TOUR de FORCE:
From State-Based to Non-State Internal Fighting

Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

vorgelegt von
Sophia Benz
aus Tübingen

Tübingen
2014
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 29.06.2015
Dekan: Professor Dr. rer.soc. Josef Schmid
1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Andreas Hasenclever
2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Sven Chojnacki
# Contents

1. **Introduction** 8

I. **Old Wars** 1

2. **Conventional Inter-State Wars: Modern, Total and Cold Warfare** 3

3. **Conventional Intra-State Wars: Greed and Grievance Conflicts** 13
   3.1. Explaining Grievance Rebellions: The Deprived Actor Model 13
   3.2. Explaining Greed Rebellions: The Rational Actor Model 22
   3.3. Summary of Major Empirical Changes 30

II. **The Concept of New Wars** 35

4. **The Political Context of New Warfare** 37

5. **The Dimensions of New Warfare** 51
   5.1. The Nature and Quantity of Actors in New Warfare 51
   5.2. Individual Motives and New War Economies 60
   5.3. The Strategy of New Warfare 64
   5.4. The Duration of New Warfare 68

6. **Interim Summary I: The Theoretical Concept of New Wars** 71

7. **Non-State vs. State-Based Internal Armed Conflicts** 75

8. **Non-State Internal Fighting vs. Terrorism** 83

9. **Critical Discussion of the Concept of New Wars** 87

III. **Refining the Concept of New Wars** 109

10. **Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Non-State Conflicts** 111
    10.1. Weinstein’s Structuralist Mechanism 113
    10.2. Kalyvas’ Mechanism of Contestation 132
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.3. Summary of Mechanisms</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Explaining Military Deaths in Non-State Conflicts</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1. Summary of Mechanisms</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Interim Summary II: Beyond the Concept of New Wars</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Data</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Data on Internal Fighting and Armed Actors</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.1. The “New List of Wars”/“Consolidated List of Wars”</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2. The “Non-State Conflict Dataset”</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Data on the Intensity of Internal Fighting</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Data on the Duration of Internal Fighting</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Data on Conflict Resources</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Data on the Political Context of Internal Fighting</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Interim Summary III: The Master-File</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. Hypotheses</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI. Analyses</strong></td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Methods of Analysis</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Descriptive Analysis</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1. The Incidence and Significance of Non-State Wars</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2. The Incidence and Significance of Non-State Conflicts</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3. The Incidence and Significance of Non-State Conflict Episodes</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Interim Summary IV: Main Results of the Descriptive Analysis</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.1. Comparison of the Quantity and Nature of Actors</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.2. Comparison of the Role of Conflict Resources</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.3. Comparison of the Scale and Nature of Violence</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.4. Comparison of the Duration of Fighting</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.5. Comparison of the Political Context of Fighting</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Interim Summary V: Main Results of the Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

5.1. Use of Child Soldiers .................................................. 54
5.2. The Context and Dimensions of New Warfare .......................... 70

10.1. Theoretical Possibilities of Rebel Organizations .................. 115
10.2. Mechanism 1 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conflict ...... 142
10.3. Mechanism 2 & 3 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conflict ... 143
10.4. Mechanism 4 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conflict ...... 145
10.5. Mechanism 5 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Conflict ...... 145

11.1. Mechanism 6 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conflict ...... 149
11.2. Mechanism 7 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conflict ...... 149
11.3. Mechanism 8 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conflict ...... 150
11.4. Mechanism 9 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conflict ...... 150
11.5. Mechanism 10 Explaining Military Deaths in Internal Conflict ..... 150

20.1. Share of Non-State Wars in All Annually Ongoing Wars .......... 250
20.2. Number of Annually Ongoing Wars and Affected Countries ....... 251
20.3. Numbers of Annually Ongoing Wars and Affected Countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in Central and South Asia .................. 253
20.5. Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Wars in all Annually Ongoing Wars ................................................................. 256
20.6. Regional Shares in the Number of All Annually Ongoing State-Based Wars ................................................................. 257
20.7. Number of New Outbreaks of Conflict ................................ 260
20.8. Share of Non-State Conflicts in All New Outbreaks of Conflict ... 261
20.9. Number of Annually Ongoing Conflicts and Affected Countries .. 262
20.10. Number of Annually Ongoing Conflicts by Region .................. 264
20.11. Number of Annually Ongoing Non-State Conflicts by Region .... 265
20.12. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conflicts .. 266
20.13. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conflicts and Affected Countries ......................... 267
20.14. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conflicts and Affected Countries ......................... 268
20.15. Number of Annually Ongoing State-Based Conflicts by Region ... 269
20.16. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conflicts .. 270
List of Figures

20.17. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conflicts and Affected Countries .......................... 271
20.18. Share of Non-State Conflicts in All Annually Ongoing Conflicts ............ 274
20.19. Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conflicts in All Annually Ongoing Conflicts .................................................. 275
20.20. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes (by Type) and Affected Countries, PRIO regional coding ... 277
20.21. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes (by Type) and Affected Countries, UCDP regional coding ... 278
20.22. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conflict Episodes . 279
20.23. Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conflict Episodes 280
20.24. Number of All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes and Affected Countries 281
20.25. Post-Cold War Numbers of All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes and Affected Countries .................................................. 282
20.26. Share of Non-State Conflict Episodes in All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes .................................................. 283
20.27. Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conflict Episodes in All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes .................................................. 284
20.28. Number of Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes by Region ................. 285

22.1. Outliers in the Number of Involved Actors ........................................ 292
22.2. Post-Cold War Avg. Regional Shares in All Battle-Deaths .................. 313
22.3. Avg. Annual Number of Battle-Deaths from Conflict by Region ............. 314
22.4. Deadliness of State-Based vs. Non-State Conflicts .......................... 315
22.5. Battle-Deaths from/per Conflict .................................................. 317
22.6. Battle-Deaths from/per Non-State Conflict by Region ........................ 318
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1.</td>
<td>State Weakness and Types of Warfare</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.</td>
<td>Ideal Types of Intra-State Warfare</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.</td>
<td>A Typology of Mass Political Violence</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.1.</td>
<td>Ranking of Countries by the Deadliness of Fighting</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.2.</td>
<td>Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.3.</td>
<td>Countries with the Greatest Discrepancy between State Legitimacy and Effectiveness</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.1.</td>
<td>Accepted and Rejected Hypotheses</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1.</td>
<td>List of Non-State Wars</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.</td>
<td>Overview of Hypotheses</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.1.</td>
<td>Overview of Fragility Measures</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.1.</td>
<td>Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.1.</td>
<td>Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.1.</td>
<td>Regression Results of the Baseline Models</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.2.</td>
<td>Regression Results of All Refined Models</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.3.</td>
<td>Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.4.</td>
<td>Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.5.</td>
<td>Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.1.</td>
<td>Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.2.</td>
<td>Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“[T]hose who live where states have failed must choose whether to be wealthy or secure; without being willing to fight, they cannot be both. The formation of militias midst diamond fields is thus emblematic of the way in which people must live when states fail.”


### 1. Introduction

For about two decades, peace and conflict research has been discussing the emergence of “New Wars.”¹ It has been argued that especially the end of the Cold War and increasing globalization resulted in significant changes in the incidence and nature of internal warfare. According to the advocates of the concept, New Wars emerge in weak states and differ from “old” inter-state wars as well as from conventional intra-state wars in the nature and number of involved actors, their motives and modes of financing warfare, the applied strategies and the duration of fighting. More specifically, advocates of the concept identify a privatization, demilitarization or internationalization of actors, an economization of motives, a brutalization of violent strategies and prolonging warfare (Kaldor 1999, pp. 6 sqq., 69 sqq.; Kaldor 2006a; Münkler 2006, p. 134). However, they admit that new and old wars in fact share certain characteristics. For example, Münkler (2006) emphasizes that a privatization and demilitarization of warfare as well as asymmetric fighting have already been observed in the past. What constitutes the fundamental novelty of New Wars is rather the *coincidence* of these three changes (Münkler 2006, pp. 134 sq., 142 sq.; Kaldor 2007, pp. 2 sq.). Accordingly, New Wars are not fundamentally “new” but characterized by a specific combination of values of already known parameters or dimensions of warfare. Therefore, reference to the occurrence of single aspects of New Warfare (e.g. the importance of non-state actors or massive violence against civilians) in *certain* old wars does not shatter the concept of New Wars. Instead, the above mentioned global theses on the changing nature of internal armed conflict require large-N empirical testing based on data with extensive temporal and geographical coverage.

¹For a summary of this discussion see Brzoska (2004).
Nevertheless, the recent discussion of the concept of New Wars generally remained a theoretical debate merely supported by case-study evidence or evidence from comparative case-study designs.\textsuperscript{2} Systematic tests of deduced hypotheses have not been conducted. On the other hand, many quantitative large-N studies tested at least some aspects of the concept, yet without explicitly referring to the concept of New Wars.\textsuperscript{3} Although Melander et al. (2006) and Melander et al. (2009) rely on the concept of New Wars for their theoretical arguments, their quantitative analyses remain limited to a single dimension of New Warfare (the quantity and quality of violence). Most importantly, however, even these authors who explicitly aim to test the concept of New Wars, resort to conflict data that do not include or only incompletely cover New Wars: Their analyses are based on conventional conflict data that do \textit{not} capture wars between non-state actors, taking place in a context of complete or partial state failure or within states that lack international recognition.

In order to close this gap, Sven Chojnacki and his colleagues from the Free University of Berlin engaged in a unique data experiment. They published a “New List of Wars” that in its latest (and for the time being last) version covers worldwide incidences of warfare between 1946 and 2009. For data collection, the authors relied on existing and well-accepted quantitative data sets. However, they added the missing category of “sub-state wars”, in the following also referred to as new, non-conventional or non-state internal wars. In contrast to conventional civil wars where the state constitutes one party to the conflict, non-conventional internal wars are mainly characterized by their non-state or sub-state nature. I rely on these and similar data (the “Non-State Conflict Dataset” compiled by the Conflict Data Program of the University of Uppsala in Sweden, UCDP) to uncover whether the incidence and the significance of non-conventional (non-state) internal fighting are indeed increasing, to investigate whether non-conventional (non-state) fighting tends to occur in more fragile states where certain conflict resources are produced more often, whether it lasts significantly longer than conventional (state-based) internal fighting and whether it is carried out by a significantly larger number of violent actors whose nature (e.g. their level of organization) also differs as well as the kind of violence they apply.

For the first time, this study links the theoretical discussion of the concept of New Wars with recently published large-N quantitative data sets that measure the incidence, the context and the nature of internal fighting. The empirical analysis reaches beyond a single or comparative case study design and does not systematically exclude non-conventional (non-state or sub-state) internal fighting. Intensive warfare and low intensity armed conflicts are equally covered. As demanded by Kahl and Teusch

\textsuperscript{2}See e.g. Heupel (2005); Heupel and Zangl (2004); Heupel and Zangl (2010); Schlichte (2002); Schlichte (2006a); Schlichte (2006b); Kalyvas (2001); Ellis (2003).

1. Introduction

(2004, pp. 384, 385, 400), Heupel and Zangl (2004, p. 349), and Zangl and Zürn (2003, pp. 182–187), this study contrasts non-conventional with conventional intra-state (instead of inter-state) wars and conflicts. This comparison not only captures every case of non-state and state-based internal fighting but all dimensions of the concept of New Wars which at the same time are general dimensions of internal fighting. If appropriate and if data are available, additional levels of analysis are taken into consideration. For most of its parts, the empirical analysis not only covers the conflict and the war level, but also the actor level, the conflict-episode level and the country level. This allows one to study the robustness of effects across levels of analysis. The results of the empirical analysis challenge the outcome of existing quantitative studies on the incidence and nature of contemporary internal warfare while the prospects and limits of systematic empirical tests of the concept of New Wars are also discussed. In addition, this study aims to theoretically refine the concept of New Wars by identifying mechanisms that link a privatization of violent actors, the availability of (certain) conflict resources and worsening levels of state weakness with changes in the nature, intensity and duration of fighting. This is especially demanding because so far the theoretical discussion of New Wars lacks a clear understanding of the meaning of the concept, its dimensions and, most importantly, an understanding of how these dimensions relate to each other. The focus on the nature of internal fighting also contributes to the State of the Art as variance in the intensity or duration comparatively rarely constitutes the dependent variable. In the past, conflict research focused on great power or inter-state wars instead of intra-state warfare while contemporary civil wars research oftentimes deals with the incidence (i.e. changes in the proportion of countries at war in every given year) or the causes instead of the nature of internal fighting.

This study is composed of six parts. The first theoretical part describes “old wars”, i.e. conventional inter-state as well as conventional intra-state wars. Because old inter-state wars are becoming a “relict of the past”, the focus soon shifts to the latter kind (so-called greed or grievance rebellions). This type of internal armed conflict had been dominating warfare at least since the end of World War II. However, within the post-Cold War era, advocates of the concept of New Wars believe they observe the emergence and increasing importance of a new type of internal warfare which is described within the second theoretical part of this study. Chapters 4 and 5 which clarify the context and dimensions of New Wars are followed by an interim summary of the original theoretical concept in chapter 6. Because New Wars are often confounded with other kinds of organized violence, chapter 7 summarizes the major similarities and differences between conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts (especially greed rebellions) on the one hand and non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts on the other. Likewise, chapter 8 briefly distinguishes non-conventional (non-state) internal armed fighting from terrorism. The second theoretical part of this study closes with a critical discussion of both the concept of New Wars and the State of the Art in chapter 9. So far, especially a clear understanding is missing of how the single dimensions of New Warfare interact with each other. The third theoretical part of this study therefore aims to provide a refinement of the concept by identifying respective mechanisms.
More specifically, I ask in how far differences between conventional and non-conventional internal armed conflicts in terms of the nature and number of violent actors, their motives and their political context can explain differences in the nature of applied violence (in the level of civilian abuse as discussed in chapter 10) as well as variance in the scale of violence (in the number of battle-related military deaths as discussed in chapter 11). The third theoretical part again concludes with an interim summary of the refined theoretical concept (chapter 12). The fourth part introduces and critically discusses data sets that are now available to measure the incidence, the context and the various dimensions of non-state and state-based internal fighting (chapters 13 to 17). The data used in the upcoming analyses (the final “Master-File”) are presented in chapter 18. The fifth part provides an overview of the hypotheses that are tested within the sixth analytical part. Chapter 19 contains some information on the methods of analysis before I present the results of the descriptive analysis (chapters 20 and 21), of the bivariate cross-sectional comparative analysis (chapters 22 and 23) and of the multiple regression analysis (chapter 24). Given the abundance of presented data and levels of analysis that are covered by the models, the final summary of the main empirical findings (chapter 25) focuses on the unambiguous outcomes. Overall, I find that non-state internal fighting indeed differs from state-based internal fighting – sometimes as proposed by the concept of New Wars. At times, however, the differences in the context and the nature of these sub-types of internal armed conflict are less pronounced or even contrary to the expectations of the concept.
Part I.

Old Wars
2. Conventional *Inter*-State Wars: Modern, Total and Cold Warfare

Mary Kaldor (2005, p. 2) uses the term “Old War” to refer to an “idealized version” of *inter*-state warfare that characterized Europe between the late 17th and the 20th century. She distinguishes the following types of old warfare: the early modern wars fought during the 17th and 18th century, the modern wars of the 19th century, the total wars of the early 20th century and the Cold War during the late 20th century (Kaldor 2007, p. 16). For about three hundred years prior to 1945 such wars between states had been the most frequent form of violent conflict (Mason 2009, p. 64). Others state that organized armed violence only began with the rise of nation-states and the underlying political problems within or between them (Tilly 1990, p. 67; Snow 1996; Kaldor 2005, p. 2; Kaldor 2004; Kaldor 2001).

Prior to the formation of states, the bearing of arms was a privilege of the nobility. In the feudal system and in the system of the city states, military service had been performed by vassals as a duty to the lord or by the armed citizenry as a duty to the city. In the late fourteenth century, the age of the condottieri, this system of personal duty was rationalized, systematized and replaced by the impersonal relationship of purchase and barter. Warfare became a business, a service performed for money by mercenaries. Because fighting wars paid well, this practice found parallels and persisted for instance in the Landsknecht system in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War, in the Swiss “Reisläufer”, who were greatly valued as mercenary soldiers throughout Europe from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century or in the use of soldiers of fortune to establish colonies by the East India Company during the eighteenth century (Münkler 2005, pp. 51 sq.).

Because mercenaries had little incentive to risk their lives for a temporary client, they developed a kind of warfare that mainly involved strategic maneuvering rather than open and decisive battles. They avoided mutual slaughter which would have put their lives at risk and undermined their interest in long term employment. Instead, these armies operated by cutting each other’s lines of supply so to force their opponent to capitulate. Ransoms which could be earned by capturing enemy officers and soldiers were also a highly desirable bonus. “If the ransom was paid, the enemy could be released and the war could start all over again” (Münkler 2003, p. 13). Although this leads to the expectation of rather low numbers of battle-related military death, the civilian population and the nobles who employed the mercenaries nevertheless suffered. First
of all, in financial terms because they constantly had to raise funds through taxes but seldom saw their objectives achieved. Secondly, because the civilian population was only spared from violence if regular pay was provided. Otherwise, the mercenaries switched to an “uncivilized form of warfare against the population involving pillage and plunder, setting fire to farmsteads and villages, killing the men and raping the women” (Münkler 2003, p. 14). Other “robber hordes” found it difficult to seize castles and walled cities and, instead of engaging in armed encounter with the enemy, devastated the countryside and burned villages and farms. Warfare during the Middle Ages and, in part, the early modern period, is therefore better described as “expeditions against the enemy’s estates and possessions” (Münkler 2005, p. 35). Mercenaries are also accused of having deliberately prolonged warfare in order to keep their pay. Oftentimes, they turned their mind to the next contract before the old one had expired. Finally, mercenary armies were usually disbanded after wars for the winter and therefore unreliable. Thus, monarchs started to replace them by standing armies (Münkler 2005, p. 53).

During the 17th and 18th century, warfare already involved partly professional armies financed through either borrowing or the starting regularization of taxation (Kaldor 1999, pp. 13–15). Early modern wars associated with the growing power of the absolutist state and are described as “state-building” or “dynastic conflicts” fought to consolidate borders. However, these wars were still carried out “prudently, in order to conserve professional forces. There was a tendency to avoid battle, defensive sieges were preferred to offensive assaults; campaigns were halted for the winter and strategic retreats were frequent” (Kaldor 2007, p. 25). This changed significantly with the further statization of warfare which was largely brought about by innovations in military technology and revolutions in tactics (Münkler 2005, p. 56). Especially the introduction of heavy artillery was decisive in shifting from defensive to offensive strategies, from wars of devastation to wars of conquest.¹ Soon, only armies that possessed a highly drilled infantry, a cavalry and a modern park of artillery could engage in successful military campaigns.² Success increasingly became a matter of combination of all three types of weaponry (Münkler 2005, p. 54). This and the development of ever larger standing armies made war an increasingly expensive business. “In the end, such wars could be fought only by states which, on the basis of tax revenue […] were able to deploy sufficient funds for a long period of time” (Münkler 2005, p. 54). In order to finance their standing armies, states further extended administration, taxation and borrowing. In addition, war offices were established to organize and improve the efficiency of expenditure (Kaldor 1999, p. 18).

¹“Although it is true that late-medieval warfare had already used the cannon, improved casting techniques now made it possible to increase the rate of fire and the size of the load, while new kinds of gun carriage made artillery more mobile and […] capable of being effectively deployed in siege warfare and on the battlefield. […] In this way, the offensive won back strategic weight from the defensive: victories in the grand style became possible, and […] the previously preferred war of devastation became less significant than war of conquest. […] To conduct a war of conquest, a commander […] needed reasonably disciplined troops” (Münkler 2005, p. 58).
²Münkler (2005, p. 60) notes that the development of a highly drilled line of infantry in Europe contributed to the reliable separation of combatants from non-combatants since “anyone who had not spent years in training to be a soldier was of no use in large-scale warfare”.

4
Standing armed forces under the control of the state became a decisive characteristic of the modern wars during the 19th century. The establishment of standing armies was an integral part of the monopolization of legitimate violence intrinsic to the modern nation-state (Kaldor 2007, p. 19). With the help of these armies and through warfare, states eliminated internal and external competitors and established their monopoly of organized violence within their territory. Nationalism, which Kaldor (2006a, p. 4) defines as “the idea that we are a community against another nation”, was built up in war. States not only became responsible for the protection of borders against other states but also for upholding the rule of law within the state (Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2004). This “job of the state [...] to defend territory against others [...] gave the state its legitimacy” (Kaldor 2005, p. 2). In other words: “states made wars and wars made states” (Tilly 1990, p. 67).

State interest became the legitimate justification for war. While earlier wars (e.g. fought by the Vikings, Cossacks or Mongols) are referred to as “autonomous activity devoid of any conscious connection to politics” or a “pre-Clausewitzian style of war”, the “Clausewitzian style of war” which emerged with the rise of the European states became “a continuation of politics by other means” that could not “be divorced from politics for a single moment any more” (Snow 1996). The notion of war as state activity was later codified in the law of war. In order to distinguish it from crime, war was defined as waged by sovereign states. Rules about what constitutes legitimate warfare also developed. The Declaration of Paris (1856) regulated maritime commerce in wartimes while the Geneva Convention (1864), the St. Petersburg Declaration (1868), the Hague Conferences (1899 and 1907) or the London Conference (1908) regulated the conduct of warfare. These treaties defined the concept of “military necessity”, they identified weapons and tactics that do not conform with this concept and they regulated the treatment of prisoners, of sick and wounded people and of non-combatants. Because it was “comprehensively institutionalized” through all these legal regulations, inter-state warfare was “the most developed form of symmetrical warfare” (Münkler 2005, p. 25). The convention also emerged that war was declared and concluded in accordance with rules. Old warfare therefore had a precise definition in time, beginning with the declaration of war and ending with the peace settlement. Finally, the law of war defined soldiers as the only personnel licensed to engage in armed violence on behalf of the state. Consequently, soldiers had to be carefully registered and controlled and uniforms were introduced to distinguish them from the civilian population. This is remarkable because between the fall of the Roman Empire and the late Middle Ages a variety of actors (e.g. the Church, city-states, barons or barbarian tribes) relied on individual warriors (like knights), citizen militias, privateers or highwaymen to fight their battles (Kaldor 2007, p. 18). With the rise of nation-states, the establishment of specialized, professional and standing state forces and with the development of the respective treaties “claims of just cause by non-state actors could no longer be pursued through violent means” (Kaldor 2007, p. 19). Private forms of protection and warfare were literally outlawed, “open markets in violence” were closed and “independent expressions of corporate military organization were eliminated” (Münkler 2005, pp. 41, 55). Of course, the ever rising costs of the
military apparatus during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (due to the rising size of armies, the need for constant training of the infantry over long periods and the need for exercises to harmonize the deployment of the three different arms) also made war too expensive and less attractive for the private sector. War and preparations for war were disconnected from the logic of capital amortization and transferred to the direct authority of the state. The warlords of early modern history gradually disappeared (Münkler 2003, p. 14). At least ever increasing costs of warfare prompted war entrepreneurs to shift their business: “[W]hoever wanted to turn a profit no longer raised mercenary troops but sold guns and other supplies to standing armies or else created factories to meet the ever-growing demand for weapons” (Münkler 2005, p. 61). By now, warfare had been gradually brought back under direct political and legal sway. As a result hostilities became shorter because both sides were now interested in a quick and decisive outcome. This development, however, was also associated with a dramatic intensification of violence on the battlefields. At least the civilian population was largely spared from violence and destruction because “[w]ar of this kind was a war of soldiers against soldiers” (Münkler 2003, p. 14).

Kaldor (2007, p. 21) and Münkler (2005, p. 41) both note that the process of monopolization of violence which eliminated private mercenaries and established professional forces subservient to the state was by no means fast, smooth or uninterrupted. Nor did it take place at the same time or in the same way in every European state. At its end, however, sharp distinctions between the legitimate bearer of arms, the non-combatant

\footnote{The development of a symmetrical warfare system and the emergence of territorial states were interrupted by the Thirty Years War that took place on the territory of the German Reich from 1618 to 1648. At that time a “backsliding into forms of warfare that had already been overcome” and that in many regard resembled New Warfare could be observed (Münkler 2005, p. 41). The Thirty Years War was characterized by the use of force “- at times principally – against the civilian population. It began with plunder and threats of pillage to extort the money required to pay and supply the troops, but there were more and more cases where often starving soldiers banded together in groups of irregulars to seize the few available resources. It is true that major battles became more frequent in the course of the war, but none of them brought a definite military outcome”. Strategies of economic exhaustion were increasingly pursued instead of military defeat, small skirmishes and expeditions, plundering and extortion, ambushes and massacres characterized warfare. Commanders increasingly lost control of their troops. Soldiers turned into “marauding ruffians who plundered and murdered their way across the land […]. [T]roops […], not having received any pay, […] gave free rein to greed and blood lust” (Münkler 2005, pp. 42 sq.). This led to the emergence of a war economy that was structurally similar to the New War Economies. “War itself became part of an economic life” and “autonomous of any political directives”. Prospect for private profit drew in “an estimated 1,500 small-scale and large-scale military entrepreneurs” who organized mercenary forces, “paid less heed to their client’s instructions than to interests of their own” and can be considered the “main actors” in this war (Münkler 2005, pp. 45, 49). Besides state loans, there were no national reserves derived from tax revenue which otherwise define the length and intensity of warfare. New reserves from abroad, the constant flow of gold and silver from the New World and the emergence of world economic ties since the discovery of America also contributed to the long duration of warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 45). Even if religious-ideological factors fanned the flames they were not the true or only cause of warfare. Instead, the Thirty Years War was mostly driven by greed and power ambitions (Münkler 2005, pp. 48 sq.). Finally, the Thirty Years War also took place in weak states – at a time when the process of statization was not yet complete (Münkler 2005, p. 49).}
or the criminal, between the permissible violence of acts of war and criminal violence, between the civil and the military, between public and private and between internal and external were established (Kaldor 2007, pp. 21 sq.; Kaldor 2001; Münkler 2005, pp. 38–41). Münkler (2005, p. 38) adds that the territorial demarcations of states made it possible to distinguish between war and peace since any unpermitted crossing of a border is a violation of the peace and may become a reason for war. Back then, warfare meant war between armed and uniformed state forces that fought for state interest according to certain rules. Success or progress in warfare was measured by the movement of armies, the success of military campaigns and the military control of territory. This is reflected in the two main theories of warfare that developed during the 19th and 20th century: Attrition and Manoeuvre Theory. According to the former, victory is achieved by wearing down the enemy by imposing a higher casualty or attrition rate. Victory is a matter of sheer size of relative resources (i.e. military strength, but also a larger population and bigger economy). According to the latter, Manoeuvre Theory, a military victory is achieved through preemptive surprise attacks, the movement and positioning of one’s own troops in locally superior numbers to break through enemy lines and finally demoralize the enemy into surrender (Collins 2009, pp. 18, 20). The success of strategies based on these two theories, which were initially described by Clausewitz in his book “On War”\footnote{This book was unfinished at Clausewitz’s death but later published, e.g. by N. Trübner in London in 1873 (translation by J.J.Graham). The text is online available at \url{http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm} (visited on 2014-02-21).}, depends on a superiority of either defensive or offensive forces and on the readiness to use this overwhelming military power. Both strategies tend towards a high concentration of forces in space and time (Kaldor 2007, pp. 24 sq.; Münkler 2005, p. 65).

Warfare was transformed from devastation of the enemy’s land to military resolution in a great battle. “[F]orces met on the battlefield to clear away all outstanding problems and issues at a single stroke and for a long time into the future” (Münkler 2005, p. 37). Thus, battle became the decisive encounter in old warfare, with an ever-increasing emphasis on scale and mobility, a growing importance of alliances and an increasing need for rational organization and scientific doctrine to manage large conglomerations of force (Kaldor 2006a, p. 3; Kaldor 2006b, p. 1; Kaldor 2005, p. 2; Kaldor 1999, p. 24; Kaldor 2007, p. 26).

The vision of warfare depicted by Attrition and Manoeuvre Theory was brought closer to reality by several advances in industrial technology that could be applied to the military field. “Particularly important was the development of the railway and the telegraph, which enabled much greater and faster mobilization of armies” (Kaldor 2007, p. 25). Out of this extension of the state activity into the industrial sphere the so-called military-industrial complex emerged – a key feature of the 20th century wars. It was then that “Old Wars reached their apex” (Kaldor 2005, p. 3). Especially the two World Wars at the beginning and in the middle of the 20th century mobilized enormous national energies both to fight and support fighting through the production of arms and necessities. Because in these total wars the public sphere tried to incorporate the
2. *Conventional Inter-State Wars*

whole of society, the distinction between public and private was eliminated.\(^5\) Total wars were national and ideological conflicts that were fought by coalitions of states or even empires. The military technologies of the early modern wars (firearms, defensive manoeuvres and sieges) had given way to massive firepower, the use of tanks and aircrafts. Mass production, mass politics, mass communications, mass armies and mass destruction characterized these wars. In World War I, economic targets were considered legitimate military targets. Even the indiscriminate bombing of civilians during World War II was justified by allied forces on the grounds of breaking enemy morale (Kaldor 2007, p. 27). Therefore, the distinction between the military and the civil, between the combatant and the non-combatant started to break down again.\(^6\) The, “application of science and technology to killing” and “the increased mobilization capacities of states” resulted in destruction on an unimaginable scale. “Some 35 million people were killed in World War I and 50 million people in World War II [...] Half of those killed were civilians” (Kaldor 2005, p. 3).

