EU security policy regarding China

Its nature and the reasons for its continuous stability

1995-2014

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To

Susanne,

Maia & Frieda
After a while he says, “Do you believe in ghosts?”

“No,” I say.

“Why not?”

“Because they are un-sci-en-ti-fic.”

The way I say this makes John smile. “They contain no matter,” I continue, “and have no energy and therefore, according to the laws of science, do not exist except in people’s minds.”

The whiskey, the fatigue and the wind in the trees start mixing my mind. “Of course,” I add, “the laws of science contain no matter and have no energy either and therefore do not exist except in people’s minds. It’s best to be completely scientific about the whole thing and refuse to believe in either ghosts or the laws of science. That way you’re safe.

That doesn’t leave you very much to believe in, but that’s scientific too.”

(Robert M. Pirsig: Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance. An Inquiry into values, pp. 38f.).
Acknowledgments

During the last five years, I had the exceptional privilege to engage extensively and profoundly with questions that had surfaced during the whole span of my university studies, but which I never really had the time to address. Questions about the relationship between theory and the reality we intend to explain with it, about explanation as such, about how we can make knowledge claims, and about science as such. It was a time of new insights in quick successions, a time of continuous critical reflection upon the own basic assumptions, a time of recurring struggles with the limits of my scientific abilities – but also a time of victories, time and again.

During these five years, I had the privilege and pleasure of meeting many people from whom I have learned a lot. Without them, I would not have been able to complete this thesis.

First of all, of course, I thank my supervisor Thomas Diez, who has accepted me, a hitherto unknown student, as one of his PhD students. After I had written my Master Thesis under the supervision of Volker Rittberger, Thomas’ postmodern take on International Relations opened up many new perspectives to me which I gratefully explored. I learned a lot from our discussions. I also thank Andreas Hasenclever and my colleagues of the PhD-Colloquium at the Institute of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Tuebingen. I have learned a lot in these discussion rounds, from the papers and PhD projects that we discussed and from the critical comments that my fellow colleagues raised concerning weak or hitherto underdeveloped arguments of my thesis.

I am very grateful that Stefano Guzzini agreed to serve as my second supervisor. I got to know Stefano during a workshop in Copenhagen in late 2011 which was one of the most important experiences in my academic life in many ways. I realized how little I knew about International Relations and about how much there was yet (and still is) to discover. The way Stefano dealt with the papers of the participants was unique. His positive criticism showed the potential that was actually in these papers – however
tangled up, underdeveloped or implicit – and in which ways one could think of further elaborating it.

I also had the pleasure to get to know many fellow PhD students from across the world during conferences and workshops with whom I had inspiring discussions. Special thanks go to Falk Ostermann, an extraordinarily friendly and open-minded colleague, whom I owe the participation in a fantastic panel at the ISA Conference 2014 in Toronto, for which Patrick T. Jackson agreed to serve as an ‘informal’ discussant. Patrick’s comments on my paper were incredibly insightful and helped me get over some of the most difficult questions concerning my discussion of causality and poststructuralist discourse analysis.

As intriguing and inspiring as these years in the academic world had been – I probably would not have survived this time without my involvement in ‘real world politics’ as a sort of balance to the academic ivory tower that I felt imprisoned in at times. Therefore, I owe great gratitude to Rainer Wieland, Member of the European Parliament and since 2009 one of its vice-presidents, for whom I had the great pleasure to work for over five years during my studies and during the first years of my PhD. During these years in the European Parliament, I had the opportunity to get insights into the engine room of democratic politics. These years and the experiences gained in them were and are still priceless. Rainer Wieland was an exemplary boss and I am greatly indebted to him for the continuous confidence and support.

My work for the Junge Europäische Föderalisten (JEF) Deutschland (Young European Federalists Germany) presented another opportunity to escape the academic ivory tower and thus helped to clear my mind every once in a while. About the time when I started to write my PhD, I got elected into the executive boards of the Young European Federalists, first into the local section of Baden-Württemberg, and from 2012 to 2014 into the German federal board. It was a fantastic, inspiring and – especially – nocturnal work in fantastic teams. I am grateful for all the friendships that have evolved during these nightshifts and study trips.

Special thanks go to Markus Breitweg, a former JEF-colleague who has become a very good friend. He proofread core parts of this thesis several times and I have discussed
many of the central problems of this thesis with him. This greatly helped to clarify my thoughts and get them straightened out.

Writing this thesis would not have been possible without the generous support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung which saw me and my PhD project worthy of being funded for over three years. But not only the financial support made these years as a scholarship holder so important – it were especially my Konstipendiaten whom I met during these three years who made this time so enriching.

It goes without saying that hardly anything one has achieved in life would have been possible without family and friends. Just saying ‘thank you’ to my parents, especially my mother, my brothers and my sister, my aunt Hedwig Renner and my uncle Ernst Renner, who showed me the innumerous worlds that rested in their bookshelves, my friends, many of whom I know since schooldays, would not be appropriate – I hope that I will be able to give back what I have received.

My wife and my two daughters have shared all my joy and frustration, my successes and failures, and have always allowed me the necessary space and time to disappear in the piles of books and articles for hours and days. I finally reappeared, done and dusted, and I dedicate the result of all this, this thesis, to you.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Carbon Capture and Storage</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSL</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of the 20 most important industrialized and emerging economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNSS</td>
<td>Global Navigation Satellite System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPG</td>
<td>Global Public Goods</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITER</td>
<td>International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Energy Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>The five permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGGE</td>
<td>United Nations Group of Government Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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1. Introduction

“[…] habetque utraque pars, quae alteri cum fructu communicare possit”
And both sides possess capabilities that they could exchange for mutual benefit
(Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Novissima Sinica, 1697)

In his “Novissima Sinica”, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz called China the “Europe of the East” because of the high level of science and knowledge in this far Eastern part of the Eurasian continent. He proposed that not only Western missionaries should go to China but that China should send missionaries to Europe in order for both sides to profit from each other’s capabilities and knowledge.

Leibniz’ report on the latest news from China was an early attempt to initiate a far reaching cultural, religious, political and economic exchange between Europe and China. Yet, as we know, the relations between Europe and China since the time of Leibniz took a rather negative turn: Several military confrontations in the second half of the 19th century between European powers and China followed the forced opening of the Chinese economy by the British Empire. The 20th century began for China with decades of inner unrest, civil war and the Japanese occupation. After the takeover of the Communist Party, the country was largely isolated from the world by the mid-20th century (cf. Gray 2002).

Since the 1980s, the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping initiated far reaching reforms and an opening of the country and its economy. About the same time, the European Community intensified its efforts to deepen its integration. For 30 years now, China and the EU find themselves in extraordinary processes of internal change which poses tremendous challenges to the governments and people of both sides. And both sides are forced, after the end of the Cold War, to find their place in the dynamic globalized world of the 21st century.

Hence, today the question arises anew how both sides relate to each other. Today’s response of the EU is in line with the quote of Leibniz: The establishment of close and
trustful relations as well as fostering mutual understanding is an important feature of the EU’s policy regarding China. This policy is, however, subject to criticism from parts of the scholarly and policy-making community across Europe. Both consider the political, economic and military rise of an authoritarian state as a potentially threatening development for Europe and the world.

This thesis aims at contributing to a better understanding of the EU’s way of relating to China. Specifically, it focuses on the EU’s security policy regarding China and aims at providing a better understanding of its nature and its reasons.

The scholarly literature on EU-China relations in general and on EU security policy regarding China in particular reveals a remarkable shortcoming: The concept of security is taken for granted and the discussions of the last decades in the field of security studies practically ignored. This neglect not only leads to a spectrum of the verdicts ranging from ‘there is no such thing as a EU security policy regarding China’ to ‘the EU’s security policy regarding China is more effective than US ‘hard’ security involvement in East Asia’; it also leads to a lack of consensus on whether the EU’s security policy regarding China has changed in the years between 2005 and 2008, which are marked by the failed attempt of the EU to lift the arms embargo and by the end of the cooperation between the EU and China in the satellite navigation project Galileo.

These problems of the EU-China scholarly literature dealing with EU security policy reflect the assessment of Sebastian Barnutz who stated that “European security is a much contested concept. [...] what remains contested is the kind of security logic implemented at the EU level [...]” (Barnutz 2010: 377). Therefore, the first question that this thesis will tackle is the question *What is EU security policy regarding China and how can we analytically and conceptually capture it?*.

Previous research has indicated that the EU’s security policy regarding China has remained constant from the EU’s first policy paper on China in 1995, over the above mentioned period between 2005 and 2008 until today (cf. Renner 2012). For several reasons which will be outlined in the next chapter, this was an astonishing result. Therefore, the second question of this thesis arose, namely *Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?*.

Thus, the first research question arose from a critical engagement with the scholarly literature, the second one emerged from the results of previous empirical research which produced an unexpected outcome.
In a nutshell, the answer to these two questions is: The EU security policy regarding China is a liberal-relational security policy, aiming at reconciling contradictory interests (the liberal part) and managing relationships (the relational part). It has remained continuously stable over two decades because the security policies of the so-called ‘big-three’ EU member states UK, France and Germany were relational security policies, too, and because the constructions of China in general were similar to those of the EU and thus reinforced the security policy on EU level instead of challenging it.

If the two research questions are to be tackled in one single, coherent theoretical approach, this approach needs to combine two requirements: A great conceptual openness in order to respond to the first research question and a focus on the more general lines of security policy instead of singular decisions in order to be able to assess continuity or change of the policy.

A poststructuralist discourse analytical approach combines these two requirements and is thus taken as the theoretical basis for this thesis. First, the Copenhagen School’s discursive re-conceptualization of security has given the object of research a greater say in what constitutes a security issue and what precisely this security issue looks like (cf. Buzan et al 1998: 33f.). This discursive approach to security and its conceptual openness can be easily incorporated into a poststructuralist framework. And second, poststructuralist foreign policy analysis focuses on the general lines of policies and the public representations that legitimize these policies (cf. Wæver 2002; Hansen 2012).

Labelling this analysis ‘poststructuralist’, however, may seem to be in need of justification. The ‘founders’ of this philosophical tradition seem to largely elude the efforts of labelling them in any way (cf. Dillet et al. 2013). Therefore, it is an ambiguous task to define what poststructuralism actually is and this effort can easily end up in a performative contradiction. Nevertheless, today the label ‘poststructuralism’ is so widely used that it may seem to have become just another ‘-ism’ that “can be worn on the scholarly kitbag” like another “academic badge” (ibid.: 1). While this may be a harsh verdict (and deplorable if true), one has to note that poststructuralism has arrived in the mainstream of Foreign Policy Analysis and has taken its place in the classic canon alongside realism, liberalism and constructivism in a textbook on FPA (cf. Hansen 2012). Similarly, it has become an accepted approach to the study of EU foreign policy (cf. Diez 2014; Carta/Morin 2014).

Therefore, on the other hand, labelling the theoretical approach of this thesis just as a
‘discursive’ approach may also raise criticism, because of the various shapes and guises in which discourse analysis comes in today’s IR and FPA, such as for example in discursive institutionalism, critical discourse analysis, constructivist approaches or poststructuralism (cf. Carta/Morin 2014; Torfing 2005).

I consider this thesis to be a poststructuralist analysis in three regards. First, by engaging in discussions with and drawing on the work of scholars such as Wæver (1998, 2002), Diez (1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2013, 2014) and Hansen (2002, 2006, 2012), all of which have intensively drawn on the work of Foucault, Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, Kristeva and others, this thesis becomes – willingly or not – part of this poststructuralist strand of International Relations (IR) and FPA. Second, these authors share a basic commitment: They underline the ontological and epistemological significance of language. This means that the researcher can only acquire knowledge of the world by the construction of worldly phenomena in language. Language is “constitutive for what is brought into being” (Hansen 2006: 17; cf. Diez 1999: 35-45; Wæver 2002: 22-24). Following from this, identity and policy, or causes and effects, are constructed simultaneously in language. Therefore, Hansen argues that one cannot draw causal relations from one to the other as there is no extra-discursive realm from which it would be possible to construct or assess competing explanations. Thus, the possibility of positivist causal explanation is rejected in favour of the notion of constitutive explanation (Hansen 2006: 25-28; Diez 2014: 31). This thesis shares the basic commitment to the ontological significance of language (it differs, however, in the consequences for causal analysis). And finally, one of poststructuralism’s basic incentives may be coined as a relentless attempt to contest limits in a productive way (cf. Dillet et al. 2013: 5). In this sense, I offer a PhD student’s humble contribution in contesting the limits set by some of the poststructuralist scholars in IR concerning the alleged impossibility of causality in this theoretical tradition. And more generally, I attempt to offer new perspectives on EU security policy regarding China by critically examining what seems rather familiar and largely unquestioned in the EU-China literature.

The main contribution of this thesis is, first, to remedy a major shortcoming of the EU-China literature – which is the neglect of the concept of security – and to put forward a proposal of what EU security policy regarding China is and how it can be best captured analytically. And second, to challenge the common notion that during the years between
2005 and 2008, which are marked by the row over the intended lifting of the arms embargo of the EU against China and the end of the Chinese participation in the Galileo satellite navigation project, the EU’s security policy regarding China had changed. Furthermore, the course of the research confirmed what had been raised before, namely that ‘EU security policy’ is a much contested concept and eludes common concepts of security. I therefore examined the concept of security in an effort to ascertain whether there are aspects of the concept which are not evident or at least not sufficiently incorporated in current research on EU security policy. I consider my discussion of the concept of security along the lines of its locus and its logic as well as the development of four ideal-types of security a valuable stipulation for further discussions about EU security policy or even regarding the field of security studies more generally.

Finally, applying a poststructuralist approach to EU foreign policy analysis in order to explain the continuity of the EU’s security policy, confronted the author with the challenge of dealing with the question whether or not a poststructuralist approach could engage in causal explanation and, if the answer was ‘yes’, what such an undertaking would look like specifically. The solution that I developed in this thesis (in a nutshell: The combination of Patrick Jackson’s ideal-type to science ‘Analyticism’ (2011) and Miljia Kurki’s broadening of causality (2008) can serve as a basis for causal explanation in a poststructuralist approach) may also be seen as valuable for the discussions in both the subfields of Foreign Policy Analysis and EU Foreign Policy Analysis respectively as well as for poststructuralist research in general.

Now, turning to the two research questions and the argument of this thesis: The first question that arose out of the engagement with the scholarly literature is *What is EU security policy regarding China and how can we analytically and conceptually capture it?*. The basic argument in responding to this question is that once we can specify the EU’s security discourse regarding China, we can infer and determine its security policy regarding China. In order to reconstruct the EU’s security discourse regarding China, I will develop ideal-types of security, which will serve a twofold purpose: First, they will serve as ‘analytical lenses’ in the discourse analysis and second, based on the concept of causal explanation in a poststructuralist approach, as material and formal causes of the EU’s security policy regarding China.

The second question of this thesis is: *Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?*. The basic argument in responding
Introduction

to this question is that the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China depends on its relation to the respective security discourses of the EU member states United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany.\(^1\) Specific ideal-typical constellations of the respective discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany can be considered to be the material and formal causes of the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China.

In **chapter 2**, I will elaborate in detail on the two research questions. I will discuss the scholarly literature on EU security policy regarding China and show that there is a remarkable neglect of the concept of security. As a consequence of this neglect, not only the question whether the EU does pursue a security policy regarding China but also the question whether this policy has changed in the years between 2005 and 2008 remains more than unclear. I have previously argued (cf. Renner 2012) that the EU’s security policy regarding China has remained continuously stable. This is a surprising finding because there are manifold constructions of China in the scholarly as well as the policy-making communities across Europe that favour a more critical and cautious approach towards this politically, economically and militarily rising authoritarian state. Some even advocate an alignment with the US and its double track approach to East Asian security policy consisting in engaging and containing China. The finding that the EU’s basic approach towards China remained a cooperative one throughout the years between 2005 and 2008 and until today therefore requires explanation.

**Chapter 3** sets the theoretical basis for this thesis. In the first section (3.1.), I will briefly argue that poststructuralist discourse theory is particularly suited for EU foreign policy analysis and especially the research questions of this thesis. I will argue, however, that the most elaborated of these approaches, Ole Wæver’s so-called ‘tree model’ to explain EU member states integration policies, cannot be easily adapted to EU foreign policy analysis. Therefore, this thesis is confronted with the need of developing an explanatory poststructuralist approach to EU foreign policy analysis. Hence, the second section (3.2.) is dedicated to developing a poststructuralist concept of causal explanation. This is necessary for two reasons: First, despite the many advantages of poststructuralist discourse theory for the analysis of EU security policy, there is one

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\(^1\) For pragmatic reasons but also due to a lack of sufficient knowledge of other European languages the analysis confines itself to these so-called ‘big three’ EU member states (cf. chapter 4).
decisive difficulty: The researcher engaging in poststructuralist discourse analysis is—by the meta-theoretical commitments of poststructuralism—bound to discourses, i.e. language and structures of meaning within language, and does therefore not have direct ‘access’ to policies. In order to say anything meaningful about policies (i.e. the EU’s security policy regarding China), discourse analysis has to clarify and specify the relationship between discourse and policy. As I will argue, one can establish a causal relationship between the two—although first, both poststructuralist discourse analysis as well as the concept of causality have to be freed from the prison of the narrow, Humean concept of causality. Moreover, responding to the second question of why the EU’s security policy has remained stable over the period of two decades also requires a causal argument.

The development of a concept of causal explanation in poststructuralism will be a three-step argument: I will first argue that poststructuralism and one of Patrick Jackson’s (2011) ideal-typical approaches to science, ‘Analyticism’, share the same meta-theoretical commitments. Both share the mind-world monist stance which means that they assume the relationship of the researcher and the world to be inextricably intertwined, i.e. that there is no ‘objective’ standpoint for the researcher. The production of knowledge “is itself also and simultaneously productive of the world” (Jackson 2011: 114). They also share the assumption that the knowledge which a researcher can acquire is confined to the empirical or experimental sphere, i.e. researchers do not have access to super-empirical, transcendental knowledge. Indeed, all that poststructuralists have access to is language and the construction of meaning about worldly phenomena in language. Causality in the understanding of Analyticism works by means of using ideal-types. According to Jackson (who refers to Max Weber as his reference theorist), ideal-types are put into a ‘singular causal analysis’, “wherein scientific researchers trace and map how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific outcomes in particular cases” (ibid.: 114). As causal explanation is possible in an Analyticist framework, so should it be in a similar way by means of ideal-types of discourses in a poststructuralist one.

This is, however, not to say that Jackson’s singular causal analysis by means of ideal-types is easily applicable to poststructuralist discourse analysis like adding spices to a soup. In fact, there is the need to specify how exactly ideal-types and discourses can work in such a causal explanation. Therefore, secondly, I will argue that Milija Kurki’s concept of constitutive causality (in contrast to the understanding of constitutive
explanation by Alexander Wendt) can be fruitfully incorporated into a poststructuralist framework. Kurki draws on the Aristotelian fourfold typology of causes, which are the so-called material, formal, effective and final causes, whereby the material and formal causes are considered as constitutive causes of a phenomenon. I will argue that, regarding the first research question, ideal-types of discourses can be considered as material and formal causes of policies. Regarding the second research question, I will argue that constellations of different discourses can be considered as material and formal causes of the stability or instability of the analyzed discourses.

Thirdly and finally, to conclude the introduction of causal explanation into poststructuralism, I will make the case for the analytical separation of discourse and policy in order to be able to draw meaningful, non-tautological causal relations from discourse to policy. Arguing that discourse has a twofold meaning as a ‘thing to be analysed’ and as a ‘way of analyzing things’ (in the words of Jackson: scientific ontology and philosophical ontology respectively), discourse and policy (in the first understanding as scientific ontology) can be easily analytically separated. One has to recall, however, that policies as well as discourses can only be analyzed by the researcher by reconstructing the discourses in which they are constructed (philosophical ontology).

Hence, this poststructuralist concept of causal explanation conceptualizes ideal-types of discourses as material and formal causes of policies as well as ideal-types of constellations of different discourses as material and formal causes of the stability of the analyzed discourses.

In section 3.3, I will develop four ideal-types of security. I will distinguish the four ideal-types along the lines of two dimensions: First, the dimension of the *locus* of security, which concerns the question of whether security is conceived of as the attribute of one actor or of a relationship of actors. And second, the dimension of the *logic* of security, which concerns the question of whether security only makes sense in a hostile international environment or whether it can also make sense in a non-hostile environment. The resulting four ideal types will be labelled realist security, common security, liberal security and relational security.

The ideal-types serve a twofold purpose. First, they will serve as ‘lenses’ for the two empirical chapters in which I will analyze the official EU policy papers and speeches about EU security policy regarding China as well as the official documents and speeches of the representatives of the governments of the UK, France and Germany. The
ideal-types of security help to reconstruct the security discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany regarding China. And secondly, if the EU’s security discourse can be proven to largely follow one or more of those ideal-types, they are considered to be the material and formal causes of the EU’s security policy.

Section 3.4 finally, is dedicated to explaining the continuous stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China. Any attempt to explain EU security policy would be incomplete without reference to the EU member states because they play a crucial role in the EU’s foreign policy making machinery. I will adapt the concept of discourse coalitions by Maarten Hajer (1995) who developed this concept in order to explain the stability of a given discourse given a variety of actors that are involved. However, as this concept is developed in a constructivist framework, it needs to be transferred into a poststructuralist framework. I will therefore develop four ideal-types of constellations of discourses (instead of coalitions), which capture the different constellations of discourses between the three EU member states UK, France and Germany and the EU. These constellations are the material and formal causes of the stability of the EU’s security discourse – and thus, as has been argued, of the EU’s security policy.

Chapter 4 will specify the methodical procedure of the thesis. I will first justify the time span of the analysis and the selection of the documents that were analyzed. The analysis of the EU’s discourse will start in 1995 with the first Communication of the European Commission concerning China. In the case of the EU member states, I will start a bit earlier, as in the case of Germany, the first Asia Strategy with many references to China was issued in 1993 and as in the case of France, the first Joint Statement of the French and the Chinese government after the incident on Tiananmen Square in 1989 was issued in 1994. In the case of Britain, it is in the years from 1993 onwards that the preparations of the negotiations with China concerning the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 gained intensity. All in all, it is in the years until about 1995 that the relations between the EU, the EU member states and China ‘normalize’ after the Chinese crackdown of the events of 1989.

I will then clarify the relationship between the researcher and these documents. The documents cannot be conceived of as being an ‘objective reality’ and as ‘speaking for themselves’. Instead the documents are conceived of as parts and products of a variety of different discourses which need to be analyzed by help of ideal-types in order for the author to be able to reconstruct the discourses that these documents contain and that
they are articulations of.
Finally, I will discuss the fact that these official documents will contain largely diplomatic language. I will argue – with reference to the US’s security discourse on China – that nevertheless the constructions of security can be reconstructed from these documents, as diplomatic language only impacts on how something is said, not what is said.

**Chapter 5** is the first of two empirical chapters. Herein, I will reconstruct the EU’s security discourse regarding China. In the first section of the chapter (5.1.), I will chronologically reconstruct the discourse. I will show that the EU’s security discourse regarding China is primarily discourse corresponding to the liberal and the relational ideal-types of security. The main threats and challenges identified by the EU are the fluidity of the international system after the end of the Cold War and the potential consequences for its leading position in the global economy. Regional stability in East Asia and the internal stability of China were further considered as compromising EU security. The responses to these threats and challenges consist in establishing close and trustful relations with China in order to manage the international (economic) system and to keep it free from protectionist trends, to foster confidence-building and regional integration in East Asia and to contribute to China’s internal stability by assisting it in its transformation and reform processes.

In a second section of this chapter (5.2.), I will check whether these general constructions of security can also be found in more specific issue areas such as the cooperation in the Galileo satellite navigation programme, the arms embargo (both of which were named as proving the change of the EU’s security policy towards China) and the issue of energy security (which is an important issue for the EU, which is, however, largely neglected by the scholarly literature). It can be shown that the EU’s security discourse regarding China follows in all three issue areas the liberal and relational ideal-types of security.

In section 5.3., I will argue with reference to the concept of causal explanation (as developed in chapter 3.2.) that with the analysis of the EU’s discourse we can infer that the EU’s security policy also follows a liberal and a relational security policy regarding China.

**Chapter 6**, the second empirical chapter, is dedicated to explaining the stability of the
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EU’s liberal-relational security policy regarding China. The chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part (6.2.), I will reconstruct the official governmental security discourses of the member states UK, France and Germany, again by means of the ideal-types of security that were developed in chapter 3.3. I will show that the discourses in all three countries correspond to the relational ideal-type of security from the very beginning of the analyzed period to the present day. The UK is a slight exception in that it does not construct its relations with China in terms of security until 1998. But from then on, there is also a relational security discourse when it comes to its relations with China.

In the second part (6.3.), I will reconstruct the constellations of the EU’s, the UK’s, the French and the German security discourses regarding China. Based on the argument of chapter 3.4., I will argue that the reconstructed ideal-types of the constellations of security discourses can in fact explain the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China.

Chapter 7 finally concludes the thesis. I will summarize the findings and discuss the implications of the findings for the research on EU security policy regarding China and in more general terms.

Two further preliminary comments need to be made before finishing the introduction. First, the concept of ‘discourse’ is a vast concept with many different ways of conceptualizing it. One of the central methodological problems of discourse analysis is how to identify a discourse “when you meet one” (Wæver 2004: 206). Identifying, delimiting and specifying the content of a discourse is a difficult task. In order to reconstruct exactly and extensively ‘the’ security discourse of the EU regarding China, one would have to specify its relations to other related concepts such as the EU’s discourses of power, of strategy, of peace, of conflict and so on. Furthermore, one would have to reconstruct how these related discourses are integrated or referred to in the EU’s security discourse. The author of this thesis decided, however, to add the second question of why the EU’s security discourse regarding China remained stable contrary to what has been expected by large parts of the literature. This latter question seemed to be an utmost relevant one. Therefore, elaborating extensively on ‘the’ EU’s security discourse regarding China would have gone beyond the constraints of this thesis. Hence, when I talk about the EU’s security discourse regarding China and the security
discourses of the three member states regarding China, I mean specifically the *discursive constructions* of security regarding China. This means, I solely focus on the specific constructions of security and leave out all the questions of delimiting a discourse and specifying its relations to other related discourses such the above mentioned (power, strategy etc.). The terms ‘security discourse’ and ‘discursive constructions of security’ are therefore used interchangeably.

Second, I will not give any account of the history of EU-China relations or of the EU security policy regarding China pre 1995 as part of this thesis, because such a proceeding would result in telling a story of so-called facts, which, however, are nothing more than an accepted discursive construction of EU security policy regarding China established and constantly reproduced by the scholarly literature. Furthermore, there is no added value of reproducing the so-called facts for my research questions and the responses to them.²

I will now turn to the discussion of the scholarly literature about EU security policy regarding China and the development of my research questions.

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² A good starting point for the engagement with the history of EU-China relations can be found in Algieri 2009 (Algieri 2009: 150-154), Casarini 2006 (Casarini 2006: 9f.) and Edmonds 2002.
The research problem

The initial puzzle that I encountered was the somewhat paradox assessment of Sebastian Bersick, who summarized the criticism that a large part of the literature on EU-China relations levelled against the EU as follows: As a consequence of the close economic cooperation in general and especially in the field of dual-use goods between the EU and China, the EU is *de facto* contributing to the military rise of China and thereby destabilizing the regional balance in East Asia. By destabilizing East Asia, however, the EU is jeopardizing its own economic security as conflicts in its most important export market would heavily impact on the economic well-being of the EU. And the EU does not have any security-political strategy to deal with the consequences of its economic policies (cf. Bersick 2009a: 110f.).

Further engagement with the literature on the EU’s security-political relations with China as well as with the EU’s own strategy papers on security policy regarding China and East Asia has shown two things: First, there is a surprising neglect of the concept of security in the literature on EU-China security-political relations. Hardly ever is the concept of security explicitly addressed and clarified; instead almost always security and security policy are implicitly conceptualized in the traditional, military-centered way. And those authors who do apply the concept of *soft security* implicitly subordinate it to *real* security policy, which is *hard security*. And second, according to the EU’s own strategy papers, the EU is pursuing a security policy regarding China and East Asia. The concept of security that we find in these papers, however, does not fit the usual understandings that we find in the academic discussions and textbooks of security studies. Nevertheless, it seems too important to be neglected and dismissed as mere rhetoric, not least because this understanding remains constant from the first EU policy paper in 1994 to the most recent policy papers, i.e. over a period of 20 years.

The first question that this thesis thus has to tackle is: *What is EU security policy regarding China?* That is to say, how can we best conceptualize and analytically capture the EU’s security policy regarding China?
The answer to this question will not only argue that the EU’s security policy is best labelled as a liberal-relational security policy, but will also show that this security policy regarding China has remained constant for the last 20 years (cf. Renner 2012; cf. Renner 2013). This is surprising because many scholars have observed a change in the EU’s security policy regarding China following the row over the arms embargo in 2005. Hence, the second question that this thesis has to tackle is: Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?

In the following section, I will discuss the neglect of security in the scholarly literature on EU security policy regarding China. Thereafter, I will discuss the consequence of this conceptual neglect in terms of the ambiguity of the verdicts about a change of EU security policy regarding China in the years between 2005 and 2008. In the last section, I will argue that the previous research results of the author of this thesis, according to which there has been no change, is an astonishing result and in need of explanation.

2.1. The neglect of ‘security’ in the literature on EU security policy regarding China

The literature on EU-China relations disagrees on the question whether the EU pursues a security policy regarding China or not. The main dividing line in this body of literature is the implicitly used understanding of what security is: Those authors who conceptualize security as related to threat, violence and military force deny that the policies of the EU towards China are actual security policies while those authors who accept the notion of ‘soft’ security acknowledge that the EU actually pursues a security policy – albeit only in the ‘soft’ areas of security issues. The problem with this whole body of literature is that it neither explicitly applies academic concepts of security to the study of EU security policy nor tries to conceptually capture the nature of what the EU calls ‘security policy’.  

Most authors implicitly apply either a (neo-)realist, military-related understanding of security or an equally underspecified notion of soft security. 

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3 To a certain extent, Oedgaard and Biscop (2007) constitute an exception in so far as they conceptualize the EU’s security approach as laid down in the European Security Strategy within the framework of “global public goods” (GPG). However, as will be pointed out later in this section, they admit that by using the concept of GPG, the meaning of security is broadened in a way that practically everything the EU does could be labeled security policy.
Consequently, the verdicts about the very existence or the nature of an EU security policy regarding China differ accordingly.

For many authors, the EU does not pursue a security policy regarding China due to its lack of military capabilities. Alyson Bailes and Anna Wetter consider the EU-China security relations as a “mismatched” partnership: “[...] the EU itself is more or less the defining case of a ‘soft power’, given the limits on its capacity and even more on its competence in the military field. China, however, is a major conventional and nuclear military power” (Bailes/Wetter 2007: 153f.). Thus, they wonder if “someone is being fooled and someone profiting unduly” and whether or not – in the context of the attempted lift of the EU arms embargo on China – “the EU had been lured by China’s skill at playing the wolf in sheep’s clothing into becoming Beijing’s accomplice in an eminently ‘hard’ field of collaboration” (ibid.: 154). Bailes and Wetter conclude that the EU’s policy towards China in security related issues is an “immature mishmash of selective blindness, wishful thinking, the profit motive, and the sheer lack of resources and will to stand up to Beijing” (ibid.: 158). And for François Godement the EU “is not a strategic partner as such, except to be used as a bargaining chip in China’s relations with the US” (Godement 2006: 56). With its policy of “unconditional engagement”, the EU is thus “ignoring reality” in its relations to China (Fox/Godement 2009: 19f.). Axel Berkofsky consents, saying that the EU – at least in the eyes of China – “does not yet need to be taken seriously as a foreign and security policy actor with the influence and capabilities to threaten Chinese regional security interests” because the EU – in contrast to the US – neither has “defence commitments in the region” nor military troops stationed in East Asia (Berkofsky 2006: 108f.). Sebastian Bersick considers the security-political role of the EU in East Asia to be only marginal (Bersick 2009b: 15): “[...] the EU and its member states have not yet developed a coherent and consolidated position or policy on Asian security. A case in point is Taiwan” (Bersick 2008: 108). Instead, according to Bersick, the EU is dependent on the security-political interests and engagement of the US in East Asia (cf. Bersick 2009a: 110f; cf. Bersick 2009b: 2).

The research problem

Wacker 2010).

Authors, on the other hand, who consider institution-building efforts and soft power capacities as *soft security* instruments acknowledge a – albeit limited to varying degrees – security-political role of the EU in East Asia.

Nicola Casarini acknowledges the EU’s contributions “to peace and security” in East Asia by taking part in and fostering multilateral security efforts via institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) or the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (cf. Casarini 2006; cf. Casarini 2009: 148f.). While Bates Gill (2008) does not see much potential for deeper EU-China cooperation in the field of *hard security*, he observes a positive trend in terms of *soft security* cooperation in fields such as senior security dialogues, military exchanges and basic exercises, energy security and climate change (cf. Gill 2008: 105). And Rosemary Foot (2010) sees the EU as a “serious and substantial actor in the area of non-traditional security” (Foot 2010: 214). Franco Algieri (2005) agrees in this respect, saying that although the EU is far from becoming a military actor in the Asia Pacific region, the “significance of the EU as an international actor with capabilities ranging from soft to hard instruments can be witnessed in a growing number of cases” (Algieri 2005: 59f.). The EU’s approach regarding China and East Asia follows “an overarching conceptual framework” with a strong focus on institution-building (Algieri 2005: 57). Juha Jokela (2009) states that the EU’s Asia strategies, and in particular its China Strategy “all reflect the strategic thinking laid out in the ESS” (Jokela 2009: 41): As a “model-power”, the EU proactively promotes its model of integration and peaceful, rule-based cooperation (ibid.). Sebastian Bersick (2007) consents to the soft power capabilities of the EU with which the latter is able to “mould the international system” towards community building processes in East Asia (Bersick 2007: 23, 29). Therewith the EU’s approach even has a “comparative advantage in dealing with the ‘rise’ of China and East Asia that the USA’s approach […] cannot produce” (Bersick 2007: 230). Thus, as Mikael Mattlin observes, the “broad strategic interest of the EU, identified here as assisting China in becoming an integrated part of global affairs – a stakeholder –, has worked reasonably well” (Mattlin 2009: 119). Although, as he admits, “the influence of the Union and the member states on this development is difficult to quantify” (ibid.).

In line with its assessment of 2006, in his 2010 analysis of the EU’s role in Asian
security, Berkofsky still sees a “very limited or even a ‘non-role’ [of the EU] in Asian hard security” (Berkofsky 2010: 2). He concludes, however, in referring to the EU’s soft power capabilities, that “the EU will continue to remain Asia’s main provider of ‘soft security’ such as food, humanitarian, economic and financial aid, thereby contributing more to Asian regional peace and stability than involvement in Asian security ever could” (Berkofsky 2010: 27).

Berkofsky’s assessment reveals the dilemma of not clarifying the concept of security that is used. What good are ‘hard’ security capabilities if ‘soft’ capabilities could be more effective in achieving peace and stability, that is: in achieving security? The problem of the ‘soft security arguments’ is that these arguments ultimately accept and postulate that ‘real’ security can only be ‘hard’ security, i.e. the concept of security must inherently be tied to notions of threat, violence and military means. Thus, by definition, ‘soft’ security capacities can only be of secondary importance. Berkofsky’s quote illustrates this perfectly when he opposes ‘soft security’ to ‘security’, which unmistakably means ‘real security’.

2.2. The consequences of the conceptual neglect: Ambiguous verdicts about the alleged change of EU security policy regarding China

This conceptual neglect of security has an impact on the discussions about an alleged change of the EU’s security policy regarding China. The contributions to this discussion not only contradict each other, but are sometimes even inherently contradictory themselves.

After the row over the attempted lifting of the EU arms embargo on China (in the years after 2005), many scholars observed a change in the EU’s security-political approach regarding China. The EU policy papers that were published after the row over the arms embargo, namely the European Commission’s communication on China (2006b), the Council’s Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (2007b) and the end of the cooperation in the satellite navigation project Galileo serve as chief evidence in all these argumentations. Some authors, however, struggle to capture the exact nature and extent of this change (cf. Casarini 2009: 14f.,177ff.).

For Bersick, these papers mark a “much more cautious approach” (Bersick 2008: 111;
emphasis added) and eventually a clear “policy change”\(^4\) of the EU regarding China (Bersick 2009b: 25; emphasis added).

May-Britt Stumbaum states that the 2006 Communication of the European Commission shows a “sobering trend” in EU policy making (Stumbaum 2007: 352). What is more, the debate about the lifting of the arms embargo “triggered a rethinking of the EU’s approach to China” (Stumbaum 2007: 352; emphasis added). Nevertheless, she continues, “the prevailing consensus is that China needs to be engaged constructively and integrated as a responsible stakeholder in world affairs” (ibid.; emphasis added).

In a similar manner, David Shambaugh cannot decide on the nature of the change. On the one hand, he argues that the EU documents published after the row over the arms embargo “reflect a change in tone, substance, and approach to China from past precedent”. However, he concludes in the same article that “none of these adjustments have been too wrenching, causing more minor tactical adaptations on both sides” (Shambaugh 2007; emphasis added. For a similar argument see Schucher 2007).

For some authors, the change manifests itself in a realignment of the EU with the US on East Asian security issues (cf. Casarini 2009, 2011; cf. Bersick 2008; cf. Grant/Barysch 2008; cf. Gill 2010). However, while Grant and Barysch ascribe this influence of the US to the fact that the “Bush administration [...] has become progressively softer during its time in office” (Grant/Barysch 2008: 60), Casarini contends that it was the “strong reaction” of the United States that “would eventually lead EU policy makers to reassess their foreign and security policy in East Asia” (Casarini 2009: 175f.).

Nicola Casarini’s (2009) verdict on the alleged change is marked by an inherently contradictory argumentation, based on different theoretical ‘lenses’: He argues that the reason to engage in a strategic partnership with China which included the cooperation in the satellite navigation project Galileo and the plans to lift the arms embargo, was the attempt “by some EU political and corporate leaders, to [...] promote European autonomy in security affairs”, i.e. to engage in “soft balancing” against the US (Casarini 2009: 10f.). This is an argument which at its core draws on realist assumptions. However, following such a balance-of-power logic and the general assumptions of structural realism, only structural changes in the international system – i.e. the distribution of power within the system – may bring about changes in the foreign policy of states (cf. Waltz 1979). Casarini, in contrast, draws on arguments that are actor-specific: According to him, the reasons for the gradual realignment of the EU with the

\(^4\) Original quote in German; own translation.
US between 2005 and 2008 (cf. Casarini 2009: 14f., 176ff.) were changes in the political leadership in some of the large EU member states (particularly Germany and France), the formation of a new (and more pro-American) European Commission headed by Manuel Barroso, […] the accession to the EU of the more Atlanticist Central and Eastern European countries […] , and the emergence of ‘negative’ perceptions about China among European public opinions. (Casarini 2009: 177) 

This theoretically inconsistent argument is picked up again in the confusion about the foreign policy paradigm that the EU is said to pursue: On the one hand, the EU shows a balancing policy towards the US; on the other hand, the EU is allegedly unable to reconcile its “idealist approach […] towards China” with the “realities of a Hobbesian balance of power in East Asia” (Casarini 2009: 15; emphasis added).

To sum up the discussion of the literature so far: The literature on EU-China relations disagrees on the existence of a ‘real’ security policy of the EU towards China and – if there is one – whether it has changed or not. As I have argued, this is due to the lack of conceptual reflection about the very concept of security.

2.3. The continuous stability of EU security policy regarding China in need of explanation

It has just been argued that parts of the literature claim to have observed a change in the EU’s security policy regarding China. The overview of the arguments in favour of such a change has shown that some of the arguments are even inherently contradictory. Previous research of this author has shown – and the detailed analysis in Chapter 5 will underline this assessment – that the EU’s security-political approach regarding China has remained constant from the first policy paper in 1995 to the most recent policy papers (cf. Renner 2012). This is surprising because there are a variety of competing

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5 There seems to be no general consensus about the way how to insert quotes into texts. This thesis therefore follows the Modern Language Association’s (MLA) rules, which prescribe that – among other things – quotes that are longer than four lines are inserted and the space between the lines remains unchanged.
perceptions of China and thus competing visions of what security policy regarding China should look like.

Eberhard Sandschneider, for example, presents such competing perceptions and different ways of “constructing” China:

China holds up a mirror to us. However, we only see what we want to see. Optimists and pessimists oppose each other with seemingly irreconcilable positions. We alternate between enthusiasm and fear, euphoria and consternation. We argue about images of China which always tell more about ourselves than about China itself. However, euphoria and tunnel views are bad prerequisites for a successful dealing with China’s rise. (Sandschneider 2007: 27)

He sketches out four types of positions regarding China in Western discussions: The ‘optimists’ are convinced that China’s rise is unstoppable and that a democratisation of the country is a necessary by-product of the economic development; the ‘pessimists’ predict a collapse of China due to the tremendous inner problems and instabilities; the ‘hawks’ expect China to become an aggressive power provoking military conflicts in East Asia; the ‘doves’, finally, are convinced that a power- and peaceful China will be integrated into the networks of international cooperation (cf. ibid.: 41).

Taking a look at the discussions on the Union-level and in the EU member states, one finds precisely such a variety of competing perceptions of China and thus competing visions of what security policy regarding China should look like.

The European Parliament traditionally is a rather critical observer of China, especially concerning its human rights situation. In Germany, the CDU/CSU-group in the German Bundestag, which was at that time part of the governing grand coalition, published an Asia Strategy in 2007 which was rather critical towards China. The strategy perceives China as a potential adversary with a competing political system and competing political values. It contains a basic uncertainty about China’s future behaviour. The strategy therefore recommends an alignment with the US and its allies on East Asian security. “In security-political terms, China could challenge the US and its allies in

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Asia”\(^7\) (CDU/CSU-group 2007: 5). And it goes on:

With China we witness the emergence of an undemocratic, non-liberal state in the global economic and political system, the emergence of a state that – competing with the West – becomes a model for the development of other states. [...] Thus, China confronts the West more and more with fundamental questions about the desirable political order and presents itself as a model for an alternative political order that challenges the economic and political interests of Germany and the EU beyond the European borders.\(^8\) (ibid.: 7f.)

Any strategy for Asia and China can therefore only be successful “in close coordination with the US” (ibid.: 12). Thus, “we can, together with the US, make sure that the rise of China and other powers in Asia will not lead to a destabilization of this continent which would inescapably have tremendous global consequences” (ibid.: 15f.).

In Britain, too, there have been quite negative perspectives on China, as a look into parliamentary debates shows. During a plenary debate on China, David Atkinson MP, designated China as “the last of the evil empires in the world” (Atkinson 1994) and his colleague, Iain Duncan Smith MP seconded that “one of the biggest problems is that North Korea and China are at the apex of a chain of proliferation” (Smith 1994). One year later, David Winnick MP called China a “notorious police state” against which “appeasement does not pay. It is about time we stopped supporting a notorious tyranny” (Winnick 1995). And finally, as a last example among many others, John Maples called China in a debate on the Strategic Defence Review a “potential adversary” of the UK: “Potential adversaries still include large states with powerful militaries whose future is uncertain, like Russia, or whose intentions are unknown, like China” (Maples 1998).

The security strategies of France and Britain, for example, comprise a variety of understandings of security. The imperatives of globalization and the immense complexity of the current global situation require a variety of political, economic and cultural strategies to achieve security for the nation as well as for a wider collective of

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\(^7\) Own translation of the original text: „Sicherheitpolitisch könnte China die USA und ihre Verbündeten in Asien zukünftig herausfordern.“

\(^8\) Own translation of the original text: „Mit China steigt ein undemokratischer, nicht-liberaler Staat in der weltwirtschaftlichen und weltpolitischen Hierarchie auf, der sich zudem – in Konkurrenz zum Westen – zu einem eigenen ordnungspolitischen Modell für andere Staaten entwickelt. [...] China stellt dem Western damit in zunehmendem Maße die Systemfrage und sieht sich als alternatives politisches Ordnungsmodell, das die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen Deutschlands und der EU außerhalb Europas herausfordert.“

Given these critical perceptions of China that can be found in academic and parliamentary debates as well as the strands of traditional understandings of security in the national security strategies of the UK and France, one would expect that these critical perceptions also impact on the EU’s security discourse regarding China, for example in terms of elements of uncertainty about China’s motives, strategies of (military) containment of China and alignment with the US on security-political issues in (East) Asia.9

It is surprising, however, that despite these critical perceptions the EU’s perspective on China is not characterized by elements of uncertainty, strategies of (military) containment or alignment with US positions on security policy in (East) Asia. To the contrary, it is rather EU security policy with China than towards China: China is seen as a vital partner in addressing the security-political consequences of globalization and thus much effort is put into managing the relationship with China to keep it free from frictions. At some points it is even underlined that if China were to be perceived as a threat, this, in turn, would be the real threat to EU security. China’s internal stability and the stability of the wider East Asian region are also of great concern to the EU. Of course, not because of Samaritan motives, but in order to maintain the EU’s leading role in the world economy by contributing to the stability of one of its most important export markets. And this approach has remained constant over a period of 20 years (cf. Renner 2012). This remarkable fact indeed requires explanation.

The second question that this thesis has to address is thus (as already formulated in the beginning of this section): Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?

In the following chapter, I will develop the theoretical framework for this thesis. I will argue, first, that poststructuralism is particularly suited to address the two research questions. In the second section, I will develop a poststructuralist concept of causal explanation. Following this, I will develop four ideal-types of security in order to

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9 And, if I may add on a personal note, the rapid change of the construction of Russia as an expansionist threat during the first half of the year 2014 underlines this assessment.
reconstruct the EU’s security discourse regarding China and in order to explain the EU’s security policy regarding China. Finally, I will develop two ideal-types of constellations of discourses which account for the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China. A summary of the argument will conclude the theory chapter.
A poststructuralist EU foreign policy theory

3. A poststructuralist EU foreign policy theory

3.1. Poststructuralist discourse theory and EU foreign policy analysis

The foreign policy of the EU – and with it the security policy of the EU understood as a part of its foreign policy – poses a special challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis.

This challenge is both analytical and substantive, in so far as it questions the applicability of the traditional tools and analytical foci of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to the new empirical domain of European foreign policy, claiming that this sphere is *sui generis* and hence in need of a radically new reconceptualization of its subject matter. (Carlsnaes 2004: 1; cf. White 2004: 29)

And indeed, efforts to conceptualize the subject matter are manifold. Brian White (2001) argues that one should differentiate between the national foreign policies of EU member states, EU foreign policy in terms of the (previously) second pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and the EU foreign policy in terms of the mainly economic external relations of the European Commission and subsume it under the label ‘European foreign policy’ (cf. White 2001: 23ff). Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughton in contrast exclude the national foreign policies from EU foreign policy as long as there is not a minimum of interaction with EU mechanisms (cf. Keukeleire/MacNaughton 2008: 29). Hazel Smith underlines the complexity of the EU, its numerous actors (the Council, the Council presidency, the Commission, the civil servants, the Parliament, the European Investment Bank, the member states etc.), the different legal foundations and the different decision-making processes according to the different issue areas (Smith 2002: 17). With her multilevel network approach, Elke Krahman even increases the complexity by analyzing the manifold interactions of public and private actors between the national, transnational and international level (cf. Krahmann 2003). The fact that ‘EU security policy’ is commonly seen as a much
contested concept (cf. Barnutz 2010) does not facilitate the conceptualization of the subject matter. Given such complexity of the subject matter, it comes as no surprise that many works dealing with EU foreign policy are descriptive and historical works (cf. Cameron 2007; cf. Smith 2008) or works focusing solely on the CFSP-side (cf. Smith 2004; cf. Gegout 2010).

Faced with the EU as an actor (cf. Bretherton/Vogler 2006), which is not a state and whose emergence many theoretical approaches struggle to account for, European foreign policy “offers a fundamental challenge to ‘state-centric realism’ as the organizing focus of this [Foreign Policy Analysis] field” (White 2004: 29; insertion by the author). Indeed, core concepts of (neo)realist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches like the ‘state’ or the ‘national interest’ are hardly applicable to the EU as a **sui generis** state-like system. In brief: The “complexity and multidimensionality” of the EU “does not lend itself to a single theory” (ibid.: 23). White therefore states that “an eclectic approach to theory-building is positively desirable” (ibid.: 23). New approaches might have important contributions to make in addressing the various aspects of EU foreign policy (cf. ibid.: 29).

Poststructuralist discourse analysis has indeed important contributions to offer in this respect. As of today, poststructuralist discourse analysis has arrived in the establishment of foreign policy theories – or at least it has made it into a recent textbook on Foreign Policy alongside the classic canon consisting of realism, liberalism and constructivism (cf. Smith et al. 2012). And it is by now also an established approach concerning EU foreign policy in general (cf. Carta/Morin 2014; Diez 2014) as well as concerning specific policies of the EU (cf. Isleyen 2014).

In this thesis, I will make the argument that poststructuralist discourse theory has important contributions to make when it comes to EU security policy and thus is particularly suited to tackle the two research questions of this thesis. It has been shown in the first chapter that there is substantial disagreement about what EU security policy regarding China actually is. The very concept of security and security policy regarding China is underspecified. This disagreement illustrates the importance of conceptual analysis and “the central role such analysis plays in the scientific enterprise” (Guzzini
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2013: 3)\textsuperscript{10} as well as the serious consequences when conceptual analysis is neglected. The implicit underlying assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalist theories about security are part of the problem that I have sketched out in the previous chapter. A poststructuralist approach offers a specific advantage in this case because it allows the researcher to abide by an inescapable requirement for any social scientist: “[...] confronting one’s own language of explanation with that of one’s subject’s self-understanding” (Taylor 1988: 226). It allows reconstructing the discursive constructions of the research object, in this case, the discursive constructions of security regarding China by the EU and its consequences for EU security policy regarding China. It has therefore a greater conceptual openness than the ‘traditional’ approaches and is thus particularly suited to – paraphrasing Carlsnaes – addressing the \textit{sui generis} security policy of a \textit{sui generis} state-like actor.

Furthermore, poststructuralist discourse analysis is not so much concerned with psychological processes, specific decisions and decision making processes, but with the main discursive structures that underpin foreign policy (cf. Hansen 2012: 103ff). The question what EU security policy regarding China actually is, i.e. how it could be conceptualized, requires the reconstruction of the main discursive structures of security policy regarding China. Addressing the second question of the policy’s stability with regard to the relationship of the EU and its member states, poststructuralism offers the advantages of not leading the researcher into the undergrowth of manifold actors, institutions and legal provisions of EU policy making and avoiding the need to ascertain whether specific decisions constitute a change of previous policies. Instead, it enables the researcher to stay at the more general level of meaning construction and thus facilitates a verdict about continuity or change in these constructions. This allows escaping the tendency found in large parts of the literature to organize their research along the lines of legal-institutional structures, i.e. the former pillar structure of the EU. In addition, a poststructuralist approach also allows staying on the level of public texts (instead of the need for background information on how and why certain decisions were \textit{actually} taken). For Wæver, this is a particular methodological strength of poststructuralist discourse theory, because “overall policy must hold a definite relationship to discursive structures, because it is always necessary for policy makers to be able to argue ‘where this takes us’” (Wæver 1998a: 107; cf. Hansen 2012: 106).

\textsuperscript{10} He refers to the complaints of David Baldwin about lacking conceptual analysis.
The particular explanatory poststructuralist approach that Wæver develops, however, is not applicable to EU foreign policy as such – and thus to this thesis – because his approach focuses on the European integration policies of EU member states. He has outlined a discourse analytical foreign policy theory which sets out to explain the European integration policies of EU member states (cf. Wæver 1998a; 2002; 2005). His theory is specifically tailored to address the EU member states’ policies, based on conceptualizations of their identities regarding the ‘we-concepts’ of state, nation and Europe.

Wæver introduces a layered discursive structure. The ‘we-concepts’ of state, nation and Europe take a central role in this layered structure, as these concepts make up the different layers of the structure (2002: 33-42; Wæver 2005: 36f.). The first and deepest layer is the basic conceptual constellation of state and nation. Here, the question is whether state and nation are identical or whether the nation exists without or beyond the state. The second layer is defined by how the state/nation relates to Europe and how Europe is integrated in this ‘we-concept’ of state and nation. Finally, the third layer is the concrete European policies, i.e. what kind of Europe is promoted (confederation, federation, etc.). On the basis of this ‘tree-like structure’ predictions about the European integration policies of member states become possible (Wæver 2002: 32).

It is difficult to imagine how such a model based on ‘we-concepts’ and identities could be applied to EU foreign policy making. Given the fact that it is probably impossible to sketch out a basic identity comparable with Wæver’s state/nation-we-concept for the EU as a whole as a solid basis for further analysis (especially with regard to the Union as well as the member states), a proper foreign policy theory for the EU needs to have another fundament than basic ‘we-concepts’. Several authors have dealt with the various forms of discourses on European identity in a broad sense and have pointed to a variety of different discourses on what the EU is or should be. Ruth Wodak claims that “a single unified identity for Europe should not and cannot be hypostasized in advance. On the contrary, the primary concern is to investigate the formation of different constructions, representations and images of Europe in particular political, historical and cultural contexts” (Wodak 2007: 74). Thomas Diez, for example, reconstructs seven different discourses of Europe, ranging from a liberal-democratic federal state-discourse to a free

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11 The same is true for Neumann’s model of Russian discourse on Europe (Neumann 2004) who also uses three layers of discourse representing basic we concepts (such as state and people), general policy orientations (such as isolation, confrontation) and concrete historical examples of policies (pan-slavism, Bolshevism etc).
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trade area-discourse with different forms of economic and intergovernmental cooperation-discourses in between (cf. Diez 1999: 99-191). Concerning a European identity in the security realm, Felix Ciuta identifies at least two contradictory ‘narratives’: On the one hand, a broad security agenda with a rebuilding of “national identities along the profoundly normative idea of European identity”, on the other hand, the traditional state-centrist understanding of security which sees “European security in terms of Realpolitik, national interests and strategic rationality” (Ciuta 2007: 191). Any meaningful concept of European identity, according to Ciuta, has to make sense of the discursive coexistence of these two views of European security – without, however, taking a definitive decision on more specific contents of the concept of European identity (cf. Ciuta 2007: 193).

In a nutshell, while Wæver’s model points from ‘we’ to a ‘we-related policy’, such an approach seems not possible for an EU foreign policy theory. What is needed, is an approach that points from ‘issue-area-discursive-constructions’ to ‘issue-area-policies’.

In the following sections, I will therefore develop a poststructuralist approach to EU security policy which is based on the discursive construction of security and security policy regarding China by the EU.

3.2. Poststructuralism and causal explanation

The concept of causal explanation in poststructuralist discourse theory is a difficult issue because the notion of causality in poststructuralism is quite controversial (cf. Diez 2013, 2014; Hansen 2006; Wæver 2002). While Lene Hansen rejects the notion of causality, Thomas Diez sees the possibility of constitutive explanations in poststructuralist discourse theory. Ole Wæver, in contrast, has aimed at combining a poststructuralist ontology with a causal epistemology. His model, however, runs the risk of being tautological as well as the risk of being built on an incoherent meta-theoretical basis. Taken together, the works of these authors raise three questions: First, is causal explanation in a poststructuralist setting possible at all? If yes, how can one assure the validity of such a causal claim if there is no way of testing the claims against objective empirical evidence? Second, what does such a causal explanation look like specifically? And third, is it possible in a poststructuralist setting to separate discourse and policy
(which is only accessible via discourse) in a way that a tautological argument can be avoided?

In the following, I will discuss Diez, Hansen and Wæver and develop the three questions. I will respond in the following three sections of this chapter, arguing in section 3.2.1. that causal explanation in poststructural discourse analysis is possible, arguing in section 3.2.2. that this concept of causality is best based on Milija Kurki’s concept of constitutive causality and arguing in section 3.2.3. that discourse and policy can be separated analytically. In section 3.2.4., I will summarize the resulting poststructuralist concept of causal explanation.

For Lene Hansen, a poststructuralist take on science is characterized by “the impossibility of causality” (Hansen 2006: 25). She holds this position for two reasons. First, in poststructuralism, there are no objective, material givens that can cause anything because all materiality is discursively constructed. There is no “‘extra-discursive’ materiality that sets itself forward independently of its discursive representation [...]” (ibid.: 25). And there is “no extra- or non-discursive realm of explanations from which one might construct competing explanations” (ibid.). And second, she points to the traditional position on causality in which cause and effect must be separated ontologically in order for the researcher to be able to observe one independently of the other and to infer causal relations (cf. Hansen 2006: 26). A causal relationship between identity and foreign policy therefore cannot be hypothesized because identity and foreign policy are simultaneously and mutually constituted in discourse:

[...] identities are produced, and reproduced, through foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign policy [...]. Poststructuralists conceptualize identity and policy as ontologically inseparable and this inseparability is enacted through discourse, and they cannot therefore adopt an epistemology documenting the causal effects of identity on foreign policy. (ibid.: 26f.)

For Thomas Diez, the main purpose that poststructuralist approaches to EU foreign policy should serve is not explanatory but critical:
It is [...] the main objective of the discourse analyst not to explain EU foreign policy, but to show how central concepts used in EU foreign policy are actually contested, how the norms reinscribed through foreign policy are the effect of hegemonic practices, and how foreign policy itself is a practice that takes part in discursive struggles, in particular those over identity. (Diez 2014: 32)

He does see, nevertheless, the possibility of explanatory research in discursive approaches to EU foreign policy. He underlines, however, that such a notion of explanation necessitates “a relaxation of the definition of explanation away from its narrow causal-analytical, positivist sense” (ibid.: 28). The strands of poststructuralist literature which engage in explanatory research strategies do so in a “constitutive rather than causal” way (ibid.: 31).

However, at first sight and without further specification, constitutive explanations – at least if understood in the way that Alexander Wendt conceptualizes them – do not easily fit into a poststructuralist framework (cf. Wendt 1998, 1999). According to Wendt, causal and constitutive explanations differ in the kind of questions that they ask; they do not, however, differ in their epistemologies: “Both kinds of theory are true or false in virtue of how well they correspond to the states of the world” (Wendt 1998: 106; cf. Wendt 1999: 85). Such a stance implies an extra-discursive realm from which to judge the trueness or falseness of explanations by objectively assessing their correspondence to ‘the world’ and is thus incompatible with a poststructuralist approach. In fact, Wendt distances himself and his constitutive explanation from post-positivist scholarship which he accuses of not pursuing science but – by rejecting to test the claims against empirical evidence – some sort of “art or revelation” (Wendt 1998: 116).

Nevertheless, the notion of constitutive explanation (in form of an analysis of the dispositions of the objects of study) can prove a fruitful way to engage with explanations in poststructuralism – if there is a way of avoiding the notion of testing the claims against an objectively accessible reality. While Wendt’s distinction between constitutive explanation and causal explanation leaves ‘real’ causality with the positivist, Humean camp, Kurki’s “reclaiming causal analysis” provides a different concept of constitutive causality which is compatible with poststructuralist theorizing (Kurki 2008). She broadens the notion of causality in a way that not only Humean
causality is seen as causal, but also constitutive causality is seen as causal with no less causal quality than its Humean sibling.\footnote{For further discussion of this issue, see chapter 3.2.2.}

Ole Wæver has developed the probably most well-known explanatory discourse-analytical foreign policy theory which aims at explaining the European integration policies of European Union member states (cf. Wæver 1998, 2002). Therefore I will briefly outline Wæver’s theory with a focus on his concept of causal explanation. I will then point to two major shortcomings of this way of introducing causal explanation into a poststructuralist framework. These two points are, first, the unclear meta-theoretical stance of the combination of a poststructuralist ontology and a constructivist epistemology and second, the unclear relationship between discourse and policies.

Wæver’s basic idea in order to ‘explain’ European integration policies of different states is to take the “somewhat unorthodox position of combining on the one hand a view of language and meaning which is more poststructuralist and semiotic than it is constructivist and sociological, and on the other hand striving for an explanatory theory with quite a dose of structuralism” (Wæver 2002: 23). The structural quality of discourses conditions the overall policies that a state or its representatives are able to pursue: “[...] although not every single decision fits the pattern to be expected from the structures used in the analysis, there is sufficient pressure from the structures that policies do turn within a certain, specified margin onto the tracks to be expected” (ibid.: 28). In order to be able to account for changes and continuity of policies at the same time, Wæver introduces a layered discursive structure (as I have just sketched out in the last section). The ‘we-concepts’ of state, nation and Europe take a central role in this layered structure, as they form the different layers of the structure (cf. Wæver 2002: 33-42; cf. Wæver 2005: 36f.). The depth-levels do not imply that the deeper structure is ‘truer’, but that there are “different degrees of sedimentation: the deeper structures are more solidly sedimented and more difficult to politicise and change [...]” (Wæver 2005: 37). The first and deepest layer is the basic conceptual constellation of state and nation. Here, the question is whether state and nation are identical or whether the nation exists without or beyond the state. The second layer is how the state/nation relates to Europe and how Europe is integrated in this ‘we concept’ of state and nation. Finally, the third layer is the concrete European policies, i.e. what kind of Europe is promoted
(confederation, federation, etc.). On the basis of this ‘tree-like structure’ predictions become possible: If there is no pressure on the discursive system, then “rather precise and strong predictions” can be made (Wæver 2002: 32). If, however, there is pressure on the system – for example if internal contradictions increase or external events cannot be accommodated by the logic of the discourse – “one can move one level down and say what other combinations [and thus policies] are possible on the basis of the deeper elements. And if the crisis is tough, then move down one more level” (ibid.: 32). Thus, “soft tests” of predictions based on the analysis of discourses are possible (ibid.: 32).

The first point of criticism to Wæver’s approach is the relationship between a poststructuralist ontology and a constructivist epistemology. Taking a closer look, one finds that the theory is ambiguous in its meta-theoretical commitments. The notion of ‘soft tests’ that are said to be possible in his model indeed suggests that the policies resulting from the discourse are independent from the discourse, if not extra-discursive phenomena. The possibility of an extra-discursive realm, however, seems to imply that there is a quasi objective position of the researcher from which the theoretical predictions can be ‘tested’ against actual policies. Consequently, Wæver’s argument is based – ontologically – on a poststructuralist understanding of language (cf. Wæver 2002: 23), simultaneously, however, on a rather ‘traditional’ constructivist understanding of epistemology, conceptualizing discourse as an independent variable, the impact of which on the dependent variable can be ‘tested’. This would, however, be incompatible with a poststructuralist take of language, as not only the researcher is intertwined in discursive contexts but since the results of the tests themselves can only ‘speak’ to us through their discursive reconstruction.

Hence, from a meta-theoretical point of view, Wæver’s approach is flawed as it mixes up two basic approaches to science which actually cannot be mixed. Following Patrick Jackson (2011), who distinguishes between mind-world dualist and mind-world monist approaches to science, ‘testing’ only makes sense in a mind-world dualist approach, where the gap between mind and world needs to be bridged and where there is need to reassure that the predictions of the theory match with the actual ‘world out there’. A poststructuralist take on language, however, presupposes a mind-world monist approach to science, for reasons that I will spell out further below (see chapters 3.2.1. and 3.2.4.).

