Outsourcing in Campaign Management

An economic approach to campaigning

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Abstract

This study investigates the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns. It is hypothesized that the extent of outsourcing is negatively related to the extent of political transaction costs and loss of control over the campaign organization if a process is given to external partners. Literature on campaigning has focused almost exclusively on campaign-voter communications. To date, no systematic investigation has considered internal campaign processes. This study closes that gap by combining aspects from the field of political science with business administration. An in-depth qualitative study was conducted, using data from 15 guided interviews with experts from political parties and agencies.

The study first sheds light on relevant aspects of political theory, indicating relevant developments in the field as well as the relevance of campaigns for election outcomes, before analyzing the environment in which campaigns are organized, in particular demographic changes and intra-campaign management challenges. This is joined by a business perspective that applies outsourcing practices in the private economy to outsourcing in political campaigns.

Findings show that while political transaction costs and loss of control only determine the extent of outsourcing, a number of economic factors (scarcity of human resources, seasonal changes in demand, financial resources) as well as organizational factors (age of organization, organizational level, need for external perspective) have an impact on the general openness of campaign organization to outsource specific processes. Contrary to expectations, it became clear that in principle there is no hesitation on the side of parties to give campaign-related processes over to external partners. Findings illustrate that while campaign organizations are hesitant to outsource processes related to strategy development and online campaigning, they are in favor of outsourcing technical and production services. The study concludes that parties generally make effective outsourcing decisions, but should show more courage to outsource strategy-related issues and creative thinking, but should limit themselves to few external partners.
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III. Preface

Everyone who has embarked on the journey to write a doctoral thesis knows the extent of this challenge as well as the amount of time and support needed to complete such a project. Writing this thesis was both, a challenge and an enriching experience. Only with the emotional and practical support of those who surrounded me was it possible to master times of crisis and maintain the necessary tension. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to give thanks for all the support I have experienced over the last years.

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My special thanks go to my wife and children. With incredible patience and necessary positive pressure, they supported me over the last six years and allowed me to manage the balancing act of being a father, coping with the challenges of a full-time job and writing this dissertation. Their support made it possible to bring this project to a successful end.
1. **Introduction**

Campaigning is one of the core competencies of any political party. In Germany, at least every four years on the federal and every five years on the Länder (state) level, parties are faced with elections that need to be accompanied by well-planned campaigns. Planning and managing a campaign is a management task par excellence. The largest part of scientific campaign research, however, was conducted in the field of campaign-voter communications. There is a significantly smaller amount of scientific work that deals with intra-campaign phenomena. Those that are available are mostly published by practitioners, such as Peter Radunski, Matthias Machnig or Frank Stauss who share best practices rather than results of scientific research.

Outsourcing is a phenomenon that has been present in the business sphere for many decades. The term ‘outsourcing’ describes the assignment of previously internally performed tasks to external partners. Standing for the terminus ‘outside resource using’, it is the result of a make-or-buy decision in favor of the option ‘buy’. The primary goal of outsourcing is cost reduction and the shift of fixed costs to variable costs. Due to specialization of external partners, service providers are often able to perform required services less expensively and more efficiently than the organization that outsources. Originating in the automotive industry, outsourcing is commonly performed in the IT-segment areas that do not belong to the core competence of the company such as security or office supplies. It is supposed to give the outsourcing company more flexibility. Mostly a phenomenon of the private sector, outsourcing has only slowly developed in the public sector, primarily in the context of privatization of formerly publicly owned service providers.

There is a large spectrum of research available in business disciplines that covers outsourcing decisions in various fields, particularly in IT. However, outsourcing in a political context, namely in campaign management has hardly been a subject for scholars in the past.

This dissertation attempts to close this research gap. By introducing a model that identifies the determinants for the extent of outsourcing, it sheds light on intra-campaign management. It approaches the field from a business perspective, regarding campaigning as a management discipline and applying models known from management studies to this
niche of political science research. Being a hybrid subject of business and political science, this study will put a new perspective on campaign management.

In particular, this dissertation attempts to find the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns. Therefore, the thesis statement “the more key players can maintain control over a campaign organization and the lower political transaction costs are, the larger the extent of outsourcing” will be tested, implying that those are the two main criteria for the outsourcing decision.

Following a literature analysis that gives an overview of the current state of research, this dissertation will in chapter 2 focus on political theory, providing necessary definitions, analyzing the relevance of campaigns for the election outcome and exploring current trends in campaigning.

In chapter 3, attention is then brought to campaign management itself. The environment in which contemporary campaigns act is elaborated as well as the organizational structures of modern campaigns.

Chapter 4 will introduce the business perspective to outsourcing and outline the instrument of outsourcing in the private economy, including its various forms, necessary decision-making criteria, the make-or-buy decision as well as which processes are subject to outsourcing and what the relevant risks exist.

Being the ‘heart’ of this study, chapter 5 analyzes the current state of outsourcing in modern campaigns. It explores motives to give processes to external service providers in the first place, defines the most important factors for determining the extent of outsourcing and sheds light on motivation of service providers to be engaged in campaigns.

Chapter 6 looks at outsourcing in campaigns from a process-based perspective. After presenting general findings, it selects those processes that appeared to be the most valuable for further exploration. It also aligns them to the previously introduced model.

The study concludes with a set of recommendations for increased productivity through optimized usage of external resources. These are based on the opinions expressed by the experts during the qualitative interviews.
The geographic population under study is the Federal Republic of Germany, attempting to create a counterbalance to available campaign management literature with clear focus on the Anglo-Saxon world.

1.1. Research Questions & Hypotheses

Private business entities often give large numbers of processes to external service providers. In contrast, political parties in Germany seem to act more conservatively when it comes to make-or-buy decisions in their campaigns. They seem to be hesitant to outsource processes, particularly when they are strategy-related. The factors that lead to such decisions are unclear. Are they products of political motivation or purely economic considerations? To answer this the main question of this dissertation is:

Q_m: What are the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns?

This research question is based on a set of assumptions:

a. If a campaign’s capacity to provide a certain service is not available, parties have the choice between outsourcing the process and building internal capacities.

b. If internal capacities are available, parties hesitate to outsource the process.

c. Parties are more willing to pay financial rather than political costs.

Basic Assumption c) implies that, although financial costs play a significant role for political parties, negative effects on the parties, particularly on responsible campaign management stemming from a loss in election results are higher than those stemming from an exceeded budget are. In other words: losing 3% in an election result might be costlier than exceeding the campaign budget by 3%.

The presumption of this dissertation is that main determinants for political parties are control over the process and minimized political transaction costs. This will be tested using the following hypothesis:

H_m: The more control key players can maintain over the campaign organization and the lower political transaction costs are, the larger the extent of outsourcing.
Based on \( H_m \) the model shown in graph 1.1 differentiates between four different possible levels of outsourcing: No outsourcing (make-or-buy decision is answered with ‘make’); internal outsourcing (the process is given to a service provider that is part of the same organization); hybrid outsourcing (the process is given to an external service provider that has strong ties to the organization) and external outsourcing. The model claims that there is a hierarchy in types of outsourcing based on the extent of willingness to accept a loss of control and/or political transaction costs by key players. Key players are those individuals assigned to be responsible for the concept and running of the campaign. They are differentiated from other party members by the fact that they are also the ones held accountable for campaign success or failure. The model seeks to locate particular campaign processes, taking into account that a campaign consists of a set of single business processes. Hence, the respective extent of outsourcing may differ.

In order to answer the main research question and to test the main hypothesis of the study, a set of assisting research questions and hypotheses need to be determined. With political transaction costs and control thought to be decisive factors, assisting research question 1 focuses on the first:

\[ Q_1: \] What factors contribute to the extent of political transaction costs?

The hypothesis that was created to answer \( Q_1 \) claims that key players attempt to internalize successes and externalize failures in order to gain benefits for their political careers from a
successful campaign, and alternatively save their political careers in case of a failed campaign:

H₁: The more key players are able to internalize successes and externalize failures, the lower potential political transaction costs are.

Once factors that lead to the extent of political transaction costs are identified, it is sensible to determine influencing factors relevant to the extent of control over a campaign. Therefore, the second assisting research question is:

Q₂: What factors contribute to the extent of possible control over the campaign organization?

As with the previous one, this assisting question is answered by formulating a hypothesis that is tested. The presumption is that the most important factors that have an impact on the level of control are the complexity of processes (the more complex a process provided by an external service provider is, the more difficult it gets to remotely control the provider), the level of standardization (the more standardized the process, the clearer the benchmarks for quality control are), and the strategic importance of the process (the larger the strategic importance is, the closer key actors want to keep control).

H₂: Only if a process is low in complexity, can be standardized and has a negligible strategic importance, are key actors able to maintain control over the campaign organization.

Knowing under what circumstances campaign management chooses to outsource, the question arises as to what other intra-organizational influencing factors are relevant for the make-or-buy decision? In particular, age of an organization, organizational level (the extent to which a party is organized on the national, regional and local level), recent changes in party leadership and party size could be factors of interest. Therefore, the third supporting question is:

Q₃: How strong is the influence of factors such as organizational level, establishment, change of leaders and party size on the willingness to use external resources?

This list of potential factors is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it is explored during expert interviews whether there are additional factors that need to be added.
As mentioned above, it seems that there is a high degree of hesitation when it comes to outsourcing certain processes. Whether this statement proves to be correct can only be tested, if there are processes that fulfill all prerequisites to be outsourced but a party still decides in favor of in-house production. This will be explored with the fourth assisting research question:

Q₄: Are there cases where a process meets all requirements to be outsourced, but a party chooses not to? If so, why does this occur?

Once present usage of outsourcing in campaign management is tested and analyzed, focus will be brought to practical implications. Naturally, the question arises whether outsourcing decisions made by parties are sensible and logical in regards to efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, the last assisting research question will attempt to find out if there are processes presently outsourced that should instead stay in-house and respectively, if there are processes provided by internal resources that should rather be given to external providers.

Q₅: What kind of processes should be outsourced?

Recommendations made in chapter 7 are purely based on experiences of the selected experts, which were expressed during the interviews.

By answering the above-given research questions, this work attempts to give an extensive inside view of outsourcing in campaign management, a concept that has its roots in the economic sphere. It will attempt to shed light on outsourcing decisions in the political context and give valuable recommendations for the future.

1.2. State of research

For many years, the main focus of research connected to campaigning was the interaction between campaigns and voters. Particularly, marketing methods and communications strategies were analyzed. However, “recent years have witnessed a growing academic interest in campaign operations”¹.

For the longest time, “scholars had little reason to study campaign strategy, because there was not much to suggest that campaign activities had a strong effect on electoral

¹ Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5
outcome."² In recent years, however, increasing research has been performed on how campaigns influence election outcome. Chapter 2.3 will further elaborate on this debate. Paul F. Lazarsfeld’s study of the 1940 presidential elections in the United States marked the beginning of the research tradition of campaign management. During the 20th century, media played an increasingly important role for election campaigns. While at the beginning of the century radio played the most important role, television became popular after World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first candidate who used television advertising for his campaign.

In Germany, political identification with parties used to be very high. For large parts of the electorate, the voting question had been pre-answered according to the respective social environment. However, “due to declining ideological bond between citizens and parties and the growing number of late-deciding voters, relevance of campaign management still has been continuously increasing in Germany.”³ Nevertheless, campaign management had not been the focus of election research in Germany. Rather, communication between campaigns and voters as well as behavior of the voter had been the major point of interest. For the longest time, management of campaigns has been only a niche of research while analyzing campaign strategies was hardly tackled. “When speaking of election research, mostly the analysis of voter behavior from a political point of view is meant.”⁴ In Germany, it took until the 1960s for a branch of research to develop that focused on intra-campaign management. A possible cause could be that research of campaign management combines several disciplines: political science, sociology, communication research and sometimes even psychology. In post-war Germany, those branches had to be reorganized and boundaries between the disciplines had to be determined.

Nevertheless, within the field of political communications, elections and election campaigns now began to be subject to intensive research.⁵ Today, particularly empirical

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² Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5
³ Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder “Yes, We Gähn!”, 19 [Original wording: “In Deutschland gewinnt die Wahlkampfforschung durch die abnehmende ideologische Bindung der Bürger an die Parteien und die zunehmende Zahl von spät entscheidenden Wählern kontinuierlich an Bedeutung.”]
⁴ Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder “Yes, We Gähn!”, 18 [Original wording: “Wenn von Wahlforschung die Rede ist, sind meistens politikwissenschaftliche Betrachtungen gemeint, die sich der Analyse des Wahlverhaltens widmen]
⁵ Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 25
election research can be considered one of the best developed branches of political science research. One of the causes for this is the international attention given to this particular field.

However, this is not the case with research dealing with internal campaign management. Only since the turn of the century has professionalization of campaigns and campaign management increasingly become the center of attention. However, “it is still not possible to draw conclusions on how ‘perfect’ campaigns are organized.”6 This underlines the lack of research in the field of campaign management in Germany. While many books and articles on a theoretical level were published in campaign communication research, the majority of books still stem from practitioners such as Peter Radunski, Mathias Machning or Frank Stauss.

### 1.3. Research Design

The following section will outline the research design that was chosen for this piece of work. Taking into consideration the small amount of research that has been performed in the field of campaign management and the close ties between theory and practice, it is logical to consider it as a field of practitioners. Therefore, to stay consistent, practitioners play the central role in the research design of this piece of work. The core research will be a set of expert interviews, which follow a comprehensive literature analysis of the current research available.

#### 1.3.1. Qualitative methodology

The decision to use qualitative research methods was heavily influenced by the outside conditions of the field. As stated earlier, there is not much research available in the context of campaign organizations. Since this requires extensive exploratory work, it seemed most sensible to apply qualitative methodology allowing an in-depth view on the subject. Further, since there are only a limited number of campaign managers in Germany, quantitative methods were not appropriate. Rather, this dissertation aims to gain inside views of the campaign organization. “Theories about the functionality of organizations and

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6 Kellermann von Schele, *Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?*, 15 [Original wording: "Es kann keine präzisen Aussagen geben hinsichtlich der 'perfekten' Wahlkampfführung"]
institutions are primarily based on qualitative descriptions". It is not only the aim to use the collected data to illustrate examples, but also to shed light on a set of hypotheses. Therefore, collected data “should be more than simple illustrations, but certainly less than a final proof. It is probable there are different levels and steps in confirming theories by qualitative data.”

The aim of this thesis is to explain observed phenomena in the field and make practical recommendations to campaign practitioners. Therefore, empirical data is of significant importance. As Mayer states, “qualitative research underlines the value of empiricism for the generation of hypotheses and the development of theories and emphasizes that hypotheses gained inductively from reality have a higher degree of reality and a higher probability of affirmation than other forms of hypotheses generation.” Hence, qualitative research suggests that theories need to be drawn from empirical studies in order to reflect reality in an appropriate manner.

In order to ensure reliability of the data, secondary data received from the literature analysis was double-checked during the expert interviews, which marked the second step of the research design.

1.3.2. Literature Analysis

During the literature analysis, the current state of research in the fields of campaigning and outsourcing was analysed. It laid the foundation for chapters 2, 3 and 4. Literature was drawn from both German and Anglo-Saxon sources. Since campaigns in Germany differ very much from political campaigns in the United States, American literature was treated

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7 Barton and Lazarsfeld, ‘Das Verhältnis von theoretischer und empirischer Analyse im Rahmen qualitativer Sozialforschung’, 82 [Original wording: „Theorien über die Funktionsweise von Organisationen und Institutionen basieren im Wesentlichen auf qualitativen Beschreibungen.”]


9 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 24–5 [Original wording: „Die qualitative Forschung betont jedoch den Wert der Empirie für die Hypothesengenese sowie die Theorieentwicklung und hebt hervor, dass die induktiv in der Realität gewonnenen Hypothesen auch in der Generalisierung - durch Verifikation - einen höheren Realitätsgrad und eine bessere Bewährungswahrscheinlichkeit haben als andere Formen der Hypothesengenerierung.”]
with great caution. Only elements that are relevant for German election campaigns are taken into consideration.

This dissertation combines two different fields of research: political science and business. In both fields, literature from distinguished researchers as well as practitioners is examined in order to receive a comprehensive and practical overview over current trends and assumptions in the fields under study.

1.3.3. Expert interviews

As mentioned above, qualitative methodology seemed to be most sensible for the empirical part of this study. “Interviews are suitable for exploration, measurement and interpretation of issues. They are relatively flexible and modifiable scientific instruments, which can be implemented in a variety of forms”\(^\text{10}\). Expert interviews represent the core of this dissertation. In the past, there have been discussions on the reliability of expert interviews. However, these conclusions were not caused by a general refusal of the methodology, but rather by the “fact that expert interviews often do not correspond to the common qualitative demands for openness and non-manipulation.”\(^\text{11}\) The reliability of data received from expert interviews therefore heavily depends on the absence of deficits in the research design.

While it is certainly possible to conduct purely qualitative interviews, it seemed more sensible for the purpose of this dissertation to conduct semi-structured interviews that are, to some extent, a hybrid form between qualitative and quantitative methods. They combine the advantages of a qualitative interview in gaining a more intensive inside view on processes with the higher level or reliability of quantitative methods. Meuser and Nagel underline that “unlike other forms of open interviews, expert interviews do not focus on the person as the object of the analysis, i.e. the person with all its orientations and attitudes

\(^{10}\) Schmid, ‘Expertenbefragung und Informationsgespräch in der Parteienforschung: Wie föderalistisch ist die CDU?’, 309

[Original wording: “Interviews eignen sich zur Entdeckung, Messung und Interpretation von Sachverhalten. Sie sind relativ flexible und modifizierbare Forschungsinstrumente, die sich in verschiedenen Formen durchführen lassen.”]

\(^{11}\) Bogner and Menz, ‘Expertenwissen und Forschungspraxis: die modernisierungstheoretische und die methodische Debatte um die Experten’, 20 [Original wording: “Tatsache, dass Experteninterviews den üblichen ‘qualitativten’ Anforderungen nach Offenheit und Nicht-Beeinflussung des Interviewpartners häufig nicht entsprechen”]
in the context of the individual and collective way of live.”

Rather, they focus on the organization process in which the interviewee is one of several actors.

In order to ensure the reliability of interview outcomes, a comprehensive preparation was required. “Expert interviews are not just informative talks that are methodologically based on an arbitrary way to gather knowledge and opinions. Just like any other sampling technique they require an accurate justification and theoretic foundation.”

According to Bogner and Menz, the expert is in the possession of three different kinds of knowledge: Technical knowledge on operations and competences, procedural knowledge on routines and interactions and interpretive knowledge. The interviews conducted for this dissertation primarily focuses on the latter form. “Theory-generating expert interviews aim at gaining interpretive knowledge, i.e. subjective relevancies, rules, points of view and interpretation of the expert that draw the picture of expert knowledge being a heterogenic conglomerate. With the reconstruction of this interpretative knowledge one […] enters the field of ideas and ideologies; of fragmented, inconsistent attempts of interpretation and explanatory patterns.” Therefore, the goal of the interviews was not only to learn about processes within the campaign organization, but also to receive opinions and perceptions of involved actors. This knowledge can then be compared to data received from the secondary literature analysis and conclusions drawn in order to shed light on the correctness of the proposed hypotheses.


14 Bogner and Menz, ‘Das thoriegenerierende Experteninterview’, 43

Guided interviews

In order to improve reliability and to be able to make comparisons for the purpose of generalization, it seemed sensible to use guided interviews as a semi-structured interview technique for this study. “This standardization eases the comparableness of several interviews. Material from many interviews can be referred to questions in the guidelines and analysed much more easily. Due to the larger number of cases, results may easier be generalized.” 16 Merton and Kendall add that this is the fact because “one can affirm that the same points of contact are touched and that the data is in correlation to the same hypotheses.”

In conducting guided interviews, a guideline with open questions is constructed prior to the interviews. There were no answering options; experts were able to answer freely without restriction. While order of the questions was not decisive for success of the interview, the guideline ensures that essential aspects of the research question are addressed during the interview.

In the context of campaign management, the goal of the interviews was further to reconstruct everyday knowledge of campaign managers. Therefore, a general openness for anecdotes etc. was required while, for the purpose of comparison, a certain structure was indispensable. “To a certain extent, a guideline standardizes the structure in regards to the content of the narrative and eases its analysis. It further allows tracing subtopics across all interviews.”18 Further, guided interviews allow experts to elaborate on their perceptions and opinions while, at the same time, they significantly reduce the possibility that interviews drift to topics that are irrelevant for the research. It acknowledges both, the expertise of the interviewee and the limited interest of the researcher.19

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16 Mayring, *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung*, 70 [Original wording: “diese Standardisierung erleichtert die Vergleichbarkeit mehrerer Interviews. Das Material aus vielen Gesprächen kann auf die jeweiligen Leitfadenfragen bezogen werden und so sehr leicht ausgewertet werden. Und durch die größeren Fallzahlen lassen sich die Ergebnisse viel leichter verallgemeinern.”]

17 Merton and Kendall, ‘Das fokussierte Interview’, 184 [Original wording: “da man sich vergewissern kann, dass die gleichen Bezugspunkte berührt werden und dass die Daten in einem Zusammenhang zu den gleichen Hypothesen stehen.”]


19 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 77
put into the development of interview guidelines eliminates the possibility that the researcher presents himself as an incompetent dialogue partner.”

The core of the guidelines was the extent of outsourcing used in election campaigns. This is coherent with Mayring’s proposition that interviews focused on a particular problem are particularly appropriate in theory-driven research with specific questions. As already mentioned, the intent during the construction of the guidelines was to gain information on both, factual knowledge as well as interpretative knowledge (with a focus on the latter). This was to be taken into consideration during the construction process. For factual information, guidelines could be more structured and questions could be focused directly on the desired information. When receiving interpretative knowledge, guidelines needed to be “as open and flexible – including generation of monologues – as possible, and as structured as necessary due to the interest of the research.”

Chosen experts

Expert interviews are a specific form of guided interviews. “The respondent is primarily a source of information; therefore the organizational and institutional context is of interest and not the personality of the interviewed person.” Politicians often consider themselves as representatives of their parties. Therefore, the choice of experts was crucial for the value of the interviews. Since expert interviews “usually make use of those persons who have gained reputation in the current subject literature”, experts approached were either researchers with good reputation in their field or current and former campaign managers who have played an active role in campaign management on the federal level. According to Mayer’s definition, individuals with clear and recallable knowledge in a specified field

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21 Mayring, *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung*, 70


25 Mayer, *Interview und schriftliche Befragung*, 41
were considered experts. This is in line with Schmid’s proposal to make use of the elite theory for expert selection. The most appropriate approach in this case is the so-called ‘decision-technique’. Therefore, experts were chosen that are regarded as decision makers with actual influence on the campaign organizations. Rather than just being nonbinding assumptions, their views are based on valid arguments, claims and judgements. While each respondent was an expert in his or her specific case, interviews were designed in a way that allowed for gaining knowledge relevant to other cases. Hence, those cases in which respondents were involved could be used as examples in the wider context of a broader generalization.

When selecting individuals for expert interviews a set of five criteria was selected within which each having a high degree of relevance for management:

a. Organizational level
b. Establishment
c. Proximity to the economy
d. Frequency of changes in party leadership
e. Party size

For each criterion, one case was required and sufficient for interview selections. In each case, at least one expert from the party side and one from a relevant service provider needed to be selected to ensure that the perspectives of both sides were represented and the bias of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>criterion</th>
<th>level</th>
<th>party</th>
<th>experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>organizational level</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>Peter Radunski, Stefan Hennewig, Axel Wallrafenstein, Lutz Meyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Green party</td>
<td>Steffi Lemke, Hans-Hermann Langguth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>establishment</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Kajo Wasserhövel, Frank Stauss, Ralf Tils, Karsten Göbel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Pirate party</td>
<td>Salomon Reyes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proximity to economy</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Katja Suding, Armin Reins</td>
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<td></td>
<td>low</td>
<td>theLeft</td>
<td>Matthias Höhn, Volker Ludwig</td>
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<tr>
<td>frequency of changes in party leadership</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Katja Suding, Armin Reins</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low</td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>Peter Radunski, Stefan Hennewig, Axel Wallrafenstein, Lutz Meyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party size</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>SPD, CDU/CSU</td>
<td>Kajo Wasserhövel, Frank Stauss, Ralf Tils, Karsten Göbel, Peter Radunski, Stefan Hennewig, Axel Wallrafenstein, Lutz Meyer</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Small</td>
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<td>Katja Suding, Armin Reins</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Green party</td>
<td>Steffi Lemke, Hans Hermann-Langguth</td>
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<td>theLeft</td>
<td>Matthias Höhn, Volker Ludwig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other career</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kajo Wasserhövel, Axel Wallrafenstein</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 1.2: Selection of experts

26 See: Schmid, ‘Expertenbefragung und Informationsgespräch in der Parteienforschung: Wie föderalistisch ist die CDU?"
selective perception was prevented. One exception was made to this principle: Since interviews showed that the Pirate Party did not employ external resources, only an expert from the side of the party was interviewed. In addition, campaign experts were selected who have accompanied a particularly high number of campaigns over a longer period of time and therefore have notable expertise in the field. In order to study the phenomenon of political transaction costs, another group of experts was added that included individuals who did not have a great political career after they had managed a campaign, but who were successful in other business disciplines. According to the concept of theoretic sampling, the sample was gradually enlarged on the basis of the respective knowledge during the research process. On several occasions, respondents mentioned names of other potential interviewees and served as a door opener. As shown in graph 1.2, some cases fit several criteria. This was taken into account during the process of analysis.

In addition, an interview was conducted with Sonja Bach-Meiers, head of the Berlin-branch of Union Betriebs-GmbH. Since the purpose of this interview was solely to gain more information about internal processes of this organization, it was not conducted using interview guidelines and not transcribed, but solely recorded.

**Interview Design**

The interview process was designed in accordance to the propositions made by Mayring. He proposed a 5-step process as indicated in graph 1.3. During the first phase, the research problem was analysed and research questions and hypotheses were formulated. In the second phase, interview guidelines were constructed as described below. In a pilot phase, the interview guidelines were tested on respondents who had a basic knowledge on campaign management, but did not belong to the basic population of campaign managers in Germany. After the interviews were conducted, the recorded interviews were transcribed into writing.

**Construction of interview guidelines**

Prior to the construction of guidelines, it was decided to use open guidelines for this research. This seemed to be the “technically neatest solution to the question on how to

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27 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 39
28 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 71
perform the data collection.”

Therefore, as the name suggests, guidelines did not serve as a strict order of questions. Rather, they served as structure for the interviews. While it was the goal to respect the order of the questions during the interview, this was not obligatory if answers of the respondents brought added value in other relevant fields.

The first step of the construction of interview guidelines consisted of the collection of questions. All questions related to the field under study were gathered. The declared goal was to receive a catalogue of as many questions as possible. While the respective importance of each question was neglected, it was attempted to approach the field with questions from all different angles and perspectives. Eighty-three questions were collected, fulfilling the goal of receiving a minimum of fifty questions for the initial catalogue. Questions were structured into categories.

Questions were tested to see if each answer was already known from the literature analysis, if they produced new knowledge and if it met certain requirements. Since they usually lead to very short answers, all factual questions, except for those needed with regards to desired case studies, were eliminated. Their content was verified to see if it could be integrated into other questions or if they could be answered with a short questionnaire prior to the interview, and whether the questions were appropriate to the knowledge of the respondents. Further, the openness of the questions was verified. The goal of the interviews was not to implicitly or explicitly communicate assumptions of the researcher. Rather, questions were formulated in a way that allowed the respondents to come up with entirely new interdependencies, observations, assumptions and judgements. Also, it ensured that all of the research questions described

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in chapter 1.1 were approached. Thus, the construction of the interview guidelines was “based on theoretic assumptions of parameters, problems or impacts that resulted from already available information.”\(^{30}\) Due to this revision, the list of questions was radically reduced to a total of thirty seven.

In the next step, the remaining questions were sorted according to content with regards to the defined research questions. This resulted in five different clusters of questions. A few questions that were important, but not allocable remained on their own and received sensible spots at the end of the interview guidelines.

In the last step, it was attempted to find simple introductory questions that were as open as possible to give the respondent room for their narratives. The previously collected questions were subsumed under that opening question. In a four-column chart, the respective opening question was marked down in the left column. In the second column, key aspects of the remaining questions were recorded to serve as memos and as checklist for possible queries. The interviewer only mentioned them if the respondent did not address them on his/her own. The third column served for specific questions that were obligatory for each respondent in a pre-defined wording. In the last column, steering questions void of content were noted that allowed the interviewer to motivate the respondents to give further information in the case of short answers. The guidelines can be found in the appendix.

_Pilot phase_

Before the actual interviews were conducted, interview guidelines were tested in pre-tests during a pilot phase. As Mayer suggested, during a pilot phase “problematic, too complex or circuitous wording can be identified and improved.”\(^{31}\) As mentioned above, respondents during the pilot phase were individuals that possessed certain knowledge on campaign management but did not belong to the basic population of campaign managers. Testing the interview guidelines was only one factor of the pilot phase. Pre-tests “also serve to train

\(^{30}\) Froschauer and Lueger, ‘ExpertInnengespräch in der interpretativen Organisationsforschung’ [Original wording: “basiert auf theoretischen Annahmen über Einflussfaktoren, Problembereiche oder Wirkungen, die sich aus bereits vorliegenden Informationen ergeben”]

\(^{31}\) Mayer, _Interview und schriftliche Befragung_, 45 [Original wording: “Problematische, zu komplexe oder unverständliche Formulierungen können dabei erkannt und verbessert werden.”]
the interviewer”. The interviewer could therefore use them to test question techniques and to become familiar with the interview situation and work with interview guidelines.

**Interviews**

Interviews were held in calm environments where respondents were neither distracted by other individuals nor had to worry that the discreetness of their answers was not respected. Before each interview, the interviewer informed the respondent that a visible Dictaphone recorded the interviews. The interviews were structured according to the guidelines. Nevertheless, it was possible that some respondents did not mention every aspect of research questions. The extent depended on the accuracy of the interviewees’ answers. As Mayring proposed, “the interview let the respondent to contribute as openly as possible to get as close to an open conversation as possible. However, it is focused on a particular problem, which is introduced by the interviewer and repeatedly revisited.”

Also, each respondent was informed about the possibility of answering anonymously in order to guarantee a productive atmosphere. However, no respondent made use of this option.

**1.3.4. Computer-assisted analysis**

The goal of the analysis of the interviews was to find common denominators as well as explore the most significant differences in the respondents’ statements. Thus, it seemed to

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33 Mayring, *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung*, 67 [Original wording: “Das Interview lässt den Befragten möglichst frei zu Wort kommen, um einem offenen Gespräch nahe zu kommen. Es ist aber zentriert auf eine bestimmte Problemstellung, die der Interviewer einführt, auf die er immer wieder zurückkommt.”]
be sensible to analyse the interviews with a comprehensive content analysis. As outlined in graph 1.4, the particular strength of content analyses is their clear and strict methodological approach. Mayring points out that the “goal of the structured qualitative content analysis is to filter out a particular structure from the material. These may be aspects in regards to form, content or particular types.”\(^{34}\) The analytic process consisted of six steps starting at phrasing the research question. In all steps, only wording of respondents was analysed. Non-verbal expressions were not subject to interpretation since they are too subjective. Meuser and Nagel add that “the goal is to identify supra-individually common elements by comparing texts to those of other experts, and to formulate representative statements on commonly shared knowledge, structures of relevance and reality, interpretation and interpretive paradigms.”\(^{35}\) For analysing the gathered material and interpret data, the software MaxQDA was used.

**Research questions**

The analytic process started as early as during the formulation of research questions. By phrasing research questions and hypotheses based on first outcomes and impressions of secondary literate analysis the frame was set for later analysis and comparisons.

**Interview recording**

All interviews were recorded with a voice recorder and later transcribed. According to the principles set out by Kuckartz\(^{36}\), interviews were quoted word for word. They were neither summarized, nor paraphrased. Language and punctuation were slightly smothered in order to be adapted to standard German. All transcripts may be found on the enclosed CD.

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\(^{34}\) *Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung*, 118 [Original wording: “Ziel der strukturierenden qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse ist es, eine bestimmte Struktur aus dem Material herauszufiltern. Das können formale Aspekte, inhaltliche Aspekte oder bestimmte Typen sein.”]


\(^{36}\) Kuckartz, *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse*, 136
Code development

Combining a deductive approach in the first step with inductive enlargement during the process a category system based on the knowledge drawn from literature analysis and in line with the formulated research questions was developed. In a deductive approach, each category served as a code to which excerpts from each interviews were appointed. For instance, one of the codes was named “standardization” referring to H2. Wording of interview partners agreeing that certain aspects of campaigns can be standardized was attributed to the sub-code ‘positive’, while wording disagreeing were accordingly attributed to the sub-code ‘negative’. By doing so, “next to the text, a sequence of codes develops that reflects how the text is evaluated under theoretical aspects and under the analytical perspectives of the defined categories”37. While reading the transcripts for the first time, “all passages are highlighted that are spontaneously visible answers to specific questions of the guidelines. During the second perusal, the highlighted passages are assigned to an existing category system, which is simultaneously enlarged.”38 This enlargement was focussed on additional explanations to the stated research questions and hypotheses that seemed of relevance. Through consistently applying this scheme the category system was inductively enlarged. This process subsumed the usable content in the category system. “This kind of open, optional pre-structuring prevents a limitation of the openness, which would have been resulted by the limited previous knowledge of the researchers and the thereby limited perspective.39”

After approximately 20 percent of the interviews were analysed, the code system was revised and slightly adapted to be better structured according to research questions. This is in line with Mayring’s proposition to perform this revision after 10 to 50 per cent. “It needed to be checked, if the logic was clear (no overlaps) and the degree of abstraction

37 Kuckartz, Einführung in die computergestützte Analyse qualitativer Daten, 60 [Original wording: “Neben dem Text entsteht so quasi eine Sequenz von Codes, die das wiedergibt, was unter theoretischen Gesichtspunkten, unter den analytischen Perspektiven der definierten Kategorien, von diesem Text zu halten ist.”]


39 Früh, ‘Kategoriexploration bei der Inhaltsanalyse’, 129 [Original wording: “Diese Art der offenen, optionalen Vorstrukturierung verhindert sogar eine Einschränkung der Offenheit, die sonst durch das begrenzte Vorwissen der Forscher und die damit eingeengte Perspektive entstanden wäre.”]
fitted to the subject of the research and the research question. After changes in the
category system were made, the material was again analysed from the very start.”

**Analysis**

Once the entire material was coded, interviews were grouped in sets. Each consisted of all
respondents with the same party affiliation. Document variables were then assigned to
each interview. The respective variable reflected the respective party affiliation of the
‘PirateParty’ were assigned, each consisting of the interviews with respondents that are
affiliated with the respective party.

During
the next
step, for
each code
(including its sub-code) cross tables were generated indicating the amount of sequences
attributed to each code grouped by party affiliation (see graph 1.5). Cross tables gave a first
indicator on whether there were significant differences in the assessment of the respective
research question between party affiliations.

In the following, segment matrices were generated that did not only show the amount but
also the wording of each coded sequences. Thereby “a synopsis of all passages of the text
sets assigned to a
particular category or
sub-category can be
created.” In addition,
results were visualized
for better analysis using code matrix browser (see graph 1.6). The synopsis represented the

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40 Mayring, *Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung*, 117 [Original wording: “Es muss geprüft werden, ob die Logik klar
ist (keine Überlappungen) und der Abstraktionsgrad zu Gegenstand und Fragestellung passt. Falls dadurch
Veränderungen des Kategoriensystems vorgenommen werden mussten, wird das Material nochmals von Anfang an
bearbeitet.”]

41 Kuckartz, *Einführung in die computergestützte Analyse qualitativer Daten*, 26 [Original wording: „kann eine Synopse aller
zu einer bestimmten Kategorie oder Subkategorie zugeordneten Textstellen des gesamten Text-Sets erstellt werden.”]
basis for the final step of analysis during which statements regarding the same research questions were compared and evaluated as to whether or not respondents from different sets contrasted. If so, it was analysed whether this was the case due to a very particular experience or whether it could be regarded as an overall trend due to their background or experience working with or for the respective party. The goal during this process was to “construct an inner logic between the single items of information with the interviews.”

The results from this analysis were then taken for the hypothesis testing and to determine whether the proposed hypotheses were valid or if they needed to be discarded. In order to better visualize results by code matrix browsers, data was transformed to line graphs.

1.3.5. Research ethics

All research that was conducted in this dissertation was subject to a strict code of ethics. All respondents agreed freely to take part in this study. In the declaration of consent, interview partners agreed to be interviewed and that the conversation would be recorded, transcribed and used for this dissertation. Interviewees were informed that the decision of not taking part in the study or in any of its parts would not have any negative consequences for them. In the spirit of ‘informed consent,’ respondents could make their own decision after being informed about how their data would be analysed and used. All data was strictly used only for the purpose of this study.

Everyone was fully informed and there were no obligations of anyone participating in the study. It was ensured that if interviewees preferred to stay anonymous, their names would not be mentioned in this dissertation and their identity would be kept confidential. Respondents who wanted to stay anonymous had the opportunity to request the disposal of any recordings as soon as they were no longer needed for the purpose of this study.

During the analysis of the available literature as well as during the analysis of the interviews it was always attempted to apply an objective view and to avoid subjective selectivity. The collected data was recorded fully and accurately.

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42 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 50 [Original wording: “Hier geht es um die Herstellung der Logik zwischen den Einzelinformationen innerhalb des Interviews.”]

43 Helfferich, Die Qualität qualitativer Daten, 190
In order to ensure comfortable reading, the author translated translations of citations in languages other than English. The translations were made to the best knowledge and belief. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the original wording is cited in the respective footnote.

1.3.6. Risks and challenges

As any other research, this study was also subject to risks and challenges. Most of them were closely connected to the research design and the decision to apply qualitative research methods. By examining and dealing with the risks, it was attempted to minimize them to an appropriate level.

“The expert has two alternatives: either he is convinced by what he is communicating or he beguiles intentionally. According to our experience, the second alternative is rather rare, but not generally to be excluded.”44 The length of the interviews limits the risk of beguilement. While it is certainly possible to maintain a deception over a short period of time, it seems to be a challenge to keep it up for an interview that takes roughly one hour.

Further, the author was aware of effects that are typical challenges in qualitative interviews. The paternalism effect is characterized by a “benevolence of the respondent with the research request.”45 Just as presentation and image borrowing effect, this effect can be used in a positive way, since the respondent is willing to communicate information that is useful for the research purpose. In the latter, the respondent wants to underline his/her competence. Being aware of the existence of these effects avoids loss of objectivity. The catharsis effect describes a situation in which respondents use the interview to communicate and compensate their frustration.46 During the analysis, this was kept in mind in order to identify possible inaccuracies due to frustrated respondents. By interviewing respondents from both sides, party and service provider, this affect was further limited.

46 Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’, 183
The iceberg effect\textsuperscript{47} describes a lack of interest in the research project and thus a hesitant willingness to release information. Since respondents agreed freely to take part in the interviews, this was a rather rare incident. According to the above-mentioned liberty of taking part, the interview was then completed as quickly as possible.

When the feedback effect occurs, the respondent tries to invert the question-answer situation. He is tempted to “find out, how his actions are perceived by the environment”\textsuperscript{48} During the interviews, it was made sure that the roles of respondent and interviewer were clearly defined. While questions for clarification were allowed, respondents were prevented from the attempt of slipping into the interviewer’s role.

Trinczek\textsuperscript{49} raises the issue that some managers tend to be very dominant during the opening period of the interview. In such cases, rather closed questions were used during the opening phase in order to channel and minimize the dominant expectations. Questions then became more open in order to create a fruitful basis for interaction.

\textsuperscript{47} Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’

\textsuperscript{48} Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’, 184 [Original wording: ‘erkundigen, wie sein Handeln vom gesellschaftlichen Umfeld wahrgenommen wird.’]

\textsuperscript{49} Trinczek, ‘Wie befrage ich Manager?’, 214
2. Political Theory

This chapter will cover relevant aspects of campaign management from the political science perspective. It will lay the theoretic foundation on which the empirical part is built. After defining the most important terms, it will address the most important influencing factors for election outcome with particular attention to the relevance of campaigns. The current trend of professionalization will then be explored and consequences for contemporary campaign management will be analyzed.