This trauma of the World Wars was not without its consequences. It “ushered in a new age in international law” (Münkler 2005, p. 70). The idea of war as an “illegitimate instrument of policy” (except in the case of self-defense) gained acceptance. This was codified in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and reinforced by the UN Charter and the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, in which German and Japanese leaders were prosecuted for “planning an aggressive war” (Kaldor 2007, p. 29). These normative developments might at least partly explain why since 1945 there have been very few inter-state wars. In addition, ever-increasing costs of warfare (e.g. for logistics and to equip troops with modern weapons) combined with ever-diminishing improvements in performance and a more and more vulnerable and problem-prone military apparatus (Münkler 2003, p. 8). “[P]roblems of mobilization, inflexibility and risks of attrition have been magnified in the Cold War and post-Cold War period” (Kaldor 2007, p. 30). This resulted in a diminishing utility of wars. The increasing vulnerability of the modern industrial and service society certainly contributed to this perception (Münkler 2006, p. 135). Especially the development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, meant “the logical endpoint of the technological trajectory of modern warfare” and rendered a major military operation almost prohibitive – except against a clearly inferior enemy. Consequently, alliances were rigidified and the distinction between what is internal and what

\(^{5}\)“The First World War mobilized all the resources of industry and recruited large numbers of civilians for the arms sector, which, if it had not functioned smoothly, would have brought the war machine at the front to a standstill. Workers producing arms became semi-combatants, so that there was no longer such a clear distinction between participants and non-participants in war” (Münkler 2005, p. 70).

\(^{6}\)“[T]he Wehrmacht’s war of plunder and annihilation, especially in the East, the partisan war in Russia and the Balkans, and finally the strategic bombing of German cities by the Western Allies effected the dividing line between combatants and non-combatants that had until then been largely respected. [...] Even after 1945 the dividing line could no longer be reliably established: the nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers [...] ultimately rested upon each side taking hostage of the other’s civilian population, with the help of strategic bombers and intercontinental missiles” (Münkler 2005, p. 70).
is external started to erode, too (Kaldor 1999, pp. 27 sq.; Kaldor 2007, p. 30). By now it had become apparent that states could not fight wars unilaterally anymore (Kaldor 2007, pp. 30 sq.).

To nevertheless justify the ever-continuing arms race and the threat of mass destruction, the Cold War was again presented as an ideological struggle between good against evil. The justification of war in terms of state interest which had anyways become hollow in light of the massive killing of people in total warfare “gave rise to a new concept of the political that extended beyond the state to blocs of nations” (Kaldor 2005, pp. 25, 3). Both blocs or parties to the conflict maintained large standing armies that were highly disciplined, hierarchically organized and technology intensive (Kaldor 2001). The revolution in electronics further improved the lethality and accuracy of munitions which strengthened the role of the scientific-military elite, of professional armies and of the military-industrial complex. Kaldor (2007, p. 32) therefore describes the Cold War as a phenomenon “that kept alive the idea of [old] war while avoiding its reality”, that sustained “a kind of war psychosis based on the theory of deterrence which is best encapsulated in the slogan ‘War is Peace’” in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four”. The Cold War logic of deterrence and superpower intervention rather restrained open warfare in the few remaining cases of inter-state conflict (India vs. Pakistan, Greece vs. Turkey or Israel vs. the Arab states). An exception was the Iran-Iraq war “which lasted for eight years and could be waged unilaterally because of the availability of oil revenues” (Kaldor 2007, p. 31).

In summary, old warfare evolved from the early modern wars during the 17th and 18th century, the modern wars during the 19th century and the total wars of the early 20th century to the “imagined” Cold War of the late 20th century. Throughout the centuries, changes can be observed in the reasons for warfare, the nature of the involved polities, the military forces, strategies and techniques and in the kinds of war economies. Initially, old wars were fought between absolute states, later between sovereign nation-states and finally among coalitions of states, empires or blocs. Only partly-professional armies were replaced by entirely professional, standing armed forces and finally mass armies. While initially these forces used firearms, defensive manoeuvres and sieges as their military technique, industrial and technical innovations brought about new instruments of warfare. Massive firepower, tanks and aircrafts were the weapons and technologies of choice in total warfare, followed by the application of electronic technology and the development of weapons of mass destruction, even nuclear weapons, during the Cold War era. Both, changes in the type of army involved and changes in the military technique, associate with the increasing importance of the scientific-military elite. The goals of old warfare evolved from reasons of state (the consolidation of borders) to increasingly national and ideological reasons during the Cold War era. Finally, in early modern warfare the war economies were characterized by a slowly starting regularization of taxation and borrowing. Administration and bureaucratization further expanded up to the evolution of a mobilization economy in total warfare and the emergence of a
2. Conventional Inter-State Wars

military-industrial complex during the Cold War era\(^7\). However despite these changes or expansions over time, all types of old warfare were “recognizably the same phenomenon: a construction of the centralized, ‘rationalized’, hierarchically ordered, territorialized modern state” (Kaldor 2007, p. 17). This admittedly stylized description of old wars points to their inter-state nature and the fact that they were fought according to certain rules by increasingly professional, large and uniformed armed forces for state interest. With only a few exceptions, old wars from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth century were of rather short duration (Münkler 2005, p. 11). This kind of warfare in which success meant the military control of territory and battle was the decisive encounter characterized Europe for centuries.

Throughout the last decades, the ratification of law on inter-state warfare as well as the experience of two very destructive World Wars contributed to a decreasing significance of this kind of warfare. Most importantly, however, during the Cold War era the superpowers avoided any direct, military confrontation due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. They kept alive only the idea of war while avoiding its reality. Because the post-World War II period was the longest time span without a war between the major European powers the American historian Gaddis (1987) even labeled this period “the long peace”. This term, however, masks the fact that the long peace was confined largely to the European continent and North America while “the member nations of Europe did their fighting elsewhere” (Mason 2009, p. 66). Both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in internal, anti-colonial revolts in Third World countries. They provided direct or indirect support to “friendly” governments faced with insurgent challenges or to insurgents challenging “hostile” regimes. These “proxy wars” between a state and a non-state group outside ones own territory (e.g. in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua or Angola) are referred to as “extra-systemic armed conflicts”, “colonial” or “imperial” wars (UCDP/PRIO 2007, p. 10). Because these ideological battles were fought in faraway countries “where the rights and wrongs of the situation were not self-evident”, the superpowers developed strategies largely based on air power that could be applied without risking the loss of their soldiers’ lives (Kaldor 1999, p. 26; Kaldor 2007, pp. 28 sq.). Nevertheless, countless soldiers and civilians were killed.\(^8\) Oftentimes, violent battle did not stop or even intensified after the end of the Cold War and the retreat of the superpowers. The same phenomenon was observed after the withdrawal of former colonial powers from countries like Angola. Intra-state wars which erupted in the wake of de-colonialisation and continued for decades were simply explained by reference to processes of “belated state-building” (Chojnacki 2004, p. 1). This terminology reflects the “continuing dominance of a classical Western view of war [which] may have caused Europeans until quite recently to overlook certain types of armed conflict occurring outside their own continent that did not fit their definition of wars, or to view these conflicts uniquely through the prism of the Cold War” (Ellis 2003, p. 31).

---

\(^7\)See Kaldor 2007, table 2.1 on p. 16.

\(^8\)Leitenberg (2003, pp. 8 sq.) estimates that within the 20th century “various colonial wars resulted in approximately 1.5 million deaths”. This number includes civilian deaths and deaths due to starvation, etc.
It can be safely concluded that despite the long peace “there were always rebellions, colonial wars or guerrilla wars, both in Europe and elsewhere, which were sometimes given the description of ‘irregular warfare’ or else not called wars at all” (Kaldor 2007, p. 17). Between 1945 and 1990 these wars and conflicts had resulted in approximately 40 million direct and indirect deaths in developing countries. In fact, conventional civil wars emerged as the dominant type of warfare during the post-World War II and Cold War era. These armed conflicts were not fought between but within states and, in this regard, resemble New Wars and Conflicts. The following section describes such conventional civil wars in more detail. Afterwards, this kind of intra-state armed conflict will be compared with New Wars and Conflicts which some believe to be the dominant type of warfare in the post-Cold War era.


10 Intra-state or internal armed conflicts are defined as armed battle “between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states”. In cases where intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides can be observed, the UCDP and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) speak of “internationalized internal armed conflicts” (UCDP/PRIO 2007, p. 10).
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars: Greed and Grievance Conflicts

Intra-state warfare is generally understood as violent fighting within an internationally recognized nation-state as opposed to warfare between two or more states. In the following, intra-state warfare will be divided into two sub-categories. The first sub-category comprises conventional internal armed conflicts as mentioned above. These have been referred to as either grievance rebellions (i.e. ethnic or ideological revolutionary or secessionist conflicts) or greed rebellions (also known as resources wars). Conventional civil wars and conflicts, whether greed or grievance-based, share an important feature: they are fought between government forces and one or several internal opposition groups. In order to explain such conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts two theoretical models of civil war and revolution are available: Deprived Actor Models and Rational Actor Models (Mason 2009). Both models emerged out of the question of what motivates rebels to engage in political violence and after the end of the Cold War replaced the dominant Western view of state-based warfare by an inner perspective. The second sub-category of intra-state warfare comprises non-conventional internal armed conflicts which I later narrowly define as entirely non-state or sub-state battle, e.g. between warlords. This kind of internal armed conflict is well described by the concept of New Wars which I will introduce in more detail below.

3.1. Explaining Grievance Rebellions: The Deprived Actor Model

According to Deprived Actor Models, different dimensions of deprivation and inequality (e.g. the experience of poverty, oppression or discrimination) motivate individuals to join a rebellion and therefore lead to the outbreak of violence. The greater the inequality and deprivation in terms of economic well-being and/or political rights suffered by citizens, the more likely the outbreak of a so-called grievance rebellion.

1 Others divide the existing schools of thought slightly differently. For instance, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) differentiate Deprived Actor Models (explaining the outbreak of grievance rebellions) from models that focus on the constraints to collective action (explaining the outbreak of greed rebellions) from models that stress the threat of social sanctions as a primary source of motivation for rebellion.
Snow (1996) argues that grievances which resulted in the outbreak of violent conflict especially prevailed within the post-colonial context of the developing world. In these countries, decolonization failed because there was hardly any attempt to create a positive sense of primary political loyalty to the state before independence. In originally multinational states, where boundaries had been drawn arbitrarily by colonial powers, public loyalty was more clearly identified with pre-colonial sources of nationality. After independence, ethnically, historically or tribally defined groups started competing for political power, often at the expense of other groups. “When independence was achieved, newly independent states were fairly often economically but not politically unified. In some cases it might have made sense to break colonial units into political entities that more accurately reflected previous realities or ethnic habitation, but such division conflicted with the economic infrastructure inherited from the colonial experience” (Snow 1996, p. 29). Beside this absent sense of national unity or inclusionary nationalism, Snow (1996) identifies a lack of national preparation for self-rule or self-governance and a shortage of competent and honest leaders. “Independence created a political landscape in newly sovereign states in which the rules were not clearly delineated nor the political actors schooled or experienced in manipulating the reins of power” (Snow 1996, p. 28). Although most of the newly independent countries adopted political forms that were democratic and usually based on some modification of the constitution of the former colonizer, the political elite and the population in most cases lacked the sophistication to master and operate a democratic system (Snow 1996, p. 28). According to the author, the most common problems were inadequate experience at governing, an underestimation of the depth of problems at hand and inadequate resources to deal with the problems that citizens expected to be solved (Snow 1996, p. 32). Thus, when disillusionment began, the tendency was even more to blame other national groups, retreat to one’s own group and engage in power struggles. Snow (1996) names this a “crisis of authority and legitimacy” and summarizes that “in situations in which there is a lack of legitimacy because of the absence of shared values, the basis of authority is necessarily the imposition of authority or coercion” (Snow 1996, p. 35). Because newly independent governments often desired a military force as a symbol of strength and modernity, in many cases military leaders were ready to seize power. Trained and schooled in the West, they considered themselves the most competent actors within the polity. However, the military was often dominated by one tribal, ethnic or national group and, when faced with severe political problems, military leaders often turned repressive.

Countries emerging from colonial domination were not only politically ill-prepared for self-rule but also almost universally poorer than they had been during the colonial experience. In addition to being underdeveloped, their economies were often skewed toward serving the purpose of the colonial ruler. “Their economies remained heavily dominated by subsistence agriculture, natural-resource extraction and possibly a bit of

---

2This led to the fact that “from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, in more than 30 percent of the observations, Africa’s heads of state came from the armed forces” (Bates 2008, p. 21). In this study, the overall sample comprises 46 African countries over a period of twenty years. One observation therefore refers to one country-year (Bates 2008, p. 33, fn 2).
cottage industry” (Snow 1996, p. 50). Thus, economic deprivation, the unequal distribution of resources and income, political malfeasance, illegitimacy, corruption, despotism, incompetence of the regime, its cronyism and the suppression of one or more groups by the government on an ethnic, religious or other basis were common features in newly independent countries.

Münkler (2005, p. 7) agrees that wars in the late 20th and early 21st century became endemic mainly in regions where a major empire held sway and then fell apart. Although newly independent states emerged, “the great majority […] proved to be weak and incapable of withstanding much pressure. These parts of the world have not seen the emergence of robust state forms similar to those in Europe. There can no longer be any doubt that many processes of state formation in the Third World, or in the periphery of the First and Second World, have been a failure”. Main reasons for this state failure were the lack of incorruptible political elites “who view the state apparatus as a source of tasks and duties rather than a vehicle for personal enrichment” and the “juxtaposition of desperate poverty and immeasurable riches” which he refers to as “potential wealth”.

According to Deprived Actor Models, the above described grievances not only provide the motivation for individuals to join a rebellion but also affect the recruitment costs. Rebel recruits are drawn from the poor because the opportunity costs of participating in violent uprisings are lower for the poor. Thus, the more unequal a society the more likely the rebels will succeed in mobilizing a viable rebel movement because the larger the pool of poor people from which they can recruit (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Within the sub-group of grievance rebellions ethnically motivated conflicts can be distinguished from ideological conflicts. In ideological civil wars rebels usually fight bad governance and extreme inequality in terms of the distribution of land, wealth, income or political power. Support for the revolutionist movement is mobilized around shared class identity and communities among often landless or land-poor segments of society.³ Contrary to this, support in ethnic conflicts is mobilized around shared ethnic identity though the goal (to overthrow the existing regime and replace it with a new one) remains the same. Because ethnicity and class coincide very often, rebel leaders can mobilize support by framing grievances not just as a matter of deprivation but of ethnic discrimination.⁴ Alternatively, grievance rebellions can be divided in revolutionary vs.

³Such peasant-based insurgencies that escalated to civil warfare happened for instance in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Peru, Cambodia, Nepal and the Philippines.

⁴This differentiation of ethnic from ideological conflicts mostly covers what Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b, pp. 8-10) or Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, p. 440) call the three variants of the basic grievance argument according to which violence against the state arises from alienation from mainstream political processes (which results in the inability to express personal dislocation and frustration through other, non-violent channels), from class differences or from ethnic and political grievances. Each variant of the argument might again be split up into different approaches. For instance, academic explanations of ethnic conflict fall into three schools of thought: a primordialist approach, an instrumentalist approach and a constructivist approach. According to the first, ethnicity is seen as a fixed characteristic of individuals and communities. Ethnic differences manifest themselves in
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

secessionist conflicts. In the former cases, the rebels’ goal is to overthrow the incumbent government and to establish themselves as the new government. In secessionist conflicts the rebels do not seek to replace the government but to secede from it and to create a new sovereign state out of a portion of the territory of the existing state. Although revolutionary conflicts may be ethnically or class based “almost all (if not all) of the secessionist conflicts of the last half century have been ethnically based” (Mason 2009, p. 69).

Because in conventional civil warfare the rebels start from the scratches while the government has at its disposal a comparatively large, hierarchically organized and already standing army, any rebel organization needs to pass a certain survival threshold to become viable. Afterwards, it moves through three stages of guerrilla warfare that are described as “sequential”, “evolutionary” (there are only gradual changes and no sharp breaks in strategy and action), “eclectic” (there are no rigid timetables but a general understanding when to move to the next stage) and “reversible” (Snow 1996, p. 70). During the first “organizational stage”, the guerrilla group is a fairly small, weak group that is discontented and decides that only violent overthrow of the government can accomplish the political goal. Basic imperatives are first of all physical survival and secondly the development of a political program to appeal to the public. The group needs to find a sheltered area and then starts a growth process by providing superior services and relations than those of the government in this area. The “political act of conversion” begins with the recruitment of guerrilla forces for the second stage, the “guerrilla warfare stage”. During this stage the insurgency becomes gradually stronger while the government turns weaker. Political acts are combined with military emphasis and a campaign of attrition to slowly shift the balance of power from the government toward the insurgents. During the final stage, the guerrilla forces aim to defeat the government forces and overthrow the government. Signs that the third stage is being approached are the progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government, the fact that

differences in traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and territorial location. This automatically leads to ethnic conflict. Ethnicity is therefore inherently conflictual. Certain groups are simply doomed to fight each other due to ethnic differences. Ethnic hatred is difficult or impossible to overcome except through ethnic separation. The second, instrumentalist approach, claims that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts. Instead, ethnic wars are the result of political decisions by individuals, groups or elites who rely on ethnicity as a tool to obtain some ends mostly to their own political advantage. This fits with Sambanis (2001) who studies the causes of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars and finds that the former are mainly due to political grievances. The third, constructivist approach, bridges these two schools of thought. It sees ethnicity neither as completely open nor as completely fixed. Instead, ethnicity is socially constructed. Like instrumentalists, constructivists see ethnicity not as inherently conflictual. Ethnic conflict is rather caused by certain pathological social systems which breed violent conflict (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, pp. 556 sq.). An example would be such an explanation of the Rwandan genocide which states that this incidence was possible because the ethnic distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi were codified by the Belgian colonial power, e.g. on the basis of cattle ownership, the issuing of ethnic identity cards or the reservation of administration and army jobs for Tutsi (Anderson 1991).

5E.g. the Sandinista rebellion in Nicaragua in 1979 or the Khmer Rouge rebels that overthrew the Cambodian government in 1975.
critical population segments are turning against the government, the fact that popular perception of regime illegitimacy is growing as well as the spreading belief that the insurgents are true national heroes. Other opposition groups start joining the insurgency and even regular army forces are recruited by the guerrillas. This results in a withdrawal of foreign support for the government by former allies and supporters and growing support for insurgents instead. Government forces start losing control over territory and the population. The government becomes isolated in a few major cities while increasingly bold guerrilla and terrorist acts are carried out against its officials and supporters. The government is incapable of preventing such attacks and the effort increasingly saps the economy. This might even result in infighting within the government over the question of sufficient or insufficient deployment of forces to engage in effective counterinsurgency.

Especially during the third stage the government must engage in heavy, large-unit counterattacks. Decimating the guerrilla forces, however, does not address the causes of insurgency but rather the effect of it. Even worse, military repression of insurgencies creates the mindset that the insurgency is a military rather than a political problem. If the government fails, the insurgency prevails. If it succeeds, the insurgency retreats to the second guerrilla warfare stage. Fighting insurgency back within this second stage only requires small-, but highly mobile unit activity. This, however, is unpopular among military leadership because the operational command reverts to a much lower point in office corps and there are relatively few large operations for the upper echelon to command (Snow 1996, pp. 70–73, 83). Due to this, governments tend to ignore or improperly approach an insurgency in its early stages. According to the author, governments are only effective in counterinsurgency if they free people from insurgent coercion, if they themselves apply good governance and if they meet rising population expectations with higher living standards. Empirically, governments have their highest probability of beating the rebels in the early stages of an insurgency. Their chances of winning drop steadily over time (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, p. 316).

The above illustrates that grievance rebellions grow from fairly small, weak and discontented groups into comparatively large movements – given they survive the initial stages. Grievance rebellions are also large in terms of the scope of warfare because the rebellion finally affects an entire region or the entire country. In addition, there is reason to assume a fairly high level of violence – especially if conflicts are fought over real or perceived deep ideological or social divisions that are turned into polarized politics by political entrepreneurs prior to the outbreak of violence. During warfare, the enemy is then easily demonized on the basis of these identity factors which legitimize the most extreme and atrocious measures on and off the battlefield. Furthermore, conflicts of principle – whether ideological or identity-based – are likely to escalate into “bloody warfare amongst fanatics” because all participants are ready to fight hard and even die for the

---

6This, however, does not mean that every rapidly growing or large movement also enjoys large popular support. People might decide to quickly join a violent organization in large numbers because they are coerced to do so or in order to save their lives (Kalyvas 2006, p. 93).
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

cause (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 64–66). In the case of ethnic or ideological conflicts, matters of dispute are indivisible. This turns warfare into a zero-sum game not only from the perspective of the rebels but also from the perspective of the government. The latter fights for its existence and has the means to let violence escalate. This results in high numbers of battle-related military deaths. In comparison, the number of battle-related civilian deaths, however, might remain low. A battle for the hearts and minds of people is crucial for both sides whose potential support resides in the same population. For this reason, they face the practical problem of how to attack the other side’s support base without attacking their own or alienating the uncommitted. The rebels are aware of the fact that indiscriminate violence against civilians will not lead to political conversion unless the other side acts even more atrociously. It might simply be more political harm than military good in a context where the rebels aim to replace the existing regime and therefore need to portray themselves as the “better” government. At least in theory, this should deter them from subjecting the civilian population to extreme brutality and indiscriminate violence. Instead, the insurgents appeal to the population mostly in a positive way in order to convince it that its interests would be better served under their rule. They apply a combination of political and military actions that ultimately will win the sympathy of the country’s population (Snow 1996, pp. 67–68). If the rebels are successful in their consistent approach to the center of gravity the rebellion sustains because preferences for violent resistance and support for the rebel movement are strong. If it occurs, harsh repression against civilians is mostly applied by government forces to undercut the civilian support base of the insurgency (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 148 sq.; Kalyvas 2004; Valentino et al. 2004). Provoking such violence by state forces might even be the intention of the rebels because “[w]hen state repression becomes indiscriminate in the selection of targets [so] that a person’s chances of becoming a victim are largely unrelated to whether or not he provides tangible supports to the rebels, then the person may turn to the rebels for protection. [. . .] Given this pattern, rebels often employ tactics designed to elicit harsh repression by the state, in the hope that such action will drive non[allies] to their side” (Mason 2009, p. 76).

Finally, during conventional grievance conflicts both parties are highly committed to achieve their overall goal as fast as possible. Because both sides at least “fight for an end” (i.e. a change in the status quo) the overall duration of warfare might be comparatively short.

In summary, the grievance model conceptualizes rebel organizations “as social [justice-seeking] movements that use violence” (Weinstein 2007, p. 34). The rebels are fighting a repressive state for the sake of a better life. They clearly focus on the political objective and aim to overthrow and replace the existing regime or to secede for the purpose of

\[\text{See Weinstein (2007, pp. 29 sq.) for reference to Mao Tse-tung’s and Che Guevara’s writings on this subject. Both wrote about the challenges of organizing guerrilla campaigns, about common principles and about necessary internal belief systems on how civilians should be treated (e.g. they stress the importance of discipline and moral conduct, of political engagement with the population and of rigid self-control).}\]
establishing a new, more abundant, equitable or egalitarian political, social and eco-

nomic order. While success or progress of old, inter-state warfare was measured by the movement of armies, the capture and control of territory and the success of bat-
tles, grievance-based insurgencies succeed if a progressive transfer of political loyalty from the government to the insurgents takes place (Snow 1996, pp. 74–75). Snow (1996) names this total political purpose of insurgent wars their first decisive characteristic. Another characteristic of grievance rebellions is that both parties – the government and the guerrilla forces – seek the same end, that is, physical control of the government. Both actors also seek an absolute goal that is rarely amenable to peaceful or negoti-
ated settlement. This renders compromise unlikely. Although both parties share the same goal, they differ in the military requirements necessary for its attainment. The guerrillas “[. . . ] must gradually shift the balance of power away from the government’s initial monopoly of force to its own”. This requires “a patient, long term program of gradual conversion and sapping of government strength” (Snow 1996, p. 66). The basic measure of success is continued survival which means the insurgency wins by not losing whereas the government can only win by successfully defeating the insurgents: it has to win to win. Snow (1996, p. 67) refers to this feature as “an asymmetry of objectives”. The fact that both sides appeal to the same population turns out to be another decisive characteristic of insurgent wars. The quest for the loyalty of the national population distinguishes true insurgent warfare from other forms of organized armed violence and backs its political nature (Snow 1996, p. 76). This “struggle over the same center of gravity” greatly affects the applied strategies. Indiscriminate violence against civilians is unlikely to be an effective long term or general practice during grievance rebellions (which sharply contrast with the supposedly high level of brutality and wantonness against civilians in New Wars). If it occurs, repression against civilians is more likely to be applied by state forces to undercut the civilian support base of the rebellion. As a result, the number of battle-related civilian deaths might be comparatively low. Still, warfare might be severe in terms of battle-related military victims – especially in cases of ethnic or ideological conflicts. High overall numbers of military deaths might also be due to the fact that grievance rebellions tend to expand and finally affect entire regions or countries. Lastly, both parties to the conflict at least “fight for an end” which might explain a comparatively short duration.

Although many studies argued in line with Deprived Actor Models, empirical findings on the relationship between the outbreak of violence and grievances (measured through land or income inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic hatred proxied by ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization) remain less than conclusive. Midlarsky (1988, p. 491) speaks of a “weak” and “barely significant” relationship between inequality and political violence – at least if conventional measures of inequality like the Gini index are used. In 1998, Mark Lichbach surveyed more than 40 early studies that tested whether greater inequality correlates with the incidence of political violence. He also concludes that there is a decided absence of findings that are robust across studies (Lichbach 1998, p. 464).
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

This outcome was later supported by the results of further empirical analyses. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) found that higher income inequality has a strong effect on the duration rather than the outbreak of civil wars. The most consistent finding is that economic underdevelopment (measured as low GDP per capita, high infant mortality rates or low life expectancy) significantly increases the risk of outbreak of violence. However, this result does not necessarily or exclusively support the grievance model. Fearon (2004) interpret their indicator (GDP per capita) as a proxy for state strength instead of deprivation and argue for the importance of strong state institutions in order to inhibit violent conflict. Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) interpret low levels of GDP per capita as a measure of low opportunity costs of participating in rebellion – a reasoning which fits their greed as well as their grievance model.

Mason (2009, pp. 72, 89) explains that inequality and poor economic development cannot serve as powerful predictors for the outbreak of civil wars because these factors change only little whereas levels of political violence can and do vary substantially over much shorter periods of time. “Even among poor nations, most nations in most years do not experience a civil war onset.[...] Therefore, the more important question is, among poor nations, what characteristics make them more or less prone to experience civil war?” In addition, Deprived Actor Models fail to explain where exactly and when civil wars break out. In some of the above mentioned cases, weak or non-existent effects might also be due to statistical issues. For instance, the impact of inequality on the outbreak of violence might be partly captured by other variables in the same specification (e.g. by economic growth rates in Collier (1999)) or national-level data used in the above listed large-N studies might be ill-suited to explore the relationship between inequality and conflict. Cramer (2001, p. 12) suggests that the significance of inequality might lie beyond merely its presence or its degree of intensity. In order to explore the consequences of inequality it might be necessary “[...] to ask what kind of inequality prevails, what form it takes, and within what mould of relations inequality is cast”.

Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) also seize the idea of grievances but further refine the theoretical argument. According to their relative deprivation theory especially a sudden sharp reversal in economic development that might even be more detrimental to some social groups than to others leads to a decline in achievement without a commensurate decline in expectations. The resulting gap between expectations and achievements produces a sense of relative deprivation. As in all grievance rebellions, the specific pathway is psychological: People experience a discrepancy between what they think they should have and what they can actually attain relative to others (Weinstein 2007, p. 34). If the resulting frustration is widespread, violent uprisings become likely. Thus, relative deprivation instead of absolute deprivation significantly increases the chances for violent conflict. “Davis and Gurr argue that the extremes of absolute deprivation corrode the

8See e.g. Collier (1999); Collier (2000); Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Collier and Hoeffler (2001); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2006).

social fabric that is necessary for collective violence to emerge. Where severe deprivation prevails, people are too preoccupied with the rigors of mere survival to engage in any collective endeavor. Instead, revolt is more likely to occur where people who have experienced some improvement in their standard of living but are confronted with a short-term crisis that severely reduces their level of wellbeing. Unlike their counterparts in the most deprived societies, they have both the motive and the means to revolt” (Mason 2009, p. 73).

This again links with Snow (1996, pp. 51 sq.), who believes in a combination of economic and political factors. The author explains the wave of internal wars which accompanied decolonization by the nature of the development process and by relative deprivation concerns. He argues that decolonization produced both the desire for economic development and the inability to meet the economic expectations of the newly free people which resulted in discontent. What triggered instability was not the mere existence of deprivation but rather the recognition of deprivation and the realization that it need not continue. As soon as the possibility of change through political action existed, political activity, including internal war to overthrow those creating the injustice, became a possibility. Thus, freedom of expression has become a vehicle for extremism as the coercive cloak has been lifted in a number of former colonies at the beginning of independence and in formerly communist countries at the end of the Cold War. Freedom from coercive control also brought older loyalties like ethnic or religious identity to the forefront which served as a basis of mobilization (Snow 1996, pp. 38 sq.). According to this argument, a violence-prone period is likely to occur when development has already begun. For a variety of economic reasons (e.g. corruption, slow and unequal economic development or lack of patience with the pace of change) people become discontented with their living conditions. These relative deprivation concerns combine with political factors (the already mentioned lack of political loyalty to the state, the lack of national unity, the incompetence of political leaders, exclusionary politics or military repression) that lead to further disillusionment and encourage the emergence of violent political leaders. As soon as the possibility of change through political action exists, the outbreak of civil war becomes very likely.

