subjectivity. The individual comes to behave according to the suggested rationalities (Cruikshank 1999: 33). In a Foucauldian sense power is ambiguous as it is no “fixed and closed regime” (Gordon 1991: 5). There is room for action and resistance at the end of the receiver (cf. ibid.), and the intentions of the actor exercising power in the first place might not always be met. As discussed before, the existence of freedom makes it possible to resist the dominant governmentality (Dean 1999). Individuals might be able to resist by setting new standards and
normality through new discourses and practices. This is also a form of “productive power” (Lipschutz 2005).

Stefano Guzzini (2012: 6–8) criticized the understanding of governmentality as power arguing that government is about achieving a specific order and power is only one tool to achieve order. I assume that government always involves power. Foucault sets power equal with government: “Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government” (Foucault 1982: 789).

Different forms of power exist. Foucault suggests that there can be a rationality of discipline, a rationality based on pastoral power, and a (neo-)liberal rationality of government (Hindess 1996: 112). Discipline emerged as a form of government in the seventeenth century in Europe and is a form of “productive power” because it constrains and enables individuals in their actions at the same time. Discipline is used in the military, prisons and similar institutions but also private individuals are subject to discipline (Hindess 1996: 113–118). Pastoral power refers to the idea of a shepherd and its flocks and thus exceeds the idea of government and suggests that the shepherd cares for its flock in a stronger way. Foucault suggests that this kind of power became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth century in Europe with the creation of the police. Also, the European welfare state was based on this idea of pastoral power (Hindess 1996: 118–123). In contrast, liberal governmentality assumes that the individual needs to be free for the state to be able to govern. While liberalism normally suggests that government needs to be as limited as possible to ensure freedom, Foucault’s concept of liberal governmentality rests on both – free individuals and the actions of the government. The state needs to ensure that its population consists of free individuals by for instance educating them in a certain way (Hindess 1996: 123–131). Foucault argues that in the last part of the 20th century, neo-liberal governmentality prevailed especially in the US but also in Europe (Foucault et al. 2008).

As governmentality relies on specific ideas, it also always includes what Dean calls “a strangely utopian element” (Dean 1999: 33). Governmentality aims to achieve a specific goal, often something of a better future. A specific kind of government always aims at increasing the wealth and well-being of the population with the population itself being a means to achieve this goal (Foucault 1991: 100; Burchell 1991: 127). This utopian element also carries an idea of emancipation. The governmentality approach however shows that even when there is freedom of individuals, there is still power. It “problematizes the radical view of emancipation as the liberation of the agency of those who are oppressed” (Dean 1999: 37). Especially neo-liberal governmentality entails the idea of empowering the under-privileged as I will discuss later.
Power is thus based on specific ideas, or knowledge and this knowledge also informs which techniques are used. For instance liberal governmentality governs with means of “visibility” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 126), such as reports, indicators, and charts (Dean 1999: 31; Walters and Haahr 2005: 30; 122).

In the following, I will define which targets, forms of knowledge, and techniques liberal and neo-liberal governmentality include. Kurki (2011a) argues that the EIDHR is based on neo-liberal rationalities. Others (Lipschutz 2004: 201, 2005; Jayasuriya 2001: 452) put forward that international organizations accept a kind of “economic constitutionalism” that refers to a neo-liberal view on the market as the instance of order and regulation. In my view, most authors do not clearly differentiate between liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. I will argue – keeping in mind Walters and Haahr’s (2005) analysis of EU integration – that EU civil society programs tend to rely on elements of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. This mix carries the ambiguities discussed earlier. This is why I will discuss their similarities and differences in the following. I will especially focus on the constitution of society in these forms of governmentality.

**Liberal governmentality**
Foucault talks about different forms of liberalism in his lectures. I will rely on his thoughts on liberalism and its interpretations to describe how liberal governmentality governs. Liberal governmentality is based on the knowledge of liberal economic theory (Foucault et al. 2008: 62). Liberal theory puts at its center economic exchange (Foucault et al. 2008: 118). Liberalism is critical of too much government, but it still assumes that the state has to supervise the market to ensure that exchange; for instance monopolies have to be prevented (Foucault et al. 2008: 116; Young 2013: 40). The market is seen to be a natural given domain with fixed laws (Lemke 2001: 200, Foucault et al. 2008: 62, 2008: 62; Dean 1999: 50). This is why Foucault says that liberalism is in fact naturalism: “(...) the limitation of its [politics] power is not given by the respect for the freedom of individuals, but simply by the evidence of economic analysis which it knows has to be respected” (Foucault et al. 2008: 62).

It is only through this freedom the state is able to govern. Freedom is defined as the space between the citizens and the government. In liberalism the government “produces” and “consumes” the freedom of individuals being the manager of freedom (Foucault et al. 2008: 63). Liberal governmentality needs freedom to govern and thus it consumes and produces it at the same time. It has to ensure that freedom exists by intervening. This is what differentiates liberal governmentality from neo-liberal governmentality. In liberalism the government intervenes to secure freedom. This is
what Foucault calls the “interplay of freedom and security” (Foucault et al. 2008: 65). The target of liberal governmentality is the population. Government must try to secure “the collective interest against individual interests” (Foucault et al. 2008: 65). This entails the assumption that there is some kind of danger threatening freedom that has to be controlled or disciplined (Foucault et al. 2008: 66–67). Foucault describes this disciplinary function comparing it to the panopticon: “Government, initially limited to the function of supervision, is only to intervene when it sees that something is not happening according to the general mechanics of behavior, exchange and economic life” (Foucault et al. 2008: 67). Such intervention – the techniques of liberal governmentality – may include social insurance as well as public health (Dean 1999: 129; Cruikshank 1999).

Thus, liberal governmentality is somewhere between rejecting any intervention and promoting it. This kind of intervention is termed “biopolitics” by Foucault, referring to governing that targets the population in matters of health, sex, culture, death and life (Dean 1999: 99). While liberalism is a critique of biopolitics and too much government, it also relies on it (Dean 1999: 113). However, this control is in contrast to the freedom that it is supposed to protect and constrain at the same time. This tension was the reason for the crisis of liberal governmentality and capitalism in Western societies Foucault argues (Foucault et al. 2008: 67–70). Liberals place much hope on civil society making sure that the state is balanced in terms of intervention and non-intervention. Liberal theory assumes that civil society is “able to hold the state in awe (…)” (Scalet and Schmidtz 2002: 35). It should make sure that government does not intervene too much in the social and economic sphere and eventually becomes an authoritarian state. The state in turn needs to recognize the “moral authority” of civil society (Scalet and Schmidtz 2002: 33).

Yet, civil society is not always the sphere of “moral authority”. Civil society is made up of individuals who enjoy both economic and legal rights. Individual freedom here refers to economic rights as well as legal rights (Dean 1999: 123). Economic rights are related to the originally liberal idea of the homo oeconomicus. Liberal governmentality constitutes the individual as an economic subject meaning “a partner of exchange” (Foucault et al. 2008: 226). As stated above, economic exchange is the heart of the market and is central for liberals. Civil society is made up of homo oeconomicus but it is also made up of individuals that feel a sense of belonging to each other (Foucault et al. 2008: 301, 303, 305). Only in this way could the “governmentability (…) of these individuals” be ensured (Foucault et al. 2008: 294–295): “(…) the art of governing must be given a reference, a domain or field of reference, a new reality on which it will be exercised, and I think this new field of reference is civil society” (Foucault et al. 2008: 295). In addition, individuals are constituted as bearers of human rights or desires in which the government should not interfere. The sphere of family and civil society is seen to be apolitical, “governed by processes that are
autonomous from the operation of sovereign authority” (Dean 1999: 55). The equal importance of legal and economic rights creates some tension because it expects the individuals to act as the economic and legal subject of rights. It is supposed to use its freedom but only to a certain extent. It is supposed to act according to economic rationalities but also fulfill its obligations towards others (Dean 1999: 121–123). This is why the social sphere is one of “cohesion and solidarity, but also of breakdown and dissolution” (Dean 1999: 125). While society is free and everyone enjoys the same rights, economic competition divides. Liberal governmentality’s constitution of individuals as economic subjects damages the “bond of civil society” (Foucault et al. 2008: 303). This is why civil society might be corrupted and does not fulfill the role of “moral authority” (Scalet and Schmidt 2002: 35). Corruption is the result of tensions between on the one hand the economic interests of the individuals and on the other hand a feeling of empathy towards the other individuals that is constantly threatened by the former (Foucault et al. 2008: 303): “Homo oeconomicus and civil society are therefore two inseparable elements. Homo oeconomicus is, if you like, the abstract, ideal, purely economic point that inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil society” (Foucault et al. 2008: 296, emphasis in original). In liberalism, legal and economic rights are at the center. In neoliberalism the homo oeconomicus is more than an economic subject as I will discuss in the following. Further, the relationship between state, society and the market is different in neo-liberalism.

**Neo-liberal governmentality**

Neo-liberal governmentality is different from liberal governmentality in the way that it considers the relationship between the state, society and the market. There are different forms of neo-liberalism however. Foucault draws on the theories of “Ordo-liberalism” in Germany and the “Chicago School” of neo-liberalism to describe the ideas or knowledge and techniques of neo-liberal governmentality (Foucault et al. 2008; Lemke 2001). “Ordo-liberalism” originated in the so-called “Freiburger Schule” in Germany after the Second World War. It was a reaction to the laissez-faire liberalism that is said to have created a society without any bonds and thus helped Nazi Germany come about (Young 2013: 38–42). But “Ordo-liberalism “was also opposed to the idea of a welfare state that made humans to “domesticated pets” (Young 2013: 42, own translation). Ordo-liberals and American neo-liberals share the assumption that the market is not naturally given. They both consider competition, instead of exchange, to be at the center of the market (Foucault et al. 2008: 118–120). The state for instance has to ensure that there is free competition (Dean 1999: 156–157). Yet, state intervention is different here from its conception in liberalism. The market principles organize all spheres in neo-liberalism: the state as well as the social sphere act according to economic principles (Lemke 2001: 200).
What the differences between German ordo-liberalism, American neo-liberalism and laissez-faire liberalism are is disputed (Young 2013). Brigitte Young (2013: 44–45) argues that ordo-liberals favor a stronger role for the state in setting the institutional framework – evidenced by the strong German focus on austerity policy during the Eurozone crisis – than the American neo-liberals that rather seem to lean to a laissez-faire type of neo-liberalism assuming a naturally given market that can regulate itself. Foucault describes the difference as following:

“(…) American liberalism is not – as it is in France at present, or as it was in Germany immediately after the war – just an economic and political choice formed and formulated by those who govern (…). Liberalism in America is a whole way of being and thinking” (Foucault et al. 2008: 218).

He continues:

“Liberalism must be a general style of thought, analysis and imagination. These then, boldly stated, are some of the general features that may enable us to make a bit of distinction between American neo-liberalism and the neo-liberalism that we have seen implemented in Germany and France” (Foucault et al. 2008: 219).

The differences originate in the idea that neo-liberalism does not differentiate between economic and social sphere any longer (Lemke 2001: 197). It enters life as a whole. Foucault’s notion of neo-liberal governmentality is thus rather based on the assumptions of American neo-liberalism than the ordo-liberal school (Lemke 2001: 201).

The neo-liberal notion of human capital is based on the idea that the economic enters the social. The concept of human capital also changed what is understood to be the homo oeconomicus. A homo oeconomicus is not an economic subject any longer but a self-entrepreneur (Lemke 2001: 200; Foucault et al. 2008: 226). Individuals are not expected to have a naturally given freedom but instead they are artificially created entrepreneurs or consumers: “The man of consumption is not one of the terms of exchange. The man of consumption, insofar as he consumes, is a producer. (…) He produces his own satisfaction” (Foucault et al. 2008: 226).

Human capital is what makes the self-entrepreneur successful. The notion of human capital was developed in relation to a critique of the concept of labor. Similar to Karl Marx but without referring to him, neo-liberals criticize that economists did not consider the category of labor in their theories (Lemke 2001: 198; Foucault et al. 2008: 221–222). While Marx makes capitalism responsible for the abstraction of labor, neo-liberals claim that the rejection of labor was a problem of economic theory not of economic reality. This is why neo-liberals focus on the worker as a subject with certain qualities. Salary is not a representation of labor, time and demand and supply but rather related to the competences of the employee (Foucault et al. 2008: 221–225). Human capital thus is on the one hand “an inborn physical-genetic predisposition” and on the other hand “the entirety of skills that
have been acquired as the result of ‘investments’ in the corresponding stimuli: nutrition, education, training and also love, affection, etc.” (Lemke 2001: 199). Individuals become entrepreneurs. The idea of human capital changed the way economists and politicians think about economic growth. Now human capital is the driver for growth and innovation (Foucault et al. 2008: 332). The concept of human capital demonstrates that neo-liberalism is not confined to the political sphere but also applies its economic concept to the social and private sphere as for instance specific family conditions such as educated parents, wealth and few children produce more human capital (Foucault et al. 2008: 229–231).

Neo-liberal governmentality constitutes individuals as entrepreneurs with human capital. Neo-liberal governing does not mean the disappearance of the state from governing (Lemke 2001: 201), instead the state governs in different ways, at “arm’s length” (Dean 1999: 161). It puts the responsibility on the individual who is free to make a rational decision and thus has to bear the consequences of her decision. Neo-liberal governmentality constitutes individuals as self-managers. Individuals have to employ “technologies of the self” (Lemke 2001: 201). While in liberalism, the state intervened to secure freedom such as with providing social security institutions, neo-liberal governmentality puts the burden on the individual to take care of her social, economic and health risks (Lemke 2001: 201). One characteristic of neo-liberal governmentality is the privatization of social security. The individual is to choose between competing service providers. The individual becomes a customer managing its own security (Lemke 2001: 158–159).

Human capital is the result of genetic disposition and “educational investments” (Foucault et al. 2008: 229). Such investment could be all kinds of trainings or schooling one undergoes to increase human capital (Foucault et al. 2008: 229). Neo-liberal governmentality thus assumes that individuals can be empowered to make use of the technologies of the self (Lemke 2001: 201). Individuals are empowered to be enabled to manage themselves (Dean 1999: 155). “Empowerment” carries ideas of emancipation and has been a strategy of the Left for triggering resistance and political participation as well (Cruikshank 1999: 68). Instead of being dependent on the state or other institutions, individuals are supposed to help themselves. Empowerment has been a central strategy in development policies (Paley 2002: 484) as well as in all kinds of civil society programs in democracies (Cruikshank 1993: 333):

“The notion that victims of social inequalities and discrimination, economic deprivation and political subordination be ‘empowered’ to cast off their status as victims and actively participate in the transformation of their condition has been, since the 1960s, remarkably compelling for thinkers, activists and reformers in liberal-democratic countries” (Dean 1999: 67).
Through empowering, individuals are supposedly able to take care of their problems and participate in democracy. It “preserves, while it radicalizes, the stress on autonomy and self-determination found in many variants of liberalism” (Dean 1999: 67). Cruikshank argues in her book “The Will to Empower” (1999) that democracies, in her case the US, produce a self-governing citizen by strategies of empowering. She criticizes empowerment because it assumes that there was a powerful and a powerless while indeed power was everywhere. Empowerment created subjection and subjectivity at the same time (Cruikshank 1999: 69-70.). Power only worked “through, not against, the subjectivity of the poor” (Cruikshank 1999: 73). In addition, the relations of empowerment are constituted and dependent on the knowledge on the side of the people who empower, the experts, and who are empowered. Empowerment always involved a “democratically unaccountable use of power” on the side of the person who empowers. As discussed earlier, even though the subject is constituted in specific ways, a space of freedom remains and is indeed necessary (Cruikshank 1999: 72; Dean 1999: 67–69). This space of freedom is sometimes even created through empowerment as individuals come to be aware of their situation and might resist (Cruikshank 1999: 80).

The governmentality perspective problematizes the notions of empowerment and emancipation. It shows that there is power as well as exclusion in all relations (Dean 1999: 35–37). Further empowerment mostly means an increase in capacities, thus referring to quantitative not a qualitative improvement. However, indeed it is a “qualitative transformation of forms of subjectivity” (Dean 1999: 70, emphasis in original). Governmentality shapes the subjectivities in the private sphere and in sites of so-called emancipation (Cruikshank 1993: 341).

A further part of the technologies of the self are technologies of performance and visibility (Walters and Haahr 2005: 124–127). Target groups have to develop objectives and activities to meet these (Walters and Haahr 2005: 122). One could also say this is a way to prove your human capital. In order to ensure that the formulated targets are met they have to be measurable and visible. Technologies of performance may include auditing practices, “the devolution of budgets, benchmarking exercises, best practice examples and the setting of performance indicators (...)” with the goal of optimizing performance (Walters and Haahr 2005: 124). This often involves the privatization of formerly public services. The technologies of performance are employed as a means to prove accountability and therefore “presuppose a culture of mistrust in professions and institutions (...)” (Dean 1999: 169). To prove this accountability, performance has to be made visible such as in tables, charts and graphs with indicators (Walters and Haahr 2005: 125–126).

Indeed, as I will show later the EU attempts to “empower” NGOs in a third country in order to enable them to take on their responsibilities. Its project funding also employs technologies of performance and visibility. Civil society organizations potentially become self-managers. Therefore,
“(…) much of what appears to be opposition – by civil society organizations in particular – is better understood as integral to governmentality” (Lipschutz 2004: 202). Yet, as I discussed in the beginning, freedom to resist – mostly within the governmentality – exists changing the expected effects (Lipschutz 2005: 765–767). Further, elements of liberal governmentality might be present in the EU policies as well.

Table 2 provides a (rather simple) distinction between the different governmentalities. Overall, the main differences between liberal and neo-liberal governmentality lie in how each constitutes the subject and their types of technologies. Liberal governmentality constitutes the subject as an individual with legal and economic rights, having human rights and rights to take part in economic exchange. It ensures these rights through regulation, disciplining its subject. Neo-liberal governmentality constitutes the subject as an economic self-entrepreneur which is responsible for its own well-being, moving the responsibility away from government. Economic rationalities dominate every aspect of life. Individuals are supposed to self-responsibly improve their performance and make it visible. The role of the governing is to “empower” individuals to do so by increasing capacities. In liberal governmentality the rights of individuals, in neo-liberal governmentality the self-responsible entrepreneurship are at the center.

Table 2: Types of governmentality in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of governmentality</th>
<th>Liberal governmentality</th>
<th>Neo-liberal governmentality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>variants of liberal theory</td>
<td>mostly American neo-liberalism, ordo-liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technologies</td>
<td>security; normalization; biopolitics (social government)</td>
<td>self-management; empowerment; visibility; performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>economic subject of exchange and legal subject of rights</td>
<td>economic self-entrepreneur/homo oeconomicus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 summarizes how civil society is constituted in both liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. I showed that the notion of civil society within the liberal and neo-liberal governmentality paradigm bears tensions, similar to the tensions between rights and market in the European integration process. This brings up the question, even if neo-liberal rationalities dominate, how are they depoliticizing? In the following section I will try to bring the arguments made in the depoliticization literature as well as in the governmentality literature together and lay out how neo-liberal governmentality is expected to depoliticize its subjects.
Neo-liberal governmentality and the depoliticization of civil society

Neo-liberal governmentality is not only encouraged by states but also by international actors such as international organizations. Richmond argues that forms of individual agency and self-regulation are part of the “liberal peace” often employed in conflict resolution by Western donors, organizations or states (Richmond 2006: 293–294). For the case of EU democracy promotion, Kurki (2011a) argues that the EU transfers a neo-liberal governmentality to NGOs in third countries by employing specific practices of civil society funding in the framework of democracy promotion.

While it remains unclear whether Foucault speaks about the “normative content” of government (Guzzini 2012: 27), authors such as Kurki (2011a), Walters and Haahr (2005) and Jaeger (2007) suggest that it is his conception of governmentality that makes us recognize the problematic consequences of a specific form of government, namely its depoliticizing effects. In the third part of this chapter I discussed what one might understand as (de)politicization. Politicization refers to putting an issue on the political agenda and contesting existing practices. Depoliticization therefore means that an issue is removed from or is not moved to the sphere of political decision-making. One element of this is that issues are increasingly regarded to be technical problems instead of being a matter of political contestation.

According to Jaeger (2007) it is especially the liberal governmentalities that depoliticize the individual and civil society. In my view, it is mostly neo-liberal governmentality that is expected to
depoliticize civil society. Many authors do not clearly differentiate between liberal and neo-liberal
governmentality although they expect the neo-liberal “technologies of the self” (Lemke 2001: 201) to
depoliticize civil society. Based on the literature I suggest that neo-liberal governmentality is
expected to depoliticize civil society in four ways. In the following I discuss these four triggers of
depoliticization. This includes a discussion of instances in which these triggers do not necessarily
have to depoliticize civil society.

Firstly, neo-liberal governmentality constitutes NGOs as self-managers that have to be
empowered to take care of human rights problems. It places the responsibility on the CSOs to solve
issues instead of addressing the level of political decision-making. NGOs become responsible for the
well-being of their target groups. EU funding empowers them to take care of underprivileged groups.
In turn the organizations transfer this idea of self-responsibility to their target groups which they aim
to empower as well. Instead of discussing the political causes of marginalization citizens are
constituted as being responsible for improving their own situation. Similarly, Jaeger (2007) argues
that the new focus on “human security” and “social development” made civil society part of a neo-
liberal governmentality. Civil society became responsible for its own development instead of
politicizing the insecurity of the marginalized. Hence, within neo-liberal governmentality individuals
cannot demand political changes instead they are asked to work on their own problems. Further,
empowerment is based on the idea of emancipation. As discussed earlier, emancipation is a
problematic concept as there are always relations of power and exclusion involved. Empowerment
practices are not subject to democratic accountability (Cruikshank 1999) and political contestation.
Further, empowerment changes the subjectivities of those involved and their understanding of
emancipation (Dean 1999: 70). In my case, the EU imposes a specific understanding and in turn the
NGOs transfer the EU’s understanding to the individuals involved in their projects.

Overall empowerment is problematic because of unequal power relations and the production
of specific exclusionary meanings. Yet, empowerment carries some potential for politicization as it
might be able to raise the awareness of civil society for discrimination and encourage them to
demand change (Cruikshank 1999: 80). It depends on the situation of the individual how powerful
this can be. Without doubt CSOs are in a better position to politicize an issue than individuals.

Secondly, taking care of your own problems might involve the provision of social services. Neo-
liberal governmentality often involves the privatization of social welfare and thus civil society
organizations have to provide social services instead of either tackling the problem or demanding
from the state to fulfill services needed. Welfare states increasingly leave the responsibility of
welfare to private and civil society actors (Kurki 2013). This depoliticizes the situation of the receivers
of those services as they are only left to wait for the services, instead of politicizing their underprivileged situation (Ferguson 1990: 256).

However, depending on the political context providing social services is a political activity. For instance charity organizations that provide services to citizens in order to gain their political support such as in the case of Islamic charity organizations (Levitt 2006) act political. On a different note, when the state is the perpetrator, such as in cases of torture, and victims need be protected against the state, providing medical, social and legal support represents opposition to the official discourse and is highly political. Both examples point to a problem of the governmentality approach which assumes that liberal governmentality was present before neo-liberalism appeared. But in “new” democracies a social welfare state often never existed and thus CSOs provide services that the state never felt responsible for in the first place.

Thirdly, the technologies of the self imply that NGOs participate in decision-making processes. Neo-liberal governmentality promotes a deliberative form of democracy relying on the resources outside the sphere of government but within civil society (Walters and Haahr 2005: 121). Participation in this context means that different stakeholders come together to find a form of “rational consensus” instead of challenging dominant discourses (Mouffe 2007: 136). Participation potentially creates a hegemonic consensus that makes civil society consider particular interests to be universal ones. Through cooperation, for instance in workshops in the framework of projects, a consensus develops that does not allow for political contestation (Mouffe 2011: 97). NGOs can hardly criticize decisions that they have been part of in some way (Jaeger 2007: 270–271). It blurs any relations of power by constituting a supposedly harmonious public sphere. Moreover, the inclusion of NGOs in governance structures inevitably excludes some organizations that do not feel represented, do not defend the consensus or are not sufficiently professionalized to participate (Amoore and Langley 2004: 103–104). Institutionalization of cooperation is assumed to lead to co-option and depoliticization (Feldman 2003). Although every inclusion in decision-making processes creates opportunities for co-option; not every instance of participation has to lead to co-option.

Last but not least, all of these self-management practices involve technologies of performance and visibility which render NGO work measurable and thus economic and technical. NGOs have to set themselves targets and develop indicators to measure whether they achieved these. Only by making their output measurable, they can justify their expenses and that they received funding in the first place. Output cannot be measured in terms of a long-term impact when a project cycle is maximum two years. Instead output comes to mean workshops, booklets, reports or publications. The management requirements of neo-liberal rationalities increase the bureaucracy on the side of the NGOs (Ferguson 1990). The employees of the organizations have to focus on paper work, writing
applications for funding, filling in time sheets, and justifying budgets. Former political activists perform more and more administrative tasks to run the work of the organizations. As a result, civil society has to act as a *homo oeconomicus* (Foucault et al. 2008: 296) assuming that if financial, operational and management capacities are increased, the effects of the NGO’s work will increase. Increasing capacities increases the chances of receiving funding when competing with other NGOs. As a consequence, civil society work focuses on increasing capacities, documenting expenses and outcomes, producing outputs, and applying for funding. The activities become more administrative and economic and decreasingly political. The subjectivities produced constrain possibilities for other actions such as resistance (Baumgarten and Ullrich 2012).

On another note, the instruments of performance and visibility potentially benefit CSOs that lack legitimacy and credibility in the public and among politicians. Through being transparent and appearing apolitical, NGOs might increase their legitimacy and thus their chances to influence policies. This last point comes down to the question of the ‘better’ strategy to improve human rights legislation. Is it better for CSOs to appear apolitical and thus secretly bring in their political positions; or should they openly antagonize to advance the cause of non-discrimination? As I will discuss in the next section, in my view this depends on the discursive struggles CSOs are engaged in. In a situation of an extremely politicized context, some depoliticization enables political contestation⁶. In the long run however, only politicization will challenge hegemonic discourses.

**Table 4: Triggers for and effects of depoliticization in neo-liberal governmentality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depoliticization triggers</th>
<th>Depoliticizing effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>civil society as self-managers; empowered and empowering</td>
<td>adapting to situation of marginalization by taking responsibility instead of bringing issues on political agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society as (social) service providers</td>
<td>relieving state of providing basic social and economic rights and putting responsibility to CSOs; social service receivers become dependent on services instead of putting their issues on political agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society as participants and advisors in political decision-making</td>
<td>co-option of civil society by creating artificial hegemonic consensus, decreases contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technologies of visibility and performance</td>
<td>constitution of rights issues as dependent on effective and economic handling of them; CSOs as administrators or business instead of political actors engaging in political debates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁶ The idea of possible positive effects of depoliticization came up during a workshop with Stefano Guzzini at the University of Tübingen who rightfully suggested this to me. I would like to express how thankful I am for his input and how much it influenced this dissertation. The idea of positive depoliticization is linked to the Securitization debate of the Copenhagen School which I will discuss briefly in the next section.
In conclusion, the neo-liberal governmentality literature on civil society and governmentality would argue that the EU is most likely to depoliticize NGOs funded. Yet, the literature has hardly looked into specific cases, has overlooked the ambiguities of the EU’s governmentality and the CSOs’ possibilities to maneuver and resist. The effects of the EU’s (neo-)liberal governmentality are likely to be ambiguous. Table 4 summarizes the triggers of neo-liberal governmentality for depoliticization and the depoliticizing effects.

As the literature lacks empirical examples, the context of CSOs has not been included in the considerations of depoliticizing effects. The power struggles NGOs are part of influence how neo-liberal rationalities affect the organizations. This is why I will now turn to how I understand and include the context of CSOs by using a discursive approach of hegemonic struggles.

2.2.3. Context matters: hegemonic struggles and (de)politicization
To understand the context as well as the NGOs’ position in the context, I rely on a poststructuralist – one could say a Foucauldian – reading of Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 2014). I am especially interested in how discourses struggle for hegemony and how to identify different discursive formations. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony – departing from a neorealist understanding – refers to consent within civil and political society. An ideology – I would call it discourse – is hegemonic if it is present within the civil and the political sphere. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is similar to Foucault’s concept of productive power because consent is an understanding of what is normal and what is normal is the result of productive power. Politics is a learning process in which individuals come to see particular interests as universal ones (Priester 1981: 33–34; Gramsci et al. 1992: 496). The consent is created through discourse in which different institutions participate constituting what is normal and thus dominant (Tepe 2012: 56). Similar to neo-liberal governmentality the concept of hegemony does not imply the exercise of coercion; instead Gramsci’s concept of hegemony entails the idea of consent within civil and political society. This consent though is “manufactured” (Buttigieg 1995: 6–7). Hegemony needs to be based on consent. If no hegemony incorporating both civil and political society exists but only a coercive state apparatus does, it is possible for forces within civil society to challenge this coercive state (Buttigieg 1995: 7–9). In contrast, when hegemony exists civil society considers the dominant ideology as being part of itself and sees the way of doing things as the “normal continuation” of political society (Bieler and Morton 2008: 119). Then, a specific group of society has realized that the interests of other groups are also its interests or that their interests can also be the interests of others (Gramsci et al. 1992: 495–496).
The notion of the integral state is central for Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony. A hegemonic state includes the civil and the political society (Gramsci et al. 1992: 783). Only a state that integrates both can be hegemonic because “hegemony” takes place in both spheres, civil and political society. An ideology or an ideological group only becomes hegemonic if it also dominates civil society. Therefore, it is exactly in civil society where hegemony – and not freedom as suggested by liberals – takes place. Only when an ideology has managed to dominate the civil and the political sphere does it become hegemonic. It is by no means clear that civil society and the state oppose each other. When there is hegemony, there is not coercion between state and civil society but rather a consensual relationship. This consent is not purely an ideal consent though but one created on the basis of power relations. Only specific groups and institutions profit from this consent (Buttigieg 1995: 4-7.).

Often though there is no clear hegemony but there is a constant struggle with one discourse dominating to some extent. Different discourses try to prevail and form a new hegemony. To challenge the old hegemony, forces within civil society have to start a revolution (Parekh 2004: 18–19). This struggle between different classes reflects and reproduces the general cleavages within society. This implies that the division between state and civil society is not clear-cut rather there are more significant ideological dividing lines within society that might unite state and society in certain strata.

Gramsci and Neo-Gramscians use the Marxist concept of classes to refer to the different groups: “different class fractions are regarded as emerging through the way production is organized in capitalism” (Bieler and Morton 2008: 120). Even though Gramsci assumes that the only two classes than can realize hegemony – namely labor and capital – emerge out of material production processes, he does not consider material relations to be deterministic (Tepe 2012: 56; Gramsci et al. 1992: 493–496). He differentiates between base or material structures as the economic production structures and superstructures as cultural, ideological, political and social relations. In contrast to Marx, to Gramsci the base does not determine the superstructure but the struggle in the superstructure rather influences the material base (Tepe 2012: 55). Gramsci emphasizes the superstructure (Priester 1981: 17) by arguing that material structures often develop on the base of ideas (Gramsci et al. 1992: 471–472). Ideas manifest themselves in material structures as in for instance in educational or city infrastructure (Bieler and Morton 2008: 118–120). These material structures in turn express the dominant ideas. Thus, struggles do not only take place around economic interests and on the level of the base; instead ideological struggles are as relevant. Gramsci assumes that it is only in the superstructure, on the level of ideology, that one becomes aware of her “material” identity in relation to the production structures (Priester 1981: 82–83).
From the poststructuralist point of view of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2014) Gramsci moves away from a Marxist binary conception of the bourgeois and the labor classes to a more complex concept of “collective wills” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 57–58). He introduces the idea of moral and intellectual leadership in addition to political leadership: “Intellectual and moral leadership constitutes (...) a higher synthesis, a ‘collective will’, which, through ideology, becomes the organic cement unifying a ‘historical bloc’” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 57). Ideology is not necessarily linked to a specific class but instead refers to a more complex constellation of ideas and principles forming a historical bloc. This implies that ideology is not only located in the superstructure but expands to both levels (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 57–58). Yet, Laclau and Mouffe still criticize Gramsci’s concept of classes for being inconsistent because

“[f]or Gramsci, even though the diverse social elements have a merely relational identity – achieved through articulatory practices – there must always be a single unifying principle in every hegemonic formation, and this can only be a fundamental class” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 59, emphasis in original).

For every hegemonic struggle it is still classes that set its structural conditions. Laclau and Mouffe take a poststructuralist approach to the concept of hegemony arguing that hegemony is created through discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 120–121). They demand a broader concept of identity that is not only related to the production processes (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 125). Identities are constituted by discursive practices that are not fixed, yet partially fixed by so-called “nodal points”. “Nodal points” are “privileged discursive points” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 99). To them hegemonic struggles are “articulatory” or discursive struggles. This is a move away from the Gramscian more essential understanding of economic classes and one hegemonic center (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 124). Instead they argue that there are multiple struggles today that the Left had to fight over such as immigrants’ and women’s rights taking place through discourse and without one hegemonic center (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 160–162): “The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 160, emphasis in original).

I will rely on Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive understanding of hegemonic struggles when analyzing the domestic context. The discursive context is always characterized by “antagonistic articulatory practices” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 122): “A hegemonic formation also embraces what opposes it, insofar as the opposing force accepts the system of basic articulation of that formation as something it negates (...)” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 125). Discursive hegemony always relates to multiple others (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 123–124) and is formed through “the opposed logics of equivalence and difference” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 129). I will make use of Martin Nonhoff’s (2006) approach to analyze the different discourses struggling for hegemony. He introduces the notion of the offensive-hegemonic strategy – although he terms it “strategy” he does not imply that
the discourse is planned and controlled (Nonhoff 2006: 312–313). An offensive-hegemonic discourse is constituted by a chain of equivalence of different demands and an antagonistic split of the discursive space including references to antagonisms/differences. Every demand is expressed in opposition to the same antagonistic chain. Through the interplay of equivalence and difference a specific discourse evolves. The antagonistic side represents all elements of failure and lack whereas the side of equivalence represents the demands to overcome the former. Third, a hegemonic formation needs one demand that functions as a general representation of the discourse. This element needs to stand in contrast to every element of the antagonistic chain (Nonhoff 2006: 313–315). Such an element is often an empty signifier which is basically without concrete meaning, yet very powerful because it manages to include all discourses (Laclau 1996: 36–46; Nonhoff 2006: 308). The antagonistic chain does not have to represent one discourse however. It includes all the elements being different from the offensive discourse. Discourses that become hegemonic are able to establish such an empty signifier and open up to other discourses. Eventually the antagonism might be broken up (Nonhoff 2006: 313–315) and the hegemonic discourse includes all. The

This brings us to the question, how the hegemonic struggles influence how (neo-)liberal governmentality (de) politicizes civil society? From a Neo-Gramscian (Cox 1983) point of view, the EU being an international organization is a highly institutionalized form of a specific order and thus most likely represents, strengthens, legitimates and results from the current international hegemony. Moreover, international organizations act according to the strategy of trasformismo including any peripheral elites and potentially counter-hegemonic forces into their structures (Cox 1983: 172–173). It appears that the EIDHR also reproduces a – European – neo-liberal hegemony (Kurki 2011a) at least to some extent. The EU’s neo-liberal governmentality might or might not resonate with the dominant discourses in the third country and thus the effects of neo-liberal governmentality might play out differently than expected.

The governmentality literature suggests that one depoliticizing effect comes from civil society participation in policy-making by creating a hegemonic consensus. This leads to “a society that is pacified and harmonious, where basic disagreements have been overcome, and where an overlapping consensus has been established around a single interpretation of common values” (Mouffe 2011: 97; Cruikshank 1999: 48). When NGOs are integrated into a domestic neo-liberal governmentality already, external intervention might just intensify the effects.

On the other hand, if struggles are polarized and hostile (neo-)liberal governmentality might contribute to politicization: “Hence the importance of distinguishing between two types of political relations: one of antagonism between enemies, and one of agonism between adversaries. We could say that the aim of democratic politics is to transform an antagonism into agonism” (Mouffe 2011: 49).
99, emphasis in original). Thus, if the hegemonic discourse considers the discourse of the organizations to be the one of an enemy, some depoliticization might actually be politicizing, enabling political contestation.

The Copenhagen School argues in a similar manner defining an extreme form of politicization as securitization. Securitization refers to a speech act in which an actor calls an issue a security problem or presents it “as an existential threat. (...) By labelling this a security issue, the actor has claimed a right to handle it with extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game” (Wæver 1998: 80). Securitization means that an issue cannot be debated any longer. There is only one option to prevent the threat. Instead de-securitization moves an issue back into the normal sphere of politics. In 1998 Ole Wæver argues that between 1960 and 1985 the EU emerged as a security community because it “did not think in terms of security/insecurity, but tried to think about something else” (Wæver 1998: 86). He defines desecuritization as asecurity, not thinking or talking about security (Wæver 1998: 81). Hence, securitization is one form of politicizing an issue but it does not allow for pluralist contestation. Ultimately it means depoliticization: “Although in one sense securitization is a further intensification of politicization (...), in another sense it is opposed to politicization. Politicization means to make an issue to appear to be open, a matter of choice (...)” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29).

Answering the question of the ‘better’ strategy for NGOs to advance human rights raised in the previous section, I put forward that in a context of extreme politicization, some depoliticization – reducing antagonism to agonism – contributes to the politicization of discrimination (in the case of the human rights NGOs). However, when there is a relationship of agonism – political struggles in which every political position is considered to have the legitimacy to exist – politicization in the form of moving issues to the sphere of political contestation is necessary.

Concluding, we have to take into account the discursive context of NGOs to understand the (de)politicizing effects of governmentality. In this part of the theory chapter I added another layer to the complexity of governmentality and depoliticization. In addition to the ambiguity within the (neo-)liberal governmentality of the EU, the discursive context of civil society actors and their role in these influence the depoliticizing effects.

2.3. Conclusions
In this chapter, I discussed how the literature on governmentality and civil society claims that (neo-)liberal governmentality has depoliticizing effects. Based on the existing literature, I first defined
depoliticization as the removal of an issue from the sphere of political contestation. Then, I argued that the literature has not taken into account the ambiguities of (neo-)liberal governmentality that have shaped the European integration process and the EU itself. To some extent what the EU does in its foreign policy is a reflection of what the EU does on the inside. EU integration is constituted by an idea of apolitical decision-making in order to overcome conflicts between European states. To generalize, EU policies largely relate to rights as well as market principles. In a third step, I introduced Foucault’s governmentality paradigm and argued for differentiating between liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. I put forward that both constitute civil society in different ways. In liberal governmentality civil society is the bearer of human, social and economic rights. In neo-liberal governmentality civil society is an economic self-entrepreneur. Moreover, I argued that it is foremost neo-liberal governmentality that depoliticizes civil society by making CSOs to managers, social-service providers and partners of government. I described the depoliticizing triggers and effects of neo-liberal governmentality and discussed how these triggers might help politicization in some instances, ultimately depending on the context of CSOs. Last, I introduced the notion of discursive hegemonic struggles to understand the domestic context of civil society funding and how it might affect the (de)politicizing mechanisms.
Chapter 3

How to study (neo-)liberal governmentality, hegemonic struggles, and (de)politicization

I will now turn to describe my research design and methodology for answering the research question of my dissertation:

(How) did EU civil society funding (de)politicize the work of rights-based civil society organizations in the context of hegemonic struggles in Turkey between 2002 and 2013?

In order to answer this question, I defined several sub-questions that I answer step by step in my analysis:

(1) On which rationalities are the EU civil society programs based?
(2) In which discursive context has EU civil society funding taken place in Turkey? Within which discursive struggles are the CSOs funded situated?
(3) How did EU civil society funding influence Turkish CSOs – did it depoliticize or politicize their issues?

First, I lay down how I analyze the governmentality of EU civil society programs in terms of methodology and text selection. Then I move on to describe how I analyzed the discursive hegemonic struggles in Turkey. The main part of my dissertation, however, is the analysis of rights-based CSOs in Turkey. For this part, I explain why I chose specific CSOs, how I operationalized my research question and which texts I used in my discourse analysis.

3.1. Analyzing the governmentality of EU civil society programs

Kurki (2011a) claimed that the EU’s civil society policies are largely based on neo-liberal rationalities. Based on my theoretical discussion, I assume that I find liberal as well as neo-liberal rationalities in the EU’s documents and argue that we should differentiate between them. Just as Kurki, I analyzed the EU’s general policy documents, but I complemented Kurki’s (2011a) analysis of the general EIDHR documents by analyzing the specific programs for Turkish civil society. I performed a discourse analysis of about 20 EU documents on EU civil society programs published between 2002 and 2013. The most important funding program for rights-based CSOs in Turkey has been the former European Initiative for Human Rights starting in 2000. In 2006 it was re-launched as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Because besides the renaming they are the same instrument, I refer to both as the EIDHR but always mention the year I refer to. Another relevant EU
program for rights-based CSOs is the EU Civil Society Facility (CSF) existing since 2008. The well-known Civil Society Dialogue largely funds cultural initiatives and was therefore excluded from my study. Whereas the EIDHR and the CSF is run by the EU Delegation in Turkey, the Civil Society Dialogue as well as other cultural funding are administered by the Central Finance and Contracts Unit of the Turkish Republic (CFCU). The CFCU was set up in 2003 and distributes funds in accordance to EU rules. Yet, many rights-based CSOs have difficulties getting funds from the CFCU and focus on direct funding from the EU Delegation.

Table 5: List of EU documents analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General EIDHR documents (by European Commission)</th>
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<tr>
<th>EIDHR calls for proposals for Turkey (by EU Delegation to Turkey)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call for proposals: EIDHR - Turkey 2006 Micro-Project Programme. Guidelines for grant applicants responding to the call for proposals for 2006. EuropeAid/124-989/L/G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for proposals: EIDHR - country based support scheme Turkey Programme. Restricted Call for Proposals 2007-2008. EuropeAid/126-845/L/G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for proposals: EIDHR - country based support scheme Turkey Programme. Restricted Call for Proposals 2009. EuropeAid/128-473/L/G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for proposals: EIDHR - country based support scheme Turkey Programme. Restricted Call for Proposals 2010. EuropeAid/130-663/L/ACR/TR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for proposals: EIDHR - country based support scheme Turkey Programme. Restricted Call for Proposals 2011. EuropeAid/131865/L/ACT/TR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Call for proposals: EIDHR - country based support scheme Turkey Programme. Restricted Call for Proposals 2012. EuropeAid/133351/L/ACT/TR.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Other documents by EU Delegation to Turkey</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. Turkey Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Turkey Programme.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I analyzed all the available policy documents of the EIDHR for the time between 2002 and 2013: the calls for proposals/guidelines for applicants in Turkey of the EDIHR, the general EIDHR strategy papers, the EIDHR brochures, the Guiding Principles for the EC Support of Civil Society Development in Turkey, the country-fiche of the Civil Society Facility, the Commission’s Implementing Decision on the Civil Society Facility, and the calls for proposals/guidelines for applicants for Civil Society Facility funds. The mentioned documents were found through the EuropeAid search site (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm) as well as through the site of the EU Delegation to Turkey (http://www.avrupa.info.tr/eu-and-civil-society/civil-society-development.html). I analyzed the texts presented in table 5.

I read all the documents looking for the discursive representations of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality as identified in table 6. Besides reading the documents, I searched for key terms in the digital files. Taking into account the textual context, I counted how many times specific concepts are mentioned and analyzed in which context they appear. I tried to pay attention to concepts that occur often but cannot be assigned to either governmentality suggested here. When closely reading the documents, I also searched for representations related or synonymous to the ones presented here. As discussed earlier, the population or civil society is the target of governmentality. I was interested in how civil society and its activities are constituted.

Table 6: Operationalization of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal governmentality</th>
<th>Neo-liberal governmentality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil society constitution</strong></td>
<td>Discursive representations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil society as a sphere of rights</td>
<td>legal rights, human rights, women’s rights, LGBT rights, Kurdish rights, rights of refugees/migrants/asylum-seekers, children’s rights, bearer of rights, dignity, individual liberty/rights, freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social rights, health rights/health care, family, children, psychological care, social care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic rights, work, participation in work life, economic exchange, wage/salary, workers’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*means that any ending is included in the search
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rights</th>
<th>civil society as third sphere and check on the state</th>
<th>check, monitor, watch-dog, report(s) violations of human rights, human rights report, control</th>
<th>civil society as part of political decision-making</th>
<th>civil society mainstream*, partners/experts in decision/policy-making, consultation/deliberation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>state, protect*, law, respect*, legislat*, freedom, ensure</td>
<td>civil society as social service providers</td>
<td>social services, medical/legal/psychological services, social care, shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>civil society as self-entrepreneurs</td>
<td>managers, entrepreneurs, setting targets, indicators, measure, report, audit, budget, evaluat*, performance, transparency, visibility, output, effective*, efficien*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My main data sources were the EU documents. To back up my findings I further included insights from my interviews with two EU officials of the EU Delegation as well as with a representative of the Civil Society Development Center (Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi, STGM) in Ankara. I asked them about their institution such as for instance the role of their institution in EU civil society funding, their position at the institution, their view on civil society funding, Turkey’s civil society as such and the state of Turkey’s democratization (see table 7).

Table 7: Interview questions for EU institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews with EU officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position and the organization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is your position? How long have you worked here? Where did you work before??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is your role in EU civil society funding programs; what are your projects?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What they do</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What are your goals in supporting civil society in Turkey?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Explain your funding programs to me!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What have been your priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How have the Turkish authorities been involved and how do you evaluate the involvement of Turkish authorities in the funding process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of funding for Turkish civil society</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What do you think are the effects of your funds for civil society? Benefits and problems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What would you say is the importance of third funding for CSOs in Turkey?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Their analysis of civil society and democracy in Turkey</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How has civil society developed in Turkey since 2000?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What have been and what are the most sensitive issues for civil society? From your point of view, what are the responsibilities of civil society in Turkey? Which role should they play?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How do you evaluate the democratization process since 2000, also including the Gezi protests?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to being responsible for the EIDHR and the CSF, the EU Delegation finances large-scale programs in which big organizations often work with smaller rights-based NGOs. The STGM is closely linked to the EU Delegation because the EU in fact set up the organization. Moreover, it is completely financed by the EU Delegation and conducts trainings with Turkish CSOs. The interviews provided an additional source to the documents to gain a more complex picture and to detect EU-internal conflicts over these policies.

The rationalities that underlie the EU’s discourse on civil society and democracy support produce specific power structures between the EU and the civil society in Turkey by defining the options to act for NGOs. Thus the EU’s discourse sets a frame for possible actions of NGOs that are part of EU programs. This does not mean though that the relation between the EU and civil society in Turkey is only one-sided. While the EU creates a certain framework, there is some room for the civil society organizations to influence how the funding programs are used (Foucault 1982: 790). Representations of alternative discourses might have found their way into the dominant one – being integrated into or absorbed by the hegemonic one, or about to take over as a counter-hegemonic one. Further, the specific representation of the neo-liberal discourse in EU documents potentially changes in terms of its focus or its means. As I suggested in my theory chapter, the EU’s policies have been shaped by a tension between neo-liberal economic rationalities and legal liberalism. Similarly, I expected the documents for the EU’s civil society program to include similar ambiguities.

3.2. Identifying hegemonic struggles in Turkey
After identifying the discursive position of the EU’s civil society support policies, I mapped the discursive context in which Turkey’s civil as well as political society acts. Many scholars divide Turkey’s society into different discursive camps – traditionally identifying a Kemalist and a rather Islamic discourse. Recent literature has drawn a more complex picture of the broader discourses for instance differentiating between various kinds of secularism as well as kinds of nationalisms (Çelik 2000; Gökarıksel and Mitchell 2005; Kuru and Stepan 2012; White 2013). However, they still run the risk of simplifying the picture. Instead of trying to construct big overall discourses, I focused on the discursive struggles in specific issue areas (Nonhoff 2006: 308) because they provide a more complex picture of the hegemonic struggles.
3.2.1 Discursive struggles on four rights-based issues

I focused on discursive struggles in four rights-based issue areas. First of all, I looked for issue areas that received funding from the EIDHR and then identified those that received funding regularly. Secondly, out of these issues I chose four issues that have been of special importance for Turkey’s political struggles and are thus to some extent representative for Turkey’s ideological divisions and overlaps.