2.1. Definitions

First, it is necessary to define certain terms that are of great value to the study. As Kellermann von Schele notes, “every scientific analysis requires clear, precise and consistent definitions and calls for the labelling of factually, socially and timely defined units.” Therefore, the following sub-chapter will define the most important terms.

2.1.1. Campaigns

Campaigns are the core focus of this dissertation. Wolf notes that “the art of campaigning is the coordination of politics and advertising by proper organization.” German campaigning expert Peter Radunski interprets campaigns as “contest of the parties for approval of program and person”. Therefore, the core of an election campaign is to inform and mobilize the electorate and to influence the casting of votes.

While many understand campaigns as an effort to win an election, this would fall short of many facets of campaigns. Rather, it is an effort to persuade and mobilize potential voters. Pippa Norris distinguishes between four elements: “the messages that the campaign organization is seeking to communicate, the channels of communication employed by

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50 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 17

51 Wolf, Wahlkampf und Demokratie, 76

52 Radunski, Wahlkämpfe, 11
these organizations, the impact of these messages on their target audience and the feedback from the audience back to the organization.\textsuperscript{53} This implies that it is possible to distinguish between different types of campaigns: the classic election campaigns, referendum campaigns, information campaigns and image campaigns.

One common denominator of all four types is that they are “limited in terms of time and that they have a tendency to sharpen the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{54} Further, campaigning is not limited to the persuasion of individuals; rather it is a trinity of political content, management efforts and communication with the people. While personalized campaigns, as the name suggests, focus on enhanced public awareness of particular individuals, campaigns generally “have the goal to get in contact with citizens in order to manipulate their opinions by sending out messages. Citizens are supposed to be motivated to go voting and to vote for a particular party or a particular candidate.”\textsuperscript{55} This implies that all subordinated efforts have to strive after the same goal in order to place messages and opinions for the own advantage. This also includes, “actors’ preparations and strategic considerations for their campaigns that often take place behind closed doors.”\textsuperscript{56}

As mentioned above, it would fall short of the complexity of the issue to limit campaigns only to elections campaigns. Geisler points out that in modern media democracies, it is

\textsuperscript{53} Norris, ‘Do campaign communications matter for civic engagement?’, 128

\textsuperscript{54} Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 66 [Original wording: “Gemeinsam ist allen Kampagnen die zeitliche Befristung und die Tendenz zur Zuspitzung von Sachverhalten.”]

\textsuperscript{55} Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 66 [Original wording: “Kampagnen haben zum Ziel, mit Bürgern in Kontakt zu treten, um mit Botschaften deren Meinung zu beeinflussen. Bürger sollen motiviert werden, zur Wahl zu gehen und eine bestimmte Partei oder einen bestimmten Kandidaten zu wählen.”]

\textsuperscript{56} Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 18 [Original wording: „Vorbereitungen und Strategieüberlegungen der Akteure speziell auf den Wahlkampf hin, die oft hinter verschlossenen Türen stattfinden.”]
common routine “to extend methods and instruments used in election campaigns to areas of ‘usual politics’”\textsuperscript{57}. He particularly points out that this is the case in the use of demographic instruments.

Before elaborating on the different types of campaigns, attention should be brought to the fact that every campaign consists of several elements: The most important one is the lead campaign. Plank points out that it is impossible to successfully campaign without one: “Particularly because voters, other than political actors, are not fully concerned about politics, a bracket is needed for the entire campaign that represents the main goal.”\textsuperscript{58} By including mutually interfering elements such as PR campaigns, usage of mass media or mobilizing efforts, a campaign seeks to approach all potential target groups.

As outlined above, the term ‘campaign’ is used in several contexts in the literature. In order to properly analyze campaigns, however, it is vital to distinguish between the following types.

\textit{Election campaigns}

Election campaigns are the main focus of this work. According to Schmitt-Beck, it is the “most obvious type [...] which is characterized by a set of competing actors (political parties/candidates) each campaigning on a range of issues (as well as a focus on candidate and party image), with the principal goal being electoral success.”\textsuperscript{59} Three phases can be identified: preparation phase, pre-election campaign and final phase.\textsuperscript{60} During the preparation phase, all necessary procedures for the party organization, such as party conventions, internal elections and decision on major focuses, are planned. They are then conducted during the pre-election phase. The biggest challenge from a managerial standpoint is to coordinate all actions up to Election Day. As pointed out above, the final phase is then characterized by the lead campaign with sub-ordinated mass media campaigns, PR campaigns as well as mobilization campaigns.

\textsuperscript{57} Geisler, ‘Alte Gladiatoren, neue Arenen’, 197 [Original wording: “die im Wahlkampf zum Einsatz gebrachten Methoden und Instrumente auch auf den Bereich der Routinepolitik auszudehnen.”]

\textsuperscript{58} Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 70 [Original wording: “Gerade weil sich Wähler - im Gegensatz zu den politischen Akteuren - oft nicht umfassend mit Politik beschäftigen, bedarf es einer Klammer um die gesamte Wahlkampagne, die das Hauptziel darstellt.”]

\textsuperscript{59} Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 4

\textsuperscript{60} Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 84
Burton, on the other hand, does not distinguish between the different phases of an election campaign, but between the extent of competition: "There are three basic types of election: uncontested, contested incumbency, and open seat."\(^{61}\) This is particularly relevant in highly personalized campaigns such as mayoral races, presidential elections with a direct election or, in Germany, in federal elections in which candidates for the federal chancellor are not elected directly but a decisive factor for the voting decision of the electorate. Blaemire describes that "an election [campaign] is like a 'one-night stand' with the voters. The Permanent Campaign is more like a marriage."\(^{62}\)

*Referendum campaigns*

A referendum campaign shares many characteristics of an election campaign, including limited length and the fact that there are competing actors.

The main differences, however, are: a) actors are not necessarily parties but also interest groups, b) the campaign is solely focused on one issue and c) in most cases there is no personalization involved.

*Information campaigns*

Information campaigns are issue-driven campaigns that are either run by government agencies or by pressure groups. While governments seek to “inform the public (e.g. 'drink and drive' campaigns), and/or to mobilize support and raise acceptance of particular policies”\(^{63}\), information campaigns run by pressure groups are interest-based. They attempt to raise awareness of particular issues and to influence their spin or the political agenda.

*Image campaigns*

Image campaigns can be performed by parties, interest groups or even individuals. They “may involve a range of issues, wrapped together with various kinds of emotional appeals. Their purpose is to raise the public esteem of the actor in question.”\(^{64}\) Image campaigns do not necessarily have to be part of an election campaign, but they may. Political actors often

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\(^{61}\) Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 39
\(^{62}\) Blaemire, 'Database Management and the Permanent Campaign', 147
\(^{63}\) Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 'Studying political campaigns and their effects', 4
\(^{64}\) Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 'Studying political campaigns and their effects', 5
use them as a permanent campaign in order to portray the respective actor in the most positive light and to prepare the electorate for the next election.

2.1.2. Success of a campaign

In order to evaluate whether techniques applied in a campaign were successful, it is necessary to define what success stands for in the context of campaigns. As Plank realizes, this is a challenging task: “Success is a stretchable term: For one party it is a success to beat the five per cent threshold while other are striving for absolute majority.”

Indeed, campaigns set themselves a large variety of goals: Some aim at winning an election while others at mobilizing as many party sympathizers as possible or occupying a particular topic. Further, the campaign is not the only relevant factor for the election outcome. Chapter 2.2 will further elaborate on a range of influencers.

Therefore, the assessment whether a campaign was successful has to be made on a very individual basis. A common denominator in election campaigns, however, is the aim of maximized mobilization. This implies that if the potential was exploited to a maximum extent, the campaign may be regarded as being successful.

2.1.3. Outsourcing

The phenomenon of outsourcing is often seen as a rather new concept. However, it has been around for decades stemming from the automotive industry. During recent years an evolution has been taking place, formalizing the process of the make-or-buy-decision as well as the bidding process, implementation and monitoring.

As Tan states, “the term ‘Outsourcing’ describes the assignment of internally performed tasks to external partners. Standing for the terminus ‘Outside Resource using’, it is the result of a make-or buy-decision in favour of the option ‘buy’.

Making use of economies of scale and expertise acquired by specialization, the goal of outsourcing is to reduce costs and increase quality. Pollert and Polzin add that outsourcing means to “outsourse measures, tasks or divisions of the enterprise to stand-alone

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65 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 66 [Original wording: “Erfolg ist dabei ein dehnbarer Begriff: Für die eine Partei ist es ein Erfolg, über die 5%-Hürde zu kommen, während eine andere Partei die absolute Mehrheit anstrebt.”]

66 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 184
companies such as research and development or IT consulting to in order to save costs and bring more flexibility to the enterprise.⁶⁷

Generally, there are four different types of outsourcing: Internal, external, global and hybrid forms. Internal outsourcing means that the respective tasks are allocated to a profit center that does not assemble an independent unit with a separate legal form but is to be seen as a subsidiary of the outsourcing company, whereas external outsourcing allocates tasks to external service providers that do not have any legal identity with the outsourcing unit. Global outsourcing points out the geographical dimension of the topic, underlining the fact that services are often not performed by service providers in the same country but all around the world. Last but not least, hybrid forms represent a mixture between internal and external outsourcing, e.g. when the unit is legally independent but personally dependent.

Simon and Gathen note that “often outsourcing is limited to activities that do not belong to the imminent core business of the enterprise.”⁶⁸ This particularly involves IT, legal affairs, car pools or canteens.

2.2. Influencers of election outcome

Despite the fact that this dissertation focusses on election campaigns, it is important to point out that those are not the only influences on the actual election outcome. The impact of situations or events that occurred before the start of a campaign can be analyzed relatively easily. More challenging, however, is the analysis of impacts of factors that occur during the running of a campaign.

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⁶⁷ Pollert, Kirchner and Polzin, Das Lexikon der Wirtschaft, 292 [Original wording: “Maßnahmen, Aufgaben oder Bereiche des Unternehmens, z.B. Forschung und Entwicklung, EDV-Beratung, in eigene Gesellschaften auszulagern, um Kosten zu sparen und mehr Flexibilität in das eigenen Unternehmen zu bekommen.”]

⁶⁸ Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 154 [Original wording: “Häufig beschränkt man sich beim Outsourcing auf die Auslagerung von Aktivitäten, die nicht unmittelbar zum Kerngeschäft des Unternehmens gehören.”]
This sub-chapter will focus on some factors that are known to have the largest impact on voters’ decisions besides campaigns of the parties. Chapter 2.3 will explore the actual relevance of campaigns for election outcome. Some literature further suggests that the impact of influencing factors in the months before the election is generally limited. Burton and Shae argues that “the voter’s choice is largely predetermined; the models that assume voters’ rationality tend to imply that the few voters who are open to persuasion are disaffected or disinterested and therefore not predisposed to vote.”

Nevertheless, the overall tendency of late-deciding voters contradicts this theory. More likely, Graner and Stern’s conclusion seems to be accurate that “the voting decision is based on both, long-term influence that is being manifested in a party identification, as well as short-term influence.”

2.2.1. Socioeconomic situation

The socioeconomic situation of the electorate has an influence on the rate of satisfaction with the government in office. Scholars therefore agree that the better the socioeconomic situation of a country is, the better are the chances for the governing coalition to be reelected. This pattern has widely been visible across Europe in the past years with numerous government changes. In nation states with solid economic performances, the governing parties were reelected or at least one of the coalition members has been able to enlarge its share of votes.

In Germany, the end of the coalition of the Social-Democrats and the Greens in 2005 is a prime example of how the socioeconomic situation influences the election outcome. A

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69 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 123

70 Graner and Stern, ‘It’s the Candidate, Stupid?’, 149 [Original wording: “Die Wahlentscheidung basiert demnach sowohl auf langfristig wirksamen Einflüssen, die sich in einer Parteidentifikation manifestieren als auch auf kurzfristigen Einflüssen.”]
perceived decline in the socioeconomic situation following Agenda 2010 – policies of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder led many voters to turn their back on the governing coalition and produced a change in government, despite an impressive campaign effort, particularly in the last weeks before elections.

2.2.2. Personalities

30 years ago, parties were still the main actors in election campaigns. Questions about the character and personality of the candidate were rarely asked (a notable exception was the candidature of Franz-Joseph Strauss). “In the 'golden age of parties,' candidates did not run campaigns - they stood for election. Office seekers were expected to contribute to their own electoral efforts, of course, perhaps with a donation to the party coffers, but day-to-day campaign operations were often left to the party.”\(^{71}\) This has significantly changed over the last decades.

Today, personalities of candidates play an increasing role in the voting decision. Since the Reagan-campaigns in the 1980’s, “the tendency in favor of personalization of American campaigns has reached a new quality: The candidate himself is the message, his appearances, the discussion of his strengths and weaknesses are the actual media event.”\(^{72}\) That this also applies to the case of Germany was visible in the 2013 campaign, when discussions on strengths and weaknesses of Peer Steinbrück received great media attention.

It is undisputed that characters and personalities of candidates nowadays play a much larger role for the election outcome than in the past. German Bundestag campaigns are highly personalized. Being a representative of certain policies, the candidate himself is part of the message. "A campaign would want to take advantage of the fact that many persuadable voters are highly interested in the election - but are stalling on their final

\(^{71}\) Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 8

\(^{72}\) Falter and Römmele, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 51

[Original wording: “hat die Tendenz zur Personalisierung der amerikanischen Wahlkämpfe allerdings eine neue Qualität erlangt: Der Kandidat selbst ist die Botschaft, seine Auftritte, die Diskussion seiner Stärken und Schwächen sind das eigentliche Medienereignis”]
answer because they are ambivalent, because some important policy preference is not squaring with their party's candidate."73

Personalization today stands for the outstanding role candidates play in media coverage, while political questions often only play a secondary role. In some campaigns, such as the 2013 CDU-campaign, the personality of the candidate is the most important message a campaign wants to communicate. Reasons behind this trend are mostly the decreasing party identification and the trend toward visualization. A strong candidate is much more tangible than a certain policy.

However, personalization and political content are not necessarily contradictions, but can go hand in hand as long as campaign strategies fit to the respective candidate.

2.2.3. Time in office

The case seems to be clear: “The truth is most incumbents win most of the time.”74 Burton and Shea underline this conclusion with the fact that V.O. Key suggested in 1966 that “voters use recent history as their guide: ‘As voters mark their ballots they may have in their minds impressions of the last TV political spectacular of the campaign, but, more important, they have in their minds recollections of their experiences of the past four years’”75

Indeed, there is no doubt that a challenger generally faces more obstacles (such as little name recognition) than the incumbent on his way to being part of the public discussions. “The incumbents of the governing party make use of the symbols of their public posts, their titles, their prominence, their statesmen-like distance, their entourage, the aura of their power.”76 If an incumbent has not been involved in any scandals or has made major mistakes, the challenger’s chances are rather weak. "A partial list of the possible sources of these asymmetries includes reputations from previous elected office, incumbency, recent policy commitments, organizational ability, and the strength or popularity of one's party.”77

73 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 124
74 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 142
75 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5
76 Althaus, 'Kommunikationsmanagement im Wahlkampf', 130 [Original wording: “Die Amtsinhaber der Regierungspartei nutzen die Symbole ihrer öffentlichen Ämter, ihre Titel, ihre Prominenz, ihre staatsmännische Distanz, ihren Tross, die Aura ihrer Macht”]
77 Meirowitz, ‘Electoral Contests, Incumbency Advantages, and Campaign Finance’, 682
At the same time, it is clear that incumbency advantage decreases with an increase in profile of the election. While at mayoral elections, particularly in smaller towns and villages an incumbent is very hard to beat, the case is different on the national level. So far, each chancellorship was ended by election defeat.

Nevertheless, incumbency is a valuable advantage. Generally, name recognition, media attention, quality of staff, financial situation, connections with interest groups and base of volunteers are better than the ones of challengers.\(^78\)

2.2.4. External events

Even in a precisely planned campaign with a popular candidate, there is still a level of uncertainty. Any moment, the momentum of a campaign can be reversed by unexpected events that happen outside of the campaigning hemisphere. “Unexpected events can lead to a sudden necessity of adapting the campaign strategy to the changed situation. Pre-defined strategies become victims “of events and developments that now move too rapidly for careful advance planning.”\(^79\)

This was particularly visible in the 2011 Baden-Württemberg state elections: “One month before the elections, 4% of voters stated that the turnaround in energy policy is their most important topic. Then there was Fukushima. All of a sudden, a week before Election Day, it was 44%. And now we have a green state premier.”\(^80\)

Also on the federal level, trends can be set by unexpected events such as crises, wars or other tragic events. "Crises are events that prevent voters from receiving your message in the final days or, worse, actions that cause voters to receive a bad message."\(^81\) Although, those events might be beyond the control of the candidates and might be subject interpretation, voters may be influenced by a certain mood leading to a reward or punishment of the respective candidate.\(^82\) Without the floods in 2002, Gerhard Schröder

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\(^78\) Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 39
\(^79\) McCurry, ‘Mass Media Politics’, 470
\(^80\) Schrade, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 23 [Original wording: “Einen Monat vor der Wahl sagten vier Prozent der Wähler, die Energiewende sei für sie das wichtigste Thema. Dann kam Fukushima - dadurch waren es eine Woche vor der Wahl plötzlich 44 Prozent, und jetzt haben wir einen grünen Ministerpräsidenten.”]
\(^81\) Allen, ‘Crisis Management in Campaigns’, 482
\(^82\) Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 45
most likely would have lost his post as chancellor. But he quickly made use of the changed situation and visited the affected region – days before his challenger Stoiber decided to do the same. It was this decision that created a mood within the population that Schröder was more capable of dealing with difficult situations.

2.2.5. Campaigns

Despite all of the named influencers on election outcome, it is undisputed that there is also an effect of campaigns to the outcome of elections. Plank notes a simple reason: "Because voters expect it."\textsuperscript{83}

There is, however, a more scientific explanation for the existence of campaigns. As shown in graph 2.3., Burton and Shae suggest that each party has a base of supporters that will give their vote to the respective party, no matter what happens during the run of the campaign. "The base vote corresponds to the worst performance that a party has shown over the past several elections."\textsuperscript{84} This part of the electorate would vote for a party even with the party’s absolute worst candidate.

The rest of the votes represent the swing vote. This is the share that parties compete for when they run their campaigns. It is the share of the electorate that has not made its final decision before the start of the campaign and could vote for either of the running parties. The so-called swing-factor therefore measures "the extent to which voters move from one party the other between two election years."\textsuperscript{85}

Part of the swing vote, however, represents a group of the electorate that has sympathies for a certain party, but that has not yet made a final decision. This group may be called the

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\textsuperscript{83} Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 68 [Original wording: "weil Wähler dies erwarten."]

\textsuperscript{84} Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 83

\textsuperscript{85} Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 84
soft partisan vote. That is “the portion of the electorate that goes for both attractive and less desirable candidates [of a party], but tends to shy away from the very worst.”

Together with the base vote, the soft partisan vote represent the typical minimum vote share a party receives in an election. Burton and Shae define this share as the partisan vote (see graph 2.4).

The rest of the vote, the so-called toss-up vote, is the share of the electorate that has no preference for either of the running parties. It is this section of the electorate that is the true site of election campaign battles. The toss-up vote, jointly with the attempt to motivate the party’s partisan vote to actually cast a vote, is what parties compete for during the run of a campaign. Due to the existence of the toss-up vote and a share of the partisan vote that needs to be mobilized, election campaigns exist. Summing it up, Korte correctly states that “the one who mobilizes, wins”.

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86 Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 84
2.3. **Relevance of campaigns for election outcomes**

After elaborating on the reasons for campaigns as well as on potential influencers for the election outcome, the question about the actual relevance of campaigns for campaign outcomes persists. The question if campaigns really matter is still an under-researched topic. "One of the problems with the research on campaign effects is that it is located at the interface of various sub-disciplines of political science - among them electoral studies, political communications research and party sociology, to name a few of the obvious ones - but does not fit easily into any one of them." At the same time, actual relevance of campaigns for election results is highly disputed. While some scholars argue that campaigns indeed have very large influence, others have strong doubts.

Perception that campaigns are highly relevant often is driven from opinion polls that show a continuously growing percentage of voters who do not make their final voting decision until the end of a campaign. It appears that campaigns are important to a growing share of the electorate. “Public opinion polls [...] can sometimes provide circumstantial evidence of [...] shifts over the course of a campaign." According to Thomas M. Holbrook, four factors are responsible for this trend:

- An increasing amount of late-deciding voters
- Decreasing party-identification
- Significant fluctuation in candidate support during a campaign
- Increasing availability of information that affects voting decisions."

Effects of campaigns can be both, positive and negative. While argued that a well-run campaign can be the decisive factor, poor and, respectively vague communications with the electorate, can also lead to dropping approval rates. Kellermann von Schele strongly argues in favor of campaigns: “Election campaigns are (co-) decisive for election results." Falter and Römmle come to a similar conclusion, also arguing that professional campaigns

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88 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 19
89 Norris, ‘Do campaign communications matter for civic engagement?’, 151
90 Strohmeier, *Moderne Wahlkämpfe*, 23
are decisive keys for election success. Particularly in close runs, campaigns may become the decisive element. Burgard argues that in such cases, “professional orchestration of candidates and content management that is supported by state-of-the-art polling may be ‘decisive’.”

This perception, however, is disputed. There are also researchers who doubt that campaigns have a significant effect. Burton and Shae argue “several early election studies found little evidence that they did”. Other previously mentioned factors lead to a situation in which campaigns are only a very small piece in the big picture of an election. Not many voters would cast their vote in favor of a specific party only due to a decent campaign. Party-identification might decrease, but the majority of voters still seem to decide based on hard facts such as party programs and on soft ones such as sympathies for the candidate.

In conclusion, it seems that campaigns have an effect on election outcome. But it is only one of many factors. Particularly campaign practitioners seem to overrate their importance. “While it would be a clear exaggeration to state that campaigns are of prime importance in determining the election result, [...] it seems pretty incontrovertible that campaigns do, indeed, matter for the behaviour of citizens at elections and referendums.”

2.4. Americanization, Modernization, Professionalization

The most visible trend in campaigning that occurred over the last couple of decades is often described by the term “Americanization”. However, this wording only refers to practices developed particularly in the United States and is because US election campaigns often serve as role models for campaigns worldwide. Nevertheless, the term “Americanization” was very useful as a starting point for modern campaign research.

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92 Falter and Römmle, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 50
93 Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder “Yes, We Gähn!”, 35 [Original wording: “können eine professionelle Inszenierung der Kandidaten und ein von moderner Meinungsforschung unterstütztes Themenmanagement ’kriegsentscheidend’ sein.”]
94 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 4
95 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Do political campaigns matter?’, 185
96 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 40
However, the term “Americanization” does not properly define and describe the actual developments. Since there are considerable differences between campaign management in the United States and in Europe, it can be regarded as a synonym for the terms ‘modernization’ or ‘professionalization’, which seem to be more appropriate. “Americanization describes a correctly identified tendency. Nevertheless [...] the terms ‘modernization’ and professionalization characterize the dominant type of campaigns more adequate than the term ‘Americanization’, which is equipped with a cultural-critical undertone.”

2.4.1. Definition
Kellermann von Schele elaborates that “professionalization in political communications, and particularly in election campaigns, means the strategic, i.e. goal-oriented planning of the campaign by economically using resources with the help of (independent) advisors and external service providers – not only coming from parties, not primarily intuitive and on no account with a continuously changing strategy.”

By accessing external advisors, campaign managers were able to use existing know-how to further enhance the quality of their campaigns and to market their respective candidate in a more effective manner.

Professionalization is a strategic approach that includes particular knowledge and skills mainly in management. While classic campaigns heavily relied on intuition, professionalized campaigns attempt to avoid situations of uncertainty.

2.4.2. Reasons
Taking developments outlined in chapters 2.2 and 2.3 into account, there seem to be three major evolutions that led to an increasing need of professionally planned campaigns:

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97 Falter and Römmele, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 62


99 Geisler, ‘Alte Gladiatoren, neue Arenen’, 197
Increasing complexity in voting behavior

Socio-cultural changes

Changes in media systems

Voting behavior has significantly evolved over the last decade. As stated above, those developments include an increasing amount of late-deciding voters and decreasing party-identification. Those factors have led to an increase in ‘toss-up vote’-share over the past years. Parties need to devote much more efforts to influencing voting behavior particularly in the last weeks and days of campaigns.

Socio-cultural changes led to a significant decrease in party-identification. In the first half of the 20th century, social milieus had a large impact on voting behavior. It used to be common sense that blue-collar workers were voting in favor of social-democrats while upper classes were more biased towards Christian-democrats or liberals. Nowadays, some of the former social milieus have disappeared and identification with others has decreased. For campaign managers this led to an increased need for more personal voter approaches. Unlike the past, it is increasingly more difficult to find topics that are relevant for entire social groups. Rather, more individualistic approaches are needed.

Thirdly and lastly, the media system has changed entirely. The past 100 years have brought numerous changes in information technology: radios, televisions, phones, mobile phones, or internet. Even within one technology, such as the internet, certain trends lead to more professionalized approaches: Today, it is indispensable that parties and candidates are present in social media. This not only requires more resources, but also very professional approaches in order use the respective media in the most efficient manner.

Every one of these developments requires higher intensity of media usage as well as more focused voter approaches.

2.4.3. Developments

Professionalization in campaign management is a relatively new phenomenon. Up until the 90’s of the past century, there was hardly any academic literature on political communications and campaign management available. Development of campaign
management is the result of social modernization processes and the rise of mass media.\textsuperscript{100} While campaigns used to be run by parties themselves and their amateur staff, they are run by professionals today. Focus more and more switches to marketing techniques and political advertising. In business speak this means that selling the product and generating profit (election success) have moved to the spot light. This tendency is not uniquely an American phenomenon. Rather, it can be observed in most western democracies. “It is dependent on various factors such as people, party and political developments and the current situation, so to speak the observed necessity for change or adaption.”\textsuperscript{101} As a result, professionalization should not be regarded as a development; rather it occurs in wave motions.

Professionalization is a development that not only affects certain techniques or styles in campaign management, rather it entirely transforms campaigns. This is particularly observed in the following developments:

(1) \textit{Consultant-centered campaigns}. Until a few years ago, German campaigns were controlled by established party structures. Normally, the secretary-general of a party headed the campaign and his staff consisted of regular party personnel. "Consultant-centered campaigns are less beholden to the old party structures than their predecessors were, as candidate have released themselves to set up their own campaign operations and have come to rely on professionals who know the strategies and tactics of campaign management."\textsuperscript{102}

(2) \textit{Mass communications}. Despite the undisputed necessity of grassroots campaigning, mass communications is still a decisive factor in campaigning. With the rise of mass media in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, campaigning has gone through a thorough transformation process. With the rise of radio, TV and internet, it became possible to access large amounts of people with comparably little effort. While this does not substitute personal contact with voters, it has changed the behavior of campaigners who set their focus on

\textsuperscript{100} Falter and Römmle, 'Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden', 50–1

\textsuperscript{101} Kellermann von Schele, \textit{Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?}, 51 [Original wording: "Sie ist abhängig von verschiedenen Faktoren wie Personen, innerparteilichen wie innerpolitischen Entwicklungen und der aktuellen Situation, gleichsam der 'gefühlten' Notwendigkeit von Veränderung oder Anpassung."]

\textsuperscript{102} Burton and Shea, \textit{Campaign Craft}, 219
techniques to reach the broad mass of people. Even today, TV duels between candidates are not only orchestrated in a very professional manner, but also accompanied by vast media attention and are thought to be a key element in parties’ media campaign.

(3) **Local campaigning.** In the past two decades, decreasing share of voters who actually cast their ballots led to the necessity of approaching voters more directly. Voters are faced with mass media advertising on a daily basis. Hence, it becomes increasingly difficult to convince people of a certain behavior (go voting) by simply throwing out mass messages. In times of web 2.0 and social media, people expect to receive tailor-made messages. “Local campaigning focused on the one activity that could best be done locally – mobilizing voters to go to the polls.”

One of the major achievements of the 2008 Obama campaign was the development of grassroots campaigning. It was realized that John Doe is more likely to listen to what his neighbor tells him than to what he reads in a letter or an email from a campaigner unknown to him. Despite the need of large numbers of volunteers, professional and efficient management is needed in order to coordinate those grassroots efforts.

### 2.4.4. Turning points

As stated above, campaign research is a relatively new field and professionalization in campaigning a contemporary phenomenon. There is only a little research available that covers campaigns before the 1990’s. However, there are four campaigns in the United States that can now be regarded as turning points in the evolution of professionalization of campaign management.

Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign was the first one that made use of television. Prior to this campaign, TV advertising and market segmentation based on research was only used by the private sector. The Eisenhower campaign not only used media for campaign purposes, but also employed expert staff from the private sector – a first step towards outsourcing. “Advertising pioneer Rosser Reeves, whose best-known slogan was ‘M&M’s - melts in your mouth, not in your hands’

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103 Denver and Hands, ‘Post-Fordism in the constituencies?’, 110
104 Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 211
In the 1960 presidential elections, John F. Kennedy ran against Vice-President Richard Nixon and eventually won the race. It happened to be the closest election since 1916. Nixon became the first presidential candidate who lost the election despite earning a majority of states. A key reason for Kennedy’s success was his successful campaign. “John F. Kennedy and his advisers spent three years planning their 1960 presidential campaign.” He reached a new level of professionalism by not campaigning in every one of the 50 states (as Nixon did), but rather concentrating on swing-states. The 1960 campaign also marked the beginning of televised presidential debates. The four debates were the first debates ever held between presidential candidates and said to be a decisive factor for Kennedy’s victory. While he looked young and full of energy, Nixon appeared pale with sweaty face. This was used heavily by the Kennedy camp to further sharpen Kennedy’s image as the energetic young candidate that represents the future.

As the third turning point in US campaigning, the 1992 Bill Clinton campaign set new standards. It is considered to be the “role model of professional campaigning” Since his campaign, professionalization in campaigning became a worldwide trend. The campaign represented a milestone in professional usage of media and voter segmentation. It also introduced the concept of a “war room” that was later used by the Blair campaign in the UK and the Schröder campaign in Germany.

In Germany, Adenauer already in his first campaign used some elements of professionalized campaigning techniques. Not only did he use external PR agencies, but also of external advertising agencies and pollsters.

For many decades, however, professionalization in Germany is linked to the work of Peter Radunski. During the campaigns he managed in the 1980s, he started to differentiate between three forms of campaigning: political campaign, advertising campaign and party campaign. In the political campaign, “he introduced the ‘One-Voice-Principle’: political

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105 Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 23
106 Kellermann von Schele, *Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?*, 13
107 Burgard, *Von Obama siegen lernen oder "Yes, We Gähn!"?*, 69
position should be communicated in one voice both, in terms of content and format. From the top of the federal party down to members.”

Until today, the 1998 SPD campaign represented the peak of professionalization in Germany. The campaign of 1998 was “characterized by a degree of professionalization that was previously unknown. In particular, this was the case with the SPD-'Kampa’—campaign.” The Kampa-concept represented an important milestone in the tendency to organize campaign personnel outside regular party structures. It was the first time that Clinton’s war room concept was applied in Germany and up until today regarded as the most advanced campaign organization Germany witnessed so far.

2.4.5. Party traditions

For many decades, parties played the main role in campaigning. Successful campaigning was considered unthinkable without the assistance of a party organization. “Office seekers relied on party organization to carry petitions, organize volunteers, give money, make telephone calls, and canvass door to door.” Only parties were able to mobilize a critical mass of people needed to carry out a campaign.

In Germany, SPD was a front-runner in terms of organization. Already in the early 20th century, the party gathered a considerable number of supporters. Party organizations suffered heavy losses during the years of National Socialism in Germany that resulted in the disappearance of most political parties. However, SPD reorganized very quickly after the war. Already in 1948, there were 10,000 local SPD committees. This lead to the fact that its party organization was present in entire Germany before the first Bundestag elections took place.

Party organization and resulting party affiliation was not only important for carrying out campaigns, but also to mobilize voters. During times when society was still heavily divided

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108 Burgard, *Von Obama siegen lernen oder 'Yes, We Gähn!'?,* 75 [Original wording: „führte der das ’One-Voice’-Prinzip ein: Die politischen Positionen sollten von der Bundesspitze bis auf die lokale Mitgliederbene inhaltlich und formal ‚mit einer Stimme‘ kommuniziert werden.”]


110 Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 11

111 Kellermann von Schele, *Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?,* 50
into classes and with SPD being the typical working class party, it seemed that party affiliation and socioeconomic situation had larger effects on voting decision than actual campaigns.

However, parties started continuously to lose members, election turnout decreased and the image of politicians generally worsened. This was triggered by a variety of factors, including scandals, increasing unemployment, and the rise of protest parties. Particularly large parties suffered from this sociocultural change. Grafe describes today’s campaigns as image campaigns of a sector that has a devastating image. Because of this trend, party support started to become less important. “A growing number of candidates began running for office without much party help.”

However, in Germany parties still dominate the political landscape. “Parties rule over the political world like God over the universe. They have the first and last word.” Although media becomes increasingly important, parties are the main trigger for political integration and communication. Party traditions are still very alive and important for parties’ identities and therefore for their actions and campaigning styles. Unlike in the United States, where campaign managers and spin-doctors are mostly hired by candidates, parties in Germany still have significant power. Spin-doctors in Germany, as few as there exist, are mostly politically motivated or gain their influence through political consulting or over the media. A prime example for this is Michael Spreng who was hired by the 2002 Stoiber team being a media expert.

However, Kellerman von Schele suggests that Spreng was a remarkable exception. According to her, party traditions hinder modernization tendencies such as the assignment of external experts in the field of strategy and campaign communications. In the future, the degree to which candidates run independently from parties and to which their traditions earn election success will decide over relevance of independent campaign managers.

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112 Grafe, Wahlkampf, 47
113 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 9
114 Steingart, ‘Politik mit Volk’, 71 [Original wording: “Über die heutige Bundesrepublik ließe sich sagen dass die Parteien die politische Welt beherrschen wie Gott das Universum. Sie haben das erste und das letzte Wort.”]
115 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 16
2.4.6. Professionalization in Germany

The previous sub-chapters applied a global look on professionalization. Despite global trends, however, national characteristics in campaigns continue to exist. It is not possible to simply use an American campaign as blue print for campaigns in other countries such as Germany. Some scholars even consider drawing conclusions from US campaigns as absurd.\textsuperscript{116} While the extent of similarities between US and German campaigns is arguable, this view seems to be quite extreme. Rather, it can be stated that there are overall and global trends in campaigning, but national characteristics still play an important role.

In Germany, for instance, “professionalization of strategies, organization and communication may be observed without a professionalization of the actual profession.”\textsuperscript{117} Campaign management is still not a clearly defined and accredited profession in Germany. However, polling is a highly professionalized sector whose services are used by all major parties. Polling institutes are highly specialized and do not directly belong to a specific party.\textsuperscript{118} But there are limits to further developments in this sector: data security laws as well as financial resources prevent parties from carrying out street campaigns of American extent.\textsuperscript{119}

Scholars, however, agree that campaigning in Germany is at a turning point. “The trend to professionalization, to topic and event management and approaches tailored to target groups is evident.”\textsuperscript{120}

2.5. Consequences for contemporary campaign management

After defining relevant terms, elaborating on the significance of campaigns for election outcome, and outlining the trend of professionalization, the following practical consequences can be drawn for contemporary campaign management:

\textsuperscript{116} Schrade, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 41
\textsuperscript{117} Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 47 [Original wording: “In deutschen Wahlkämpfen ist eine Professionalisierung der Strategien, der Organisation und der Kommunikation zu beobachten, ohne dass sich der Berufsstand im eigentlichen Sinne professionalisiert.”]
\textsuperscript{118} Geisler, ‘Alte Gladiatoren, neue Arenen’, 197
\textsuperscript{119} Hoogvliet, ‘Contribution in the conference’
\textsuperscript{120} Falter and Römmle, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 49
(1) **Campaigning is important.** Although there are many other factors that have influence on election outcome, proper campaigning is not only expected by the electorate, but still required to mobilize potential voters.

(2) **Campaigning is neither high art nor pure science.** Campaigning has become a profession. Although intuition is still a valuable asset with which the electorate can be impressed, modern campaigns would not successfully work without a professional approach that includes pollsters as well as media or PR consultants that are able to transfer the appropriate messages to the relevant target groups. The extent to which campaigning is professionalized varies from region to region. While in the United States, spin-doctors even have their own professional organization\(^\text{121}\), German campaigns so far have reached their professional peak with the 1998 SPD campaign. However, it can be expected that Anglo-Saxon campaigns continue to serve as role models and the degree of professionalization in German campaigns will continue to grow.

(3) **Campaigns can be run like small businesses.** “Political organizations and institutions develop their own professional know how (spin-doctors) in order to design their media and communications strategy in an optimal way.”\(^\text{122}\) While campaigns used to be run based on a broad basis of volunteers and in a rather intuitive manner, professionals can coordinate almost every aspect of campaigning today. Parties “have responded to the rise of high-tech, market-driven electioneering, which draws outside consultants into the mix, by merging into 'service-oriented' organizations that allocate money and expertise.”\(^\text{123}\) Financial resources are playing an increasingly important role.

The third finding in particular leads to the conclusion that the environment of campaigning has evolved and changed in favor of business-minded approaches. The following chapter

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\(^{121}\) The American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC) was founded in 1969 as a "nonpartisan organization of political professionals" and is the trade group for political consulting professionals in the United States. Campaigning icon Joseph Napolitan was one of its founding fathers. AAPC set a code of professional ethics for its members and set the target of "improving public confidence in the American political system". It is considered the largest organization of political consultants in the world and hosts the annual Pollie Awards in which it awards political communications and public affairs. [see: http://www.theaapc.org/]

\(^{122}\) Schmid, **Wahlkampf in Baden-Württemberg**, 9 [Original wording: „Politische Organisationen und Institutionen entwickeln eigenen professionellen Sachverstand (sog. Spin Doctors), um ihre Medien- und Kommunikationsstrategien optimal zu gestalten”]

\(^{123}\) Burton and Shea, **Campaign Craft**, 4
will therefore elaborate on the question whether management practices that previously had their homes in the private economy, such as outsourcing, seem to be appropriate approaches to cope with the new challenges and realities of campaigning.
3. **Campaign Management**

Campaign management has a long history that reaches back to ancient Roman times. Quintus Tuilius Cicero may be considered as the first campaign manager in history. In charge of his brother’s campaign for a seat in the Senate he already realized the importance of a well-organized and efficiently running campaign. In a letter to his brother Marcus he gave advice: "Seek out men everywhere who will represent you as if they themselves were running for office.”

Traditionally, parties and candidates used to rely on their own organizational structures and their own resources. As already indicated in the previous chapter, this has at least partly changed in recent decades. “Generally, media presentation of candidates is not organized by party organizations, but by external consultants. These so-called “political consultants” not only take over sub-tasks such as Press and Public Relations, advertising, target group analysis, direct marketing, acquisition of donations or opponent research, but also manage entire campaigns.” Characteristics of campaign management will therefore be the focus of this chapter. After elaborating on the evolution of campaigning, attention will be brought to contemporary campaign management and how today’s campaigns are organized as well as to the specific tasks of campaign teams and managers.

3.1. **The evolution of campaigning**

As shown in chapter 2.3, campaigning does matter. Recent developments and trends indicate that this will continue to be the case. Of particular importance to the evolution of campaigning are the following sociocultural developments:

- Rise of a media democracy;
- Decreasing political interest / Change in communication with voters;
- Increasing volatility of voters; and

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124 Cicero, *How to win an election*, 47
126 Kellermann von Schele, *Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?*, 19
- Decreasing party identification.

Particularly in the second part of the 20th century, campaigning has undergone a remarkable evolution: Professionalism in campaigning began with Mark Hanna's work in 1896 and was hastened by Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1952 campaign for president. Since then, campaigns have been significantly more professional and scientific. The 1970s and 1980s brought marketing-orientation and professional fund-raising. In retrospect, the most significant development took place in the 1990s with the rise of the internet. It brought fundamental change to campaigning and campaign management. "Every position paper, every advertisement, every news release, can now be personalized to voters across the World Wide Web." While it is then possible to precisely target particular voter groups, this also meant an increase in costs. Campaign managers were faced with increasingly expensive new campaigning tools: micro-targeting, radio, video, website productions. Particularly in the United States, this led to a significant rise of campaign budgets. The US remains a role model for German campaigns. Just as overseas, campaign managers were faced with an increasing share of non-voters or swing voters.