A second point of criticism is offered by Diez. He criticizes that Wæver’s variant of
discourse-analytical foreign policy theory has problems “as far as the status of explanation is concerned [...]. Particularly problematic is that the structure of the discourse is derived from the policy articulations that the structure is later supposed to explain. In other words, the model is tautological, if not in theory then at least in its methodological consequences” (Diez 2013: 5; cf. Diez 2014: 31). This is due to the fact that the relationship between discourse and discursive practice is not entirely clear. In his ‘tree-model’ that I have sketched out above, the discursive practice (European policies) is simultaneously a part of the discursive structure – as has already been shown – as well as a result of the deeper discursive structures: “[...] if there is sufficient pressure from the structures that policies do turn within a certain, specified margin onto the tracks to be expected” (Wæver 2002: 28). And a little later: “In a specific political culture, there are certain basic concepts, figures, narratives and codes”. If these codes are “sufficiently inert”, they “put relatively narrow limits on possible policies” and thus “can be seen as ‘causal’ factors in relation to policies” (Wæver 2002: 30).

Therefore the question of the relationship between discursive practices (European policies) and the discourse as a whole arises but is not answered by Wæver. As Diez put it: “Is it [the policy] the product of, but ontologically outside discourse; or is it part of discourse, operating on a different level than state/nation concepts?” (Diez 2001: 12).

This question, whether discourse and policy are mutually constitutive or whether they can at least analytically be separated in order to hypothesize a causal relationship will be addressed further below in chapter 3.2.3.

In the following three sections, I will respond to the three questions that I have mentioned in the beginning of this section and that I have elaborated on in this discussion of the literature.

In order to answer the first question, I will argue in section 3.2.1. that poststructuralism shares its basic meta-theoretical commitments with Jackson’s ideal-typical approach to science, which he calls “Analyticism” (Jackson 2011). Since in Analyticism causal explanations are possible, they should be possible in poststructuralism as well.

In order to respond to the second question, I will further detail the kind of causality that I consider being compatible with poststructuralism in referring to Milija Kurki’s broadening of the concept in section 3.2.2. (cf. Kurki 2008). I will argue that discursive ideal-types can be seen as the material and formal causes of a specific (discursively reconstructed) phenomenon.
In order to respond to the third question, I will argue in section 3.2.3. that it is important to keep in mind that there is a crucial ambiguity of the term ‘discourse’ which concerns the question whether discourse is a ‘thing to be analyzed’ or a ‘way of analyzing things’. This is about whether discourse is about scientific ontology, i.e. the object of research, or whether discourse is about philosophical ontology, i.e. the approach to science and knowledge production. Discourse as object of research can therefore be separated analytically from policy and thus a tautological argument is avoided. Discourse as a way of analyzing things, however, reminds us that both, discourses and policies, can only be analyzed as discursive reconstructions.

In section 3.2.4. I will summarize my poststructuralist concept of causal explanation.

### 3.2.1. Analyticism and the possibility of causal explanation in poststructuralist discourse theory

Patrick Jackson develops four different ideal-types of approaches to (social) science. He distinguishes these approaches along two dimensions: First, the dimension of philosophical ontology, i.e. *the relationship between the researcher and the world*. And second, the dimension of the *kind of knowledge that the researcher has access to* (cf. Jackson 2011).

Philosophical ontology refers to the relationship between the researcher and the world, that is, to our ‘hook up’ to the world. Jackson distinguishes between what he calls ‘mind-world dualism’ and ‘mind-world monism’. The former specifies the relationship between researcher and world in the way that “the objects of study have a more or less determinate essential character that is separate from the researcher’s activity” while the latter specifies this relationship as deeply intertwined in a way that “the process of research in some sense constitutes the object of study *en passant*, in the course of gathering and assembling data” (Jackson 2011: 35). These conceptualizations have implications for the processes of knowledge production: In a mind-world dualist setting, “research has to be directed toward properly crossing that gap, and valid knowledge...”

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13 I guess the accusation of running the risk of being ‘idealistic’ cannot be countered too often in this context. As Jackson puts it: “[...] mind-world monism is no more ‘idealistic’ (in the sense of privileging ideas about the world) than mind-world dualism is ‘realist’ (in the sense of privileging the world); it is not the privileging of one or the other side of a mind-world dichotomy that makes a position monistic, but the rejection of the very distinction in the first place” (Jackson 2011: 36).
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must in the end be related to some sort of accurate correspondence between empirical and theoretical propositions on the one hand and the actual character of a mind-independent world on the other” (ibid.). In a mind-world monist setting, “the researcher is a part of the world in such a way that speaking of ‘the world’ as divorced from the activities of making sense of the world is literally nonsensical” (ibid.: 35f.). Knowledge claims are based on “a disciplined ordering of the facts of experience” in order to generate useful or plausible accounts of these facts (ibid.: 114).

Jackson combines this distinction between mind-world dualism and mind-world monism with a second dimension concerning the type of knowledge about the world. That is either super-empirical, transcendental knowledge or knowledge that is confined to the empirical, observable and experimental sphere (Jackson 2011: 35). He calls the former understanding ‘transfactualism’ and the latter one ‘phenomenalism’ (ibid.: 36).

The result of the combination of the two dimensions is four ideal-typical philosophical-ontological commitments or approaches to (social) science. The approach that combines mind-world dualism and phenomenalism he calls ‘Neopositivism’. This approach represents the ‘standard’ approach to social sciences which aims at testing and confirming (or falsifying) law-like hypothesis. ‘Critical Realism’, which is the approach signified by the combination of mind-world dualism and transfactualism, regards “knowledge-claims as attempts to approximate the mind-independent world by disclosing the deep dispositional properties of the objects within it and regard our knowledge to be the best current approximation that we have” (ibid.: 198). The combination of mind-world monism and transfactualism is called ‘Reflexivity’. From this perspective, “knowledge is also instrumentally valuable, but only insofar as it provokes greater self-awareness and self-reflection on the part of the producers and consumers of such knowledge; from this follows the notion that the validation of a knowledge claim start out, of necessity, with the theorizing of the social conditions of its own production” (ibid.: 198). And finally, the combination of the mind-world monist philosophical ontology and a scientific ontology that limits itself to “things that can be experienced and empirically observed” results in an approach to scientific research that Jackson labels ‘Analyticism’ (Jackson 2011: 36). In this understanding, ideal-typical accounts of causal factors, processes and mechanisms are used to form an analytical narrative. Knowledge is understood as a useful account of the empirical world (cf. Jackson 2011: 198f.).

Jackson underlines that there is no reason to privilege one approach over the others,
because the philosophical-ontological commitments are arbitrary decisions. Once a decision is made, however, it does have consequences for the way knowledge is generated, i.e. for epistemological questions (for example: It would not make sense at all to test anything against an independently existing world in a mind-world monist approach).

I will now compare Analyticism and poststructuralist discourse theory and show that they share their basic meta-theoretical commitments.

### 3.2.1.1. Analyticism

Jackson chooses the designation ‘Analyticism’ to point out the connection of this approach with “the tradition of analytical philosophy out of which some of the most important monist and phenomenalist thinkers (especially those focusing on language-in-use, following broadly in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein) come”\(^{14}\) (Jackson 2011: 142). As already mentioned, the basic meta-theoretical commitments of this approach are a mind-world monist stance and the restriction of knowledge on empirically observable phenomena. This has consequences for the conduct of scientific inquiry and the kind of causal claims.

The researcher in an analyticist understanding does not stand outside the world that he or she is studying and thus cannot objectively describe or record or explain what is going on there. Instead, the researcher is inextricably tied to the world that he or she is studying. As Jackson puts it:

> [...] the researcher is part of the world in such a way that speaking of ‘the world’ as divorced from the activities of making sense of the world is literally nonsensical: ‘world’ is endogenous to social practices of knowledge-production, including (but not limited to) scholarly practices and hence scholarly knowledge-production is in no sense a simple description or recording of already existing stable worldly objects. (ibid.: 35f.)

This is not to say that the mind-world monist position of the Analyticist approach

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\(^{14}\) While Jackson chooses the designation ‘Analyticism’ for his ideal-typical approach to science in order to point out the connection to the tradition of analytical philosophy, this ideal-type is not to be confused with the latter. Analytical philosophy is an umbrella term for a variety of philosophical traditions, comprising – for example – the mathematical-logical works of Wittgenstein and Russell, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle or the philosophy of language (‘linguistic turn’) (cf. Störig 2004: 768-774).
privileges the ‘mind side’ over the materially constituted ‘world side’; the point is that the mind-world dichotomy is rejected as such in the first place. This has as consequence that “the process of research in some sense constitutes the object of study en passant, in the course of gathering and assembling data” (ibid.: 35). Therefore, the ‘usual’ scientific procedure of deriving hypotheses from laws or theories and then testing them against empirical data (and, in the end, finding general laws) is not a valid method in this understanding. Instead, the notions of ideal-types and singular causal analyses are crucial. According to Jackson, Analyticists are not bound to the kind of covariation-causality that emerges from neopositivist commitments, since for analyticists there simply is no need to distinguish between systematic causal relations characteristic of the external world and idiosyncratic relations characteristic of the accidents of specific cases. For analyticists, it is simply meaningless to speak of ‘the external world’ in the first place. So analyticists offer the notion of ‘singular causal analysis’, wherein scientific researchers trace and map how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific outcomes in particular cases. (ibid.: 114)

Ideal-types within these singular causal analyses help “to organize the empirical material of specific cases into a coherent story that differentiates between analytically general and case-specific factors responsible for bringing about an outcome and details their sequential interaction and concatenation over the time frame of the analysis” (ibid.: 154). Therefore, for each specific case, the researcher needs to identify the ‘adequate’ and the ‘coincidental’ causes of the effect. Adequate causes are those causes without which we cannot imagine the outcome having occurred. Coincidental causes are unique, idiosyncratic factors which are important for the outcome in a particular situation but which are not part of an adequate causal configuration (ibid.: 149; cf. Weber 1988b: 286ff.). I will come back to adequate and coincidental causes again later in the discussion when I discuss Kurki’s concept of causality.

Ideal-types are deliberate oversimplifications of phenomena and processes and thus are a means to comprehend what happened in a particular case. They are analytical constructs which are formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view
and through bringing together a great many diffuse and discrete, more or less present
and occasionally absent concrete individual events which are arranged according to
these emphatically one-sided points of view (Jackson 2011: 143; cf. Diez 1999: 63-66;

For this reason (i.e. their analytical nature), ideal-types cannot be tested against
‘empirical evidence’ to see whether they are ‘true’ or not. The validity and usefulness of
ideal-types is revealed by their successful (or unsuccessful) accomplishment of the
pragmatic explanatory goals for which they were crafted (cf. Jackson 2011: 143). Or as
Weber put it: “Indeed, whether they are pure intellectual game or a valuable scientific
instrument cannot be decided a priori; there is only one criterion: the success for the
comprehension of specific phenomena in their specific contexts, their causal condition
and their wider meaning”\(^\text{15}\) (Weber 1988a: 193). Or as Jackson put it: Ideal-types thus
serve to order the facts of our experience and the only way to evaluate the usefulness of
an ideal-type is to examine whether the ideal-type is “efficacious in revealing intriguing
and useful things about the objects to which it is applied” (Jackson 2011: 146).

To sum up: The key point is that knowledge production – i.e. explanation – in the
Analyticist understanding utilizes ideal-types and singular causal analyses to form a “set
of analytical claims, which ground the subsequent empirical account and so are never
exposed to any sort of ‘testing’ within it, [and] provide the framework and the
vocabulary for constructing a deliberately and explicitly non-representational case-
specific narrative” (Jackson 2011: 152).

\[3.2.1.2. \quad \textbf{Poststructuralism and Analyticism}\]

Poststructuralism shares with Analyticism two meta-theoretical commitments, which are
the mind-world monist stance and the focus on observable phenomena, the latter of
which in the case of poststructuralism is language and the different ways that
phenomena are constructed in language. “To poststructuralism”, Hansen states,
“language is ontologically significant: it is only through the construction in language
that ‘things’ – objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material structures – are given
meaning and endowed with a particular identity” (Hansen 2006: 18). Language,
therefore, cannot be a neutral or “transparent tool functioning as a medium for the
registration of data” of ‘reality’ because there is no ‘objective’ or ‘true’ meaning beyond

\(^{15}\) Own translation of the original German text.
the linguistic representation to which one can refer (Hansen 2006: 18). Thus language
Discourse in this understanding is a system of linguistic practices or statements which
bring into being the objects that are the basis for human action (cf. ibid.: 43; cf. Wæver
2002: 29). Due to the ontological significance of language, discourses are not merely
ideational or idealist constructs, but do have a material character (cf. Hansen 2006: 43).
“The power of discourse thus is a definitional power. Trying to escape discourse would
mean to be unable to speak or act” (Diez 1999: 43).
This means that we (as researchers) cannot perceive reality outside of discourses
because we ourselves are inextricably intertwined in discourses; this does not mean that
no ‘reality’ outside of discourses exists – however, it means that we do not have access
to it, only to its representations and reconstructions in discourses (cf. ibid.: 43). This is
what Diez called “epistemological constructivism”16 (ibid.: 39).
Such an ontological position impacts on epistemological questions and on the role of the
researcher. The mind-world monist commitment is expressed in the assumption that
there is no ‘objective’ point of observation for the researcher, therefore she or he has no
‘objective’ access to the ‘real world’ but is intertwined in discourses. Consequently,
discourses cannot be treated as ‘reality’ which is to be studied by the researcher (cf.
ibid.: 51). The discourses that the researcher sets out to analyze are themselves (re-)
constructions. In this context, Thomas Diez refers to Niklas Luhmann’s
conceptualization of observations as active “operations of distinguishing and naming”17
(ibid.: 52). Observing thus becomes an active practice, the practice of (re-)constructing.
Quoting Luhmann, Diez goes on: “Observation changes the world that is being
observed”18 (ibid.: 52; quoted from Luhmann 1990: 73-75, 82).
The production of knowledge therefore cannot be subject to testing hypotheses or
theories against an external reality. Knowledge is being evaluated against its usefulness
in a specific context and can only be evaluated by its plausibility in this context (cf.
Diez 1999: 51f.).

Summing up, Analyticism and Poststructuralism share the phenomenalist focus on the
empirical and experiential sphere, which in the case of poststructuralism means the

16 Own translation of the German text: Erkenntnistheoretischer Konstruktivismus.
17 Own translation of the German text: Operationen des Unterscheidens und Bezeichnens.
18 Own translation of the German text: Luhmann insistierte, daß das Beobachten die Welt in der beobachtet
wird, verändert.
sphere of language and the discursive constructions of empirical phenomena (cf. ibid.: 42; cf. Hansen 2006: 18). They also share the mind-world monist stance: While for Jackson “the production of knowledge is itself also and simultaneously productive of the world” (Jackson 2011: 114), for poststructuralists “every theory is simultaneously a socio-political practice because it is not outside of the world and thus not describing the world ‘objectively’ but because it is tied into a discursive context and reproduces specific reconstructions of reality” (Diez 1999: 41; cf. Hansen 2006: 18ff). Based on these commitments, the general feature of knowledge production in both approaches is quite similar.

3.2.2. A broader concept of causality

Kurki’s point of departure for her ‘reclaiming of causal analysis’ is the finding that although the division of IR as a discipline between the so-called rationalist and the reflectivist camp (or between causal and constitutive theorizing respectively) is of great importance for the self-image of the field, one of the basic distinguishing features, the concept of causality, is hardly ever discussed in detail (cf. Kurki 2008: 5f.). Both, the proponents of the rationalist approaches, who see causality as one of the crucial features of science, as well as the reflectivists, who reject such a mechanical ‘if A then B’ causality, refer implicitly to a Humean understanding of causality (cf. ibid.: 88-144). Therefore, her basic argument concerning a broader understanding of causality is that the ‘constitutive’ theorizing of reflectivist scholars is actually a form of ‘real’ causal theorizing – a fact that is just obscured by the unquestioned dominance of the Humean concept of causality (cf. Kurki 2006: 190).

This Humean understanding of causality rests on four key assumptions. First, causes are tied to regular successions of perceptions and events: “Beyond regular successions of perceived events or occurrences there is no meaning to the notion of cause” (ibid.: 36). These regularities, secondly, are tied to observable objects. Given Hume’s empiricist philosophy, knowledge – and thus causal claims – is only possible about ‘observables’ (cf. ibid.: 36f.). Third, Humean causality is characterized by what Kurki calls “regularity-determinism” (ibid.: 38). This involves, firstly, that all reference to an ontological nature of causes is avoided, as the ontological nature of phenomena is not empirically accessible. According to Hume, all we can observe are regular conjunctions
of objects or events, but we can never comprehend any deeper (or even ontological) connection between them (cf. Hume 1975: 70). Instead, the causal connection between A and B can only be a (psycho)logical connection, i.e. that there is no ontological-necessary connection, but only a connection of the imaginations or perceptions of these two phenomena (cf. Kurki 2008: 37f.). “When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s existence” (Hume 1975: 76). Based on the regular experience of such conjunctures, one may infer a notion of cause and connection (cf. ibid.: 78). “Basing analysis of causal relations on relations of regularities, we can make causal claims of the form ‘given that regularities connect type A and type B events, we have the basis for assuming when A, then B’” (Kurki 2008: 38). This assumption forms the basis for the predictive capacities of causality: “Given regularities we can logically deduce, or predict, a given event, even if only probabilistically” (ibid.: 38). And fourth and finally, Humean causation relies on the notion of ‘efficient’ causes, i.e. an understanding of causes as extrinsic, object-independent forces that impact on an object by ‘pushing’ or ‘pulling’ it (cf. ibid.: 38). Efficient causes in a positivist understanding are conceptualized as being independent from their effects, as preceding the effects in time and as absolutely necessary for the effects to occur (cf. Wendt 1998: 105).

In short, this understanding of causality thus rests on the assumption that causal claims can only be made on the basis of observable empirical regularities, which are the basis for predictions (at least probabilistic ones). And causes are conceptualized as efficient causes. As such, according to Kurki, it is the dominant and undisputed basis of rationalist, positivist theorizing in contemporary IR (ibid.: 122).

However, even the reflectivist theorists are part of this “Humean problem-field” in that it is their rejection of causal analysis as such (which is, however, only the Humean understanding of causality) that reinforces the influence of the Humean discourse of causation in IR (ibid.: 190). “This is because when they reject causal analysis, they reject it on the basis of having accepted, often inadvertently, core Humean assumptions regarding the nature of causation” (ibid.: 124f.). The consequences are that reflectivists do not elaborate on alternative understandings of causality but resort to a ‘constitutive’ terminology which supposedly is non-causal and thus does not challenge the Humean understanding, but reifies it (ibid.: 142 ff).
To remedy this situation and to provide the field of IR with an alternative understanding of causality, Kurki sets out to deepen and broaden the concept of causality. ‘Deepening’ the concept of causes refers, first, to an ontological grounding of causes, i.e. to ground them in the nature of objects “through making existential claims about their constituting structures and causal powers [...]” (Kurki 2008: 198). Secondly, it refers to accounting for the role of unobservables, such as ideas, reasons and discourses as in contrast to the positivist-empiricist restriction on observable patterns of behaviour.\(^2\) And thirdly, it refers to the ontological significance of social structures as ‘real’ and ‘causal’ phenomena (cf. ibid.: 210). From a poststructuralist perspective, grounded in Jackson’s analyticist approach which is – as I have outlined above – based on phenomenalism (i.e. the restriction of knowledge to in principle observable objects), ontological grounding of phenomena (causes or structures) beyond language or reference to unobservable phenomena is not possible.

However, the ‘broadening’ of the concept of causes seems very fruitful to a poststructuralist approach. Kurki argues that Aristotle’s four-fold typology of causes is a useful conceptual approach to specify the way in which different aspects of the world can be seen as causal (cf. ibid.: 219). Aristotle distinguishes between material, formal, efficient and final causes and these causes ‘cause’ in different ways. While efficient and final causes are considered as extrinsic or active causes, material and formal causes are considered as intrinsic or constitutive causes.

Efficient causes refer to the extrinsic sources of change, “to the setting in motion of the potential of a patient” (ibid.: 222). In contrast to material and formal causes, they are not part of the outcomes they produce, but are external to them.

Final causes refer to “the ends and purposes ‘for the sake of which a thing is’” and can be understood as the “purposive goals that direct ‘mechanistic’ processes” (ibid.: 222).

Material causes point to “the material basis from which things arise” (ibid.: 221). Kurki here refers to both, so-called prime matter, which is the basis for the very existence of any object as well as to so-called secondary matter, which is substance that has already taken a specific form, “such as wood or a gun” (ibid.). Nevertheless, depending on the

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\(^2\) The reason why Milija Kurki refers to discourses as unobservables whereas for a poststructuralist, discourses are the only thing he or she can really ‘observe’ lies in the location of these two on different sides of the question of mind-world dualism or monism. From a mind-world dualist perspective (and as a ‘critical realist’ as what Kurki would most probably consider herself) we can directly access the empirical world of facts and behaviour. Ideas, meaning and discourses seem rather unobservable. From a poststructuralist mind-world monist perspective, however, the world of fact and behaviour is not accessible as such but only mediated through its discursive construction. Therefore, discourses are the only things poststructuralists have access to and the discursive reconstructions they work with are pretty observable – or at least reconstructable.
circumstances and the research focus, wood can be considered to be the material cause of a wooden table and a gun can be considered as the material cause of a specific murder. In the context of a poststructural analysis, such a concept of material causes seems problematic, as poststructuralist researchers do not have direct access to the materiality of the ‘real’ world. However, bearing in mind the ontological significance of discourses for poststructuralists, I argue that language and discourses can be considered as material causes in a poststructuralist setting. I will come back to this argument later on in chapter 3.2.4.

Finally, formal causes “refer to what Aristotle conceptualized as that which shapes or defines matter” (ibid.: 221). To stick with the example above, wood can take on manifold forms and in order to form a table, the material basis has to be put in a specific form and table legs and tabletop have to be there in a specific number and relation to each other.

These last two causes constitute – or cause – things by defining meanings and relations, by constraining and enabling specific outcomes. For Aristotle, these four types of causes – although analytically separable – always work together and in relation to each other (cf. ibid.: 222). This may be illustrated with the example of building a house: The efficient cause of the house is the labour of the workmen, the final cause of the house is the purposes of the individuals having it built, the material cause is the bricks, glass, steel and mortar of which it is made and the formal cause is the blueprint which specifies how the material is to be arranged.\textsuperscript{20}

Kurki argues that in order to be able to account for different phenomena, one needs to take into account all four types of causes. Therefore, giving up the narrow Humean understanding of causality with its focus on efficient causes as the \textit{only} form of causality and instead accepting material, formal, efficient and final causes as equally causal, helps us to overcome the causal-constitutive divide in IR (cf. Kurki: 234) as well as provides us with a broader understanding of causality. We can speak of a Humean (or efficient) causality, a final causality and a constitutive causality (i.e. material and formal causality), all of which are equally causal.

In this way, the concept of constitutive causality developed by Kurki differs from Wendt’s constitutive explanation in that Kurki introduces different \textit{kinds} of causes, whereas Wendt only distinguishes causal and constitutive explanations by the kind of

\textsuperscript{20} See Wendt (2003: 495), who gives this example in his article on “Why a world state is inevitable” in which he introduces the fourfold typology of Aristotelian causes, in which, however, he only further elaborates on the final cause.
questions they ask but remains caught in a Humean understanding of causality (cf. Wendt 1998: 103).\(^{21}\)

In one of his ideal-typical approaches to science, Analyticism, Jackson conceptualizes causes in a similar way. He uses the terminology of “adequate” and “coincidental” causes (Jackson 2011: 149). Jackson conceptualizes adequate causes as causes without which we cannot imagine the outcome having occurred. And coincidental causes are conceptualized as the unique, idiosyncratic causes which are important for the outcome of a particular situation (see chapter 3.2.1.1.). Applied to a discourse-analytical setting, Jackson proposes to conceptualize the “basic discourses that are implicated in a given situation” as the adequate causes and the particular deployments and mobilizations that link identity and policy, i.e. the important, but single-case-specific factors, as the coincidental causes (Jackson 2011: 232). Unfortunately, he does not further elaborate on this argument.

Comparing Kurki’s material and formal causes with Jackson’s adequate and coincidental causes, one finds that they are conceptualized in a very similar way as the material basis of an outcome (adequate and material causes respectively) and as the specific characteristics which impact on the specific particularities of the outcome (coincidental and formal causes respectively). Therefore, parallel to Jackson’s adequate and coincidental causes in an Analyticist framework, I will conceptualize the presence of a discursive construction of a phenomenon as the material causes and the specific discursive constructions of a phenomenon as its formal causes. I will further elaborate on this in chapter 3.2.4. when I present the poststructuralist concept of causal explanation.

Summing up: Kurki’s broadening of causality provides us with a concept of constitutive causality (i.e. material and formal causes) which is of no less causal quality than Humean causality and which is compatible with poststructuralist theorizing.

\(^{21}\) And Wendt’s concept of causal ‘why’ questions and constitutive ‘how possible’ questions easily ends up in mere semantics as the examples that he gives show (cf. Wendt 1998: 104). To give just one example: assumed that the answer to the causal ‘why’ question “why does the sun rise in the East?” (ibid.: 104) is because of the constellations of the earth and the sun and the respective rotations of the two, the why question does not fulfill the criteria for causal questions which are “1) that X and Y exist independent from each other, 2) that X precedes Y in time, and 2) that but for X, Y would not have occurred” (ibid.: 105). Obviously the constellation of the earth and the sun and their rotations are not independent from the fact that the sun rises in the East and the constellation certainly does not precede the sunrise.
3.2.3. Analytical separation of discourse and policy

Discussing the issue of a separation of discourse and policy, it is of great importance to recall that in a poststructuralist discourse-analytical approach, discourse has two meanings. First, discourse designates the scientific ontology, i.e. the research object. Discourse in this understanding can be easily separated from policy in conceptual terms (empirically, however, this may not always be that easy). Second, discourse designates a specific way of analyzing things. In the words of Patrick Jackson,\textsuperscript{22} it designates the philosophical ontology, which means the relationship between the researcher and the world and thus the possibilities and ways of analyzing the world.

In the first understanding – discourse as a research object – discourse can be defined as consisting of two sides: First, the contextual side, in which the relationships between the different meanings of the different discursively constructed phenomena are defined (structures of meaning). And second, the articulatory side, in which these contextual relations are articulated. The relationship between both sides is conceptualized as co-constitutive: Context impacts on the articulations and the articulations impact on the context, thus discourse is never stable but constantly subject to change. As Diez writes: “The relationship between discourse, if by discourse is meant the context in which an articulation occurs, and policy articulation is [...] a mutually constitutive one. It is thus appropriate to say that discourses inform articulations, and that articulations reproduce discourses [...] but this is not a causal relationship in the positivist sense” (Diez 2013: 6; cf. Diez 2014: 29). The core problem for the establishment of a causal relationship (even if ‘only’ constitutively causal) arises, when articulations are conceptualized as both, articulations in the form of verbal and textual utterances as well as policy articulations. Then, the tautology is unavoidable: In order to reconstruct the contextual side of the discourse, one needs to analyze the articulatory side – which, however, is to be explained by the contextual structures. Therefore, we tend to end up in a tautological argument.

This understanding of discourse can be visualized like this:

\textsuperscript{22} In his role as informal discussant on the ISA panel “Fear No More: Clearing the Ground for Discourse and Practice in IR and FPA”, 55\textsuperscript{th} ISA Annual Convention, Toronto, 26-29 March 2014.
The solution to this problem is the separation of discourse (understood as context and its articulations) on the one hand and policies on the other hand. In order to make meaningful statements about the impact of discourse on policies (or, in a different research context, of policies on discourse), policy needs to be thought of as analytically distinct from articulations. Articulations, for the purposes of this thesis, are conceptualized as verbal or textual utterances accessible through documents, speeches and so on, i.e. expressions in language. Policies, for the purposes of this thesis, are conceptualized as deeds, practices, something executed, such as invasions or air strikes after a declaration of war (or – as it is common nowadays – without a declaration of war), the (re-)establishment of temporary border controls in Europe or the rocketing into the orbit of the European Galileo satellites with Chinese parts in them.23
Of course, sometimes a policy may consist in repeated articulations and sometimes a mere articulation may have an impact comparable to the invasion of a foreign country (one may think of the announcements of the rating agencies concerning the credit-worthiness of states). This is, however, more an empirical problem and not a conceptual problem and for many cases the difference between an articulation and an executed policy should not be too difficult to make. Therefore, in conceptual terms as well as for the majority of empirical cases, this distinction should work. The analytical separation of discourse and policy can be visualized like this:

23 They have the same ‘quality of existence’ as earthquakes or a falling brick (cf. Laclau/Mouffe 1985).
Figure 3.2.: Analytical separation of discourse and policy

Once executed, policies (invasions, border controls, orbited satellites) are reconstructed by many different discourses by being articulated in a discourse-specific manner. In fact, as has been underlined before, policies can only be accessed by their reconstructions in language. When the American boots were on the ground in Iraq in 2003, this policy had been reconstructed at least in three different ways: By the US and their allies as the liberation of the Iraqi people from a cruel dictator, who threatened the world with his weapons of mass destruction; by many Europeans as an irresponsible breach of international law with unforeseen consequences for the country and the region; and by many Muslim Arabs as yet another invasion of Arab land by godless infidels. Or the ‘fact’ that there are Chinese parts onboard the Galileo satellites may be reconstructed by official EU discourse as the accomplishment of a long-term successful and trustful cooperation in a landmark project with China, while (factions of) the European Parliament may reconstruct this ‘fact’ as partly dangerous as China might exploit this project for its own purposes (as one might suspect Chinese espionage or the like).

Not making the distinction between policies and articulations would therefore mean to ignore the manifold ways in which one specific phenomenon can be reconstructed in different discourses.
Policies being reconstructed by different discourses simultaneously can be visualized like this:

**Figure 3.3.: Policies as being reconstructed by different discourses**

Now, turning to the understanding of discourse as a way of analyzing things (philosophical ontology), we have to be aware that the only thing a discourse analyst has access to is language and thus only the discursive constructions of worldly phenomena (discourses, policies etc.). The only way to reconstruct these discursive constructions is via their articulations in language (verbal utterances in speeches, documents etc.). This is true for discourses (as research objects) as well as for policies. Policies, too, can only be reconstructed by their articulations in the different discourses which reconstruct them.

The danger of a tautological argument is thus avoided by separating discourse (as a research object) from policies and by conceptualizing *policies as being partly independent of one single discourse and simultaneously reconstructed by a number of different discourses*. Therefore, policies can be reconstructed by means of the respective
articulations of different discourses and are thus not only reconstructed by the articulations of the discourse which is supposed to explain them. Therefore, methodologically, too, a tautological argument can be circumvented by drawing on the articulations of different discourses when reconstructing policies. For this thesis, the question of how exactly one reconstructs policies by means of articulations of different discourses is not important. What is important, however, is that discourses can be considered as causes of policies. That is to say, when we can reconstruct a discourse, we can assume that policies follow these discursive constructions at least in general terms. This does not mean that in every instance every decision will be in line with the discursive construction, but that we can assume that the general lines of the policy are in accordance with the discursive construction.24

3.2.4. A poststructuralist concept of causal explanation

The discussion of the meta-theoretical commitments of both Jackson’s Analyticism and poststructuralist discourse theory has shown that causal explanation is possible in a poststructuralist discourse-analytical approach. Referring to Kurki’s broadened concept of causality, I have argued that discourses and ideal-types of discourses can be considered as material and formal causes of policies. Finally, by separating discourse and policy, I have shown that tautological arguments can be avoided. We can conceptualize causal explanation in a poststructuralist framework in a nutshell as follows: The very fact of a discursive construction of a phenomenon can be considered to be the material cause. Discursive ideal-types can be considered as formal causes of a given (discursively reconstructed) phenomenon (policy or other).

Discursive ideal-types understood as deliberately oversimplified and one-sidedly accentuated reconstructions of discourses play a crucial role in this concept of causal explanation. Diez has introduced ideal-types into discourse-analytical theorizing in order to “read” the different debates in the UK about European integration against this background (Diez 1999: 63-66). In order to make a causal argument, however,

24 The results of my argument are thus very similar to Wæver’s ‘tree model’ (2002) in as much as we say that discourses cause the general lines of policies. However, the basis and the development of the two arguments are quite different. I argue that my variant of the argument solves the major criticisms that have been raised against Wæver’s model.
discursive ideal-types need to be put into singular causal analyses which help to “trace and map how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific outcomes in particular cases” (Jackson 2011: 114). Relating discursive ideal-types to Kurki’s concept of causality, they can be conceived of as formal causes in so far as these ideal-types specify the meanings and the relations of discursive phenomena. Language itself and the fact that something is discursively constructed can be conceived of as material causes. To illustrate this by an example: Unicorns did not play any role in the decision of the US to invade Iraq in 2003. Why? Because unicorns were not discursively constructed (and thus were no material cause) as a threat to US national security (and thus were no formal cause). In contrast, Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction most probably existed as much as unicorns do. However, these weapons were discursively constructed (material cause) and presented as a serious threat to US security (formal cause), thus being one formal cause for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The ‘particular configurations’ of the singular causal analyses are thus the particular configurations of discursive ideal-types as material and formal causes.

Kurki’s concept of constitutive causality (comprised of the material and formal causes) exceeds the concept of constitutive explanation proposed by Wendt in as much as Kurki’s concept goes beyond the (often mere semantic) difference between the types of questions asked (‘why’ and ‘how possible’) as well as beyond an explanation by concept which stands in contrast to ‘real’ causal, i.e. Humean, explanation (cf. Wendt 1998: 111). Instead, she introduces a typology of causes which are equally causal and thereby overcomes the narrowness of the Humean understanding of causality in which the Wendtian conceptualization of causality and explanation is still enrooted.

To make the status of discursive ideal-types and their causal power clear: Poststructuralist discourse analysts do not reject the idea of a reality existing outside of discourse (cf. Diez 1999: 35ff; cf. Hansen 2006: 21ff). They do claim, however, that the discursive constructions of worldly phenomena are the only things we have access to – and this only by reconstructing these discursive constructions.25 Ideal-types in a poststructuralist setting cannot be used in order to ‘measure’ reality against them and see where reality departs from the constructions. Instead, the discursive ideal-types that

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25 At this point it is necessary to recall the previous point that in a poststructuralist, mind-world monist approach, observing is a practice of (re)construction (Diez 1999: 52; quoted from Luhmann 1990: 73-75, 82).
are constructed in this thesis (chapter 3.3.) claim to capture the important aspects of the discourses ‘out there’ and thereby try to help to make sense of the impact of the discourses in terms of the resulting policies (or, as will be argued in chapter 3.4.), of the resulting effects on other phenomena such as the stability of a specific discourse). In this sense, discursive ideal-types are conceived of as material and formal causes.

Based on such a concept of causal explanation, we can respond to the first research question *What is EU security policy regarding China?* by reconstructing the EU’s security discourse regarding China. As we can assume that the EU’s security policy is materially and formally caused by this discursive construction, we can assume that the general lines of the policy are in accordance with the discursive construction. We can also respond to the second research question of *Why has this policy remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?*. Taking Maarten Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions, which states that coalitions of discourses can stabilize a given discourse, as a starting point, I will argue in chapter 3.4.2. that the ideal-typified constellations of the discursive constructions of security policy regarding China between the Union level and the level of the member states can be conceived of as the particular configurations of ideal-typified factors that materially and formally cause the stability of the Union level discourse.

### 3.2.5. Conclusion

The concept of causal explanation that has been developed in this chapter responds to the questions raised at the beginning of the chapter in the discussions of Lene Hansen’s, Thomas Diez’ and Ole Wæver’s concerns with or against causality in poststructuralism. In contrast to Wæver’s way of integrating a causal argument into a poststructuralist framework, I provided a coherent meta-theoretical ground and I clearly separated discourse from policy in order to allow for causal relations without running the risk of a tautological argument. While I fully agree with Diez that it is a formidable task of poststructuralism to be critical, “to problematise what is usually seen as given; [...] to interrogate the familiar” (Diez 2013: 4), I have shown that causal arguments (beyond the Wendtian form of constitutive explanation) in a poststructuralist setting are
possible.\textsuperscript{26} I have argued that Kurki’s concept of constitutive causality is better suited for a poststructuralist approach than Wendt’s concept of constitutive explanation which he develops in contrast to ‘real’ causal explanation.

And finally, taking a closer look at Lene Hansen’s rejection of causality, one finds – in line with Kurki’s argument – that she does actually not oppose causality per se, but the Humean understanding of causality as it has been canonized in IR by King, Keohane and Verba (King/Keohane/Verba 1994; Hansen 2006: 9-11, 26). As has been shown, Hansen rejects causality in poststructuralism for two reasons. First, because of the notion of competing explanations, which require an extra-discursive position of the researcher in order to objectively assess the relative success of the respective variables. And second, because cause and effect must be separated ontologically in order to be able to observe one independently of the other and to infer causal relations (cf. Hansen 2006: 26). As the discussion of Analyticism and Kurki’s broader concept of causality has shown, these requirements only apply in a specific approach to science (in Jackson’s terminology in a Neopositivist approach) and within a Humean concept of causality.

However, taking another approach to science (Analyticism) and broadening the concept of causality, other forms of causal explanation become possible: In this case, causal explanation in terms of particular configurations of discursive ideal-types as material and formal causes of policies or other phenomena like the stability of discourses.

3.3. Explaining EU security policy regarding China: Ideal-types of security

In this section, I will develop four ideal-types of concepts of security. These ideal-types serve a twofold purpose. First, they will serve as ‘analytical lenses’ for the discourse analysis of the EU’s and the EU member states’ security discourses regarding China. As such they guide the search for the constructions of security in the documents. And second, if it can be shown by the help of these ideal-types that the discursive constructions of security regarding China on the EU level are in line with one or several

\textsuperscript{26} Which of the two tasks is to be preferred would be subject of a normative debate. By the way, this aspect of the relationship between poststructuralism and causal analysis is neglected by Kurki. She does not further discuss the aspect that one important task of scientific inquiry is the posing of critical questions, the ‘problematising of what is seen as given’, the ‘contestation of the uncontested’, the ‘interrogation of the familiar’; short: the critical impetus of science and the revealing of marginalized and neglected positions (cf. Diez 1999, 2001, 2013).
ideal-types of security, it can be assumed that the EU security policy follows the general lines of these constructions.

In this section, I will first show that the standard concepts of security do not capture the EU’s concept of security (3.3.1.). I will then (3.3.2.) discuss the concept of security along the lines of its locus, i.e. whether security is seen as an attribute of an actor or as an attribute of a relationship, and along the lines of its logic, i.e. whether security is only about hostile self-other relations in a anarchic international system or whether security is also about managing relations between non-hostile actors (3.3.3.). This is the basis for developing four ideal-types of security which will be labelled ‘neorealist security’, ‘common security’, ‘liberal security’ and ‘relational security’ (3.3.4.). These ideal-types aim at overcoming the logic of security which is inherent in the neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist and also the Copenhagen School’s concepts of security and at providing a broader conceptual basis, which includes the former, but also allows for broader logics of security. Therefore, this conceptualization goes beyond adding mere adjectives to the term security. These four ideal-types differ by their very logic. This means that there may be ‘international security’ with the security logics of the neorealist, common, liberal or relational security ideal-type. Or environmental security with the security logics of the neorealist, common, liberal or relational security ideal-type.

### 3.3.1. EU security policy and standard concepts of security: A misfit

Sebastian Barnutz stated that EU security policy puts a new quality to the question of what ‘security’ actually is (cf. Barnutz 2010; cf. Gebhard/Nordheim-Martinsen 2011). And indeed, turning to the ‘standard’ approaches of security, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, which are widely used in the EU-China literature, one finds that they are of little help in capturing the EU’s understanding of security as it is applied in the documents on China.

Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism conceptualize security as resulting from the “absence of a sovereign authority” in the international system; therefore, “states must worry that others will seek to take advantage of them” (Jervis 1999: 43). Even if this situation of uncertainty and danger is solved by crafting agreements, “the incentives
that operate when agreements are signed may be quite different when the time comes for them to be carried out” (ibid.: 44). Therefore, ultimately, security in both approaches is related to the “threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991: 212).

The two approaches differ only in their assessments of the possibilities and probabilities of cooperative behaviour of states:

The disagreements between realism and neoliberalism have not only been exaggerated, but they have also been misunderstood. Neoliberalism does not see more cooperation than does realism; rather, neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation than does realism, and the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in world politics is unnecessary or avoidable in the sense of actors failing to agree even though their preferences overlap. (Jervis 1999: 47)

One of the reasons for the alleged misunderstanding of the perspectives of neorealism and neoliberalism is the fact that the two approaches “study different worlds”: “Neoliberal institutionalists concentrate on issues of international political economy (IPE) and the environment; realists are more prone to study international security and the causes, conduct, and consequences of wars” (ibid.: 45). This observation finds its expression in the notions of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security and ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of power (cf. Nye 2004). Taken in combination, the two approaches suggest a hierarchy that consists of ‘real’ security that is concerned with military- and defense-related issues and some ‘secondary’ form of security, which is concerned with the possibilities and probabilities of cooperation given common gains and mutual benefit in the – broadly speaking – economic realm.

This “excessively narrow” and “militarized interpretation of security” (Buzan 1991: 5) was being challenged since the beginning of the 1980s (Buzan 1983). The so-called Copenhagen School has later re-conceptualized security and made it applicable to a wide range of issues and sectors, such as – besides the military sector – the economic, the political, the environmental and the societal sector (cf. Buzan et al. 1998). Buzan et al. took a discursive approach to security, stating that “[a]s a first step, the designation of what constitutes a security issue comes from political actors, not analysts, but analysts interpret political actors’ actions and sort out when these actions fulfill the security criteria” (ibid.: 33f.). These criteria – the core logic of security – were defined
as the presentation of an issue as an existential threat to the survival of the referent object as well as the claim of the right to handle this issue through extraordinary means, i.e. “to break the normal political rules of the game” (ibid.: 24). The problem with the Copenhagen School’s concept of the logic of security, however, lies in the fact that with its focus on existential threats to the survival of the referent object and extraordinary measures to counter these threats beyond the ‘normal’ political sphere, it is in its essence the same as the neorealist and neoliberal logic of security. As Michael Williams put it: “[...] the specificity of ‘security’ as a particular kind of speech-act in the work of the Copenhagen School is underpinned by an understanding of the politics of enmity, decision, and emergency which has deep roots in Schmitt’s understanding of political order” (Williams 2003: 515). Accordingly, Matt McDonald states that “the securitization framework is parasitic upon traditionalist (Realist) discourses of security that are taken as indicative of a universal and timeless logic of security” (McDonald 2008: 579; cf. Browning/McDonald 2013). And this logic is marked by a potentially hostile self-other relationship given that states must always worry that others seek advantage of them and threaten their survival. Therefore, states ultimately have to resort to extraordinary means to ensure their survival.

As has been argued in the beginning of this section, the EU’s approach to security (in general, but also specifically regarding China) eludes these concepts of security (cf. Barnutz 2010: 377). The problem is, as Felix Ciuta has pointedly summed up, that “European actors still stubbornly speak security, even in the absence of existential threats“ (Ciuta 2009: 313).

In order to capture the changing security architecture after the Cold War, Elke Krahmann has introduced the concept of “security governance” (Krahmann 2003). However, the focus of this body of literature was slightly more on ‘governance’ than on ‘security’ (cf. ibid.: 20). In 2010, George Christou et al. argued that the EU security governance literature still has no sufficient account of different meanings and concepts of security: “[...] we do believe that it lacks a more complex understanding of the variegated meaning of security and security logics in the context of the EU” (Christou et

27 Scholars dealing with environmental or climate security are confronted with a similar challenge. The solution that has been found by these scholars is to differentiate between security (corresponding to the Copenhagen School’s concept) and risk (as proposed by Ulrich Beck) (cf. Trombetta 2008; Lucke, Wellmann, Diez 2014). For this thesis, however, the notion of risk does not seem fruitful, because the research object, the EU, itself speaks of security. Therefore, the very concept of security will be analysed in an attempt to render it analytically useful for the EU’s policies regarding China.

Trying to conceptually capture the EU’s approach to security, Liselotte Oedgaard and Sven Biscop have characterized it as a “holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach” and conceptualized it in terms of Global Public Goods (GPG) (Oedgaard/Biscop 2007: 55; cf. Biscop/Andersson 2008). GPGs are public goods “in the sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at local, national, regional, and global levels of authority” (ibid.). According to Oedgaard and Biscop, the understanding of effective multilateralism as it is put forward in the European Security Strategy in terms of the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order, can be understood as ensuring access to GPG: “Global stability, and therefore the security of all states, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG” (ibid.: 56).

The problem with the conceptualization of the EU’s understanding of security in terms of GPGs is – and Oedgaard and Biscop point to this fact themselves – that either the concept of security is widened in a way that the concept is practically meaningless or – if one sticks with a narrow(er) concept of security – the policies can no longer be labelled as security policies. Accordingly, Oedgaard and Biscop admit that an integrated approach deals with all GPG simultaneously, but does not require that all issues must be put under the label of security [...] Accordingly, rather than including all challenges under the label of security, issues must not be dealt with as security threats unless they pose an effective threat of violence. In that sense, the ESS has perhaps not really been aptly named. It really is a foreign policy strategy rather than just a security strategy. (ibid.: 57f.)

One should, however, take the designation by the EU as a security strategy seriously and one should not dismiss the labelling as wrong just because the scholarly concepts cannot make sense of it.

Felix Berenskoetter’s comparison of the US National Security Strategy and the EU Security Strategy is a case in point to take the EU’s position seriously when it talks about security beyond the commonly known borders of the concept. As he points out, “the prime danger for the ESS derives from instability and conflict as such. Where the NSS frames disorder in moral terms and locates threat in the ‘evil’ intentions of other
actors, the ESS is more concerned about the breakdown of political processes in an interdependent world” (Berenskoetter 2005: 89).

The question thus is: Can we think of a concept of security that deals with the “breakdown of political processes in an interdependent world” (Berenskoetter), that somehow resembles GPG in the sense of guaranteeing the “security of all states” (Oedgaard/Biscop) and that makes sense even in “the absence of existential threats” (Ciuta)? Can we conceptualize these characteristics of the EU’s approach in terms of security or not? Thus, can we think of a concept of security beyond a hostile self-other relationship which somehow includes the security of more than just one state?

The answer to this question of course is ‘yes’. In the following two sections, I will discuss the concept of security along the lines of its locus, i.e. the question whether security is conceptualized as the attribute of an actor or as the attribute of a relationship of actors, and along the lines of its logic, i.e. whether or not the concept of security only makes sense in an anarchic, hostile self-help environment. In chapter 3.3.4., I will present the resulting two-times-two table with four ideal-types of security in which the conceptualizations of Berenskoetter, Oedgaard/Biscop and Ciuta find their place.

### 3.3.2. The locus of security

Arnold Wolfers (1952) points to a crucial feature of security, which is actually well known, but which is treated like an orphan: He highlights the relational character of security. This means that security is not so much seen as an attribute of an actor, but as an attribute of a relationship of actors instead. Wolfers states that

> national security policy, except when directed against a country unalterably committed to attack, is the more rational the more it succeeds in taking the interests, including the security interests, of the other side into consideration. [...] Rather than to insist, then, that under all conditions security be sought by reliance on nothing but defensive power and be pushed in a spirit of national selfishness toward the highest targets, it should be stressed that in most instances efforts to satisfy legitimate demands of others are likely to promise better results in terms of security. (Wolfers 1952: 497)
While this assessment is still tied to actors and their legitimate demands, the following quote points to an attribute of a relationship of actors that should be taken into account by an ‘ideal’ security policy:

It should always be kept in mind that the ideal security policy is one which would lead to a distribution of values so satisfactory to all nations that the intention to attack and with it the problem of security would be minimized. While this is a utopian goal policy makers and particularly peacemakers would do well to remember that there are occasions when greater approximation to such a goal can be effected. (ibid.: 498)

The distribution of values is an attribute of the relationship of several actors. Thus, for Wolfers, ideal security policy aims at managing relationships in order to achieve satisfactory conditions for all actors.

In fact, the relational character of security is an inherent feature of the concept, be it in terms of the ‘security dilemma’ (Herz 1950) or in the conceptualization of ‘deterrence’ (Freedman 2004), which is – as Egon Bahr once pointedly put it – already a form of ‘common security’ in that the adversaries are inextricably tied to one another by their common goal of war-prevention (Bahr 1982, quoted in Böge, Wilke 1984: 140). A number of other scholars have also discussed the ‘relational’ nature of security. Barry Buzan (1991), for example, locates the relational character of security in between the national and the international level. He states that

the dynamics of national security are highly relational and interdependent between states. [...] The idea of ‘international security’ is therefore best used to refer to the systematic conditions that influence the ways in which states make each other more or less secure. Individual national securities can only be fully understood when considered in relation both to each other and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole. (Buzan 1991: 22)

“National security”, Buzan states, therefore “might well be so inherently self-defeating as almost to amount to a contradiction in terms” (ibid.: 7). However, instead of further investigating the consequences of this insight for the concept of security, he investigates
the consequences of the interrelatedness of national and international security for the structure of the international system (in terms of different forms of anarchy) and the establishment of regional security complexes.

Bill McSweeney observes that with the traditional neorealist approach to security “one view of security dominates the academic discipline and is presented, not as an option, a choice, but as the only one which is valid and relevant” (McSweeney 1999: 16). He contrasts and complements this traditional approach with an alternative understanding of security which he conceptualizes as a “property of the relationship, a quality making each secure in the other” (ibid.: 15). He locates, however, this alternative, relational understanding of security on the level of the individual and not on the level of states.\(^{28}\)

Paul D. Williams differentiates between two “philosophies” of security: One that conceives of security as a commodity of an actor in terms of accumulation of power. The other conceives of security as consisting in a relationship between actors: “Understood in a relational sense, security involves gaining a degree of confidence about our relationships that comes through sharing certain commitments, which, in turn, provides a degree of reassurance and predictability” (Williams 2008: 6). Unfortunately, however, he does not further elaborate on this distinction that he makes.

As these examples have shown, there are many references to the relational side of the concept of security in the literature; none of the authors, however, elaborates on this aspect in a way that it could be used for the purposes of this thesis. In the following, I will therefore specify the relational understanding and contrast it to an actor-specific understanding. Making the difference between security as an attribute of an actor and security as an attribute of a relationship of actors is a crucial differentiation for a fuller understanding of the concept of security and thus for the purposes of this thesis.

When specifying the concept of security, several aspects or questions are commonly named which serve to define the concept that is used. Following David Baldwin, these questions are ‘security for whom’, ‘security for which values’, ‘how much security’, ‘security from what threats’, ‘security by what means’, ‘security at what cost’ and ‘security in what time period’ (Baldwin 1997: 13-17). Other authors refer to fewer aspects or add a few others (cf. Buzan/Hansen 2009: 10-13; Williams 2008: 5-10). I

\(^{28}\) Quite similarly, one finds this argument already in Thomas Hobbes’ work, who states that “Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe [...] if we compare Cities” (i.e. states); however, simultaneously, “Man to Man is a kind of God [...] if we compare Citizens amongst themselves” (Hobbes 1983 (1642): 24; italics in the original).
consider three aspects to be of core importance for the distinction of an actor-specific and a relational concept of security.

First, the referent object: Who or what needs to be secured? Second, the threats: What are the threats and where do they emanate from? And third, the responses: What are adequate and efficient responses to these threats in order to achieve security?

Closely connected with the first aspect of the referent object, and thus specifying this aspect, are the questions concerning the values that need to be secured and the question concerning the security provider. The values that need to be secured can be the survival of the referent object or its influence in the world, its wealth, its political stability, its territorial integrity and so on. The security provider can be the referent object itself, it can, however, also be other states which jointly try to achieve security.

In a concept of security that conceptualized security as an attribute of an actor, i.e. an *actor-specific understanding of security*, the actor is the referent object of security. Threats to the security of this actor emanate primarily from other actors (either because of general hostility and mistrust or because of contradicting interests) and responses to ensure security thus must be directed towards these other actors (and their hostile intentions or contradicting interests). The values that are concerned are those of the referent object (its survival, its wealth, its status, its influence etc.) and the security provider is the actor himself.

Visualizing this description in a graphic, actor-specific security looks like this:
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Figure 3.4.: Actor-specific understanding of security

Actor A is the sole referent object whose security needs to be achieved. Threats potentially emanate from the other actors and the responses are thus directed towards these actors. It is only the values (survival, wealth, influence etc.) of Actor A that are threatened and Actor A is the only one who can provide security for himself.

By contrast, a relational understanding of security is about relationships of actors and their dynamics. The referent objects are all actors involved in a particular security situation (which, in the graphic below would be all actors as well as actor A, as the research object in a foreign policy analysis that, of course, is also concerned about its own security). Because the whole is more than the sum of its parts, the referent object is also the relationship between the actors itself and its specificities (such as the distribution of values, cf. Wolfers 1952: 498). Threats are conceived of as emanating from the dynamics of relationships. Consequently responses to these threats are directed towards the dynamics of relationships in an effort to manage them in order to prevent security threats for all actors involved.

The values that are concerned are thus not only the values of one actor, but of several or all actors or the specificities of the relationship. For example their common survival, their wealth, their influence and so on. All actors, or at least several actors are thus involved in providing security to other or all actors.
Visualizing this description in a graphic, relational security looks like this:

Figure 3.5.: Relational understanding of security

Following a relational concept of security, security for Actor A can only be achieved when security for all other actors is achieved. Therefore, not only Actor A is the referent object, but the entirety of actors and their relationships is the referent object, too. Threats do not emanate from other actors but from dynamics of the relationships, such as, for example, unintended but negative externalities of the interactions of two or more states. The responses must therefore be directed towards these interactions. The values of several or all actors need to be secured and it is several or all actors that can provide security for Actor A and for all other actors.

To give an example of a relational understanding and make these propositions more tangible, I quote McSweeney who writes: “We can contrast the pre-1945 situation in which [...] France and Germany were mutually threatened by the structure of their relationship with one in which a benign structure conditions their actions. [...] Security

29 At this point, one might wonder that this is the core problem of the security dilemma, too. However, the security dilemma can only arise if security is understood as an attribute of an actor: If only one actor is regarded as the referent object and if the security policies are targeted at other actors, the vicious cycle of the security dilemma cannot be broken. If, however, security is understood as a relationship of actors, the dilemma disappears: If all actors and their relationship are considered to be the referent object, armament programs for just one actor do not make sense anymore. Security policy then aims at managing – and even changing – the (malign) relationship.
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policy within a malign and structured relationship must be directed towards changing the relationship” (McSweeney 1999: 91). In the graphic above, the Franco-German-relationship would be relationship between Actor B and Actor C, the threats emerging from their malign relationship. The security policies can thus be only directed towards that relationship and other actors (such as Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom) may well contribute to easing the tensions in the relationship (but also to exacerbating them).

To sum up: The *locus* of security thus refers to the localization of security either as an attribute of one actor or as an attribute of relationships of actors. In an actor-specific understanding, the referent object is the actor in question, the threats emanate from other actors and the security policies are targeted towards these other actors. In a relational understanding, the referent object is all actors concerned and their relationship. Threats arise from dynamics of relationships and security policies are targeted at these relational dynamics in order to manage these relationships.

In short, while an actor-specific understanding is about ‘achieving security towards’ or ‘achieving security against’, a relational understanding is about ‘achieving security with’.

However, adherents to the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist perspectives\(^{30}\) – and with them those authors that implicitly follow the basic assumptions of these widespread approaches\(^{31}\) – would reject this relational concept of security as irrelevant. The consequences of the basic assumption of an *anarchic* international system dictate that security policies focus on the actors in question instead of relationships. According to Kenneth Waltz, the units of anarchic systems must be self-regarding units: “To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy – be they people, corporations, states, or whatever – must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order” (Waltz 1979: 111). That is, any notion of achieving security by managing relationships and by cooperating with other actors is nonsensical because of the “uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and

\(^{30}\)For the basic similarities concerning the concept of security see Jervis 1999., chapter 3.3.1.

\(^{31}\)As has been argued in the discussion of the literature on EU security policy towards China: Many scholars implicitly use a neorealist or neoliberal understanding of security. Hence, they cannot properly capture the EU’s concept which is beyond these narrow understandings, cf. chapter 2.1.
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actions” (ibid.: 105).
This direct link between anarchy and self-help behaviour of the units is, however, only valid in the purely structural perspective of Waltzian realism in which the attributes of the units are not seen as relevant for explanation. As soon as one takes attributes of the units into consideration, the effects of anarchy on behaviour are at least modified if not mitigated by those attributes.
To clarify this point: Anarchy is commonly associated with Thomas Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature characterized by mistrust, self-help, competition, hostility and enmity, in brief: “a state of war” (Waltz 1979: 102f.; see also Williams 1996). However, taking a closer look, things are not as clear cut as they seem. Tracing Hobbes’ famous quote of homo homini lupus to its origins, one finds that the original quote of the ancient Roman play writer Titus Maccius Plautus is slightly longer but much richer in its meaning. Plautus writes that: “lupus est homo homini, non homo, quom qualis sit non novit”32 (Plautus 1956: 176). That is to say, already in the original writing of Plautus, the possibility of competition, hostility and violence between actors is balanced by the quality of the relationship, i.e. by the question of whether actors have knowledge about each other or not. Now, knowledge (of each other) is not an explanatory factor in the Waltzian structural model of the international system in which the states are blackboxed and treated as functionally uniform units. However, as soon as the purely structural Waltzian perspective is given up and attributes of actors are taken into account as having explanatory power, the extended original quote of Plautus impacts heavily on the consequences of anarchy: It does not lead to self-help behaviour automatically, but is mediated by attributes of the actors. This is in essence also Alexander Wendt’s argument in his thought experiment about ‘first contact’ between two actors. By the processes of “signaling, interpreting, and responding” intersubjective meanings are created.

Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes a new gesture, again signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter, and again alter responds, adding to the pool of knowledge each has about the other, and so on over time. [...]. If repeated long enough, these ‘reciprocal typifications’ will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction. (Wendt 1992: 405)

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32 A man is a wolf, and not a man, to another man, for as long as he doesn’t know what he is like
That is to say, ‘ego’ may come to the conclusion that the best way to achieve security of itself is to provide security to ‘alter’, too, thus achieving security for both of them. What can be said at this point is that the relational concept of security is by no means irrelevant; once one leaves the purely structural perspective of Waltzian realism, this concept might well make sense.

The discussion of the assumption of anarchy raises another, closely related question: In a self-help environment, relations between actors are characterized by mistrust, competition, hostility, enmity and survival. The question that arises is, whether security only makes sense in such an anarchic, self-help environment or whether security can also make sense in an environment which is not characterized by anarchy and its consequences.

### 3.3.3. The logic of security

In his seminal article on national security, Arnold Wolfers (1952) has rejected the notion of survival — and thus emergency, existential threats and enmity — as a defining characteristic of security. He writes that

>a glance at history will suffice to show that survival has only exceptionally been at stake, particularly for the major Powers. If nations were not concerned with the protection of values other than their survival as independent states, most of them, most of the time, would not have had to be seriously worried about their security, despite what manipulators of public opinion engaged in mustering greater security efforts may have said to the contrary. What ‘compulsion’ there is, then, is a function not merely of the will of others, real or imagined, to destroy the nation’s independence but of national desires and ambitions to retain a wealth of other values such as rank, respect, material possessions and special privileges. (Wolfers 1952: 488f.)

Security, Wolfers puts this quite clearly, can thus serve “as a cloak for other more enticing demands” (ibid. 488). Naturally, if there is a whole range of different values (from survival to the preservation of wealth, status or privileges) to be secured, the
means to achieve security for these values under different circumstances may differ
tremendously: “[...] means which in one instance may be totally ineffective or utopian
[...] may [in other instances] have considerable protective value” (ibid. 490). Therefore:
“[...] the term ‘security’ covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies
can be interpreted as policies of security” (Wolfers 1952: 484).

Hence, if security is conceptualized to be basically about survival – and, as has been
argued, about the implicit assumption of hostility due to constant mistrust about the
motives of the other actors (cf. Waltz 1979: 102ff) – a lot of the meaning of the concept
is lost. I contend that security does also make sense in a non-anarchic environment in
which relationships between actors are not determined by emergency, existential threats
and hostility.

Conceptualizing security beyond survival, and thus without the basic assumption of
anarchy, should not cause too many troubles, even from a Waltzean perspective. The
assumption of anarchy which entails hostile self-other relations is for Waltz an
*analytical assumption* and *not an empirical fact.* According to Waltz own
understanding of theory, if analytical assumptions have no explanatory value in a certain
realm or for a certain research question, then there is no reason to stick to them. Waltz
states: “[...] theory is not an edifice of truth and not a reproduction of reality, [...] a
theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity” (Waltz
1979: 8). That is to say, it is an ideal-type in the Weberian sense (cf. Jackson 2011:
112f.). Waltz goes on: “The question, as ever with theories, is not whether the isolation
of a realm is realistic, but whether it is useful. And usefulness is judged by the
explanatory and predictive powers of the theory that may be fashioned” (Waltz 1979: 8).
And he repeats this crucial point later on in his seminal book: “A theory contains at least
one theoretical assumption. Such assumptions are not factual. One therefore cannot
legitimately ask if they are true, but only if they are useful” (ibid.: 117f.). If, therefore,
the assumption of anarchy and its connection with self-help behaviour of and
competition and hostile relations between states are not useful, i.e. have no explanatory
or predictive power, there is no reason to use them. Scholars who argue that self-help
and anarchy cannot be separated because of empirical findings therefore totally mistake
the core concept of the Waltzean structural realism (such as for example

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33 Patrick Jackson underlines this understanding of theory and argues that Kenneth Waltz’ Theory of
Goddard/Nexon 2005: 44f. and Snyder 2002). Precisely for this reason, approaches that do not use the assumption of anarchy and survival cannot be accused of being ‘unrealistic’ because of the \textit{analytical} and not \textit{empirical} nature of these assumptions. Similarly, approaches that conceptualize security as an attribute of relationships as in the previous section cannot be accused of being unrealistic.

Once anarchy as an analytical assumption is dropped, there are manifold ways in which actors can relate to each other. The literature on the identity of states has conceptualized many forms of self-other relations, from hostile and antagonistic to non-hostile and cooperative (cf. Neumann 1996: 154f.; Campbell 1992; Wendt 1994; Diez 2005; Hansen 2006). Felix Berenskoetter even introduces the concept of friendship as a specific form of self-other relations into IR theorizing (cf. Berenskoetter 2007). Berenskoetter not only questions the assumption of anarchy as the baseline for theorizing in IR, but goes back to Thomas Hobbes and his theorizing of the individual which has strongly influenced Western thinking ever since:

By sticking with the assumption of the individual and its desire for autonomy and liberty, any attempt to alleviate the ‘problem’ of anarchy has little choice but to rely on the social contract, entered through reason and/or socialization, as a theoretical solution. Friendship understood as an intimate relationship simply falls off the conceptual map. Bringing it (back) on requires seeking an alternative to the human condition proposed by Hobbes. (Berenskoetter 2007: 654)

Berenskoetter instead refers to Martin Heidegger’s assumption of “anxiety” as “the foundational sentiment defining the human condition” (ibid.: 655). Anxiety about uncertainty as such and not fear from other individuals characterizes the human condition. Accordingly, states need to be conceptualized not so much as fearing other states but as being anxious about uncertainty as such (cf. ibid.: 655). Hence, “the Self seeks companionship to control anxiety; [...] in what follows I will argue more specifically that states seek friends” (ibid.: 656).