The EIDHR funded different human rights causes: women’s rights, LGBT rights, children’s rights, Youth rights, rights of the disabled, mental health issues, the rights of religious or ethnic minorities such as Kurdish rights, Alevi rights, Jewish rights, Armenian rights, Christian rights, as well as the rights of migrants and refugees. In addition, the EU supported projects that aimed to strengthen civil society or human rights in general (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c, 2014b). Overall, the EIDHR financed most projects in the areas of women’s rights, the rights of LGBT people, the rights of Kurds, and refugee and migrants’ rights (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b, 2014c).

Moreover, these four issues are of importance for Turkey’s political struggles and challenge important notions of Turkey’s identity such as patriarchy, heteronormativity and ethnic and national belonging.

First, I selected women’s rights because they have been central in Turkey since the beginning of the Turkish Republic and still are at the center of political debates. The founder of Turkey’s Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, radically modernized Turkey. Part of this modernization project was that women became a symbol for the modern and ‘westernized’ Turkish Republic. Because of this history, Turkey has been more progressive than other European countries in terms of women’s participation in public offices and science (Altan-Olcay 2009: 167–169). At the same time however Atatürk banned all existing women’s rights groups (Pope and Pope 2011: 63) and society has remained rather conservative up to today (Pope and Pope 2011: 305–307). Moreover, the ‘western’ secular image of woman always stood in contrast to the Muslim women, veiled and backward (Altan-Olcay 2009: 170). Thus, a feminist movement emerged criticizing the patriarchy of the state after the military coup in 1980. Street protests took place and a feminist civil society formed (Arat 1994). While the women’s civil society movement has thus one of the longest traditions, women’s rights are still debated. The election of a Muslim party into government also meant that the debates on women’s rights partly changed bringing religious rights more into the focus. One of the most prominent subjects of discussions has been the right to wear a headscarf. Further, women’s groups have struggled with conservatives who speak out against abortions.
While women’s rights groups challenge the patriarchal understanding of society, LGBT groups go one step further and question heteronormative conceptions. Just as in other European countries, LGBT rights came onto the agenda later than women’s rights. The LGBT movement formed in the 1990s and has become visible in the 2000s. In the early and mid-2000s, LGBT NGOs were threatened to be closed by authorities. Although LGBT rights are not as constitutive for Turkey’s debates as women’s rights and are still on the margins (Ataman 2011), they have gained importance. For instance there has been a debate to include LGBT rights in the new constitution for Turkey. Further, the so-called Gezi Protests in early summer 2013 increased the visibility of the LGBT community among Turkey’s human rights CSOs as well as society in general. Because LGBT groups have become so central in the human rights community and because they have gained legitimacy since the early 2000s, I included them in my analysis.

Third, I selected Kurdish rights because among issues of ethnic or national identity the so-called Kurdish question has been one of the most central issues for Turkish politics as well as human rights organizations. Talking about the issues of Kurds or about the existence of a Kurdish minority as such used to be a taboo in Turkey. In the 1990s many people were imprisoned and tortured, among them many Kurds. Most large human rights organizations were established to help people by providing legal and medical service, often risking their own lives in the process. One example is the human rights organization İHD which was the first human rights NGO founded in Turkey. The time period between 2002 and 2013 witnessed increasingly open debates about granting minority rights to Kurds and approaching the PKK in a new way. Yet, discussions still polarize around Kurdish rights (see Somer and Liaras 2010). Because they were constitutive for most human rights organizations as well as for the understanding of the Turkish nation, I include the struggles over Kurdish rights as one part of my analysis (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b).

The fourth area I studied is the rights of refugees and migrants in Turkey. Immigration also questions the notion of national belonging. Migration is about granting “others” human rights. The rights of refugees and migrants have only come to the focus after 2005 when Turkey realized that it became a transit as well as destination country. At the end of my study period, Turkey’s parliament passed a new migration law being largely in accordance to EU law (Aydin and Kiriçi 2013: 375–376). This issue area is particularly interesting because it is rather new in political debates and will probably gain bigger status in the future due to Turkey’s economic growth as well as the crises on its borders. Further, the state used to not provide any support in this area, leaving everything to CSOs or international organizations. Whether and how the state wants to provide services in the future is thus extremely significant here. Interestingly however, the EU has increasingly given funds to refugee
rights NGOs while it concluded a so-called readmission agreement obliging Turkey to take back any refugees that entered the EU from Turkey.

Concluding, I selected four human rights issues that received most funding from the EIDHR and were significant for Turkey’s discursive struggles. Whereas women’s rights and Kurdish rights have been on the agenda longest, LGBT rights and rights of migrants and refugees have gained recognition especially during my study period. Moreover, all four rights-based issues are not only part of political struggles but also require the provision of certain services such as legal and medical help either by state or civil society actors. Thus, it is especially interesting to analyze how EU funding influences CSOs in these contexts.

3.2.2. Operationalization: How to study hegemonic struggles
The discussion of the case selection indicates that there are struggles over hegemony in Turkey. In the theory chapter I laid down that I rely on the understanding of hegemony by Laclau and Mouffe (2014) and Nonhoff (2006) to analyze the different discourses struggling for hegemony. Nonhoff defines a discourse struggling for hegemony as an offensive-hegemonic strategy – although he terms it “strategy” he does not imply that the discourse is planned and controlled (Nonhoff 2006: 312–313). I constructed the discourses struggling for hegemony by identifying their chain of equivalence of different demands. I reconstructed the chains of equivalences by looking for signifiers that describe the issue in question (Renner 2014: 270). For instance, to analyze struggles over LGBT rights, I looked for words that are semantically linked to LGBT people or LGBT rights. This includes adjectives, verbs and nouns. The latter could for instance be metaphors and flagwords. Further, references to bigger narratives such as references to Turkey’s Kemalist identity or Ottoman history were of interest (Aydıň-Duzgit 2014: 359). In addition, I examined how antagonistic splits are created. I did this by identifying references that are made in negative opposition to the word presenting the issue in question or any other part of the equivalence chain. This could be a claim such as the others are “undemocratic”. A discourse is hegemonic if it includes one demand that functions as a general representation of the discourse. Thus, if there is one part of the equivalence chain that stands in opposition to all parts of the antagonistic chain, I am able to identify a hegemonic status. Such an element is often an empty signifier which is basically without concrete meaning, yet very powerful because it manages to involve all discourses (Laclau 1996: 36–46; Nonhoff 2006: 308). Eventually the antagonism might be broken up (Nonhoff 2006: 313–315). If there are no opposing discourses and no antagonistic split a discourse has a strong hegemonic position.

There does not have to be only one opposing discourses. The chain of antagonism does not always form one discourse; instead it only represents the discursive positions that are constructed as
others by the offensive discourse. Indeed I showed that discursive struggles in Turkey are more complex than often assumed. Yet, it is important to analyze the discourse that is referred to as the antagonistic other in order to examine which discourses are most powerful and struggling most strongly against each other regarding the specific issue. Based on the chain of antagonism, I shed light on how opposing discourses form chain of equivalences. However, I mostly focused on the offensive hegemonic discourse. In the end, I draw a picture of the different discourses including their chains of equivalence and chains of antagonisms.

3.2.3. Texts
Because my analysis focuses on hegemonic struggles which take place in public, I mainly analyzed newspaper articles published in the three main quality newspapers in Turkey – namely Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Radikal – between 2002 and 2013. The media analysis is most important for analyzing the public discourse although I used secondary sources to support my argument. I included the most popular newspapers of different political directions to understand the public debate. Cumhuriyet is a Kemalist or republican newspaper that has been published since 1924 and has a circulation of more than 50,000. Zaman is one of the most popular newspapers with an Islamic background that has existed since 1986 and has a circulation of more than one million. Zaman also publishes the English Today’s Zaman that sells around 10,000 newspapers a day. Radikal is a left liberal newspaper, published only since 1996 and circulating more than 20,000 newspapers every day. In some instances, I referred to Hürriyet which is an important but more populist and nationalist newspaper with a circulation of almost 400,000 a day. Hürriyet has been published since 1948. The English issue of the Turkish Hürriyet Daily News has been published since 1961 and sells around 5,000 papers daily. It has only been connected to the Turkish Hürriyet since 2001 when the Doğan Media Group – which is also the owner of Radikal – bought the paper. In some cases, I referred to smaller newspapers. Generally, I analyzed pieces that report on news to include statements of political and societal actors. The quotes used are my own translation from Turkish to English unless I quote news pieces published in an English language newspaper.

The newspapers all have online archives covering the time period between 2002 and 2013. I searched these archives for articles on women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and refugee rights. More specifically, for women’s rights I typed in the following words (in Turkish): woman/women; women’s rights; headscarf; abortion; caesarian(s). For LGBT rights I looked for: LGBT(T); homosexuals; bisexuals; transgender; LGBT rights. For Kurdish rights I typed into the search engines: Kurds; Kurdish rights;

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8 The circulation numbers are taken from the webpage Medyatava which publishes the weekly circulation numbers of Turkish newspapers. The page was accessed on 26 November 2013 (Medyatava 2013). I also double-checked the numbers by looking at the homepages of the newspapers.
Imralı process; peace (process); Öcalan. For refugee rights I looked for: refugee(s) and migrant(s); (im)migration; refugee rights. I compared the articles that I found on one topic from different newspapers to identify main themes of public debate and then chose articles which cover these main themes reoccurring. There is one limitation: online articles often do not give you any information on whether and how the article was published in the newspapers. Yet, I excluded articles that were just a few lines of news. I focused on the statements issued by politicians and sometimes civil society actors covered in the articles. Sometimes this led me to press statements of CSOs on specific issues which I referred to as well. In addition, I conducted a google search on the topic looking for the terms defined above to make sure I did not miss any major debates. Especially when the articles I found in the main newspapers make reference to texts in other newspapers, I also included them in my analysis.

3.3. Analyzing the constitutive effects of EU civil society programs on CSOs in terms of (de)politicization within hegemonic struggles

3.3.1. Selecting CSOs to be studied
Next, I selected the NGOs to be studied. As stated before, I focused on rights-based organizations but chose them from four different policy fields: Kurdish rights, women’s rights, LGBT rights and refugee and migrants’ rights. To select the NGOs, I used the EU’s Award Notices for civil society funding. I identified the CSOs supported in the four areas. I found up to five organizations for each field. In addition, I did research on the websites of the organizations funded to identify further NGOs they might have cooperated with on certain issues. The NGO database provided for by Amnesty International Turkey (Amnesty International Turkey) helped me to get an overview of the different organizations in each policy field. In addition, I talked to representatives of organizations that work with rights-based NGOs in Turkey, for instance within large-scale projects directly financed by the EU Delegation. These associations include the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı, TÜSEV) as well as YADA (Yaşama Dair Vakfı). Both think tanks work with CSOs and conduct research on civil society in Turkey. In my interviews, I asked their representatives about their organization and their position, but mostly focused on their perspective on Turkey’s human rights organizations, the importance and consequences of EU funding and the state of democratization in Turkey (see table 10). I gained an understanding of the NGOs receiving funding and their connections with each other by talking to other academics working in the field as well as to friends working in Turkish civil society, relying on academic work on Turkish civil society as well as on information provided in my interviews with NGO representatives. I further included two organizations which oppose EU funding to learn why CSOs would reject funding and how the possibility of funds
influences them. Mazlumder is a human rights organization with Muslim roots and conservative values. While the Izmir branch received EIDHR funds once, the rest of the organization is against using EU grants (Interview N 2013). The second organization is Amargi, an organization dealing with women’s and LGBT rights. It never received EU funds. The organization is politically on the left side of the spectrum. However, its members had links to the more established organizations receiving funds as well (Interview J 2013). Thus both organizations differ in terms of their political position from the other NGOs studied, but they are both known and recognized by the organizations I studied according to my interview partners. In addition, I included all large-scale EIDHR funded projects that target the rights of civil society per se. They represent important developments in EU funding policy and often include the CSOs chosen here. Table 8 lists the organizations studied including information on their working area, their founding year and their location. This list however is only limited to the organizations I studied in detail. In some instances, I also referred to other organizations in my analysis.

**Table 8: List of CSOs studied**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Basic info on the organization (area of work; year of foundation; place)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amargi</td>
<td>“feminist kollektif”; women’s and LGBT rights; founded in 2001 and dissolved itself in 2012 Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (Helsinki Yurtaşlar Derneği; HYD)</td>
<td>general human rights; many projects on Kurdish rights and rights of refugees; run a Refugee Support Program founded in 1993 Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği; İHD)</td>
<td>general human rights, but known for their work on Kurdish rights; one of the first human rights CSOs founded in 1986 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates (Kadın Adayları Derneği; Kader)</td>
<td>women's rights with a focus on political participation of women founded in 1997 Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Center Foundation (Kadın Merkezi Vakfı; Kamer)</td>
<td>women’s rights in a mostly Kurdish area founded in 1997 Diyarbakır</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research Association (Kaos Gey ve Lezbiyen Araştırmalar Derneği; KAOS-GL)</td>
<td>LGBT rights; oldest LGBT organization founded in 1994 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği, Mazlumder)</td>
<td>general human rights; one focus on rights of Muslim women; Muslim organization founded in 1991 Istanbul, Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation (Mor)</td>
<td>women’s rights; oldest women’s rights CSO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.2. Operationalization: how to detect instances of depoliticization

After having selected the cases, I moved on to the most important part of my analysis – finding out whether and how EU funding depoliticizes civil society organizations. In order to analyze the depoliticizing effects of EU funding, I conducted a discourse analysis. This also includes practices such as ways to work and organize which I consider to be part of the discourse as they are articulated through discourse.

Based on previous literature on (neo-)liberal governmentality and depoliticization, I concluded in my theoretical chapter that it is five constitutive elements of neo-liberal governmentality that are expected to depoliticize its subject: the constitution of self-managers that are empowered and empower others; the constitution as social service providers; the constitution as participants and advisors of government; and the reliance on technologies of performance and visibility. In the theory chapter, I explained how they are expected to be depoliticizing. In the analysis of the CSOs I looked for these different representations of CSO work in discursive practices. Table 9 shows the discursive representations I looked for to identify the different activities. Further, it provides the indicators for the depoliticizing effects of neo-liberal rationalities. However, I expected to find ambiguous effects.

As I show in the following chapter, the EU’s civil society programs are based on liberal and neo-liberal rationalities. As I discussed before, within liberal governmentality civil society is assumed to put rights issues on the political agenda. This is why I also looked for typical “liberal” civil society
activities and indicators for their politicizing effects. Moreover, the depoliticization of CSO work might enable political engagement in the first place; or CSOs resist to being constituted in these depoliticizing ways.

Table 9: Operationalization of (de)politicization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neo-liberal governmentality</th>
<th>Liberal governmentality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators (activities and its discursive representations) for neo-liberal rationalities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicators for depoliticizing effects (discursive representations)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>providing social services: social services, medical/legal/psychological services, social care, shelter</td>
<td>human rights as social issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>using technologies of visibility and performance: manager, entrepreneur, setting targets, indicators, measure, report*, audit*, budget*, evaluation*, performance, transparency, visibility, output, effective*, efficiency*</td>
<td>human rights as issue of effective management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I organized my analysis according to the different issue areas presented in my chapter on discursive struggles in Turkey. I thereby was able to account for the different contexts the CSOs act in and reveal whether there are differences in terms of depoliticizing effects depending on the issue a CSO works in. Moreover, I structured the different parts by analyzing one organization at a time. This way I was able to include all discourses and activities of a CSO in my analysis. NGOs do a mix of things using EU funds for specific purposes. And if EU funding has depoliticizing effects, they should also become visible within the organization at large. I first analyzed the general work of the NGOs and then continued assessing their EU funded activities.
3.3.3. Texts
For my analysis, I used both official and non-official forms of texts. The more official ones included documents on EU funded projects, press releases, and general mission statements. Thus I analyzed anything I could find about EU funded projects on the websites of the CSOs or which was given to me by people working for the CSOs. However, the websites of the NGOs often do not provide full information on all the projects. People working at the organization now were not always sure they remembered correctly. Moreover, the EU websites are sometimes not completely up to date and do not mention all the projects. Further, CSOs did not always have any written information on EU funded projects that were conducted in the past. I asked the EU Delegation to give out information on the projects funded in Turkey but they denied to do so and asked me to ask the organizations directly. For these reasons, I cannot claim to have all the information on all projects. Further, I was interested in how CSOs present themselves on their homepages in terms of professional appearance or references to the EU, and which activities they pursue besides EU projects. Thus I checked every page on their homepages such as sections on their mission and goals, their activities, press releases and public statements on the issues concerned. The quotes used are my own translation from Turkish to English unless I refer to English websites or documents.

To get a better insight into the Turkish CSO landscape and to strengthen my analysis, I conducted interviews with employees and activists of the CSOs. The interviews were done in English – with a mix of Turkish – as CSOs’ employees and activists have good English skills and it was too difficult for me to listen, understand, take notes and think about follow-up questions in Turkish all at once. My interviews are semi-structured using individuals as informants (Blaikie 2003: 191–192). I had a set of questions that I wanted to get answers to but often I adapted the order of the questions in accordance to how the conversation developed. Table 10 lists the questions that I included in my interviews. First, I asked questions about the background of the CSOs to know more about the structure and resources of the organization as well as the position of the person I interviewed. The second and third sets of questions were the most important ones for my research. They were about the type of activities the NGOs have done with and without EU or other funding. I asked about the activities of the CSOs including the objectives, typical activities or changes over time in terms of activities as well as achievements in the area they work. Third, I asked about the organization’s budget and the importance of EU funding. Here, I asked my interview partner to describe EU funded projects to me and evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of funding from the EU and other donors. Last, I was interested in the organization’s and the members’ personal involvement in the Gezi Park protests and its meaning for them. This way I was able to connect to recent events and find out more about the relevance and immediate influence of the protests on the CSOs and their representatives. In most cases, the conversation was rather relaxed and informal. To achieve this
informality I did not record my interviews but only took notes. This way it appeared easier to the interviewees to take back something they had just said or say something off-record (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 126). To document the interview, I typed my notes immediately after the meetings.

I conducted my first interviews in February and March 2013. I talked to two academics working on EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s democratization, to a representative of the known human rights organization HYD as well as to a representative of the EU Delegation and of the STGM in Ankara. With these first interviews I gained a better understanding of the structure of EU funding and of the civil society sector as such. However, I conducted most of my interviews with CSO representatives in September 2013 after the so-called Gezi protests in early summer of 2013. During my stay in Istanbul new protests erupted. Of course, people in civil society were influenced by the events. To understand the impact of the protests and to separate this from day-to-day work of the organizations, I asked my interviewees about the meaning the events had for them and how they had been involved. I continuously tried to reflect on the influence the protests had on the interviewees when I analyzed the interviews.

Table 10: Interview questions for CSOs and experts or think tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews with CSOs</th>
<th>Interviews with experts (academics, expert organizations, think tanks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position and the organization</td>
<td>Position and if applicable the organization they work for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is your position? How long have you worked here? Where did you work before?</td>
<td>- What is your position? How long have you worked here? Where did you work before?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How is your CSO organized? How many people work here? Has that changed?</td>
<td>- How is your CSO organized? How many people work here? Has that changed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What they do</td>
<td>What some of them do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How would you describe the CSO’s objectives? How do you achieve them?</td>
<td>- How would you describe the CSO’s objectives? How do you achieve them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What does an activity of your CSO usually look like?</td>
<td>- Do you work with CSOs? (e.g. training, networks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How did your organization come about?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Has there been a development in terms of the rights of women/LGBT/Kurds/refugees?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What have been and are most important issues?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Has the way your CSO works changed since the beginning? If, how?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Do you have any contacts to political parties/supporters? Where do you locate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is your work political?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Do you cooperate with other CSOs? How? With whom? Why or why not?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget, ways of funding, importance and their evaluation of EU funding</td>
<td>Role of funding for Turkish civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How does your CSO finance itself?</td>
<td>- What would you say is the importance of third funding for CSOs in Turkey?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How important is EU funding? Other funding?</td>
<td>- What do you think are the effects of EU funding for civil society? Benefits and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Tell me about a project funded by the EU? Success, impact, problems?
- Why do you apply for which funding (also other)?
- Generally, how do you evaluate EU funding? Support you need? Has it changed the way you work? How about other funding?
- Generally, how would describe the effect EU funding had on Turkish civil society and political pluralism?
- Have you received training how to apply for EU funding?

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<tr>
<th>Involvement in Gezi-Park protests and their conclusions from the protests, outlook</th>
<th>Their analysis of civil society and democracy in Turkey</th>
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<td>Has your CSO been active in the protests? How?</td>
<td>- How has civil society developed in Turkey since 2000?</td>
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<td>What do the protests mean for the issue you work on/to your CSO/to you?</td>
<td>- What have been and what are the most sensitive issues for civil society? From your point of view, what are the responsibilities of civil society in Turkey? Which role should they play?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the meaning for Turkish civil society and democratization?</td>
<td>- How do you evaluate the democratization process since 2000, also including the Gezi protests?</td>
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<td>Are you generally positive or negative about the future?</td>
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Moreover, I cannot take anything said by the interviewed as given or the only interpretation of the situation of CSOs. The statements of people working for CSOs are always normative and shaped by their experience, their working context and social expectations. Interviews are always a result of interaction (Hansen 2006: 85–86). For instance, it is likely that NGO workers would deny that their organization has become less political or that their work would not make a difference. I tried to reflect on this throughout my analysis. In addition, I relied on other sources such as the NGO websites and documents for my analysis.

After I have described my methodological approach, I will now move on to analyze the EU’s civil society programs.
Chapter 4

The (neo-)liberal governmentality of EU civil society programs

As explained in the methodology chapter, I will now begin with analyzing the EU’s civil society programs. As Kurki (2011a) and others (Mitchell 2006) argue, neo-liberal governmentality is part of how the EU governs. The purpose of this chapter is first of all to show that governmentality exists in the EU’s civil society programs for Turkey. Secondly, doing this I want to point out that – as I suggested in my theoretical chapter – the EU’s governmentality is ambiguous because it relies on neo-liberal as well as liberal rationalities. The literature on governmentality does not differentiate the different forms of governmentality enough when discussing its potential effects. This is why this chapter clearly makes the distinction between discursive representations of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. Thirdly, I try to relate my findings to the overall EU context as I proposed in the theory part that the coexistence of liberal and neo-liberal rationalities is not surprising. Kurki (2011a) did not place the EIDHR in its overall context however.

Thus, here I analyze the discourse of EU civil society programs for Turkey. I largely focus on the EIDHR assessing the general EIDHR documents and the EIDHR strategies and calls for Turkey between 2002 and 2012. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2002-2006) was reintroduced as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (2007-2012) in 2007 but largely remained the same policy and thus I refer to them both as the EIDHR. In addition to the EIDHR, I analyze documents of the Civil Society Facility (CSF) created in 2008 which includes general program and Turkey-specific documents. I also take note of the first call for proposals published in 2013 within the Sivil Düşün Programme. Further, I give examples of the TASCO program set up in 2009. To strengthen my analysis I use my interviews with the representative of the EU Delegation to Turkey, the Sivil Düşün program and the STGM.

I organize my analysis according to the different elements of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. The documents include some clear instances of neo-liberal rationalities and other more contested ones. I focus first on the liberal rationalities in the EU civil society programs. I begin with the notion of legal, economic and social rights and continue with the role of civil society as a check on the state. Then, I move on to analyze the neo-liberal rationalities of program documents focusing on ideas of empowerment, civil society as social service provider, civil society participation in decision-making (and pluralism as we will see), and technologies of performance and visibility. Last, I conclude my analysis highlighting clear instances of neo-liberal and liberal governmentality and pointing out the differences between Kurki’s (2011a) and my findings.
4.1. Liberal rationalities in EU civil society programs

4.1.1. Economic, social and legal rights in civil society

The EIDHR is an instrument which has to be seen in the context of the EU having been and being a project for peace. The basic idea of the EIDHR policy is to spread human rights and democracy in third countries. This goes back to the tradition of the EU being a “Rechtsgemeinschaft” (a community based on law) as suggested by Walter Hallstein (Somek 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that the EIDHR starts from a fundamentally liberal idea. In fact, liberal here means that the EIDHR places importance on legal (what I mostly refer to as human rights such as right to bodily integrity or freedom of expression), economic (such as access to the employment market) and social rights (such as right to unemployment or health insurance). Indeed, the EIDHR increasingly emphasized economic and social rights as human rights as I will show.

The EIDHR Programming Document for 2002 to 2004 by the Commission mentions four priority aims:

“1) Support to strengthen democratisation, good governance, and the rule of law; 2) Activities in support of the abolition of the death penalty; 3) Support for the fight against torture and impunity and for international tribunals and criminal courts; 4) Combating racism and xenophobia and discrimination against minorities and indigenous people” (European Commission 2001: 5).

Over time the support for democracy, human rights and rule of law has become more dominant in the aims of the EIDHR. The strategy paper for the time frame between 2007 and 2010 complements this with a focus on civil society as a promoter of these rights (European Commission 2007):

“1) Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries and regions where they are most at risk; 2) Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reforms, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interest and consolidating political participation and representation; 3) Supporting actions on human rights and democracy issues in areas covered by EU Guidelines, including on human rights dialogues, on human rights defenders, on the death penalty, on torture, and on children and armed conflict; 4) Supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy; 5) Building confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral processes, in particular through election observation” (European Commission 2007: 2, 2010: 1).

Thus the goals of the overall EIDHR largely focus on legal rights – or human rights – concerning a wide range of areas – from democratic rights, fighting torture and the death penalty, children’s rights, and the rule of law. The documents stress that human rights and democracy should be promoted. For instance in 2004 the EIDHR document includes the rights of women and of minorities (European Commission 2004). The rights of refugees and migrants appear in the next EIDHR document (European Commission 2007) while the rights of LGBT individuals were added in the paper for 2011 to 2013 (European Commission 2010). The stated goals express the European idea of
forming a community consisting of bearers of the same rights and bringing peace through human rights and democracy (Parker and Rosamond 2013). Accordingly civil society is constituted as a participant in democratic decision-making by assigning it the role of promoting human rights and democracy is defined as the sphere of civil society as the EIDHR is supposed to strengthen “the role of civil society in promoting” those rights (European Commission 2007: 2).

Although originally the EIDHR strictly focused on classical human rights, in 2007 the EIDHR program mentioned social and economic rights. Considering the EU’s history of being an economic union, the EU traditionally constitutes individuals as economic subjects (Walters and Haahr 2005: 45–48). Under objective 1, the document mentions “the right to form and join a trade union” under the heading of the “right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association”. Although under this objective projects should focus on “fundamental freedoms (...) and keeping in mind the holistic approach to human rights”, social and economic as well as cultural rights can serve as “entry points” (European Commission 2007: 7). Objective 2 specifically mentions economic and social rights as belonging to human rights. Social and economic rights are further mentioned under objective 2 as the right to equal participation of men and women (European Commission 2007: 8). Against the background of the European economic crisis, the strategy paper for 2011 to 2013 represents an even stronger turn towards putting more emphasis on economic and social rights. After consulting with the European Economic and Social Committee the paper was adapted with “in particular a reinforced emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights (...)” (European Commission 2010: 6). It further states that in times of economic crisis human rights had to especially be protected and moreover there was “an increasingly consensual understanding that the fulfilment of the international human rights agenda also requires increased efforts to promote and protect economic, social and cultural rights” (European Commission 2010: 7). The document continues that “the EIDHR will strengthen its role in supporting initiatives to protect and promote economic, social and cultural rights (...)” (European Commission 2010: 13). Thus the EIDHR with an initially sole focus on more classical human rights increasingly included economic and social rights (as well as cultural ones) constituting its subject legally, economically and socially; legal – as a bearer of human rights that have to protected against by the state; economic – as a subject that is enabled to take part in economic exchange; and social – as a subject that has a rights to basic needs provided for by the state (Walters and Haahr 2005: 45–48).

Similarly in the first five years, the concrete calls for proposals for Turkey mostly focus on legal rights and afterwards increasingly mention social and economic rights. In 2003 the goals are “Democracy and Governance” and the “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights” including “prevention of torture and combating impunity” and “combat discrimination and to preserve and
respect cultural diversity” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 2–3). The call for 2005 adds the priority of “freedom of expression and independent media” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005a: 2–3). The following calls (EU Delegation to Turkey 2006, 2005b) both prioritize “Fostering a culture of human rights” and “Advancing equality, tolerance and peace”. Here the first priority refers to: “Strengthening civil society organisations in advocacy of the rights of vulnerable groups (...)”, and “enhancing education, training, monitoring and awareness-raising on human rights and democratisation issues” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 3, 2005a: 4, 2005b: 3). This goal reflects the liberal notion of civil society to monitor and raise awareness but it also includes the neo-liberal notion of empowering I will discuss later. Regarding the issue areas I focus on, the rights of women as well as of minorities are explicitly included (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 3, 2005a: 4, 2005b: 3). whereas only the earlier call of 2005 (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005a: 4) mentions the rights of refugees and neither of the calls between 2002 and 2006 refers to LGBT rights yet. Torture has been included from the start – as Kurds were mostly affected by torture this is an issue concerning Kurdish rights.

In 2007 the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights replaced the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights but its overall goals remained the same. They were “to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and the respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The EIDHR was supposed “to help civil society to become an effective force for political reform and defence of human rights” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 4). In the following call for the year 2009, the priority areas mentioned are very broad and include different human rights from the rights of women, children, social rights, rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants to freedom of expression, press, association, relation and freedom from torture (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 4). In 2010, the EU kept the focus areas even though they were re-formulated in the calls. The rights of women, LGBT, migrants and asylum-seekers are covered in all of them (EU Delegation to Turkey 2010: 4–5, 2011a, 2012).

Thus, the calls for Turkey foremost focus on supporting human rights – a focus also reflected in the grants awarded (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b) – constituting individuals as free and bearing rights of freedom. The Guiding Principles for Turkey stress: “While not supporting party political activities, the EC thus aims at contributing to a more open, participatory and dynamic Turkish democracy” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014a). However, the calls increasingly mention economic and social rights – complementing a liberal conception of the individual. The call for proposals of 2009 mentions the “social rights of vulnerable groups” for the first time under its priority areas (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 4). Similarly in 2010 they include “social rights (including but not limited to trade union rights, right to education, health and housing)” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2010:
4). For the first time the call of 2011 – and the subsequent call of 2012 as well – refers to “economic, social and cultural rights” together with “civil and political rights” as rights to be promoted by so-called human rights defenders (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 5, 2012: 5). Under objective 1 of “strengthening civil society’s involvement” “social rights and equal opportunities (including but not limited to women rights, trade union rights, right to education, health and housing)” are mentioned again (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 5, 2012: 5).

Concluding, from the start the general strategy papers of the EIDHR as well as the specific calls for Turkey reflect a liberal idea in its goals to promote democracy and human rights. As in liberal governmentality, they constitute civil society and the individual as a subject of legal (human), economic and social rights that have to be protected. This comes however with a responsibility of the individual and civil society to also promote these rights; just as the EU constitutes its citizens as part of a community based on law (Walters and Haahr 2005: 45–48; Somek 2003).

Besides the EIDHR program, the EU Delegation in Turkey gives funding to CSOs in the framework of the CSF. The EU set up the CSF in 2008 (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 2) as part of the so-called Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations (TASCO). The CSF is about technical assistance for CSOs and the European Commission states that the CSF “should focus on empowering CSOs (...) thus to be used as a means” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 15; emphasis in original). However the overall goal of the CSF is similar to the one of the EIDHR: “In line with the original vision for the Civil Society Facility (CSF), the overall objective for the CSF period is: ‘To contribute to anchoring democratic values and structures, human rights, social inclusion and the rule of law, thereby supporting the EU integration process’ (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 2; emphasis in original). The goals refer to human or legal rights and social rights and the broader integration project.

As I will discuss in the remaining part civil society is expected to promote these rights in different – sometimes contradictory – ways. Now I will turn to the EU’s liberal constitution of civil society as a check on the state. Later I will show that the CSF and the EIDHR increasingly produce a neo-liberal role of civil society in promoting these rights.

4.1.2. Civil society as a check on the state
As discussed in the theory chapter, liberalism constitutes civil society as a check on the state. Civil society is supposed to monitor the state. The EIDHR indeed assigns this role to civil society: CSOs
should monitor\(^9\) human rights practices and report when human rights are violated such as in cases of torture, corruption, and discrimination. The general EIDHR and the Turkey-specific EIDHR documents refer to this kind of monitoring several times. It is a key goal (European Commission 2001: 4, 2004: 6). From 2003 on monitoring human rights reappears next to other goals of possible EIDHR projects throughout the documents:

“strengthening civil society organisations in advocacy of the rights of vulnerable groups (…); reducing the occurrence of torture, effectively implementing international instruments against torture and providing support to the rehabilitation of victims of torture; enhancing education, training, \textit{monitoring} and awareness-raising on human rights and democratisation issues” (European Commission 2004: 16; emphasis added; also see European Commission 2010: 14, 2007: 7).

Monitoring of for instance women’s rights is suggested to take place in the form of a coordinated action of different NGOs which develop a common monitoring mechanism (European Commission 2007: 8, 2010: 17). The programming document for 2005 and 2006 put observing human rights violations at the center: “it [the campaign (Promoting justice and the rule of law)] will also reinforce the work of international mechanisms which \textit{monitor and report} on respect for human rights and related \textit{treaty obligations}” (European Commission 2004: 14; emphasis in original). The second campaign “Fostering a culture of human rights” “[t]hrough its focus on \textit{human rights education}, \textit{training, monitoring and awareness-raising}, Campaign 2 will seek to empower individuals and civil society to enhance respect for human rights and prevent human rights violations (…)” (European Commission 2004: 16; emphasis in original).

The calls for Turkey reflect the importance of the controlling function of civil society. In all calls monitoring is mentioned as one task of civil society. In 2005 the EIDHR calls on CSOs to implement projects that observe human rights abuses in the media and monitor torture (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005a: 2–3). The following calls include the second campaign on fostering human rights and aim at “Enhancing education, training, monitoring and awareness-raising on human rights and democratisation issues” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005b: 3, 2006: 5). The calls for 2006 and 2009 mention monitoring together with “watchdog activities” as possible actions for projects (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 7, 2006: 10, 2009: 5). The term “watchdog” describes a strong role of control for civil society within liberal governmentality. The EU suggests reports that publish the results of monitoring as an outcome for a funded project (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 5). For the year of 2010 the EU re-formulated the “two specific objectives” that remained for the years of 2011 and 2012. One of them puts its focus on the monitoring role of civil society: “To strengthen and/or increase civil society’s involvement in the making, implementation and \textit{monitoring} of human rights

\(^9\) The word “monitoring” also appears in the meaning of evaluating the EIDHR policy or the CSOs’ activities. However, this kind of monitoring is part of the neo-liberal technologies of performance which I discuss later.
policies at local and national levels” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2010: 4, emphasis added; also see EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 4, 2012: 4).

Although the CSF focuses on participatory democracy and technical assistance, its documents mention the controlling function of CSOs as well (European Commission 2008b: 13, 15, 22). Specifically, it supports civil society networks (national or international ones) that work on “legal and political literacy (especially on fundamental rights and freedoms) among individuals in order to reinforce the watchdog role of civil society” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 7).

My interviews at the EU Delegation and the STGM support this interpretation (Interview C 2013; Interview B 2013). Especially at the latter organization – which was set up by the EU and conducts trainings – the monitoring role was stressed throughout the interview: “We offer training for local NGOs to monitor local authorities, their budget and their political processes” and “CSOs are getting stronger, they create good platforms, good monitoring processes” (Interview B 2013). The watchdog role is a liberal conception of civil society. In this role CSOs can potentially politicize issues as they criticize human rights practices and put them on the agenda. Kurki (2011a: 357) identifies that the EIDHR constitutes civil society as “a check against the state” and calls this a “liberal notion of civil society”. At the same time she uses this as another example of the neo-liberal governmentality of the EIDHR conflating liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. Thus, one needs to be careful to not count everything as neo-liberal governmentality. In fact, the basic idea of the EIDHR is liberal. Moreover, the EIDHR is embedded in an EU context which is originally constituted by liberal ideas of legal and economic rights. However, there are clear (and not so clear) instance of neo-liberal governmentality in the EU’s civil society policies which potentially depoliticize the issues NGOs address as I will argue now.

4.2. Neo-liberal rationalities in EU civil society programs

4.2.1. Technologies of empowerment

With the overall goal being the support of human rights, the EIDHR aims to empower human rights CSOs. TASCO drafted a glossary with terms for CSOs which shows how the EU understands empowerment. Presenting different definitions, the manual first mentions that empowerment is “[a] process that strengthens the abilities, confidence, analysis and power of poor and excluded people and their organisations so they can challenge unjust and authoritarian power relations, make their own choices, speak out on their own behalf and control their own lives or situations” (EU TASCO 2010: 5). Following this description empowerment is supposed to enable people to take action
against their own marginalization. Further, the glossary suggests that capacity-building includes “strengthening and building their [individuals and communities in poor countries] understanding and knowledge of their own needs, entitlements and rights, and enabling them to organise themselves to respond to this understanding” (EU TASCO 2010: 2). Empowerment means that marginalized individuals are supposed to become active citizens and by increasing their capacities they are enabled to do so. However, the critical literature argues that empowerment is always to some extent a subjection of individuals by the instance that empowers. In neo-liberal governmentality empowerment creates subjectivities of civil society and the individual as self-governing and self-responsible (Cruikshank 1999: 69–70; Dean 1999: 155).

Accordingly, the EIDHR Programming Document for 2002 to 2004 by the Commission formulates the first priority as “[s]trengthening the capacity of civil society” including “better contribution of civil society organizations (...) to policy design” as well as “better civil society input to international human rights fora”. Another objective is “Human rights education and training” which refers to “citizens empowered to take action in defence of their human rights”, “capacity of public officials to protect human rights enhanced”, and “networks of expertise in human rights and democracy deployed” (European Commission 2001: 7). CSOs are empowered to fulfil their different functions and they are empowered to empower other individuals to stand up for themselves. The paper refers to increasing capacities of CSOs more than 20 times and to empowerment five times (European Commission 2001). Capacity building was important for CSOs in order to be able to “improve their management skills and ability to design, apply, implement and sustain their activities” (European Commission 2001: 26). Thus, the EIDHR Working Document of 2001 heavily relies on neo-liberal governmental terminology constituting civil society as an actor that has to be empowered by increasing its capacities to be able to act.

The second programming document of the EIDHR for 2005 to 2006 refers to the aim “to empower individuals and civil society to enhance respect for human rights (...)” (European Commission 2004: 15). The focus of the document is the idea that the EU can enable civil society to fulfil its responsibilities through capacity-building which it mentions eight times (European Commission 2004). Similarly, the strategy paper of 2007 to 2010 (European Commission 2007) stresses the support for civil society as a main objective. It states that

“[w]ork with, for and through civil society organizations will give the response strategy its critical profile. It will on the one hand, promote the kind of open society, which civil society requires in order to thrive, and on the other hand, will support civil society in becoming an effective force for dialogue and reform relying on the role of men, women and children as individuals with the power, capacity and will to create development” (European Commission 2007: 5).
Further, “support of civil society and human rights defenders” is important “to help empower citizens, allow them to claim their rights and build and sustain momentum for change and political reform” (European Commission 2007: 4). According to the EU guidelines, human rights defenders “are those individuals, groups and organs of society that promote and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European Commission 2008a: 2). They are expected to pursue activities such as “capacity building and public awareness campaigns” (European Commission 2008a: 8). Throughout the whole document, the goals of “empowerment” of civil society or vulnerable groups and capacity-building are mentioned (European Commission 2007: 9–10). Overall, the concepts of capacity, capacity building and empowerment appear more than five times.

The strategy paper of the EIDHR for the years 2011 to 2013 mentions the very same objectives as the one of 2007 to 2010 (European Commission 2010: 1). The second objective with the focus of “Strengthening the role of civil society (...)” includes all the rights in focus of my analysis again (European Commission 2010: 16). The document stresses the importance of enhancing capacity or capacity building (more than 20 times) as well as the goal to empower (European Commission 2010: 17) civil society or individuals.

The general EIDHR documents emphasize the need to “empower” civil society to take on its tasks. Democracy promotion and development policies suppose that empowering the marginalized enables the emancipation of people. Empowerment is part of neo-liberal governmentality and makes individual responsible for her or his own destiny.

Although the calls for Turkey do not mention the notion of empowerment before 2007 the idea is already present earlier. Under the heading of protecting and respecting cultural diversity “the capacity and representation of disadvantaged groups (...), inter alia through providing assistance to obtain better access to justice” should be strengthened (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 3, 2005a: 4). The call of 2005 states that this should be done “through training on their rights” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005a: 2–3). In 2007 the term “empowerment” appears for the first time under the objective of “Enhancing political representation and participation”: “political participation and representation in the decision-making processes through the empowerment of organized civil society and citizens’ groups” and the “responsiveness and accountability of the ‘political society’” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 5). The following call for the year 2009 narrows down the key objectives to (1) “to strengthen the involvement of organised civil society in the shaping of local and national policies regarding human rights and democratic reform”, and (2) “to empower underrepresented groups” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 4). Thus, the EIDHR aims to increase civil society participation in
decision-making and to empower marginalized groups. As argued before both concepts constitute civil society and (underrepresented) citizens as self-responsible actors. These goals are of special importance in this call: “The global objective of this Call for Proposals is in order to empower these groups for active citizenship and enhance their representation in civil society” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 4, emphasis in original). Whereas the expected outcomes largely focus on political participation, the suggested activities reflect the aim of empowering “underrepresented groups”. Besides the creation of participation mechanisms and campaigning activities, CSOs can focus on “capacity building activities for the mobilisation of underrepresented groups” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 5).

For the years of 2010, 2011, and 2012 the EU reformulated their “two specific objectives” increasing the focus on civil society and human rights defenders: “To strengthen and/or increase civil society's involvement in the making, implementation and monitoring of human rights policies at local and national levels”; and “To support human rights defenders in their efforts to promote and strive for the protection and realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the local level” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2010: 4-5; emphasis in original, 2011a: 4, 2012: 4). Funds are supposed to empower human rights defenders by providing protection as well as by “strengthening capacities” through training and direct funding (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 5). The notion of human rights defenders stresses the idea of individuals being responsible for themselves. The rationality of increasing capacities is also present in the “Guiding Principles” for EU civil society support in Turkey for 2011-2015 formulated in 2010. The Commission intends to pursue its strategy by “strengthening the capacities of organised (active) citizens” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014a: 4–6).

The CSF – while largely focusing on empowering in terms of increasing operational capacities – also aims to empower civil society in the sense of enabling them to become a strong self-responsible actor: “The Civil Society Facility should focus on empowering CSOs (...) thus to be used as a means” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 15, emphasis in original). The CSF generally aims at the development of civil society and aims to – among other things – increase the “credibility” of civil society” (European Commission 2008b: 2).

Thus, the EU reaches out to the individual by addressing civil society. Neo-liberal governmentality constitutes the individual as being part of civil society (Foucault et al. 2008: 294–295). Following this paradigm, in turn NGOs funded and thus empowered by the EU are supposed to empower the individuals of their target group to take over responsibilities.
4.2.2. Civil society as provider of social services

Kurki (2011a: 358) emphasizes that the EIDHR constitutes CSOs as providers of social services. Within neo-liberal governmentality civil society takes over the responsibility to provide social services such as welfare or health services. Yet, I hardly find references to service provision of CSOs in the general EIDHR and the Turkey-specific EIDHR documents. The EIDHR might fund services in terms of training people providing services for marginalized groups as discussed in the section before but it hardly finances – at least the documents suggest so – projects that only provide social services.

One exception is the area of torture for which the EIDHR was willing to give funding. The strategy papers for 2002, 2007 and 2011 state that the EIDHR could support CSOs that deliver services to minorities (European Commission 2001: 38) or torture victims (European Commission 2007: 11, 2010: 21):

“EIDHR will also support rehabilitation activities which aim at restoring the victim’s right to remedy and reparation, and which takes an integrated approach encompassing elements of medical and social rehabilitation as well as of legal redress. Attention should be paid to the special needs of women and children. Activities should also contribute to strengthening the monitoring of the prevalence of torture, for example through providing data that can be used in prevention activities.”

Further, “[t]hese actions should seek to strengthen local professional capacity and networking and enhance the sustainability of local services’ capacity. A local organisation should therefore figure as project partner” (European Commission 2007: 11). Thus, the EIDHR stresses the need for taking care of torture survivors. However, this is not a traditional domain of the state as it is in most cases the state which tortures its citizens. Social service provision to torture victims is not constitutive for neo-liberal governmentality. The call for Turkey in 2009 includes “legal support services” as one possible action (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 5). Otherwise however the EIDHR calls for Turkey (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2012) exclude provision of social services from eligible actions. The calls of 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 state: “All actions aiming to achieve one of the specific objectives of Section 1.2 could qualify for financing, except for the following types of actions which are ineligible: (…) actions concerned only or mainly with directly delivering social services to target groups” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 9, emphasis in original; also see EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 9, 2010: 9, 2009: 8).

In contradiction to the calls, the first general document of the CSF (not for Turkey) stresses the role of CSOs in providing social services: “More, the limits of state action has led to an increased awareness of the potential role of civic organisations in the provision of public goods and social services, either separately or in partnership with state bodies” (European Commission 2008b: 13). However the following document says about CSOs in Turkey and the Western Balkans: “While the majority continue to focus on service delivery, an increasing number are engaging in advocacy,
lobbying and public policy. However, many CSOs have embraced advocacy only as it became a priority donor funding and overall influence remains scarce” (European Commission 2011a: 3). Thus, the Commission wants CSOs to move away from a service provision function. The document for Turkey does not state anything on social service delivery (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b). However, the CSF call for Turkey which introduces the Sivil Düşün Program says that “actions concerned only or mainly with directly delivering social services to target groups” were “ineligible” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2013b: 10–11). The statements clarify that the EIDHR in fact discourages CSOs to apply for projects that focus on providing social services to disadvantaged groups.

The conviction that civil society should not fill the gap of the state was also expressed in my interviews with people working for the EU Delegation (Interview K 2013; Interview C 2013). Although this does not necessarily mean that funded projects never include social service provision, the EIDHR documents clearly suggest that the EU does not constitute CSOs as providers of social services as neo-liberal governmentality and also Kurki (2011a: 358) suggest. Instead the focus of the EIDHR as well as of the CSF shifted to empower civil society in order to participate in political decision-making processes on human rights as I discuss in the following.

4.2.3. Consensus-making participation and pluralism
Instead of providing social services, the EIDHR increasingly focused on the idea of what the EU calls “civil society mainstreaming”: “Our aim is to mainstream civil society participation and to encourage authorities to work with civil society. (...) I mean that civil society is involved in decision-making in all stages”. Further: “We have an organic approach, we want to strengthen the capacity of civil society to participate in and to monitor issues, to help them improve the legal environment of the CSOs” (Interview C 2013). In an interview, the Vice Coordinator Assistant at STGM in Ankara, an intermediary organization between the EU and the CSOs set up by the EU Commission, emphasized this as well: “We have different projects but we always focus on the cooperation between civil society and the public sectors. We want to involve civil society in the political process” (Interview B 2013).

The TASCO glossary describes civil society participation as one way of empowerment: “Participation is the goal in itself; that is, participation is empowering of people in terms of their acquiring the skills, knowledge and experience to take control and ownership for their development” (EU TASCO 2010: 11). Further, “[p]articipation can be seen as a process of empowerment of the deprived and the excluded. (...) Participation in this sense necessitates the creation of organisations of the poor which are democratic, independent and self-reliant” (EU TASCO 2010: 11). Thus, the EU
connects civil society participation and empowerment. According to Haahr the ‘technologies of citizenship’ constitute individuals as “active citizens, (...)”, or members of self-managing communities and organizations” while the “technologies of involvement” produce an “active participants in common projects” (Haahr 2004: 218). The EU constitutes CSOs as active participants in the project of Turkish democratization.