3.1.1. Rise of a media democracy

"No campaign escapes mass media. Through mass media, voters are being informed about what is happening in politics." Mass media may easily be considered as the single most significant change in campaign-voter, respectively, intra-campaign communications in the 21st century. With the rise of radio, TV and internet, communications channels have changed entirely. Politics is faced with a steady drift away from party democracies towards media democracies. Important indicators for this development are increased

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127 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5
128 Plank, 'Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?', 73
commercialization, specialization of actors and, most significant for this work, increased usage of external sources. Packaging politics as entertainment is common subject to debate. In the 2013 Bundestag campaign, the discussion whether the comedian Stefan Raab was an appropriate person to co-host the general televised debate showed that entertainment has become a common element in today’s campaigns. That has the potential to reach groups of the electorate that previously had no interest in politics (and therefore likely to belong to the toss-up vote). At the same time, there are heavy critics among politically interested people who argue that ‘Politainment’ neglects the actual importance and seriousness that should be devoted to politics. In recent decades it has become a common understanding that campaigns which do not use media in their means are unlikely to be successful.

At the same time, “influence of media on campaigns has realized a dramatic change. [...] By now, people know whether something is a media hype, let it be positive of negative, or whether it is reality.” Practitioner Robert Heinrich, who has managed several campaigns for the Green Party, underlines that “what is written in newspapers is important. How it is intonated and commented should not be overestimated.” The electorate is mature enough to draw their own conclusions of what is presented to them via media. Some scholars argue that media debates often do not actually reach voters: “The difference between media outrage and citizen outrage has become significant.” The main thesis of those critics is that excitements in media do not necessarily reflect excitements among the electorate. This leads to the conclusion that not only a certain degree of tiredness towards politics may be observed (the following chapters will elaborate more on this), but also some towards media. The latter is said to be caused by extensive usage and continuously increasing velocity of news. Media is the main source of information for most people. This is likely to persist. “In coming campaigns, classic media will still play a main

129 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 46
130 Baule, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 37
131 Fäßler, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 10 [Original wording: “Der Einfluss der Medien auf den Wahlkampf hat eine dramatische Wendung erfahren. [...] Menschen [wissen] inzwischen genau zu unterscheiden [...] ob es ein Medienhype ist, sei er positiv oder negativ, oder die Realität.]”
133 Hoogvliet, ‘Contribution in the conference’ [Original wording: “Der Unterschied von Medienempörung und Bürgerempörung ist inzwischen eklatant]”
134 Schmitz, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 30
role in opinion forming."  

For the largest part of the electorate, classic media is still the number one source of information. While digital media is clearly on the rise, “what is written in FAZ, Spiegel, Bild, etc. will be picked up by social media and there it becomes the topic of the day. Classic media therefore still decides what is being talked about.” In recent years, web 2.0 has been revolutionizing campaign communications. Social media has witnessed a rise in significance as a news source. In this context, Facebook has rather become a forum for discussion while Twitter has overtaken the role as source of information, particularly in areas of conflicts where the presence of journalists is hardly possible. In the context of campaigning, Twitter has become a tool for fast reactions. Since Tweets can only hold a maximum of 180 characters, content is limited. For candidates, Facebook today not only serves as an important display for self-presentation, but also as a direct forum for communication with a large part of the electorate.

For campaigns, this development leads to a new challenge: In mass media, parties do not only compete with their political opponent, but also with private advertisers that largely have a significantly higher budget and, most important, professionally made advertisements. Due to evolving challenges for journalists as well as rising expectations regarding media competences of politicians, political actors need to carefully consider opportunities and threats of this trend. “For politics, adapting to the rules of media means to adapt to the necessities of media. Media need pictures, people and short statements. Emotions are as demanded as professional appearance, particularly in front of cameras and microphones.”

The most significant change to campaigners caused by the rise of mass media and internet is the overall velocity of politics. In the past, year two after a campaign was comparably quiet. This has significantly changed. Parties today are faced with campaign processes that

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135 Christiansen, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 23 [Original wording: “werden die klassischen Medien am Ende im kommenden Wahlkampf immer noch eine Hauptrolle in der Meinungsbildung spielen, denn sie sind immer noch für die meisten Menschen die erste Informationsquelle.”]

136 Schrade, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 24 [Original wording: “Aber was FAZ, Spiegel, BILD & CO. schreiben, geht auch durch die sozialen Netzwerke und wird dort oft zum Tagethema. Klassische Medien entscheiden also weiterhin, worüber gesprochen wird.”]

137 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 68

are almost continuous. “There’s no such thing as an off year anymore. [...] Campaign cycles once measured in months and weeks are now measured in hours and minutes.”

While there used to be daily, quite well-defined news cycles, today news goes in and out on a 24/7 basis. "Within minutes of a major announcement or development, opinions are formed, positions are staked out by the principals, and any response that sounds 'conventional' will likely be ignored or treated as something other than wise." Therefore, campaign managers and spin doctors need to react far more quickly than in the past.

With the rise of a media democracy, professional campaign management needs adapt to new habits of the electorate. It has to cope with the challenges of shorter attention spans and nonstop flows of information that voters are faced with.

Today’s campaigns therefore need to be focused on mass media. This has direct influence on internal organization of campaigns: “Media-centered campaigns are centralized campaigns. But communications management not only needs to have an eye on campaign headquarters crew, leaders of parliamentary groups or on the government, but on all campaigners. Actual communicators are not the few professionals at the tip of the organization, but also local party leaders when they visit a local newspaper.”

Campaign managers attempt to react to this trend by devoting more importance to political staging, symbolic policies and pseudo-events. For German campaigners, US campaigns still represent the role model in this regard where party conventions are staged in party-like atmospheres. In addition, “important informal contacts to journalists, whose selection and supervision must be done with particular attention” serve as direct channels of communication to the media. By continuously nurturing those contacts, campaign managers and spin doctors attempt to exert influence on relevant media channels. Increased importance to advertising in media, particularly on television, also leads to increased costs. “Therefore, political actors have a strong incentive to supplement these

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139 Faucheux (1), ‘Introduction’, 22
140 McCurry, ‘Mass Media Politcs’, 470
142 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 55 [Original wording: "wichtige informelle Kontakte zu Journalisten, deren Auswahl und Betreuung mit besonderer Aufmerksamkeit durchgeführt werden müssen."]
'paid' media by 'free' media [...], through appearances in the news and other political programs on television as well as in the press.”

Digital media has the potential to take over core functions in campaign management. “By now, digital channels are indispensable to mobilize own supporters.” This view is shared by many other practitioners. Michael Spreng adds that “politically internet can only work when it is understood as participation media. This includes publicly discussing drafts for party programs as well as drafts for laws. For today’s politicians it is more important and more efficient to build up Facebook communities [...] rather than organizing elective assemblies.”

In conclusion, it may be stated that the rise of a media democracy is likely to have brought the most significant changes to campaign management during the past decades. While it brought a range of new challenges related to the increase of the overall velocity of campaigns, it also brought opportunities to each campaign mostly on the digital level. Particularly communications with followers and supporters have become much easier. Campaign managers need to make use of these opportunities while, at the same time, attempt to limit negative influences on their work. "Too many contemporary campaigners are allowing the stress of media inquiry and rapid-fire technology to rob them of their dignity.” Media therefore certainly plays a central role in contemporary campaigns and needs to be used to enhance communications with voters and intra-campaign communications, but campaign managers need to be aware of the pitfalls.

3.1.2. Decreasing political interest / Change in communication with voters

Another major development all parties in Germany are faced with is a continuous decrease in political interest among the electorate. Political topics are not the main issues anymore that are being discussed at regulars’ tables. The most visible result of this development is the decrease in turnout. While in the 1970’s turnouts were around 90%147, it declined to

143 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 8
146 Faucheux (1), ‘Introduction’, 22
70.9 % in 2009\textsuperscript{148}. The share of voters who are actually interested in politics is even lower. In fact, "the number of truly concerned, interested citizens has been modest over the past decade - about 30 percent are interested in campaigns."\textsuperscript{149} By assuming that regular citizens closely follow activities of parties and candidates, party activists would make a "fatal mistake".\textsuperscript{150}

Decreased political interest also has an effect on campaign management: “Parties depend on their members and followers. For instance, they are the ones who staff info booths, run events, are ready to discuss issues and therefore locally represent the party’s offer to the electorate.”\textsuperscript{151} While candidates increasingly become the center of attention in campaigns, they are not necessarily a decisive factor. "Only when a dramatic, crosscutting issue divides the electorate would voters be swayed by candidate appeals."\textsuperscript{152} Neither are they the ones who raise the most substantial part of financial resources. This is particularly important since financial resources play in increasingly important role. “Campaigns cost money, a lot of money. Therefore, parties rely on donations. But in times of funding scandals, mistrust is spreading and so is the old prejudice, parties could swim in money.”\textsuperscript{153}

One of the strategies to counter this development is to attempt to communicate with voters directly. Since they are not used to that, voters are not only surprised, but also have the feeling that they (and their concerns) are being taken seriously.\textsuperscript{154}

The other strategy is to change intra-campaign communications from a top-down to a bottom-up model. With the top-down model being the traditional way of running a

\textsuperscript{148} See: www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/bundestagswahlen/55588/nach-bundeslaendern [accessed on 27th July 2015]
\textsuperscript{149} Burton and Shea, \textit{Campaign Craft}, 38
\textsuperscript{150} Gerster, 'Botschaften und Bilder', 99
\textsuperscript{151} Plank, 'Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?', 73 [Original wording: “Parteien sind auf ihre Mitglieder und Sympathisanten angewiesen. Sie sind es, die in den Wochen vor der Wahl beispielsweise Infostände besetzen, Veranstaltungen durchführen, als Diskussionspartner zur Verfügung stehen und so vor Ort für das Angebot der Parteien an die Wähler stehen.”]
\textsuperscript{152} Burton and Shea, \textit{Campaign Craft}, 5
\textsuperscript{154} Plank, 'Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?', 74
campaign, this used to be the main choice of German parties. Only on the first view, such a change seems to contradict with the overall assumption that campaigns are run like dictatorships, rather than democracies: “It is the duty of political campaign leaders to define the main message and focus topics of a campaign as well as the presentation of the candidate.” However, the 2009 Obama campaign showed that it is indeed possible to have a strong hierarchical order and a bottom-up focus at the same time. While there was clear leadership by his campaign managers under the auspices of David Axelrod “a large number of volunteers were appointed as organizers of the campaign and led to increased independence of the campaign according to the bottom-up principle.” The biggest challenge hereby was to create a large number of multipliers who were able to convince their surroundings of the candidate and to acquire new potential supporters. Particularly since "volunteers take time to organize and they are sometimes unreliable", management of a bottom-up approach needs to be straightforward: “As outlined in an 80-page manual, volunteers were trained to be specific organizers according to their interests and talents. After completion of a four-day seminar they received titles such as team coordinator, data coordinator, volunteer coordinator, voter registry coordinator or voter contact coordinator. In addition, everywhere in the country precinct captains were trained.”

By applying a bottom-up approach, communications with the voter is not only changed, hence more direct, but also the vast potential of volunteers (in business speak: cheap resources) may be used. The general tendency of decreased political interest is countered

155 Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder 'Yes, We Gähn!'?, 196
157 Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder 'Yes, We Gähn!'?, 195 [Original wording: „Eine große Zahl von Freiwilligen wurde selbst zu Organisatoren der Kampagne gemacht und damit eine Verselbstständigung der Kampagne von unten nach dem 'bottom-up'-Prinzip herbeigeführt.”]
158 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 139
by an approach that specifically uses the natural surroundings, i.e. neighbors, family, etc. of targeted voters to provide them with personal relations to the party, candidate or the message of a campaign. The feeling of being approached personally and being personally engaged may play an important role by activating resources that could be decisive on Election Day.

3.1.3. Increasing volatility of voters / Late deciding voters

Recent federal elections in Germany have shown comparably large differences between results projected by polling institutions and actual election results. While one can draw the conclusion that polling institutions simply failed in providing an accurate picture, another explanation seems to be more likely: At the time of the poll, respondents simply have not made up their minds. This hypothesis underlines the fact that the share of late deciding voters consistently increases. Even “polls a few days before the election often deviate from the final result. Most important reasons are the voters’ late readiness to decide and the decreasing turnout.”\textsuperscript{160}

McAllister sums up that "this new phenomenon of the late deciding voter is often traced to partisan dealignment; with fewer voters possessing affective loyalties to the major parties, they enter the election campaign undecided about their vote and therefore more susceptible to the issues, appeals and themes which emerge during the course of the campaign."\textsuperscript{161}

For campaign management, this leads to an important conclusion: There is an increasingly large share of voters still reachable during the run of a campaign. Hence, an increasingly large number of voters are still available to be politically influenced by a well-run campaign.

3.1.4. Decreasing party identification

During the first decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, voting decisions of large parts of the electorate were literally pre-determined. Unlike today, it was not only clear to voters to cast their ballots in an election, they often voted for the same party during their entire life according

\textsuperscript{160} Schönenborn, ‘Demoskopie in der beschleunigten Stimmungsdemokratie’, 312 [Original wording: “[...] dass auch Umfragen wenige Tage vor der Wahl häufig noch stark vom späteren Ergebnis abweichen. Wichtigste Gründe sind die immer spätere Entscheidungsbereitschaft der Wähler und die nachlassende Wahlbeteiligung”]

\textsuperscript{161} McAllister, ‘Calculating or capricious?’, 22
to their social class. Working class people, for instance, had a tendency to vote in favor of the social democrats. This was due to a strong identification with a certain party. Already Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the ‘Michigan School’ considered party identification as a “powerful explanatory factor of electoral choice.”

Today, German parties are faced with an increasing number of swing and non-voters. While some are neither party members, nor core voters, “many do not want to be voters at all.” There are a few explanations for this development. Some scholars argue that "party politics are important, but there are other forces: ideology, personal finance, imagery, a sense of identity, and so forth." While this argument seems logical, one can ask what has brought the change to party identification over time. Have the above-mentioned factors not played a role 50 years ago? While this explanation seems to be unlikely, it is more sensible that parties themselves were largely responsible for the decline in party identification: “There are factors that encourage change as well as restrictions. As cause for the failure of changes, crises and party affairs [CDU] as well as intra-party conflicts may be named. Hence, internal conflicts between ideological wings, unfavorable personnel situations and sometimes also detrimental communication cultures hinder the development and implementation of organizational, content-related as well as communicative strategies for further development of the party.” It seems that this explanation provides an inconvenient truth for parties. Rather than blaming sociocultural developments, parties themselves play a major role in the decrease of party identification. Rather than tackling this issue with determination, parties seem to ignore it. According to Michael Spreng the reason is that “parties would promptly come to the conclusion that the shortage of democracy within the party is a central cause for lack of engagement for democracy.”

Rather than dealing with this conclusion, there is a tendency to hide the current legitimacy crisis. Spreng further reminds parties that “turnout is a result of political participation. A

162 Lachat and Sciarini, ‘When do election campaign matter, and to whom?’, 42
163 Steingart, ‘Politik mit Volk’, 72 [Original wording: Viele wollen gar keine Wähler mehr sein.”]
164 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 7
166 Spreng, ‘Frischzellenkur’, 301 [Original wording: „kämen die Parteien schnell zu dem Schluss, dass der Mangel an realer innerparteitlicher Demokratie eine der zentralen Ursachen für den Mangel an Engagement für die Demokratie ist.”]
result of the chance to participate outside of established party structures rather than just casting a vote every four or five years.”  

Scholars agree that parties have not yet reacted appropriately to counter the crisis in party identification. Schöneborn draws a comparison to business and economics describing this crisis as market failure in which provided supply (of political offerings) is not as demanded anymore as in the past.  

For campaign management this leads to two important conclusions:
- There is a growing share of the electorate that can potentially be influenced in their voting decision by a campaign.
- Parties have to make more effort to convince people to vote than in the past.

The swing vote that was defined in chapter 2.2.5 has been growing. "Party identification has a sheltering effect, meaning that it protects citizens from the influence of the campaign. This is not to say that party identifiers will not pay any attention to the campaign, but that their party identification will strongly bias the way they process new information." Since swing and non-voters are the main targets of campaigns, there is a direct effect of decreasing party identification on relevance of campaigns for election success. At the same time, campaigns face the challenge that due to “increasing unemployment, small and large scandals, resignings, the ghost of radical right-wing groups, new bourgeois protest parties [...] election campaigns are advertising campaigns in a sector with a horrific image.”

3.2. Contemporary campaign management

Campaigning has reached a remarkable level of professionalism. Contemporary campaigns are largely organized similarly to private business entities. Outsourcing and modularization of tasks into processes are just two characteristics. "The professionalization of political campaigns stems partly from the efficiency of well-executed modularization." There is an increasing awareness that well-organized campaigns are a key element for success. In the 2013 SPD election campaign this became particularly visible when it became known to

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168 Schönenborn, ‘Demoskopie in der beschleunigten Stimmungsdemokratie’, e317

169 Lachat and Sciarini, ‘When do election campaign matter, and to whom?’, 43


171 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 17
the media that “topic in the hallways of Willy-Brandt-Building is not success chances of the candidates, but the deficiencies of single campaign members.”¹⁷² There had been great confusion regarding competences as well as internal “trench warfare” ¹⁷³.

Sticking to this martial wording, "for a political strategist, campaigns are civilized warfare, a form of single combat.”¹⁷⁴ Scholars suggest that campaigns need congruent management that is able to react quickly to unexpected situations. "While the strategic goal of professional campaigning remains the same as it ever was - finding enough votes to win an election - the tools of the trade have undergone, and continue to undergo, a permanent technological revolution.”¹⁷⁵ In the following, contemporary campaign management is analyzed and described. Data therefore stems from both, secondary sources as well as from interviews with distinguished campaigning experts.

### 3.2.1. Party Organization

Before campaign management is examined, it is important to define influential factors on management decisions. In this regard, the most interesting question to ask is “how large is the influence of party organizations to management decisions in campaigns?” The term ‘party organization’ refers to permanent party committees and institutions that have a saying in basic political decision-making. Other than in the United States, even party leaders are very loyal to party organizations. “Under American circumstances, talented younger German politicians such as Andrea Nahles or Sigmar Gabriel, but also popular mayors like Petra Roth in Frankfurt or Christian Ude in Munich would have challenged party establishment long ago.”¹⁷⁶ The extent to which party organization plays a role for the campaign can be illustrated in the process of how an election manifesto is being developed and what function it serves. Such manifestos are being developed and adopted by party conventions. Unlike one might assume this is not a pseudo-democratic process. Rather they are actual discussions and debates on content. This leads to the fact that electoral

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¹⁷³ Medick, 'Struktur für SPD-Wahlkampf'

¹⁷⁴ Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 206

¹⁷⁵ Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 3

¹⁷⁶ Steingart, 'Politik mit Volk', 73 [Original wording: “Unter den amerikanischen Bedingungen hätten talentierte jüngere deutsche Politiker vom Schlage einer Andrea Nahles oder eines Sigmar Gabriel, aber auch populäre Oberbürgermeister wie Petra Roth in Frankfurt und Christian Ude in München vermutlich längst das Parteiestablishment herausgefordert.”]
manifestos have an internally integrating function that both serves as a tool for mobilization and to discipline the respective party wings. The external advertising effect should not be overestimated.

In Germany, campaign leaders have an important hinge function between campaign organization and party organization. On behalf of leading party committees, they steer the campaign. Hence, party leaders as well as external consultants or researchers are often represented in campaign management functions. This applies to both, leading functions as well as responsibilities aspects of the campaign. Although some scholars argue that “by now, influence of party committees on real decisions in the framework of campaign planning and implementation can be considered as low” 177, there are still strong indicators that party organization indeed does have strong influence on how a campaign is run. “If you have to rely on the support of the party, which is more than likely, you’ll need to be diplomatic. Sit down with party leaders and get a complete understanding of their wishes and strategies as they pertain to your campaign” 178

3.2.2. Campaigning as a management task

Most of the available research analyzes campaigns from a political point of view. It elaborates on its function for democracy and sheds light on campaign-voter communications. As described above, this work applies a different view. “A relatively new branch in Germany is functional campaign research that covers organizational, technical and communicative aspects from the viewpoint of acting players. For them, campaigning is a modern management task like everything else that has to be handled in order to reach the best possible result.” 179 Regarding campaigning as a management task is the basic rationale of this work. Well-respected campaign managers such as Peter Radunski have advocated this on a number of occasions. 180 American campaign expert Joe Napolitan realizes that "If your candidate wins, it's because of his charm, appeal and powers of

177 Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 87 [Original wording: “Mittlerweile kann der Einfluss der Parteigremien auf die reale Entscheidungen im Rahmen der Wahlkampfplanung und -umsetzung als gering erachtet werden.”]
178 Fujan, ‘Hiring the Right Telephone Consultants and Vendors’, 559
179 Hetterich, Von Adenauer zu Schröder, der Kampf um Stimmen, 22 [Original wording: “Ein für Deutschland relativ neuer Zweig ist die funktionalistische Wahlkampfforschung, die aus Sicht der handelnden Akteure organisatorische, technische und kommunikative Aspekte behandelt. Für sie ist Wahlkampfführung eine moderne Managementaufgabe wie andere auch, die zu bewältigen ist, um ein bestmögliches Ergebnis erreichen zu können.”]
180 Radunski, Wahlkämpfe, 24
persuasion; if he loses, it's your fault."¹⁸¹ In the end, even top-notch politicians admit that a well-organized campaign was crucial for their success: "Incumbents tell us they would not have been elected if their past campaigns were not correctly run."¹⁸²

When regarding contemporary campaign management as a regular management task, it becomes obvious that many conclusions can be drawn from management of private corporations. "Because political campaigns share many of the same day-to-day processes as corporations, we can learn from corporate experience. Both campaigns and corporations have a specific goal - to elect a candidate or increase profit. They have an operating structure focused by a leader - campaign manager or president or CEO. Both campaigns and corporations raise money. They mobilize staff and other stakeholders to accomplish specific objectives. Both need to reach a targeted public audience, using the media and events to demonstrate credibility and increase brand awareness."¹⁸³

There is no such thing as a blueprint for campaign organization. Every campaign is to some extent unique (how unique it is will be elaborated at a later stage). "The contours of a campaign plan will vary from candidate to candidate, campaign to campaign, and consultant to consultant."¹⁸⁴ For a limited amount of time, the campaign takes over both, coordination and steering of political messages.¹⁸⁵ For campaign managers this implies that they have to manage a team that includes a variety of experts: from fundraisers to communication experts, from pollsters to district managers.

Just as in private businesses, this is impossible to fulfill without a profound strategy. "Strategy is the single most important factor in a political campaign [...]. Even a brilliant campaign is likely to fail if the strategy is wrong. The strategy must be adapted to fit the campaign; you cannot adapt the campaign to fit the strategy."¹⁸⁶ The strategy further needs to comply with the fact financial as well as human resources are limited (just as in private corporations). Therefore, "political support must be nurtured, identified, recruited and activated. Limited capital must be optimized. Ad hoc assemblages of human resources, often under the most chaotic and emotionally charged conditions must be managed."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸¹ Napolitan, ‘Napolitan’s Rules’, 45
¹⁸² Bender, Grant and Nagle, ‘Campaign Self-Examinations’, 106
¹⁸³ Oeffinger, ‘Computer Conferences’, 324
¹⁸⁴ Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 27
¹⁸⁵ Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 19
¹⁸⁶ Napolitan, ‘Napolitan’s Rules’, 26
¹⁸⁷ Faucheux (1), ‘Introduction’, 20
Depending on the size, amount of supporters and available resources, parties have to adapt their strategy to the circumstances. "Campaigns with money to spare might pay attention to coverage, while those that are short on funds might decide to go with efficiency."\(^{188}\)

### 3.2.3. Organizational management

Organization is a crucial element of successful campaigns. Although there is a permanent party organization, campaigns place considerable demands on the respective organization. “A campaign is that period in the permanent competition of parties in which parties make additional organizational and content-related efforts to gain votes.”\(^{189}\)

To manage organizations, leadership skills are a basic prerequisite. But what is the appropriate leadership style for campaigns? Due to immense time pressure and the necessity to react quickly to unforeseen events, scholars agree that authoritarian leadership styles are more appropriate than laissez-faire styles. Often parallels to military organizations are drawn. "Napoleon believed that there is nothing more important than unity of command. Campaigns should be run by dictatorships, not committees. Time is everything, and decision-making moves much too quickly for you to sit around and get everybody's input. Few statues were ever built to honor a committee."\(^{190}\) This implies that successful contemporary campaigns require tight organization, stringent concepts and strong leadership skills. "Campaigns are crazy enough as it is. Vague job descriptions not only waste time and resources, they spur turf warfare. You are much better off if your staff's competitive juices are being directed toward the opposing campaign rather than each other."\(^{191}\) An important element to achieve this is a clear and thought out campaign plan that describes what is to be done by whom and what instruments need to be used. "Election and referendum campaigns can be seen as complex processes of purposive political communication that are essentially 'top down', originating from campaign organizations like parties, candidate's support organizations, government institutions or interest groups, and aimed at the mass public in its entirety or at specific 'target'...

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\(^{188}\) Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 89  

\(^{190}\) Sweitzer, ‘War Without Blood’, 99  
\(^{191}\) Editors of Campaigns & Elections, ‘50 Things never to Do in a Political Campaign’, 60
segments.” Nevertheless, even leadership requirements in campaign organization have undergone a process of evolution. With increased involvement of external actors and an increasing degree of professionalism, top-down structures have become increasingly important. "Studies of developments in political campaigning over the last two decades note marked changes in the way that elections are managed. It appears now to be the normative view that campaigns are highly strategic and coordinated affairs under the control of small cadres at the top of party structures. These campaign teams will rely heavily on the advice of consultants, often from the commercial sector, who will be embedded within the coordinating body." However, clear organizational structure and authoritarian leadership styles must not undermine the development of a sense of team spirit in the team. Efficiency and capabilities to react quickly can only be assured if the individual parts of the team mesh together. "For a campaign to function at an optimal level, the staff must work as a team. Staff meetings not only allow you to exchange information, but reinforce the cooperative aspect of the campaign." 

Another important aspect is whether or not a campaign is centralized or decentralized. While authoritarian leadership style initially suggests a rather centralized approach, the sheer size of electoral territory in national elections provides a solid argument for decentralized organization. At the same time, however, control is an important aspect in providing the electorate with clear and coordinated messages. Therefore, centralization seems to be more appropriate when there are strong local constituencies. “Centralization of campaigning is perhaps appropriate for political systems where there is little link between voting and local representation. Under proportional representation votes are cast solely to gain representation within national political legislatures.” However, given the above-described tendency towards more professionalization, "it is difficult to contest the accuracy of claims that campaigning has become centralized and a more professional affair."

One of the characteristics of increased professionalism is the rise of ‘war rooms’. Those represent a centralized campaign quarter which purpose is to react quickly to unforeseen

192 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 5
193 Lilleker, ‘Local campaign Management’, 979
194 Editors of Campaigns & Elections, ‘50 Things never to Do in a Political Campaign’, 65
195 Lilleker, ‘Local campaign Management’, 982
196 Lilleker, ‘Local campaign Management’, 980–1
situations. The fact that “large campaign organizations need a ‘war room’ as strategic center is considered an unshakable lesson of the 1990’s. Unfortunately also the misunderstanding is spreading that an external headquarter, hence separate from party headquarters, is absolutely necessary.”

In conclusion, it is necessary to adapt management style as well as organization to the actual circumstances of the campaign. In cases where local constituencies are rather weak or less decisive due to smaller electoral areas, centralized campaign management seems to be more sensible.

3.2.4. Managing business processes

The basic assumption of this study is that management processes in campaign organization can be defined and described as business processes just as in private business entities. When describing a campaign as a set of processes that go hand in hand, it is necessary to define what is meant with the term ‘business process’. A business process describes a set of structured tasks that produces a particular product or service for the consumer or customer. As early as in the 1780’s, Adam Smith elaborated on business processes in his famous pin factory example. Being an important element of the ‘division of labor” concept, a business process “characterizes a logically structured series of activities, respectively subprocesses that characterize the business of an enterprise. They serve the purpose to provide the customer with more or less clearly defined output (performance) made from a specific input und ultimately aim at the implementation of business goals and protection of business success. This means that business processes create costs and take time.”

When defining the work of a campaign as a set of business processes, it means that a campaign consists of many small modules that need to be managed. "Contemporary campaigns are built by adapting pretested components to the particular needs of different localities, candidacies, and constituencies.”

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198 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 15 [Original wording: "Demzufolge charakterisiert er eine logisch strukturierte Abfolge von Aktivitäten bzw. Teilprozessen, die das Geschäft eines Unternehmens charakterisieren. Sie dienen dem Zweck, aus einem bestimmten Input ein mehr oder minder klar definiertes Output (Leistung) für einen bestimmten Abnehmer zu erbringen, und zielen letztendlich auf die Umsetzung der Unternehmensziele und Sicherung des Unternehmenserfolgs ab. Dies induziert, dass Geschäftsprozesse Kosten verursachen und Zeit in Anspruch nehmen.”]

199 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 16
Although campaigns need a certain degree of individual approach, some processes can be found in any campaign. "Campaign consultants formulate a basic strategy and then mix and match preexisting slogans, color schemes, policy stands, and media strategies to suit a range of clients. Campaigns, in this sense, are neither handcrafted, as in the days of retail campaigning, nor mass-produced."\(^{200}\)

Campaign managers can define which processes should be defined as core processes and which as support processes. Not only can a hierarchy and thus a ranking order of priorities be defined, but campaign managers can easily decide to outsource certain processes.

According to business processes, roles and responsibilities in a campaign are defined with the campaign manager being the supervisor and strategists.

### 3.2.5. Campaign manager

While the candidate is the focus of media attention and naturally the most important person in a campaign for the electorate, campaign managers are the most decisive staff members for the campaign itself. The campaign manager is “the person who runs the entire campaign operation, implements strategy, oversees staff, coordinates consultants.”\(^{201}\)

There is no doubt that wishes and convictions of the candidates need to be represented in the campaign. However, during campaigns, candidates are driven by their extremely tight schedules. They simply do not have the time to take care of everyday business or to develop long-term strategies. Campaign managers take this role. Scholars as well as practitioners agree “the ultimate responsibility for making campaign decisions should rest with the campaign manager.”\(^{202}\)

There is no such thing as a job description for campaign managers. Nevertheless, Peter Radunski, who is probably Germany’s most experienced campaigning expert, defines a set of competences that should be given to the campaign manager:\(^{203}\):

- Direct access to the candidate and party leaders
- Membership/participation in all committees and meetings relevant for the campaign

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\(^{200}\) Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 16

\(^{201}\) Faucheux (2), ‘Writing your Campaign Plan’, 76–77

\(^{202}\) Napolitan, ‘Napolitan’s Rules’, 47

\(^{203}\) Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 87
- Budgetary sovereignty
- Authority on the definition of the campaign schedule
- Sovereignty over campaigning measures

The campaign manager serves as team leader and chief strategist. "A strong manager makes a consultant’s life easier by reducing internal problems that may have needed their attention. Managers should also work to make sure the consultants are meeting their goals on time and within the established budget." Further, the campaign manager should always know where every campaign staffer can be reached in case of an unexpected event. The manager should have clear competences and be superior to specialized consultants. "Managing a campaign means managing the consultants. Manage your consultants - or else they will manage you."

This leads to the question of what personal competences and characters campaign managers need to have? Peter Radunski adds to a set of competences he declares as indispensable for a successful manager:

- Knowledge about party history, program and policies
- Political conviction
- Knowledge about internal organization and decision making processes
- Knowledge about communications channels to the voters
- Willingness to work together with PR agencies.

Campaign managers should therefore have a strong character with in-depth knowledge of the party and a political sense. Further, "managers need to sacrifice their own aspirations or popularity in order to take difficult actions, for example, challenging debate sponsors over a proposed format." Since the campaign manager is surrounded by staff that consists of experts in their respective field, he/she must be willing to accept that his/her employees have an advantage of knowledge in their specialist area. The professional background of campaign managers can vary. "Campaign managers usually come in one of three types: (a) professionals who go from one election to another, (b) amateurs who are

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205 Dupré and Gull, ‘Advise for First-Time Campaign Managers’, 310
206 Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 87
so good at it that they become professionals and (c) amateurs who have other careers and take on the job to help a friend or to further a cause.\textsuperscript{208} Largely this depends on the financial background of the campaign. "The independent professionals who have become the core of the campaign team expect direct payment for their labors."\textsuperscript{209} Although financial resources are also limited in campaigns on the national level, having amateur campaign managers would be a remarkable exception. The trend of professionalism has reached campaigns to an extent that they are either staffed with competent party members or with outside professionals.

3.2.6. Campaign Staff

There is no such thing as a blue print to show how staffing should look. It varies from campaign to campaign. Nevertheless, there are roles that are somehow represented in the vast majority of campaign organizations. Those will be outlined in the following. Managing human resources is a core competence of any campaign manager. "If you don't have control of the checkbook, you aren't really the manager. Your job is to work with your candidate and consultants to make choices where to allocate precious resources, whether time or money."\textsuperscript{210} Just like in private enterprises, resources are limited. This applies to human just as to financial resources. Therefore, it is of utmost important to fill decisive positions with appropriate persons and to stay flexible. "Forget about recruiting the 'perfect' staff. Organize staffing by tasks and function. Even if you have it in July, it won't be there in October. Some will quit for better paying jobs or to spend more time with their families. Some will jump to other campaigns. Others won't work out."\textsuperscript{211} However, scholars underline that if there was one field where money should be spent, it is experienced and competent campaign staff. "Although all campaigns must be conscious of costs, price shouldn't dictate which consultant or vendor is chosen. Campaigns need to look for value,

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{campaign_staff.png}
\caption{Campaign staff}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{208} Faucheux (2), 'Writing your Campaign Plan', 77
\textsuperscript{209} Burton and Shea, \textit{Campaign Craft}, 9
\textsuperscript{210} Dupré and Gull, 'Advise for First-Time Campaign Managers', 310
\textsuperscript{211} Dupré and Gull, 'Advise for First-Time Campaign Managers', 312
Regardless of what function an employee serves, a core competence is to have a sense for political developments. Therefore, staffing a campaign with proven experts in their relevant field, but who do not have a political background is a risk that is not worth taking. "It’s better to hire a media consultant with a strong political background. But if one is not available or affordable, and if you’re forced to rely on people with campaign experience, make sure someone with a political background - such as a general consultant, pollster or campaign manager - supervises the ad production and directs concept, message and the writing of copy."

Specialization of staff and, hence, opinions of staff members is a valuable good that should not be underestimated. Consultants are a campaign manager’s most valuable resource, whether they come from inside or outside. They offer experience that campaign managers themselves might not have.

Generally, staff can be divided into three categories: Internal experts, external experts and individuals who come from the closer surroundings of the candidate. "Every candidate has a circle of close friends whom he or she has known for years and whose opinions he respects. These people are trusted confidantes and have only the candidate’s best interests at heart."

They might be experts in certain fields or have a particular sense for the candidate’s personality, respectively political developments.

**Finance director**

There is no such thing as a free lunch. No matter whether a campaign organization solely consists of non-paid volunteers or of much-praised professionals, there are costs that need to be covered and finances that need to be managed. Without financial resources, there is no campaign. It is as simple as this. Therefore, "the finance director is the most important person in any campaign, other than the candidate and the campaign manager. If the director fails to raise the necessary funds, the campaign will falter."

When recruiting staff, campaign managers therefore need to clearly define who will be responsible for finance. In large organizations, this is a full-time job. However, in smaller races campaign managers might as well take over the role of the finance director, holding everything in their hands that is of managerial importance.

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212 Cherry, 'Hiring the Right Telephone Consultants and Vendors', 556
213 Faucheux (2), 'Writing your Campaign Plan', 75
214 Editors of Campaigns & Elections, '50 Things never to Do in a Political Campaign', 61
215 Bennett, 'Gearing Up Your Finance Committee', 263
Consultants

Consultants to the campaign can either be actual members of the campaign organization or could be hired externally. "Though capabilities vary, most good consultants provide strategy advice as well as produce and place ads. Some are highly experienced in politics and will assume the role of chief strategist."216 The question whether campaigns are actually willing to employ external consultants in matters of strategy will be analyzed at a later stage of the study. Some parties are in the position to have experienced staff that have taken part in many campaigns over a long period of time. Experienced personnel might as well serve as consultants at a later stage of their career. A prominent example of this model would be Peter Radunski, who served as campaign manager for many years and now works as a private consultant. In addition, other fields of specialized consultants include fundraising, direct mail, telephone contact, web sites and database management".

Media Consultants

Media consultants are important specialists who have become increasingly significant for the success of a campaign. Depending on campaign budget, media consultants either stick to their defined role or additionally assume a strategy function. Michael Spreng in the 2002 CDU campaign was an important consultant to candidate Edmund Stoiber. Despite his media background he did not only serve as a media consultant. Rather he was also tasked with overall strategic questions and served as a main advisor to the campaign.

Media consultants are a rather new phenomenon that is closely linked to the rise of media democracy. "In the early 1990s, few political professionals had heard of the Internet, but in the new millennium a strong presence on the World Wide Web is considered essential."217 Hence, job descriptions in campaign organizations have evolved. Today, media consultants are a central element of a campaign. Their main task is to "maximize the number of times that eligible voters can be reached with a campaign pitch, either through paid advertising or through news coverage."218 In close cooperation with campaign managers and general strategy consultants they develop campaign messages and ensure

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216 Faucheux, (2) ‘Writing your Campaign Plan’, 74
217 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 173
218 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 162
their distribution. Media consultants may either have a party background or come from external sources, mainly from PR agencies.

As described above, political experience is a core competence for campaign staff. This does not apply only to general consultants, but also to personnel tasked with media issues. "Media consultants with limited political experience - such as a local advertising or PR agency that makes ads primarily for grocery stores and car dealers - should be limited to technical or creative tasks such as designing logos and sign, taping and editing TV spots, etc." Preferred media consultant staff is therefore a senior member of a PR agency with good reputation who is either a member of the party he/she is willing to work for or already has experience in past campaigns.

Spin Doctors

Being a rather new phenomenon, there is an urgent need to define this function. “Spin Doctor is a term difficult to translate that did not appear in dictionaries of the 1970’s. It is meant to be a kind of witch doctor of campaigning, a miracle healer who brews the appropriate magic potion at the right time to even lead ‘underdogs’ to victory.” Hence, Spin Doctors interpret particular developments or events in a way for the public that is most helpful for the party to reach the goal of a successful campaign. In Germany, Peter Radunski can be considered as one of the first spin doctors in the 1980’s. The first time a spin doctor gained public attention was in 1997, when Peter Mandelson was responsible for Tony Blair’s campaign in the UK and for the transition of his party to “New Labour”. This was picked up by German Social Democrats who introduced Bodo Hombach as Spin Doctor for Gerhard Schröder’s campaign. Some scholars argue that “the great years of Spin Doctors are over. Self-staging, always a considerable part of their professional performance, doesn’t work in the media anymore.” Nevertheless, Spin Doctors still are needed not only for public interpretation, but also to quickly find common speech in all party constituencies. “As long as polling institutes ‘only’ present forecasts or first

219 Faucheux (2), ‘Writing your Campaign Plan’, 74
projections, the time frame for adventurous interpretation is still open since one can always refer to the provisional nature of the results. Naturally, this ‘spin’ is coordinated internally in a party – particularly in state elections it is striking how identical wording in state parliaments and Berlin is.”

*Polling & Research*

Polling is a task seldomly performed by internal campaign members. Generally, it is performed by polling institutes that have long history and experience in their field. Polling is considered key when it comes to development of strategies. “I would not underestimate the strategic handling of polling results as a central instrument of campaigning, particularly when both coalition formations that are up for elections do not have a prospect of reaching the majority.” Polling experts and researchers who either further analyze the behavior of voters or perform background searches on relevant issues are staff that can be found in almost every campaign organization.

"Voters clearly respond to targeted, precise information, effectively delivered by either the press or the candidates. Today’s realities leave little room for error in a candidate's organization and presentation." Despite the fact that some scholars point out that polling has become less important to the increase of late deciding voters, outcomes of polls and research still represent an important basis for every campaign. Data is gathered that needs to be managed. "Database management - if the campaign is large enough, you may need full-time staff to handle this function. If not, a part-time paid or volunteer consultant will do." Ultimately it depends on the parameters of the campaign whether this task is performed internally or externally, with professionals or with volunteers.