Especially when dealing with the EU and its relations to others, the assumption of anarchy and behaviour that is induced by anarchy is of little explanatory value and thus can be dropped.
Ole Wæver has argued that in the case of the EU, “the enemy image is today to no very large extend ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘the Russians’ or anything similar – rather Europe’s Other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future” (Wæver 1996: 122). He goes on:

Europe’s past of wars and divisions is held up as the other to be negated, and on this basis it is argued that ‘Europe’ can only be if we avoid renewed fragmentation. And if first fragmentation sets in, it will be a self-reinforcing force that rules out for a long time any possibility of ‘Europe’. Integration is thus the referent point for a security rhetoric of ‘Europe’, and it takes on the existential quality characteristic of security, because integration/fragmentation is not a question of how Europe will be, but whether Europe will be. At this very point security, politics, identity and Europe meet in something which is even self-declared as a project of constructing a ‘security identity’. (ibid.: 128)

Bahar Rumelili assesses the self-other relationships of Europe with its external environment and states that the “case of the EU points to the need to rethink and re-conceptualize the relationship between self and other in the IR literature” (Rumelili 2004: 29). She concludes that in many instances there is no ‘othering’ by the EU in terms of a representation of the other as a threat to the EU and its identity but rather a positive identification with the other (Rumelili 2004: 45ff).

More specifically, the traditional neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist concepts of security and the EU seem to be not easily reconciled: “European security is a much contested concept. [...] The EU has implemented remarkable structures, bodies, capabilities and processes to act as a global actor in the field of security. At the same time, what remains contested is the kind of security logic implemented at the EU level [...]” (Barnutz 2010: 377). Felix Ciuta seconds Barnutz and states that “European actors still stubbornly speak security, even in the absence of existential threats” (Ciuta 2009: 313). Finally, Felix Berenskoetter characterizes the EU’s approach to security – in contrast to the approach of the United States which locates threat in the ‘evil’ intentions of other actors – as “more concerned about the breakdown of political processes in an interdependent world.” (Berenskoetter 2005: 89). These quotations point to the fact that ‘survival’ and with it the traditional logic of security does not play a crucial role in conceptualizing security when it comes to EU security policy.
But what, then, is security without the existential threats by potentially hostile others to the survival of an actor in an anarchic world? Threats may still emerge from other actors, which are, however, not hostile, but which pursue their legitimate interests. These legitimate interests of different states may conflict with one another and thus potentially pose a threat to one or both states. To give an example: After the Cold War, one of Europe’s core interests was to contribute to stability in its Eastern neighbourhood. Part of the policies to stabilize the region was the EU association process as well as the enlargement of the NATO. At least in Europe, this was perceived as a legitimate security interest. The newly independent Eastern European countries were themselves eager to join the EU and the NATO which – after their history in the USSR – could also be perceived as legitimate. From the perspective of Russia, however, these legitimate interests seemed to compromise – legitimate – Russian security interests. It does not require too much of imagination that any expansion of NATO right to the borders of Russia must be perceived as threatening to Russia. According to a senior German official, these differing interests could be balanced and reconciled until around the year 2000, when the Western strategy was composed of two pillars: Enlargement of NATO and simultaneously intensifying and deepening the partnership with Russia (cf. Ischinger 2014: 20). Even a possible membership of Russia in NATO was discussed (cf. ibid.). Following George W. Bush’s coming into office and Vladimir Putin’s second term as President, the second pillar was neglected and NATO expansion was the only policy that was pursued. Therefore, a clash of these differing – but from each perspective legitimate – interests was unavoidable and, as it happened in early 2014, not surprising (cf. ibid.).

Alternatively, threats may emerge from non-hostile relationships in the form of misunderstandings or negative externalities of non-hostile state (inter)action. The concept of vulnerability, as introduced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, can serve as an example (cf. Keohane/Nye 1977). Vulnerability in this sense means “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered” (ibid.: 13). The world financial crisis which started in 2007 and the need for global governance structures may serve as an example. The crisis has shown “how tightly the economies and financial markets of the world are tied together, with a shock in one major country rapidly propagating to the entire system” (Palais Royal Initiative 2011: 2). Rapid capital flows, increases in interest rates of countries’ government bonds or the
collapse of a major national bank or insurance can “overwhelm countries’ ability to preserve macroeconomic and financial stability” and thus poses a serious threat to its security (ibid.: 3). The solution can only be substantially intensified international cooperation and the establishment of an effective system of global governance in the international monetary system. “The G20 is in a powerful position to promote the global common good, and to make it prevail, at times against limited, parochial interpretations of national interests” (ibid.: 8). The referent object in this example is the system as a whole and with it each of the states of the system. The threats emerge because of the nature of the relationship: its dense interconnectedness combined with a lack of steering and problem-solving capacities. And responses therefore cannot be directed against any single actor but need to aim at the reformation of the very structures of the relationship between the states.

Having argued that the concept of security does make sense in a non-anarchic, non-hostile environment, this thesis is confronted with a crucial question: If security is not about survival, existential threats by hostile others and the need to apply extraordinary measures, how do we then know a security issue when we meet one? Is not just anything a security issue then if the scholar so wishes? Is the concept not at risk of being so broad that it becomes analytically useless?

The answer clearly has to be ‘no’. But there is a reasonable reason why the answer is no: The starting point to identify security for Buzan et al. is the designation of a security issue by their research object (political actors). The analyst then has to decide whether this designation fulfils the security criteria (cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 33f.). The crucial security criterion for Buzan et al. is the notion of survival: Confronted with an existential threat, the referent object may resort to extraordinary measures to address them (cf. ibid.: 21). In order to comprise the breadth of the concept as it has been sketched out so far, a broader criterion is needed to help the analyst decide whether an issue is a security issue.

I therefore propose two key components of a core criterion for security: the identification of threats and the formulation of timely responses to these threats by the research object.

In order for security to be at stake, threats need to be identified by the research object. These threats may range from existential threats to the survival of the referent object to
other values such as status, wealth, influence and so on.\textsuperscript{34} And these threats may emanate from hostile and non-hostile actors as well as from hostile or non-hostile relationships.

This criterion, however, is not sufficient as it leaves the designation of a security issue purely in the hands of the research object. Therefore, as in Buzan et al. (1998), a second criterion is needed: The formulation of timely responses to these threats. The need for timely responses indicates that security is indeed – at least in the perception of the referent object – at stake and hence something needs to be done about it. Based on this second criterion, the researcher can decide whether an issue is a security issue or not. These responses may be – according to the identified threats – directed towards hostile actors, non-hostile actors (with contradicting legitimate interests), manage hostile relationships or manage non-hostile relationships.

From the perspective of the Copenhagen School, this second criterion might not be enough to separate security from politics. However, this objection only makes sense in a Copenhagen framework, which rests on a clear separation of the realm of security and the realm of politics, which again rests on its realist core logic (cf. Chapter 3.3.1 as well as Williams 2003: 515; Mc Donald 2008: 579).

With these two criterions, the identification of threats and the formulation of timely responses, the concept of security is broad enough to encompass actor-specific as well as relational understandings of security in hostile as well as in non-hostile self-other relations. That is to say, security can still be about existential threats and extraordinary means, but it does not have to exclusively. It can also be about threats and political solutions. A minimum of drama of the Copenhagen School’s basic logic is still inherited in terms of the need to formulate a policy to address the threats. Therefore, not anything can be a security issue, only those issues that require a timely response.

Concepts of security can thus be distinguished – besides the above mentioned criterion of actor-specific and relational – by the criterion whether they conceive of the relationship between self and other as principally hostile and antagonistic or as non-hostile and potentially cooperative. Taking the two dimensions together, there are four

\textsuperscript{34} As Wolfers so pointedly put it and as I have quoted before: “[...] a glance at history will suffice to show that survival has only exceptionally been at stake, particularly for the major Powers. If nations were not concerned with the protection of values other than their survival as independent states, most of them, most of the time, would not have had to be seriously worried about their security, despite what manipulators of public opinion engaged in mustering greater security efforts may have said to the contrary” (Wolfers 1952: 488f.).
ideal-typical understandings of security which I will further specify in the next section.

### 3.3.4. Four ideal-types of security

Mapping the different understandings of security along the dimensions of actor-specific/relational and hostile/non-hostile self-other relations, one gets a two times two table with four different ideal-typical understandings of security:

Table 3.1: Ideal-types of security (the attributes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus of Security</th>
<th>Actor-specific</th>
<th>Relational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Hostile self-other relations** | - Security as an attribute of an actor  
- Threats emanating from hostile actors  
- Responses directed towards hostile actors/protection of the actor | - Security as an attribute of a relationship  
- Threats emanate from hostile relationships  
- Responses directed towards hostile relationships |
| **Non-hostile self-other relations** | - Security as an attribute of an actor  
- Threats emanate from actors with different/contradictory interests  
- Responses directed towards actors with different/contradictory interests/protection of the actor’s interests | - Security as an attribute of a relationship  
- Threats emanate from relationships (e.g. negative externalities, vulnerabilities)  
- Responses directed towards relationships (e.g. management of relationships) |

The first, actor-specific/hostile understanding of security conceptualizes security as an attribute of an actor. Threats to security emanate from hostile actors and responses to these threats therefore need to be directed towards these hostile actors. This understanding of security is to be found in the neorealist and, due to their similarity regarding their logic of security, also the neoliberal institutionalist schools of IR theorizing. As has been argued above, the assumption of anarchy leads to self-regarding
behaviour of the units, i.e. actor-specific behaviour in terms of achieving security because of the mistrust and maybe even hostility towards other actors. Only the actor in question can provide security for himself, preferentially by the accumulation of (material) power as well as policies directed at other states in order to deter them and keep them from attacking.

The second, relational/hostile understanding of security conceptualizes security as an attribute of a relationship in an anarchic environment and with generally hostile self-other relations. Threats, however, in contrast to the actor-specific understanding, emanate from the dynamics of the (hostile) relationship. The responses to be taken therefore need to be directed towards the management of the hostile relationships. This understanding of security comes close to the concept of ‘common security’ which was developed by the so-called Palme Commission in the beginning of the 1980s (cf. Palme 1982; Böge/Wilke 1984; Pahr et al. 1987). The basic assumption of ‘common security’ was that not the antagonists US and USSR were the most dangerous threats to each other, but the possible outcome of their relationship which was total nuclear war and mutual destruction. Security, in the understanding of the Palme Commission, under the circumstances of nuclear armament and the possibility of a full scale nuclear war, could no longer be achieved for one single country, not even the US or the USSR. Their survival – and thus their security – was inextricably tied to the survival and security of the other: “They must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him.” International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival [...] They cannot achieve security against their adversaries” (Palme 1982: ix - xi). In line with this localization of security in the relationship of actors, the threats to security do not emanate from hostile intentions of other actors, but from dynamics of hostile relationships: “[...] the continuing expansion of national arsenals is in turn interpreted by other nations as evidence of hostile intent, a cycle which undermines the security of the international community as a whole” (ibid.: 3). It is to be noted that the referent object identified here is ‘the international community as a whole’, i.e. security is definitely not an attribute of an actor. Finally, the responses to these threats cannot be actor-specific but need to be directed towards managing these malign relationships.

35 To recall what I have argued in Chapter 3.3.2.: Security as the attribute of a relationship means that the referent objects are all actors involved in a particular security situation as well as – because the whole is more than the sum of its parts – the relationship between the actors itself and its specificities (such as the distribution of values [cf. Wolfs 1952: 498] or – in this case – their joint survival).

36 As outlined in this thesis in section 3.3.2.
Common security requires states to “organize their security policies in cooperation with one another” (ibid.: 6). This entails a “tireless process of negotiation, rapprochement, and normalization, with the goal of removing mutual suspicion and fear. We face common dangers and thus must also promote our security in common” (ibid.: 12). In brief: “There must be a partnership in the struggle against war itself” (ibid.: 139).

As a child of the Cold War and hostile superpower confrontation, the concept of common security as developed by the Palme Commission is characterized by the assumption of hostile self-other relations and simultaneously the assumption that security cannot be achieved for single actors but only for all actors involved. The main means to achieve security in this relational/hostile understanding are arms control, disarmament, confidence-building or measures of non-offensive defence (cf. Agrell 1987; cf. Saperstein 1987).

The third, actor-specific/non-hostile understanding of security conceptualizes security as an attribute of an actor in an environment generally characterized by non-hostile self-other relations. This understanding comes close to a liberal understanding of security. Many aspects of the broad liberal tradition have found their way into IR theorizing, from (the often pejoratively called) idealism with its focus on international law (cf. McDougal 1952), to Doyle’s liberal peace thesis (Doyle 1983), to neoliberal institutionalism, which shares many basic assumptions with neorealism (cf. Jervis 1999). Moreover, many scholars would agree to the proposition that as “the core elements of liberalism are disputable”, there is no authoritative systematic overview on liberal international theory (Zacher/Matthew 1995: 137).

Nevertheless, Zacher and Matthew distill a few central theses of liberal international theory which justify to equate the actor-specific/non-hostile understanding of security with a liberal understanding of security.

First, “[L]iberals view states as the most important collective actors in our present era” (ibid.: 118). These “self-interested” states and their interests, the way they are “embedded in both their own societies and the international system are the main focus of liberal analysts” (ibid.: 118f.). However, liberals “are not comfortable with a simple conception of the system as anarchical” and thus do not subscribe to the consequences of anarchy in terms of self-help and hostile self-other relations. Instead, they assume that
international relations are gradually being transformed such that they promote greater human freedom by establishing conditions of peace, prosperity and justice. This attitude towards progress reflects a general liberal stance because [...] liberalism, apart from being individualist, egalitarian and universalist, is ‘meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements’. (ibid.: 109, quoted after Gray 1986: x)

This expectation of progress is rooted in the conceptualization of the state not only as self-interested, but also as other-regarding: “Also, most liberals regard states’ policies as other-regarding to some extend since they believe that the growth of liberal democracy increases people’s concern for other humans” (ibid.: 118). Of course, liberals do not deny the occurrence of conflicts and wars, “but they believe as part of their evolutionary perspective that mutualities of interests and noncoercive bargaining will become more prominent features of international life” (ibid.: 110). Therefore, one can assume that the general understanding of security in the liberal tradition conceptualizes security as the attribute of an actor (i.e. the state as the most important collective actor) and threats to this state’s security may arise out of conflicting interests of other states. The means to resolve the resulting conflicts lie in addressing the respective actors by engaging in noncoercive bargaining and the achievement of a mutuality of interests, i.e. a reconciliation of interests and negotiations (cf. ibid.: 110).

The fourth relational/non-hostile understanding of security conceptualizes security as an attribute of a relationship in a non-anarchic environment with non-hostile self-other relations. Threats emanate from dynamics of non-hostile relationships (e.g. in the form of negative externalities of non-hostile state action, in the form of misunderstandings or in the form of vulnerabilities in the face of complex and interdependent relational dynamics) and therefore responses to these threats need to be addressed to these relationships, e.g. in the form of some sort of relationship management.

Regarding this ideal-typical understanding of security, one might first think of security communities, as introduced by Karl Deutsch et al. (1957) and further developed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a, 1998b). The concept does see the possibility – and does investigate the preconditions and probabilities – of overcoming hostile self-other relations in the international realm by mutual trust, shared identity and social learning. One important feature of mature security communities is, however, the difference between inside and outside the community, i.e. the common definition of
threats which come from the ‘others’ outside of the community. Therefore, security communities are best understood as enlarged selves in a hostile world with outside threats and thus do not fit easily into the non-hostile self-other, relational understanding (cf. Adler/Barnett 1998b: 56; cf. McSweeney 1999: 49).

This relational/non-hostile understanding of security must not be confused with Ole Wæver’s “asecurity” (Wæver 1998b). With asecurity Wæver points to the fact that security may be achieved as an unintended side effect of other policies or as a deliberate attempt to foster integration by directing attention away from security issues (cf. ibid.: 76f.). However, the relational/non-hostile understanding of security is about security as the identification of threats and the formulation of responses to these threats, ergo, it is about security as such. As has been argued, security threats emanating from non-hostile relationships in terms of vulnerabilities may be even existential (as the example of the debt crises of some EU member states has shown) and require timely responses (which, as the provision of billions of Euros in the framework of the European Stability Mechanism has shown, can be even extraordinary and previously unthinkable responses).

Less prominent but closer to this relational/non-hostile understanding of security is the modification of the common security concept by Volker Rittberger and Hans Werbik (1987). Although this concept, as a product of the Cold War, is still stuck in hostile self-other relations, it points into the direction of the relational/non-hostile understanding. Trying to define common security positively beyond the negation of the zero-sum thinking of mutual deterrence, Rittberger and Werbik introduce the concept of gewaltfreie Interaktionssteuerung, i.e. non-violent interaction management (cf. Rittberger/Werbik 1987: 16). The two basic principles of non-violent interaction management are ‘empathy’ and ‘tolerance’. Empathy means to respect and take seriously the self-perception of the security requirements of the other actor(s), i.e. viewing the world through the eyes of the adversary by a change of perspective. Tolerance, on the other hand, means to accept the adversary and the inevitability of the coexistence of contradictory positions. Given the indeterminacy of historical processes, these two principles – and with them the concept of gewaltfreie Interaktionssteuerung – are the basis for overcoming conflictual and hostile self-other relations: They open the possibility of a “change of the bases of conflicts within and in between the involved actors or the gradual loss of importance of the initial causes of conflict [...]” (ibid.: 17).

Although Rittberger and Werbik’s modified concept of common security does open the
door to the possibility of an overcoming of hostile relations, it just points in this direction without really going through this door. For the lack of a name-giver, I label this ideal-typical understanding ‘relational security’. Security in this understanding is relational in the sense that threats emerge from non-hostile relationships in terms of negative externalities, vulnerabilities or from ‘conflictual’ relationships in terms of unresolved conflicts of interests (nota bene, not conflictual in terms of necessarily conflictual because of the consequences of anarchy and hostile relations per se); threats are therefore not assigned to other actors. Security policies are thus directed towards relationships in order to manage them, to keep them free of frictions or overcoming the sources of conflicts of interests. For example, joint actions resulting from joint responsibility are policies to tackle the threats. The referent objects are all actors involved and their relationship. The security providers thus may be all actors involved. On the basis of the previous discussion, I will label the ideal-types of security as ‘neorealist security’, ‘common security’, ‘liberal security’ and ‘relational security’.

Table 3.2.: Ideal-types of security

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic of Security</th>
<th>Locus of Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor-specific</td>
<td>Relational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile self-other relations</td>
<td>Neorealist Security</td>
<td>Common Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-hostile self-other relations</td>
<td>Liberal Security</td>
<td>Relational Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 This designation is certainly not ideal, because the dimension and the ideal-type are labelled identically. However, no other designation that was suggested during my research and that I myself contemplated about captured either the meaning of the dimension or the understanding of security better than the term ‘relational’. The risk of misleading associations induced by other designations weighs heavier than the ‘dual-use’ of the term ‘relational’. 
3.3.5. Conclusion

I have developed four ideal-typical understandings of security by distinguishing the concept along the lines of the dimension of its locus, according to which security can be conceptualized as an attribute of an actor or an attribute of a relationship, and the dimension of its logic, according to which security does also make sense in a non-anarchical, non-hostile environment. The resulting ideal-types have been set into relation with traditions or authors of the IR literature and were labelled neorealist, common, liberal and relational security.

In section 3.3.1., I have quoted the conceptualizations of EU security policy by Berenskoetter and Oedgaad/Biscop, who define EU security policy as concerned with the “breakdown of political processes in an interdependent world” (Berenskoetter 2005) or the aim of achieving the “security of all states” (Oedgaard/Biscop 2007). They have, however, not further elaborated on the possible concepts of security behind these preliminary and descriptive conceptualizations. The relational ideal-type of security, which is about threats that emerge from the dynamics of non-hostile relationships and about responses that are directed towards these relationships, comes pretty close to these two conceptualizations and therefore seems able to capture the EU’s understanding of security. Referring to Berenskoetter’s ‘friendship’ in international relations again (2007), this ideal-typical understanding of security is not about ‘fear from the other’ but about ‘anxiety of uncertainty’.

These ideal-types will serve as the ‘lenses’ for reconstructing the EU’s security discourse and the discourses of the UK, France and Germany regarding China in chapters 5 and 6.2.

I will now turn to the theoretical basis for the response to the second research question.
3.4. Explaining the stability of EU security policy regarding China: Ideal-types of constellations of security discourses

This section aims at responding to the second research question: *Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?*

In section 3.2., I have argued that discourses can be considered to be the material and formal causes of policies. Hence, in order to explain the stability of policies, it suffices to explain the stability of discourses.

In this section, two questions need to be addressed. First, under which conditions can we expect stability of a discourse; or more specifically, under which conditions can we expect stability of the discursive construction of security policy regarding China on the Union level. And second, how can the EU member states be integrated into the analysis of the stability of the Union level discourse? Because talking about EU foreign policy and EU security policy specifically without paying attention to the role of the member states would be somewhat incomplete and odd. The EU member states are crucial factors in shaping the EU’s foreign and security policies (cf. Cameron 2007: 40ff; cf. Smith 2008: 49ff). The role of the member states in foreign policy making weighs so heavy that one cannot observe stability on the EU level and not ask for the role that the member states play in contributing to this stability. The reasons for a specific EU foreign policy must be sought in the relationship of the Union level and the member states. How do they act together (or against each other) in order to account for a specific outcome?

Therefore, tackling the second research question of this thesis necessitates developing a concept which can account for the stability of a discourse and at the same time is capable of analyzing the relationship between the Union level and the member states level concerning this discourse.

Maarten Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions seems to be a promising starting point for the development of a concept that fulfils these criteria that I just mentioned because it focuses on the question of how a certain discourse can become (and remain) stable
given the interplay of different actors (cf. Hajer 1993; Hajer 1995; Hajer 2005). As much as it seems to be a fruitful starting point, however, it needs to be adapted because it puts its focus too strongly on actors to be applicable in a poststructuralist framework. In the following, I will first present Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions. I will argue that the concept is too close to coalitions of actors to be used without the risk of misunderstandings in a poststructuralist framework. Therefore, I will then translate the basic idea of discourse coalitions – according to which the dominance of a certain discourse is enabled by similar conceptualizations of central elements (‘story-lines’) of various other discourses which are also central elements of the dominant discourse – into a poststructuralist framework. I will reconceptualise them as constellations of discourses instead of discourse coalitions. And thirdly, I will sketch out four different ideal-types of constellations of security discourses regarding China, two of which are considered to be material and formal causes of stability of the Union level discourse.

3.4.1. The concept of discourse coalitions

Maarten Hajer set out to explain the emergence of the dominance of the ecological modernization discourse in the West: “The main historical thesis of this book concerns the emergence of ecological modernization as the new dominant policy discourse in the environmental domain” (Hajer 1995: 206). His basic idea is that the concept of discourse coalitions enables a “communicative miracle” that allows actors from various different backgrounds to find common ground in terms of problem analysis and solutions (ibid.: 42ff., 61). This is possible because of similar conceptualizations of central elements (‘story-lines’) of various other discourses which are also central elements of the dominant discourse. In a nutshell: He sets out to explain the stability of a specific discourse. Therefore, it seems promising to integrate such a concept into the poststructralist framework which tends to underline the contingency and fragility of all discursive constructions (cf. Wæver 2002: 23; Diez 1999: 45; Laclau/Mouffe 1985). In a poststructuralist understanding, fixations of meaning can only be temporary as articulations of the discourse reproduce and reshape the discourse constantly. In this process of meaning production, discursive struggles – struggles over meaning – are a constant feature (cf. Diez 2013). On the other hand, one may think of discursive
constructions such as state or nation (cf. Wæver 2002) which are so firmly sedimented that gradual change occurs only in longer time spans. This does not mean, however, that these meanings are undisputed.

Change and instability is thus an inherent feature of discourse, which results from different sources: First, it can be the result of the process of constant re-articulation and reproduction of a discourse, possibly stemming from inconsistencies internal to the discourse. Second, it may result from external events when “a hegemonic discourse becomes dislocated when it is confronted by new events that it cannot explain, represent, or in other ways domesticate” (Torfing 2005: 16). And finally, dominant discourses may change or be replaced by others if a constellation of discourses appears which Hajer labelled “discourse coalitions” (Hajer 1995; cf. Rogers 2009). Discourse coalitions, however, may as well work the other way round and – once they replaced another discourse – enhance the stability of the incumbent dominant discourse (cf. Hajer 1995).

Therefore, the concept of discourse coalitions seems to be particularly suited for the present research interest, as it cannot only account for stability of discourses, but also gives insights into the relationships of different discourses – in this case, the relationship between discourses on the Union-level and discourses on the member states’ level.

Hajer starts from a social constructivist notion of discourse which he defines as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44). He identifies and delimits discourses by allocating discourses to different subjects, such as physics or natural sciences in general, economics, engineering, jurisdiction, philosophy and so on (cf. Hajer 1995: 44f.). Hajer follows the work of Michael Billig (1987) and Rom Harré (Davies/Harré 1990) and their “social-interactionist” approach to discourse analysis which stresses the role of individual action: “[...] the social interactionists argue that persons are constituted by discursive practices, and they conceptualize human interaction as an exchange of arguments, of contradictory suggestions of how one is to make sense of reality” (Hajer 1995: 53).

In order to allow for inter-discursive communication of actors coming from various discursive backgrounds, Hajer introduces two “middle range concepts”: “story lines” and “discourse coalitions” (ibid.: 61). Story lines are conceptualized as “narratives on
social reality through which elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding” (Hajer 1995: 62). They derive their power from “discursive affinities” which means that the different elements of the story-line “have a similar cognitive or discursive structure which suggest that they belong together” (ibid.: 66f.). Discourse coalitions are conceptualized as “the ensemble of (1) a set of story-lines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based” (Hajer 1995: 65). In order to show how hegemonic discourses come about, discourse coalitions play a crucial role, as in discourse coalitions actors from diverse discursive backgrounds may link up with one another around the story-lines (cf. ibid.: 61).

Such a concept of discourse coalitions is, however, not easily applicable in a poststructuralist framework. This is not so much because of the constructivist framework of his discourse coalitions, but because Hajer’s discourse coalitions remain very close to such a coalition of actors, which would be problematic from a discourse-analytical perspective:38 The very definition of discourse coalitions (see above) features actors as a core element of the coalitions. The story lines, which make up the “discourse part” of the coalition can be considered more or less as a means to facilitate the communication between the actors; therefore, the “communicative miracle” enabling actors to talk to and understand each other plays a central role in Hajer’s concept (Hajer 1995: 42ff). Furthermore, his general ‘social-interactionist’ approach stresses the role of individual action and thus the boundary lines between his discourse coalitions and Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988)39 become rather blurry at some points of the analysis.

38 Cf. the discussion of the role of the subject in poststructuralist discourse theory in Diez 1999: 49f.
39 Paul Sabatier (1988) conceptualizes advocacy coalitions as coalitions of individual actors (policy elites) of specific areas of policy areas, policy analysts, journalists and so on. It is about their specific interaction, given their specific believe systems and the processes of social learning (Sabatier 1988: 131).
3.4.2. Discourse coalitions in a poststructuralist framework:

Constellations of discourses

Instead of talking about coalitions in this regard, in a poststructuralist framework it is more suitable to speak of constellations. The difference is that coalition might be understood as being related to interest-based, rational action of actors, whereas constellation signifies a more passive, structural pattern of the relationship between different discourses. Focusing on a constellation allows to leave aside questions regarding the reasons for this constellation, for example, the rational action of actors who aimed at reaching a specific constellation (this would be questions in the context of a coalition: Who forms a coalition with whom and why?). Focusing on a constellation allows analyzing the consequences of this particular structural pattern for a given phenomenon. This means, whether we focus on constellations of discourses or on constellations of actors who adhere to certain discourses does not make a difference in this respect. Applying these constellations to the relationship of the EU and its member states therefore avoids the risk of ending up in analyzing and talking about a coalition of actors and their motivations in forming them. One can simply analyze the constellations of discourses which are dominant on the level of the different member states and on the Union level and draw conclusions about the stability of the respective discourses without asking why certain discourses are dominant in certain member states.

Distilling down Hajer’s approach, the basic idea is that the dominance of a certain discourse is enabled by similar conceptualizations of central elements (‘story-lines’) of various other discourses which are also central elements of the dominant discourse. Thus, if in different discourses central elements are constructed in the same or a similar manner, i.e. if there is ‘discursive affinity’, these discourses reinforce and thus stabilize each other. That is to say: Because of the absence of discursive struggles, of struggles over meaning, specific ‘constellations of same or similar discursive constructions’ can stabilize the discursive constructions which are in the focus of the analysis.

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40 The latin origin of these two terms reflect this differentiation: whereas ‘coalescere’ can be translated as actively ‘coming together’, ‘constellatio’ designates the fixed ‘positions of the stars’.
41 Cf. Thomas Diez (1999a: 328, 1999b: 607 ) who applies the concept of “Anschlussfähigkeit” (‘affinity’ or ‘mutual translatability’) of discourses as an indicator of the power of discourses.
In the framework of causal explanation in a poststructuralist approach, such idealtypically reconstructed constellations of same or similar discourses can be considered to be the formal causes of the stability of specific discourses. The very fact of the presence of these constellations of discourses can be considered to be the material cause.

Applied to the case of EU security policy regarding China, the constellations of same or similar discursive constructions of security policy regarding China between the Union level and the member states’ level can be considered to be the formal cause of the stability of the Union-level discursive construction of security policy regarding China. This means specifically: If there are the same or similar discursive constructions of security regarding China (e.g. one or more of the ideal-types of security that were developed in section 3.3.) on the member states’ and the Union level, one can consider this to be the material and formal cause of the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China.

We can assume that if a decisive\textsuperscript{42} number of member states discursively constructs security policy regarding China in the same or in a similar manner as the EU level constructions, we can expect that the EU’s constructions remain stable. And vice versa, in the case of the absence of the formal cause, i.e. in the case of the absence of a decisive number of same or similar discursive constructions of security policy regarding China, that is to say, in the case of many different, possibly competing discursive constructions of security policy regarding China, we can expect to find discursive struggles which would impede a longer lasting stability of the discourse on the Union level.

\subsection*{3.4.3. Ideal-types of constellations of discourses}

The question now is how these constellations of same or similar discourses of security policy regarding China between the Union level and the member states’ level can be applied specifically. It would certainly be beyond the limits of this thesis to include 28

\textsuperscript{42} The term ‘decisive number’ is sufficient here in the theory chapter. This term is insufficient, however, with regard to an empirical analysis. The question, what specific number of EU member states need to share the same or a similar discursive construction of security towards China needs to be answered on a case specific basis and is subject to a verdict of plausibility. As I will focus on the ‘big three’ Germany, France and the UK, I will argue that the decisive number in my case is two of these three member states.
discourses of security policy regarding China and distinguish between the different constellations of same, similar or competing constructions.

Therefore, I will focus on the analysis of the official governmental discourses of security policy regarding China of the governments of Germany, France and the UK, i.e. the so-called ‘big three’. This is a legitimate simplification as one can assume that these three countries play a decisive role in the EU foreign policy making machinery. For this reason, it is common in EU foreign policy analyses to focus on these three states. Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, for example, see France, Germany and the UK as “primus inter pares” (Manners/Whitman 2000) and Wolfram Hilz sees them as an “impeded leadership trio” (Hilz 2005). In the case of the EU’s China policies, Stumbaum (2009b) and Grant and Barysch (2008) also focus on the ‘big three’ in their analyses. And Algieri states that the UK, France and Germany are “without any doubt [...] the most influential in defining the European China policy” (Algieri 2008: 80).

We thus have to analyze ideal-typical constellations of discourses of security policy regarding China between the Union level and the three member states Germany, France and the United Kingdom.44

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43 This is not only a legitimate but also an inevitable decision because of the lack of knowledge in other languages, such as for example, Spanish, Italian, Polish, Hungarian etc.

44 In the following graphic, I visualize the Union level and the three member states. This is, however, not to say that on these levels there have to be clearly separable or even mutually exclusive discourses or discursive constructions. To the contrary, there may not only be similar discursive constructions in two or more member states and the Union, there may be even identical discursive constructions, which could be conceptualized as belonging to one and the same discourse.
It is to be noted that constellations of discourses between the Union level and the member states level can stabilize the discourses in all member states as well as the Union level. However, as the focus of this thesis is on the question of why the Union level is stable, I will in the following analyze constellations in order to explain the stability of the Union construction and not the constructions on the member states level; although, as I just said, this would be also possible given a different research interest.

Returning to the question how the continuous stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China can be explained, there are two different ideal-typified constellations of security discourses regarding China which would formally cause stability on the Union level. And there are also two ideal-typified constellations which would formally cause instability of the Union level discourse.

First, a constellation of security discourses regarding China that encompasses all three member states as well as the Union. In this case, there are the same or similar discursive constructions of security policy regarding China in all three member states and the Union. This constellation is stable as there is hardly any position conceivable from which a competing discursive construction could challenge this discursive constellation. Regarding the recurring question in the literature on EU-China relations of whether there is a common European strategy regarding China, this constellation would suggest that there is a common European strategy.
Second, one may conceive of a constellation of discourses which comprises two member states as well as the Union. In this case, there is also reason to expect stability as the deviating position may not impede a common Union-level position due to the above mentioned mechanisms of package deals or the legally non-binding nature of Council Conclusions for the member states, resulting in occasional vertical incoherence. There is, however, one limitation to the expectation of stability in this case: If the discursive constructions of the ‘deviating’ member state are contradictory to and incompatible with the constructions of the Union and the other member states, one needs to check on a case-specific basis if this has consequences for the expected stability.
Figure 3.8.: Constellation of security discourses regarding China (type 2)

One can also conceive of constellations which are instable but tend to result in stable constellations. For example, when the constellation of discourses is formed by all three member states but without the Union-level. This constellation would, however, quickly result in the first constellation of discourses described here, as the member states discourses would most probably replace the construction on the Union-level.

There are, however, two constellations which are unstable and for which one cannot formulate expectations of how the discursive struggles may end.

If two member states form a constellation of same or similar discursive constructions and the third state forms another constellation of same or similar discourses together with the Union-level, one would expect instability because of discursive struggles.
And finally, there is a constellation of discourses with no same or similar constructions of security policy regarding China at all. Therefore, discursive struggles – and thus instability – between the three member states as well as between them and the Union level are expected.
3.4.4. Conclusion

To sum up: I have argued that the concept of discourse coalitions proved fruitful in offering the possibility to account for the stability of a discourse and the possibility to integrate the EU member states in analyzing the EU’s security discourse regarding China. I have transferred this concept into a poststructuralist framework and adapted it to ideal-typified constellations of discourses. The difference to the Hajer’s discourse coalitions in which actors and their communication play a central role lies in fact that I am asking for the structural pattern of the constellations of discourses, which in my case happen to be tied to the central actors in EU security policy making. The focus lies on the structural pattern of these constellations and not on the actors and their interests, strategies or communication in forming discourse coalitions. In another setting, the constellations of discourses can be applied without having to be tied to the EU and its member states.

I argued further that the existence of constellations of same or similar security discourses regarding China between the Union level and the member states’ level are the material, the specific kinds of constellations the formal causes of the stability of the
Union level discourse.

The specific constellations of discourses between the Union level and the member states will be reconstructed in chapter 6.3.

After the conclusion of the theory chapter, I will turn to specifying the methodical issues of this thesis.

3.5. Conclusion: Explaining EU security policy regarding China

This chapter was dedicated to providing the theoretical basis for responding to the two research questions. These are, first, What is EU security policy regarding China and how can it best be captured analytically? and second, Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?

In the first part of the chapter (3.1.), I have argued that poststructuralist discourse theory is particularly suited to address the two research questions of this thesis for two reasons: First, it has been argued that there is substantial disagreement about what EU security policy regarding China actually is. By reconstructing the discourses of the research object, a poststructuralist approach allows leaving aside fixed theoretical concepts and provides a greater conceptual openness. In the case of a sui generis security policy of a sui generis actor, this is a particular advantage. And second, the general nature of the second research question does not require a focus on particular decisions, a particular institutional setup or particular legal provisions but instead requires a focus on the general lines of a policy, on a more general level of meaning construction.

Both research questions have the EU’s security policy as its general point of interest. Poststructuralism, however, operates primarily on the level of discourse. Chapter 3.2. therefore deals with the questions of the relationship between discourse and policy and with the tightly related question of the possibility of a causal connection between discourse and policy and the possibility of causal explanation in a poststructuralist approach in general. In order to introduce the possibility of causally explaining policy from discourse, I have made a three step-argument. First, I have argued that Patrick Jackson’s Analyticism and poststructuralism share the basic meta-theoretical commitments. As Jackson confirms the possibility of causality in Analyticism by means
of ideal-types, I argued that causal explanation is also possible in a poststructuralist approach. Second, I have argued that the specific role of ideal-types in a poststructuralist approach can be specified by referring to the work of Milija Kurki, who has broadened the concept of causality beyond the narrow Humean understanding. A concept of constitutive causality based on material and formal causes can be fruitfully applied in a poststructuralist framework.

Chapter 3.3. is specifically dedicated to responding to the first research question. I have developed four different ideal-types of security which serve as analytical tools for the discourse analysis of the EU’s security discourse. I argued that if we can analytically capture the EU’s security discourse by means of these ideal-types, we can assume, based on the argument of chapter 3.2., that the EU’s security policy follows this discursive constructions in general lines. These ideal-types differ in the question of the locus of security, i.e. whether security is an attribute of an actor or an attribute of a relationship, and in the question of the logic of security, i.e. whether security only makes sense in an anarchic, self-help environment or whether security also makes sense in a non-anarchic, non self-help environment. It has been shown that the relational ideal-type indeed is able to capture the descriptions of EU security policy as given by Berenskoetter (2005) and Oedgaard/Biscop (2007).

Finally, in chapter 3.4., I set out to tackle the second research question about the reasons for the continuous stability of the EU’s security policy regarding China. Inspired by Maarten Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions, I have developed four ideal-typical constellations of security discourses between the EU and the three EU member states UK, France and Germany. Two of those can explain the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China as its material and formal causes.
4. Methods

This methods chapter has to respond to three questions. First, which documents do I select, where do I find them and what is the time frame of the analysis? Second, what is the relationship between the researcher and these documents in a poststructuralist approach? And third, how do I analyze the documents specifically, given that the official documents contain largely diplomatic language?

Recalling figure 3.2. (chapter 3.2.3.), I have separated between discourse, consisting of the context (structures of meaning) and articulations (in form of verbal utterances), and policy, conceptualized as executed deeds. According to this figure, by analysing the EU documents (articulations), I will reconstruct the context (structures of meaning) and thus the EU’s security discourse regarding China. This security discourse can thus be considered to be the material and formal cause of the EU’s liberal-relational security policy regarding China.

4.1. Time frame and selection of documents

The analysis of the EU discourse will start in 1995 with the first Communication of the European Commission concerning China. In the case of the EU member states, I will start earlier, as in the case of Germany, the first Asia Strategy with many references to China was issued in 1993 and as in the case of France, the first Joint Statement of the French and the Chinese government after the incident on Tiananmen Square in 1989 was issued in 1994. For Britain, it is in the years from 1993 onwards that the preparations of the negotiations with China concerning the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 gain intensity.

In order to respond to the first research question of this thesis, the focus lies on the official EU discourse on security policy regarding China, or more specifically, the EU’s
official discursive construction of security policy regarding China. For that reason, it is not the multitude of different European discourses on security regarding China as they may exist in the public, in the media, in the cultural sector, in the economic sector, in the European Parliament or elsewhere. It is the official discourse which is put forward by the EU institutions which are responsible for formulating and executing EU security policy regarding China. These are, according to the treaty of Lisbon, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the European Commission and the European Council and the respective presidencies of the Council (TEU Art. 21-46). According to the treaty of Maastricht (Art. J-J.11) as well as to the treaty of Amsterdam and Nice (TEU, Art. 11-28), the European Council, the Council, the general secretary of the Council which is simultaneously High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission (cf. ibid.: Art. 27) are the central institutions (cf. Cameron 2007: 40; cf. Algieri 2008:80).

The role of the Commission, however, might be questioned, but it is argued here, that the Commission, too, plays a central role in the EU’s foreign and security policies. Catherine Gegout sees the Commission as having a “major impact on the shape of CFSP outcomes [...]. The Commission can promote its own preferences to the detriment of some states, even big states” (Gegout 2010: 161; cf. also Edwards 2005: 53). This capacity is mainly due to the ‘packaging’ capabilities, by which the Commission negotiates package deals of several measures with the member states as well as to the information asymmetry by which the Commission can have an advance in certain topics and can thus engage in agenda setting or – as just mentioned – engage in forging package deals (cf. Gegout 2010: 162f.).

Locating the Council firmly on the side of the Union may raise some doubts and questions; however, previous research has shown that there is a common Union-level discourse which can be reconstructed from the documents of the Commission as well as the documents of the Council (Renner 2012). Despite the need for unanimity in Council decisions on foreign and security political issues, there is no direct and one-to-one translation of member states’ positions into Council positions. This ‘not-one-to-one’ translation of member states’ positions into Council positions is due to two circumstances: First, a strong role of Union-level actors such as the Commission (see

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45 Not least because of the provisions of the treaties: A strong role of the European Commission in the CFSP has been fixed in the treaties since Maastricht in Article J.9 (and Art. 27 in the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice) and especially since the treaty of Lisbon by which the High Representative became Vice President of the Commission (TEU Art. 18 and Art. 27).
Methods

above, Gegout 2010) or the Council’s secretariat, together with a strong role of the High Representative, who (pre-Lisbon) was also general secretary of the Council’s secretariat and who now is Commissioner for foreign relations and vice-president of the European Commission (cf. Cameron 2007: 48). And second, there is a lack of vertical coherence. The crucial question in this respect is, as Nuttall puts it “to what extent are member states prepared to bind their national foreign policies to the outcome of the CFSP and the EU’s other external relations policies [...]?” (Nuttall 2005: 106). As there are no legally binding mechanisms which could force the member states to oblige the decisions taken in the Council, they may be reluctant to implement these decisions in their own policies. Hence, given the weak binding quality and the capacities of Union-level actors to negotiate package deals, there is no necessary direct one-to-one link between the member states positions and the outcomes of Council decisions.

For these reasons, the Council can be conceived of as a Union-level institution and thus more than just a mirror of the member states’ positions; all the more given the already ascertained coherent Union-level discourse on China.

The European Parliament will be neglected in this analysis as its influence on the foreign and security political decision-making process is negligible (cf. Edwards 2005: 57).

The documents that will be analyzed are the official policy papers and Communications that are issued by the above mentioned institutions as well as speeches of the respective top representatives on special representative occasions (such as EU-China summits). These documents are easily accessible online via the webpages of the EU and the European External Action Service as well as the respective websites of the President of the Commission and the High Representative, where speeches and other relevant documents can be found.

In order to respond to the second research question of this thesis, the focus lies on the official discourse in the three EU member states on security policy regarding China, or more specifically, the official discursive construction of security policy regarding China.

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46 One may argue that many policies that the European Parliament is initiating or co-deciding can be subsumed under a broader understanding of security policy. However, the main actors (for example in trade negotiations, climate negotiations, negotiations about bilateral agreements, international and bilateral summits) remain the Commission and the Council. Therefore, their discursive constructions remain at the centre of this analysis.

by the three member states UK, France and Germany. I will focus on the official discursive constructions which are to be found in the relevant foreign and security political institutions of the three countries.\textsuperscript{48}

In the case of the UK, this is the prime minister and the cabinet office respectively as well as the foreign and Commonwealth office (cf. Forster 2000: 49). For the UK, only a few documents from UK-China summits could be found. The efforts to reconstruct the UK’s discursive construction of security policy regarding China had to focus on the speeches and written answers of the prime minister, the foreign minister and the respective state ministers in the parliament. The documents can be found via the homepage of the so-called ‘Hansard’, in which all the parliamentary debates from 1803 to the present day are available.\textsuperscript{49} Further speeches of UK officials concerning China for the time between 2006 and 2011 were found on the website of the UK embassy in China which is accessible via the National Archives.\textsuperscript{50} Other documents like the security strategy were found via the website of the UK government.\textsuperscript{51}

In the case of France, the relevant institutions are the president, the foreign minister and the prime minister (cf. Blunden 2000: 28). The documents were found primarily via the website of the archive of the French foreign ministry which also contained the speeches and press statements of the president and the prime minister to all occasions like Franco-Chinese summits.\textsuperscript{52} Strategy papers like the security strategy were found via the website of the “Direction de l’information légale et administrative” which is assigned to the prime minister’s office.\textsuperscript{53}

In the case of Germany, relevant foreign and security political institutions are the chancellor and the foreign minister (cf. Oppermann/Höse 2007: 46-51; cf. Aggestam 2000). All the relevant documents and speeches were found via the website of the “Bulletin” of the Federal Government as well as on the website of the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{54}

In the analysis of the French and German discourse, I will provide the original French

\textsuperscript{48} I have argued in chapter 3.4.3. that it is legitimate from a scientific standpoint to focus on the ‘big three’ Germany, France and the UK in order to analyze EU foreign policy. There is, however, also a reason purely related to methodical questions: Countries like Spain or Poland could not be included into the analysis because of a lack of knowledge of the respective languages by the author.

\textsuperscript{49} http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/; http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/

\textsuperscript{50} http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http://www.uk.cn/.

\textsuperscript{51} https://www.gov.uk/.

\textsuperscript{52} http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/

\textsuperscript{53} http://www.vie-publique.fr/.

\textsuperscript{54} http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Service/Bulletin/_node.html; http://www.auswaertiges- amt.de.
and German quotes in the footnotes, in order to give the reader the opportunity to judge my reconstructions from this textual basis on her or his own.

In cases where the available sources were only few, I also included the speeches of other ministers like the minister for economic affairs, defence minister or the respective ambassadors in China into the analysis.

Interviews have not been conducted, because this would have complicated the reconstruction of the official discursive constructions of security rather than facilitated it. Poststructuralist discourse analysis, though not exclusively relying on public texts, relies to a considerable extent on public representations of foreign policies which leads poststructuralist foreign policy analysts to “a concern with public texts” (Hansen 2012: 106). This is because, first, it is not a theory of decision-making, groupthink or psychology of the relevant actors, it is a theory about the construction of meaning and its impact on the general lines of the policies in question. Conducting interviews would drag the researcher into the sensitivities and turf wars between institutions, between departments and between decision-makers. The researcher would thus be confronted with a whole lot more than just the official discursive construction of security regarding China. This restraint to publicly available documents, however, is not a weakness of poststructuralist discourse theory, but a strength. As Wæver puts it:

What is often presented as a weakness of discourse analysis – ‘how do you find out if they really mean what they say?,’ ‘what if it is only rhetoric?’ – can be turned into a methodological strength, as soon as one is conscientious in sticking to discourse as discourse. One often finds a confusion of discourse analysis with psychological or cognitive approaches, or a commonsensical assumption that the ‘real’ motives must be what we are all interested in, and texts can only be a (limited) means to get to this. Not so! Structures within discourses condition possible policies. In particular overall policy must hold a definite relationship to discursive structure, because it is always necessary for policy makers to be able to argue ‘where this takes us’ [...]. (Wæver 2002: 27)

And particularly for foreign policy analysis where the ‘real’ motives are often almost impossible to investigate, it becomes a huge methodological advantage to stay at the level of public discourse (cf. Wæver 1998a: 107).
4.2. How to get from document to discourse: The researcher’s role, the documents and the discourse

Having delimited the body of documents that was analyzed, the question arises what these documents are in relation to the EU’s and the member states’ discursive constructions of security that I aim to reconstruct and how the researcher relates to both.

As has been pointed out in section 3.2.1. of the theory chapter, the researcher in a poststructuralist discourse-analytical approach does not have an objective access to reality. The documents that pile on the desk of the researcher must not be mistaken for part of an ‘objective reality’ that ‘speaks for itself’ and only need to be analyzed in order to ‘find’ the security discourses. In their form of pure paper materiality (or, for that matter, pure binary digitality on the computer screen), they are parts and products of a variety of different discourses, such as, for example discourses of the culture of writing, discourses of the EU as a legal community, discourses of transparency and accountability, discourses of economic policies, foreign policies, security policies and so on. More specifically – and recalling the graphic from chapter 3.2.3. – the documents contain the articulations of all these different discourses by means of which one can reconstruct the contextual side of the discourses, the structures of meaning, and thus the whole discourse as object of research (scientific ontology).

Following a philosophical-ontological understanding of discourse (as a way of analyzing things), the discourse as research object (consisting of the articulations and the context) can be reconstructed by the researcher by active operations of distinguishing and naming (cf. Diez 1999: 52). Or, to be more precise: The discursive constructions of security regarding China can be reconstructed by these active operations of distinguishing and naming.

The question now is, how do we distinguish and name? This is done by means of ideal-types. Ideal-types help to structure and order the expressions of the various discourses in the documents. That is to say, in order to reconstruct the discourse of the culture of writing, one would need ideal-types of (certain elements of) the culture of writing. For the purposes of this thesis, the ideal-types of security which were developed in chapter
3.3. help to reconstruct the discursive constructions of security which are contained in the documents (that is: if they are contained in the documents). Therefore, the ideal-types of security are guidelines which help both the researcher to organize these processes of distinguishing, naming and reconstructing the security discourses as well as the audience to follow and evaluate these research processes.

According to the ideal-types of security that were developed in chapter 3.3. and keeping in mind the ‘core definition’ of security as identification of threats and the formulation of timely responses to these threats, the constructions of security in the documents will be analyzed according to how threats and which threats are constructed (is China constructed as a threat? Or what else is constructed as a threat? Are hostile actors or relational dynamics constructed as threatening?) and whether and how timely responses are formulated in order to address these threats (e.g. are threats addressed by military means, policies of détente, reconciliation efforts or by management of relationships?). Following from the construction of the threats, I expect that the respective referent objects (who is threatened?), the values (what exactly is threatened? The survival, economic well-being, global status etc?), and the security provider (who can achieve security for the referent object?) will be simultaneously – implicitly or explicitly – constructed. Ideally, the constructions of security regarding China in the documents correspond to one or more of the ideal-types that were developed. These ideal-types of security can then be conceptualized – according to chapter 3.2. of this thesis – as material and formal causes of security policy regarding China.

If there are, however, no discursive constructions of security, either due to the lack of a construction of a threat or the construction of a timely response, then I will ask how China is constructed and in which context China is placed. Then we do not get the constructions of security but still an idea of how China is constructed in more general terms.

Furthermore, I will only consider the constructions in the documents as relevant for the reconstruction of the ideal-types which are expressed at least twice or more often. For discursive constructions to be discursive constructions, i.e. structures of meaning, they should be a continuous feature in the analysed material.

Having reconstructed the discursive constructions of security regarding China on the EU level and on the level of the three member states, I can then determine whether there
Methods

are constellations of these constructions which correspond to one of the ideal-typical constellations of discursive constructions that I developed in chapter 3.4. If I find that one of the two constellations which cause stability can be reconstructed, we then have the explanation for the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China.

4.3. Analyzing the documents

Working with this body of empirical material raises some more specific questions that need to be addressed.

First, as already explained above, I will reconstruct the discursive constructions of security regarding China by means of the ideal-types of security. I will present detailed quotes of the constructions of security and China that fit into the frameworks of the ideal-types in order to give the reader the possibility to draw the same or different conclusions from the quotations. I will furthermore not try to overly structure and arrange the material as this would already be an interpretation of the material that might be biased. The overall structure will be chronologic, taking the issuing of policy papers and major strategies as landmarks from which one might determine whether the constructions have remained stable or not. For the reasons of clarity and readability, I will nevertheless structure according to different issues of concern within the different periods.

And second, as we are dealing with documents with a largely diplomatic language, the question arises, what sort of statements do we expect? For example, do we expect to find statements of the sort that ‘China is a hostile nation which we have to deter’? How do we know whether in these diplomatically formulated documents and speeches it is really expressed what the policy makers mean? This last question has been already responded to in the previous section 4.1. in the way that it is not a weakness, but a strength of poststructuralist discourse analysis to stay at the level of the discourse and the discursive constructions rather than to dive into the universe of ‘what they really mean’ (cf. Wæver 2002). Basically, it is not about which statements are made, but how

55 Extensive quotations may remind more of a dissertation in history than in political science. It is, however, indispensable to provide a solid textual basis for the reconstruction of the constructions of security.
‘security regarding China’ is constructed. The question, however, what we expect to find, how we expect the constructions of security to be presented, remains. It is therefore worth to take a quick look at a security discourse on China in which we most certainly expect to find a construction of security that does – at least partly – construct China as a potential threat: The US security discourse regarding China.

The official US discursive construction of security regarding China is characterized by a basic dichotomy. On the one hand, China is constructed as a power with which cooperation and good relations are vital. On the other hand, there is a basic uncertainty about China’s intentions and thus, basically, China is constructed as constituting a – potential or probable – threat to the US.

To take the example of the 2009 Joint Communiqué: Both sides underline that regular exchanges between leaders of the two countries are essential to the long-term, sound, and steady growth of U.S.-China relations. [...] The two sides reiterated that they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century, and will take concrete actions to steadily build a partnership to address common challenges. (Government of the United States of America/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2009)

In its National Security Strategy (2010), too, the US underlines the necessity to cooperate with China “in areas of mutual interest” and to pursue “a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China” (The President of the United States 2010: 43). However, parallel to these statements of the necessity of a positive and constructive relationship, there are clear constructions of distance and of a basic uncertainty about China’s intentions. The Joint Communiqué of 2009 states: “The goal of these efforts is to improve their capabilities for practical cooperation and foster greater understanding of each other’s intentions and of the international security environment” (Government of the United States of America/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2009). A great deal of uncertainty about the motives and intentions of ‘the other’ speaks out of this statement. A few lines later, it becomes clear,

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56 This is the basis of the so-called approach of ‘congagement’: A combination of engagement and containment (cf. Rudolf 2006)
what dimension this uncertainty has: “They reaffirmed their commitment made on 27 June 1998 not to target at each other the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control” (ibid.). The uncertainty about the intentions is in fact about the projection of existential threats to one another.

The potential threat that China poses to the US (and its interests) is also visible when it is not explicitly spelled out. In a speech at Tsinghua University and being asked about the US-China relations and Taiwan, President Bush did not explicitly state that China poses a threat, but strongly and unmistakably referred to the Taiwan Relations Act: “[...] And, secondly, when my country makes an agreement, we stick with it. And there is called the Taiwan Relations Act, and I honor that act, which says we will help Taiwan defend herself if provoked. But we've also sent the same message that there should be no provocation by either party for a peaceful dialogue” (Bush 2002). The Taiwan Relations Act states that the US considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”; therefore it is essential “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan” (Government of the United States of America 1979). The unspoken source of such a threat is naturally not Japan nor the Philippines but of course the People’s Republic of China. Potentially – and even probably – China is perceived as a serious threat to the US security and interests.

That is to say, the official security discourse regarding China by the construction of uncertainty about China’s future behaviour opens a ‘discursive space’ which then can be filled by other constructions.

The National Security Strategies and strategy papers from the defence department are more explicit in this respect and fill in this ‘discursive space’ opened by the construction of uncertainty. The National Security Strategy of 2002 states that “our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities” (The President of the United States 2002: 36). And the 2010 Security Strategy reiterates that the US “will monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected” (The President of the United States 2010: 43). In defence-related terms (and military-thinking is undoubtedly an influential strand in the US political arena, as – among others – the presence of high ranking military personal
China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China’s growing military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities. Our interaction with China will be long-term and multi-dimensional and will involve peacetime engagement between defense establishments as much as fielded combat capabilities. The objective of this effort is to mitigate near term challenges while preserving and enhancing U.S. national advantages over time. (United States Department of Defense 2008: 3)

The distance and uncertainty about China’s motives and intentions which is expressed in the Joint Communiqué is amended by the statements of the respective security and strategy papers which ‘fill’ this distance and uncertainty with the need to prepare for an aggressive China and therefore to pursue a policy of hedging against China. This construction of security policy regarding China is in its core an understanding of security which comes closest to the neorealist ideal-type of security. Security in this understanding is the attribute of the United States and threats emerge from potentially hostile actors which need to be addressed accordingly. Although it is acknowledged that national securities are interdependent and impact upon each other (which is basically the concept of ‘international security’), the possibility of achieving security in a relationship is excluded. Security can ultimately only be achieved by preparing the nation against external threats and averting potentially hostile actors from projecting threats to the nation.

Therefore, the construction of an uncertainty about China’s motives and future actions is an indicator for a possible construction of China as a threat. Hence, if instances of uncertainty about China and its motives are found in the analyzed discourses, the search has to be expanded in order to look for constructions which fill in this uncertainty. For example, in the case of the UK’s discourse, one might expect in this context that the role
of the Five Power Defence Agreements\textsuperscript{57} is underlined (cf. Bersick 2009a, 2009b). However, this can be said at this point, neither the Five Power Defence Agreements play any role in the UK’s security discourse on China, nor are there any constructions of uncertainty about China’s future behaviour in the analysed discourses.

I will now turn to the analysis of the EU’s security discourse regarding China.

\textsuperscript{57} The Five Power Defence Agreements are a series of agreements between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, cf. Thayer 2007.
5. Discourse Analysis I: The EU’s security discourse regarding China

This chapter is dedicated to responding to the first research question: *What is EU security policy regarding China and how can we analytically capture it?* In a nutshell, the answer is that the EU’s security *discourse* corresponds to the liberal and relational ideal-types of security and that the EU’s security *policy* regarding China therefore is a liberal and relational security policy.

In the first part of this chapter (5.1.), I will reconstruct the EU’s security discourse regarding China by means of the ideal-types of security that I have developed in chapter 3.3. I will first give a short summary of the basic features of the EU’s discursive construction of security regarding China and then turn to analyze the respective documents and speeches of EU officials between 1995 and 2014. The EU’s discursive constructions of security regarding China remain continuously stable over the analyzed period, therefore there are no substantial reasons which would necessitate any sort of arrangement of the material according to changes in the discourse or policy. I will therefore arrange the empirical material according to the major reference documents (policy papers, strategies) concerning the EU’s security-political approach regarding China. This allows to pinpoint the continuity (or, if there were any, the changes) in the discursive constructions.

These documents are the very first China Strategy of the EU (European Commission 1995a), the very first European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council 2003), the very first Security Strategy towards East Asia (Council of the European Union 2007b), the evaluation of the ESS (European Council 2008), the evaluation of the Security Strategy towards East Asia (Council of the European Union 2012b), and the “EU China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” (European Union 2013).
The periods and thus subsections of this chapter which result from these documents are thus:

- 1995-2003: From the first China Strategy to the ESS
- 2013-2014: From the ‘EU China Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’ to the present day

In the second part of this chapter (5.2.), I will then reconstruct the EU’s constructions of the Galileo satellite navigation project, the arms embargo issue and the question of energy security. As I have shown in the discussion of the scholarly literature (2.2.), the first two issues are contentious issues which are often presented in the scholarly literature as either the reasons or the consequences of a policy change of the EU towards China. Furthermore, I will reconstruct the discourse on energy security, which is of great security-political importance to the EU, but which is largely neglected in the scholarly literature. I will show, to the contrary, that the EU’s constructions of these issues fit perfectly well into the overall discourse which remained continuously stable.

In the third part of this chapter (5.3.), I will recall the causal connection between discourse and policy (based on the discussions of chapter 3.2.4.) and argue that given the continuously stable security discourse regarding China in terms of the liberal and relational ideal-types of security, we can assume that the EU’s overall security policy regarding China also remained continuously stable and in line with the discourse.

A summary of the findings (5.4.) will conclude this chapter.

5.1. The EU’s security discourse on China: A liberal-relational construction of security

The EU’s construction of security regarding China has to be located in the lower row of the two-times-two table of security ideal-types, i.e. in the non-hostile dimension of the logic of security. Neither China nor East Asia or Asia is constructed as a threat to the EU
in terms of being hostile actors. In general, the notion of hostile actors is not present in the EU’s overall security discourse. It is rather conflicts of interests and relational dynamics like unresolved disputes or the consequences of the dynamics caused by the rise of China that are seen as potential sources of threats. This is in stark contrast to the US Security Strategies in which “enemies” and “tyrannies” feature high on the agenda (The President of the United States 2002, 2010). Even if Iran and its nuclear programme are seen as threats to the EU, the possibility for Iran to regain “the trust of the international community” by engaging in dialogue and negotiations and finally dismantling its programme is always open (European Council 2008: 3). In the discourse on China, China as an actor is never constructed as a threat and there are no constructions of uncertainties about China’s intentions and potential future hostile behaviour (as in the case of the US’s China discourse). Quite to the contrary: It is constructed as threatening if China was perceived as a threat by the European public, because this would damage this important relationship and foster demands for protectionism (which in turn would impact on the leading role of the EU in the global economy).

The referent object in the EU’s discursive construction of security regarding China is neither solely the EU nor solely the relationship of actors. The security of the EU is constructed as tightly connected to the security of China and the East Asian region.

When it comes to the main value to be secured for the EU, which is its leading role in the global economy, security is constructed as an attribute of the EU. The constructions of interests which are at stake for the EU in East Asia and the threats to regional security which impact directly upon EU security underline this view. However, it becomes quite clear quite quickly that the EU does not expect to be able to achieve security for itself without achieving security for China and the other states in East Asia. The very possibility of achieving security for the EU (securing its leading role in the global economy) is inextricably tied to the necessity to achieve security for China and East Asia. Security is thus constructed neither as purely an attribute of an actor nor as purely an attribute of a relationship. Instead these two conceptualizations are tightly intertwined.

Following from this overall concern, the EU strives for openness and stability of the global economic system as well as for security and stability in East Asia and China. Due

58 See also the discussion in Chapter 4.3.
to the ever growing importance of the East Asian and Chinese market, their stability and security is crucial for the achievement of the overarching goal of its globally leading role in the world (economic) system. Closely connected to this is the concern for the internal stability of China, which is also a recurring and important theme in the EU’s security discourse. Therefore, the support for the Chinese transition not only to a democratic system, but also towards a market economy is a central piece of its security discourse regarding China.

The security providers are thus both the EU and the East Asian states including China. The construction of the referent object (and following from this, the construction of the values and the security providers) therefore has features of both, the liberal and the relational ideal-type and cannot be easily put into the box of one of the two.

The threats and challenges that the EU faces do not emanate from hostile actors or from hostile relationships. Instead, overall concerns (as they threaten its leading position in the global economy) are the consequences of globalization as well as the ‘fluidity’ and the dynamic changes within the international system after the Cold War. Protectionism and protectionist trends are also constructed as serious challenges that potentially impact negatively on the security of the EU. Further challenges and threats are regional conflicts in East Asia due to unresolved territorial disputes, increasing armament programmes and potentials for distrust in the East Asian region, especially in the South China Sea, because they might destabilize the whole region which is one of the most important markets and trading partners for the EU. The same is true for the case of an instability of China or for a failure of integrating China into the international community.

With the exception of an instable or non-integrated China, in the case of which the threats would emanate from an actor (which then would correspond to the liberal ideal-type of security), the threats are constructed as emanating from dynamics of non-hostile relationships and therefore correspond to the relational ideal-type of security.

The response to a potentially unstable and protectionist international system and to coping with its fluidity consists in increasing efforts to manage global interdependence by aiming at the establishment of jointly agreed international rules. This is achieved by associating all stake-holders in the management of international affairs, by promoting

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59 In East Asia, actors may construct their security situation as corresponding to the common security ideal-type or to the neorealist security ideal-type, however, for the EU in its relationship with East Asia and China, there are no hostilities.
political dialogues and establishing partnerships of equals in order to find common analyses of the common challenges and by gaining greater understanding of each other’s viewpoints and problems. This goal of establishing a rules-based international (economic) system aims at the management of relationships in order to generate agreed rules according to which contradicting interests can compete or according to which contradicting interests can be reconciled and fits within the relational ideal-type of security.