Here, participation means that individuals become active in dealing with their own problems. In 2001 the EIDHR documents stresses that NGOs should influence policy-making and engage in a “participatory democracy” or “participatory governance” (European Commission 2001: 26). In total, the document refers to “participatory governance” or “participatory democracy” six times and mentions it as a crosscutting issue. In 2007 the idea of participatory democracy is formulated more explicitly as “political representation and participation” (European Commission 2007: 9–10). Consensus is to be reached on controversial issues as well as between opposing groups (European Commission 2007: 8, 16).

However, the policy includes two goals which seem contradictory at first: the idea of consensus-finding cooperation between civil society and the public sector and the idea of a pluralism of positions. In 2004 participation and pluralism appear together for the first time (European Commission 2004: 17). The strategy paper of 2007 mentions the goal of increasing pluralism seven times: the EIDHR should “enhance the inclusiveness and pluralism of civil society” (European Commission 2007: 9–10) and focus on

“assisting civil society to develop greater cohesion in working on human rights, political pluralism and democratic political participation and representation, in contributing to the peaceful conciliation of group interests, (...), thus becoming an effective force for positive change, through cooperation among civil society organizations and stakeholders” (European Commission 2007: 8).

The strategy document for after 2010 includes mentions the goal of “(political) pluralism” seven times. The ideas of political pluralism as well as of “political representation and participation” are most central under the second objective: “The emphasis will be on assisting civil society to develop greater cohesion in working on human rights, political pluralism and democratic political participation and representation, (...), thus becoming an effective force for positive change (...)” (European Commission 2010: 16). Under the third objective, “the inclusiveness and pluralism of civil society” and “political representation and participation” are to be enhanced (European Commission 2010: 17). Indeed, both participation and pluralism originate from the Habermasian liberal idea of deliberative democracy in which policies are made by finding a compromise starting from a plurality of positions. Pluralism further refers to the “liberal” goal of EU civil society programs namely to support human rights (see Dean 1999: 121–123). Yet there is a tension here between liberal and neo-
liberal rationalities. When civil society takes over and provides the resources for governing this is part of “Advanced Liberalism” (Walters and Haahr 2005: 122–126) or what I call neo-liberal governmentality. CSOs become responsible for governing in a way that it improves their own position.

Cooperating with stakeholders is one of the activities suggested by the document in 2010 as well: “Ideally, they [the projects] should aim at building broad coalitions of support of a wide range of local stakeholders and civil society organisations and contribute to empower local populations to continue claiming their rights beyond the life of the project” (European Commission 2010: 14). The EiDHR clearly defines the responsibility of civil society to build consensus among groups. In fact the priority of “building towards consensus on disputed or controversial areas of policy” (European Commission 2010: 17) is included under the second objective of “Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform (...)” (European Commission 2010: 16).

Regarding the role of civil society within democracy, participatory democracy is mentioned in the first documents and continues to be present in more explicit terms as “political participation and representation”. In addition pluralism has become a more prominent concept in the documents of 2007 and 2010. Interestingly, this focus on pluralism is not taken up by the calls for Turkey. “Pluralism of civil society” is only mentioned in 2004 and 2005 under the eligibility criteria (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005b: 8, 2005a: 4). Instead the calls focus on civil society participation.

The first calls for Turkey suggest that CSOs should strengthen “advocacy, raise awareness and promote lobbying” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2005a: 2–3, 2003: 2–3). Every priority includes that projects should “encourage advocacy” and “raise awareness” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 3). Advocacy and awareness are mentioned about three times in this context in each document (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003, 2005b). The call of 2007 then strengthens the focus on participation and consensus-making. Civil society is supposed to support the process of democratization by focusing on three issues which are the “pursuit of common agendas for human rights and democratic reforms”, “building towards a consensus on disputed controversial areas of policy”, and “enhancing political representation and participation” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 4–5). The call’s third priority becomes more increasingly important in later calls. It prioritizes the “political participation and representation in the decision-making processes through the empowerment of organized civil society and citizens’ groups” and the “responsiveness and accountability of the ‘political society’” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 5). As in the general strategy papers, there appears to be an increasing conviction that civil society has to participate in policy-making, to make political decisions respond to citizens’ needs and make political society accountable.
This call also introduces the idea of networking. In the call, “[c]ross-cutting issues” are the support for “networking and coalition-building among civil society”, the “regional balance” for selecting CSOs, and “the promotion of gender equality, the protection of the rights of women and children and concern for the environment” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 5). Networks and platforms have become a key idea to achieve the priorities. Civil society should create links with other civil society actors as well as with public institutions (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 5). Networking thus serves the purpose to engage with public actors.

The 2009 call mentions the “expected outcomes” of projects and focuses on creating consensus even between “opposing” interests and influencing decision-making: CSOs should “help achieve broad consensus between groups with opposing interests” and they “should establish platforms” and “formulate structured positions towards draft legislation” to influence decision-making in “controversial areas” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 5; emphasis added). However the term consensus as such is not present in the calls of 2010, 2011, and 2012 (EU Delegation to Turkey 2010, 2011a, 2012). Nevertheless, the EIDHR increased its focus on the involvement of NGOs in decision-making processes. The calls for Turkey have included this as a specific objective since 2009 (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 4) but reformulated it in 2010 as one out of two funding lots: “To strengthen and/or increase civil society’s involvement in the making, implementation and monitoring of human rights policies at local and national levels” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2010: 4; emphasis added; also see EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 4–5, 2012: 4–5). To promote human rights NGOs are supposed not only to monitor them – one liberal idea of civil society tasks – but also to participate in making and implementing them. Between 2010 and 2012 Turkish CSOs are only eligible for EIDHR funding when they either do a project about or including civil society involvement or when they support human rights defenders. Thus civil society mainstreaming moved to a center place in the EIDHR calls for Turkey whereas pluralism is not an important notion here.

Accordingly, the more recent CSF focuses on “participatory democracy”. The purpose of the CSF program was “to achieve: ‘A more dynamic civil society actively participating in public debate on democracy, human rights, social inclusion and the rule of law and with capacity to influence policy and decision making processes’” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 2; emphasis in original; European Commission 2011a: 2). Further the general CSF document describes as the expected result: “Increased intervention of CSOs to significantly impact public strategy and policy, across the region and at the European level” (European Commission 2008b: 32–33) assuming that “[p]ublic authorities and stakeholders recognize CSOs as providers of expertise in key topics” (European Commission 2008b: 33).
The CSF document claims that in Turkey “the participation of CSOs in policy-making is still weak” (European Commission 2008b: 8). The program should have three “outcomes” that are linked to this main objective of political participation. The legal environment of CSOs and their relations with “state institutions” should be improved; “Greater commitment and capacity of civil society organisations (...) networks to give citizens a voice and influence public sector reform process through analysis, monitoring and advocacy”, and the improvement of the possibilities of local CSOs to get access to funding with the help of more professionalized CSOs are goals (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 2).

The document further quotes from the Enlargement Strategy 2010-2011 for Turkey that constitutes the role of civil society as actors involved in political decision-making processes. In regard to the CSF it states: It “helps civil society organisations to strengthen their capacities and professionalism, allowing them to engage in an effective dialogue with public and private actors and to monitor developments in areas such as the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 3; emphasis added). The words participation, participatory, or participate occurs in the document more than 25 times as “participatory democracy/governance/approach/society” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 2,3,5,12,15) or as “participation of civil society/citizens/marginalized or underrepresented groups” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 4, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17) or as the verb to “participate in decision-making/platforms/networks” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 4,9). The Sivil Düşün call stresses the idea of creating networks and platforms between CSOs to be able to have an impact on decision-making:

“The specific objective 1 of this Call for Proposals is to contribute to the strengthening of capacities of existing or new national, regional (...), local and/or thematic platforms and networks of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to give citizens a voice and influence public sector reform processes through their activities” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2013b: 4; emphasis in original).

Although the Sivil Düşün document does not mention pluralism, the country fiche document for Turkey raises the concept of pluralism five times (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 3,4,5). The Enlargement Strategy stated that “civil society activities” should “strengthen the consensus for a pluralistic society” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 3). The CSF document defines “effective pluralism” as implying “the respect for human rights, the rule of law and the possibility for political chance. Civil society activities (...) mirror this pluralism” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 5). This discursive representation again reflects the liberal rationalities of the EU constituted by a pluralism of people with human rights.
Concluding, I found that the EU increasingly stresses the need for cooperation between civil society and the public sector and accordingly shifted the focus of its funding activities. At the same time the EU mixes a liberal notion of pluralism with a more neo-liberal notion of consensual decision-making which reflects the basic ambiguities of the EU and its foreign policies discussed in the previous section in this chapter as well as in the theoretical chapter. The focus on civil society participation prevails however: “Basically all areas require for a closer relationship with civil society e.g. social inclusion, employment, gender participation, child labor (but we cannot do all)” (Interview C 2013). Similarly, the STGM defines one of her goals being to improve the relations between civil society and the public sector. Accordingly the STGM is involved in a project call “Public Sector-Civil Society Cooperation” which I will discuss later. From a theoretical point of view, close cooperation between NGOs and political representatives corrupts and depoliticizes them. As suggested by the EU it might create consensus between “oppositional” discourses and thus eliminates different political positions.

4.2.4. Technologies of visibility and performance
The key aspect of neo-liberal governmentality is that it constitutes the individual as well as civil society as a self-entrepreneur, thus as a self-responsible actor that has to govern itself. Governing yourself is done by using technologies of visibility and performance. In this section I show that these technologies of visibility and performance are strongly (re)produced in the EIDHR documents. Here I see one of the clearest instances of neo-liberal governmentality.

The general EIDHR documents refer to the technologies as “management skills”: “Capacity building for grassroots should aim to improve their management skills and ability to design, apply, implement and sustain their activities” (European Commission 2001: 26; emphasis added). According to this document, improving management skills is important for local organizations. Further, the paper for 2005 to 2006 says that one problem was that southern NGOs so far received less funds than northern NGOs and “[t]o a large extent this is due to limited management and absorption capacities of southern NGOs (…)” among others (European Commission 2004: 12). In 2010 the EIDHR document in its “lessons learned” stressed the need for CSOs to have “project cycle management”: “EC Delegations are increasingly using the available envelope (…) to effectively contribute to building local organisations’ capacities on project cycle management and funding procedures” (European Commission 2010: 11). Thus the EU envisions for CSOs to develop the skills or what the EU calls “capacities” to manage projects using neo-liberal technologies.

One of these management requirements is being accountable. Accountability of civil society actors is integrated as a cross-cutting or mainstreaming issue just as empowerment and participation
Accountability refers to being effective in terms of input and output and in terms of achieving what is promised. Accounting thus means to make performance visible. However, the EU documents refer to being effective more often stressing that funding is based on cost-benefit considerations. The notion of effective(ness) is very central in all of the documents appearing 20 to 30 times in each one. The adjective effective is used in combination with different nouns such as effective measures [European Commission 2001: 15, 2007: 11], effective force (for political reform) [European Commission 2007: 2, 2010: 5], effective action (e.g. by civil society organizations) [European Commission 2007: 9, 2010: 16], effective outcomes [European Commission 2007: 8] and as effectiveness as such or effectiveness of action [European Commission 2007: 14] or of EIDHR projects [European Commission 2001: 22]. The strategy paper for 2005 and 2006 emphasizes that the EU wishes to “maximise the effectiveness, impact and visibility of the EIDHR” [European Commission 2004: 3]. Thus performance as in effective action is a key requirement for EIDHR projects.

In the general EIDHR documents the EU constitutes its own practices as making use of technologies of visibility and performance. For choosing activities to be funded as well as for evaluating these activities the document mentions the “likely effectiveness” as a key criterion. Measuring effectiveness – meaning output – expresses a neo-liberal rationality of cost-benefit calculations. The EU further wants to make the effects measurable. In 2004 the EIDHR document says that indicators to measure the impact of projects still had to be developed: “(...) an objective, genuine difficulty persists in ascertaining how to measure more precisely the effective impact of EIDHR operations by applying relevant performance and impact indicators” [European Commission 2004: 13; emphasis in original]. The next paper then mentions indicators and expected outcomes of projects: “(...) projects will be selected in the light of their expected results and likely effectiveness” [European Commission 2007: 15]. First results of projects should be visible in 2009 and 2010. Further: “The general indicators of the increased impact of civil society action on decision-making and political life in the countries covered will be found in media coverage, political discourse, quality of decisions and responsiveness of government to the concerns of civil society organisations” [European Commission 2007: 16].

Whereas the general EIDHR documents focus on defining the EU’s need to evaluate, review and report on the effectiveness of its policies, the EIDHR documents for Turkey are more specific on the requirements of CSOs regarding the visibility and the performance of their projects. The “Rules of this call for proposals” and the section on “Evaluation and Selection of Applicants” set out specific criteria for eligible applicants and the selection of projects. Although these parts of the calls are
largely similar, over the time period studied there are signs of an increasing presence of neo-liberal rationalities.

Regardless of what CSOs do with the funds, their actions are supposed to be “effective” in several ways. Projects have to be “cost-effective”. Thus, effective is here used as a synonym to efficiency which actually refers to using resources in the most optimal way whereas effectiveness is about achieving the intended impact. Cost-effectiveness is one category for the evaluation of project proposals: “It is (...) in the applicant’s interest to provide a realistic and cost-effective budget” and “costs must (...) comply with the principles of sound financial management, in particular value for money and cost-effectiveness” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 8). The “evaluation grid” specifies the criterion of budget and cost-effectiveness: The budget needs to be “clear and detailed” and “the proposed expenditure” must be “necessary for the implementation of the action” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 13; emphasis in original). The award criteria link the cost-effectiveness to effectiveness and sustainability of action:

“The award criteria allow (...) grants to be awarded to actions which maximise the overall effectiveness of the call for proposals. They cover such aspects as the relevance of action, its consistency with the objectives of the call for proposals, quality, expected impact, sustainability and cost-effectiveness” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2003: 12; emphasis added).

In 2007, the criterion of cost-effectiveness is complemented by the criteria “Effectiveness and Feasibility of action” as well as “Sustainability of action” for the evaluation of the concept notes applicants send in before being invited to send a full application (EU Delegation to Turkey 2007: 17–18). In 2011 and 2012 the criterion of effectiveness and feasibility includes a new aspect: the proposal should contain “objectively verifiable indicators for the outcome of the action” and an evaluation process (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011a: 17–18, 2012: 17–18). Thus the EU demands from the CSOs to be able to measure the impact of their actions “objectively” similarly to measuring economic gains. Thus CSOs have to set the goals they want to achieve by the end of the project, clarify which steps they take to achieve these and they measure whether they achieved these goals in the end. To prove their performance, they have to develop indicators and make their output visible. This all has to be linked to a budget which is as economic as possible. These elements are characteristic for neo-liberal governmentality (Walters and Haahr 2005: 122–126). As discussed in chapter three the technologies of performance and visibility are constitutive of the EU as such. For instance within the OMC the EU sets itself goals and guidelines and develop performance indicators and monitors its own performance (Haahr 2004: 219).

In addition to proposing an “effective and sustainable action”, applicants need to “demonstrate their capacity to manage activities” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 8). Every call from
2002 to 2012 includes this criterion. Management capacity is further mentioned under the heading of “operational and financial capacity” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 18) and refers to “staff, equipment and ability to handle the budget for action” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 19, 2005a: 12). In order to be able to receive funds CSOs thus have to have economic capacities. The calls imply that their normal capacities are not enough.

Similarly, the “Guiding Principles” for the EIDHR in Turkey express the need for effectiveness in all areas. Its goals are “effective improvements regarding the freedom of expression and assembly” and “effective civic participation in local, regional and national-level policy processes (...)” (European Commission 2011b: 5), the more “effectively” mobilizing of support, “effective advocacy skills” and “more effectively” (European Commission 2011b: 6) networking were necessary. While the principles stress the goals of spreading human rights, the demand for “effectiveness” implies that the effects or the output can be measured and thus would justify the input. As in the calls, the Guiding Principles itself list “indicators” to measure progress in the different areas and thus ensure its effectiveness (European Commission 2011b: 6).

Linked to the idea of impact is sustainability. Throughout the years, sustainability has been a criterion in the so-called evaluation grid for the full proposals: “Are the expected results of the proposed action sustainable?” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 18). Sustainable here means that there will be funds and institutions to carry on the activities after the funding ends. It also includes “local ownership” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 19). This stands in contrast to the short-term character of the funding and the idea that funding is not for the daily work of CSOs. Whether it is indeed feasible for CSOs to continue activities after EU funding has ended or whether EIDHR projects are limited to the funding period becomes relevant in the analysis of NGO work in Turkey. Similarly, the document stresses the “responsibility” of CSOs: They must “be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with their partners (...)” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2012: 7). Some calls stress the responsibility of the organizations in the application process (EU Delegation to Turkey 2009: 6, 2010: 13, 2007: 7, 8, 13, 2005a: 5, 2005b: 5). Even though the term “responsible” is hardly directly present in the calls, the way the documents set out the conditions and expectations for applications constitutes CSOs as actors being responsible to demonstrate their work as being effective and responsible in terms of impact, finances and long-term effectiveness.

The technologies of visibility and performance constitute civil society as economic actors in the process of applying for funding and designing the actions. Moreover, the idea of measuring impact pronounces how civil society work is constituted as economic. This idea has become more prominent
over the years. In addition, effectiveness has become more significant as a criterion in the calls. The more recently created CSF reflects these ideas. It aims to help CSOs to professionalize by increasing their capacities (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 2). In 2008 the general project document states: “The project aims to [c]ontinue promoting and enhancing the accountability, credibility of civil society sector and improving the institutional and operational capacity of CSOs in relation with all stakeholders in the region and EU, from large public to decision-makers” (European Commission 2008b: 2). Thus while including the goal of public-civil society cooperation, the first project purpose mentioned stresses the need to increase the “institutional and operational capacity of CSOs”. Further, it states that the CSF should “provide for training opportunities on subjects such as (...), communication, financial management, procurement rules and procedures; advocacy, monitoring and evaluation” (European Commission 2008b: 4). The CSF generally focuses on the means of CSOs and thus aims to enable or to empower CSOs to manage projects, thus to use technologies of visibility and performance. The program includes supporting networks of civil society, giving small ad-hoc funds, promoting “active citizenship”, and raising awareness among CSOs about EU funding options (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 7–10). The first component supports platforms and networks of civil society “through technical assistance, capacity building, training, exchange of information and best practices” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 7–10). This element gets the biggest amount of funding with € 1 000 000, followed by the fourth component with € 800 000 having a similar focus on training CSOs to increase their capacities. Here, CSOs should learn about the CSF funding opportunities, they get support “to develop knowledge and skills for fund raising, including pre-grant and post-grant training” and to be able to create “measurable and objectively verifiable indicators”. Thus, they are trained in how to make their performance visible. Further, they get training on how to distribute the outcome of projects to other actors, and “a pool of experts” for other CSOs should be established. Similarly to the EIDHR, there is a focus on small CSOs. Their “capacity needs” should be studied (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 10). The CSF aims to empower civil society by increasing its capacities. Here, capacities mainly refer to management capacities, in terms of running a project (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 10). Under the second and fourth components small grants are available for small NGOs are available to strengthen their material and organizational capacities (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 8, 10).

Under expected results the document lists several “measurable indicators” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 10). The indicators mainly rely on either an increase or decrease in numbers: increase in number of CSOs existing, CSO corporation, public campaigns, volunteers, income from membership, “of CSOs reports taken into consideration by public authorities”, in donors; and decrease in number of closed organizations, CSOs in court, CSO income from a one donor (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 11). The EU intends to measure its own performance with these
indicators in training CSOs. The EU teaches NGOs the way it works itself. As mentioned before, the CSF funding itself is to train CSOs in setting up “measurable and objectively verifiable indicators” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2011b: 10) for the effects of their activities. Thus, the EU tries to make its own work measurable and transfers this rationality to the CSOs it supports.

The call published within the CSF for Turkey includes the same eligible criteria as the EIDHR calls. CSOs have to prove the “financial and operational capacity”, the “effectiveness and feasibility of action”, the “sustainability of action” including financial sustainability, and the “budget and cost-effectiveness of action” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2013b: 22–23). Thus, even before receiving funding, they have to be able to make visible their expected performance and prove its effectiveness.

Already in 2000 the EU created an institution that is responsible for training CSOs in the neoliberal technologies needed for managing a project. The STGM receives all of its funding from the EU Delegation even though it continuously has to reapply for funding, but its funding can be regarded certain. In fact, the EU set up the STGM to act in between the EU and the domestic NGOs on the ground. A representative from the EU Delegation described them as an “EU supported CSO resource center” and “intermediary organization” (Interview C 2013). The homepage of STGM lists six objectives of which three are dedicated to increasing the capacities of NGOs:

1. to help civil organisations improve their work through specific studies and actions designed to fill in their gaps in information, material means and assertiveness, (...), 4. to help NGOs improve their organisational, institutional, managerial, financial and legal bases as well communication and human resources capacity by encouraging their participation to decision making processes, communication with the public at large, involvement in international cooperation and networks for communication and information exchange, (...), 6. develop methods to ensure the efficient, fair and principled use of support extended to NGOs” (STGM 2010b).

The last objective clearly refers to the idea of helping NGOs to receive funds; the first two objectives refer to improving NGOs in terms of their knowledge and their material situation as well as their “managerial bases” and “human resources capacity”. STGM Vice Coordinator Assistant made the focus of the organization’s work very clear:

“We do capacity building training. (...) We train local civil society organizations, give technical expertise and provide training facilities. (...) This is very important because we need to train them on project-building for EU funds, how to manage projects, funding, fundraising, manage volunteering, how to manage discrimination” (Interview B 2013).

The STGM assumes that Turkish NGOs need to learn how to conduct projects and be effective self-managers. About 400 NGOs participated in the organization’s trainings by March 2013 (Interview B 2013). CSOs can approach the organization in case they need help writing a project proposal, want to receive training or like to find a contact in Europe (STGM 2010a). The intermediary organization
channels the needs and activities of the NGOs. The STGM exists in order to increase the capacities of local NGOs to employ technologies of performance and visibility through trainings and technical support. Within the project “Civil Society-Public Sector Dialogue” funded by the EU Delegation and by the CFCU the STGM has the responsibility to train NGOs: “We are developing some training programs; also tailor-made trainings in cooperation with NGOs incorporating their request and their needs” (Interview B 2013). My interview partner stressed the importance of the technologies of making performance visible: “Monitoring and the drafting of reports are so important for rights-based NGOs. This makes them sustainable” (Interview B 2013). The STGM itself applies evaluation technologies to its own work: “An expert at Izmir University is developing a monitoring tool, how we can measure the outputs of the trainings for STGM and YADA” (Interview B 2013). The ideas of performance and the visibility of performance are central in this institution as for the EU as such.

In addition to the STGM, the EU Delegation funds TASCO. TASCO provides technical assistance to CSOs: “It is about coordination, facilitation, how to organize campaigns, (...) how to produce visibility” (Interview P 2013). Similarly, the representative of the EU Delegation stressed the need for visibility: “Technical assistance is about how to produce visibility” (Interview C 2013). The EU makes a contract with a service company which provides the trainings (Interview P 2013). TASCO is a regional project including Balkan countries and Turkey. In each participating country there is one organization responsible for its implementation whereas the Swedish Institute for Public Administration (SIPU) heads the Consortium. In Turkey the Human Resource Development Foundation (İnsan Kaynağını Geliştirme Vakfı, İKGV)¹⁰ was part of the first consortium and was part of the steering committee in the second round of the project (TASCO 2010b). The aim was basically to train NGOs in conducting projects by using technologies of the self, performance and visibility. In 2010, the TASCO brochure described the activities of TASCO as “capacity-building” and “networking activities”:

“This project assists CSOs in overcoming these challenges primarily through capacity-building activities such as trainings, e-learning, exchange of experience, advising, coaching etc. and networking activities such as kick-off, partnership and information events both at the national and regional level” (TASCO 2010b: emphasis in original).

In the brochure for the second project round between 2011 and 2013 it is stated that “TASCO’s mission is to increase and improve the capacity and actions of CSOs as well as their democratic role”

¹⁰ Business people and academics founded İKGV in Istanbul in 1988 to improve the situation of people migrating from the countryside to urban areas in Turkey. Thus, its original focus was on population development, migration and health issues (İKGV 2014a). Since then İKGV has conducted projects on the reproductive health of women, illegal trafficking, women’s “empowerment”, and civil society development (İKGV 2014b).
(TASCO 2014: 1). Thus, even though TASCO aims at contributing “to stimulate a civil society-friendly environment and culture” (TASCO 2014: 1), the focus is on increasing the capacities of NGOs to be able to use the technologies of visibility and performance needed for project management. TASCO held 6000 trainings with more than 19 800 people participating in them in the first project round between 2009 and 2011 (TASCO 2014: 11). TASCO produced a glossary with all the terms used in the EIDHR context. The handbook helps CSOs to understand the technologies needed for managing a project (EU TASCO 2010). Especially the definition of organizational capacity refers to technologies of visibility and performance: “The organisation’s potential to perform. Its ability to define and realise goals effectively, efficiently, and in a relevant and sustainable manner” (EU TASCO 2010: 10); all technologies of neo-liberal governmentality (Haahr 2004).

The existence of the CSF as well as of institutions such as the STGM and TASCO show how important the technologies of visibility and performance are in the EU’s civil society policies. The latter two organizations receive special funding from the EU to provide training in management for CSOs to enable them to apply and manage EU funds. Further, the EIDHR programs for Turkey over the period of 2002 to 2012 increasingly refer to the need of the CSOs to be able to perform and measure and make their performance visible. I hope to have shown that the technologies of visibility and performance are clearly dominant in the EU’s civil society promotion policies towards Turkey. In fact, they present a strong instance of the EU’s neo-liberal governmentality.

4.3. Conclusions
In this chapter I analyzed the documents of different EU civil society programs which provide funding for Turkish CSOs. As expected I showed that the EU’s programs heavily rely on representations of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality. I differentiated between both forms of governmentality and thus I drew a more complex picture of EU democracy promotion than suggested by Kurki (2011a) and others blurring the differences between liberal and neo-liberal governmentality in EU or foreign policies. I further related these findings to the wider EU context which is characterized by liberal and neo-liberal governmentality as well. Overall, the analysis brings the ambiguities of the EU’s civil society policy in general and towards Turkey to the light.

I began this chapter with analyzing whether and how the liberal notion of civil society as the sphere of legal, economic and social rights reproduced by the EU programs. I argued that it is indeed this very idea of a free legal, economic and social subject within the sphere of civil society on which the EIDHR is based. Not surprisingly, the EU civil society programs aim to promote peace and
democracy, goals constitutive for the EU project as such. Secondly, I showed that the EU’s civil society policy constitutes civil society as a check on the state, as a monitor of state practices be it policy-making, torture or violating freedom of expression. The idea of civil society as a watchdog of the state is widespread in the documents and constitutes a liberal conception of state and civil society. It is important to identify the liberal elements of the EU’s policies because they make it possible for civil society to politicize rights. For instance, monitoring human rights politicizes the violation of human rights as it criticizes the status quo and demands change.

Then, I moved on to analyze the elements of neo-liberal governmentality. I showed how the idea of empowering civil society is a cornerstone in the EU’s policies. The policies are supposed to empower civil society to take on their responsibility in all kinds of instances. However, not necessarily to support the provision of social services as suggested by Kurki (2011a) and the general literature on civil society and governmentality (Jaeger 2007; Paley 2002). Instead, CSOs and individuals are to be empowered to assume responsibility for their rights. In this concept, protection against discrimination is not the responsibility of the state or politics but of the individual. It moves the question of rights to the private sphere.

Moreover, increasingly civil society is seen to be a partner of government. CSOs should participate in political decision-making processes to become part of a consensus. Although civil society participation is increasingly mentioned in the EU policies, the idea of pluralism is brought up in parallel several times. I suggested that “pluralism” here refers to a Habermasian liberal idea of deliberative democracy that fits the co-existent liberal and neo-liberal nature of the EU’s policy and its tensions. However, the institutionalization of cooperation brings the risk of co-option and exclusion of parts of civil society. Yet it is unlikely that in Turkey politicians would agree to involve civil society actors in policy-making process as I will discuss in my analysis of the effects.

In any case, there is an even stronger instance of neo-liberal governmentality in the EU’s policy. The EU clearly refers to technologies of visibility and performance; technologies the EU itself employs in implementing its civil society policies. All civil society funds require the exercise of these technologies: applicants have to set their own goals, develop means to achieve these goals, document their actions and their budget, and measure their performance to make it visible. The literature argues that these technologies constitute CSOs as economic actors and reduce their roles to the one of a manager. The subjectivities of CSOs change accordingly and they decreasingly politicize their issues.

To summarize, my analysis of a wide range of EU documents including all EIDHR documents and calls for Turkey, the CSF, Sivil Düşün and TASCO as well as interviews conducted with individuals
working for these programs or institutions shows how ideas of liberal governmentality constitute conception fundamental for the programs while neo-liberal rationalities increasingly dominate the way CSOs are expected to work. Also the notion of including civil society in political decision-making became stronger over the period studied whereas social service provision is hardly promoted by the EU.

However, the neo-liberal rationalities underpinning the EU civil society policy in third countries do not have to have a depoliticizing effect on civil society, its discourses and practices because firstly, the liberal rationalities of the EU programs create opportunities for CSOs to politicize their issues in monitoring or campaigning practices. Secondly, even when subjected to neo-liberal rationalities civil society can change or resist them to some extent. Thirdly, as I suggested before how (de)politicizing neo-liberal rationalities are depends on the context of discursive struggles CSOs act in. For instance, creating transparency or conducting projects involving citizens might increase the legitimacy of a CSO that was under state pressure before and makes the public discussion of its demands possible.

In the following, I will analyze how the effects play out in the practice of the projects funded and in the discourse of the CSOs in Turkey. As the discursive context of CSOs matters for such an analysis, I will first draw a picture of the hegemonic struggles over the issues on which Turkish CSOs funded work.
Chapter 5

Discursive struggles in Turkey between 2002 and 2013
I will now turn to the effects of these policies in Turkey. In order to be able to understand whether and how depoliticization of specific issues CSOs tackle might occur, I will first give an analysis of the different discursive struggles over these issues. I point out the positions of the NGOs within these struggles although I will elaborate on this in more detail in the following chapter.

Many scholars (for instance see Alpan and Diez 2012; Kuru 2006; Yavuz 2009b) argue that there is a divide between a pro-Islam and a Kemalist discourse in Turkey. This divide made the articulation of alternative positions such as liberal ones impossible. I agree that the space to express alternative positions has become smaller again since 2008. Yet, I am interested in the period before as well and in how discursive struggles over specific issues played out. This way I can largely avoid reproducing the binary divisions and get a more comprehensive picture of the existing discourses and the EU’s effects on them. This analysis will show that liberal positions were possible in some instances. I will analyze the discursive struggles on women’s rights, LGBT rights, Kurdish rights, and rights of immigrants and refugees. As argued in chapter three, these four topics are constitutive for Turkey’s political struggles over democratization and human rights. For instance, the issue of Kurdish rights was one of the central themes of the AKP’s terms in government and questions understandings of the Turkish nation. Women’s rights issues have been equally important as visible in the debate on the headscarf. The rights of LGBT and refugees also gained importance although they present rather new issues of political debate. However, this is why they are especially interesting to study in terms of the effects of EU civil society funding.

I show that the discursive struggles in the four different issue areas are complex incorporating diverse discursive positions. For example, there is not just one Muslim position or one Kemalist position on the issues. There are more liberal, more left and more conservative ones on every spectrum. Moreover, while the discourse trying to become hegemonic aims to divide the discursive space, this does not mean that there is only one coherent ‘other’ discourse on the side of the antagonistic chain. The antagonistic chain could include several opposing positions. My analysis will show that different discursive groups join one side on different issues.
5.1. Discursive struggles over women’s rights

Debates around women’s rights are often framed as religious rights and the other way around. Thus, the rights of women have been at the center of debates about democratization and modernization during my study period in Turkey (Göle 2008). As the debates on women’s rights circle around many different aspects, I chose two different issues here. I selected the headscarf and the abortion debate because they both demonstrate the complexity of the struggle over women’s rights in Turkey. The headscarf debate has served as a symbol in the political struggles in Turkey especially since the 1990s, while the abortion debate is a more recent phenomenon and points to a changing discursive context. Both topics have been important for women’s CSOs in Turkey. The government’s attempt to lift the headscarf ban in early 2008 was a trigger for an intensified struggle between a rather Muslim and a strictly Kemalist discourse leading to the attempt of the Kemalists to close the AKP. It is especially interesting that the headscarf debate managed to unite Muslim and liberal parts of society. However – as I will show in the second part – discursive struggles over the right of abortion (and caesarians) produced a new division between those sides.

5.1.1. The headscarf debate

The headscarf debate is an example of a discursive struggle in which the pro-Islamic forces pursued an offensive hegemonic strategy questioning the status quo of the ban of headscarves in public institutions and offices. It is an example of an offensive-hegemonic discourse which managed to integrate other discourses such as the liberal ones. While the headscarf issue can be framed as an issue of religious rights, a human right or women’s rights as well as a restriction of rights, here I discuss the headscarf issue under the heading of women’s rights because – as I will show – the discursive struggles focused on the rights and the role of women in society as well as the general notion of human rights.

I begin my analysis with looking at the discourse that the offensive one aims to overcome. For the longest time a discursive position of ‘no headscarves in public’ was dominant. This has to do with Turkey’s history. Wearing a headscarf in the Turkish public can create fierce reactions. The wives of several AKP politicians’ for instance were faced with not being invited to official events because people wearing a headscarf are seen to be “against the system” (Seckinelgin 2011: 144; Hale and Özbudun 2010: 85). At first sight, the headscarf debate appears to reflect the division of society between secularism and Islamism (for a critical engagement see Göle 2008). Since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, women were supposed to reflect the image of a westernized Turkey (Altan-Olcay 2009: 169). They took part in Turkish public life because an active role of women in public life meant progress and modernization. Even though in the private realm Turkish women were still
subordinate to men, legally up until the New Civil Code of 2001, the image of the urban, educated, working woman is part of Turkey’s secularist identity (Seckinelgin 2011: 139–141). In the coup of 1997 when the military had taken over power it banned the headscarves from all public institutions (Pope and Pope 2011: 354). The headscarf was associated with being backwards, uneducated, or outsiders, in fact quite similar to how veiled women have been perceived in European countries such as France where they are seen as immigrants that do not integrate (Gökarıksel and Mitchell 2005: 148; Gole 2006: 250). However in many EU states, there is a double-standard when it comes to the display of religious symbols, such as in Germany where crucifixes in the classrooms are allowed but the headscarf is regarded a problem. Although in January 2015 the German Constitutional Court decided that teachers had to be allowed to wear headscarves in school (Deutsche Welle 2015).

As Nilüfer Göle (2003: 817) argued, in Turkey women with headscarves do not symbolize subordination and backwardness any longer, instead veiled women go to universities, live in cities and are visible in society. Women wearing headscarves in public express a sense of social and religious belonging and wearing the headscarf symbolizes a modern choice. Yet, secular women continue seeing women with headscarf as a threat to the secularist nature of the state, and in Turkey secularism has been a security referent and thus needs to be secured (Bilgin 2008a: 141). But as we will see, the headscarf debate does not simply divide Turkey’s discourses in secularist and Islamists. Rather, it “exposed disagreements between liberal and authoritarian secularists” (Göle 2008: 36).

As Turkey has always been a Muslim society, the headscarf has been part of Turkish culture. There are different kinds of headscarves in Turkey nowadays carrying different meanings. The old cotton-style headscarf called yemeni is accepted because this kind of covering was popular on the countryside by older women and is seen as traditionally Turkish. A loosely worn kerchief called eşarp is still worn by the generation of the urban elites’ grandparents. What has caused polarization and struggling discourses in Turkey is the modern way of veiling preferred by young Muslim women in the urban centers. The so-called tesettür is often a headscarf combined with a long coat and is made of silk or polyester. Women wearing the tesettür want to express “a desire to be modern, fashionable, and urban while expressing their Muslim faith” (White 2013: 89). A whole fashion industry developed that offers an immense choice of different modern headscarves (Gökarıksel and Mitchell 2005). In the 1980s when it was allowed for women to wear the headscarf, the state called it türban while women continued using the term başörtüsü (Saktanber and Corbacioglu 2008: 519–520).

Since the AKP came into power in 2002 it pursued the goal of lifting the headscarf ban in Turkish universities and schools. Fearing the ban of their pro-Islam party the government did not tackle the issue before it won the following elections in 2007. In February 2008 the parliament
passed the constitutional amendment that would have allowed students to wear the headscarf at universities. For lifting the ban, the AKP sought the support of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). Representatives of both parties met several times to agree on the amendments to articles ten and 42 (Zaman 2013a). Even though the liberal parts of society criticized the AKP for cooperating with the highly nationalist MHP, liberal NGOs such as human rights groups generally supported lifting the headscarf ban (Saktanber and Corbacioglu 2008; Seckinelgin 2011) as I discuss later. As the AKP managed to pass the law, the opposition party, Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; CHP), declared only days later that it would appeal to the Constitutional Court as they saw the amendment to be against the second article of the Constitution that stated the nature of the Turkish state as being secular among others as well as against the fourth constitutional article that stated that the first three articles were not to be changed (Zaman 2008). To defend and spread its position, the AKP expressed the need to lift the headscarf ban by setting it equal to freedom of religion, women’s rights and democracy and thus a liberal, modern and European image of Turkey (also see Göle 2008: 36). Their discourse connected the representation of a modern democratic Turkey with the need to allow traditional practices part of Turkish historic and present times. In the end of January 2008 Baykal of the CHP stated that changing the constitution meant a threat to the secularist nature of the state. The turban was imposed by Islamist countries and was not Turkish because it was not the headscarf of the Turkish women in Anatolia. It was a “yabancı üniforma”, a foreign uniform (Radikal 2008; Haberler 2008). This statement refers to ideas of what it means to be Turkish and the need to protect this against the danger of Islamist countries. Erdoğan replied by also invoking ideas of Turkishness. He asked Baykal how democratic he was if he did not accept other views. Erdoğan repeated over and over again that he did not want a dictatorial regime. He claimed that 70 to 80 years ago in Anatolia a women would not go out without her headscarf and how this would fit into his worldview (Milliyet 2008). Thus a discursive split evolved between a pro-headscarf position referring to the headscarf as being something traditional in Turkey that has even been there when Kemalists governed Turkey and something wanted by the majority of the people and a no-headscarf position which was undemocratic and not Turkish. However, as stated before liberal parts of society supported the AKP’s line of argumentation.

In June 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the amendments unconstitutional. Moreover on the grounds of AKP’s attempt to lift the headscarf ban, the Constitutional Court made an attempt to close the AKP (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 71–74). Regarding this decision and the position of the CHP Erdoğan said that only the CHP would defend this kind of Zeitgeist, and that he could not see anyone else neither academics nor politicians defending this kind of Zeitgeist (Cumhuriyet 2008). While here the CHP relied on the importance of supposedly secularist values, the AKP claimed to be more liberal and modern in its position. Although the Kemalist CHP opposed the amendments, the
party was not completely rejecting the idea as one of their representatives had stated that the problem was not the headscarf but the turban. Thus, the headscarf might be allowed whereas the turban had to be forbidden (Türköne 2008). They saw a difference between headscarf and turban. The CHP took a first attempt to close the discursive gap and adapt its position to an increasingly hegemonic one, however still trying to fight it constitutionally.

As it turned out, in 2008 the decision was only postponed. With the AKP gaining more support and after winning the referendum on various constitutional changes in 2010, the AKP government declared it would support every student discriminated because of wearing a headscarf. In the following, the Higher Education Council of Turkey (YÖK) stated that universities should allow students to wear the headscarf which resulted in most universities accepting women to wear headscarves (White 2013: 88). Not only the AKP pushed for allowing students to wear headscarves but the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) strongly supported lifting the ban. In October 2010 a BDP deputy introduced a motion to the parliament to remove all barriers for women wearing headscarves in Turkish universities (Hürriyet Daily News 2013e). Interestingly, it was during this time that Baykal from the CHP, once a strong opponent of headscarves, considered allowing women with headscarf to register for their party. This is a sign that the CHP had to move towards a more liberal stance on this issue (Cumhuriyet 2010) and adjusted to the rising hegemonic discourse.

Following the lifting of the ban for students, Erdoğan suggested that academics working at the university had to be allowed to wear the headscarf. He asked what happens when the university students wearing headscarves want to work at the university. Erdoğan stressed that the right to wear a headscarf was part of democracy stating that “the US has it. Japan has it. Europe has it. Turkey does not” (Radikal 2011). He firstly stresses that everyone should have access to education and jobs she or he wishes to pursue, and secondly that the right to wear a headscarf was western and European. This implies that a democracy had to allow women to wear the headscarf.

In the context of drafting the new constitution, there were debates about allowing civil servants to wear the headscarf. The government stated that there was no need to change the constitution for this because the constitution itself did not make a ban necessary (Hayatsever 2013). The AKP’s position is supported by the Muslim women’s NGO AK-DER which expressed that the problems of women wearing a headscarf were not caused by the constitution but by a “pro-ban mentality” in Turkey (Zibak 2013). The Kemalist CHP opposed the idea to allow public servants to wear headscarves (Hayatsever 2013).
When the AKP government presented the democratization package of 2013, it emphasized that the reforms abolished the ban to wear headscarves in public (Hürriyet 2013b). One month after the law allowed headscarves in public institutions, four members of the Turkish parliament appeared for the first time wearing headscarves. That day Erdoğan made an announcement on the headscarf issues. He said that lifting the ban was another step towards “normalization”. He linked the public appearance of deputies with headscarves to the democratization process of Turkey (Hürriyet 2013d). He talked about the founding days of the Turkish Republic and concluded that the headscarf ban was not in the name of the founders of the Republic and in the name of equality in a majority Muslim country. He further said – drawing a bifurcation between the AKP’s discourse and the CHP’s one – that many authoritarian regimes misused the name of the republic. He continued: “Democracy is not – how it was many years claimed – in contradiction to the republic but an integral part” (Hürriyet 2013c). Thus, the pro-headscarf discourse sets different elements equivalent: right to wear a headscarf, democratization, Turkish Republic, normalization. By referring to the founder and the principles of the Turkish republic this discourse integrates a reference usually made within the discourse of the other side. It accuses Kemalists of being authoritarian and not taking the principles of Atatürk seriously. It draws a dividing line between the pro-headscarf and democracy discourse and contra-headscarf and supposedly undemocratic discourse. The BDP expressed a similar discourse putting a stronger emphasis on women’s rights though. Gültan Kışanak, the head of the BDP, stated: “Today the solution of the headscarf question is a big improvement for us. It is a gain in equality. Especially for women this is a big gain in equality. It is a response to the Alevi’s demands for equality” (Zaman 2013c). Already in January of 2013, BDP member of the parliament Altan Tan turned in a parliamentary motion to allow women to wear headscarves in school and in public institutions. In his statement he stressed the context in which the headscarf ban came about – the so-called 28 February events referring to the last military coup of 1997 – reminding the parliament of the unjust actions of the military and stressing the need to change the law introduced under military rule (Hürriyet 2013a).

It does not come as a surprise that the cause was and still is most strongly promoted by Muslim women’s NGOs (Seckinelgin 2006: 761–762) such as for instance AK-DER, ÖZGÜ-DER and the Muslim human rights CSO Mazlumder (Kadioğlu 2005). These organizations fought for the right to wear the headscarves since their beginnings. Mazlumder refers to this right as a human right and stresses that Turkey is a Muslim majority country. The ban was “haksız ve huküsüz” (without rights and unlawful) (Mazlumder 2012d). Kader refers to the right to wear the headscarf as a legal right (Özipek 2008). The trade union Memur-Sen is strongly lobbying for allowing public servants to wear the headscarf (Yıldırım 2013).
On the other side were Kemalist organizations such as The Association for Kemalist Thought or The Association for the Support of Modern Life of Turkey that considered allowing the headscarf as a threat to the modern secular Turkish woman (Seckinelgin 2011: 142). Yet, the business organization TÜSİAD that used to be strictly Kemalist but have become more supportive of the government seems more favorable than before. Similarly, the women’s business organization TİKAD is strongly in favor of lifting the ban (Yildirim 2013).

Much more support has come from human rights groups neither defined as Muslim nor as Kemalist such as the human rights organization İHD which has continuously put out statements on the issue. In 2002 İHD sent a letter to Ahment Necdet Sezer, then president of Turkey and member of the CDP, as well as to other CHP politicians. The CSO said that they were against any “locking in of women at home and excluding of women from the public on the base of what they wear”. They described the issue to be one of human rights and democratization (Yeni Şafak 2002). In 2007, the head of the organization stated that the headscarf ban represented violence against women (Haberler 2007). In 2012 İHD published a statement on the headscarf issue stating that it was not the public which could decide over what someone wears and that the headscarf ban excluded women from society (İHD 2012). The oldest LGBT organization KAOS-GL supported the “Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği” (Capital Woman Platform Foundation) in its demands to allow women with headscarves to work in the public sector in 2013. The women’s rights CSO Kamer supported their demands framed as women’s rights (Kaos GL 2013c). Some liberal women’s NGOs however are skeptical of allowing religious symbols in public service (Yildirim 2013). Overall, the pro-headscarf discourse was strongest among Muslim parts of society such as in the AKP and Islamic human and women’s rights organizations. Still, it managed to integrate liberal groups of society including formerly rather Kemalist groups. Liberal human rights organizations took up the framing of the right to wear the headscarf as a human and women’s right that has to be guaranteed in a democracy.

I demonstrated that the discourse for the right to wear the headscarf drew on the representations of human, women’s and religious rights in the context of democratization. It stressed the individual decisions of women what to wear. It referred to the right to have access to jobs as well as to the tradition of Turkey as a majority Muslim society. It tried to draw a division between itself and the other side that is portrayed as undemocratic, illegal (law passed under military rule), ignorant of Turkish history or with a wrong interpretation of Kemalism, excluding women and being anti-European. The pro-headscarf discourse was in a marginalized position in the beginning – as seen by the party closure case against the AKP on the grounds of lifting the headscarf ban – but managed to become dominant including liberal parts of society and even pressure members of the Kemalist party and organizations to express more favorable positions. This was possible because it described
its cause to be democratic, modern and European. Using these references was also an attempt to question the original linking of secularism and belonging to Europe or the west (Bilgin 2008b: 602). As Pinar Bilgin (2008b: 596) argues secularism “could also be read as a response to non-military and non-specific security concerns rooted in the ambivalence of European/international society toward Turkey’s difference”. Instead the hegemonic discourses links displaying Muslim religion to being European and democratic. This is also interesting against the background that in 2004 the European Court of Human Rights confirmed Turkey’s headscarf ban when the Turkish student Leyla Şahin brought her case to the court. She was banned from university because she was wearing a headscarf (Gole 2006: 250).

Nevertheless, the pro-headscarf discourses successfully referred to “democratic” making it a general discursive representation standing in contrast to all the elements of the antagonistic chain (table 11). Based on my analysis I conclude that the offensive hegemonic discourse was mainly expressed by the AKP government and supported by other parts of society such as human rights organizations, Kurdish parties and organizations as well as some Kemalist groups. However, the discourse tried to create a discursive split between itself and the strictly Kemalist discourse. That some parts of the Kemalist discourse gave up its strict opposition is one the one hand a sign of the success of the offensive hegemonic discourse and on the other hand points to the different discursive positions within bigger more fundamental discourses.

Table 11: Offensive hegemonic discourse “Right to wear a headscarf”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chain of equivalence</th>
<th>women’s rights, human rights</th>
<th>tradition and history</th>
<th>democratic, modern, European</th>
<th>access to education and jobs</th>
<th>individualism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>freedom of religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suppression of religion</td>
<td>Kemalist secularism</td>
<td>foreign</td>
<td>not democratic</td>
<td>exclusion of women</td>
<td>not European</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But it is questionable that the AKP government is concerned about other issues of women’s emancipation as well (Bilgin 2008a: 150) as the following part will show. In the next part of this chapter, I will analyze the discursive struggles over an issue that has to do with women’s rights and religious rights/values: the right of abortion. The next part will show that in these issue areas there is no consensus between Muslim and liberal parts of society – a symbolic development for the last years of study period.