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222 Schönenborn, 'Demoskopie in der beschleunigten Stimmungsdemokratie', 314 [Original wording: "Solange die Institute ‘nur’ eine Prognose oder erste Hochrechnungen vorlegen, man also immer noch auf die Vorläufigkeit der Ergebnisse verweisen kann, scheint das Zeitfenster geöffnet für abenteuerliche Interpretationen. Dieses ‘Spinning’ wird natürlich parteiintern abgesprochen - denn gerade bei Landtagswahlen fällt auf, wie wortgleich in den Landtage und in Berlin kommentiert wird."]

222 Korte, 'Contribution in the conference', 16 [Original wording: "Den strategischen Umgang mit demoskopischen Ergebnissen würde ich als ein zentrales Instrument der Wahlkampfführung nicht unterschätzen, zumal wenn die beiden zu wählenden Koalitionsformationen keine Aussicht auf eine Mehrheit haben.”

224 McCurry, 'Mass Media Politics', 474

225 Christiansen, 'Contribution in the conference', 23

226 Faucheux (2), 'Writing your Campaign Plan', 77
Communications

Communications directors have a three-way function: "they staff and oversee [...] the entire press / media / advertising operation and its coordination" in close cooperation with media consultants and the spin doctor. They need to ensure that internal communication is working and they have supervised communications that is performed by the candidate. "Some campaigns also make the mistake of failing to stay in contact with volunteers throughout the campaign cycle. While some campaigns continuously update their volunteers on activities and seek their assistance, far too many only call the volunteers at the last minute, when they are in pinch." It is a matter of efficiency. If communications directors do well in their job to shorten the distances with a campaign, the entire organization is able to move faster and quicker to unforeseen events. Candidates are in need of professional communications. "Media training political candidates has become an increasingly popular product for public relations companies and independent consultants." In times of fast-spreading news and when there is no day during a campaign the candidate is not seen on television this is an important aspect. So is the fact that candidates are extremely busy and rush from one appointment to the other. Therefore, communications with the candidate is a basic prerequisite for successful campaigns. “This rule seems obvious but too often candidate and campaign manager are too busy to proactively schedule time when problems can be discussed and decisions made.” Particularly in large organizations great attention needs to be brought to this issue.

Volunteers

For many decades, volunteers have served as the backbone of campaigns. "Historically, campaigns were run by armies of volunteers made up of family, friends, and party activists who used such time-honored tactics as neighborhood canvassing and street corner pamphleteering." Some volunteers were strong and loyal party supporters, others family members of candidates.

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227 Faucheux, (2) ‘Writing your Campaign Plan’, 78
228 Caroline, ‘Grassroots Politics’, 520
229 Ansell, ‘Picking a Media Trainer’, 462
231 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 3
Volunteers are important to campaigns for a number of reasons. The first aspect is that they are a comparably cheap resource. "Volunteers are a pain in the neck. But, like getting out of bed in the morning, they are an essential pain in the neck. First of all, despite their deficiencies, they do some work and they do it for free. Effective use of volunteers can reduce a campaign's payroll by 20 percent."232 Particularly when a campaign has limited financial resources or is running low on funds, volunteer operations may be a key element in campaign strategy.

Volunteers are most relevant for local campaigning. While professional campaign managers define the overall strategy, it would be almost impossible to cover all regions and villages in a national election without an army of volunteer supporters. "Local voluntary activists canvass the neighborhood and seek face-to-face discussions with their fellow citizens at street stands. They are also a human resource important for organizing the local rallies for candidates and party leaders."233 In this regard, volunteers serve as multipliers. A significant number of enthusiastic volunteers suggest that there is a strong emotional support for the respective party or candidate. This may lead to additional volunteers joining the campaign and further increased support. “Volunteers suggest to voters that the candidate is worthy of commitment. Volunteers, in other words, not only help deliver messages to voters - by licking envelopes, writing notes or telephoning friends - they are messages in themselves.”234 However, it is clear that a campaign cannot solely rely on volunteers. They are a precious resource, but they need to be motivated and guided.

Generally, there are two kinds of motivations behind voluntary engagement: (a) belief in the cause or (b) expectation of a benefit. Despite all changes in campaigns over time, Cicero’s observation is still valid: "They will only support you if they believe they have something to gain. If so, they will miss no chance to help you."235 For some supporters, this might be a potential job after a successful election, others solely expect benefits due to new policies according to the respective party program. Regardless of what the basic motivation is, all practitioners and scholars agree that conviction and enthusiasm are important factors in keeping voluntary staff motivated. “Convinced party supporters

232 Webb and Mockus, ‘Volunteer Recruitment’, 527
233 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 7
234 Webb and Mockus, ‘Volunteer Recruitment’, 527
235 Cicero, How to win an election, 47
continue to be the decisive factor in interpersonal communications and the decisive addition to mass communications, because they perform the actual persuasive work.”

They are the ones who talk to large parts of the electorate on the street and who have to argue in favor of their respective party. Current poll results may also play a role in how motivated voluntary staff is. "The supporters whose candidate is perceived as behind are motivated to work harder, while those of the candidate seen to be ahead tend to become overconfident and lazy.”

Enthusiasm and motivation alone do not automatically lead to an efficient and effective army of volunteers. There are also certain experiences that volunteers should have in order to be of real help to the campaign. "A persistent problem for political professionals is the impassioned amateur - the person with enthusiasm but little experience - who does not have the knowledge to put the campaign in perspective.” This does not necessarily mean that volunteers need specialized skills. For those tasks there are the above-mentioned specialists. Rather, general social communicative and persuasive skills are helpful. "Because so many people these days are competent on PCs, it feels logical to do it themselves rather than to pay a vendor. But just because a person writes letters doesn't mean he can also write a novel. Just because a person is competent with a video camera doesn't mean he should be making the campaign commercials.”

A campaign therefore may not solely consist of volunteers. Specialized professionals are essential. But volunteers represent the foot soldiers of a campaign. They “are absolutely essential and can take on a lot of responsibility in a campaign, but they don't substitute for professionally designed mail and other services you need.”

Ideally, there are a significant number of volunteers supporting a campaign. Volunteers are usually spread over the whole election area. There is an urgent need in communicating with them and coordinating their activities. For this purpose, particularly larger campaign require “volunteer program coordinators” - staffers paid or unpaid who organize door-to-door canvassing, phones, voter registration, absentee ballots, early voting efforts, postcard

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236 Radunski, Wahlkämpfe, 128 [Original wording: "Eine überzeugte Parteien-Anhängerschaft ist nach wie vor der entscheidende Faktor in der interpersonalen Kommunikation und die entscheidende Ergänzung zur Massenkommunikation, weil sie erst die eigentliche Überzeugungsarbeit leistet.”]
237 Napolitan, ‘Napolitan’s Rules’, 26
238 Napolitan, ‘Napolitan’s Rules’, 49
239 Blaemire, ‘Database Management’, 142
and letter writing, coffee parties, signs, rallies, get-out-the-vote operations, poll workers and Election Day legal teams." Some even argue that volunteer coordinators should belong to the core staff of a campaign, serving as the single point of contact. Not only is it the task of the volunteer coordinator to communicate with supporters and to mediate in case of quarrels, it is also their job to keep them busy and motivated. "To truly have an effective corps of volunteers, campaigns need to keep their volunteers engaged, or they will wither and die on the vine. It's far easier to maintain a volunteer base than it is to reactivate or re-create one from scratch." In conclusion, it can be said that volunteers represent both, a major challenge and an important support factor to the campaign. For campaign management it means that one has to differentiate between a core staff of specialists that is in the close surroundings of the campaign managers and a wider array of volunteer supporters who are likely to never be in personal touch with the campaign management.

3.2.7. Challenges & Conclusion

Campaigns are unusual times for parties. Relatively slim party organizations need to be temporarily enlarged to meet the demands of running a contemporary campaign. "The ‘fight’ before an election is fought on short-term with a high degree of financial as well as human resources in order to then release voters to the everyday life that is characterized by a minimum of attention coming from political actors and their persons in charge of marketing quickly after the election.” Hence, campaigns temporarily change organizational structures as well as decision-making processes of parties. Formerly simple questions become difficult and complex, and lobbying groups attempt to exert increased influence on party policies. Kellermann von Schele outlines the most important challenges management is faced with during the run of a campaign:

- Realistic judgment of the situation (current situation and condition of the party)
- Political strategy

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241 Faucheux (2), ‘Writing your Campaign Plan’, 77
242 Caroline, ‘Grassroots Politics’, 520
244 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 63
Communications strategy
- Effective campaign management
- Professional usage of instruments and techniques
- Coordination of party and candidate
- Linking topics with persons
- Monitoring and effective crisis management
- Tactics, flexibility, ability to react

Although staff in party headquarters and campaign staff have been increased during the
run of a campaign, particularly in fields related to online communications, campaign
managers must not aspire to reach all potential voters. “Resources are limited; there are
never enough people to staff info booths or call numbers on phone lists, there is never
enough money to place further ads on radio or newspapers”

For campaign managers this means that they have to cope with the challenge of very
uncertain environments, scarcities of resources and staff that might possess very different
levels of qualifications. The challenge is to find an organizational structure that fits to the
campaign, to recruit core personnel with actual expertise in their respective field, manage
and motivate volunteer supporters and find the right PR strategy and to find an external
partner that fits to the circumstances. As described above, campaign tasks may be regarded
as business processes. Without having to restructure the entire campaign, campaign
managers therefore may easily decide, which processes they wish to be performed by
internal staff members and which are given to external experts. The following chapter will
therefore explore how outsourcing is performed in private business entities in order to
draw a conclusion on what is sensible to be outsourced in campaigns.

245 Althaus, 'Kommunikationsmanagement im Wahlkampf', 127 [Original wording;
"Ressourcen sind begrenzt; es gibt niemals genug Leute, die Infostände besetzen oder Telefonlisten abtelefonieren, es gibt
niemals genug Geld, um weitere Radiospots oder Zeitungsanzeigen zu schalten."]
4. Outsourcing in Business

After elaborating on political theory as well as on campaigning and campaign management, this chapter will introduce a business view on outsourcing. Before both fields (business and political science) are brought together, this chapter will analyze how outsourcing is performed in private enterprises. As described above, outsourcing is not a new phenomenon. It “has gained considerable management attention since the 1980s. Traditionally, many non-core information technology (IT) activities, such as desktop support, call centers, network operations, and application development have been relegated to external service vendors.”

This may be seen in the context of a trend to focus on processes that belong to the core business of an enterprise. This chapter will therefore outline what reasons there are to employ external sources and describe potential motives for outsourcing particular processes. “Single activities or production steps represent the basic elements of a process. Consequently, all products or services produced in a business that are composed of singular activities can be mapped in processes. A process is defined as a closed, and logical sequence of activities in terms of time and content that are triggered by an event and produce a defined work result from a defined input.”

Chapter 4.2 will introduce a model that puts the different styles of outsourcing into context. In the following, the different steps of an outsourcing process will be described before focusing on the make-or-buy decision and what processes potentially may be outsourced. Finally, risks and problems that may occur with outsourcing will be presented.

4.1. Motives

There are various motives that can lead to a make-or-buy decision in favor of ‘buy’. As mentioned in the introduction, the most common model is to outsource processes that do not belong to the core competences of the business. “The fundamental idea of performance-oriented motives is that the usage of an external service provider can lead to increases in performance since it has comprehensive know-how, qualified specialists and

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246 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 180

modern technology.” In the following, the most commonly known motives are described. Naturally, this is not a exhaustive list, but it does have the aspiration to cover those that also play an important role when it comes to outsourcing in campaign management.

4.1.1. Cost savings

Increased competition due to the continuous trend of globalization has led to the situation that the motive of cost savings nowadays is probably the most important one for the decision to outsource. Particularly in the long run, companies need to ensure that they keep their fixed costs at a low level in order to be profitable. One instrument to keep fixed costs at a lower level may be outsourcing. “Thereby the customers reduce their fixed costs, respectively transform them into variable costs.”

Financial costs as well as other opportunity costs need to be calculated carefully. Particularly, processes that are not needed at all times may be potential elements to be outsourced. This needs to be analyzed on a case-to-case basis and with a long-term perspective, since outsourcing often creates costs particularly at the beginning of a contract. “In the long run, despite initial investments (project planning, selection of provider, migration, staff reduction, etc.) and some higher operating costs (e.g. telecommunications, provider management, etc.) significant savings may be realized that considerably compensate such increases in costs.”

This is particularly the case when outsourcing allows using the product or service

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248 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 59 [Original wording: “Grundgedanke der leistungsorientieren Motive ist, dass die Inanspruchnahme eines externen Dienstleisters zu Leistungsverbesserungen führen kann, da dieser über umfassendes Know-how, qualifizierte Fachkräfte und moderne Technologien verfügt.”]


250 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 36 [Original wording: “Langfristig lassen sich trotz der Anfangsinvestitionen (Projektplanung, Provider-Auswahl, Migration, Personalabbau etc.) und einiger erhöhter Betriebskosten (z.B.
on an on-demand basis, allowing reducing costs to almost zero in times when there is no demand. It is important to note that “in the long-run, cost advantages can only be reached if the outsourcing provider offers structural advantages.” These may include lower factor costs such as labor, availability of more efficient technology or knowledge and, most importantly, economies of scale.

"A supplier can lower costs if it can centralize the work of several companies to one location, or if it can use volume purchasing to buy materials or supplies." The service provider therefore can create cost savings by making use of economies of scale. Economies of scale occur when an increased output in a given period of time decreases the average cost per unit. “It is therefore a cost-reducing effect depending on volume.” Since the vendor normally only provides the service for itself and therefore only deals with comparably small numbers, it does not have the capability to create economies of scale itself. By contrast, the service provider serves a whole range of customers with the same product and is therefore able to produce significantly higher numbers in output. “The usage of economies of scale of the business process outsourcing provider is particularly visible in the composition of procurement volumes, enhanced utilization of IT-structures, choice of more capable suppliers and the better utilization of critical resources.” Globalization is an important factor that promotes cost savings through service providers. This is particularly the case when resources from low cost countries are used (see chapter 4.1.5). “The merging of markets allows producing business processes in off- and nearshore countries in order to reduce process costs or by using cheaper, fully available production factors to flexibly react to changes in quantities.” Therefore, outsourcing is regarded as an appropriate tool to lower costs and create more flexibility. As shown in graph 4.1, outsourced production leads to increased transaction costs due to fees and non-financial costs for transfer and control.

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251 Tzouvaras, ‘Make-or-By in der Finanzbranche’, 57 (Original wording: “Kostenvorteile können langfristig nur dann erreicht werden, wenn der Outsourcing-Anbieter strukturelle Vorteile bietet.”)

252 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 39

253 Osterloh, Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen, Heft 160, 75 (Original wording: “Es handelt sich somit um eine volumenabhängige Kostendegression.”)


255 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 87 (Original wording: “Das Zusammenwachsen der Märkte ermöglicht eine Geschäftsprozessunterstellung in Off- und Nearshore-Ländern zur Reduktion der Prozesskosten oder durch Nutzung günstiger, umfassend zur Verfügung stehender Produktionsfaktoren zur flexiblen Reaktion auf Volumenänderungen.”)
costs such as increased demand for communications. At the same time, however, it may considerably decrease production costs in comparison to in-house provision.

4.1.2. Increase in Productivity

Specialization has a positive impact on productivity. "As professionals hone their skills, they become more efficient." Therefore, outsourcing allows internal staff to focus on a set of few and clearly defined core competences, while other task are given to specialized contractors who are able to fulfill the same task in a shorter amount of time. This has two important consequences: time savings and, hence, again cost savings. For the outsourcing company, giving away particular processes leads to a smaller degree of complexity. The amount processes staying in-house is reduced. “A provider’s lead in know how may not only be limited to single temporary projects, but can also lead to increases in efficiency in day-to-day business.” In many cases, the decisions to outsource particular services are connected to larger restructuring programs in the organization that further increase productivity. “The background is that a business relieves itself through targeted outsourcing of certain activities that only represent fringe areas and do not belong to the core business of an organization. By doing so, a business is able to concentrate its resources and business activities on the remaining relevant areas in which it already possesses core competences or wants to build those up.”

4.1.3. Increase in Quality

When a provider is specialized in a certain field, he is normally able to deploy more and better resources to the task than a business that has to cover a wide range of different processes. This may also have a positive impact on quality. “Transparency and consistence of processes represent a prerequisite to increase their quality. Relocating processes to a specialized outsourcing provider is connected to the expectation not only potential cost savings may be exploited and that focus can be set on core processes, but also to the

256 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 15
257 Osterloh, Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen, Heft 160, 85 [Original wording: “Ein Know-how-Vorsprung des Anbieters muss sich jedoch nicht nur auf einzelne zeitlich begrenzte Projekte beschränken, sondern kann auch im Tagesgeschäft zu Verbesserungen der Effizienz führen.”]
expectation of a significant rise in quality of processes.”

By outsourcing processes, businesses are able to make use of external know how of providers who are able to pool their competencies in order to reach a product of superior quality. “The increase in process quality can be reached through pooling processes from several businesses that are equal in terms of content and able to be standardized through the business process outsourcing provider.”

Since providers deal with a significantly larger amount of similar processes that come from a variety of vendors, they are able to build up greater expertise and a steeper learning curve than the outsourcing organization for which the outsourced process is just one support process of many.

4.1.4. Scarcity of Resources

A rather obvious motivation for outsourcing is that the organization may not have enough qualified personnel to fulfill a certain task or it needs potential staff or other important functions. "A company may find that the skill set of its in-house staff is inadequate for a given function. [...] A company can solve this problem by handing over the function to an outsourcing supplier who specializes in that function and is highly competent in its administration, using well-trained and experienced staff and the most current procedures and technological advances." Buying the product or service from an outsourcing provider can be more cost effective than hiring needed additional staff. By engaging in a close cooperation with the service provider, the vendor is able to assess the resources, know-how and experience of the provider. This might enable him to “secure a better competitive position than when providing the services in-house.”

4.1.5. Labor Arbitrage

The term ‘arbitrage’ describes the use of differences in prices for the same product in different markets. By consuming a resource from a market in which the product is offered
at lower cost than in the home market, cost advantages can be reached while the same product is still consumed. “Labor Arbitrage effects occur when the structure of personnel costs of an IT service provider is lower than the personnel costs of the outsourcing business. This can result from simple differences in labor costs or from differences in the age pyramids.”

Prerequisite for achieving labor arbitrage effects is that the outsourcing provider is able to use a different market than the vendor.

4.2. Types of outsourcing

As indicated in the research hypotheses in chapter 1.1, there are several forms of outsourcing. The most commonly known type is classic external outsourcing to an independent service provider. Nevertheless, this does not represent the only form of outsourcing. Processes may also be given to internal providers that act as a separate entity within the same organization. In the following, the most common types of outsourcing will be defined and described.

4.2.1. Internal outsourcing

As the name suggests, internal outsourcing is the relocation of processes to a provider that is part of the same organization. “In internal outsourcing, capital participation is agreed or a division of an enterprise is relocated as a separate subsidiary, respectively profit center.” In most cases, so-called shared service centers are created that provide the outsourced processes to several entities within the organization. “Through this centralization, economies of scales

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264 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 156–7 [Original wording: "Beim internen Outsourcing hingegen wird eine Kapitalbeteiligung eingegangen, eine Kooperation vereinbart oder eine Abteilung des Unternehmens als eigene Tochtergesellschaft bzw. Profit Center ausgelagert."]
can steadily be achieved and processes within these centers generally are generally easier to be further professionalized and industrialized.” 265

Prerequisite to attain advantages from this form of outsourcing is that several divisions within the company work separately on the same processes. By sourcing them out to an internal service provider, those services can be bundled, specialization can be developed and economies of scale can be reached. “Shared service centers bundle the competences as an internal service provider. They have to know the increasing expectations and requirements they are faced with and can derive targeted courses of actions.” 266

4.2.2. External outsourcing

The classic form of outsourcing is a relocation of processes to an external service provider. “In relocation or external outsourcing a partial or complete transfer of business functions to external, legally independent organizations takes place, on which no direct influence through capital links can be exerted.” 267 Unlike the outsourcing business, the service provider has a core competence in the services it is supplying. “With giving up in-house production, a business gives up own competences and becomes dependent on the market.” 268

Those skills are not only provided to one customer, but the same service is delivered to a whole range of outsourcing companies. External outsourcing providers are able to pool competences and create large economies of scale.


266 Tzouvaras, ‘Make-or-By in der Finanzbranche’, 51 [Original wording: “Shared Services bündeln die Kompetenzen als ein interner Leistungserbringer. Sie müssen die an sie gerichteten steigenden Anforderungen und Erwartungen kennen und gezielt neue Handlungsoptionen ableiten.”]


268 Streit, ‘Outsourcing’, 6 [Original wording: “Mit dem Verzicht auf die bis dahin erfolgte Eigenfertigung gibt das Unternehmen eigene Kompetenzen auf und begibt sich in die Abhängigkeit des Marktes.”]
Global sourcing may be described as a sub-type of external outsourcing, therefore it is necessary to name this form separately. The reason for this is that global sourcing is one of the main reasons why outsourcing has a rather negative image among German workforces.

Global sourcing describes outsourcing to an external provider which is using resources on a global market. Hence, global sourcing is often used to create larger labor arbitrage effects. This is possible by substituting high German labor costs by human resources from low cost countries such as India. Particularly in the segment of IT, global sourcing is a widely common phenomenon. There is a set of reasons in favor of global sourcing:

- Usage of advantages of world-wide division of labor
- Usage of world-wide know-how
- Usage of world-wide information sources and monitoring systems
- Overcoming market entry barriers
- Preparation for further globalization of products and the creation of foreign subsidiaries
- Reduction of dependencies from single suppliers

Global sourcing providers by definition need to be of a certain size. Being locally present in at least the core target markets is a prerequisite.

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269 Bea and Haas, Strategisches Management, 516
4.2.3. Hybrid forms

As alternatives to internal and external outsourcing, different hybrid forms can be named. Hybrid forms describe a relocation of processes to an external partner that still has strong ties to the outsourcing company. Those ties might either be in the form of capital investments or of personnel that have close connections to the vendor. This might be either because personnel were formerly employed by the vendor or because (and this is of particular interest for political parties) there are strong sympathies for them. “A range of cooperation strategies belong to hybrid forms, e.g. in which a service division is built up and operated jointly. Besides risk sharing, each of the involved partners brings their comparative advantages into the cooperation and allows reaching synergy effects.”

4.3. Make-or-buy decision

The make-or-buy decision is the core step in an outsourcing project. It is the basic question every company needs to ask itself when it is considering outsourcing a particular process. The alternatives are simple: either a process stays in-house or it is given to an internal or external outsourcing provider. When attempting to answer the question, one important equation needs to be in everybody’s mind: “Only intelligent [...] outsourcing promises benefits.”

There is a general agreement in literature that concentration on core competences leads to cost advantages and therefore to an improvement of competitive advantage. As a general rule, core competences should not be outsourced. "The corporate goals serve as a

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271 Gründer, Erfolgreiches IT-Management - Strategisches Sourcing als Option', 27 ['Vorteile bringt nur intelligentes [...] Outsourcing.']
basis for determining project success. Core competencies, as a general rule should not be outsourced.”

Houssem recommends that “projects build up on business processes, respectively activities, that are based on inimitable, not substitutable and that are benefit generating, respectively have synergetic relations to other in-house resources and to exclude them from offshoring considerations.” Therefore, the determination of core competences is a necessary element in order to answer the make-or-buy decision. Inimitability represents a strategic competitive advantage since it leads to an insufficiency of the market in favor of the possessing company and, hence, to a high surplus. A possible substitute has a significant negative impact on the strategic importance of the process. Therefore, the make-or-buy decision may not be seen as a single decision, but rather as part of the process that will be described in the following sub-chapter.

4.4. Steps in outsourcings

Outsourcing is not a technique which can be implemented from one day to another. Rather, it is a process involving several steps. Ideally, the process should consist of a series of five steps described in the following (see graph 4.5).

4.4.1. Analysis of the status quo

Analysis of the status quo or due diligence is the first step in the outsourcing process and represents the basis for anything that follows. “During the situation analysis the processes of the supply chain are examined in order to identify functions suitable for outsourcing. For

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272 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 36
273 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 106 [*empfiehlt es sich für Outsourcing- [...] Vorhaben, Geschäftsprozesse bzw. Aktivitäten, die auf unternehmensspezifischen, nicht imitierbaren, nicht-substituierbaren und nutzenstiftenden Ressourcen aufbauen bzw. eine synergetische Beziehung zu anderen In-house Ressourcen aufweisen, aus den Offshoring-Überlegungen auszuschließen.”]
274 Cf. Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 104
this purpose, every single step of the supply chain needs to be analyzed whether its provided service is eligible to be outsourced.”

In particular, Hösel recommends devoting attention to the following areas:

- Costs
- Quantity
- Quality
- Capital requirements
- Resources
- Utilization
- Organization
- Scope

Outsourcing should only be performed in areas in which the vendor does not have core competences and in which its performance is inferior to the one of potential service providers. The goal is to ensure that strategically important processes are not harmed and that key knowledge is kept. “Identify your company’s core competences and determine its strategic objectives.” In order to achieve this, for each process the necessary skills need to be defined and examined whether those skills are available in the organization or not. “A second step analyses whether those competences contribute to developing, respectively keep competitive advantages and therefore belong to the core competences.” Another important aspect of due diligence is also to make processes transparent and measurable. It needs to be clearly defined what resources are needed for the respective process. Even in case the make-or-buy decision is answered in favor of ‘make’, important information was gained from this step of the process. A positive side effect of due diligence is that internal provision of services is becoming transparent and measurable. “Services all of a sudden become plannable and steerable.”

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276 Hösel, 'Make or buy?', 8

277 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 33


4.4.2. Requirement profile and contacting

After the status quo is analyzed and needs are defined, a requirement profile should be developed that clearly defines characteristics and qualities a potential service provider needs to have. Such a profile is not only needed in order ensure a high level of quality of a bought service, but also to ensure that the role and tasks of the provider are clearly cut. It also prevents misunderstandings between the vendor and the future provider. “The more complex a service is the more difficult is it to find a suitable partner.”

Once a profile is developed, first contact to service providers is established. This is usually done with the use of a so-called “Request for Proposal” or RFP, in which providers are asked to submit their bids according to the specific requirements and necessary profile.

4.4.3. Decision for service provider

When all processes potentially available for outsourcing have been analyzed, those that are not directly connected with the core competences of the business are possibly eligible to be outsourced. The next step is the actual decision in favor or against outsourcing the process. Important factors in this consideration are not only purely financial costs, but also the impact on quality, quantity and efficiency needs to be regarded. A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis needs to evaluate whether the expected benefit exceeds all transaction costs, both financial and non-financial. After all offers are scanned, a decision in favor of a particular service provider needs to be made. Important aspects therefore are mostly expected performance, availability, and costs of the provider. Simon recommends a scoring-system for a profound evaluation: “A scoring-process has proved to be helpful in the decision between different businesses in order to not only take quantitative (cost-) aspects but also quality of the service and criteria concerning the cooperation into consideration.” Since it takes considerable effort to dissolve an outsourcing relationship and even more to go back to in-house production, the decision is meant to be a long-term directive that marks the starting point of a close cooperation that requires trust on both sides.

280 Pätzold, ‘DIE LINKE wirkt, nicht nur politisch...’, 22 [Original wording: „Je komplexer die Dienstleistung, desto schwieriger ist es, den geeigneten Partner zu finden.”]

281 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 159 [Original wording: “Bei der Entscheidung zwischen verschiedenen Unternehmen erweist sich ein Scoring-Verfahren als hilfreich, um neben quantitativen (Kosten-)Aspekten auch die Qualität der Leistung und der Zusammenarbeit betreffende Kriterien berücksichtigen zu können.”]
4.4.4. Implementation

The implementation phase marks the period in which outsourcing is actually performed. During this step, production of the outsourced service is being fully transferred to the service provider who from the point on delivers it according to the agreed conditions. During this phase "legal aspects play a role. This includes labor legislation schemes that need to be considered when laying off employees or in case of a relocation of employees to the service provider. Particularly in the field of outsourcing of data management, privacy considerations are of great significance."²⁸² Management of an outsourcing relation also requires resources. Manpower is needed in order to ensure that regular and quick communication channels are established and transaction costs occur due to increased need for exchange between the vendor and the service provider. Therefore, efficient management of the relation is a core element in order to keep costs at the lowest possible level.

4.5. Elements to be outsourced

As mentioned above, processes that do not belong to the core competences of a business are the ones that are most suitable to be outsourced. Popular outsourced processes include IT, legal affairs, vehicle fleet and catering. Outsourcing entire processes is also called ‘business process outsourcing’ or BPO. "Recent years have seen burgeoning business process outsourcing (BPO), which involves farming out non-core yet mission-critical business processes such as finance and accounting, human resources, and customer support to third-party service providers, often in offshore location."²⁸³ In order to identify processes potentially suitable to be outsourced, it is sensible to distinguish between the following functions:

- Leading functions
- Specialized functions
- Clerical functions

²⁸² Simon and Gathen, *Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente*, 159 ["Darüber hinaus spielen spätestens in dieser Phase juristische Aspekte eine Rolle. Hierzu zählen beispielsweise arbeitsrechtliche Regelungen, die bei einer Freisetzung von Mitarbeitern oder im Fall einer Umsetzung von Arbeitnehmern in das ausgegliederte Unternehmen zu berücksichtigen sind. Insbesondere bei der Auslagerung der Datenverarbeitung sind darüber hinaus datenschutzrechtliche Gesichtspunkte von großer Bedeutung."]

²⁸³ Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 180
– Support functions

Leading functions are core management functions and should stay within the organization in order to ensure proper coordination and strategic vision. Specialized functions are often part of the core competence and the knowledge present in those functions frequently constitutes the competitive advantage over opponents.

However, the latter two might be potential processes to be outsourced. Particularly clerical and support functions, whether they are singular tasks, project tasks or frequently recurring, seem to be much more suitable to be given to an external provider.

4.5.1. Singular tasks

Singular tasks are often project tasks that require a high level of knowledge and creativity. They are less standardized and do not occur in high numbers. It is not possible to learn from experience caused by a continuous repetition of the task. Rather, there are high dynamics and emotions connected with the fulfillment of singular tasks. Prime examples are strategic decision-making, negotiations or fundamental research. In all cases, due to the lack of experience, there is no established problem-solving mechanism available. Singular tasks are found in all of the above-mentioned categories, in particular in leading and specialized functions. Singular tasks often require specialized personnel with a high degree of qualifications. Hence, it is rather risky and unusual to outsource singular tasks.

4.5.2. Recurring tasks

Recurring tasks are characterized by high determination and structure as well as a comparatively low degree of dynamics. Other than singular or project tasks, they mostly require a lower degree of information.\textsuperscript{284} Recurring tasks can usually be classified as clerical

\textsuperscript{284} Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 64
or support functions. Depending on the particular characteristics of the process, standardized tasks may often be performed in an assembly line type structure or, since the degree of experience plays an important role, with a rather low degree of necessary knowledge. Since they have a high potential to be standardized, they are suitable to be outsourced. Recurring tasks are often support functions that do not belong to the core business or core competences of the organization. They are mostly routine functions that support strategy leaders or specialists in their work. Administrative task are often clerical functions with a high degree of repetition and routine. Regular triggers such as orders, complaints or other standardized procedures cause them. Low complexity and dynamics as well as high determination are common characteristics.\textsuperscript{285} Administrative tasks are often clerical functions that mostly deal with the handling of databases and standard procedures. Many administrative tasks nowadays are fulfilled almost entirely automatically. Holiday applications, for instance, can be filed using an application. Depending on the degree of automization, administrative task may be outsourced comparably easily.

4.5.3. Project tasks

Projects tasks are a hybrid form between singular and recurring tasks. “In comparison to content-related recurring tasks, project task possess a higher degree of complexity and a lower degree of repetition. They are differentiated from singular tasks due to their project character, their higher degree of repetition and their often recurring framework conditions.”\textsuperscript{286} Since project task usually have a very clearly specified scope, it is possible to differentiate them clearly from other processes in the organization. This makes them quite suitable to give to an external service provider. Whether it is sensible to outsource the project mostly depends on its strategic importance. If the project is related to the core business or core competences of the organization, organizations are very hesitant to outsource it. If it is rather a support function, they are highly suitable to be given to an external provider.

\textsuperscript{285} Housssem, Business Process Offshoring, 62
\textsuperscript{286} Housssem, Business Process Offshoring, 62 [Original wording: ”Im Vergleich zu den sachbezogenen Regelaufgaben weisen Projektaufgaben eine höhere Komplexität und einen niedrigeren Wiederholungsgrad auf. Von Einzelfallaufgaben werden sie jedoch aufgrund ihres Projektcharakters, ihres höheren Wiederholungsgrads sowie ihrer häufig wiederkehrenden Rahmenbedingungen abgegrenzt.”]
4.6.  Risks & Problems

Outsourcing should not be regarded as a panacea for all problems of in-house processes or lacks of efficiency that occur. Some of the problems outlined in the following occur before an outsourcing relationship is established. Some during the implementation phase and some do not become apparent until the contract is terminated and processes should be re-integrated. “There is no doubt that outsourcing relieves from problems, but there is also no doubt that it creates new ones that would not exist – at least in this form – without outsourcing.”\(^{287}\) Some of the problems that might occur “are outsourcing imminent risk factors that need to be accepted.”\(^{288}\) However, other risks are caused by transaction costs that are not necessarily financial as well as by an increased complexity caused by difficult customer-provider relations. Competent management, sensible contract design and efficient monitoring mechanisms can limit the latter. Strategies to limit potential risks are further explored in chapter 4.6.6. Problems and risks may arise in all phases of the outsourcing process: Choosing the right partner is the first major obstacle. Each relationship then needs to be effectively managed and monitored in order to avoid the costs that are described below.

4.6.1.  Principal/Agent-Problem

Principal/agent-problems commonly occur in asymmetric relations between the vendor and the service provider. Main driver of agency costs are asymmetries in information between the principal and the agent. On one hand, the agent has a much deeper knowledge of its own business characteristics, intentions and actions than the principal does. Due to those asymmetries, the agent is able to perform actions that will remain hidden from the principal. On the other hand, “the external service provider usually lacks knowledge about the culture of the outsourcing business and inside view on its business processes.”\(^{289}\) This represents an increased risk for the vendor and uncertainty whether it is able to fulfill the demands in an appropriate manner.

\(^{287}\) Grell, ‘Outsourcing’, 20 [Original wording: "Outsourcing entlastet zweifellos von Problemen, schafft aber ebenso zweifelsfrei neue, die es ohne Outsourcing - jedenfalls in dieser Form - nicht gäbe.”]

\(^{288}\) Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 65 [Original wording: „handelt es sich um Outsourcing immanente Risikofaktoren, die in Kauf genommen werden müssen.”]

\(^{289}\) Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 40 [Original wording: "Dem externen Dienstleister fehlen i.d.R. die Kenntnis über die Kultur des outssourcenden Unternehmens sowie die Einblicke in seine unternehmerischen Prozesse.”]
The outsourcing contract and employees that coordinate and monitor the implementation are of critical importance in this regard. It is their responsibility to minimize information asymmetries and therefore minimize costs that occur due to hidden actions of one of the outsourcing partners.

4.6.2. Transaction costs

Transaction costs occur during all phases of the outsourcing relationship. Simon and Gathen include “initiation costs, e.g. for information, contacting and contract negotiations, logistical costs, costs for communications and coordination with the external business and quality control of the provided services” (see graph 4.7). Transaction costs on one hand include financial costs such as fees for the provided services, but also non-financial costs that occur when there is an increased need for coordination, lack of communications or through the inability to assign precious resources to other projects. Therefore, outsourcing projects may become risky and expensive. They might exceed the costs that were formerly needed for in-house production. This may particularly be the case when the expected costs for outsourcing the process were miscalculated or when costs were incorrectly attributed to the process during the due diligence phase. "The reason for higher total costs compared to the initial situation can lie in the fact that the aimed rationalization and cost reduction goals could not be achieved by the contract partner due to lack of consistent implementation or unrealistic goals." The amount of actual transaction costs often depend on the quantity of

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291 Gründer, ‘Erfolgreiches IT-Management - Strategisches Sourcing als Option’, 20

transactions. Through economies of scale, an increase in quantity of transactions with similar transaction costs not only decrease average production costs, but also lower average transaction costs.

*Initiation costs*

Transaction costs may appear when an outsourcing relationship has not yet been established. Initiation costs include all financial, non-financial, personnel and material costs that are required for gathering information about potential service providers.

*Agreement costs*

Once potential providers have been identified and RFPs have been answered, contract negotiations are the next source for costs. Not only do costs occur directly with negotiations, e.g. wages for negotiators, travels, hotel bookings, etc., it is also of critical importance that negotiations and the following agreement are based on reliable and correct information. “If the outsourcing decision was based on an opaque or insufficient basis of cost data, it is inevitably a suboptimal decision that can hardly lead to the goal of cost reduction.”

*Implementation and controlling costs*

The agreed fee for the provision of the outsourced process is not the only cost during the implementation phase. In addition, implementation and controlling costs occur. They are costs for managing, leading and coordinating the relationship between the vendor and the service provider. The level of those costs highly depends on the amount of outsourced processes, complexity and customization of the processes, accuracy of the contract, priorities of the provider and available human resources on both sides. The risk hereby is that "the time required to manage the contract may make it more expensive than initially calculated - even beyond its intended value-add." If the contract needs to be renegotiated or adapted, further costs occur. Therefore, there is the danger that outsourcing fees plus implementation costs may add up to a sum that exceeds in-house production of the process.

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4.6.3. Dependency on service provider

As mentioned above, once a process is given to an external provider, it is a challenge to re-integrate it into the organization. Particularly in cases when entire processes are fully outsourced to external providers, there is a danger that the vendor becomes dependent on the particular service provider. “The customer becomes dependent when the complete return transfer of assets given to the provider is not regulated. If it wanted to resolve the contractual relationship, it would have to expect high costs for new acquisitions and training of new employees or for the development of alternative providers.”

During the implementation of a contract a close cooperation can also lead to a dependency. Decreases of quality or delays in provision of the service may lead to serious consequences in business activities of the vendor. “Dependencies are given, when ‘decisions and activities of one business partner, without having influence on those, have influence on the own welfare.’”

For an outsourcing company, dependency on the service provider has the consequence that it is “likely to be locked into that relationship,” neither able to receive its requested services in an adequate manner nor be able to move to a different supplier. The risk is particularly high, when relying on just one provider or when the outsourced process is critical to business success. Processes that have a low degree of complexity, however, may be imitated comparably easily and therefore there is a lower danger of dependency.

4.6.4. Brain Drain

Of particular importance is the risk to lose know-how that might be needed for future business activities. With outsourcing particular processes and transferring employees to the service provider, personnel that might be of value at a later point might leave the company and leave a gap of knowledge behind that could have a negative impact on the company’s performance in the long run. “Outsourcing cuts labour costs but simultaneously

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297 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 189
reduces the scope for internal innovative activity and, hence, may result in being detrimental to long-run productivity gains." \footnote{298} This danger is particularly high when knowledge that was built up over a longer period of time leaves the outsourcing organization for good.