In order to contribute to stability in the East Asian region, the EU’s economic presence is seen as a crucial asset. The EU aims at intensifying the trade relations with and within the region in order to make conflicts less possible and to increase cooperation. The EU also promotes confidence-building measures, regional cooperation and aims at the establishment of a regional security architecture. These policies are directed towards a group of actors and towards the management of their relations in order to solve or prevent security issues. Therefore, these responses can be considered as corresponding to the relational ideal-type of security. If, however, the EU’s and the regional actor’s interests concerning the means to achieve regional stability and security differ, they need to be reconciled by negotiations and dialogue. In this case, the constructions would qualify as liberal security.

In order to maintain its leading role in the global economy, the EU tries to improve its own competitiveness by gaining access to the markets in China and East Asia and consequently by engaging in a fair competition with China. Finally, in order to contribute to the stability and integration of China into the international community, the transformation process in China and its integration into international governance structures is supported. This policy aims at both stabilizing China by rewarding it for its achievements and stabilizing the international system by preventing the emergence of a left-out ‘maverick’ country that might act against it. These policies are targeted at a non-hostile actor, require a reconciliation of different interests and therefore correspond to the liberal ideal-type.

A general underlying feature of the EU’s security discourse regarding China is the call for the establishment of close and trustful relations with China and the countries of East Asia which can be considered as a general precondition for the achievement of security. This corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security.

I have just argued that there are constructions of threats, but are there also constructions
of timely responses to these threats, i.e. the second criterion which is necessary to identify a construction of security? Indeed, there are. We do find several times the expression of an urgency of engaging in the formulated policies. Furthermore, the very publication of the policy papers on China and (East) Asia and their frequent updates can be interpreted as guiding lines for immediate implementation in the current policy processes.

To sum up: The EU’s constructions of the threats, the referent objects, and the responses correspond to the liberal and the relational ideal-type of security. Of course, as ideal-types are oversimplifications and as the discursive constructions are complex, there is no one-to-one correspondence. However, the general and often even specific features of the reconstructed constructions of security regarding China correspond unmistakably with the liberal and relational ideal-types. We can therefore speak of a liberal-relational discursive construction of security regarding China. The following table sums up these results.
Table 5.1.: The EU’s security discourse regarding China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Liberal security</th>
<th>Relational security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>*(The actor): The EU</td>
<td>*(All actors and their relationships): The EU, China, the East Asian states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*(Of the actor): The EU’s leading role in the world economy</td>
<td>*(Of all actors, of the relationship): Regional stability in East Asia, China’s stability and integration, close relations between the EU and China/East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Provider</td>
<td>*(The actor): The EU</td>
<td>*(All actors): The EU, China, the East Asian states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>*(Emanating from actors): Instability of China, non-integration of China, (non-competitiveness of the EU)</td>
<td>*(Emanating from relational dynamics): Globalisation and fluidity of the international system, protectionism, regional conflicts in East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>*(Targeted towards actors): Stabilize China, Integrate China, (improve the EU’s competitiveness by fair competition with China)</td>
<td>*(Targeted towards relationships): Manage globalisation and fluidity (e.g. by a rules-based international system), act against protectionism, foster stability in East Asia (e.g. regional security architecture), build close relationships with China and East Asian states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will now set out to reconstruct the construction of security regarding China in greater detail by analyzing and discussing the respective documents and speeches of the EU and its officials.


5.1.1.1. The first Communication on China (1995): Threats, challenges and responses
The EU’s first strategy on China, which was issued in 1995, needs to be read against the background of the first EU Asia Strategy, which was issued one year earlier. The China Strategy itself states that it defines the “EU’s relationship with China in the spirit of the ‘new Asia strategy’” (European Commission 1995a: 3).
The central point of concern for the EU in its Asia Strategy is the possibility to lose out “on the economic miracle taking place in Asia” because of the “strong competition” from Japan and the United States in the Asian markets (European Commission 1994: 11). For the EU, it is therefore “a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy” (ibid.: 1; emphasis added). Being unsuccessful in this regard “will have political costs, and at the very least it will exacerbate the calls for more defensive policies from those who view Asia as a threat rather than as a valuable partner, which in turn will further reduce the benefits to be gained from Asia, and so on, in a spiral of decline” (ibid.: 11). This last quote is interesting as it indicates that it is not Asia which is seen as a threat, but the possibility that Asia could be seen as a threat is the actual worrying concern for the EU.60

These overall concerns, however, need to be presented “in the framework of the political and security balance of power in the region”, as the end of the cold war “has created a regional environment of unparalleled political fluidity” (ibid.: 1f.). At the same time, military budgets are growing, being a potential source of conflicts in a region with a number of unresolved territorial conflicts (cf. ibid.: 6).

That is to say, the values to be secured are the EU’s leading role in the world economy as well as political and security-political stability in Asia. “The maintenance of peace and stability in Asia is an important factor […] for the protection of the Union’s interests in this region, including the economic ones […]” (ibid.: 5).

Threats to regional stability in Asia come from, “rapid economic growth, territorial disputes, increasingly ambitious armament programs, the potential for distrust in such a large region and the weakness of the multilateral organizations for political consultations” (ibid.: 7). In order to preserve stability in Asia, not only the role of the US as “the key player” in terms of security – at least “at the present moment” – is important (ibid.: 5). It is also necessary to “support efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the regional and sub-regional level such as the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to enhancing peace and security in the region […]” (ibid.: 2). That is to say, not only the EU is the provider of its own security (in terms of preserving its leading role in the global economy), but by being associated in the management of regional and

60 This point should be kept in mind for the discussion of the alleged change of the EU’s security policies towards China in the context of the 2006 Communication. Although the EU is more specific and outspoken with its criticism on China, it does not construct China as a threat – the contrary is true: given the criticism towards China and the growing dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the relationship, the EU reinforces its liberal-relational approach aiming to establish dialogues about the contested issues. Therefore, it holds true that the actual threat is not China but the perception of China as a threat by the European public.
international security affairs (cf. ibid.: 2), Asian states themselves become security providers for the EU (in terms of, firstly, regional stability which, secondly, is vital for maintaining the leading global economic role).

The overall policy objectives of the EU are therefore “to strengthen the Union’s economic presence in Asia”, “to contribute to stability in Asia by promoting international co-operation and understanding”, “to promote economic development [in order] to contribute to poverty alleviation and sustainable growth”, as well as “to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law” (ibid.: 2).

Establishing political dialogues is central to EU responses to these threats and concerns. Such dialogues need to be directed at establishing a “partnership of equals capable of playing a constructive and stabilizing role in the world” (ibid.: 1). The identification of consensus solutions is facilitated by generating a “greater understanding of each other’s viewpoints and problems” (ibid.: 1) – a theme that will be constantly recurring in the EU’s security discourse on China and (East) Asia. Especially dialogues with “those countries in the region which are prepared and able to make a significant contribution to the maintenance of the region’s peace and stability” are sought (ibid.: 6). Finally, the notion of “equal partnership” also applies to the global economy. The “maintenance of an open rule-based world trade system” is a vital interest of the EU (ibid.: 11). In order to achieve this goal, the Asian countries should be integrated into this system and “non-confrontational dialogues of equals” should be established in order to “consider jointly the growing number of global concerns” (ibid.: 11). After all, “we are all now partners in a global economy” (ibid.: 11).

The EU’s first strategy on China identified the question whether or not China can be integrated into the international community and associated in addressing the central global issues as a central challenge. Given the ever growing importance of China for “world security and economic system at a time of greater economic interdependence and when global problems [...] require coordinated commitment from governments worldwide” it is vital that China takes part in the efforts to solve all these issues (European Commission 1995a: 3). The second challenge identified is China’s internal stability, which, if affected negatively, impacts on its ability to take over the mentioned responsibilities. “China’s political importance makes its stability of great concern both to its neighbours and to the world community at large” (ibid.: 3). China therefore
becomes a security provider for the EU’s concerns as its stability and constructive involvement is vital to address global and regional security issues. And regional security and stability, as mentioned above, are vital for the EU’s interest in maintaining its leading role in the world economy.

The responses to these challenges are in line with the Asia Strategy and underline that “Europe must set itself the overriding general objective of promoting the fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether on security, political, environmental, social or economic issues. We must also increase mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese [...]” (ibid.: 5). China’s integration into the management of regional and global affairs is seen as vital for European interests in a stable Asian region as “China’s decisions on how to employ its economic and military weight will have an essential impact on this” (ibid.: 5). Political dialogues should therefore serve to “discuss mutual interests and find common ground on the full range of political and security issues” (ibid.: 6).

In order to achieve the internal stability of China the EU should engage in “supporting the development in China of institutions and a civil society based on the rule of law” (ibid.: 5).

The Council’s endorsement of the Commission’s strategy on China underlines that – given the important role of China “both in the political and military field and in the economic field” – it is “a matter of priority for Europe to establish a relationship with China that will reflect the country’s actual and potential influence at world and regional level” (Council of the European Union 1995; emphasis added). A failure to associate China in the efforts to address the main global challenges would be an enormous setback. Simultaneously, China’s internal stability is considered to be “a matter of regional and global importance” (ibid.).

Speeches by Leon Brittan, commissioner for external relations and vice president of the European Commission from 1995 to 1999 reflect the basic constructions made by the Commission and Council documents.

In a speech held at the British Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in September 1995, he made the case for “convergence” between Europe and Asia (Brittan 1995b). Faced with the rise of Asia, which is “dramatically changing the world balance of economic power”, it is essential to build up strong relationships with Asian countries and promoting European economic presence in the region: “To do otherwise [...] would
certainly be a recipe for ever steeper decline in European prosperity and in European standing worldwide” (ibid.). Given this situation, Brittan calls for a strong cooperative relationship between Europe and Asia as the two face the same challenges and have common interests [...]. Our objective is a broad relationship, based on equality, on dialogue, on mutual support. We want to work on the basis of respect for differences between the Asian and European regions, and for diversity in each region. If we succeed in building a stronger partnership, we will put behind us the mutual mistrust and ignorance of the past and can help each other to contribute to a more stable, more prosperous and more secure future. (ibid.)

Brittan makes one interesting point about achieving security by military means and by means of a dialogue: He states that European member states contributed to Asian regional security for example by being part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. He underlined, however, that the “best recent example of European engagement is over the Spratlys” (ibid.): Europe helped soothing this territorial conflict by getting all parties involved to the negotiation table during the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei.

Concerning the engagement with China, Brittan stated that it is “in Europe’s vital interest” – and therefore a source for major concern if unsuccessful – “to steer China into the world economic and political mainstream and away from isolation” (European Commission 1995b). In this speech, there is indeed the notion of “uncertainty” about China’s future behaviour (Brittan 1995a). This is, however, only a “part of the problem”, as after the Cold War the whole situation in the region is unclear, especially because of an uncertainty about the United States’ future plans of engagement in the region (ibid.). Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to ensure China’s participation in the existing international institutions, as this “will help cement reform within China itself as well as making China a source of stability in Asia and beyond” (ibid.). The double concern of China’s internal stability and contribution to regional and global stability becomes apparent here, too. Leon Brittan further underlined the need for the EU to closely cooperate with China in order to pursue its interests. Firstly, aiming at regional stability, support of the Chinese reform policies and the integration of China into the world economic system (especially in terms of a WTO accession) would foster the stability of China in terms of its internal stability and the continuation of its foreign
policy path of constructive engagement. And secondly, aiming at Europe’s economic presence, ensuring access to the Chinese market “where US and Japanese competition is already fierce” (European Commission 1995a: 5) is vital for Europe’s security: “We must be a dominant foreign presence there if we are to survive on world markets” (Brittan 1995a; emphasis added).

5.1.1.2. The European Commission’s Communications on China (1998, 2001 and 2003) and the Communication on Asia of 2001: Threats, challenges and responses

The 1998 Communication on China echoes the previous Communications of the Commission and Conclusions of the Council. The new strategy aims at updating the relationship between Europe and China while much had happened – or was about to happen – in the years since the first strategy: the EU was about to introduce the common currency and prepared for the biggest enlargement in its history. Hong Kong was just handed over to China as the country dealt with the impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which revealed structural weaknesses in China and the broader Asian region. Furthermore, the death of Deng Xiaoping and the endorsement of the new economic reforms in China were a reason to look more closely at the internal situation in China. It was far from certain that the course of economic reform was being continued by the new leadership (cf. European Commission 1998).

The basic assessment of the earlier strategies is confirmed in this Communication and the latter largely serves as a tool for further intensifying the relations with China. The double concern of regional stability and internal stability of China is still apparent: “The EU’s prime objectives must be to see China integrated rapidly and fully into the international community, both politically and economically, and to support its transition towards an open society based upon the rule of law: this will facilitate both development in China and greater global stability” (European Commission 1998: 5). The overall objectives remain to further build a close relationship with China through an intensified political dialogue and through further assisting the internal economic and social reforms of China (cf. ibid.).

Leon Brittan underlined more pronounced than before that the integration of China into the international political and economic structures is of utmost importance:
China – the Middle Kingdom – is breaking out of its traditional insularity and embarking on an unprecedented process of engagement in international affairs. I am firmly of the view that this process represents one of the greatest strategic challenges for foreign policy makers in Europe, the United States, Asia and elsewhere and that the way it unfolds will be one of the determining factors shaping the international order of the 21st Century. (Brittan 1998a: 2; cf. Brittan 1998c: 3)

The international engagement of China is dependent on its internal development, which faces enormous challenges as Brittan further points out: Not only have transitions in political power in China often been volatile, even violent, but also the economic reforms which have been started in reforming the state-owned enterprises are daunting as “the potential social consequences are also overwhelming. [...] The risk of social unrest cannot be ignored” (Brittan 1998a: 5). Therefore, “there is no alternative to engagement with China” (ibid.: 8). To the contrary: It would be against European interests if China and its growing weight for international political and economic affairs would be “a source of anxiety and even fear” and perceived as threatening (ibid.: 8). Here it is again: the concern that the real threat to Europe is the perception that China is a threat to Europe.

Shimmering through these concerns for a stable China and a stable East Asian region are the concerns for the EU’s global position and welfare: “By engaging with China, we are not only in a position to point China towards a path of sustainable growth but we will also be protecting the welfare of Europe into the next Millenium and beyond” (ibid.: 8).

The responses to this challenge – integrating China into the political and economic global structures – aim at creating a common ground for common analyses and strategies:

China and Europe are also united by the fact that the world depends heavily on both of us, in a time of global economic uncertainty, for economic leadership and security. These common challenges and responsibilities give us an ideal platform to cement ties between us and work together for a sounder, more stable and more open world economy. (Brittan 1998d: 7)
Here, the concern for a stable and more open world economy implicitly points to the rationale that by safeguarding the world economic system as it is and by stabilizing it, the leading position of the EU in this very system is automatically maintained, too. And again, the need to manage the relationship between the EU and China is mentioned by Brittan: “Ultimately, our relationship is based on a profound sense of equality and mutual respect. This requires that both of us listen to each other’s concerns and respond to them where possible. [...] In this way, a relationship of respect, trust and reliability can be developed” (Brittan 1998b: 7).

The coming into office of the new Commission under president Romano Prodi in 1999 did not alter the EU’s discursive constructions of security regarding China. The new Asia Strategy, which was issued in September 2001 confirms and updates the 1994 Asia Strategy of the EU. Given that globalization has significantly increased the “speed at which events in one part of the world influence conditions in another, and the intensity of our economic, political, and social interdependence” and the fact that Asia is both, “the locus of some of the world’s most critical potential flash-points, and [...] home to the majority of the world’s poor” (European Commission 2001b: 10, 27), a coherent and up-to-date strategy towards Asia is vital for the security interests of the EU. The “key objectives” of the updated Asia Strategy – as they have been already formulated in the 1994 Communication – are “strengthening our economic presence in the region, contributing to its political stability through a broadening of our political and economic relations with the region as a whole, promoting the development of the less prosperous countries, and contributing to the spread of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights” (ibid.: 5). The Communication further underlines the “shared interests in promoting peace and security” (ibid.: 10). The main policy approach remains a policy of engagement and relationship management: “More than ever before, the EU and its Asian partners should work together in addressing the global challenges which we both face, and the global opportunities which we should all be able to share. Our Asian partners are invited to reflect on their side on how we might address these issues together” (ibid.: 4).

On China, this Communication has a slightly more critical tone on China than the previous ones. China is depicted as both, “a major opportunity, and challenge, for the EU for years to come” (ibid.: 22). However, the policy regarding China remains firmly the same than in previous Communications: China needs to be integrated into the
international community, the internal transition and reform process needs to be supported and the overall political dialogue intensified (ibid.: 22).

The new Commissioner for external affairs, Chris Patten, outlined the underlying principles of the EU’s approach towards Asia in his speech at the Japanese Institute of International Affairs in July 2000. The first general principle is “constructive engagement”, which is inherent to Europe’s post-war history: “The EU itself is a spectacular example of how traditional geopolitical problems can be transformed by constructive engagement” (Patten 2000a: 4). Multilateral cooperation, the second basic principle, aims at helping states to overcome conflict and to prevent the “tendency to go to war with one another”: “The skills we have developed to manage our own affairs are enormously relevant to a world that struggles to develop a framework to contain the passions of states, to help manage relations between them, and to channel globalization in beneficent directions” (ibid.: 5). And finally, the third principle, openness, aims at breaking down barriers by integrating economically, building common markets and cooperating constructively (ibid.: 5). These principles also apply to the European policies aiming at Asian security issues because – despite being distant – “if they go badly, [they] will have an impact on Europe’s own prosperity” (ibid.: 8). Here, it is again Europe’s prosperity, i.e. its position in the global economic system, which is the main value that is to be secured. However, security for this value can only be achieved by ensuring the security of the (East) Asian countries. Security is thus constructed as the attribute of the relationship between the EU and Asia. As Patten puts it on another occasion: “Asia’s vulnerabilities left us vulnerable too” (Patten 2000b: 2). The strategy to be pursued is therefore the strategy that had transformed the centuries old European conflicts: “Stability and peace through regional economic integration and pooled sovereignty has been the approach Europe has adopted for itself. It is also the strategy we advocate for our neighbours in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. I hope that Asia will find its appeal contagious” (ibid.: 6).

In another speech at the International Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden, Netherlands, Patten set out the fundamental reasons for constructive engagement with China and Asia. Delving into the literature and quoting Rudyard Kipling and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Patten explained the basic principle of EU foreign and security policy in a globalized world: “In a globalized world, we simply must accept that equal and closer partnerships are the best, perhaps the only, way to ensure wealth, health, security and
better mutual understanding for all our peoples. We need to work together to tackle the new types of problems that the dark side of globalization throws up” (Patten 2001: 5). To tackle the dark side of globalization and its threats for security, Patten underlines the central importance of dialogue and mutual understanding: “In this context, is it really credible to claim we are forever condemned to glower at each other from the turrets of our inviolate cultural fortresses? To continue insisting that East and West shall never meet? That they will remain totally alien to each other, separated by a gulf of misunderstanding, destined for some sort of clash of civilizations?” (ibid.: 3).

Javier Solana, in his speech on the “Future relations between the European Union and Asia” in Singapore, specifies the nature of the threats to Europe and Asia as common threats:

Both our regions are struck with the same sorts of problems: drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering and terrorism. These can only now be tackled effectively on a regional or global level. We need to cooperate on these issues. I believe that openness and preparedness to talk and to listen to each other, and to learn from our respective experiences, while respecting our different approaches to certain issues, is essential. [...] I welcome the fact that Europe and Asia, on the brink of a new millennium, can face these challenges together, for the benefit of our peoples and for that of the world as a whole. (Solana 2000)

The Commission’s 2001 Communication on China reiterates the points made by the previous Communications. Its aim is merely to fine-tune the objectives and instruments of the EU’s China policies and to formulate clear cut action points which should facilitate the achievement of the formulated goals of the policy (European Commission 2001a: 6).  

Two aspects of this Communication, however, stand out. First, there is a slightly more critical tone than in previous Communications concerning China’s cooperation efforts. The Communication states that “China is not always an easy partner for the EU” and that “a country the size of China is both part of the problem and the solution to all major issues of international and regional concern” (ibid.: 7). So, already years before the row

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61 A point which underlines my previous statement (in section 5.1.) that the frequent issuing of the papers is an indicator of the necessity of a timely implementation of the described policies.
over the arms embargo and in a time when the cooperation in the Galileo satellite navigation project just started,\textsuperscript{62} the EU realized that ‘a partnership of equals’ does not mean that the other side behaves as one expects, but that there might be differences which demand lots of efforts to be overcome. That is to say, one cannot blame the EU for being naïve towards China. Nevertheless, the approach towards China cannot be anything else than engagement: “Engagement means developing comprehensive relations which allow for working towards a common understanding on all issues of concern, in support of multilateral problem-solving wherever this applies on international and regional issues” (ibid.: 7).

The second point, which is more prominent than in previous Communications, is the concern for China’s the internal stability:

China’s continuing and far-reaching reform process is affecting ever more parts of Chinese society. Corruption and increasing disparities in regional development and in incomes are key concerns. The anticipated accession to the WTO will give added impetus to the pace of economic and social reform. However, it is also likely to give, at least in the short term, continued rise to both urban and rural unemployment, possibly straining China’s social security system and adding to social tensions. Increased internal and external migration over the past years illustrates the challenges. The general political situation in China is affected by upcoming leadership changes (16\textsuperscript{th} Communist Party Congress in autumn 2002) and continued tensions over the issue of Taiwan. (ibid.: 6)

That is to say, although the EU is conscious about the difficulties of the relationship and does express criticism, it nevertheless is concerned about China’s stability. The policy of engagement remains a central feature in the documents. The joint statement of the fourth EU-China summit of 5 September 2001 reiterates the basic features of the EU’s discursive constructions regarding China. It underlines the equality of the partnership and the aim for mutual benefits, calls for intensifying the dialogues and improving cooperation (cf. European Commission 2001c: 1). The EU and China further agreed that they “[...] should conduct more in-depth consultations and exchanges of views at all levels, with more regular meetings of senior officials and experts, on EU-China

\textsuperscript{62} As outlined in section 2.2., especially the arms embargo and the end of the cooperation in the Galileo satellite navigation network serve as evidence for an alleged policy change of the EU (cf. Casarini 2009: 177ff).
relations and on international and regional security issues of mutual concern, including non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament” (ibid.: 2).

In a speech at the Central Party School in Beijing in April 2002, Commissioner Patten spoke about “Europe’s external policy in the age of globalization” (Patten 2002a). In it, he explicitly addressed conceptual questions of security. “Security”, he stated, “is not only about military capacity” (ibid.: 4). Given the characteristics of globalization, which are the enormous speed of transnational links and the tremendous degree of interdependence in today’s world, the threats of the ‘dark side of globalization’ cannot be addressed by nation states on their own anymore but require international cooperation: “[...] more and more foreign ministers find themselves faced with issues which are rather new to the foreign policy debate. They have to address the relationship between security and the dark side of globalization” (ibid.: 4) As threats to security he not only mentions illicit trade in drugs, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, state failure, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons or organized crime. He also mentioned – and today, after the world financial crisis and the so called Euro crisis, we know all too well the potential for instability of capital movements – the enormous speed and quantity of capital that is moving around the world in a way that limits nation state’s capacities to manage their economic affairs on their own dramatically:

We can no longer think of security in entirely military terms or simply in terms of defending state borders. [...] Capital moves around the world at a speed and in quantities which limit the ability of states to manage their economic affairs on their own. [...] Put all these things together and you see that no nation state however mighty is sufficient unto itself. (ibid.: 5)

Therefore, these problems “can only be resolved through international cooperation on an unprecedented scale [...]. At the moment, international cooperation lags behind many of the consequences of globalization. As I will argue later, we have to deal with this if we are not to suffer from greater insecurity” (ibid.: 5). And, specifically on China, he continues: “The integrity and effectiveness of multilateralism [...] depend crucially on what happens in China, on your relationship with the rest of the world, and on your relationship with us” (ibid.: 8).

To address the threats of the dark side of globalization, the well-being of all states and
their “fate depends on the decisions we take as an international community and the policies we pursue” in the attempts to “create an international infrastructure that will make the world a safer and more prosperous place [...]” (ibid.: 9). China is a key actor in this process because the internal developments and the external policies that China pursues will determine the future not just of the region, but of the world. [...] China represents between a fifth and a quarter of humanity, with more than its share of creative and hard-working men and women. If they cannot overcome the challenges that face them the future for all of us will be bleak. So it is not China’s success that should worry us, but rather what happens if China fails. (Patten 2002b: 7)

In this speech, it becomes clear that security is understood as an attribute of a relationship: The security of the EU is depending on the security of China. No state actor on its own can tackle the challenges that the dynamics of globalization produces. Successful achievement of security can only be achieved for all states by the involvement of all states. And again it becomes clear that China is not perceived as a threat. To the contrary, instability of China is what is actually threatening.

The 2003 Communication on China updates the EU’s strategy regarding China and formulates new action points. It contains, however, two main concerns. First, the concerns of the EU regarding the “sluggish world economy and concomitant negative trends in protectionism” which “loom as potential threats to global trade and development” (European Commission 2003a: 3). Given that the EU’s prime concern of its leading role in world economy is directly threatened by the above mentioned sluggish world economy and protectionist trends, the Communication strongly favours an even stronger commitment to cooperation with China to counter these trends: “The EU and China have an ever-greater interest to work together as strategic partners to safeguard and promote sustainable development, peace and stability” (ibid.: 3). A whole range of new fields for economic cooperation are suggested, ranging from sanitary standards to competition policy, from intellectual property rights to human resources development, from information society to scientific and technological cooperation and to new “agreements covering co-operation in research and related peaceful use of
nuclear energy and on the EU’s Galileo programme” (ibid.: 4). In short: For the EU, there are “high stakes involved” and China is one key partner to safeguard these stakes (ibid.: 4).

The second concern is – as in the previous Communication – China’s internal stability:

Internally, the process of economic and social reform is continuing, although it is facing growing challenges in the form of unemployment, social and regional disparities, corruption and threats to the stability of the financial and fiscal systems. The new – fourth – leadership generation which took office in March 2003 is expected to continue on the path of domestic reform and economic liberalization. (ibid.: 6)

Furthermore, new types of international security concerns such as “climate change, environmental degradation, illegal migration, international crime, [...] global health concerns such as HIV/AIDS [...] may pose a serious threat to China’s long-term development” (ibid.: 7). One of the key proposals to ensure internal stability is more and more becoming the call for democratic accountability, rule of law and respect of human rights, which “constitute the best guarantees for the long-term stability of a society and for the sustainability of a country’s economic development” (ibid.: 12).

In addition to these two main concerns, regional economic and political stability in East Asia should be addressed by the EU and China together. The EU expects China to take a “lead role in furthering regional integration and [...] helping to resolve pending regional conflicts” (ibid.: 8). All in all, “developing a robust, enduring and mutually beneficial relationship of equals [...] should be a major aim for both the EU and China in the coming years” (ibid.: 7). The two should therefore promote their shared interests and thus “shore up their joint security and other interests in Asia and elsewhere” (ibid.: 7).

To sum up: The main concern for the EU regarding China and East Asia is to maintain its leading position in the global economic system and to survive on the world markets (cf. Brittan 1995a). In order to ensure this goal, the EU counters protectionism and protectionist trends wherever possible. Furthermore, stability in East Asia is an essential precondition for achieving this overall goal. In order to achieve security, the EU promotes regional integration in East Asia and tries to promote itself and its history as an example of how to overcome conflictual relations.
China is a key actor in all these regards. Its internal stability affects the security of the EU, because if China fails to remain a stable and reliable actor, the future of the EU and many other states and regions would be “bleak” (Patten 2002b). Therefore, the integration of China into the international system as an equal partner is seen as one of the greatest challenges for the EU in the decades to come (cf. Brittan 1998a). And it is to be noted that it is not China that is constructed as a threat, but it would be the failure of China to develop or the perception of China as a threat among the European public that would be threatening.

Finally, the ‘fluidity’ of the international system after the Cold War (which is later constructed as the ‘dark side’ of the globalization) needs to be addressed by increased international cooperation and increased efforts in mutual understanding – a theme that will be ever recurring in the EU’s construction of security regarding China.

The referent object in this construction of security is the EU and the main value to be protected is the leading position in the global economic system. However, this can only be achieved in cooperation with other actors and by achieving security for them, too. Thus, the EU’s security is inextricably intertwined with the security of China and that of the East Asian states.

The threats, such as protectionism, instability in the international system due to dynamics of the dark side of globalization and regional conflicts emanate from relational dynamics. In the case of instability of China, the threat emerges from an actor. The responses are therefore directed towards managing the relationships of the actors in the international system (e.g. establishing rules in order to cope with conflicting interests) and in East Asia (e.g. confidence-building measures) or towards China in order to sustain its stability and integration.

Overall, this construction of security shows features of both the liberal and the relational ideal-types.
5.1.2. From the European Security Strategy (ESS) to the first ‘Guidelines on EU foreign and security policy in East Asia’ (2003-2007)

Some authors consider the period between 2003 and 2007 to start with the ‘love affair’ (cf. Berkofsky 2006; cf. Prodi 2004) between the EU and China and end with a change of the EU’s security policies towards China after the row over the arms embargo in 2005. The Communication of the European Commission on China (2006) and the end of the cooperation in the Galileo project in 2008 serve as further proof for this argument (cf. Casarini 2009: 177ff).

This section will show to the contrary that the EU’s discursive construction of security regarding China remains unchanged over this period. The allegedly more critical tone of the 2006 Communication is nothing else than a continuation of the criticisms that had been raised already since the 2001 Communication. What is more, the response of the EU to the criticism it raises towards China is a stronger emphasis of the liberal-relational constructions of security and not a change of this constructions (for example in terms of re-alignment with the US positions in East Asia as some authors claim to observe). This is totally within the logic of the EU’s approach: If China is not as responsive to the EU’s policy as the EU would expect China to be, the answer must be to engage China even more, to intensify the dialogues and cooperation even more. Because it is not China that is constructed as a threat, it is the failure to associate this key player into the management of global affairs which is perceived as threatening. Given this construction of threats (and especially the fact that China is not constructed as a threat in the EU’s discourse), a policy change towards an alignment with US positions on China and East Asia – in which China is constructed as a potential threat to the US and its interests in the region – would entail a fundamental change in the EU’s discourse and the way that threats are constructed. This is not the case at all.

5.1.2.1. The European Security Strategy (ESS): Threats, challenges and responses

The key threats for the EU as described in the European Security Strategy, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime, are increasingly complex in nature and global in scope (European
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Council 2003: 1-5). Addressing these threats requires, among other things, “an effective multilateral system [...] well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order” (ibid.: 9). International and regional organizations, regimes and treaties are seen as key instruments “in confronting threats to international peace and security” (ibid.: 9). Given the complex and global nature of the threats, the EU needs to cooperate with partners: “There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors” (ibid.: 13). China as one of the EU’s strategic partners is thus key for the EU in fostering its own and international security (ibid.: 14).

The construction of security in the ESS thus mirrors what has been present in the previous documents and statements on China. The following joint statements of the EU and China reiterate these basics of the relationship: “The two sides emphasized the importance of high-level political dialogue and consultations at all levels in enhancing understanding, expanding common ground and advancing bilateral relations” in their efforts to address “issues of common concern” (Council of the European Union 2005a: 2; cf. Council of the European Union 2004; European Commission 2003b).

Javier Solana further spells out the basics of the Security Strategy and points out that the EU’s key concerns, among which terrorism features high since the terrorist attacks of Madrid, “need to be confronted collectively by the international community” (Solana 2004: 2). China, as one of the EU’s six strategic partners, shares the EU’s key concerns and also in the choice of methods to resolve these problems (cf. ibid.). The EU and China are on their way to develop a “common appreciation of the challenges confronting the international community” (ibid.: 3). The rationale behind the European approach is: “[...] the European nations have understood that only co-operation and solidarity will allow them to advance in peace and prosperity. An interdependent world has further taught us at the end of the XX century that no region can reach security and stability if it ignores the plight of others” (ibid.: 2).

He underlines these positions in a speech given in 2005 at the China Europe International Business School:

Clearly, the key challenges which we both face are largely the same. What is
more, China and the EU have the same broad agenda in seeking to address them. We are natural partners in many ways. We both prize international stability and order. We are both strong supporters of multilateralism and international law as the best means to achieve this. (Solana 2005a: 4)

Behind this emphasis of the relationship and the many things the EU and China have in common is the rationale that “when we work together, we can achieve big results” because “today’s problems are far too great and too complex for any country to solve alone. International partnerships are essential” (ibid.: 1). Creating, maintaining and managing these relationships as well as achieving “shared objectives is not always easy. It takes time and entails compromises. It always requires considerable efforts. But the results are worth it. The outcomes are always better than what we could achieve through unilateral action” (ibid.: 1).

In a speech by Romano Prodi given at the EU-China Business Forum in May 2004, he points out that the rise of China “will radically change the pattern of global economic relations” (Prodi 2004: 4). The concern for the European position in these radically changed global economic relations is obvious. The response to this challenge for Prodi is to seek ever closer coordination and cooperation with China, for example in the high-tech fields of satellite navigation (Galileo) or energy policy with the thermo-nuclear experimental reactor ITER. Such cooperation is meant to foster “mutual understanding and trust” and thus a comprehensive partnership (ibid.: 3). On the basis of such a relationship other issues of security-political importance can be addressed jointly: “The Union and China increasingly exchange views and seek to coordinate their positions on international issues and global challenges. We have a strong joint interest in consulting each other on issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation and regional conflicts” (ibid.: 3).

As has been the case in 1999, the coming into office of the new Commission under President José Manuel Barroso in 2004 did not alter the security discourse of the EU regarding China. The new President of the European Commission reiterated the points made by his predecessor. He underlines the “many common multilateral priorities” and the need to “go further and strengthen our global partnership to promote international cooperation, global security and governance and forge new alliances to counter the darker side of
globalization, which includes international crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and epidemics” (Barroso 2005: 6).

The new Commissioner for trade, Peter Mandelson, sees the “major geopolitical change brought by globalization” as a major challenge which is “profoundly transforming the relations between our nations. With more and more integrated economies, we are also politically more dependent on each other” (Mandelson 2005: 4). The wrong answer to this challenge would be – and here comes again the fear of protectionist trends in the global economy – “to build new tariff barriers and to protect us behind unrealistic walls” (ibid.: 4). The EU should, to the contrary, pursue a “policy of openness to the world”, including deepening the partnership with China (ibid.).

The constructions of security regarding China fit into the larger framework of the constructions of security in the ESS. In both cases, the complexity and global reach of threats and challenges and the necessity of international cooperation (including mutual trust and understanding) are characterizing features.

5.1.2.2. The 2006 Communication on China: Threats, challenges and responses

The Communication “EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities” (2006) is seen in the scholarly literature as an indicator of a turning point in the relations between the EU and China. However, as I will show in the following, there was no change in the EU’s discursive construction of security regarding China in terms of the liberal-relational ideal-type.

The reason that leads some authors to conclude that there had been a change in the EU’s policy is the fact that some criticisms have been expressed more audibly than before – but, as I have already argued – these criticisms are all but new. They have been there in previous Communications, they may have just been overlooked by some authors; maybe because they have not fitted into the catchy picture of a ‘love affair’ between the EU and China. What is important is that the construction of China as an indispensable partner has not changed, neither did the EU’s liberal-relational security discourse change. To the contrary, the policy of constructive engagement and ‘relationship management’ is not terminated, but intensified. The establishment of a High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue which is meant to deal with all issues concerning trade imbalances, barriers to market access, intellectual property rights and so on is a strong
indicator for this assessment.

The key challenges that the EU identified in its 2006 Communication on China are regional stability in East Asia, including the Taiwan Strait, non-proliferation as well as the global problems that have already been identified by previous papers. The way to solve these challenges is still a policy of “engagement and partnership” and the offering of “joint solutions to global problems” (European Commission 2006b: 2).

The concerns that the EU raises regarding China – which, as I already mentioned, are not new, but which for the first time take a more prominent and outspoken position – require a closer look. Lacking transparency in Chinese military spending is criticized, along with the perception that China is not quite living up to its responsibilities in the relationship and that concerning the mutual benefits of the relations there is still room for more benefits for the EU (cf. ibid.: 3f., 11). Obstacles to market access, lack of protection of intellectual property rights and trade imbalances are also sources for the criticism (cf. ibid.: 7f.).

All in all, Chinese competition together with not living up to the expectations of the EU concerning its WTO commitments is seen as a challenge for Europe (European Commission 2006c: 3). That’s why, given the Chinese participation in Galileo and ITER, the EU’s “participation in Chinese programmes should be increased” (European Commission 2006b: 8). Where China is not living up to its obligations stemming from WTO accession, the EU will try to resolve “irritants with China through dialogue and negotiations” and “where other efforts have failed, the Commission will use the WTO dispute settlement system to ensure compliance with multilaterally agreed rules and obligations” (ibid.: 8). However, “closing Europe’s doors to Chinese competition is not the answer” (ibid.: 2). Instead, “Europe should accept fierce competition. China should ensure that it is fair competition” (European Commission 2006c: 15).

To sum up:

China is one of the EU’s most important partners. China’s re-emergence is a welcome phenomenon [...]. We have a strong and growing bilateral relationship. But we must continue to build on this [...] A closer, stronger strategic partnership is in the EU’s and China’s interests. But with this comes an increase in responsibilities, and a need for openness which will require concerted action by both sides. (European Commission 2006b: 12)
The Council’s conclusions endorsing the Commission’s Communication were broadly in the same manner: They underlined the need for more reciprocity in EU-China trade and economic relations. But otherwise, the basic tenets of the EU’s security policy regarding China remained the same as in the previous years (Council of the European Union 2006b). The need for cooperation in jointly addressing the common challenges is still present: “The partnership is increasingly focused on addressing global challenges, and China plays a key role in the effective international response to these issues” (ibid.: 1). Also, the cooperation in providing energy security should be intensified (cf. ibid.: 7). Concerning the disputed issues of trade imbalances and obstacles to market access, the Council states:

The challenge for the Union, and also for China, is to manage and deepen the relationship in a sustainable, predictable and balanced way. This is best achieved in partnership, through cooperation, common rules and mutual agreements [...] The Council underlines the need for reciprocity in the EU-China trade and investment relationship. The answer to growing competition with China cannot be to protect the EU from fair competition. Instead the EU should continue to pursue an active policy of openness at home while demanding a similar effort from China. (ibid.: 9f.)

All in all, the Council reaffirms that “the EU should actively support China’s emergence as a successful and responsible member of the international community” (ibid.: 6). Totally in line with its policy of dialogue and mutual understanding, the EU addressed the disputed issues by establishing a High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue with China which “will cover issues affecting the trade imbalance, including inter alia effective market access, intellectual property rights, environment, high technology and energy in order to find concrete means to increase trade in a balanced way” (Council of the European Union 2007a: 9). Concerning the overall relationship, the Council reiterates that “the full and effective political dialogue mechanism established between the two sides had played a positive role in enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and expanding common ground and cooperation, and serves as an important foundation for stronger China-EU political mutual trust” (ibid.: 1).

It is to be noted that even if the most important value of the EU’s security is concerned
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– its global competitiveness – the EU reacts with a strengthening of its policy and not with a change of its policy.

The EU’s discursive constructions of security policy regarding China and addressing global challenges together with China has thus not changed. The speech of Peter Mandelson, Commissioner for Trade, at the Tsinghua University in Beijing called “Europe and China: partnership, competition and leadership” makes this clear: “Europe has a strong stake in an economically successful China” (Mandelson 2006: 2). Therefore, he was a “China optimist, not a China fear-monger. This is the spirit and attitude of the European Commission’s recently published policy on China which is the basis of my approach. You can sum it up like this: Europe and China are competitors. We are also partners. Together, we share global responsibilities” (ibid.: 4). For any global problem, China is an indispensable part of the solution (cf. ibid.: 4). And as China’s stability or instability affects the whole world, China’s future is everyone’s future: “However we frame the questions raised by China’s dramatic rise, the one thing we know for sure is that all our destinies are intertwined” (ibid.: 9). That is why China and the EU have a “joint stake in managing the global economy and maintaining a stable and equitable world” (ibid.: 6). That is not to say, that there are no differences in the relationship. However, the EU will address unfair competition practices by dialogue and by the mechanisms that it is entitled to take under the WTO rules (ibid.: 8).

The continuity of the EU’s approach is also underlined by the speech of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, at Renmin University in Beijing in 2007. She saw the relations between the EU and China as deep as they have never been before: “Most importantly, I think our relations are now mature. They are mature enough to tackle any differences we have, mature enough to understand and take each other’s interests into account, and mature enough to realize the wider impact and importance of our relationship” (Ferrero-Waldner 2007: 6). The basis for the relationship are the “common goals and interests, in effective multilateralism, in peace, security and stability” and the wish to “work more closely together to tackle today’s global challenges” (ibid.: 3).

Joaquin Almunia, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, underlined the points of his colleague and reiterates that the EU and China “have a responsibility to establish a peaceful, secure and stable world, certainly not a job that one nation acting alone could ever hope to achieve. The task of managing global challenges can therefore
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The same spirit of responsibility and partnership should guide our approach to the world economy. As China and the EU are key actors in the international economic system, so global growth and stability is a shared concern. And so long as current account imbalances pose a risk to the global economy, they represent a common challenge. Although the EU’s current account situation is close to balance, we are fully aware that, along with China and the rest of the world, our economies would be damaged by a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances. [...] A concerted effort [of the EU and China] to tackle imbalances would also send a clear message to the protectionist forces that appear to be on the rise in various parts of the world. (ibid.: 5f.)

Tackling these challenges, the EU and China “can draw valuable lessons from each other’s approach” to address these issues (ibid.: 6).

José Manuel Barroso underlined in a speech at the Central Party School in Beijing that one serious threat would emerge if China was perceived as a threat. He stated that there is the necessity to achieve greater reciprocity in trade and economic affairs, because in Europe “there is a risk that the economic emergence of China is seen [...] as a threat. This is why we need to deal with this question responsibly to avoid protectionist pressures which would be very difficult to contain.” (Barroso 2007: 4). And he added: in addressing global challenges “we need global solutions. And we must work together even when there are differences in our political systems” (ibid.: 2).

Finally, the EU’s approach regarding Asia in general has also remained constant: The 6th Asia-Europe Meting took place under the overarching theme “10 Years of ASEM: Global Challenges, Joint Responses” (Council of the European Union 2006c: 1). Given the global nature of most challenges, “common efforts of both regions [are needed] to develop joint responses to the profound changes in the international environment, including increased global interdependence” (ibid.: 1). Concerning regional stability and security,

leaders share the view that, reflecting European experiences of successfully
transforming their mistrust and confrontation into dialogue and cooperation, promoting multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia would enhance mutual understanding and confidence among the countries in the region and thereby lay the foundation for greater peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia. (ibid.: 3)

This notion of a multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia could be seen as being opposed to the US security system of bilateral security relationships (‘hubs and spokes’, cf. Bersick 2009b). As I have indicated in section 5.1.1.1. and as I will argue in the next section, the role of the US in East Asia in terms of guaranteeing security is accepted by the EU, however, these statements are amended with temporal restrictions such as ‘at the present moment’ (cf. European Commission 1994: 5).

5.1.2.3. The ‘Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia’: Threats, challenges and responses

The “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia” (2007) underline the central concern of the EU, which is the maintenance of its leading role in the global economy given the dynamic changes in the international system. It states that “East Asia is a region of especially dynamic change in which the EU has substantial interests” (Council of the European Union 2007b: 1). These substantial interests are predominantly economic interests. “East Asia is the home of some of the world's largest and fastest growing economies. [...] East Asia offers substantial and rapidly expanding market opportunities for EU firms, while EU direct investment in the region is the key to both sides’ global competitiveness” (ibid.:2). The region’s economic success is therefore a precondition for the EU’s economic success. Therefore, “[...] threats to regional security [...] have a direct bearing on the interests of the EU” (ibid.: 2). These threats to the regional stability and security are the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the nuclear programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and competitive nationalism. Especially concerning the last point, it should be noted that it is not particular states that are perceived as threats in the sense of hostile actors, but it is the “underlying tensions” that exist that could lead to “miscalculation”, the “unresolved historical and territorial disputes”, the “rising energy demand and the desire for energy security” and, finally, it is the “uncertainties generated by such geopolitical changes” as are happening in East Asia that have the potential to
create tensions (ibid.: 2). That is to say, the threats are constructed as emerging from relational dynamics.

Regarding the global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration and climate change, the “attitude of the major East Asian players is also increasingly important to the EU’s wider global agenda. The EU needs, and seeks to promote, multilateral solutions to global challenges” (ibid.: 3). Therefore, the “EU has a more general stake in good co-operative relations between the region’s major players” (ibid.: 3).

Also, China’s internal stability and challenges resulting from its reform and transformation process are of concern to the EU (cf. ibid.: 6). Overall, cooperation with China and the strengthening of cooperative and trustful relations with this country is key to the EU’s policy in East Asia (cf. ibid.: 6).

The EU’s assets in contributing to regional stability and security is its “economic presence in the region, and its unique experience of post-war reconciliation and political and economic integration” (ibid.: 4). The policies to address threats to regional stability thus consist of promoting confidence-building measures, promoting transparency in military spending in the region, encourage the development of the economic relations into better political relations in order to identify shared interests and finally to “promote effective multilateralism [...] and regional integration” (ibid.: 5). That is to say, the policies are directed towards the management of relationships and not towards actors.

At this point at the end of this section, it is necessary to address again the question of alignment of EU positions with US positions on East Asian security. This point has been made most elaborately by Nicola Casarini and he states that this “realignment would be enshrined in the Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia [...]. At the same time, EU policy makers would increasingly realign with US positions on China and East Asia. Signaling a return to the traditional transatlantic alliance” (Casarini 2009: 187f.). I strongly disagree with this assertion for two reasons. First, as I have outlined in this chapter, the expressed criticism of the EU towards China has been there for a much longer time and did not just pop up with the row over the arms embargo and the 2006 Communication of the Commission. It was rather overseen by scholars who put their focus on the ‘love affair’ between the EU and China and thereby lost the sight for the whole – and more complex – picture. These criticisms have been addressed by the EU by reinforcing its liberal-relational approach regarding China.
And second, already in the 1994 Asia Strategy, the EU acknowledged the central role of the US in East Asian security: “From a security viewpoint the US remains the key player in the region and the current situation is characterized by a web of bilateral security arrangements between the United States and a number of Asian countries” (European Commission 1994: 5). However, already then, this statement was complemented with a temporal limitation: “At the present moment” the US is seen as indispensable (ibid.: 5). The main priority of the EU, however, consisted in supporting “efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the regional and sub-regional level such as the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to enhancing peace and security in the region [...]” (ibid.: 2). And in the concluding remarks, the Commission underlines that the “ASEAN Regional Forum is of particular note in that it allows for a wide-ranging dialogue on security concerns encompassing the greater part of Pacific” (ibid.: 15). It is apparent that the EU – at least as much as it acknowledges the US position – supports “Asian approaches to Asian problems” (ibid.: 5). The Guidelines of 2007 take a virtually identical stance in this question, only more outspoken. It states that the “US’s security commitments to Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and the associated presence of US forces in the region give the US a distinct perspective on the region’s security challenges. It is important that the EU is sensitive to this” (Council of the European Union 2007b: 3). As in the 1994 Communication, this statement is complemented with temporal limitations: “[...] for the foreseeable future an essential element in the security architecture of the region is provided by the US’s network of bilateral alliances and its associated military presence” (ibid.: 7; emphasis added). Therefore, the EU should “recognize that the credibility of US defence guarantees in the region is essential at present [...]” (ibid.: 7; emphasis added). There is no doubt, however, that the “EU’s long-term aim should be increasing regional integration and the emergence of strong regional institutions based on clear recognition of shared interests. These should embody closer cooperation on foreign and security policy objectives across East Asia in line with international norms” (ibid.: 7).

Summing up: There has not been a change of the EU’s discursive construction of security regarding China from 1994 until 2007. The main concerns were the maintenance of the leading position in the global economy and therefore regional stability in East Asia, stability of China and its integration into the international community, and in general, a management of the increasing interdependence of the
states due to the dynamics of the globalization. The threats to security in Asia are constructed as resulting from relational dynamics such as ‘underlying tensions’, ‘miscalculation’ and ‘uncertainties’. As before, no actor is constructed as a hostile threat. And the security of the EU is depending on the security of East Asia, because “no region can reach security and stability if it ignores the plight of others” (Solana 2004). As before, the construction of the referent object, the threats and the responses correspond to the liberal and the relational ideal-types of security.

It was furthermore shown that the construction of the role of the US in Asia Pacific and East Asia has not changed either. There is no realignment of the EU’s position but a reiteration of the statements that the US presence is essential at present but that in the long term there is the need of a genuine Asian security architecture.

5.1.3. From the ‘Report on the Implementation of the ESS’ to the updated ‘Guidelines of the EU’s foreign and security policy in East Asia’ (2008-2012)

5.1.3.1. The ‘Report on the Implementation of the ESS’: Threats, challenges and responses

In the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008), the EU gives a more detailed account of the threats and challenges that the EU faces than the ESS. Regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, terrorism, proliferation, cyber and energy security and climate change feature as key threats to EU security. Globalization has made these threats more complex and interconnected (Council of the European Union 2008: 1).

The responses to these threats are a “greater engagement with our neighbourhood” (ibid.: 10) to ensure stability in the region and to build “partnerships for effective multilateralism” (ibid.: 11). For effective multilateralism, a working international system is vital. This, however, is seen as being under pressure on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral for a made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and
creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions. (ibid.: 12)

China is seen as a key strategic partner in achieving this. What is more, the EU does not identify specific states as hostile actors per se. Especially North Korea and Iran and their nuclear programmes are seen as sources of concern and even threats. However, the response to these threats points towards a relational understanding of security: Both dialogue with as well as pressure on Iran – together with the US, China and Russia – should be maintained, in order for the Iran “to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community” (ibid.: 7). That is to say, instead of targeting the respective state with means of deterrence or threats to violently dismantle the nuclear capabilities, the response points towards a reconciliation of contradictory interests and a ‘management’ of relations: The states are encouraged to reengage with the international community.

Javier Solana outlined the EU’s general approach to security in a speech at the Ditchley Foundation in Oxfordshire in July 2009. He sketched out the “new geo-political landscape in which Europeans have to live”: A world in flux. One where big power shifts are taking place. And where the nature of power itself is changing too. Once it was measured in the size of your army and population. Now in terms of GDP per capita, reputation and whether you get to host the Olympic Games […]. All this is a consequence of globalization which remains the mega-trend shaping our world […] As it spreads, it deepens interdependence. The financial crisis demonstrates how much we are inter-connected […] The core dilemma of globalization is that problems are global, but resources and legitimacy remain at the national level […] The only way to tackle global problems is through global solutions. (Solana 2009: 2)

All the challenges, threats and concerns of the previous years are present: The dynamic changes in the international system and the ensuing ‘uncertainties’ of these geopolitical changes, the utmost importance of maintaining a leading role in the global economy due to the ever growing importance of economic power (in contrast to military power), globalization and its ‘dark side’ with new threats to security (such as organized crime,
migration, poverty, climate change etc), the ever growing degree of interdependence and the lack of global governance mechanisms to tackle respective problems. Therefore, the call for cooperation with partners and effective multilateralism to find common solutions to common problems (cf. ibid.: 2).

Given the necessity to cooperate, Solana saw the problems of different or contradictory interests. Working with partners may be a “slow and painful” process because other actors “by definition, have their own ideas and interests”. The best means to reconcile these differing interests was therefore “to create agreed rules [...]. Rules to tame the passion of states and individuals, to end conflicts within or between states. Rules to help us address the mega-issues of our time. The accumulation of rules, procedures and institutions sounds like dreary work. But this is what global civilization is made of. Agreed rules make states secure and people free.” (ibid.: 7). Creating rules is thus directly linked with the security of states: Rule making is constructed as security policy. This focus on the negotiation and reconciliation of different interests and management of relationships is pointedly summed up in the statement that “the solution is always political. Civil wars, inter-state conflicts; problems with energy, climate change or non-proliferation: all require a political deal which takes account of the interests and power of all involved. Power is not just military or financial muscle; legitimacy is important too. In the end, it is the most important element” (ibid.: 6). While reconciliation of interests corresponds to the liberal ideal-type, creating legitimacy is an endeavour in a relationship and thus corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security.

The President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, underlines in a speech at the Collège d’Europe the high importance of economic power in today’s globalized world: “The result of our economic efforts also determines our place in the world. Therefore, I keep saying that, in the end, economic growth is about ‘the survival of our European way of life’” (van Rompuy 2010: 6; emphasis added. Cf. van Rompuy 2011a: 6). The threat of losing the leading role in the global economy – and thereby simultaneously the political power to influence global politics – is maybe as clearly expressed as never before.

Giving a response to this challenge, van Rompuy agrees with Solana that a political answer is needed: “The world is changing and we must get ready for the change. History is on the move. Just as in the post-war days of Professor Brugmans: this requires a political answer” (van Rompuy 2010: 4). This political answer is, very similar
to what Javier Solana said, to “further develop global economic governance” (the *rules* of the global economy) and to “strengthen our relationship with key partners” (of which China is part of) (ibid.: 2010: 7).

Focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, van Rompuy sees the danger of an arms race, which is not yet reality, but which is in the realm of the possible given the high degree of military spending and “confrontational psychology” in the region (van Rompuy 2011c: 7). “It will thus be key to continue deepening economic relationships within that region, so as to make a war as it were ‘materially impossible’” (ibid.: 7). As the region’s largest trade partner, the EU has a role to play in Asia-Pacific security and stability: “Therefore, the EU does not only have a significant stake IN regional stability, but itself is a potential major factor contributing TO this stability” (ibid. 7). It is to be noted here that economic policies, trade and deepening of economic relations is seen as key policies in order to make war *materially* impossible. That is to say, economic policies are constructed as security policies. And the targets of these policies are not specific states but the economic relations between the states of East Asia. Therefore, this corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security.

The Joint Statements of the EU-China Summits as well as respective statements of EU representatives fit into these more general constructions. Besides global security issues such as climate change, the financial crisis, energy and resource security, food security, terrorism, proliferation, transnational crime and major diseases, it is especially the “ever changing international context” and the “instability and uncertainties in the international landscape” that pose challenges to world peace and development (Council of the European Union 2009b: 1f.; cf. Council of the European Union 2012a: 1). It is therefore “becoming increasingly urgent for the international community to deepen cooperation and coordinate efforts in tackling these challenges” (Council of the European Union 2009b: 1; emphasis added). And again, protectionism is perceived as a potential danger looming over the European – and global – economic well-being (cf. Council of the European Union 2009b: 5; cf. Council of the European Union 2009a: 2).

In combination with the ever growing global interdependence of nation states and regions, the consequences of these challenges and threats are global in nature and scope and therefore there is no alternative to multilateral cooperation in order to address this challenge (cf. Council of the European Union 2012a: 1).

One way to frame this multilateral cooperation is to focus on managing the global
relationships, especially the EU-China relationship in a constructive and mutually beneficial way. Building the relationship on the basis of “mutual respect, equality, mutual trust, reciprocity and win-win-cooperation” (Council of the European Union 2009a: 1; cf. Council of the European Union 2009b: 2; cf. Council of the European Union 2012a: 1) and “mutual support” (Council of the European Union 2012d: 2), the EU-China partnership is designed to “set a good example for international cooperation in the 21st century” (Council of the European Union 2012a: 1; cf. Council of the European Union 2012c). Therefore, bearing in mind that – according to Wolfers (1952) – the most promising security policy is one which takes the interests of all actors into account, the EU aims at rendering the relationship mutually beneficial and seeking common ground for the definition of common interests (cf. Council of the European Union 2009b: 2; cf. Council of the European Union 2012a; cf. Council of the European Union 2012c).

When the financial crisis hit Europe, financial and economic stability more than before moved into the focus of EU security reflections. The financial crisis was perceived as the “greatest ‘stress test’ ever” (Barroso 2010: 2) and the Greek inability to refinance itself on the markets was perceived as a “serious threat for the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole” (van Rompuy 2011b: 2). This crisis, which has started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, was an example of “how bad policies or insufficient surveillance in one region can affect the others. Nobody is immune to that. Yet I feel that we have not fully drawn the lessons of the global interdependence” (ibid.: 5). International cooperation is thus more urgent than ever. It is “in everybody’s interest to strengthen global economic surveillance and the impartial institutions which could enact it, such as the International Monetary Fund” (ibid.: 5). What is more, the global system of international trade must be kept open: “If not, populism and protectionism loom” (ibid.: 5).

The conclusion he draws thus strongly corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security: “Managing global interdependence is the great challenge of our young century” (ibid.: 4). The crisis has shown that the world is “interconnected beyond imagination” (ibid.: 6). And especially the EU and China are as mutually interdependent as never before. Therefore, “we are becoming part of the solution of the other side’s challenges” (ibid.: 6).

63 In 2013, van Rompuy even called it an “existential threat to the eurozone” (van Rompuy 2013b: 2).
5.1.3.2. The ‘Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia’ (2012): Threats, challenges and responses

The main challenge underlying the EU’s updated strategic view on East Asia is the increased economic interconnectedness (Council of the European Union 2012b: 4). East Asia and specifically China as the holder of the world’s largest foreign currency reserves are indispensable actors in managing world-wide financial relations and financial stability (cf. ibid.: 4).

Due to this interdependence, threats to regional security in East Asia are direct threats to the EU and its economic interests in general and in the region (cf. ibid.: 5). The main threats to regional security are the nuclear missile programmes of the DPRK, the tensions over the Taiwan Strait and the tensions in the South China Sea (cf. ibid.: 5). In particular, the South China Sea is an example of the combination of competitive nationalisms, the geopolitical changes caused by the rise of China, combined with unresolved historical and territorial disputes as well as a competition for resources and questions of energy security (cf. ibid.: 5). As the EU is dependent on the policies and actions of the major East Asian players, it “needs, and seeks to promote, multilateral solutions to global challenges” (ibid.: 6). Especially the rising energy demand of East Asian countries “raises new concerns on the world’s energy security. This shared challenge requires collective response” (ibid.: 6). Therefore, regional integration with ASEAN at its core, is a strategic interest of the EU (ibid.: 7f.). In this context, the integration of China into the international community and the strengthening of the strategic relationship is still a priority for the EU (cf. ibid.: 14).

The assets that the EU has to bring to bear to pursue its policies and interests are first and foremost its “economic presence in the region, and its unique experience of post-war reconciliation and political and economic integration” (ibid.: 8). Confidence-building measures, transparency in military affairs including military-to-military exchanges, fostering political dialogue and promoting multilateralism and regional integration are key policies to pursue the EU’s security and wider economic interests in the region (cf. ibid.: 11). Especially, the support for the “emergence of an effective, rules-based multilateral security architecture” in the region is a key priority – while, as has been pointed out before, the “US defence guarantees in the region” are acknowledged to be “essential at present” (ibid.: 15).

Thus, the updated Guidelines merely reiterate and specify the main contents of 2007 while the basic discursive constructions of security regarding China remain unchanged.
To sum up: In the years between 2008 and 2012, the maintenance of the EU’s leading position in the global economy is still the central security concern. As van Rompuy put it, economic growth is about the survival of the European way of life (cf. van Rompuy 2010).

The world is depicted as a world being in flux (cf. Solana 2009) or as history being on the move (cf. van Rompuy 2010) while the world is simultaneously interconnected beyond imagination (cf. van Rompuy 2011b). This interdependence needs to be addressed by managing the relations, by finding common solutions to common challenges and agreed rules to tame the passion of states and make them secure (cf. Solana 2009). Each actor is becoming increasingly the solution to the other actor’s problems (cf. van Rompuy 2011b).

Hence, there has been no change in the EU’s construction of security regarding China.

5.1.4. From the ‘EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’ to the present day (2013-2014)

During the 16th China-EU Summit on 20 and 21 November 2013, the two sides jointly adopted the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, a document in which they set out their common agenda concerning peace and security, prosperity, sustainable development and people-to-people exchanges (cf. European Union 2013).

The underlying challenges are the “profound and complex changes” that the world is experiencing (ibid.: 2): “The global financial crisis has had a far-reaching impact. Imbalance in global development has widened. International and local conflicts keep breaking out. Conventional and non conventional security issues are interwoven” (ibid.: 3).

The EU and China therefore agreed to “consult fully and effectively on major bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual concern” and to “increase mutual understanding, deepen mutual trust, build common ground, and provide strategic support for promoting bilateral relations and safeguarding international peace and development” (ibid.: 3). Key to achieve stability and security in East Asia is regional cooperation and the “building of an equal, open, transparent and inclusive regional
architecture in Asia” (ibid.: 3). Concerning cyber space, the aim of the EU and China is to “support and promote the establishment of a peaceful, secure, resilient and open cyber space, promoting mutual trust and cooperation through such platforms as the EU-China Cyber Taskforce” (ibid.: 4).

Concerning the global economy, they underline their mutual dependence: “[...] trade and investment exchanges have become a major engine driving their respective economic development and innovation. Both sides share responsibility for ensuring that their economies remain key drivers for global economic growth and providing prosperity for all” (ibid.: 5; cf. Barroso 2014).

In order to achieve progress in the area of market access and protection of intellectual property, the EU relies on the continuation of the annual High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (cf. ibid.: 5). In order to stabilize the global economy after the financial and economic crisis, it is key to “step up coordination at the multilateral level, notably on global governance issues dealt with by the G20 and WTO” (ibid.: 6).

In his opening remarks to the 16th EU-China Summit, Herman van Rompuy underlined that “the nature of international threats has evolved considerably in the early 21st century. We are all affected by events that take place across the world. We cooperate in international fora, especially at the UN and have to solve our problems via dialogue and negotiations” (van Rompuy 2013a: 2). Therefore, any disruption of the “security of the Asia-Pacific region [...] would impact directly on our security and prosperity” (van Rompuy 2013b: 3). Given this high level of interdependence, each side becomes part of the other side’s solutions: “The next ten years of our Strategic Partnership will require even more interaction between us and more support to each other’s growth and development if we are to succeed in achieving our goals” (van Rompuy 2013a: 2). Given the strong interdependence between the EU and China, “we appreciate that the only way to overcome the challenges we face is through greater understanding and cooperation” (van Rompuy 2013c: 6; cf. Barnier 2014).

The Joint Statement about “Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit” reiterates the points made by the “2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” (European External Action Service 2014). Especially the joint responsibility for the global economic system is underlined: “Both sides share responsibility that their economies remain key drivers for global economic growth and providing prosperity for all. The EU and China reaffirmed their shared commitment to an open global economy and a fair, transparent and rules-based trade and investment
environment, opposing protectionism” (ibid.: 2; cf. Ashton 2014).