11 The single elements of the chain of equivalence stand in contrast to one or several elements of the chain of antagonism. However, the element in bold can be seen to be in contrast to all elements of the chain of antagonism and thus comes close to being an empty signifier enabling the discourse to become hegemonic.
5.1.2. The abortion debate

After having analyzed the issue mostly debated in relations to women’s rights in the study decade, I will now turn to the issue of abortion which became the center of discussion in 2012. The analysis will show that discursive struggles changed since the headscarf debate. Turkish law allows a woman an abortion up to ten weeks of pregnancy; if the woman is married, she needs the husband’s consent. In case of health risks women do not need the husband’s permission and further might get an abortion after more than ten weeks. In 2012, the right to abortion was contested when Erdoğan stated that women who aborted children were murderers. Erdoğan made the first comment on abortions during a speech about the Uludure incident. The Uludure incident refers to the killing of 34 Kurdish smugglers which were thought to be PKK militants by the Turkish military in 2011. Speaking to women at the AKP branch in Ankara Erdoğan said: “I see abortion as murder, and I call upon those circles and members of the media who oppose my comments: You live and breathe Uludere. I say every abortion is an Uludure” (Radikal 2012b). Erdoğan refers to an event which was a shock to the Kurdish as well as the liberal parts of society in Turkey. By drawing such a parallel between abortions and the killings in Uludure he antagonized the liberal and Kurdish discourses.

In fact he had already made a statement on abortions and caesarians one day earlier at a conference about population development in Istanbul. He stated: “I love children. In my country I want everyone to have at least three children because I know that young people create dynamism in our aging society” (Radikal 2012a). He linked the demographic and the economic development to the issue of abortion. He further called women who abort murderers: “I also clearly say that I am a prime minister that is against birth by caesarians. I see every abortion as murder. (...) There is no difference in a mother killing her child before and after birth” (Radikal 2012a). A few days later Erdoğan once again commented on the abortion and caesarian issue when opening a private hospital. This time he stated that he was against caesarians because a woman who has had a caesarian could not have more than two children. He further announced that his government was preparing a law to ban abortions reasoning again that abortions equaled murders. Further, he compared Turkey to European countries and the US claiming that these states had similar laws against abortions. This implies that the Turkish law was not discriminatory or anti-democratic. At the same time he stressed the religious necessity to ban abortions: “In the US there is a terrible fight over abortions. Bans exist. In many parts of Europe it is the same. We are working on it. This is important to us. Allah forbid, that these things and death threats are separate questions” (Radikal 2012c).

Erdoğan was faced with strong criticism from the side of the Kemalist party CHP as well as from street protests which were organized by feminist groups. He addressed the feminist groups by denouncing their protest as “feminist propaganda” and calling women murderers. He said: “There is
a right to live. We are talking about life in development. If the baby is killed inside the body life is also killed. For us it is the same”. He further repeated the claim that women who give birth with caesarians could not have more than two children. In addition he accused the hospitals of trying to make more money with caesarians (Radikal 2012d) thus blaming them for bad morals and self-interests.

Erdoğan tried to challenge an existing dominant discursive position which was the right to abortion. He did this by creating a chain of equivalence setting no abortions equal with having many children equal with a dynamic Turkish society. He further reasoned that it was in Allah’s will to not have abortions. Dividing the discursive space he set abortions equal with murder equal with the Uludure killings equal with being immoral and being anti-western. He discredited the other side as pursuing feminist propaganda, thus not being credible. He further linked the issue of caesarians to having abortions as he represented it as a threat to the fertility of women that could not have more than two children with a caesarian.

Although Erdoğan created a discursive division the anti-abortion discourse did not manage to include other discourses such as the more liberal or the Kemalist ones. In contrast, the abortion debate increased the distance between a rather Islamic discourse and societal liberal discourses that had almost been closed during the headscarf debate. Women protested on the streets in Istanbul for their right to abortion. The civil society platform “Kürtaj Haktır! Karar Kadınların Platformu” (Right to abortion! The decision of women’s platform”) was founded. Among others the women’s organizations Amargi, Kamer as well as Mor Çatı are members. Further, women’s groups of the BDP, the socialist party as well as of unions participate (Kürtaj Haktır! Karar Kadınların Platformu). The platform organized country-wide protests on 8 June 2012 and distributed a press release which was read out at the protests. Among others it demanded that women were allowed to abort a child until 12 weeks into pregnancy. In the first four to six weeks it was too dangerous for the women to have an abortion. Yet this was suggested by the new law of the government which aimed to ban abortions after the sixth week of pregnancy. The platform said that the decision of abortion should not be given to a private company, done in unhealthy conditions and dependent on the doctors’ consciousness. Further, the platform pointed out that women were often referred to as synonymous with family (Kürtaj Haktır! Karar Kadınların Platformu 2012). Already on 3 June three thousand women and men joined protests in Istanbul against the government’s plans. The protestors carried signs saying “It is my body, so who are you?”, “Abortion is my choice, murder is men’s method,” “AKP, keep your hands off me” as well as “Uludere is a massacre, abortion is a right” referring to the initial comment made by the prime minister (Yezdani 2012).
In addition to the civil society groups – especially the women’s CSOs – the CHP opposed the law proposed. The head of the CHP parliamentary group, Akif Hamzaçebi, said that Turkey’s slowdown in population growth was similar to that of other developing countries and thus normal. It was not appropriate to intervene in the decisions of a couple” (Zeyrek 2012). Another deputy of the CHP, Aylin Nazliaka, said: “The prime minister should stop standing guard over women’s vaginas” (Milliyet 2012).

In June 2013, the AKP government introduced the project called “aile olmak” (to be a family). Erdoğan stressed that family was important in Turkish culture and civilization. Again he linked abortions and caesarians to the development of Turkish population suggesting an international conspiracy against Turkey and the growth of the Turkish population:

“The growth of population should not decrease as in some of our neighboring countries. In this country for years mechanisms for birth control were provided. Our citizens, our people were castrated so to say. For medical interventions they did everything. These interventions are abortions and caesarians. Everything they did, and everything they do is practically murder. They were basically betrayed, they said that when you died they would save you from dying” (Radikal 2013c).

The AKP government did not ban abortions, but women who get a medically unnecessary abortion after the ten week time frame face legal punishment. The Turkish Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology claimed that the online system of the state hospitals stopped showing the code for abortions making it impossible for doctors to carry out (Hürriyet Daily News 2014). Further, women who choose to have an unnecessary caesarian can be punished by law (Shafak 2012b).

During the Gezi Park protests many demonstrators carried signs saying “Abortion is a right” and similar ones. Although the government did not change much in terms of policy, the discourse pursued by the AKP divided the society. It especially alienated the so-called liberals from the AKP voters. Thus at the end of the study period, the AKP was not successful in creating a general representation for their demands to which many discursive positions could agree. Table 12 suggests a chain of equivalence and antagonism as presented in my analysis.

Table 12: Offensive hegemonic discourse “No right to abortion and caesarians”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chain of equivalence</th>
<th>population growth, dynamic society</th>
<th>family</th>
<th>(Muslim) values</th>
<th>right to live – human rights</th>
<th>US, European</th>
<th>fertility of Turkish women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chain of antagonism</td>
<td>murderers</td>
<td>immoral</td>
<td>conspiracy against Turkey</td>
<td>Uludure</td>
<td>feminist propaganda</td>
<td>money-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Considering both debates – the debate on the headscarf and on abortions – together, we see how the discursive space is divided into different discursive groups depending on the specific issue in the struggles over women’s rights and the point in time. In the beginning, the dominant pro-Islamic discourse and more liberal discourses – Kemalist and non-Kemalist ones – agreed on a pro-headscarf discourse. A few years later, both discursive groups are split over the question of abortion. Instead liberal and Kemalist discourses share the same pro-abortion position. Similarly, discourses divided when in 2004 the AKP government attempted to criminalize adultery right before the EU wanted to start negotiations. Then, EU pressure was too high and Erdoğan agreed to drop the article on adultery in turn for the opening of negotiations (Fisher Onar and Müftüler-Baç 2011). LGBT rights – which I will turn to now – divide discourses in similar, yet different ways.

5.2. Discursive struggles over LGBT rights

The rights of LGBTs were less prominent on the political agenda and in the public debate in Turkey. This in itself indicates that LGBT people were marginalized in Turkey for a long time. Prejudices against homosexuals run deep: 84 per cent of Turkish people do not want to have homosexuals living in their neighborhood according to a study of the World Values Survey (Shafak 2012a). Thus, a discourse that tries to bring forward their rights was a counterhegemonic one at the beginning of the 2000s. Just as in other European countries LGBT issues eventually became a topic of debate. The analysis of the discursive struggle over LGBT rights points to a maybe somewhat contradictory finding for the end of my study period: On the one hand, LGBT issues did not enter the center stage of public debate and are largely neglected. On the other hand, there is an incrementally increasing acceptance of LGBT individuals almost across ideological lines in Turkey without strong polarization.

The offensive-hegemonic discourse has largely been expressed by LGBT organizations. However, here I will largely restrict my analysis to discursive articulations present in the public media as explained in the methodology chapter. Nevertheless, this entails statements of CSO representatives.

In the beginning of the study period LGBT rights were hardly discussed in Turkish media and LGBT organizations were threatened by closure. In 2008, Lambda, an organization that works as a community center, was closed by a local court in Istanbul. However, the Supreme Court declared the ruling unconstitutional and stopped the closure (Amnesty International Turkey 2009). In 2009 the murder of Ahmet Yıldız, an openly gay man, became known as the first known so-called gay honor killing as his father killed him for being gay (Shafak 2012a). LGBT organizations tried to make clear
that one should not use the term honor killing as honor refers to a concept that has been legitimate in Turkish law. They also demanded “justice” for the murder of Yıldız (Akkuş and Şahan 2013). The Yıldız case was the first killing of a homosexual by a family member that became this public. The publicity was increased by the film “Zenne” which is based on Yıldız’s story. It won several Turkish film awards and was discussed in Turkish media such as in the Hürriyet and the Radikal (Aydemir 2012; Vural 2011).

Even though the situation of LGBT people remained to be very difficult in Turkey, it is not acceptable to discriminate against them in public any longer (Akkuş and Şahan 2013). LGBT organizations successfully referred to LGBT rights as “human rights” and as part of democratization. KAOS-GL, the oldest LGBT CSO, for instance defines its goals to be the fight discrimination based on sex, gender, race, language and including the defense of all human rights (Kaos GL 2011). The CSO called on the general court of Turkey and the head of the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish government to respect the right to different sexualities when the court ruled on the newspaper Vakit calling homosexuals “perverse”. The court ruled that this had crossed the line of journalistic criticism (Benli 2012).

In fact, Erdoğan referred to LGBT rights as human rights several times. When he ran for prime minister for the first time he was asked on LGBT rights during his election campaign. He answered: “LGBT human rights must be protected by the law. There have been incidents on TV shows in which they have been treated inhumanely” (Kaos GL 2002). He reaffirmed his position when visiting the office of KAOS-GL in 2010: “The rights of homosexuals are also human rights”. He promised that in the framework of the “democratic opening” the new constitution would include sexual orientation and gender identity in the article on equality and non-discrimination (Kaos GL 2010). However, it is exactly the inclusion of LGBT rights in new legislation which has created new debates. In May 2013 the opposition party CHP – with the support of the BDP – introduced the Equality Bill into Turkish parliament. The bill was supposed to legally protect gender identity and sexual orientation. Binnaz Toprak of the CHP who sponsored the bill stated:

“LGBT individuals face serious prejudices. Politicians have not done what was needed to this date. They are harassed by the police. Their families ostracize them. They are forced to commit suicide. Courts reduce the sentences of the murderers. They can’t find work, or are subjected to mobbing in their professional lives”; she continued: “This picture is unacceptable. As the Parliament, we have to change it. We cannot ignore these rights in a country that we claim is an advanced democracy” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013d).

Toprak referred to the discriminations faced by LGBT people and placed the need to do something about in the context of democracy. The reaction of the governing AKP was mixed though featuring some AKP politicians supporting it but a majority of AKP politicians turning it down. During Toprak’s
speech an AKP deputy shouted that she was defending “immorality” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013d). AKP deputy Türkan Dağoğlu stated: “As a doctor, I consider the condition defined as LGBT as abnormal behavior” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013d). AKP politicians thus stated that homosexuality was a disease while CHP deputies accused the AKP of not taking offenses against LGBT people seriously (Hürriyet Daily News 2013d). The Kurdish BDP – known for its strong support for LGBT organizations – supported the preposition of the CHP. The deputy Ertuğrul Kürkçü stated that one has to realize that some women love women and some men love men and that it was the duty of the parliament to defend everyone’s rights including those of LGBT people (Işık 2013).

In the end, the AKP as well as the MHP voted against the proposal to include the protection of sexual orientation and gender identity in the constitution reasoning that that constitution did not allow discrimination based on these reasons in any case. The LGBT community was accused of wanting to have special legal arrangements. The LGBT organization Black Pink Triangle reacted stating: “Every day five women are killed, and every day LGBT people die. It is not right to call us egoistic in such a situation. What we want exists in Germany and in England. Here the approach is despotism” (Dursun 2013a). Both the AKP as well as the LGBT organizations referred to legal rights in their statement. The LGBT organization expressed that the demanded inclusion would be European and democratic.

In October 2013, AKP politician Fatma Bostan Ünsal made a statement on LGBT rights stressing that there should be open communication with LGBT citizens. She further said: “We should open a space for LGBT people in the mosques”. She compared LGBT people with women wearing headscarves: “Ahmet Nedet Sezer said ‘there are no students with headscarves’. But they are. It is the same with LGBT people” (Oda TV 2013). She expressed that everyone has the same rights and that there is a way for Islam and the LGBT community to come together. Interestingly when Erdoğan ran for presidency in 2014 a new LGBT group formed with the AKP supporting Erdoğan. The so-called AK Parti LGBT group became very visible in Turkish media. They stress the compatibility of being Muslim and being homosexual and want to increase understanding and awareness for homosexuals within the AKP (Radikal 2014; Durgun 2014).

The constitution debate brought LGBT rights onto the agenda and forced politicians to take a stance. It demonstrates how the discursive positions were not either being Islamic and being against homosexuality and being Kemalist and being for homosexual rights. Although it was mostly the AKP politicians which opposed the LGBT discourse, some parts of the more Islamic discourses were supportive of LGBT issues. Further, Kemalist discourses used to be against LGBT discourses as well, and some parts still are.
In public and within civil society the LGBT community became much more visible during the so-called Gezi Park protests. The LGBT organizations joined as one movement and many LGBT CSOs became members of the Taksim Solidarity Platform. The Gay Pride following the Gezi protests in 2013 was visited by 100,000 visitors, 60,000 more than the year before. LGBT demonstrators often carry signs saying “Trans var”, “Gey var”, “Lezbien var” meaning “Transpeople, gay and lesbian people exist”. These statements indirectly refer to claims about the abnormality of anything different than heterosexuality which the opposing discourses often use.

In sum, there is an opening towards accepting LGBT rights as human rights in Turkey. The LGBT rights discourse managed to equal LGBT rights with human rights, having rights as everyone else, democracy and being European countering and mostly ignoring representations of home-, bi- and transsexuality as being sick. It expressed that LGBT rights are human rights just as women’s rights are human rights even comparing the right to wear a headscarf to the rights of LGBTs to appear in public. The LGBT discourse did split the discursive space but only to a very limited extent. The split was created through referring to the other as being backward, ignoring the reality of people being gay, lesbian, bi- or transsexual and for being homophobic. Instead of only dividing the discursive space the LGBT discourse has been very successful in posing one general demand: asking for human rights for everyone (see table 13). It has not managed to incorporate everyone but at least in public LGBT rights were mostly regarded as human rights at the end of my study period. However in the private sphere daily discrimination of LGBT people and prejudices against them continue to exist.

Table 13: Offensive hegemonic discourse “LGBT rights”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chain of equivalence</th>
<th>LGBT rights as human rights</th>
<th>same rights as everyone</th>
<th>normal</th>
<th>democracy</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>military service law inhuman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>undemocratic</td>
<td>homophobic</td>
<td>ignoring reality</td>
<td>against human rights</td>
<td>backwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another big issue which should be mentioned here is homosexuality in Turkish military service. Gay men do not have to attend military service in Turkey, but they have to prove that they are gay either with pictures, videos of sexual intercourse or with anal examinations. They are treated as if they were sick and have to go through discriminatory practices before being excluded from military service. This has been a big issue for LGBT CSOs which continuously publish reports and articles on this topic (Kaos GL). However, mainstream media has hardly picked it up and it has not been on the political agenda.
5.3. Discursive struggles over the Kurdish issue
The Kurdish issue has stuck with Turkey since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. Even though in the beginning of the Republic Kurds were recognized, in 1924 Atatürk banned Kurdish schools, publications and organizations. Kurds reacted with an uprising of several thousand Turks in 1925 which was crushed by the government. Since then Turks have been rather suspicious of Kurds (Pope and Pope 2011: 249–250). Moreover, the Turkish modernization project heavily relied on a Turkish nationalism based on a homogenous identity excluding Kurds (Somer 2008: 107). The Kurdish issue was – if ever mentioned – framed as a separatist movement and a security threat (Efegil 2011: 27). Only talking about the Kurdish problem implies to acknowledge that Turkey’s Kemalist modernization project never managed to take care of the Kurdish issue and it means that ideas of Turkish identity are challenged (Somer 2008: 103–104). Interestingly though, mixed marriages between Turks and Kurds have been quite common as both are Sunni Muslims (Pope and Pope 2011: 253–254). Still, even in 2007 a study revealed that only 11.4 per cent of Turkish population was supportive of the right of education in Kurdish (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2007). Thus, the Kurdish issue – in contrast to the LGBT issue but similarly as the headscarf debate – has been central to political struggles in Turkey. Kurds have been marginalized for a long time and whoever tried to support Kurdish issues was deemed an enemy of the state. A discourse in favor of Kurdish rights and making a step towards negotiating Turkish-Kurdish peace is clearly counter-hegemonic in this context.

The first effort to change the discourse was made in 1992 by Özal who called the Kurdish issue a “Kurdish question” for the first time. He wanted to improve the conditions for Kurds including granting political rights, recognition of Kurdish identity and language and an amnesty for PKK militants (Efegil 2011: 28–30). Even though the Kurdish problem was recognized and named by politics in the 1990s (Somer 2008: 104), after Özal’s sudden death no government seriously took steps to tackle it (Efegil 2011: 30). Only the AKP, in government since 2002, tried to follow Özal in his approach to the Kurdish question (Efegil 2011).

The Kurdish problem or question usually refers to two related issues. It firstly refers to the denial of Kurdish rights such as teaching, learning, publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish. Secondly, it means the armed conflict in Turkey’s southeast between Turkish military forces and the Kurdish fighters of the PKK led by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This conflict supposedly used to be about Kurdish separatism and independence (Efegil 2011). In contrast, the AKP government has recognized that most Kurds do not aim at independence but rather demand Kurdish rights (Efegil 2011: 30). The AKP government has opposed any Kurdish separatism or any federal system that would partly allow for it. It has rejected the idea to establish Kurdish as a second official language. Yet, the AKP government introduced numerous reforms improving political and cultural rights of
Kurds (Efegil 2011: 32–33). Broadcasting in Kurdish was already legalized in 2002 but was only possible without any restrictions in 2009 (Somer and Liaras 2010: 153). Erdoğan used a pro-Kurdish rights discourse ever since his first election and winning Kurdish votes in the next elections of 2007 (Somer and Liaras 2010: 154), and introduced first reforms between 1999 and 2005 such as the right to learn Kurdish or name children in Kurdish (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2012: 13). Since 2009, villages have gotten their original Kurdish names back and political campaigning in Kurdish has been allowed (White 2013: 13). Since September 2012 Kurdish language classes can be elected in public schools and universities offer Kurdish degrees (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2012: 13). In 2013, the Security General Directorate approved Kurdish language classes for police staff in Diyarbakır to make their work with Kurdish speaking citizen easier (Kacar and Gunes 2013).

The AKP government tried to tackle the conflict with the PKK, even though at first largely unsuccessful. The first attempt was the so-called “Kurdish opening” initiative which included that 34 PKK rebels were allowed to return from Northern Iraq to Turkey. The celebration of their return in Turkey’s Southeast was strongly criticized by the opposition and the Turkish public. As a consequence, the rebels were prosecuted or had to flee Turkey. In the following PKK violence increased again and in December 2009, the Kurdish party DTP was closed. Moreover, more than 2000 people among them many BDP members were prosecuted or imprisoned. In the aftermath and before the 2011 elections, the AKP changed its discourse again and heavily relied on nationalist rhetoric and neglected the Kurdish problem. At that time, Kurdish violence came to a peak again (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2012: 13). After failed attempts between 2009 and 2011, the so-called Oslo process, in the end of 2012 the AKP government continued the negotiations with the PKK resulting in the announcement of a ceasefire by Öcalan in March 2013. The government has been negotiating with Öcalan on the disarmament of the PKK fighters (Mathees and Seufert 2013).

Despite the setbacks the AKP and mostly its leader Erdoğan has pushed a pro-solution discourse since the mid of the decade challenging the old hegemonic discourse on Turkishness. The AKP government reasoned that the Kurdish question was in fact a question of democracy. Erdoğan stressed that peace and the solution of the Kurdish question came with more democratization and what he calls normalization: “For us the Kurdish question is a question of democratization” (Zaman 2005a). In addition, economic development of the Eastern regions would contribute to solve the Kurdish question. In 2005 Erdoğan visited Diyarbakır in the East of Turkey and emphasized the continuing economic development of the region: “We are solving it, we will solve it. With one state, one nation, one flag and more democracy we will solve the Kurdish question. We will not ignore any problems” (Zaman 2005b). Further he stated: “It is enough! (...) You don’t solve any problems with force and fighting” (Zaman 2005b).
He further stressed the diversity of Turkey including different colors and different music (Zaman 2005b). Similarly he stated a few weeks later that Kurds were part of Turkey just as other ethnicities were as well part of Turkey. He said that the Kurdish question and the PKK terror were two different things that should not be mixed up. The question of the PKK was about bringing peace whereas the Kurdish question was about living together (Zaman 2005c).

In 2009, the AKP government initiated what it called “Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi” – the National Unity and Brotherhood Project. Since then the government has increasingly used the word “kardeşimler” which translates into “my brothers and sisters” when talking to and about Kurdish Turkish citizens. In 2011 Erdoğan said: “I love my Kurdish brothers and sisters (...). I love them as much as love my Turkish, Bosnian, Laz brothers and sisters. I love them because of the creator” (Zaman 2011). Further he said: “In this country there is no Kurdish question any longer. In this country there is a question of my Kurdish brothers and sisters” (HaberTürk 2011). The democratic will of Turkey did not want to accept the terror of the separatists any longer. That was not democracy, not freedom, and not fundamental rights (HaberTürk 2011). He stressed that his government improved the rights of Kurds: “The process continues (...) We fight against any form of discrimination (...) We ended the politics of assimilation (...) We do not allow any citizens to become victims of terror any longer” (Zaman 2011). Erdoğan said hinting at Turkish economic and democratic development that Turkey was now respected in the world, Turkey was a new Turkey (Zaman 2011). Thus, economic and democratic development basically calls for the solution of the Kurdish problem to continue. Erdoğan and the AKP government created a discourse that links democracy, economic development, unity and brotherhood, peace and fundamental rights in a chain of equivalence.

In the beginning of 2013 when the government decided to start negotiating with Öcalan about the disarmament of the PKK again, Erdoğan said that PKK fighters could leave the country or return to their homes if they had not committed a crime (Hürriyet Daily News 2013c). Further, he ensured that there would not be any military operations made during the withdrawal of the PKK fighters stating: “The previous mistakes will not be made” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013b). He later denied that he had given amnesty to PKK fighters as he said this was not in his authority but the authority of the jurisdiction (Hürriyet Daily News 2013f).

Justifying the peace negotiations against nationalist critics – but partly in contradiction to earlier statements – Erdoğan said that Kurds are not a different ethnic group but Turks. He referred to BDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş in his statement: “Making the diagnostic that there are two people in this country is discrimination. Demirtaş should learn that. I am joined at the hip to my Kurdish brothers. That’s how we see the issue while we try to erase ethnic discrimination” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013c). Before he had expressed that his party was against ethnic nationalism (Sabah
2013). On the one hand, Erdoğan tries to accommodate the nationalists by referring to the Kemalist notion that everyone is a Turk but he tries to appeal to Kurdish and liberal discourses by acknowledging the discrimination of Kurds and showing intentions to overcome it. He was criticized when he visited Diyarbakır in 2013 for using the word “Kurdistan” and saying that the first Kurdish parliament called the southeastern region Kurdistan too. Nationalist claimed Erdoğan was aiming at Kurdish separatism in a federal state system. Erdoğan replied in a provocative manner by referring to the Kemalist nationalists’ leading figure: “Then, was Mustafa Kemal a separatist, too? Were all the deputies at the time who used the word ‘Kurdistan’ separatists, too?” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013g). Erdoğan thus pointed to similarities with the Kemalists and drew a division between them at the same time. He further hinted at the narrow-mindedness of his political enemies: “A big state cannot be built with fear. Those who are afraid of words, concepts, of taboos… cannot build a big state” (Hürriyet Daily News 2013g). He sees the peace process as part of the process of normalization (HaberTürk 2013). The government’s discourse drew a line between its discourse of democracy looking into the future and the undemocratic narrow-minded discourse of his opponents.

The pro-peace process discourse has been mostly opposed by a Kemalist discourse represented by the CHP and the more nationalist MHP (Mathees and Seufert 2013). Throughout the study period the nationalist MHP considered the talks to be a betrayal of the Turkish nation. The party has rejected any negotiations with the PKK and attempts to integrate the Kurds as they claim that there was no Kurdish problem but just a problem of terrorism. They basically set the Kurdish party BDP equal with the terrorist organization PKK (Yetkin 2013). Also the CHP is very critical of the government’s steps. In the mid-2000s the nationalist discourse against any talks with the PKK was dominant. Already in 2005 when the AKP government for the first time spoke of a Kurdish problem and had started to introduce reforms for Kurdish rights, former CHP leader Deniz Baykal accused the prime minister to indirectly negotiate with the PKK and Öcalan (Hürriyet 2005b, 2005a). In the following years Baykal was a strong opponent of negotiations with the PKK even though his position sometimes appeared to become more liberal (Güler 2007). In 2009, Baykal criticized the so-called “Democratic Opening” as he saw Turkish unity threatened. Furthermore, he accused the Kurdish party DTP of cooperating with terrorist Öcalan (Today’s Zaman 2009) and the Turkish government of talking with the “condemned one” in the first place. Öcalan was not to make any proposals. Baykal was against introducing education in Kurdish (Erdem 2009). The CHP did not agree to the government’s proposal in parliament (Yetkin 2013). Other members of the party such as Ankara Deputy Eşref Erdem and Şevket Gürsoy, deputy in Adıyaman, criticized Baykal’s position and called to support any initiative to solve the Kurdish issue (Yavuz 2009a).
Up until 2013 the CHP was not united on the issue, yet it was generally united in its suspicion towards Erdoğan. It especially criticized the direct negotiations between Öcalan and the Turkish government and emphasized its suspicions against what it considers to be secret and non-transparent negotiations (Açar 2013). After PKK leader Öcalan announced a ceasefire on Nevroz, the Kurdish New Year’s celebrations, the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu expressed his discontent with the talks between the government and the PKK when stating that he did not want to comment on this because he did not know anything about the talks (Açar 2013). Yet, CHP spokesperson Muharrem İnce as well as CHP’s old leader Baykal are more nationalist and populist on this issue. Both did not consider the AKP’s steps to be any solution at all. They connected Erdoğan’s conservative social ideas with his Kurdish policies making them look illegitimate. İnce described Erdoğan to be the dictator that tells everyone how to do everything in their daily life from what to drink to how many children to have but not saying anything about the talks “with terrorist Öcalan behind closed doors” (Radikal 2013b; Haber Gazete 2013). Moreover, the negotiations were only about votes as the prime minister was accused of just wanting to have the votes of the Kurdish population (Radikal 2013b). Baykal openly criticized Kılıçdaroğlu’s general support for the process and stated that the AKP was taking away the Turkish national identity. He criticized the CHP for having transformed itself into a “new CHP” and not being “neo-nationalist” enough (Esayan 2013). Similarly to the CHP, Kemalist organizations such as the Association for Atatürk Thought and the Association for Supporting Contemporary Life expressed a discourse shaped by nationalist Kemalism and thus have seen any move towards Kurdish rights and the PKK as a threat to the Turkish nation (Kaliber and Tocci 2010: 198–200). On the other hand, the formerly strongly Kemalist-oriented business organization TÜSİAD expressed its support for the AKP’s initiatives (Efegil 2011: 33). The president of TÜSİAD Muharrem Yılmaz explicitly stated his organization’s support for the İmralı process. His association was of the opinion that the negotiations contributed to peace in Turkey (Radikal 2013a). The pro-Kurdish peace discourse of the AKP managed to integrate some actors usually identifying with Kemalist ideas.

The Kurdish BDP has generally been in favor of the peace negotiations and pro-Kurdish rights policies. Its party representatives always demanded from the government to directly negotiate with Öcalan and the PKK. It stressed that they had to be part of the process. They supported the policies to increase Kurdish rights but remained critical of the progress made (Hess 2012). When the government openly started negotiating with Öcalan, the BDP was involved. BDP representatives regularly visited Öcalan on the prison island for talks that are part of the negotiations (Mathees and Seufert 2013). Representatives of the BDP continuously expressed the need to continue the negotiations (Bozkurt 2013). However, especially since 2013 the Kurdish BDP has criticized the government’s discourse. The democratization package the government introduced in the fall of 2013 did not get rid of the ban to teach in Kurdish language in public schools. Turkish citizens had still been
imprisoned on the base of the Anti-Terror Law (Gökpinar 2013). The BDP is critical of Erdoğan’s self-centered way of doing things. Demirtaş said that Erdoğan was talking about the peace process as if it was his own claiming the ownership of the BDP and the Kurds (Bozkurt 2013). When the AKP government was criticized for the brutal reaction of police forces to the Gezi protestors, the BDP tried to distance itself from the AKP stressing that it was Öcalan who started the peace process. They claimed that it was their peace process and Erdoğan had to deliver now with more democratic reforms (Zaman 2013b).

Generally, the government’s approach to the Kurdish question gained support from liberal parts of society. NGOs such as the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TİHV) as well as some Kurdish women’s NGOs such as the Kurdish Women’s Center have strongly supported and lobbied for the legal protection and implementation of Kurdish rights as we will see in my analysis of the NGOs’ work. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, TESEV) drafted a document with suggestions for the government how to solve the Kurdish issue based on ideas of many Kurdish NGOs (TESEV 2008).

In sum, the analysis shows that a strong pro-Kurdish discourse has evolved and been pushed in Turkey including the granting of rights to Kurdish people as well as coming to a settlement of the conflict with the PKK. Despite partly minor steps in policies, the governing party and especially its head Erdoğan pursued a discourse in favor of improving rights and negotiating with Öcalan that strongly built on the discursive representations of democratic and economic progress and peace with brothers and sisters (see table 14).

Table 14: Offensive hegemonic discourse "Kurdish rights and peace"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chain of equivalence</th>
<th>Kurdish brothers and sisters</th>
<th>democracy</th>
<th>economic progress</th>
<th>Kurdish rights as human rights</th>
<th>peace</th>
<th>national unity – new Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chain of antagonism</strong></td>
<td>backward/neglecting</td>
<td>undemocratic</td>
<td>against progress</td>
<td>dividing</td>
<td>conflict</td>
<td>wrong Kemalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These parts of the equivalence chain enabled the discourse to become stronger and include originally different discursive positions of the BDP, the liberal groups as well as some liberal groups of the CHP. The discursive struggle shows that broader discourses – such as the Kemalist one – are not as united as assumed. Further, it demonstrated that critical voices complaining about too little progress on Kurdish rights and the negotiation process have become louder again, also due to the more
authoritarian discourse and policies of the AKP government at the end of my study period. However a general consensus on reconciliation and granting of Kurdish rights has been achieved.

5.4. Discursive struggles over rights of immigrants and refugees
The rights of migrants and refugees have not been a very central topic in the Turkish public sphere. In contrast to the other issue areas studied, migration policies have hardly been publicly debated in Turkey and awareness of migration has been low. With the large influx of Syrian refugees during the civil war in Syria from 2011 onwards however more conflictual debates have evolved. Nevertheless, migration management has been an important topic for Turkish policy-makers (İçduygu 2004). Different steps have been taken since the beginning of the century to align Turkish policies to international and especially to EU immigration policy standards (Aydın and Kiriçi 2013). As a lot of changes took place within Turkish immigration policy but not much debate over the specific policies appeared, I will start with summarizing the policy steps taken during the study period.

Turkey has become a transit as well as a target country for refugees and asylum-seekers from bordering as well as other regions such as African countries. About 10,000 applications for asylum are turned in each year while around 2004 there were only 5,000 asylum-seekers (Aydın and Kiriçi 2013: 382; İçduygu 2004: 89). However, migration is not a new phenomenon in Turkey. The first immigrants came from Iran after the Iranian regime change in 1979. The second wave of immigrants came from Iraq and Bulgaria as well as the Soviet republics. From 1994 onwards, more diverse irregular migration occurred and many immigrants used Turkey as a transit country trying to get to European countries. As immigration and its consequences became more visible since the turn of the millennium, Turkish governments have started taking action to manage immigration (İçduygu 2004: 90–91).

The Turkish authorities together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Ankara were responsible for dealing with applications until the end of the study period. Turkey’s migration law includes a so-called “geographical limitation” going back to the Geneva Convention of 1951 only allowing immigrants from Europe to apply for asylum in Turkey. Nevertheless, basically all applications come from non-Europeans. In these cases, the office tries to find a solution for resettlement outside of Turkey (İçduygu 2004: 92). But most immigrants crossing non-European borders with one-month visas start working illegally or entered into arranged marriages in Turkey (İçduygu 2004: 93). After 2000 Turkey signed different internal protocols and treaties to fight illegal trafficking and organized crime. In August 2002 the parliament passed the Law
on Combating Benefits-Oriented Criminal Organizations defining human trafficking and imposing punishment on it. In February 2003 the parliament passed a law on work permits for immigrants allowing them to do domestic work. Further, in June 2003 the requirements for citizenship after marrying a Turkish citizen were changed. Before one would get a Turkish passport immediately after marrying a Turkish national; now one would have to wait three years. A National Task Force on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings was set up including the civil society organization İKGV as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Directorate General of the Status and Problems of Women (İçduygı 2004: 94–95).

One of the biggest problems is the geographical limitation in Turkish immigration policies as it does not match reality any longer. In 2003 a National Program was introduced which opens up the possibility of lifting the limitation clause and calls on the EU to implement burden-sharing measures for countries on its borders (İçduygı 2004: 96). In 2008, the Ministry for Interior created a civilian unit to handle asylum and migration policy. This unit created the draft for a new law. It is largely in line with EU standards but the geographical limitation is still intact (Atasoy 2005: 383). The so-called Law on Foreigners and International Protection was passed by the Turkish parliament in April 2013 and represents the first legislation on immigration and refugees. The law foresees the establishment of the General Directorate of Migration Management which will become responsible for immigration procedures – a main requirement set by the EU. The law ensures that foreigners and people with international protection cannot be sent back to states in which they would face torture or inhuman treatment. In addition the law states that foreigners who receive a work permit will automatically receive a residence permit (Güneş 2013). As I will discuss in the next analytical chapter, CSOs played a strong role in the establishment of this law, as well as the UNHCR and the European Court of Human Rights (Aydın and Kirişçi 2013: 384; Erkuş 2012).

Although this law represents a decisive step in Turkey’s migration policy, it was hardly influenced by public debates. Public discursive struggles only took place in the sense that CSOs criticized existing practices and called on the government to bring laws in accordance to EU and human rights standards. CSOs criticized the law for not lifting the “geographical limitation” which only grants non-European immigrants temporary asylum (Küçükkoşum 2010) although in general the law was not questioned. The governing party justified the need to create a migration law on the base of the EU accession and its democratization process. The ministers for Interior Beşir Atalay stated that on this base Turkey needed to fight illegal immigration and protect the human rights of immigrants. The law was necessary because of the EU process but not only because of it; because Turkey needed it (Cumhuriyet 2011a). In addition, the EU created another linkage to which the
Turkish government agreed: the EU should lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU in return for Turkey's signature under a readmission agreement. In 2011 the State Secretary of the Ministry for Interior Zekeriya Şarbak stated: “As you know since 1980 European countries require visas from our citizens. This practice is unfair and unjust and we hope to change this as soon as possible”. He continued that because of Turkey's democratization and economic development Turkey had become the target country for immigration. Turkey had to coordinate its migration policies with other countries and especially women and children of immigrants needed protection. Further the government would fight illegal migration effectively, and improve control and surveillance of the borders, work against illegal migration and smuggle but also improve human rights conditions (Cumhuriyet 2011b). Indeed, in 2014 the Turkish parliament passed the EU readmission agreement which foresees that Turkey takes back every immigrant who entered the EU through Turkey. In return the EU intends lifting visa restrictions for Turkish citizens. The opposition party CHP criticized this step because Turkey was not prepared to handle the number of illegal immigrants coming to Turkey in the future (Today's Zaman 2014). Refugee rights NGOs criticized the law for undermining rights of migrants and refugees (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2013). However, the positions of the CHP and the NGOs reflect that there is a general consensus in Turkey that migration policies had to be introduced. NGOs stress the importance of human rights whereas the official discourse stresses both the protection of human rights as well as the fight against illegal immigration. Still, NGOs largely welcomed the new migration management system. Thus, framing the need for migration policies as necessary because of the EU accession process as well as to fight illegal migration and improve human rights’ standards proved to be successful.

The government’s policy towards Syrian refugees leaving their country because of the civil war starting in 2011 has been subject to more debate. Erdoğan promoted an “open-door” policy not restricting the numbers of Syrian refugees entering Turkey. Up to 2013 Turkey received 600,000 Syrian “guests” – the largest number of Syrian refugees for one country. Erdoğan stated that the Syrian refugees were “our brothers” (Today’s Zaman 2013). He addressed the Syrian refugees saying: “You have suffered a lot. The cruel Syrian regime, the cruel Assad, has martyred nearly 50,000 Syrians so far” (Reuters 2013). The strong support for Syrian refugees – especially in comparison with other refugees – is a way of stressing Turkey’s Muslim identity. This was emphasized by the traditional clothes Erdoğan was wearing when visiting the refugee (Reuters 2013). The Turkish government turned against Syrian president Bashar-Al-Assad and tried to win the sympathy of the immigrants – as it was perceived by the opposition party. In 2013 the CHP accused the AKP of giving Syrian refugees Turkish passports to enable them to vote in the local elections in 2013 (Hürriyet Daily News 2013h). Generally, the CHP has criticized the government for not having a comprehensive strategy to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees and the civil war in Syria. The head of the CHP
parliamentary group accused the government of not giving out correct numbers on the refugees (Cumhuriyet 2013). Further, parts of the public have become critical of the Syrian refugees begging on the streets in Turkey’s big cities (Milliyet 2013b; Aljazeera 2014) whereas civil society organizations have called for a more “depersonalized” or less emotional debate (Kılıç 2014).

It appears that for the first time Turkish citizens became aware of immigrants in Turkey whereas before the issue of immigration was hardly debated. The Syrian civil war puts a special pressure on Turkey and makes refugees more visible. Generally though, migration policies have been more or less based on a consensus in Turkish politics with CSOs and international organizations playing a big role in its development. In sum, the discourse for migration policies did not divide the discursive arena but instead managed to include most other political discourses. Although the pro-migration-policy discourse – based on representations of fighting illegal immigration, EU accession and democratization process as well as human rights – represents a hegemonic discourse, the issue itself has only gained importance in the public with the Syrian crisis. There was no discursive struggle that created a discursive split within the public as migration policies were not much debated.

5.5. Conclusions
In this chapter I analyzed the discursive struggles over women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and refugee rights in Turkey and I showed that hegemonic struggles in Turkey are more complex than often assumed. Instead of identifying broader different discourses such as ones over identity or narratives, I suggested to look at four specific issues. Although the struggle between Kemalist and Islamic parties shaped the political struggles at the end of the last century and are felt in my study period as well, there are more discursive positions in contemporary Turkey. For instance Kurdish and liberal – but not Kemalist – discourses entered political debates. Moreover, within these broad groups – Kemalist, Islamic, Kurdish and liberal discourses – variations of discourses exists (be it more liberal or more conservative or nationalist) and these differentiated discourse might join other discourses depending on the issue at hand.

I conducted a critical discourse analysis assessing the offensive hegemonic discourses – meaning the discourses that tried to become hegemonic between 2002 and 2013 – in the four issue areas of women’s rights, LGBT rights, Kurdish rights and rights of immigrants and refugees. I gave two more specific examples for women’s rights demonstrating how discursive struggles have taken place across different ideological lines. The headscarf debate brought the AKP on one side with rather liberal parts of society and managed to become a hegemonic discourse with even incorporating some
Kemalist discourses over time. It successfully based its discourse on the representation of the rights to wear a headscarf as a human right. In contrast, the abortion debate has increased the division between more Muslim groups and rather western liberal parts as well as Kemalists. I showed how the AKP tried to divide the discursive space between its own discourse and the other supposedly “immoral” parts of society.

The analysis of the debate on LGBT rights points to on the one hand a marginalization of this topic and on the other hand an increasing public acceptance of LGBT issues and rights. The pro-LGBT discourse tried to push its cause by relying on a human rights discourse and including everyone in this discourse, instead of polarizing the discursive space in the first place. However, the opponents to this discourse tried to create a divide by calling LGBT sick and immoral. Interestingly, the LGBT discourse was rather successful even though in private hate speech and crimes persist.

The discursive struggles over Kurdish issues were much more central during the study period as the government made the solution of the Kurdish problem one of its priorities. Similar to the headscarf debate, this offensive discourse made reference to human rights, democratization and progress to make its discourse hegemonic. It tried to distance itself from the Kemalists who are described as backward and neglecting reality. The pro-Kurdish discourse incorporated Kurdish parts of society as well as more liberal parts of society. Yet, especially the latter have become more skeptical of governmental policies during the third governmental period of the AKP. Overall the pro-Kurdish discourses though became hegemonic and integrated discourses from all parts of society. It has become consensus that a solution to the Kurdish problem needs to be found.

The immigration policy was discussed much less than any other issue analyzed. The government established legislation and a new migration management institution in close cooperation with CSOs. It linked the necessity for these policies to the EU harmonization process as well as to the general democratization process of Turkey. It stressed the need to fight illegal immigration. There was no need to create a discursive division as no challenging position evolved.

To summarize, my analysis of the four different issues shows that the issues of women’s rights and Kurdish rights were strongly contested and subject to intense discursive struggles. Increasingly LGBT rights – formerly completely marginalized – were discussed as well. Within the struggles over Kurdish and LGBT rights a new pro-discourses became rather hegemonic uniting discourses by referring to human rights and democracy. Women’s rights are increasingly contested. The debate over refugee rights was different as they were hardly publicly discussed. Without much opposition, a new moderate refugee rights discourse was established.
Moreover, my analysis showed that it is too simplistic to describe Turkish political struggles as bipolar, or as an Islamist-Kemalist divide. There are more discursive positions – from Kurdish, liberal ones to extremely nationalist ones. Further, discursive coalitions shifted across and within the issue areas. In some areas the more Islamic groups managed to include the more liberal groups to join the same discursive positions, such as in the headscarf debate. In other areas liberal and Kemalist groups were more in line, such as in the abortion debate. New discursive coalitions emerged in the struggle over LGBT rights. I analyzed the different contexts in which different human rights CSOs have to act and gave a comprehensive picture of the context that shapes the effects of neo-liberal governmentality on Turkish civil society. This is what I will turn to in the following chapter.
Chapter 6

The (de)politicizing effects of EU civil society funding in Turkey
In the following chapter I analyze how the EU’s civil society policies – its liberal and neo-liberal rationalities – influenced the work of CSOs funded by the EU in Turkey between 2002 and 2013. In the previous chapter I showed that the EIDHR as well as complementing civil society policies are based on both liberal as well as neo-liberal governmentality. The theory expects that only the latter depoliticizes civil society organizations. The (de)politicizing effect of EU civil society promotion thus depends on (1) the coexistence of liberal and neo-liberal rationalities, and (2) on the CSO’s context of discursive struggles. I now move on to analyze the effects of the EU policies in the Turkish context. As described in the methodology, I will analyze the NGOs with a special focus on their activities funded by the EU. I will also look into their general self-representation such as on their websites, their daily work and general organizational set-up. Overall, I organize my analysis – as in my chapter on discursive struggles – according to the different issue areas: women’s rights, LGBT rights, Kurdish rights, and rights of immigrants and refugees. I expect that there are different effects of (de)politicization depending on the issue area in question. Secondly, I will organize the analysis within the different parts according to different organizations in order to get a full picture of every organization including EU funded projects as well as their work not funded by the EU. Analyzing CSO’s documents, websites, press appearance and my interviews, I will look for representations of the four triggers for depoliticization and their expected depoliticizing effects as described in the theoretical chapter and operationalized in the methodological part. I will further identify existing liberal rationalities and their potential politicizing effects. I will begin my analysis with studying the effects on CSOs working on women’s rights.

I will argue that (1) the organizations funded by the EU indeed increasingly work using the technologies of visibility and performance – constituting their work as economic activities, (2) conduct projects of empowerment, and (3) at the same time perform politicizing activities such as monitoring and lobbying for their issue. However, whether the reliance on neo-liberal rationalities in combination with more political activities is depoliticizing depends on the discursive struggles the organizations are embedded in.
6.1. The (de) politicizing effects on CSOs working on women’s rights
In the last chapter I showed how women’s rights have united as well as divided different ideological sides in Turkey during the study period. The discursive position to abolish the headscarf ban became hegemonic by referring to human and religious rights while the debate on abortion divided the rather Islamic governmental discourse and more liberal discourses. It triggered opposition and protest from organizations such as Mor Çatı and Kamer.\(^{12}\) In the following I will study the work of Mor Çatı, Kader and Kamer which have received EU funding most frequently. I also include a women’s rights project conducted by HYD.

6.1.1. Mor Çatı (Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation, Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınakı Vakfı)

The organization and its non-EU funded work
The CSO Mor Çatı was founded in Istanbul in 1990 to provide a shelter for women and support victims of violence. The organization dedicated its work to fighting violence against women (Mor Çatı 2014e). Around ten people work at the organization and more than 30 volunteers are active for Mor Çatı (Interview I 2013). Although a large part of Mor Çatı’s work focuses on providing social, medical, psychological and legal services to women, they describe themselves to be feminists. The Turkish description of the CSO’s methods begins with: “At Mor Çatı the fight against male violence is done on the base of feminist methods” (Mor Çatı 2014e). Similarly my interview partner from the organization emphasized the political nature of the NGO’s activities. In the long term Mor Çatı aims to fight inequality in order to eliminate violence against women. In the short term, the organization focuses on informing and helping female victims of violence. EIDHR funding is not the only source of the CSO’s budget. In addition Mor Çatı receives money through donations, and from other funders such as the Global Dialogue or the Swedish Consulate (Interview I 2013).