Remaining personnel might lack the needed knowledge causing a decrease of performance quality. "You cannot prevent such a Brain Drain even with the best contract." \footnote{299}

\subsection*{4.6.5. Data security}

For successful outsourcing close and open cooperation are necessary prerequisites. However, "through close interlocking of business processes, respectively the design of complex interfaces it is inevitable that the involved parties in part gain in-depth insight into the respective other organization." \footnote{300} There is a conflict between necessary openness for the sake of a successful outsourcing relationship on one hand and commitment for secrecy on the other. Particularly in relationships with insufficient monitoring mechanisms, this provides a danger for data security and confidentiality. "Adequate handling of customer data [...] is a crucial criterion for the selection of an outsourcing provider." \footnote{301}

\subsection*{4.6.6. Risk-minimization}

In order to limit the above-mentioned risks, a general set of risk minimization tools is available. While risks of dependency and brain drain can be approached by very targeted measures, there are also general strategies available to limit principal/agent problems and transaction costs. Those can be summed up under the key words ‘signaling’, ‘screening’ and ‘self-selection’. Above all, substantial benchmarking provides the basis for a significant minimization of risks. "Do your due diligence. It’s better to spend more time and resources in the selection process than to regret your decision later. Create a request for proposal, and have it answer all of your questions regarding the systems, procedures and costs." \footnote{302}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{298} Morroni, ‘Introduction: Organizational variety and economic performance’, 10
  \item \footnote{299} Joppe and Ganowski, \textit{Die Outsourcing-Falle}, 17 [Original wording: "Einen solchen Brain Drain können Sie selbst mit dem besten Vertrag nicht verhindern."]
  \item \footnote{300} Osterloh, \textit{Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen}, Heft 160, 102 [Original wording: "Durch die enge Verzahnung betrieblicher Abläufe bzw. die Gestaltung komplexer Schnittstellen ist es unvermeidlich, dass die beteiligten Parteien teils recht detaillierte Einblicke in die jeweils andere Unternehmung erhalten."]
  \item \footnote{301} Westhoff, ‘Politiker wählen Wesselmann’, 1155 [Original wording: "Die entsprechende Handhabung von Kundendaten ist [...] maßgebliches Kriterium für die Auswahl eines Outsourcing-Dienstleisters."]
  \item \footnote{302} Fujan, ‘Hiring the Right Telephone Consultants and Vendors’, 558
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The risk for dependency can be lowered by permanent exchange and transparency in order to make adjustments when unforeseeable events occur. Spreading process to several providers generally limits the risk of dependency. On the other hand, increased implementation costs can be expected due to the higher complexity of outsourcing relations. “Generally, strategic dependencies due to outsourcing should be avoided. In many cases the assessment is valid that only those processes and systems are suitable for outsourcing that only have a moderate (or low) strategic significance.”

In order to limit the risk, an organization is well advised not to outsource their entire knowledge in the intended field. “Outsourcing can create significant flexibility pitfalls if internal skills are not maintained. Such buffers, or slack resources, may not be cost efficient, but make perfect sense if dependency on a vendor needs to be mitigated.” A core team should stay in-house performing similar task. This may have a positive impact on knowledge in the organization and on coordination efforts with the service provider whose problems and issues are much easier to understand when there is still some expertise in the field available.

Signaling describes activities of an agent to draw the attention to the high quality of processes it provides to potential principals. “Those signals are voluntary samples of own competences, such as, for example, insights on own processes of service provision, involvement of neutral technical experts and various reference cases of other clients as well as the provision of above-average guarantee durations.” By sending out those signals and providing that data, the potential agent attempts to level asymmetries in information concerning the quality of its provided services. In order to make signaling attractive and sensible, for ‘desired’ agents, costs for signaling need to be lower than expected benefits while for ‘undesired’ agents the opposite is the case.

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303 Tzouvaras, ‘Make-or-By in der Finanzbranche’, 49 [Original wording: “Grundsätzlich gilt es, strategische Abhängigkeiten durch eine Verlagerung zu vermeiden. Vielfach findet sich daher die Einschätzung, dass nur diejenigen Prozesse und Systeme für eine Auslagerung geeignet sind, die nur eine mäßige (oder geringe) strategische Bedeutung haben.”]

304 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 189–90

Screening, on the other hand, describes activities of the outsourcing company to reduce asymmetries in information by actively requesting signals from potential agents concerning their abilities, quality and intentions.

In a self-selection mechanism, the principal confronts the agent with its requirements and asks for a decision to be made by the potential agent. A prime example for this tool is the request for proposal (RFP), described in chapter 4.4.2. In an RFP, the outsourcing company clearly defines the requirement expected for the intended form of cooperation and the potential service providers need to make decision which service level they are willing or able to provide. By doing so, self-selection is initiated since agents that are not able to meet the requirements properly are likely to withdraw from the bidding process.

Finally, incentive schemes may contribute to increased determination and care of agents to provide the service in the requested quality. Incentive schemes “may [include] agent behavior control measures such as risk premiums, contract penalties and result-oriented remuneration.”

4.7. Consequences for campaign management

The above-mentioned aspects provide a series of important consequences for campaign management. Since campaigns are also faced with a scarcity of financial and human resources that is similar to the ones of private entities, outsourcing represents a technique, which is generally adequate to be used in campaign management as well. Particularly support functions that include either recurring processes with a low degree of complexity or more complex processes that can be regarded as independent projects are sensible to be outsourced if cost savings, increases in productivity or quality can be expected. "Campaigns should plan forward from the resources they have, or that they can reasonably expect to receive." If benefits of outsourcing particular processes exceeded the connected costs, outsourcing the process should be considered. Campaigning takes place in highly dynamic and volatile environments. Necessary coordination with service providers may harm the ability to react quickly to unforeseen events. Therefore, it would be wise to outsource standard processes that are not influenced by sudden external changes.

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307 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 29
The most important consequence is that vendors (hence political parties) should not outsource processes that belong to their core competence and create competitive advantages. In the long-run, this would harm the competitive position of the party and have a negative impact on its electoral performance.

The following chapter will pick up those conclusions and examine how outsourcing is already performed in the field of campaign management.
5. **Usage of external sources – key empirical findings**

As examined in chapter 3, campaigns have become a management task. Meanwhile, “it has become clear in politics, that external knowledge is almost indispensable.”308 Because of described changes of campaign characteristics due to the rise of media democracy, parties have become increasingly open to externalizing particular tasks. Nevertheless, there are large discrepancies between the practice of outsourcing in the United States and in Germany. Scholars argue that there is no such thing in Germany as there are “political consultants in the United States, who are often entrusted with the overall responsibility for a campaign”.309 Rather, it seems that external expertise is mainly gathered in creative and productive fields. The extent of outsourcing varies. This will further be explored in this chapter. It is important to note that the relationship between the extent of outsourcing and quality of output is not linear. Giving processes to external service providers does not automatically mean that there are increases in quality or cost saving. Some scholars argue that “excessive creativity may even lead to decreased return on advertising investment.”310 Nevertheless, it is obvious that modern campaign organizations are heavily influenced by strategies and methods from product marketing and commercial advertising. This leads to the impression that campaigns become livelier when considerable responsibility is given to external experts.311 Adapting to the increasingly volatile environment of a media democracy with rapid news cycles may be a secondary objective of employing external experts, but they do not seem to be the major drivers and motives of usage of external resources. Neither do they explain differences in the extent of outsourcing. The question remains why in some areas outsourcing seems to be a common practice while in others it is hardly being performed. This chapter will therefore shed light on the extent and motives to outsource certain processes to external agents and factors that are relevant for the extent of outsourcing. At the end of the chapter, focus is changed to service providers. It

308 Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 89
309 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnenmanagement?, 47
310 Li, ‘The effects of agency creativity on campaign outcomes’, 111
311 Althaus, ‘Kommunikationsmanagement im Wahlkampf’, 134
will be explored why some agents are willing to take the significant risk to provide political parties with a campaign, while others hesitate.

5.1. Factors influencing openness to outsource

Before the extent of outsourcing is explored, attention should be brought to the motivation of political parties not to provide a service in-house, but to employ external resources. Generally, motives from the business environment analyzed in chapter 4.1 are also valid in the political sphere. The only exception is the motivation of labor arbitrage. The reason therefore stems mostly from ethical considerations. A party aiming at representing a certain part of German population and of national interests is unlikely to employ foreign sources and bypass German workforce just for the sake of labor arbitrage effects. This would be a strategy that would sooner or later backfire at the party during the run of a campaign. Generally, factors influencing the make-or-buy decision in political parties can be divided into two categories: economic considerations and organizational influence.

5.1.1. Economic factors

Political parties are faced with scarce resources. This includes financial as well as human resources. Financed by official party funds as well as by donations from institutional and private entities, all practitioners agree that there is not a significant lack of financial means, but a scarcity that makes parties uncompetitive to the private business sectors when it comes to marketing budgets and salaries. Therefore, parties are unlikely to be as able to reach outcomes in terms of quality and productivity to the same extent as private providers specialized in these fields.

In the following, a set of motives is further illustrated that are of particular significance for political parties: Scarcity of own resources, significant changes in demand between campaign and off-campaign seasons and the need for an external perspective.

5.1.1.1. Scarcity of own human resources

As mentioned above, financial resources may play an important role in the outsourcing decision of political campaigns. This aspect is further explored in chapter 5.1.1.3. The more immediate reason for giving a process to an external provider, however, is that there is a lack of knowledge or skills within the party to provide it internally. This is mostly due to a
lack of skilled personnel in campaign organizations. Hans-Hermann Langguth\textsuperscript{312} is reminded of “when I was with the Greens, one always wished that we had three graphic designers and two cutters at our disposal [...] and one cinematographers, two sound engineers and one screen designer and three good copywriters. This is just not realizable. And this does not reflect the reality of such a party.”\textsuperscript{313} Instead, reality shows that particularly small parties may only possess a small team of employees that is able to run the party’s online presence. This mostly includes the party’s website and social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Large parties, such as CDU with its party own CDU TV, may be able to maintain a semi-professional TV team that can produce own videos for the party’s YouTube channel or record party conventions and speeches. However, none of the German parties is able to produce state-of-the-art TV commercials due to lack of skilled employees and adequate technology.

A reason for this lies in the complexity of those processes. In order to build up an own team of competence it is not sufficient to only hire one or two individuals. Rather, a whole set of skilled people must be hired that need to be remunerated at a fairly high level. Katja Suding\textsuperscript{314} emphasizes that “because one graphic designer doesn’t help you in a good campaign. Then you can just let it go. A graphic designer is not what you need to launch a good campaign. [...] He can design a flyer, but that is not what you need.”\textsuperscript{315} In fact, it is much more complex. More specialized skills in a whole variety of topics are needed, ranging from strategy development to creative functions. It is for this reason that Stefan

\begin{footnotes}
\item[312] Hans-Hermann Langguth is managing co-partner of PR agency „Zum Goldenen Hirschen“. Since 2006 he is leading its campaigning unit. In 1999 he became speaker of the federal organization of the Green party. From 2002 until 2005 he was deputy speaker of the Gerhard Schröder government.
\item[313] Langguth, Hans-Herrmann [Original wording: „Als ich bei den Grünen war, hätte man sich immer gewünscht, man hätte selbst drei Grafiker und zwei Cutter [...] und einen Kameramann, zwei Tonmänner und noch ein Screendesigner und drei gute Texter. Das ist einfach nicht darstellbar. Das spiegelt ja auch die Realität von so einer Partei nicht wider.”]
\item[314] Katja Suding is one of three deputy leaders of FDP. Since 2011, she is member of the Hamburg state parliament. In the 2015 state election she was main candidate in Hamburg and was responsible for FDP’s first electoral success since the 2013 Bundestag election in which the party failed to reach the five-percent threshold.
\item[315] Suding, Katja [Original wording: „Weil ein Grafikdesigner eben nichts hilft in einer guten Werbekampagne, dann können Sie es gleich sein lassen. Ein Grafikdesigner ist nicht das, was man braucht, um eine gute Werbekampagne zu machen. [...] Der kann mal einen Flyer erstellen, aber das ist nicht, das was Sie brauchen.” ]
\end{footnotes}
Hennewig underlines that “rather criteria are limits of performance of present resources, both in terms of quantity and quality.”

When this required expertise is not available within campaign organizations, political parties have a strong incentive to either build up own expertise or to outsource these services. Building up own expertise is likely to be very costly. As mentioned above, in these fields parties compete with the private economy for high quality staff. This leads to considerable expenses for salaries. Most parties are simply unable to provide this. “You cannot provide this degree of professionalism and the high quality in any party. No chance.”

Another aspect that leads to a scarcity of human resources of parties is the demographic changes. Parties that have a smaller amount of active supporters are faced with the problem that those large volunteer support forces known in the 70s and 80s tend to decline. “With fewer members and activists, they frequently lack the resources, human and material, with which to maintain local-level campaigning, such as canvassing and mail drops.”

This aspect touches upon an entirely different field. It is not the high-skilled specialists that are affected by those changes. Rather, parties’ foot soldiers dissolve. For many decades, very practical tasks that do not require higher levels of training, such as above mentioned canvassing was carried out by volunteer work forces. Only smaller parties such as FDP had to outsource this service since they did not have the necessary degree of local organization. For parties, canvassing by volunteers not only saved financial resources, it was also a method of activation of followers and a marketing technique. Voters watching individuals from their community setting up election posters alone had an impact on them. With the

316 Stefan Hennewig is head of campaign and marketing at CDU headquarters in Konrad-Adenauer Haus and a key player for the 2017 CDU campaign. As head of internal management he was already deeply involved in the 2009 and 2013 federal CDU campaigns.

317 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: “Kriterien sind eher die Leistungsgrenzen der Ressourcen, die vorhanden sind, sowohl quantitativ als auch qualitativ.”]

318 Suding, Katja [Original wording: “Sie können in der Qualität in keiner Partei […] die Spezialisierung und die hohe Qualität vorhalten. Keine Chance.”]

319 McAllister, ‘Calculating or capricious?’, 38
aging society, this is getting increasingly difficult, Peter Radunski\(^{320}\) explains: “There is a very simple physiological difficulty. Since the average age of party members has been 57, it doesn’t work anymore. When they were 37 it was something entirely different. I mean, let alone carrying a rack of newspapers. Carry that one up the stairs and distribute them. You can’t do that anymore once you reached a certain age.”\(^{321}\)

It can therefore be concluded that both, a lack of skilled personnel for specialized tasks due to limited resources as well as declining amounts of foot soldiers for mass distribution lead to increased motivation to outsource certain processes.

### 5.1.1.2. Seasonal changes

Another key reason for giving processes to external partners is the large difference in workload between campaign and off-campaign seasons. Since federal campaigns only take place every four years, there is a long-term gap during which there is no demand for most campaign processes. Frank Stauss\(^{322}\) underlines that “this gap in between is the actual basic explanation [...]. If I only had to provide particular competences, particular performance peaks, only every four years, every business in the world would say that we use external resources during peak times. Whether those are temporary workers or agencies is only a question of the sector.”\(^{323}\) There is no party in Germany that is in the position to maintain enough permanent party personnel to cover all areas of campaigning. At the same time, this would create significant costs. “What should they do for the rest of the time? I have to

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\(^{320}\) Peter Radunski has been a senior member of CDU since the late 1960s. From 1981 until 1991 he was CDU federal manager followed by the post of senator in Berlin. Between 1976 and 1990, he managed all CDU campaigns and was a key player in Helmut Kohl’s campaign organizations. As consultant he advised several state campaigns and is considered to be Germany’s pioneer in modern campaigning.

\(^{321}\) Radunski, Peter [Original wording: “Das hat eine ganz einfache physiologische Schwierigkeit. Seit das Durchschnittsalter der Partei 57 Jahre alt ist, geht es natürlich nicht mehr so. Als die 37 waren war das was anderes. Ich meine, allein so einen Stapel Zeitungen: tragen sie die Mal die Treppe rauf. Und verteilen. Können sie gar nicht als Älterer.”]

\(^{322}\) Frank Stauss is creative director and managing co-partner of Düsseldorf-based agency BUTTER. In this function he was deeply involved in all major SPD campaigns from 2001. Also, he was in charge of the 2013 ÖVP campaign in Austria. In 2013 he published his top-selling book ‘Höllenritt Wahlkampf’ in which he shared many stories from his campaigns.

\(^{323}\) Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “Dieses Gap dazwischen, eigentlich ist das die Grunderklärung [...] Wenn ich bestimmte Kompetenzen, bestimmte Leistungspeaks nur alle vier Jahre erbringen muss, dann würde jedes Unternehmen der Welt sagen, dann hole ich mir für die Spitzenzeiten Externe. Ob das Leiharbeiter sind oder Agenturen, ist dann nur eine Frage der Branche.”]
keep paying them. So that makes absolutely no sense." Therefore, much valuable and costly expertise is needed during the run of a campaign. From an economic standpoint, however, it would be inefficient to employ such staff on a permanent basis, given that there is no demand during off-season.

One option to balance those peaks would be building own expertise that is not only active during federal campaigns, but also in state elections. This would lead to a significantly higher degree of utilization and therefore increased efficiency. By moving from election to election there would hardly be any off-season times for such a campaign team. The reason this model (so far) has not been followed more seriously lies in the federal organization of parties. Each state organization considers itself relatively independent from the federal party. This implies that campaign leaders on the state level are not fond of the idea of a campaign team from the federal organization coming to the state, claiming to have superior knowledge and taking over campaign responsibility. While even in SPD with its relatively centralized organization this would cause conflicts, in decentralized CDU where even membership fees are collected by its local entities, this model would likely cause outrage among state party leaders. Although its federal structure is also used for messaging, particularly if CDU is in the position to be part of an unpopular government, regional entities are unlikely to follow instructions from the federal level. As Axel Wallrabenstein states, “if they said they should work together with this agency, they wouldn’t do it.”

Another issue concerns actions in case of a series of defeats. In case of bad experiences with an external partner, it is simple to substitute it with a different one. Consequences would be more difficult if the same campaign processes were outsourced to an internal partner. It would not be possible to remove an internal team in case of dissatisfaction. If they “lost five times in a row. Then no one is eager to work with them, because they had a

324 Suding, Katja [Original wording: “Was soll die denn sonst die restliche Zeit machen? Die muss ich ja weiter bezahlen. Also das macht überhaupt keinen Sinn.”]

325 Axel Wallrabenstein is co-founder of public relations agency publicis and today chairman of MSL group Germany. He is former spokesperson of the Ministry of the Interior of the state Saxony and of Berlin’s Senator of Science, Research and Cultural affairs.

326 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: “Wenn die sagen die sollen mit der Agentur arbeiten das würden die gar nicht machen.”]
loser image. Hence, it is, of course, one option, but it can only be part of a combination. I mean, you don’t work together with an agency either that has lost six campaigns in a row. You always aim for those that won or that narrowly lost but have conducted a good campaign.”\textsuperscript{327}

Nevertheless, CDU is the first party that considered building up such a center of competence within party structures. CDU’s ‘Meine CDU 2017’ manifesto proposes a service center for campaigns within Konrad-Adenauer-House, which is supposed to service state, regional and local party entities in their respective campaigns\textsuperscript{328}. This project has not been implemented yet. Therefore, until such a concept has proven to be accepted by parties’ state entities, parties are not yet able to balance seasonal changes between campaigns themselves. Hence, outsourcing particular processes to external service providers remains an efficient and economical way to gather necessary expertise during peak times.

5.1.1.3. Financial resources

After elaborating on scarcity of human resources, attention may be brought to probably the most decisive economic factor: Scarcity of financial resources. In the end, everything depends on the availability of financial resources. Personnel with necessary knowledge is generally available, but

\begin{center}
\textbf{Graph 5.1: Influence of financial resources on political transaction costs}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{327} Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: “Die verliert jetzt fünfmal hintereinander in der Struktur. Dann hat doch der 6. beim Landtagswahlkampf keinen Bock mehr mit denen zu arbeiten, weil die natürlich ein Loser-Image haben. Also deswegen ist es natürlich eine Möglichkeit, aber es ist nur ein Teil einer Kombi-Möglichkeit, weil ich meine, man arbeitet ja auch nicht mit einer Agentur zusammen, die 6 Wahlkämpfe hintereinander mitverloren hat, sondern man sucht sich immer die raus, die mal gewonnen haben oder die Wahl knapp verloren haben aber den Wahlkampf gut gemacht haben.”]

\textsuperscript{328} See: Meine CDU 2017. Available at: https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/150817-beschluss-meine-cdu-2017-1.pdf?file=1
at high costs. Therefore, financial resources determine, whether it is possible for a campaign to employ permanently costly expertise necessary for in-house production. As shown in graph 5.1, a significant majority of experts agree that availability of financial resources has influence on the openness to outsourcing. Of 26 mentions, only five were skeptical of such influence.

The underlying question in this regard may be: Is outsourcing more expensive than in-house-production? If outsourcing turned out to be more cost effective, a general openness to outsource should be assumed. Parties are faced with scarce financial resources. Therefore, a key task is to allocate budget in a most efficient way. “Budgets are not considerably growing anymore. CDU’s budget has declined in comparison to the 1990’s due to its party donation scandal. FDP’s budget has declined due to Möllemann. [...] Even SPD’s budget has declined because affiliated publishing houses don’t create as much revenue anymore. And the Green’s budget has slightly increased, but coming from a very low level. And DieLinke’s budget is stagnating. At the same time an entire new sector of task comes into play. This is the sector of content, marketing and internet social media.”

As mentioned above, experts agree that financial resources are a key factor to openness to outsourcing. Budget is decisive when parties have to decide which channels to use to convey their messages. When faced with scarcity of resources some channels are dropped, while for others, the most economical solution is found. Depending on the costs of outsourcing, this may have direct influence on whether processes are given to external partners. Volker Ludwig underlines that “from the point of view of the client, it is of course always a question of price. They have to afford it. From their standpoint, the price-

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130 Volker Ludwig is director of Berlin-based agency DiG. Since 2002 he participated and later was in charge of DieLinke campaigns, respectively of its predecessor PDS. In 2005, he was considered to be the person that invented the catchy brand name “DieLinke”. He is also member of the party.
performance ratio must be in order.” This ratio is often connected to the already mentioned seasonal changes. Parties need to consider whether they are able to provide services with significant peaks in demand for conditions that are competitive with offers from external providers that focus on peak times. Steffi Lemke\textsuperscript{332} states that “campaigning is primarily distribution of resources. For which area do I employ which means? [...] Money is always scarce in each campaign. At least for the Greens. You always have to decide where you do not spend it.” Experts not only agree that financial resources have an influence on openness to outsource, but also that there is an illusion that tasks provided within the campaign may be more cost effective. In many cases, this is not the case. Many important processes cannot or only with great passive costs be provided in-house. They might not visibly create costs, because resources are available anyways. What is often ignored is the fact that these resources might be more effectively deployed with other tasks for which they are now missing. Experts also point out directly employing temporary personnel will most likely be more expensive than deploying an experienced partner. A number of temporary contracts create an amount of additional work in terms of administration and training that would not be cost efficient.

On the other hand, a few experts doubt that outsourcing is more economical than in-house production in a purely cost-focused approach. “Of course it is more expensive. But at least it works then.”\textsuperscript{334} At the same time, some respondents argue that complaining about financial resources of campaigns happen on a high comfort level. Creating a basic level of visibility can be achieved without vast financial resources. This was shown by the Pirate Party in the 2013 campaign in which they reached a high level of visibility with only a fragment of the budget of established parties. Organizations which have the largest need to cooperate with external partners due to absence of own resources, are also the ones

\textsuperscript{331} Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: “Aus Sicht des Auftraggebers ist es natürlich auch immer eine Preisfrage. Also dass sie sich das leisten können. Dass aus ihrer Sicht quasi das Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis in Ordnung ist.”]

\textsuperscript{332} Steffi Lemke had been Member of Parliament from 1994 to 2002 and again since 2013. From 2002 until 2013 she was political general manager of the Green Party. In this function she was responsible for the 2005, 2009 and 2013 Bundestag campaigns as well as for the 2004 and 2009 European election campaign.


\textsuperscript{334} Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Natürlich es teurer, aber da funktioniert es wenigstens.”]
that have the lowest degree of financial resources available to hire external partners.

In conclusion, there is no general rule indicating that outsourcing processes will lead to increases or decreases of costs. Experts, however, agree that when it comes to efficiency, outsourcing indeed has a positive impact. This is also shown by the fact that campaigns regularly employ smaller agencies with campaign tasks. Armin Reins\textsuperscript{335} underlines that “it’s not given that, as a customer, I get a lot of quality for a lot of money. Money is not the basis for quality. I may find a smaller creative agency with committed creative people that have fun doing something cool.”\textsuperscript{336} By doing so, campaign management realizes that it is unable to provide the respective service on its own and therefore finds ways for cost-efficient outsourcing. In the end, experts agree that in cases where seasonal changes lead to situations in which processes needed during campaigns are not required during off seasons, outsourcing provides the more cost-efficient way of service provision. Therefore, financial resources play a decisive role in the openness to outsource since they are scarce and campaign organizations need to find most cost-effective ways to provide services that underlie seasonal changes.

5.1.2. Organizational factors

After elaborating on economic factors that determine openness to outsource, attention should be brought to factors that lie within campaign organizations. Research question 3 picks up this aspect, asking what influencing factors such as organizational level, change of leaders and party size have on the openness to use external resources.

5.1.2.1. Age of organization

The German party system is very mature and stable. Nevertheless, every few years, new parties develop. Some of these, such as the Greens, manage to become a sustainable power. Others, such as the Republicans or the Pirate Party achieve successes that receive strong popular attention mainly on the state level, but then do not manage to transform

\textsuperscript{335} Armin Reins is co-partner of Hamburg-based agency Reinsclassen. He is head of the campaigning section of the agency and was responsible for the 2013 FDP Bundestag campaign. He is also author of a number of bestselling books on marketing.

\textsuperscript{336} Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Es ist nicht gesagt, dass man als Kunde für viel Geld eine gute Qualität bekommt. Geld ist nicht die Grundlage für Qualität. Ich kann mir als Kunde eine kleine, kreative “günstige” Agentur suchen, mit engagierten Menschen, die Spaß daran haben, etwas Geiles zu machen.”]
those into a sustainable high level of popular support. Young parties generally do not possess a developed party organization with nationwide subsidiaries and only a limited number of active supporters. Hence, as shown in graph 5.2, experts agree that age of organizations has influence on the openness to outsource processes.

Newly established parties normally lack qualified and experienced personnel who have already taken part in federal elections. Therefore, there would be a certain need for external partners to fill this gap. However, since party financing in Germany is mostly based on public party financing (based on past success) and donations, young parties only have limited financial resources available. This often forces them to cover as many processes as possible by volunteers or low-cost resources. They seldom possess resources to employ qualified personnel no matter whether located in-house or at an external service provider. Lutz Meyer\textsuperscript{337} elaborates \textquotedblleft a young party is always a bit less organized and therefore initially outsources less, because people think they could do it on their own. That becomes less over time. On the other hand, it is very much dependent on its participation culture."\textsuperscript{338} In 2013, this could be observed very well in the campaign of the PirateParty. Due to a lack of financial resources and very active volunteer supporters, they managed to organize a federal campaign with a very low level of resources. This suggests that the limiting factor for openness to outsource is not necessarily the age of the organization itself, but the lack of financial and organizational

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\textsuperscript{337} Lutz Meyer is founder and partner of communications agency ‘Blumberry’. Until April 2016 he was also general manager. In 2013 he was heading the CDU Angela Merkel campaign on the side of the service provider. From 1998 to 2000 he was speaker of Minister of the Interior Ott Schily and deeply involved in the 2002 SPD campaign, being office manager of Matthias Machnig.

\textsuperscript{338} Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: “Eine junge Partei ist immer etwas unorganisierter und lagert deswegen erstmal weniger aus, weil die Leute noch als meinen selber machen zu können. Das wird sicherlich dann über die Strecke dann weniger. Auf der anderen Seite ist sie aber sehr stark abhängig von der Mitmachkultur.”]
resources which are connected to it. With parties developing positively but the initial enthusiasm about the new party going down, campaign organizations not only are faced with an even increasing need for outsourcing, but they become able to spend needed resources for the employment of external partners.

As suggested in graph 5.3, the level of in-house provision of services drops significantly once financial resources are received after a first electoral success. “Once they become reasonably successful, they suddenly have more money available after the campaign and then they can afford buying-in professions.”339 The extent and speed depends on the respected service. While some, such as hanging posters, might be outsourced at an early state, others, such as social media campaigning might stay with the organization for a longer period of time. At a certain point, however, there is a turning point from which outsourcing again decreases and in-house provision goes up. This is due to the development of local party entities, a growing amount of supporters and increased knowledge within the campaign organization. However, this process develops significantly slower than the first drop of in-house provision. Again, speed and amount of increase depend on the particular characteristics of the party. It is unlikely, however, that the amount of in-house provision reaches the same point as right after the party’s foundation. Once certain financial resources are available, there is a set of processes that only under very specific circumstances would be sensible to provide in-house (e.g. printing). A vivid example for this model is the development of the Green Party. In fact, the Green party did not employ an external partner until the 1998 campaign. Since then, very strong ties have been developed with Berlin-based agency ‘Zum Goldenen Hirschen’, which provides many

339 Interview with Stefan Hennewig [Original wording: “Wenn die dann halbwegs erfolgreich sind, haben die dann plötzlich Geld nach dem Wahlkampf und dann kann man es sich eben leisten, professionell zuzukaufen.”]
services for the campaign. Some tasks like social media are still performed within party campaign structures.

In conclusion, the age of organizations is only an indicator for its maturity. In this regard, German party system consists of three clusters of relevant parties:

- Mature parties: CDU, SPD, FDP
- Middle-aged parties: Greens, DieLinke (incl. predecessor PDS)
- Young parties: PirateParty, AfD

According to those clusters, the openness to outsource differs. While the degree of outsourcing is very low among young parties, middle-aged parties are comparably open and mature parties already have a high degree of internal expertise.

5.1.2.2. Party size

As age of parties might have influence on the availability of resources, the same might apply to the size of parties. Experts agree that it is likely that party size also influences openness to outsource (see graph 5.4). As a general rule, the more members a party has, the larger is the potential for active volunteer supporters “In the end success of a campaign also depends on to what extent the campaign is accepted by campaigning party members.”340

The larger the ‘reservoir’ of active campaign members is, the lower is the necessity to employ external partners. If there are enough supporters to hang posters, this may be done by the party itself instead of by an agent. “If a party is very small in its personnel structure, it has to outsource a lot. If it is large, it can internally implement many processes, which we have creatively pre-developed. For CDU, much was created in the field of digital communications. […] We

set the frame, developed the style and defined topics. But then a party organization can also implement a lot. However, if a party only has few personnel and a low budget, it becomes difficult." Hence, party size might be another indicator for the availability of human and financial resources that may be used for the implementation for a campaign. The larger a party is, the higher is the chance that enough qualified personnel may be accumulated that are able to provide certain services without external expertise. Another relevant factor for the extent of openness to outsource in relation to party size is the available institutional structure of the party. Larger parties often possess well-developed structures with expertise in many relevant fields and with entities down to the local level over the entire geographical extent of the country. This aspect, which may closely be related to party size, will be examined below.

5.1.2.3. Organizational level

The organizational level of parties represents a valuable asset for campaign organization. As mentioned above, with a large force of volunteer supporters available, need for cooperation with external partners decreases. While a small group of campaign leaders normally defines cornerstones of a campaign, possibly jointly with a lead agency, campaign organization often follows a top-down approach that requires a broad base of supporters. Hence organizational level is of particular importance on the local level. Experts agree that this has influence on the openness to outsource. As shown in graph 5.5, only

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341 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: "Wenn die Partei sehr klein in der Personalstruktur ist, dann muss sie sehr viel auslagern. Wenn sie groß ist, kann sie viele Prozesse auch intern auch umsetzen, die wir kreativ einmal vorentwickelt haben. Bei der CDU konkret ist viel selbst entstanden im Bereich digitaler Kommunikation […] Wir haben den Rahmen gesetzt, den Stil entwickelt, die Themen definiert. Aber dann kann eine Parteorganisation auch selbst viel umsetzen. Wenn allerdings die Partei wenig Person hat und auch noch wenig Budget, dann wird es schwierig.”]
representatives of FDP were rather skeptical. At the same time, it is remarkable that representatives of larger parties with better developed organizational level hardly doubt an influence. This suggests that parties that are in the position to enjoy this position realize the importance of this asset in a campaign. Respondents of DieLinke or FDP who were more critical might have not experienced the advantages of strong local entities over the entire area of the republic. “If our parties each have about 500,000 members you need an additional 2 million volunteers.” This can hardly be attained without strong local party organizations. During the 2013 campaign Angela Merkel’s ‘TeAM’ received special attention since it was a prime example of a broad workforce of supporters that was steered from the federal level, but organized with local or regional party structures. Without a strong local workforce, federal campaigns are difficult to implement. “To me, these are the heroes of each campaign. I have done that myself. There are more comfortable jobs than to climb on a ladder and attach those things with strange cable straps to lampposts on a Sunday afternoon, and to listen to funny comments of passers-by. Without these people campaigns would not nearly have this effect, because they would not be as visible.”

Some of the tasks provided by volunteers may not be provided at all by external partners. It would be hard to imagine seeing hired professionals campaigning at a party booth in front of a local supermarket. This most likely would not work. Actively including local party organizations also has a positive effect of activation. Parties enjoy having organizations of volunteers that do not exist in the private economy. Not only is it likely that active volunteers would actually cast their vote for the respective party, their engagement might also convince family members or friends to do the same. It can therefore be concluded that having a large workforce on the local level might be critical to election success.

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342 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: “Wenn unsere Parteien etwa jede so 500.000 Mitglieder haben müssen sie nochmal zwei Millionen Freiwillige haben.”]

In times of demographic changes, parties are faced with new challenges when it comes to organizing campaigns on the local level. Not only is the number of members decreasing, party members also become older and not as resilient as they used to be.

There are a few processes for which organizational level has no influence on openness to outsource. This is mostly the case for strategy development. “A strategy is not developed by party members, but there is an elected board that determines a committee. Hence, this is a very small group that eventually makes the decision how we want to position ourselves.”\(^{344}\) In some cases, (as the Greens in 2013) members decide on what general topics are important to them. But strategic campaign decisions are taken independently from the party’s organizational level.

Nevertheless, it may be stated that depending on the organizational structure on the local level, campaign management needs to decide which tasks may be provided by volunteers and which need to be professionalized. The lower the organizational level of a party is, the greater is the need and, hence, openness to employ external partners.

**5.1.2.4. Changes in leadership**

Another aspect that may influence openness to outsource is whether there have been changes in party leadership before a campaign. Parties’ histories differ greatly in this regard. While leadership in CDU has been very constant over past campaigns, other parties, such as SPD or the Greens have experienced more leadership changes. The question is, whether this has influence on openness to outsource. As shown in graph 5.6, experts are rather skeptical. There is no doubt that in successful campaigns, party leaders or main candidates have heavy influence on the party’s program. This was visible during SPD’s Schröder campaigns as well as when CDU shifted to Merkel as its leader. On the other hand, it could be observed in the 2013 SPD campaign that when the main candidate is confronted with a predetermined program that does not fit his character, failure becomes more likely. How large is the influence of campaign leadership to employ external partners?

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344 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: „Eine Strategie wird auch nicht von einer Mitgliederpartei gemacht, sondern da ist ein gewählter Landesvorstand, der wiederum ein Gremium bestimmt. Also das ist eine ganz kleine Gruppe, die am Ende da die Entscheidung trifft: so wollen wir uns aufstellen.”]
During the long period of Helmut Kohl as party leader, CDU experienced a continuous increase of external expertise incorporated into campaign organizations. In their ‘campaign commission’ they accumulated marketing experts from the private economy who gave valuable support to the assigned agencies. During the 1990’s this was further professionalized. At the same time, similar processes could be seen at SPD’s campaign that had a total of six party leaders between 1990 and 1998. The same observation could be found again, when SPD was headed by another five different persons between 2002 and 2009. In the same period of time CDU, was only headed by Angela Merkel. Again, both parties developed similarly in terms of openness to outsource. Therefore, there is no strong indication available that changes in party leadership lead to an increased or decreased openness to employ external partners. The same applies to situations in which campaign leadership changes.

However, what changes in party leadership seem to affect is the choice of the external partner. While some respondents argue that particularly during the first period of new campaign leadership, available expertise should be kept, others underline that one way to bring necessary changes to campaigns (e.g. after electoral defeats that led to changes in leadership), replacement of external partners is a popular choice. As Kajo Wasserhövel\textsuperscript{345} states, “a change in leadership often leads to a realignment of consulting structures. [...]

\textsuperscript{345} Karl-Josef Wasserhövel is chairman of PR agency ‘Elephantlogic’. From 1995 to 1998 he was personal assistant to SPD federal manager Franz Müntefering. After Müntefering’s election as General Secretary, Wasserhövel became his office manager. From 2004 until 2009 he was SPD federal manager and was charged with organizing SPD election campaigns.
[There is] of course trust that develops towards leadership personalities. [...] A new party leader or new party leadership normally realigns this accordingly.”

A particular problem for external partners is when campaign leadership changes during the run of a campaign. Although this does not happen often, agents employed at the 2013 FDP campaign were confronted with this phenomenon when main candidate Philipp Rösler was replaced by Rainer Brüderle. “With the change to Brüderle different consultants suddenly came into play that had their own topics and agendas. This changed the work and made it more difficult.” With that change, well-planned concepts and strategies needed to be revised in order to fit the new situation and candidate. This led to the situation that deadlines could not or only hardly be met. Once Election Day came closer and polls were at frighteningly low levels, a certain degree of panic could be observed within the campaign, leading to impulsive decisions on both sides that were not coordinated well. Hence, it was impossible for the necessary trust between new party leadership and agents to develop, resulting in uncoordinated activities that most likely had negative effects on the overall effect of the campaign.

In conclusion, it may be stated that changes in campaign leadership do not have a significant influence on the openness to outsource, but they may have influence on the choice of which external partner to task and on the efficiency of cooperation between principal and agent.

5.1.2.5. Decision making processes

A factor that came up during the running of the interviews was the influence of decision making processes to the openness to outsource. A variety of respondents suggested that unclear decision making processes and several centers of power may have a direct influence on the amount of external partners tasked with particular processes in a campaign (see graph 5.7). In an ideal campaign, there is one center of power, which is a

346 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Ein Führungswechsel führt oft dazu, dass die Strukturen in der Beratung neu aufgestellt werden. [...] [Es gibt] natürlich auch Vertrauensverhältnisse, die entstehen zu den FührungsPersönlichkeiten. [...] Ein neuer Parteivorsitzender oder eine neue Parteiführung arrondiert das dann auch entsprechend neu.”]

347 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Beim Wechsel zu Brüderle kamen plötzlich andere Berater ins Spiel, die ihre eigenen Themen und Agenda hatten. Das veränderte und erschwerte das Arbeiten.”]
symbiosis of the campaign manager and the main candidate. “Nothing was released without me seeing it. And if I said no, it would not be published.”\textsuperscript{348} Having one center of power is a crucial element to effectiveness of campaigns. Everyone involved needs to know who is in the position to decide and this must be a small circle of people. This plays a particularly important role when it comes to interacting with external service providers. A greater variety of contact points would lead to chaotic circumstances. “In the end, it is decisive that there is one responsible person who then is also able to make decisions.”\textsuperscript{349} This does not need to be a front row politician. In fact, most of the tasks that need to be fulfilled in a campaign are well under the radar of top political decision makers. But it must be clear to everyone who is in the position to make final decisions. The fewer people there are, the most effective a campaign organization works. In terms of outsourcing, this does not necessarily have an impact on the openness to outsource a larger amount of tasks, but it is less likely that a variety of partners will be hired by different centers of power who might work contradictory to each other.

A particularly vivid example of how unclear decision making processes may lead to unwanted increased outsourcing was the 2013 SPD campaign. Observers as well as participants agree that there had been a variety of centers of power:

- Secretary General Andrea Nahles who was in charge of the overall campaign but not

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\textsuperscript{348} Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Es wurde nichts freigegeben, was ich nicht gesehen habe. Und wenn ich gesagt habe nein, dann gab es dann auch nicht.”]

\textsuperscript{349} Interview with Axel Wallraabenstein [Original wording: “Entscheidend ist am Ende immer, dass es einen Verantwortlichen gibt, der dann auch entscheidungsfähig ist.”]
settled in party headquarters and had a very difficult relation with candidate Steinbrück and party leader Gabriel.

- head of party Sigmar Gabriel who tried to avoid a major failure in his first campaign as party leader,
- head of parliamentary group Frank-Walter Steinmeier who gathered parliamentary expertise and used to be main candidate in the previous campaign, and
- main candidate Peer Steinbrück who only gradually seemed to adjust to his visible position, who was faced with a program that did not connect to his personal convictions, and who seemed to have almost no support within Willy-Brand-House.

As official strategic partner, a joint venture stemming from popular agencies ‘Johannsen+Kretschmer’ and ‘Super an der Spree’ was chosen from campaign leadership. In addition, Hamburg-based APOS was tasked with strategic consultation. With Aimaq von Lobenstein, another strategic consultant was chosen by party leader Gabriel to add to the campaign. It turned out that head of campaign Andrea Nahles was very reluctant towards them, because she had closer relations to ‘Super J+K’. As a result, there were several teams working quite uncoordinated on the same campaign. Rals Tils explains that “this was problematic, because the understanding of the agency’s role was not coordinated with the central decision makers, but with the secretary general.” This deficit became particularly apparent when comparisons to the CDU campaign were drawn, where only one major external partner was employed and where clearly defined decision-making processes could be observed that only had two points of contacts for external partners. Once imbalances through several centers of power have been created, “it cannot be stabilized through an external or outsourced consulting structure. They do not have a chance in that regard. That’s what also happened in 2013.”