5.1.5. Conclusion

In the period from 1995 (or 1994, if one takes the Asia Strategy as the starting point) until 2014, the main concerns of the EU have been to maintain its leading role in the global economic system and, as a function of that, to contribute to stability in East Asia and China, to integrate China into the international community and to address the consequences of the dynamic changes after the Cold War and the consequences of the globalization. The threats to these values are constructed as emanating from relational dynamics (e.g. the ‘dark side’ of the globalization, protectionist trends, tensions between East Asian states and resulting miscalculations) and from China if it failed to develop and therefore became a source of instability. The responses that the EU constructs in order to achieve security for itself consist in improving its own competitiveness (by gaining access to dynamic markets in China and East Asia) and prevent protectionism as well as in contributing to the security and stability in East Asia, the stability of China and its integration into the international system as well as to manage the increased global interdependence. Managing interdependence requires promoting political dialogues and establishing partnerships of equals in order to find common analyses of the common challenges, to gain a greater understanding of each other’s viewpoints and problems.

All in all, the construction of the referent objects, their values, the threats and the responses to them correspond to the liberal and the relational ideal-type of security and remain unchanged over the analyzed period.
5.2. Liberal-relational security policy in medias res

In the previous section, I have shown that the EU’s overall discursive construction of security regarding China corresponds to the liberal as well as the relational ideal-type of security. In this section, I will specifically focus on the EU’s discursive constructions of the Galileo satellite navigation project, the issue of the arms embargo and the issue of energy security. Energy security is largely neglected by the secondary literature, however, for the EU, it is constructed as an important aspect of the relations with China. As will be shown, the constructions of these three issues also correspond to the liberal and the relational ideal-type of security, thereby underlining the argument that the EU’s security discourse regarding China has continuously been a liberal-relational one.

5.2.1. Cooperation in space technology: The Galileo satellite navigation project

For Casarini, the end of the cooperation between the EU and China in the satellite navigation project Galileo is one of the clear signs for a policy change of the EU towards China (Casarini 2009: 177ff). I will argue in the following that the end of this cooperation was accompanied by conflicts of interests between the EU and China (which were, however, not the reason for the end of the cooperation), but that it did not constitute a policy change by the EU, as the basic discursive constructions remained unchanged.

The initial reasons for the EU to cooperate with China in the satellite navigation system Galileo were, according to Nicola Casarini, twofold. First, it was an attempt “to acquire market shares of the global aerospace sector in order to counter a perceived American dominance in the market and, at the same time, increase political autonomy from Washington” (Casarini 2008: 70; cf. Geiger 2005). This is amended by a different perception of space between the US and the EU. While the US puts emphasis on space power and military superiority based on space technology, the EU sees space
related activities a medium for international cooperation (cf. Casarini 2008: 71). As the
EU did not see China as a military threat, EU policy-makers see Galileo as a means “to
build trust with China” (ibid.).
Later on, Casarini diagnoses a change in the EU policies regarding China, which, he
argues, was caused by the continuing problems of intellectual property rights, growing
challenge from China’s own satellite navigation system Beidou and US pressure
following a Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007 (Casarini 2009: 180).
As I will show in this section, Galileo was constructed an integral part of the EU’s
strategy for maintaining its global competitiveness, the EU’s central security concern.
Therefore, it seems improbable that the issue of intellectual property rights – an issue
that has been on the agenda with China for years and that has been nothing new – which
is addressed in various dialogue fora could be a reason for ending the cooperation in a
vital policy area. The existence of the Chinese satellite navigation system Beidou was
well known by the EU when the cooperation was initiated. The growing competition
became an issue only after the Galileo programme was delayed due to problems within
the European consortium which was meant to develop and run the Galileo system. And
finally, US pressure seems to be an argument which always comes to play when it fits in
and when there are no other explanations. The question, however, when the US
influence is decisive and when it is not decisive, is not answered. For example, in 2004,
the EU could break the US resistance against the establishment of Galileo (cf. Geiger
2005: 19). But why could the US a few years later force the EU to end the cooperation,
especially given that – at least according to Geiger – earlier US interference into the
European space policy caused massive annoyance in Europe (ibid.: 11)?
The reason why the EU ended the cooperation with China in Galileo was the delay in
the establishment of the system caused by the inability of the private consortium to
agree on basic issues and the resulting time pressure to establish the system given the
advance that the systems of Russia, India and China had in the meantime.

In order to underline this argumentation, I will turn to reconstruct the EU’s discourse on
the Galileo satellite navigation project.
In 1996 the European Commission formulated its space strategy (European Commission
1996b). It identified the “urgent need for action in order to establish an appropriate
environment for the development of applications of space techniques and to improve the
competitiveness of European industry at world level” (ibid.: 28; emphasis added). After
the end of the Cold War and the primarily military dominated sector of space technology, this sector became increasingly important for the European economy and the European industry’s global competitiveness: “[...] world competition on the markets for satellites and launch services is becoming increasingly intense and global” (ibid.: 2). Especially the US is seen as a strong competitor with the advantage of strong demand from its military, which facilitates economies of scale (ibid.: 7).

The change in this field brought by the end of the Cold War is among others also the increasingly civilian nature of this sector. Globalization and the trend “towards the global information society have opened new application areas (satellite personal communications, multimedia, navigation etc.) whose importance was unforeseen only a few years ago” (ibid.: 5). As it is a sector of worldwide competition, European initiatives must be strengthened in these emerging fields such as satellite navigation (ibid.: 7). International cooperation is a priority for the EU, given the advantage of “international risk sharing” and “fostering the access to new markets” in and for the private sector (ibid.: 25). “In this perspective, the opportunities for industrial and technological cooperation with established players such as the US, Russia, China and Japan, but also the emerging ones such as India and Brazil, must be considered” (ibid.: 25).

In the Action Plan following this Communication, the European Commission underlined the urgency of the development of space technology and especially satellite communications (European Commission 1997: 2): “Global satellite infrastructures will [...] become a critical part of the world’s economic system [...]. As a result, a strong and coherent satellite communications industry and services sector is of high economic and political importance for Europe” (ibid.: 2). As the European position in this segment is not very good, “Europe risks missing out on very important emerging markets for global satellite communications systems” (ibid.). Inaction or failure to improve the European position will have consequences which “should not be underestimated as first movers will have clear advantages in the market” (ibid.: 2). Besides removing barriers to the development of an internal market in the EU as well as reinforcing the research and development initiatives in this sector, international cooperation and partnerships are crucial in order to “develop further the European technological base in global markets and for the social and economic benefit of these nations”, as well as to achieve “effective access to markets” in this area (ibid.: 8).

The Communication on Galileo (European Commission 1999) underlined the
“formidable challenge” that global satellite navigation poses to Europe and the crucial role that this area will be playing for the EU’s global competitiveness (ibid.: iv). Deciding not to develop own capacities in satellite navigation and thus reliance on third countries’ systems would entail “serious problems both of sovereignty and security” (ibid.) Also, a dominant position of another actor in this market which could lead to a monopoly in this industrial segment would entail the risk of charges and fees (which would undermine the competitiveness of European companies) and thus seriously constrain the EU’s industry to compete in this “lucrative market” (ibid.). Therefore, “an urgent decision is needed: The US is committed to developing GPS and reinforcing its global dominance” (ibid.; emphasis added). Given this situation, the Commission recommends to develop the Galileo system which should be open to participation by other actors (cf. ibid.: v).

The White Paper on European space policy (European Commission 2003c) underlined the essential importance of space technology for European “economic growth, job creation and industrial competitiveness” as well as for a successful enlargement of the Union, sustainable development, security and defence and fighting poverty (ibid.: 6). International partnerships with existing and coming space nations are important in order to “maximize benefits and minimize risks” (ibid.: 20). Besides cooperation with the US and Russia, cooperation with China was seen as a key point because China is “likely to generate the world’s largest demand for space infrastructures” (ibid.: 20).

In the progress report on Galileo (European Commission 2004), the Commission underlines the “exemplary Agreement with China” on bilateral cooperation in the Galileo project (ibid.: 9). The areas of cooperation range from regulatory aspects (e.g. certification, frequencies, intellectual property) to scientific, industrial and financial cooperation (cf. ibid.: 9). Taking the agreement with China as an example, the Council has authorized to start new cooperation negotiations with India, Israel and other interested countries such as South Korea, Brazil, Japan, Canada, Australia, Mexico and Chile (cf. ibid.: 10).

The advantages of cooperation for the EU are the reduction of the technical and political risks that such a large project entails as well as the ability to define the “services likely to comply with requirements” of future users. “Lastly, international cooperation involves a strong political dimension, since it enables numerous third countries to be associated with the management of a strategic infrastructure” (ibid.: 8).

The 2006 report on the implementation on Galileo reiterated the commercial importance
of the project as well as the importance of international cooperation, noting that besides China cooperation agreements were signed with Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco and South Korea (cf. European Commission 2006a: 2, 9).

In 2007, negotiations within the consortium that was meant to develop and run Galileo stalled (cf. European Commission 2007b: 4). The Commission identified the causes as follows:

the material reason for this negotiation not progressing is primarily related to the inability of the Merged Consortium to effectively manage the process, agree on a common position, and engage in the negotiation as a consequence of the underestimated complexity of the programme, the unclear parameters for revenues and the heterogeneous composition of the consortium. (ibid.: 6)

The Communication concluded that

the Commission considers that the current situation is a result of the combined effects of continuous, unresolved disputes over share of industrial work, a misjudgement that market risk could be transferred to the private sector, an unresolved negotiation with respect to the transfer of design risk, the technical complexity of the programme, and insufficiently strong and clear public governance. (ibid.: 6)

Therefore, Galileo had been in trouble in 2007 due to the inability of the Commission and the consortium to agree how to further finance and develop the system. The Communication underlined once again the strategic value and its important contribution to the Lisbon strategy, [...] incarnating the political, economic, and technological dimensions of the European Union. [...] Abandoning Galileo would recreate and significantly increase the dependency on GPS (US) and potentially Glonass (Russia) and Compass/Beidou (China). All these systems are of a governmental, dual use or military nature, constructed and operated on the basis of public funding. [...] This would mean that the European Union be dependent on military/dual use foreign systems and
technologies for applications vital to the running of the society tomorrow. (ibid.: 6f.)

That is to say, the delay in the development of Galileo put heavy pressure on the EU to quickly find a solution and make the system work. Galileo was then ‘restarted’ under the full responsibility of the European Commission and as a purely public project. However, as by 2011, the project was delayed by at least three years. While international cooperation is still seen as important, especially in its function as a “market opener” (European Commission 2011b: 9) and while ‘space dialogues’ with strategic partners and existing as well as emerging space powers have to be strengthened (ibid.: 10), the issue of global competitiveness rises again due to the delay:

The global and regional systems developed by the USA, Russia, China, Japan and India provide a challenge for the European programmes not only in terms of frequency compatibility and interoperability, but also in competitive terms, so that it is now important for these programmes to culminate speedily in the provisions of high-quality services in order to ensure efficient market penetration. (European Commission 2011a: 6)

“Complex discussions with China, the United States, Russia, India and Japan” have to be undertaken, while “with regard to China, the question of the overlay of frequencies is a major problem for the security of the EU and the Member States” (ibid.: 5). The specific difficulty with China is due to an initial cooperation to get specific frequencies at the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva (cf. European Commission 2002b). Hence, there was now a conflict of interests between China and the EU in a genuine security issue. The response of the EU – as I will show below – consisted in dialogue and efforts to reconcile these interests.

Due to the delay in the development of the Galileo satellite navigation project, the EU came into a situation compared to the one that it described in its Communication on Galileo in 1999. However, this time, not only the US was “committed to developing GPS and reinforcing its global dominance” (European Commission 1999: iv), but also other actors such as China, Russia and India emerged as strong competitors in satellite
navigation. Therefore, the priorities of the EU were to get its own system operational at all; considerations such as minimizing risks by international cooperation or questions of market access in partner countries were secondary.

Concerning the question of the use of the frequencies between the EU and China, the EU sticks to seeking “constructive solutions [with China] to issues of cooperation and sharing open frequencies in the field of satellite navigation” (European Commission 2011b: 10).

Summing up, the basic discursive constructions of Galileo and space cooperation with other states have not changed. The reasons for the change of the policy of the EU in terms of the end of the cooperation with China in the satellite navigation project Galileo are instead located in the failure of the European consortium of private companies to find a solution on how to finance and develop the system. In the meantime, international competitors made significant progress and the EU’s main priority was to catch up and make sure that it gets Galileo operational at all. To achieve this, a reconciliation of interests with China in the sense of the liberal ideal-type of security is necessary.

5.2.2. The arms embargo issue

As mentioned in section 2.2, several authors took the issue of the arms embargo as an indicator for a policy change of the EU regarding China. These verdicts, however, have remained rather ambiguous. Most elaborately, Casarini argued that the initial reasons to lift the embargo were – similar to the cooperation in Galileo – the will to upgrade the strategic partnership with China which was simultaneously meant to provide strategic autonomy from the US (cf. Casarini 2008: 68). The postponement of the decision to lift the embargo and the disappearance of the issue from official EU agendas was caused, according to Casarini, by the strong opposition from the US, “increasing uneasiness” within the European Parliament, China’s human rights record, the Chinese anti-secession law, the new German government of Angela Merkel and the EU enlargement (cf. ibid.: 72f.).

After the embargo issue could not be resolved, “the EU and its member states, unable to reach consensus on what kind of power China is and act consequently, would realign their foreign and security policy in China and East Asia to US positions, seen now as a
safe harbor after the wreckage of the Chinese arms embargo affair” (Casarini 2009: 15). The strong reaction of the US and its East Asian allies to the plans to lift the embargo caused the EU to reassess its foreign and security policy in East Asia – a process of which the ‘Guidelines on the EU’s foreign and security policy in East Asia’ were the result. With these ‘Guidelines’ “it appears that the EU would be now ready to endorse some form of containment towards China” (ibid.: 176).

As in the case of Galileo, here, too, the arguments of Casarini are not convincing. If the inability of the EU member states to agree on what kind of power China is leads them to a non-decision in the question of the embargo, how in the world did they then manage to take the decision to realign behind the US, to even adopt a policy of containment against China? A claim, by the way, that is not substantiated by any sources and seems to be off the track, as the discussion of the ‘Guidelines’ in section 5.1.2.3. and 5.1.3.2. has shown.

I will show in the following that the EU’s discursive construction of the arms embargo has not changed over the years and remained in line with the liberal-relational security discourse. For the EU, the security-political implications were not considered to be overly worrying and to be covered by the provisions taken in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

The EU arms embargo against China consists in a declaration of the European Council (1989) which was taken in the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), i.e. in pre-CFSP times. Therefore, it has no legally binding nature but is a mere declaration of intent of the member states of the European Community and therefore subject to their interpretation of the declaration (cf. Maij-Weggen 1998; cf. Gill 2010: 268). In 1998, the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports was introduced, which established a consultation mechanism among member states concerning export license denials and an annual report on the member states’ arms exports. In contrast to the embargo, which consists in one half sentence (“interruption by the member states of the community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China”, European Council 1989), the Code of Conduct details the conditions for legal arms exports on ten pages (cf. Council of the European Union 1998).

The case of the EU arms embargo on China is an ambiguous issue in terms of its
Discourse Analysis I: The EU’s security discourse regarding China

security-political nature. In its discursive construction it was, from the outset, not so much a security-political instrument but a means to respond to the human rights violations in China in June 1989. The Madrid declaration of the European Council “strongly condemns the brutal repression taking place in China” and “requests the Chinese authorities to respect human rights” (European Council 1989). As a response to the suppression of the protests on Tiananmen Square, the Council decided to raise “the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora”, to interrupt the military cooperation of the member states and “an embargo on trade in arms with China”, to suspend bilateral ministerial and high level contacts, to postpone cooperation projects, to reduce the existing cooperation programmes and to prolong the visas of Chinese students (ibid.).

At the outset, the question of the arms embargo was not constructed as a security issue by the EU. There was no identification of threats to the EU and therefore no formulation of timely responses. This assessment is underlined by the fact that in the following months, all suspensions were lifted, including the interruption of military cooperation. Several military-to-military exchanges in the years since then and the cooperation in the EU Atalanta mission underline this (cf. Gill 2008).

In 1997, several EU member states began to speak out in favour of lifting the arms embargo (cf. Wacker 2004: 2). In 2003, the issue finally made it into official statements and consultations (cf. Council of the European Union 2003: 19). Given that all the other measures of the 1989 declaration had been lifted, given that the Code of Conduct was a legally more appropriate instrument for the regulation of arms exports than half a sentence of legally non-binding quality, given that in 2003 the EU had just decided to cooperate with China in the Galileo project (which presumably has stronger security-political implications than the question of the lifting of half a sentence of a non-binding declaration) and given that the EU did not perceive China as a threat to its own or the security of East Asia, this plan made sense in the overall discursive context.

What made the issue a ‘real’ security issue – at least in the view of the majority of observers – was the reaction of the US: The US administration made repeatedly clear that it considered the plans of the EU to lift the embargo to be undermining “the legitimate security concerns” of the United States, to be “destabilizing to the region”, and to be “unjustified by any improvement in China’s human rights record” (US Congress 2004: iv). The possibility of increased arms sales to China constitutes “a direct
threat to Taiwan. It certainly is a potential threat to the United States forces and raises the ability of the People’s Republic of China to coerce Taiwan” (ibid.: 19). The US thus strongly opposed the lifting of the embargo and threatened the EU to suspend military cooperation with or even introduce sanctions against companies of EU member states which sold arms to China (cf. Wacker 2004: 4).

Opposition to lifting the embargo came also from the European Parliament, some EU member states and some East Asian countries like Japan. Faced with this opposition, the Council could or at least did not decide in favour of lifting the embargo. This fact did not, however, result in any change of the discursive construction of the issue.

In its conclusions of December 2004, the European Council “reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo. It invited the next Presidency to finalise the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision” (Council of the European Union 2005b: 19). Besides ensuring that there would be no increase in arms sales, the “European Council recalled the importance of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on arms exports, in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly or allied countries” (ibid.).

The 2006 Communication on China, which many observers consider to be the proof of a policy change, stated that the “EU has agreed to continue to work towards embargo lift, but further work will be necessary by both sides” (European Commission 2006b: 11). This included finalizing technical preparations on the side of the EU in order to ensure that there would not be any increase in arms sales to China. China should make progress in its human rights situation, working to improve cross-straits relations and improve the transparency of its military spending (cf. ibid.: 11).

Still, the EU continued to declare the will to lift the embargo (which indicates that China was still not perceived as a threat – which is fully in line with the broader context of the liberal-relational security discourse), while at the same time connecting this issue to the human rights situation in China and the security political concerns of the US. This way, a non-decision on the embargo issue (probably due to disagreements between the EU member states) could be discursively justified without changing the discursive construction of China as such.

The will to lift the embargo was later on expressed in the joint statements of the EU-China summits of 2006 and 2007 (Council of the European Union 2006a; 2007a). In the years after 2007, the issue of the arms embargo disappeared from the official statements and was only occasionally raised by officials of member states (cf. Hellström 2010).
According to media reports, the Spanish EU Presidency in 2010 raised the issue in favour of lifting the embargo, but the issue did not make it into official statements or documents anymore (cf. The Economist 2010; cf. Rettman 2010).

Summing up: The embargo issue fits into the EU’s overall liberal-relational security discourse because the very intent to lift the embargo testifies that the EU did not perceive China as a threat. The issue is mainly discussed under the heading of the human rights situation in China while issues such as regional stability and the security of other countries are considered – and found to be not endangered by a lifting. In terms of the overall discourse, the will to lift the embargo could be interpreted as an effort to strengthen the partnership. In addition, the EU expresses trust in the peaceful intents of China which can be seen as a further measure in building trust in the relationship. The removal of an irritant from the relationship which has not the intended effect anyway can be considered as an effort to manage the relationship in more positive ways. In short: The EU does not construct the embargo as a security issue, but rather as a human rights issue. The lifting of the embargo is therefore a consequent step in a relationship with a partner which is considered to be one of the most important for the EU. Furthermore, the actual legally binding instrument to control arms exports is the EU Code of Conduct, not the embargo. The reason why the EU finally did not lift the embargo probably lies within the disagreements of the member states on this issue, probably fostered by US influence.

### 5.2.3. Energy security

As mentioned above, the issue of energy security has hardly made it into the analyses of the scholarly literature on EU-China relations. However, for the EU, this issue is of security-political importance and the EU addresses it in the overall framework of its liberal and relational security discourse.

Rising demand in energy has been present in the EU’s reflections on East Asian security at least since the 2007 Guidelines. The tensions that are already present in the region, caused by unresolved historical and territorial disputes, uncertainties generated by the rise of China as well as competitive nationalism, can be exacerbated by rising energy
demand and the pursuit of energy security: “Rising energy demand and the desire for energy security can compound these tensions” (Council of the European Union 2007b: 2; cf. 2012b: 6). In its 2012 Guidelines, the EU calls for a “collective response” to this “shared challenge” (ibid.: 6). By seeking stable and transparent energy markets, the EU tries to manage this challenge in a cooperative and constructive way with its partners and other countries (cf. ibid.: 6).

This approach can be traced back to the start of the Synergy-Program in 1995 when the EU presented a multiannual programme to promote international cooperation on energy policy. This was because the European Commission perceived the “international energy problems” to become “increasingly urgent in the coming decades, particularly as regards security of supply and environmental factors” (European Commission 1995c: 3; emphasis added).

The projection into the year 2010 was that the EU energy demand would consist of up to 70 per cent of energy imports, while at the same time, the demand of energy for the countries of Asia would double, making up to 40 per cent of world-wide energy consumption (cf. ibid.: 8f.). Given that China would be predominantly depending on coal and other fossil energy resources, the environmental problems were said to become important (cf. ibid.: 8).

Therefore, managing the global energy demand as well as managing the environmental impact were key concerns of the EU in the realm of energy security.

In the “Europe-Asia Co-operation Strategy for Energy” (1996), which is placed within the framework of the Asia Strategy of 1994, three major “repercussions” for the EU caused by the economic and political rise of Asia are perceived. First, security of supply, second, opportunities for the European energy industry and third, consequences for the global environment (cf. European Commission 1996a: 3).

“The explosion of the energy demand in Asia, caused by this very rapid economic growth, is unfortunately being confronted with energy production capacities which are often inadequate” (ibid.: 6). This causes “severe economic and social disturbances” which – as they negatively impact on (East) Asian stability – directly impact on security interests of Europe in terms of energy prices as well as regional stability in an important export market (ibid.).

In the spirit of the fear of losing out on the economic miracle taking place in Asia and the consequences for the EU’s leading role in the world economy, the EU sees great
opportunities for European companies in energy production in Asia. For Europe and its companies, “greater penetration into the Asian market through exports and investment is essential if they are to maintain or develop their world position and safeguard their jobs or possible create new ones” (ibid.: 7f.).

The three main strategies to tackle these challenges are thus “to strengthen the security of supply in Asia and in Europe, to participate in Asian energy markets, [and] to protect the global environment” (ibid.: 11).

In order to achieve the first objective, the EU aims at “establishing an ongoing dialogue on energy policy between the Community and Asian countries on a bilateral basis or through competent international or regional organization” (ibid.: 12). The identification of mutual interest between Asia and Europe will be the starting point to justify each new project, and this will be expressed in terms of benefits for both partners in the short, medium or long term. What is more, the concept of partnership implies that resources will be made available by both sides in the interests of the project. This principle is well accepted from the Asian point of view, as has been seen from recent energy co-operation projects. (ibid.: 12)

In its 2007 Communication, the European Commission underlined its basic approach to energy policy (European Commission 2011c). As the EU imports more than 60 per cent of its gas and 80 per cent of its oil, the perspective that global energy demand is likely to rise by 40 per cent until 2013 and the ensuing “growing competition for fossil fuel resources” is perceived as a key challenge to the EU (ibid.: 2). The response to this challenge is

to develop mutually beneficial energy partnerships with key players on all subjects of common interest, including energy security, investments in sustainability and environmental protection, low-carbon technologies, energy efficiency and nuclear safety. This Communication proposes concrete ways to extend energy cooperation beyond the mere physical security of imports. It is compatible with and builds upon the December 2003 European Security Strategy, as reviewed by the December 2008 European Council. (ibid.: 3)

In its role as the world’s biggest energy consumer, China creates specific challenges for
the EU’s energy policies and energy security, which “calls for a strong response” (ibid.: 11). This response consists in an

EU-China dialogue [that] has been successfully built up in the recent years. Both Europe and China have a strong interest in enhancing energy efficiency and sustainability in China and to ensure a level playing field for the EU companies. Subjects for the future cooperation include energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean coal, carbon capture and storage, smart grids, fusion research and nuclear safety, taking account also of China’s rapid urbanization. (ibid.: 12)

All in all, the constructive dialogue already in place with China offers a “good example of such cooperation with consumer countries” (ibid.: 11).

Herman van Rompuy, who designates the competition for energy as a “matter of survival, of war and peace” and who sees Europe in a “vulnerable position” due to its dependency on imports, does not perceive China – which is the biggest consumer of energy – as a threat, but potentially even as a “role model”, if it succeeds in its efforts concerning energy efficiency and in “lowering the cost of deploying technologies such as clean coal, CCS or smart grids” (van Rompuy 2011a: 5).

Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger, stated in a speech on Energy Security at the first EU-China High-Level meeting on Energy in 2012 that “without energy security, there is no national security” (Oettinger 2012: 2). The “world energy demand threatens to grow faster than global production, creating the potential for a global energy squeeze” (ibid.: 2). The response to this challenge is to reinforce cooperation with key partners, among which China is one of the most important ones: “Security, Economics and Geopolitics. Three reasons why we need a solid and long-term partnership between the EU and China” (ibid.: 2). Given the shared common concerns of the EU and China, “we shall jointly identify practical steps for EU and China to cooperatively enhance their respective energy security” (ibid.: 3).

Summing up, the EU identified energy very early as a security issue. The approach that the EU took, specifically regarding China, remained constantly an approach of constructive engagement, cooperation, joint solutions and reconciliation of potentially differing interests between two large energy consuming economies. Thus, the way this
issue is discursively constructed is fully in line with the overall construction of security policy regarding China.

5.2.4. Conclusion

The discursive constructions of the cooperation with China in the Galileo project, the arms embargo and the issue of energy security fit into the overall liberal-relational security discourse. China is always constructed as a vital partner and never as a threat. In the case of Galileo, the reasons for the end of the cooperation are constructed as the inability of the European private consortium to agree on the financing of the development and operation of the system. After the failure of the consortium, the EU had to reset the project quickly in order not to lose out on the other competitors (like the US, Russia, India and China) who had in the meantime further developed their own systems. The discursive construction of China was not altered and the conflict over the frequencies for the respective satellite navigation projects was to be solved by dialogue and negotiation.

In the case of the arms embargo, the EU did predominantly construct the issue as related to human rights and less as a question of security. Given that an increase in arms exports to China would have been prevented by the Code of Conduct, the plans to lift the arms embargo were in line with the logic of a relationship of partners – especially when the partner even participates in a satellite navigation project which can be considered to be more security relevant than a legally non-binding arms embargo. The reasons for the non-decision probably lay in the inability of the EU member states to find a consensus given external pressure from the US.

And finally, energy security has been constructed by the EU as an important security issue and China as one of the biggest energy consumers to be an important competitor for energy. The response to this problem has, however, always remained in the boundaries of the liberal-relational construction of security, underlining the need for constructive engagement, cooperation, and joint solutions such as a transparent energy market.
5.3. From discourse to policy

Chapter 5 so far was dedicated to reconstructing the EU’s security discourse regarding China. Hence, at this point, we cannot yet make any assessments about the EU’s security policy regarding China. The research question of this thesis is, however, what EU security policy is and not what the EU’s security discourse is.

In this section, I will therefore establish the connection between the reconstructed discourse and the policies by drawing on the discussions of chapter 3.

I have argued in chapter 3.2.1.2. that poststructuralism (in the understanding of Hansen, Diez and Wæver) and Analyticism share two meta-theoretical commitments: The mind-world monist stance and the focus on observable phenomena, which in the case of poststructuralism is language and the different ways that phenomena are constructed in language. In an Analyticist approach, causal explanation takes the form of ‘singular causal analyses’ in which researchers “trace and map how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific outcomes in particular cases” (Jackson 2011: 114). Based on identical meta-theoretical commitments, knowledge production, i.e. causal explanation, should also work along the same lines.

I have further argued in chapter 3.2.4. that the very fact of a discursive construction of a phenomenon can be considered to be its material cause. Discursive ideal-types, i.e. the specific characteristics of this construction, can be considered to be the formal causes of a given phenomenon. In the case of the EU’s security policy regarding China, the very fact of a discursive construction of security policy can be considered to be the material cause of the EU’s security policy regarding China. The specific characteristics of these constructions, the discursive ideal-types that I have reconstructed in the discourse analysis in the preceding sections of this chapter, can be considered to be the formal causes of the EU’s security policy regarding China – which then is, according to the results of this chapter, a liberal-relational security policy.

Drawing such a causal relationship from discourse to policy required the analytical separation of discourse and policy in order to avoid the tautology that Diez has pointed at. I have argued in chapter 3.2.3. that this is possible because policies can be conceptualized as being reconstructed by different discourses and thus as being (at least
partly) independent from specific discourses.
Recalling figure 3.2 (chapter 3.2.3.), I have separated between discourse, consisting of the context (structures of meaning) and articulations (in form of verbal utterances), and policy, conceptualized as executed deeds. According to this figure, by analysing the EU policy papers, documents and speeches (articulations), I have reconstructed the context (structures of meaning) and thus the discourse. This security discourse can thus be considered to be the material and formal cause of the EU’s liberal-relational security policy regarding China.
That is not to say that each and every specific security policy decision of the EU must be in accordance with the liberal and relational ideal-types of security. However, the broad lines of the EU’s security policy will follow these discursive constructions.

5.4. Conclusion: The EU’s security policy regarding China

What is EU security policy and how can it be analytically captured? This is the first research question of this thesis.
In order to respond to it, this chapter reconstructed the EU’s security discourse regarding China by means of the ideal-types of security that were developed in chapter 3.3. and argued, based on chapter 3.2., that this discourse is the material and formal cause of the EU’s security policy regarding China.
The main threats and challenges identified by the EU were the fluidity of the international system after the end of the Cold War, protectionist trends and the potential consequences of both for its leading position in the global economy. Regional stability in East Asia and the internal stability of China were further considered as compromising EU security. The responses to these threats and challenges consisted in establishing close and trustful relations with China in order to manage the international (economic) system and to keep it free from protectionist trends, to foster confidence-building and regional integration in East Asia and to contribute to China’s internal stability by assisting it in its transformation and reform processes. It has to be stressed that China is never, not even when there are serious security-political contradictions of interests, constructed as a threat. All security issues, including the conflicts of interests over the frequencies of the satellite navigation projects or competition for energy resources can only be successfully addressed together with China, never against China. The security
of the EU is constructed as intertwined with the security of China and the East Asian region.

I have argued that the constructions referring to managing the international system and fostering regional stability correspond to the relational ideal-type, whereas the concern for China’s stability and integration correspond to the liberal ideal-type of security.

As I have concluded in chapter 5.2.4., the constructions of the Galileo satellite navigation project, the arms embargo and energy security all fit within the overall liberal-relational security discourse.

As just argued in chapter 5.3., the general lines of the EU’s security policy are in line with the EU’s liberal-relational discourse. Therefore, this liberal-relational security policy has remained continuously stable throughout the analyzed period from 1995 until 2014.

This chapter has further shown that the contrast between the EU’s economic policies towards China and the alleged lack of security-political interest is wrong. First, because the major security concern for the EU is the maintenance of its leading position in the global economy. Therefore, economic policies are security policies. But second, also as a response to regional conflicts, the EU constructs economic policies as security policies. Herman van Rompuy stated that given the dangers of arms races and a ‘confrontational psychology’ in East Asia, the best way to address them was to deepen the economic and trade relations between all actors in order to make war materially impossible (cf. van Rompuy 2011c). Against the background of the European history of overcoming military conflicts such a construction is hardly surprising.

The huge advantage of this discourse-analytical argument over the contributions that have been discussed in chapter 2 is that the analyst is not easily distracted by singular policy decisions and is thus not misled to false conclusions about changes of policies. Taking the discursive constructions as the guiding line for assessing the policies, the verdicts about changes or continuity are more unerring.
6. Discourse Analysis II: Constellations of security discourses regarding China

6.1. Overview of the chapter

This chapter is dedicated to addressing the second research question: Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years? In a nutshell, the answer is that the constellations of discourses between the EU and the three member states UK, France and Germany cause the stability of the security discourse on the Union level. Given the stability of the discourse, we can conclude that the security policy, too, has remained stable.

This chapter will be subdivided into two main parts. In the first part (6.2.), I will reconstruct and analyze the discursive constructions regarding China of the EU member states United Kingdom, France and Germany. I will show that not only are the discourses of the three countries remarkably stable and do not change in their basic constructions, but they are also remarkably similar to one another and to the constructions of the EU. The official constructions in all three countries correspond to the relational ideal-type of security. In the case of the UK and France, there are also constructions of liberal security, which, however, are not very distinct. In the case of Germany, there are no constructions of liberal security. Still, these constructions are very similar to those of the EU (e.g. a general cooperative approach regarding China, the necessity of close economic relations). There are no constructions which contradict other constructions from the other member states of the EU.

In the second part of the chapter (6.3.), I will (based on the discussions in chapter 3.4.3.) relate the security discourses of the UK, France and Germany to the security discourse of the EU and thereby reconstruct the ideal-types of constellations of security discourses. I will show that over the period from 1993 until 2014, there are two different constellations of the security discourses. First, from 1993 until 1997, the UK’s
Discourse Analysis II: Constellations of security discourses regarding China

Constructions do not qualify as constructions of security, thus there is a constellation of security discourses consisting of the EU, France and Germany. By the end of the 1990s, the UK’s constructions more and more become constructions of relational security, so that in the years from 1998 until 2014 we have a constellation of discourses comprising the EU and all three member states. The reconstruction of these two ideal-types of constellations of security discourses explains the remarkable stability of the EU’s discourse over the last two decades.

In the third part of this chapter (6.4.), I will summarize the findings.

6.2. Discourse Analysis of the ‘big three’: United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany

6.2.1. The UK’s security discourse regarding China

In the mid-1990s, the UK’s discourse regarding China was characterized by sporadic human rights issues and especially the upcoming handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and the respective negotiations with the Chinese side. In contrast to the EU with its policy paper on Asia (1994) and China (1995), to Germany with its Asia Strategy of 1993 and to France with its Sino-French Joint Communication of 1994, there has not been any such document between the UK and China in the mid-1990s, which could mark a kind of restart of the relations after the Tiananmen incident and the following embargos in 1989.

Only the successful handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 seemed to indicate a restart of the relations between the UK and China, embodied in the UK-China Joint Statement of 1998 (HM Government, Government of the People’s Republic of China 1998). This statement has been updated in 2004 (HM Government/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2004). The first China Strategy of the UK was published in 2009 (HM Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2009). I will take these main documents as reference points for my discourse analysis. Thus the following analysis will be divided in four phases, the first stretching from 1993 to the handover of Hong Kong in 1997.

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64 I’ll take the year 1993 as the starting point for the analysis in order to see whether there have been any reactions to the German Asia strategy or the following papers by the Commission or the Sino-French
1997, the second between the two Joint statements of 1998 and 2004, the third between the second Joint declaration and the first China Strategy in 2009 and the fourth from 2009 until the present day:

- 1993-1997: Until the handover of Hong Kong to China
- 1998-2004: From the first UK-China Joint Statement to the second UK-China Joint Statement
- 2004-2009: From the second UK-China Joint Statement to the first UK China Strategy
- 2009-2014: From the first UK China Strategy to the present day

In the first period, the UK’s discursive construction of China is not a security discourse due to the lack of constructions of threats and timely responses. The discourse is characterized by the need to practically cooperate with China, while China is not seen as threatening or having potentially hostile intentions.

In the time from 1998 onwards, there are constructions of security which correspond to the relational ideal-type of security and which are similar to the constructions of the EU. The concern for an open world trading system and the maintenance of the UK’s prosperity and influence within it are seen as the prime concerns for the UK. Therefore, a strategic and trustful relationship with China is seen as an absolute necessity. Given the ‘breakneck speed’ of changes of the international system, the management of international relations (in order to maintain stability, an open trading system and the UK’s position within it) necessitates the formation of a ‘doctrine of international community’ and thus also the engagement and integration of China as a major economic power. China’s internal stability is also an area of concern for the UK; although not as distinctly as for the EU.

In the whole period between 1993 and 2014, there are no contradictions or incompatible constructions between the UK’s and the EU’s discursive constructions of security regarding China. Even if in the beginning of the analyzed periods, the UK’s discourse is not a security discourse, the constructions emphasizing the need for cooperative relations are quite similar. Therefore, we have a constellation of same and similar discursive constructions between the EU and the UK for the years between 1993 and 2014.

Joint Declaration. There is no policy document concerning a broader spectrum of UK-China relations except for the Joint Declaration of the UK and China concerning the Question of Hong Kong, which dates from 1984.
6.2.1.1. Until the handover of Hong Kong to China (1993-1997)

The UK’s discourse on China was dominated by the upcoming transfer of sovereignty from the UK to China and the corresponding negotiations. While in some parts of the Parliament, there are highly critical constructions of China, such as “the last of the evil empires in the world” (Atkinson 1994) or a “notorious police state” (Winnick 1995), the UK government generally follows a cooperative and non-confrontational discourse regarding China.

In 1996, conflict between China and Taiwan hit the agenda as well as the issue of the nuclear tests of China and France and the non-proliferation treaty. In terms of an assessment of the new international situation after the Cold War and its impact on UK security, first instances of notions of fluidity and dramatic change are visible.

In any case, the UK neither constructed China as a threat nor did it construct uncertainties about possible future hostile behaviour or intentions of China.

6.2.1.1.1. The UK, China and Hong Kong

Hong Kong and the transfer of sovereignty from the UK to China is the central issue in the UK’s discursive constructions regarding China. In 1993, the negotiations between the UK and China about the future electoral system and the overall terms of the handover were in full progress. Government officials have laid down the position of the UK government in several debates on China and Hong Kong in the House of Commons. They considered Hong Kong to be the “key aspect” (Goodlad 1994), “single most important priority” (Rifkind 1996a), “central element in the relationship between Britain and China” (Hurd 1995) and a “central part of our foreign policy” (ibid.). Therefore, as foreign minister Douglas Hurd put it, the UK’s China policy and its Hong Kong policy are just two sides of the same medal: “Some people speak as if we had a choice between China policy and Hong Kong policy. In fact, we cannot have one without the other. Only within the context of a wide-ranging relationship with China can we fulfil our responsibility for Hong Kong” (ibid.).

Despite some differences and disputes about the future constitutional setup of Hong Kong, Britain takes a constructive and non-confrontational approach towards China. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, underlined that
there is no argument between Britain and China over the principle that Hong Kong's democratic institutions should continue to develop. That is set out in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. [...] We are prepared to work seriously and constructively to that end. [...] We all know that that is a unique task and one that we have not had to do in this form before. It is also difficult, and it is best carried out together. (Hurd 1993)

And the minister of state for overseas development, Lynda Chalker, underlined: “Britain has never chosen confrontation [about the constitutional setup of Hong Kong]: we have sought co-operation. If the noble Earl were to be privy to some of the details of those 17 rounds of discussions, he would know exactly why I refer to that with a great deal of feeling. A great deal of patience was shown in those discussions” (Chalker 1994). And although there were issues in which no consensus could be found, the Chinese side generally was seen to be also cooperative in general. As she continued: “Chinese Ministers and officials have stressed that co-operation in other areas will continue. We, too, attach the highest importance to working with China over the range of Hong Kong issues. More widely still, Britain and China share important interests – diplomatic, economic and in the area of international security” (ibid.). Therefore, cooperation with China – not only over Hong Kong but on a broad range of issues – “is the only way ahead after 1997” (ibid.). That is to say: “With China, we need to put aside the sensitivities and suspicions of the past and press ahead with practical co-operation” (Hurd 1994).

The notions of shared interests between the UK and China over Hong Kong was not just diplomatic rhetoric, but was backed by the constructions of increasingly interdependent economic relations. Britain had traditionally close economic ties with its (former) colony and China was becoming increasingly dependent on Hong Kong’s economy. The foreign minister, Malcolm Rifkind, stated:

Hong Kong provides nearly two thirds of all foreign investment in China. About half of China's exports pass through Hong Kong. Much of the trade that does not physically enter the territory is financed or otherwise managed from there. With an economy roughly one fifth the size of China's, Hong Kong truly is China's gateway to the world. Economically now, as politically in future, China and Hong
Kong are bound together. For Britain, there is no realistic choice between our relationship with China and our responsibilities and interests in Hong Kong, now or after 1997. Our duty towards Hong Kong is best discharged – in fact, can only properly be discharged – in the framework of a sensible relationship with Beijing. That is an important reason why, since becoming Foreign Secretary, I have had no fewer than four meetings with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Vice Premier Qian Qichen. It is also one reason why we were pleased to welcome to Britain last week Vice Premier Li Lanqing. (Rifkind 1996b)

The statement of prime minister John Major, that in case of a breach of the Sino-British joint declaration on Hong Kong (1984) Britain would “pursue every avenue open to us and mobilize the international community” is not very likely to have a military connotation (Major 1996). Not once, so far, have British military capabilities been mentioned in the context of its Hong Kong or China policy. ‘Mobilising the international community’ in this context rather refers to building up pressure on China in case of a breach of the agreement to stick to the rules. Mutual dependence, especially in the commercial realm would give the UK the measures necessary to hurt China and bring it back to the negotiating table.

The response to the differences with China over Hong Kong is therefore not a policy of subtle threats in any shape or form, but instead a policy of engagement and broad cooperation. Rifkind stated that the steadily increasing pace and range of exchanges between Britain and China has greatly helped in managing the agenda of the transition. It has also contributed to our wider objective of developing a closer political and commercial relationship with China as it resumes its historical position as one of the world's most important centres of power and civilisation. (Rifkind 1996b)

Shortly before the handover of Hong Kong to China, the relations between the UK and

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65 His successor as foreign minister, Robin Cook, made an interesting, rather self-critical point about the democratic setup of Hong Kong in a speech when he was still member of parliament: “We would fail if we had such a debate without acknowledging that each side must share the weight of its historic legacy and historic failures. Britain has been responsible for the government of Hong Kong for 150 years. We would be in a much stronger position in negotiating on the future of Hong Kong under China if we had not discovered democracy so strongly in the past five of those 150 years or if the present Government had made more rapid progress in the first five years after the joint declaration in 1984. As it is, we are in the slightly difficult position of saying that the lack of democracy that we have tolerated for 145 years will become intolerable two years from now when China takes over” (Cook 1995).
China have substantially improved and Hong Kong is constructed as a “bridge” between the UK and China. As the minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Derek Fatchett, stated: “As my right hon. Friend told the Chinese Foreign Minister in Hong Kong, Britain and China have substantial common interests. We aim to build a new, broad and forward-looking relationship. We want Hong Kong to be a bridge not a barrier between us” (Fatchett 1997).

6.2.1.1.2. Taiwan

In 1996, the conflict between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) exacerbated: Taiwan threatened to declare independence from China and China responded with military exercises and with firing missiles into the Taiwanese waters close to its main ports. However, in the discursive construction of the crisis by the UK government, China is not constructed as a threat or aggressor. Minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Jeremy Hanley, stated in front of the House of Commons: “I do not wish to be alarmist. The evidence we possess points to intimidation and bellicose activity but not an attack. The risks at this stage are potential rather than actual. If all sides act with good sense, as I hope and believe they will, calm should return and tensions be relaxed” (Hanley 1996). At another occasion, his fellow minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Nicholas Bonsor, even attested China conformity with international law in pursuing the missile tests:

Since 8 March, the Chinese navy and air force have been conducting military exercises in the Taiwan straits. For this purpose, they have established and duly notified a series of maritime and air exclusion zones. While diversions by ships and aircraft may have been necessary, the Chinese exercises have not prevented transit passage through the straits. Although China is not yet a state party to the United Nations convention on the law of the sea, her actions, including notification procedures, appear to be in general conformity with international practice. (Bonsor 1996)

Instead, as the first quote shows, both sides are called upon to restrain from unilateral action which could worsen the situation. As Hanley further states:
Let me make the Government's position clear. We acknowledge the Chinese Government's position that Taiwan is a province of China. The Taiwanese should be singularly ill advised were they to proceed to a declaration of independence or some similar initiative. Our understanding is that the Taiwanese authorities seek negotiations about reunification, not independence [...]. Equally, on the Chinese side, we have no current reason to believe that the present activity is the prelude to a military attack on Taiwan or that the Government of the People's Republic have abandoned their long-standing policy of seeking peaceful reunification, the policy repeated by the Chinese premier Li Peng to our Prime Minister less than two weeks ago. Nevertheless, it is clear that the present position has heightened tensions in the region and is potentially dangerous – indeed disastrous. There is a risk of error or a miscalculation that could have the most serious consequences. (Hanley 1996)

As means to deescalate the crisis, Hanley pointed to the economic relations and interdependencies between China and Taiwan. An escalation of the crisis would therefore be detrimental to both sides:

The astonishing economic transformation of the coastal provinces of China has, as my hon. Friend rightly said, benefited greatly from this infusion of capital and business acumen from across the Taiwan strait. These substantial economic benefits would be put at risk if the present crisis were to escalate out of control. There could also be consequences of particular importance for us in Britain – but also for China – if the situation led to a drop in confidence in Hong Kong. (ibid.)

Interestingly, the British government neither constructed China nor Taiwan as an aggressor or threat, but instead underlines the risk of error and miscalculation. This and the mentioning of economic interdependencies as a reason for both sides to deescalate the situation point to similarities between this construction and the construction of security regarding China by the EU.

There is, however, the reference to the US actions taken in this situation and the expression of support for it, which sort of falls out of this construction: “For its security, Taiwan has always looked to the support of the United States, which has already backed up its warnings about the serious seriousness of the position by moving two task forces near to
Taiwan. We support and welcome the sensible precautions that the American Government have taken” (ibid.). Same as in the EU security discourse on China, there is a singular reference to the role of the US which does not really fit into the overall constructions. As this reference is, however, just two sentences in much longer statement and is a singular statement, it does not alter the basic discursive construction as I have sketched out just now. It might well be, however, a reminder of the presence of competing discourses on China not only in the parliament but at times also within the government.

6.2.1.1.3. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

In 1996, the nuclear tests of China raised concerns in the international community and in Britain. Here again, China and its actions were not constructed as threatening or hostile and no uncertainties about its intentions surface. Instead, the UK government put the question of Chinese missile tests in context with the simultaneous French tests: “My Lords, it is clear that the Chinese work on exactly the same basis as the French. The Chinese will do so much testing and then stop. It is clear that neither the French nor the Chinese intend to go on testing at the end of this programme” (Chalker 1996). There was confidence on the side of the UK government that China would keep its commitment to a moratorium which was to take effect after the final test in September 1996 (cf. ibid.).

Summing up the discussion so far, the UK official discursive constructions regarding China underline the importance of cooperation and dialogue. In the years up to 1997 and the handover of Hong Kong, the discourse became more positive on China, stressing more and more the need for a closer partnership and the function of Hong Kong as a ‘bridge’ between the two countries. The old ‘suspicions’ of the past have to be left behind. The economic relations between China and Hong Kong and between China and Taiwan are constructed as having the potential to soothe the conflictual relationships and remind the parties of the mutual benefits to be gained from economic cooperation.

The UK’s discursive constructions in this period are, however, no constructions of security. To be sure, with Taiwan and the conflictual situation in the Taiwan strait, a security issue enters the discourse regarding China. But even in this case, there are no constructions of threats to the UK and no constructions of timely responses. To the
contrary: The constructions of the situation in the Taiwan strait rather downplay the issue by arguing that there is no need to be ‘alarmist’ and by pointing to the fact that China’s behaviour is in line with international law. The UK’s construction of ‘error’ and ‘miscalculation’ as factors that could exacerbate the situation in the Taiwan strait is very similar to the EU’s construction of threats to East Asian regional security. In any case, China is not constructed as a threat, nor are there constructions of uncertainties about Chinese intentions or behaviour. The emphasis on dialogue and cooperation and on the increasing need of a closer economic partnership shows considerable similarities to the EU’s construction of security regarding China.

6.2.1.2. From the first UK-China Joint Statement to the second UK-China Joint Statement (1998-2004)

6.2.1.2.1. The first UK-China Joint Statement (1998)

The transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK to China was perceived as a success. The Joint Statement between the UK and China considered the handover and the preceding Joint Declaration of 1984 as “historic achievements” (HM Government/Government of the People’s Republic of China 1998): “The peaceful resolution of the question of Hong Kong is something in which the people of both countries [...] can take pride” (ibid.). This success led to a “fresh start down a broad road” (Fatchett 1998b; cf. Blair 1998) and a “new, more constructive footing” (Fatchett 1998a) of the Sino-British relationship which the Joint Statement of 1998 is proof of. The two sides agreed on cooperating more closely on political and military issues as well as on expanding the economic and trade relationship. Besides concrete economic advantages, closer economic ties were seen as being conductive to the overall relationship: “The two sides note that growing economic ties and trade between China and UK are not only of mutual benefit, but also serve to enhance overall cooperation and understanding” (HM Government/Government of the People’s Republic of China 1998). In this context, the growing international interdependence and the related concern for a sound international environment for economic development was mentioned:

The two sides note the growing global interdependence of national economies and financial structures. In this context, they will strengthen the China/UK Financial
Dialogue, conduct regular exchanges on strategic economic and financial issues and foster wider regional and global discussions of these issues, with the aim of ensuring a stable environment for development. (ibid.)

In this context, close relations between the EU and Asia as a whole are welcomed (cf. ibid.).

All in all, the “two sides agree that the above statement should form the framework for an enhanced, comprehensive China/UK partnership. Both sides look forward to developing to the full the opportunities offered by such a partnership, and to working together to address the shared challenges of the new millennium” (ibid.).

In the following years, the focus of UK China policy was on fostering the commercial relations with China (cf. Blair 1998) as well as further engaging China on a wide range of issues and integrating it into the management of international affairs. As the minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, John Battle, put it: “It is right that we should seek to expand our dialogue and draw China more closely into the international political and trade mechanisms for solving problems and disputes” (Battle 1999; cf. Battle 2000).

The focus on economic relations as such and on economic relations as a means to foster mutual understanding, the concern for a stable international system given the growing interdependencies as well as the notion of shared challenges show clear parallels to the constructions of the EU’s discourse.

6.2.1.2.2. From positive to strategic relations

In the years after the successful and smooth transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK to China, the British construction of China became more and more positive. In a debate on China in 2002, the parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Denis MacShane, stated that “I am positive about China, as are the rest of the Government [...], but we need a little dose of corrective realism” (MacShane 2002). This dose of corrective realism, however, has nothing to do with uncertainty about Chinese intentions or alleged aggressive behaviour or some such, but refers to the rapid economic growth of China and its environmental impact, especially the increase in desert areas and questions of global warming, the well-known lament concerning the protection of intellectual property rights, the role of trade unions in China, the question of the situation in Tibet and the relations to Taiwan (cf. ibid.).
That is to say, except for the last two points, there is a concern for the internal stability of China. Concerning the last two points, MacShane calls for dialogue with the Dalai Lama and states that “increasing commercial contact between Taiwan and China seems a better way forward than mutually reinforcing military systems” (ibid.). Here again, tight economic ties are seen as a better way to prevent or solve a conflict than resorting to military means.

The positive construction of China is reiterated in another debate in 2004. The parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Bill Rammell, sees a lot of “positive trends and developments” (Rammell 2004). The way China dealt with the SARS crisis was a “success” (ibid.). Having cooperated closely with the World Health Organisation, “China undoubtedly now has a more open approach to informing the public of public health crises and the measures that are being taken to address them. That is a particularly positive development” (ibid.). Also, the Chinese constitution had been amended by the enhanced recognition of the important role of the private sector, the strengthening and protection of private property rights and an amendment to safeguard and respect human rights. Furthermore, the involvement of China in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme “has been extremely positive” (ibid.). And finally, concerning Hong Kong, the handover is perceived as “a good example of Sino-British cooperation [...]. We are pleased that the handover went smoothly – to be blunt, better than many people had expected” (ibid.). This experience made the Hong Kong issue to function as a bridge in the bilateral relations and plays a “dynamic and positive part [...] in our relationship with China” (ibid.). Given these positive perspectives on China, Rammell even sees the UK as “one of China’s friends” (ibid.).

This positive construction of China translated more and more into the assessment of the necessity of stronger strategic and security-political relations with China in order to pursue Britain’s interests in international affairs.

Whether the issue is climate change, economic prosperity and development or world security, if we are not engaging with China, we are seriously missing out. We have important interests to pursue, including promoting regional security, helping China to reform its economy and reduce poverty and fulfilling our obligations to the people of Hong Kong. [...] Building a strategic relationship with China is, I believe, key to our international interests. (ibid.)
The main aims of the British China policy should therefore be to encourage greater Chinese engagement in international issues, supporting greater Chinese integration into the world economy, pushing the political and economic reform process in China and promoting Britain as a partner for China (cf. ibid.).

6.2.1.2.3. The EU arms embargo

The issue of the arms embargo against China and the initiative of the EU to review the embargo came onto the agenda in early 2004. The UK government took a rather modest stance on this issue. It underlined the need to carefully consider the human rights situation in China and the conflict over the Taiwan Strait (cf. Symons 2004). In this context, the government referred to the EU Code of Conduct as a more effective means than the embargo to regulate arms exports. The minister of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Elizabeth Symons, stated that “[...] in the event of a decision [...] to lift the arms embargo, the European Union code of practice on arms exports is a very effective means of limiting the arms trade” (ibid.). In fact, the Code of Conduct “in many ways is a better instrument for arms regulation” (ibid.). And the parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, Bill Rammell, reiterated this position a few weeks later, stated that – referring to the EU Code of Conduct – “lifting the embargo would not remove our ability to control arms sales to China” (Rammell 2004).

Thus, while the UK has not opposed to the lifting of the embargo and while the reference to the Code of Conduct as a more effective means could be considered to justify a decision in favour of the lifting, the government was very cautious with this topic and underlined that there would not be any increases in arms sales to China.

6.2.1.2.4. The international environment

Similarly to the EU’s discourse, the international environment after the Cold War was constructed as undergoing dramatic changes that potentially compromised the security of the UK and that could only be tackled by international cooperation. Prime minister Tony Blair sketched out this perspective on a speech he gave at Tuebingen University in 2000. He stated that
we are living through an age of global change, one of the most dramatic and unpredictable in the history of the world [...]. Our world is moving at breakneck speed [...]. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that we are in the middle of the greatest economic, technological and social upheaval the world has seen since the industrial revolution began over two centuries ago [...]. So the change is fast and fierce, replete with opportunities and dangers. The issue is: do we shape it or does it shape us? Do we master it, or do we let it overwhelm us? That's the sole key to politics in the modern world: how to manage change. Resist it: futile; let it happen: dangerous. So - the third way - manage it. But it cannot be managed unless there are rules of management, value judgements as to how and why we are managing it in a particular way. (Blair 2000)

The referent object here is not clearly spelled out. However, we can assume that the ‘we’ that Blair refers to is the UK as well as the wider international community. This assessment is underlined by the mentioning of values that are seen to be endangered and the responses that need to be given to the threats and challenges.

The main values to be secured in this dynamic environment are the international free trading system within the framework of the World Trade Organisation, the international financial system and the environment. Threats and challenges such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, global diseases and organized crime require a cooperative approach and a common response of the international community. As Blair further sketched out:

How we collectively respond to globalisation in many ways will determine whether we can bridge that gap between these aspirations and today's reality. I believe we will only succeed if we start to develop a doctrine of international community based on the principle of enlightened self-interest. As within countries, so between countries. A community based on the equal worth of all, on the foundation of mutual rights and mutual responsibilities. This is not to say nations will not pursue their self-interest or that there will not be occasions when those interests conflict in a way that diminishes or overwhelms the desire for mutual understanding. We are not naive. But it is to say that increasingly, our problems are shared and our societies and economies threatened where no understanding to resolve these problems exists; and benefit greatly where it does.
The response to dealing with the ‘breakneck speed’ of the international environment and the diverse threats like proliferation and organized crime consists in developing a ‘doctrine of international community’ and mutual understanding. This is a security policy aimed at constructing a relationship and therefore corresponding almost ideally to the relational ideal-type of security. This construction runs parallel to the EU’s construction of the ‘fluidity’ of the international system, as does the emphasis on ‘mutual rights’, ‘mutual responsibility’ and ‘mutual understanding’.

To sum up: In the period between 1998 and 2004, the relationship between the UK and China is constructed as being quite positive. The relationship and increasingly the partnership with China are more and more vital for the UK in order to address these challenges that result from the dynamics of globalization. There are constructions of relational security in this period. First, there is the need for timely action in the efforts to build close relations with China: Otherwise the UK would ‘seriously miss out’ and neglect its key interests. Second, the speech of Tony Blair further specifies why such tight relations are of key concern to the UK: Dealing with the ‘breakneck speed’ with which the world is changing and the ‘upheaval’ taking place, the UK needs China as a partner in order to remain in the position to shape these events and processes. Managing international relations by means of a ‘doctrine of international community’ according to agreed rules and gaining mutual understanding is seen as vital in dealing with global change.

6.2.1.3. From the second UK-China Joint Statement to the first UK-China Strategy (2004-2009)

6.2.1.3.1. The second UK-China Joint Statement and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

In 2004, the UK and China announced the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in a Joint Statement following the visit of the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao to London (HM Government/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2004). Both countries considered the bilateral relations to be among the respective top
international priorities and underlined the common interest in increased cooperation (ibid.). The partnership had grown significantly and both cooperated on an increasing number of “shared issues of international concern including environmental management and protection, energy, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and tackling organized crime” (ibid.). The main aims in order “to meet the challenges of the 21st century” were to further consolidate and strengthen the bilateral relationship (for example by increased exchanges of high level visits and cooperation in “fields such as strategic security and non-proliferation”), to further strengthen and consolidate cooperation on multilateral fora on issues of mutual and international concern and to enhance cooperation in international economic problems and promote sustainable development (ibid.).

In the following years, the statements and speeches underlined the positive development of the UK-China relationship. Nota bene: In the years, in which many scholars see a deterioration of EU-China relations due to the failed lifting of the arms embargo and the end of the cooperation in the Galileo satellite navigation project, the statements of UK officials became more and more positive about the bilateral relationship with China. Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, stated in a speech given at the foreign policy centre of the Chinese academy of social sciences in 2005 that the UK-China relationship “is going from strength to strength” (Straw 2005). The British ambassador in Beijing, William Ehrman, designated the year 2006 as

an encouraging year. China worked well with other P5 members in the Security Council following the North Korean nuclear test. It has worked cooperatively with the E3 on Iran. It is significantly increasing its numbers of UN peacekeepers. It played a constructive role during the Nepalese constitutional crisis. Relations with Japan have taken a turn for the better. China worked to persuade Sudan to accept the Annan plan at the end of the year. Its trade with Africa and the infrastructure it is building there are contributing significantly to African growth. We have agreed a senior level dialogue on Africa and hope to see closer cooperation on development issues. (Ehrman 2007)

Consequently, he continued that the current relations are “the best ever relations that now exist between Britain and China”, only to repeat himself in the same speech, saying that “we are fortunate at present to have as good relations with China as we have ever
had” (ibid.). And the successor of Jack Straw as foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, underlined that

China’s role here in the Asia-Pacific region has been increasingly active and increasingly positive. The UK warmly welcomes the improvement in relations between China and Japan – so vital to the region, and indeed to our own interests. China has played a key role in the Six Party Talks with North Korea. I hope that China can bring that same influence to bear on the regime in Burma. [...] We do not want less of China. We do not want China to stay at home. We want – we need – you to do even more in the world. (Beckett 2007)

And the former EU Commissioner for Trade and then UK First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Peter Mandelson, stated that “I also celebrate the fact that relations between Britain and China have never been stronger” (Mandelson 2009). In the same year, the foreign secretary, David Miliband, said that “we are at the front of a very exciting time in relations between Britain and China, a time when I think our relations can go from strength to strength in the economic, social, cultural and political spheres” (Miliband 2009).

As just argued, the rise of China is constructed as a positive development and as an opportunity which is welcomed by the United Kingdom (cf. Straw 2005, cf. Ehrman 2007, cf. Miliband 2007, cf. Mandelson 2009). Besides these positive assessments of the relationship, there are no instances of serious differences or uncertainties about China’s future course or of China’s intentions. That is to say, as in the years before, there is no ‘discursive space’ which could be filled with other constructions which depict China as (potentially) threatening.

David Miliband’s statement underlined that there was no alternative to partnership, as the interests and the fortunes of the UK and Britain were closely intertwined:

I firmly believe that the argument about engagement versus containment of China is the language of a bygone age. China’s phenomenal growth and opening over the last thirty years has brought huge benefits to the people of China, and to the rest of us. The British Government welcomes China’s economic development and integration into the world community. We want China to succeed. That is essential not only to your interests, but to ours in the UK too. (Miliband 2007)
6.2.1.3.2. Free trade and protectionism

The proper management of the global economic system was one of the most important issues in the UK’s discursive constructions regarding China. The need to preserve free trade and to prevent protectionism was raised several times. The British Ambassador to China, William Ehrman, stated:

There are growing risks of protectionism. Perhaps I should say something about the UK’s stance at this point. We have a strong vested interest in an open global trading system. We need your help to ensure that progress towards further liberalisation is sustained. We are free traders by instinct, and we do not think the correct response to the competitive challenge posed by China and other countries is to restrict access to our markets. We are in no doubt that we benefit from closer trading and investment links with China and we are keen to encourage further integration. The UK consumer benefits from low-cost, high-quality manufactured goods produced here. I am not the first person to observe that competitive Chinese imports have helped keep UK inflation down. What I hope all this demonstrates is that we in the UK can present, with some justification, China’s rise as an opportunity to enhance our own economic welfare. (Ehrman 2006)

And Margaret Beckett underlined:

I’ve been in the British government for ten years, dealing with trade, with agriculture and now with foreign policy. And I can say with some certainty that there has never been greater pressure on the global consensus on free trade. People worry about the changing balance of the global economy. In Europe (perhaps even more in the US) – and particularly in the manufacturing sector – producers are focussing increasingly on China as the source of new competition. [...] As China moves centre stage for the Olympics, its actions will be under greater scrutiny than ever before. By continuing to open up its own economy, and by taking a positive lead in addressing common global challenges, China greatly strengthens the hand of those, like the British Government, who want to keep markets open and maintain an open trading system. (Beckett 2007)
Furthermore, Peter Mandelson highlighted the importance of an open international trade system for the prosperity and security of the UK:

> The choices that we will make in the next few years will be fundamental to our long term prosperity and security. If we are to preserve the open global economy that has underwritten two decades of growth then we will need to draw the right lessons from the banking crisis and keep our markets open and the state playing an appropriate but not dominant role in business and enterprise. (Mandelson 2009)

Given these challenges, China and the UK have to perceive these challenges as common ones in need of shared solutions: “Our task as Chinese or Europeans is [...] above all to see many of China’s and Europe’s biggest challenges as common problems, in need of shared solutions” (cf. ibid.). Protectionism thus was constructed as a threat to the UK’s long term security and prosperity and the response was constructed as joint efforts by the UK and China to counter these trends.

6.2.1.3.3. **Competition for resources**

The question of open markets is closely linked to the question of the management of global resources. Margaret Beckett identifies the competition for natural resources as the “greatest threat of all” (Beckett 2007):

> The breakneck speed of globalisation is putting pressure on the resources we hold in common. Globally, we use double the amount of water we did in 1960. The International Energy Agency predicts a rise of more than 50 per cent in primary energy demand in the next twenty five years. There are hundreds of millions going hungry. In other words, the resources available to us are already stretched to the limit. And an unstable climate is now putting them under yet more strain, taking them to the breaking point and beyond. (ibid.)