Its website provides information on why violence against women exists, how violence typically becomes incorporated into a relationship and how women experiencing violence can seek help. It further informs about sexual rape and assault and the sexual abuse of children. The website lists the objects which Mor Çatı’s shelters need at that particular moment (Mor Çatı 2014b). Social service provision is a big part of the organization’s general work. Since its opening the organization has focused on running shelters or lobbying for the opening of more shelters. The organization has a solidarity center which women can contact to get psychological and legal support. Mor Çatı operates

\(^{12}\) Organizations such as Mazlumder have welcomed the political changes between 2002 and 2013. Mazlumder is a Muslim human rights organization which strongly pushed the right to wear the headscarf. Besides Mazlumder there are women’s rights organizations that have solely focused on the right to wear the headscarf (AK-Der; Özgür-Der) (Kadioğlu 2005) but never received EU civil society funding. Because of these reasons I do not focus on them. In the section on Kurdish rights I will analyze Mazlumder’s work as many CSOs mentioned them as a positive force for Kurdish rights in my interviews.
shelters because the state does not provide enough protection for women and never did – thus there is no decrease in state responsibility. In the long-term the organization aims to hand over the shelters completely to the municipalities. Otherwise this was neo-liberal politics, my interview partner, formerly working for the organization, said: “Why does the state not do anything? Of course this is neo-liberal politics just as it exists in Europe. The state does not take any responsibility and expects NGOs to continue running shelters. The idea is to minimize the state” (Interview I 2013). Thus, the CSO criticizes that the state has not taken over a lot of shelter work. One step was made with the foundation of so-called Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers (ŞÖNIM) by the Family and Social Policy Ministry in 2012. The centers offer services to women who have experienced violence (Today's Zaman 2012). Social service provision is thus an important part of Mor Çatı’s work but the CSO pressured the cities to deliver these services instead. Moreover, Turkey has never been European model social welfare state and thus NGOs were partly forced to provide social services if they wanted to help women in need and not protected by the state. Therefore, there is no depoliticizing development; rather the organization makes the need for services visible and tries to hand over this responsibility to the state.

Mor Çatı is not only known for being the first Turkish women’s CSO that ran the first shelter for women but also for being a public voice for women. The NGO tries to put women’s issues on the political agenda by press statements or publishing reports. The organization regularly appears in national newspapers. For instance, it publishes reports on violence against women in Turkey that are quoted by the media. In 2013 the organization drafted a report on the problems of ŞÖNIM (Karakaş 2013; Today's Zaman 2012). The report described how women who applied for help became victims of violence and ignorance when reporting to the police (Karakaş 2013). The organization monitors the new public system of shelters. NGO is a member of the Women’s Shelter Assembly in which CSOs running shelters and state social workers meet (Interview I 2013). Together with other women’s CSOs Mor Çatı organized demonstrations to protest against violence against women, for the right to abortion and against sexism in TV shows (Mor Çatı 2014a; Bianet 2010). Members of Mor Çatı attended the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and the organization opened its offices for protestors (Interview I 2013). Mor Çatı produces posters, radio spots and videos to spread its message (Mor Çatı 2014b).

In addition, Mor Çatı targets political representatives. Together with other women’s rights’ organizations including Kamer, they published a critical statement on the government’s policies for women. The women’s NGOs criticize the AKP for its “liberal-conservative” policies which did not prevent violence against women and instead strengthened male dominance in Turkish society. Limiting the rights to abortion is mentioned as an example (Mor Çatı 2013c). In the Istanbul Feminist
Kolektif women speak to female members of the parliament and ask them to place specific topics on the parliamentary agenda. The CSOs thus lobbied for women’s rights and got into direct contact with women. The organization was not institutionally involved in political decision-making processes but instead tried to bring its issues on the agenda, politicizing it.

**EU funded projects**

Mor Çatı received EIDHR funding at least four times since 2007 when the first EU funded project took place. EU funds – in combination with support from Şişli Municipality in Istanbul – were used to run a shelter in the neighborhood of Şişli Istanbul (Mor Çatı 2014d). In line with the CSO’s goal to hand over shelter work to the public, the first projects of Mor Çatı aimed at encouraging municipalities to open women’s shelters and to learn about the work in shelters from Mor Çatı. The CSO generally offers training to people working at municipalities (Mor Çatı 2014c). In this case, EU funds have contributed to providing social services and to actually employ people such as social workers for these services. The projects organized panels with people working for the municipalities, social workers as well as politicians, to raise awareness of violence against women, open new shelters and share the experience of the CSO’s shelter with psychologists and social workers (Interview I 2013). In other words, this project aimed to improve the possibilities and quality of support for women provided for by the Turkish municipalities. Although this represents a form of cooperation with local governments, the goal is to transfer responsibility to them. Hence, the NGO is working against the neo-liberal rationality of private social service provision.

However, another project focused on the idea of empowerment. “Building Bridges for Prevention of Violence Against Women” aimed to “[s]upport women and children in shelters in Turkey, creating a living alternative away from violence for a higher number of them; enabling women victims of violence outside shelters to receive the necessary information through the advice centers”, next to lobbying and creating communication networks (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b). More concretely, a workshop with psychologists working in shelters was organized “in collaboration with the Turkish Psychological Association and Turkish Association of Social Workers”. There was a conference on the issue of abortion with presentations by Mor Çatı and the Women Commission of the Turkish Medical Association (European Commission 2013a: 2). Further, at an international symposium Turkish and foreign experts talked about the “fight against violence towards women in the 2010 decade”. Visible results of the projects were the publications of books and leaflets (European Commission 2013a: 3). The EU document on this project cites three women from Mor Çatı commenting on the success stressing the idea of creating an international network as well as the “empowerment” of women in contrast to “helping” them (HYD 2006a: 3). Although the project
included politicizing elements, it relies on the idea of empowering women through providing them with information on how to help themselves, such as by making it possible to have a life after violence. Women are constituted as victims that should emancipate themselves from being victims in an individual way. The idea of political change is marginal here.

In 2011 the project “We want justice for women” integrated political lobbying and empowerment more equally. It documented the experiences of 250 women and the support they received from the NGO in a report which was distributed to the minister of interior, politicians, media and local responsible people. In addition, a book including the stories of 20 women was published. By reaching out to politicians, the NGO tried to put the issue on the political agenda. At the same time the organization wanted to empower women by publishing a handbook with information on their legal and medical rights (Mor Çatı 2013b), an attempt to appeal to the self-responsibility of women constituting them as active instead of passive recipients of help. This implies that violence against women is rather an individual problem than a political one.

The last project of my study period took a very different approach and targeted the justice system. “Women’s Collaboration for Gender Justice” included representatives from the judicial system. Mor Çatı organized an exchange on cases of violence against women between women’s organizations and members of the Supreme Court. In March 2013 members of the Supreme Court met with representatives of the NGO, of the Human Rights Law Research Center of Istanbul Bilgi University, and of the EU Delegation to Turkey to talk about their experience in court cases on violence against women (Mor Çatı 2013a). This project involved people with judicial decision-making powers. Although it does not change laws, it at least raises awareness among members of the judiciary for problems women are facing. For instance, during the meeting participants discussed the issue of “mitigation for unjust provocation” concerning unmarried women being in a relationship with a man or married women being in a relationship with a different man. Even though participants did not fully agree on the issues (Mor Çatı 2013a), they were confronted with the civil society’s arguments. The project still targets individuals and calls on the self-responsibility of the judges to help women instead of changing laws and directing demands at the political level. Yet, judges are in a more powerful position than individual women to influence the granting of rights to women.

On the one hand Mor Çatı’s EU funded projects demanded from the state to improve their social services for women thus rejecting their responsibility to do so. The provision of services seems to be a necessary evil until the state is willing to provide those or the situation for women has significantly improved. EU funds enabled Mor Çatı to hire more people, for instance a social worker was employed as part of a project but such positions are always dependent on projects even though the organization tries to prolong jobs created within projects (Interview I 2013). On the other hand,
two projects aimed to empower women by giving them information on their rights. Compared to empowerment, putting issues on the political agenda was a small part of Mor Çatı’s EU funded projects.

Mor Çatı continuously applied for EIDHR funding although parts of the organization are critical of EU policies (Interview I 2013). It shows how difficult it is to ignore and reject the possibility of funding from the EU. The NGO conducted four EIDHR funded projects in the second half of my study period. Due to the number of EU projects the organization necessarily becomes something of a manager employing technologies of visibility and performance. As required by the EU, the projects usually produce some sort of book, booklet or handbook as a visible output. However, as we could see this does not mean that the organization stops to engage in discursive struggles. Partly in the framework of the projects but mostly outside the projects the organization tried to put women’s issues on the political agenda. Within the context of the intensified struggle over women’s rights there is a political division – in spite of cooperation on the local level concerning shelters – between the organization and the government which Mor Çatı expressed. Hence, the organization is far away from being coopted, however the EU funded project hardly contribute to putting the issue on the political agenda.

6.1.2. Kamer (Women’s Center Foundation, Kadin Merkezi Vakfı)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

Kamer conducts similar activities with a different geographical focus. The organization was officially founded in 1996. Kamer is based in Diyarbakır and opened offices in 23 provinces of Eastern and Southern Anatolia. In the different offices Kamer employs around 50 women (Interview S 2014). Besides EU funding, Kamer received funds from SIDA, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the Bernard Van Leer Foundation, the Canadian Embassy, the Open Society Foundation (Açık Toplum Vakfı), and the social support program of the Turkish state (SODES). The website provides information mostly in Turkish and Kurdish for women seeking help. Many Kurdish people live in the region in which Kamer works. Eastern Turkey is on average poorer and disadvantaged compared to centers such as Istanbul. Kamer has a website with information on their activities in Turkish and Kurdish. Some information on the website is translated to English as well (Kamer 2014).

Similar to Mor Çatı, Kamer expresses a political understanding of women’s rights in its goals. It aims to fight the “sexist system” and considers domestic violence against women the first instance in which the “sexist system” becomes visible. Women working at Kamer identify themselves to be “women who have recognized, questioned, and started to transform the violence in their lives and
their traditional statuses” (Kamer 2014). This description refers to a self-responsibility of women to change their own situation that fits nicely with neo-liberal governmentality. At the same time, such a self-constitution potentially makes women aware of the need for political change (Cruikshank 1999: 80).

Kamer mainly runs support centers for women who experienced violence or discrimination. The local offices provide psychological and legal support to women (Interview S 2014). It is the only place women can go to in the Eastern part of Turkey while the state does not provide protection. As long as the state does not ensure women’s protection, there appears to be no other choice. Kamer aims at improving women’s rights as well. Kamer tries to influence policies for women such as by participating in the debates on the headscarf ban on the right to abortion. The organization supported lifting the headscarf ban but pointed out that it was not enough. Religious tolerance needed to go further and cover equality regarding all areas including sexual orientation, ethnic origin and gender representation (Tahaoğlu 2013). Kamer expressed dissatisfaction with other women’s rights issues that have been less on the political agenda than the headscarf ban. Moreover, instead of talking about violence against women, abortion rights have been questioned. A local newspaper published an interview with the head of Kamer, Nebahat Akhoç, about the abortion issue. She commented on Erdoğan’s claim that every abortion was an “Uludure” by expressing that this sentence hurt her and that she did not understand this comparison. She referred to the problems women had in southeastern Turkey mentioning rape, sexual violence, a lack of access to education and health services. Politics should solve these issues and not talk about abortions. No woman liked to have an abortion in the first place (Kamer 2012). The CSO directly challenged the hegemonic discourse on abortions defended by the government. The statement expresses that rape and sexual violence are more pressing issues for women in southeastern Turkey. Kamer aims to improve the situation of women in the under-privileged parts of Turkey and not in its urban centers.

Similarly to the EU, Kamer uses a human rights and democracy discourse to make its point. For instance, in a press statement Kamer, together with Kader, stated that democracy and violence against women could not coexist, and the empowerment of women was not possible without a democratic opening. The statement was issued in preparation of a meeting with Erdoğan (Kamer 2010b). In a project starting in 2014 the organization similarly refers to a human rights’ discourse. It is called “Women’s rights are human rights”. The homepage of Kamer features this statement on the top making it the slogan of the organization (Kamer 2014). As my analysis of the hegemonic struggles on issues in Turkey demonstrated, making reference to rights has been very powerful in the area of women’s rights (at least in the beginning of my study period) and LGBT rights. Women’s organizations tried to put pressure on politics by using this discourse. Although Kamer’s main area of
work is social service provision – as the state does not protect women – it got involved in political struggles and made direct references to the government’s discourse putting women’s rights, mainly violence against women in southeastern Turkey, on the political agenda.

**EU funded projects**

Until 2013, Kamer conducted two EIDHR funded projects which mainly focused on reporting violence against women and thereby raising awareness for the issue. In 2006, Kamer ran the project “Women face to the future” in which 125 different groups met in 13 cities and 21 communities to talk about gender roles, sexism, economic rights, and how to fight violence. A hotline for women was established and advertised with flyers (Interview S 2014). In addition to providing support to women, the project created a data base on honor killings and a yearly report (EU Delegation to Turkey 2008b: 32; Kamer 2006) to make the public aware of the problem. The second report of 2011 was funded by SIDA and the Open Society Foundation (Kamer 2010a).

In 2011 and 2013, Kamer conducted the project “My Body is Mine” together with the medical faculty of Istanbul University. Women who experienced sexual violence were eligible to apply for medical help. As in the previous project, the CSO documented the cases to draft a study on sexual violence including data on the age of women, their perpetrators and the kind of violence (Bianet 2012). The study was supposed to increase knowledge on sexual violence and improve help for victims of violence in Kamer’s support centers and the regions as such (Interview S 2014).

Both EU funded projects mainly supported monitoring activities which are part of liberal governmentality. They combined providing protection for women with trying to increase an understanding of the political problem. Kamer acted as a check on the state. Monitoring brings women’s rights onto the agenda. Still, EU projects always entail neo-liberal rationalities in its requirements for documentation and management. Both projects produced a visible output either in the form of books, reports or database. Yet, documenting cases of violence creates public awareness of violence towards women and contributes to a political debate. The projects were supposed to both improve support for women and bring violence against women on the political agenda. In contrast to Kurki’s suggestions, both Kamer and Mor Çati did not provide services in the framework of EU funded projects.
6.1.3. Kader (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates, Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği)

The organization and its non-EU funded work
Kader has a different focus than Mor Çatı and Kamer. It was founded in Istanbul in 1997 and specialized in the participation of women in politics. It assumes that equality in all spheres is only possible with the equal representation of women in political offices (Kader 2014b). Six people work at the organization which is also supported by volunteers (Interview R 2014). Kader received funding from the EU, SIDA, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Danish development cooperation program DANIDA, Heinrich Böll Foundation and Matra Netherlands during the study period (Interview R 2014). Generally Kader has a professional websites (even though most of it is not translated to English) which provides information on its activities, involvement in public debates, campaigns and publications. On the website there are videos on the history of women’s participation in politics and Kader’s activities (Kader 2014e).

According to the homepage, Kader supports “all women that want to end all forms of discrimination and violence against women, support a secular republic, the respect for human rights and the rule of law and democracy, act against any form of racism, extremism, violence and war, with a consciousness for environmental protection, are truthful and follow their principles” (Kader 2014b). The statement emphasizes the active role of women in improving women’s rights. Differently to Kamer and Mor Çatı, Kader constitutes women much less as victims in the first place. In line with the goals of for instance Kamer, Kader considers women to be a force for changing the situation of women, hence placing responsibility on them. As stated before, this can be politicizing and depoliticizing depending on what women do and their context, which I will turn to further down. In addition, although Kader does not support any particular party, the reference to “Laik Cumhuriyet” (secular republic) (Kader 2014b) in the statement about itself hints at a secular orientation of the organization.

In spite of this, Kamer tries to address women’s participation in all parties. The organization invites female politicians from all parliamentary parties to meetings at the Hilton hotel in Istanbul or Ankara to talk about the situation of women in Turkish politics and create solidarity among women across different parties. Although Kader focuses on the participation of women in politics, the organization organizes events on other issues of women’s rights such as the right of daycare for children or the problem of sexual violence against women (Kader 2014d). In 2013, a conference on gender equality and the new constitution took place in Istanbul. Former politicians from other European countries and academics spoke on the issue. This conference was financed by SIDA (Kader 2013a). Kader published reports including the numbers of women who are in Turkish political
institutions in every year (Kader 2010-2013) and ran campaigns on the lack of women candidates in elections. The CSO stresses that the candidates of all big parties are men (Kader 2009). The campaigns used provocative images to get the message across. For instance, one shows women with mustache or ties (as a drawing on the photo) and asks “Do I have to be a man to run for office” (Kader 2007) challenging male dominance in politics. Kader published many bulletins on the subject of women in political life (Kader 2014c). The activities reached out to many national newspapers. National and local media such as Hürriyat (Daily News), Habertürk, Today’s Zaman, Radikal, and the Kurdish newspaper Özgür Gündem covered Kader’s campaigns for women’s participation in politics, events Kader participated in or organized and press statements regularly. As Kamer focuses on female candidates in politics, Kamer mostly targeted women of the more educated and elitist parts of society.

In addition to the CSO’s main topic of women’s political participation, Kader participated in debates on other women’s issues. Newspapers asked for the expertise of Kader and quoted the organization’s view on issues concerning women’s rights such as violence against women or women in politics (Kader 2014a). When the headscarf ban was debated in Turkey in 2010 Hürriyet Daily News published a piece in which a representative from Kader spoke out in favor of lifting the headscarf ban if it was grounded in a “national consensus” (Şenerdem 2010). In 2013, the organization further expressed that lifting the ban was good but other issues such as women’s participation in politics were important as well. Just as Kamer, Kader criticized the government for only focusing on the headscarf ban (Tahaoğlu 2013). Both Kader and Kamer are part of the Women’s Rights Platform established in 2011 together with private entities such as Hürriyet and the think tank TÜSIAD (Haklı Kadın Platformu 2014b). The platform published statements. In one the NGO strongly criticized Erdoğan’s comments on abortions, caesarians and how many children one should have (Haklı Kadın Platformu). Kader also sent letters to Erdoğan and other party leaders about the lack of women’s candidates in politics (Haklı Kadın Platformu 2014a). Kader was part of the political struggles supporting lifting the headscarf ban but criticizing the government for not doing anything else for women. The organization participated in political struggles and challenged the dominant discourse of the government. In comparison to Kamer and Mor Çatı however, Kader’s discourse mostly targeted the issue of female representation in politics and not feminist politics as such. Kader’s work carried a specific vision of women being part of the active political elite.

EU funded projects

In spite of the organization’s rather politically neutral appearance, my interview partner at Kamer indicated that the organization’s political ideas caused problems in one EU funded project, called
“Empowerment of Women Activists and Women Citizens as Voters and Active Citizens” which began in 2013 and continued until 2015 (Kader 2013b). The EIDHR funded project was a follow-up project of one that was funded by the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) between 2008 and 2011 (Kader 2008; Interview R 2014). The example of the EIDHR project shows how the actor who “empowers” exercises power over the ones to be “empowered”. It transfers a specific idea of emancipation to women (Cruikshank 1999: 68–70). The NGO conducted workshops with 20 women from local women’s NGOs in seven regions. The project produced a handbook on “women’s rights, citizenship awareness, how to be an active citizen, to become active in processes” (Interview R 2014). Esra Koç, who wrote another guidebook for women for the HYD before, contributed to the Kader guidebook with a section on citizenship. Together with a women’s human rights lawyer and an academic she provided training for women. The project coordinator at Kader described the goal of the project as following: “The aim of the project is to deliver trainings of trainers to local women on active citizenship” (Interview R 2014). Differing from most other women’s rights NGOs Kader focused on women’s political rights. The idea clearly is to empower women to become active citizens as the project descriptions shows:

“Kader aims to enable women to use their rights effectively as citizens. Political participation as a result of active citizenship is expected to be the ultimate goal of the project. The project aims at improving the capacity of women who are active in local civil society organisations in engaging with women citizens, raising awareness of citizenship rights among women citizens prior to the 2014 and 2015 local and general elections” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c).

Empowerment is to be achieved through increasing “capacity”. Women are constituted as self-managers having to increase their resources in order to act in a way a “citizen” is supposed to act (see Dean 1999: 67). Citizens should be active and responsible and thus women should be as well. As the project coordinator at Kader pointed out, the project prescribes a specific interpretation of women’s rights:

“I think the differences of the regions should be considered more. For instance, in Konya there were pro-AKP women but if the trainer is very anti-AKP it is difficult even though she tries to stay objective. For instance if she sees abortion as a women’s right, you are labelled as anti-AKP by the women and it is difficult to work with them then” (Interview R 2014).

This experience shows that projects use an approach that might not match the daily life of individuals included in the project activities. It points to the problems of “empowerment”. Such a project pays little attention to individual emancipation according to people’s own needs and ideas. Instead it tries to shape or change women’s political views on the individual level (see Cruikshank 1999: 73). The empowerment of women does not manage to politicize women to demand what they want from politics instead it focuses on the depoliticized idea of equal representation. Nevertheless, the political position of the project or the organization could not be hidden and was met with resistance. The attempt to depoliticize was not successful but the women in question were probably not
encouraged to take part in politics either. In terms of impact my interview partner was aware of the problems: “Of course I feel like we are making a difference. But we go to a region and we cannot reach out to everyone” (Interview R 2014). Accordingly, it is difficult to ensure “effectiveness” as the EU demands. Projects confront women with specific ideas and these ideas do not always match the local experiences.

Not only have Istanbul or Ankara based organizations problems understanding women on the countryside, the documentation requirements of the EU are hard for them to fulfill as well. The EU’s technologies of visibility and transparency make it very difficult to conduct projects outside of major cities. In this project, the EU granted per diems to workshop attendants but only handed them out via bank transfer. However, many women in rural areas do not have a bank account (Interview R 2014). Moreover, the EU’s requirements of documentation occupies one person full-time and produces feelings of distrust: “They treat us as if we did anything corrupted” (Interview R 2014). Thus, there is some resistance to the EU’s technologies of visibility and performance although Kader has institutionalized project-application activities by creating a commission which is responsible for drafting project applications and specifying the content of projects. The commission is also responsible to define specific activities once funding is approved (Interview R 2014). Hence, the people working for the organization’s project commission are not involved in daily CSO activities; instead they focus on writing applications in which they continuously have to justify their work and the organization’s eligibility for funds.

Kader has a different focus in its work – mainly equal political participation of women – and has been able to put this issue on the political agenda in Turkey. However, the CSO’s demands only covered the more educated women in society. In its project Kader exclusively focused on empowering women, depoliticizing women’s rights by placing the responsibility to act on women and constituting their ways to act in a specific way.

6.1.4. The HYD (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Helsinki Yurtaşlar Derneşi) and its project “The Handbook of the Woman Citizen”
The HYD is not a women’s rights organization. It considers itself to be a human rights organization as it tries to tackle different human rights. While it conducts projects on Kurdish rights, one part of the organization solely runs a refugee support center – both of which I will discuss later. In total 30 people work at HYD (Interview A 2013). Here I only focus on one EIDHR-funded project of HYD which worked on women’s rights. Similarly to the project of Kader, HYD created a handbook for women. The handbook was supposed “to provide daily-life guidance and legal know-how” (HYD 2014c). Its “specific objective” is:
“Providing practical guidance in daily-life & legal know-how to facilitate the access of women (of Turkish & Kurdish origin, particularly of disadvantaged groups such as internally displaced persons, migrants & non-literate) to justice, through dissemination of information/reference material & through providing consultation on their civil rights as citizens by training events. Thus improving the level of women’s awareness & effectiveness of implementation of EU reforms regarding women’s civil rights among disadvantaged groups” (HYD 2014c).

Training sessions as well as the handbook produced within this project were supposed to provide “guidance” for women. The handbook was published in Turkish and Kurdish and contains information on women’s rights in different areas of life including health rights, economic and social rights, property rights, family law, citizen rights, rights concerning relations to children, political rights, how to go to court, education rights, rights of movement and settlement and the situation of women in media (Koç and Kaya 2006, 2007: 3–7). The introduction to the guide stresses the need for women to be able to speak of “I” (“ben”), to say “no” (“hayır”), and to decrease self-insecurity (“kendine güvensizlik”) (Koç and Kaya 2006, 2007: 9–10). The handbook underlines the self-responsibility of women to improve their way to manage their life and their rights. It represents a discourse of self-management. The project organized assemblies with the help of women’s NGOs such as Kamer to distribute the handbooks. The newspapers Radikal, Hürriyet, and Birgün (left opposition newspaper) reported on the publication of the handbook (HYD 2007a).

The project did not only increase women’s knowledge on their rights but also intended “to raise the interest of women, particularly from disadvantaged groups into learning & exercising their civil rights in different fields of public life”, and “[t]he popular engagement of women into policy making bodies of NGOs, citizen’s initiatives, women’s organizations and advocacy groups is also an expected effect of these objectives” (HYD 2014c). Hence, firstly the project constitutes women as people in need who should stand up for their own rights. To do this – to self-manage – they need the skills and capacities provided for by the project. Secondly, women targeted are expected to become active citizens, become involved in decision-making processes and NGO work. Citizens affected by discrimination are constituted as activists who are responsible for their self-management as well as for other people – similar to the project of Kader.

As HYD did not do any other activities for women, this project was not integrated in a bigger political context of the organization. Indeed it mostly followed the neo-liberal rationality of empowerment and technologies of visibility and performance. The project expected to create self-responsible women which take care of their own issues. Over a long-term this could encourage women to take part in politics and put women’s rights and specific issues on the political agenda. Yet, the project itself does not do this although it could try to get involved directly. It transfers the responsibility to the people affected most. It partly covered up the political nature of the inequality of women suggesting that more engagement would change politics immediately (see Dean 1999: 67).
Such single projects focusing on empowerment lack a bigger political strategy and depoliticize the issue by covering the causes of inequality and putting all responsibility on the marginalized.

6.1.5. Conclusions on the (de)politicizing effects on CSOs working on women’s rights
My analysis of the women’s CSOs and their EU funded projects shows that running EU projects does not necessary equal depoliticization. Traditionally women CSOs such as Mor Çatı and Kamer focused on offering shelter to women who experienced violence. Some of the EU funded projects involved measures to improve services or the access of women to services. From their beginnings however, women’s CSOs provided shelter for victims of violence as the state did not offer any protection. The NGOs aim to transfer this responsibility to the state. In contrast to what most critical literature suggests, social service provision is not a big part of EIDHR funded projects. It was not an integral feature of the EU’s policy documents either, as I showed in chapter four. Increasingly however projects tried to “empower” women to defend themselves against violence, and to become active against discrimination. This constitutes women as being responsible for their own emancipation (Cruikshank 1999). For instance they should change traditional gender roles and become active citizens. The women NGOs do not just want to offer help but to help women to help themselves. This idea of being an entrepreneur of yourself and your own social situation is part of neo-liberal governmentality and is present in the EU documents as well. It blurs the causes of marginalization and its political nature. Instead of recognizing the political nature of the problem, responsibility is transferred to the level of the individual. Women’s NGOs expect women to become politically active to fight for their own situation thus putting the issue on the political agenda at some point. Yet, it is unrealistic to expect women who are underprivileged and experience violence to get involved in political struggles whereas the NGOs have more resources to do so. Especially the HYD project which focused on providing a handbook for women only constituted the problem of gender discrimination as a problem of women not knowing their rights and their possibilities. Such projects have the clearest depoliticizing tendencies. Nevertheless, informing people about their rights might politicize individuals if it is combined with discussing the causes and the need for politicizing the issue. Most projects included components of putting the issue on the agenda and demanding change such as the protection of women or changing legal implementation.

Still, the depoliticizing tendencies are strengthened by economic technologies used in EU project management. Following the EU requirements organizations have to write project proposals in which they set their own goals, strategies and budgetary needs. After having received funds, they have to document every step of the project and every cent spent. Usually the project budget includes the position of a project manager, an assistant and an accountant. These three persons have to
organize, implement, and document the project as well as its expenses. It is inevitable that they perform technologies of visibility and performance. Some organizations have institutionalized a position which is responsible for applying for project funding. Kader runs a whole commission for this purpose. As discussed, the budget documentation requirements are sometimes impossible to fulfill for civil society groups and create feelings of not being taken seriously and trusted. Further, critiques of EU and other external funding exist within the organizations. The possibility of funding changed the way women NGOs work and created competition to develop innovative projects. The technologies of performance make NGOs work like entrepreneurs eventually losing sight of the political dimension. Further, they force organizations to produce something material as a visible output of the project – publications which have a limited outreach. Moreover, when a general human rights organization runs a women’s rights project the depoliticizing triggers are less balanced by political involvement. Projects then lack a political context and solely focus on the individual responsibility of women affected.

In sum, I found that NGOs have not forgotten to participate in political debates and some of their projects confronted politics as well. CSOs monitored the situation of women in Turkey and documented harassment and violence against women demanding that women’s rights need to be protected. The reports published contributed to the political debate informing the public, raising awareness and demanding political change. The political context regarding women’s rights was dominated by the issue of the headscarf ban and abortion rights. The NGOs tried to point out that there are other more pressing women’s rights issues such as ending violence against women and the lack of female political representation. As the political divide deepened, there has been little cooperation between the government and civil society. Especially the political context at the end of my study period – as described in the last chapter – made cooperation and thus co-option unlikely. The government’s discourse provoked organizations to take a political stance in public debates in addition to their project work. The organizations I studied disagree with the increasingly conservative governmental statements on women’s rights such as the right to abortion. NGOs have reacted and strongly criticized the government on their websites and in national newspapers.
6.2. The (de)politicizing effects on CSOs working on LGBT rights

As discussed in my previous chapter, the discrimination of LGBT individuals came onto the agenda during the 2000s. Before, LGBT issues and people were marginalized and not visible in political debates. Especially in the second half of the 2010s, LGBT rights have increasingly been framed as human rights and become part of political struggles, for instance in the debate on the new constitution. While it has become less accepted to discriminate against LGBT individuals on an official level, in private life many LGBT people are still harassed and even murdered on the streets and in their families.

Traditionally, the LGBT scene has been an anarchist movement (Interview G 2013; Interview Q 2013). The LGBT movement in Turkey is largely based on activists and volunteers. It became visible during the Gezi Park protests in May and June 2013 where the different LGBT organizations showed up as one “LGBT bloc” (Interview Q 2013). LGBT CSOs – or at least the people working there – consider themselves to be activists as well. They organize the annual pride week and parade together. Representatives of the organizations take part in public debates and events (Spod 2012g). LGBT activists have been very critical of accepting third party funding: “LGBT organizations are always debating whether to get funding, whether it is legitimate. There is no one single answer to it, to the choice of self-funding. (...) It is always about western powers and rising neo-liberalism in those countries that impedes social rights” (Interview Q 2013). Organizing the Gay Pride in 2013 activists and organizations discussed whether to accept money from the Dutch authorities. The analysis of the NGOs will show though that the LGBT NGOs heavily rely on external funding. In the following, I analyze how LGBT organizations work with and without EU funding. In the following, I analyze the discourse and work of Kaos GL, Spod, and Pink Life in more detail.

6.2.1. Kaos GL (Chaos Gay and Lesbian Cultural Research Association, Kaos Gey ve Lezbiyen Araştırmalar Derneğii)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

Kaos GL is the oldest organization working for LGBT rights in Turkey. It was officially founded in 1994 but LGBT activists already met in private since 1990. The organization has around 150 members and employs ten people (Interview H 2013). 17 academics sit on the organization’s advisory board (Kaos GL 2014c). For Kaos GL EU funding was one of the most important financial sources between 2002

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13 In this part I could have also looked at the organization Black Pink Triangle which was founded in Izmir in 2009. It is the first LGBT organization in Izmir. It faced a closure case immediately after its foundation. The Governor of Izmir claimed that one article of its constitution violated the Turkish civil code because it was against an article on Turkish moral values and family structure. As the organization denied changing the article, the governor brought the case to the court (Amnesty International 2010). The CSO Istanbul LGBTTI had similar problems. It was founded in Istanbul in 2007 as a “civil initiative”. Only in 2011 it was approved to be a legal association. The CSO describes itself to be a “human rights organisation” (Istanbul LGBTTI 2014). As I did not manage to get an interview with representatives of either organization and their websites do not provide much information, I decided to largely exclude the CSOs from my analysis.
and 2013. The CSO receives small fees from its members which account for about the rent of the office in Ankara. The organization only gained a legal status in 2005 – as LGBT organizations were not recognized before – and since then it acquires international funding. The biggest amount comes indeed from the EU accounting for around 100,000 Euro since 2005 and the rest from the Open Society Institute, embassies, and European national funding agencies such as SIDA (Interview G 2013).

The organization makes a very professional impression because of its elaborate website featuring information on its activities as well as news concerning LGBTs in Turkey and the world. Many components of the website are translated into English. In addition, every field of work is described (Kaos GL 2014c). Kaos GL’s magazine has been published since 1994 and its 3,000 copies are distributed in 24 cities (Kaos GL 2014c). There is an online publication of the magazine to reach out to more people. It is designed as a news page containing numerous articles on recent news and events concerning LGBT rights. It is updated every day (Kaos GL 2014b).

Kaos GL aims to support lesbians, gays, bisexual and trans people “in embracing libertarian values, realizing their own existence, and in cultivating themselves in order to contribute to the development of social peace and welfare together with the development of their individual, social and cultural life and behavior” (Kaos GL 2014c). The CSO aims to fight against homophobia, transphobia, sexism as well as nationalism and militarism (Kaos GL 2014c). My interview partner stressed that Kaos GL supports all kind of human rights issues including the right to wear the headscarf and Kurdish rights (Interview H 2013). The organization tries to refer to the general human rights discourse and to stay away from a specific political position to make its demands legitimate and hegemonic. The reference to the headscarf issue is especially powerful here as it unites liberal as well as more religious positions.

Kaos GL aims to raise awareness for LGBT rights and politicizes the issue in some of its activities. Kaos GL is a member of many platforms that extend the cause of LGBT rights and deal with other human rights issues such as women’s rights, Kurdish rights, and religious rights (Kaos GL 2014c). Every year in May Kaos GL has organized an “International Meeting against Homophobia”. Since 2006 it has taken place in Ankara and in another 30 cities across Turkey on the International Day against Homophobia to discuss issues of LGBT discrimination and make LGBT individuals more visible. The event ends in a march against homophobia. On a regular basis the CSO held symposiums against discrimination to discuss the connection between homo- and transphobia and the Turkish notion of “hate crimes” (Kaos GL 2014c).
As part of the organization’s Human Rights Program Kaos GL has monitored and reported human rights violations since 2007. Since 2008 the organization has also monitored the media; according to the website Kaos GL around 5,000 news pieces each year. It has critically followed legal cases involving hate crimes against LGBT individuals such as the case of Ahmet Yıldız (Kaos GL 2014c).

The organization also provides protection of and services for LGBT individuals. For instance every year the CSO provides legal support and counselling for around 2,000 LGBT individuals including refugees. In 2004 the organization started its human rights training program in which it trains each year around 500 people – either LGBT individuals, teachers, psychological or social workers and lawyers – about “fundamental human rights concepts, human rights and protectionism activities” (Kaos GL 2014c).

Hence, the organization is working with different instruments. As neo-liberal governmentality suggests it tries to empower people within its training programs, and it offers social services to LGBT individuals such as legal and counselling services. However social service provision is necessary when hate crimes happen every other day and the state does not protect the victims. Kaos GL’s monitoring and awareness-raising activities are “liberal” tasks of civil society and politicize the issue. They stress that the individuals has rights which have to be protected by state (see Dean 1999: 121–123)

Moreover, Kaos GL aims to influence politics more directly as well. “Lobbying and advocacy activities in the field of human rights, rule of law and democratization” are mentioned on the website. The organization “is involved in the legislate and executive processes below with all possible collaboration with key official stakeholders” (Kaos GL 2014c). The list includes the new constitution, hate crimes law, the Turkish Penal Code, Turkish Labor law, the Discipline Code for the Turkish military, National Human Rights Institution Law, and the monitoring of the EU Accession Process (Kaos GL 2014c). Kaos GL was engaged in public debates during the study period. It published press statements for instance on the recognition of gender identity in the new constitution. Further, Kaos GL spoke out against violence against women and LGBT individuals (Kaos GL 2014a). Media reporting on LGBT issues often quote experts from Kaos GL. Kaos GL is very active in taking part in public debates on LGBT issues. In contrast to most other human rights NGOs, Kaos GL and other LGBT groups took a clear position in and for the so-called Gezi protests in 2013 with publishing press releases on its website and joining a LGBT forum (Interview G 2013; Dursun 2013b). Kaos GL published brochures, books, and reports on hate speech, the situation of LGBT individuals in Turkey, homosexuals in the military, and LGBT individuals in the social welfare sector (Kaos GL 2014d, 2014g, 2014h). Overall, the CSO tried to put its issues on the political agenda in different ways. In a situation of prior neglect and continuing marginalization of LGBT rights, Kaos GL’s activities are clearly politicizing a formerly illegitimate issue.
EU funded projects

Kaos GL regularly ran EIDHR projects. In 2009 Kaos GL conducted an EIDHR funded project called “Colours of Life” which included elements of empowerment and awareness-raising. This project focused on empowering LGBT individuals by increasing their knowledge on human rights. This was supposed to enable them to react to situations in which their human rights are violated. In addition, Kaos GL drafted a study on the situation of LGBT individuals in Ankara and produced several radio programs (EU Delegation to Turkey 2008b: 41). For the study, the CSO interviewed LGBT people in Ankara about their discriminating experiences (Kaos GL 2008). The radio program was produced together with Middle East Technical University in Ankara (METU) and had twelve different shows to raise awareness of LGBT rights framing them as human rights. In the program writers, academics, psychologists, and a politician were interviewed. The radio show was announced in the media for instance by the Hürriyet edition for Ankara (Biliroğlu 2007). The project combines strategies of empowerment with awareness-raising for the discrimination of LGBT people. The project does not completely rely on individuals to change their own situation but is aware that the political context has to change too.

Kaos GL further received EIDHR funds for the project “Never Again”(2010-2011) (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b) which mainly monitored human rights violations against LGBT individuals. Within the project, the CSO drafted a report on hate crimes in collaboration with Black Pink Triangle and Pink Life. It gives an account of every crime done against LGBT individuals in Turkey mentioning the name of the victim, the date, and the place and explaining what exactly happened, including murder cases (Kaos GL et al. 2010). The report makes reference to declarations against hate speech or discrimination on any grounds in documents of the Council of Europe, other nation states, the European Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Turkish constitution to stress the necessity and obligation of Turkey to protect the human rights of LGBT individuals (Kaos GL et al. 2010: 29–32). The report uses the notion of human rights and its international acceptance to legitimize its demands. The authors criticize the Turkish state that did not punish offenders enough (Kaos GL et al. 2010: 15), calls on the Turkish state to use the knowledge of the report in order to protect LGBT individuals in their human rights and punish those who violate their human rights (Kaos GL et al. 2010: 36).

Similarly, within the Hope project (2012-2013) (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c) in collaboration with Black Pink Triangle KAOS-GL monitored hate crimes and hate speech and presented the result in a report (Interview G 2013). To raise awareness the project reached out to politicians and students. Representatives from the CHP, BDP, and some from the AKP attended their workshops (Interview G 2013). The main output of the project was a media guide for Kaos GL media correspondents as well as other people working in media and reporting on LGBT issues. It gives them
recommendations how to use specific adjectives such as gay, lesbian and trans, to refrain from discriminating nationalities by speaking of “us” or “good” and “bad” news, and to be careful to use metaphors such as militarist ones. One part is a small dictionary on terms such as gender. In the end, sources to be used for writing about LGBT issues are listed (Güner 2013). The content of both projects “Never Again” and “Hope” combined monitoring and reporting with awareness-raising activities and hence overall attempted to politicize the issue.

The EU program Sivil Düşün contributed 4,388 Euro to the “Symposium against discrimination” organized by KAOS-GL in 2013 (EU Sivil Düşün 2013: 1) which largely served to bring different people together to talk about LGBT rights in public. It created awareness and helped bringing LGBT rights into political debates. The symposium took place the second time and also received funds from the Germany, Swiss, Norwegian, and British Embassy, Irish Labour Party, and SIDA Sweden. LGBT activists from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey attended the meeting in December 2013. Academics, civil society activists and academics spoke about issues of LGBT discrimination (Kaos GL 2013a). Besides academics, a few parliamentary deputies talked at the panels. From Turkey Sebahat Tuncel, Istanbul deputy from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) as well as Hüseyin Aygün, CHP deputy in Dersim participated. Tuncel opened the panel while Aygün was one panelist (Kaos GL 2013b). In 2012, the symposium was also supported by different embassies as well as by the STGM. It hosted different CHP and BDP politicians. Further, Turkish LGBT CSOs as well as persons from civil society and academics across Europe joined (Kaos GL 2012). The symposium provided the platform to publically talk about LGBT rights, creating awareness and politicizing the issue.

As Turkish legislation does not protect LGBT rights, LGBT individuals are marginalized and have difficulties receiving funding. EU funding supported Kaos GL in its monitoring, reporting and awareness-raising practices. In addition, it allowed the NGO to continue employing the same people which have experience and have a stake in the movement. Thus it made it possible to follow a specific position over a longer time (Interview G 2013). Moreover, it enabled the CSO to act in a position of marginalization: “The EU does not just mean financial support for us but the EU is for all organizations one of the closes political partner in Turkey” (Interview G 2013). Probably not all organizations would agree to this statement and Kaos GL also expressed criticism of the EU such as for its refugee policy (Interview G 2013). Overall, the organization sees EU funding positive. EU projects helped to “open doors” for LGBT NGOs. Before civil society was often associated with political positions and links to parties, EU funding made CSOs look “civil” again and this helped them to be heard (Interview G 2013). This shows that an apolitical appearance helps in gaining legitimacy in the Turkish political context.
Thus, the EU funded projects of Kaos GL focused on empowering LGBT individuals by informing them about their rights and ways to write news, raised awareness and knowledge among the media and the public, monitored and reported on hate crimes against LGBT individuals, and called for action. Within the projects, Kaos GL did not deliver any social services although it is one necessary part of their daily work. The CSO managed to reach out to politicians. Considering the marginalized or for most of my study period invisible position of LGBT issues co-option is very unlikely. EU projects helped Kaos GL to appear as a more legitimate – and indeed less political – actor. Making reference to human rights increased the legitimacy of its discourse. In this way, there is some depoliticization but a form of depoliticization which in a situation of neglect of LGBT issues helped putting LGBT rights on the political agenda, thus actually contributing to politicization. Moreover, Kaos GL conducted all of its projects in cooperation with other LGBT CSOs in Turkey and thus created a network which strengthens its position. Here EU funding did not divide the LGBT scene but enabled it to work together.

At the same time, the organization increasingly used its resources for managing budgets, documenting budgets and activities as prescribed by EU programs. In a similar fashion Kaos GL makes it finances transparent by publishing a budget report since 2009. All documents on regulations for expenses and anti-corruption are online. The CSO published activity reports; in 2013 even one for every month most of them funded by the Council of Europe (Kaos GL 2014e, 2014f, 2014h). It has established a method of accounting and documenting – technologies of visibility and performance – its expenses as well as its activities as mentioned before (Kaos GL 2014h). These practices consume time which could be used for other activities. However in this case, the neo-liberal management technologies increased Kaos GL’s legitimacy. The LGBT movement came from a very invisible position and struggled to make their claims legitimate. Documentation and transparency made the organization appear as a trustworthy actor. Hence, depoliticization enabled politicization. It helped Kaos GL to put LGBT issues on the political agenda.

6.2.2. Spod (Social Policies, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation Studies Association, Sosyal Politikalar Cisiyet Kimliği ve Cinsel Yönelim Çalışmaları Derneği)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

Spod was only founded in 2011 and therefore did not exist for the most part of my study period. Spod is based in Istanbul. Until Spod’s foundation, there was Istanbul LGBT and Lambda Istanbul as LGBT groups. Lambda however is more of a social center than a CSO and is completely volunteer based (Lambdaistanbul 2014). In 2013, Spod had three full-time and one half-time employees and around ten active volunteers (Interview Q 2013). In the future, Spod aims to cover 50 per cent of its
expenses with membership fees and the rest with funding from the EU, foundations and other donors (Interview Q 2013).

Spod wants to work on achieving “equality and human rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people at the national level” and defines its six main areas of activities being economic and social rights, legal issues, political participation, knowledge production, media, and international solidarity (Spod 2012b). The goals defined on the website as well my interview partner express that Spod’s main focus is on influencing policies:

“Yes, we are becoming more and more a political actor. And we see it as our responsibility to pull LGBT rights organizations to be more active in the political arena and in political advocacy and lobbying. They should make their work more visible to policy makers and be more outspoken. It has/we have an effect on policies” (Interview Q 2013).

Spod’s activities reflect these aims. Since 2014, Spod has a special website for its “political representation” which in the format of a blog publishes news on LGBT issues, the organization’s press statements and information on its activities (Spod 2014b). Spod together with many other local LGBT organizations published political demands for the presidential elections of 2014: being included in local political decision-making, anti-discrimination in employment, and improving social and health services for LGBT individuals. They demanded to protect “LGBT rights” (Spod 2013d). Many activities dealt with the inclusion of LGBT rights in the new constitution. One event combined different expert panels and visits to the three major parties – AKP, CHP, and BDP. One panel was on “fundamental rights” (temel haklar) and LGBT rights (Spod 2012i). Many activities were organized in cooperation with other NGOs such as the LGBT social center Lambda Istanbul, Kaos GL, Mor Çatı, and İHD (Spod 2012e, 2013a, 2012f). Spod had regular contacts to politicians from all major parties, however especially with the BDP and CHP (Spod 2013b) to which other LGBT groups had most contacts as well. Besides the debate on the constitution, Spod engaged in public discussions on the murder of a homosexual man and commented on the statement of Professor Nevzat Tarhan who told media that homosexuality was a disease (Spod 2014a, 2012c).

Spod makes its work very transparent by publishing a report on its activities online for every month since 2012. These reports, documenting every small activity, reflect how the CSO has internalized the technologies of visibility and performance. The reports further provide links to media coverage of events if existing (Spod 2012a).

As other CSOs Spod also offers psychological support to LGBT individuals (Spod 2012i). Once a month it invites trans people to a group therapy session (Şapka 2014). In its academic program the NGO supports academic research on LGBT issues by opening its library. It wants to use academic research for its strategy to push LGBT issues in Turkey (Spod 2012d).
Compared to other NGOs, Spod had a special focus on pressuring politics. Providing services was a smaller part of their activities and Spod did not publish reports on hate crimes or LGBT discrimination. It asked a research institute to conduct a study on Turkish people’s opinions on LGBT individuals and homosexuality. One employee of Spod published an analysis of the report in the Radikal newspaper (Yılmaz 2012). In general neither monitoring nor empowering was central for the organization. Spod did not incorporate goals based on neo-liberal rationalities such as empowerment in its general activities, instead they constituted the subject in a liberal way, as a bearer of legal rights (see Dean 1999: 121–123).

Since its beginning, the CSO pursued the creation of networks to achieve change together with other groups. It set up the “LGBT Political Representation and Participation Platform” that aims to improve the conditions of political participation of LGBT people in Turkey. The Kurdish LGBT CSO Hêvi LGBTI Initiative, Lambda Istanbul as well as Istanbul LGBTT are members of the platform (Spod 2013c). Spod as well as Kaos GL participate in the so-called “Checks and Balances Network” initiated by the International Policy Center at Sabancı University. The network monitors the constitutional reform process and publishes weekly reports (Istanbul Policy Center 2012).

**EU-funded projects**

Spod’s first funding came from TASCO which supported events on LGBT rights and the new constitution: “It was quite supportive. Spod was not even a year old and the work on the new constitution was one of our top work” (Interview Q 2013). In December 2012, members of Spod and of other LGBT NGOs such as Pink Life and Kaos GL visited an event of the EU Delegation on human rights defenders (Spod 2012e). In the following March, Spod held a symposium on “Social Policy and LGBT Rights in Turkey and Europe” in Istanbul which was supported by TASCO as well as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the social politics forum. The symposium discussed work life, educational rights, health rights, family politics, social security, and demands for the constitution (Spod 2012h). Spod often compared Turkey and Europe regarding the situation of LGBT rights to stress the legitimacy of its claims. The LGBT discourse refers to human rights and European democratic standards. The newspaper HaberTürk published an article on the symposium and especially laid out the conditions and problems of changing or adjusting your biological sex (Tezel 2012), which is a topic not often discussed in mainstream media. Hence, the activities funded managed to bring LGBT issues in the media and discuss it with politicians.