Although the relative deprivation argument seems convincing, Mason (2009, p. 73) criticizes the authors for not explaining why people facing such a sharp decline in their standard of living would not adjust their expectations downward. His main point of critique, however, refers to the fact that Relative Deprivation Theory as well as Deprived Actor Models do not address the collective action problem of grievance rebellions as described by Mancur Olson (1965). ¹⁰ Because grievance rebellions are a sort of collective action that, if successful, produces benefits that are public goods (non-excludable and non-rival) a “rebel’s dilemma” arises. The benefits of a successful revolution (a more just, egalitarian and abundant social, political and economic order) can be enjoyed by everyone – whether he or she participated in warfare or not. Thus, and regardless of

¹⁰See also Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b, pp. 11 sqq.) for this point of objection.
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

what anyone else does, a rational actor would always have a strong incentive to “free ride”, stay at home and let others do the fighting. The temptations to free ride are also especially strong because the benefits of rebel victory are uncertain due to the fact that rebellions often fail. The benefits of rebel victory are unknown, too, in the sense that there is no guarantee that victorious rebels will indeed establish a more just, abundant and peaceful order. In addition, temptations to free ride are especially strong because the benefits of rebel victory are only prospective. There is no pay-off that is instantly distributed among fighters which requires patience and a strong motivation to continue fighting. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) name this constraint of grievance rebellions a “time consistency problem”. Lastly, participation in grievance rebellions is comparatively costly. Engagement in violent conflict means less time for alternative income-earning opportunities within the repressive but still existing state and its legal economy. Participation in a grievance rebellion is also especially costly because it not only carries the possibility of being killed, captured or severely injured but also the risk of being sanctioned by the state – during the course of the rebellion as well as afterwards in the case of failure. In addition, the comparatively large size of the rebel organization means higher internal coordination costs and comparatively little influence for each individual participant over strategic or distributive decisions. Under such circumstances, the formation of a rebel movement as a form of collective action becomes very unlikely. The decisive yet unresolved question remains in how far and under what conditions this constraint can be overcome. The failure of Deprived Actor Models to address and solve this collective action problem motivated Rational Actor Models of civil war which shall now be described in more detail.11

3.2. Explaining Greed Rebellions: The Rational Actor Model

Rational Actor Models have been used to explain the emergence of so-called greed rebellions. These models argue that due to the aforementioned collective action problem, civil war will not occur, no matter how widespread and severe the deprivations suffered by society. Instead, “among poor nations, factors that influence the ability of inspiring rebels to solve the collective action problem should affect the probability of civil war onset” (Mason 2009, p. 89). Economic factors rather than grievances are decisive in order to explain the emergence of rebel organizations, the outbreak and the duration of violence.

In greed rebellions the collective action problem faced by grievance rebellions (due to the public good character of rebel victory) is overcome through the provision of selective incentives, defined as “private benefits that are available only to those who participate in the collective action” (Mason 2009, p. 75). In greed rebellions, benefits from participation

---

11The ideas expressed by Rational Actor Models are elsewhere attributed to “Utilitarian Individualism” (Schlichte 2006a, p. 116).
and from rebel victory are private instead of public goods. The goal of such rebellions is not the achievement of justice or anything alike but to overthrow and replace the existing regime or secede from it for the purpose of private gain (e.g. the exploitation of lootable resources). This led to the expectation that greed rebellions most likely occur where rebels have access to lootable and precious goods such as gemstones, timber or drugs. Such resources form the “taxable base” over which rebels and government troops are fighting. They provide a strong motivation for individuals to engage in fighting in the first place and opportunity to keep on fighting over an extended period of time. Capturing these commodities allows the rebels to pay, arm and equip their fighters during the later stages of rebellion as well as during the initial start-up phase when the rebels need to overcome the survival threshold.

While in grievance rebellions the exploitation of lootable resources is a means towards the achievement of the overall goal, in greed rebellions it is an aim in itself. Greed rebellions are not justice-seeking movements but loot-seeking. While in grievance rebellions the benefits from rebel victory are public, uncertain, unknown and prospective, profits from participating in and winning a greed rebellion are private, known, relatively certain and immediately distributed among fighters.

12 The abundance of these resources has been measured through the share of primary commodity exports in GDP. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue and find support for a non-linear relationship between the abundance of lootable resources and the risk of outbreak of violence. Increases in the share of primary commodity exports in GDP correlate with an increased risk of conflict up to a certain point. A medium share of primary commodity exports in GDP (around 32 percent) bears the greatest risk of an outbreak of violence. If the share of primary commodity exports in GDP increases further, the government has a strong incentive to defend these resources as it also uses them for taxation and therefore its own war effort. This again reduces the risk of outbreak of violence.
13 More precisely, the civil war literature discusses four or five causal mechanisms linking the production of natural resources to the onset of civil warfare: Firstly, the “motivation argument” that resource wealth encourages internal armed conflicts by increasing the value of the state as a target (which applies in cases where the rebels aim to capture the state) or by increasing the value of sovereignty in mineral-rich regions (which might motivate separatist movements). Secondly, the “opportunity argument” that resource wealth helps fund rebel organizations. Thirdly, the “political dutch disease argument” that resource wealth causes internal armed conflicts by weakening the state. Resource wealth is said to associate with weak state apparatuses because rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues (Ross 1999; Ross 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Dunning 2005). Although this argument was originally developed to explain the unexpectedly weak state apparatuses of relatively rich oil producing states, others argued that secondary diamonds and narcotics have similar devastating effects on the quality of state institutions (Snyder and R. 2005; Gates and Lektzian 2005; Lujala 2010). Finally, resource wealth might lead to the outbreak of internal armed conflict through trade shocks because the prize of minerals is unusually volatile making the production of minerals susceptible to trade shocks and those countries who depend on this source of revenue susceptible to civil war. In regard to the duration of internal armed conflict, it has been argued that “resources wealth could lengthen a conflict if it provides funding to the weaker side, helping it equalize the balance of forces” and “by providing combatants with opportunities to get rich that would be absent in peacetime. By making war profitable, it would reduce incentives to bargain for peace” (Ross 2006, pp. 280-282).
14 Because government troops are serious opponents and greed rebellions therefore also likely to fail, benefits from rebel victory are still uncertain. During warfare, however, private profit can already be skimmed off. These benefits are comparatively certain.
Contrary to grievance rebellions where the preferences for violent resistance are strong, where the rather large, vertically organized rebel movement enjoys strong popular support and where the rebellion spreads to entire regions or the entire country, greed rebellions simply happen because they are feasible and because the constraints upon rebellion are weak. Popular support for the rebel movement, which is composed of rather small, loosely organized quasi-criminal groups, is comparatively low.\footnote{Mason (2009, p. 77) observes that groups who rely on lootable goods “have a tendency to degenerate into organizations that are more criminal than revolutionary and, organizationally, they often resemble the rebel equivalent of a neo-patrimonial state”.} These groups fight for resources that can only be produced in limited geographic regions. Fighting is therefore often confined to remote rural areas where the coercive reach of the central state is weak (Mason 2009, p. 90). Only in these areas can the rebels hide, establish secure base camps, evade the state’s counterinsurgency operations and survive. Accordingly, certain geographic characteristics (e.g. a large share of mountainous terrain, forested land or shared borders) which reduce the risk of participation in warfare and therefore the recruitment costs for the rebels are expected to correlate with an increased risk of civil war onset and a longer duration of fighting – though empirical evidence remains mixed.\footnote{See e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Sambanis (2004).}

The comparatively small size of the rebel organization means that profits need to be distributed amongst few participants only. This increases the slice of the cake each member can expect to receive. Within smaller organizations, each participant also enjoys more influence over strategic or distributive decisions. Finally, the small size of the rebel organization associates with comparatively low coordination costs. In case of discrepancies among group members, the rebel organization splits further. As soon as rebel organizations start fighting each other, however, non-conventional (non-state or sub-state) warfare can be detected which shall later be described in more detail.

Although Rational Actor Models seem to overcome the collective action problem they are not without critique. To begin with, “the selective incentive solution assumes the existence of a rebel organization capable of raising and dispersing selective incentives but the genesis of that organization poses a prior collective action problem that cannot be explained by selective incentives alone”. The availability of lootable resources may account for how the nth rebel is induced to join the movement but it does not account for how the rebel organization came into being at a time when it did not have any revenue flows to provide selective incentives or to recruit enough fighters in order to capture the flow of the respective commodities (Mason 2009, p. 75). Approaches emphasizing the role of selective incentives when explaining participation in violent uprisings have also been criticized for their one-sided focus on positive incentives, so-called “pull factors”, at the expense of “push factors”.\footnote{For this point of critique see e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006b, pp. 12 sq.) or Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, pp. 437, 441 sq.).} This gives the impression that engagement in warfare is largely voluntary while coercion (or protection from rebel violence that is offered...
as a private benefit) is generally overlooked. At least in certain cases, the assumption that individuals have agency in making their choices about participation in warfare is “empirically suspect”. For instance, 88 percent of former RUF fighters interviewed by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, p. 438) reported being abducted. The selective incentive solution further implies that participation in conventional greed rebellions is largely a mercenary consideration. Participants can be counted on to support the rebellion “only so long as selective incentives are forthcoming and their value (discounted for the risks involved in earning them) exceeds the value of what can be earned in the legal economy” (Mason 2009, p. 91). Under such circumstances the rebel movement is likely to fail because fighters will desert at the first setback that degrades the ability of the rebel organization to pay them or if the risks of participation increase (Mason 2009, pp. 76 sq.). This suggests a rather low success rate of conventional greed rebellions. The rebels might be capable of sustaining warfare for years, but rarely if ever win. The availability of lootable resources therefore seems more relevant to explain the duration of civil wars rather than their onset (Mason 2009, p. 92; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

As a response to these weaknesses, the concept of “leadership goods” has been introduced. Leadership goods are private benefits like office or political power that will accrue to the rebel leaders in case they succeed in overthrowing the government. Such promises of future benefits might help to explain the emergence of the revolutionary organizations when monetary benefits are not yet available and the risk of participation is high. But Mason (2009, p. 76) rightly doubts that any rebel organization will have the capacity to provide enough selective incentives to offset the extreme individual risks associated with participation in conventional civil warfare. As in grievance rebellions, rebels in greed conflicts face a still functioning and militarily superior state army. Especially in cases where lootable resources are important for the national economy, the government has a strong incentive to defend these commodities to raise tax revenue for the provision of public (and in some cases private) goods, including national security. Thus, the government fights for the control of these resources but also for its existence as the rebels still aim to overthrow or secede from the existing regime. Therefore, high numbers of battle-related military deaths can be expected. Again, the rebels do not only face the risk of being captured, severely injured or even killed but also the risk of being sanctioned by the state – during or after the course of the rebellion. Like in grievance rebellions, opportunity costs are also non-negligible because engagement in greed rebellions means less time for alternative income-generating tasks within the still existing legal economy.

Finally, advocates of Social Movement Theory, of Resource Mobilization Theory and of state-centric models of insurgencies criticized Rational Actor Models for their exclusive focus on economic variables.\textsuperscript{18} In order to explain the outbreak of violent conflict they instead emphasize the importance of social networks and institutions, of political factors (changes in the political opportunity structure) and of state-structures and practices. Ac-

\textsuperscript{18}See Mason (2009, pp. 70, 78 sqq.) for an overview of these approaches.
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

cording to Social Movement Theory “[…] people do not choose between participation and free riding as isolated, atomized individuals. Their lives are embedded in already established networks of social interaction that exist in part for the purpose of solving collective action problems in everyday life” (Mason 2009, p. 70). These community networks and institutions provide a variety of social incentives for their (rational) members to contribute to the public good and to participate in warfare as a collective action even in the absence of selective, monetary incentives (Mason 2009, pp. 78 sq.). Furthermore, social institutions and networks can be used or misused as “mobilizing structures” by the leaders of rebel organizations (Mason 2009, p. 80). In order to persuade the members of local social networks to join their national movement, rebel leaders employ framing processes. They identify injustices and then try to convince people that the existing regime is either responsible for these injustices or has the means to solve them but is unwilling to do so. Thirdly, rebel leaders try to convince potential rebels that their troubles are shared by others beyond the boundaries of their own community and, fourthly, that only if each of them contributes to the collective action will the rebellion be successful. Within this framing process, leaders make use of traditional symbols “to attract nonelites to a new set of values and beliefs about the state that will make them more willing to participate in a movement that challenges the state’s sovereignty. In so doing, they redefine local groups’ collective identity in such a way that members feel a commitment to contribute to the national movement’s success” (Mason 2009, p. 80). A counter elite emerges that develops the organizational capacity to mobilize a large segment of the population, to establish itself as the de facto government in their everyday lives and to engage in violent battle against the existing regime. The state then no longer exercises a monopoly over the legitimate use of power within its territory but faces a situation of “multiple sovereignty”. Likewise, strong and preexisting social networks and shared collective identities serve as a valuable resource to monitor individual behavior and to socially sanction defectors. People might simply join a rebellion because they fear social sanctions if they don’t and only free-ride. In such cases, social pressure brought about by strong communities changes the cost-benefit calculations of joining a rebellion. This argument leads to the expectation that individuals are more likely to engage in violent uprisings against the state if members of their own community are already participating voluntarily in the movement and if their community is characterized by strong social structures, e.g. if their communities are relatively isolated with little mobility but a high degree of autonomy from outside control, if strong peasant associations and cooperatives exist, if community structures are decentralized and participatory, or if resources are held and regulated by the collective itself.19

Resource Mobilization Theory also provides an explanation for the outbreak of internal warfare that reaches beyond economic factors. According to this theory the timing of the outbreak of violent conflict depends on changes in the political opportunity structure. “Even if large segments of the population are aggrieved, and even if dissident leaders and organizations exist to mobilize them for collective action, people are not likely to

join such a movement unless they perceive some change to have occurred in the stability of the dominant coalition of elites and classes, and in the capacity and propensity of the state to repress dissent activity” (Mason 2009, p. 80). Systemic crises, especially a sudden weakening of institutional features (the state’s administrative organizations), of the repressive capacity of the state (the state’s military and policing organizations) or of informal political alignment render the existing regime weak and vulnerable. Changes in access to power, shifts in ruling alignments and the emergence of potential allies or of cleavages among elites also offer new political opportunities. Such changes lower the costs for collective action, they increase the rebellion’s chances of being successful and of escaping state repression or they point political entrepreneurs toward vulnerabilities among elites that can be exploited. The identification of such “trigger factors” adds value to Deprived Actor Models. According to Resource Mobilization Theory, poverty or inequality itself does not suffice to explain the outbreak of internal warfare. Instead, the capacity of leaders to successfully mobilize fighters in a situation of systemic crisis is decisive in order to figure out why poor nations are more or less prone to experience a grievance rebellion. Likewise, changes in the political opportunity structure and the ability to mobilize large segments of the population through framing processes also help to explain why (and when) local greed conflicts escalate into nation-wide civil warfare.

Due to a lack of cross-national measures of the key concepts contained in Resource Mobilization Theory, there is a lack of systematic tests. However, empirical research on ethnic conflict provides some support. These studies assume shared ethnic identity serves as a basis for mobilization because it facilitates recruitment as well as the detection and punishment of free-riders. Potential members and free-riders can be easily distinguished from others on the basis of ethnic markers. In addition, shared ethnic identity increases the level of cohesion within the rebel organization. Grievances can be framed in ethnic terms so that deprivation is equated with ethnic discrimination. Existing quantitative analyses cannot measure the extent of popular mobilization directly but instead include various measures for the extent to which a society is fragmented among multiple ethnic groups. The “Ethnolinguistic-Fractionalization Index” serves as a common measure. However, findings on the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the outbreak of armed conflict are again inconclusive. Elbadawi (1999) and Reynal-Querol (2002) find that ethnically polarized societies face the greatest risk of outbreak of civil war while Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoefler (1998), Collier and Hoefler (2001), and Collier and Hoefler (2004) emphasize that ethnic dominance (e.g. defined as a situation where the largest ethnic group constitutes between 45 to 90 percent of the population) significantly increases the risk of civil war onset. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) also dismiss any linear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the probability of civil war onset and instead argue in favor of an “inverted-u-shaped” relationship. According to these authors, civil war is least likely in ethnically homogeneous and very heterogeneous societies while the danger of civil war is greatest in societies with a middle level of ethnomlinguistic fractionalization. Although the existence of different ethnic

20McAdam (1986, pp. 24, 32); Weinstein (2007, p. 46); Ellis (2003, p. 34) provide a similar argument.
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

groups is necessary for dispute to arise, too much fractionalization increases the costs of coordination for the purpose of rebellion between groups as well as recruitment costs. Finally, Ellingsen (2000) used the relative size of ethnic groups as a measure. She found that societies divided among relatively few but relatively large ethnic groups face a significantly higher risk of civil war (as compared with societies that are composed of a relatively large number of relatively small ethnic groups or societies that are ethnically homogeneous).

Which ethnic composition (whether ethnic fractionalization, polarization or dominance) poses the greatest risk in terms of the outbreak of armed conflict is still being discussed. Uncovering the relationship is especially difficult as levels of ethnic or religious fractionalization, polarization and dominance are endogenous to warfare. Armed conflict itself changes or even generates new ethnic or religious identities and cleavages. Bosnia and Croatia serve as examples where the relationship between prewar polarization and civil war either seems to be inverse or where polarization only increased shortly before or after the war erupted (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 74–82). Others warned that “the extent to which ethnic groups are mobilized for collective action is a stronger predictor of civil war than is the extent and depth of the grievances that motivated them” (Mason 2009, p. 94). In other words: Regardless of the level of grievances among ethnic minorities, if mobilization fails, armed conflict does not occur. Among those characteristics that affect the ability of ethnic groups to mobilize, a shared ethnic identity but also the geographical concentration of the ethnic groups as well as institutional features need to be taken into account.  

State-centric theories of revolution also emerged as a reaction to Rational Actor Models as well as Deprived Actor Models that almost exclusively focus on conditions within society that fuel civil war. Theda Skocpol criticized that the state – the prize over which traditional civil wars are fought – was conspicuously absent from earlier conceptual frameworks although the state has interests of its own and oftentimes generates the crisis that leads to the outbreak of violence. According to her, what catalyzes social revolutions are not conditions or developments in society but a politico-military crisis of the state and class domination generated in part by the actions of the state itself. This “echoes the concept of changes in the political opportunity structure that social movement theorists posit as a determinant of when revolutions erupt. However, Skocpol goes beyond this concept to explore how the structure of the state itself and developmental changes in both the patterns of state-society relations and the states’ relationship with its international environment produce the crisis that ignite revolutionary outbreaks” (Mason 2009, p. 81). More specifically, long term trends within nations and in the international arena can generate conflicts of interest between the state and the dominant economic class. “Whether these conflicts produce a crisis of the state that makes revolution possible or not likely is a function, in part, of the degree of the state

autonomy from that dominant economic class. For Skocpol and for Glodstein (1991),
states that lacked sufficient autonomy from the dominant economic class were more
likely to experience revolution” (Mason 2009, p. 82). Other studies identify exclusionary
authoritarian regimes (neopatrimonial and sultanistic varieties), patrimonial praetorian
regimes or mafiacracies as most vulnerable to revolutionary challenges. Specific state
practices that make certain types of regimes susceptible to violent uprising are also
given. Among these are the state sponsorship or the protection of unpopular economic
and social arrangements (such as inequitable land tenure arrangements or oppressive
labor conditions), the exclusion of newly mobilized groups from access to state power
or state resources, intolerance and repression of grassroots mobilization, indiscriminate
but not overwhelming state violence against opposition leaders, weak or geographically
uneven policing practices and infrastructural power, corrupt or arbitrary rule and the
de-professionalization of the military (Mason 2009, pp. 85–87).

Empirical studies investigating the claim that certain regime types are more prone
to civil wars than others are plagued by the absence of direct measures of types of au-
thoritarian regimes (Mason 2009, p. 95). Instead, they rely on proxy measures of regime
type. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003, pp. 75 sq.) argue that “financially, organi-
zationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and
attractive” due to weak local policing, inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices and
a lack of infrastructure development that would otherwise allow the state to extent its
authority throughout the entire territory to inhibit the emergence of insurgencies. They
measure state capacity only indirectly through GDP per capita and find support for their
hypothesis. The “domestic democratic peace” proposition which expects democracies to
be relatively immune to civil warfare is related to the claim that weak authoritarian
regimes are more at risk. Although several studies have tested this claim, results are
inconclusive. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do not find a sig-
nificant relationship while Krain and Myers (1997) and Henderson and D. Singer (2000)
find democracies to be less likely to experience civil war. Hegre, Ellingsen, et al. (2001)
argue and find support for an inverted-u-shape relationship. According to them, full
democracies and autocracies are rather stable and less likely to experience civil war than
autocracies. In addition, they find that changes in the level of democracy are impor-
tant in regard to the onset of civil war: unconsolidated democracies, semi-democracies
or weak autocracies are indeed fragile and unstable and therefore less likely to survive
either positive or negative changes in their democracy scores (as compared with full
democracies or full autocracies). Thus, the probability of civil war onset declines with
each year that democracy persists and consolidates.
3. Conventional Intra-State Wars

3.3. Summary of Major Empirical Changes

Over three or more centuries prior to 1945, Europeans developed a theory and practice of war in which massive violence is inflicted by large and organized state forces upon other nations. Inter-state warfare reached its peak with the World Wars, was globally exported and formed the basis of international rule-making on war. Since the end of World War II, however, especially great power wars but also international wars in general have increasingly turned into a “relict of the past” (Berdal 2003, p. 483). Intra-state wars have replaced inter-state wars as the most frequent form of armed conflict. Chojnacki is more cautious when noting that wars within states have dominated the picture of violent conflict already since the early 19th century – at least in terms of numbers and with the exception of the 1930 to 1939 period (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 49; Chojnacki 2004, p. 3).

Though he agrees that during the second half of the 20th century the ratio of inter-state to intra-state wars acuminated due to a decline in great power wars and inter-state wars in relation to conventional civil wars. Thus, we are safe to conclude that the frequency of intra-state wars (which has always been above that of inter-state wars) has increased dramatically since World War II, even after controlling for the size of the international system (Hensel 2002, p. 7).

Today, civil warfare within nation-states is not only the most frequent but also the most destructive form of armed conflict. In the 1990s, over 90 percent of deaths caused by warfare occurred during intra-state wars (Weinstein 2007, p. 5). Between 1945 and 1999, warfare between states resulted in 3.33 million battle-deaths while civil warfare within states killed about 16.2 million people (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 75). The Yearbook 2011 of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) informs that for the seventh year running, no major inter-state conflict was active in 2010. Over the decade of 2001 to 2010, only 2 out of 29 major armed conflicts were inter-state in nature (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). If low-intensity armed conflicts are taken into account, the number of conflicts within countries also by far exceeds the number of conflicts between states: The 2014 UCDP/PRIO data report just three inter-state armed conflicts within the last ten years but 274 intra-state armed conflicts.

This, however, does not mean that militarized inter-state disputes (understood as threats to use force, the display of force or even the use of force short of war) disappeared. In fact, the absolute number of such disputes between states increased after the end of World War II. However, only about 4 percent of all militarized inter-state disputes between 1816 and 1997 escalated to the point of inter-state warfare (Hensel 2002, p. 6). Others note that at least between 1816 and 1976, the share of countries affected by militarized inter-state disputes stayed rather constant because the overall number of independent states had also changed respectively. See Jones et al. (1996, p. 184) and Gochman and Maoz (1984, p. 594) cited by Chojnacki (2006b, p. 52).

Because the number of internationally recognized nation-states changed over time and because ceteris paribus we would expect more conflict when there are more states that are eligible to fight each other, the ratio (instead of the total number) of countries involved in warfare serves as the better indicator.


Thailand vs. Cambodia (2011), Eritrea vs. Djibouti (2008), and Sudan vs. South Sudan (2012).
Most of the intra-state armed conflicts take place in Third World nations (Hensel 2002, pp. 11, 28). Gantzel (2002, p. 2) refers to data gathered by the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung” (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg which indicate that between 1945 and 2001, 93 percent of all 218 wars happened within developing countries. In contrast, the 19th century inter- and intra-state wars concentrated in the Western Hemisphere and Europe where the system of nation-states emerged. For a small subset of today’s countries, civil warfare even seems to be “a chronic condition” (Mason 2009, p. 66). Empirical evidence suggests that prior civil war experience increases the chances of further civil war involvement. The 124 civil wars counted by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) took place in 69 countries and the 127 civil wars counted by Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 75) involved 73 states. The latter note that between 1945 and 1999, single countries had been involved in up to five civil wars.

Changes in the incidence (defined as the number of ongoing armed conflicts in any given year) are also observable. The incidence of internal armed conflict increased throughout the Cold War era and peaked in the mid 1990s. It then dropped considerably and has remained stable thereafter. The initial increase in the incidence of armed conflict results from a “steady accumulation of ongoing conflicts” due to difficulties in their termination. In other words, this development does not reflect any change over time in the frequency or risk of onsets. The fraction of countries experiencing new conflicts each year has been stable at between 1-2 percent during the entire period of 1945 to 1994. Instead, the rate at which wars ended was significantly lower compared to the rate at which new wars began (Hegre 2004, pp. 243 sq.; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Variance in the duration of warfare therefore is a decisive factor behind changes in the incidence of civil warfare. Likewise, the decrease in the number of ongoing civil wars within the second half of the 1990s is “more a function of existing wars being brought to an end [i.e. a shortening of their duration] than of any significant decline in the rate at which new wars begin” (Mason 2009, p. 66).

In this regard, the more proactive role of the international community, which through the United Nations and other international bodies intervened in intra-state warfare to separate warring parties and to broker peace agreements, seems decisive. It has been argued that the kind of intervention matters (e.g. whether peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement takes place or whether peacekeeping is multidimensional or traditional in nature). Empirical analyses on the question in how far such interventions affect the duration of warfare or the stability of peace, however, yielded somewhat contradictory results (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). The timing of intervention and the side on which the external forces are intervening also seems to be important for a successful settlement (Collier and Hoefler 2004). In addition, different kinds of termination of internal warfare (a decisive victory of either side, a negotiated compromise settlement, a truce or a peace treaty) correlate with more or less stable peace (Fortna 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that the longer the war lasts, the less likely a decisive victory of either side. The result is a situation of a military stalemate (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, et al. 1999). According to the Ripeness Theory, this stalemate needs
to be “mutually hurting” in order for the warring parties to start negotiations. This structural element of a “ripe situation” is at least identified as a necessary (though insufficient) condition for negotiation (Zartman 1995; Zartman 2001). In any case, a fast and decisive victory of either side seems to be desirable\(^\text{26}\) as negotiated settlements have a major downside: compared to wars that ended by decisive victory, cases which ended through negotiation are of a three times longer duration and violence is twice as likely to break out again within a period of five years after the settlement. From this perspective it seems concerning that, contrary to the Cold War era, a growing number of recent wars ended through negotiation (HSC 2006, p. 4; Fortna 2004). However, even in the case of compromise settlements that suffer from commitment problems, a renewed outbreak of violence can be avoided if a third party is willing to guarantee the safety of the adversaries during the critical implementation phase (Walter 1997; Walter 2002; Fearon 2004). Such guarantees can also be built into the institutional design of the treaty itself e.g. in the form of power-sharing mechanisms (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Licklider 2001; DeRouen, Lea, et al. 2009). Others found that the length of internal warfare associates with structural conditions prevailing prior to conflict (e.g. the degree of income inequality, per capita income levels, the degree of ethnic division or population density) as well as circumstances during conflict like access to large revenues from natural resources (Fearon 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Lujala 2010; Elwert 1997; Olsson and Congdon Fors 2004). Furthermore, a lack of state capacity (i.e. an ineffective bureaucracy or a weak national army) and the respective regime type in interaction with “viability enhancing factors” (e.g. geographical factors like mountain cover that allows rebels to retreat and hide) also seem to contribute to a long duration of fighting (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Herbst 2004). Final agreement on the decisive factors determining the duration of warfare and stable peace is still pending. In the meantime (throughout the last two decades), the average duration of intra-state wars has more than doubled (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This kind of warfare lasts at least four times as long as inter-state wars.\(^\text{27}\)

The comparatively long duration of civil wars explains their overall destructiveness. “On average, casualties in civil wars occur at a much lower rate than in inter-state wars. However, because civil wars last so much longer, their cumulative death toll substantively exceeds that of inter-state wars” (Mason 2009, p. 67).

In addition to significant changes in the incidence and in the duration of conventional intra-state wars, some argue for another major shift in the pattern of armed conflict:

\(^{26}\)For rather radical theses see Luttwak (1999).