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350 Alexander and Fischaleck, ‘Die Kanzlerrmacher’
351 Dr. Ralf Tils is partner of APOS (Agentur für politische Strategie). He was deeply involved in the 2013 SPD campaign, where he was hired as consultant focussing on strategic issues. He therefore added to the scope of lead agency ‘Super J+S’ which was tasked with overall campaign development.
352 Interview with Ralf Tils [Original wording: „Das war dann problematisch, weil das Rollenverständnis dieser Agentur war eben nicht mit den zentralen Entscheidungsträgern aber schon mit der Generalsekretärin abgestimmt.”]
353 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Kann es auch nicht über eine externe oder outgesourcte Beratungsstrukturen stabilisiert werden. Da haben die gar keine Chancen mehr, das zu machen. Das war das, was 2013 auch stattgefunden hat.”]
It may be concluded that uncoordinated decision-making processes may accidentally lead to an unintended larger openness to outsource processes. With several centers of power, each one attempts to exert influence on the campaign organization. That may also include that every center employs different consultants and agents with whom they have built a relationship of trust. In cases, where only one center of power exists, which is the final authority to decide, clear decision making processes lead to a coordinated cooperation with one or only a few selected partners with clear responsibilities.

5.1.2.6. Need for external perspective

Just like in the private business world there is a natural danger of developing tunnel vision in case of a strong focus on particular issues. Political parties seem to be exposed particularly to this trap since there is a high danger that positions and opinions of party members do not necessarily represent the overall society. Hence, topics that might play a central role for close supporters might not have the same significance for the vast majority of society and thereby for a large potential of votes.

Being aware of this tendency, parties often actively demand support from external partners to add an outside perspective to their considerations. On one hand, topics need to be developed by the party itself, “on the other hand, they are naturally deeply involved in the topics so that it sometimes helps to employ an external service provider, which sometimes clears a path through the thicket.”

Parties sometimes need to be corrected in their considerations. An external partner who is not biased by the party’s political line can most effectively do this. Parties therefore expect professional support and expertise from service providers that the party itself would not be able to provide. “That used to be such a trend to say we employ agencies that have never conducted a campaign. Something fresh, something new with an external view. You can do that. But you can only do that if you are well-positioned. Because if you employ an inexperienced agency and, at the same time, you are internally badly organized you have a serious problem. That doesn’t work.”

354 Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “Auf der anderen Seite sind sie natürlich auch so sehr in den Themen drin, dass es manchmal eben auch hilft, einen externen Dienstleister mit reinzuziehen, der eben auch dann manchmal eine Schneise in das Dickicht schlägt”]

355 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: “Das war ja mal so ein Trend zu sagen, wir holen uns Agenturen, die noch nie politische Kampagnen gemacht haben, was Frisches, was Neues, und der Blick von außen usw. Kann man machen. Kann
5.2. Factors influencing extent of outsourcing

Once the make-or-buy decision is answered in favor of ‘buy’ the question arises what influences the extent of outsourcing. Outsourcing is not always outsourcing. As indicated in chapters 1.1 and 4.2 a range of outsourcing mechanism ranging from internal shared service centers to classic external outsourcing is possible. Therefore, this subchapter will pick up the main research question ‘what are the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns?’ According to the main hypothesis, focus is put on two factors, recalling the model introduced in chapter 1.1. (see graph 5.8): Potential loss of control and political transaction costs. The basic principle is that larger potential loss of control or political transaction costs are, the smaller willingness to give the service to an external partner is. It is not necessary that both factors are equally pronounced. The following explores if these two factors have the suggested impact.

5.2.1. Political transaction costs

As outlined in chapter 4.6.2, outsourcing certain processes to external partners leads to transaction costs. On one hand, those are financial costs resulting from payments made to the agent. On the other hand, there are non-financial costs, reaching from an increased need for coordination (between principal and agent) to a brain drain on the side of the principal. Therefore, decision makers need to evaluate the costs and benefits of outsourcing to make an informed decision.

Graph 5.8: Outsourcing decision based on political transaction Costs and potential loss of control

man aber nur machen, wenn man gut aufgestellt ist. Weil wenn man eine unerfahrene Agentur holt und gleichzeitig noch sozusagen intern als Partei schlecht aufgestellt ist, dann hat man ein echtes Problem. Das funktioniert nicht."


With politics being an area where personal reputation, success stories and power play an even more important role than in the private economy, another factor is of significant importance: political transaction costs. They describe the extent to which key players in campaign management face personal consequences for their career, reputation, etc. in the case of outsourcing certain processes to external providers. As stated in chapter 1.1, being tested is ‘the more key players are able to internalize successes and externalize failures, the lower potential transaction costs are’. Particularly heads of campaigns are in very visible positions. This may lead to promotions to superior party positions or to attractive positions in the private economy (e.g. the area of lobbying or political consulting) in case of success. At the same time, it may also lead to the end of a political career in the case of major failures. In the end, “it is always the campaign manager who is to blame”\(^{356}\). This leads to a very high degree of responsibility and, hence, to tendency for risk-aversion. Frank Stauss reminds us that there indeed have been former campaign managers who were promoted to ministerial positions, but, “I would not know an actual campaign manager who had a notable career on the federal level or who ended up as Prime Minister of a state at any point in history.”\(^{357}\) This underlines that key party personnel are under heavy pressure, particularly when their political fate is connected to the success of the respective campaign. Party key players have a genuine interest in personally benefiting from successful campaigns. As campaign manager, “you need a political nose, political thinking, and a political gut. Perhaps gut feeling is even more important.”\(^{358}\) Therefore, they are unlikely to give a process to an external partner if it does not serve the purpose.

During the run of expert interviews, it became clear that a factor that is highly relevant for principal-agent relationship in this regard is trust. Hence, three aspects that have an impact on political transaction costs are explored more thoroughly in the following: Potential internalization of success, potential externalization of failures and trust.

\(^{356}\) Stauss, Frank [Original wording: „Der Wahlkampfmanager ist natürlich immer schuld“]

\(^{357}\) Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “Ich kann mich nicht daran erinnern, dass jetzt in der Geschichte der Republik ein tatsächlicher Wahlkampfmanager am Ende irgendwo in der Ebene von einer nennenswerten bundesweiten Karriere gelandet wäre oder Ministerpräsident oder sowas geworden wäre.”]

\(^{358}\) Lemke, Steffi [Original wording: „Sie brauchen eine politische Nase, ein politisches Denken, einen politischen Bauch. Vielleicht ist das Bauchgefühl sogar noch wichtiger.”]
5.2.1.1. Internalization of successes

As mentioned above, an aspect that is of central importance to key campaign personnel is that they are able to convert success in campaigns to benefits for their personal professional careers. Particularly during the last phase of a campaign, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate clearly between contributions that have their origins internally and those that come from external partners. In most cases, they stem from mutual collaboration. However, in order to reach personal benefits for responsible personnel, it seems necessary that achieved successes is being attributed to campaign management itself and not to external factors or external partners. Therefore, the question arises whether internalization of successes is a factor that contributes to the extent of political transaction costs. When talking about the factor of internalization of successes, experts had a quite clear opinion. As shown in graph 5.9, eight out of ten times the issue was raised with a clear position. Experts claimed that internalization of successes indeed plays an important role when it comes to the extent of political transaction costs.

Before thoroughly analyzing more particular factors and examples of internalization of successes, an important differentiation between internal and external perception of success factors needs to be made. Matthias Höhn states “publicly you will never manage that agents […] stand in the spotlight. In case of doubt, it will always be the

Graph 5.9: Influence of internalization of successes on political transaction costs

359 Matthias Höhn is federal manager of leftist party DieLinke. From 2005 until 2012 he was party leader in the state of Sachsen-Anhalt. He was first elected into DieLinke’s federal board in 2010. As federal manager, he is responsible of DieLinke campaigns since 2012.
candidate or the party leader and sometimes it is both in personal union.” However, when it comes to personal consequences, the internal perspective is of more importance to party personnel. Axel Wallrabenstein underlines in this context that “internally you always can see very clearly who was in charge of a campaign and who contributed to its success.”

During the running of the interviews, it became very clear that internalization of success is a factor that is significantly more relevant for experts that were involved in campaigns of the two large parties SPD and CDU. Of the above noted ten mentions, nine can be assigned to representative of those two parties. Two explanations seem to be most sensible for this phenomenon:

- Of all parties on the federal level, only CDU and SPD have a realistic prospect of being the dominant force in government. Therefore, those two parties offer the most promising chances for distinctive political careers.
- Both parties experienced rather large changes in cooperation with external partners. While DieLinke and the Greens also relied on long-lasting relationships in the 2013 elections, CDU and SPD largely worked together with sets of new agents.

Career prospects play an important role in the extent to which actors perceive political transaction costs as relevant for the run of their careers. If a player was responsible for a campaign of a party that only has marginal chances to be part of government, career options may be limited to internal party positions. This might still represent an attractive option; however, arguably government positions are more desirable for most players. A prime example is the 2002 SPD campaigns run by Franz Müntefering and Matthias Machnig. Both were in very powerful and visible positions and both seemed to have desire for further reaching careers. Hence, they had a genuine interest in being associated with potential election success. “Everything was clearly assigned. Müntefering and Machnig run a campaign [...] They drew the entire political responsibility for the campaign to

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360 Höhn, Matthias [Original wording: „Öffentlich werden sie es nie schaffen, dass Agenturen […] im Fokus stehen. Das wird dann im Zweifel immer der Spitzenkandidat oder die Parteivorsitzenden und manchmal ist es Personalunion.”]

361 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: „Nach innen sieht man das schon sehr genau, wer auch für einen Wahlkampf mitverantwortlich war und wer mit am Sieg beteiligt war.”]
themselves.” Although CDU led all polls, SPD managed to defend its majority. There is no doubt that this was also due to some external factors, such as the big flood in eastern Germany. However, Müntefering and Machnig managed to internalize the unexpected success of the campaign. A few months later, Müntefering was head of the party, minister for labor and Vice-Chancellor and Machnig state secretary, respectively minister on the state level at a later stage.

When parties and agents have been working together in a long-lasting and resilient relationship, short-term internalization of success is not as common as when there is a rather high fluctuation of external partners. In a long-term relationship, principal and agents work together in a series of campaigns and projects and therefore always have to keep in mind that it would be inopportune to upset the respective partner by claiming responsibility for successes actually achieved by the partner.

In the case of fluctuation of external providers, key party players often understand agents as purely a service provider remunerated for its services. “Consultants are gone afterwards. They have fulfilled their contract.” Although it is clear to all actors that every success has many fathers, there is a natural tendency on both sides attempting to internalize success in order to qualify themselves either for further political positions in the case of party actors or for further campaign tasks in the case of external service providers. In the 2013 election, a large-scale CDU billboard covering the façade of a house next to Berlin main station showing the popular ‘Merkel rhombus’ gained large attention (see graph 5.10). During the running of the interviews it became clear that both, party and agency claimed responsibility for this project. While it will be literally impossible to investigate who had

![Graph 5.10: Merkel rhombus billboard](image)

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362 Tils, Ralf [Original wording: „Da war es ganz klar zugeordnet. Müntefering und Machnig machen eine Kampagne […] Die haben die politische Verantwortung für den Wahlkampf komplett an sich gezogen.”]

363 Tils, Ralf [Original wording: „Die Berater sind hinterher weg. Die haben ihren Vertrag erfüllt.”]
the initial idea for the billboard, it is apparent that both sides attempted to be associated with this successful project and tried to internalize this success factor. As Kajo Wasserhövel underlines it is a natural reaction by the agent to try to prove its capabilities by claiming responsibility for such success stories. It is a genuine asset for an agent to underline that “I was responsible for Merkel 2013. And when there are other advertisers sitting there they will applaud and say ‘great, cool guys.’” Hence, it is a natural tendency for the economic man to internalize successes wherever possible to prove one’s personal capabilities for personal profit.

At the same time, one has to realize that in the political sphere this has its limitations. The extent to which this is possible or necessary seems connected to the extent to which the service provider is dependent on the agent.

If there are long lasting relationships with realistic prospects for further cooperation (e.g. between the Greens and the agency ‘Zum Goldenen Hirschen’ or between DieLinke and DiG), hesitation to internalize success on the side of the agent seems to be larger than in the case of SPD and CDU. The latters’ agents are more dependent on success stories in order to find other contractors after cooperation with the party has ended.

5.2.1.2. Externalization of failures

Naturally, taking over responsibility does not only imply that potential successes are attributed to people in charge. Accordingly, responsible actors might also be associated with potential failures. As describe above, campaign managers often are in their position because they strive for higher political careers. While being associated with successes may be helpful to attain this goal, failures might cause the exact opposite and bring harm to career plans. Therefore, this section examines if tendencies to externalize failures play a role in campaigns and if that they are a relevant aspect for the extent of political transaction costs. The assumption is that the smaller possibilities to externalize failures are, the larger the impact on political transaction costs is.

Campaigns are complicated systems of processes that require distinctive expertise. It is literally impossible for any campaign manager to have always the maximum of knowledge

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364 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Ich habe 2013 Merkel gemacht. Und wenn da die Werber sitzen, dann klatschen die und sagen super, coole Type.”]
available that is necessary to fully steer all processes of a campaign. Nevertheless, “political
decision makers need to make decisions because they are holding the responsibility. […] But I would leave a question mark to the aspect of how professional that is.” It is clear
to all actors that there is no such thing as a campaign without mistakes or errors. They
happen and they are natural. Hence, as shown in graph 5.4, experts have a clear tendency
to consider externalization of failures as relevant to political transaction costs. Of 21
mentions with clear positioning, only six considered externalization of failures as an
irrelevant factor, while 15 statements implied relevance for political transaction costs.

An interesting aspect is the fact that while experts from smaller parties hardly mentioned
this aspect, it was mainly CDU and SPD affiliates who raised this topic. While SPD experts
were divided (four statements for each characteristic), a clear majority of eight to four
mentions of CDU affiliates claimed that externalization of failures is not
only a reality, but also a relevant factor for political transaction costs. “I think everybody
has this reflex. And it is also relevant for political organizations. If you are winning, it was
you and if you are not winning it was somebody else. Then, the agency is ‘somebody
else’.” When focussing on the 2013 SPD campaign, experts agree that externalization of
failures was indeed a relevant factor. From the very start when Peer Steinbrink was chosen

Graph 5.11: Influence of externalization of failures on political transaction costs

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365 Interview with Ralf Tils [Original wording: „Dann müssen aber die politischen Entscheidungsträger letztendlich die
Entscheidung treffen, weil die müssen auch die Verantwortung tragen. […] Aber ob das dann immer so versiert in
professioneller Hinsicht ist, da möchte ich noch einmal ein Fragezeichen dahinter hinsetzen.”]

366 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: „Ich glaube, diesen Reflex haben alle. Und er gilt auch für politische
Organisationen. Wenn man gewinnt war man das selber und wenn man nicht gewinnt waren es andere. Und die
Agenturpartner sind dann eben der Andere.”]
as candidate, it became obvious that party and candidate did not work in a symbiosis, but rather as community of purpose. “Then they said ‘Peer, you can get everything what you want. But the result is your responsibility.” Particularly when it was foreseeable that the campaign would not lead to election success, actors attempted not to be associated with this campaign in order not having to face negative consequences. It became obvious in the interviews that this is phenomenon is present on both sides, the principal and the agent. A variety of actors particularly pointed out mistakes that were done in areas that did not belong to their respective responsibility before claiming that externalization of failures is actually not a relevant factor. Therefore, the difference between SPD and CDU may stem from the fact that neglecting externalization of failures might already be a step in doing so if the party was faced with a major defeat in the past (as it was the case with SPD in 2013).

Peter Radunski brings it to the point: “There is nothing nicer than making the agency responsible. But there is also nothing more dubious”\(^\text{368}\), keeping in mind that it is not the agent that runs a campaign, but it is campaign management on the side of the party. Hence, the attempt to externalize failures at the expense of the agent is a real phenomenon. However, it is weak when it comes to the facts on the ground. This normally would become apparent during the revision process in the aftermath of a campaign. However, “revision has been and continues to be a catastrophe. They are normally not performed, if there is no political will. In particular, when there is continuity in campaign leadership. They would have to tell themselves what they had been doing wrong.”\(^\text{369}\)

Nevertheless, the vast majority of experts agree that externalization of failures is an aspect that is relevant and contributes to the extent of political transaction costs. Even experts that maintain long-term relationships with their agents acknowledge that “you can assume in each campaign that the agency or the head of campaign […] are the ones held responsible. That is part of the game. The agency knows that and, being head of campaign,

\(^{367}\) Interview with Ralf Tils [Original wording: „Dann haben sie gesagt du kannst alles haben was du willst, Peer. Aber das ist deine Verantwortung was dabei rauskommt.”]

\(^{368}\) Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: „Es gibt ja nichts Schöneres, als wenn sie die Agentur verantwortlich machen können. Es gibt aber auch nichts Unseröseres.”]

\(^{369}\) Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: „Die Aufarbeitungen sind und bleiben eine Katastrophe. Sie werden in der Regel nicht gemacht, wenn sie politisch nicht gewollt sind. Vor allen Dingen dann, wenn die Führung sich fortsetzt. Müssen sie sich ja nicht erzählen, dass sie was falsch gemacht hat.”]
I know this as well.370 Experts point out that externalization of failures is particularly present when parties are in processes of realignment. Failures are often used to enforce strategic decisions. Regularly one consequence of an election defeat is a change of agent, regardless whether errors could be proven or not.

Since there is also a considerable number of respondents claiming that externalization of failures is not a relevant element, the question remains what was different in campaigns these respondents took part in. As mentioned above, neglecting this phenomenon might already be a characteristic of externalization. However, two other aspects are likely to play a role in the extent of externalization of failures:

- Is there a will to continue to work together with the same partner?
- The extent to which the external partner was involved in the campaign

Similar to internalization of successes, externalization of failures becomes a less relevant factor when there are long-lasting relationships between the principal and the agent. As suggested by game theory, players act differently when they know that there are some more rounds to come. Hence, the interest in upsetting one’s partner by making him responsible for one’s own mistakes is limited. Everybody in the organization knows that “you as political decision maker are responsible. Normally, you know exactly with which result you are going home. No political decision maker can say the agency wasn’t that good in case of failures.”371 This explanation is supported by the observation that those experts who had been working together in long-term relationships (e.g. Frank Stauss and Kajo Wasserhövel) did not report considerable externalization of failures. “Perhaps we were just lucky, but we have never experienced this. Not even after difficult campaigns and tough defeats, anyone would have pointed the finger at us. That might be caused by the acting

370 Interview with Matthias Höhn [Original wording: Sie können bei jedem Wahlkampf davon ausgehen, dass die Agentur bzw. der Wahlkampfleiter […] dann doch die sind, die Schuld sind. Das gehört dazu. Das weiß die Agentur und das weiß auch ich als Wahlkampfleiter]

371 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Sie stehen als politischer Entscheider in der Verantwortung. Normalerweise wissen sie ganz genau, mit dem Ergebnis gehen sie nach Hause. Kein politischer Entscheider kann sich hinstellen wenn das schlecht läuft und sagen die Agentur war nicht so gut.”]
The other aspect is the extent to which the external partner was involved in the campaign. There are considerable differences in scopes of external partners. While in some campaigns they are involved from the very beginning of strategy planning (find one example in chapter 6.3), in other campaigns, external partners serve as pure service providers for particular services (see chapter 6.4). Depending on the extent of involvement, externalization of failures may be possible. “If an agency has only been an extended workbench [...] one can hardly make them responsible for a defeat.”

In conclusion, it can be stated that externalization of failures is a relevant factor in campaigning, particularly when highly fluctuating external partners are involved in key aspects of campaigns. For the most part, this phenomenon is accepted by all stakeholders although it is considered a signal of bad chemistry between the principal and the agent.

5.2.1.3. Trust

During the running of the interviews, it became apparent that there is a third factor that has an impact on the extent of political transaction costs: trust. Experts clearly stated that trust between principal and agent is a valuable asset due to a number of reasons that will be explored in the following. As shown in graph 5.12, of 41

![Graph 5.12: Influence of trust on political transaction costs](image_url)

372 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: „Vielleicht haben wir bisher nur Glück gehabt, aber wir haben es noch nie erlebt. Auch nach schwierigen Wahlkämpfen und nach harten Niederlagen, dass man mit dem Finger auf uns gezeigt hätte. Das mag an den handelnden Personen gelegen haben.”]

373 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: „Wenn eine Agentur von vornherein immer nur verlängerte Werkbank ist [...] dann kann man sie nachher auch schwer mitverantwortlich machen für einen Verlust”]
mentions a vast majority of 31 claimed that trust plays a role and has an effect on the extent of political transaction costs. Only three stated that this aspect might be negligible.

Trust is a resource that cannot be created from one day to another. Rather it takes time and personal contact for trust to develop. Since there is a danger that actors attempt to internalize successes and externalize failures, players seek for a partner they may trust enough to minimize dangers of falsely being blamed. There are several factors that contribute to the benefits of trust:

- Similar ways of thinking;
- Knowledge that the partner is able to provide all needed resources;
- Continuity in partnership;
- Identification with principal, and
- Discreetness

As Kajo Wasserhövel points out, campaigns are in a field of tension between seeking partners that have similar attitudes, opinions and convictions and partners that might be able to set new impulses. “I am not fond of relationships, which are too close. That only leads to discussions that are not to the point and you also might be too careless when performance is not provided. On the other hand, it is difficult if you have a service provider – this depends on the subject – that is too far away from politics and you continuously have to brief him. That may be very time-consuming.”

The decisive factor is whether the principal can be sure that the agent is not only striving for profit maximization, but rather for winning the campaign. To attain this goal, a certain number of like-minded actors are necessary. In practice, campaign management bases principal decisions on whom to work with on subjective gut feeling and past experiences. Respondents summarized this fact under the key word ‘chemistry’ between principal and agent. Often, this aspect is already considered in the selection process for service providers. In many cases, there is no public tender, but campaign managers contact agencies they know (perhaps through past cooperation) and they can imagine as a trustworthy partner again. The ideal goal for

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374 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Ich halte nichts davon, wenn das zu eng ist. Weil das dazu führt, dass man nicht auf den Punkt miteinander redet und auch unter Umständen zu nachlässig ist, wenn die Leistung nicht gebracht wird. Es ist aber auch schwierig, wenn Sie Dienstleister haben - kommt jetzt auf das Gewerk an - der zu weit von Politik oder von ihnen weg ist und sie müssen ihn permanent neu einbrieien. Das kann auch sehr aufwendig sein.”]
campaign management is to find partners that combine both, advantages of closeness and of distance. “Proximity brings understanding. But proximity also brings conformity of ideas.”

Hence, relationships between party managers and agencies that are characterized by very similar ways of thinking might be very harmonic, but there is a danger that they might sooner or later lose some of their initial creativity.

In addition, respondents agree that the principal needs to trust that the agent is able to provide all necessary resources at the requested point in time. It is expected by campaign managers that agents do not attempt to postpone certain tasks due to lack of human resources (e.g. through holidays). Since parties are not able to provide certain services and therefore strive for cooperation with external partners, there is a certain degree of dependency. PirateParty campaign manager Salomon Reyes underlines, “we trust the persons in charge. If we choose someone, there is a reason for it. [...] We don’t have the possibilities to constantly second someone who monitors if what needs to be done has been done and how the result looks like. At the moment we emit a task it is being taken over very liberally.”

Failure in service provision may lead to negative consequences that also might have backlashes on campaign managers personally. Therefore, campaign managers are well-advised in working together with trustworthy partners, which can ensure that necessary resources can be provided.

As mentioned above, trust is a factor that grows over time. Therefore, an aspect that contributes largely to the extent of trust is continuity in partnerships. Particularly experts that were involved in campaigns of DieLinke and the Greens who have been part to close and long-term relationships underline the value of trust to both sides. It adds to efficiency and effectiveness of a campaign organization. As already mentioned in chapter 5.1.2.4 in cases of changes in party leadership, long-term relations between principal and agent may be terminated due to a realignment of party structures. This does not necessarily have to

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375 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Nähe bringt Verständnis. Nähe bringt aber vielleicht auch eine Gleichschaltung der Ideen.”]

376 Salomon Reyes has been member of the PirateParty since 2011. He was charged with the overall management of the 2013 Bundestag campaign.

377 Interview with Salomon Reyes [Original wording: „Wir vertrauen den Personen. Wenn wir sie ausgewählt haben, dann hat das einen Grund. [...] Wir haben nicht die Möglichkeiten, die ganze Zeit jemanden abzustellen, der darauf guckt, ob dass, was da gemacht werden muss, auch so gemacht wird, wie es sein soll. In dem Moment, wo wir eine Aufgabe abgeben, wird die sehr frei übernommen.”]
bring an end to a trustworthy relationship if decisions have been made in a transparent and understandable manner.

Politics is a market that triggers emotions. Results of an election may have direct impacts on all citizens of a country and beyond. Therefore, experts agree that a general tendency in favor of the program of the principal is a good basis for a trustworthy relationship. However, the question arises how strong identification with the respective party needs to be. Experts agree that holding membership of the party is not a prerequisite. However, “there needs to be a certain basic conviction and harmony. Otherwise it doesn’t work. But one does not have to be a party member and one does not have to agree to all points.”

This does not only apply to the head of the agent, but also to members that work in the responsible team. Without a similar basic conviction, it would be hard to find intrinsic motivation to work for the success of a given party. All experts from agencies claim that only a small percentage of their workforce engaged in campaigns actually holds membership in a political party. A particularly interesting case is Lutz Meyer who was in charge of the 2013 Merkel campaign with his agency ‘Blumbery’. “Meyer had been SPD member for many years, from 1998 to 2000 speaker of SPD minister of interior Schily and during the 2002 campaign office manager of campaign manager Matthias Machnig and considerably engaged in ‘Kampa’ that helped SPD and Gerhard Schröder to win elections.”

More important than having party membership is an understanding for the respective organization. This includes understanding for structure, history and procedures. The last factor that contributes to trust is the ability to act in discreet ways and to preserve secrets. “It is just trust for trust. The customer trusts us and we trust our employees. [...] Of course there is a clause in each contract that is signed by everyone [...]. But in the end it doesn’t help anything because in eight of ten cases you cannot prove where it is coming from.”

378 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: „Es muss eine gewisse Grundüberzeugung und -harmonie gegeben sein. Sonst funktioniert das nicht. Aber man muss nicht Parteimitglied sein oder man muss nicht in allen Punkten übereinstimmen.”]

Since parties aim for any weakness in opponents’ campaigns, it is of utmost importance that potential points of attacks are not being created due to lack of discreetness on the side of the partner. Nevertheless, Armin Reins reminds us that this is not a factor unique to campaigns. Obligations of secrecy are sometimes even larger in the private sector. “When we advertise for a new car, you can imagine that secrecy is much larger. In a party, what is secret there?” Nevertheless, it is a clear expectation by both sides that relevant aspects of a campaign remain to be unknown for the public and opponents in order not to lose possible competitive advantages.

It can be concluded that trust is essential to campaigns. While principal and agent do not have to be structurally interwoven, every side needs to be sure that they can address issues in private. If actors need to fear that secrets are brought to the attention of the public, there is no basis for a fruitful partnership. Hence, trust significantly contributes to political transaction costs when party personnel are risking political disadvantages due to inadequacies of the service provider.

5.2.2. Control

The proposed model states that the extent of outsourcing is not only dependent on the level of political transaction costs, but also on the extent of possible loss of control over certain aspects of the campaign. This indicates that the higher potential loss of control is, the lower the willingness is to give a process to an external service provider. This subchapter will pick up research question two and elaborate on factors that contribute to the extent of possible control over the campaign organization. Hypothesis two stated in this regard that only if a process is low in complexity, can be standardized, and has negligible strategic importance, key actors are able to maintain control over the campaign organization. Hence, the following will explore whether these are indeed decisive factors that contribute to the degree of control.

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380 Interview with Hans-Hermann Langguth [Original wording: „Es ist nur Vertrauen für Vertrauen. Der Kunde vertraut uns und wir vertrauen unseren Mitarbeitern. [...] Es steht natürlich in jedem Arbeitsvertrag eine Klausel, die jeder unterschreibt [...] Im Zweifelsfall nutzt ihnen das gar nichts, im Zweifel kann man ja in acht von zehn Fällen gar nicht beweisen, wo es herkommt.”]

381 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: „Wenn ich für ein neues Auto werbe, ist die Geheimhaltung viel größer. In einer Partei, was ist denn da bitte wirklich geheim?”]
All experts agree that there is no ultimate control over the agent. Nevertheless, agents need to be led in order for the campaign organization to work effectively. “Many politicians or campaigns fail because they don’t know or don’t realize that an agency also needs to be led.”

It should be defined what role the agent is playing in the overall structure and what responsibilities it is taking over.

Campaign organizations attempt to protect themselves against a possible loss of control. While in the past this was done on the basis of clearly defined budgets, tasks and contractual clauses that led to penalties in case of underperformance, other actors (such as the Greens) try to exert control by integrating the agent deeply into the campaign structure, both physically and in terms of responsibilities.

The following will further explore the mentioned three factors identifying their contribution to potential loss of control, indicating possible ways to avoid this phenomenon.

5.2.2.1. Complexity

Although this aspect was only mentioned a few times, complexity of outsourced services seems to play a role in the extent of possible loss of control. All respondents that mentioned this factor underlined its relevance. As shown in graph 5.13 all six mentions supported this concept. However, it is important to note that all stem from experts related to CDU and SPD. Experts affiliated with other parties did not mention this aspect.

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382 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: „Viele Politiker oder viele Kampagnen scheitern sicherlich auch daran, dass sie das nicht wissen oder sie sich überhaupt nicht bewusst sind, dass eine Agentur auch gesteuert werden muss.”]
A low degree of control not only leads to enhanced possibilities for standardization (this will further be explored in chapter 5.2.2.2), but it also makes services more measurable and, hence, more controllable. Complexity of outsourced tasks particularly becomes a relevant factor when it adds to increased non-financial opportunity costs. Those might stem from increasing need for time-consuming coordination and briefings.

Experts agree that complexity of services is closely connected with the question whether the task is a typical service provision such as printing posters or whether it is connected with content-related issues of the party. In particular, tasks that are related to internal party processes and close to the core of party functions lead to increased risk of loss of control in the case of being outsourced. Karsten Göbel\textsuperscript{383} underlines that “everything that is closer to the core brand, to the nature of politics and party, is difficult to impossible to outsource.”\textsuperscript{384} Therefore, experts agree that when dealing with the core of a campaign, the more complex tasks should be provided by the party itself.

\textsuperscript{383} Karsten Göbel in managing director of Berlin-based agency Super an der Spree. He led the 2013 SPD campaign as head of a joint venture with agency Johannsen & Kretschmer. Before joining Super an der Spree in 2009, he was planning director of agency Zum Goldenen Hirschen, which is closely connected to the Green party.

\textsuperscript{384} Interview with Karsten Göbel [Original wording: „Alles was stärker am Marktkern, am Wesen von Politik und Partei ist, lässt sich immer weniger bis gar nicht auslagern.”]
5.2.2.2. Standardization

As mentioned above, standardization of processes may lead to increased monitoring and, hence, to better control over the outsourced task and the entire campaign organization. However, in order to profit from standardization, there must be a general possibility to standardize campaign processes. Therefore, the following will explore if processes in campaigns may be standardized and if so, whether this leads to an increased level of control over the organization. As shown in graph 5.14, experts’ responses are quite different in this regard. In fact, they are equally torn between agreeing that it is possible and that there is an effect on control and neglecting possibilities to standardized campaigns. Of 33 mentions, 16 are in favor of the concept of standardization, while 17 are against. The question hereby is not whether there would be a positive impact of standardization on control. This is agreed by almost all experts. Rather, it is controversial whether campaigns may be standardized in the first place.

A number of respondents argue that many aspects of a campaign consist of standard tools that only have to be adapted to the respective campaign reality. In Germany, each campaign uses standardized formats such as posters, Wesselmann billboards, direct mailings etc. that differ in their content, but not in their form. “In principle each campaign is built on certain tangents.” Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: „Im Grundsatz schon baut jeder Wahlkampf eigentlich auf Tangenten auf.”]

Graph 5.14: Influence of standardization of outsourced tasks on potential loss of control

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385 Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: „Im Grundsatz schon baut jeder Wahlkampf eigentlich auf Tangenten auf.”]
can be reused in future campaigns. For those processes, a very large extent of control is possible. The same applies to organizational processes. “Haptics are more or less the same everywhere. With haptics, I mean that candidates have election districts. Those districts and those candidates need district-related advertising material. [...] Somehow, there is an online social media component. [...] This also applies to the central campaign of the frontrunner. At some point there are large-size billboards, at some point a TV spot, at some point a radio spot. An online presence needs to be developed, you need a social media strategy, you need a press and PR strategy.”

Many of the organizational processes are standardized and may be applied in similar ways in various campaigns. In most cases, structures of campaign organizations are alike. For many campaigns, SPD has been working in the ‘Kampa’-format while DieLinke has been using its concept of ‘Bundeswahlbüro’. Therefore, respondents agree that general structures of campaigns are alike and may be reused with little risk of losing control to external partners.

On the other hand, experts also point out that there are elements that are highly individual for each campaign. “Nonetheless there are relatively regular changes in a campaign. Or the starting position can change regularly and then you are quickly done with standard tools or standardization.” While Peter Radunski even claims that nothing may be standardized in campaigns, experts agree that hardly any standardization is possible in the context of content and strategy. “The standard is that you always have to restart from scratch” The areas of strategy and content, as well as all creative tasks, need to be entirely redeveloped. Regularly, it is the same service provider and even the same personnel that is re-tasked with the same process, which they already managed during an earlier campaign. This is particularly the case in long-term relationships between principal and agent. Not only are

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387 Interview with Karsten Göbel [Original wording: „Nichtsdestotrotz ändert sich in einem Wahlkampf natürlich relativ regelmäßig oder die Ausgangslage kann sich regelmäßig ändern und da ist man dann mit Standard-Tools oder Standardisierung schnell am Ende.”]

388 Interview with Salomon Reyes [Original wording: „Der Standard ist, dass immer alles wieder von vorne angefangen wird.”]
there changes in the visual appearance of campaigns, but there might be changes in overall strategies. Since campaigning is not a static business, but evolving constantly, there are regular changes in the environment that campaigns need to adapt to. Whether it was the introduction of television, the rise of internet or of social media, all developments brought significant changes to campaigns and made standardization difficult. Since campaigns are perceived with great public attention, there is a need for campaigns to react quickly to unforeseen developments. “A campaign on canned peas you may plan from the beginning to the end and then implement. You may also plan a political campaign, but you are always faced with 10 to 15 incidents that you did not expect, that you perhaps don’t want to have. But somehow you need to react to them.”389 This may not be done in standardized ways. Rather, they must be adapted to the specific situation.

It may be concluded that the possibility to standardize and, hence, its contribution to control over outsourced processes depends on whether the process is of technical or of strategic, content-related, respectively creative nature. While in the former case, a comparably high level of standardization and control is possible, this is not the case in the latter. By outsourcing those to an external service provider, campaign managers take high risks of being dependent on the expertise of the agent and therefore risk losing control over some aspects of the campaign.

5.2.2.3. Strategic importance

A key aspect that contributes to potential loss of control is the importance of the outsourced process. Importance of processes in campaigns differs greatly. Some tasks, such as printing, are obviously important to the overall picture, but there is no strategic significance attached. In case of underperformance it is possible to redo the process. This might cause unnecessary delays, but it would not put the success of the campaign at stake. Therefore, decision makers would not risk losing control over the campaign by outsourcing such a process. Experts agree that there is a difference when it comes to processes that are

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389 Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: „Eine Kampagne über Erbsen in Dosen können Sie von vorne bis hinten durchplanen und dann abfeiern. Eine politische Wahlkampfkampagne können Sie auch planen, aber sie kriegen immer 10 bis 15 Ereignisse rein, mit denen Sie gar nicht gerechnet haben, die sie auch vielleicht gar nicht haben wollen. Aber man muss irgendwie drauf reagieren.”]
important for the overall strategy. This includes tasks such as strategy development and content development.

As shown in graph 5.15, of 27 mentions 24 indicated that strategic importance of outsourced task is a relevant factor for potential loss of control over the campaign organization. This was an agreement that could be found across almost all parties.

As the name implies, a strategically important task is developing the campaign strategy. This is considered to be a core competence of the parties that should be discussed in party institutions and committees. In order to find necessary support by party members and supporters, broad dialogues over relevant topics are necessary. Without these, experts fear negative consequences on the level of volunteer support during the campaign. For all parties this is a process that they do not even consider to outsource. “Strategy needs to be done by you. External consultants can never tell you what topics are important and how you play them [...]. You can never outsource strategy.” 390 This does not imply that external partners may not be engaged in the process, but this engagement should be limited to the process of strategy development in the context of technical advertising/PR strategies. “It may still happen that there is an external strategy consulting / strategy development. But not necessarily triggered by a committee decision, rather through the leading person who says that ‘I need an external view’”391. All experts agree, however, that

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390 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Das müssen sie selber machen. Ein externer Berater kann Ihnen niemals sagen, welche Themen hier wichtig sind, wie sie diese spielen [...]. Strategie können Sie niemals outsourcen.”]

391 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Es kann trotzdem sein, dass es dann externe Strategieberatung / Strategieentwicklung gibt. Aber jetzt nicht unbedingt ausgelöst durch einen Gremienbeschluss, sondern eher ausgelöst durch die Führungs Persönlichkeit, die sagt ich brauch noch einmal einen Blick von außen.”]
outsourcing processes that possess significant content-related strategic importance would lead to increased loss of control.

In particular, the definition of topics or content is considered a core competence of parties with significant strategic implications. While campaign strategies might be comparably similar across parties, content development is the main aspect that individualizes parties. From the standpoint of agencies, “the party needs to deliver the program. Not the other way around. The program is the product.”

Being democratic institutions, parties need to have tight control on content issues. Decisions need to go through various committees until they are officially adopted.

It can therefore be concluded that “campaigns are politics. Are they too far away from politics, they are not good campaigns anymore.” Hence, as stated above, there is a strong connection between the extent of potential loss of control and the strategic importance of outsourced tasks. Campaign managers would risk losing control over the campaign organization if they outsourced tasks that are particularly related to the definition of strategic topics, which represent the backbone of the party’s campaign.

5.3. Hesitation to outsource

After identifying the relevant factors that lead to outsourcing in general and define the extent of outsourcing, research question four may be picked up, which implies that there might be a general tendency to hesitate outsourcing processes to external providers: ‘Are there cases where a process meets all requirements to be outsourced, but a party chooses not to? If so, why not?’

Data received from interviews was very clear in negating the underlying assumption. There is no evidence in favor of a general tendency to be hesitant on outsourcing. Rather, it seems that parties apply a very pragmatic approach to the issue.

Respondents only reported on minor examples of cases, where campaign members decided in favor of own production, although requirements were met to outsource the

192 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: "Die Partei muss der Agentur das Programm liefern. Nicht umgekehrt. Das Programm ist das Produkt."]

193 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: „Wahlkampf ist Politik, entfernt er sich zu weit von der Politik ist er kein guter Wahlkampf mehr.”]
process. This was mostly connected with decisions of local party entities to produce own advertising material independently from layouts predetermined by federal campaign management and the relevant agent. Experts described cases of own leaflet or social media video production that, in their view, was of minor quality due to decisions of local or regional entities to go into own production.

Ultimately, there does not seem to be a difference in openness towards outsourcing between private economy and campaigns.

5.4. Motivation of service providers

After identifying the most relevant factors that influence the openness of political campaigns to give processes to external providers and what has effect on its extent, it is worth analyzing motivations on the other side: Why do service providers aim at providing their services to political campaigns?

During a very early stage of the interviews, it became clear that economic reasons may not play the decisive role. “The incentive for agencies that are usually active on the classic market to go into campaigning is not that high, because it is extremely exhausting, very time-consuming, there are considerable risks that parts of customers have problems with you doing the campaign of party xy and because you do not have the autonomy over brand communications of a campaign.” Therefore, despite the fact that agencies might be involved in campaign strategy development, they are dependent on opinions of campaign management and party committees.