Spod did not receive any EIDHR funding between 2011 and 2013 partly because it is much more complicated to apply for EIDHR funds than for TASCO. Further, there was no call for LGBT
organizations. In the future the NGO wants to apply for EU funding (Interview Q 2013). However, for Spod funding from other donors such as the Heinrich Böll or Friedrich Ebert Foundation was more accessible than EU funding which required a higher amount of bureaucracy. There was also less suspicion towards the foundations as they did not interfere with their agenda while EU funding is considered to be politically problematic: “It [the critique] is always about western powers and rising neo-liberalism in those countries that impedes social rights” (Interview Q 2013). The activists are more critical than the organizations however. Spod intends to apply for EU funding and decided not to be strictly against it (Interview Q 2013).

Between 2011 and 2013 Spod was very close to the EU discourse and worked with the EU. It strongly incorporated the neo-liberal technologies of visibility and performance in the way it works. Yet, similar to Kaos GL it did not pursue the typical projects focusing on empowering individuals and improving social services. Instead it considered it most important to bring issues on the political agenda and to involve politicians. It thus tried to politicize the demands of LGBT groups.

6.2.3. Pink Life (Pembe Hayat)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

Pink Life was founded in Ankara in 2006. The CSO aims to defend LGBT rights in general but its activities and its publications have a stronger focus on trans individuals, sex workers, and HIV/aids than other LGBT CSOs. In several of its issues the magazine informs about HIV/aids, how to prevent, how to live with it and where to go with HIV/aids (Pembe Hayat 2007). Conditions of sex workers were also discussed a lot; one issue is dedicated to the topic (Pembe Hayat 2010b). Mainly, Pink Life tried to increase awareness. The organization held two symposiums on “Sex workers and human rights” sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 2011 and 2013. Activists, NGO employees, advocates as well as academics from around the world spoke on the symposiums. The talks were summarized in two books which are available on the website. The first symposium was entitled “Sex workers’ rights are human rights” (Ordek 2011). The second symposium was held under the slogan “Police, take your hands off my body” (Pembe Hayat 2013b). The NGO challenges state authorities with its events.

Pink Life worked to increase knowledge about and awareness of issues of trans individuals. As in Spod’s work, sexual transformations were on topic. In 2012, Pink Life produced a book which focuses on the stories of seven women who became men and aims to raise awareness of trans men. It begins with the history on transgender and LGBT, and concludes with interviews with a doctor and a lawyer on sexual transformations. The main part of the book however consist of seven interviews
with individuals who changed their biological sex telling their personal social, medical and psychological story (Güngör 2012). Although it is questionable that such a publication makes it to the broader public, the organization tried to create awareness of the situation of transgender people. With the same aim, Pink Life organized a day to remember victims of hate crimes against trans people. Turkish and international politicians, academics and other civil society actors participated. Their contributions were collected in a publication to be found on the website. This event was funded by the Norwegian embassy (Pembe Hayat 2013a).

Together with other NGOs such as Kaos GL and Lambda Istanbul, Pink Life formed the “LGBT Bireyler İnsan Hakları İzleme ve Hukuk Komisyonu” (Commission on LGBT people’s human rights law and monitoring) to monitor the violations of LGBT individual’s human rights and draft reports (Kaos GL 2007). To fulfill the so-called watchdog role together strengthens the position of the organizations and the results of the reports.

Similar to Kaos GL the organization publishes a magazine dealing with LGBT issues called “Lubunya” four times a year, downloadable on the website (Pembe Hayat 2014b). Further, there are different publications online which the CSO produced as part of several projects (Pembe Hayat 2014c). The magazine shows that the CSO considers itself to be part of LGBT activism as it reported on street demonstrations and marches and co-organized or called on people to join demonstrations such as for instance the 1 May and the women’s day demonstrations (Pembe Hayat 2011, 2012b). It further invited and talked to politicians from the BDP and CHP (Pembe Hayat 2012a). Pink Life organized cultural events such as the Kuir Fest (Queer fest), a queer film festival. The first one took place in Ankara in November 2011. The website of the film festival is in fact more professional than the one of the organization itself (Pembe Hayat 2014a). Overall Pink Life politicized the issues of LGBT people by raising awareness, spreading knowledge and involving politicians.

**EU funded projects**

Many of the EU funded projects Pink Life did were in in cooperation with Kaos GL. TASCO as well as the Sivil Düşün project line co-financed single events of Pink Life. In November 2010, Pink Life held the “trans remembrance meeting” which was financially supported by TASCO and the STGM as well as by Amnesty International, the Dutch embassy, and the municipality of Çankaya in Ankara. The meeting was to remember hate crimes against trans individuals and to discuss problems of trans-people in Turkey. The conference consisted of panels on the topics of hate crime, sex work, and HIV/aids as well as a meeting of 25 trans individuals from across Turkey to develop strategies to fight hate and discrimination. Representatives from Kaos GL, Amargi, Lambda Istanbul, TİHV, Pink Life and
international LGBT groups took part in the discussions. The different events took place on the campus of METU and Bilkent University in Ankara in cooperation with the universities’ LGBT student groups (Pembe Hayat 2010c). A march in the city of Ankara was part of the program (Pembe Hayat 2010a). For this meeting the CSO created an own website (Pembe Hayat 2010c). This event involved civil society actors mostly but it created a visibility for LGBT issues as it was hosted by student groups of two of the most know universities of Turkey and its march was held in the middle of the Turkish capital.

Pink Life did a follow-up event (2011) for which it invited speakers, civil society and citizens to the “Conference on Combating Transphobic Hatred – We need a law” financed by TASCO, the UN, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Dutch Mamacash foundation and the Urgent Action Fund. The conference solely focused on hate crimes and hate speech. One panel discussed European legislation on hate crimes and what had been done so far in Turkey; on another panel politicians from CHP and BDP participated. Again there was a march against hate crimes and a new meeting of trans individuals from different Turkish cities (ILGA Europe 2011). Thus, this time the scope of the event was extended also including politicians. Both projects are similar to Pink Life’s non-EU funded work and include awareness-raising activities. Moreover, Pink Life called for a law to fight hate crimes against LGBT people in Turkey.

Pink Life also monitored crimes against LGBT people. Together with Kaos GL, Pink Life received one of the first Sivil Düşün funds for drafting a report on “Sexual and gender orientation and human rights” documenting every crime against trans individuals in Turkey. The report included hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity, hate speech, violations of freedom of speech, ongoing cases and results of legal cases (Pembe Hayat and Kaos GL 2013).

Whereas most of the CSO’s activities were liberal practices and clearly politicizing the issue of hate crimes, one project taking place after the end of my study period in 2014 aimed to empower LGBT individuals by informing them about their rights. The project implemented together with Kaos GL was funded by the Sivil Düşün program. Its title “LGBT Hakları İnsan Haklarıdır” (“LGBT rights are human rights”) referred to the human rights discourse. The CSOs drafted a handbook on human rights including the areas of health, education, financial and social services, freedoms of movement and thoughts (Pembe Hayat and Kaos GL 2014), thus enabling trans people to get the services they need. Against the background of Pink Life’s overall politicizing strategy, such a handbook is rather complimentary than depoliticizing.

In sum, although during my time period new LGBT organizations emerged, the NGOs do not seem divided. In contrast, I found that Pink Life cooperates a lot with Kaos GL and complements the
work of Kaos GL with its focus on trans individuals, sex workers and health issues. Together they managed to receive international funding. EU funding especially meant short term funding such as TASCO or Sivil Düşün. Pink Life mainly raised public awareness for LGBT issues and tried to bring LGBT rights onto the political agenda. Only one project explicitly aimed to empower trans-people. It also referred to a human rights discourse to get its message across. Pink Life worked project based with funding from different international donors. Overall, Pink Life politicized LGBT rights.

6.2.4. Sivil Düşün funding for individual LGBT activists

In 2012, the EU’s program “Sivil Düşün” (“Think/Dream Civil”) began which is supposed to continue until 2016. The program is directly financed by the EU Delegation and is for “more sensitive issues” (Interview K 2013). LGBT groups and individuals received several funds in this program (EU Sivil Düşün 2013). Applications for Sivil Düşün, do not need to include full project ideas. Different than the EIDHR, it funds individual activists, civil society platforms as well as CSOs. Activists can apply for single activities (Interview K 2013). For instance, LGBT activist Kivilcim Arat has received 112 Euro in financial support for participating in a demonstration. The EU paid for the posters he used to protest against hate crimes on Taksim (EU Sivil Düşün 2013: 1). Here, the EU financed a grassroots activity. This grant makes it possible to support activists in their daily actions. Thus, activists are freer to choose their activities and face fewer requirements to receive funding.

Another LGBT activist was provided with funds for a documentary on education problems of trans men. Barış Sulu received money for traveling, technical materials, copying and distribution (EU Sivil Düşün 2013: 2). More than 10,000 people saw his documentary which seven trans men talk about their experiences in the education sector. He sent the documentary to schools, education institutions, trade unions and NGOs (EU Sivil Düşün 2013: 2). The rather conservative newspaper Milliyet interviewed Sulu about his project (Milliyet 2013a). As he is a known activist he has been interviewed before by Hürriyet about his experiences and general transgender issues (Hakan Gence 2012). The direct support given by the EU facilitates the activist’s activities. Sulu received money for a project that he would have pursued in this way anyway if he had found enough funds. The documentary entered the political discourse at least among the LGBT activists and some parts of the media. Sivil Düşün further funded the showing of a family movie touching on LGBT issues at the European Parliament (EU Sivil Düşün 2013: 1). The Sivil Düşün instrument provides a chance for a politicization of the issue and room for emancipatory politics. Applicants are freer in their choice of activities and do not need to manage a whole project.
6.2.5. Amargi

All the organizations I studied so far applied for EIDHR funding during the study period. Although some of them criticize EU funding, generally they value it as a financial source additional to donations and other external funding. In contrast to other external funding, the EIDHR provides in fact more long-term support than just for single activities although I just discussed the advantages of such funding. Here, I want to introduce an organization which works on both women’s and LGBT rights and decided against applying for EU funds. As stated in the methodology chapter, I include Amargi because it is an example for an organization which is on a more radically left position of the political spectrum, yet has links to the organizations funded and discussed here. For instance, there are personal links between Amargi and Kaos GL (Interview J 2013). Hence, one could expect the organization to pursue similar strategies. Indeed, the organization considered applying for EU funds and decided against it. While I cannot include all organizations not applying for EU funding in Turkey, I decided to select two CSOs as examples to gain an understanding of what happens without EU funding or when EU funding is contested.

Amargi was founded in 2001 and considered itself to be a “Feminist Kollektif”. The CSO fought for women’s as well as LGBT rights. Amargi ran a feminist library in Istanbul and organized open meetings. It dissolved in 2012 (Interview J 2013). Amargi mostly provided a place for left feminists to meet, exchange, and discuss. Amargi’s description about itself says: “Amargi is a feminist, anti-hierarchic, anti-nationalist, and anti-militarist organization”. Indeed the group had no leader and every decision was reached through discussion and then consensus. Further, the organization stressed the role of feminist theory and academic literature (Amargi 2014b). One of Amargi’s main activities was the organization of workshops on sexuality and gender. Its participants talked about sexuality, how they define sexuality, and how they are influenced by others how to see it (Amargi 2011). Other workshops focused on expressing yourself through movement or self-defense techniques (Amargi 2014a). The activists further organized several seminars on gender in film and literature (Amargi 2014a). In contrast to the other women’s NGOs studied, Amargi functioned as an activity center where women could meet and discuss different aspects of feminism and queer issues, where people could learn about theory, literature and art on gender, and where women could be empowered. The organization was politically outspoken. Amargi did not offer any services such as counseling of women but instead intended to be a political group (Interview J 2013). Amargi took a stance on the case of Pınar Selek who is one of the founding members of Amargi and has been subjected to legal prosecution. Selek is accused of being associated with the PKK and having staged a bomb attack on the Egyptian bazar in Istanbul 1998. However, most experts believe that the explosion was an accident caused by a gas leak. Another member of Amargi acts as the spokesperson.
for Selek who lives in exile in France and Amargi’s website provides information on the development of Selek’s case (Amargi 2014c).

Everyone involved in the organization was a volunteer or in their eyes a political activists. No one was paid; except sometimes travel costs were covered. Amargi did not have many financial resources. The question whether to apply for external funding was much debated. The Heinrich-Böll Foundation, Mamacash Netherlands and the UN funded some workshops but it was contested whether funding was good: “Once we got funding from the UN Women’s Fund. Afterwards we had big discussions because we don’t support the UN policy which is capitalist and carries patriarchal thinking and supports wars” (Interview J 2013). The members opposed funding because they opposed the policies of the donors. However, some within the organization wanted to apply for more funding including EU grants, which they never had applied for. According to my interview partner the issue of funding created division among activists. Some saw some funding as the opportunity to change something and to survive as a group in the first place. But most activists rejected to work in project-cycles being dependent on outside donors whose political ideas they did not support: “We thought that it should not be our aim just to survive if we cannot reach our main aim which is to get rid of patriarchy and to change society. Then it is not meaningful and thus we decided to close the organization” (Interview J 2013). The organization lacked financial resources and external funding seemed to be the only possibility. Moreover, the discussions about funding absorbed most of their time and people were tired of it (Interview J 2013). In the end, the members of Amargi decided to give up the organization.

The case of Amargi shows that the opportunity to apply for funding potentially creates conflicts and resistance within organizations. Although the original problem of Amargi was a lack of financial resources, the possibility of applying for EU funding contributed to the dissolution of the collective as EU support was discussed as a solution. Hence, the members of the CSO did not see any other way to fund themselves any longer and lost some unity among its members to continue as a grassroots group and raise money through other activities or do less budget-intensive work. Moreover, this example shows that organizations disagreeing with the EU’s political line are less willing to accept EU or other outside funding fearing that it would change their work and corrupt their political position. Amargi disagreed with general EU politics more than other NGOs and thus showed stronger resistance.
6.2.6. Conclusions on the (de)politicizing effects on CSOs working on LGBT rights

In Turkey there has been an increase in the number of LGBT organizations between 2002 and 2013. Whereas the LGBT grassroots movement has existed since the 1990s, LGBT organizations – except for Kaos GL and Lambda Istanbul – only came into being after the second half of the 2000s. Kaos GL used to be the only big organization but several other organizations in Izmir, Istanbul, and Ankara have been founded. Against the background that most of them are relatively young, LGBT organizations received a significant amount of EU funding. They profited from EIDHR, TASCO and Sivil Düşün funds. Pink Life, Black Pink Triangle and Spod were founded in a time in which some of them – Black Pink Triangle and Istanbul LGBTT – were threatened by legal closure. Their demands used to be invisible and illegitimate. Yet, the organizations were never closed and LGBT rights were increasingly considered to be human rights and part of democratization processes. The foundation of more LGBT CSOs was also a consequence of the political opening.

Between 2002 and 2013 the oldest organization Kaos GL performed classical NGO activities with monitoring and documenting hate crimes and hate speech. Pink Life drafted many of the reports with Kaos GL. The reports criticized official policies and demanded change from politics. They potentially politicized the topic. At the same time all organizations – especially Kaos GL – provided social services in the form of psychological, social, and medical support to LGBT individuals because no public institution provides this kind of support.

Overall, the main aim of most LGBT groups was to politicize the issue of LGBT rights, thus constituting individuals mostly as holders of legal rights as the EU historically has done as well as discussed in my theoretical chapter (Parker and Rosamond 2013: 238–239). For instance, in the process of making the new constitution the CSOs organized different conferences and symposiums to achieve an inclusion of LGBT rights in the constitution. They invited politicians to participate and present their point of views. Moreover, some organizations had very regular contacts with BDP and CHP politicians – and some AKP politicians. The newest CSO Spod focused on lobbying and pressuring politics to achieve political change. Although the LGBT discourse was marginalized before, NGOs especially targeted politics. They did so by using a human rights discourse and referring to the situation of LGBT individuals in Europe. The discourse and the EU grants increased their legitimacy. Especially Kaos GL profited a lot from EIDHR grants in this way. Moreover, the funding programs of TASCO and Sivil Düşün which grant support to single events such as a conference to raise awareness were useful for LGBT organizations and required less management skills and project planning from them.

Fewer projects constituted individuals as self-entrepreneurs that had to do something to get their rights. They aimed at “empowering” LGBT individuals to defend themselves and to become
active for their rights. These projects created handbooks on LGBT rights such as charters on LGBT rights as human rights. In combination with the politicizing activities, they rather function as a complimentary tool that is useful for LGBT people as long as they face discrimination.

Yet to politicize LGBT rights, the NGOs heavily relied on EU funding and project work. Working in projects changed the organizations which act in a strong grassroots context. They learned how to apply for money, how to document budgets and performance, to employ technologies of visibility and performance. That the organizations incorporated these rationalities was visible in the ways they present themselves. This is especially noteworthy as the LGBT organizations are said to not being used to keep track of expenses, collecting receipts and writing budgets. Other organizations have helped LGBT groups to learn the technologies needed for EU projects. (Interview P 2013). They seem to have done so successfully. Even though the CSOs cooperate in different projects, the increase in the number of LGBT CSOs still means that they are eventually competing for funding and becoming more and more entrepreneurs. Moreover, many NGOs apply for external funding although on the grassroots level LGBT people are very critical of external funding. Thus, the downside of EU funding is that it created some tensions within the LGBT movement which is anarchist and grassroots. On the positive side however, organizations increased their legitimacy by using the technologies of performance and visibility. They appeared less political than before when LGBT issues were not accepted as a political topic. Depoliticization made it possible for them to bring their issues onto the political agenda in the first place. It made it easier for them to pose demands.
6.3. The (de)politicizing effects on CSOs working on Kurdish rights

Because working on Kurdish rights was extremely dangerous in the 1990s and still raises suspicion, most CSO work is conducted under the heading of fighting torture or just defending human rights. Suppression of Kurdish people still exists and people working for Kurdish rights are assumed to have links to the PKK and are arrested on this ground – such as my interview partner Osman İşçi who worked and volunteers for İHD. As the discrimination of Kurdish people was the first topic of human rights NGOs, it was the first issue area for which the EU gave financial support in Turkey. Most of the organizations active for Kurdish rights such as HYD, İHD, Amnesty International, Mazlumder and TİHV founded a network called İnsan Hakları Platformu (Human Rights Platform, İHOP) in 2005. Mazlumder and TİHV left the platform in 2007 though. İHOP aims to strengthen dialogue and solidarity among human rights activists (İHOP 2007). The platform was later supported by the Capacity Development Association (Kapasite Geliştirme Derneği; KAGED) and the funds of the EU’s “Strengthening Public-Civil Society Dialogue” project (Kapasite Geliştirme Derneği 2014), which I will turn to in more detail at the end of this chapter. İHOP ran training programs for human rights defenders, organized workshops and conferences with civil society activists and academics on different human rights issues such as the role of media in discrimination. The platform published human rights reports and statements on specific issues such as common comments on the violation of human rights during the Gezi Park protests (İHOP 2014, 2013a, 2013b). Overall İHOP enables the NGOs to cooperate in their daily activities. In the following, I analyze their work, including EU funded projects of İHD and TİHV, HYD, and Mazlumder.

6.3.1. İHD (Human Rights Association, İnsan Hakları Derneği) and TİHV (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

İHD was the first human rights organization founded in Turkey. It came into being in 1986 as a reaction to the military coup of 1980 which was followed by many arrests and torture of prisoners. Besides the headquarters in Ankara, İHD has 29 offices all over Turkey, and 10,000 members (İHD 2008a). The membership fees contribute to a relatively large part of the budget. The CSO employed four people in paid positions in 2013 and had 35 so-called committee members which are volunteers. It finances itself with membership fees and occasional funding. Traditionally, members pay travel costs themselves as a form of donation (Interview E 2013).

In 1990, İHD founded the organization TİHV for the treatment of torture survivors. In the 1990s 23 members of İHD were killed. In 1998 its president survived a murder attempt in which he was shot in his office (İHD 2008a). My interview partner volunteers as the International Affairs Secretary at the
CSO and he himself was arrested in June 2012 accused of having links to the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu; KESK) which is considered to be the urban wing of the PKK. He was released in April 2013 after having been in prison for ten month without being informed of the allegations (Interview E 2013). Human rights organizations still face special obstacles when working on Kurdish rights. However, the goals of İHD are not solely focused on Kurdish rights any longer. The CSO’s website states:

“IHD upholds the principle that the human rights are universal in nature and indivisible. IHD struggles against any kinds of discrimination based on language, religion, color, gender, political thought and etc... (...) Human Rights Association accepts and defends personal, political, economic, social and cultural rights and solidarity rights as a whole” (İHD 2014b).

The homepage further says that İHD works on problems in prisons, against torture, on the Kurdish Question, on economic and social rights, for human rights education, and for disabled persons (İHD 2008a). My interview partner similarly emphasized that the organization does not only work on Kurdish rights:

“As long as there are human rights violations, we work. (...) For instance we work on internally displaced people. It doesn't matter who they are. And it doesn't matter whether other people claim then that we are pro-Kurdish. We also work on the headscarf issue. Our only purpose is our human rights activity. If we miss something in this area, it is only because of our incapacities” (Interview E 2013).

Indeed most of the organization’s EU funded projects are not on Kurdish rights. Just as Kaos GL, the organization also refers to the right to wear a headscarf to show its commitment to include all kinds of human rights issues. Including all human rights legitimizes the organization and defends it against critiques. Still, the CSO’s original focus was on the situation of Kurdish people in Turkey and the armed conflict. While TIHV is responsible for giving medical, psychological as well as legal help to victims of torture, İHD focuses on monitoring and reporting human rights violations especially the ones “which resulted from military operations and armed conflict in the East and Southeast Regions of Turkey” (İHD 2008a). As such, the organization conducted traditional civil society activities which focused on demanding respect for human rights. İHD constitutes individuals as bearers of rights and demands the respect and protection of these rights. Every year İHD has published a report on human rights violations in Turkey which begins with an overview in numbers of human rights violations resulting in deaths and bodily harm. The report gives detailed information on every incident and is about 500 pages long and includes numbers on the deaths of prisoners, torture of prisoners, violations against refugees as well as violence against women and children (İHD 2013c).

In addition, every year the CSO published on average around ten special reports such as on human rights violations during the Gezi protests (İHD 2013a), the development of the peace process (İHD 2014a), human rights violations in prisons (İHD 2013b), using the Kurdish language (İHD Diyarbakır Şubesi 2009) as well as the conditions of Öcalan’s imprisonment (İHD 2003). İHD also
cooperated with other organizations drafting special reports. For instance, İHD worked with Mazlumder in several cases. In 2013, İHD and Mazlumder formed a commission together to investigate cases of harassment of Kurdish students in Karabük (İHD 2013d). In 2011, İHD and Mazlumder constituted a platform to investigate the massacre that took place in Roboski, Uludure, on 20 December 2011. The commission was joined by TİHV, KESK, the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), the Contemporary Lawyers Association (ÇHD), the Peace Assembly of Turkey (TBM), and DISK Genel-İş Trade Union. The commission has its own blog on which it informs about the result of its investigations and demands from politics to clarify what happened (Roboski’ye Adalet Platformu 2012).

Between 2002 and 2013, İHD regularly published press statements intervening in political debates and bringing Kurdish rights and other human rights on the political agenda. In all its statements, the CSO stressed peaceful approaches. In the early 2000s when the war in Iraq began, İHD called for peace instead of war (Öndül 2002c, 2002a; İHD 2002). Other press releases dealt with death in prisons due to their conditions and hunger strikes and called on the Turkish government to change the conditions and to stop torture (İHD 2005; Öndül 2002d) referring to a “democratic public” which was not enough to stop deaths in prisons and asking which democratic country allowed these deaths (Öndül 2002b). Hence, as other CSOs İHĐD used the reference to the democratization process of Turkey to strengthen its point. Many statements are on the peace process and stress that the organization supports the peace process and opposes any violence to solve the conflict. It emphasizes that a peaceful solution can be achieved through democracy (İHD 2010, 2013e, 2006). The organization expressed that “[t]he most important problem of Turkey is the question of human rights and democracy. And of this main question the Kurdish question is the most important one” (İHD 2008d). In another statement the CSO said that the Kurdish question was a political questions as well as a question of human rights: “If Turkey is a democratic country, we have to find human rights and freedoms for all parts of society (İHD 2009). İHD also suggested changes to improve Kurdish rights for the new constitution (İHD 2013f). During the headscarf debate İHD spoke out in favor of the freedom to wear a headscarf arguing that the headscarf issue was an issue of freedom and of human rights (İHD 2008c), and criticized the attempt to close the AKP as undemocratic (Öndül 2008). At the same time, the organization criticized the government’s policies on the Kurdish issue and torture. It generally sticks to a discourse that continuously refers to human rights when speaking of Kurdish rights and tries to bring them into the political debate.

Although the majority of İHD activities are about political demands, some projects try to empower individuals. In 2008, the Dutch Helsinki Committee funded a project in which İHD cooperated with Mazlumder and Amnesty International Turkey entitled “Strengthening of local
human rights volunteers”. Within the project the CSOs drafted a handbook for human rights educators in which they learn about different human rights systems and techniques of reporting, meetings and applying. During the project İHD, Mazlumder and Amnesty International held workshops with human rights volunteers (İHD 2008e, 2008b). Here, people were empowered to act as human rights defenders – a notion I will discuss in the section of EU funded projects in more detail.

İHD’s related organization TIHV has focused on the individual cases of torture and combined reporting activities with the provision of social services which the state would not provide for. It runs a documentation center for human rights violations (Interview F 2013). Their reports have been financed by different donor organizations; sometimes EU projects contributed some financial resources (TIHV 2006). Besides providing medical, legal and psychological support to torture survivors, they draft an “alternative medical report” when victims of torture come to them (Interview F 2013). Further, its reports have been published and distributed “to all relevant stakeholders: NGOs, media, MPs, and international organizations” (Interview F 2013). During the Gezi protests, TIHV had more than 200 applicants who experienced torture and state violence. The CSO documented their cases and published them in a report (Interview F 2013; Ünüyar et al. 2013). Generally, TIHV has given support to torture survivors, which is a political activity in a situation where torture is exercised by the state, and reported the cases of torture to prove the injustice done and demand change. The activities are politicizing.

**EU funded projects**

Together İHD and TIHV received EIDHR funding at least seven times for different projects – also concerning the areas of women’s and refugees’ rights. However, for both of them EU funding was just one small part of the budget. Most of the projects that İHD received EIDHR support for did not deal with the Kurdish issue. For instance, in one project İHD monitored court cases against women (Interview F 2013; EU Delegation to Turkey 2013a). Another one was about the protection of refugees, and one more about the rights of disabled people (EU Delegation to Turkey 2013a). In 2006 and 2007, İHD received funding for a project on landmines in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Within the project the CSO aimed to establish a “Landmine Action Plan” to prevent further victims from landmines and restore areas for living. It further was supposed to improve the access of landmine victims to medical and legal support. This included “training of the target groups, (…), increasing public awareness, and lobbying law makers and opinion leaders for an end to the practice of mining and de-mining of affected regions” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2013a). The projects thus included all three goals – empowering, assistance, and lobbying.
TIHV traditionally focused on fighting torture and taking care of torture survivors and received several EIDHR funds for this goal. Since the state was mostly responsible for torture incidents, the state did not provide any help to people affected by torture. In the situation of lacking public support CSOs have to offer support for torture survivors. Four of TIHV’s EU funded projects provided services. The NGO acquired funding for its daily work. Between 2003 and 2007, the “Project concerning the treatment and rehabilitation of torture survivors” was conducted twice and aimed “at providing medical and psychiatric care free of charge for torture survivors and their relatives; social and legal assistance for torture survivors” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2008b: 8). In 2009, a similar project started again with the same title and same goals (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b). However, the EU’s financial contribution to services for tortured people is neither depoliticizing nor reducing the responsibility of the Turkish state. As long as there is torture exercised by the state, it is necessary that NGOs provide medical, psychological and legal support to fight the consequences and the offenders. In parallel, the organization worked on the introduction of legal mechanisms to prevent torture. In 2013, TIHV prepared a report on national measures to prevent tortures with financial contributions from the EU and Swedish and Norwegian organizations. The report which was discussed at workshops presents other states’ measures against torture and makes suggestions for Turkey (Doğanoğlu and Verhaar 2013).

However, TIHV also conducted projects focusing on empowerment. In 2005 and 2006 TIHV intended

“to increase the capacity of NGOs working in the field of human rights, to strengthen partnerships and cooperation and to increase lobbying activities directed towards the government, the media and the public, in order to effectively monitor and report on the implementation of the legal reforms undertaken in Turkey within the framework of accession to the European Union membership in the field of freedom of thought, freedom of association and the prevention of torture” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2008b: 29).

The CSO trained other NGOs in order to increase their capacity for monitoring and reporting human rights abuses. TIHV held workshops with NGOs in seven different regions of Turkey. In addition to expanding “the capacity on reporting” the goal was to “develop a common language among human rights organizations” (TIHV 2006: 3). In this specific case, the economic neo-liberal rationalities dominate. Civil society actors are constituted as self-responsible individuals that have to take action. Further, the idea to develop partnerships is part of a consensual understanding of politics and might co-opt civil society in the long-term. Moreover, the target groups do not have much freedom in deciding how they intend to work for human rights. Yet, more monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses across Turkey enables more politicization. Here both empowering and monitoring activities are combined and create a mixed picture.
Another way to empower citizens to become self-entrepreneurs is through calling them “human rights defenders”. The conception of human rights defenders has become central in the EU’s civil society programs as I discussed in the chapter on the EU’s governmentality. Turkish human rights activists described themselves to be “human rights defenders”:

“I myself have a personal political opinion but as a human rights defender I have human rights principles. We stand with the victims. We went a world without any violation. This is no dream of socialism or communism. As long as there are HR violations, we work. As an organization we don't have a political position” (Interview E 2013).

The EU aims to fund projects which empower human rights defenders that are conceptualized as being non-political. In line with this, an EIDHR funded project by IHD starting at the end of my study period is entitled “Strengthening human rights defenders with their own power” and its short description for the EU website states:

“This project is extremely strategic as it links to the EU Delegation local strategy for Human Rights Defenders and because it will provide comprehensive technical support to HRDs to enable them to be more effective in their difficult action in Turkey. The project aims at protecting human rights defenders in their efforts to promote human rights and freedoms, strengthening technical knowledge and skills of human rights defenders and increasing awareness on the rights of the human rights defenders and duties and responsibilities of the state to protect human rights defenders and fundamental rights and freedoms” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c).

The project and its focus on human rights defenders carries different (neo-)liberal ideas with depoliticizing effects. Firstly, individuals are constituted as “human rights defenders”, thus human rights activists in a liberal understanding (Rivetti 2013: 207–208). A specific role of these people is normalized. Yet, people targeted might consider themselves for instance Kurdish activists or left political activists. As introduced in the chapter on neo-liberal governmentality in the EU’s civil society programs, the EU considers human rights defenders to be “those individuals, groups and organs of society that promote and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms” excluding “those individuals who commit or propagate violence” (European Commission 2008a: 2). Following from this, there is only one interpretation of human rights and thus only one role for citizens defending rights. Secondly, the project constitutes individuals as self-entrepreneurs who need to acquire “technical knowledge and skills” (...) “to be more effective”. Human rights defenders thus have to act according to economic rationalities to efficiently manage themselves. However, citizens that consider themselves political actors rather see the need to improve political strategies and arguments while discriminated groups such as torture survivors might just seek protection or legal advice. As the self-description of my interview partner shows, human rights defenders are supposed to appear apolitical, only defending human rights.
Although EU funding was not always the support İHD and TİHV needed, discursively the EU’s rationalities have been quite powerful. The International Affairs Secretary of İHD describes the advantages of EU funding:

“We are learning from this that we should have an agenda because in Turkey generally we are working in a disorganized way (...) There are advantages: it is more planned working. This is more than good for us. We learn how to follow up on a situation and we receive input and produce output because of the requirements in the application” (Interview E 2013).

My interview partner considers the technologies of visibility and performance to be useful in being more successful. The CSO recognized that outputs are important. Within EU projects, NGOs have to write reports for the EU; often they produce other reports and handbooks as part of the projects as well. In addition, most human rights CSOs produce material describing their EU funded projects with the EU’s discursive concepts of goals and activities. For instance, the TİHV produced leaflets about their EİDHR projects listing the project’s goals (“hedefleri”) and the project’s activities (“faaliyetleri”) (TİHV 2010). Concluding, EU funding did not change the way TİHV worked as it mainly provides social services to torture survivors, but it influenced İHD in the way it works using technologies of visibility and performance and empowering individuals. The neutral and apolitical appearance of EU funded projects however legitimized the activities of the organization which faced a lot of political pressure and overall aimed to increase political awareness.

6.3.2. HYD (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Helsinki Yurtaşlar Derneği)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

HYD has a very different background than İHD. It was founded by public intellectuals such as Orhan Pamuk and Ahmet İnsel in 1992. Its name “Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly” refers to an international conference on human rights held in Helsinki in 1975 which was part of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The conference resulted in the “Helsinki Final Act” aiming to improve relations in Europe and declaring human rights as shared values. HYD is part of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Network founded in Prague in 1990 in which NGOs work together on promoting human rights and peace (HYD 2014b, 2014d, 2014f). HYD works on all different human rights areas including “minority rights and multiculturalism”, “civic approaches to conflict”, “the rule of law”, “human rights and civic participation”, “democracy and strengthening civil society”, and the “EU integration process” (HYD 2014f). Due to its support of known intellectuals and its alignment with all human rights issues and the EU integration process from the very beginning – HYD held conferences on the EU and Turkey in 1993 and 1999 already (HYD 2014f) – it did not face the pressure İHD faced and enjoyed more legitimacy amongst the Turkish public. It is further special in the sense that most of its
financial resources come from EU funding in addition to other project support from for instance SIDA, OSI or other European countries. The organization employs around 30 people and has several legal fellows. Most of its people however work in the “Refugee Support Program” (Interview A 2013) which I will assess in the section on refugee rights NGOs and EU funds.

HYD largely worked in different projects on different topics such as Kurdish rights, the peace process with the Kurds, the EU accession process, and the rights of Roma in Turkey between 2002 and 2013. HYD tackled different aspects of Kurdish rights within its projects. In 2003, it held a conference in Istanbul on “Language Rights in the Process of European Integration”. The conference focused on the language rights of Kurds and Laz people in Turkey and discussed which kind of language legislation Turkey needed to comply with EU standards. It thus framed the need for language rights for minorities as necessary within Turkey’s EU accession process. The CSO published the presentations in a book (HYD 2003b). Between 2010 and 2012, HYD received project funding from the Finish Crisis Management Initiative for a conference with academics, activists and students on the Kurdish peace process of which the conference proceedings were published in a book later (Güçlüer 2013). In 2013 when Öcalan announced that the PKK would give up its arms, HYD together with other NGOs of the İHOP platform spoke out in favor of this move and the peace process in general (İHOP 2013b).

Besides Kurdish rights, the rights of Roma have been one area of HYD’s activities (HYD 2014e). Within a project called “Promoting Roma Rights in Turkey” HYD organized several meetings – also called “trainings” – with representatives from NGOs and Roma organizations to discuss the situation of Roma in Turkey and how they can try to change it (HYD 2007b). HYD further organized several summer schools with different participants for instance one brought Turkish and Armenian youth together and an earlier one discussed the EU accession process of Turkey (HYD 2014g).

Despite its focus on projects, HYD intervened in the broader political debates in Turkey. It organized a conference on the new constitution inviting speakers from other countries that are in the process of writing a new constitution such as from Tunisia and Egypt in 2012 (HYD 2012). The organization commented on the events of the Gezi protests. Together with other human rights organization such as İHD, Mazlumder, AI, TİHV, TTB, Mülteci-Der, İnsan Hakları Araştırmaları Derneği (İHAD), and İnsan Hakları Gündemi Derneği (İHGD) the NGO criticized the harsh use of force against Gezi Park protestors (HYD 2013). A few months later the government presented a new democratization package which was criticized by CSOs including HYD (İHOP 2013a).

HYD sees itself to be something of pioneer in civil society work in Turkey and therefore intends to pass its experience on to other organizations. Announcing a guide for NGOs consisting of five
“useful handbooks” the website says: “Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly continues its activities in civil society since 1990, and this booklet set was prepared to share hCa’s [Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly] experiences gathered in this process with other organizations working in the same field” (HYD 2003a). The five single booklets deal with NGOs strategies including setting goals, deciding on instruments, and making civil society’s voice heard in the public (HYD 2003c). HYD is teaching other NGOs to employ the technologies of performance and visibility, the qualifications you need to run an EU funded project. In 2004, HYD distributed copies of the translation of a handbook for NGOs “New Tactics in Human Rights: A Resource for Practitioners” to Turkish CSOs (HYD 2004).

HYD focused on improving the rights of minorities such as of Kurds and Sinti and Roma and supporting the peace process between the Kurds and the Turkish government. In contrast to IHD, HYD did this mostly in the framework of projects which in the end produced a publication as a form of documentation or information for people affected. HYD internalized the EU’s way of doing civil society work – documenting activities and producing output. HYD tried to share its experiences with project-work with other CSOs to help them increase their capabilities and thus spreads the depoliticizing technologies of visibility and performance.

EU funded projects
The HYD itself conducted at least seven EIDHR financed projects acquiring more funding than most other CSOs. One of the first EU funded projects was the project on the handbook for women described in a previous part of this chapter. The other projects did not focus on women. Instead they dealt with Kurdish rights but referred to them as minority rights.

In 2006 and 2007, a HYD project intended to empower human rights defenders. The project “Strategic Mapping of Torture in Turkey” is an example for how rationalities of effectiveness become part of NGO activities. The project’s

“[O]ur main goal has been to introduce a new perspective of systematic analysis, encouraging strategic thinking and inspiring creativity, innovation and holistic action to tackle the issue of torture. The approach and methodology of implementation aspires for an improved synergy amongst human rights defenders as well as for the enlargement and enrichment of the human rights community. (...) We hope that the project, both by its process and its products, facilitates the efficient use of knowledge and paves the way for establishing cooperation to fight against torture with the goal of the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture as well as adopting a National Plan of Action against torture” (HYD 2006b).

The map created within the project systematizes knowledge on the interaction of different actors within the area of torture. The knowledge provided was supposed to empower the target groups which were “activists, non-governmental organizations, experts and professionals working on the
issue of torture and/or related areas, administrative/governmental institutions, semi-official bodies, media agencies and relevant academic and research centers” (HYD 2006b) in their fight against torture. The project outcome was for individuals that take action against torture. The quote shows how the organizations internalized the neo-liberal idea of “efficient” civil society work.

The project “Encouraging and Empowering Teachers as an Actor in Peace-Building and Democratization” (2012) had a similar focus on empowerment. The research report of the project published as a book by HYD states: “(...) the main objective of the research as part of the [name of the project] project was to empower teachers (...)” (Can et al. 2013: 4). The introduction of the report states that the project included workshops and seminars with teachers that were supposed to provide them

“with tools to deal with challenges that stem from the Kurdish issue – (...) – and to contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation at school setting. With these programmes, we wanted to inform and inspire teachers on skills and approaches that could be employed to eradicate discrimination at the classroom and to democratically manage the classroom. The programmes were also instrumental in training teachers on creating a critical classroom environment while teaching contradictory issues” (Can et al. 2013: 1–2).

Further, the report is supposed to give “suggestions that were specifically developed to empower teachers who could play crucial roles in building societal peace” (Can et al. 2013: 2).

The project aimed to increase awareness among teachers for problems of Kurdish students although officially it was not about Kurdish rights as this might have created problems with the Turkish state: “Generally our NGO is more subtle about human rights objectives” (Interview A 2013). The project wanted to strengthen Kurdish rights and support a solution for the Kurdish conflict mainly through training teachers. Although the concept is not mentioned, in this project teachers become human rights defenders who have to be “encouraged and empowered” to take on their responsibility: “We promised teachers to improve their self-development. (...) The teachers were thrilled to improve their self-development. They always aim at having more training and further qualifications” (Interview A 2013). Teachers are expected to “self-develop” and thus to develop skills and tools through training in order to manage issues of Kurdish rights in their classrooms in a better way. HYD held two consecutive workshops in three different Turkish cities. In the first sessions, teachers were supposed to talk about their experiences, they learned about international experiences and how to solve conflicts in school (Can et al. 2013: 48). In the second workshop, participants had to take part in “awareness” activities, practice in-classroom-situations and learn how “to democratically manage the classroom”. The teachers further heard about psychological, political and social pedagogical perspectives on children in conflict (Can et al. 2013: 51). The discourse and the practices of this project constitute teachers as an “Actor in Peace-Building and
Democratization” targeting their self-management capabilities. They are empowered not to choose freely how to go about but to follow a specific script in contributing to peace and democratization (see Rivetti 2013: 207–208; Cruikshank 1999: 69–70). While in the long-term there might be a socializing effect making teachers more aware of respecting and supporting Kurdish rights, the project avoids a politicization of the issue and only makes very small individual changes possible.

HYD used other EIDHR funding mainly to organize workshops and meetings to exchange experiences and views on the rights of minorities and the problems of nationalism and secularism. In 2008, HYD received EIDHR support for organizing a summer school with students from different ethnicities within the project “Citizenship and Nationalism: Are we aware?”. It was supposed to bring different ethnic groups together to discuss the problem of nationalism. Part of the summer school was a panel with students on the theme of the project. The output of the project was a book with different points of view of academics and student presented at the summer school (HYD 2007a; EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b). A similar broad theme was the focus of the project “Envisioning Secularism” in 2009 and 2010. HYD organized different panels with representatives of CSOs discussing secularism in universities, schools, health services, municipalities and media. Conferences and debates were documented in the form of public reports written in English. The reports are protocols which inform about the content and the procedures of the meetings (HYD 2009).

In 2013, HYD began the project “Assessment of Religious Services Provided by the State in a Socio-Economic Context as an Aspect of Social Policy” supported by the EIDHR. To provide information about the project’s activities, HYD created a web blog. The project aimed to improve religious rights and minority rights and change the “anti-discriminatory nature” of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c; HYD 2014a). HYD invited representatives of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı, DIB), academics, representatives of religious groups such as the Alevi community as well as civil society people to discuss the role of DIB and how to improve religious and minority rights in Turkey in the context of the new constitution. It was criticized that the Turkish education system only spoke about one “national religion” (HYD 2014a). At the end of the project – largely consisting of meetings to discuss the role of DIB – HYD was to draft a report (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c).

HYD conducted most of its work in projects during the study period – many of them funded by the EU. Different than IHD, the CSO did not publish regular reports or provided social services in the area of Kurdish rights (and minority rights). Instead it focused on empowering civil society and citizens affected by discrimination and created awareness among stakeholders for problems of minorities. It always placed Kurdish rights in the larger context of minority rights and especially in the early 2000s it integrated it in the context of the EU accession process. This way HYD could create
legitimacy for its projects and avoid opposition from the state. The projects aiming at empowerment show an incorporation of the neo-liberal idea of self-responsible economic individuals with capacities (see Dean 1999: 67). Teachers and activists become self-entrepreneurs instead of political actors or just teachers. However, as discussed earlier Kurdish activists have faced extreme pressures and thus might profit from appearing more apolitical. HYD further participated in public debates on minority rights, the Kurdish peace process and the new constitution, mostly together with other NGOs through İHOP.

Yet, there are clear instances of the adoption of neo-liberal technologies at HYD. In its EU and non-EU funded projects the CSO created transparency through documenting all its activities and produced outputs in form of publications for each project. Moreover, it taught other CSOs how to document, apply for and manage projects. The HYD generally considers EU funding to be positive: “(...) overall it created opportunities for organizations to increase capacities to do good stuff” (Interview A 2013). The idea of project work manifests in the job position of my interview partner who is solely responsible for applying for and running projects (Interview A 2013). He separates the job at HYD from the grassroots activities he is involved in: “I guess we can make the distinction between more professional organizations and more grassroots organizations. It’s different groups with different needs” (Interview A 2013). This perspective supports the argument that Turkish civil society is divided over funding. However, the divide is not just between CSOs with different political positions as Ketola suggests (2011; also see Zihnioğlu 2013b) but cuts across single movements dividing grassroots activists and NGO workers as also seen in the analysis of LGBT groups. This shows that people working at NGO do not consider themselves to be activists that they see to be more political. Moreover, especially HYD constitutes itself as a NGO that does projects in different areas and cooperates with other actors. The organization is less interested in political lobbying, campaigning or getting involved in political debates. Overall, it works with neo-liberal technologies in a depoliticized manner and is strongly involved with EU funding and actors.

6.3.3. Mazlumder (Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed, İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği)

The organization and its non-EU funded work
I include the Muslim organization Mazlumder in my study as it is the only Muslim human rights organization that once received funding from the EU. However, it is also the only organization – besides Amargi – that otherwise opposed funding. 54 people founded it in 1991 at a time of oppression of Kurds and Muslims. Mazlumder considers the oppression of the Kurds, Christians and Armenians, Alevi and Muslims to be the biggest problem of the 1990s (Interview N 2013). Already
then Mazlumder worked on the Kurdish issue. It held a Kurdish forum in 1993 and 2012 (Mazlumder 2012a). After the soft coup of 1997, Muslims wanting to show their religion came under increasing pressure again. The military closed down religious schools and brought down the Muslim governing party of Erbakan (White 2013: 39–43; Hale and Özbudun 2010: 4–5; Interview N 2013). Mazlumder runs a campaign on the so-called 28 February demanding that all political decisions from that day are reversed (Koçer 2013). It was after the soft coup that Mazlumder started to fight for women who wanted to wear a headscarf as it was banned by the military (Interview N 2013).

In 2013, the organization had 27 branches all over Turkey and employed twelve people in Istanbul and six people in Ankara. Mazlumder had 4,000 registered members in 2013. The CSO works together with judicial experts, academics, and journalists in specific projects (Interview N 2013). Mazlumder hardly received any external funding between 2002 and 2013. The CSO collects enough membership fees and donations to survive: “We do not take funding to be independent” (Interview N 2013). As I will discuss later, Mazlumder’s İzmir branch ran two EIDHR projects which were strongly criticized from within the organization (Interview N 2013). Generally, Muslim organizations have been better off since the AKP took over the government in 2002. The AKP promoted the role of Muslim charitable organizations as providers of social services and made it thus easier for them to acquire donations (Şen et al. 2009: 269–270).

Mazlumder describes its goals as “defending human rights” and “the development of human rights and freedoms, ending all kinds of human rights violations”. Mazlumder supports the rights of all “oppressed people no matter what form of oppression whether religious, ethnic, cultural, sexual or other identity differences” (Mazlumder 2014a). In fact, the Turkish word “mazlum” means “oppressed”. Among its activities are the organization of seminars, conferences, panels, film and theater events (Mazlumder 2014a).

Different than other CSOs studied, Mazlumder has direct connections to the government. The head of the Istanbul branch is friends with former foreign minister and now Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Erdoğan is a former member of the organization. However, the NGO stresses that this does not influence its independency (Interview N 2013). Outside the scope of EU projects, representatives of Mazlumder were part of the negotiations to settle the Kurdish conflict: “For instance there are 67 people that are distributed to the regions of Turkey. They are selected by the government to give support to the negotiation process. There are seven persons from Mazlumder” (Interview N 2013). Generally the organization is often asked to play an intermediary role between the government and other groups of civil society (Interview N 2013). The close political ties with the AKP have not prevented the organization from raising criticism.
The website of Mazlumder provides a lot of information on its activities including publications such as reports, books, brochures and press statements. The organization monitors and reports on human rights violations. The website gives up-to-date news on specific developments. Since 2009 Mazlumder published on a daily basis all the news on human rights violations reported in Turkish media (Mazlumder 2014b). It published yearly reports on human rights violations in Turkey between 2002 and 2013 similar to İHD. Mazlumder’s reports included general human rights violations such as the violation of freedom of speech and torture. Mazlumder’s reports focused more on religious rights, the discrimination of women with headscarves and their access to education (Biten 2011). Monthly reports documented cases of “honor killings” (Mazlumder 2007). Mazlumder published “balance sheets” with an overview of the numbers of specific human rights violations (Mazlumder 2011). The reports dealt with the situation in prisons as well, for instance reports written together with İHD (Mazlumder and İHĐ 2006). It further documented the events and human rights violations that took place around the Kurdish new year’s (Nevroz) celebrations on 22 March in 2008 (Mazlumder 2008a).