\(^{27}\)“The 108 civil wars in the Correlates of War project lasted on average 1665 days, whereas the 23 inter-state wars lasted only 480 days on average” (Mason 2009, p. 67). The 25 inter-state wars identified by Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 75) lasted three months on average while the average duration of a civil war within the same period (1945 to 1999) was as high as six years.
Advocates of the concept of New Wars believe to observe the emergence of a new or non-conventional type of intra-state armed conflict especially within the post-Cold War era. Like Deprived Actor Models and Rational Actor Models, this third model takes the nature and interests of actors and the costs and benefits of participation in warfare as a starting point to explain the causes and nature of internal warfare. The concept of New Wars also builds on the assumption of rationality. All three models assume that actors make choices that they believe will lead “to the best feasible outcomes for them as defined by their personal values and preferences” (De Mesquita 2009, pp. 5 sq.) and that during warfare, decision makers act strategically. “They connect alternatives consistently (i.e. transitivity) in relation of preference or indifference”, take constraints and the anticipated actions of others into account and “act in a manner that is consistent with their desires and beliefs”. The assumption of rationality, however, does not mean that decision makers have complete freedom of action or are in full control. Instead “they must consider whatever constraints block the path to the outcome they desire and adjust their behavior accordingly, often abandoning their most preferred goal in favor of an attainable second or third best”. Also, “rational decision makers do not exhaustively consider all possible alternatives if the cost of doing so exceeds the marginal gain” (De Mesquita 2009, p. 6). Although “critics mistakenly believe that the assumption of rationality means that self-interested actors must want to maximize their income or wealth”, the rationality condition says nothing about the content of the ultimate goal(s) pursued by the actors whose preferences might vary from theory to theory. (De Mesquita 2009, p. 7) emphasizes that “the assumption of rationality neither limits the goals to be studied nor the identity of actors pursuing these goals. It only limits how actors chose actions given their desires and beliefs”. Despite the fact that Rational Choice Theory provides the basis for all three models of intra-state warfare presented here, the concept of New Wars also touches upon Social Mobilization Theory when referring to the role of so-called “identity politics”. According to the concept of New Wars, the absence of functioning state institutions in times of state collapse contributes to the outbreak and conduct of violence. This recalls the notion of systemic (politico-military) crisis and changing political opportunity structures which also determine the timing of the outbreak of violence according to Resource Mobilization Theory and state-centric models of civil war. New Wars share some characteristics with grievance and with greed rebellions, too, though they significantly differ in regard to other features. The following second part of this book introduces this new, non-conventional kind of intra-state armed conflict before summarizing major similarities and differences between them on the one hand and conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts on the other.

Münkler (2005, p. 91) criticizes that the New Wars discourse gave so much attention to ethnic or religious-cultural factors that economic aspects and motives were overlooked. New Wars were wrongly identified as irrational warfare driven by “behavior from passions” (like ancient ethnic hatred) instead of interests. “So long as the economic structures underlying these wars have not been addressed, one can persist in the comfortable belief that rationalization and pacification would go hand in hand [...]”. On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the new wars are in many respects the result of economically purposive rationality, or that people pursuing economic objectives play a major role in them as entrepreneurs, politicians and, not least, fighting men.”
Part II.

The Concept of New Wars
4. The Political Context of New Warfare

The above argued that the process of decolonization overlaid by the Cold War produced armed conflicts within Third World countries which arose in the absence of consensual values or a sense of national unity, i.e. in weak societies but in situations where the coercive power of the state was considerable, i.e. in strong states. Such insurgencies aimed to replace or secede from the existing repressive regimes in order to establish a more just and abundant political, social and economic order.

In 2008, Robert Bates presented a popular and convincing theory on the emergence of these repressive regimes and their failure in late-century Africa. According to this author, the political and economic legacies of state failure in Africa reach back to the restructuring of political institutions after independence which “triggered a logic of exclusion, resulted in political privilege and economic inequality” (Bates 2008, p. 51). Bates explains how the political elites in many African countries managed to “capture the state” and to use their power to accumulate wealth (Bates 2008, p. 37). They formed “single-party” or “no-party” authoritarian regimes in which the heads of state controlled the means of coercion as well as access to material benefits (Bates 2008, pp. 43 sq.). The president supplied a small ruling coalition with political favors while the rest of the “national pie” went to his own bank account (Bates 2008, p. 47). This gave way to a political culture where “constituents viewed politicians as their agents whose job it was to bring material benefit to the local community – jobs, loans, or cash. […] Competitive elections came to resemble a political marketplace in which votes were exchanged for material benefit” (Bates 2008, p. 38). Any incentive to provide public goods for the broad public did not exist. A number of wrong policy choices (e.g. the decision to distort key prices and to regulate markets and industries) aimed to establish “control regimes” to the benefit of the ruling elite and “contributed to the subsequent collapse of Africa’s states” (Bates 2008, p. 56). In reaction to the forging of authoritarian political

---

1 A weak society refers to the progressive absence of “a broad general consensus on the underlying values of the society” (Snow 1996, p. 35).
2 Snow (1996) refers to a strong state as “a situation in which the state’s coercive capabilities and mechanisms are particularly robust, whereas a weak state has a less developed coercive component” (Snow 1996, p. 35).
3 For instance, governments subsidized the cost of capital and overvalued their own currency to protect certain goods/sectors (e.g. the urban and industrial sector) from global competition. This led to the adoption of (highly inefficient but still privately profitable) capital intensive technologies. In cases where their own currency was over-valued to the advantage of importers, exporting farmers faced losses when selling their products on foreign markets. Elsewhere, governments bought “cash crops at
4. Political Context of New Wars

Institutions and the establishment of control regimes, the real economy fled from the reach of the government. The emergence of black markets and widespread smuggling are only two indicators of the resulting political and economic crisis at the national level (Bates 2008, pp. 98 sq.).

Only a number of “trigger factors” managed to shatter these rather stable systems. The increase in oil prices in the 1970s caused a global recession leading to sharp decreases in the demand for African imports. Because export taxes were “the single largest source” of fiscal income in most African countries, this resulted in a sharp decrease in public revenue (which had already been declining due to the above mentioned bad policy choices and due to the predatory behavior of the political elites). Public sector salaries eroded as did the quality of public services. Roads and railways “fell into despair”, state-owned companies were forced to shut down due to a lack of power and maintenance and the public education system deteriorated. Corruption and private trade became a way of income for public servants. Because military salaries also decreased, soldiers turned to looting or other ways of income, e.g. the collection of thoroughfares in exchange for access to streets which they controlled. Some African oil-producing countries who had initially profited from rising oil prices and initiated new projects “found themselves burdened by the costs of these ventures” when petroleum prices returned to normal. Oftentimes, they decided to borrow money and, for this reason, were equally drawn into the following debt crisis (Bates 2008, pp. 24 sq., 99–105). Demands by creditors for political reform and a shift to multi-party politics led to an unanticipated increase in the level of political risk for those in power. Their political future suddenly turned insecure (Bates 2008, pp. 26 sq., 108–110). Because they at the same time faced an environment richly endowed by nature, rulers often employed means of coercion to prey upon this wealth (instead of protecting the creation of it) while private citizens also decided to devote their time to warfare and the predation of resources (instead of to the production of wealth) (Bates 2008, p. 28). Former freedom fighters also began agitating for “the rewards of independence” (Bates 2008, p. 37). Predation of resources became their way of compensation for the struggle. The violent and extractive political order they built secured their private enrichment and their jobs. Finally, foreign support to authoritarian regimes eased or even stopped with the end of the Cold War. “Abandoned by foreign patrons and facing increasing threats at home, incumbents had increased reason to fear for their political future. Their time horizons therefore shortened. In the long run, repression might increase the level of political disorder, but incumbents had less reason to place great weight on the long run” (Bates 2008, pp. 116 sq.). This allowed for punitive measures against the national opposition (which caused further grievances) and again increased the temptation to engage in predation as an alternative source of private income.

low domestic prizes, sold them at the prices prevailing in international markets, and deposited the difference in prices in the public treasury” (Bates 2008, p. 59). For more examples see Bates (2008, pp. 55–74).
Sub-national tensions rooted in the economies of Africa’s “politically expansionary rural communities” further exacerbated the situation. In times of political instability and decreasing public revenue, such local conflicts could no longer be contained. They acquired national significance and accelerated the failure of states (Bates 2008, pp. 75, 92). “[W]hile triggered at the elite level, political disorder was marked by the rapid spread of insecurity to the local level […] The nature of Africa’s societies helps to account for the speed with which political disorder cascaded from the center to the periphery” (Bates 2008, p. 93). Rival politicians transformed political organizations in armed militias and regional tensions rose.

This illustrates how a number of exogenous shocks resulted in changes in two key variables: the level of public revenue and the elite’s rate of discount (Bates 2008, pp. 19 sq.). In an environment richly endowed by nature, these “trigger factors”, in combination with the already existing economic and political crisis at the national level and sub-national tensions, led to the emergence of violent militias (which the author equates with state failure) and the outbreak of greed- and grievance-based internal violence.

One aspect of the above-stated is particularly interesting in light of this study. Like the concept of New Wars, Bates (2008, pp. 9–11) identifies the exploitation of natural resources for war finance as well as ethnic violence as “joint products of state failure”. Both are symptoms of state failure, instead of causes. He argues that payoffs that result from predation (as opposed to payoffs that result from taxing the citizenry) are especially attractive if tax revenue is low, if rewards from predation are high and if immediate benefits weigh more heavily than future payoffs because the latter are insecure. Failing or failed states meet all three of these conditions. The argument itself applies to state as well as non-state actors though Bates (2008, p. 131) focuses on the behavior of incumbents (not insurgents) and aims to explain why African elites adopted policies that impoverished their citizens. In addition, the author notes that “[a]t times of state failure, politicians can […] marshal political followings and recruit armed militias by championing the defense of land rights. In the midst of state failure, ethnicity may therefore come to the fore. But by this reasoning it is the product rather than the source of political disorder”. In addition, ethnic violence is in fact nothing more than “a struggle over the regional allocation of resources” (Bates 2008, p. 133). The remainder of this book illustrates how well this fits within the concept of New Wars and its masterminds.

During the post-Cold War era, Snow (1996) also identifies a movement towards greater freedom of expression, increasingly little social cohesion and therefore a weakening of the coercive ability of those in power in a number of places. Failed or failing states emerged that exhibit weak societies and weak state structures. Snow (1996) leaves aside the question whether this weakening of state structures rendered the emergence of grievance-

---

4Bates (2008, pp. 78 sq., 90–93) explains that the strong forces of territorial expansion in Africa which lead to competing claims for land and local non-state conflict between rural communities are underplayed by powerful cultural issues but also due to poverty and diminishing returns which causes an out-migration of the youth to settle land on the periphery.
4. Political Context of New Wars

Based insurgencies also more likely. Instead, he argues that a new kind of internal armed conflict (“attacks from criminal insurgencies”) is especially likely to emerge and to succeed in such a context and therefore appears to be more prominent during the post-Cold War era. This leads to the four-fold taxonomy presented in table 4.1 on this page.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Cell 1</td>
<td>Cell 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Cell 3 (Insurgencies)</td>
<td>Cell 4 (New Wars)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1.: State Weakness and Types of Warfare (Snow 1996, p. 35)

States in Cell 1 have strong coercive powers and share a strong consensus on underlying social values. This is also referred to as a situation of “popular dictatorship”. In these cases agreement exists that society needs to include the strict enforcement of the political order which is, for instance, the case in Singapore (Snow 1996, pp. 35 sq.).

States in Cell 2 represent the Western norm. There exists an underlying agreement on social, political and economic issues or norms such as democracy and market economy which produces freedom and motivation to nurture a highly developed free market economy. The existence of this societal support means that the state does not require great coercive capacity but suppresses only criminal activity and deviation from the order. Ironically, the most advanced states that fall into this category also possess the most sophisticated technologies to insure the survival of its citizenry and thus the greatest potential for massive coercive control.

States in Cell 3 and Cell 4 represent the most problematic combination. These are the above described situations most likely to result in instability and violence. Cell 3-states face the combination of a weak social structure but a coercive state most often associated with authoritarian regimes. This strongly coercive state imposes authority in the absence of a population that willingly accepts the authority of the state and that confers legitimacy to the regime. The absence of commonly shared values also means that some groups are imposing their values on others. This results in resistance by those who feel oppressed which explains the emergence of grievance-based insurgencies during the Cold War era and some post-Cold War violence. According to Snow (1996), virtually all Cell 3 conflicts that remained unresolved at the end of the 1990s had such roots (Snow 1996, p. 49).
States in Cell 4 struggle with the absence of both social cohesion and strong governmental mechanisms capable of imposing order on society. Power struggles among groups take place and there is little or no governmental ability to mediate or suppress outbreaks of violence. The worst case scenario constitutes state failure. Examples are Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia. Snow (1996) clearly mentions that these cases of warfare are not unique to the post-Cold War world. Instead, they simply became more obvious. The “new internal war” is sui generis not a form so fundamentally different from that of the Cold War. “What is different is that some forms now appear less frequently, making the remainder seem more prominent” (Snow 1996, p. 49). Thus, he believes to observe a post-Cold War pattern which is tipping away from the more prevalent Cell 3 cases (insurgencies taking place in strong coercive states masking weak societies) to Cell 4 cases (New Wars taking place in weak or failed states revealing weak societies).

It remains somewhat unclear whether Snow’s “new internal wars” just comprise “power struggles among [non-state] groups” or whether the concept also covers state-based greed conflicts as implied by the term “attacks by criminal insurgencies”. Likewise, it remains to be answered whether today’s Cell 4 cases are yesterday’s Cell 3 cases (i.e. whether we observe a change in the type of warfare within cases or across cases). The author is, however, very clear on the fact that New Wars arise in a context of state weakness and also specifies this term. What makes him a true mastermind of the concept of New Wars, however, is the fact that according to his theory, the strength of state structures and society are decisive in determining not only the risk but also the type of warfare a society is likely to face.

Some support for his theses stems from the fact that the concentration of internal wars in the post-Cold War era is moving away from developing countries to those that have not yet entered the developmental process. Again, armed conflict in the poorest countries is not a post-Cold War phenomenon but more of the armed conflicts appear to be occurring in these kinds of places. This is not what the development literature of the 1950s and 1960s predicted: The paradigm that internal violence occurs mainly in states undergoing development has apparently given way to a tendency of internal violence to occur in the poorest and weakest states (Snow 1996, p. 58). Kaldor agrees by emphasizing that New Wars take place where the modern state is “unraveling”, in “frail”, in “quasi-” or “shadow states” (Kaldor 2004; Kaldor 2006b, pp. 6, 8; Kaldor 2001). Elsewhere she and others mention that New Warfare “involves” or is “associated” with state failure, an unbuilding, disintegration or implosion of typically authoritarian states under the impact of globalization (Kaldor 2005, pp. 3, 8; Kaldor 2006a, pp. 5 sq.; Kaldor 2000; Münkler 2005, p. 76). This leaves the direction of relationship between state disintegration and the outbreak of armed conflict undetermined. It also remains unclear how state disintegration is defined (e.g. whether the term only refers to the coercive power of state institutions or societal factors as well), how much disintegration is required to speak of state failure or a failed state and how exactly state failure may lead to the outbreak of a certain kind of violent conflict. Instead, Kaldor (1999) at first turns to the causes of these processes of state disintegration. She stresses two macro-factors.
4. **Political Context of New Wars**

that in particular contributed to state weakness or an “erosion of the state’s monopoly of legitimate organized violence from above”: processes of globalization during the 1980s and 1990s (understood as “the intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural”) and the end of the Cold War (Kaldor 2007, pp. 3 sq., 6; Snow 1996, p. 35). In fact, the demise of the Eastern bloc, and therefore the end of the Cold War, is itself seen as a consequence of globalization.5

Kaldor (2007, p. 4) accepts the argument that globalization has its roots in modernity or even earlier. Still, she considers the globalization of the 1980s and 1990s “a qualitatively new phenomenon” because it came as “a consequence of the revolution in information technologies and dramatic improvements in communication and data-processing”. She is also aware of the fact that economic globalisation which often goes hand in hand with a liberalization and privatization can have positive impacts. For instance, privatization breaks down authoritarian tendencies and, in a globalized world that is connected through electronic media and international travel, external pressure for democratization also easily reaches authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. “People in those societies feel they have some opening, some possibility of making change” so that internal pressure for reform also increases (Kaldor 2006a, p. 5). But in many countries this “pressure for democratization led to increasingly desperate bids to remain in power, often through fomenting ethnic tensions” (Kaldor 1999, p. 82). Kaldor (2000) warns that “in […] situations where domestic pressures for reform are weak and where civil society is least developed […] the opening up of the state both to the outside world and to increased participation through the democratisation process is most dangerous”. According to her, an outbreak of violence is most likely in cases where the process of democratisation is largely confined to elections (while other prerequisites of democratic procedures like the rule of law, a separation of powers and freedom rights are not in place) or in cases where these other prerequisites are more or less established but where decades of authoritarianism leave the political culture vulnerable to populist ideologies. “These are the circumstances that give rise to the ‘new wars’” (Kaldor 2000).

In addition, Kaldor argues that globalization weakened states’ monopoly of legitimate organized violence through the increasing transnationalization of military forces. Although, this process had already started during the two world wars, it was institutionalized by the block system during the Cold War era. Innumerable transnational connections between armed forces also developed in the post-Cold War period. Kaldor explains this growing importance of military alliances, cooperation and exchanges by

---

5 “The fundamental source of the new wars is the crisis of state authority, a profound loss of legitimacy that became apparent in the post-colonial states in the 1970s and 1980s and in the post-communist states only after 1989. Part of the story of that crisis is the failure or exhaustion of populist emancipatory projects such as socialism or national liberation, especially those that were implemented within an authoritarian communitarian framework. But this failure cannot be disentangled from the impact of globalisation” (Kaldor 2000). “[T]he end of the Cold War could be viewed as the way in which the Eastern bloc succumbed to the inevitable encroachment of globalization” (Kaldor 2007, p. 4).
referring to changes in military technology, the growing destructiveness of weapons and the evolution of international norms, e.g. on arms control or the illegitimacy of unilateral aggression (Kaldor 1999, pp. 4 sq.; Kaldor 2007, p. 5). As a result, external actors are increasingly interfering in conflict and post-conflict situations. Kaldor speaks of a “network of global actors” that is composed of international reporters, mercenary troops, military advisers, diaspora volunteers and an “army” of international agencies ranging from NGOs to international institutions (Kaldor 1999, p. 4; Kaldor 2007, p. 5).

Both globalization and the end of the East-West controversy also contributed to crises of identity, the rise of alternative, vertical identities and the emergence of “identity politics”. Kaldor (1999, pp. 73 sq.) argues that globalization breaks up vertically organized cultures that have been characteristic of the era of the nation-state and that gave rise to a sense of national identity and security. In many countries, globalization also associates with extensive rural-urban labor migration. Traditional rural communities that were characterized by strong family ties and a strong sense of belonging were broken up and replaced by more anonymous urban communities. This resulted in a “crisis of identity” and “a sense of alienation and disorientation”. A similar “vacuum” followed the discrediting of socialism at the end of the Cold War as well as the discrediting of the nation-building rhetoric of the first generation of post-colonial leaders (Kaldor 2007, pp. 7 sq.). As a consequence, new horizontal cultures that undermine the sense of a shared political community arose out of informal non-governmental and transnational networks, religious and ethnic groups, transnational crime or the regionalization of governments. Ethnic or religious-cultural lines of divide that were supposed to provide the necessary orientation and perspective quickly replaced old ideological references (Münkler 2005, p. 91).

This “historic shift away from the vertical cultures” towards new horizontal cultures offers the perfect breeding ground for identity politics defined as movements which mobilize around sectarian (ethnic, racial or religious) identities for the purpose of claiming state power (Kaldor 2007, p. 80). These sectarian identities that form the basis for identity politics are “re-invented” in the context of state failure or the corrosion of other sources of political legitimacy (Kaldor 2007, pp. 7 sq.). For the purpose of political mobilization, they are newly “constructed or accentuated” by ruling politicians and aspiring opposition leaders who draw on pre-existing ethnic, religious or tribal cleavages and past memories and experiences. Political groupings based on such identities are therefore described as fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive movements of nostalgia that reconstruct a heroic past and the memory of injustices, real or imagined, and of famous battles, won or lost. They acquire meaning through insecurity, rekindled fear of historic enemies or a sense of being threatened by those with different labels (Kaldor 1999, p. 78). In New Warfare, violent actors use such identity politics to mobilize combatants and to justify their criminal and illegal activities as well as their violent strategies.⁶

⁶Former administrative or intellectual elites ally with non-state actors on the margins of society to mobilize the excluded and abandoned, alienated and insecure for the purposes of capturing and
Globalization contributes to the spread of this type of mobilization through electronic media.\(^7\) The ease of travel and communication in a globalized world also increases the possibility of transnational support from diaspora communities (Kaldor 2007, p. 8). In New Warfare, this support (e.g. in the form of ideas, funds and techniques) is especially important because the end of the Cold War led to a shortfall of financial and material assistance from the former superpowers and other outside patrons (Kaldor 2004). This further weakened states as well as non-state actors and fundamentally changed the ways of financing warfare. As far as possible, the lack of financial resources was or is being compensated by natural resource extraction and the build-up of mostly criminal war economies that are well-connected to the global market.\(^8\) The negative economic consequences of globalization, especially the failure of neoliberal development strategies and the following debt crisis, further aggravated this fight over natural resources.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\) See Kaldor (2006a, p. 6) and Kaldor (2001) for evidence from Rwanda. In general and thanks to global media, New Wars are fought out in public – contemporary warfare is “more theatrical than ever before” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 4).

\(^8\) “Diminishing tensions between the two superpowers has reduced external financing for many rebel groups and governments. This made them more dependent on alternative financing, including financing from natural resource exploitation” (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 545). See also Münkler (2005, p. 97), Ellis (2003, p. 34) or Berdal (2003, p. 484). The latter refers to the case of Angola where the end of the Cold War resulted in “a privatization of UNITA’s existing supply networks” because former agents who were no longer of use to the Cold War networks started their own business relationships with UNITA (Berdal 2003, p. 494). Heupel and Zangl (2003, fn 15 on p. 16) cite the case of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia who after the end of the Cold War also increasingly augmented assistance from their former allies with natural resource extraction. Because violent actors compensated the loss of support from former Cold War allies with independent and frequently criminal sources of income the end of the Cold War is especially linked with a criminalization of war economies (Heupel and Zangl 2010, p. 31). In general, Ross (2006, p. 270) finds that already “existing rebel groups shifted towards contraband funding, particularly at two points: in the mid-1980s, when insurgents in Colombia and Peru began to take advantage of the narcotics trade; and at the beginning of the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War forced rebels in Angola and Cambodia to turn to gemstones (and in the case of Cambodia, timber) to replace their foreign funding. […] [C]ontraband became a more common way to finance new conflict once the Cold War had ended”. He adds that contraband helped to fund seven of the 92 civil wars (7.6 percent) that began between 1945 and 1988, but eight of the 36 wars (25 percent) that began after 1988.

\(^9\) “As foreign assistance began to be replaced by commercial borrowing in the 1970s, as foreign debt mounted and ‘structural adjustment’ programs were introduced, state revenues declined and, as in the former communist countries, political competition for control over resources intensified” (Kaldor 1999, p. 82). Elsewhere, Kaldor argues that through neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programs countries were forced to open their economies, to reduce their budget deficits and to stabilize their budgets (Kaldor 1999, pp. 81 sq.; Kaldor 2007, pp. 85–87). As a result, public spending was cut and disparities in income and levels of unemployment increased. The decline of the welfare state and the failure to overcome poverty and inequality led to the disillusion of post-independence hopes and
Finally, the end of the Cold War not only left an enormous surplus of small and light weapons that are primarily used in New Wars (Kaldor 2007, p. 102; Kaldor 1999, p. 96; Münkler 2005, pp. 74 sq.) but also resulted in a large supply of well-trained and battle-tested soldiers. Spiegel Online (2004) estimates that the end of the Cold War resulted in up to seven million former soldiers that had been released into civil life. Berdal (2003, p. 495) adds that “not only UNITA but a wide range of warring groups, factions, and governments around the world […] have benefited from the collapse of […] export control regimes and the ability to monitor surplus stocks of weapons in former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet republics”. Both, the availability of surplus arms and soldiers gave rise to private military companies and mercenaries that further weaken the state’s monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Wulf 2005; Paul Singer 2008). Leading researchers from the Correlates of Wars Project also link the end of the Cold War and globalization processes with the emergence of violent non-state actors as well as the emergence of criminalized war economies which shall later be discussed in more detail. More specifically, Sarkees and Wayman (2010, p. 45) note that the “flourishing of non-state actors has been related to […] the increase in worldwide arms trade and the development of private armies; the growth of international drug trafficking; the expanding power of multinational corporations; the fact that boundaries are increasingly permeable by people, weapons, drugs; and the formation of diverse coalitions that acquire weapons and form armies”. These various forms of criminal behavior by violent non-state actors of course challenge the stability of states.

To those states that “turned” weak one needs to add those that were “born” (institutionally) weak. For instance, Münkler (2005, p. 66) attributes a certain predisposition to New Warfare to societies “where there is no long tradition of military discipline, and where forms of violence similar to ‘small-wars’ practices are an established part of the lifestyle” (Münkler 2005, p. 66). As an example he refers to nomadic peoples. However, only some of these societies actually experience New Warfare. Similarly, it is often argued that after colonialism, newly independent but weak states were born (Kaldor 2007, pp. 84 sq.). Snow (1996) already touches upon the colonial legacy of countries when explaining the emergence of insurgencies during the Cold War era. However and although the colonial past of a country is often linked with today’s political, economic and societal weaknesses, empirical evidence shows that neither the colonial legacy itself nor the identity of the colonial power (e.g. former British vs. French colony) seems to be the decisive factor. Instead, Acemoglu et al. (2001) found that the quality of institutions created by former colonial powers correlates with the quality of today’s institutions which strongly influences the current economic and political performance (which are both decisive factors in the prediction of the outbreak of violence). The authors explain that the willingness or readiness to create high quality institutions, “the colonization strategy or policy”, was very much determined by the conditions on the ground. The more favorable the situation for the settlers themselves, the more likely they would settle and
to a loss of legitimacy of post-colonial states. This all contributed to the disintegration and erosion of state structures and the outbreak of violence (Newman 2004, pp. 175 sq.).
subsequently establish and implement appropriate institutions to regulate their political, social and economic life. For example, unfavorable living conditions, like high (infant) mortality rates and contagious diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, but the presence of valuable resources led to the establishment of an extractive state in the Congo. Institutions established by the Belgians did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government expropriation.

At the other extreme, Europeans migrated and settled in a number of more favorable colonies (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US), where they tried to replicate European institutions. This theoretical argument provides the basis for an empirical investigation by Acemoglu et al. (2001) who apply Two-Stage Least Squares estimation technique to account for reverse causation. The results support their hypotheses that the (potential) settler mortality rates were a major determinant of settlements, settlements were a major determinant of high quality, early institutions and that there is a strong correlation between the quality of early institutions and the quality of institutions today. Therefore, today’s institutional weaknesses – whether these relate to commonly shared social, political or economic norms like democracy, market economy/the distribution of wealth and property or the coercive power of governments – and the resulting economical, political and security problems are not only explained by processes related to the end of the Cold War or globalization but date back to the colonial or institutional legacy of the respective countries. Murshed (2003) agrees that a “functional social contract” and the concomitant institutions that distribute income and resolve disputes can prevent the violent expression of greed or grievance. He adds that “conflict affected nations have histories of weak degenerating social contracts. This weakness is often a legacy of colonialism, with institutionalized mechanisms favoring certain groups over others” (Murshed 2003). Rwanda might be an example where such policies provided ground for ethnic violence culminating in the 1994 genocide. The institutionalist argument not only applies to the African context but has also been mentioned e.g. by Calic (2005) when discussing the root causes of the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia. According to her, the main cause (a lack of an integrative, political concept of national identity based on state tradition and shared norms and institutions instead of language or religion) can be traced back to policies of foreign powers who ruled South Eastern Europe for centuries. Wade (2005), Keen (2000) or Schlichte (2006b) also consider institutional mechanisms in regard to the causes and context of New Wars. Schlichte (2006b) links the functioning of neopatrimonial regimes with the delegation and fragmentation of statehood, although he disagrees with the thesis of a denationalization of contemporary internal wars.