In Germany, campaigning is not a lucrative business for agencies. For them, they only represent minor incomes in comparison with the private economy. “The main problem is [...] that no agency in Germany can live from only doing campaigns. Since budgets are comparably small and campaigns last several months, it is extremely difficult for

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394 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Der Anreiz für Agenturen, die sich eher im klassischen Markt bewegen, in Wahlkämpfe reinzugehen, ist nicht so hoch, weil das ist extrem anstrengend, sehr zeitaufwendig, die Risiken sind für eine Agentur nicht gering, dass ein Teil der Kundschaft sagt, ich habe ein Problem damit, dass du für die Partei XY eine Kampagne machst und man hat auch nicht die Autonomie, die man in der Markenkommunikation über die Kampagne hat.”]

395 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: “Das Hauptproblem ist, [...] dass keine Agentur in Deutschland allein vom Wahlkampf leben kann.”]
professional agencies to serve this market. In fact, agencies need to have a sound base of customers that provides stable, necessary revenue in order to be able to enter into campaigning.

Agencies need to realize that by entering a campaign they are also entering great risks in the case of a failure. Due to its high visibility, agencies are more recognized than during classic product campaigns. Due to the above-mentioned effects of externalization of failures, they may end up in the position of being the actor that is publicly blamed for mistakes done by the campaign organization. “If you do everything well, everything was right. If you do something badly, you have a great reputation problem.”

Many agencies therefore decide not to enter campaigns, fearing negative consequences in case of failure.

A much-disputed field is the question of consequences of campaigns for further assignments. As mentioned above, the effect of participation in campaigns on orders from the private economy seems to be rather negative. From the moment an agency accepts cooperation with a political party, it is publicly received as commitment towards this party. This may lead to the effect that customers who are not in favor of this party turn their back on the agency. “With a political campaign you sometimes obstruct follow-up orders. That needs to be seen very clearly.” There is disagreement whether cooperation in campaigns leads to increased public orders in case of election success. While some respondents argue that this is a natural part of the game, others claim that the exact opposite happens. “It is often assumed that for an agency this is a great story in regards to orders from the public sector. The opposite is the case. Agencies that were active in campaigns, even if they worked for the succeeding parties, often seem not to have the possibility to assert successfully in the aftermath,” due to fears that this could be perceived negatively.

Although this is claimed by a number of respondents, many cases received great public attention where the opposite happened. For instance, this was the case, when agency

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396 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: “Wenn Sie das gut machen, ist alles richtig gewesen, wenn Sie das schlecht machen, dann haben Sie ein großes Reputationsproblem.”]
397 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Sie verbauen sich manchmal mit einer politischen Kampagne Folgeaufträge. Das muss man ganz klar sehen.”]
398 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Es wird oft unterstellt, dass es eigentlich für eine Agentur im Hinblick auf Beauftragung aus dem staatlichen Bereich eine gute Geschichte ist. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall. In der Regel ist es eigentlich so, dass eine Agentur die im Wahlkampf aktiv ist, auch wenn sie dann für eine erfolgreiche Partei gearbeitet hat, danach eigentlich nicht Möglichkeiten hat, sich erfolgreich durchzusetzen.”]
'Butter’, which worked together with SPD for a number of federal and state campaigns received a large-scale order from SPD-led Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.\textsuperscript{399} Therefore, there is no general rule available on the effects on public orders, but it is clear that parties face risks concerning their customer base.

Due to those reasons, only a limited number of agencies decide to enter this market, while a large number of potential service providers prefer staying in classic consumer markets. Nevertheless, there are agencies that decide to enter campaigns. What is driving them?

Many respondents claimed this is very closely connected to emotions that arise in political campaigns (in fact, this might as well have a negative impact). “Detergent is ‘only’ detergent. A party, and in particular when it is a campaign that decides over general directions, is close to my heart. You realize the consequences when you lose. And that’s why you are very close to it.\textsuperscript{400} It is easier to cope with sales figures that are too low than with political consequences of a lost campaign. At the same time, respondents see more philosophical ‘sense’ in working for political campaigns than only for consumer products. “It is a meaningful task that is probably more challenging that saying that I increase market share of product xy from 11.5 to 11.8 percent.”\textsuperscript{401}

Another aspect is the increased thrill attached to campaigns. As in no consumer campaign there is a strict deadline at 6 p.m. on Election Day. From one minute to the other, success or defeat becomes apparent. This leads to high levels of excitement in campaigns. In classic product campaigns, there are always options to readjust when expected outcomes do not appear. This is not possible in campaigns. If outcomes on Election Day are below expectations and goals, the campaign was a failure. Particularly since this thrill is connected to the fact that political campaigns may be considered as high-interest goods with great public attention, campaigning is considered to be the ‘Champions’ League’ among advertisers. With no other campaign, agencies receive such large feedback in a positive and

\textsuperscript{400} Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Ein Waschpulver ist ‘nur’ ein Waschpulver. Eine Partei und gerade wenn es dann im Wahlkampf, um einen Richtungswahlkampf geht, da hängt man mit seinem ganzem Herzen drin. Man sieht natürlich auch was es für Auswirkungen es haben kann, wenn man verliert. Und deswegen geht einem die Sache sehr nah.”]
\textsuperscript{401} Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Es ist eine sinnstiftende Aufgabe, die etwas wahrscheinlich in dem Fall anspruchsvoller ist, als zu sagen, ich steigere jetzt den Marktanteil von Produkt XY von 11,5 auf 11,8 %.”]
negative sense. Particularly if agents have already entered the campaign market on the level of state elections, there is no other discipline with superior interest and relevance than campaigns on the federal level.

Therefore, it can be concluded that economic incentives for service providers are rather limited. What attracts them are emotional aspects such as the large relevance of campaigns and their emotional thrill.

5.5. Conclusion

The main research question of this dissertation has been ‘what are the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns?’ This chapter has carefully explored potential factors that can have an influence on the outsourcing decision in general and on the extent of outsourcing in particular.

Openness of campaign organization to outsource processes depends on factors that can be divided into two groups: economic and organizational factors. Within the area of economic factors, scarcity of own human resources with necessary knowledge on the side of the campaign and considerable fluctuation in demand between campaign seasons and off-seasons work in favor of giving campaign processes to an external partner. The limiting economic factor is the scarcity of financial resources, particularly among smaller and newly established parties.

A set of organizational factors further influences openness to outsource.

- **Age of party:** Very young parties do not have necessary financial resources, but an enthusiastic group of supporters that lead to a very high level of in-house production. After initial enthusiasm begins to wear off and financial resources increase, willingness to outsource increases as well. This is again being followed by a longer period of time during which increasing own expertise and better party structures again lead to a slowly increasing willingness to provide services in-house.

- **Organizational level:** Being more important than party size or establishment in society, a high organizational level in regions and communities leads to decreased openness to outsource processes that can be as well provided by local volunteers.

- **Need for external perspective:** Particularly in times of defeat, parties notice that realities within the party do not necessarily represent the outside world. In order to correct this misperception, a high willingness to employ external partners can be observed.
- **Change of leaders**: While some professions are outsourced regardless of party leadership, others heavily depend on personal relationships and experience made with campaign decision-makers. While this factor also has some influence on general willingness to outsource, it is one of the most relevant reasons for potential changes of service providers.

- **Decision-making**: Clearly defined and transparent decision making processes do not only have an influence on openness to outsource. Moreover, it is a key factor for efficiency and success of outsourcing relationships. In case of absence of clear decision-making processes, employing external partners will most likely lead to chaotic conditions within the campaign organization.

As suggested by Hm, the extent of outsourcing indeed seems to be dependent on two major factors:

- The extent of political transaction costs
- The extent of loss of control over campaign organization

Both factors can have direct influence on the political future of leading campaign managers. Therefore, the higher the risk for at least one of the two factors, the more hesitant campaign managers are to outsource the respective process. In case of high risk, the make-or-buy decision is answered in favor of ‘make’. The situation may arise when all economic and organizational factors would signal openness to outsourcing. This, however, does not automatically lead to external service provision. Decision makers may still come to the conclusion that due political transaction costs and/or loss of control are too high and decide in favor of in-house production.

According to the proposed model, it is indeed possible that one of the factors is pronounced while the other is well kept under control. In such a case, the presence of one of the two risks is sufficient for campaign management to hesitate to outsource. Only if risks for both aspects were low would campaigns give tasks to truly external providers.

Potential for internalization of success and externalization of failures are important factors influencing the extent of political transaction costs particularly in principal-agent-relations that have not yet been growing over years. In all cases, however, in short and long-term cooperation, the extent of trust is the most relevant factor for political transaction costs. It
is the basis for every customer relation. With high level of trust on both sides, political transaction costs can be decreased considerably.

The extent of loss of control is mostly dependent on the extent of possible standardization of outsourced processes and their strategic importance for the overall campaign. If strategic importance may be negligible and the respective process is standardized, potential loss of control is only minor. Complexity of the process may as well play a role, but is not as decisive as the other two factors.

From a purely economic standpoint, campaigns do not represent attractive opportunities for agencies. In comparison with consumer markets, budgets that are given to service providers are comparably low and agencies enter a high risk of being publicly blamed in case of a loss. Hence, a considerable number of agents avoid this discipline. For others, however, it represents a highly interesting field mostly connected to emotions. Although some might strive for follow-up jobs in case of successes, the main motivation seems to be the outlook to take part in a thrilling campaign of a high-interest good with public presence larger than any other campaign. In particular, the circumstance that the campaign needs to target a particular day during which the result of the campaign is measured provides a powerful incentive. It is therefore considered a “champions’ league” for advertisers.

Based on these findings, the following chapter further explores particular examples of campaign processes and shed light on underlying reasons why campaign managers decided in favor of either ‘make’ or ‘buy.
6. Outsourcing of processes

After identifying factors that are relevant for the openness of campaigns to give processes to external partners and what influences the extent of outsourcing, this chapter aims at outlining findings on the state of outsourcing based on particular processes in German campaigns. Hence, focus of the following is to analyze the current situation and to identify which form of outsourcing is used for which reason. While chapter 6.1 will elaborate on general findings, the following sub-chapters will point out cases that are of special interest due to very particular characteristics that represent a certain extent of outsourcing in a vivid manner.

6.1. Overall Findings

This sub-chapter will focus on findings that were of similar characteristics across all relevant parties, while the following choose particular examples of principal-agent relationships that were of individual character. Across all parties, similarities in the extent of outsourcing could be observed in the fields of strategy development, advertising, online campaign and logistics. Therefore, they represent the backbone of the following analysis.

6.1.1. Strategy development

The process of strategy development in this case is strictly regarded as finding a strategy for the party’s PR campaign. It does not imply content-related issues, but is rather a technical process. Across all parties, strategy development is performed in close cooperation with external partners. On first sight, this is surprising since it appears to be contradictory to the proposed model. However, when analyzing it in more detail, it becomes clear that there is a high degree of external expertise present, but only to the extent to which no strategic decisions need to be made.

Once strategic considerations come into play, campaign management very much strives for pulling the strings themselves. In those strategic questions, external service providers serve as consultants that make proposals. Decisions are not outsourced, but kept well within party structures. “What we don’t do is buying programs or strategic papers. They are almost entirely developed by the party structure, respectively discussed and decided by
committees.” This is also the case in other parties. External parties are engaged by campaign management, invited to develop implementation strategies, present them to decision makers and party committees who then make strategic decisions. Some parties, such as CDU even start their strategy development without any involvement of external partners. This mostly involves a situation analysis, benchmarking and demographic analyses (more about the latter can be found in chapter 6.5). Based on the outcomes of this process they decide which partner fits best to the respective situation. Most parties therefore maintain strategic divisions, which are tasked with this kind of service provision. “We provide advice and support. What is then done is under the sovereignty of politics.” Therefore, not outsourcing the process of strategy development does not mean that there are no external partners involved. However, their role is limited to consulting tasks, respectively, at a later stage, development of implementation strategies for the campaign.

In the field of strategy development, hesitation to outsource relevant processes mostly stem from a high potential of loss of control over the campaign organization (see graph 6.1). Although political transaction costs may still appear in the form of backlashes of potential mistakes done by the tasked agent to campaign management, decision makers would risk losing control over the campaign when giving very basic considerations that have direct influence on the run of the campaign out of hand. Developing the main campaign

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402 Interview with Matthias Höhn [Original wording: “Aber was wir nicht machen ist Programme oder strategische Papiere einzukaufen. Die werden fast komplett vom hauptamtlichen Apparat entwickelt bzw. von den Gremien dann diskutiert oder beschlossen.”]

403 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Wir bieten Rat und Unterstützung an. Was dann gemacht wird, ist natürlich die Hoheit der Politik.”]
strategy is not only very complex (all aspects of a campaign need to be included), it is also of prime strategic importance for the overall campaign organization. Therefore, campaign managers prefer controlling this aspect of campaigns by not giving it to external service providers.

6.1.2. Advertising material

During the strategy development process, a variety of advertising strategies are also considered, which requires strong expertise in the field. Hence, almost all practical processes related to advertising are outsourced to external service providers across all relevant parties. Advertising processes include tasks that require special competences or infrastructure, such as design, creation, printing, photography, film production, production of advertising material, etc. “A poster designer, an art designer came from outside. We couldn’t provide that. We couldn’t produce films. Those we had to do together with others. The same applies to TV and radio spots and so on. Those large walls at large party conventions: couldn’t do those. Others had to make them.”

Processes connected to advertising can be divided into two categories: creative and production processes.

Creative processes require highly qualified personnel in the field in order to reach outcomes that are of a quality suitable for federal campaigns. Due to the seasonal changes mentioned in chapter 5.1.1.2, parties are not in the need to maintain costly creative personnel during off-campaign seasons. Generally, the same agents that consulted during the strategy development process are tasked with creative implementation of the defined strategy. This mostly involves all campaign materials, ranging from posters to online campaign. For specific disciplines, additional partners or sub-contractors are hired. This includes photographers who contribute to candidate images as well as film crews, which produce TV commercial or YouTube videos.

For processes related to the production of advertising material, particular infrastructure is needed that would not be economic for the parties to provide. In order to print large amounts of poster, special printers are needed which professional printing companies are

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able to provide. The same applies to mailing activities. Writing, printing, bagging, stamping and dispatching mailings on a large scale would bind party resources to an extent that would not be acceptable. With external providers’ technologies and economies of scale, they are able to provide those services faster and most likely cheaper than the respective party itself is. Hence, such processes are widely outsourced to external agents. Even the PirateParty, which is very skeptical of cooperating with the private economy, chose that way. “We had a system, the so-called P-Shop, Pirate Shop, to which the single state associations gave their orders. How much money they wanted to spend, respectively how many posters and how much scatter material they wanted to order. […] And exactly those things then went to the warehouse of the Pirate Shop and from there to the individual association.” The Pirate Shop worked together with a choice of private printing companies that provided professional printing services to the campaign. This not only led to decreases of costs due to economies of scale, but also to increased quality of advertising materials. This system of centralized process provision by an external service provider is a very popular model and is observed at all parties.

This trend only started a few years ago. In past times, large parties, such as SPD and CDU were in the possession of printing plans that were charged with producing advertising material in a hybrid outsourcing model. However, this changed with the rise of the internet and the ability to access quickly resources that are distant from party headquarters.

*Interview with Salomon Reyes [Original wording: „Wir hatten ein System, den sogenannten P-Shop, Piratenshop. An den haben die einzelnen Landesverbände ihre Aufträge gegeben. Wie viel Geld sie ausgeben wollten für bestimmte Plakate, bzw. wie viel Plakate und wie viel Streumaterial sie ordern wollten. […] Und genau die Sachen gingen dann in das Lager des Piratenshops und wurden von da weitergeleitet an die einzelnen Gliederungen.”]*
“Today, it is mostly cheaper to produce that through so-called online printing houses, where you send data to and which deliver directly. Because they can use a higher utilization rate than the printer around your corner, costs are normally reduced by 50 percent. “406 Nowadays, although some party-owned printing plants still exist they are not tasked with large-scale production of advertising material due to lack of competitiveness. Depending on the organizational level of the party external services, providers are also used for the distribution of advertising material and hanging of posters.

As shown in graph 6.2, advertising is a process that is outsourced almost entirely to external service providers by all parties. Advertising only possesses a very limited potential to lead to loss of control. Since processes outsourced in the field of advertising only have a limited and very technical scope, strategic importance of the respective service is low. In all cases, failures in the production process would not lead to strategically significant consequences. While redoing processes would lead to unnecessary delays, it would not have negative impacts on the strategic goals of the campaign. Advertising processes are highly standardized, since only a limited amount of different campaign material is used in German campaigns. Content-related questions would be of more strategic relevance, but they may be included in aspects covered by chapter 6.1.1.

The same applies to potential political transaction costs for campaign decision makers. Failures in a production process of a certain advertising product would not lead to negative effects for top campaign personnel’s’ careers. At the same time, however, there is no significant potential to internalize successes in advertising processes, since they are mostly routine tasks, which are expected to be fulfilled smoothly. Therefore, design and production of advertising materials is mostly if not entirely outsourced to external providers across all German parties.

6.1.3. Online campaign

Online campaigns are probably the aspect of campaigning that has experienced the most dramatic changes over the past decade. While in the 1990s, it was only a marginal

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406 Interview with Lutz Meyer (“Heute ist es häufig günstiger, das über so genannte Online-Druckereien zu machen, wo man die Daten hinschickt und die dann direkt ausliefern. Weil die mit einer anderen Auslastung fahren können als der Drucker um die Ecke und damit gehen die Kosten in der Regel um 50 % runter.”)
phenomenon, online campaigns have developed to become an important strategic pillar in every election campaign. By today, campaigns need to develop entirely new strategies for their online presence that go hand in hand with their offline-strategy. Knowing that this field is of considerable strategic importance and attainable without a large amount of financial resources, parties mostly employ in-house units developing and implementing their online campaign. Since online communications is also a primary channel for the parties’ permanent campaign, online campaigning is not subject to seasonal changes to the extent of classic campaigns.

There have been several attempts to outsource online campaigning to external service providers. In most cases, however, they proved not to be successful. “In 2009 we had a service provider that was in charge of this ‘MyCampaign’-tool. In 2013 we brought that back to our house and did it on our own.”

407 A particular characteristic of online campaigning tools is speed which plays a decisive role. Campaigns need to be able to react instantly to events, particularly in the field of social media. Hence, there is often no time for lengthy coordination processes between party organization and service provider. It proved to be more efficient if the actors who decide over content (the party) are also the ones who are in charge of the online campaign. Again, this does not mean that there are no external partners involved, but their role is limited to the provision of ‘online advertising materials’ with similar characteristics as the ones described in chapter 6.1.2.

As shown in graph 6.3, there is a high risk of loss of control and of potential political transaction costs attached to processing a party’s online campaign. Hence, parties choose not to outsource this task, but rather to provide it internally.

Key campaign personnel would be likely to feel consequences for their political future, in case of failures in widely-perceived online campaigns. It would be difficult to argue that processes of such strategic importance are given to external providers and externalize mistakes on their account. Hence, a very high level of trust would be necessary for both sides to cooperate. Since online campaigns nowadays include a whole variety of formats, reaching from classic campaign websites to social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and up to attempts to connect offline tools with online counterparts, it has become an area of great complexity. Although individual platforms are standardized, there is a high degree of freedom when it comes to content and how those platforms are used.

Therefore, the situation is comparable to the one of strategy development: While external service providers may deliver particular tools and designs, the overall strategy and control over a party’s online campaign is kept within party structures.

6.1.4. Logistics and events

Logistics and events are an area with particular characteristics that differ from many other aspects of the campaign. Hardly any other aspect is as detached from political issues as logistics and events. They are highly technical tasks for which very specialized expertise is necessary and which include processes such as logistic services for candidates as well as material, stage construction, security and sound and video technology.

For the provision of all processes, German parties almost solely use external service providers. This is mostly due to the reason that those services are rarely demanded during off-campaign seasons. There are only very few party events (such as conventions) between campaign times that require significant expertise and workforces in the field. It is a prime example for services that do not belong to the core competences of parties. In logistics and events, “much happens via state and county associations. There is little organized centrally. Actually only the central kickoff and closing events for campaigns, which we generally run
with our service providers.\textsuperscript{408} As shown in graph 6.4, there is a low extent of political transaction costs and a low level of potential loss of control attached to these processes. Since they require very particular expertise, no political leader will be held responsible for mistakes made in logistics and events. While all relevant process may have a high level of technical complexity, they may still be considered of low complexity from a managerial standpoint since tasks are clearly defined and of limited scope. This is particularly the case in technical process connected to events. There is a high degree of standardization, since campaign events do not differ in their organizational and technical characteristics from non-political events organized on a very regular basis by private entities. Strategic importance of individual process is limited in this field, because they only represent technical components that add to campaign and advertising strategy. They are important elements to the overall picture, but they are not connected to strategic decisions. Hence, all parties prefer to outsource those processes to external service providers.

6.2. Case 1 - Union Betriebs-GmbH

All relevant German parties hold participations in a number of enterprises. However, there are significant differences in their extent. While The Greens largest participation is a 2,13\% holding of locally active ‘1. Bürger Solaranlage Hemmingen GbR’\textsuperscript{409}, SPD’s fully owned

\textsuperscript{408} Interview with Steffi Lemke [Original wording: “Veranstaltungsmanagement passiert viel über die Länder- und die Kreisverbände. Es wird wenig zentral organisiert. Eigentlich nur die zentralen Auf- und Abtaktveranstaltungen für die Wahlkämpfe, die wir dann in der Regel mit unserem Dienstleister zusammen gemacht haben.”]

\textsuperscript{409} See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2014 Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen. Available at: https://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/2014_Rechenschaftsbericht_END.pdf
subsidiary Deutsche Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (DDVG) is a holding with nominal capital of 36 Million Euro\textsuperscript{410} that holds shares in a whole variety of businesses, mostly publishing houses. Although publishers generally would qualify as agents for campaign-related services, this is hardly the case. DDVG mostly represents a source of revenue for SPD.

A more interesting case for outsourcing of campaign tasks is CDU subsidiary Union Betriebs-

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph6.5.png}
\caption{Entanglement of CDU and UBG}
\end{figure}

GmbH (UBG). CDU holds 100 per cent of UBG, an operating company with 2.15 Million Euro nominal capital.\textsuperscript{411} Unlike DDVG, UBG cannot be considered as a holding with the primary goal of revenue creation, rather it is a party owned company that offers very practical and tangible services to both CDU and third parties. The company currently employs roughly 50 individuals mostly located at the headquarters in Rheinbach (close to former federal capital Bonn), divided into four divisions:

- IT
- Computer center

\textsuperscript{410} See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2013 SPD. Available at: https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Parteiorganisation/Finanzen/Rechenschaftsberichte/

\textsuperscript{411} See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2013 CDU. Available at: https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/rechenschaftsbericht2013.pdf?file=1
In addition, there is a graphic team consisting of four people in UBG’s Berlin branch located in CDU headquarters at Konrad-Adenauer-Haus. The organization is headed by a managing director who is assisted by an authorized officer. A managing director who is assisted by an authorized officer heads the organization. A department head heads the second establishment in Berlin. There are two fiduciary partners of UBG. Ex officio those are CDU federal manager (and head of campaigns) and the head of the party’s central department (Zentrale Aufgaben und Service - ZA). Hence, there is close organizational interaction between UBG and party leadership. Nevertheless, UBG claims a certain degree of independence from CDU. “We are a pure enterprise, we are self-financed, we are not on the drip of CDU.”

UBG is active on the free market. CDU is not its only customer. It is offering services to institutions, companies or individuals in various fields. Nevertheless, CDU and affiliates on European, federal, Länder, county and local levels represent UBG’s core customers. In this context, it is important to note that even for the provision of services of CDU, UBG formally needs to compete with other agents in countrywide tenders. It has to submit an offer just like any other potential service provider. Nevertheless, it can be stated that UBG has a competitive advantage not only being located in the heart of CDU headquarters, but also knowing exactly what is expected by party decision makers through personal interaction.

The close structural entanglement between CDU and UBG may lead to conflicts of interests, because the partners are also the company’s largest customer. “What works for a party would always lead to problems in commercial enterprises, because as partner you have to look at profit orientation, but at the same time, being the principal client, you also want to have fast services.” This may become particularly problematic if CDU needed to have a certain service provided as quickly as possible while a different customer is willing to pay a

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412 Bach-Meiers, Sonja [Original wording: „Wir sind ein reiner Wirtschaftsbetrieb, wir müssen uns komplett finanzieren, wir hängen nicht am Tropf der CDU.”]

413 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: “Was für eine Partei funktioniert, würde in einem Wirtschaftsunternehmen immer zu Problemen führen, weil man als Gesellschafter auf die Gewinnorientierung gucken muss, aber man als Hauptauftraggeber natürlich auch einen schnellen Service will.”]
higher price for a service provided instead. UBG claims to attempt to satisfy both sides. “Although CDU is always present with priority, one always tries to find solutions that satisfy both sides.”\textsuperscript{414} This is attempted either by negotiating deadlines for service provisions or by working overtimes.

**Processes outsourced to UBG**

CDU outsources processes to UBG in both, campaign and off-campaign seasons. During off-seasons, UBG provides services typical to the ones of PR agencies, making use of its graphic team located in Berlin. That includes graphic design for permanent campaign billboards or layouts for printed party material.

UBG’s publishing house is used mainly by CDU for its member magazine ‘Union’. Although it does also play a certain role in campaigns, the magazine can more precisely be seen as a tool of permanent campaigning and activation medium for party members. Since UBG’s graphic team only consists of four people, it is not able to provide all creative services needed during a campaign. In addition, “it is not that UBG could map a complete service during campaign, neither in the area of printing, nor in IT.”\textsuperscript{415} Rather, UBG serves as one of several ‘external’ providers interacting with each other and campaign management. For candidates’ and local or regional entities, UBG provides layouts for their campaign. This does not only include websites, but also elements such as stationary, business cards, argumentation cards and election posters. This is a web creation tool, but also includes printing.

Printing is offered by UBG in its own printing plant and in cooperation with sub-contractors. The only exception are large-size billboards for which UBG does not have own capacities. Often, printing is given to UBG together with related IT services, such as web site creation and production of leaflets.

The most relevant processes of CDU campaigns outsourced to UBG are IT processes. UBG serves as a webhost for the entire web presence of the party’s federal branch and of most regional associations. In this case, webhosting also includes email management for the

\textsuperscript{414} Bach-Meiers, Sonja [Original wording: „Die CDU ist zwar immer prioritär da, aber man versucht die Lösungen herbeizuführen, dass beide Seiten gleichermaßen befriedigt werden.”]

\textsuperscript{415} Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: „Aber es ist nicht so, dass die UBG den Kompletservice im Wahlkampf auch nicht im Bereich Druckerei abbilden könnte und auch nicht im Bereich IT.”]
entire party. Some CDU candidates or MPs insist on local providers to carry out their web services. This is mainly due to local PR considerations. “But during the last five, six years one can notice the tendency that more and more state organizations request UBG services. This is probably connected to the fact that IT is getting more complex. [...] Nowadays, a connection of the website to the central member database is sensible and relevant [...]. Then it makes sense to contact UBG, because there it is located. I think that this is the reason that we notice an increasing power of UBG as a service provider for IT for the entire party.”\(^{416}\)

*Shared service-center*

UBG represents a very illustrative example of internal outsourcing to a shared service-center. With this variety of customers, UBG is able to achieve higher utilization than each of the outsourcing entities would on their own. In particular, the high discrepancies between campaign seasons and off-seasons can be compensated. In addition, the degree of professionalization and of price-quality ratio seems to rise. “I consider this as an extremely good way, because you reach a degree of professionalism that you otherwise would have to acquire externally more expensively and more diverse.”\(^{417}\) At the same time, with many party entities using UBG services, a higher degree of corporate identity can be ensured than with each candidate or local organization working with different partners from their respective precinct.

*Organizational factors influencing openness to outsource*

Founded immediately after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1945, CDU is the second oldest party after SPD. According to the model described in chapter 5.1.2.1, it is therefore at a stage, where processes are increasingly reintegrated into party structures. UBG was founded in 1960\(^{418}\) and therefore has a history of over 50 years during

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\(^{416}\) Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: „Aber es ist schon Tendenz der letzten fünf, sechs Jahre festzustellen, dass mehr und mehr Landesverbände Angebote bei der UBG abfragen. Was aber wahrscheinlich damit zu tun hat, dass die Komplexität der IT größer wird. [...] Jetzt ist eine Anbindung der Website an die zentrale Mitgliederdatei schon sinnvoll und relevant [...] Dann macht es Sinn gleich mal bei der UBG nachzufragen, weil da liegt das Ding. Ich glaube, dass das der Grund dafür ist, dass wir da eine zunehmende Stärkung der UBG als Dienstleister im IT-Bereich für die Gesamtpartei merken”]

\(^{417}\) Meier, Lutz [Original wording: “Das finde ich ist ein extrem guter Weg, weil sie damit einen Professionalisierungsgrad reinkriegen, den sie draußen viel teurer und auch viel diverser einkaufen müssten.”]

\(^{418}\) See: https://www.ubgnet.de/ueber-uns.html
which significant development and knowledge building was possible. After originally founded as a publishing house, its development over six decades made it possible to offer a variety of services and processes. Hence, age of the party seems to be an important factor that processes are outsourced from CDU to UBG.

Being a very established people’s party with the largest number of members among German parties, CDU had total assets of almost 176 Million Euros in 2013\textsuperscript{419}. It is therefore in a relatively comparably comfortable financial situation. For the 2013 campaign, CDU had a campaign budget of 47.2 Million Euros\textsuperscript{420}. Together with roughly 20 Million Euros spent by sister party CSU, it had the largest campaign budget during the 2013 campaign. It is therefore able to give processes to external partners that charged for their services. Even outsourcing posting in many districts, CDU indeed outsources rather many services. This would most likely be impossible without the relatively large financial resources gathered by the party over the years of its existence.

During the 2013 campaign, CDU applied very lean decision-making processes. External partners only had two points of contact within the party: Federal manager and head of campaign and marketing. This was mainly due to the fact that trust “has been growing over time since there were also many constants in staffing and now it is a relatively small corridor up from working level. Discussion with the campaign manager, sometimes a meeting with the Secretary General, but then normally directly from there to the panel with the party leader.”\textsuperscript{421} This created a very outsourcing-friendly environment in which transaction costs in the form of increased need for coordination is kept at a minimum level.

There is an exceptionally high degree of constancy in CDU leadership. Since 1973, the party only has had three party leaders. Since 2000, Angela Merkel has been leading the party. Hence, there was no need to change deliberately service providers for profiling reasons or to send out the signal of a restart. This is visible in the long-lasting cooperation between


\textsuperscript{420} See: http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/140330/wahlkampfausgaben

\textsuperscript{421} Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: „Was wahrscheinlich damit zu tun, das Stichwort Vertrauen, was Sie gerade fragten, auch hausintern natürlich gewachsen ist über die Zeit, weil da auch viele Konstanten in der Personenbesetzung dabei sind und das ist jetzt ein relativ schmaler Gang von [der] Arbeitsebene: Besprechung mit dem Wahlkampfmanager, manchmal noch eine Runde mit dem Generalsekretär in der Regel aber dann direkt von da aus in die Runde mit der Parteivorsitzenden.”]
CDU and UBG.

*Political transaction costs*

Since UBG offices are not only located in CDU headquarters, but with the company being a full subsidiary of the party, it is integrated very well into campaign structures. From the office of CDU’s campaign manager to UBG head of office it is only a short walk down three sets of stairs. The close relation of the two organizations, both from a logistical as well as organizational point of view, leads to a very high level of trust between the two entities. Hence, processes, which have a fairly high risk of significant political transaction costs in case of failures and that lead to a comparably high level of loss of control may be given to UBG as an internal outsourcing provider.

A closer look on outsourced processes shows that this is indeed the case. Although social media is still carried out by CDU itself, its online presence is a sensitive service, which only wants to be given to a partner that is in the possession of a high degree of trust from party decision makers. Particularly during the last decades, campaigns have gone increasingly more online. Hence, a party’s online presence is of increasing importance.

Political transaction costs are comparably high, since it is expected from party members that CDU affiliate UBG be given a certain role (‘if not the party trusts in UBG, who then does?’).

At the same time, it is hardly possible to externalize failures on a campaign’s web presence, since it is based mainly on content that comes from the party directly. UBG may be in charge of web design, but what is observed mainly from the electorate stems from the party’s program and official party positions. Hence, UBG can hardly be held responsible for major failures in this context.

Therefore, campaign manages would face risks if they neglected a cooperation with UBG.
or if party and campaign websites were of significant lower quality than before. Not giving any processes to UBG seems to be literally impossible since the close entanglement between the two organizations, particularly in IT and member data management creates a significant competitive advantage for UBG. Therefore, keeping UBG out of the campaign would expose key campaign personnel to notable criticism even within their own party.

In conclusion, it can be stated that political transaction costs for key campaign personnel are fairly high due to the actual existence of UBG. Although UBG without a doubt represents a very useful agent for CDU that has the potential to work efficiently and with a high degree of utilization, political transaction costs are high because campaign managers hardly have a chance to avoid its services.

**Loss of control**

As mentioned above, there are two processes outsourced to UBG that are of significant strategic importance: The party’s online presence and its member data management.

Party websites are of significance due to the rise of media democracy and voters’ expectations that parties have a strong online presence. Naturally, the party’s web design needs to go hand in hand with overall strategic considerations and corporate identity that are not developed by UBG, but by the party itself and external partners. Nevertheless, the federal party’s online presence as well as the one of regional associations are strategically important ‘entry points’ for potential voters to get to know the party, its personnel and positions.

CDU’s member index might not be as visible for outsiders during the run of a campaign, but it possesses an even higher strategic importance than the party’s web presence. Member indices are an element in German campaigns many campaigners from oversees envy. It is a database with approx. 450,000 potential voters, who can already be considered as supporters or who have at least strong sympathies for CDU.\(^{422}\) That represents a most valuable source of actual voters who mostly do not need to be persuaded, but only activated. Since this is of considerable strategic importance, it seems quite sensible not to give this process to an external agent, but to keep it within the party organization. At the same time, it is a process that can be easily standardized. Technically speaking, member

indices are databases that can also be found elsewhere in the business world. It is not a process that needs to be newly created for the campaign. Rather, it can be regarded as a standard process with limited complexity. The database itself can be administrated in routine tasks. More complex is integrating membership data into campaign websites and the ones of regional or local party entities. In particular, a balance between practicability, benefit and strict German privacy laws needs to be incorporated.

As already mentioned above, the party’s online presence is also of significant strategic importance, since large parts of political campaigns happen to take place online nowadays. However, it is important to note that UBG was only in charge of hosting and administrating party websites. They did not play an active role in planning and designing the party’s online campaign. Therefore, the process outsourced to UBG, is mainly a provision of a platform. That process is highly standardized with a whole range of CDU entities using the same designs, webhosts and layouts. UBG provides a standardized platform and toolkits that can be adopted by the customers to their specific needs. Hence, those processes are of limited complexity.

It can be concluded that despite the strategic importance of its member database, the party only faces a limited risk of losing control over the campaign, since processes given to UBG are of high standardization and low complexity. Therefore, self-made political transaction costs seem to be higher than the potential loss of control.

Overall, UBG as an internal outsourcing provider creates notable added value for CDU, particularly in the field of routine tasks that can be given to a trustworthy partner that is integrated deeply into party structures and that is able to offer competitive pricing and clear priorities in favor of the party.

6.3. Case 2 - DieLinke/DiG

There are many similarities in the characteristic of campaign management and their cooperation with external partners between the parties DieLinke and the Greens. In both cases, not only fringe processes are given to partners. Rather, they take part in key strategic decisions. In addition, from an organizational point of view, both parties apply a model of outsourcing that can be considered as a hybrid form of outsourcing. While the Greens have been closely cooperating with agency ‘Zum Goldenen Hirschen’ of their former speaker Hans-Hermann Langguth, DieLinke has been cooperating for many years with agency DiG
headed by the inventor of the brand name ‘DieLinke’, Volker Ludwig. While there has been a whole range of media coverage concerning the Greens and their “house agency”\(^{423}\) Zum Goldenen Hirschen, less is known about campaign organization of DieLinke, which will be described and analyzed in the following.

There are two major external partner involved in DieLinke campaigns: above-mentioned DiG and Media Service GmbH. The latter is a classic example of internal outsourcing, similar to the one analyzed in chapter 6.5. ‘Föderative Verlags-, Consulting- und Handelsgesellschaft mbH’ or short ‘FEVAC’ is a full subsidiary of DieLinke. FEVAC is in the possession of shares of a number of businesses. One of them is Media Service GmbH of which FEVAC holds 45 per cent of nominal capital\(^{424}\). Therefore, services outsourced to Media Service GmbH can be regarded as internal outsourcing. They include production-related implementation of DiG proposals as well as logistics.

A third external partner is ‘minuskel screen partner’. They are responsible for the implementation of DieLinke’s websites.

Clearly, the main partner and lead agency is DiG. The relation between left wing party DieLinke and DiG is closely connected with the personality of DiG managing director Volker Ludwig. Already in 2002, he managed the left party’s (at this point still known as PDS) youth campaign, since 2007 he is party member\(^{425}\). From years of its creation between 2005 and 2007 until today, Ludwig has been a key person in the creation of the brand ‘DieLinke’. “Agency stake in this name finding is ‘Die’ as prerequisite for the establishment of a new, independent political brand.”\(^{426}\)

Hence, his agency has been in charge of literally every campaign ever since. “This is a very special form of cooperation between principal and agent with all its advantages and disadvantages and therefore without tender.”\(^{427}\)

\(^{423}\) Alexander and Fischaleck, ‘Die Kanzlermacher’

\(^{424}\) See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2014 DieLinke. Available at: http://www.die-linke.de/partei/fakten/finanzen/rechenschaftsberichte/

\(^{425}\) See: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/volker-ludwig/4893546.html

\(^{426}\) Pätzold, ‘DIE LINKE wirkt, nicht nur politisch…’, 3 [Original wording: “Agenturanteil an dieser Namensfindung ist dieses ‘DIE’ als Voraussetzung für die Etablierung einer neuen, eigenständigen politischen Marke.”]

\(^{427}\) Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: “Das ist schon eine ziemlich besondere Form der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Auftraggeber und Agentur mit allen Vor- und Nachteilen und insofern ohne Ausschreibung.”]
From a legal standpoint, DiG is a privately registered organization that has no capital investment from its vendor. However, there are extremely close ties between DiG and DieLinke. This is not only the case in the person of Volker Ludwig, but also in the ones of many of its employees and the fact that the managing director of the agent is also member of the principal. Hence, services outsourced from DieLinke to DiG are no classic cases of external outsourcing. Rather they represent a hybrid form between external and internal outsourcing. “In fact there is no formal connection. Therefore, in terms of organization it is outsourcing, but, apart from personal political relations, if you developed campaigns and the fundamental image of the party together for such a long time, a form of symbiosis is naturally developing.”

This reasoning is further supported when light is shed on the way the two organizations cooperate during the run of a campaign. Although DiG is not in the same building or in the immediate proximity from the party’s headquarters, distances are still very short. Both are located in the eastern part of Berlin, both sides frequently visit each other. There is constant contact over phone. “In this respect it is almost like we are a branch office during the run of a campaign without actually being part of the party.”

Ludwig believes that this is even more cost efficient than actually being present in party headquarters on a permanent basis.

For campaigns, staff in DieLinke headquarters shifts into campaign mode. Approximately one year before an election, party leadership decides on a campaign strategy. For better understanding of relevant aspects, external partners, including DiG, are being heard. In a committee named ‘Bundeswahlbüro’ all internal campaign expertise is brought together. The committee consists of relevant division leaders, representatives of regional associations and of top candidates. It meets about once a month. External partners, namely DiG, are also part of the committee, developing an implementation strategy of the strategic campaign outlines defined by party executive. “There, we are actually equal partner.

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428 Höhn, Matthias [Original wording: „Es gibt in der Tat sozusagen keine formale Verbindung. Insofern ist es eine Auslagerung im organisatorischen Sinne, aber natürlich, abgesehen von persönlichen politischen Beziehungen oder Mitgliedschaften, wenn sie über einen so langen Prozess gemeinsam Kampagnen entwickeln bzw. auch das grundsätzliche Erscheinungsbild der Partei, dann entsteht natürlich so eine Form von Symbiose.”]