The response, here too, can only be cooperation between China and the UK, or – more promising – between China and the EU:

> We now need to think about how, together, the world's largest single market and
the world's fastest growing economy can act in our mutual interest across a much wider range of trade and investment policies to drive down the costs and boost the growth in markets for low-carbon and energy efficient goods and services: and in so doing make them more affordable for our consumers, and a source of revenue for our companies. How, in other words, by acting together with sufficient ambition we can help each other achieve the goals we are setting ourselves on energy and climate. (ibid.)

That is to say, the response to the ‘greatest threat of all’ is to define the mutual interests and cooperate with China in order to help each other to achieve the commonly set goals in terms of energy and climate policies.

6.2.1.3.4. Climate change

Finally, closely related to questions of resources is the question of climate change. Jack Straw conceives of climate change as a potential source of conflict over scarce resources as well as an economic threat, too:

The third issue which I want to highlight today, and also a priority of Britain's G8 presidency this year, is tackling the threat from climate change. [...] Climate change is an economic threat too: Swiss Re, the world's second-largest reinsurer, has estimated the insurance costs at an extra $265 billion per year by 2010. [...] So for all these reasons, this is a threat which we must tackle. (Straw 2005)

Reduction of emissions, increasing energy efficiency, innovation in low-carbon technologies and renewable energy sources are key policies in addressing this threat (cf. ibid.). Cooperation between the UK and China will be necessary to respond to this common challenge. Though they will not agree on every issue in this respect, but “there is an enormous amount of work for us to do together” (ibid.). Beckett conceptualizes climate change as a threat multiplier and therefore a ‘real’ security issue:

if you prefer the analysis of generals rather than economists, you could read the recent report by eleven of the most senior retired military figures in the US. It recommends that climate change be an integral part of all planning for national
security. In their words, climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ in some of the most unstable regions in the world. (Beckett 2007)

Addressing this threat can only work internationally with a central role of China and the UK – or, in this case, not even the UK but the EU as a whole:

One of those potential levers is the economic relationship between China and the EU. Because of the scale of our economies, this is a big piece of the global economic architecture. [...] We have the same interests: we want to produce and consume energy more efficiently; we want to lessen our dependence on imported oil and gas; we want to diversify our supply, including through renewable energy. [...] We now need to think about how, together, the world’s largest single market and the world’s fastest growing economy can act in our mutual interest across a much wider range of trade and investment policies to drive down the costs and boost the growth in markets for low-carbon and energy efficient goods and services: and in so doing make them more affordable for our consumers, and a source of revenue for our companies. How, in other words, by acting together with sufficient ambition we can help each other achieve the goals we are setting ourselves on energy and climate. [...] We do not want less of China. We do not want China to stay at home. We want - we need - you to do even more in the world. (ibid.; cf. Miliband 2007; cf. Mandelson 2009)

6.2.1.3.5. Managing globalization

In order to manage the consequences of globalization, China was constructed as an indispensable partner; not least because China is not only seen as a product of globalization but as a key driving force of it. The stakes of all the actors are so deeply intertwined that the failure of China to cope with globalization would impact on the ability of the others, especially the UK, to cope with it. As the foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, stated in 2007 at the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s development is breathtaking and the consequences of its rise stretch beyond even the direct impact it has had on some one-fifth of all humanity. Because what goes on here in China is an integral part of that wider social, economic and political phenomenon we know as globalisation: driven by it and in
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turn driving it forward. The challenge I believe that we – all of us in this room – face today is keeping that process – perhaps the most powerful force there has ever been for human progress - on a path that will continue to deliver security, prosperity and justice to an ever wider circle of humanity. Globalisation is something in which we all have a stake. Our national interests are vested in whether it succeeds or fails. And it could fail: there are no guarantees. Such rapid change unleashes stresses between societies and within them that could easily throw us off course - division where there is now international cooperation, stagnation where there is now growth, closed barriers where there is now open trade. (Beckett 2007)

Beckett considers the relationship between the UK and China as strategic because it is key in sustaining China’s internal reform process as well as managing global development: “[...] in a globalising world of interdependent states, the success of China is good for the world, and its failure would harm us all. Literally and figuratively, the rest of the world has a stake in your continued growth and stability - and as the largest European investor in China that goes for the UK more than most” (ibid.). Britain’s vital interest is therefore best served by a stable and successful China with which the former can cooperate in order to manage the risks of globalization (ibid.). And both nations share common interests:

The overarching goal that China has set itself - addressing the social, environmental, economic and political aspects of the international agenda together and with equal weight - echoes the principles that guide my own foreign policy. I am convinced that in the past the world has been too reactive: responding to each crisis of the day as it happens. But I share your view that if we are successfully to manage the risks of globalisation we should be spending as much time and effort – if not more – dealing with the insecurities which are the constant undercurrent to global tension. (ibid.)

In more general terms, Peter Mandelson, too, stressed the need for global cooperation: “Although we are slow to recognise it, some of the biggest problems in world politics are no longer questions of how we position our states for national advantage, but how we deploy national action to solve international problems” (Mandelson 2009).
This goes hand in hand with the view on globalization that prime minister Gordon Brown has outlined in 2007. Brown perceives a post-Cold War world which is marked by “a level of disorder and uncertainty that no-one predicted. And no one foresaw the scale of the dramatic and seismic shifts in economy, culture and communications that are now truly global” (Brown 2007). In order to preserve the British interest and Britain’s security, Brown relies on “vigilant and resolute” British armed forces. However, new challenges of global interdependence force “the international community to discover common purpose” (ibid.). The challenges that need to be jointly addressed are failed and rogue states, terrorism, the biggest shift of economic power since the industrial revolution and “the rapid emergence of India and China as global powers with legitimate global aspirations”, climate change, global competition for resources, pandemics and worldwide migration (ibid.). While the defining image of the 20th century, according to Brown, was the Berlin wall representing division, the defining image of the 21st century is a tightly connected web of relations: “[...] a world where we can rightly now talk not just of the wealth of nations but the wealth of networks. The web cannot be controlled in the end by any single force or any single leader. And what happens within it cannot be predicted from day to day” (ibid.). Therefore, as Brown continued,

we cannot any longer escape the consequences of our interdependence. The old distinction between ‘over there’ and ‘over here’ does not make sense of this interdependent world. For there is no longer an ‘over there’ of terrorism, failed states, poverty, forced migration and environmental degradation and an ‘over here’ that is insulated or immune. Today a nation's self-interest will be found not in isolation but in cooperation to overcome shared challenges. And so the underlying issue for our country – indeed for every country – is how together in this new interdependent world we renew and strengthen our international rules, institutions and networks. (ibid.)

Brown constructed security in remarkably clear cut terms as an attribute of a relationship: As the attribute of the interdependent web of nation states. And the only way to ensure security for all states (because security for a single state alone is no more possible) is by strengthening international rules, institutions and networks.
6.2.1.3.6. **The UK’s 2009 China Strategy**

The more frequent constructions of threats and challenges that need to be tackled together with China were in 2009 amended by a China Strategy. As before in the case of the EU’s discourse regarding China, this may be interpreted as an expression of a formulation of a timely response to the threats and challenges.

The foreword of the prime minister, Gordon Brown, set the tone for the whole strategy, which was in line with the previous constructions of China and the UK’s policies towards China. Restoring “an open, flexible and robust global economy” is the most “pressing” issue (HM Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2009: 3). Therefore “co-operation with China is vital” and “we must work together if we are to deal with the major challenges we face” (ibid.). In order to “make the most of our relationship with China, we need to understand China better, through our schools, universities, cultural institutions, our businesses and in Government” (ibid.).

The three main goals of the strategy are “getting the best for the UK from China’s growth”, “fostering China’s emergence as a responsible global player” and “promoting sustainable development, modernization and internal reform in China” (ibid.: 5f.). The main instruments to achieve these goals are regular interaction with the Chinese counterparts, cooperation within the EU and with EU member states as well as the US. The main approach towards China is marked by “co-operation, not confrontation. Building a progressive, comprehensive relationship with China will be a major priority in the years ahead” (ibid.: 6). Especially concerning the last point of promoting internal reform in China, the strategy stated that the UK “should do what we can to help China manage the economic, political, environmental and social risks (to them and to us) of its rapid development” (ibid.: 14).

China is especially important in order to maintain “UK national prosperity”: “China’s huge economic potential means business, educational, scientific and cultural opportunities for the UK – and big challenges for our competitiveness” (ibid.: 7). But cooperation with China is also “vital” in order to restore and maintain “global economic stability” (ibid.). And also issues of climate change, sustaining development, international security cannot be tackled without the cooperation with China (ibid.: 8).

Finally, the management of the international system is depending on cooperation with China: “China’s growing economic and political impact is one part of a complex shift in global power. We need to work together with China to reform international institutions
if they are to remain relevant and effective. [...] Building a progressive, comprehensive relationship with China will be a major priority in the years ahead” (ibid.: 8, 20).

Summing up the discursive constructions in the period between 2004 and 2009, one finds that the discourse has become a security discourse. The threats that are identified are the dramatic changes (‘breakneck speed’) in the international system as well as the consequent ‘disorder’ and ‘uncertainties’ which could cause ‘stresses’ between societies. Protectionism, nuclear proliferation, competition for resources (the ‘greatest threat of all’) and the consequences of climate change (as a threat multiplier) tend to reinforce these challenges. These threats are all constructed as emanating from non-hostile relational dynamics and not from (hostile) actors. Instability of China and a failure in its transformation process are also constructed as potentially threatening the UK and the international community.

In order to tackle these ‘challenges of the 21st century’, it is vital to find ways to manage the international relations and to establish cooperative relations between states. Given that the well being and the security of all states more and more depend on the well being and security of other states, it is crucial to ‘discover common purpose’. Strategic and trustful relations with China, building on mutual understanding, are key in achieving these goals.

The referent object is both the UK (and its security and prosperity) as well as the open global economy and the ‘international community’.

This construction of security therefore corresponds very strongly with the relational ideal-type of security, in as much as the threats are constructed as emerging from dynamics of non-hostile relationships and are not located at a specific (hostile) actor. The responses consequently aim at managing the relationships and find common responses to the common challenges. The concern for a stable China corresponds to the liberal ideal-type of security, although the construction of threat and the formulation of a timely response are less clear cut as in the case of the relational security discourse.

Overall, the UK’s discourse on China is very similar to the EU’s discourse: The dynamic changes of the international system, protectionism, competition for resources (energy security) and an instability of China feature as main threats. The responses are in both cases efforts to improve the capacities to manage the international system, to preserve an open global economy and to gain mutual understanding by establishing close relations between the UK (the EU respectively) and China.
6.2.1.4. From the National Security Strategy to the present day (2010-2014)

6.2.1.4.1. The 2010 National Security Strategy

In 2010, the UK government published its first ever security strategy (HM Government 2010). As in the speeches of Tony Blair (2000) and Gordon Brown (2007) before, the Security Strategy identifies a “startling change” of the world as the most significant factor concerning the security of the UK (cf. ibid.: 3). In the first decade of the 21st century, the world has “changed almost beyond recognition” (ibid.: 4). Britain does not currently face a conventional threat of attack of a hostile power, but it is more vulnerable than before “because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is more networked than ever before” (ibid.). The UK needs to be resilient in the face of four main sources of threat: terrorism, cyber crime or cyber attacks, international military crises and natural disasters (ibid.: 5). The Armed Forces will stay a central instrument in achieving security in this “age of uncertainty” and its tasks will be laid down in an extra Strategic Defence and Security Review (ibid.: 3).

However, Britain’s overall security situation is inextricably tied to its economic capabilities:

Our ability to meet these current and future threats depends crucially on tackling the budget deficit. Our national security depends on our economic security and vice versa. An economic deficit is also a security deficit. [...] we should be under no illusion that our national interest requires our economy to compete with the strongest and the best and our entire government effort overseas must be geared to promote our trade, the lifeblood of our economy. (ibid.:4, cf. ibid.: 14)

The basic rationale of the UK’s strategic approach is “to use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world and strengthen our security. The networks we use to build our prosperity will also use to build our security” (ibid.: 9). In short: “Security and prosperity form a virtuous circle” (ibid.: 22). What has been implicitly there for a longer time is now spelled out explicitly: Economic security and national security are constructed as two sides of the same medal and as inseparable. This, again, is very similar to the security construction of the EU, which has constructed economic security – the preservation of its leading position in the global
economic system – as the overall concern already in its first Asia and China Strategy in 1994 and 1995 respectively.

Maintaining economic security in a world that is changing rapidly necessitates cooperation with the world’s raising powers such as China. The Strategy further states that the financial crisis “demonstrated the level of interdependence and the depth of integration of economies across the world. [...] The world of 2030 will be increasingly multipolar, with power distributed more widely than in the last two decades. [...] The UK has strategic and economic imperatives to build closer ties with the new economic powers” (ibid.: 15). Protectionism, energy security and climate change are also challenges that need to be addressed in cooperation with these emerging powers (cf. ibid.: 17).

The main aims in pursuing security are therefore to strengthen the rules-based international system and the key alliances, to preserve an open global economy and to reform the international institutions in order to make them more effective and legitimate (cf. ibid.: 10, 15).

Cyber security is an important aspect of the National Security Strategy. In this issue, too, China is not constructed as a threat and there is no discursive construction which would leave discursive space for such a construction in other, more specialized documents. In its policy paper on China, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK underlines the cooperation with China in these issues and China’s cooperative behaviour:

We welcome China’s contribution to the recent UN Group of Government Experts (UNGGE) discussion on Cyber Security. Agreeing recommendations for responsible state behaviour, confidence building measures and capacity building measures is a significant step forward to tackle challenges in cyberspace which affect us all. We hope China will join us in supporting the adoption of the UNGGE’s report at this year’s UN General Assembly. [...] In addition to raising cyber issues with the Chinese at official-level meetings, we fund exchanges and dialogues on cyber issues which increase our dialogue with China on a range of issues from cyber security, cyber crime and internet governance. We also work closely with the Chinese to combat cyber crime. (HM Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013)
Besides these discursive constructions which are consistent with the constructions of security regarding China that I have reconstructed so far, there are other discursive constructions – not in relation to China – in the National Security Strategy which correspond to the neorealist ideal-type of security.\footnote{Which should not be surprising as in a document which encompasses all security issues, it is likely that all the (historical) understandings of security which are present in the governmental apparatus find their place. Otherwise, we would witness a major paradigm shift in the area of security, which is a rather seldom and unlikely event.} The strategy states that the UK faces security threats from a range of sources, including by (state or state-sponsored) adversaries and enemies which today “seek means of threat or attack which are cheaper, more easily accessible and less attributable than conventional warfare. These include gathering hostile intelligence, cyber attack, the disruption of critical services, and the exercise of malign influence over citizens or governments” (ibid.: 18). Besides new means to counter these threats and resilience of the state as a whole, military power and the traditional alliances (with the US, for example) continue to play a major part in the UK’s security strategy (cf. ibid.: 4). Against this background, it is remarkable that the UK’s discourse on China never constructs China as a threat and never points to its alliance with the US or to the Five Power Defence Agreements\footnote{The Five Power Defence Agreements are a series of agreements between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, cf. Thayer 2007.} when it deals with security issues regarding China or East Asia. Also, the critical points regarding China that are raised by the UK officials are questions of human rights, market access and intellectual property and they are responded by referring to the need for dialogues about these issues. It is never criticism or uncertainty concerning China’s intentions or (hostile) actions.

\subsection*{6.2.1.4.2. UK security policy regarding China}

After 2010, as has been the case already before, China is constructed very positively and presented as an opportunity for the UK and its economic and political interests. Prime minister David Cameron underlined in a speech held at Beida University in Beijing in November 2010 that people could react to the rise of China in two different ways:

They can see China’s rise as a threat or they can see it as an opportunity. They can protect their markets from China or open their markets to China. They can try and shut China out or welcome China in, to a new place at the top table of global...
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affairs. There has been a change of Government in Britain and a change of Prime Minister. But on this vital point there is absolute continuity between my government and the Governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. We want a strong relationship with China. Strong on trade. Strong on investment. Strong on dialogue. I made that clear as Leader of the Opposition when I visited Beijing and Chongqing three years ago. And I repeat it as Prime Minister here in China’s capital today. In the argument about how to react to the rise of China I say it’s an opportunity. (Cameron 2010)

The successful cooperation in transferring the sovereignty of Hong Kong from the UK to China and Hong Kong’s role as a ‘bridge’ between the two countries is still referred to: The transfer of Hong Kong is an “example to the world of what can be achieved when two countries cooperate in confidence and with mutual respect” (ibid.). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s China policy paper called it a “major milestone in the development of UK-China relations” (HM Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013). And in 2013, Cameron reiterates that the UK-China partnership is “indispensable” for both countries and that therefore he sees “China’s rise as an opportunity not just for the people of this county, but for Britain and for the world. Britain wants China to realise its dream, and I believe we can help each other succeed in the global race” (Cameron 2013). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office states, in its description of the relations between the UK and China, that “the relationship between China and the UK is broader and deeper than at any other time in our history” (HM Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013). And finally, in June 2014 Cameron reinforced its extraordinarily positive perspective on China stating that “I would say that Britain is a strong and good friend of China and a great supporter of China’s rise” (Cameron 2014).

In its speech in 2010, Cameron claimed that “we share an interest in an international system governed by rules and norms. We share an interest in effective cooperative governance, including for the world economy. We share an interest in fighting protectionism and in a co-ordinated rebalancing between surplus and deficit countries” (Cameron 2010). This threat is, however, still looming:

Countries will increasingly be tempted to try to maximise their own growth and
their own employment, at the expense of others. Globalisation - the force that has been so powerful in driving development and bringing huge numbers into the world economy could go into reverse. If we follow that path we will all lose out. The West would lose for sure. But so too would China. (ibid.)

The threat of protectionism is a common challenge for the UK and China and therefore requires common responses of the two actors: “If we manage things properly, if we win the arguments for free trade, if we find a way to better regulation, we can both grow together. But if we don’t, we will both suffer” (ibid.).

In the same year, the foreign secretary David Miliband identified the fight against protectionism as urgent:

> The foundation of our mutual prosperity has been the growing interdependence of economies, connected by more open markets in goods and services. But in the last two years, the economic crisis has refocused attention on the risks of interdependence rather than its rewards. [...] The need is urgent: if we do not make the case, the result will be destructive nationalism, embodied in protectionism that harms us all. (Miliband 2010)

Three years later, Cameron again made the case for free trade and against protectionism:

> Some, in Europe and elsewhere, see the world changing and want to shut China off behind a bamboo curtain of trade barriers. Britain wants to tear those trade barriers down. I believe, as I said to Premier Li just now, the way forward for Britain and China is more openness and dialogue, delivering mutual benefits for people here and back at home. (Cameron 2013)

The issue of climate change and – closely connected – the issue of competition over natural resources was also framed in a framework of immediate urgency. David Miliband outlined in a speech at the Shanghai Institute for International Affairs in 2010, that in order to “prevent rising commodity prices from thwarting the economic recovery, and to stop the resource crunch from pushing us back towards a destabilizing zero-sum scramble for resources, we urgently need to shift to low carbon development [...] The dangers of resource crunch and green protectionism are real” (Miliband 2010).
The discursive construction of these two issues of protectionism and resource scarcity point to another feature in the UK’s discourse on China which had appeared already before but which is more visible since about 2010: There is more and more reference to the EU as the partner for China in addressing these issues: “The EU and China have a clear shared interest in working together on energy and resource efficiency. We both want to reduce our dependence on imports of oil and gas. We both recognise not just the economic dangers, but also the commercial potential” (Miliband 2010). And the same is true for the issue of protectionism: “It is therefore essential that those with an interest in open trade create a bulwark against protectionism. There is a clear case for partnership here between the world’s fastest growing economy, China, and its largest single market, the European Union” (ibid.). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s policy paper on China reiterated this development stating that the “EU is central to many UK interests in China” (HM Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013). And most interestingly, discussing China’s role in the key security issues in East Asia, the UK adopts a remarkably similar position to that of the EU on these issues:

In both cases\(^{68}\), the UK is concerned that an unforeseen event between rival parties, perhaps involving military or civilian enforcement vessels, could escalate into a more serious incident. Threats to Asia-Pacific peace and stability might have far reaching effects, including on the UK: for instance, recent tensions in the East China Sea have had a negative impact on trade between China and Japan, when the West is looking to Asia to generate global growth. Together with our partners in the EU, we encourage all sides to exercise restraint, resolve territorial issues through a process of dialogue and keep communication channels open (ibid.)

There is no single actor with hostile intentions that is considered to be the threat to East Asian security, but there are rival parties, unforeseen events and tensions. The responses to this situation are dialogue and open communication channels.

The policy paper further raised two already well known issues: First, cooperation between the UK and China in order to solve international conflicts and to “prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction” (ibid.). And second, cooperation between the UK and China in order to “take action against dangerous climate change

\(^{68}\) Which are the disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the disputes in the South China Sea.
and to promote energy security” (ibid.). All in all, the UK sees “China as a key partner with whom we want to expand our wider ties and common interest while having a constructive dialogue on areas where we disagree” (ibid.).

To sum up: The discursive constructions regarding China were constructions of security in the period between 2010 and 2014. The ongoing ‘startling change’ of the international environment was the key challenge for the maintenance of the prosperity, influence and security of the UK. Its economic strength was one key asset in achieving prosperity and security, which were constructed as inextricably intertwined. As before, China was neither constructed as a threat, nor were there instances of uncertainties about China’s behaviour or motives. To the contrary: China was considered as a ‘friend’ (cf. Cameron 2014) and in order to achieve its security-political goals, a close and trustful strategic partnership with China was a key priority and absolutely vital for the UK. Especially in the common cause against the consequences of the financial and economic crisis and protectionism, the security of both actors was constructed as inseparable and thus these challenges had to be tackled jointly.

Not only were there similarities to the EU’s constructions of security regarding China, but increasingly, the EU served as a reference point for the UK’s policies regarding China. This discursive construction of threats (changing international environment, protectionism), which emanate from relational dynamics and the respective responses, which are directed towards managing and building trustful relationships still strongly corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security.

6.2.1.5. Conclusion
In the first period that has been analyzed, from 1993 to 1997, the UK’s discourse regarding China was characterized by the need for practical cooperation regarding the handover of Hong Kong. The ‘suspicions’ of the past had been left behind and even in the discussion about the tensions in the Taiwan strait or the nuclear tests of China, the UK took a rather calming stance and did not construct China as threatening or at least irresponsible. It was, however, not a security discourse. From 1998 onwards, there were constructions of relational security regarding China. The main threats that were identified were the ‘breakneck speed’ of the changes in the international system after the Cold War and trends towards protectionism. Furthermore,
resource scarcity and climate change as a threat multiplier as well as nuclear proliferation were seen as compromising UK security. Besides the UK and its security and prosperity, the ‘we’ of the international community was constructed as a referent object. The security provider therefore was the UK and the international community, who – in order to tackle the threats – had to develop a ‘doctrine of international community’ to be able to jointly manage the risks of globalization. Therefore, an open global economic system and close economic ties between the UK and China were seen as vital. In general, the establishment of close relations with China and mutual understanding were constructed as crucial in order to achieve security. Besides this construction, which corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security, there were constructions which concerned the possibility of an instable China and called for policies to assist China in managing the risks of its rapid development. However, as there were no clear constructions of timely responses to this potential threat, this is no unambiguous construction of security and is therefore put in brackets. What stands out in the UK’s construction of security regarding China is that China is never constructed as a threat and there are no instances of uncertainties about China’s future behaviour which might open up a discursive space for other constructions of security. Given that the UK’s national security strategy (2010) contains constructions of the neorealist ideal-type of security, it is remarkable that in its discourse on China, there are no instances which might correspond to this ideal-type, such as for example, references to its alliance with the US or its Five Power Defence Agreement when dealing with China. To the very contrary: The relations with China are constructed as increasingly positive to an extent that China is even considered as a ‘friend’. Furthermore, since about 2010, the security of the UK and the prosperity of the UK are constructed as two sides of the same medal. The policies that are pursued to build Britain’s prosperity were considered to build Britain’s security. Therefore, as in the case of the EU’s discourse, security and prosperity are inextricably intertwined to an extent that the assumption that economic policies might compromise security policies cannot be upheld. Finally, not only does the EU feature as an important partner for the UK in pursuing its policies regarding China, but the UK’s construction of security shows many similarities with the EU’s constructions. The ‘breakneck speed’ of globalization and the fluidity of the international system both require a close and trustful management of the
international system and a ‘doctrine of community’. The preservation of an open global economic system and the concern for energy security and resource scarcity respectively were essential imperatives in both discourses. All in all, there are no contradictory, competing or otherwise incompatible constructions between France and the EU in any of the analyzed periods.

The following table sums up the UK’s construction of security regarding China.

Table 6.1.: The UK’s security discourse regarding China (1998-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Liberal security</th>
<th>Relational security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td></td>
<td>*(All actors and their relationships): The UK and the international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Provider</td>
<td></td>
<td>*(Of all actors, of the relationship): The UK’s security and prosperity, open global economy, international financial system, the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>*(Emanating from actors): (Instability of China)</td>
<td>*(Emanating from relational dynamics): Breakneck-speed of the international environment, protectionism, competition for resources, climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>*(Targeted towards actors): (Help China manage the risks of its rapid development)</td>
<td>*(Targeted towards relationships): Management of the international community (develop a ‘doctrine of international community’), preserve an open trading system, intensify economic cooperation with China, build a close relationship with China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.2. France’s security discourse regarding China

After the events of Tiananmen square in 1989, the relationship between France and China was strained. The French position towards China was divided into two factions of which one aimed at normalization of the relations with China and the other one aimed at intensifying relations with Taiwan, including selling military equipment to Taiwan (cf. Neßhöver 1999). By 1994, however, efforts to reset the relations between France and China and to gain access to the rapidly growing Chinese market resulted in the first French-Chinese Joint Statement. In 1997, France and China declared their relationship to be a ‘global partnership’\(^6\) in a second Joint Statement. Five years later, the bilateral relationship was designated as a ‘global strategic partnership’.\(^7\) Since 2004, there were neither major alterations of the discursive constructions regarding China nor were there other major documents or declarations which would necessitate another periodisation.

The resulting periods that are analyzed are thus:
- 1997-2004: From the ‘global partnership’ to the ‘global strategic partnership’
- 2004-2014: From the ‘global strategic partnership’ to the present day.

Throughout the analyzed period, the French discursive constructions of security correspond to the relational ideal-type of security and, to a lesser extent, to the liberal ideal-type. The main threats to France and to international security and peace emanate from the radical and rapid changes that take place in the international system after the end of the Cold War. The global financial crisis which started in 2008 seemed to prove this threat analysis and president Sarkozy saw the world standing at the rim of an ‘abyss’. Terrorism, drugs and nuclear proliferation are also seen as threatening. In order to tackle these threats, France aims at building a new international order – a multipolar world, in which the great poles (among which, of course, is France) cooperate closely and foster mutual understanding. Only by building close relationships and gaining mutual confidence, the international political, economic and financial system can be managed properly.

As France and China converge on many important international issues, the two

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\(^6\) Partenariat global
\(^7\) Partenariat global stratégique
countries are natural partners in building such a multipolar world.
In contrast to this relational construction of security, the liberal construction is less clear cut. A major concern for France is to gain access to the Chinese market in order to participate and profit from the enormous potential for growth. French employment, as it was put pointedly, is defended in Beijing. While the policies of gaining market access are formulated with quite a dose of urgency, there is only a more or less implicit construction of threat: The danger to miss out on the potentials of the Chinese markets and thus to suffer economically (i.e. lose employment). If these constructions were to be considered constructions of security, they would correspond to the liberal ideal-type, as the threats emerge from a non-hostile actor by not granting market access and the responses are directed towards this actor by trying to negotiate market access.

Two aspects stand out in the French discourse on China: One is the emphasis on the convergence in many questions of international importance and the resulting expressions of friendship between the two countries. The other is a great portion of understanding for deviating Chinese positions in the UN Security Council or on human rights issues. As the French foreign minister Douste-Blazy put it: “Sometimes I hear people tell me: ‘but in the Security Council China is a bit isolated’ or ‘China thinks this or that’; but with a history of five thousand years, who has the right to give lessons to China?”

All in all, the French constructions of security leave no discursive space for alternative constructions as the French-Sino relations are constructed as a tight partnership.

6.2.2.1. From the Joint Declaration of 1994 to the ‘global partnership’ (1994-1997)

In the Joint Declaration of 1994, France and China stated that “the two parties agreed that France and China should rebuild their traditionally friendly and cooperative relations on the basis of the principles which guided the relations between the two countries since its establishment” (Government of the French Republic/Government of the People's Republic of China 1994). Given the strong opposition of the Chinese

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71 Own translation of the original text: Certes la Chine agit des modes qui lui sont propres, mais n'est ce pas légitime de la part d'un peuple et d'une civilisation cinq fois millénaires ? J'entends parfois des gens me dire, mais au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations unies, la Chine s'est un peu isolée ou la Chine pense ceci ou la Chine cela, mais quand on est une civilisation vieille de 5 000 ans, qui a le droit de faire la leçon à la Chine ?

72 Les deux parties sont d'avis que la France et la Chine doivent restaurer leurs relations d'amitié et de coopération traditionnelles sur la base des principes qui ont présidé à l'établissement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays.
government against arms sales to Taiwan, the French government agreed not to sell any military equipments to Taiwan: “Considering the concerns of the Chinese side, the French government will not authorize French companies to take part in an armament of Taiwan”\(^73\) (ibid.). Furthermore, the two sides agreed to strengthen their political dialogue, to install regular meetings and to develop their economic and commercial partnership (cf. ibid.).

From the French perspective, the renewal of the bilateral relationship was necessary for two reasons. First, the new and fluent situation of the world after the Cold War and second, the necessity for France to profit from the immense growth rates and prospects of the Chinese market. A third feature of the discursive constructions regarding China is the emphasis on convergences in foreign policy orientations and positions between France and China.

6.2.2.1.1. Changes of the international system and the notion of multipolarity

Edouard Balladour, the French prime minister, stated on a press conference during a visit in China that “in a world which is characterized by radical and rapid changes as well as by the appearance of new tensions, it is important that our two countries maintain a close dialogue about the important international issues and that we cooperate in order to settle regional crises”\(^74\) (Balladour 1994a). In a speech in front of the French community in Shanghai two days later, he drew the picture even a bit more dramatic:

> The world today witnesses rapid and sometimes sudden changes. Numerous new tensions and hotspots of instability emerge and new dangers threaten international security and peace. In this context, the few countries that possess the means and the capabilities to exert an influence on the important international issues should be in a regular dialogue. France and China, which are both nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN security council, have both certain responsibilities and thus have to play their role in the world. It is thus our common interest that our two countries coordinate with one another regularly on the important international issues. This is the spirit of my visit that I pay today to this great

\(^73\) Pour tenir compte des préoccupations de la partie chinoise, le gouvernement français s'engage à ne pas autoriser à l'avenir les entreprises françaises à participer à l'armement de Taiwan.

\(^74\) Dans un monde caractérisé par des bouleversements rapides et par l'apparition de nouveaux foyers de tensions, il est important que nos deux pays entretiennent un dialogue étroit sur l'ensemble des grandes questions internationales et coopèrent pour le règlement des crises régionales.
This analysis of the global situation and the ensuing necessity to cooperate with China remained a continuous feature of the discourse. In 1996, foreign minister Hervé de Charette stated in an interview with the Chinese press that it is precisely because the world in the post-Cold War era is unsteady and is changing fast that we have to strengthen our relations with China [...]. That’s why we need to coordinate our policies on strategic issues constructively, whether it is about security, regional integration, new threats such as illegal trade in drugs, terrorism, nuclear proliferation... On all these subjects, China and France could cooperate closely.\textsuperscript{76} (de Charette 1996d)

Since 1997, the picture of an unsteadily changing world is amended by the notion of ‘multipolarity’. As president Jacques Chirac stated:

The world in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century will be characterized by multipolarity. China will be one of the main poles in this new world. The European Union which is gaining in strength and which will issue its own currency that will be equal to the dollar next year, will also be a major pole. [...] I hope that our civilizations can enrich themselves mutually and that we can build a harmonious, multipolar world together.\textsuperscript{77} (Chirac 1997a; cf. Chirac 1997b; de Charette 1997a; Government of the French Republic, Government of the People's Republic of China 1997)

\textsuperscript{75} Le monde d'aujourd'hui connaît des transformations rapides et parfois brutales. De nombreux foyers de tensions et d'instabilité se développent, des dangers nouveaux menacent la paix et la sécurité internationales. Dans ce contexte, les quelques pays qui ont les moyens et la capacité d'exercer une influence sur les grandes questions internationales doivent avoir un dialogue régulier. La France et la Chine, toutes deux puissances nucléaires et membes permanents du Conseil de sécurité, ont chacune des responsabilités et un rôle à jouer dans le monde. Il est de notre intérêt commun que nos deux pays se concertent de manière suivie sur les grandes questions internationales. Tel est le sens de la visite que je rends aujourd'hui à ce grand pays.

\textsuperscript{76} C'est justement parce que le monde de l'après-guerre froide est plus mouvant, plus volatile, que nos relations politiques avec la Chine doivent se renforcer. L'ére du condominium est dépassée. La France, avec l'Allemagne, oeuvre pour que l'Union européenne se dote d'une politique étrangère efficace, qui soit un contrepoids utile et un point d'équilibre. C'est ainsi que nous pouvons avoir avec la Chine une concertation politique constructive sur les questions stratégiques, qu'il s'agisse de la sécurité, des processus d'intégration régionale, des nouvelles menaces que constituent le trafic de drogue, le terrorisme, le trafic de matières nucléaires... Sur tous ces sujets, la Chine et la France peuvent coopérer étroitement.

\textsuperscript{77} Le monde du XXI\textsuperscript{ème} siècle sera multipolaire. La Chine sera l'un des principaux pôles de ce monde nouveau. L'Union européenne, qui se renforce, qui crée l'an prochain sa monnaie unique à l'égal du dollar, sera aussi un pôle majeur. [...] Je souhaite que nos civilisations puissent s'enrichir mutuellement et qu'ensemble nous bâtissions un monde multipolaire harmonieux.
Chirac perceives a far-reaching consensus between the French and the Chinese position:

The first thing to do is to develop friendly relations between the different grand poles of power in the world. This is what France wants and this is what China wants. Today, we do not solve problems by going to war, but by managing the political and economic relationships. I am convinced that France and China – both members of the UN security council as well as nuclear powers – have the possibility of making an essential contribution to the development of a multipolar world; a multipolar world which is harmonious, in which the grand poles [...] develop in a harmonious way and not in a spirit of confrontation. [...] This is the policy of China and this is the policy of France.78 (Chirac 1997c)

And he dates back the idea of multipolarity to the times of the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and China. The policy of Charles de Gaulle was, according to Chirac, already aiming at overcoming the confrontational bipolarity:

The China of Mao Tsetoung and the France of general de Gaulle were the first countries to stand up against the bipolar order which was leading towards confrontation, towards ideological conflicts and the Cold War. By establishing diplomatic relations in 1964, they have shown the way. But we had to wait 25 years until in 1989 the Berlin wall fell and the partition of Yalta disappeared. A new world is to be build. This world, obviously, should not be unipolar. Building a new international order necessarily means strengthening its multipolar dimension. (Chirac 1997d)

The foreign minister, Hervé de Charette, put this aspiration for multipolarity in context with the relations of the other great powers, especially the United States:

78 La première chose à faire, c’est de développer des relations politiques amicales entre les différents grands pôles de puissance dans le monde. C’est ce que souhaite la France et c’est ce que souhaite la Chine. Aujourd’hui nous ne réglerons pas les problèmes par la guerre, nous les réglerons par la relation politique, économique. Je suis persuadé que la France comme la Chine, toutes deux membres du Conseil de sécurité, deux puissances nucléaires également, ont la possibilité d’apporter une contribution essentielle au développement d’un monde multipolaire mais d’un monde multipolaire harmonieux, où les grands pôles de développement - l’Europe, l’Amérique du Nord, l’Amérique du Sud, l’Asie du Sud-est et naturellement la Chine, le Japon - se développeront de façon harmonieuse et non pas dans un esprit de confrontation. Cela suppose que tout le monde y mette du sien. C’est la politique de la Chine et c’est celle de la France.
It is not normal that the dialogue with China should be an exclusive responsibility of the Russians or the Americans, all the more the relationships of Beijing with Moscow or Washington have never been tension-free. That’s why the Europeans, and France in the first place, must maintain a regular dialogue, tight and constructive, with China. If some in the world try to hamper our efforts, it is clearly because they wish to retain the monopoly on the relations with Beijing.\(^{29}\) (de Charette 1997c)

### 6.2.2.1.2. Economic cooperation

The renewal of the bilateral relationship with China was also of special importance in order not to miss out on the enormous promises of the Chinese market and to link the French economy to its rapid growth rates. The Joint Statement speaks of the need to develop the economic and commercial cooperation (cf. Government of the French Republic/Government of the People's Republic of China 1994). During his visit in China, prime minister Balladur made clear that the participation in the quickly growing Chinese market is essential for France:

The visit that I have paid to the liquid air factory this morning and then the conversations I had with the representatives of French companies, confirmed the remarkable potential of an economy in full expansion as well as the important role that French companies could play here. Without any doubt, China offers considerable perspectives for our companies. Her needs are important and frequently correspond to industrial sectors in which our companies have special competences and appreciation, such as energy, transport, telecommunications.\(^{30}\) (Balladur 1994b)

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\(^{29}\) Il n’est pas normal que le dialogue avec la Chine soit le seul apanage des Russes ou des Américains, et ce d’autant plus que les relations de Pékin avec Moscou ou Washington n’ont jamais été vraiment sereines. C’est pourquoi les Européens, et la France au premier rang, doivent entretenir un dialogue régulier, dense et constructif, avec la Chine. Que certains dans le monde cherchent à nous en empêcher, on voit bien pourquoi, c’est parce qu’ils souhaitent en conserver le monopole.

\(^{30}\) La visite que j’ai effectuée ce matin sur le site de l’usine Air liquide, puis les entretiens que j’ai eus avec des représentants de sociétés françaises, me semblent confirmer le remarquable potentiel d’une économie en pleine expansion et le rôle important que les entreprises françaises peuvent y avoir. La Chine offre sans nul doute pour nos entreprises des perspectives considérables. Ses besoins sont importants et correspondent souvent à des secteurs industriels - je pense notamment à l’énergie, aux transports, ou encore aux télécommunications - où nos sociétés sont particulièrement compétentes et appréciées.
Hervé de Charette was not satisfied with the status quo of French presence on the Chinese market:

the place of France is insufficient. And to achieve a better place, we have to force ourselves to improve our knowledge of your country. We wish to develop our exchanges in a balanced way in order to achieve for France a position in the Chinese market which corresponds to its status as the fourth biggest exporting country in the world. As of now, our share in the Chinese market is abnormally weak and we both have to make efforts to change this.  

And he underlined: “[...] the economic relations between China and France are an absolute priority of our policy in Asia” (ibid.). One day later, his statement showed the urgency with which the lacking presence of French companies in China are assessed:

“We can easily see that French employment is defended in Beijing as well as in a number of other major Asian countries. [...] What I demand, what our ambition should be, is simultaneously what I called the political dialogue, economic development and the strengthening of our cultural relations” (de Charette 1996b; cf. Chirac 1997a; cf. Chirac 1997b).

In his 1997 speech on “China today and tomorrow”, de Charette clearly formulated the criticisms towards China that will continue to play a major role in the French as well as in the European economic relations with China. He started by assessing that the French position in the Chinese market is still unsatisfactory. While the political relations with China, according to de Charette, are excellent, the results in economic terms are not:

“ [...] one has to acknowledge that our companies do not profit from the Chinese growth than our German or Italian competitors” (de Charette 1997c). This unsatisfactory position is caused by trade barriers, especially in the agricultural and food industry, vine
and luxury industry, areas, in which France has a widely known competence (cf. ibid.). He also raised the issue of protection of intellectual property rights and clearly states that “we hope to achieve rapid and substantial concessions of the Chinese government in all of these areas” (ibid.).

6.2.2.1.3. **Convergence of the positions of France and China**

All in all, the French government did not construct China as a threat and constructed no uncertainties about China’s intentions. Even when the relations between France and China deteriorated after 1989, Juppé did not see major divergences in their respective foreign policy outlooks: “The dialogue was interrupted although there were no major divergences in our respective foreign policies” (Juppé 1994). De Charette even observed mutual comprehension:

> The Chinese are clearly interested in France. They are interested in our position. And what is it precisely that they are interested in? It is France’s attitude of independence. It is also theirs. There is in a special way this element of a common diplomatic philosophy. It is a nation holding rigidly on to its independence. France has a philosophy of diplomacy which is of the same nature. So, we understand each other.

And two months later he underlined that “our two countries certainly have some differences, but no contentious issues” (de Charette 1996d). In 1997 he described the Sino-French relations even as a natural partnership:

> The partnership of today is not the result of certain circumstances. It results from an encounter, one might say a natural one, of two great nations that have in
common a long and glorious past, global responsibilities, the desire to maintain their position in the world and the unalterable will to preserve their national independence.\(^{90}\) (de Charette 1997b)

Given this convergence of the positions and foreign policy outlooks, Hervé de Charette called for a deeper understanding of the Chinese side. He presented the Chinese view on Europe and France:

The Chinese take – justifiably – pride in their civilization which is uninterruptedly the most ancient one on the planet: The first dynasty, the Shang, existed – along with the first Chinese ideographs – since 1530 before Christ; i.e. since the 18\(^{th}\) Egyptian dynasty of Akhnaton and Tutankhamun. Confucius and Laozi, which are contemporaries of Buddha (about 550 B.C.), are born one century before Socrates. [...] France, which exists as a nation state since one millennial, is regarded with respect, but all in all rather as a baby sister. For the Chinese decision makers, our declaration of human rights or the pursuit of happiness proclaimed in the American constitution which both do not exist for longer than two centuries, are first and foremost foreign and only recent inventions which cannot easily claim universality.\(^{91}\) (de Charette 1997c)

He then rather self-critically reflected upon the historical encounters of France, Europe and China:

One finds that it is very present in the thinking of Chinese decision makers that it

\(^{90}\) Le partenariat qui aujourd'hui nous lie n'est pas le fruit des circonstances. Il découle de la rencontre, à vrai dire naturelle, de deux grandes nations qui ont la caractéristique commune d'avoir un passé long et glorieux, des responsabilités mondiales, le désir de tenir leur rang dans le monde et la volonté inflexible de préserver leur indépendance nationale.

\(^{91}\) Les Chinois tirent une grande -et légitime- fierté de ce que leur civilisation soit la plus ancienne de la planète sans discontinuité : la première dynastie, celle des Shang, est attestée, ainsi que les premiers idéogrammes, vers 1530 avant Jésus-Christ. Elle est donc contemporaine de la XVIIIème dynastie égyptienne, celle d'Akhenaton et de Toutankhamon. Confucius et Lao Tseu, exactement contemporains du Bouddha, en 550 avant Jésus-Christ, sont nés un siècle avant Socrate. Avec une civilisation dont l'écriture et la langue remontent à 3500 ans et dont les codes philosophiques et sociaux ont été fondés il y a 2500 ans, les Chinois, qui valorisent à l'extrême l'ancienneté et l'expérience conformément à ce que leur enseigne le confucianisme, ont une difficulté réelle à admettre que des pays ou des civilisations plus récentes prétendent leur faire la leçon. La France, qui n'existe comme État-nation que depuis un millénaire, est regardée avec respect, mais somme toute comme une cadette. Pour les responsables chinois, notre déclaration des Droits de l'Homme, ou l'aspiration au bonheur individuel proclamée par la constitution américaine, qui n'ont, l'une et l'autre, que deux siècles d'existence, sont d'abord des inventions étrangères et des inventions récentes, dont il ne va pas de soi qu'elle peuvent prétendre à l'universalité.
were the Western powers that dismantled China in the course of the 19th century. The English took Hong Kong during the Opium wars, which had as the goal to force the Chinese empire to buy opium from the British Indies in order to re-establish the trade balance between the two countries. The Germans settled on the Liaoning peninsula. The French destroyed the Summer Palace in Beijing in 1860, were engaged in Yunnan and on Hainan and settled with a concession in Shanghai. We must not forget the trauma that our predecessors have caused yesterday: they help to explain why the demands for democracy and human rights that we make today are sometimes hard to accept by the Chinese decision makers.92 (ibid.)

That is to say, when differences between France and China in terms of human rights are assessed, this assessment has to be seen in context of this remarkable statement of understanding for the Chinese position. This did not mean that France accepted the Chinese position on human rights, but that it understood why China takes a rather hesitating position on the issue. The frequently made statements about mutual understanding seem to be – at least in this case – put into practice. This also means that the differences that are assessed in terms of criticism of the economic policies or human rights by far did not have the potential to really bring a distance into the relationship, but rather lead to intensified dialogue in order to foster mutual understanding in this regard.

Given the paramount importance of its economic interests, combined with the aspiration to create a multipolar world, the understanding for the Chinese position on its (historical) relations with the West and the magnitude of China, de Charette concluded that any policy of containment towards China would be absurd and a grave mistake:

That's why choosing a policy of containment à la Foster Dulles would be absurd. Putting China aside in whatever form of isolation would be a serious mistake. [...].

The international community as a whole needs a stable and prosperous China, a

92 En témoigne le fait, toujours très présent dans l'esprit des dirigeants chinois, que ce sont les puissances occidentales qui dépecèrent la Chine tout au long du XIXème siècle. Les Anglais acquièrent Hong Kong à l'issue des "Guerres de l'Opium", destinées à forcer l'Empire chinois à acheter l'opium des Indes britanniques pour rétablir l'équilibre commercial entre les deux pays. Les Allemands s'établirent dans la péninsule du Liaoning. Quant aux Français, ils mirent à sac le Palais d'Eté de Pékin en 1860, eurent des visées sur le Yunnan et l'Île de Haïnan et s'installèrent dans une concession à Shanghai. Nous ne devons pas oublier les traumas que nos prédécesseurs ont causé hier : ils expliquent aussi pourquoi les appels à la démocratie et au respect des Droits de l'Homme en Chine que nous prodiguons si volontiers aujourd'hui sont parfois bien difficiles à accepter par les dirigeants chinois.
China which has confidence in its development and the integration into the international community.\textsuperscript{93} (ibid.)

The Joint Statement of 1997 finally summed up all the points that have already been raised, calling for a \textit{global partnership} in order to establish a multipolar world, cooperating on international security issues to foster disarmament and prevent proliferation, deepening and institutionalizing the bilateral relations, intensifying the economic and commercial as well as the technological, scientific and cultural relations (cf. Government of the French Republic, Government of the People's Republic of China 1997).

Summing up the French construction of China in the years from 1994 to 1997, one finds, first, that the notion of multipolarity played an important role: The world after the Cold War is seen as rapidly changing and there is the need for the great powers or poles, including France and China, to manage the new situation by working together. Relating multipolarity back to the times of Charles de Gaulle and Mao Tsetung and their alleged efforts to counter the confrontational bipolar logic of the Cold War, the notion already implicitly carried quite a dose of criticism towards the US in it. The constructions of threats as emanating from ‘rapid’, ‘sudden’ and ‘radical’ changes and the ensuing need to manage the international system by establishing a new, multipolar order correspond to the relational ideal-type of security. The emphasis on the convergences with China and the mutual understanding in a close partnership further underlines this assessment. Secondly, the importance of economic relations between France and China was emphasized. French employment was seen as – as it is expressed in quite security-political vocabulary – being defended in China. France thus has to put all efforts into developing its economic relations with China – all the more, because France seemed to be already behind other European countries such as Germany or Italy. These constructions contain more than just a grain of security-political, urgent content. It becomes clear that the French are addressing their Chinese counterparts in order to negotiate the best possible conditions for French companies. Yet, the construction of threats is not clear cut and only implicit in the formulation of the urgent policies. Still,

\textsuperscript{93} C'est pourquoi choisir, à l'égard de la Chine, une politique d'endiguement à la Foster Dulles de ce grand pays serait une absurdité. Sa mise à l'écart dans je ne sais quelle quarantaine serait une faute grave. […] La communauté internationale dans son ensemble a besoin d'une Chine stable et prospère, confiante dans son développement et intégrée dans les règles et les disciplines mondiales.
one may consider these constructions as corresponding to the liberal ideal-type of security: Threats emerging from Chinese non-willingness to grant market access and the responses directed towards China in order to negotiate the best possible conditions for market access for French companies.

6.2.2.2. From the ‘global partnership’ to the ‘global strategic partnership’ (1997-2004)

In the years between the establishment of the global partnership (1997) and the strategic global partnership (2004), the three main issues remained the same: French officials pointed out, first, their continuous ambition to create a multipolar world in which the grand poles cooperate in order to tackle the fluid international situation with many dangers and pay tribute to the increasingly interdependent international situation. These constructions have increasingly a rather critical tone towards the US policies. Second, the French focus to strengthen its position on the Chinese market remained a top priority. Third, the convergences between French and Chinese positions on their basic foreign policy outlooks are underlined. Fourth and finally, the issue of the arms embargo hit the agenda. According to French government representatives, there was no more justification for the arms embargo to stay in place.

6.2.2.2.1. Multipolarity and interdependence

The construction of a multipolar – or sometimes multilateral, however, with the same connotations as the concept of multipolarity (cf. de Villepin 2003b) – world order in which France and China were meant to play a crucial role gained in strength in the years between 1997 and 2004 (cf. Védrine 1998a; cf. Jospin 1998b; cf. Dufourcq 1998; cf. Chirac 1999a; cf. Védrine 2000; cf. Chirac 2004d; cf. Chirac 2004f). This construction gradually took a more outspoken critical stance towards US policies, which were perceived as largely unilateral. Furthermore, in a world which was perceived as more fluid and dangerous after September 11, 2001, China was seen as an integral part of the changes taking place and of the changes which China itself was a cause of. The concept of multipolarity was still related back to the policies of Charles de Gaulle, stating that the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1964 was already in these days aimed at overcoming the bipolar confrontation. The creation of the common European currency, the Euro, was constructed as a counterweight against the dominance dollar and France
was taking sides with China on the issues of Taiwan and Iraq.

As Bertrand Dufourcq, the secretary-general of the foreign minister, stated:

France recommends multipolarity, that is to say, the construction of balanced and harmonious relationships between the grand poles of the international society. We reject the idea of one single dominant power, engaged in a global mission, imposing its laws and norms or its internal values on the international stage. Instead, we aspire reinforced cooperation on the basis of equality of rights and duties and on the basis of the respect of the identities of everyone.\(^\text{94}\) (Dufourcq 1998)

In 1999, Chirac spoke of the “suffocating” character of a unipolar world and – as if it was the solution to this problem – announced that Paris had installed a direct and encrypted line to Beijing in order to enable direct consultations on urgent international questions. China had virtually been upgraded to the status of Washington and Moscow\(^\text{95}\) (Chirac 1999b).

The criticism concerning US dominance led to a strong alignment with China on the issue of Iraq. Although there were major tensions between France and the US – or ‘old Europe’ versus the US – it is nevertheless remarkable how strongly France constructed the unanimity with China:

You are familiar with the French position on Iraq, we are very close to the position of China. We’ve been in close coordination with China during the whole period. Together we have opposed the principle of war. Together we have adopted the resolution 1546 concerning the return of sovereignty to Iraq and the

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\(^{94}\) La France recommande pour sa part la multipolarité, c’est-à-dire la construction de rapports équilibrés et harmonieux entre les grands pôles de la société internationale. Nous récusons l’idée d’une puissance dominante, investie d’une mission mondiale, imposant ses lois, ses normes ou ses valeurs internes à l’échelle internationale. En revanche, nous aspirons à des coopérations renforcées basées sur l’égalité des droits et des devoirs et sur le respect des identités de chacun.

\(^{95}\) Nous voulons exclure deux dérives: celle d’un monde qui n’aurait pas de règles universellement reconnues, un monde qui serait en quelque sorte un peu chaotique, et une deuxième dérive toujours possible, qui serait celle d’un monde unipolaire qui risquerait fort de devenir un monde étouffant. […] Pour avoir une meilleure approche de ces problèmes internationaux, nous avons donc décidé, d’une part, d’organiser une concertation permanente de nos deux représentants à New York, de nos deux ambassadeurs à New York, pour avoir une concertation permanente sur les problèmes du monde tels qu’appréciés au niveau de l’ONU, et nous avons également décidé, comme Paris l’a déjà fait avec Moscou et Washington, d’établir une ligne directe, cryptée, entre Pékin et Paris, afin de pouvoir nous consulter directement en cas de besoin.
organization of elections before the end of January. Thus, we are totally in line with each other's point of view. I observe that the demons of civil war and terrorism continue ever more frequently and more strongly to trouble Iraq. Therefore, I am worried about the future situation in Iraq. We are in close coordination with Germany, Spain, Russia and China on these issues.\(^6\) (Chirac 2004c; cf. de Villepin 2003c)

On the issue of the announced Taiwanese referendum, too, France took a clear stance against the referendum and was thus firmly on the side of China:

It is also because of the rejection of the fatality of division and confrontation that France sticks to its commitment concerning the one-China-principle. [...]. Jeopardizing the status quo by a unilateral and destabilizing initiative of whatever shape and form comprising a referendum, would mean to prefer division over union. This would be a terrible mistake. This would mean taking on a heavy responsibility for the stability of the region.\(^7\) (Chirac 2004a; cf. Chirac 2004b)

Chirac related the concept of multipolarity again to the policy of Charles de Gaulle:

When general de Gaulle recognized China, his aim was to escape the global system of confrontation between two blocs. Confrontation is always a bad solution in human history. Therefore, it is essential to develop everything that is able to allow for respect and dialogue between civilizations, cultures, the search for common interests and common values. And it is in this context that China, which is on its way to become a global power, has a considerable role to play. And it is normal that a group of states such as the EU want to have very close

\(^6\) Vous connaissez la position de la France sur l'Irak, elle est d'ailleurs très proche de celle de la Chine, nous avons eu une longue concertation pendant toute cette période. Nous avons ensemble refusé le principe même de la guerre. Nous avons ensemble approuvé la résolution 1546 pour le retour à la souveraineté de l'Irak et à des élections, en principe avant la fin janvier. Donc nous sommes tout à fait sur la même ligne. J'observe que les démons de la guerre civile, du terrorisme, continuent à agir, et même à agir de plus en plus souvent et de plus en plus fort, et donc je suis, c'est vrai, très inquiet pour l'avenir de la situation en Irak. Nous avons une concertation permanente entre la France, l'Allemagne, l'Espagne, la Russie et la Chine sur ces problèmes.

\(^7\) C'est également dans ce refus de la fatalité de la division et de l'affrontement que la France prit son attachement à l'existence d'une seule Chine. Les Français souhaitaient à leurs amis Chinois, où qu'ils résident de part et d'autre du détroit, paix, bonheur et prospérité. Le peuple chinois a en héritage indivisible une culture et une histoire exceptionnelles. Rompre le statu quo par une initiative unilatérale déstabilisatrice, quelle qu'elle soit, y compris un référendum, serait privilégier la division sur l'union. Ce serait une grave erreur. Ce serait prendre une lourde responsabilité pour la stabilité de la région.
relations with China, in order to face the multipolar world together which is currently taking its future shapes.\footnote{Quand le général de Gaulle a reconnu la Chine, sa volonté était de sortir d'un système de confrontation mondiale entre deux blocs. La confrontation est toujours une mauvaise solution dans l'histoire des hommes. Par conséquent, il est essentiel de développer tout ce qui peut permettre le respect et le dialogue des civilisations, des cultures, la recherche d'un intérêt commun et de valeurs communes. Et c'est dans cet esprit que la Chine, qui devient l'une des premières puissances mondiales, a un rôle considérable à jouer. Et il est normal qu'un groupe de pays comme l'Europe veuille avoir avec la Chine des relations de très grande proximité, de façon à pouvoir aborder en commun le monde multipolaire qui est en train de se dessiner pour demain.}{Chirac 2004c; cf. Chirac 2000a}

Closely related to the notion of multipolarity, the growing interdependence of the world became more and more a prominent feature of the French discourse on China (cf. Védrine 1998a; cf. Dufourcq 1998; cf. Chirac 2004a). Dominique de Villepin described the interdependent world quite pointedly in a speech at the University of Fudan:

Day after day, it seems that the problems are more and more connected. There is interdependence. [...] These dangers are entangled and complex. They concern every one. They do not spare anyone. No country, no region of the world can set itself aside of these new threats and risks. Whether it is about the economy, the environment or security, issues which are more and more inseparable, our world needs solidarity. [...] Together, we have to mobilize ourselves to construct a more peaceful world, a world for everyone and not just for the few. Never before have our destinies been tied together in such a manner, and never before have the dangers been so threatening. [...] Today more than ever, our world is characterized by two implacable laws: urgency and interdependence.\footnote{Jour après jour, il apparaît que les problèmes sont de plus en plus liés. Interdépendance il y a. [...] Ces dangers sont ramifiés et complexes. Ils concernent tout le monde. Ils n'épargneront personne. Aucun pays, aucune région du monde ne peut se croire à l'abri des nouvelles menaces et des nouveaux risques. Qu'il s'agisse de l'économie, de l'environnement ou de la sécurité, aspects de plus en plus indissociables, notre monde porte l'exigence générale de la solidarité.[...] Ensemble, nous devons nous mobiliser pour construire un monde en paix, un monde pour tous et non pas seulement pour quelques uns. Jamais nos destins n'ont été aussi liés, mais jamais les dangers n'ont été aussi menaçants. [...] Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, notre monde est régi par deux lois implacables : l'urgence et l’interdépendance.}{de Villepin 2003c}

At the same time, the world was perceived as more unstable and fluid than during the Cold War. Bertrand Dufourcq stated that

from the perspective of France, the end of the Cold War eight years ago has given birth to a new international reality. The confrontation between two superpowers [...] has given way to a more fluid and thus more unstable system. This fluidity
explains without doubt the extremely fast rhythm of the globalization of exchanges, in which information technologies and the movements of capital could travel freely across the world. But the instability that has resulted from the new liberties has, at the same time, reminded us of the obligation of the states, freed from the tutelage of the superpowers, to organize for themselves the conditions of their interdependence.\(^{100}\) (Dufourcq 1998)

Especially after September 11, 2001, the world was perceived as more dangerous than before. As Dominique de Villepin stated during his visit in China:

> My visit to China takes place at a special moment in the situation of the world, in which everyone of you can see the risks, the urgency, the interdependence of all the difficulties and all the crises that happen just now. It is true, and everyone sees it in the situation in Iraq. It is true and everyone sees it in the situation of North Korea, but one also sees it in a number of other crises in Africa and the Middle East. All this makes the world especially dangerous and endows diplomacy with a particular force. It is vital that the different countries of the world, those that have a particular responsibility – and obviously China and France have in common that they are permanent members of the security council –, those that possess nuclear capabilities and thus are powers that weigh heavy on the destiny of the world, it is thus vital that we can exchange opinions, get together and get to know each other better on a daily basis.\(^{101}\) (de Villepin 2003a; cf. de Villepin 2003b)

With regard to regional security in East Asia, Jacques Chirac stated that security policy

\(^{100}\) Vue de la France, la fin de la guerre froide, il y a huit ans, a donné naissance à une nouvelle réalité internationale. La confrontation latente entre deux superpuissances, qui contraindrait plus ou moins le reste du monde à se situer par rapport à elle et qui tendait à geler l'évolution des relations internationales, a cédé la place à un système plus fluide et donc plus instable. La fluidité explique sans doute le rythme extrêmement rapide de la globalisation des échanges, dans la mesure où les technologies de l'information et les mouvements de capitaux ont pu progresser librement à travers le monde. Mais l'instabilité qui a résulté de ces nouvelles libertés nous ont, parallèlement, rappelé l'obligation faite aux États, dégagés de la tutelle des superpuissances, d'organiser eux-mêmes les conditions de leur interdépendance.

\(^{101}\) Ma visite en Chine intervient à un moment particulier de la situation du monde, où chacun de vous peut constater les risques, l'urgence, l'interdépendance de toutes les difficultés et de toutes les crises, qui actuellement le frappent. C'est vrai, et chacun le voit de la situation de l'Iraq. C'est vrai, et chacun le voit de la situation de la Corée du Nord mais on le voit sur bien d'autres crises, un peu partout en Afrique, ou au Proche Orient. Tout ceci fait un monde particulièrement dangereux où la diplomatie prend une force particulière. Il est essentiel que les différents pays du monde, ceux qui ont une responsabilité particulière - et évidemment entre la France et la Chine, il y a en commun d'être membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité -, des puissances nucléaires, puissances capables de peser sur le destin du monde, il est donc essentiel qu'au quotidien, nous puissions échanger, nous rapprocher et mieux nous connaître.
in such an environment is primarily about confidence: “Security, this means first and foremost confidence. This means constant dialogue, difficult at times, between neighbouring nations”\(^{102}\) (Chirac 1997d). And his foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, confirmed: “The lesson of the last half century is that dialogue, exchanges and cooperation mark the path of economic growth and peace. [...] Together, let us transform the dangers that loom in the future into a force that unites us and that brings us to act together, into a common will to contribute to peace and stability in the world”\(^{103}\) (de Villepin 2003c).

6.2.2.2. Economic cooperation

Expanding the French position in the Chinese market remained a central motive in the French discourse on China in the years between 1997 and 2004. The French position was still perceived as too small (cf. Védrine 1998b; cf. de Charette 1997c; cf. Chirac 1997a). The creation of employment in France was a central concern – expressed in the words of prime minister Lionel Jospin: “Let us not forget that each French success in China is one more victory for employment in France, for the development of our country”\(^{104}\) (Jospin 1998a). And he continues:

The government can help here by pushing China, friendly but firmly, to further open up its borders, to reduce their tariffs, to dismantle the protections of all sorts behind which it hides. And we have arguments to support our cause: The French market itself is very open, the Chinese exports continue to grow, although we have one of the highest trade deficits with China.\(^{105}\) (Jospin 1998c; cf. de Charette 1997c; cf. Chirac 2000c)

China is seen as being one of the coming economic powerhouses of the world and

\(^{102}\) La sécurité, c’est d’abord la confiance. C’est ce dialogue constant, difficile parfois, entre nations voisines.

\(^{103}\) La grande leçon du demi-siècle écoulé est que le dialogue, l’échange et la coopération jalonnent le chemin de la croissance et de la paix. [...] Ensemble, transformons les menaces qui pèsent sur notre avenir en une force pour nous rassembler et agir, en une volonté commune de contribuer à la paix et à la stabilité du monde.

\(^{104}\) N’oublions pas que chaque succès français en Chine est une victoire de plus pour l’emploi en France, pour le développement de notre pays.

\(^{105}\) Le gouvernement peut y aider en poussant, amicalement mais fermement, la Chine à ouvrir plus largement ses frontières, à réduire ses tarifs douaniers, à démanteler les protections de toute nature derrière lesquelles elle se protège. Nous avons des arguments en ce sens : le marché français est lui-même très ouvert, les exportations chinoises ne cessent de se développer, si bien que nous connaissions avec la Chine l’un de nos plus importants déficits bilatéraux.
“France wants to take part in this development to the fullest possible extent” (Chirac 1997b).