It follows from the above that especially the end of the Cold War, increasing globalization, or a combination of both contribute to New Wars in multiple ways, directly as well as indirectly through weakening effects on state authority. The colonial legacy as one additional source of state weakness has also been mentioned. Kaldor (2007, p. 33) provides the example of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the following war in Bosnia which she calls “the archetypal example, the paradigm of the new type of

---

This is in line with the previously mentioned “political dutch disease”- argument.
“war”. In line with her argument, the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, both at the federal and at the republican level, associated with the emergence of “virulent nationalism”, which “reinvented particular versions of history and memory” and was based on “certain traditional social divisions and prejudices” to construct new cultural forms that can be used for political mobilization. This kind of nationalism “has to be understood in terms of the struggle, on the part of increasingly desperate (and corrupt) elites, to control the remnants of the state” (Kaldor 2007, p. 37). Such identity politics that were used before and during warfare worked well due to a preceding crisis of identity. The Yugoslav political identity was drawn from the struggle of the partisans in World War II, from the state’s capacity to provide reasonable living standards and from its political role as the leader of the non-aligned movement. But “[a]s the memory of World War II faded and as the economic and social gains of the post-war period began to disappear, it was inevitable that its legitimacy would be called into question […]” (Kaldor 2007, p. 38). Because the ruling communist party was discredited due to corruption scandals, nationalist parties were the best available option. Thus, national communitarian identities filled the vacuum created by the loss of Yugoslavism. Unfortunately, nationalist arguments seemed also most appropriate to cope with increasing economic difficulties. While Yugoslavia had been supported by the West as a buffer against a possible Soviet attack on Southeast Europe during the Cold War era, foreign aid declined substantively in the 1970s and was replaced by commercial loans (Kaldor 2007, p. 39). A slowdown in growth in Western countries, which associated with a decrease in remittances from diaspora communities, was followed by a debt crisis of some 20 billion US dollars at the end of the decade. The IMF Recovery Plan intensified competition over resources among the republics and contributed to a growing criminalization of the economy (Kaldor 2007, p. 39). High inflation and unemployment rates and series of corruption scandals (which involved former politicians and future key figures of the war) are also mentioned as signs of the unraveling Yugoslav statehood (Kaldor 2007, p. 40). Uneven development between and within the single republics and “the growing divide between the economic and scientific elite and backward rural regions […] which was especially acute in Bosnia-Herzegovina and was exacerbated in the 1980s” contributed to rising discontent (Kaldor 2007, p. 43). The republics started to call for single economic space. They wanted to declare autonomous regions, disregarded constitutional decisions, aimed at controlling their own TV and radio stations and even builtin their own armed forces. Territorial Defense Units (TOs) were established in the republics, “the Slovens and Croats were secretly organizing and arming their own independent forces based on [these] TOs and the police through the growing black-market for surplus arms then emerging in Eastern Europe” while the Serbs created their own paramilitary groups. These were later sided by forces of the former Yugoslav army and increasingly used as a tool by Slobodan Milosevic (Kaldor 2007, p. 41). This breakdown of the monopoly of organized violence in former Yugoslavia marked the beginning of the breakdown of stability within Bosnia. The nationalism emerging in the region was not only new because it was associated with the disintegration of the state (in contrast to earlier “modern” nationalisms which aimed at state-building). It also lacked a modernizing ideology and “[…] it was […] new in
4. Political Context of New Wars

terms of the techniques of mobilization and the forms of organization. It was Milosevic
who was the first to make extensive use of the electronic media to propagate the
nationalist message” (Kaldor 2007, p. 41). Kaldor (2007, p. 42) speaks of a “victim men-
tality” that was “nurtured with an electronic diet of tales of genocide” and a “virtual
war” that was experienced by the Serb public long before actual warfare started. The
Croats also relied on transnational forms of organization. They mobilized the Croatian
diaspora in the US who provided funds, arms and mercenaries (Kaldor 2007, pp. 42 sq.).
This supports the idea of a globalized world as the perfect context in which New Warfare
arises. The role of neighboring countries (Croatia and Serbia) as well as the role of the
international community in the outbreak of violence in Bosnia was also decisive. The
war was precipitated by the decision of the international community to recognize other
former Yugoslav republics. Bosnia itself was only recognized at the very moment of its
disintegration (Kaldor 2007, p. 46).

The more recent case of Iraq also illustrates the extent to which the disintegration of
the state links with the end of the East-West controversy, increasing globalization, the
rise of identity politics and, after the invasion by the United States, the outbreak of New
Warfare (Kaldor 2006b). “The [Iraqi] regime exhibited characteristics that are typical
of the last phases of totalitarianism – a system that is breaking up under the impact of
globalization, unable to sustain its closed, autarchic, tightly controlled character […]
On the eve of the invasion, Iraq was showing all signs of incipient state failure” (Kaldor
2006b, pp. 6, 8). In the Iraqi case, the “signs of incipient state failure” that could be
observed prior to the outbreak of New Warfare were high and increasing levels of debt,
failing GDP (mostly due to sanctions), increasing infant mortality, declining literacy
and de-urbanization (the proportion of those engaged in agriculture was doubling while
educated middle class people left the country). In addition, stronger appeals to tribalism
and Islam by the government in times of declining legitimacy were observable, as was a
discrediting of the Ba’athist ideology, the destruction of civil society, the emergence of a
parallel dollar economy, increasing corruption and criminality (Kaldor 2006b, pp. 7 sq.).

Elsewhere, Kaldor notes that this and other failing states might still be formally rec-
ognized by the international community and display “some of the trappings of statehood –
an incomplete administrative apparatus, a flag, sometimes a currency”. However, they
have lost control over their territory and “access to the state apparatus is about private
gain not public policy” (Kaldor 2001). More concrete indicators of state failure mentioned
by the author are declining tax revenues or even the absence of an effective system of
internal taxation to provide public services and to support the infrastructure of warfare.
This leads to reductions in public expenditure, a worsening of all sorts of socio-economic
indicators, a growing informal economy, increased corruption, rent-seeking and criminal
activity (Kaldor 2001).

The concept of New Wars argues that the degree of autonomy of private actors at the
local level increases along with the fragmentation of political authority. In failing or failed
states, domestic groups cannot count on the government for protection or to guarantee
economic stability and wellbeing. They start competing for control so they can provide their own security and follow their own economic interests. A classical security dilemma arises because “these actions make others feel less secure, so they respond in kind, and the environment is made less stable” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 36 sq.). Non-state actors are able to establish alternative, territorially restricted forms of centralized violence. Because state institutions are unable to inhibit a privatization of violent actors, to effectively end fighting if it breaks out among non-state groups and to stop them from criminal activity, the civilian population and natural resources fall prey to those who exercise control over them (Münkler 2003, pp. 16 sq.). Thus, collapsed or collapsing states with an increasingly fragmented political authority and order are the perfect environments for New Wars. Advocates of the concept of New Wars expect the failure of the state to be accompanied by a proliferation of private security agencies and the emergence of a complex system of overlapping commands which leads to an “erosion of the state’s monopoly of organized violence from below” (Kaldor 2007, p. 6).

However, weak states are not only a precondition for the emergence of violent non-state actors but the existence and activities of such actors in return further weaken states. “Each stage of the conflict accelerates the process of unraveling state institutions and shared norms and rules” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 18). Due to this feed-back effect, the increasing involvement of private, non-state or sub-state actors in fighting turns out to be the centerpiece of the concept of New Wars (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 48). Consequently, the restoration of a functioning state monopoly of legitimate organized violence is the key for the termination of New Wars and a return to sustainable peace (Kaldor 2007, p. 11; Kaldor 2006b, p. 19; Kaldor 2005, p. 9; Kaldor 2000).

In summary, the concept of New Wars links changes at the macro-level (increasing globalization and the end of the Cold War) with national context factors (weak states, the availability of conflict resources and identity factors) and with the emergence of violent non-state actors who follow their private economic interests during warfare. The existence and activities of these actors further weaken states and feed back on national as well as global context factors. Violent non-state actors and their economic motives are crucial to understanding the emergence of specific war economies, the strategies of New Warfare as well as the long duration of New Wars. The following chapter further clarifies these dimensions of New Warfare.
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

5.1. The Nature and Quantity of Actors in New Warfare

As mentioned above, internal and external non-state or “para-state” actors who confront each other are the central feature of New Warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 8). The advocates of the concept of New Wars speak of a privatization of warfare from above and from below.\(^1\)

Kaldor (2007, p. 100) and Münkler (2005, pp. 20 sq.) emphasize the growing importance of private security companies, privatized military companies (PMFs) and mercenaries who actively engage in New Warfare. Especially the resurrection of mercenary forces seems somehow surprising given their earlier downfall due to their “unreliability”. In New Warfare, however, the disadvantages of mercenary armies (their focus on economic incentives and their lack of political loyalty) seem to be either irrelevant or even an advantage.\(^2\) In addition, child soldiers\(^3\) are a central part in New Warfare. Adolescents are often “automatically driven into the arms of the warring parties” by their hunger and their lack of peacetime social and economic prospects. Although child

\(^1\)While the term “private violence” refers to the violence of the criminal, “privatized violence” challenges or even substitutes the government’s monopoly of force Eppler (2002, pp. 12–14). Eppler (2002) distinguishes between a privatization of violence from below (i.e. the emergence of non-state or sub-state violent actors who either challenge the government or take over government functions and start fighting each other) and a privatization of violence from above. The latter describes the outsourcing of security functions by the state to non-state actors (e.g. privatized military companies) or to paramilitary forces who get out of control.

\(^2\)Münkler (2005, p. 52) warned that “when the only bond between the political leadership and the military has been bought with money for a limited period, it does not take long for suspicions to creep in”. Such suspicions contributed to the replacement of the condottieri by more reliable standing armed forces. In New Wars, the lack of loyalty to the political cause does not constitute a mayor problem because there is neither a political cause nor a politically legitimate leadership to obey. Those who employ mercenaries in New Warfare are some kind of businessmen who for instance wish to exploit or to protect mining spots. Most private actors in New Warfare are not duty-bound to any third, political party or institution. “Apart from the rules of the global economy, there is no framework to which they must adhere” (Münkler 2005, p. 92).

\(^3\)Child soldiers are children aged between eight and a certain maximum age (fourteen, fifteen or eighteen) “who have permanently joined the ranks of a warring party and bear arms and use force on its behalf” (Münkler 2003, p. 17). Broader definitions include peripheral support roles (e.g. cooks or domestic labor) as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. See e.g. CSI (2011, cover page). For a discussion of different definitions see J. Davis (2008, pp. 24 sq.).
soldiers struggle for material resources, including food and water, they also struggle for prestige and recognition. “The experience of humiliation, together with a sudden power that has never been subject to military discipline, leads to excesses of violence in which pent-up hatred explodes in wild fantasies of omnipotence”. During warfare, these armed adolescents can overcome hunger and destitution and act out these power fantasies without hindrance. This includes a “free rein given to sexual needs” (Münkler 2005, pp. 78, 19). From the perspective of the warring factions, child soldiers significantly reduce the costs of warfare. They are not only cheap but also effective instruments in warfare due to their undemanding nature and their low awareness of risks because of lack of experience. “Young people […] display a remarkable insouciance in the face of danger: fear and death rarely touches their thoughts and actions, and their instinct for self-preservation, especially in puberty, is considerably less marked than among adults. […] [T]his also means that they have fewer inhibitions in using violence, make no allowances for defenseless people and tend to be especially cruel and brutal” (Münkler 2005, p. 80). Children are recruited because they are especially loyal to questionable figures and because they commit violent acts that adults would shy away from (J. Davis 2008, pp. 13 sq.). Child soldiers are also very obedient and easy to manipulate or misuse to carry out extremely cruel acts of violence or crime because their systems of norms and values are not yet solid or fixed (Gantzel 2002, p. 15; Pittwald 2004, p. 210). This inclination is boosted by drug consumption. The supply of drugs and the provision of regular meals (or the possibility to plunder what they need) is enough to ensure their loyalty and subservience. In addition, child soldiers are especially valuable when warlords are confronted with UN peacekeeping troops who then face ethical problems. They hesitate to use open fire or even prefer to surrender rather than become involved in direct battle with children (Münkler 2005, p. 80; Münkler 2003, p. 17). Especially when the number of available and healthy adult recruits decreases due to high numbers of casualties incurred in long term fighting, the likelihood of child recruitment seems to increase. The longer the war, the more likely the use of child soldiers who simply replace killed or wounded adult fighters. Thus, child soldiering might well associate with the long duration of New Warfare. In many countries, increasing rates of HIV/AIDS and other diseases also significantly reduced the number of available adult males to serve as soldiers at the expense of children (Pittwald 2004, p. 211; J. Davis 2008, pp. 9, 19). In any case, non-state actors do not have access to regular conscripts and might therefore more often rely on the (forced) recruitment of children (Pittwald 2004, p. 211). Finally, technological developments might explain the increasing use of child soldiers especially in New Wars that are fought with small weapons. These weapons do not require much training and their size and weight have fallen while their firing frequency has increased. This makes them easy to handle by children. Especially the spread of the AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle is considered “a key explanatory variable in the growth of child soldiering” (J. Davis 2008, pp. 9 sq.; Pittwald 2004, p. 212). Due to these reasons child soldiers became “one of the warlords’ favourite tools” (Münkler 2003, p. 17).
Unfortunately, reliable data on the exact number of child soldiers involved in past as well as present internal armed conflicts are not available. The only report monitoring the recruitment, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers worldwide is published by Child Soldiers International (CSI), formerly known as the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS). The organization’s Child Soldiers Global Reports monitor the compliance of governments and armed political groups with international standards governing the recruitment and use of child soldiers, they provide detailed country-by-country analyses of recruitment standards and practices, cover a wide range of countries and help to identify national, regional and global trends. The reports monitor the practices of all relevant groups involved in armed conflicts – government forces, government-linked paramilitaries and non-governmental armed groups. In addition, data on the use of child soldiers in countries with and without conflict/war experience are given. Up to now, however, the Coalition only collected data on the period from mid 1998 to 2012, the reports are only published every three to four years, they are plagued by missing data and data collection remains far from being systematic.\footnote{The CSI report from 2012 “is based on information on military recruitment and use in over 100 states which includes detailed reviews of laws, policies and practices of more than 50 ‘conflict’ and ‘non-conflict’ states; information provided by 55 governments; reviews of documentation relating to Optional Protocol implementation by some 70 states; and data contained in other UN and NGO reports on child soldier recruitment and use in specific countries” (CSI 2012, p. 5).}

Blattman and Annan (2010) compiled disaggregated, individual-level data on child soldiers in order to assess the economic, educational and psychological effects of child soldiering. The geographical scope of this study, however, is limited to a single country, namely Uganda, where an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 youth have been abducted by the Lords Resistance Army.\footnote{Elsewhere it is estimated that approximately 85 percent of the LRA’s forces were made up of children and that the LRA abducted a total of 20,000 to 30,000 children (J. Davis 2008, p. 16).} “Two-thirds of abductees were forced to perpetrate a crime or violence. A third eventually became fighters, and a fifth were forced to murder soldiers, civilians, or even family members in order to bind them to the group, reduce their fear of killing, and discourage disobedience” (Blattman and Annan 2010, p. 883). Similar disaggregated data on child soldiering elsewhere are not available. In general, it is difficult to obtain reliable figures on the level of child soldiering because those who illegally deploy children are “generally unwilling to verify the use of child soldiers. Especially rebel groups rarely maintain reliable statistical information on their force strength or ages of participants” (J. Davis 2008, p. 18). Available global estimates of the number of child soldiers therefore greatly vary between 300,000 and more than 500,000 (Münkler 2003, p. 17; J. Davis 2008, p. 2).
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

Between April 2004 and October 2007, children were actively involved in armed conflict as part of government forces or non-state armed groups in 19 countries or territories, namely in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Ivory Coast, the DRC, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda (see fig. 5.1 on the current page).

![Countries/situations where children were recruited or used in hostilities - April 2004 to October 2007](image)

Figure 5.1.: Use of Child Soldiers, Apr.2004 - Oct.2007 (CSUCS 2008, pp. 2 sq.).

A dramatic increase in the number of child soldiers occurred between 1988 and 2002 when their number nearly doubled (J. Davis 2008, p. 6; Achvarina and Reich 2006, p. 128). “Since 1975, Africa has become the epicenter of the problem. […] Estimates suggest that […] 40 percent of all child soldiers, were soldiering in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century. East Asia and the Pacific ranked a distant second […]. Furthermore, Africa has experienced the fastest growth in the use of child soldiers in recent years” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, pp. 130 sq.). In many conventional civil wars, child soldiers are fighting on the side of governments.⁶

⁶“Our data for the Liberian conflict of 1989 - 96 does indicate an overwhelming proportion of child soldiers among the ranks of rebels and not the state’s military, but other conflicts demonstrate a contrary trend toward a larger use of child soldiers by governments. The Liberian conflict of 1999 - 2003, for example, had a 70:30 split between rebel and government forces. The Sudanese civil war of 1993 - 2002 had a 64:36 split between rebel and governmental forces, but that majority was reversed.
At least CSI’s 2008 Global Report found that the recruitment and use of child soldiers by government armed forces had declined. By 2008, and as claimed by the advocates of the concept of New Wars, “the majority of under-18s involved in armed conflict were recruited by non-state armed groups” (i.e. by government-backed paramilitary groups, militias, self-defense units and political groups opposed to central governments, groups composed of ethnic, religious and other minorities, groups espousing separatist and other political ideologies and clan-based or factional groups fighting governments and each other to defend territory and resources). Thus, “[w]hile fewer states are recruiting and using child soldiers, when it comes to non-state armed groups the news is far less positive. Despite some examples of progress, the bigger picture remains essentially unaltered”. Non-state armed groups were/are deploying child soldiers in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Ivory Coast, DRC, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda (CSUCS 2008, pp. 12, 22, 24). The organization also notes that solutions have proved elusive especially in relation to groups involved in protracted low-level conflicts where child soldiers have been recruited and used over many years. Particularly challenging are also those armed conflicts which involve irregular groups “with obscure goals and opaque command structures that fragment, fracture and shift alliances and whose activities are often as criminal as they are political” (CSUCS 2008, p. 24). Again, this seems to confirm the concept of New Wars.

In New Wars, child soldiers are often forcibly recruited by paramilitary groups, who are the most common fighting group. They are defined as groups of armed men centered around an individual leader that are often associated with particular extremist parties or political factions. Paramilitary groups are mostly composed of redundant government soldiers or breakaway soldiers but also include common criminals and unemployed young men who rarely wear uniforms. Although their small-scale character has much in common with the non-state groups involved in guerrilla warfare, “they lack the hierarchy, order and vertical command systems that have been typical of guerrilla forces” (Kaldor 1999, pp. 93–95; Kaldor 2007, pp. 98 sq.).

The role of state actors in New Warfare remains “barely reactive” (Münkler 2006, p. 134). If anything, regular troops participate in international military interventions, or, in accordance with the definition later provided by the “New List of Wars”, can only be considered quasi-state actors or breakaway units thereof (Kaldor 2007, pp. 101, 104). Kaldor explains this decay of national regular armed forces after the end of the Cold...

to a 24 (rebel) and 76 (government) distribution by 2004. The data we compiled for the Angolan conflict although not definitive, suggest that children have made up between 24 and 33 percent of the government’s forces since the war against the rebels began in 1996. In that case, abduction has been a major method of recruitment, with both sides estimated to have seized 40,000 children in total by 2003” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, pp. 129 sq.). Between January 2010 and June 2012, CSI reports that there were 20 states “which are known to have used children in hostilities in one type of force or another or in one capacity or another” (CSI 2012, p. 18).
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

War by referring to cuts in military spending, often encouraged by external donors for the best of motives (Kaldor 2007, pp. 97 sq.; Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2006a, p. 5). This led to declining prestige of the regular armed forces, shortages of equipment, spare parts, fuel and ammunition, inadequate training and loss of morale. In cases where governments could no longer ensure adequate training and pay, breakaway groups of soldiers acquired surplus arms and joined private militias or became warlords who sought out their own sources of funding. “Soldiers become looters for whom the laws of war or any kind of military code of punishment no longer enter the picture”. So-called regular armies, who might still claim to defend the state, “are mostly nothing other than marauding bands [who are] not really subject to sanctions threatened under international law” (Münkler 2005, pp. 14, 22).

Besides the non-state nature of protagonists, New Warfare is said to be characterized by a large number of different groups of violent actors because weak states are unable to avert the fragmentation of the regular army and the proliferation of violent actors. In addition, these violent groups do not fight a strong national army which otherwise might require cohesive and joint action of opposition groups. Instead, they fight each other over resources. Distributional conflicts within these fighting units contribute to a further fragmentation and an even higher number of involved actors (Kaldor 2007, pp. 97 sq.). “[E]ither warlords end up quarrelling with other entrepreneurs of war or some of their junior leaders, believing they have not had their [fair] share of the booty, [or they] start new wars to get their hands on the big pot of power and riches” (Münkler 2005, p. 80). Berdal (2003, p. 487) agrees that “[i]n situations where participants become preoccupied primarily with economic gain, a process of fragmentation typically sets in, with major armed factions splintering into smaller groups and units”. Münkler argues that low costs of warfare contribute to an ever increasing number of those who simply can afford to participate in New Wars (Münkler 2006, p. 140; Münkler 2005, pp. 3, 75 sq.). Warriors are hastily and easily recruited and even cheaper to deploy because they take care of themselves through extortion, plunder and robbery. In addition, the weapons and technology used in New Wars (e.g. automatic rifles, land mines, multiple rocket launchers or modern communication devices like cellular phones or laptops) are also cheap, light and small though rather advanced and accurate. Particularly concerning is the low price of automatic weapons which has been driven below the cost of production since the flooding of the market especially with Russian products. These weapons can easily be obtained, they do not require lengthy training and they can be operated even by children. In addition, New Wars “use the civilian infrastructure” in such a way that light pick-up trucks and jeeps are turned into armored personal carriers. Heavy weapons are only occasionally deployed. If they are used, they consist mostly of remnants from the stockpiles of the Cold War (Münkler 2005, p. 75; Münkler 2003, pp. 15 sq.; Kaldor 2007, pp. 9 sq.).

Kaldor again refers to New Warfare in Iraq and Bosnia for the purpose of illustration. In line with her argument, New Warfare in Iraq involved “numerous, small and highly decentralized cells with varying degrees of co-ordination that often [did] not even know
their leaders or sources of financing”. Initially, it was estimated that fighting was carried out by no more than 5,000 insurgents. In 2004, estimates by American officials had increased to up to 20,000 fighters organized in about 70 cells (Kaldor 2006b, pp. 8, 12). After the US invasion and the dissolution of the army, former military personnel and remnants of the former regime were the most important recruits. They formed “the backbone” of New Warfare which now started in Iraq. Kaldor (2006b, pp. 8 sq.) reports that former soldiers were especially valuable to the warring factions not only because they provided the professional know-how but also because they were able to access some of the former regime’s weapons stores. Although “some co-ordination from the pattern of violent” could be observed in the Iraq case (e.g. an increase of attacks in the run-up to the elections) there was also “some degree of infighting […] and disagreements over tactics” which contributed to a further fractionalization of involved groups of actors (Kaldor 2006b, p. 13).

A similar decay of the regular armed forces and break-up of the military-industrial complex could also be observed in Bosnia. From 1986 to 1991, military spending fell dramatically, from 2.49 billion US dollars in constant 1988 prices to 1.38 billion (Kaldor 2007, p. 47). This contributed to a “growing sense of victimization and paranoia about internal and external enemies” within the Yugoslav National Army. In the following, the regular army and the newly emerging Territorial Defense Units disintegrated into a combination of “regular and irregular forces augmented by criminals, volunteers and former mercenaries competing for control over former Yugoslavia’s military assets” (Kaldor 2007, p. 47). Some of the most notorious underground figures suddenly occupied key positions in these so-called paramilitary groups (Münkler 2005, p. 80). One Serbian group, the Tigers, was led by Arkan, a criminal of the Belgrad underground world. Prior to the war, he worked as an assassin and was involved in smuggling activities which he expanded considerably during the war. Another Serbian paramilitary group, the Chetniks or White Eagles, even recruited additional “weekend fighters” (Kaldor 2007, p. 50). Both groups cooperated with the Yugoslav National Army and sometimes exerted control over local paramilitary groups. The Wolves, a Croatian paramilitary group, was led by another underground figure from Sarajevo who had been in prison but managed to escape. On the Bosnian side, similar groups existed (Kaldor 2007, p. 51). These actors used various black-market sources to acquire surplus ex-Warsaw Pact equipment which is why they were very well armed. The Tigers, for instance, even used tanks and mortars (Kaldor 2007, pp. 49 sq.). Kaldor speaks of a bewildering array of military and paramilitary forces at the outset of the Bosnian war. Only during the course of the war were forces increasingly centralized and three main regular forces (The Bosnian Serb Army, the Croat Defence Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) developed. In addition to these regular forces, three main types of irregular forces continued to participate in warfare: paramilitary forces like the ones mentioned above, foreign mer-

---

7“Towards the end of the war, the local militia and paramilitary groups were absorbed into the regular armies. The former became local brigades and the latter became ‘Special Units’” (Kaldor 2007, p. 58).
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

centary groups (like the Mujahedin, the Garibaldi Unit and mercenaries from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the US and Great Britain. The later were “made redundant in the post-Cold War cuts and took up positions training both Bosnian and Croatian forces”) as well as local militia or police forces organized by municipalities or big enterprises and augmented by armed civilians (Kaldor 2007, p. 51). “The UN Commission of Experts identified eighty-three paramilitary groups on the territory of former Yugoslavia – some fifty-six were Serbian, thirteen were Croatian and fourteen were Bosnian” (Kaldor 2007, p. 49).

Although these numbers might vary between sources, the thesis that New Wars are fought between many non-state or only quasi-state groups of violent actors obviously finds some empirical support. Nevertheless (and maybe even to increasing extent), non-state actors are also fighting in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts against government troops. A privatization of violence from above through the outsourcing of security functions to private military companies is also often observed in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts (e.g. in Columbia). In fact, the privatization of violence from above requires at least the existence of a state that is able to outsource security functions and that is challenged by rebel forces. Thus, it seems reasonable to ask whether we observe a significant difference in the quantity of non-state armed groups involved in new (non-state) armed conflicts on the one hand and conventional (state-based) armed conflicts on the other. Hypothesis 2 addresses this issue within the empirical part of this book.

Despite changes in the quantity of actors and the aforementioned trends of privatization, the advocates of the concept of New Wars also believe to observe changes in the quality or nature of actors involved in intra-state warfare. According to them, in a globalized post-Cold War world external military and non-military actors are more and more engaged in internal wars. They argue that international peacekeeping forces are more often deployed because the end of the Cold War significantly reduced ideological barriers within the United Nations Security Council. In addition, new technologies facilitate and reduce costs in international transport and communication which also affects the extent of engagement of humanitarian organizations, diasporas, criminal actors and networks, private military companies or foreign mercenaries. This results in an inter- or transnationalization of actors (Kaldor 2007, pp. 4 sq., 100 sq.).

The following factors might explain a comparatively strong interest of external actors to militarily intervene in New Wars: 1.) the brutality of strategies, which justifies military intervention in order to protect human rights, to sanction violence and to inhibit the outbreak of New Wars elsewhere, 2.) other costly “spill-over” effects such as refugee flows or the spill-over of illegal activities and war economies that destabilize neighboring countries or entire regions and 3.) the long duration of New Wars which justifies military intervention in order to end fighting. Last but not least, New Warfare might be more

---

8See also Heupel and Zangl (2004, p. 351); Calic (1996).
likely to grow into protracted transnational warfare because the disputed territories often contain mineral resources that can be sold on the world market. The anticipation of mining rights or promises for engagement in future oil production might explain a strong interest of external actors to engage in New Warfare in the form of military or financial assistance.9

Because the affected states are weak and unable to stop or prevent the outbreak of violence themselves, the demand for external military support also increases. Due to protection failures, governments but also multinational companies hire foreign security companies often recruited from retired British or American soldiers to protect their employees and production sites. For instance, in Sierra Leone and Angola, diamond mines were protected by Executive Outcomes (Kaldor 2007, p. 100) while elsewhere foreign mercenary companies actively engaged in warfare. Thus, the privatization of violence automatically associates with a commercialization and an internationalization of the involved actors. Because the growing demand for external military intervention overburdens some of the existing international organizations, they also increasingly “outsource” the provision of security to private military companies which contributes to a further privatization (Wulf 2005). Empirical support comes from Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster (2009, pp. 31, 19 sqq.), who find that a transnationalization (in terms of actors) of state-based and non-state internal warfare indeed comes along with a privatization. More precisely, their study reveals that external military interventions by non-UN forces strongly increase the probability of mercenary activities. The authors also list the reasons for this trend. A privatization of warfare through the deployment of mercenaries (who are by definition not members of the regular forces) is advantageous for state actors insofar as it reduces the risk of being killed for their own regular troops. It also enables state actors to intervene in internal warfare and at the same time to circumvent political control by their own constituency. Finally, through the use of mercenary forces they are able to disclaim responsibility in cases where things go wrong (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, pp. 11 sqq.).

Especially when compared with old, inter-state wars, New Warfare appears to be specifically transnational in nature. Münkler (2005, p. 8) describes the old, state-building wars in Europe or North America as taking place under “almost clinical conditions, with no major influences from ‘outside’ [whereas] the state-disintegrating wars in the Third World or the periphery of the First and Second Worlds […] have been subject to constant political attempts from outside to influence the course of events”. Differences, however, might be less pronounced when sub-types of internal warfare are compared with each other. Critics of the concept of New Wars argue that warfare in general is becoming more international. Military alliances have been on the rise for quite some time, and there is indeed a greater willingness and actual engagement in active fighting (and post-conflict reconstruction) abroad (Schlichte 2006b, p. 550). Because the involvement of external actors might be on the rise in state-based civil wars, too, the comparative

9Ross (2004) refers to this as “payment by booty futures”. See also Münkler (2005, pp. 125–130, 7).
analysis presented within the empirical part of this book also investigates whether there exists a significant difference in the quality of involved actors between conventional internal armed conflicts on the one hand and new (non-state) armed conflicts on the other (see Hypothesis 3).

To summarize the above, fighting units in New Wars include foreign regular armed forces operating under the umbrella of International Organizations (IOs), foreign mercenaries, former national police and army forces or breakaway units thereof, local self-defense units (composed of volunteers) as well as local, national or foreign private security companies, criminal gangs, warlords and paramilitary groups (who oftentimes recruit child soldiers) (Kaldor 1999, pp. 91–95). These actors can be distinguished along two lines: internal vs. external and former/quasi-state vs. non-state actors. According to the advocates of the concept, the number of involved groups of violent actors is especially high in New Wars, violent groups are especially prone to factionalize and external actors as especially likely to participate in warfare.