Also similar to other NGOs, Mazlumder sent observers to the Gezi demonstrations and made a report. The NGO concluded that the critique of the government’s neo-liberal politics was justified and criticized the violence of the police towards the protestors. However, the CSO balanced its criticism of the state’s reaction with blaming the “terrorist and marginalized groups” for dominating the protests in the end and having “destroyed public and private goods”. Mazlumder further observed “incidents especially to young women with headscarves” (Interview N 2013). My interview partner stressed that the role of Mazlumder was one of an observer: “We don’t intervene in such kind of political processes” (Interview N 2013). Mazlumder tries to keep distance from the government, occasionally criticizes it but also takes a more supportive stance towards it than other NGOs. Similar to other NGOs however, it critically observes and comments on the ongoing process of making the new constitution (Mazlumder 2012c). Mazlumder does not only focus on Turkey but also observed the human rights situation in other Muslim majority countries (Mazlumder 2014c). For instance the NGO wrote a report on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza strip (Mazlumder 2009b). Its press statements criticized Israel and demanded from the Turkish government to oppose Israel and help Palestinians (Mazlumder 2009a).

In addition to the numerous reports, Mazlumder published around 100 press statements every year to participate in public debates. Its press declarations deal with Turkish as well as international issues. A press statement announced a report on the Ergenekom trials stressing that the investigations were important for the future of Turkish democracy (Mazlumder 2008b). Similar to İHD, it called on politicians not to forget the victims of the Uludere events and cohosted an event to
which the victims’ mothers were invited (Mazlumder 2012b, 2013). A press release together with other organizations called on politics to guarantee unlimited freedom to wear the headscarf and criticized the “demagogy of the opposition” in this question (Özgürder et al. 2008). Mazlumder organized conferences on the headscarf issue (Mazlumder 2004). It also issued a statement regarding the abortion debate in which it distanced itself from Erdoğan’s comparison of abortions and the Uludere incident but stressed that it considers abortions to violate human rights (Ünsal 2012).

Overall, Mazlumder’s activities focused on political participation in the form of monitoring human rights violations or publishing statements. With the AKP in government, Mazlumder was much less under pressure than in previous times. In fact, it has close relations to the AKP which creates risks of co-option. On the other hand, it criticized governmental policies. Instead of conducting projects, it focused on participating in political debates, running own campaigns such as on 28 February or the headscarf issue, and monitoring human rights violations – classical liberal activities that politicize issues. Although it has a different position on the abortion debate, Mazlumder tried to introduce a more nuanced and less emotional point of view than the government discourse. Overall, the organization is strongly involved in discursive struggles.

**EU funded projects**

Generally, Mazlumder supports the EU accession process: “With the EU policies we have many matching points in their human rights approach” (Interview N 2013). Yet, Mazlumder is critical of specific EU policies such as homosexuality which it opposes. For this reason and because Mazlumder does not want to appear dependent or corrupted, it generally rejects EU funding although Mazlumder had conducted two EIDHR funded projects. They were strongly criticized within the organization and thus the CSO did not apply for EU funds again (Interview N 2013). It is very hard to find information on the two projects and my interview partner could not or did not want to tell me much either. I can only rely on the information on the website of the EIDHR.

According to the EU site, Mazlumder Ankara conducted an EIDHR funded project in the area of refugees in 2004. The project documented the psycho-social situation of refugees in Turkey and to draft recommendations for the Turkish government to improve the situation (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b). The İzmir branch of Mazlumder carried out the project “Training of Muslim Functionaries (Imams) in Turkey on Basic National and International Human Rights Standards” in 2005. Here, imams are constituted as human rights defenders – even though this term is not mentioned – as they are supposed to “spread” human rights and freedoms:
“This project aimed to raise the awareness of Imams in several provinces of Turkey on human rights and freedoms with a view to spread and encourage the upholding of these values by the Cemaat via Imams, as well as to contribute to the correction of misconception about religion and human rights” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014b).

It appears that the representatives of the organization rather prefer not to talk about the project as it created so much opposition within the NGO. However, within the official project descriptions the EU’s human rights discourse was taken up.

Mazlumder generally did not work in the format of projects. In the almost complete absence of EU funds there are no signs of depoliticizing the issues at hand. Overall, the organization does not work with neo-liberal technologies in any area. Instead it constitutes civil society and the individual in a liberal way. Individuals and civil society demand that human rights are not violated. They control state policy and take part in political debates. Similar to Amargi – although representing a very different political position – Mazlumder opposed EU funds due to political reasons.

The case of Mazlumder shows that CSOs rejecting EU funds – as well as other international funding – are unlikely to incorporate neo-liberal rationalities. In the case of Mazlumder as well as Amargi they reject neo-liberal ideas in the first place (see Ketola 2011). They stress the liberal role of civil society instead. Further, the cases of Mazlumder and Amargi suggest that the possibility to apply for funding creates conflicts within organizations because they are forced to take a position on whether to apply for funding. Financially, Mazlumder was in an advantaged position as it could afford to work without EU funds. The favorable political context gives the CSO more security as well.

6.3.4. Conclusions on the (de)politicizing effects on CSOs working on Kurdish rights

Most CSOs working for Kurdish rights are general human rights organizations which were however founded to help Kurdish people facing extreme oppression in the 1990s. The CSOs faced similar oppressions. Working for the Kurdish issue used to be set equal with supporting terrorism and thus CSOs working for that issue were acting in a highly politicized context as discussed in the previous chapter. Anyone speaking about Kurdish rights used to be considered an enemy. Thus political contestation was not possible (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 99). In the last years of my study period, the issue came on the political agenda and became a more legitimate topic. NGOs such as THV and IHD are still affected by discriminatory practices however. Overall, these organizations politicized Kurdish rights by participating in political debates about Kurdish rights and the peace process, publishing reports to criticize oppressive practices such as torture of prisoners and organizing demonstrations. Similarly, HYD and Mazlumder engage in the political struggle via press statements, the former publishing less reports.
TİHV provides social services to torture survivors that the state would not give as it commits these acts of violence. In this case, EU funding provided resources for medical, psychological and legal services. The organization largely exists to take care of torture survivors. İHD on the other hand acts more political but also conducted several EIDHR projects and considers them to be beneficial to their work. The projects influenced the ideas of how to work, how to set goals and account for them, thus how to employ technologies of performance and visibility. HYD worked mostly project-based focusing on ideas of empowerment, awareness-raising and making information visible. HYD financed its work largely with EU-funds and always works in a project format. The organization encouraged and trained other CSOs to work in a similar way. İHD and HYD constitute individuals as human rights defenders that need to be empowered to act as a responsible citizen thus placing the responsibility on them. However, especially İHD was also involved in the struggles over Kurdish rights and as an organization that used to be highly politicized from the outside it gained some legitimacy through depoliticizing its work.

The analysis of Mazlumder further showed similarities with the case of Amargi. Mazlumder rejected funding for political reasons. At first, this decision was contested within the organization. In contrast to Amargi, Mazlumder’s existence was not at risk by denying external grants. As the organization is more in line with the current hegemonic discourse, it is easier to resist funds. Mazlumder did not depend on funding and acquired large sums of donations and member fees. The example further demonstrates that an organization working without EU funding did not take up neoliberal rationalities. Its work focused on formulating opinions and drafting reports on human rights violations.

Overall, in a highly politicized and threatening context some depoliticization of the issue occurred; however it increased the legitimacy of organizations formerly under extreme pressure. The organizations still acted as political voices in the conflicts (HYD is an exception here) while at the same time trying to make their work more transparent and spreading responsibility to individuals.
6.4. The (de)politicizing effects on CSOs working on immigrants’ rights
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the rights of immigrants and refugees only came on the agenda in Turkey during the second half of my study period. Mülteci-Der is the youngest organization and was only founded in 2008. SGDD has existed since 1995 but was not very active for about ten years. The “Refugee Advocacy and Support Program” of HYD was founded in 2004. In 2010, HYD, IHD, Mülteci-Der, Amnesty International Turkey, and İHGD founded the refugee rights NGO platform Mülteci Hakları Koordinasyonu (Refugee Rights Coordination) (Mülteci Hakları Koordinasyonu 2010). Kaos-GL became a member of the platform later as well. KAGED also supported the platform in its networking activities in the framework of the “Civil Society-Public Sector Cooperation” project funded by the EU between 2012 and 2014 (Mülteci Hakları Koordinasyonu 2014). The refugee rights platform aims to monitor refugee rights policies, support the policy and institutional developments in the framework of EU-Turkey relations, and increase the consciousness of the refugees’ problems Turkey (Mülteci Hakları Koordinasyonu 2010). It served as a common platform of the NGOs to communicate opinions on the situation of refugee rights. Press releases, public statements and commenting articles are published on the website of the platform (Mülteci Hakları Koordinasyonu 2014). Thus it is a way for the CSOs to participate in public debates. In the following, I will analyze the general work of these organizations as well as their EU funded projects to assess the depoliticizing effects of EU funding in this specific context.

6.4.1. SGDD (Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, Sağınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışma Derneği)

The organization and its non-EU funded work
SGDD was founded in 1995 in Ankara. By 2013, the NGO had twenty offices all over Turkey and employed 110 people as interpreters, trainers, and administrative staff. In addition, the organization has volunteers such as Erasmus students or students of social work studies who do an internship at the organization. SGDD registers incoming refugees and sends them to the satellite cities. The refugee NGO is an implementing partner of the UNHCR. It provides legal and psychological counseling, organizes social events and offers language courses. In addition, SGDD tried to influence migration policies through its advocacy activities (Interview H 2013; SGDD 2014b). Most financial resources of the organization came from the UNHCR, some from the British Embassy as well as from the EU. According to my interview partner, SGDD did not pursue many activities up until 2005 (Interview H 2013).

The website of the organization informs about the different activities which are all referred to as “projects”. On the one hand SGDD runs local offices supporting refugees and on the other hand it
is involved in decision-making processes. The organization gave social, psychological, legal and medical help for immigrants in Turkey. With funds of the International Medical Corps, SGDD provided medical and social support and offered social and educational activities to refugees in Nevşehir and Kayseri between 2012 and 2014 (SGDD 2014e). Other projects gave special support to children and women in situations of migration including Syrian refugees (SGDD 2014a). The local offices organized sport activities for refugee children (SGDD 2014f). The website does not publish any press statements on the situation of refugees in Turkey although my interview partner said that the organization monitored the situation of refugees. For instance, the organization wrote a report on the situation of Syrian refugees for the UNHCR (Interview H 2013)

SGDD was very involved in making and implementing migration policies. It helped the government to implement the new migration law of 2013 which established the Migration Management Agency. The NGO held meetings with government representatives from the Migration Management Department to help them with staff such as fieldworkers and interpreters during the interim period between the old and the new system. For this purpose, SGDD opened an office in Izmir. Further, SGDD cooperated with local authorities in the satellite cities. According to the organization, the authorities were open to their support

“because we make their work easier. For instance the local authorities from Samsun invited us. Yet, between 2005 and 2006 it was difficult to work in the field because there were prejudices against NGOs, especially against NGOs working for refugees. The government actually closed one of our offices” (Interview H 2013).

The government’s attitude changed and then welcomed advice. The NGO on the other hand sees it as its responsibility to support them: “We assist the new Migration Management Department. We help them. It is very easy to always criticize but we want to help” (Interview H 2013). Right after my interview SGDD was meeting with officials from the ministry of Interior to improve the implementation of the migration law: “I do a lot of lobbying activities. You just need to speak with the right language, suggest things in a friendly way” (Interview H 2013). Although this approach is pragmatic, it reveals a tendency towards being less critical and radical in the evaluation of migration policies.

The focus of the organization is on providing services to refugees which until now were not provided for by the state. At the same time SGDD influenced decision-making. However, it rarely politicized refugee rights through monitoring or criticizing policies.
EU funded projects

SGDD received EU funding for two projects. One project was financed by the CFCU and thus not directly by the EU Delegation. This is the type of funding that most human rights organizations were not able to get because their issues are marginalized by the state. This shows that SGDD’s work is less conflictual than of other human rights groups. The CSO drafted a guide for refugees and migrants in Turkey. The booklets provide information on the Turkish city the refugees live in, how to do specific things in Turkey, their rights, how to get medical and legal help. The booklets also include forms needed to apply for services (SGDD 2014c). The guidebooks were translated into Arabic, Somali, Persian and English. More copies were printed and distributed with financial support of the British Embassy (Interview H 2013; SGDD 2014d). The project was supposed to empower asylum-seekers and refugees: “This is small but it is helpful because it is about the self-counseling of the refugees. They can use it themselves” (Interview H 2013).

In 2010 and 2011 SGDD conducted one EIDHR project with the title “Perceived Lives, Suspended Lives”. At the heart of the project was the production of a study on the perceptions of refugees among Turkish citizens (Kavlak 2011). SGDD wanted to make sure that people are informed about refugees and their situation before conflicts arose (Interview H 2013). The research on the perception of migrants among Turkish citizens was carried out by the Documentation and Training Foundation for Social Work (RDTF) which interviewed citizens in seven Turkish cities. The study was supported by the Ministry of Interior and was supposed to provide input for the “legislative activities”, meaning the migration law (SGDD 2014c: iii; 3). In addition to the study, the project organized “training seminars and awareness raising” (SGDD 2014c: iii). SGDD trained citizens, public service providers, NGOs providing services, local government officials, academics, personnel from reception centers as well as citizens (SGDD 2014c: 1). The outputs were suggestions developed in the workshops that included improving the knowledge within the population about refugees and their origin countries through trainings as well as providing information to migrants to learn about Turkey, cultural ideas and hygiene standards (SGDD 2014c: 56–59). Interviews from participants of these trainings as well as with refugees were documented in a film (SGDD 2014c: 1). The project thus created awareness of the refugees’ problems and passed on some responsibility to other NGOs and refugees to tackle the problems and provide services.

The whole project including its setup, assumptions, goals, hypothesis, methodology and limitations as well as the study and the “outputs from the training seminars” (SGDD 2014c: 56) is documented in a 70 page long booklet available in English and Turkish on the website of SGDD (SGDD 2014c). The project conceptualizes activities in an economic way: It aims to collect information, to empower by training and to make its performance visible. Although it asks about the perceptions of
local citizens, the suggestions focus on what migrants can do to improve the situation “to cast off their status as victims” (Dean 1999: 67).

In spite of this project which the organization considers successful (Interview H 2013), SGDD is critical of EIDHR funding:

“In general, we cannot continue with EU projects because it is not enough funding and it is not sustainable. It is not enough to organize a conference and talk about your knowledge. We do counseling with 25 000 refugees every year. It is like “We play, we dance”. The same people always attend the conferences, we talk to the others about refugees and they talk to us about it” (Interview H 2013).

Moreover, the problem of refugee rights was a problem of global inequality that could not be solved by EU projects (Interview H 2013). While my interview partner considers the solution to migration to be ultimately a political one, the organization rather tries to work with the government to achieve small improvements. Refugee rights policy is the only area in which very close cooperation between CSOs and the government was possible in the end. While this has contributed to change, decision on migration policies are hardly subject to political debate. In addition, the CSO provided services to refugees who would not receive services without them. However, it remains to be seen when the state will take over these services – as it only did for Syrian refugees. The organization hardly politicized the issue of refugee rights but presents it more as matter of efficient and apolitical policy-making.

6.4.2. Mülteci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees, Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği)

The organization and its non-EU funded work

The organization Mülteci-Der was founded in İzmir in 2008. The foundation came up after an event on migration in İzmir which Amnesty International and Mazlumder organized. The organization’s goal is “to do activities that support children, women, the law and human rights, education, psychosocial support, work, and human support together with other civil society institutions, professional associations and international institutions and mechanisms” (Mülteci-Der 2008). Mülteci-Der wanted to help people in difficult situations. Its website states that it did not want to speak of refugees as a “burden to be shared” but an “honor to be shared” (Mülteci-Der 2008). The website as well as the CSO’s activities are under the heading “İltica temel bir hakkıdır” meaning “Asylum is a fundamental right” (Mülteci-Der 2014c).

Mülteci-Der’s general website only contains news on recent events. One cannot go back to later years. But the more recent news indicate an involvement in political debates such as on the Syrian refugees (Mülteci-Der 2014c). Otherwise it offers information on the CSO’s activities and
provides documents. Among the activities are the organization of photo exhibitions, public debates and presentations about the rights of refugees and providing information to university students. In 2010, the CSO signed a cooperation protocol with UNHCR. In 2009 the human rights commissioner of the European Council Thomas Hammarberg visited Mülteci-Der (Mülteci-Der 2014b). In 2012 Mülteci-Der organized a conference which representatives from the EU Delegation, the UNHCR, Istanbul Bilgi University and NGOs attended to discuss the problem of imprisonment of irregular migrants and how to monitor and control those more effectively (Mülteci-Der 2012b). Otherwise about half of the activities listed are part of the two EIDHR funded projects conducted by the CSO (Mülteci-Der 2014b).

The documents on the website – except for one – were not produced by Mülteci-Der. The organization did not monitor migration management practices itself. The reports on the situation of refugees and immigrants in Turkey were drafted by other NGOs such as Amnesty International, HYD, the LGBT rights platform, İHGD, or Human Rights Watch. Nevertheless, the organization tried to raise awareness of the problems of refugee rights’ violations. There is one document that was prepared by Mülteci-Der with the financial support of the Finnish Embassy in Turkey (Mülteci-Der 2014a). It is a handbook for journalists working on the topic of migrants and refugees in Turkey – similar to the media handbook for LGBT issues made by LGBT NGOs. It gives information on the legal status of refugees and migrants, the numbers and how to use terms correctly (Ulusoy and Sarıkaya 2010). Mülteci-Der focused on awareness-raising activities in small academic circles and the enablement of journalists to report on migration in an informed and sensible way.

However, the websites of the two EIDHR funded projects of Mülteci-Der have a “news” section that mostly deals with news outside of the project. It provides press statements of the organization as well as articles written by the CSO that were published in Turkish media. Mülteci-Der involved itself in political debates. One article published by Today’s Zaman criticizes the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey signed in 2013 as a “price” to pay for visa liberalization. The head of Mülteci-Der wrote:

“Of course, every state is entitled to control its borders, ensure its security and identity those who enter or leave the country for security reasons as part of its sovereign rights. This is actually necessary to ensure a country's security as well. However, this right is not absolute or unlimited. As always, it is restricted by human rights laws and international law. In this context, human rights laws always supersede a state's sovereign rights and set the boundaries of a country's sovereignty. (...) This is why it is not ethical for Turkey to try to obtain visa-free travel for its citizens in return for signing a readmission agreement under which it undertakes the practice of deporting the citizens of third countries who have fled their countries and reached the borders of Europe in search of their rights, which are enshrined in international law” (Kılıç 2013b).

Taner Kılıç’s argument refers to human rights and international law while acknowledging the sovereignty of states – instead of defending a more radical position on open borders for instance.
Together with other NGOs such as HYD, Amnesty International, İHD, Kaos GL, and İHGD Mülteci-Der published a statement criticizing the agreement as part of their yearly statement on the international refugee day (İHD et al. 2013). On another note, the head of Mülteci-Der Kılıç was interviewed on the topic of Syrian refugees in Turkey by Hürriyet Daily News. He argued that Turkey should be proud of its open-door policy and should open its camps to NGOs and media to make it more transparent (Hürriyet Daily News 2013a). He argued in the Radikal newspaper that there should be a debate about Turkey’s refugee policy (Öğünç 2013). The law on migration was another topic. The organization lobbied for the new migration law and it was included in the process of drafting the new law setting a legal framework for migration and asylum (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2013b: 4). Today’s Zaman reported that refugee organizations among them Mülteci-Der and HYD demanded from the government to introduce the law to parliament and to speed up the legislative process (Kılıç 2013a). The contributions to newspaper articles and the press statements show that Mülteci-Der was involved in struggles over the rights of refugees. While the position of the NGO is not radically different, Mülteci-Der tried to induce wider political debates on migration.

EU funded projects

The website gives the impression that most of the organization’s work is part of EIDHR funded projects. Since its foundation Mülteci-Der has run two EIDHR funded projects. The first one began in 2012 and took 14 month. It was called “Civil Act for Refugee Rights Emancipation Act - CARE”. The project has its own website which provides much more information than the general website of the organization (Mülteci-Der 2013d). The project was conducted in eleven different cities across Turkey (Mülteci-Der 2013b). The CSO collected information on the situation of migration in these cities such as how many people come, where are they from and what is their socioeconomic situation. One of the outcomes was that the different provinces handled migration very differently (Mülteci-Der 2013f). Using this information Mülteci-Der developed a training program for local NGOs in these cities to contribute to “capacity building of NGOs the target cities in order to combat with the limited legal, financial and institutional capacities in terms of migrant and refugee reception policies” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014c). The project organized different seminars to which representatives of civil society organizations such as the HYD refugee program and representatives of local governments such as governors as well as academics and activists came to talk about the situation of migrants and refugees in the different cities and how to improve services for them (Mülteci-Der 2012a, 2012c). In addition, a meeting was organized in which NGOs, activist and lawyers discussed the strategies of civil society to improve the rights of refugees and migrants. The seminar further focused on the development of projects (Mülteci-Der 2013a). One of the visible outcomes of the
projects was the report that was drafted (Mülteci-Der 2013f). At the closing panel of the project, Mülteci-Der presented its work to other organizations working in the field of refugee and migration rights (Mülteci-Der 2013c).

Following the last activities of this project, the same project coordinator began a new EIDHR funded project called “Satellite Cities - Monitoring and Reporting (SC-MORE)” from March 2013 until August 2014. The project took place in six other provinces (than Care). The project has a similar website and states very broad goals referring to human rights and democracy: “The main aim of the 18 month project is to contribute to the development of democracy and human rights and that refugees and migrants can enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms by research, the interest representation, lobbying, awareness and reporting activities” (Mülteci-Der 2013e). As the previous project, SC was supposed to develop the “capacities” for services and interventions of local civil society (Mülteci-Der 2013e). The project organized two visits to NGOs in the target cities. During the first visit, Mülteci-Der met with refugees and immigrants as well as local authorities and presented a report on the current situation. Further developments in service provision and future directions were planned together. A network between the NGOs was created to enable them to participate in the new “e-platform” created by the Care project before (it appears to just be the website which has a forum section for discussions). During the second visit, Mülteci-Der held seminars to inform academics and NGO representatives about refugee right and further taught the local NGOs how to “increase capacities and manage projects” (Mülteci-Der 2013e).

These two projects were rather similar. Both projects collected information on the situation of refugees and immigrants and provided information to local actors. In a second step, both projects tried to teach local CSOs to develop strategies and projects themselves. These two steps are both based on the idea to empower local actors to provide services to refugees and to increase their “capacities” to conduct projects such as EU projects. Often EIDHR funded projects get different names and a new focus but the activities are largely the same. Similar to projects in other areas, the EIDHR did not directly fund service provision but the improvement of service provision. This goal is complemented by a component to increase knowledge and raise awareness. However, public officials were also targeted here. The projects constitute migrants’ rights as a question of capacities and management which depoliticizing them. The reporting process of the projects in websites and documents further shows the application of technologies of visibility and performance which were probably taught to local CSOs as well. However, this element is not as strong on Mülteci-Der’s website as on other NGO’s homepages. In addition, the NGO was involved in political struggles over migration issues – also in cooperation with other NGOs – and targeted public representatives in its projects.
6.4.3. Refugee Advocacy and Support Program at HYD

The program and its non-EU funded work

The HYD Refugee Support Program on the one hand focuses on awareness-raising and on the other hand offers “legal aid” and “psychological support” to refugees, especially legal counseling. The HYD Refugee Program receives most funding from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights and the UN refugee funds. According to the NGO they do not take any funding from the UNHCR as they monitor their work (Interview O 2013).

The head of the HYD Refugee Support Program emphasized the importance of monitoring: “The critical watchdog role is the one that really defines us” (Interview O 2013). The program published its monitoring outcomes in reports. The people from the HYD Refugee Support Program painfully learned how relevant reports are for the government:

“In 2008 we researched and published our second report and that was on the physical conditions of the ‘guest houses’, now called removal centers, and the immigration detention facilities. We found ill-treatment amounting to torture. In our reports we always give an overview of domestic and international standards and present a list of positive recommendations. But before we published our finding, we wanted to give the National Police Department of Foreigners Borders and Asylum an opportunity to respond to our findings and present any observations of their own. We offered to publish their input along with our own findings in order to use this process as an opportunity for constructive dialogue. With that aspiration, we sent it to them and offered to discuss it. They kept us waiting for four months, and then when they finally replied and said: If you go public with this report, we will stop sitting at a table with you. It was a threatening reply, a one and a half page response that our findings are unacceptable. From then they stopped interacting with us” (Interview O 2013).

The government tried to prevent that the topic of migration became a matter of public debate. As in other areas, the authorities were very critical of the work a refugee NGO. SGDD had made a similar experience two years earlier when the government closed one of its offices (Interview G 2013). In March 2010, HYD and six other NGOs including İHD, Mülteci-Der, İHGD, İHAD, Amnesty International and Mazlumder coordinated their efforts to influence legislation on refugee rights: “The initiative represents a shared commitment to working together to promote public awareness and ownership of asylum issues in Turkey and to intervene in the Government’s policy agenda on asylum and migration management from a human rights perspective” (HYD 2010). The NGOs hoped to be stronger together and intended to influence policies.

Around that time, the Turkish government became much more willing to listen to HYD. The government realized that it is the NGOs that have the knowledge and capacities the government needs for dealing with migration. HYD was also involved in drafting the new law by working with the Ministry of Interior’s Asylum and Migration Bureau and the Border Management Bureau after 2008:

“They said that they would like to meet us because we have been carrying out very valuable work in the field of asylum. Since then we have been able to build a pretty good relationship. The first goal of the
bureau was to draft a new law that was adopted. They wanted to do that in a transparent and participatory way. They had the UNHCR, academics and CSOs involved to give recommendations. This participatory process created opportunities for us to establish ourselves as more of a stakeholder” (Interview O 2013).

Before, the National Police Department of Asylum and Migrants was responsible for migration policies. They had excluded refugee rights NGOs from consultations because their reports were too critical in their eyes. The “new” cooperation is unusual though and the head coordinator from of HYD believes that it was only because of the new open-minded director at that institution (Interview O 2013).

My interview partner wishes for NGOs to increase their “stakeholder” role by professionalizing in a way also envisioned by the EU and its neo-liberal rationalities of performance and visibility:

“It is necessary to have a government willing to engage with civil society stakeholders, but at the same time civil society actors also need to develop their own skills and knowledge to be effective. But for that civil society stakeholders need resources. For civil society actors to be able to project sustained and targeted efforts and strategies; there needs to be more dedicated professional capacities and expertise in the NGO sphere and the human rights movement. Overall the EU process is an important driving force to build partnerships with EU counterparts and to see how it is in best examples and how it takes place in other countries” (Interview O 2013).

If the organization had more resources, it would also consider opening an office in Ankara to influence policy-making (Interview O 2013). The political context changed in a favorable way for refugee rights organizations after 2008 while in other rights areas the development is rather the opposite. Before 2008, NGOs faced strong opposition from the government when demanding legislative changes. Afterwards civils society became more of a partner in decision-making. This new role influenced the work and discourse of HYD and SGDD making it more supportive of the government and reconstituting their role more of a “professional” stakeholder in policy-making instead of a watchdog.

**EU funded projects**

In 2006 the Refugee Support Program began the EIDHR funded project called “Refugees in Satellite Cities: A Training Program for Local NGOs” in different cities in Turkey. The project also received some financial support from the Heinrich Böll Foundation. The trainings in Eskişehir and Konya consisted of three different days. During the first day, the project was introduced and refugees told their stories of coming to Turkey and their daily problems to CSO representatives. On the second day, NGOs dealing with migration such as SGDD, İKGV and Amnesty International exchanged their experiences. In the afternoon representatives from local governments attended the meetings which together with the CSOs created suggestions of what can be done. During the third day, “practical
"Collaborative Action Plan" were developed in a workshop (HYD 2006a). The project is thus very similar to the projects done by Mülteci-Der focusing on providing information and training to all actors involved in migration policies and placing responsibility on civil society and individuals to improve their situation. However, the involvement of local governmental representatives stands out as a way to bring the issue more into the focus of politics and state institutions. The project was further supposed to help improving service provision although direct service provision is not funded by the EU. The UN finances a lot of services provided for by refugee NGOs in Turkey which could also be the state’s responsibility to finance (Interview O 2013).

The head of the Refugee and Asylum-Seekers Program of the HYD considers EU funding to have a positive effect on Turkish CSOs and stressed the responsibility of the EU to help CSOs professionalize:

“If NGOs are to participate in democratic processes, they need to be strong in expertise and resources that they can use. Only this way they can create tactics and strategies to find their way into the policy process.(...) For civil society actors to be able to project sustained and targeted efforts and strategies, there needs to be more dedicated professional capacities and expertise in the NGO sphere and the human rights movement. Overall the EU process is an important driving force to build partnerships with EU counterparts and to see how it is in best examples and how it takes place in other countries (…) People who say that human rights work should be entirely based on volunteer contributions often have an activist perspective which has its limits. We need more professionalism. (…) We need to try to strengthen our professional capacities in order to become more effective advocacy actors” (Interview O 2013).

This statement implies the idea that CSOs have to professionalize to successfully influence politics. Professionalizing refers to learning how to use the neo-liberal technologies of visibility and performance, how to run projects and how to take part in decision-making process. CSOs should become entrepreneurs (see Kurki 2011a: 357). In addition, it constitutes a divide between professional NGO employees and activists. The project coordinator also praised the EU because “the agenda of the EU is very transparent and known, priorities are clear, so that is good in a way” (Interview A 2013). EU funded projects provide the budget to hire one project coordinator to manage the project which means documenting activities and budget. For the NGO this is a positive change in the way CSOs work. The technologies of visibility and performance as well as the rationality to “empower” have been very powerful here even though the struggles over migration were not very strongly politicized. While the new migration law is a success of refugee NGOs in Turkey, the depoliticization of the issue makes more progressive policies to protect refugees’ rights difficult.
6.4.4. Conclusions on the (de) politicizing effects on CSOs working on immigrants’ rights
The discursive context of the issue of migrants’ and refugee rights is different than the context in the other rights areas studied. Migration only entered political debates in the second half of my study period. Publically it never became a strongly contested or politicized topic although the government was highly skeptical of NGOs working in that area in the beginning. Turkey tried to adapt its policy to EU law introducing a law on migration for the first time. In the end, the NGOs had a big influence on the law. Law makers asked them for their support. It appears that this openness is largely due to the general change in migration policies coming with the recognition that migration has to be dealt with and NGOs have most expertise. Also, CSOs already provided social services. In their EU funded projects CSOs pursued activities aiming at improving legislation and public and private service provision.

Concluding, there are two depoliticizing effects arising from the NGOs’ activities. Firstly, the close interaction between the government and the NGOs as described by SGDD and HYD however suggests that monitoring government practices is difficult in such a close relationship. Moreover, most NGOs do not monitor the situation systematically but concentrated on improving the provision of social services in target cities and training NGO workers as well as officials working in the satellite cities. However, Mülteci-Der has been more outspoken about criticizing national and international migration policies.

A second problem is that NGOs as well as the state have an interest in leaving the role of service provision with the NGOs. With the establishment of the new migration management system in Turkey a civil management office is introduced to deal with migration. Before, the police was responsible for migration management (Erkuş 2012). Yet CSOs say that they still had a “complementary service provision role to play” in addition to its monitoring role (Interview O 2013). My interviewees suggested that it was possible that they keep doing their work but financed by the state when it comes to basic services for refugees. Whether the state will pay remains to be seen.

In addition to the rights-based NGOs from the liberal discourse which are supported by the EU, there are Muslim organizations that have received more funding and provide a lot of services in the migration sector as well (Saritoprak 2015: 51). The state has focused on supporting Syrian refugees. Organizations such as SGDD take care of refugees from other countries. Moreover, in the case of migration, NGOs have been able to influence the new law on migration and its implementation to a great extent. While providing expertise as well as services, NGOs decreased their monitoring activities and became less radical in their critique of migration policies. Except for the criticism of the visa deal with the EU, migration CSOs have been careful to express stronger criticism of migration
restrictions in order to not jeopardize the small steps taken. Moreover, CSOs might always stay service providers in this area.
6.5. The (de)politicizing effects of large scale EU funded civil society programs in Turkey

6.5.1. The EU project “Preparation of Methodology for Monitoring the Freedom of Association in Turkey”

The STGM supports the monitoring practices of CSOs by training CSOs to enable them to “monitor the local authorities, their budget and the political processes” (Interview B 2013). In 2009, TÜSEV and STGM received large scale EU funds for a project called “Preparation of Methodology for Monitoring the Freedom of Association in Turkey”. This project conducted a survey with CSOs all over Turkey to document the situation of CSOs in Turkey and to determine the “barriers to freedom of association”. A report was published (STGM and TÜSEV 2009). For instance, issues such as registering, taxes, funding and fines were investigated. In addition, a guidebook on how to best monitor freedom of association was produced (EU Delegation to Turkey 2008a: 6). TÜSEV continued publishing monitoring reports after the project (TÜSEV 2011-2013). Three years later, a similar international project started focusing on “Monitoring enabling environment for civil society development” in Turkey. The basic assumption was that monitoring freedom of association increases the possibility for improving the situation of NGOs. CSOs were included in the development of the “monitoring matrix”. The project funded by the EU, the European Network of National Civil Society Organizations (ENNA), and the European Centre of Non-Profit Organizations Law (ECNL). TÜSEV is just one implementing partner of the transnational project coordinated by the Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN) (TÜSEV 2013). The overall goal of the project was:

“Through this matrix, the projects aims to create a monitoring mechanism for tracking of development of civil society, to facilitate the inclusion of related matters in the EU Progress Report and to support the participation of CSOs in the decision making processes at the national and EU level” (TÜSEV 2013).

One part of the project was to document the availability of state funding in the different countries. CSOs, representatives from public institutions, and academics were involved in the development of the monitoring matrix (TÜSEV 2013). Thus, within this large scale international project the situation of CSOs in different countries including Turkey was monitored. In order to do this, a monitoring instrument was developed. The reporting was done to improve the participation of CSOs in political decision-making processes, an aspect even more taken up by another large scale project that followed in 2013 and which I will discuss in the next section.

The discourses and practices of CSOs as well as the number of reports published show that monitoring and reporting is central for Turkish NGOs. Although it is hard to tell how much influence the reports on human rights abuses have, politicians do react to reports and media takes them up. They have politicizing potential. The EU however increasingly focuses on “civil society mainstreaming” as I discuss in the following.
6.5.2. The EU project “Strengthening Public-Civil Society Dialogue”

As the EU wants to improve the involvement of civil society in political decision-making processes in Turkey, it funds a large collaborative project on “Strengthening Public-Civil Society Dialogue” conducted by TÜSEV, STGM and YADA. The EU finances 80 per cent and the CFCU 20 per cent of the project’s budget of in total seven million Euro (Interview L 2013). The objectives of the project are the following:

“The establishment of civil society organisations that are active and able to attain financial resources within a better legal framework. The effective participation of civil society in all levels of policy preparations. Support provided to the sustainable development of grassroots civil society organisations and established organisations and networks” (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2013a).

The goal is that “civil society should be involved in every step of the decision-making at all levels” (Interview B 2013) or “to strengthen the participation of CSOs in decision-making in the public sector” (Interview L 2013). The activities to reach this aim include the creation of a code of conduct for cooperation between civil society and public officials; to improve the legal environment of NGOs; the development of a monitoring methodology for public-civil society dialogue; a guide for increasing the public reputation of CSOs as well as capacity building trainings. Specifically, the project organized meetings in Istanbul, Van, Izmir and Trabzon for CSOs to exchange their experiences of cooperation with the public sector (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2014). Local public representatives shared their experiences in other workshops (Interview L 2013). Further, a study on the practices of public-civil society cooperation in other countries was conducted (Divjak 2014). The study is supposed to provide input for drafting the code of conduct. In total the project targeted 700 CSOs, ten local governments, and three public institutions (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2013a).

Even though this project is backed by the Turkish government as it is partly financed by the Turkish authorities, the NGOs still face resistance from policy makers:

“They are not open to our meetings. Normally they agree and say ‘Great let’s work together’. Then we do training for them and then they seem to be open but at the end it is not easy to get the end result. (...). Also, all legislation always goes to the prime ministry today. That is a problem. For instance, we had agreed on a law with the Minister for Family but when the law came back from the prime ministry it was completely different” (Interview L 2013).

Further, in the workshops the local NGOs complained that relations between civil society and the public sector are always “personal”: “You have to know someone. And if the government changes, you also have to change your policies” (Interview L 2013). The report of the meetings states shows that consultation between CSOs and governmental institutions exists. Yet, for rights-based NGOs it is much more difficult to get access to decision-making processes than for other kind of NGOs. The report summarizes:
“Representatives of rights-based organizations expressed that problems in the field of freedom of expression decrease the capacity and organizational strength of their CSOs. Rights based CSOs also expressed that the public institutions arbitrarily select the CSOs which will be included in consultation processes” (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2013b: 6).

Within the project the three different organizations concentrated on different activities. TÜSEV focused on drafting the code of conduct. STGM was responsible for training NGOs: “We are developing some training programs, also tailor-made trainings in cooperation with NGOs incorporating their request and their needs”; further “we want to finalize the project with developing monitoring processes and tools” (Interview B 2013). YADA, founded in 2005, is a research NGO focusing on the reputation of civil society in Turkey. This is why in the project, YADA conducted research on the reputation of CSOs among government officials and among society. Further, it offered NGOs training in “reputation management” (Interview M 2013). The report on the research on code of conduct practices in other countries begins with defining different terms surrounding civil society-public sector cooperation referring to the TASCO manual (2010a). One central category is the concept of “good governance” which refers to:

“among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on a broad consensus in society and that the poorest and most vulnerable members of society are heard in decision making over the allocation of development resources” (Divjak 2014: 6).

Good governance is basically neo-liberal governmentality based on the rationalities of participation, accountability, effectiveness and consensus-making. One central element is “policy dialogues” which are

“carefully constructed, deliberative meetings that address regulatory, policy, or planning issues that are of common interest. Generally speaking, policy dialogues seek to exchange information and build consensus recommendations between the public, private, and civic sectors through leaders who are in a position to forge alliances, make decisions, or strongly influence the trajectory of a possible solution to a challenging issue. Policy dialogues go by many names. Some call them "Roundtables" or "Issue Workshops." Others take the form of specialized committees, commissions, regulatory negotiations, or working groups. Regardless of their name, all are policy dialogues” (Divjak 2014: 7).

Policy dialogues are defined as institutionalized practices of cooperation between civil society and the public sector. The document states that for those “advisory bodies” CSO representatives have to be selected either by civil society or the government (Divjak 2014: 87–88). The report suggests a governmental support office for CSOs as well as advisory bodies to institutionalize dialogue (Divjak 2014: 104–105). The CSO representatives in the bodies should consult with other CSOs to develop a common opinion (Divjak 2014: 101–102). Either a governmental or civil society office should monitor the participation of civil society in decision-making processes (Divjak 2014: 102). The (de)politicizing effects of such cooperation are difficult to assess and depend on their discursive context. On the one hand, institutionalized civil society-public sector cooperation enables CSOs to take influence of NGOs
on policies. On the other hand, it is unlikely that it is the most marginalized groups that get to take part in institutionalized participation as it is easier for more established organizations which have networks already to enter the institutionalized set-up. The EU increasingly supports the creation of specific consortia such as the in the case of the “Civil Society-Public Sector Cooperation” project. These projects often develop without a public call and include big professionalized organizations only excluding smaller NGOs (Interview D 2013). Moreover, in the long term a harmonious relationship is constituted which makes it difficult for NGOs to monitor and publically criticize government decisions – especially if they have been part of the decision-making process, as seen in the case of migration CSOs.

In addition to this large scale program, three organizations got funding for smaller projects within the same program: HYD; Bilgi University Youth Studies Unit; and KAGED (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2013a). HYD organized “14 local workshops to improve capacities of civil constituencies, make their work more effective, and improve their analysis and decision-making” (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014a; Interview A 2013). In addition to the activities on improving public-civil society relations, the project focused on training and empowering civil society actors. Bilgi University focused on the involvement of young people in decision-making processes (Siviltoplum Kamu İşbirliği 2013a). KAGED as an organization solely works on developing civil society networks which I mentioned in the sections on the issue areas before. The NGO was responsible for developing a dialogue between eight networks and government representatives. These dialogues were to be sustainable and long-lasting – exceeding the time frame of the project (EU Delegation to Turkey 2014a). KAGED supported the women’s coalition, İHOP, and a platform for refugee organizations. The platform “Kadın Koalisyonu” was created by KAGED as part of the large-scale EU funded project “Strengthening Public-Civil Society Dialogue”. It focuses on women’s rights and women’s social and political participation (Kadın Koalisyonu 2014). Similarly to other platforms the women’s coalition focuses on publishing statements that for instance call to stop all violence against women via its website or Facebook. Further, the coalition regularly organizes meetings of women’s organizations all over the country (Kadın Koalisyonu 2014; https://de-de.facebook.com/KadinKoalisyonu). Although only the women’s platform came into being with EU funding, the large scale project “Civil Society-Public Sector Cooperation” provided financial support for these platforms through KAGED between 2012 and 2014 (İHOP 2007).

In sum, the EU funded project aimed to help CSOs to overcome the obstacles of cooperation with the public sector. This project constitutes CSOs as actors in political decision-making processes. The project tries to target both the obstacles existing on the side of government and the capacities of NGOs to influence decision-making processes. The first aim is to be achieved by conducting
workshops with officials and the drafting of the code of conduct involving civil society as well as representatives of the public sector. The second goal is supposed to be reached by training CSOs. This large project reproduces the idea of training NGOs and increasing their capacities to manage to make them better self-entrepreneurs as Kurki (2011a: 357) suggested. It further demonstrates how EU funding increasingly aims to enable civil society to take part in decision-making processes. The EU intends to institutionalize civil society-public sector relations with establishing a code of conduct, creating sustainable links between civil society platforms and government representatives. If successful, such institutionalization constitutes civil society and governments as partners and excludes marginalized CSOs that are not part of the platforms or targets of the EU-funded project. It creates a governance structure in which different discursive positions merge and become blurry. While this might enable the strengthening of some positions, overall it tames civil society. The increasing focus on government civil society cooperation is ambiguous. Its constitutive effects depend on how politicized the discursive context of NGOs is and whether cooperation blurs discursive differences or strengthens the position of marginalized discourses in the struggles.
6.6. Conclusions on the (de)politicalizing effects of EU civil society funding in Turkey

In this chapter I analyzed the discursive representation of the work of CSOs working in the area of women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and refugees’ rights in Turkey. I especially looked at NGOs which received funding from the EU. I assessed the CSOs in terms of their general goals, activities and statements as well as their goals and activities in EU funded projects. I focused on the four different depoliticizing triggers and their expected effects identified in the theory chapter. I also looked for the existence of activities typical for liberal governmentality. I argued that the discursive context of CSOs needs to be taken into account to understand the (de)politicalizing effect of EU funding. Because NGOs act within discursive struggles over the issues they deal with, I organized my analysis according to the different issue areas. I further included an assessment of large scale EU projects that became popular at the end of my study period to show where EU funding might be heading.

Here, I want to summarize and compare my findings. Overall, I found that EU funding does not simply depoliticize the goals of human rights organizations. In most instances the consequences are more complex and ambiguous.

Firstly, one of Kurki’s (2011a: 357–358) central claims was that the EiDHR turned NGOs into service providers; a criticism of neo-liberal governmentality that is raised by many authors (for instance Jaeger 2007; Ferguson 1990). I showed in chapter four that the EU documents do not support this claim. Instead the EU tries to avoid funding services. Nevertheless, NGOs in all sectors – women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and refugee rights – provided social services to vulnerable groups. Yet, for the most part this is done without EU funding and it is done because the state has never felt responsible to protect the human rights of the respective groups. In fact, providing services against the consent of the state is a form of politicization. For instance, providing services to torture survivors rather presents a criticism of the state as the state is usually the one exercising torture. Similarly, LGBT individuals could not expect any form of protection from the side of the state. Women NGOs have tried to hand over women’s shelters to the municipalities arguing that it was the state’s responsibility. Although women’s rights have gained more legitimacy in the past two decades in Turkey, the political struggles have shown little awareness of violence against women. Instead women’s rights for instance the right to abortion were questioned. For refugee CSOs running satellite cities and support centers for immigrants has been a central part of their activities. Until 2010 the state did not accept any responsibility in this area. It remains to be seen whether the NGOs actually hand this work over to the state or continue their activities with the financial support of the state.

Secondly, Kurki (2011a: 357) as well as others (Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1999: 67) argued that neo-liberal governmentality constitutes civil society as self-responsible individuals that are “empowered” to tackle their own marginalization. The argument goes that empowerment
depoliticized the discrimination of specific groups as it blurs the political causes of it and prevents that the issue is put on the political agenda. I found that many EU projects in all areas include the idea of empowering marginalized individuals. Especially in the area of women’s rights and Kurdish rights – but also in LGBT and refugee rights – projects focused on increasing the knowledge and capabilities of individuals or so-called human rights defenders. Hence, NGOs put some responsibility on the individual to change her or his situation by acting in a specific way, by assuming a participatory role. While these forms of empowerment appear neutral, they produce specific subjectivities which either depoliticize the issue of marginalization or are met with resistance as seen in one project by Kader. I also discussed that despite its problematic effects of power and its feature of imposing a specific idea of emancipation character, empowerment might change the subjectivities of individuals in a way that they take action. For instance, according to HYD, teachers that were trained in dealing with Kurdish rights indeed became open to change how they treat Kurdish children. Moreover, some CSOs trained smaller organizations in liberal activities such as monitoring human rights violations and thus contributed to a politicization of the issue. Nevertheless, the problematic power relations remain and the political nature of the projects are covered.

Thirdly, in all areas EU projects included the use of technologies of visibility and performance which are integral to neo-liberal governmentality and to the EU’s way of doing things (Walters and Haahr 2005: 122-126). The conditions of the EU calls which I analyzed in chapter four make it impossible not to use the neo-liberal technologies in projects. However, NGOs reproduced them to different extents. I found that it is especially LGBT CSOs that documented their activities and budgets outside the scope of EU projects. The threat of closure made transparency an important tool for LGBT NGOs to increase their legitimacy. This is true for smaller CSOs such as Spod as well as for bigger groups such as Kaos GL. Further, big human rights organizations such as İHD and HYD also incorporated the neo-liberal technologies. However, İHD has not implemented this on its website, only my interview partner expressed that he was convinced of the EU’s methods. Here, the effects are more ambiguous as well. On the one hand, the technologies of visibility and performance are present in all EU funded projects and are a trigger for depoliticization. On the other hand, when organizations that were completely illegitimate before such as LGBT NGOS use these technologies to increase their legitimacy while they still put pressure on politics to change rights legislation and protect their rights, the technologies proved useful for politicization.

Although all NGOs used the neo-liberal technologies in their EU projects and even partly in their work, most of them still focused on campaigning for their goals by organizing public debates, publishing statements and criticizing policies and human rights violations through reports. In a liberal manner (Dean 1999: 123), they stressed that individuals are bearer of human rights that cannot be
violated. The oldest women’s NGOs as well as all LGBT organizations and the human rights NGOs İHD and Mazlumder regularly published monitoring reports on human rights violations. Moreover, organizations working for Kurdish rights, LGBT and women’s rights have been particularly vocal in expressing their political positions on issues linked to women, LGBT and Kurdish rights – although in interviews many of them described themselves as being apolitical. They stressed that their organizations defended all kinds of human rights issues and often referred to the right to wear a headscarf. This issue has become a powerful symbol for how liberal and Muslim (simplified representation) come together. At the same time, women’s rights organizations that supported lifting the band demanded more improvements for women’s rights e.g. to end violence against women. Some refugee organizations such as Mülteci-Der participated in public debates by publishing statements and articles, but especially refugee organizations rather expressed satisfaction with governmental policies or talked to “stakeholders” behind closed doors. Although they successfully influenced policies, public politicization was less visible here.