6.2.2.3. Convergence of the positions of France and China

Despite minor divergences between France and China, French officials kept on emphasizing that there were no contentious issues between the two powers. Foreign minister Hubert Védrine stated in 1998 that “there is no contentious element between France and China” (Védrine 1998a). To the contrary, Jacques Chirac considered the relations to be even based on a friendship-like relationship:

The second development undoubtedly leads to a better knowledge and understanding of each other, and a will to reinforce our cooperation and partnership. It is very, very frank. [...] In the past years, I have seen a stronger and stronger basis which results in an ever stronger cooperation. And I would say, an ever more friendly and even warm-hearted cooperation. (Chirac 2004f; cf. Chirac 2004d)

One of the reasons for this friendly relationship was the assessment that China was more and more becoming a responsible actor on the international scene. Especially its role during the Asian crisis was appreciated by the French government: “I take this opportunity to salute the wise and responsible policies that you have pursued during the last months in order to limit the spread of tensions in the region. From now on, China is one of the major actors to maintain international financial and monetary stability.”

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106 La France souhaite participer pleinement à cette évolution.
107 Il n’y a aucun élément de contentieux entre la France et la Chine.
108 La deuxième évolution, c’est incontestablement une meilleure compréhension et connaissance l’un de l’autre, de la Chine et de la France, et une volonté qui s’affirme de renforcer nos coopérations, nos partenariats. C’est très très net. Il faut dans la culture chinoise prendre le temps nécessaire pour permettre les évolutions qui s’imposent. J’ai vu, au fil des ans, se conforter et se prolonger une racine solide donnant un fruit qui est une coopération de plus en plus forte. Et je dirais de plus en plus amicale, et même chaleureuse.
109 Je tiens à ce propos à saluer la politique sage et responsable que vous avez inspirée au cours des
(Jospin 1998). Chirac seconded his prime minister in stating that China had taken “a particularly responsible attitude”\textsuperscript{110} during the Asian financial crisis (Chirac 1999a; cf. Chirac 2000b; cf. Chirac 2004a).

On the basis of the lack of contentious issues and a responsibly acting China, France assessed that the two countries had many common perspectives and positions on international issues. As the secretary general of the foreign minister, Bertrand Dufourcq, stated during a speech on ‘France and China in the contemporary world’ at the ‘Institut de Diplomatie’, that

on each and every of these specific points [which were: the Asian financial crisis, the crisis in Iraq, the crisis between India and Pakistan in South Asia and the controversy about Human Rights issues in the Human Rights Commission of the UN] France and China have an convergent approach, which serves not only our respective interests but which, above all, paves the way to more balanced and mutually beneficial relations, bringing respect and responsibility to each one. In the spirit of the joint declaration of May 1997, France and Europe are ready to go much further with China on the way to accelerate the construction of a multipolar world.\textsuperscript{111} (Dufourcq 1998)

And Chirac reiterated this assessment a year later, stating that “I have just told you that there were strong convergences between China and France, between China and Europe, which are political convergences, convergences of interests and convictions about a certain equilibrium of the world of tomorrow”\textsuperscript{112} (Chirac 1999b). One year later, Chirac again claimed that “generally, on all these issues [which are disarmament, ABM treaty, problems in a multipolar world., the situation on the Korean peninsula, regional crises] China and France have common approaches and common point of views which later
derniers mois pour limiter la propagation des tensions dans la région. La Chine est désormais partie prenante à la stabilité monétaire et financière internationale.
\textsuperscript{110} Autre épreuve, la crise financière asiatique, pendant laquelle la Chine a adopté une attitude particulièrement responsable.
\textsuperscript{111} Sur chacun de ces points concrets, la France et la Chine ont une approche convergente, qui sert non seulement leurs intérêts respectifs mais qui, surtout, montre la voie de relations équilibrées, mutuellement bénéfiques, apportant à chacun considération et responsabilité. Dans l'esprit de la déclaration conjointe de mai 1997, la France, et l'Europe, sont prêtes à aller plus loin avec la Chine sur ce chemin pour accélérer la construction du monde multipolaire.
\textsuperscript{112} Je vous ai dit tout à l'heure qu'il y avait entre la Chine et la France, la Chine et l'Europe, des convergences fortes, qui sont des convergences politiques, des convergences d'intérêt et de conviction sur un certain équilibre du monde de demain.
translate into common votes in the UN security council” (Chirac 2000c; cf. Chirac 2004a).

In cases of divergences, the solution is simply to foster dialogue on these issues. As Chirac stated: “Of course, there are also divergences. There is no reason to hide them. We have a different approach concerning the values of humanism and therefore we think we should talk about this. And we have talked about this a long time, of course without unnecessary aggression, but with conviction” (Chirac 1999b; cf. Védrine 2000).

6.2.2.2.4. The arms embargo

On the issue of the weapons embargo against China, France took a clear position in favour of lifting the embargo, arguing that, due to China’s role, responsible behaviour and status in the world, the embargo was absolutely unjustified: “This embargo makes no more sense today” (Chirac 2004b). And half a year later, he reiterated:

The current embargo has no more justification and, by the way, no consequence anymore. It is a measure which was necessary under different circumstances, but which today is simply and purely hostile towards China. I may remind you that there is no EU embargo in place against North Korea, thus the embargo towards China has no more justification. That’s why France, along with the majority of European countries, is in favour of lifting the embargo which is not justified anymore. I think that the embargo will be lifted in the coming months, at least that’s what I hope for. (Chirac 2004e; cf. Chirac 2004b)

The French officials also pointed to the EU Code of Conduct which was a legally

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113 Sur tous ces sujets, en règle générale, la Chine et la France ont des approches communes et des points de vue communs qui se traduisent d’ailleurs par des votes communs au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.

114 Il y a aussi naturellement des divergences. Il n’y a aucune raison de les cacher. Nous avons une approche en ce qui concerne les valeurs de l’humanisme qui n’est pas la même, et donc nous estimons qu’il faut en parler. Et nous en avons parlé longuement, sans agressivité inutile naturellement, mais avec conviction.

115 Cet embargo n’a plus aucun sens aujourd’hui.

116 L’embargo actuel n’a aucune justification et d’ailleurs aucune conséquence. C’est une mesure de circonstance qui est purement et simplement hostile à l’égard de la Chine. Je vous rappelle que la Corée du Nord n’est pas soumise à l’embargo de l’Union européenne, c’est vous dire si nous sommes là dans une situation qui n’a aucune justification, ni fondement. C’est la raison pour laquelle la France, comme d’ailleurs la plupart des pays de l’Union européenne sont favorables à la levée de cet embargo que rien ne justifie aujourd’hui. Je pense que cet embargo sera levé dans les mois qui viennent, en tous les cas, je le souhaite.

The joint declaration of 2004 reflected many of the just mentioned points and summarized the important ones already in its title: “Deepening the French-Chinese global strategic partnership in order to foster a world which is more secure, more respectful of its diversity and more solidarity” (Government of the French Republic/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2004). Besides the complex changes of the world, the need for a multilateral system addressing these changes, economic and commercial cooperation, the tackling of global challenges such as climate change or pandemics and human rights are all mentioned (ibid.).

Summing up the French discursive constructions regarding China between 1997 and 2004, one finds that the basic constructions remained constant. The notion of multipolarity played an increasingly important security-political role. Furthermore, this notion was amended by an observed growing interdependence of the international system in which still tremendous changes took place. As foreign minister de Villepin said, ‘never before’ had the world been so interconnected and ‘never before had the dangers been so threatening’. Secondly, economic cooperation and the acquisition of market shares of the promising Chinese market also remained a priority for the French policy regarding China. Thirdly, convergences between the foreign policies and interests of France and China were underlined, especially regarding Iraq and Taiwan. The arms embargo was seen as a hostile measure against China and therefore needed to be removed, given that the EU Code of Conduct was in place to regulate EU arms exports.

6.2.2.3. From the ‘global strategic partnership’ to the present day (2004-2014)
The period from 2004 until today was marked by four major themes. First, the notion of multipolarity remained a constant feature of the French discourse regarding China. Second, the French-Chinese relations are perceived as excellent throughout this period and it was emphasized that France and China had and have many common positions. The criticism that arose, third, was limited to the economic sphere, where France demanded more reciprocity in terms of market openness and protection of intellectual property rights as well as a more balanced trading relationship. These criticisms were,
however, not of such a magnitude and severity as to impact on the relationship as a whole. Fourth – and quite to the contrary – the management of the international system, especially after the beginning of the financial crisis, necessitated and active and constructive involvement of China in order to address the global challenges. Only through cooperation and shared responsibility could the challenges of the 21st century be tackled.

6.2.2.3.1. Multipolarity, China and the EU

The notion of multipolarity remained a constant feature of the French discourse regarding China. However, the notion was not constructed as strongly as before, especially when it was linked to a sometimes implicit, sometimes outspoken criticism of US unilateral policies. As the EU gained more prominence in the French discourse regarding China, so did the concept of multilateralism, which was often linked to multipolarity.

In a speech at the university of Shanghai, French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin stated that

we had the feeling very early that there would develop strategic relations between China and Europe. China today reoccupies the place that has always been and will always be her place in the centre of the world. A more united and stronger Europe claims its place on the international scene. What would be more normal than these two poles intensifying their exchanges?¹¹⁷ (Raffarin 2005b; cf. Chirac 2006c; cf. Jouyet 2007)

And he went on: “On the international stage, China and Europe defend the same principles, multilateralism, in order to achieve peace by an equilibrium between the continents, the respect of international law and by the preservation of cultural diversity which emerges from different identities”¹¹⁸ (ibid.). And in 2007, foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy reiterated: “I believe that generally China and France share the

¹¹⁷ Nous avons eu très tôt l'intuition des relations stratégiques qui devaient se nouer entre la Chine et l'Europe. La Chine retrouve aujourd'hui la place qui avait toujours été la sienne et qui aurait du toujours être la sienne au centre du monde. Une Europe plus unie, et plus forte elle aussi s'affirme sur la scène internationale. Quoi de plus naturel que ces deux pôles en devenir intensifient leurs échanges!
¹¹⁸ Sur la scène internationale, la Chine et l'Europe défendent les mêmes principes, le "multilatéralisme", pour que notre monde vive en paix, par équilibre des continents, le respect du droit international mais aussi la préservation de la diversité culturelle, née des différentes identités.
same vision of multilateralism, we believe that the world will be multipolar and we want it to be soever more”\textsuperscript{119} (Dousté-Blazy 2007d; cf. Chirac 2007; cf. Alliot-Marie 2007b). In 2011, foreign minister Alain Juppé underlined again the role of Europe and China in a multipolar world: “Europe and China need each other to maintain their development and to assure the continuity of a multipolar world which is the guarantee for peace and stability”\textsuperscript{120} (Juppé 2011a).

In 2010, president Nicolas Sarkozy stated that after the world financial crisis there is a new “multipolar monetary order”\textsuperscript{121} (Sarkozy 2010a; cf. Sarkozy 2011). And in the Joint Declaration of 2010, China and France stated that “in the world of today, which is multipolar and globalized, the system of global governance needs to be profoundly reformed”\textsuperscript{122} (Government of the French Republic/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2010; cf. Juppé 2011a). And finally, president François Hollande stated on his visit to China in 2013 that “China needs a strong Europe, both politically – in order to build the multipolar world that we both want – and economically”\textsuperscript{123} (Hollande 2013c; cf. Hollande 2013d).

6.2.2.3.2. Excellent relationship and convergences

Jacques Chirac underlined the high quality of the relationship between France and China which is marked by confidence and common positions:

My second message is a message of confidence. Confidence in the future of French-Chinese relations. [...] Confidence in our capability to put our global strategic partnership into the service for peace and progress. Confidence in the capacity of China to establish itself as a great and responsible nation, attached to international security and concerned about fostering a global economic development which is more balanced, more solidary and more aware of the

\textsuperscript{119} Je crois que, d’une manière générale, les Chinois et les Français partagent la même vision du multilatéralisme, nous croyons que le monde sera multipolaire et nous souhaitons qu’il le soit plus encore.

\textsuperscript{120} Dans le monde de demain, l’Europe aura un rôle majeur à jouer, comme pôle de stabilité, de prospérité et de démocratie. Rien ne se fera sans la Chine, mais rien ne se fera sans l’Europe. L’Europe et la Chine ont donc besoin l’une de l’autre pour conforter leur développement et assurer ensemble la pérennité d’un monde multipolaire, gage de paix et de stabilité.

\textsuperscript{121} [...] nouvel ordre monétaire multipolaire.

\textsuperscript{122} Les deux parties estiment que dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, multipolaire et mondialisé, le système de gouvernance mondiale doit être réformé profondément.

\textsuperscript{123} Mais la Chine a besoin d’une Europe forte, à la fois sur le plan politique pour bâtir le monde multipolaire que nous voulons, et sur le plan économique.
environment. [...]. Since 2003, I observe a fast rapprochement in our analyses on the important international issues.\textsuperscript{124} (Chirac 2006a; cf. Fillon 2009a; cf. Fillon 2009b; cf. Fillon 2009c; cf. Juppé 2011c; cf. Fabius 2013)

And, a bit later, he confirmed: “There are no power rivalries between us, but common interests”\textsuperscript{125} (Chirac 2006c). To the contrary: “Never in the long history of our relationship, a history in which general de Gaulle has written one of the most important pages, have our relations been so close and so confident. Our friendship, characterized by mutual respect, allows for all undertakings, even the most ambitious ones”\textsuperscript{126} (ibid.). This view was confirmed by foreign minister Kouchner who sees a lot of common positions and potential for cooperation, for example in Africa (cf. Kouchner 2007). In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy stated that the rise of China was “a chance for the world. I have come to Beijing determined to reinforce our cooperation and our partnership and say to the Chinese that we need you to solve the crises such as the ones in Iran, Darfour, North Korea, that we need China to find solutions to the global problems that the world is confronted with”\textsuperscript{127} (Sarkozy 2007a).

And the new foreign minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, stated that he finds the relations between France and China “really excellent”\textsuperscript{128} (Douste-Blazy 2007a; cf. Douste-Blazy 2007b; cf. Kouchner 2010). The relations seem so close that different positions in the security council are not perceived as dramatic, but as ‘normal’:

Certainly, China acts in its own ways, but is it not legitimate for a people and a civilization that looks back on five thousand years of history? Sometimes I hear people tell me: ‘but in the Security Council China is a bit isolated’ or ‘China

\textsuperscript{124} Mon deuxième message est un message de confiance. Confiance dans l’avenir des relations franco-chinoises. L’Année de la Chine en France et l’Année de la France en Chine ont été des succès exceptionnels qui se prolongent aujourd’hui. Confiance dans notre capacité à mettre notre partenariat stratégique global au service de la paix et du progrès. Confiance dans la capacité de la Chine à s’affirmer comme une grande nation responsable, attachée à la sécurité internationale et soucieuse de promouvoir un développement économique mondial plus équilibré, plus solidaire et plus respectueux de l’environnement. [...] Depuis 2003, j’observe un rapprochement rapide de nos analyses sur les grandes questions internationales.

\textsuperscript{125} Il n’y a pas entre nous de rivalités de puissance, mais des intérêts communs.

\textsuperscript{126} Jamais dans la longue histoire de nos relations, une histoire dont le général de Gaulle a écrit l’une des pages les plus fortes, nos liens n’ont été aussi denses et aussi confiants. Et notre amitié, marquée par le respect réciproque, autorise tous les projets, même les plus ambitieux.

\textsuperscript{127} C’est une chance pour le monde. Je suis venu à Pékin déterminé à renforcer notre coopération et notre partenariat et dire à la Chine que nous avons besoin d’elle pour régler des crises telles que celles de l’Iran, du Darfour, de la Corée du Nord, que nous avons besoin de la Chine pour trouver des solutions aux problèmes globaux auxquels le monde est confronté.

\textsuperscript{128} Je les trouve vraiment excellentes.
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thinks this or that’; but with a history of five thousand years, who has the right to
give lessons to China?129 (Douste-Blazy 2007c)

These close relations are partly the result of common principles which guide their
respective foreign policies. Francois Hollande stated that it is necessary
to bring together France and China as close as possible on the big international
questions, on issues of global governance. We do not have the same regime, we
do not have the same society, we do not have the same size, we do not have the
same population, but there are the principles which unite us, the principles of
foreign policy: independence, sovereignty, dialogue and the ambition to strive for
a multipolar world.130 (Hollande 2013a; cf. Hollande 2013b)

It comes as no surprise given the closeness of the relations that in the question of the
weapons embargo, the French side kept its position in favour of lifting it (cf. de Villepin
2005; cf. Government of the French Republic, Government of the People's Republic of

All in all, France perceives China’s rise as a positive phenomenon and as a correction of
a historic anomaly:

France has quite early made the decision to accompany your country in this
development. We think that the rise of China is not an anomaly, but the correction
of an anomaly. The anomaly was the absence of your country for one and a half
century of troubles and suffering. The return into the first place is for China, even
if this might sound surprising, the return to a historic normality. Because we
regard the Chinese people with friendship, we rejoice at the progress that has been
achieved in the last decades. France supports the aspirations of China, a global
power, to retake its place in the management of global affairs.131 (Fabius 2012)

129 Certes la Chine agit des modes qui lui sont propres, mais n'est ce pas légitime de la part d'un peuple et
d'une civilisation cinq fois millénaires ? J'entends parfois des gens me dire, mais au Conseil de Sécurité
des Nations unies, la Chine s'est un peu isolée ou la Chine pense ceci ou la Chine cela, mais quand on est
une civilisation vieille de 5 000 ans, qui a le droit de faire la leçon à la Chine ?
130 [...] rapprocher autant qu'il est possible la France et la Chine sur les grandes questions internationales,
sur la gouvernance du monde. Nous n'avons pas le même régime, nous n'avons pas la même société, nous
n'avons pas la même taille, nous n'avons pas la même population, mais il y a des principes qui nous
unissent, des principes de politique extérieure, l'indépendance, la souveraineté, le dialogue, la volonté
d'un monde multipolaire.
131 La France a fait le choix, très tôt, d'accompagner votre pays dans cette mutation. Nous considérons que
6.2.2.3.3. Economic cooperation and criticism

In the years after 2005, a critical tone appeared in the discourse with regard to the economic relations. Access to the Chinese market, protection of intellectual property rights and the imbalances in the trade relationship were the main reasons for this criticism.

This criticism often took the form of the mentioning of the principle of reciprocity, i.e. the opening of the Chinese markets given that the European markets were open for Chinese products. The prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, pointed to these concerns especially regarding textiles and protection of intellectual property rights:

> I think that we have to talk about these issues with serenity. Naturally, the EU strongly defends the European interests in these questions, but we demand that they are respected by the European side just as by our other partners, just as the rules of the WTO, that everything is done according to the rules and that we can be sure that the Chinese market is open, which is particularly significant for a wide range of our products.\(^{132}\) (Raffarin 2005a)

Since then, the notion of reciprocity is a constant feature of the criticism concerning the economic realm of French-Sino relations. Dominique de Villepin stated in 2006 that “we also need a real reciprocity between the great economic powers. Each one has to stick to the same norms, without which competition is biased and distorted”\(^{133}\) (de Villepin 2006; cf. Sarkozy 2007a; cf. Sarkozy 2007b; cf. Sarkozy 2010c; cf. Hollande 2013c; cf. Hollande 2013d). And in 2012, Laurent Fabius argued that “in the economic sphere, we have to succeed in rebalancing the relations between France and China. […]"

\(^{132}\) Je pense, notamment, au dossier du textile ou bien à la protection intellectuelle. Je crois qu'il faut parler de ces sujets avec sérénité. Naturellement, nous entendons que l'Union européenne défende avec fermeté les intérêts européens sur ces questions, mais nous demandons aussi que soient respectés, du côté européen comme du côté des autres partenaires, les règlements de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce et que tout se fasse dans le respect des règles mais aussi qu'on puisse tenir compte de l'ouverture du marché chinois, particulièrement significative pour un grand nombre de nos productions.

\(^{133}\) Nous avons également besoin d'une véritable règle de réciprocité entre les grandes puissances économiques. Chacun doit être soumis aux même normes, sans quoi la compétition est biaisée, faussée.
In the short term, we have to act on issues such as a better market access, the protection of intellectual property and the protection of investments”\textsuperscript{134} (Fabius 2012; cf. Fabius 2013; cf. Chirac 2006b; cf. Jouyet 2007).

Addressing these criticisms, France always opted for a cooperative approach, using the established dialogues between France and China. Nikolas Sarkozy stated that he talked with president Hu about “economic questions concerning security of investments, safety of products, the respect of intellectual property rights and the fight against counterfeit goods. We are going to tackle these questions in a cooperative manner rather than in a useless confrontational attitude”\textsuperscript{135} (Sarkozy 2007b; cf. Sarkozy 2011).

6.2.2.3.4. \textit{The financial crisis and the stability of the international order}

More important than these points of criticism in the economic realm were the interests of France in tackling the pressing international problems together with China. In 2005, Jean-Pierre Raffarin sketched out in his speech at the University of Shanghai the basic themes that would be recurring time and again in the following years. Faced with global risks such as nuclear proliferation, environmental degradation and organized crime, the rise of China, of which this visit allows me to perceive the full magnitude, is a chance, a chance for Europe, a chance for France. [...] The rise of China fosters the apparition of a more secure, more solidary and more respectful world in which Europe, too, strongly takes its place. China and Europe can build a relationship of co-responsibility for the world of tomorrow [...] What would be more natural than that the two emerging poles intensify their exchanges.\textsuperscript{136} (Raffarin 2005b)

\textsuperscript{134} Sur le plan économique d'abord, il faut que nous parvenions à rééquilibrer la relation entre la Chine et la France. À long terme, la solution passe par des réformes internes en France et en Europe, que le gouvernement auquel j’appartiens est déterminé à conduire. Elle passe par un rééquilibrage interne de l’économie chinoise dans le sens du développement du marché intérieur. Mais «dans le long terme, nous serons tous morts» disait l’économiste Keynes. Il nous faut donc agir, en attendant, sur le court terme, sur des sujets tels qu'un meilleur accès au marché, la protection de la propriété intellectuelle ou la protection des investissements.

\textsuperscript{135} [...]des questions économiques comme la sécurité des investissements, la sécurité des produits, le respect de la propriété intellectuelle et la lutte contre la contrefaçon. Nous allons faire de ces questions des thèmes de coopération plutôt que d'affrontements stériles. J’ai évoqué deux dossiers précis, ceux de Danone et Schneider, j’espère des progrès concrets dans la recherche de solutions amiables, avec le soutien des autorités de nos deux pays.

\textsuperscript{136} Je pense en priorité aux réponses à apporter aux risques globaux, en particulier la prolifération nucléaire et les atteintes à l'environnement ou le crime organisé. L'émergence de la Chine dont cette nouvelle visite me permet de prendre toute la mesure est une chance, une chance pour l'Europe, une chance pour la France. La Chine retrouve aujourd'hui sa place. Tout laisse à penser que de la transition en
That is why it is a matter of urgency for Europe and China to work towards a new cooperation framework (cf. ibid.; cf. Chirac 2006c).

While before the financial crisis, the notion of interdependence had played a role (cf. Douste-Blazy 2007d; cf. Alliot-Marie 2007a), the question how to manage interdependence became a priority when the financial and economic crisis hit the globe. The crisis brought the world to the rim of the “abyss” and the reform of global (financial) governance was thus a matter of urgency (Sarkozy 2010b). As Nicolas Sarkozy put it in an interview with the Chinese press:

We’ve not yet fully recovered from the crisis, even if the worst part is probably behind us. Today, all the indicators show that the global economy recovers. This is good news, but this may not prevent us from drawing all the lessons of this crisis, in order to avoid that the same causes will ever again have the same consequences. We resolutely have to put an end to the irresponsible behaviour that has brought us at the rim of the abyss. That’s why we have established the G20 and that’s why we have engaged in an unprecedented reform of the international financial system.137 (ibid.)

The global financial system was seen as a threat to global stability and security which appeared to be in need of reform and proper management:

The international flows of capital have become more volatile. They expose the emerging countries in situations which threaten their economic, social and even political stability. [...] Given this situation which is absolutely undeniable, there are two possible reactions: Each one for himself, and this would mean wars of...
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currencies which in turn would mean new crises; or cooperation and coordination. Actually we do not have a choice. Wars of currencies and more crises or coordination and cooperation.138 (Sarkozy 2011; cf. Juppé 2011a; cf. Juppé 2011b; cf. Hollande 2013c)

The work of the G20 was therefore constructed as highly important and should be given a central place in the global governance system (cf. Fillon 2009b). In 2011 the latest, the financial crisis had become a security issue for France, when – given the threatening character of the financial crisis – president Sarkozy called for urgent action: “And if we do not take care of it right now, we will have to deal with it when it is too late, that is to say in the midst of major crises of the international system”139 (Sarkozy 2011).

Besides the management of global interdependence and especially of global financial relations, other “common challenges”140 are identified: climate change, dealing with the financial crisis, management of the big economic imbalances, solving regional crises and reforming the system of global governance (Sarkozy 2010c; cf. Juppé 2011b; cf. Hollande 2013b). As president Hollande put it: “These are the issues which have to unite us”141 (Hollande 2013d).

Summing up the discursive constructions regarding China in the period between 2004 and 2014, one finds that they were in line with the constructions of the previous periods. The wish to build a multipolar world together with China, the convergences on many important international issues, criticism in the economic realm and demands for more reciprocity concerning market access remained the central features. The constructions of security were still constructions of relational security in terms of the management of the international (financial) system. The ‘abyss’ at which the world had stood was a threat that needed to be urgently avoided in the future. The policies and points of criticism aiming at market access in China also remained constant and can be considered as constructions of liberal security.

138 Les mouvements internationaux de capitaux sont devenus plus volatiles. Ils exposent les pays émergents à des retournements qui mettent en péril leur stabilité économique, sociale et même politique […] Face à cette situation qui est absolument incontestable, il y a deux réactions possibles: le chacun pour soi, et dans ce cas-là, ce sera la guerre des monnaies et la guerre des monnaies, ce sont de nouvelles crises ; soit la coopération et la coordination. Nous n’avons pas le choix. La guerre des monnaies, la crise ou la coordination et la coopération.
139 Et si on ne s’en occupe pas maintenant, nous serons obligés de nous en occuper quand il sera trop tard, c’est-à-dire en plein cœur de crises majeures du système international.
140 Défis communs
141 Voilà des themes qui doivent nous rassembler.
6.2.2.4. **Conclusion**
The French discursive constructions regarding China correspond to the relational ideal-type of security and – to a lesser extent – to the liberal ideal-type of security and remain stable throughout the analysed period.

Given a world in which dramatic changes take place, the need to establish a multipolar world order – of which France and China are two important poles – is continuously and increasingly emphasized. At times, the notion of multipolarity is explicitly directed against the US’s unilateral and aggressive behaviour, such as in Iraq in 2003. Concerning this and other important issues of international relations, the French and Chinese positions are constructed as being very close to each other, converging on the important international questions. Close and trustful relations in order to manage the multipolar world are seen as essential.

Besides the establishment of a multipolar world, the need to gain access to the Chinese market for French companies was a constant feature of the French discourse. French employment, as it was expressed, is defended in Beijing. These constructions contain more than just a grain of security-political, urgent content. The increasing criticism that was expressed may be a hint to a growing urgency in achieving this goal. By constructing this challenge as emanating from China’s refusal to gain market access and by constructing the response targeted towards China in order to negotiate favourable market access conditions for French companies, this construction qualifies as liberal security.

It stands out that France considered its positions on many important international issues to be converging closely with the positions of China. Furthermore, French officials showed a great deal of understanding when they justified deviating Chinese positions in the UN Security Council or on human rights issues with regard to the long history of China. China is depicted as a natural partner for France. Thus, there is no discursive space for alternative constructions of security.

The constructions of relational security are very similar to the EU’s constructions of relational security regarding China. Both identify fluidity or rapid changes as major threats and both aim at managing the international system by establishing close and trustful relations with the major powers. There are no contradictory, competing or otherwise incompatible constructions between France and the EU in any of the analysed
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periods.

Table 6.2: The French security discourse regarding China (1994-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Liberal security</th>
<th>Relational security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>* (All actors and their relationships): France, the international system</td>
<td>* (Of all actors, of the relationship):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Provider</td>
<td></td>
<td>* (All actors): France and the other major poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>* (Emanating from actors): (Lack of access to the Chinese market)</td>
<td>* (Emanating from relational dynamics): Radical and rapid changes in the international system, the financial crisis, terrorism, nuclear proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>* (Targeted towards actors): (gain access to the Chinese market)</td>
<td>* (Targeted towards relationships): Building a multipolar world with close and trustful relationships between the major poles, managing political and economic relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.3. Germany’s security discourse regarding China

The Asia Strategy of the German government of 1993 was the first German strategy document regarding this region and was also the first document of this kind by a European Union member state (Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 1993). In 2002, the foreign ministry specified the strategy for East Asia (Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany 2002). The Joint Communiqué of 2010 marks another intensification of the bilateral relations and can be considered to be the prelude for the German-Chinese intergovernmental consultations which took place for the first time in Berlin in 2011 (Government of the Federal Republic of Germany/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2010).

Based on these documents, I will analyze the following periods:
- 1993-2002: From the Asia Strategy to the East Asia Strategy
- 2002-2010: From the East Asia Strategy to the German-Chinese Joint Communiqué
- 2010-2014: From the German-Chinese Joint Communiqué to the present day

The main focus of the German discursive constructions regarding China is the aim of building a close and trustful relationship with China in order to manage globalization, interdependence and the dramatic changes of the international system. In contrast to the EU’s, France’s and the UK’s constructions, there is not as much emphasis on the economic relations (maybe because Germany traditionally had comparably good economic relations with China). Still, economic success and political influence are seen as two sides of the same medal.

All in all, with its focus on the management of relations, the German construction of security regarding China continuously corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security.

6.2.3.1. From the Asia Strategy to the East Asia Strategy (1993-2002)

The leitmotif of the German Asia Strategy of 1993 is the management of the rise of Asia. This development is perceived as one of the crucial issues to address in safeguarding German political and economic interests as well as global stability. Already in 1993, this strategy constructs Asia as an indispensable partner and insists on
the necessity of cooperation and dialogue: “Global tasks, such as preserving peace, development, preservation of the environment, can only be achieved together with the Asia-Pacific governments and the civil societies, not without them and absolutely not against them”\textsuperscript{142} (Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 1993: 1). Therefore, there “is no alternative for Germany than dialogue and cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries and regional organizations”\textsuperscript{143} (ibid.: 11). Hence, the main aim must be to integrate these states in the formulation of the respective policies: “[...] to be successful in achieving these aims, we have to integrate them into a policy which is accepted by the Asian states because they perceive it as being in their very own interest. [...] It is all about the establishment of substantial partnerships in order to achieve mutual benefits”\textsuperscript{144} (ibid.: 2). Participation of Asian states in the management of global questions is vital and not only has to be made possible, but also has to be requested from them: “We not only have to enable participation of the Asia-Pacific governments in addressing the important global questions but also demand it from them”\textsuperscript{145} (ibid.: 10).

The international situation is characterized by the effects of globalization, the phenomenon which brings states in close and interdependent relations:

The connections of the Asian-Pacific states beyond their own region, due to economic developments as well as due to the enormous intensification of worldwide communication compared to just ten or fifteen years ago, have become closer to an unimaginable extent. Globalization not only of the markets but also of political events has become a reality for Asia. This is why the events and developments in Asia concern us in a much more immediate way.\textsuperscript{146} (ibid.: 2)

\textsuperscript{142} Globale Aufgaben der Friedenssicherung, einer menschenwürdigen Entwicklung, der Erhaltung und Regeneration unserer Umwelt, werden nur mit den asiatisch-pazifischen regierungen und gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, nicht ohne sie und schon gar nicht gegen sie erledigt werden können.

\textsuperscript{143} Zu Dialog und Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern und Regionalorganisationen des asiatisch-pazifischen Raums gibt es für Deutschland keine Alternative

\textsuperscript{144} […] um mit diesen Zielsetzungen Erfolg zu haben, müssen wir sie in die Politik einbetten, die von der Mehrheit der asiatisch-pazifischen Länder deshalb akzeptiert wird, weil sie auch ihnen nützt. […] Es geht also um den Ausbau substantieller Partnerschaften zu beiderseitigem Nutzen.

\textsuperscript{145} Unsere wichtigsten politischen Anliegen in Asien/Pazifik sind: […] die Mitwirkung der asiatisch-pazifischen Staaten an der Behandlung aller wichtigen globalen Fragen einzufordern; dazu müssen wir aber auch asiatisch-pazifische Mitwirkung in allen wichtigen internationalen Foren fördern.

\textsuperscript{146} Ihre Verbindungen über die Region hinaus sind aber, vornehmlich aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen und wegen der großen Verdichtung der weltweiten Kommunikation, in einem noch vor zehn oder 15 Jahren unvorstellbaren Umfang enger geworden. Die Globalisierung nicht nur der Märkte sondern auch der politischen Ereignisse ist auch für Asien Wirklichkeit geworden. Eben deshalb treffen auch uns die Ereignisse und Entwicklungen aus Asien unmittelbarer.
This increased interdependence makes Asia-Pacific relevant for Germany’s security policy: “Our security is also depending on the situation in Asia. We have a specific interest in a rules-based, democratic and social market economy-oriented internal constitution of the states of the region, in regional stability and in securing peace in the Asia-Pacific area (so-called broadened security concept)”\(^{147}\) (ibid.: 3).

The main task of German security policy is therefore to establish a broad security-political and strategic dialogue which should especially include questions of arms control in order to foster international stability (cf. ibid.: 10).\(^{148}\) This should be achieved by a regular exchange of views, in order to build confidence, by an exchange of military personnel in order to generate mutual understanding of particularities in military affairs which could contribute to conflict prevention, and by a cooperation in areas of arms control and proliferation (cf. ibid.). In particular, Germany could foster regional stability and security by “contributing our experiences from the areas of confidence-building-, arms control- and disarmament-measures (for example in the CSCE process, CFE) and to promote approaches to a closer cooperation with and among the states of Asia-Pacific and to foster new regional dialogue concepts (for example in South Asia)”\(^{149}\) (ibid.: 11).

Besides the political and security-political implications of the rapid developments in Asia, economic considerations took a central place:

Already today, Asia is one of the most important engines of the global economy. This will be increasingly so in the coming century. The development of Asia and the Pacific area will offer enormous but so far largely unexploited opportunities for our economy today and in the future. It is also an enormous challenge for the innovation capacity of our companies and for our economic policies.\(^{150}\) (ibid.: 1)

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\(^{147}\) Unsere Sicherheit wird von der Lage auf dem asiatischen Kontinent mitbestimmt. Wir haben an einer rechtsstaatlichen, demokratischen und auf soziale Marktwirtschaft gerichteten inneren Verfassung der Staaten der Region, an regionaler Stabilität und an der Sicherung des Friedens im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum ein eigenes Interesse (sogenannter erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff).

\(^{148}\) „Durch einen breit angelegten sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Dialog, der insbesondere auch rüstungskontrollpolitische Elemente einbezieht, soll ein Beitrag zur internationalen Stabilität und Friedenssicherung im Sinne der Charta der VN geleistet werden.“

\(^{149}\) [...] um durch Einbringen unserer Erfahrungen aus dem Bereich vertrauensbildender, rüstungskontroll- und abrüstungspolitischer Maßnahmen (z.B. KSZE-Prozeß, KSE) für Ansätze zu einer engeren Zusammenarbeit mit den und unter den asiatisch-pazifischen Staaten zu werben und neue regionale Dialogkonzepte (z.B. in Südasien) zu fördern.

\(^{150}\) In Asien läuft schon heute einer der zugkräftigsten Motoren der Weltwirtschaft. Dies wird im nächsten Jahrhundert verstärkt der Fall sein. Die Entwicklung Asiens und des pazifischen Raums bietet unserer Wirtschaft heute und für die Zukunft große, bislang jedoch noch unzureichend genutzte Chancen. Sie ist auch eine gewaltige Herausforderung an die Innovationsfähigkeit unserer Unternehmen und an unsere
Special attention is put onto necessary domestic reforms in order to assure international competitiveness of the German economy and to prevent the loss of employment. Furthermore, the necessity of assistance for German companies which want to export and invest in the Asia-Pacific region is underlined by measures such as the expansion of the network of institutions like the chambers of foreign trade and German houses, enhancement of the capacities of economic services offered by the embassies and consulates, the organization of conferences on the Asia-Pacific region, the foundation of an Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business, foreign trade fairs, export insurances and so on. Cooperation is also intended in the areas of science and technology, environmental issues, telecommunication, development and culture (cf. ibid.: 3-9).

In a nutshell, the strategy highlights the security-political and economic implications of the rise of Asia: “The region Asia-Pacific will possess enormous potential in the future. This has to be accounted for by political and economic decision makers. An active Asia-Pacific policy serves our political and economic interests. Such a policy also safeguards our future potential. It is a indispensable part of a global policy of preserving peace” (ibid.: 1).

In a speech on the occasion of a state visit by prime minister Li Peng in Germany, chancellor Helmut Kohl underlined the economic dimension of the German-Chinese relations: “Due to the policy of a step-by-step restructuring of the economy, China is one of the most dynamic centres of economic growth” (Kohl 1994). By hosting the German-Chinese economic conference, “we underline how much importance we attribute to the further expansion of our economic relations” (ibid.). The aim is to establish a long-term and reliable partnership (cf. ibid.). The minister of economic affairs, Günter Rexrodt, underlined that Germany had to catch up concerning its economic presence and engagement in Asia (cf. Rexrodt 1994). One important task for the political decision makers was to improve market access for German companies and guarantee a ‘level playing field’: “[...] therefore we have to improve the market access in the Asia-Pacific region. Products and companies from Asia-Pacific enjoy unhampered access to the German and European markets. We want comparable

Wirtschaftspolitik.


152 Dank ihrer Politik einer schrittweisen wirtschaftlichen Umgestaltung zählt die Volksrepublik China heute zu den dynamischsten Wachstumszentren in der Welt.

153 Wir unterstreichen damit, welche Bedeutung wir dem weiteren Ausbau unserer wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen beizumessen.
conditions in the Asian countries.” The question of reciprocity and of a ‘level playing field’ which came to prominence especially in the 2006 Communication of the European Commission and which was one of the reasons for some scholars to diagnose a change in EU policies towards China, was already present in the German discourse in the early 1990s. This problematie was thus not new when it popped up again more outspokenly in 2006.

Rexrodt also sees challenges in adapting the German economic system to the global changes and to undertake reforms in order to ensure competitiveness (cf. ibid.).

German decision-makers underlined (as was already indicated in the Asia Strategy) that close economic relations are the precondition for and also entail the need for security-political cooperation and thus security. As chancellor Kohl put it: “Decisions in favour of a close cooperation in the economic realm are always decisions for prosperity, stability and peace” (Kohl 1995). And the minister of defence, Volker Rühe, added: “Security-political cooperation and economic progress are two sides of the same medal. Both are preconditions for enduring stability” (Rühe 1995).

The lessons of the past century in overcoming conflictual relationships took a prominent role from the very beginning in the German discourse. An important aspect is the reference to European integration history and the conflictual history of the continent respectively. Kohl set the policies of the German and Chinese government into the historical context of the 20th century: “Prime Minster, let us both try – as representatives of our peoples – at the end of this century and after the experiences of the history of this century to take good decisions for the future of our countries; for the benefit of the people in China and in Germany” (Kohl 1995).

And foreign minister Kinkel reiterated:

In the 21st century, Asia’s share of the world’s gross national product will be


155 Entscheidungen für eine enge Zusammenarbeit im ökonomischen Bereich sind immer auch Entscheidungen für Wohlstand, Stabilität und Frieden.

156 Sicherheitskooperation und wirtschaftlicher Fortschritt sind zwei Seiten derselben Medaille. Beide sind Voraussetzungen für dauerhafte Stabilität.

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according to its share of the world’s population. This continent must not imitate the negative example of Europe in the first half of the 20th century. The world expects and hopes that in the 21st century Asia will export technological progress and solidarity and not conflicts. This is Asia’s historic responsibility. And to achieve this, Europe holds out its hand for an equal partnership.158 (Kinkel 1997)

Especially the CSCE process could serve as an example:

Each region must find its own way, but we can learn from each other. European integration or the CSCE process can serve as a model for the solution of the problems of Asia. This form of cooperation channels different interests, eradicates differences between larger and smaller members, creates confidence and bundles forces. ASEAN successfully showed this: Regional integration and cooperation are a way to security and prosperity in Asia, too.159 (ibid.)

Based on the reference to European historical experiences, the German discourse has a special feature: There is the notion that antagonistic relationships and conflicts are not objectively given, but are subject to the political will of the actors. Confrontation and conflict can be prevented or overcome by political will: “Our two countries are separated by thousands of kilometres, but this distance is meaningless if there is the will to cooperate and especially if there is the will for friendship. This is exactly what we want: Friendship and good cooperation between the Chinese and the German people”160 (Kohl 1995; emphasis added). In addition, Rühe stated: “European post-war history shows that increased cooperation in security-political issues can help to overcome old


rivalries and reservations”¹⁶¹ (Rühe 1995). Foreign minister Kinkel underlined that “[…] if Europe and Asia are serious about their partnership for the 21st century and if they want to strengthen each other, then both sides have to learn to perceive their respective highly developed but very different civilizations as a complement and enrichment and not as an antagonism”¹⁶² (Kinkel 1997; emphasis added).

Given this construction of malleability of relationships and the necessity of cooperation faced with enormous challenges resulting from the rise of Asia and the ever growing interdependence, the German government put great emphasis on the establishment of good and close political relations. Kohl stated that because Germany sees the Chinese development with great sympathy, “we wish a partnership which is of mutual benefit of both countries”¹⁶³ (Kohl 1995). In order to achieve such a partnership, not only close personal contacts are vital, but also the establishment of a broad relationship concerning all the areas of politics, security policy, economy, science, technology and culture (cf. ibid.). The more mutual understanding, the more rapprochement there will be: “Rapprochement arises from mutual understanding”¹⁶⁴ (ibid.).

As has been outlined in the Asia Strategy, German decision-makers underlined the necessity of close relations with China and a cooperative relationship given the international situation which is characterized by the rise of Asia, interdependence and dramatic changes: “We agreed that we are faced with a phase of dramatic changes in the world – in Asia and in Europe. […] Our two states are forced to take over more responsibility in our regional contexts and worldwide. That’s why we have to coordinate in political questions more closely”¹⁶⁵ (Kohl 1995; cf. Kohl 1996). And foreign minister Kinkel added that “I am expecting that all partners develop an increased awareness for the mutual dependence and vulnerability by this dialogues”¹⁶⁶ (Kinkel 1997).

¹⁶¹ Europas Nachkriegsgeschichte zeigt, daß verstärkte Sicherheitskooperation alte Gegnerschaften und Vorbehalte überwinden kann.
¹⁶³ Wir wünschen uns partnerschaftliche Beziehungen zum gegenseitigen Nutzen unserer beiden Länder.
¹⁶⁴ Verständigung erwächst aus gegenseitigem Verstehen.
¹⁶⁶ Ich erwarte mir von diesem engmaschiger werdenden Dialog vor allem ein erhöhtes Bewußtsein aller Partner für die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit und Verletzbarkeit.
Summing up the German discourse so far, one finds that the potential consequences of the rise of Asia and China in an increasingly interdependent international system are of major concern for German officials. German security is constructed as being dependent on the developments and events in Asia. The emphasis on the need for confidence-building and mutual understanding in military affairs underlines the concerns for Asian stability. Therefore, the integration of Asia and China into a system which also serves their own interests, the generation of confidence and mutual understanding are seen as vital in order to be able to properly manage international affairs.

The economic development of Asia and China is constructed as comprising great opportunities but also enormous challenges. Developing tight economic relations with Asia and China is therefore not only an economic imperative, but also a security-political imperative as security and economic relations are seen as two sides of the same medal.

The publication of a policy paper on Asia as early as 1993 (as the first European country) indicates that Germany attached a high priority and urgency to establishing close relationships with China and other Asian countries.

As the threats are located in relational dynamics and the policies aim at managing relationships, the construction of security therefore corresponds to the relational ideal-type.

6.2.3.2. From the East Asia Strategy to the German-Chinese Joint Communiqué (2002-2010)

6.2.3.2.1. The East Asia Strategy (2002)

The discursive constructions remained constant after the change of government in 1998 and the German foreign ministry’s strategy for East Asia thus did not alter the discursive constructions regarding China.

The assessment of the international scene is marked by the phenomenon of globalization, through which risks and opportunities affect all countries in a similar manner, by the uncertainty about the existing international order and by the perception of Asia as a region full of opportunities but also as a competitor in economic terms and a potential source of conflictual developments with global repercussions (cf. Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany 2002: 1f.): “In the foreseeable future we
will face a globalization of political and economic opportunities as well as risks [...]. The importance of regional and security-political developments in Asia has grown for the European states. Some of the crises in Asia are factors with security-political implications which go beyond the region.” (ibid.: 1). The uncertainties about the existing order in East Asia are caused by the USA and Russia which are “re-evaluating their positions, their political, geostrategic and economic opportunities as well as threats in Asia and integrating the resulting evaluations into the perceptions of their new global role” (ibid.: 1).

Besides cooperation in development policy as well as the environmental, scientific and cultural realm, the main tasks of the German East Asia policy are identified as the promotion of democracy, of the rule of law and human rights, the promotion of peace and stability and, last but not least, the promotion of Germany’s economic interests (cf. ibid.: 5-14). Concerning peace and stability, Germany strives to promote confidence-building and détente by means of a broad security-political and strategic dialogue, based on confident and reciprocal military cooperation including the discussion of question of arms control as well as by the support of approaches to multilateral cooperation (for example the ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum) in order to improve the security- and confidence-building in the region, based on our experiences in the CSCE/OSCE. (ibid.: 6)

The integration of China into the international community is seen as one of the most important tasks of German policy regarding East Asia:

One of our most important foreign political tasks is the integration of China with...
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its rapidly growing political and economic importance into the international community. China, as a rising regional power and member of the UN Security Council, has to be convinced to assume responsibility for world peace, the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and for global issues in general. This includes the peaceful resolution of all questions arising between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. We want to foster this process by engaging in – also critical – dialogue, by fostering more openness and cooperation and by supporting the transformation processes.\textsuperscript{170} (ibid.: 7)

The major potential hotspots in East Asia, such as the conflicts between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are considered to be “conflicts of interests”\textsuperscript{171} which can be solved by peaceful means (ibid.: 14). They are not considered as conflicts between democratic allies on the one side and rogue states on the other or anything likewise.

In the economic realm, the German government “supports the German companies to make use of the opportunities of the region with its enormous potential for growth. […] Economic – and thus political – success in this area of growth requires long-lasting presence and systematically established, confident networks”\textsuperscript{172} (ibid.: 7). Here, again, the close interrelatedness of economic and political issues becomes visible.

The East Asia Strategy thus specified the constructions that were already there in the Asia Strategy of 1993: The rise of Asia and interdependence were constructed as part of the phenomenon of globalization, the latter of which affects all countries in a similar manner with its risks and opportunities. The basic uncertainty about the existing international order and the emergence of East Asia as an economic competitor and a potential source of conflictual developments with global repercussions necessitate the establishment of close and trustful relations with the countries in the region and

\textsuperscript{170} Eines unserer wichtigsten außenpolitischen Anliegen ist die Integration des an politischer und wirtschaftlicher Bedeutung rasch zunehmenden China in die Staatengemeinschaft. China muss überzeugt werden, als aufstrebende Regionalmacht und Sicherheitsratsmitglied zunehmend Verantwortung für den Weltfrieden, für die Stabilität der asiatisch-pazifischen Region und für die globalen Anliegen zu übernehmen. Dazu gehört auch eine friedliche Lösung aller sich zwischen beiden Seiten der Taiwan-Straße stellenden Fragen. Wir wollen diesen Prozess durch das - auch kritische - Gespräch fördern, in dem wir auf weitere Öffnung und steigende Kooperationsbereitschaft hinwirken und Transformationsprozesse unterstützen.

\textsuperscript{171} Interessengegensätze

\textsuperscript{172} Die Bundesregierung unterstützt die deutsche Wirtschaft dabei, die Chancen in der Region mit ihrem großen Wachstumspotenzial zu nutzen. […] Wirtschaftlicher – und damit auch politischer – Erfolg in dieser Wachstumsregion bedarf langfristiger Präsenz und systematisch ausgebauter, vertrauensvoller Netzwerke.
especially with China. Economic engagement and success was seen as vital for Germany and as a precondition for political influence in the region. Therefore, security policy and economic policies are still constructed as two sides of the same medal.

6.2.3.2.2. **The arms embargo**

Chancellor Schröder continued the efforts to deepen the relationship with China and in 2004 established a strategic partnership with China. Fostering the access to the Chinese market for German small and medium-sized enterprises as well as improving the protection of intellectual property rights was one of the priorities of his policies regarding China (cf. Schröder 2004). The minister for economic affairs, Wolfgang Clement, underlined these concerns and added the concerns about the German deficit in the trade balance as well as the forced technology transfer to China (cf. Clement 2005). He states that “competition should, no, has to take place under fair conditions”\(^\text{173}\) (ibid.). However, he underlined that the relations between Germany and China were of an excellent quality (cf. ibid.).

Concerning the international environment, chancellor Schröder was convinced that key international threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the conflict on the Korean peninsula and international terrorism could only be tackled in the framework of multilateral fora: “China and Germany share the conviction that security and peace can only be achieved on the basis of effective multilateral structures”\(^\text{174}\) (Schröder 2004). And he added that “as we know, security in our world is indivisible”\(^\text{175}\) (ibid.). Especially in the question of the North Korean nuclear programme, the role of China had been decisive in establishing the six-party-talks and enabling dialogue (cf. ibid.).

Therefore, the integration of China into the international structures was still perceived as one of the crucial tasks of the 21\(^{st}\) century. Foreign minister Josef Fischer stated that “the question of the integration of this emerging world power [...] is one of the crucial questions for the stability of the international system in the 21\(^{st}\) century”\(^\text{176}\) (Fischer 2005; cf. Schröder 2005).

The plans to lift the weapons embargo against China can be seen as one step in this

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\(^{173}\) Dieser Wettbewerb sollte, nein, er muss unter fairen Bedingungen stattfinden.  
\(^{174}\) China und Deutschland teilen die Überzeugung, dass Sicherheit und Frieden nur auf der Grundlage effizienter multilateraler Strukturen möglich sind.  
\(^{175}\) Sicherheit, das wissen wir, ist in unserer Welt nicht teilbar.  
\(^{176}\) Die Frage der Integration dieser aufstrebenden Weltmacht [...] ist für die Stabilität des internationalen Systems im 21. Jahrhundert eine der zentralen Fragen.
direction. Schröder perceived the embargo as a “political-symbolic instrument”\textsuperscript{177} which was the only one of the various embargo measures that had been taken in summer 1989 still in place (Schröder 2005). Since the China of 2005 was totally different from the China of 1989, Schröder considered the embargo as superfluous and argued that it should be abolished: “It is a fact that the China of today is not the China of 1989 anymore. [...] That’s why the EU has decided to work towards a lifting of the arms embargo. [...] I was and I am convinced that the embargo is dispensable”\textsuperscript{178} (ibid.). In the discussion about the embargo and the possible consequences for regional stability in case of its lifting, Schröder argued that in order to get a complete picture of the regional stability, one needed to consider the US weapons sells to Taiwan which had been worth 260 millions of dollars in 2003\textsuperscript{179} (cf. ibid.). He claimed, however, that arguments like these were just a superficial debate. What it was actually about was, according to Schröder, the basic question of how the European Union and Germany want to bring to bear their interests and concerns in the medium and long term. It is thus about the questions how we want to organize our relations with this big and important country in the medium and long term, how we want to help foster an environment in this country that facilitates a peaceful and democratic development and it is about the question of how the dynamically developing China can become an important pillar of a cooperative and multilateral regional and global order.\textsuperscript{180} (ibid.)

And the answer he gives is firmly rooted in the German discourse on China: “The European Union strives for a strategic partnership with China. [...] This can only succeed if the partners encounter each other with mutual respect for their different

\textsuperscript{177} Alle anderen Sanktionen, die seinerzeit verhängt worden sind, wurden bereits nach wenigen Monaten aufgehoben. Nur das politisch-symbolische Instrument des Embargos ist in Kraft geblieben.

\textsuperscript{178} Klar ist: Das China von heute ist nicht mehr das China von 1989. [...] Deswegen hat die Europäische Union beschlossen, auf eine Aufhebung des Waffenembargos hinzuarbeiten. [...] Ich war und bin der Überzeugung, dass das Embargo entbehrlich ist.


\textsuperscript{180} Im Kern geht es um die Frage, wie die Europäische Union und Deutschland ihre Interessen, ihre Anliegen gegenüber China mittel- und langfristig zur Geltung bringen wollen. Es geht also um die Frage, wie wir unsere Beziehungen zu diesem in der Tat großen und wichtigen Land mittel- und langfristig gestalten wollen, wie wir im Übrigen mithelfen wollen, in diesem großen Land ein Umfeld zur Förderung einer friedlichen und demokratischen Entwicklung zu schaffen, und es geht um die Frage, wie das sich dynamisch entwickelnde China regional und global zu einem tragenden Pfeiler einer kooperativen und multilateralen Ordnung werden kann.
cultures and if they develop a relationship of trust. This is the only way we can really influence the development in that country."\(^{181}\) (ibid.).

Schröder conceded that there were doubtlessly some problems and concerns in the relations and he pointed to the devaluation of the Chinese currency in relation to other currencies, the protection of intellectual property rights and forced transfer of technology. “We address these question with the Chinese government on the occasion of every visit. These are crucial questions in the economic and political development of the relations between Germany and China."\(^{182}\) (ibid.).

However, one should not forget that China was acting increasingly responsible on the international stage, for example during the Asian financial crisis. He continued:

> Without the contribution of this country, none of the huge global challenges can be solved. [...] I agree with the former foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who recently said that China has become a real factor of global stability. [...] If we want to foster peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and beyond, we have to make sure that China continues to pursue such a responsible and multilateral policy. This is what the strategic partnership of the EU and Germany with China aims at: A constructive policy of cooperation and integration of China. Sanctions of no matter what sort do not fit into such an approach. Sanctions aim at isolation and discrimination. The federal government however chooses cooperation, integration and the associated changes.\(^{183}\) (ibid.)

The disputes in the German government about the question of the lifting of the arms embargo, especially between the social-democratic chancellor Schröder and the green foreign minister Josef Fischer were not disputes about the basic constructions of China

\(^{181}\) Die Europäische Union strebt wie wir eine strategische Partnerschaft mit China an. [...] Das kann aber nur gelingen, wenn sich die beteiligten Partner im gegenseitigen Respekt vor ganz unterschiedlich gewachsenen Kulturen begegnen und ein Vertrauensverhältnis entwickeln. Nur so werden wir wirklich Einfluss auf die Entwicklung auch in diesem Land nehmen können.

\(^{182}\) Diese Fragen diskutieren wir mit der chinesischen Regierung bei jedem Besuch. Das sind zentrale Fragen der ökonomischen und der politischen Entwicklung im Verhältnis Deutschlands zu China.

and the basic security policies regarding China. Fischer did not construct another picture of China or of the necessity of another, more critical security-political approach towards China. Instead, he underlined the question of the human rights situation in China and stated that “the Chinese government has to realize that it can contribute a lot to the emergence of a European consensus on this question” by improving the human rights situation in the country\(^{184}\) (Fischer 2005).

Such a construction is in line with the initial constructions of the EU, as I have argued in chapter 5.2.2. The discursive construction of the arms embargo by the EU was constructed partly as a security-political issue only after the intervention of the US. Before, the embargo was constructed as a measure taken because of the human rights violations in China during the suppression of the protests on Tiananmen Square in 1989.

6.2.3.2.3. The Asia Strategy of the CDU/CSU-group in the German Bundestag

With the coming into office of the new Christian-democratic led government in 2005, many observers found that the German China policy changed. Some observed a more critical attitude towards China (cf. Gottwald/Seemann 2006: 62), others detected even a restart of the relations (cf. Friedrich 2007: 417). The former chancellor Schröder assessed a break with the previous policies and recommended a return to cooperation instead of confrontation (cf. Schröder 2008). The fact that chancellor Merkel met – privately as it was termed, but nevertheless in the chancellery – the Dalai Lama in September 2007 was indeed remarkable in as much as Merkel was the first German chancellor to receive the Dalai Lama. Neither Kohl nor Schröder had done this before (cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007).

As has been already outlined in section 2.3., the Asia Strategy of the CDU/CSU-group in the German Bundestag was rather critical of China. In security-political terms, China was constructed as potentially challenging the US position and the security of its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore the Strategy recommended close coordination with the US on security issues relating to East Asia and China (cf. CDU/CSU Group 2007: 5, 12, 15). Most importantly, China was perceived as a competitor for the West in as much as it appeared to be an undemocratic, non-liberal state which promoted its own model of development and political order: “China increasingly confronts the West with questions about the political order and perceives itself as an alternative political model that

\[\text{Da wir diesen Konsens erreichen wollen appelliere ich an die chinesische Regierung; Sie muss begreifen, dass sie sehr viel dazu beitragen kann, dass ein solcher Konsens möglich wird.}\]
challenges the economic and political interests of Germany and the EU outside of Europe”\textsuperscript{185} (ibid.: 8).

However, neither the meeting of chancellor Merkel with the Dalai Lama nor the Asia Strategy of the CDU/CSU-group in the German Bundestag constituted or triggered a change in the discursive construction of China and security policy regarding China by the German government. First, as I have argued elsewhere, the meeting with the Dalai Lama and the more perceptible critical stance concerning human rights issues by chancellor Merkel can be explained by strategic action within the newly formed coalition government (cf. Renner 2008). In a nutshell: While the social-democratic party in the coalition government could refer to the human rights policies under chancellor Schröder and especially to the rule of law dialogue with China (Rechtsstaatsdialog), the Christian-democratic party under chancellor Merkel needed to cover the issue of human rights, too. However, as the ‘silent’ human rights policy (e.g. rule of law dialogue) was already covered by the social democrats, chancellor Merkel had to pursue a more ‘outspoken’, critical human rights policy (cf. ibid.: 90ff). This policy, however, had no implications – except sharp criticism by the Chinese side – for the economic or security policies of Germany regarding China.

And second, the constructions in the Asia Strategy were made by the CDU/CSU-group in the German parliament, not by the government. The government under chancellor Merkel stuck firmly to the constructions that had characterized the discourse regarding China since 1993. Merkel’s speech on the occasion of the Asia-congress of the CDU/CSU group in the German Bundestag, in which she outlined the China policy of her government, is an important proof of the continuity of the German governmental discourse (cf. Merkel 2007d). Against the background of the dynamic changes brought about by the processes of globalization, Merkel saw potential conflicts not as resulting from antagonistic states with different political orders but from “totally changed collisions of interests”\textsuperscript{186} (ibid.). And she diplomatically but clearly disagreed with the concept of alignment with the US and its allies resulting from contradictory concepts of political order: “This means that we should not approach the challenges of Asia with fear [...] And I also say, we should not try to play off certain Asian states against others. [...] We should take each country seriously in its wishes and prospects and we should

\textsuperscript{185} China stellt dem Westen damit in zunehmendem Maße die Systemfrage und sieht sich als alternatives politisches Ordnungsmodell, das die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen Deutschlands und der EU außerhalb Europas herausfordert.

\textsuperscript{186} Vollkommen veränderte Interessenkollisionen.
not think in the old terms of spheres of interests”\textsuperscript{(187)}(ibid.). Instead, Merkel perceived the challenges as “common, global challenges”\textsuperscript{(188)} which needed to be addressed jointly (ibid.). China, in her view, was a responsible actor: “Concerning the issue of North Korea, we have witnessed the fact that China has taken on responsibility in an impressive manner. I dare the assertion that without Chinese engagement, the containment of the North Korean nuclear programme would not have come about”\textsuperscript{(189)}(ibid.).

The basic question that she formulated for the engagement with East Asia – and with that she was quite close to the position of her predecessors – was: “[...] how does the world cooperate politically? The right answer is, as I am convinced, and this is appreciated in Asia, to say: We take a multilateral approach. This multilateral approach gains its competence, its legitimacy from the United Nations”\textsuperscript{(190)}(ibid.). And concerning the security-political situation in the East Asian region, Merkel was optimistic that the countries of the region could find their own multilateral ways: “The countries will develop. The countries will also establish good relationships with one another even if sometimes it takes a while. Asia achieves self-confidence step by step. One can witness this development in the regional partnerships. Asia learns from the European experiences and from the experiences of the EU”\textsuperscript{(191)}(ibid.). Therefore, with her rejecting a concept of conflicts of political orders and instead her notion of conflicts of interests, with her perception of China as a responsible actor, with her reference to the European example of peaceful conflict resolution and regional integration and with her affirmation of multilateralism, Merkel stood firmly in the tradition of the German discursive constructions regarding China. Thus, the changes that have been observed in the German policy regarding China were adaptations in the tone of the human rights discourse. There was no change whatsoever in the German

\textsuperscript{187} Das heißt aber, wir sollten an die Herausforderungen auch mit Blick auf Asien nicht mit Angst herangehen […]Ich sage auch, wir sollten nicht versuchen, die Länder Asiens gegeneinander auszuspielen. […]Wir sollten jedes Land mit seinen Wünschen ernst nehmen. Und wir sollten nicht in den alten Kategorien der Interessensphären-Zuordnung denken.

\textsuperscript{188} Gemeinsame, globale Herausforderungen.

\textsuperscript{189} Wir haben am Thema Nordkorea gesehen, dass hier China erfreulicherweise in einem beeindruckenden Maß Mitverantwortung übernommen hat. Ich wage die Behauptung, ohne das chinesische Engagement wäre die Eindämmung des nordkoreanischen Atomprogramms so nicht möglich gewesen.

\textsuperscript{190} Wie will die Welt politisch zusammenarbeiten? Dabei ist es, wie ich glaube, richtig und das wird in Asien auch geschätzt, dass wir sagen: Wir haben einen multilateralen Ansatz. Dieser multilaterale Ansatz gewinnt seine Kompetenz, seine Legitimation aus den Vereinten Nationen.

security discourse regarding China and in the construction of China as such (namely as an indispensible partner).

This assessment can be further underlined by various speeches of German government officials. As the minister for economic affairs, Michael Glos pointed out: ‘The bilateral relationship with India and China consists of a closely knit and reliable network of consultations and contacts. In the case of China, one could even speak of a relationship of trust that has been growing over a period of almost 30 years’”\(^{192}\) (Glos 2006). The problems in the relations with China consisted in the lack of protection of intellectual property, forced transfer of technology and insufficient access to the Chinese market (cf. ibid.). However, when speaking of the economic challenges concerning China,

\[\text{it is worth to remind ourselves for a moment of the economic challenges that we faced some decades ago. In the 1960s there was the ‘American challenge’. Later, there was the ‘Japanese challenge’. And just a few years ago, there was the challenge of the ‘new economy’. And each time there was a big fuss and the view that only extraordinary measures like sealing off and closing our borders could rescue us. We’re lucky that these measures were never taken.}^{193}\) (ibid.)