5.2. Individual Motives and New War Economies

The thesis that intra-state wars are increasingly fought between private, non-state actors within weak or even failed states relates to the statement that actors in New Wars mostly follow economic rationale. “From Mujahedin networks to contingents of hastily recruited fighters, from distinguished-looking security firms linked to the top addresses in the arms trade through rowdy adventurers noted for their overindulgence in alcohol and for going weeks without washing to preserve the traces of battle: none of these consists of state subjects fighting out of a mixture of political duty and patriotic attachment to a cause, but rather of individuals driven mainly by financial gain, a lust for adventure and a range of ideological motives” (Münkler 2005, p. 21). The main goal of conventional civil warfare has been to overthrow unjust or corrupt governments and gain control over the capital of the country to assert political interests and ideas (Münkler 2005, p. 23). This changed dramatically in the New Wars era where actors aim to gain or maintain control over resources or trading routes. 10

Contrary to the war economies of the two world wars that were state controlled and centralized (to increase the efficiency of the war and to maximize revenue to pay for the war), that were totalizing (to mobilize as many people as possible to participate in the war effort) and that were autarkic (to be self-sufficient), New War Economies are almost the opposite. They are characterized by high unemployment, a weak, fragmented and decentralized administration as well as high levels of imports and low domestic production. Generally, participation in the war is low relative to the population because

---

10See Jean and Rufin (1996); Elwert (1997); Malone and Berdal (1999); Keen (2000); Reno (2000); Le Billon (2000); Collier and Hoefler (2004).
of lack of pay and legitimacy on the part of the warring parties (Münkler 2005, p. 13; Kaldor 2007, p. 95). As normal trade and tax revenue also decline, the war effort becomes heavily dependent on the exploitation of natural resources, illegal activities and external support.

Private fighting units in New Wars not only finance their war efforts but also realize their own economic interests through various forms of “asset transfer” (e.g. through local predation, loot, robbery, extortion, pillage, hostage-taking or market pressure). Checkpoints control the supply of food and necessities, as do sieges or blockades. Division of territory between paramilitary groups allows them to control market prices. They raise war taxes and “protection” money or engage in the production and black-market trading of drugs, arms and valuable commodities such as oil or diamonds (Kaldor 2007, pp. 10, 108 sq.; Kaldor 2001). “Where no raw materials or mineral resources are available to be sold […], and where geographical or climatic conditions are not suited to the growing of poppy or coca plants, there is still the option of kidnapping women on a large scale and forcing them into prostitution in the brothels of the OECD world” (Münkler 2005, p. 97).

Assistance from neighboring governments, revenue from affluent diaspora communities as well as the diversion or “taxing” of humanitarian aid are additional sources for private profit and financing warfare. Even refugee camps are part of the war economy. They are deliberately used by warlords as recruiting grounds, places to hide and to fall back on food or medicine. “Indeed, the strategists of these wars now include international aid as a logistical element in their operational planning. This is a further factor pushing down the cost of war” (Münkler 2005, pp. 18, 87 sq.). With the help of international camera crews, warlords have also learned how to start up and control the delivery of relief aid. Thus, the media no longer serve a war-reporting function but have involuntarily become a participant in war (Münkler 2005, pp. 88, 90). Oftentimes, warlords sell relief aid which they somehow acquired to local dealers and smugglers who they keep in business and who sell the goods on the local market. This keeps the war economy running, leads to a collapse of local production and creates long term dependence on international aid. In other cases (e.g. in Somalia) smaller NGOs had to rely on locally available transportation to get their aid deliveries from the ports to the refugee camps. “Usually, it is only the local warlords who have the necessary lorries and pick-ups. Most of all, however, aid workers need protection against all kinds of attacks, and that too is something which only the militia leaders and warlords can provide” (Münkler 2005, pp. 88 sq.).

The emergence of a typical New War Economy is observable in the DRC where fighting mainly was (and still is) about the control and trade of a few key mineral resources (coltan, diamonds, copper and gold). These resources are exploited by violent actors through confiscation, extraction, the establishment of forced monopolies and price-fixing. Similarly, between 1990 and 1994 Charles Taylor is believed to have made 75 million US dollars per year by levying taxes on Liberian diamond, gold, iron ore, rubber and timber exports organized from the territory under his control as a rebel leader during the Liberian civil war (Berdal 2005, p. 485). In Sierra Leone, the RUF rebels are estimated to have earned 25 to 125 million dollars per year during the 1990s through the sale
of diamonds (Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 26). In Angola, violent conflict mutated into New Warfare after the end of the Cold War. Between 1992 and 2000, the value of diamonds produced under the control of the UNITA rebels is estimated at 3 to 4 billion dollars. The actual level of profits is unknown (Le Billon 2001, p. 69; Global Witness 1998; Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 21). In the Bosnian case, regular forces were largely funded and equipped by sponsor governments while the local militia were funded by municipalities (who “taxed” humanitarian assistance, enterprises and citizens of their territory and abroad). The paramilitary, however, financed themselves through loot and extortion of expelled people, the confiscation of equipment from conquered territory, taxation of humanitarian aid (which they collected at many checkpoints) and trafficking in contraband (Kaldor 2007, p. 52; Berdal 2003, p. 492). Although there were nationalist fanatics among the paramilitary, Kaldor (2007, p. 57) notes that “[t]he motivation of the paramilitary groups seems to have been largely economic”. She continues by quoting Vasic, who estimated that around 80 percent of the paramilitary were common criminals. The remaining 20 percent were fanatical nationalists but they did not last long because “fanaticism is bad for business”. In Bosnia and elsewhere, even UN personnel were part of the war economy – deliberately if they engaged in black-market activities (Kaldor 2007, p. 66) but also involuntarily or forcibly. For instance, when the Bosnian Serbs laid siege on Sarajevo, they refused to let UN convoys into the city until they had skimmed off a large part of the relief supplies for themselves. Humanitarian aid became “something extra” that could be used for a continuation of the war and the siege. The UN, in that case, assisted both the besiegers and the besieged. In the Iraq, the Americans believe that “the insurgents have unlimited money supply by members of the former regime or by Saudi and religious charities” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 14). In addition, the exploitation and production of conflict resources (oil and drugs) provided funding. Even some of the funds made available under the oil-for-food programme “found their ways into the new war economy”. In addition and despite the fact “that former Ba’athists and some Islamic groups have substantial funding […] it is also clear that there is widespread looting, hostage taking and convoy hijacking for money” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 14). While various groups rely on such methods to finance their warfare, some of this behavior is “purely criminal” and serves private enrichment. Similarly and although most of the groups insist that their main target is the Western occupation and that they oppose abductions or assassinations, “there are some groups that seem to specialize in these latter roles” (Kaldor 2006b, p. 10). Thus, in Iraq “various organized crime groups, which operate under the cover of the insurgency” emerged (Kaldor 2006b, p. 11). Kaldor (2006b, p. 14) speaks of a “typical new war criminalized economy in which income often depends on violent methods”. In general, New War Economies are characterized by a criminalization of internal and external lines of supply and a symbiotic relationship between warlords and organized crime (Heupel and Zangl 2003, pp. 8 sq.).

This very well links with another decisive feature of New War Economies, namely their “openness” evident in their linkage to the international criminal economy. In the case of Afghanistan, Münkler (2005, p. 94) observes a transition from a closed war economy (that was operating on the basis of subsistence agriculture and Western and Islamic
subsidies) to an open war economy. The key feature of this open war economy was the growing production of raw opium which could yield considerable profits on the trade routes to the eastern Mediterranean. “Local warlords entered into cooperation with international crime syndicates that also took in the countries’ traditionally well-organized rings of smugglers. These rings [...] earned large profits that each warlord increasingly threatened to confiscate by erecting road-blocks and charging tolls on through traffic. In the 1990s, [...] this informal economy of the warlords was linked to the international criminal economy” (Münkler 2005, p. 94). The author emphasizes that in many other countries where legal goods (like rare minerals or tropical woods) are produced during warfare, a better integration into the world market “has by no means improved the chances for peace, but has mainly consolidated the position of warlords” who were in control of these resources (Münkler 2005, pp. 94 sq.).

In order to maximize their profit, those involved in New Warfare even cooperate with each other across supposed lines of confrontation. A famous example is the so called “sell game” in Sierra Leone where government troops sold arms and ammunition to rebels. In Bosnia, “all three types of forces [the regular forces, the paramilitary and the militia] cooperated with each other both militarily and economically” (Kaldor 2007, p. 52). This is evident in one instance when the United Nations Protection Force intercepted a telephone conversation between the local Muslim commander and the local Serb commander fighting each other in the city of Mostar. In this telephone call, they were discussing the price in German marks to be paid if the Serbs would shell the Croats. Similarly, when the Serbs took Mount Igman in 1993, the paramilitary groups that defended Mount Igman at that moment were ready to “sell” their positions in exchange for control over the black-market routes (Kaldor 2007, pp. 53 sq.). In light of this kind of cooperation between opponents it comes as no surprise that there was no continuous front, relatively little fighting took place and little territory changed hands (Kaldor 2007, p. 53; Kaldor 2006a, p. 6; Berdal 2003, pp. 486 sq.).

In summary, the combination of weak state authority, political instability and inefficient national markets on the one hand but the presence of lootable, profitable resources, the possibility of various forms of asset transfer and access to the global market on the other leads to the emergence of specific war economies that serve the economic interests of private actors in New Wars. State disintegration and the ease with which war economies are able to feed into the flows of capital and goods in the world market have made war on a private basis “once more worthwhile”. It is this “profitability of force” which encourages a further privatization of warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 91; Münkler 2003, p. 17). Some empirical support again comes from Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster (2009, p. 31), who find that the involvement of at least mercenary forces is particularly likely in (state-based and non-state) internal armed conflicts happening in countries with (lootable and non-lootable) diamond deposits. The effect is not only statistically significant and stable but also substantial. “Diamonds increase the probability of mer-

5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

senarios by approximately 20 percentage points” (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, p. 22). Whether this specific conflict resource is increasingly exploited to finance internal warfare in general and New Warfare in particular will be further analyzed within the empirical part of this book (see Hypotheses 4, 4a and 4b).

Finally, New War Economies can be linked with the already mentioned identity politics. According to Kaldor (1999, pp. 78 sq.), the new identity politics have two sources: firstly, they emerge as a reaction to the declining importance and legitimacy of the established classes in the context of weak states. In this case, identity politics become a form of political mobilization, a survival tactic for those involved in politics. Especially where lootable resources do not occur, exclusive identities serve as the main source of motivation. Secondly, identity politics also emerge out of the above described parallel economy because they serve to legitimize the building of alliances, various forms of bribery, insider dealing, all sorts of shadowy forms of economic activities and otherwise illegal or illegitimate methods of private gain. In return, exclusive identities are cemented or reinforced by mutual dependence on the continued functioning of the war economy (Kaldor 1999, p. 84). Thus, the New War Economies cannot be disentangled from identity politics. In addition, Kaldor (2007, p. 113) notes that economic motivation alone is insufficient to explain the scale, brutality or “sheer viciousness” of New Wars. Especially the use of identity politics contributes to the understanding of the severity of violence applied in New Warfare. This shall be discussed in the following.

5.3. The Strategy of New Warfare

As indicated above, the changing nature of actors and motives connects with changing methods of warfare. Nevertheless, the New Wars Strategy is not something fundamentally new but borrows from both guerrilla warfare and from counterinsurgency (Kaldor 1999, p. 7). It borrows from revolutionary warfare the strategy of avoiding battle. There are “few actual engagements and no major battles; military forces do not lock horns and wear each other down, but spare each other” (Münkler 2005, p. 3). Like the guerrillas, actors in New Warfare aim to control territory politically rather than militarily through capturing territory from the enemy. This is easy as the central authority is weak and the main contenders are not government forces but similar types of fighting units. Often the various factions even cooperate in dividing up territory.

In comparison with revolutionary warfare, however, the method of political control differs. Even though fear was a significant element, popular support and allegiance to the revolutionary idea was the central aim in guerrilla warfare. This is also referred to as a strategy of “winning the hearts and minds of people”. Contrary to this, in New Wars control is established through allegiance to a label (i.e. ethnic or religious identity) rather than an idea or ideology. Again, exclusive identities are cemented or reinforced
by shared complicity in war crimes (Kaldor 1999, pp. 84, 99). “Ethnic differences are repeatedly used to justify the excesses [and therefore] intensify the violence [although] they do not cause it” (Münkler 2005, p. 79).

Those who do not admit to the right label are eliminated. “Instead of creating a favourable environment for the guerrilla, the New Warfare aims to create an unfavourable environment for all those people it cannot control” (Kaldor 1999, p. 98). The main method of territorial control is not popular support but massive and forced popular displacement. “Control of one’s own side depends not on positive benefits, since in the impoverished, disorderly conditions of New Warfare, there is not much that can be offered. Rather, it depends on continuing fear and insecurity and on the perpetuation of hatred of the other” (Kaldor 1999, pp. 98 sq.). Thus and similar to counterinsurgency technique, destabilization is applied, aimed at sowing fear and hatred.

In a context of state failure, civilians cannot rely on the state for their physical protection. Instead, former state forces or breakaway units of the national army themselves participate in such kind of violent action. Kaldor (2000) therefore describes New Wars as “protection failures”. This unwillingness or inability of the state to protect its citizens from being attacked by violent non-state actors is observable in ethnic cleansing, systematic assaults on (or even systematic murder of) civilians, massive forcible population expulsion or increasing numbers of internally displaced people and refugees. In order to render areas uninhabitable, anti-personal land mines, shells and rockets are used against civilian targets like homes, hospitals and crowded places. Forced famines, sieges, the destruction of historic and cultural monuments or the involvement of civilians in active fighting as a buffer are also mentioned as indicators (Kaldor 2007, pp. 8 sq., 104–107). In addition, Kaldor lists defilement through systematic rape and sexual abuse as part of the strategy applied in New Wars (Kaldor 1999, pp. 98 sq.). If sexual violence against women is applied as a cheap and effective instrument of warfare or ethnic cleansing, it targets the community’s ethnic-cultural identity and the community’s reproductive power represented by the women. Rape aims to wound the self-esteem of communities and to ensure that the women raped no longer appear as potential wives and mothers. The objective is “to smash up communities, to shatter family ties and to interrupt the sequence of generations, thereby breaking its members’ will to assert their identity” (Münkler 2005, p. 85). In other instances, rape serves as an instrument of humiliation and emasculation and is applied to destroy the remaining illusions of power and property of the opponent men. In this case, violence against women targets the enemy’s will through violence inflicted on the women’s body. “This explains why in the new wars […] many rapes take place in public places, or at least in the presence of the husband, father and other relatives of the victim” (Münkler 2005, p. 85).

Unbelievable crimes against civilians, including rape as a weapon of war, were and are still occurring in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where several non-state forces are still fighting, the Congolese army, external regular forces and each other. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that 75 percent of all the rape cases
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

it dealt with worldwide were in Eastern Congo. A census by UNICEF counted 18,505 persons treated for sexual violence in the first 10 months of 2008, 30 percent of whom were children. In 2009, the situation deteriorated further with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reporting a huge surge in sexual violence and rape in Eastern Congo (Grignon 2009). Besides rape, countless people were tortured or murdered and child soldiers were forcibly recruited. As a consequence, up to 400,000 people have been displaced since violence re-erupted in North Kivu in 2006. Between 850,000 to 1 million IDPs are still unable to return safely to their areas of origin (ICG 2008; ICG 2009).

In more detail, Kaldor (2007, p. 54) describes the “destruction of communities from the top down” during the Bosnian war where violent acts against civilians were more directed in nature. While “in urban areas […] ethnic cleansing was a slower, more legalistic process” (Kaldor 2007, p. 55), the typical pattern of ethnic cleansing that was applied to rural areas is described as follows: The regular forces started with shelling the area and issued frightening propaganda (e.g. information on acts of terror in neighboring villages) in order to create fear and panic. Then they closed in, terrorized non-Serb residents with random killing, rape and looting and established control over the local administration. Oftentimes, non-Serb men were separated from women and taken to detention camps or killed. “Women were robbed and/or raped and allowed to go or taken to special rape detention centers. Houses and cultural buildings such as mosques were looted, burned or blown up. The paramilitary groups also seemed to have lists of prominent people – community leaders, intellectuals, SDA members, wealthy people – who were separated from the rest and executed” (Kaldor 2007, p. 55) refers to a UN report when stating that the worst atrocities (mass rape, sexual assault, killing and torture in detention facilities) especially during the early stages of warfare were committed by paramilitary fighters. In fact, “paramilitary groups were ‘hired’ to do the dirty work necessary to instil the ‘fear and hate’ which was not yet endemic in Bosnian society” (Kaldor 2007, p. 57). In line with the aforementioned, “the situation was better in a few places where the local state apparatus survived” (Kaldor 2007, pp. 57 sq.). The city of Tuzla is given as an example, which was defended by the local police and volunteers, where “an ideology of multicultural civic values was vigorously promoted”, where taxes were raised and even energy supply and mining activities continued throughout the war.

This illustrates Kaldor’s famous conclusion that “what were considered to be undesirable and illegitimate side-effects of old wars have become central to the mode of fighting in the new wars” (Kaldor 1999, p. 100). What was proscribed according to the classical rules of warfare and codified in the laws of war in the late nineteenth century (e.g. sieges, the destruction of historic monuments or atrocities against non-combatants) are essential components of the New Wars Strategy. Thus, New Wars might well be specifically brutal. However, Kaldor also emphasizes that it is less the scale but the quality of violence that changes. In New Wars most violence is directed against civilians instead of military targets as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics and ethnic cleansing.
or due to difficulties in distinguishing insurgents from civilians (Kaldor 2005, pp. 3, 8; Kaldor 2006b, pp. 15 sq.; Münkler 2005, p. 14). Respective trends over time are identified, too (Kaldor 2007, p. 9; Münkler 2006, p. 137). The thesis that violent actors in internal warfare increasingly attack and kill civilians is then backed by referring to significant changes in the ratio of civilian to military battle-deaths. Although they choose a different wording and do not speak of “New Warfare”, Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005, pp. 160 sq.) conclude with a similar statement. They note that most present warfare is in the form of civil conflict and in the form of “wars of state failure taking place outside of areas of the major powers’ strategic interest”. The authors expect “that many of these conflicts will be characterised more by severe humanitarian crises than combat of the intensity seen during the Cold War”.

A serious comparison of the kind of violence applied in state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts would require information on the (civilian or military) identity of direct and indirect victims and perpetrators for both types of conflict. Reliable indicators on the numbers of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) by type of armed conflict would also be desirable. At least for new (non-state) armed conflicts such data are not available. So far, it is impossible to assign the correct number of refugees and IDPs to single cases of warfare if countries are experiencing several armed conflicts of different type, maybe even at the same time. Due to this lack of data, the analysis presented in the empirical part of this book is forced to focus on the scale of violence. More precisely, Hypothesis 5 asks in how far the severity of fighting in new (non-state) armed conflicts is significantly higher compared with conventional (state-based) armed conflicts.

12Kaldor (1999, p. 100) and Münkler (2005, p. 14) both state that at the beginning of the 20th century, 80 to 90 percent of casualties in war were military, i.e. combatants under international law. By the late 1990s, this has been almost exactly reversed. Nowadays, approximately 80 percent of all casualties are civilian. Mack (2007) calls this a “conventional wisdom” and the given numbers the “most widely-cited statistics” although no evidence has ever been produced to substantiate these fatality statistics. He believes the actual figure to be much lower and refers to UCDP data. These data suggest that today 30 to 60 percent of violent deaths in armed conflicts are civilians (Mack 2007, p. 8). Chojnacki (2003, p. 4) refers to Eckhardt (1989) when stating that “[t]he only study known to analyse this relation in a historically systematical manner over a longer period of time concludes that the proportion of civilians among war victims has constantly remained at about 50 percent since the 18th century”. Although this criticism is well taken, the ratio of civilian to military deaths might still be much higher for a certain sub-type of intra-state armed conflict. In addition, the average certainly masks regional differences.
5. The Dimensions of New Warfare

5.4. The Duration of New Warfare

Especially the economic motives of private actors and the emergence of New War Economies help to theoretically explain the long duration of fighting. Since the above listed (illegal) sources of private profit and financing can only be sustained in a context of continued violence and state weakness, a war-logic is built into the functioning of the economy (Kaldor 1999, p. 9). “Those, who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzian terms, based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war” (Kaldor 2007, p. 95).

Münkler (2005, pp. 45 sq., 94) adds that wars normally last longer the more access the participants have to the resources of the world economy and the more of the conflict resources can be sold on the world market which feeds and strengthens the warlords and militia leaders economically. Thus, the notion of an underlying economic interest in the continuation of warfare needs to be extended to the consumers of conflict resources like timber, diamonds or drugs, who often reside in Western countries, as well as to foreign producers and external providers of weapons and funds. Because actors in New Warfare are not dependent on tax revenue which otherwise defines the length (and intensity) of warfare, New Wars can at least in theory continue as long as external support and internal resources are available. In addition, what matters in sustaining war is the extent to which the goal and applied strategies of warfare are recognized by those who participate in the war as legitimate (Kaldor 1999, p. 27). To provide a justification for otherwise illegal methods of private gain and to legitimize violent strategies that systematically and permanently target civilians, New Wars Actors resort to identity politics. The result are specifically brutal conflicts involving ethnic or religious issues which are difficult to end. Kaldor summarizes that the networks of actors involved in New Warfare have a vested interest in perpetuating violence, both for political reasons, because they thrive on fear and hate and for economic reasons (Kaldor 2004; Kaldor 2000).

Like in conventional civil warfare, the strategy of avoiding direct military encounters also contributes to a long duration of New Warfare. “[S]ince these wars do not usually involve a rapid and total mobilization of forces but slowly use them up on an ongoing basis, most of them last a long time and keep flaring up after temporary lulls” (Münkler 2005, p. 45).

Finally, the high number of opposed actors can be linked with a comparatively long duration of New Warfare. With an increase in the number of fighting factions, peace negotiations become more difficult and renewed outbreaks of violence more likely. 13

---

13 Münkler (2005, pp. 46 sq.) again provides the historic example of the Thirty Years’ War that shares much likeness with New Wars: “For some fourteen years there had been talk of holding a comprehensive European peace congress, before this finally resulted in the Peace of Westfalia [...] It took three years for the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück to end in an agreement on the main (not all) points. This was partly due to the fact that many interest groups had taken shape in the
If even one of the many small groups of violent actors is unhappy with the emerging peacetime conditions, it is an easy matter for them to rekindle the flames of war. Münkler (2005, p. 13) warns that because each of the many groups capable of violence needs to be won over to the renunciation of violence, peace agreements are replaced by lengthy and fragile peace processes. The latter require outside guarantees in terms of funds and forces and more often end in failure than in success. Therefore, the duration of New Wars is expected to be significantly longer compared with conventional civil wars (see Hypothesis 6). A final overview of the context and dimensions of New Warfare is provided by the following figure (see fig. 5.2 on the following page).
Figure 5.2: The Context and Dimensions of New Warfare. Source: own depiction.
6. Interim Summary I: The Theoretical Concept of New Wars

According to the advocates of the concept, New Wars arise in a context of “state failure [...] or at least a failing state” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 6). Especially processes of globalization and the end of the Cold War contributed to state weakness. Globalization weakened states’ monopoly of legitimate organized violence “from above” e.g. through the increasing transnationalization of military forces and the interference of private external actors in conflict and post-conflict situations. Both globalization and the end of the East-West controversy contributed to crises of identity, the rise of alternative, vertical identities and the emergence of “identity politics”. The latter are used by violent actors in New Warfare to mobilize combatants and to justify their criminal and illegal activities. The end of the Cold War also led to a shortfall of financial and material support from former super-powers which further weakened states and violent non-state actors. As far as possible, the lack of financial resources is compensated by natural resource extraction and the build-up of specific New War Economies. The failure of neoliberal development strategies and the following debt crisis further aggravated the fight over natural resources. Finally, the end of the Cold War not only left an enormous surplus of small and light weapons that are primarily used in New Wars but also resulted in a large supply of well trained and war-experienced soldiers. This gave rise to rebel groups, private military companies and mercenaries.

Weak states are unable to inhibit a privatization of violence, to effectively end fighting if it breaks out among non-state groups and to stop them from criminal activity. At worst, non-state or quasi-state actors completely take over government functions up to the provision of selective security. This has been referred to as an erosion of states’ monopoly of organized violence “from below”.

The emergence of multiple non-state actors following their private economic interests results in the establishment of New War Economies. Within these war economies, the realization of private gain depends on the continuation of fear and the perpetuation of hate. In order to stabilize war economies violent actors therefore resort to identity politics and strategies that systematically and permanently target civilians.
Both the New War Economies and the New War Strategies explain the comparatively long duration of New Warfare. In addition, a quick and stable settlement solution through negotiation is unlikely due to the high number of opposed actors which also increases the chances of a renewed outbreak of violence (Kaldor 1999, p. 9).

Because extensive and intensive warfare further weaken states there exist feedback loops which render a determination of the direction of relationships difficult. For instance, while in Old Wars victory over an enemy resulted in state-building, New Wars “exacerbate the disintegration of the states” (Kaldor 2005, p. 3; Münkler 2005, p. 76). Therefore, state weakness contributes to the outbreak of New Wars and Conflicts as much as it can be considered a consequence of New Warfare. Likewise, state weakness is a precondition for the emergence of violent non-state actors. However, the existence and activities of non-state violent actors in return weaken states. Similarly, exclusive identities can be considered a cause of New Warfare because they contribute to the outbreak of violence, provide ground for the emergence of identity politics, excessive violence and the functioning of war economies. However, the spread and hardening of sectarian ideologies (up to the emergence of a “culture of violence”) are also a consequence of (prolonged and intense) warfare (Kaldor 2001). Kaldor (2006a, p. 8) notes that “those conditions I describe that lead to war are worsened by war. The criminalised economy has spread, extremist ideologies catch on, as people get killed they start to hate. The institutions of the state are even weaker than they were before and what that means is that these are wars that are terribly difficult to end, they go on for years and years and years”.

The above introduced the term “New Warfare” as a sub-type of internal armed conflict that is characterized by a specific combination of values of the following dimensions of warfare: The nature and quantity of actors involved in fighting, their motives and modes of financing warfare, the applied strategies and the duration of fighting. This is largely in line with Kaldor (1999, p. 14), who distinguishes old, inter-state wars from New Wars with respect to the type of policy and army involved in fighting, the goals of warfare, the associated mode of financing warfare and the applied military technique. Others came up with slightly different distinguishing features which indicates that a clear differentiation of Old from New Wars is by no means trivial. Kaldor further complicates the matter by noting that New Wars involve elements of pre-modernity and modernity such as a

---

1 Heupel and Zangl (2010, p. 31) distinguish old and new intra-state wars “by four criteria relating to the warring parties, their war economy, war motives and warfare strategies”. They use these criteria as “gradual scales” to determine the extent to which their selected cases of warfare resemble a new wars profile. According to Snow (1996, p. 76), New Wars and conventional insurgencies differ in regard to the overt purpose of gaining political power, the degree to which the parties pursue the political loyalty of an identical center of gravity, the degree to which they rely on terror and intimidation rather than positive appeals and the extent to which they follow something like the mobile-guerrilla strategy in waging war. Newman (2004, p. 174) distinguishes Old from New Wars in terms of the protagonists (state/public or non-state/private actors), their primary motives (ideology, territorial secession or material aggrandizement), the spacial context of warfare (inter-state, ‘civil’, regional or global), the technological means of violence (weapons and strategies), the social, material and human impact of conflict and the political economy and social structure of conflict.
blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gains) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals) (Kaldor 2007, p. 2; Kaldor 1999, pp. 2 sq.; Kaldor 2005, p. 3). Although New Wars are localized, they build on transnational connections so that a distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attack from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), between local and global are difficult to sustain. Although the privatization of violence is an important element of New Wars, Kaldor realizes that in practice, the distinction between what is private and what is public, state or non-state, informal and formal, between what is done for economic or political motives cannot easily be applied. Single features of New Wars and Conflicts have indeed been mentioned as characteristics of old, inter-state wars. For example, the use of mercenaries or only partly professional armies can already be observed in the early modern wars. An erosion of what is internal and external already happened in ideological Cold War fighting when the importance of military alliances became apparent. The elimination of the distinction between private and public and the targeting of civilians and economic infrastructure have as well been mentioned as features of total warfare while private interests in warfare (the latest) rose with the emergence of the military-industrial complex. This renders a clear differentiation of types of armed conflict in general (and between sub-types of internal armed conflict in particular) very difficult though indispensable.

An exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology (that includes all dimensions of armed conflict, that assigns each case to only one type of armed conflict and that is able to concisely describe a great deal of information) still needs to be developed through a systematic process rather than merely by intuition. The development of such a typology is necessary not only for rhetorical reasons to justify the labeling of these wars and conflicts as “new” but mostly for analytical purpose. Kaldor (2005, p. 10) adds another argument. She calls New Wars “new” not because they are altogether new but “because we can only develop alternative strategies if we see how different they are from World War II, [the] Cold War or the ‘War on Terror’”. Although I agree that a profound understanding of the phenomenon forms the basis of any political action including intervention, I disagree in one regard: in order to develop alternative strategies we especially need to see how different New Wars are from conventional, intra-state wars (Kahl and Teusch 2004, pp. 384 sq., 400; Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 6). The following chapter therefore summarizes major similarities and differences between sub-types of internal warfare. The aim is to provide a more systematic comparison of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts (especially greed rebellions) on the one hand and new (non-state) armed conflicts as first described by Mary Kaldor (1999) on the other. This comparison does not substitute for the development of an exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology but hopefully adds some clarity.
7. Non-State vs. State-Based Internal Armed Conflicts

Greed models and the concept of New Wars share the importance that is attributed to the role of lootable resources and to the establishment of war economies. In both types of warfare, violent actors fight over the control of lootable resources that provide motivation for fighting and opportunity to finance the war effort. Both types of warfare are either predominantly or even entirely loot-seeking. Often, external actors participate in the looting of resources and demand their share in the country’s wealth. Contrary to this, in grievance rebellions the exploitation of resources is not an aim in itself but a means towards the achievement of an “ennobling” political or ideological goal – to overthrow or secede from the existing regime in order to establish a new, more abundant, equitable or egalitarian political, social and economic order. If external actors participate, they do so for the same reason (to achieve the overall political goal) and justify their engagement in terms of shared identity or ideology with one of the warring factions. Conventional greed rebellions and New Wars and Conflicts also share the characteristic that benefits from rebel victory are private and immediately distributed among those involved in warfare. On the contrary, grievance rebellions face a “rebels’ dilemma” due to strong incentives to freeride as well as a “time-consistency problem” because benefits from rebel victory can be enjoyed by everyone and are only prospective. If ever, these collective action constraints can only be overcome in cases where the grievances suffered by the civilian population and the shared identity among fighters are very serious. Grievance models have therefore been criticized for not offering a convincing solution to the collective action problem. As a result, they most likely over-predict civil wars. In both conventional greed rebellions and New Wars and Conflicts, the rebel organizations involved in fighting are described as comparatively small, quasi-criminal organizations. The small size of the organization guarantees each individual member more influence (e.g. on the distribution of benefits). Because warfare is a constant competition over the control of resources, both types of warfare are also likely to experience a further fractionalization of the warring parties. Finally and like in greed rebellions, violent groups in New Warfare are only loosely organized. They “lack the hierarchy, order and vertical command systems that have been typical of guerrilla forces” fighting insurgencies or grievance rebellions (Kaldor 2007, p. 101; Kaldor 2006b, p. 8). Despite these similarities, however, conventional greed rebellions differ from New Wars and Conflicts in many regard.
7. Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting

Firstly, the (repressive) state still exists and constitutes the opponent in greed (as well as grievance) rebellions while New Wars and Conflicts take place in a context of state failure or even state collapse. According to Snow (1996), Cold War insurgencies occurred in countries with weak societies but relatively strong and oppressive state structures, while New Wars are happening in countries characterized by weak societies and weak state structures. Greed and grievance rebellions happen because they are feasible (due to the availability of conflict resources) or because preferences for violent resistance are strong. New Wars and Conflicts occur because they are feasible and because there is nothing to prevent them.

While greed (and grievance) rebellions always involve state forces who fight internal opposition groups, New Wars and Conflicts are non-state or sub-state in nature. A functioning state army does not exist any more or is unable or unwilling to intervene. Instead of a comparatively strong army (that fights for its existence, the control over important resources and has the means to let violence escalate), rebels battle each other. All opponents in New Wars and Conflicts are small, quasi-criminal gangs that mostly rely on light weapons. Thanks to globalization and left-over stockpiles from the Cold War, “everybody more or less can have access to accurate and destructive weapons” which results in an “equalisation of military technology” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 7). In contrast, conventional greed and grievance rebellions are characterized by an asymmetry in military power.¹

The distribution of military power among opponents affects the strategies, the scale and nature of violence. Because rebels in conventional civil wars know that they cannot defeat regular armies, they avoid open battle. Instead, they aim to politically control territory by winning the hearts and minds of people and then use that territory as a safe haven. From there, they hit the regular army in little incidents, through attrition. If necessary, they retreat until the government would be sufficiently weakened to be defeated or to give up (Kaldor 2006a, p. 6). Kaldor and Münkler emphasize that in New Warfare, direct military encounter among the warring parties is rare, too (Kaldor 2005, p. 3; Kaldor 2006b, p. 1; Münkler 2005, p. 3). In fact, it might be even less likely than in conventional, state-based armed conflicts because “battles are just too dangerous, because of the equalization of military technology” (Kaldor 2006a, p. 7). This leads to the expectation of rather low, overall numbers of direct, battle-related military casualties per conflict and year.

¹I follow Kaldor’s argument that New Wars are characterized by a symmetry of military power and objectives, although much of the violence in New Warfare is applied asymmetrically (against unarmed civilians instead of warring parties). Münkler also emphasizes this one-sided, asymmetric nature of violence in New Warfare, but he also speaks of the “new (military) asymmetries” that appeared with the emergence of private actors in internal warfare (Münkler 2005, p. 135; Münkler 2006, pp. 134 sq., 142 sq.). In this regard, he fails to clearly differentiate new (non-state and symmetric) internal armed conflicts from conventional (state-based and asymmetric) civil wars.
On the other hand, identity politics are applied which might result in bloody ethnic or religious wars with especially high numbers of direct battle-related civilian casualties. Actors in New Warfare can afford strategies that systematically target civilians because winning is not their primary objective. They neither pursue political loyalty nor the loyalty of an identical center of gravity. They do not battle for the hearts and minds of people. New Warfare lacks any conscious connection to politics and is “hardly ever ideological in the sense of offering an alternative and presumably superior, form of governance” (Snow 1996, p. 56). Because violent actors in these conflicts do not need to portray themselves as the better government, some even predict a senseless slaughter of civilians and a reversion to the pre-Clausewitzian style of war. Consequently, popular support for such rebellions is comparatively low. These two offsetting characteristics (comparatively low numbers of direct military deaths but high numbers of direct civilian deaths) could explain why the average total number of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths might not necessarily differ much from conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. At least there is no straightforward answer as to whether the overall scale of violence significantly varies between these sub-types of intra-state armed conflict. The composition of overall deaths, however, most likely is due to the comparatively high share of civilian victims in New Wars.

In addition to the nature of the victims, the nature of the perpetrators of violence differs. In New Wars and Conflicts, violence against civilians is applied by non-state forces while in conventional civil wars “harsh repression” against civilians is mostly applied by state instead of non-state forces. While the former is evident (due to the entirely non-state nature of the involved actors) the latter requires some explanation. Again, it can be argued that in conventional civil warfare (even in greed conflicts), the rebels aim to replace the existing regime for political or economic reasons and therefore need to sell themselves as the better government. At least in theory, this should deter them from exerting indiscriminate violence against civilians. Contrary to this, the government needs to react swiftly to crush the rebellion once and for all. While the rebels can retreat in order to regain strength and recover from set-backs, the government needs to win in order to survive and to avoid lengthy and costly warfare. In conventional armed conflicts, counter-insurgency by government forces therefore involves rigorous measures not only against the rebels but also against civilians who support or hide the rebels (Valentino et al. 2004; Azam and Hoeffler 2002). The longer the rebellion lasts, the more inappropriate and unsuccessful are the counter-insurgency measures by the government. In the end, this serves the rebels, who even provoke harsh and disproportionate repression by the government against civilians because such reprisals help them to recruit supporters (Kalyvas 2006, p. 151).

---

2“A Clausewitzian analysis does very little to explain the rampage in Rwanda, wherein there was no ennobling political or ideological goal behind the slaughter (other than possibly serving to keep conservative Hutu in power), one could find no common center of gravity to which contending parties were attempting to appeal, and the rapaciousness of the violence violated all tenets of the theories of insurgency-counterinsurgency” (Snow 1996, pp. 26 sq.).
7. Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting

Another difference between conventional greed rebellions and New Wars and Conflicts concerns the scope of warfare which links with the context of state collapse. Violent actors in greed rebellions fight over lootable resources in remote rural areas where the coercive reach of the central state is weak. Such warfare remains local and distant from the center. In contrast, due to state collapse, violent actors in New Warfare are able to fight each other over lootable resources wherever they occur. Such warfare carries the potential to affect an entire, resource rich region even close to the capital. Besides the occurrence of resources and their geological form, there are few constraints that inhibit warfare from spreading to a comparatively large share of the national territory. In regard to their scope, New Wars and Conflict rather resemble conventional grievance instead of greed rebellions that also affect entire regions (in case of secessionist conflicts) or the entire nation-state – though for different reasons.

Finally, while “politics of ideas” serve as the source of mobilization in conventional civil wars, “identity politics” serve as the source of mobilization in New Warfare. Kaldor explains that in conventional civil wars supporters are often mobilized on the basis of shared ideological beliefs. This is what she describes as “politics of ideas” that “tend to be integrative, embracing all those who support the idea” (Kaldor 1999, pp. 77 sq.). In addition to ideology, shared ethnic or religious identity and community ties also serve as a basis for mobilization. In conventional civil wars, these identities are then linked “either to a notion of state interest or to some forward-looking project – ideas about how society should be organized” (Kaldor 2007, p. 7). Thus, identities are used as a source of mobilization for political campaigns and lead to “demands for cultural and religious rights” which is quite different from the identity politics applied in New Warfare. Identity politics are not demands for political and religious rights, but “demand[s] for political rights based on identity”, i.e. “[a] form of communitarianism that is distinct from and may [even] conflict with individual political rights” (Kaldor 1999, p. 77). Elsewhere, Kaldor (2006a, p. 6) explains that a New War is “fought not to acquire cultural rights or religious rights, it’s fought because you feel that as a Muslim, as a Hindu, as a Serb, as a Croat, you have a right to the state: it’s about labels”. Instead of integrative, forward-looking projects, identity politics are described as exclusive, fragmentative and backward-looking movements of nostalgia used by rebel leaders to increase legitimacy, to justify authoritarian policies or their predatory behavior, to create scapegoats and to mobilize support around fear and insecurity. Ideology is not important anymore. Instead, control is established through allegiance to a label rather than an idea. Those who do not profess to the right label are eliminated (Kaldor 1999, pp. 77 sq., 81, 98).

In addition to identity politics, New Wars and Conflicts mobilize their participants on the basis of selective incentives. Like in greed rebellions, participants in New Wars and Conflicts can be counted on to support the rebellion only so long as these incentives are provided. If the “payments” to the rebels are not forthcoming anymore or if the risks of participation increase, New Wars and Conflicts are also likely to fail. This means that there is not much difference between conventional greed rebellions and New Warfare in the logic that drives violent action. However, a situation in which participants would
desert is far less likely in New Wars and Conflicts because warfare is less risky due to the absence of a functioning state that would otherwise defend its resources. This guarantees a steady flow of private benefits from warfare. In addition, the protagonists do not face any risk of being sanctioned by the government because there simply is no state. Furthermore, individuals involved in New Warfare are less likely to desert and the rebellion is less likely to fail because warfare is comparatively cheap. The fact that the state and the legal economy collapsed greatly reduces the opportunity costs of joining the rebellion because alternative income-earning opportunities do not exist. Snow (1996) notes that contrary to insurgencies that happened in developing countries, New Wars are taking place in even poorer countries that belong to the group of least developed states.

Most importantly, however, lootable resources do not need to be “provided” or captured from the state but are simply available for exploitation via self-service. If rebels engage in battle, they only fight similar criminal gangs (in terms of size, structure, interests and weaponry) over the distribution of these resources. Because there is nothing to prevent the rebels from exploiting these resources in the first place, they are capable of rising and dispersing selective incentives right from the beginning. This solves the question of who provides the selective incentives within the initial stage of warfare.3

Such New Warfare then sustains for years – not because the rebels are unsuccessful in defeating the government but because winning is not what they intend. Although conventional civil wars that are fought according to the principles of guerrilla warfare might last long, too, the rebels still seek “a military resolution of the war”. Contrary to this, “most players in new wars […] content themselves with what Mao called ‘strategic defensive’; that is, they use military force essentially for self-preservation, without seriously looking for a military resolution to the war. If both sides conduct the war with this aim in mind, then clearly, with sufficient internal and external funding, it can theoretically last for ever” (Münkler 2005, p. 12). As long as the benefits outweigh the costs of participation, a change in the status quo is not desired by either party to the conflict. Only the continuation of instability and state dysfunction guarantees these profits. Both sides win if they do not lose. This logic also applies to greed rebellions, but only to one side of the conflict (namely the rebels). As long as the benefits outweigh the costs of participation, the rebels do not have any interest in changing the status quo (although in the long run an overthrow of the existing regime or secession in order to gain full control over resources would guarantee even more profit and fewer war-induced costs). In conventional greed rebellions, however, the other side to the conflict (the government) needs to win to win. Therefore, conventional greed (and grievance) conflicts are characterized by an “asymmetry of objectives” while in New Wars and Conflicts a “symmetry of objective” exists.

3However, it does not in itself explain why the state no longer exercises its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. The causes of state collapse reach beyond economic factors as briefly mentioned before.
7. Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting

In summary, I argued that out of the question of what motivates rebels to engage in political violence, two theoretical models of civil warfare emerged which after the end of the Cold War replaced the dominant Western view of inter-state armed conflict by an intra-state perspective: Deprived Actor Models and Rational Actor Models. The first part of this study presented both models which are widely used to describe conventional (state-based) greed and grievance rebellions. Afterwards, I introduced a third model which explains the causes and nature of non-conventional internal armed conflicts: The concept of New Wars. I continued to compare conventional (state-based) greed and grievance rebellions with new (non-state) armed conflicts in terms of their political context, the violent actors they involve (their nature, their overall aim, their organizational size and their sources of motivation, mobilization and financing), in regard to the costs and benefits of fighting, the scale and nature of applied violence as well as the duration and scope of warfare. This comparison revealed some similarities but also substantial differences between these sub-types of internal armed conflict which are summarized by table 7.1 on page 82. For instance, I argued in favor of significant differences in the nature (instead of the scale) of violence that is applied. The share of civilian victims in overall battle-related deaths is expected to be especially large in non-conventional (non-state) fighting (although the overall number of battle-related deaths per conflict and year might not differ much). In addition, New Wars and Conflicts are expected to result in a large share of indirect civilian victims (e.g. internally displaced people) as opposed to direct, battle-related (military and civilian) deaths. The micro-mechanisms explaining especially brutal strategies towards civilians during new (non-state) armed conflicts will be identified and discussed within the following part of this study. Furthermore, the above came to the conclusion that grievance models most likely over-estimate the outbreak of violence because they do not offer a solution to the collective action problem. Greed models address this issue through the provision of selective incentives. Still, they fail to offer an answer to the question of who provides the selective incentives at the beginning of the movement. Even the concept of leadership goods (the requisites of office and political power) cannot explain the emergence of rebel organizations from scratch and the participation of early joiners when the risks are greatest, when the prospects of victory are lowest and when the rebels lack the means to offer immediate material rewards. Greed rebellions therefore also tend to over-predict the outbreak of violence. Instead, they might be better suited to explain the duration of warfare. In regard to the solution of the collective action problem, the concept of New Wars and Conflicts performs better. As in greed rebellions, collective action failures are overcome through the provision of selective incentives. Benefits of participating in fighting are privatized and immediately available to those who engage in the collective action. However, easily lootable and accessible resources do not need to be captured from the state but, in a situation of state failure or even state collapse, simply need to be taken by the rebels. Because there is no militarily superior opponent who prevents the rebels from looting these resources in the first place, they are capable of rising and dispersing selective incentives right from the beginning. Selective incentives are therefore already available within the early stages of rebellion. The distribution of these resources among similar competing groups remains the only matter of dispute.
Whether these differences justify the introduction of a new sub-type of intra-state warfare is heavily disputed. The next chapter, which provides a critical discussion of the concept of New Wars, comments on this and other major points of critique. Beforehand, however, I would like to briefly contrast New Wars and Conflicts with terrorism – another contemporary form of organized violence that is often (and wrongly) equated with New Wars by the critics as well as the advocates of the concept of New Wars.
### Table 7.1: Non-State vs. State-Based Fighting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Point of View</th>
<th>Marechal</th>
<th>Reach</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Finance</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deprived Actor Model/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Concept of New Wars/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Deprived Actor Model/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Concept of New Wars/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Deprived Actor Model/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Concept of New Wars/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Deprived Actor Model/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Concept of New Wars/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Deprived Actor Model/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Concept of New Wars/Rational Choice</td>
<td>Deprived Actor Model/Rational Choice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Non-State Internal Fighting vs. Terrorism

Münkler (2005, pp. 3, 30 sq., 131) refers to international terrorism as “a method” of New Warfare which fits well with his understanding of New Wars as a form of asymmetric battle. Elsewhere the author speaks of the “new terrorist wars” and explicitly notes that “[t]errorism is a form of warfare” (Münkler 2005, pp. 102, 111). According to him terrorism has changed its nature. Traditional forms of terrorism (e.g. social-revolutionary or ethnic-nationalist terrorism) have been replaced or supplemented by “new forms of terrorism”. Traditional terrorists limited their actions “to a brief phase of the liberation struggle and to a highly selective list of targets”. They had their constituency in mind, in whose interests they claimed to wage their struggle. Such kinds of terrorism started from the need to actively involve this “third party” in the struggle as a source of legitimacy while “none of the members of the constituency was supposed to come to harm as a result of any terrorist attack – a condition that totally excluded the use of weapons of mass destruction”. Through demonstrative acts of violence, terrorists aimed to rouse this third party from its (supposed) political apathy or resignation and to motivate it for the armed struggle.

On the contrary, “in the new forms of terrorism that third party must be not only activated but first produced as a political quantity”. Religious-fundamentalist themes are increasingly used as an impetus and justification for terrorist attacks. The emergence of religious-fundamentalist forms of terrorism resulted in a greater diffuseness of the constituency and definition of the enemy of terrorist attacks beyond the holders of political power to entire civilizations. This, and the increasing internationalization of terrorism, which only began in the 1960s and took off in the 1990s, removed the limits of violence which led to higher casualty rates of terrorist attacks by organizations that might even consider the use of atomic, biological or chemical weapons.¹ In religiously motivated terrorism, a third party as the basis of legitimacy to which the operation is addressed is not even needed. Instead, “[g]od, or the Divine, provides legitimacy or even an addressee – or at any rate a reference – and requires no political calculation of the maximum damage and the maximum number of casualties that an attack must not exceed” (Münkler 2005, p. 113). Increasingly, “the success of operations came to be measured by the resulting material damage, the numbers killed and wounded, and above

¹See Münkler (2005, pp. 102–104, 112 sq.) and Sarkees and Wayman (2010, p. 560), who also argue that their supranational character differentiates terrorist threats of al-Quaida from earlier terrorism.
all the intensity and duration of the media reporting of the incident […] [T]errorism has changed into a global war of terror fought with no restrictions as to the choice of targets. In a parallel process, the civilian population and infrastructure have become critical resources of war” (Münkler 2005, pp. 106 sq.).

Similar to those actors involved in New Wars, terrorists avoid any direct military confrontation. Like New Warfare, the new forms of terrorism require a minimum of funds that are mostly provided by external actors. Both kinds of violence involve rather small, non-hierarchically organized cells. Brzoska (2004, p. 112) refers to Münkler and Eppler, who both identify many similarities between rebels in New Wars and international terrorists, e.g. in terms of tactics, sources of funding and their disregard for any restraint on violence. Kaldor (2004) even lists terrorist cells among the actors of New Warfare. In the preface to the second edition of her book on “New and Old Wars” she explicitly notes that “[t]errorism has to be understood as one variant of ‘new wars’” (Kaldor 2007, p. ix). Elsewhere she refers to terrorist incidences in New York or Iraq as “a variant of [the] new strategy – the use of spectacular, often gruesome, violence to create fear and conflict” (Kaldor 2007, p. 9). She continues that “the characteristics of new wars […] are to be found in North America and Western Europe as well. The right-wing militia groups in the United States are not so very different from the paramilitary groups in Eastern Europe or Africa […] [Even] [t]he violence in the inner cities of Western Europe and North America can, in some sense, be described as new wars” (Kaldor 2007, pp. 12 sq.). These and similar remarks blur the line between conventional insurgencies and old forms of terrorism as well as between New Wars and new forms of terrorism. Further conceptual confusion stems from the fact that the same authors who more or less equate armed conflict or (new) warfare with terrorism also identify differences between both concepts. In the following I summarize these distinguishing features in order to argue in favor of a clear differentiation of the two concepts.

Contrary to any kind of armed conflict or warfare, terrorism mainly seeks to produce results in an indirect way. Terrorists choose targets that only symbolize what they oppose and their strategies are designed to cause psychological rather than direct physical effects. The main purpose of the actual and demonstrative act of violence is not to defeat anybody militarily or to defend or gain control over resources. Instead, terrorists want to draw attention to their cause and to obtain the greatest publicity in order to send a message through which the political will of those under attack shall be broken. Terrorists count on the psychological effect of violence and the resulting fear which is spread by the media. This fear causes economic damage which appears to Münkler (2005, p. 100); Münkler (2006, pp. 146 sq.) to be the ultimate goal of terrorism. Terrorism clearly influences an audience beyond the immediate victim.

This links with the fact that, unlike armed conflict, terrorism has two addressees. Those who are the direct object of attack (e.g. the US army in Iraq, US politicians or the US public), who are shown that they are vulnerable and that their continued presence in Iraq will incur political costs (material damage and human losses).
Secondly, every terrorist attack contains a message to a third party in whose interests the terrorists claim to be waging their struggle. Even in the case of religiously-motivated terrorism, where this message to the third party might have lost significance, it is still there. In Iraq, terrorists also aim to send the message that resistance to what appears to be a superior power is possible and also successful in changing policies (Münkler 2005, pp. 101 sq.).

Thirdly, New Warfare mostly happens in (remote) rural areas of failing or already failed states where natural resources occur. Although an important transnational component exists in regard to the financing of warfare and the involved actors, this sub-type of intra-state warfare takes place within a nation-state. In contrast, terrorism carries violence into the population centers of the enemy under attack. Transnational or international terrorism strikes elsewhere, in faraway countries, while the terrorist organization remains based within its home country. The enemy under attack is often “the West” because the terrorists know that post-industrial societies with a democratic constitution and a high media density are unable to respond in kind and at the same level (Münkler 2005, p. 109).

While terrorism is a strategy whereby militarily weaker forces engage in violent operations against large powers or even superpowers, New Wars and Conflicts involve similar, small groups of non-state actors who fight each other.

Terrorism and New Wars and Conflicts also differ in regard to the weapon technologies used. While in New Wars and Conflicts actors mostly rely on light and small firearms, “[t]he offensive capabilities of terrorists rest upon their logistical use of the civilian infrastructure of the country under attack, and at the same time on their conversion of it into a weapon” (Münkler 2005, p. 29). Examples are the attacks on the World Trade Center, when the terrorists used airplanes as rockets or the attacks on the public transportation systems in London and Madrid.

While actors in New Warfare are most concerned about private gain and avoid any situation where they might need to risk their lives, terrorists are prepared to sacrifice themselves. Münkler (2005, p. 109) speaks of heroic determination to the cause which allows terrorists to focus all their energy on the attack itself instead of worrying about escape routes and how to maximize their personal means of income generation (Münkler 2005, p. 109). This links with the notion that terrorism and New Wars differ in regard to their purpose. Terrorism is the systematic use of terror to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. Münkler (2005, p. 100) himself defines terrorism as a means of forcibly imposing a political will. “If such a will cannot be determined, it may be possible to speak of terror, but not of terrorism”. Due to the absence of such a political will it is rather terror (i.e. terrible events causing great fear) instead of terrorism (i.e. a strategy or tactic to achieve a political, religious or ideological goal) that is (and always has been) applied in warfare.
In general, I reject the notion that terrorism is a kind of warfare. Amongst peace and conflict analysts, the term warfare is usually and rightly reserved for bilateral and sustained acts of violence among two or more organized armed groups while terrorist violence remains unilateral in nature. For an event to be classified as an armed conflict or even warfare a certain number of people need to be killed per year and on both sides. These criteria rule out sporadic and one-sided acts of violence such as genocides or terrorist incidents. Together with the above mentioned points these differences justify a clear conceptual distinction between the concepts of armed conflict/warfare and terrorism. Arguing in favor of such a clear conceptual distinction by no means denies empirical changes in both phenomena. The incidence and nature of terrorism as well as counter-terrorism strategies certainly changed over time. Whether these changes are profound enough to speak of new (as opposed to old) terrorism needs to be discussed and decided elsewhere. For the purpose of this book, it just seemed important to mention that New Wars are not simply a merger of internal warfare with terrorism. New Wars and new forms of terrorism are not equatable. This implies that New Wars are neither the only kind of warfare nor the only kind of organized violence occurring today. New Warfare is just one of many different contemporary forms of bilateral and unilateral, sporadic or more sustained forms of organized violence. Besides (extra-state, international and internal) state-based and non-state armed conflicts, contemporary forms of organized violence also include campaigns of one-sided violence (e.g. genocides/politicides, acts of terrorism and organized crime). “The new network wars” which Kaldor believes to be “the dominant wars of our time” are not even the only kind of New Warfare identified by the author. Kaldor also observes the emergence and increasing importance of so-called spectacle wars\(^2\) and of neo-modern wars\(^3\). Both, however, are inter-state in nature and therefore not the focus of this study.

---

\(^2\)Spectacle wars are waged by states, linked to the need to maintain a military role for the US after the end of the Cold War and to justify high levels of military spending. Examples are the US invasion of Iraq or the War on Terror (Kaldor 2005, pp. 1, 7). Because powerful norms emerged that prohibit killing, these wars combine aerial bombardment at long distance and rapid offensive maneuvers (as in old warfare) with high technology. This allows casualty-free warfare (at least in terms of Americans killed). A “Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network” (Der Derian 2001) emerges which allows US citizens to watch these wars “as a kind of replay of World War II” and to imagine that they are leading “a mission for democracy” or a “powerful moral crusade of freedom” against tyrants or terrorists (Kaldor 2005, pp. 6–8). The origins of this kind of warfare date back to the post-Vietnam era. Spectacle (inter-state) warfare and new (non-state and intra-state) warfare reinforce each other, e.g. in Iraq where the violence following the US invasion resembles New Warfare (Kaldor 2005, p. 8; Kaldor 2004).

\(^3\)Neo-modern wars are waged by states that seek to achieve conventional military objectives and are willing to risk the lives of their soldiers. They involve either limited inter-state warfare or counter-insurgency to defeat extremist networks (e.g. the conflicts in Chechnya or the Kashmir conflict). Because warfare involves counter-insurgency measures, the impact on civilians is devastating and similar to the impact of the New Wars. Yet, due to the growing destructiveness of weapons and the resulting difficulties of overcoming defensive positions, military victory is hard to achieve (Kaldor 2004). Nevertheless, states that engage in neo-modern militarism “are still under the illusion that they can win militarily” (Kaldor 2001).
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept of New Wars

The concept of New Wars has been criticized for conceptual weaknesses as well as its lack of empirical relevance (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 48). Some of the criticism put forward is well-considered and justified, while other objections are based on a rather superficial reading or simplified interpretation of the concept. For instance, in an early paper on this matter Kalyvas (2001), one of the most fierce critics of the concept of New Wars, distinguishes old from new civil wars in regard to their causes or motivations (collective vs. private causes and motivations), their popular support base (whether they enjoy or lack popular support) and the kind of violence applied (controlled vs. gratuitous violence). By reducing the concept to these three dimensions, the author misses decisive characteristics of New Warfare, e.g. the nature and number of actors involved. Likewise, he oversimplifies the discussion, e.g. on the question whether the quantity or quality of violence differs between types of internal armed conflict or whether these parameters changed over time within cases of warfare.

While descriptions of the concept of New Wars often remain superficial, lists of New Wars authors and those who are accused of having adopted “a related analytical distinction” are overly comprehensive. On the one extreme, Kalyvas (2001, pp. 100 sq.) and Kahl and Teusch (2004, fn 7, p. 8) include best-selling authors like Enzensberger or Kaplan whose writings on civil warfare in general and on single New Wars cases have been controversially discussed.\(^1\) Both are not academics but journalists, essayists, poets or dramatists. On the other extreme, their lists of New Wars authors comprise Paul Collier and his colleagues from the World Bank who are well known for their theoretical models of greed and grievance conflicts and their ambitious econometric analyses. According to my understanding, Collier et al. are neither representatives of the concept of New Wars nor have they adopted a related analytical distinction. They investigate conventional civil warfare and therefore stick to state-based armed conflicts. Squeezing these diverse authors under the umbrella of one school of thought is awkward. Kaplan’s and Enzensberger’s works have been referred to as “pessimistic culturalism” (Schlichte 2006a, p. 112). They believe to observe a tendency to self-destruction and collective madness. According to Enzensberger (1994, fn 6, p. 30), New Wars are fought “about nothing at all” while Paul Collier and his colleagues define greed conflicts as violent competition between rebel groups and the national government for the control of valuable resources.

---

\(^1\)See Enzensberger (1994); Kaplan (1994a); Kaplan (1994b).
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

(Collier and Hoeffler 2004, pp. 565–570). While the former describes New Warfare as the uncontrolled and senseless slaughter of civilians by combatants who have an “innate inability to think and act in terms of past and future”, the latter describe violent actors as greedy and rational individuals who follow their private economic interest and thereby apply violence strategically. Thus, I agree with Münkler (2006, p. 133), who accusses the critics of the concept of New Wars to make little effort in choosing representatives of this school of thought and in differentiating their arguments.