This brings me to the last point that within neo-liberal governmentality civil society is also supposed to become a partner of government to reach a consensus on policies. It is argued that CSOs that are included in policy-making will find it difficult to criticize policy decisions that they were part of. Thus close partnership leads to depoliticization of the issue at hand (Jaeger 2007: 270–271). In the case of Turkey, an inclusion of civil society in decision-making processes has been extremely rare as politics and society are still suspicious of civil society groups. One of the large scale projects I analyzed aims at improving cooperation between civil society and the public. So far, this has not been successful. Some NGOs managed to talk to establish meetings with politicians and invited deputies to public events. Only in the area of migration did CSOs sit at the table with government officials to design policies. Here at the end of my study period close cooperation developed. I observed that these civil society actors hardly criticized the migration policies. For the most part though, the EU’s strategy to “mainstream” civil society has remained unsuccessful due to the domestic political struggles.

In addition, I included two organizations that opposed and/or have never received EU funding. The two cases suggested first of all that organizations rejected EU funding for political reasons. Ketola (2013) and Zihnioğlu (2013a) showed this in their studies in a much more detailed way. Secondly, in both NGOs there was no consensus on whether to apply for EU funding or not. The possibility to receive funding created tensions within the organizations. In the case of Amargi I found indications that the debate about whether to apply for EU grants contributed to its dissolution. For Mazlumder it was easier to decide on not applying for external funding as the organization had enough financial resources. Thirdly, I also found that both organizations did not incorporate neo-
liberal rationalities. One might expect big organizations to “professionalize” in the way that they make use of neo-liberal technologies of performance and visibility. Mazlumder is one of the biggest organizations in Turkey but its website includes mainly information on political campaigns, statements and human rights reports thus politicizing the issue.

Considering all my findings, I conclude this chapter with restating my main argument: The EU transferred neo-liberal rationalities of empowerment and visibility and performance to many human rights CSOs in Turkey. Most of them however continued monitoring, reporting and lobbying potentially bringing issues to the agenda. How depoliticizing this combination is depends to a large extent on which activities dominate and the discursive contexts CSOs act in – and in most areas in Turkey the discursive struggles have been very strong or even oppressive. Thus I cannot say that EU civil society funding clearly depoliticized Turkish human rights organizations as suggested by the literature on EU democracy promotion and global civil society. Instead in some instances – LGBT or Kurdish rights – it contributed to the politicization of it in the first place. In the following chapter I will in a first step review what I did to answer my research question, and summarize my findings. In a second step, I will discuss what I found out about the relation between governmentality and (de)politicization and what remains unclear. In a third step, I suggest what my findings mean for the EU’s role in international relations as well as for the EU’s internal policies. Last but not least, I will discuss the consequences for Turkey-EU relations and Turkey’s political struggles.
Chapter 7

Concluding thoughts on the (de) politicization of the (de) politicized

7.1. Summarizing the ambiguous effects of the EU’s (neo-) liberal governmentality on CSOs in Turkey

I started my dissertation with a discussion of the existing research on democracy promotion and specifically the democracy promotion practices of the EU. I showed that the early literature focused on the instruments used for democracy promotion. Since the 2000s democracy promoters have increasingly aimed to include civil society in their policies, and thus scholars have begun studying the role of civil society funding within democracy promotion policies, labelling it a bottom-up approach. Such bottom-up democracy promotion was further strengthened after the Arab Spring in light of which scholars questioned the effectiveness of the EU’s policies that relied on the cooperation with non-democratic regimes whereas direct support to civil society appeared more promising. Thus, since the early 2000s civil society funding has come into focus. Many authors found however that the EU avoided funding Islamic organizations and concluded that the EU rather pursued security goals than the aim of spreading democratic values. I suggested that we should analyze what the EU’s civil society funding actually does do in domestic and local contexts instead of discussing its “effectiveness” or the EU’s intentions. Here I found Kurki’s (2011a) analysis of the EU’s democracy promotion policies, especially the EIDHR, promising. Kurki argues that the EIDHR was shaped by neo-liberal governmentality. Moreover, the EIDHR’s neo-liberal governmentality formed civil societies in third countries. Kurki, who analyzed the documents of the EIDHR, as well as other authors suggest that neo-liberal governmentality depoliticizes civil society organizations and their work.

I discussed this argument in my theoretical chapter. At first sight I found the argument convincing and relevant as it points to the problematic consequences of the EU’s approach – and of other donors as well. However I argued that the argument needs specification in two instances.

Firstly, the argument overlooks the ambiguity of governmentality which is present in the EU integration project as such. Referring to the debate on the founding ideas and myth of the EU, I showed that the EU itself was based on the idea of “un-ideological” and “apolitical” decision-making which was supposed to secure peace and well-being on a war-torn continent. From the start the EU project was characterized by an ambiguity: being a peace and democracy project on the one hand and being an “apolitical”, “functional”, and “technical” union on the other hand. Generally speaking, the EU is shaped by liberal ideas (peace, democracy and fundamental rights) and neo-liberal ideas (economic rationalities and decision-making). I proposed that the governmentality literature often blurs this difference between liberal and neo-liberal governmentality and does not clarify which
elements have a depoliticizing effect and how it defines depoliticization in the first place. I discussed how I understand depoliticization combining the literature on governmentality with the debate on depoliticization in the discipline of political economy. I further laid out the differences between neo-functionalist, liberal and neo-liberal rationalities and why and how we can expect depoliticizing effects mostly from neo-liberal rationalities.

Secondly, Kurki did not analyze the consequences in a specific case. I suggested analyzing the case of Turkey. Turkey is an interesting case. In the framework of the EU accession process the EU gives direct funding to Turkish human rights organizations. A lot is written about the expansion of Turkish civil society due to the EU’s involvement. At the same time the Turkish political establishment as well as the public treat civil society with a great measure of skepticism and indeed blame it for being political. In light of this, it appeared very unlikely that EU funding would simply depoliticize civil society. This is why I pointed out that the literature suggesting depoliticizing effects of neo-liberal governmentality does not take the discursive context of CSOs funded into account. Ketola (2011) similarly argued that the EU did not pay attention to the Turkish local context which did not fit the EU model of liberal democracy. According to Ketola, EU funding deepens the divisions between funded and non-funded groups. Although I find similar effects, many of these divisions between ideologically different groups existed before. Instead, I was interested in whether the groups that receive EU grants are actually depoliticized by the rationalities as suggested by the literature. Building on an understanding of political struggles over hegemony following Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014) and borrowing an argument from the securitization literature, I suggested that when an issue (that CSOs bring forward) is highly politicized in a domestic setting, neo-liberal governmentality helps to open up political debates and make new positions legitimate.

After laying out my theoretical and methodological approach, I analyzed the documents of the EU’s civil society programs in which Turkey participates looking for instances of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality in chapter five. The analysis supported Kurki’s argument by showing that the EU’s civil society policy is indeed based on neo-liberal governmentality. However, I clarified that it is further shaped by liberal governmentality – a difference that most literature blurs. I argued that the EU’s policies include representations of liberal rationalities – namely the idea of legal rights including human, social and economic rights, and the representations of civil society as a check on the state. As previously argued, this should not come as a surprise as the original idea of the policy is to promote human rights and democracy. Moving on to neo-liberal rationalities, I demonstrated that the EU refers to the rationalities of empowerment, consensus-making cooperation and technologies of performance and visibility. The EU strongly constitutes NGOs as self-responsible managers that should cooperate with public institutions and politics in strengthening human rights. Yet, in contrast
to Kurki I could not find any clear representations of CSOs as service providers – a central role of civil society in neo-liberal governmentality. In fact, the EU’s discourse rather opposes funding social services.

I then analyzed the context of the Turkish NGOs funded by the EU as I reasoned that the discursive setting influences the (de)politicizing effects of EU funds. I argued that the often-claimed Kemalist-Islamist divide is a simplified representation of Turkey’s discursive struggles. The struggles over specific rights issues are characterized by shifting discursive coalitions and differentiations within the Islamic, Kemalist, Kurdish or liberal discourses. For instance, the CSOs funded defend liberal discourses – some of them more on the left side of the political spectrum than others – present in society and parts of politics as well. Although debates on human rights issues in Turkey often divide the discursive space, these divisions present different constellations and overlapping discourses. To summarize, my analysis of the discourses trying to become hegemonic in the area of women’s rights showed that there were different discursive splits over the headscarf ban and over the right to abortions and caesarians. In the first case, more liberal and more Muslim discourses joined referring to human rights including religious as well as women’s rights to successfully overcome the dominant position for a headscarf ban. However these discursive groups were more or less divided again in the debate over the rights to abortion and caesarians in which Kemalist and liberal discourses formed one discursive position. Similarly, in the area of Kurdish rights more Muslim-shaped and liberal discourses came together in favor of improving Kurdish rights and settling the conflict – still a marginalized and dangerous position in the 1990s and to a lesser extent today – even though liberal groups have become skeptical of the AKP’s intentions at the end of my study period. In the struggle over LGBT rights liberal groups in civil society were most vocal but their human rights based discourse received support from mostly Kurdish but also Kemalist discourses within society and politics. Some parts of the Muslim discourses expressed supportive positions as well. The LGBT rights struggle was left in a contradictory position in which LGBT rights are recognized to be human rights but are still strongly violated in Turkish daily life. I further showed that the rights of migrants were not part of political struggles to begin with and only came onto the agenda in the last years of my study period. Here a consensual discourse represented by liberal civil society and all parts of politics emerged hardly challenged by other discursive positions.

In light of these discursive contexts, I analyzed the effects of EU funding on Turkish human rights CSOs in the area of women’s, LGBT, Kurdish and refugees’ rights. I looked for instances of neo-liberal and liberal governmentality and assessed whether the depoliticizing effects expected exist. Based on NGO documents and interviews with their representatives I analyzed their work inside and outside EU funded projects. Overall, I argued that in all areas organizations monitored human rights
violations and intervened in political debates while increasingly aiming to empower individuals or citizens and employing technologies of visibility and performance. Yet, this occurs to different extents and has different consequences depending on the context.

I began with analyzing women’s rights CSOs and found that both liberal and neo-liberal rationalities shape their work. Here the picture is the most mixed one. Most women’s rights CSOs conducted monitoring activities and published reports on the violation of women’s rights. In addition, they engaged in political struggles over women’s rights. Especially in the last years of my study period women organizations have become more vocal again criticizing the government for its positions on abortions and caesarians. They have criticized the focus on the headscarf ban and demanded more governmental initiatives to protect women’s rights. They fulfilled a classical liberal watchdog role. At the same time these organizations received EU funding for conducting projects on women’s rights. As these NGOs traditionally provide services to women, some projects aimed to improve the service but CSOs have tried to push the state or municipalities to run shelters and offer support.

However in most EU funded projects, the idea of empowerment has been strong. The projects aimed to empower other women to become active citizens and achieve “emancipation”. The empowering practices of CSOs prescribe a specific form of emancipation not leaving many options for women in rural areas. Although the analysis has shown how empowerment always involves asymmetrical power relations and the imposition of ideas, when leaving more space empowerment produces an awareness of the need to politicize and thus enables incremental change. Overall however the projects on empowerment hardly emphasize the need for political change. In addition, within the projects NGOs use technologies of visibility and performance which constitute them as self-entrepreneurs. Although women’s rights have been under attack again, women’s NGOs did not face as much suppression as CSOs working on other topics. This is why neo-liberal technologies have more problematic effects here. Women’s CSOs are able to be more vocal and are less dependent on appearing apolitical. So far, the depoliticizing tendencies were balanced by the NGO’s involvement in political debates which become stronger again as the struggle over abortions and caesarians intensified after 2010.

Next, I analyzed the work of LGBT CSOs in Turkey. The LGBT movement has been critical of any external funding. Somehow contradictory, most of its larger organizations relied on EU funding. Some activists received individual support as well. The CSOs, especially Kaos GL, monitored and reported violations of LGBT rights. The organizations further participated in public debates on LGBT issues. Kaos GL and Pink Life have published magazines which discuss LGBT topics and events. Spod had a special focus on lobbying activities including regular meetings and talks with politicians. Other
organizations had links with politicians from opposition parties as well as the AKP. Generally, the monitoring and lobbying role of LGBT CSOs was very strong. Also within EU projects they organized debates with politicians, activists and academics from European countries to share experiences, increase visibility and bring their issues onto the political agenda.

Similar to women’s organizations, LGBT NGOs are the only place for LGBT individuals to receive legal, psychological and medical advice. That the organizations provide social services is not a sign for depoliticization. Also, LGBT CSOs ran EU funded projects in which they focused on “empowering” individuals teaching them about their rights. This practice supported emancipation but also limited options for what emancipation means by imposing a liberal idea of emancipation. It further implies that improving LGBT rights can be done on the individual level. Yet, in many instances empowerment meant to inform LGBT individuals about their rights, a practice that is not strongly politicizing. However you need to know your rights to demand their protection.

The clearest instance of neo-liberal governmentality is present in the way most LGBT CSOs used the technologies of visibility and performance characteristic for the EU’s civil society programs. They strongly document every activity they do in- and outside of EU-funded projects. They internalized the idea that everything has to be made transparent and one has to define goals and strategies to reach these goals. They become self-entrepreneurs but this did not strictly have depoliticizing effects. The example of LGBT CSOs shows how neo-liberal technologies enable political contestation in the first place. As LGBT organizations were considered to be illegitimate, neo-liberal technologies created transparency and increased legitimacy. The NGOs used the technologies to prove that they are a credible actor that poses reasonable demands. On the negative side, once LGBT rights are more established, there is a danger of becoming less political. Also, working in projects was criticized by LGBT grassroots activists and created a conflict in the LGBT community.

The EU’s funding has similar effects on Kurdish rights organizations which I analyzed in the next section. Kurdish rights used to be a taboo subject in Turkey. Kurdish people and people fighting for Kurdish rights faced state oppression. Many human rights NGOs working on Kurdish rights were founded in the 1980s and 1990s when Kurds faced the harshest discrimination. Although the conflict with the Kurdish PKK and the rights of Kurdish people moved to the center of political struggles in Turkey between 2002 and 2013, there is still severe pressure on and discrimination of Kurdish people in Turkey. Organizations working on Kurdish rights traditionally did not have any EU funding for their work. They worked with membership fees or donations and largely depended on volunteer work. The oldest Turkish human rights organizations İHD and TIHV focused on service provision and monitoring activities. They provided medical, social and psychological care to torture survivors, monitored human rights violations, and published reports. The organizations including Mazlumder and HYD
published press statements on current issues in support of Kurdish rights and a peaceful solution of the conflict with the Kurds.

The NGOs increasingly ran EU funded projects of which some aimed to improve the provision of social services and most of them focused on empowering individuals or so-called human rights defenders transferring responsibility to them. This constitutes Kurdish activists as more neutral human rights workers and increases the legitimacy of their activities. EU funded projects raised less suspicion and at least enabled people to talk about Kurdish rights. In any case, for organizations such as İHD EU projects were only a small part of their daily work.

At the same time all organizations – expect for Mazlumder which I will discuss at the end of this chapter’s summary – increasingly used the technologies of visibility and performance considering it an opportunity to improve the outcome of their work and to look more legitimate. Organizations strongly under pressure such as İHD and TIHV profited from neo-liberal governmentality which made it possible for them to put their issue onto the political agenda. Hence, human rights organization working for Kurdish rights have profited from EU support and the apolitical appearance of its technologies as well as from a more favorable political climate.

The last issue area I was interested in was refugee rights. As I had laid out in chapter five, this topic was less prominent in Turkish political struggles. It was only during my study period that it became a more important issue, however less contested than other ones. New refugee organizations were founded during that time. The most established ones such as SGDD and the HYD refugee program focused on providing services to immigrants and refugees in satellite cities, reception or support centers including legal, social, medical and psychological assistance. EU funded projects aimed at improving the services provided to refugees. In addition, the CSOs successfully influenced migration reform. The goal of most organizations was to establish a migration law which is in line with EU standards. Thus NGOs adopted the EU’s discourse. However, CSOs did not express stronger positions or criticism. Some of them closely cooperated with government officials or the new migration management system. Until now, they provide the services the state could provide instead. Partly, they are pushing for more state responsibility.

In contrast to the other issues, refugee rights NGOs do not conduct regular monitoring activities of how immigrants are treated. This is not surprising as they are the ones organizing and providing a large part of the services to refugees and asylum-seekers in Turkey. In addition to providing services, they ran EU projects in which they had to use the instruments of visibility and performance and aimed to empower refugees and asylum-seekers. Overall, refugee NGOs were very successful in influencing policies and cooperating with political institutions while fulfilling the role of
a service provider. Although the new migration law can be regarded a success from a refugee rights perspective, their strong role in the making and implementation of that law limited their controlling function and depoliticized their discourse.

In sum, I showed that the activities of most women’s, LGBT and Kurdish rights CSOs include on the one hand monitoring human rights’ violations and lobbying for human rights and on the other hand empowerment projects and employing technologies of visibility and performance. Women’s rights have moved to the center of debates but faced more marginalization again. However, as they are considered to be more legitimate, focusing on empowerment and visibility and performance technologies contributed to less visibility of women’s rights demands on the political agenda. Yet, in their non-EU funded activities women’s CSOs pushed the cause of women’s NGOs to political debates. LGBT rights faced much more oppression in the early 2000s and thus incorporating the language and practice of neo-liberal governmentality increased these organizations’ legitimacy and enabled the possibility of discussing LGBT rights as human rights on the political level. However, EU funding also created a divide between the NGOs and activists which weakens the movement. Similarly, Kurdish rights NGOs saw the EU’s rationalities as an opportunity to become more “effective” and more legitimate. These organizations were very political themselves and/or strongly politicized from the outside and thus profited from the apolitical nature of EU funds enabling them to put their issue on the agenda. I saw the clearest instances of depoliticization in the area of migration rights. Refugee NGOs provided social services and conducted EU projects focusing on empowering. They monitored less and worked closely with government representatives. Although it was largely their involvement that made the first migration law in Turkey possible, there are signs for a depoliticization of the issue at hand.

After having summarized my analysis, I want to point to a few exceptions from the findings described above. These exceptions are organizations that do not want to receive EU funding such as Amargi and Mazlumder. They rejected EU funding for political reasons. Amargi, a feminist collective that is involved in LGBT issues and is from the left political spectrum, criticized the neo-liberal character of EU – and other international – funding and feared to become a project manager giving up its political ideas. Because Amargi’s members had different positions on this, the question divided them and contributed to the end of the organization. Mazlumder decided not to receive any EU and other international funding because it rejected the EU’s neo-liberal policies including its liberal position on LGBT rights. Moreover, they denied any political dependency. Mazlumder however had sufficient financial resources to survive without EU funding. I observed hardly any neo-liberal rationalities in either organization. Instead the CSOs stressed the importance of political discussions, political education, monitoring and lobbying. These findings show two things. Firstly, organizations
not working with EU and other project funds did different activities and did not incorporate neo-liberal rationalities. Secondly, the possibility of EU funding forced organizations to take a position on whether to apply for funding and potentially triggers conflict within CSOs.

I argued that the EU’s neo-liberal governmentality and its depoliticizing effects on civil society are more ambiguous than assumed. They depend on the context of discursive struggles civil society is part of. To demonstrate this, I attempted to show how the (neo-)liberal governmentality of the EU depoliticized CSOs and their work in the specific case of Turkey. I suggested looking at the case of Turkey because there many human rights CSOs depend on EU funding but most of them work in a context in which their activities are viewed with strong skepticism by the Turkish public.

7.2. What we know and still don’t know about (neo-)liberal governmentality and (de)politicization and the consequences for the EU’s civil society policies

Now, one might wonder: could the EU’s rationalities have had different effects? Let me discuss this question before I elaborate on what this analysis shows in terms of the relation between governmentality and (de)politicization and what we still do not know about the two. In the end of this part, I will suggest what these insights hold for the future of the EU’s civil society funding.

So, how could it have been different? I disagreed with the existing literature mostly by stating that neo-liberal rationalities do not have to be depoliticizing and that this depends on the context. One of my main claims was that for LGBT and Kurdish rights organizations some depoliticization that was triggered by projects of empowerment or technologies of visibility and performance actually transformed into a possibility for politicization. Yet, this was only the case because the dominant discourse in Turkey accepted the EU as a legitimate actor. The recognition of CSOs that are supported by the EU depended to a large extent on the domestic actors. The organizations became increasingly accepted because the government and Turkey’s public was strongly supportive of EU membership at least up until 2008. If the public discourse had been less favorable, this positive depoliticization-politicization effect would not have occurred. In fact, during the last years of my study period the official discourse has become more skeptical and partly dismissive towards the EU. Accordingly, many CSO representatives I interviewed said that the government has been less open towards them at the last years of my study period. However, CSOs that only focus on managing and documenting projects of empowerment will never politicize their issues in the sense of making it a matter of political contestation. Thus, to politicize it is necessary to perform liberal civil society activities in any context. For instance, if Kaos GL limited its activities to documenting its budget and performance and
training people by informing them about their rights, the issue of LGBT rights would hardly become an issue of contestation. In the Turkish context, some depoliticization made it possible to pursue politicizing activities and discourses, but it should be clear that it is an illusion to measure the performance of a human rights project. Moreover, if neo-liberal rationalities dominate civil society activities and involvement for human rights becomes a matter of cost-benefit calculations, human rights will lose their meaning and are depoliticized. Then politicization will hardly be possible. Thus, the EU would benefit from reducing its documentation and measurement requirements and being more honest about the limits of transparency.

And what if the EU had not been there and imposed its way of doing things, what would things look like now? I was only able to show how things are with EU funding in Turkey. I will never be able to know how things would be without funding. EU civil society support has become very central for many organizations. It is possible that some organizations would have adopted neo-liberal ways of doing things even without EU funding because they are part of an international trend and neo-liberal policies are dominant in Turkey as well. Yet, my analysis showed that organizations still do liberal civil society work such as monitoring and campaigning. It is the EU funded projects that are shaped most strongly by neo-liberal rationalities, for instance in the case of women’s NGOs doing empowerment projects in rural areas. I found parallel developments in different NGOs. Especially in terms of EU supported projects, the activities of the CSOs were very similar. Moreover, I provided an idea of how civil society would work without EU funding by giving the examples of Amargi and Mazlumder, two organizations rejecting EU support. However, they partly act within different contexts and their situation would be different if the opportunity of EU funding did not exist in the first place. Future research should compare the case of Turkey to other countries with or without EU funding to identify similarities and differences and strengthen or adjust the arguments I brought forward.

Although I argued for ambiguous effects of EU civil society funding, I would like to emphasize the importance of pointing to the problematic consequences of (neo-)liberal govern mentality. My endeavor was ambiguous as such. On the one hand, I intended to stress the problematic consequences of neo-liberal govern mentality in EU civil society programs. On the other hand, I put forward that the EU policies are not only based on neo-liberal rationalities but on liberal ones as well and this combination might enable even politicizing effects. I further argued that the domestic context of discursive struggles influences how (neo-)liberal govern mentality affects actors and issues of theses struggles. Doing this, I did not want to cover the negative effects of neo-liberal govern mentality. Instead, I put forward that we should not ignore the emancipatory effects EU funding has in some instances. Only then we acknowledge what EU funding means for local contexts.
and actors and find a way to improve civil society policies. It should also have become clear that neo-
liberal rationalities without liberal ones are still strongly depoliticizing.

Overall, the literature on governmentality and civil society should be more careful in claiming
what neo-liberal governmentality is and what its effects will be. Governmentality is usually part of
more complicated contexts. As I argued, the context influences how governmentality affects civil
society. When thinking about the case of Turkey it appeared strongly unlikely that rights issues would
be depoliticized. For instance, Kurdish rights used to be extremely politicized which in fact made it
impossible to even talk about Kurdish rights. People demanding Kurdish rights were considered to be
an “enemy”, not just an “adversary” as Mouffe (2011: 99) put it. One does not engage in a
conversation with an enemy. Similarly, LGBT individuals were not considered to be a legitimate
adversary in discursive struggles. The literature on securitization has discussed this in more detail
already. It suggests that securitization is an extreme form of politicization which prevents political
contestation (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). When an issue is declared a security threat, extreme political
measures are justified which cannot be legitimately contested (Wæver 1998: 80). In the Turkish case,
Kurdish rights have been securitized. The headscarf ban also used to be regarded as an instrument to
secure Turkey against Islamists (for a similar argument see Göle 2008; Bilgin 2008b). Securitization
scholars would argue that these issues needed to be de-securitized to enable normal political
contestation. The examples show that there is a dialectical relationship between politicization and
depoliticization. Too much politicization is also problematic for political contestation. My analysis
demonstrated that in a situation of extreme politicization some depoliticization enabled political
contestation. Yet, what is “good” or “bad” politicization, and what is “enough” politicization in a
democracy? It is difficult to distinguish between politicization and securitization or too much
politicization. Based on the analysis, I suggest that too much politicization means that there is only
one true story about an issue that is allowed in public discourse. Every alternative discourse is
considered to be a threat (see Wæver 1998: 80), or is the one of an enemy (see Mouffe 2011: 99),
and is thus oppressed. For example, it was not legitimate to question the headscarf ban after 1997,
up until the AKP challenged it. Turkish democracy meant secularism and this meant a headscarf ban.
Similarly, any demands raised by Kurds could only be about separatism and be illegitimate.

Future research on neo-liberal governmentality and depoliticization should try to distinguish
better between different forms and intensities of politicization and discuss their consequences for
pluralism and political contestation. Here I tried to lay the groundwork for such future research by
using the case of Turkey to show the interplaying dynamics of different forms of politicization and
depoliticization. Despite my theoretical specification of what “depoliticization” means, its
identification in the empirical world remains difficult. I defined depoliticization to mean the removal
of an issue from political contestation or as not bringing it to the arena of political contestation in the first place. Yet, it is unlikely that an issue is completely removed from the political arena. In most cases there are small steps of and indications for depoliticization. Moreover, most CSOs engage in both politicizing and depoliticizing discourses. To weigh both and conclude what is stronger is not an easy task. Instead of drawing a clear conclusion, I decided to show these ambiguities and tensions between politicizing and depoliticizing discourses and evaluate their consequences.

Here, let me discuss again how exactly the ambiguities play out in what I identified as depoliticization triggers of neo-liberal governmentality. As I showed, in small instances neo-liberal rationalities are able to politicize issues.

Firstly, scholars consider social service provision to be part of neo-liberal governmentality and thus depoliticizing (Kurki 2011a). However, such claims are based on the assumption that neo-liberalism follows liberalism. Foucault talked about the development of welfare states in Europe and the US (Foucault et al. 2008). In European welfare states neo-liberal policies privatized social services and made them subject to economic rationalities. This does not apply to a country that is still undergoing democratic consolidation such as Turkey. Instead CSOs that provide services to people in need rather express their dissatisfaction with the situation of human rights. Their services often protect people from violence exercised by the state such as in the case of torture. Moreover, as the analysis showed many NGOs demand from the state to introduce welfare policies. Hence, in such a context providing social services politicizes the issue at hand. It is true that the EU’s liberal conception of the state and civil society does not match Turkey’s reality (Zihnioğlu 2013b; Ketola 2011). Another example is when CSOs provide services in order to gain support for their ideology such as in the case of Hamas (Levitt 2006). The mismatch has some positive effects in terms of politicization. Does that mean that the governmentality lens is not applicable in a “non-western” context? No, I suggest that the contrary is the case because it offers a new perspective. The EU transfers neo-liberal rationalities to third countries although they have a different background. We just cannot assume that this has the same effects in every country. Rather it is especially interesting to see which roles civil society fulfills when the state has never had the responsibility to provide social services. Do they continue offering social support or do they push for the state to provide services?

Secondly, the literature suggests that “empowering” other people is problematic and often constitutes individuals as self-managers that become responsible for their own destiny (Cruikshank 1999). Such an approach covers the political causes of marginalization. Moreover, it imposes a specific vision of emancipation. Here, a specific neo-liberal idea of rights is transferred to people in a different context. The example of Kader’s empowerment projects showed how women resist these
specific ideas. Moreover, individuals are asked to change their behavior, instead of addressing the political level. In some instance, such workshops have the potential to produce a consciousness for the need to politicize for instance women’s rights. It was beyond the scope of the dissertation to assess how the perception of people participating in such projects change. Overall though, empowerment activities redirect attention to the individual while NGOs would have more resources to put an issue onto the political agenda.

Thirdly, the literature on global governance (Jaeger 2007) especially criticized the consensus-making nature of neo-liberal governmentality. Civil society becomes a partner of governance when it takes part in decision-making processes. As a consequence it is not able to effectively exercise control any longer. While most EIDHR funded projects did not emphasize the inclusion of civil society in policy-making, the large-scale programs of the EU focus on “civil society mainstreaming”. The EU intends to include CSOs in decision-making process at all levels. So far, this has only worked to some extent in the area of migration reform. I argued that this had depoliticizing effects as the NGOs expressed little criticism of the government’s policies and did not fulfill a strong monitoring role. Still, in some instances the NGOs achieved a politicization of the topic since the parliament passed the first law on migration partly designed by the NGOs. Including civil society in policy-making processes certainly has some politicizing effects. Yet, considering the broader and more long-term picture, close cooperation runs the risk of co-option and depoliticization.

Last but not least, the technologies of visibility and performance are a constitutive part of the EU’s neo-liberal governmentality (Walters and Haahr 2005). They are dominant in the EU’s civil society programs as well as in the NGOs’ projects. I argued that they enabled politicization in the case of LGBT rights and Kurdish rights by making the organization appear less political. The CSOs increased their legitimacy by providing transparency. Despite this positive effect on politicization, I still want to stress its problematic nature. In all parts of our life, we have to document and evaluate processes and our performance nowadays. How does that change us? How does it change what we do, how we use our time? Without doubt CSOs spend an increasing amount of time on managing projects and documenting their work and thus have less time for writing press statements or developing campaigns that actually aim to put their issue on the political agenda. Moreover, it increasingly produces the impression that only what we can count counts. But we cannot count politicization activities and its effects, especially if they are long-term. Documenting and application writing should not take center stage in the daily work of CSOs.

In sum, I see a danger in neo-liberal governmentality and accordingly assigned every depoliticizing effect I found to the neo-liberal rationalities of EU programs. At the same time, I argued that in liberal governmentality civil society politicizes issues. This raises the question whether liberal
governmentality is the ‘better’ choice in terms of politicization? Indeed, liberal rationalities constitute civil society as a check on the state. In liberal governmentality the state is supposed to protect economic, social and legal rights. Civil society demands that these rights are respected and ensured. There are different kinds of liberalism. Following Foucault’s understanding of liberal governmentality as described in chapter two, the liberal conception of civil society bears some tensions. On the one hand civil society is supposed to care for others; on the other hand it is supposed to act according to economic interests (Foucault et al. 2008: 303). This is where the danger of corruption lies (Scalet and Schmidt 2002: 35). On another note, Foucault suggested that liberal governmentality is “dangerous” too because it intervenes in the private lives of individuals through biopolitics disciplining individuals. (Foucault et al. 2008: 67–70).

More radically, I would argue for an understanding of civil society as suggested by Laclau and Mouffe (2014), going back to Gramsci (1992). Such an understanding assumes that civil society is part of political struggles (as discussed in chapters two and five). It emphasizes the role of civil society to question the hegemonic discourse, to actively politicize discrimination and inequality by discussing its causes and demanding change. Civil society is not less political than political society. From this perspective, workshops and trainings are less useful although monitoring continues to be important. Instead, CSOs should organize debates, publish their positions, demonstrate and protest and put pressure on politics.

Is the EU able to focus its funding on such activities? From the EU perspective, it is difficult to provide grants to organizations for taking part in political debates and organizing demonstrations for two reasons. Firstly, the EU does not want to appear as if it is intervening in a third country politically. This is partly why it uses the human rights discourses and the neo-liberal technologies in the first place. The EU intends to prevent upsetting Turkey’s government. In addition, the EU itself does not want to argue over the content of its democracy promotion. As Kurki (2011a: 351) rightly put it:

“(...)questions of normative, political, and ideological nature are typically avoided in EU democracy promotion in favor of programmatic and technical forms of discussion. The European Union has sought to depoliticize its democracy promotion.”

Secondly, the EU basically just demands from CSOs what it demands of itself. The technologies of visibility and performance are constitutive for EU policies. Documenting works better for a clearly defined time frame and a specific set of activities. Still, the EU is probably able to reduce its requirements, and change its priorities for funding. Politicizing activities should come more into the focus. The EU should allow CSOs the freedom to adjust its activities in the course of the projects.
Overall, this analysis has shown that the EU should consider the CSO’s discursive context more carefully to decide which CSOs to support in which activities. For instance, in the area of women’s rights the struggles intensified again and here CSOs could be supported in projects that involve political society, instead of focusing on the empowerment of individual women. At the same time, the EU should discursively continue to support the civil society’s demands for protecting human rights and improving human rights legislation.

In the end, it should be clear that the EU’s civil society funding is not apolitical and never will be. As Kurki’s (2011a) study as well as my analysis show there are “hidden political logics” (Kurki 2011a: 351). EU civil society programs are based on neo-liberal and liberal rationalities. Yet, through their “depoliticizing” dynamics political decisions appear to be neutral. Neo-liberal rationalities create the illusion that the best and most effective or efficient policy is chosen. In fact, neo-liberal policies are implemented. The depoliticization move covers the neo-liberal nature of governing and appears as being without alternatives. Generally, the EU should reflect on its political position, make it more transparent and allow for more pluralism within its policies. The EU’s civil society funding is political in nature and at least needs to be contested, otherwise it lacks democratic legitimacy. To enable political contestation, I as well as other authors have made the hegemonic (neo-)liberal discourses visible. In the last part of this chapter I will argue that the EU’s neo-liberal policies need to be debated and contested on another level as well. Otherwise, depoliticization might lead to extreme forms of politicization or securitization as we are witnessing in the EU right now.

7.3. Consequences for the state of the EU inside and outside
The EU’s civil society policies are part of a larger EU context. They reflect and shape other EU foreign policies as well as the EU integration project as such. In the following, I will discuss what my analysis means for the EU integration project and for the EU’s role in international relations.

Altogether one can assume “good” intentions of the EU in its democracy promotion policies. The EU tries to support the marginalized groups of society in other countries in claiming their rights. Although it was not the focus of my dissertation, my analysis suggests that the EU does support marginalized parts of society but by no means reaches all. For example, I saw that smaller and less “professionalized” groups have fewer chances to receive funding. Organizations need to have the time to write applications, need to master English, management and budgetary skills. They need to understand the EU’s project language. That the EU demands CSOs to fulfill comprehensive funding conditions and is thus not able to reach all marginalized groups of society has to do with the EU’s
historical roots. As I proposed, the EU is trapped in its own logic of transparency, effectivity and accountability or what I described as the rationalities of neo-liberal governmentality. These rationalities convey an idea of “objective” decision-making which shaped the EU from its beginning and was supposed to prevent ideological battles over EU integration. The idea of rationality was the founding myth of a united and peaceful Europe. Just as this “apolitical” way of governing had some advantages in terms of maintaining peace, depoliticizing a highly politicized issue was also helpful in some case in Turkey. Nevertheless, the EU is transferring its own rationalities to other countries where they have problematic consequences.

Civil society support is not the only foreign policy area in which the EU more or less imposes its own way of doing things. As for instance Merlingen (2007) pointed out, civilian missions also carry norms of empowerment and state-building. Similarly in ‘the Balkans’ EU enlargement policies spread ideas of state-building (Chandler 2007). The EU’s foreign policies do not allow for much pluralism and local ideas in spite of the EU’s rhetorical commitment to equal partnerships. The EU meets resistance and loses legitimacy as a consequence. In the countries of the Arab Spring, the EU partly lost its credibility by supporting autocratic regimes privileging security over democracy. Moreover, in the specific case of Turkey’s enlargement, the EU’s commitment to make the Republic of Cyprus a member of the EU although the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots continues damaged the EU’s credibility. Similarly, the EU could have anticipated Russia’s unease with the EU’s commitment to Eastern Europe and the Ukraine. The conflict between the Ukraine and Russia marked the return of war to the European continent and increasing tensions between Russia and the EU. On a more positive note, the EU’s enlargement policies – especially its Eastern Enlargement – have been a success story. The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the EU’s foreign policy by introducing a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service. This all goes to the show that the EU’s foreign policy has not been insignificant in the past decade as often suggested; it has partly been successful but it has also been damaging, and it has not been consistently subjected to political contestation to allow for a plurality of views. This has damaged the EU’s credibility and image as a ‘normative’ power in international relations.

As suggested before, what the EU does outside is linked to what the EU does inside. Generally speaking, the EU is just doing abroad what it is doing internally. For instance, wherever the EU grants any type funds neo-liberal technologies of visibility and performance are present (Mitchell 2006). For instance, the application and implementation procedures for EU research funds are equally based on neo-liberal rationalities of measuring research and making it effective. To some extent EU policy makers are caught in this EU context that does not allow them to provide funds on any other base.
On a broader scale, the European integration project has been presented as apolitical or neutral. The question of European integration has been depoliticized. In the beginning experts were decision-makers in the European community; then civil society became part of EU committees to find the “best” solutions (Walters and Haahr 2005). As a consequence the EU presented its policy decisions as being without alternatives.

In 1998, Wæver argued that Europe did not construct its identity against an enemy as an “Other”. Instead it secured itself against its own past (Wæver 1998: 90). Today, Europe looks more like a nation-state that secures itself against its outsiders – immigrants, terrorists, authoritarian states. Parts of the European public perceive the EU as an elitist project that does not take their needs into account. In this context, far right parties gained support and entered the European parliament although they disregard the idea of European integration. They blame the political elites and identify anything that they regard as foreign as a threat to Europe’s security. Populist parties now politicize the question of European integration and want to do away with the EU as they perceive pluralism as a threat. Here we observe what can happen when issues have been depoliticized: ironically they become extremely politicized or securitized as the Copenhagen School puts it. Thus, once again the relationship between depoliticization and politicization appears to be dialectical. If political decisions are presented as apolitical, extreme discourses politicize the issue in question by creating enemy discourses.

Similarly, right-wing discourses identify enemies within the EU borders pointing to the south European member states undergoing economic crisis. Although the EU’s policies of austerity worsened the situation of many crisis countries, the EU presented them as being without alternative. However, left parties from the crisis countries have risen and challenged the neo-liberal economic policies of the EU. For instance the Greek left party Syriza won the parliamentary elections in Greece in January 2015. Although the Syriza government has shown itself to be open to compromise, the Greek leaders contest the EU’s economic policies, politicizing the response to the economic crisis.

Nevertheless, the EU is left in a very fragmented state. The rising left parties and the countries mostly affected by the crisis have also lost trust in the EU’s integration project. The depoliticization of economic policies triggered resistance to the EU from different sides. The most concerning consequences is the rise of far right parties especially in Europe’s north. Here and abroad the EU must be careful not to strengthen people’s alienation from its peace project by presenting politics as non-political management. This has already infused disillusion and denial. Instead the EU and its member states should “transform an antagonism into agonism” (Mouffe 2011: 99), thus actively engaging in deconstructing discourses of threat and creating more space for democratic political contestation. This means that EU politicians discuss different policy choices more openly, and
present alternatives. Moreover, it is no news that the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making needs to be increased. In the Eurozone crisis, the political leaders of Germany and France have had a disproportionately large role. Overall, the EU should enable informed discussions over what the EU should be and what its policies should look like.

The Eurozone crisis and the rise of far right parties have also decreased the EU’s attractiveness in the eyes of membership candidates such as Turkey. Moreover, the relations between Turkey and the EU have been shaped by the EU’s way of apolitical governing as I showed in my analysis. In the very last part of my dissertation, I will now discuss the consequences of the (de)politicizing effects analyzed for Turkey’s political struggles, and assess the state and future of Turkey-EU relations.

7.4. Consequences for Turkey’s political struggles and Turkey-EU relations
During my study period Turkey and the EU did not only begin accession negotiations but Turkey moved significantly closer to the EU than it had ever done before. As I discussed in chapter five, Turkey underwent significant democratic reforms such as in regard to minority rights, and the right of association as well as the abolishment of the death penalty in 2005. Moreover, the relations between the Turkish military and the government changed. For the first time, a Muslim-rooted party stayed in government and was not overthrown by the military. The AKP government decreased the role of the military in the National Security Council. In 2005, the EU opened membership negotiations with Turkey. Only shortly after, the German and French governments expressed their skepticism and proposed the concept of ‘privileged partnership’. Although more reforms in the judicial area – for instance allowing for trying military staff in civilian courts – followed, generally the optimistic days are over. Out of 35 negotiation chapters, only the one on Science and Technology was provisionally closed (for an overview see Diez and Mühlenhoff 2014).

In Turkey support for membership declined after 2008 as the discursive reference to the EU lost its power. The EU has not shown much commitment to Turkey’s EU accession either. It still blocks eight negotiation chapters, drew Turkey into an unfair deal with the visa and readmission agreement and has not offered Turkey any inclusion in the negotiations on the free trade agreement with the US. Similarly, the EU’s programs for civil society in Turkey have partly expressed distrust and ignorance of domestic struggles as I discussed in this dissertation. In light of this, the latest Europeanization literature largely argues that the EU’s influence has decreased (see special issue by Alpan and Diez 2014).
In contrast, I argued that the EU’s civil society funding has had effects in Turkey, although they are not simply top-down and not necessarily the ones intended. In most instances the EU’s support for human rights organizations in Turkey depoliticized the NGOs’ way of working as they increasingly used technologies of visibility and performance. However, in the context of intense discursive struggles CSOs gained legitimacy and were able to politicize their issues. Moreover, most CSOs continue to pursue liberal activities of monitoring and taking part in political debates. On the downside, EU funding created some conflicts within CSOs and between them and grassroots activists. Further, CSOs increasingly pursued empowerment projects redirecting responsibility to individuals. In sum, my analysis demonstrated that the EU influenced Turkish CSOs involved in and affected by domestic struggles in various ways.

Moreover, political debates pluralized as well. My analysis of the struggles in Turkey showed that contemporary Turkish politics is characterized by complex discursive struggles. Although at the end of my study period a more conservative Islamic discourse has increasingly dominated political debates – most often expressed by Erdoğan himself – the opposing discourses have become more diverse and hard to pin down – ranging from what one could call left communist, left liberal, liberal Islamic to nationalist Kemalist and liberal Kemalist ones. Moreover, even the conservative Islamic discourse is hard to define as it includes neo-liberal economic ideas common in other European countries as well. Turkey’s government has become increasingly authoritarian again. “Again” because the AKP style of governing resembles the state-centered style of the previous Kemalist governments. Overall, we should be careful to understand Erdoğan’s increasing references to Islamic values as a representation of an Islamic discourse. Instead neo-liberal economic ideas, conservative societal ideas and Kemalist-style state-centric ideas form his discourse.

Still, especially Erdoğan’s discourse polarizes and shows less toleration for other voices. Although Erdoğan moved from being prime minister to president, he still dominates Turkish political debates while Prime Minister Davutoğlu is less visible. The government introduced conservative laws such as the restriction on selling alcohol after ten at night and assigns traditional roles to women. The government reasons for its policies referring to Islamic values. The so-called Gezi protests of 2013 were a reaction to this increasingly conservative government. Triggered by a demonstration against the building of an Ottoman-style shopping mall on the site of a park with trees in the center of Istanbul, the protests developed into a big street movement against the government’s conservative policies as well as the massive use of violence against protesters. The movement brought the diversity of discourses within Turkish society to the streets. For the first time Kemalists, Marxist Muslims and left liberals came together and got into contact with each other. While many people active for CSOs were also on the streets, most organizations – with the exception of LGBT
organizations – did not officially support the protests but provided medical and moral support to demonstrators by opening their offices and writing reports on human rights violations. Although the initial euphoria of the Gezi park days has largely turned into frustration, the events have changed Turkish society enabling interaction and solidarity between different discourses.

At the same time, the EU praised Turkey’s civil society and continued to fund human rights CSOs and made some small changes to its policies (such as by including support for activists). The question emerges whether EU civil society support has contributed to the emergence of the social movement or whether it has rather prevented it by taming civil society? Street protests strongly politicize an issue. It is of course a question of its (de)politicizing effects whether the EU’s funding contributed to the emergence of the protests. It is clear that the EU did not directly fund any of the protests. It is further clear that the CSOs did not join the demonstrations as CSOs but often as individuals that work or are active for NGOs. However based on my analysis, I conclude that the EU’s funding did both- it contributed to civil society movement and it tamed it at the same time. On the one hand, the EU’s support at least partly increased the legitimacy and self-confidence of Turkey’s civil society. For instance, LGBT groups especially profited from the EU’s funding as well as from the Gezi protests in which they became visible for other parts of society. In the instances in which EU civil society funding made politicization possible – even through depoliticization – it was supportive for Turkey’s civil society. Moreover, the overall EU accession protests strengthened the voices that are in favor of human rights in Turkey.

On the other hand, where EU funding depoliticized human rights and civil society work, it tamed any form of protest. Except for the Sivil Düşün funds, EU grants did not encourage any form of political protests or demonstrations. Instead, civil society work is constituted as projects. I showed that the EIDHR has given funds for politicizing activities but it would refrain from financially contributing to anti-government protests. Moreover, the EU’s funding has supported projects focusing more on workshops and less conflictual awareness-raising. In contrast to LGBT groups, women’s rights and refugee rights were less visible during the protests. In addition, although many people working for CSOs were personally involved in the protests, the impact on their work is likely to stay rather marginal. They were not able to utilize the protests for their political claims.

Moreover, it would be wrong to assign every change in Turkey to the EU. Instead the Gezi protests were mostly about the domestic political struggle between a dominant conservative, neo-liberal and Muslim discourse and different alternative discourses agreeing on their opposition against the neo-liberal and increasingly authoritarian policies of the government. It was not organizations but individuals and different groups of society that took the streets. CSOs played a rather marginal role although they provided shelter, medical support and food. It was mostly young people in
Turkey’s urban centers, but not only. In any case, it was an experience of incredible solidarity for many protestors which provided hope for change. Two years later many of them are frustrated because the policemen who brutally crushed down the protest were not punished and because the AKP continues to be popular despite a corruption scandal in December 2013 and internal quarrels between Erdoğan and other members of the party. The government’s authoritarian policies were also criticized by the EU’s progress reports for Turkey in 2013 and 2014 (European Commission 2013b, 2014). The Commission criticized the government’s reactions to the protests in 2013 (European Commission 2013b: 5), the restrictions on freedom of speech such as the ban of Youtube as well as the increase of governmental control of the judiciary after the corruption scandal (European Commission 2014: 2).

Turkey has difficult times ahead. The trials against the policemen responsible for killing Gezi protestors as well as the cases against demonstrators (Hürriyet Daily News 2015a) have already intensified the struggles. In Mach 2015, members of the far left Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front (DHKP/C) took a prosecutor dealing with the case of a policeman killing a Gezi protestor hostage. In the end the captors and the prosecutor died. In April 2015 Turkey’s government banned Facebook, Twitter and Youtube until they had deleted pictures of the killed prosecutor (Hürriyet Daily News 2015b). Moreover, the war on Turkey’s borders poses a challenge to Turkey’s peace process with the Kurds and the government’s foreign policy doctrine of zero-problems (Pope 2014).

In all these areas, the EU should not only rely on civil society but also engage Turkey’s government. While many discourses in Turkey are also critical of the EU, the crackdown on the Gezi protestors triggered the hope that Turkish EU accession would prevent that Turkey’s political system becomes more authoritarian. Indeed support for Turkey’s EU accession has risen again (Pierini and Ülgen 2014). In 2013 the EU even opened a new negotiation chapter – on regional policy and coordination of structural instruments. At the end of 2014 the new Turkish government expressed its commitment to the EU accession process (see Pierini and Ülgen 2014).

In any case, Turkey’s relations with the EU have left Turkey, its political and civil society changed. The AKP government does not fear a military crackdown any longer. Moreover, Turkish CSOs increased their legitimacy on the public stage coming from a strongly marginalized position. Further, networks developed and civil society works differently than before, partly more depoliticized and partly more engaged in public debates, as I showed. Most NGOs are more self-confident to express their demands. In the future, the EU should further support the politicizing activities of the CSOs and try to reduce its documentation and transparency requirements. Foremost it should politicize its democracy promotion policies and discuss its underlying rationalities and their possible consequences in domestic contexts.
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