And already during her first visit in China, Merkel reiterated the well known features of the German discourse on China:

\[\text{I am convinced, to tell you this beforehand, that the German-Chinese relations possess a great potential that we want to use in its full breadth and that we want to invest with regards to the future. We want to broaden our cooperation on all levels [...] . I believe that, in a globalized world, we have to cooperate more and more closely. [...] That’s why it is imperative for all of us to tackle the challenges and to}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize Im bilateralen Verhältnis zu Indien wie auch zu China verfügt die Bundesregierung über ein eng geknüpftes und über die Jahre bewährtes Netz von Konsultationen und Kontakten. Im Falle Chinas kann man sogar von einem Vertrauensverhältnis sprechen, das über einen Zeitraum von über 30 Jahren gewachsen ist.}^{192}\)


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seize the opportunities of globalization and of course to tackle the risks jointly.\(^{(194)}\)
(Merkel 2006; cf. Erler 2007)

Besides the criticism which traditionally focussed on the lacking degree of openness of
the Chinese market and the insufficient protection of intellectual property rights, Merkel
perceived China as a responsible partner, which, for example, had contributed
significantly to the dialogue with North Korea: “We have many common tasks in the
foreign policy realm, and these tasks will bring us closer together. [...] There is trust
between us. There is the capacity of open dialogue. There is reliability in the contacts
that we’ve had so far for which I want to express my gratitude”\(^{(195)}\) (Merkel 2006).

And one year later, during her second visit to China, Merkel stated that the relations
between Germany and China, as well as between the EU and China were “very good”
(Merkel 2007c). Both sides carried a shared global responsibility. She underlined that
China had taken a responsible role in the negotiations about North Korea’s nuclear
programme and that similar progress needed to be achieved on the questions of Sudan
and Iran (cf. ibid.).

On the Munich security conference in 2007, Merkel outlined her understanding of
security when she sketched out what kind of answers the current threats required. In this
context, she also referred to the experiences of the European integration process:

Is it not true that countries and peoples have moved closer together in times of
crises, when they wanted to solve and overcome these crises? Was the European
integration process, for example, not born out of the experience that European
nation states would never be able to break through the vicious cycle of war and
destruction on their own but that only in the community they could pursue their
interests in an ever more interdependent world?\(^{(196)}\) (Merkel 2007a)

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\(^{(194)}\) Ich bin überzeugt davon, um es gleich vorweg zu sagen, dass die deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen
über ein großes Potenzial verfügen, dass wir sie auch in Zukunft in ganzer Breite nutzen und
zukunftsgerichtet intensivieren wollen. Wir wollen unsere Zusammenarbeit auf allen Ebenen - dass die
Bundesminister für Wirtschaft und für Verkehr mitgekommen sind, zeigt dies auch - verbreitern. Ich
glauibe, dass wir in einer sich globalisierenden Welt ohnehin immer enger zusammenarbeiten müssen.
[...] Deshalb gilt es für uns alle, die Herausforderungen, vor die uns die Globalisierung stellt, zu meistern,
die Chancen, die darin liegen, zu ergreifen und natürlich auch die Risiken gemeinsam anzuheben und
ihnen gemeinsam zu begegnen.

\(^{(195)}\) Wir haben viele gemeinsame außenpolitische Aufgaben, und diese außenpolitischen Aufgaben werden
uns auch enger zusammenführen. [...]Es gibt Vertrauen zwischen uns. Es gibt die Fähigkeit zu einem
offenen Dialog. Es gibt in unseren Kontakten, die wir bisher hatten, Verlässlichkeit auch von Ihrer Seite
aus, für die ich mich ganz herzlich bedanken möchte.

\(^{(196)}\) Es gilt die Frage zu beantworten: Ist es denn nicht so, dass Länder und Völker unter dem Eindruck von
Discourse Analysis II: Constellations of security discourses regarding China

Threats like climate change, forced migration and regional crises could, according to Merkel, only be addressed in joint efforts:

I believe that tackling global crises in joint responsibility requires a new, broad understanding of security. [...] In a nutshell: Those who want to prevent and sustainably overcome crises cannot act alone, but has to have the capacity to invest in hope and confidence, in justice and rule of law, in good governance and economic reconstruction, in education and health. In short: One has to invest broadly in human development. This is, in my view, global responsibility towards global challenges.\(^{197}\) (ibid.)

In these efforts, China of course was an indispensable partner: “We have very close political contacts on all levels. The Prime Minister and me have met four times in the last two years and have talked on the phone quite often. Our talks are characterized by a climate of trust. We exchange our views frankly and honestly. We meet with respect. And we have a joint responsibility for global problems”\(^{198}\) (Merkel 2007b).

The discursive constructions of foreign minister Steinmeier were also in the tradition of the German discourse of the preceding years. His main priority concerning China was to win Asia and especially China as a partner (cf. Steinmeier 2007). A fearful strategy of isolation towards China, in Steinmeier’s view, would be a dangerous strategy in itself:

If we look more closely how some people fan fear with notions like ‘spies from...
China’, ‘economic war’ or a ‘Western alliance against Asia, then this is a much more dangerous strategy which is familiar to us from another context. I remind you of last year’s so-called dispute of cultures. Conflicts of interests become cultural conflicts and are thus exacerbated with a high potential of escalation. I consider this a highly dangerous tendency.199 (Steinmeier 2007; cf. Erler 2008)

That is to say, the possibility that China is perceived as threatening is an actual threat. Consequently, the alternative approach that he sketched out implicitly rejected the conflictual logic of the CDU/CSU strategy paper, too:

I say: We need a joint global awareness for the necessity of cooperation.200 And this is an ambitious aim: In order to achieve it we have to overcome cultural dividing lines and national borders that have existed for centuries. In the world of tomorrow, in which new powers such as India, China and others come to the forefront, we cannot assume anymore that the Western-European culture is accepted naturally as a universal guideline. This is, however, all but a reason for fear and panic – at least if one is ready to learn and to convince others. It underlines the necessity to make us – literally – understandable.201 (Steinmeier 2007)

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200 Note that this is a very similar construction to Tony Blair’s ‘doctrine of international community’ (Blair 2000).

6.2.3.2.4. **In search for the new world order and the concept of ‘globale Verantwortungspartnerschaft’**

Foreign minister Steinmeier considered the relations between China and Germany almost as strengthened after the imbroglio caused by the meeting of Merkel with the Dalai Lama in September 2007. Looking back on that year, Steinmeier said that behind us is a year which was not one of the easiest in the history of German-Chinese relations. This is, however, not the place to dive into the reasons for it. We have already talked about it. What is important: We’ve never stopped talking, especially when it became difficult. We have struggled for truth, perspectives, perceptions and traditions, sometimes we argued, but we never broke contact. To the contrary: Never before in my time in office have I talked to my colleague Yang Jiechi so often and so intensely as in the past 12 months. And I have noticed in the speech of your Prime Minister [...] that he was relieved that the unease of the recent past were removed; not often have I heard one of the important leaders talk with so much enthusiasm, warmth and almost affection about his relations to Germany and the Germans.\(^{202}\) (Steinmeier 2008d)

The reasons for the need for dialogue and good relations did not come from wishful thinking but were dictated by necessity. As Steinmeier described the international situation: “We are living in a time of huge changes. New political and economic powers emerge, China is at the forefront of this development. The world is in search of a new order”\(^{203}\) (ibid.). In addition, the challenges that arise in the era of globalization cannot be tackled by any exclusive alliance on its own: “We have to form a Global Responsibility Partnership”\(^{204}\) (ibid.). What must absolutely not happen is a step back to


\(^{204}\) Diese Herausforderungen können von keinem Land der Welt, von keinem exklusiven Bündnis mehr allein gelöst werden. Wir müssen vielmehr daran gehen, eine „globale Verantwortungspartnerschaft“ zu
the logic of the Cold War:

No one is naïve. Interests and thus conflicts of interests will persist. But without resorting to reason, the rules according to which we deal with these conflicts will be devaluated and ousted. If we go back to the logic of power blocks, if we revive the patterns of the Cold War, we are heading in the wrong direction. [...] Without the dialogue with the rising states such as Brazil, Russia, India and China, we will not find that new order.\(^{205}\) (ibid.)

In following statements, Steinmeier reiterated the need of a Global Responsibility Partnership (‘globale Verantwortungspartnerschaft’) in the face of new challenges and a world in search of a new order: “The world has changed since the end of the Cold War. It has become more confusing. It is searching for a new order. One thing, however, is certain despite the enduring process of ‘remeasurement’: We need a global partnership of responsibility – with China”\(^{206}\) (Steinmeier 2008b). In an interview with the radio channel ‘Deutschlandfunk’, Steinmeier even speaks of a ‘multipolar’ world; probably in reference to the French concept (cf. Steinmeier 2008c). The solution to managing successfully, i.e. peacefully this international situation of uncertainty is cooperation and reconciliation of interests:

The solution is not to rebuke each other for certain things or to fan fears of the ‘yellow danger’. The world is in search for a new order. We have to integrate China as well as India step by step into an era of worldwide cooperation and to make them stakeholders and co-creators of that new order. If we have common interest we will find common solutions.\(^{207}\) (ibid.)


The notion of a “fair reconciliation of interests”\(^\text{208}\) is raised repeatedly (ibid.).

On a more general level, Steinmeier underlined these principles again in a speech at a conference organized by the Bertelsmann-Stiftung labelled ‘Managing Global Insecurity’ in 2008:\(^\text{209}\) Given the dramatic changes in the global system, the consequences of globalization, the global challenges such as terrorism, “food insecurity, climate change, growing competition for resources as well as global financial turmoil [which] are undermining global stability”, our current system of global governance is not sufficiently prepared to deal with these new challenges. We are in midst of a global reorientation, a collective process of adjustment in reaction to these new challenges. We need to come up with new concepts to master them. ‘Responsible Sovereignty’ – as you term it in your project – refers to the most important part of this new approach: shared responsibility among the members of the international community, maximizing the opportunities and minimizing the risks brought about by the changed international situation. (Steinmeier 2008a)

Shared responsibility is an absolute necessity as no country and none of the traditional alliances – present or future – can shoulder these tremendous tasks alone. [...] We cannot manage the new challenges without integrating the emerging powers of Asia, Latin America and Africa into rules-based global regimes. [...] In all these challenges we either win together or we fail together. Therefore, we need to come up with a way to not only link up our capacities to anticipate and prevent threats but also to identify our joint political interests, to forge global consensus and to strengthen international cooperation.

Responsibility and Cooperation – these are the key terms for shaping the 21st century. [...] We have to take Russia, China, India on board as well as other emerging powers such as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa to mention only a few. We have to find a global agenda that enables us to tackle the great challenges of our time together: energy security and climate change, financial markets, non-

\(^{208}\) Fairer Interessenausgleich.

\(^{209}\) The speech was held in English.
proliferation and disarmament – and the transformation of global governance structures by means of a Global Responsibility Partnership. (ibid.)

Summing up the discursive constructions of the period between 2004 and 2010, one finds that there were no changes in the constructions of security regarding China and that the assessments of the Asia Strategy were further specified. Dramatic changes in a world marked by uncertainties about its future order, potentials for regional conflicts in Asia and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism were seen as the major threats to security.

The question that appeared crucial was how to organize the relations between states in such an environment and officials warned that a way back into the thinking of the Cold War would be dangerous. Also, if China was perceived as a threat, this would be an actual threat. Peace and stability can only be achieved by confidence-building, by multilateral cooperation and close and trustful dialogue. Emerging powers like China had to be integrated into the international system and into co-creating this very system, which was in a process of deep changes. Economic success and security-political influence were seen as two sides of the same medal.

Security was considered to be indivisible (cf. Schröder 2004) and therefore, all states would ‘win together or fail together’ (cf. Steinmeier 2008a).

Security policy therefore consisted ultimately in the association of all states in the management of international affairs, in establishing a ‘globale Verantwortungspartnerschaft’.

The construction of security therefore corresponded to a relational construction of security.

6.2.3.3. **From the German-Chinese Joint Communiqué to the present day**

(2010-2014)

The German-Chinese Joint Communiqué of 2010 reiterated the main and well-known constructions of the official German discourse: The German-Chinese strategic partnership aimed at mutual benefit, preservation of peace, sustainable development and at contributing to the solution of global challenges (cf. Government of the Federal Republic of Germany/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2010). Dialogue as a means to foster mutual understanding and trust (especially in security- and military-related issues) featured prominently in the document (cf. ibid.). Accordingly, both sides
underlined that they would “pay attention to the other side’s core interests and will strengthen mutual understanding as well as political trust in order to ensure the sustainable and stable development of bilateral relations”

Chancellor Merkel perceived China as a strong competitor in many areas, nevertheless she saw that the interests of the two export-oriented countries had increasingly converged (cf. Merkel 2010b). She underlined the responsible role that China had taken during the global economic and financial crisis: “China has overcome the international financial and economic crisis in an impressive manner and has thereby assisted other countries, especially Germany as an exporting nation, in overcoming the crisis” (Merkel 2010a). Given this importance of China and the close interconnectedness of the German and Chinese economies, “China is a key partner for the EU in the 21st century” (ibid.; cf. Merkel 2011).

Steinmeier’s successor, the new foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, reiterated the basic constructions of Steinmeier and the previous German discourse. Living in a “world of change”, it was essential to maintain the traditional partnerships but also “to found new partner- and friendships in a world of shifting power balances” (Westerwelle 2011; cf. Westerwelle 2012a; cf. Westerwelle 2012b). Any fears concerning China were unjustified:

I think that fears concerning China are unjustified as they are based on a zero-sum thinking, along the lines of: if China grows stronger, others must become weaker, if China’s influence grows, the influence of Europe decreases. The opposite is true: China’s influence grows, the Chinese economy grows and simultaneously, if we act reasonably, it is not to our detriment but clearly to our benefit. (ibid.)

For example, the emerging Chinese middle class would not only buy German high

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210 Beide Seiten betonen [...] die Kerninteressen der jeweils anderen Seite zu berücksichtigen und das gegenseitige Verständnis und politische Vertrauen zu stärken, um die langfristige und stabile Entwicklung der bilateralen Beziehungen sicherzustellen.
211 China hat in beeindruckender Weise die international Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise überwunden und damit auch einen Beitrag geleistet, dass auch andere, das ist insbesondere auch Deutschland als Exportnation und andere Nationen auch, die Krise überwinden konnten.
212 Wir haben in einer Welt des Wandels eine Kernaufgabe, nämlich einerseits die alten Partnerschaften und Freundschaften, die traditionellen Beziehungen zu pflegen und auch auszubauen, aber gleichzeitig geht es darum, in einer Welt mit sich verschiebenden Gewichten neue Partnerschaften und neue Freundschaften zu begründen.
213 For the German original text see the following footnote.
quality products but also get in contact with European values: “[...] this exchange that we know very well in Germany under the heading of ‘change through rapprochement’, this exchange we want to foster” (ibid.). There was no important issue or problem that could be solved without Chinese contribution, so ensuring close relations was essential for Westerwelle (cf. ibid.).

In 2012, Westerwelle underlined the “depth of the relations” which was expressed in the second intergovernmental consultations which took place in Beijing in August 2012 (Westerwelle 2012a): “It is remarkable that we can, despite our differences, talk openly and work together closely” (Westerwelle 2012b; cf. Westerwelle 2010). In times of globalization and in the “multipolar world of the 21st century”, the “model of cooperation has a clear advantage over the model of confrontation” (ibid.; cf. Westerwelle 2012a). In this sense, the intergovernmental consultations between Germany and China testified the new quality of the bilateral relationship (cf. Westerwelle 2012b).

The joint declaration following the second intergovernmental consultations reiterated the basic points: Faced with global challenges, it is essential to engage in dialogues which help foster mutual understanding and trust and thus allow for a reconciliation of interests and the resolution of common challenges (cf. Government of the Federal Republic of Germany/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2012). The consultations took place in a “friendly and cooperative atmosphere” and both sides agreed to “further develop the mutual political trust and foster the cooperation for mutual benefit” (ibid.). Therefore, they agreed to mutually pay attention to the other


217 Die Konsultationen fanden in freundschaftlicher und kooperativer Atmosphäre statt. […] beide Seiten […] sind entschlossen, das Niveau der zukunftsgerichteten deutsch-chinesischen strategischen Partnerschaft weiter zu heben, das gegenseitige politische Vertrauen zu stärken und die Zusammenarbeit
side’s core interests. And both sides underlined that they aimed at contributing to regional and
global peace and development as well as to a stable recovery and growth of the global economy: “Faced with the
global challenges, a strengthening of the German-Chinese cooperation is in the interest of both sides and will not only foster the
development of both countries but will also foster peace and development worldwide”\(^{218}\) (ibid.).

Despite the persisting German criticism concerning market access, protection of intellectual property rights and the general calls for more reciprocity in the commercial relationship (cf. Merkel 2012a), the basic parameters nevertheless remained the same: “I say it again and again: Dialogue creates trust, dialogue creates better understanding”\(^{219}\); therefore it is essential “that we cooperate closely, that we build trust and that we again and again struggle in order to find the right way and that in this process we do engage in controversial discussions. [...] We live in a globalized world and we know that we have to take on responsibility for each other”\(^{220}\) (Merkel 2012b).

In 2014, Germany and China established a “broad strategic partnership” (Government of the Federal Republic of Germany/Government of the People’s Republic of China 2014). Given the “complex international challenges”, “Germany and China have both as important economies and influential countries a joint responsibility for peace and prosperity”\(^{221}\) (ibid.). Trust, dialogue and understanding remain the principal means in addressing global challenges, working towards regional integration and a more just and rules based international order (cf. ibid.).

During her visits in China in 2014, Merkel underlined again the positive role that China played during the financial and the Euro crisis: “I have again made clear that we have

\(^{218}\) Deutschland und China tragen aktiv dazu bei, Frieden und Entwicklung in ihrer Region und der Welt zu wahren sowie eine stabile Erholung und Wachstum der globalen Wirtschaft zu fördern. Angesichts der globalen Herausforderungen liegt eine weitere Stärkung der deutsch-chinesischen Zusammenarbeit im Interesse beider Seiten und wird nicht nur die jeweilige Entwicklung beider Länder fördern, sondern auch für Frieden und Entwicklung weltweit förderlich sein.

\(^{219}\) Ich sage es aber immer wieder: Dialog schafft Vertrauen, Dialog schafft besseres Verstehen.

\(^{220}\) Das erfordert, dass wir eng miteinander kooperieren, dass wir Vertrauen aufbauen und dass wir immer wieder um den richtigen Weg ringen und dabei auch durchaus strittige Diskussionen führen. [...] Wir leben in einer globalisierten Welt zusammen und wissen, dass wir deshalb auch für einander Verantwortung tragen.

\(^{221}\) Deutschland und China teilen die Ansicht, dass die internationale politische Lage und die Weltwirtschaft komplexe Herausforderungen darstellen. Deutschland und China haben als wichtige Volkswirtschaften und einflussreiche Länder in der Welt gemeinsam eine wichtige Verantwortung für Frieden und Wohlstand.
appreciated very much that China has been a reliable partner for the EU in the difficult times of the Euro crisis. This has helped us a lot to overcome this difficult phase (Merkel 2014a). And, a day later, she referred to the experiences of European history and underlined the importance of cooperation, discussion and dialogue:

How do we solve conflicts today? In the EU, we say: Military solutions of such conflicts are not an option. So we need peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms – by dialogue, talks, negotiations and by international organizations such as the OSCE. Whether it is about the North Korean nuclear programme, the nuclear programme of Iran, the climate conferences or other issues – such questions, that we are confronted with globally, are to be solved jointly by repeated exchanges of opinion, cooperation, discussions and talks (Merkel 2014b).

And, underlining the essential relations with China: “Today, not one single global question can be solved without China or without its contribution” (ibid.).

Finally, in 2012, the German federal government published its strategy for dealing with the consequences of political and economic globalization: The concept called “Shaping globalization – expanding partnerships – sharing responsibility” reiterated on a more basic level all the previously raised points (cf. Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 2012). The starting point was the assessment of a multipolar and interdependent world in which new powers, the so-called Gestaltungsmächte were raising. Their integration into the management of global affairs would be crucial for a global Ordnungspolitik. On the basis of the traditional partnerships and the new ones with the Gestaltungsmächte the German government strived to develop “innovative

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222 Ich habe auch noch einmal deutlich gemacht, dass wir es sehr geschätzt haben, dass sich China in der schweren Zeit der Eurokrise als ein verlässlicher Partner für die Europäische Union und ganz besonders für die Eurozone herausgestellt hat. Das hat uns sehr geholfen, diese schwierige Phase auch zu überwinden.

223 Wie löst man heute solche Konflikte? In der Europäischen Union sagen wir: Militärische Lösungen eines solchen Konflikts kommen nicht in Frage. Also brauchen wir friedliche Konfliktlösungsmechanismen – durch Dialog, durch Reden, durch Verhandeln und durch den Einsatz von internationalen Organisationen, in diesem Fall der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, die sogenannte OSZE. Ob es auch um das Atomprogramm von Nordkorea, das Atomprogramm des Iran, um die Klimakonferenzen oder anderes geht – solche Fragen, die sich uns heute weltweit stellen, sind immer wieder durch Austausch, Kooperation, Diskurs und Reden miteinander zu lösen.

224 Heute lässt sich keine einzige globale Frage mehr ohne China und ohne die Mitwirkung Chinas lösen.

225 States that have the ability to have a decisive impact on global affairs, that are able to shape globalization.

226 Ordnungspolitik in this context may be understood as policies aiming at finding commonly agreed rules for the international system, i.e. working towards a rules-based system of global governance.
political approaches to the management of global questions and to build alliances for their implementation. By means of these partnerships we want to maintain and expand the scope, reach and impact of our joint, global *Gestaltungskaft* in a multipolar world.”227 (ibid.: 6). This was meant as an offer of cooperation in the sense of a “joint and equal work on the basis of partnership in order to achieve a fair globalization and to find solutions for global challenges”228 (ibid.: 6).

In terms of security-political cooperation, the concept favours regional security architectures based on legitimate democratic inner-state structures as well as confidence-building measures (cf. ibid.: 23). The ideal security policy tackles conflicts before they escalate into violent confrontations, therefore such a security policy is anticipatory and rests on a comprehensive and broad understanding of security.

Today, no state in the world can provide security for itself by purely military means or even on its own. Therefore, the federal government puts special emphasis on the development and deepening of security-political partnerships with states in distant regions as well as the regional organizations (e.g. the African Union or the Arab League).229 (ibid.: 22)

Summing up the period from 2010 to 2014, the joint management of the changing world remained the characterizing feature of the discursive constructions of security regarding China. Faced with the challenges of emerging powers, Germany and Europe should not fall back into Cold War zero sum thinking but should instead establish and deepen close and trustful partnerships with the major powers, including China. China’s role and importance during the global financial and economic crisis as well as the so-called Euro crisis was perceived as positive. Dialogue, trust and understanding were the means to

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228 Das vorliegende Konzept ist ein Dialog- und Kooperationsangebot der Bundesregierung an die neuen Gestaltungsstärken für die gemeinsame, partnerschaftliche und gleichberechtigte Arbeit an einer fairen Globalisierung und an Lösungsansätzen für globale Herausforderungen.

solve conflicts not only in the security-political realm but also in economic relations. Where conflicts of interests arose, these should be solved by dialogue, which also comprised controversial discussions. Therefore, the construction of security still corresponded to the relational ideal-type of security.

6.2.3.4. Conclusion
Dramatic changes in the international system and an uncertainty about the future world order due to the effects of globalization and the rise of new political and economic powers were the main sources of concern for the German policy-makers. Due to the dense interconnectedness of the international system, regional conflicts in Asia were considered to impact directly on German security. Furthermore, threats from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism added to these concerns. The consequence of this situation was, for German officials, that security was constructed as indivisible. No actor alone could achieve security for himself anymore. A joint ‘global awareness for the necessity of cooperation’ was needed in order to be able to jointly tackle global challenges. Strategic dialogues, close relations, mutual understanding and confidence-building measures (especially in terms of military transparency and arms control) were seen as vital in achieving security. The integration of China into the international system and close relations to this important actor is an absolute prerequisite in this respect. If this aim could not be achieved and if China was perceived as a threat, this would be an actual threat for Germany and the international community.

Furthermore, what stands out in the German discourse on China is the reference to the experiences of European post-war integration. The notion that if there is the political will to overcome conflictual relationships these can be in fact overcome, refers to the integration process as well as the notion that many conflicts consist of differences of interests which can be reconciled peacefully by negotiation and dialogue. Finally, economic relations and security are constructed as two sides of the same coin. Therefore, the German construction of security regarding China corresponded to the relational ideal-type and has remained stable over the analyzed period.

With the concern for the changing international environment and the global consequences of regional crises in Asia and with the responses that consisted in
managing these changes by building close relationships with major actors and fostering mutual understanding, trust and integration in Asia, the German discourse is very similar to the EU’s discourse.

Although the economic concerns do not occupy such a central place as they do in the EU’s discourse and are not constructed in terms of security, the discourses are nevertheless very similar in this respect. In any case, there were no contradictory, competing or otherwise incompatible constructions in the German and the EU’s discourse on China.

Table 6.3.: The German security discourse regarding China (1993-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Liberal security</th>
<th>Relational security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td></td>
<td>• (All actors and their relationships): Germany and China (Asia), security is ‘indivisible’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Provider</td>
<td></td>
<td>• (Of all actors, of the relationship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>• (Emanating from actors)</td>
<td>• (Emanating from relational dynamics): regional instability in Asia, dramatic changes in the international system due to the effects of globalisation, uncertainty about the future world order, proliferation of WMD, terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>• (Targeted towards actors)</td>
<td>• (Targeted towards relationships): Establishing close and trustful relationships between the states of the international system, confidence-building (e.g. Transparency in military affairs), multilateral cooperation, integration and establishment of regional security architectures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3. Explaining stability: The constellations of security discourses regarding China

In chapter 5 and in the previous sections of this chapter, I have reconstructed the security discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany regarding China. We can now compare and assess whether the ensemble of these reconstructed security discourses corresponds to one or more of the ideal-types of constellations of discourses that I have developed in chapter 3.4.3. On the basis of the discussions in chapter 3.2., we can consider the very existence of such constellations as the material cause and their specific form as the formal cause of the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China.

In the following three sections, I will compare the security discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany in terms of whether they construct China as a threat (6.3.1.) and whether they construct security policy regarding China in terms of relational security (6.3.2.) or liberal security (6.3.3.). Based on this comparison, I will reconstruct the ideal-types of constellations of the security discourses (6.3.4.).

Before I turn to the following discussions, the overall result deserves to be presented: The remarkable similarity of all four discursive constructions of security policy regarding China. This result is surprising, given the competing discourses regarding China that have been presented in the elaboration on the second research question in chapter 2.3. From the mid-1990s to 2014, the security discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany have been remarkably similar and continuously stable.

6.3.1. China is not a threat

A second result of the analysis of all four security discourses regarding China is that there is never, not once, any notion of China as a threatening or potentially hostile actor. There is not a single notion of uncertainties about China’s future behaviour. With the
exception of the UK, in the case of which such a construction only evolves after the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, all other constructions portray China as an indispensible partner from the very beginning of this analysis’ timeframe. While there are very few references to the US’s security-political role in East Asia, there is never a discursive construction similar to those of the US which open a discursive space that can be filled with more critical constructions of China. To the contrary, an actually threatening development would occur if China was perceived as a threat. This notion is quite explicit in the EU’s and the German discourse, a bit more implicit in the French and the UK’s discourse. The EU, the UK, France and Germany all want a successful China and welcome as well as demand more engagement of this country in international affairs. Consequently, in the case of the UK, the Five Powers Defence Agreement does not play any role in the security discourse on China. It remains to be seen how China’s recent so-called 16+1 initiative, in which it aims at intensifying its relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, will be constructed in the EU’s discourse on China – it has not played any role in the documents that have been analyzed for this thesis. Hence, there are no constructions corresponding to the neorealist security or common security ideal-types.

6.3.2. Relational security policy regarding China

Coming back to the specific constructions of security: The main threat for the EU is the fluidity of the international system after the Cold War and the resulting uncertainties. Protectionism and regional conflicts in East Asia (which would impact seriously on the EU’s political and economic interests as the region is one of the most important economic partners for the EU) are also constructed as threats to EU security. The fluidity of the international system after the Cold War finds its counterparts in all the other constructions of the UK, France and Germany. The response of the EU consists in associating China and the East Asian states as stakeholders in managing the ever more interdependent international relationships, in establishing a close and trustful partnership with China, in gaining mutual understanding and in establishing a rules-based international system. These policies correlate with the discursive constructions of the three EU member states. Beginning with the period between 1998 and 2004, the UK identifies dramatic
global changes as key challenges that have to be tackled. Later, this phenomenon is constructed as disorder and uncertainty in the international system. The response of the UK is to establish a strategic, trustful and friendly relationship with China, which is seen as an indispensable partner for the successful tackling of most of the international challenges and threats. The main aim of the UK is to maintain its ability to shape events, and cooperation with China is essential for ensuring this.

France also perceives sudden, dramatic and rapid changes in the international system after the Cold War. Later on, the ever growing interdependence and a general notion of urgency to tackle these changes characterize the French constructions of the international environment. The French response is to establish close and trustful relations with China, which it considers as being or becoming one of the major poles of power, in order to build a multipolar world. Multipolarity in the construction of the French discourse is seen as contributing to a less confrontational, more harmonious world (and criticizes implicitly the US’ unilateral approaches). Also, the experiences of European integration can help to soothe the conflicts that emerge in a highly interdependent world.

From the outset, Germany also constructs the international system as highly interdependent and being subject to dramatic changes. The international system is characterized by uncertainty after the Cold War and as being in the search for a new world order. The response to these threatening challenges consists in integrating Asia and China into the international system and making them stakeholders and co-creators of this system. Cooperation and confidence-building, especially in the military sector as well as building a close and trustful relationship with China are seen as vital measures in order to manage this uncertainty. A special feature of the German discourse is the notion of a malleability of the relations between states. According to this notion, if there is the political will, conflictual relationships can be transformed into cooperative ones.

All these constructions of threatening challenges posed by the fluidity of the international system are responded to by efforts to manage the highly interdependent international relations. Thus, although these constructions are all slightly nuanced, they are very similar and all correspond to the relational ideal-type of security.

A second threatening challenge that the EU identifies is protectionism and protectionist trends in the global economy. Resistance towards these trends in close cooperation with China, which, as an export-oriented economy, has also great stakes in an open trading
system, is formulated as a response. The maintenance of an open trading system can only be achieved when China joins in these efforts.

One of the UK’s key interests is also to keep the international trading system as open as possible and to counter all trends towards protectionism. For the UK as for the EU, the maintenance of an open trade system is a precondition for prosperity and security. As protectionism emerges from relational dynamics and as responses to it are directed not towards countries but towards these processes, it qualifies as a construction of relational security.

For France, economic relations with China and especially access to the Chinese market are seen as essential in ‘defending’ employment in France (which can be considered as a construction of liberal security). The notion of an open trade system, however, plays only a marginal role.

In the German constructions, there is concern, too, for maintaining an open trading system. However, it does not feature as prominently as in the EU’s or the UK’s constructions.

In the case of both Germany and France, these constructions are therefore no constructions of security. Still, the constructions of close economic relations, market access in China and an increase in trade with China are constructions that are similar to those of the EU and the UK.

Third, I have argued that the EU’s concern for regional stability in East Asia corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security. Tensions, unresolved conflicts, uncertainties generated by shifting power relations due to the rise of China, misunderstandings and armament programmes are constructed as threats impacting on the security and stability of East Asia and thus on the EU’s own security. The responses consist in addressing the relationships by fostering regional economic and political integration, the establishment of a regional security architecture and confidence-building measures.

In the discursive constructions of the UK, France and Germany, regional stability in East Asia does not play a prominent role and is not constructed as a security issue. However, regional integration efforts are seen as important and the EU’s own example of transforming conflictual relations into cooperative relations is raised time and again. That is to say, while there are no security constructions on part of the three member states, there are nevertheless similar and compatible constructions to the discursive
constructions of the EU.

6.3.3. Liberal security policy regarding China

Finally, the internal stability and a successful transformation process of China is an important security concern for the EU. A failure of China’s transformation process and possibly ensuing instability would heavily impact on East Asian and global stability as well as on the EU’s economic well-being. Assistance for the Chinese transformation process is therefore a key policy aim of the EU, expressed by the great number of assistance measures and sectoral dialogues. Besides, the integration of China into the international structures, especially the WTO, is a key interest of the EU. The threats are thus constructed as emanating from an instable or unsuccessful China and the responses are directed towards China in order to ensure the maintenance of its reform processes and its stability.

In the security discourses of the UK, France and Germany, such an explicit construction of a security-political concern for the internal stability of China was not found. However, all of the three member states construct the necessity of a successful China. The notion of ‘if China fails, we all fail’ and ‘if China succeeds, we all succeed’ is a recurring feature.

That is to say, there is no security construction on part of the member states but quite similar constructions to the ones of the EU.

6.3.4. The constellations of security discourses regarding China

Summing up what has been said so far and relating it back to the different constellations of security discourses that I have developed in chapter 3.4.3., we have a constellation of discourses corresponding to type 2 in the years from 1995 until 1997:
The EU, France and Germany construct security corresponding to the relational ideal-type. There are no constructions of liberal security in the French and German discourse. However, in the French and German discourse there are no constructions either that are contradictory or incompatible to the EU’s constructions. To the contrary, the necessity to build close and trustful relations with China implicitly points to the need to ensure a stable China.

The UK does not yet construct any types of security in its discourse regarding China in these years. Still, the UK already has similar constructions like the other three, consisting of cooperative policies towards China, conflict solution via dialogues and the absence of any notion of China as being threatening.

From the end of the 1990s onwards, the UK’s constructions become constructions of security corresponding to the relational ideal-type. Therefore, the constellations of security discourses change to the type 1 constellation:
The constructions of security in the three EU member states correspond to the relational ideal-type whereas the constructions of the EU correspond to the relational as well as the liberal ideal-types. As has been shown, there are no contradictions or incompatibilities between the discursive constructions of the member states and those of the EU. Even though the member states do not construct liberal types of security, there are similar constructions in terms of the need of a stable and successful China. What is remarkable (and has not been expected by the author prior to the analysis, probably due to the ubiquitous common prejudices) is that overall, the UK’s constructions of security regarding China are closest to the EU’s constructions. Although the UK seems a bit more reluctant towards China than the EU, France and Germany, and although it is also more reluctant than the EU, France and Germany regarding the arms embargo issue, its constructions come quite close to those of the EU: The concern for its own prosperity and security and the concern to retain its ability to shape events (EU: maintain the leading position in the global economy); the threat construction of climate change as a threat multiplier and the threat construction of competition for resources; and the resulting need to establish close relations with China in order to maintain an open trade system and counter protectionism and to find
common solutions to all these common threats and challenges.

6.4. Conclusion: Explaining stability by constellations of security discourses

Chapter 6 has been dedicated to responding to the second research question of this thesis: *Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?* The argument of this chapter has drawn on the theoretical discussion of chapter 3.2. and particularly chapter 3.4. I have argued that the EU’s security discourse can be seen as the material and formal cause of the EU’s security policy. Furthermore, I have argued that the ideal-typical constellations of the security discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany regarding China can be considered to be the material and formal causes of the stability of the EU’s security discourse and therefore also of the EU’s security policy regarding China.

This chapter has been divided into two main parts. In the first part, I have reconstructed the security discourses of the UK, France and Germany by means of the ideal-types of security that I have developed in chapter 3.3. It has been shown that the security discourses regarding China of all three member states correspond to the relational ideal-type of security (in the case of the UK a bit delayed from 1998 onwards). In the case of the UK and France, there are also liberal constructions of security, which are, however, not very distinct. All in all, the constructions of security regarding China – and the construction of China in general – are remarkably similar in all three member states and on EU level throughout the analysed period. Given the competing discourses that I have presented in the development of the research problem (chapter 2.3.) this could not be expected.

In the second part of the chapter, I then compared the different constructions of security regarding China and reconstructed the ideal-types of constellations of security discourses that I have developed in chapter 3.4.3. It could be shown that in the years from 1995 to 1997, there was a constellation of type 2. The UK’s discourse was not a security discourse in these years. Still, the constructions of China were very similar to those of the EU, France and Germany. Therefore, the expectation of the stability of the EU’s discourse that is materially and formally caused by this constellation could be
confirmed. From 1998 onwards until 2014, there was a constellation of discourses corresponding to the ideal-type 1 which included all three member states and the Union level. This constellation therefore materially and formally caused the stability of the EU’s security discourse and thus also the EU’s security policy regarding China.
7. Conclusion

7.1. Summary of the findings

This thesis set out to respond to the two research questions What is EU security policy regarding China and how can we analytically and conceptually capture it? and Why has the EU’s security policy regarding China remained continuously stable over the last 20 years?.

In order to address the first question, I reconstructed the EU’s security discourse regarding China in chapter 5, based on the discussions in sections 3.2. and 3.3. of the theory chapter.

The EU’s discursive constructions of the threats, the referent objects, and the responses correspond to the liberal and the relational ideal-type of security. We can therefore speak of a liberal-relational security policy regarding China.

In detail: The EU does not construct the threats as emanating from hostile actors or from hostile relationships. Instead, the consequences of globalization as well as the ‘fluidity’ and the dynamic changes within the international system after the Cold War are constructed as threatening challenges that may endanger the EU’s leading position in the global economy. Protectionism is also constructed as a threatening challenge that potentially impacts negatively on the security of the EU. Furthermore, regional conflicts in East Asia due to unresolved territorial disputes, increasing armament programmes and potentials for distrust in the East Asian region, especially in the South China Sea are constructed as threats for the EU. Such conflicts may have the potential destabilize the whole region, which is one of the most important markets and trading partners for the EU. Instability of China or a failure of the Chinese integration process into the international community may have the same impact on the region and beyond and therefore also impacts negatively on EU security interests.

With the exception of a possibly instable or non-integrated China, in the case of which the threats would emanate from a non-hostile actor (which then would correspond to the
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liberal ideal-type of security), the threats are constructed as emanating from dynamics of non-hostile relationships and therefore correspond to the relational ideal-type of security.

The response to a potentially unstable, protectionist international system and its fluidity consists in increasing efforts to manage global interdependence by aiming at the establishment of jointly agreed international rules. In order to achieve this, all stakeholders should be associated in the management of international affairs. Political dialogues should be promoted and partnerships of equals should be established in order to find common analyses of the common challenges and in order to gain greater understanding of each other’s viewpoints and problems. The objective of establishing a rules-based international (economic) system aims at the management of relationships in order to generate agreed rules according to which contradicting interests can compete or even be reconciled fits within the relational ideal-type of security.

In order to contribute to stability in the East Asian region, the EU’s economic presence is seen as a crucial asset. The EU aims at intensifying the trade relations with and within the region in order to make conflicts less possible and to increase cooperation. The EU also promotes confidence-building measures and regional cooperation. One of its central goals is the establishment of a regional security architecture. These policies are directed towards a group of actors and towards the management of their relations in order to solve or prevent security issues. Therefore, these responses can be considered to correspond to the relational ideal-type of security.

Finally, in order to contribute to the stability and integration of China into the international community, the EU supports the transformation process in China and its integration into international governance structures. This policy aims at both stabilizing China by rewarding it for its achievements and stabilizing the international system by preventing the emergence of a left-out ‘maverick’ country that might act against it. Furthermore, the EU tries to improve its own competitiveness by gaining access to the markets in China and East Asia and consequently by engaging in a fierce but fair competition with China. These policies are targeted at a non-hostile actor, require a reconciliation of different interests and therefore correspond to the liberal ideal-type.

A general underlying feature of the EU’s security discourse regarding China is the call for the establishment of close and trustful relations with China and the countries of East Asia which can be considered as a general precondition for the achievement of security. This corresponds to the relational ideal-type of security.
The referent object in the EU’s discursive construction of security regarding China is neither solely the EU nor solely the relationship of actors. The security of the EU is constructed as tightly connected to the security of China and the East Asian region. When it comes to the main value to be secured for the EU, namely its leading role in the global economy, security is constructed as an attribute of the EU. However, it is apparent that the EU does not expect achieving security for itself without simultaneously achieving security for China and the other states in East Asia. The very possibility of achieving security for the EU in terms of securing its leading role in the global economy is inextricably tied to the necessity of achieving security for China and East Asia. Security is thus constructed neither as purely an attribute of an actor nor as purely an attribute of a relationship. These two conceptualizations are tightly intertwined.

Regarding the issues of the Galileo satellite navigation project and the arms embargo – which are considered by large parts of the EU-China scholarly literature as proof of a change in the EU’s security policy regarding China – this thesis has shown that these two issues fit into the overall liberal-relational security discourse. The end of the cooperation with China in the Galileo project was not justified with reference to threats emerging from China but with reference to the inability of the consortium of private European companies to agree on the financial basis of the project, thus leading to a delay in comparison to competing satellite navigation projects of the US, Russia, India and China. After this failure, it was the EU’s main aim to get Galileo operational at all and therefore took over the whole project. The conflicts of interests which emerged from competition for the same frequencies between the EU and China were to be tackled by dialogue and negotiations.

In the case of the failure to lift the arms embargo, the EU – in contrast to the scholarly literature – hardly constructed this issue in terms of security but always with regard to the human rights situation in China. The plans to lift the arms embargo were in line with the construction of a relationship of partners – especially when the partner even participates in a satellite navigation project which can be considered as more security relevant than a legally non-binding arms embargo. And indeed, until today, the official construction of the EU favours the continuation of efforts to lift the embargo. It is, however, most probably due to resistance from the US, which constructs this issue as a crucial security issue, that the EU was and still is unable to take the unanimous decision to lift it.
Hence, both issues are constructed within the boundaries of the overall liberal-relational discourse.

It stands out that China as an actor is never – not even in the constructions of Galileo and the arms embargo – constructed as a threat and there are no constructions of uncertainties about China’s intentions and potential future hostile behaviour. Quite to the contrary: It is constructed as threatening if China was perceived as a threat by the European public, because such a perception could damage this important relationship and foster demands for protectionism (which in turn would impact on the leading role of the EU in the global economy). This is a decisive difference to the China discourse of the United States. Therefore, it should be underlined that there has not been an alignment of the EU with the US position on East Asian security.

In order to respond to the second question, I reconstructed the security discourses regarding China of the three EU member states UK, France and Germany.

I have shown that the three EU member states construct security policy regarding China very similar to the constructions of the EU and corresponding to the relational ideal-type of security. The main threat for the member states as for the EU is the dynamics and uncertainties of the international system after the Cold War.

Beginning with the period between 1998 and 2004, the UK identifies dramatic global changes as key challenges that have to be tackled. Later, this phenomenon is constructed as disorder and uncertainty which characterizes the international system. The response of the UK is to establish a strategic, trustful and friendly relationship with China which is seen as an indispensable partner for the successful tackling of most of the international challenges and threats. The main objective of the UK is to maintain its ability to shape events, and cooperation with China is essential in ensuring this.

France also perceives sudden, dramatic and rapid changes in the international system after the Cold War. Later on the ever growing interdependence and a general notion of urgency to tackle these characterize the constructions of the international environment. The French response is to establish close and trustful relations with China, which France perceives as being or becoming one of the major poles of power, in order to build a multipolar world. Multipolarity in the construction of the French discourse is seen as contributing to a less confrontational (as opposed to the US unilateral approaches), more harmonious world. Besides, the experiences of European integration can help to soothe the conflicts that emerge in a highly interdependent world.
Germany also constructs the international system as highly interdependent and subject to dramatic changes. The international system is characterized by uncertainty after the Cold War and appears to be in the search for a new world order. The response to these threatening challenges consists in integrating Asia and China into the international system and making them stakeholders and co-creators of this system. Cooperation and confidence-building, especially in the military sector as well as building a close and trustful relationship with China are seen as vital in order to manage this uncertainty. A special feature of the German discourse is the malleability of the relations between states: If there is the political will, conflictual relationships can be transformed into cooperative ones.

All these constructions of threatening challenges posed by the fluidity of the international system are responded to by efforts to manage the highly interdependent international relations. Thus, although the constructions of the EU, the UK, France and Germany are all slightly nuanced, they are very similar and all correspond to the relational ideal-type of security.

A second threatening challenge that the EU identifies is protectionism and protectionist trends in the global economy. The response consists in resistance towards these trends in close cooperation with China.

Similarly, one of the UK’s key interests is to keep the international trading system as open as possible and to counter all tendencies towards protectionism. For the UK as for the EU, the maintenance of an open trade system is a precondition for prosperity and security. As protectionism emerges from relational dynamics and responses to it are directed not towards countries but towards these processes, it qualifies as a construction of relational security.

For France, the notion of an open trade system plays only a marginal role. More important are its economic relations with China and especially the access for French companies to the Chinese market. This is seen as essential in ‘defending’ employment in France.

In the German constructions, there is concern, too, about maintaining an open trading system. However, it does not feature as prominently as in the EU’s or the UK’s constructions. In the case of both Germany and France, these constructions are no constructions of security. Still, the constructions of close economic relations, market access in China and an increase in trade with China are constructions that are similar to those of the EU and the UK.
A third threatening challenge for the EU is the danger of regional instability in East Asia. Tensions, unresolved conflicts, uncertainties generated by shifting power relations due to the rise of China, misunderstandings and armament programmes are constructed as threats impacting on the security and stability of East Asia and thus on the EU’s own security. The responses consist in addressing the relationships by fostering regional economic and political integration, the establishment of a regional security architecture and confidence-building measures. In the discursive constructions of the UK, France and Germany, regional stability in East Asia is not constructed as a security issue. Yet, regional integration efforts are seen as important and the EU’s own example of transforming conflictual relations into cooperative relations is raised time and again. In other words, while there are no security constructions on part of the three member states concerning regional stability, there are nevertheless similar and compatible constructions to the constructions of the EU.

Besides the relational ideal-type of security, the liberal ideal-type plays an important role in the EU’s security discourse regarding China. The internal stability of China and a successful transformation process are important security concerns for the EU. The assistance of China in its transformation process is therefore a key policy aim of the EU, expressed in the great number of assistance measures and sectoral dialogues. Moreover, the integration of China into the international structures, especially the WTO, is a key interest of the EU. The threats are thus constructed as emanating from an unsuccessful China and the responses targeted towards China in order to support the latter’s reform processes and its stability. In the security discourses of the UK, France and Germany, such an explicit construction of a security-political concern for the internal stability of China was not found. However, all of the three member states construct the necessity of a successful China. The notions of ‘if China fails, we all fail’ and ‘if China succeeds, we all succeed’ are recurring features. Hence, there is no security construction on part of the member states but quite similar constructions to the ones of the EU.

Summing up these constructions of security in terms of the constellations of discourses that I have developed in chapter 3.4., one finds that in the years from 1995 to 1997, there was a constellation of security discourses corresponding to the second ideal-type (type 2): The UK’s discourse was not a security discourse in these years. Still, the constructions of China were very similar to those of the EU, France and Germany. Therefore, the expectation of the stability of the EU’s discourse that is materially and formally caused by this constellation could be confirmed.
From 1998 onwards until 2014, there was a constellation of discourses corresponding to the first ideal-type (type 1) which included all three member states and the Union level. This constellation therefore materially and formally caused the stability of the EU’s security discourse regarding China and thus also the EU’s security policy regarding China. This is a remarkable result: Many scholars argue that the EU and its member states do not have a common and coherent strategy on how to address security issues regarding China (cf. Bersick 2009b; Berkofsky 2010; Casarini 2008; Sandschneider 2006, 2008; Stumbaum 2009a; Tanca 2006; Umbach 2005). This verdict – at least on the more general level of the discursive constructions of security policy regarding China – cannot be confirmed by this thesis. It seems also to be the result of the neglect of the concept of security in the EU-China literature.

Finally and in a nutshell, the response to the two research questions is: The EU’s security policy regarding China is a liberal-relational security policy which has remained continuously stable in the years between 1995 and 2014 because of same or similar security discourses of the UK, France and Germany. Taken together, the EU’s security discourse and the security discourses of the UK, France and Germany formed two specific constellations of security discourses which stabilized the discourse on the Union level.

### 7.2. Implications

Despite the important results that this thesis has revealed, the limits of the approach taken in this thesis are apparent: As it focuses on the overall security policy of the EU regarding China, this thesis cannot say anything about specific policy decisions that were taken in a complex environment with the interplay of different institutions, legal provisions, bureaucratic turf wars, psychological factors, personal vanities and the influence of international actors. It can only provide the material and formal causes for the security policy and had to neglect the efficient and final causes which may emanate from the aforementioned factors. But such a focus is justified by the need to take a broader and more structuring perspective on an issue that is stricken by contradictory verdicts due to the neglect of the concept of security and the challenge that the analysis of EU foreign policy as such poses.
Another question that could not be addressed due to the limitations of a doctoral thesis is the question as to why the security discourses of the EU, the UK, France and Germany are so similar. Without any doubt, this appears to be an intriguing question for further research. Whether or not and to what degree processes of ‘Brusselisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ (cf. Smith 1996; White 2004) or other processes relating to the interaction between different discourses – or indeed within the one overall discourse encompassing the EU, UK, France and Germany – can account for this finding would certainly add to the understanding of EU security policy regarding China and in general.

But to come back to the results of this thesis: Adherents to the verdicts that there is no such thing as an EU security policy regarding China may probably still be not convinced. From their perspective, a policy that cannot dispose of military means and that does not hedge against China’s military power is not a security policy, but a stupid or at best naïve policy – no matter whether one labels it liberal-relational or otherwise. The response of this thesis to this objection is: From the perspective of the neorealist ideal-type of security this verdict is absolutely true. However, from the perspective of the common security ideal-type, the liberal security ideal-type and especially the relational ideal-type of security the only ‘stupid’ policies are those that constantly reproduce the security dilemma. And the recipes of the advocates of acquiring military means to hedge against an alleged threat increase the odds of indeed producing a security dilemma and thus decreasing security for all actors involved.

A second objection might be the conclusion that the EU pursues still primarily economic policies, no matter whether they are re-labelled as security policies or not. This argument, however, only makes sense in a context where the concept of security is neglected and is simply understood as being essentially about military or defence issues. As soon as one detaches security from a ‘substantial’ definition and re-conceptualizes it in terms of identification of threats and timely responses to these threats, economic policies can be conceptualized as being also security policies. The quotes of Herman van Rompuy boil this notion down to its essence: The EU wants to foster its economic presence in East Asia and strengthen the economic ties between the East Asian states in order to make war materially impossible. This is the basic lesson that Europeans drew from the cataclysms of the two world wars. Integrate economically (and later on politically) to make war materially impossible. Thus, so-called economic policies can – depending on the identification of threats and the formulation of timely responses – also
be considered as security policies. However, as this thesis has shown, the EU’s security policies go far beyond mere ‘economic-as-security-policies’.

I am furthermore convinced that the literature on EU-China relations will benefit from the insights of this thesis. First, further discussions about the concept of security and the nature of the EU’s security policy regarding China will help to bring more coherence in the verdicts which to date range from the assertion that the EU is ‘ignoring reality’ and is ‘lured by China’s skill at playing the wolf in sheep’s clothing’ to the startling verdict that the EU is in fact contributing more to East Asian peace and stability than it could ever achieve if it was involved with ‘hard security’ capabilities in the region (cf. chapter 2.1.).

And second, the discussions about a possible alignment of the EU with the US on East Asian security issues – and on a more general level even about the EU’s and the US’s approach to security – will benefit from more explicit conceptualizations of security. The four ideal-types that I have developed may be helpful for more sophisticated analyses (such as Berenskoetter 2005) in order to overcome simplistic arguments about ‘paradise and power’ (cf. Kagan 2003).

From the perspective of the EU-China literature, the assessment that the EU’s security policy is a liberal-relational security policy, focusing on the reconciliation of differing interests and the management of relationships, may be surprising. However, against the background of the discussions about ‘European Security’ (cf. Böge/Wilke 1984; Pahr/Rittberger/Werbik 1987; Wæver/Lemaitre/Tromer 1989) this result is not really a surprise. Already during the Cold War, European scholars, combining the study of security with a strong liaison to peace and conflict studies, developed the concepts of gewaltfreie Interaktionssteuerung (non-violent interaction management) and called for ‘empathy’ and ‘tolerance’ as means to ease the security logic of that time (cf. chapter 3.3.4.: Rittberger/Werbik 1987: 16). Ultimately, they introduced into the academic discussions what policy makers had already been doing since the beginning of the 1970s with the new German Ostpolitik and the negotiations between the rival parties in the framework of the CSCE. That is to say, after removing the conditioning factor of anarchy and hostile self-other relations, the way from the common security ideal-type to the relational ideal-type is not very far. Today, the relevance of the relational ideal-type of security is still apparent: During the meeting of the so-called core group of the
Munich Security Conference in New Delhi in October 2014, one of the central topics was the establishment of a new rule of global governance (cf. Munich Security Governance 2014). In this context, new governance structures for the sea lanes in the Asia-Pacific region were demanded. The main proposition was to establish a joint management system for these sea lanes in the form of an ‘Asia-Pacific version’ of the Treaty of Coal and Steel. Thus, threats were constructed as emanating from dysfunctional or absent structures of global or regional governance and the responses were directed at the renewal of such structures.

The discussion of the concept of security in this thesis – inspired by the seminal article of Wolfers (1952) – along the lines of the dimensions of its locus and its logic, may also be of value to the discussions in the field of International Security Studies. Very often, different concepts of security are distinguished by adding different adjectives to the term, such as international security, economic security, environmental security, national security and so forth. On the basis of the four ideal-types of security, I argue that there can be different understandings of these concepts such as international relational security, international common security or environmental neorealist security etc. Similar efforts to distinguish concepts of security not only by adding adjectives but by interrogating the concept itself have been undertaken, for example, in the field of environmental security, where discussions about ‘risk’ have been incorporated into discussions about security (cf. Trombetta 2008; Lucke/Wellmann/Diez 2014). Integrating the concept of risk not necessarily as a parallel or competing concept to security, but in terms of a specification of the construction of threats, may facilitate integrating notions of risk management, prevention and resilience into the overall concept of security and thus add to the further refinement of the understanding of EU security policy.

Furthermore, the discussion of the concept of security beyond the basic assumption of anarchy and its consequences in terms of hostile self-other relations, opens the possibility of more systematically dealing with the proposition of Berenskoetter to conceptualize the Heideggerian ‘anxiety’ instead of ‘anarchy’ as the prime concern for states’ security policies (cf. Berenskoetter 2007; McSweeney 1999). This may also enrich the discussions about ‘contextualizing’ security and facilitate and structure the efforts to determine the “local ontological ways in which danger, risk and (in)security are defined” (Bubandt 2005: 276; cf. Ciuta 2009; Strizel 2011).
Having shown the possible benefit of my discussions for the wider field of Security Studies, it still remains to be specified how exactly my conceptualization of security differs from the Copenhagen School’s concept. There are basically two differences: A minor one and one with wider implications. First, referring to Wolfers, I assume that threats to security can be existential threats to survival, but do not have to be. As Wolfers put it: If security was always and only about threats to the survival of a state, then most of the states, most of the time would not have to be worried about their security. Thus, security is also about threats to ‘more enticing’ demands like status, wealth, influence and so on (cf. chapter 3.3.3.). Second, and more importantly, security for the Copenhagen School is always about extraordinary measures and the leaving of the space of ‘the political’. In contrast, I have conceptualized security as identification of threats and timely responses to these threats. The responses can comply with the threats, i.e. if there are no existential threats, there need not be extraordinary measures. The empirical analysis of this thesis has even shown that despite the identification of existential threats, the EU and its member states formulate ‘only’ ordinary – almost boringly ordinary – responses: The response of the UK to ‘the greatest threat of all’, namely climate change, consisted in developing low-carbon and energy efficient technologies (see chapter 6.2.1.3.3.); the German minister for economic affairs stated that confronted with the economic challenges from the US and Japan, fortunately no extraordinary measures like closing the borders and resort to protectionism had been taken (cf. chapter 6.2.3.2.3.); and the EU’s response to the urgent need to ensure its survival on the world markets consists in engaging China in a range of sectoral dialogues in order to support the Chinese transition process and to benefit from the potentials of this growing market (cf. chapter 5.1.2.). This should bring us to focus more critically on this aspect (namely the need for extraordinary measures to identify a security issue) of the Copenhagen School’s concept of security. One should recall that the response of the European countries to the global cataclysms of the two world wars was European integration which was and still is – all in all – a bureaucratic and sometimes extraordinarily boring and technical undertaking. That is to say, if the only extraordinary aspect of security policy is its bureaucratic tediousness, what has the Copenhagen School to say to this? Not a lot, I would argue, because of the remnants of the assumption of anarchy that still underlie the Copenhagen School’s concept. But how do such boring measures and security fit together? Here again, Berenskoetter’s notion of anxiety about uncertainty as such may help: If states are indeed concerned with
addressing their anxiety about uncertainty as such, then the seeking of ‘companionship’,
the building of relationships with each other – at times in the form of lengthy and boring
processes of negotiations and dialogue – start to make sense as security policies. This
way, the sphere of ‘the political’ is reclaimed by security and the differences between
securitizing, desecuritizing and politicizing tend to lose their normative undertones.
In this context, there have been discussions on whether or not securitization is
necessarily a negative concept (cf. Roe 2012). Rita Floyd even referred to the just war
theory and argued that if the referent object of security was morally legitimate, the
threat to it objectively existential and the response adequate to the threat, then
securitization could be morally just (cf. Floyd 2011). Drawing on the discussions of
security in this thesis, I would argue that securitization can be a normatively desirable
process, if it follows the logic of the relational ideal-type of security in terms of
addressing uncertainties by building trustful relations with other actors.

With its research focus and the answers it has given in terms of the assessment of a
liberal and relational security policy, this thesis complements and refines – from a
security perspective – the larger strand of literature dealing with EU foreign policy. A
large part of this literature is concerned with the very nature of the EU as an
international actor and the very nature of the kind of foreign policy that this actor
pursues – if it does pursue one at all. Thus, ‘making sense’ of the EU and its foreign
policy is a recurring theme in the contributions to this topic (cf. White 2001; Smith
2002; Carlsnaes 2004; White 2004; Jørgensen 2004; Sjursen 2004; Bretherton/Vogler
2006; see also chapter 3.1. of this thesis). Brian White states that the “central
ontological question posed here is what is meant by European foreign policy. Some
‘deconstruction’ of this term is necessary if we are to proceed further with analysis”
(White 2004: 12). Knud Erik Jørgensen consents, saying that the central question that he
addresses is “how the end of the Cold War and the developments within the EU since
then have changed the nature of foreign policy in Europe, both with respect to the
conduct of foreign policy by individual member states and by the EU itself” (Jørgensen
2004: 32). Therefore, analysing EU foreign policy with the focus “on the relationship
between national and EU foreign policies constitutes a genuine analytical challenge”
(ibid.). The approach to EU foreign policy analysis that has been developed in this
thesis specifically addresses this challenge of explaining EU foreign policy (or, more
specifically, the EU’s security policy) with regard to the interplay between the Union
and its member states. I have argued that by reconstructing the EU’s security discourse regarding China, we can explain the EU’s security policy – not every single decision but the general lines of the policy. I have further argued that by reconstructing the security discourses regarding China of the three EU member states UK, France and Germany and by assessing how they relate to each other and to the EU’s construction, we can explain the stability of the Union-level discourse. I am convinced that other poststructuralist or discourse-analytical research projects with an explanatory focus will benefit from the arguments of this thesis. The combination of Jackson’s ‘Analyticism’ and Kurki’s broadened notion of causality provides us with the possibility of conceptualizing causal explanation in a poststructuralist approach. Such a concept of ‘constitutive’ causality is more suited to a poststructuralist approach than Wendt’s version of constitutive explanation.

With respect to EU security policy as a subfield of EU foreign policy, there are no less analytical challenges. Helen Sjursen observes that “European integration also has affected the conditions under which security policy is made, as well as the meaning of security in Europe” (Sjursen 2004: 60; cf. Barnutz 2010). The concepts that have so far been developed like “comprehensive security, soft security, human security, securitization, desecuritization and so forth” have not been able to satisfactorily capture the nature of EU security policy (cf. Sjursen 2004: 60). She therefore proposes to base the analysis of EU security and defence policy on the theory of communicative action developed by Jürgen Habermas in order to capture what she calls “co-operative security”. This concept is about establishing international institutions based on a commitment to common rules and norms (ibid.: 66). Finally, Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan update the concept of foreign policy by introducing what they label “structural foreign policy” (2008: 25). With this concept, they refer to “a foreign policy which, conducted over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures” (ibid.). After the end of the Cold War, such a structural foreign policy “must try to reorder and restructure the international arena to diminish vulnerability and uncertainties. [...] The capacity to ‘structure’ the global environment and influence long-term developments becomes critical” (ibid.: 26; cf. Algieri 2010). Employing this updated concept of foreign policy “allowed us to consider dimensions of the EU’s foreign policy which have tended to be overlooked” (ibid.: 335). With the encompassing discussion of the concept of security in this thesis which integrates both the rather widespread and commonly used
understandings of security in the form of the neorealist and the common security ideal-type as well as the less widespread liberal and relational ideal-types of security, this thesis complements and refines this strand of literature from a security perspective. I have shown that a concern for establishing international institutions and common rules can indeed be conceptualized within the boundaries of security. The assessment of Keukeleire and MacNaughtan that the EU’s foreign policy as structural foreign policy is directed towards the structuring and restructuring of the international arena to counter uncertainties is mirrored by the results of this thesis which found that EU security policy regarding China can be understood as part of wider efforts to address the uncertainties of the international system in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, against the background of the discussion about ‘Normative Power Europe’, one might come to the conclusion that the EU’s liberal-relational security policy regarding China may be normatively more desirable than the US’ efforts to contain China. Can the results of this thesis, thus, be interpreted in support of the claims that the EU is a normative or maybe even an ethical power (cf. Manners 2002, 2008; Aggestam 2008)? I would argue that such interpretations should be made carefully and should not be overemphasized. Diez has rightly pointed to the dangers of using the concept Normative Power Europe without self-reflection (cf. Diez 2005). He argued that the label normative power can easily end up being barely more than a self-attribution. The example of the US shows that the self understanding as a normative power and the widespread use of military means in pursuing normative goals may not at all be perceived as a contradiction. Therefore, despite the fact that the assessed liberal-relational security policy regarding China fits into a wider tradition of EU security policy and the security policies of the EU member states respectively, one should not cease to examine this and other areas of EU foreign and security policy in a critical manner (cf. Diez 2012).

Nevertheless, I am convinced that the four ideal-types of security that were developed in this thesis can be of relevance to European and other policy makers, especially in conflict sensitive environments. The awareness that a strengthening of discursive constructions that point away from actor-specific, hostile constructions of security to either the relational dimension of the common and relational security ideal-type or to the liberal security ideal-type can be an important asset in reshaping conflictual
relationships. In fact, the above mentioned efforts undertaken by the core group of the Munich Security Conference in terms of transferring the basic European experiences with integration and pooling of sovereignty into conflict sensitive issue areas can be seen as a concrete attempt to reshape the security environment in the Asia-Pacific – away from an understanding of security corresponding to the neorealist ideal-type.

In a world which has been hit by a series of severe crises in the years 2014 and 2015 in the course of which constructions of security have again come in the form of well-known enemy images, there is more need than before to critically examine these constructions and formulate alternatives where it is possible. Searching for common ground between alleged adversaries has usually proved far more successful in achieving security than reifying enemy images. In this sense, this thesis wishes to contribute to efforts aiming at engaging in mutual exchange, mutual understanding and, in this way, creating mutual benefit and security – thus reaffirming the intentions of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz back in 1697.
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