Nevertheless, it is clear to all in the round that there is the agent whom we assign and who receives our money.” A subordinated committee, ‘Wahlstab’, is then responsible for operational implementation. Meeting approximately once a week, it is headed by federal manager Matthias Höhn and consists of relevant division managers, finance managers, the party leader’s office and the federal manager’s office. The ‘Wahlstab’ discusses all operational issues, leading from logistical question, delivery dates and circulation volumes to online activities and qualification measures. In short: everything that needs to be organized during the run of a campaign. Again, DiG is an inherent component of this committee. In conclusion, it can be summarized that, although formally being an external actor, DiG is part of all relevant party institutions related to campaign management.

This model of cooperation is regarded as superior to classic forms of external outsourcing.

While short distances between principal and agent are guaranteed and party structures do not have to be duplicated, permanent personnel of party headquarters receive valuable assistance from DiG and its employees. The party’s goal is to create an efficient organizational structure and to transform party headquarters to campaign headquarters with DiG personnel being the only external element present. Important to note in this regard is that there is a discrepancy in formal versus actual decision making processes. Formally, there is a campaign committee (Bundeswahlbüro) with a fragile balance of

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Ludwig, Volker [Original wording:”Wir sind da eigentlich Gleichberechtigte. In der Runde ist es aber allen trotzdem klar, da sitzt sozusagen der Dienstleister, den wir beauftragen, der unser Geld quasi bekommt.”]
specifically proportional representation of members from various backgrounds. However, this committee proved to be too large and hardly working in this campaign. Therefore, many strategic decisions were taken in unofficial channels between party leadership and agent.

Processes outsourced to DiG

DiG was in charge of a variety of processes in the past federal campaign. Besides typical services offered by PR agencies such as poster design and production, DiG is also in charge of online campaigns of both the federal party division and on the state level. In addition, DiG not only drafts the campaign strategy, but is also in charge of implementation once the party (again in close consultation with the agent) makes decisions about content. Unusual for outsourcing in the political sphere is that DiG is also tasked with financial controlling. Mirrored to the respective division in party headquarters, the agency also maintains a controlling unit that monitors campaign budgets. Finally, yet importantly, the only comprehensive archive of DieLinke campaigns does not exist in party headquarters. Rather it is in the possession of DiG. Neither the party itself, nor Rosa Luxemburg foundation are able to maintain such an archive. DiG, however, considers this as part of their mission. This creates an element of dependency of the principal on the agent.

Organizational factors influencing openness to outsource

As described in chapter 5.1.2.1, DieLinke and the Greens constitute the cluster of middle-aged parties. Although DieLinke was only created in 2005, it is important to note that this newly united party is mostly based on personnel and infrastructure of the former party PDS, which was founded in 1990 after German reunification. Hence, the ‘real’ age of the organization is already over 25 years. Therefore, unlike newly established parties, DieLinke was able to resort to a grown party organization that was already in the possession of own subsidiaries to which processes could be outsourced.

Being focussed mostly on the left wing of society, DieLinke is not a people’s party. Their financial resources are not of the same kind as the ones of CDU or SPD. “DieLinke does not have such a large amount of financial resources to only stuff external expertise in its structure. Hence, in this constellation, party employees are employed only with
campaigning. Everything else is somewhat left behind.”\textsuperscript{431} For a party with limited resources, this is a very rational approach: To rededicate existing personnel to the greatest extent possible and use external expertise for those functions that can’t be covered by its own people. In campaign mode, daily party business needs to be continued. Therefore, DieLinke keeps certain core staff in its campaign headquarters next to the campaign organization.

As stated above, main party motivation to work together with DiG seems to be the criterion of continuity. It is unlikely that this approach will soon change unless a major election defeat on the federal level shakes the party. Therefore, an extremely high level of trust plays a major role in DieLinke’s cooperation with DiG.

\textit{Political transaction costs}

Since both sides have been working together for a long period of time, a deep relationship of trust was developed. This is underlined by the fact that even changes in key campaign personnel in the party did not lead to a termination of this cooperation. Volker Ludwig underlines that they “would not work for a different party. […] The party always has a very direct access to us.”\textsuperscript{432}

Nevertheless, political transaction costs considering the services offered by DiG are of limited extent. Being closely connected to DieLinke and cooperation with DieLinke

\textsuperscript{431} Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: “DieLinke hat nicht derartig viele finanzielle Ressourcen, um nur mit externe Expertise so in gegliederte Strukturen zu stopfen. D.h. da kommen die Mitarbeiter der Partei zum Einsatz und die beschäftigen sich dann in so einer Konstellation ausschließlich mit Wahlkampf, alles andere bleibt irgendwie liegen.”]

\textsuperscript{432} Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: „Erst einmal ist es so, dass wir nicht für eine andere Partei arbeiten würden… Die Partei hat immer einen sehr direkten Zugriff auf uns.”]
subsidiary Media Service, human reflexes leading to an externalization of failures are hampered. On the contrary, party key personnel would expose themselves to great risk in case of a change of agents. So far, DieLinke campaigns have been comparably successful. Over a long period of time and thanks to consistency in the choice of their partners, DieLinke managed to build a very consistent brand image. A campaign manager willing to bring change to this fruitful cooperation has to take big risks connected to his or her own career. If change was brought with the following election not being a success, it very likely that this would create a core center of criticism. Therefore, DieLinke campaign managers would only risk the political transaction costs of a change if there was enough reasoning in the form of a major defeat.

Loss of control

The degree of potential loss of control DieLinke is risking with its cooperation with DiG is significantly higher than political transaction costs. Although party management underlines that strategy finding processes are kept within party committees, DiG is already involved in this stage of the campaign. Taking part in all major committee meetings making proposals to party leadership, DiG is in a unique and powerful position. They might not be final decision makers, but there is no doubt that their advice is being heard, respected and influential for the actual campaign strategy.

While processes easy to standardize, such as print or logistics or the party’s online shop, are given to subsidiary Media Service, processes carried out by DiG include campaign strategy development, campaign design, online campaign and other elements where only a limited extent of standardization is possible. Those elements need to be re-invented for each campaign. As mentioned above, DiG and DieLinke are very consistent in their brand communication. Hence, there are certain elements that can be reused, but in terms of design and approach, there have been changes to the party’s campaigns over the last years. The same applies to the complexity of DiG’s services. They are mostly of creative nature, leading to the necessity of very individual approaches.

The fact that DiG has a high standing in internal campaign hierarchy and the fact that a change of agents would require significant risk taking shows that, although the party still holds its hand over final strategic decision, the extent of loss of control can be regarded as comparably high.
6.4. **Case 3 - Wesselmann**

Arguably the most established case of outsourcing in German campaigns is advertising made by Wahlkampf Werbung Wesselmann Wattenscheid GmbH. The company provides large-size portable billboards that are displayed during the course of a campaign mostly on center strips of busy roads. Those billboards are only permitted to be erected during a clearly defined period of time before each election and have to be taken down in the aftermath. Wesselmann offers full service consisting of negotiations on behalf of the ordering party with communities, the display itself and its setup and dismantling. The company is the only large-scale supplier of such a service and is contractor to almost all parties. It is “the largest outsourcing activity that exists in campaigning.”

During federal elections, roughly 28.000 billboards need to be serviced, each equipped with new posters every six weeks.

Wesselmann founded his company in 1961. The reason behind Wesselmann’s success lies in the fact that unauthorized billboarding was prohibited during the mid-60’s of the past century. Wesselmann took that chance and offered his services to both, SPD and CDU.

While its billboards are rarely used by marketing campaigns outside the political sphere, Wahlkampf Werbung Wesselmann Wattenscheid GmbH’s dominance is exemplified by the fact that those billboards are actually called „Wesselmänner“ in political jargon. For parties they are of particular importance because German campaigns are “very billboard dominated campaigns, because they possess the best media value. Hence, reach, visibility

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433 Radunski, Peter [Original wording: „Das ist also […] die größte Outsourcing-Aktion, die es eigentlich gibt im Wahlkampf.”]

434 Westhoff, ‘Politiker wählen Wesselmann’

435 Westhoff, ‘Politiker wählen Wesselmann’
and costs are in a very good ratio." Since they are only temporary, yet located at strategically important spots close to large streets, they disturb the surroundings and therefore possess a high level of visibility.

**Organizational factors influencing openness to outsource**

Setting up large-scale billboards does not require specific know how, but a rather large workforce that enables a nationwide erection within a short period of time. Most parties, in particular peoples’ parties such as CDU and SPD, should be able to provide the needed workforce due to their intense organizational level even on local level. However, logistic requirements are very high since Wesselmann billboards are of large scale. A high number of vans as well as solid structures to which billboards can be attached are necessary to provide the service. Since parties do not possess those resources, they would need to be built up. That would lead to financial burdens that would not be in a healthy relationship to other means of political marketing. “You need to manage that. They need huge hangars. Those posters, they are delivered quite early, they have to be mounted, dried and then they lay there to dry. And then you quickly need human resources as well as material to build them up everywhere. [...] You cannot quickly copy that.”

Since Wesselmann provides its service to all parties in all campaigns nationwide it makes use of economies of scale that could only be reached by parties if they created a shared service center on their own, servicing all party entities. However, due to the reasons mentioned in chapter 5.1.1.2 such centers do not (yet) exist. Therefore, there are clear economic indicators suggesting outsourcing this service to an external provider such as Wesselmann.

Particularly in established parties that have been working together with Wesselmann for a longer period of time there is a degree of expectations that is very much in favour of Wesselmann. “If you said, as a party, that we go down and book 20% less Wesselmann billboards, with guarantee you face a shitstorm within the party. Because everyone

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436 Lutz Meyer [Original wording: "Damit ist es zunächst einmal ein sehr plakatdominierter Wahlkampf, weil die die besten Mediawerte haben, also Reichweite, Sichtbarkeit und Kosten stehen in einem echt guten Verhältnis]

437 Stauss, Frank: [Original wording: "Sie müssen das erst mal schaffen. Die brauchen da riesige Hallen, diese Plakate, die werden ja auch relativ früh angeliefert, weil die werden alle aufgezogen, getrocknet, dann liegen die da erst mal zum Trocknen und dann müssen sie natürlich auch zeitnah das Personal und das Material zur Verfügung haben, um die überall aufzustellen. [...]das kann man nicht so schnell nachmachen."]
instantly calls you and say ‘there has always been a Wesselmann, now there is none, what’s going on?’438. This tendency seems to be more developed in established parties than in young parties such as the PirateParty that do not have a long-term relationship with Wesselmann.

**Political Transaction costs**

With their billboards, Wesselmann offers a channel of communication to political parties. They do not offer entire strategies. Despite the fact that Wesselmann billboards are very popular and widely used by parties, plenty of other communication channels are available. Hence there is no danger of dependency on Wesselmann services. At the same time, their importance to the foundation of campaigns is too limited that errors in delivery could have drawbacks on key players in campaign management. No one has to fear negative implications to their career because a Wesselmann billboard was set up in a false way or at an unattractive location. Hence, political transaction costs for key players are very low. A unique element of Wesselmann services is that they are used by various parties during the same electoral campaign. Unlike other service providers, Wesselmann offers its services simultaneously to direct competitors. This again underlines Wesselmann’s role as a provider of single profession. They are not involved in any strategy development.

**Loss of Control**

There are significant strategic implications on where which large-size billboard is presented. However, as mentioned above, from an organizational point of view, 

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438 Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “Wenn sie als Partei sagen, ich gehe jetzt mal runter und ich buche 20% Wesselmänner weniger und dann haben sie einen Shitstorm in der Partei garantiert, weil sofort die Leute anrufen und sagen: ‘hier stand immer ein Wesselmann, jetzt steh keiner da, was soll das?’”]
Wesselmann billboards represent one of many channels of communication to voters. They might play an important role within the overall strategy, but they are not the strategy. Therefore, there are few strategic implications from a managerial point of view and can rather easily be given to an external service provider. There is no notable loss of control in case of outsourcing.

The processes Wesselmann offers are highly standardized. By offering only three sizes of billboards, set-up, gluing, poster changes and dismantling, there is a limited scope consisting of routine tasks. Since the same boards are stored between campaigns and are reused, Wesselmann offers tasks that are routine and of limited complexity for its employees.

With both factors, political transaction costs and loss of control at a low level, services offered by Wesselmann are a prime example for services that should be outsourced to third parties. Although parties in principle could negotiate with communities and set up billboards on their own, Wesselmann is able to use tremendous economies of scale by offering its services to all parties for all kinds of elections as well as non-political institutions (such as World Games 2005). Therefore, outsourcing large-size billboards to external service increases efficiency of a campaign.

6.5. Case 4 - Polling & Research

Polling represents a special case in outsourcing of campaign processes. Polling is the only process that has been outsourced by all parties for some time. Therefore, it is the only outsourcing process for which a considerable amount of research is available and can be analyzed as a whole ranging over all relevant parties. As early as in 1965, computer-based projections were published. “They came from Bad Godesberg-based Ifa-Institute that had the reputation from the very start to be close to SPD, making its analyses part of ideological trench battles in the 60s and 70s.”\textsuperscript{439} During the following decades, polling and research was not only performed by newspapers and TV stations, but also by parties themselves.

Processes outsourced to polling agencies

\textsuperscript{439} Schönenborn, ‘Demoskopie in der beschleunigten Stimmungsdemokratie’, 310 [Original wording: “Sie kamen vom Bad Godesberger Ifas-Institut, das von Beginn an im Ruf der SPD-Nähe stand und dessen Analysen damit fast automatisch Teil der ideologischen Grabenkämpfe der sechziger und siebziger Jahre wurden.”]
While at the beginning focus was mostly put on the projection of potential election outcomes, it has shifted to research on relevant groups of voters and to opposition research. "But by the late 1990's, opposition research had come to mean sitting in front of a computer examining everything from newspaper articles, to property records, to civil and criminal court records".\textsuperscript{440} By today, polling and research has become an integral part of any federal campaign. Before campaign strategies are implemented, they are tested thoroughly by assigned polling agencies in order to find out which technique or method is perceived in which way. “For this, polls provide good and reliable material. Therefore, parties on the federal or state level usually assign suitable institutes at an early stage.”\textsuperscript{441} Their core function is to find the current support level for the party, identify fields of policy that are of relevance and to find how the party is perceived among society. This information today may be critical for election success. Therefore, parties expect increased professionalism in polling agencies. "Campaign polls are usually run by professional polling firms, not in-house volunteer operations, where enthusiasm and inexperience might introduce unwanted variables."\textsuperscript{442}

\textit{Organizational influence on outsourcing decision}

Polling and research are processes being outsourced over the entire spectrum of parties. Those organizational aspects that highly differ between the relevant parties only lead to insufficient answers. Inadequate factors include organizational level and size of parties (large and highly organized parties, such as SPD, and smaller parties with weaker local representations, such as FDP, outsource polling and research) as well as age of organization and establishment, (old and established parties, like SPD or CDU, and middle-aged parties, like the Greens and DieLinke, and young parties like AfD), all employ polling agencies). Marking those factors as irrelevant for the decision to outsource polling and research, there are two factors left which seem to bring an explanation: lack of knowledge within the organization and the extent of financial resources.

\textsuperscript{440} Burton and Shea, \textit{Campaign Craft}, 55
\textsuperscript{441} Gerster, ‘Botschaften und Bilder’, 100 [Original wording: "Umfragen liefern dazu gutes und gesichertes Material. Deswegen beauftragen Parteien auf Bundes- oder Landesebene dafür in der Regel frühzeitig geeignete Institute.”]
\textsuperscript{442} Burton and Shea, \textit{Campaign Craft}, 111–2
Polling and research are highly sophisticated areas in which a high degree of knowledge is required in order to conduct surveys and interpret them adequately and reliably. Since this know how is very costly and only required for a very short period of time and at particular points in time, it is not economic for parties to provide this service on their own. Therefore, it seems that the major driver for outsourcing polling and research does not come from classic organizational factors, but from economic considerations. These are based on financial backgrounds of the parties.

In order to conduct professional and reliable polls, a reasonable financial investment is necessary. In 2013, all parties except for the Pirate Party, employed external polling agencies. While ‘classic parties’ had campaign budgets between 4 and 23 Million Euros, Pirate Party claims to have only a budget of 400,000 Euros. With such a small amount at disposal, the vast majority of the budget was spent for design and production of advertising material as well as logistics. PirateParty’s lack of financial resources can therefore explain its hesitation to outsource polling.

**Political transaction costs**

Polling agencies can be hardly held responsible for defeats. Due to the nature of their services, they do not represent a goal for externalization of failures. However, particularly during the 2005 Bundestag election, polling institutes were criticized heavily for deviations of up to six percent between projections and actual election outcome. However, it is difficult to prove whether this was indeed an error of polling institutes. Late deciding voters occur in a significantly increasing amount and therefore it seems very likely that they caused the errors instead. Nevertheless, cooperation with public opinion research requires a high amount of trust, since large parts of campaigns are built on the outcomes of polls that were conducted on behalf of the respective party. Therefore, long-term cooperation between parties and polling agencies has been developed. This is shown by the fact that SPD has a long-lasting relationship with Infratest Dimap while CDU has been working together with Allensbach Demographic Institutes for several decades. It is highly unlikely

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443 See: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/millionen-aufwand-spd-goennt-sich-groesstes-wahlkampf-budget-a-905334.html

that those relationships will change in the foreseeable future. It can be summarized that political transaction costs for outsourcing polling and research are relatively small.

**Loss of control**

Polling consists of highly standardized processes that allow comparison between surveys. Polling techniques need to be very transparent and known to campaign management in order to be able to draw correct conclusions. As mentioned above, polls and research outcomes are of supreme strategic importance since entire campaigns can be built on them. "Research is the most underrated of professions and one of the most important. Spring for the money - it can make the difference." By giving this decisive process out of house, the party takes a very high risk of losing control over the following campaign. Therefore, campaign members with respective backgrounds closely accompany the work of polling agencies. The polls themselves are standardized, but of high complexity. Many aspects can provoke inaccurate results. "Even the method of payment can affect data quality. An hourly wage might reduce the incentive to submit bogus call reports, but it provides less motivation to complete the calls in a timely manner. Piecework payments might reward persistent employees, but might also credit sham call reports."  

Therefore, conducting proper and methodologically clear polls require a high level of expertise. Overall, the level of loss of control is defined higher than political transaction costs, but still limited since polling is a very standardized process that is very transparent and open to monitoring.

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445 Burton and Shea, *Campaign Craft*, 112
7. Conclusion

Chapters 5 and 6 examined factors which contribute to the overall openness to outsource processes in campaign organizations and which influence the extent to which they are outsourced. This final chapter will sum up the most important aspects of the research and outline possibilities and limitations of transferring knowledge and techniques from the business world to a political context. In the final passage, it will make recommendations to improve further efficiency of campaign organizations by applying an optimized approach to outsourcing in campaigns.

7.1. Academic value

In the following, conclusions are drawn concerning the scientific benefit of this study. In particular, research questions stated in chapter 1.1 will be picked up and answered as well as general remarks concerning the adoption of business management techniques. It became clear that the environment of campaign organizations has changed significantly over the last decades. Decreasing political interest together with decreasing party identification and increasing voter volatility have led to an increasing need for professionalized campaigns with the ability to specifically aim at relevant target groups. Employing professional agents with relevant processes may be one way to raise the level of professionalism of a campaign.

Transfer of management knowledge to campaigns

The basic approach to this study was the attempt to apply management techniques found in the private economy to a political context. Management processes in campaign organizations can generally be considered as similar to the ones of private entities. This is particularly the case when it comes to standardized processes, which are simple to operationalize. As outlined in chapter 6.1, those include the production of advertising material or logistics. Examples of outsourcing processes with a high degree of standardization can be found in most of the mainstream outsourcing literature. This is due to the fact, that its focus is mainly on the IT industry, which is dealing with processes of similar standardized characteristics.

However, there are limitations in the possibility to transfer this knowledge to campaigns. Unlike in standard economic literature, there are a number of processes in campaigns
(particularly concerning strategy development), that are of highest complexity. As shown in chapter 5.2.2, they tend to have very high necessity to exert close control. While this need exceeds the one of most businesses that outsources standardized processes, there seem to be more similarities with highly innovative firms. Like political parties, they are faced with more costs that are difficult to measure and operationalized. This particularly concerns non-financial costs, which may be of considerable extent. Their control requirements are comparably higher as the ones of political parties. Therefore, it can be concluded that transfer of management knowledge concerning outsourcing is indeed possible, but mainstream outsourcing literature is insufficient. There are notable differences between standard economic organizations and political parties. Moreover, parallels are found in literature dealing with innovation outsourcing. As MaryAnne M. Gobble, realizes in her 2013 essay, “outsourcing innovation, in particular, demands that client firms move from regarding outsourcing as a transaction – x dollars paid for y units manufactured – to engaging in ongoing relationships with vendors who are true partners in the process.” This underlines the parallels between innovative businesses and political parties with intangible transaction costs as the common denominator. Therefore, popular transaction costs economics turn out to be insufficient for further explanation. The model of knowledge-based explanations of boundary choice seems to be a more suitable approach. “Knowledge-based theories of the firm also regard the specificity of assets, particularly human assets embedded in firm-specific routines, language, and skills, as critical to the performance of the firm.” This is particularly relevant when classic transactions costs models are not able to explain further factors such as intangible political transaction costs for decision makers in complex structures like campaign organizations.

**Determinants for the openness to outsource**

Although organizational factors (Q3) were meant to be considered at a later stage, it became clear they not only influence the extent of outsourcing, but even the openness to outsource at all. This willingness to outsource is mostly determined by economic factors, namely scarcity of own human resources, seasonal changes in demand and available

446 Gobble, ‘Outsourcing Innovation’, 66

447 Poppo and Zenger, ‘Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost, knowledge-based and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information service’, 857
financial resources. In addition, some organizational factors are relevant: age of a party, its organizational level, and the need for an external perspective. This is valid under the assumption that campaign organizations have the choice to build up either their own expertise or to employ an external service provider.

Determinants of the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns

The main research question is concerned with factors related the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns (Qm). The answer to this question is that the most prominent determinants are the extent of political transaction costs for leading campaign managers and the extent of loss of control over the campaign organization in case a process is given to an external partner.

Main factors that contribute to the extent of political transaction costs (Q1) are natural tendencies to externalize failures and to internalize successes as well as the extent of trust between the outsourcing organization and the service provider. The latter is mainly achieved through close and long-lasting relationships.

The extent of control over the campaign organization (Q2) is determined by the complexity of the service, its strategic importance and possibilities for standardization. Here, above mentioned differences to mainstream outsourcing literature come into play where, in most cases, complexity is not as developed as in the political campaign context.

Depending on the degree of those two factors, the model introduced in chapter 1.1.1 can be applied. Outsourcing may be performed at four possible intensities: not at all, service provision by an internal provider (shared-service-center), service provision by a hybrid agent, and classic external outsourcing. The larger political transaction costs and/or loss of control are the lower the willingness of parties to give the process to an external service provider.

No general hesitation to outsource processes

A hypothesis that was picked up with Q4 is that campaign organizations are more reluctant to give processes to external providers than private business organizations. However, it became quite clear that this is not the case. There is no indicator for increased hesitation to outsource among campaign managers. As described above, the decision depends on
organizational and economic factors as well as on the extent of political transactions costs and control.

However, parties are hesitant to outsource strategy development, because they consider this process as one of their core competences. The same phenomenon can be observed in the field of online campaigning, which has experienced a considerable rise during the last two decades. On the other hand, it is common practice that all processes connected to the production of advertising material are given to agents. Only in rare cases, larger parties are able to provide this by a printing plant that belongs to the respective party’s group of companies.

**Variance between parties**

A significant variation between parties was observed when differentiating by the factor of age. Very young parties rarely outsource processes due to a very enthusiastic support group, which is able to provide many processes by itself and to a lack of financial resources. Middle-aged parties, such as DieLinke or the Greens outsource even basic processes like hanging of posters, due to their inability to be present in remote areas. Mature parties, such as SPD or CDU, again produce a variety of services in-house. This is possible through gained expertise and increased financial means through past election successes.

### 7.2. Recommendations for optimized usage of external resources

This last sub-chapter asks the question, whether the current state of outsourcing is effective and sensible. It therefore picks up research question 5: What kind of processes should be outsourced? Recommendations are based on opinions expressed by experts during the running of the interviews. The focus thereby was not to choose particular processes and to define to what extent they should be outsourced. This depends on the particular situation and circumstances. Rather, general recommendations are made that may have an influence on a whole variety of processes and their make-or-buy decisions.

#### 7.2.1. Have more courage to outsource strategy development

As shown in chapter 6.1.1, campaign organizations are very reluctant when it comes to outsourcing strategy development. This is connected to both, fear of loss of control and to risks of political transaction costs. Some experts are very clear in this regard: “You can never outsource actual politics. If you started to do so, you have already lost. You have to this on
It is clear that definition of content is the core competence of a political party and its program is its product. Core competences should not be outsourced, particularly if it needs to go through a somewhat democratic process and needs to be adopted by the majority of party convention delegates. It therefore also possesses a function of identification trigger for party members. It would be hard to motivate party members to actively engage in campaigns, if they had no say in what the party stands for.

However, there is nothing wrong with integrating an external consultant into the process. While its task might not be the definition of a program, it would indeed have the competence to define a focus strategy for various topics based on outcomes of demographic surveys. They could very well serve as a valuable consultant in this regard not only at the very beginning of the campaign, but months (and perhaps even years) before. “They don’t trust the creatives or thinkers enough that they could give valuable input. Arrogance of parties that only they have a political view is too large. From time to time it would be sensible to listen to employees of agencies. They are also voters.”

Most experts agree that parties would benefit from having a sparring partner with whom they may analyze and discuss their strengths and weaknesses, although it is also agreed that final decisions need to be made by campaign leadership.

External partners might as well serve as facilitators in strategy development processes. “Normally it is clear that formation of opinion, negotiation process and the decision are the task of party committees. This I would never question. As far as I can observe it, the problem is that party committees, party boards, party executive committees, party executive are no longer areas of mutual trust. This is due to various changes we experience. It means that people increasingly act tactically to each other. Moreover, this tactical handling does not necessarily lead to good decisions being made.”

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448 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: "Aber die eigentliche Politik können Sie niemals outsourcen. Wenn Sie das machen, haben Sie schon verloren. Das müssen Sie selber machen."]


450 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: "Normalerweise sagt man, klar, das ist die Meinungsbildung, der Aushandlungsprozess und die Entscheidung die Aufgabe von Parteigremien sind. Das würde ich auch nie in Frage stellen. Das Problem ist aber nur, soweit ich das beobachten kann, dass durch verschiedene Veränderungen, die wir haben, die Parteigremien, Parteivorsstände, Parteipräsidien, Fraktionsvorstände, keine Vertrauensräume mehr sind. D.h. die Leute..."]
partners could not only give advice, but moderate decisions making processes that bring decision makers as well as regular party members on board. While focus hereby would not be to find the Holy Grail that changes everything from one day to another, but to consistently build strategies that are perceived well by the electorate, particularly in phases of crises.

7.2.2. Implement shared service centers to cope with seasonal changes

As elaborated in chapter 5.1.1.2, significant seasonal changes between campaign and off-campaign seasons are a decisive economic factor that prevents parties from building up their own expertise. The main argument from almost all respondents from party organizations has been that elections on the federal level only take place every four years. In between, costly human resources for campaign tasks are not needed.

While this might be true on the federal level, this changes when state elections are also taken into account. With 16 states holding elections every 5 years on different time tracks, there are multiple elections held every year on the state level or above. Hence, if party structures allowed the implementation of a shared service center with gathered campaign expertise that is accessible by all state associations as well as by the federal party, significant increases in productivity could be achieved. As shown in chapter 5.2.2.2, there are many processes needed in a campaign that are well possible to standardize. By giving those tasks to a shared service center, utilization could be increased and expertise could be held within the organization, avoiding a brain drain.

Some party experts argue that this model might be perceived critically, because state associations of parties very much underline their independence from the federal party (particularly, when they conclude bad that outcomes in polls are connected to federal policies). In some parties, such as CDU, membership fees are even collected on the local level and given up the ladder until they reach the federal association. Therefore, state parties might fear that they would lose some of their independence. In addition, a change of external partners is a particular wish in order to pursue changes of image or strategy. In
case of a series of losses, it would be difficult to convince state organizations to work with
the same partner again.

However, a shared service center does not need to be tasked with all relevant processes of
a campaign. A certain degree of freedom to find suitable a truly external partner is sensible.
However, there are no reasons not to install a shared service center for all state and federal
associations which are tasked with those processes that are considered of low strategic
importance. This shared service center would be able to provide processes on a very
constant basis to all state and federal campaigns of the party. To a certain extent, Union
Betriebs-GmbH is a step towards that direction. However, its resources considering
campaigns are very limited. A true shared service center would be able to build up
necessary expertise within party structures that would fill a current gap: “I am not aware
of any true talent pool of any party, where you could say that business is really being
learnt.”451 Hence, a shared service center for campaigns would have multiple possibilities
to improve productivity of a campaign, without necessarily increasing costs.

7.2.3. Outsource creative thinking

Being important elements of each democracy, parties themselves possess democratic
internal structures. Unfortunately, those processes are often rather time-consuming and
complex. In the opinion of many respondents, this is a contrast to creative thinking.
Creative minds need some freedom to manoeuvre. Being tight in party structures and
dependent on committees is likely to have negative consequences on the outcome of their
work. As mentioned in chapter 5.1.2.6, having an external perspective on the party itself,
its program and its perception among the electorate is often sensible and helpful, since
parties tend to mix up their internal with external perception. Often this leads to increased
alienation with the electorate. “Concerning advertising and design questions, it is strongly
recommended to have a partner on the side who is not only an external idea provider, but
one that prevents you to look at PR work from solely an internal perspective.”452 By

451 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Ich kenne eigentlich keine wirkliche Kaderschmiede einer Partei, wo man
sagt, da wird dieses Handwerk wirklich gelernt.”]

452 Interview with Matthias Höhn [Original wording: “Bei der werberischen und Gestaltungsfrage empfiehlt es sich aus meiner
Sicht dingend, einen Partner an seiner Seite zu haben, der nicht nur Ideengeber von außen ist, sondern sie auch ein
Stückchen davor bewahrt, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit aus einer kompletten Binnensicht heraus zu entwickeln.”]
employing an external partner who is tasked with creative thinking, chances are good that
creative PR strategies are developed, that are actually able to reach the intended groups.
Nevertheless, it is important to integrate the external partner well into party and campaign
structures so that it can understand and sense a party’s identity and convictions. “Such a
publication can actually only be texted by someone who worked in many party committees
and was involved when this field of policy was developed, someone who is deeply involved
in terms of content.”

This combination of external perspective with enough room to be
creative and thorough knowledge about the party’s program can be achieved by proposed
outsourcing of creative thinking to a trusted partner who is working in close cooperation
with the rest of the campaign organization.

7.2.4. Don’t use too many external partners

Every campaign organization is well-advised to consider carefully where external expertise
is needed and in what fields, and where they are able to provide the necessary services on
their own. “I can only establish the rule to analyze own strengths and weaknesses and to
make the best possible decision what to buy externally and what to provide with internal
resources based on such a SWOT analysis and the available financial resources.”

Regardless of the extent of services provided by an external partner, all respondents advise
that only a very limited number of service providers should be employed. Limit both in the
sense of employed simultaneously and over the long run.

As shown in chapter 5.1.2.5 one reason that led to SPD’s major failure in the 2013 campaign
was that too many centers of powers employed too many external partners which did not
cooperate with each other. This is not a problem exclusive to SPD. If there were only one
major external partner, who perhaps has sub-contractors for the provision of specialized
services, productivity and efficiency of the campaign would considerably be increased.

Need for time-consuming cooperation meetings and briefing could be limited to the lowest

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453 Interview with Karsten Göbel [Original wording: “So eine Publikation, die kann eigentlich nur jemand textlich erstellt
werden, der in vielen Gremien einer Partei mitgearbeitet hat und auch dabei war, als dieses Politikfeld bearbeitet worden
ist, der inhaltlich so stark drin ist.”]

454 Interview with Steffi Lemke [Original wording: “Ich kann da nur die Regel aufstellen, die eigenen Ressourcen, die eigenen
Stärken und Schwächen analysieren und aus einer solchen SWOT-Analyse und den Finanzmitteln, die zur Verfügung
stehen, die bestmögliche Entscheidung treffen, wo kaufe ich mir extern was dazu und wo muss ich es mit internen Mitteln
selber bekommen.”]
possible extent. At the same time, it may be ensured that the entire campaign fits together and follows a consistent strategy and design.

Just as important as to only employ a limited number of service providers at a time it is to minimize fluctuation of external partners. Only close principal-agent relationships that involve high levels of trust may lead to desired success. As described in chapter 5.2.1.3, trust needs time and experience to develop. It takes time getting to know the partner, his convictions and reactions. If trust is attained, then campaigns follow a clearly defined strategy that follows a consistent concept, time is needed to develop this. It literally takes years of trusted relationships to develop a party image that fits to the party and appreciated by the electorate.

In conclusion, campaigns should build a well-functioning and efficient campaign organization with only few external partners which deliver a sound and consistent message to the electorate.

7.2.5. What should not be outsourced

Last, but not least, experts do not only make recommendations concerning processes being outsourced, but also what processes should NOT be outsourced. As a general rule, processes suitable to being outsourced should be “manageable, billable and of with characteristics that the client, hence the party, says that we can’t do it.”\textsuperscript{455} If one of those basic criteria is not met, a campaign organization should prefer providing the service in-house. The same applies to processes, which are party-specific and content-related and have influence on the identity of the party. By outsourcing such a process, a party would risk losing support of its followers and active members.

However, the most important kind of processes, which should not be given to external providers, are processes linked to messages parties try to transmit. The party’s content or, as noted in chapter 5.2.2.3, the party’s core competence. The closer a process is linked to the core brand of the party, the more cautious a party should be when confronted with the make-or-buy decision. The product needs to come from the party itself. An external agent may assist it, as proposed in chapter 7.1, but content needs to come from the party.

\textsuperscript{455} Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: “Überschaubar, abrechenbar und letztlich der Gestalt, dass der Auftraggeber, also die Partei, sagt, das kriegen wir auch gar nicht hin.”]
“Actually, you can outsource almost everything, except for the point, what is important to me in an election? Thus, the question what is my fundamental conviction? Why am I competing? This, you cannot actually outsource.” As several respondents report, this was attempted on a few occasions, but it failed, because it did not fit to the party’s political DNA.

It can therefore be concluded that that productivity of campaigns can be even further increased by making slight changes to their outsourcing behavior. More courage to outsource strategy development processes should be considered as long as they do not interfere with the party’s core competences that are connected to fundamental convictions and the basic program of the party. Those processes should be kept in-house. Creativity is considered a field that requires mental freedom and does not fit to the very tight, democratic and lengthy organizational process of political parties that require involvement of a number of different party leaders and committees. Parties should refrain from employing too many external partners, both simultaneously and over the run of several elections. The development of mutual trust is considered a key factor for campaign success. This aspect could be affected negatively, if a party consistently changes its external partners. Employing several service providers in the same campaign should be avoided, because it may lead to mistrust, chaos, lengthy coordination processes and to an inconsistent campaign image.

A promising approach would be the implementation of a shared service center located at a party’s federal headquarters that would not only be available for federal campaigns, but also to campaigns run on the state level. With this approach and the circumstance where there are usually multiple elections on state level or above every year, higher utilization rates could be attained, brain drains avoided and a higher level of productivity achieved.

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456 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Eigentlich können sie fast alles auslagern bis auf den Punkt, worum geht es ihnen selber bei einer Wahl? Also die Frage, was ist meine Grundüberzeugung, warum trete ich an? Das können Sie eigentlich nicht auslagern.”]
IV. References


Grafe, Peter Wahlkampf: Die Olympiade der Demokratie (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1994).


## V. Appendix

### Interview guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leitfrage (Erzählauflforderung)</th>
<th>Check- Wurde das erwähnt? Memo für mögliche Nachfragen (nur stellen wenn nicht von allein angesprochen) Formulierung anpassen!</th>
<th>Konkrete Fragen – an passender Stelle in dieser Formulierung stellen</th>
<th>Aufrechterhaltungs- und Steuerungsfragen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Teil I - Organisation der Kampagne**  
Aufgaben des Kampagnenmanagers  
Rolle anderer Akteure in der Kampagnenorganisation  
Vergleich zu früheren Kampagnen  
Grad der Standardisierung | Wie war das Kampagnenteam aufgebaut?  
Wer waren die wichtigsten Akteure auf Seiten der Partei?  
Beschreiben Sie die Aufgaben und Herausforderungen eines Kampagnenmanagers.  
Welche Rolle spielten  
- Parteigremien  
- innerpart.Machstrukturen  
- politische Entscheider bei der Planung und Durchführung der Kampagne?  
Gab es eine Abgrenzung zwischen technischer und politischer Kampagnenführung?  
Wo lagen Gemeinsamkeiten bzw. Unterschiede zwischen Ihrer letzten Kampagne und früheren?  
Wie standardisiert kann eine Kampagne sein?  
Gibt es einzelne Standardprozesse? | Wie war das mit Ihrer Rolle?  
Wer hatte auf Parteiseite das Sagen?  
Wer spielte innerhalb der Partei noch eine Rolle?  
Wie waren die Interessenlagen zwischen den Parteigremien? |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Teil II – Entscheidung und Ablauf der Auslagerung</th>
<th>Kriterien bei der Auslagerungs-Entscheidung</th>
<th>Nach welchen Kriterien wählten Sie Ihren/Ihren Anbieter aus?</th>
<th>Und welche Rolle spielt das Vertrauen?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Können Sie mir etwas über die Entscheidungsfindung bei der Frage der Auslagerung und den Ablauf einer Auslagerung erzählen?</td>
<td>Rolle von Führungswechsel</td>
<td>Haben mögliche kurz zuvor stattgefunden Führungswechsel eine Auswirkung auf die Auslagerungsbereitschaft?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rolle von Exklusivität und politischer Nähe des Service-Anbieters</td>
<td>Wie eng muss ein Anbieter mit der Partei verwoben sein?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Was motiviert den Wahlkampfleiter?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rolle finanzieller Ressourcen</td>
<td>Was ist die größte Angst eines Wahlkampfleiters?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Transaktionskosten</td>
<td>Mit welcher Motivation wird ein Prozess an einen externen Anbieter vergeben?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Geeignete und ungeeignete Bereiche</td>
<td>Was ist die Motivation eines Anbieters an einem Wahlkampf mitzuwirken?</td>
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<td>Welche Rolle spielte das Geld?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leitfrage (Erzählauflößung)</td>
<td>Check- Wurde das erwähnt? Memo für mögliche Nachfragen (nur stellen wenn nicht von allein angesprochen) Formulierung anpassen!</td>
<td>Konkrete Fragen – an passender Stelle in dieser Formulierung stellen</td>
<td>Aufrechterhaltungs- und Steuerungsfragen</td>
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<td>besonders schlecht für eine Auslagerung?</td>
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<td>Anbieter als Sündenbock</td>
<td>Wie stellen Sie sicher, dass ein Anbieter im Laufe der Kampagne kein „Eigenleben“ entwickelt?</td>
<td>Müssen Anbieter für Fehler des Parteimanagements herhalten?</td>
<td>Wann überschreitet ein Dienstleister seine Grenzen?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fallbeispiele</td>
<td>Wer bekommt die Lorbeeren bei einer erfolgreichen Kampagne?</td>
<td>Wer bekommt den Ruhm bzw. die Tracht Prügel?</td>
<td>Wer bekommt den Ruhm bei ihren Kampagnen ausgelagert?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Was wurde von externen Dienstleistern ausgeführt?</td>
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<td>Können Sie noch mehr zu den Anbietern und den ausgelagerten Prozessen erzählen?</td>
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<td>Was wurde von der Partei selbst durchgeführt?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wer hat praktische Arbeiten wie Plakatdesign, Plakatierung, Wahlumfragen, Veranstaltungen etc. durchgeführt?</td>
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<td>Was würden Sie künftigen Kampagnen raten?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gab es Prozesse, die selbst durchgeführt wurde, aber besser hätten ausgelagert werden sollen? Bzw. andersherum?</td>
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<td>Welche Prozesse sollten Ihrer Meinung nach ausgelagert werden?</td>
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<td>Können Sie mir noch etwas über die Aufgaben von Freiwilligen erzählen?</td>
<td>Welche Rolle spielt das Alter einer Partei?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>