Because Kalyvas (2001) lumps together the above mentioned diverse concepts, he more or less equates conventional (state-based) greed conflicts with new (non-state or sub-state) warfare. This explains why a large part of his critique refers to the concept of looting which is central to the concept of greed conflicts. He calls the concept of looting “analytically problematic” because it remains unclear whether it refers to the causes of warfare or to the motivations of the combatants (or to both). He asks whether people wage war in order to loot or whether they engage in looting in order to wage war. At the same time, however, he admits that the direction of causality may be irrelevant for predicting the likelihood of armed conflict which Paul Collier and his colleagues aim to explain (Kalyvas 2001, p. 104, fn 21). Like many others, Kalyvas (2001, p. 104) rightly questions the validity of the proxies used for measuring “lootable resources” and notes that the concept of New Wars fails to clarify who does the looting (elites, autonomous militias or armed peasants).

This relates to the phenomenon of warlordism. Kalyvas (2001, p. 105) suggests looking at historical cases which prove that a key feature of warlordism has always been and still is rule (rather than looting). According to him and others, warlords were and are state-builders. This, however, is not at odds with the concept of New Wars, which

---

2 Studies on resource wealth and civil war have been criticized for theoretical reasons (e.g. uncertainty about causal mechanisms) and for statistical reasons (e.g. problems of reverse causation, a lack of robustness and measurement errors). See e.g. Lujala, N. P, Gleditsch, et al. (2005); Ross (2006); DeSoysa (2002); Ballatine (2003) or the Special Issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4) in 2005. It has been argued that looting in fact depends on other factors (e.g. access to the regional and global markets, the value of the resources or the technological as well as geographical availability of the resources to the predators). This led to the suggestion of conditional theories of the resource curse because easily lootable resources have been present and processed in many countries for quite a while but only at times they are looted by violent actors and only under certain circumstances they fuel warfare (see also Dunning (2005) for a similar argument). In other words, there is too little variance in the abundance of lootable resources in order to explain the great variance in the outbreak or duration of violent conflict. Although the abundance or production of lootable resources might in general increase the risk of war onset, it can neither explain the timing of the outbreak of violence nor is it the only factor increasing the risk of warfare. Chojnacki (2004, p. 10) suggests to consider the varying effect of different resources on the onset and duration of armed conflicts and adds that different kinds of asset transfer (e.g. the exploitation of precious gemstones or the looting of civilian populations by rebels) follow different logics of action.

3 For instance, Schlichte (2006b, p. 565) notes that non-state actors involved in warfare in developing countries often take over state functions, they establish welfare systems, their own rules of warfare and systems of financing their war effort. He extends this argument further by stating that after World War II, all kinds of wars (wars of decolonization, social-revolutionary wars, wars within developing
argues that warlords, because they emerge in a context of state weakness, are able to offer services and even provide (selective) security which otherwise would be provided by the state. The concept acknowledges that warlords establish structures for financing their war efforts and to enrich themselves, e.g. they levy taxes. This explicitly includes sophisticated economic interaction with foreign firms that buy raw materials like diamonds or timber from the rebels and/or sell them weapons (Kaldor 2007, p. 111). An example is De Beers (the world’s leading diamond company), which has been accused of buying and trading “blood diamonds” from and with rebels that have been produced by slaves or child soldiers during and after warfare in the DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone (Le Billon 2000; Le Billon 2001; Global Witness 1998). Foreign businesses have also been involved in the coltan trade in the DRC (Raeymaeker 2002) while The Danzer Group (the number one hardwood veneer producer and one of the biggest exporters of round timber, sawn timber and veneer in the world) earned several hundred million US dollars a year by exporting timber from war-torn countries like Liberia or the DRC. This company’s contractors and partners were not only conducting massive anarchic and illegal logging outside their concessions but also cooperated with violent actors. Danzer/Interholco’s exclusive agent for the export of round timber in Liberia, the Inland Logging Company, was closely related to the former Liberian warlord and president, Charles Taylor, whose rebels were controlling the illegal trade in diamonds during the Liberian war. In March 2001, the UN imposed a ban on trading diamonds from and arms to Liberia and 130 people surrounding Charles Taylor were confronted with a travel ban. This included Maurice Cooper, the owner of the Inland Logging Company. The Manager of another vendor to Danzer/Interholco, The Oriental Timber Company, is deemed to be the central figure in the logistics of the illegal arms trade to Liberia (Greenpeace 2005). In addition, warlords establish structures for cooperation with international crime syndicates (Münkler 2005, p. 94). According to Kalyvas (2001, p. 105), such organized, systematic and sophisticated economic interaction is at odds with the extreme fragmentation implied by the concept of New Wars. However, the
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

author fails to provide a convincing explanation for this bold conclusion. Instead, one might argue that economic exchange between foreign companies and contemporary warlords is mostly illegal and often violates existing embargoes. The risky nature of such endeavors might well contribute to the fragmentation of armed groups not least because organized, systematic and sophisticated economic interaction during warfare is much easier to sustain for small (but internally more cohesive) splinter groups.

The concept of New Wars also addresses well the question whether and in how far the phenomenon of warlordism has changed over time. Advocates of the concept agree that warlordism was already observed in early modern warfare and is by no means a new phenomenon. Still, contemporary forms of warlordism and classical warlordism differ. While “[i]n the classical forms of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, warlordism rested upon the structures and conjunctures of an agrarian economy, it has since penetrated the subcultures of urban youth (its largest source of recruitment), where it uses the culture-industry settings of rap or ragga and corresponding promises of consumption and status to draw in and motivate future fighters. In some warlord configurations, sunglasses and kalashnikovs have become iconic signs of a readiness to engage in brutal unpredictable violence” (Münkler 2005, p. 17). According to Münkler (2005, p. 66) this “combination of kalashnikov and Hollywood” is not only new but also in part explains the unchaining of violence in New Wars. Elsewhere, he notes that “[t]he passage from closed to open war economies is mainly what distinguishes the new wars from the warlord configurations in nineteenth-century Latin America or in China in the first half of the twentieth century, as well as from the classical model of civil war” (Münkler 2005, p. 95). The closed war economies of classical warlordism rested essentially upon agrarian subsistence economies, could maintain themselves for long periods only in peripheral and usually isolated areas and had a limited sphere of influence. They did not pose a major problem for either international relations or the world economy. “In terms of world politics, they were so marginal that they could be virtually ignored. [...] [P]olitical or economic metastasis was not a feature of these war economies” (Münkler 2005, p. 96). Warlords and the closed war economies they established and exploited were more a transitional phenomenon, “a feature of the immediate postwar period than of the war itself, and black-markets soon disappeared as the supply of goods increased and currency stabilized” (Münkler 2005, p. 77). Regional warlords had strong incentives to soon formalize and regularize the structures of force or to take over offices and institutions. This has changed. From the 1950s onwards, war economies opened up to the influence of either the Eastern or the Western block. They were placed under a certain political control by the respective superpowers who kept them running. But with the end of the Cold War, this option of building an open war economy by relying on a powerful third party vanished. At least the flow of resources that used to take place within the East-West controversy was replaced with links mediated by the world market.4 Although the new, open war economies also prosper from a constant inflow of resources from abroad, warfare funded through shadow globalization became an “increasingly attractive option for

4See also Kahl and Teusch (2004, p. 396).
regional belligerents”. The new warlords derive income from the exploitation of strategic raw materials and from illegal goods sold in the global shadow economy (Münkler 2005, pp. 95, 97). Today’s global market offers opportunities for extra-territorial reinvestment and accumulation of wealth which classical warlords simply lacked (Kahl and Teusch 2004, p. 399). Today, most of the wars and war economies in question are no longer subject to outside political control by other states or international organizations. Münkler (2005, p. 98) summarizes that scarcely any of today’s warlord configurations rests upon a closed war economy. Warlords who have long been seen as a typical feature of stalled modernization processes “have been propelling a modernization process of their own during the last two decades. They have emancipated themselves from the specific social and economic structures to which they used to be tied”.

In general, critics of the concept claim that the importance of economic motivations has been greatly overstated in new civil wars and greatly understated in old civil wars (Newman 2004, p. 183; Berdal 2003, pp. 479, 490 sqq.). They argue that rebel motivations are (and have always been) diverse and include concerns that go beyond mere banditry (Schlichte 2002, pp. 129 sq.; Schlichte 2006a, pp. 117 sqq.). Therefore, “to focus excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired motivations of actors may lead to one-sided explanations of conflict” (Bøås 2005, p. 73). Bøås (2005) points to the historical roots (rather than mere greed) that created political and economic grievances and cemented ethnic cleavages in Liberia which later inspired internal warfare. He adds the regional context, the role of external actors and Charles Taylor’s interests and politics as alternative explanations for the outbreak or escalation of violence. Unwittingly, however, many of his arguments correspond quite well with the concept of New War, which leaves room for historical and identity factors, e.g. when it comes to the causes of state weakness and the emergence of identity politics. Bøås (2005, pp. 78 sqq.) himself describes how Liberia mutated from a typical “Cell 3 case” with weak social structures but a strong coercive state into a “Cell 4 case” characterized by the absence of both social cohesion and strong governmental mechanisms capable of imposing order on society. “The” Liberian civil war as implied by the title of his essay does not exist. Instead, several conventional (state-based) and new (non-state) armed conflicts took place.5 Kalyvas (2001, pp. 103–105) refers to the New War cases in Sierra Leone or Mozambique.

5In 1979, grievances led to the outbreak of riots. President Tolbert was killed by a group of young officers and Samuel Doe assumed state power. Later, Charles Taylor and his rebel army sneaked over to Liberia from Ivory Coast to topple Doe’s brutal and despotic regime. What had started as another (conventional) grievance rebellion soon changed into (or was accompanied by) a new (non-state) armed conflict. During the 1990s, “[d]issension emerged within Taylor’s ranks” and splinter groups (e.g. Taylor’s NPFL rebels, Prince Johnson’s forces, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J and the Liberian Peace Council) started to fight each other and the ECOMOG force. “[S]ignificant human rights violations” occurred, “economic motives became to play an increasingly important role” and an underground war economy emerged in which “the factions’ leaders and the Nigerian generals in ECOMOG […] became important actors” (Bøås 2005, pp. 81 sqq.). Warfare only ended in 1997 when Charles Taylor was elected president. Because his political practice was again characterized by corruption, patronage and coercion, another conventional and internationalized grievance rebellion broke out. Until 2003, LURD and MODEL rebels fought against the government of Charles Taylor.
where the rebels have been “stigmatized as lacking any ideology” although they had a “sophisticated political understanding of their participation” and articulated “peasant ideologies”. He accuses the New Wars argument as being based on “incomplete or biased evidence derived from journalistic reports that tend to quote uncritically city-dwellers and members of pro-governmental organizations” who portray the rebels as reckless loot-seeking criminals. Ideological motivations are simply overlooked because they are less visible. It remains somewhat unclear whether this point of critique is a conceptual one or whether the author intends to criticize the measurement of rebel motivations and the quality of data used. One might counter that at least indirect measures of rebel motivations (like the kind of violence applied or the identity of the victims) might well capture the motives, even in cases where the true motivations are not made explicit. Furthermore, reference to single cases that contradict the concept of new wars does not necessarily disprove an overall, general trend. Finally, some of these authors’ concerns are in fact shared and addressed by the advocates of the concept of New Wars. Kalyvas (2001, p. 104, fn 25) emphasizes the diversity of individual motives to join a rebellion which range from getting food for survival or stopping others from killing your family and friends to forced recruitment or sheer adventurism. This almost perfectly resembles Mary Kaldor (1999, pp. 19, 25), who notes that “[m]en go to war for a variety of individual reasons – adventure, honor, fear, comradeship or the protection of ‘home and hearth’”. In fact, “more emotive causes have always been required to instill loyalty and to persuade men to risk their lives”. According to Kaldor (1999, p. 25) and Kaldor (2007, p. 28), economic incentives as well as state interest are inadequate as a motivation for warfare because “socially organized legitimate violence needs a common goal in which the individual soldier can believe and which he shares with others. If soldiers are to be treated as heroes and not as criminals, then heroic justification is needed to mobilize their energies, to persuade to kill and risk to be killed”. While in old wars the recruitment of combatants, the cohesion of armed groups and the legitimacy of warfare depended on a shared ideology and a common political goal, New Warfare relies on identity politics instead of ideology and offers economic incentives to mobilize people to engage in warfare and to sustain fighting. In fact, the satisfaction of economic interests suffices to instill loyalty and to persuade the combatants to risk their lives because the risk of being killed on the battlefield is relatively low. In addition, those involved in New Warfare do not

---

6See also Kalyvas (2006, pp. 44–46), who notes that ideology does motivate action as much as financial considerations, social cleavages, local politics, personal animosities, peer pressure or the desire to take revenge, to save jobs, privileges or the own life. The author speaks of multiple and often conflicting reasons. Later he notes that “joining a rebel army and collaboration with it result from variable and complex sets of heterogeneous and interacting motivations, which are affected by preferences over outcomes, beliefs about outcomes, the behavior of others and the networks into which people are embedded, and security considerations in an environment where chance and contingency cannot be underestimated”. Other fighters are motivated by their “curiosity, the prospect of excitement or adventure, the lure of danger, the acquisition of a new and more rewarding individual identity or moral world view, the pleasure of acting as one’s own agent, and purely criminal motives” (like access to public goods or individual material benefits). “Protection against indiscriminate violence from the opposite side, escape from obligations, acquisition of higher status, personal or local disputes, or simply the response to emotions” (e.g. to anger or personal humiliation) complete his long list (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 95–97).
care much about their reputation and whether they are treated as heroes or criminals. The applied violence is neither socially organized nor legitimate. New Warfare cannot be described anymore as an “act of extreme coercion, involving socially organized order, discipline, hierarchy and obedience [that] requires loyalty, devotion and belief from each individual” (Kaldor 2007, p. 29). Still, the increasing importance or dominance of economic motives does not mean that more emotive causes are entirely irrelevant – especially because identity politics play upon them. Heupel and Zangl (2003, pp. 10, 22) agree and provide case evidence from Angola where ethnic differences played an important role in the formation of rebel groups and their initial grievance rebellion. Over time, however, conventional internal warfare increasingly turned into New Warfare. Ethnic differences clearly paled and were merely used by the UNITA rebels to cover their true economic interest in warfare. Münkler (2005, p. 24) fails to provide a clear distinction between “politics of ideas” and “identity politics” but elaborates further on the rather instrumental role of ideological and identity factors as merely ordering or rhetorical devices in New Warfare. He notes that players, “if necessary, use ideologies to legitimize their struggle” and that “warring parties are more than happy to exploit [ethnic and cultural] differences as an ideological resource for the recruitment of followers and the mobilization of support”. Therefore, “ethnic or religious oppositions are not usually the causes of a conflict, but merely reinforce it” (Münkler 2005, p. 6). According to him, individuals in New Warfare are “mainly driven by financial gain, a lust for adventure and a range of ideological motives” (Münkler 2005, p. 21). He speaks of a “web of motives and causes” and a “mixture of personal cravings for power, ideological convictions and ethnic-cultural oppositions that keep the new wars smoldering away”. Obviously, he and other New Wars advocates do not clearly differentiate recruitment from retention, although these are separate processes (Nordás and Gates 2010). The initial motivations (the reasons for joining an army), the reasons for remaining in it and the reasons for active engagement in actual warfare significantly differ (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 100 sq.). At least, however, Münkler (2005, pp. 6–8) also distances himself from any economic reductionism by noting that “[n]one of the [above mentioned] causes may be singled out as the really decisive one […] so that the various monocausal explanations […] fall short of the mark”.

Unfortunately, the concept of new wars does not address differences in motivations within rebel organizations although ordinary soldiers’ motivations most likely differ from leaders’ motivations as well as their rhetoric. Kalyvas (2001, pp. 107, 110–112, 119) accuses civil war research in general of inferring the motivations of the rank and file members from their leadership’s articulation of ideological messages. Because the meaning of rebellions is often articulated by elites in the language of national cleavages, observers tend to erroneously code them as actually mobilizing popular support along those cleavages. Individual motivations, however, are not necessarily informed by impersonal cleavages related to grievances, but often by local and personal conflict. The individual decision to join one side or the other is shaped by local loyalties and rivalries, e.g. between competing clans. Kalyvas (2001, p. 107) even states that “local considerations have always trumped ideological ones at the mass level”. Schlichte (2006a, p. 118)
distinguishes between the motivations of the rebel leaders (who might be most interested in political power, material aggrandizement but also social privilege, honor and the establishment of some sort of political order), the regional and local commanders (who might still be ideologically motivated but also strive for access to political power or revenge for historical injustice) and the rank and file members (who are participating in warfare because of fear or coercion as well as their aim for a better life). Theoretically, this issue could be addressed by a Principal Agent Approach which depicts the leaders of the rebel groups as the principals, the soldiers as the agents and the regional commanders as either agents (in relation to the leaders) or principals (in relation to the soldiers). Kalyvas (2001, p. 108) further elaborates upon this issue by referring to “numerous studies” investigating soldier’s motivations to participate in armed struggle. These studies found that ordinary combatants are usually motivated by group pressures and processes involving either regard for their comrades, respect for their leaders, concern for their own reputation with both or an urge to contribute to the success of the group. These findings, however, are based on interviews with participants of conventional (state-based) guerrilla warfare. The motivations of rebels engaged in sub-state or non-state warfare are not investigated. Unfortunately, this also holds for otherwise promising recent studies by Cunningham (2013), Nordås and Gates (2010), Seymour (2010), or Findley and Rudloff (2012). In addition, the evidence provided by Kalyvas (2001) is again derived from single case studies and therefore inadequate to disprove the rather general or global trends proposed by the concept of New Wars. In order to explore whether the true motivations of those engaged in conventional (state-based) civil wars differ from those engaged in new (non-state) warfare, standardized interviews with the combatants of both kinds of internal warfare across a large number of cases and regions are needed.

Attached to the causes and motivations of internal warfare is the issue of popular support. The concept of New Wars states that old civil wars were based on considerable popular support at least for the rebels while New Wars are characterized by a lack thereof. According to Kalyvas (2001, p. 109), this impression is again based upon incomplete and biased information. Renamo in Mozambique is given as an example of a New Wars actor who nevertheless enjoyed “considerable popular support”. The author reports that “this support was present in rural areas controlled by Renamo, where researchers and journalists rarely traveled rather than in the cities under government control”. Likewise, popular support in many old civil wars was much lower than often presumed. He and others refer to Latin American civil wars and the war in Vietnam where the Vietkong relied on extensive coercion against the civilian population. Kalyvas (2001, p. 113) summarizes that “[i]n old civil wars, popular support was shaped, won, and lost during the war, often by means of coercion and violence and along lines of kinship and locality; it was not purely consensual, immutable, fixed, and primarily ideological. In this respect, old civil wars are not as different from new civil wars as they appear to be.”
Contrary to what Kaldor argues, mass population displacement is nothing new either. Likewise, the critics of the concept of New Wars remark that the abduction of children and the practice of recruiting child soldiers has already happened in old civil wars (e.g. in Afghanistan, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua or during the Cultural Revolution in China). In the latter case, eight to fifteen year olds (the Young Red Guards) were among the most violent groups (Kalyvas 2001, p. 115). Similarly, the critics of the concept argue that violence in warfare has always been especially directed against women (Newman 2004, p. 183). Münkler (2005, p. 81) replies by opposing this “strong form of generalization” because it presents violence against women “as an ever identical phenomenon” or “an anthropological constant” and therefore overlooks the extent to which violence against women during warfare has varied historically in both scale and intensity. He argues that since the eighteenth century, “mass rapes have no longer been a semi-institutional part of war” because since then rape has been considered a war crime for which the penalty has usually been death. In old warfare, sexual violence on the enemy territory was even considered dysfunctional because it slowed down the movement of armies, because it increased the risk of infections with sexually transmitted diseases and because it undermined morale (Münkler 2005, pp. 81, 83). In cases where it nevertheless occurred, the use of violence against women was mainly the outcome of misconduct among soldiers. In contrast, violence against women is often highly functional and the outcome of calculated planning in New Wars. There, “women are no longer just booty, trophies or sex objects” but the main target of attack and part of a strategy based on ethnic cleansing. In New Wars, the local military leadership does not prevent or punish sexual violence against women but orders and organizes the systematic rape and forced pregnancy of women in that section of the population which is targeted for expulsion. Because rape does not require any extra deployment of forces, weapons or immediate risk of life from the side of the perpetrator, ethnic cleansing can be achieved more effectively and cost efficiently through systematic rape. In those cases where rape is not part of a planned strategy by the military leadership, it is still part of the New War Economy. In nearly all New Wars, the rape of women is also a prize for the victors and conquerors. It is not applied as an on-off action and limited to a short period of time after the end of hostilities but happens extensively throughout the entire duration of New Warfare.

In defense of the advocates of the concept of New Wars I record that they acknowledge the existence of phenomena like warlordism, war economies or violence against civilians/women in old warfare. However, they argue that the scale and/or quality of these phenomena have changed. For instance, even if the practice of child recruitment is

---


8 Again, such strategies are not necessarily new. However, earlier population transfers “may be regarded as a policy success, in so far as they laid the foundation for a redrawing of state frontiers or a reconfiguration of multinational empires into a number of nation states” (Münkler 2005, p. 82). This is not the case in New Warfare, where according to the author ethnic cleansing and massacres replace battle and any political purpose of warfare.
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

nothing new and even if entire sub-units like the Young Red Guards have been composed of children in old civil warfare, the overall share of children in the total armed forces of violent groups might still have increased over time. The recruitment of child soldiers became increasingly popular within the last 10 to 15 years – especially in Africa where a tradition of child soldiering does not exist (Pittwald 2004, p. 215). Others agree that “in pre-colonial African armies, the general practice was that children could not be considered warriors until three to four years after reaching puberty” (J. Davis 2008, pp. 6 sq.). The author refers to Peter Singer (2008), who even notes that he could not find a single example where traditional tribes or ancient civilizations relied upon fighting forces made up of young boys or girls. This might relate to the fact that the functions of child soldiers have changed. J. Davis (2008, pp. 1 sq.) explains that one of the consistencies throughout history has been the avoidance of using children as combatants. “Even in pre-modern societies, where adulthood was considerably younger than the eighteen years currently prescribed in international law, children were typically used in support roles as cooks, supply assistants, or launderers but rarely as armed combatants”. The author sees The Children’s Crusade, the Hitler Jugend or the Janissaries of the early Ottoman Empire as anomalous cases. Only “[i]n recent wars, there has been a significant increase in the mobilization and use of children in combat, as opposed to support roles”. The American Civil War of the 19th century is one of the first historic examples of children being mobilized as actual combatants. The next example of this practice was not seen until World War II (J. Davis 2008, p. 8).

Dramatic increases in the number of child soldiers especially in Africa seem to support the expectation that (forced) child soldiering especially occurs in New Wars. It has been argued that non-state actors involved in New Wars lack access to regular conscripts and therefore more often rely on children. Child soldiering might also be especially likely in New Wars because over its extended duration, New Warfare depletes the pool of adult conscripts. In addition, children might be more likely to be misused as soldiers in New Wars because these wars are fought with small arms that are easy to handle by children. Achvarina and Reich (2006) adds another point which very well fits into this line of argument. The author states that “the degree to which children are protected in refugee camps is the primary determinant of child soldier recruitment rates” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, p. 132). According to this thesis, a larger percentage of fighting forces will be made up of child soldiers in those cases where refugee and IDP camps are vulnerable to infiltration or raids by violent groups. If unprotected, these camps are an important resource pool for the recruitment of the camps’ inhabitants (including children) through the use of coercion or propaganda because then violent actors are able to infiltrate the camps and become indistinct from the civilian population. The result is a “militarization” of camps which under “normal” conditions would be impossible or more difficult because then these camps would fall under the protection of a legitimate judicial authority (the government, a regional entity or an international organization). In New Warfare, this protection crumbles because the state is collapsing or already collapsed. Furthermore, those fleeing from non-state or sub-state armed conflicts do not fall under the conventional definition of a refugee, asylum seeker or internally displaced
person. Refugee and IDP camps are much better protected under international law in the case of conventional (state-based) internal warfare. If the international community does not intervene to protect these forced migrants, and if a way out does not exist because borders are closed, children are much more likely to be recruited as warriors in a situation of New Warfare. It is at least tempting to assume that the increase in the number of child soldiers after the end of the Cold War is a product of the breakdown of state control (and that rebel forces, not states, recruit child soldiers). However, and as already mentioned, empirical evidence drawn from African cases is “far more ambiguous” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, pp. 129 sq.). It remains to be answered whether the observed increase in the number of child soldiers is indeed due to their more frequent use in emerging New Wars or whether it is due to their increasing use in conventional (state-based) civil wars (where they are also often recruited by governments).

In defense of the concept of New Wars, one might also argue that even if old civil warfare also resulted in many deaths, the quality of violence might have changed (e.g., the share of direct and indirect civilian victims might have increased). Even if the total number of civilian battle-related deaths did not change significantly, the share of such victims might have increased (if the overall number of direct military deaths decreased). Likewise, the perpetrators of violence against civilians might have changed. Advocates of the concept of New Wars claim that in old civil wars violence against civilians was mostly committed by state forces (as a means of punishment for supporting the rebels) while in New Wars this kind of violence is carried out by non-state forces. Such changes cannot be detected by looking at the (maybe even declining) overall level of violence.

Kalyvas (2001) remains silent on time trends but critically comments on differences in the nature of violence across types of internal warfare. According to him, violence in New Warfare is not as senseless or gratuitous as it often appears. He refers to massacres in Algeria and Mozambique that were highly selective and where violence had been applied strategically. In Sierra Leone, rebels cut off the hands of women to prevent them from sowing and their husbands from deserting and returning to their villages during harvest season. The rebels used the same tactic to hinder people from casting their vote in the upcoming election which the rebels boycotted. In this and other cases, horrifying and seemingly absurd acts of violence entailed a high degree of rational calculation.9 Such kind of rebel behavior does not contradict the concept of New Wars. It very well fits with the notion that violence against civilians is part of a strategy aimed at sowing fear and hatred. Systematic rape as well as public, very visible acts of brutality are indicators of New Wars that “are rational in the sense that they apply rational thinking to the aims of war and refuse normative constraints” (Kaldor 1999, p. 100; Münkler 2006, p. 141).

Advocates of the concept of New Wars would also agree with their critics10 that intra-state warfare in general is particularly cruel and that violence is in fact the central

---

9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

component of all kinds of internal warfare – whether ethnic or non-ethnic, old or new. However, they would insist that the scale and quality of violence varies considerably within and between categories of internal warfare. Whether one accepts Kalyvas (2001, p. 114) reference to Madame de Stael who observes “that all civil wars are more or less similar in their atrocity” depends on what “more or less similar” in terms of atrocity means. Between 1945 and 1999, 145 conventional civil wars occurred which resulted in 16 to 21 million direct, battle-related deaths. While the mean number of battle-related deaths per conflict stands at 143,883, the median is only 19,000. A few cases like the war in the DRC (from 1998 to 2003) are characterized by an extraordinary high death toll while half of all civil wars resulted in 19,000 or fewer direct victims. The distribution of battle-related deaths is therefore heavily right-skewed and by no means equal (Sambanis 2004, p. 820). This great deal of variation in the scale of violence in civil warfare constitutes the dependent variable in numerous quantitative studies. These analyses found that certain types of civil wars (e.g. identity conflicts, religious conflicts in combination with separatist movements or civilizational conflicts) are significantly more violent in terms of direct, battle-related deaths. This holds even if the respective studies control for intervening variables like the overall length of warfare or the population size of the affected country.11

Those who do not share the expectation that New Wars are specifically brutal or bloody12 might instead claim that New Warfare is nothing other than “small warfare”, which is not a new phenomenon either. Once more, New Wars theorists agree at least with the second half of this statement. They note that small wars already existed, e.g. in the eighteenth century. Back then, “the small wars, with their use of light troops, chasseurs and hussars, had had the function of protecting the movements of the main army, preventing the advance of enemy troops, repeatedly cutting their supply lines for short periods and generally inflicting the maximum economic damage on the enemy by means of plunder and devastation” (Münkler 2005, p. 23). This very much sounds like New Warfare. However, the combination of small and large wars no longer applies in New Warfare. Münkler (2005, pp. 23 sq.) refers to Christopher Daase, who finds that “small wars changed from a supportive instrument for large wars to its functional replacement”.

Still, the question remains whether another new class of internal warfare is actually needed in light of the myriad of existing related concepts like “small wars”, “low-intensity conflicts”, “wildcat wars”, “molecular civil wars”, “neo-Hobbesian wars”, simply “internal” or “civil wars”, “privatized” or “informal” wars, “post-modern” or “degenerate” warfare. At least Henderson and D. Singer (2002) doubt that “the landscape of armed conflict has changed so dramatically that it has necessitated a revision of the prevalent typology of war, a reconsideration of the correlates of war, and a reconceptualization of the theoretical assumptions regarding the etiology of war. While it is clear that pat-

11 See Fox (2002); Fox (2004); Melander et al. (2006); Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006); Lacina (2006); Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005).
12 Even Mary Kaldor distances herself from this claim when emphasizing that it is less the scale but the quality of violence that changes (Kaldor 2005, pp. 3, 8; Kaldor 2006b, pp. 15 sq.).
terns of warfare shift across time and space, it is not clear that war itself has changed ‘fundamentally’ and has become inexplicable in light of theoretical arguments in world politics. Advocates of the concept of New Wars counter-argue that related concepts come only close to the New Wars and have been developed with another purpose in mind. For instance, the argument that small wars have replaced large wars (and that New Warfare therefore only means small warfare) has been “[...] made chiefly with regard to the consequences for the international order, and not so much for the purpose of understanding the evolution of new wars as such” (Münkler 2005, p. 24). Christopher Daase indeed explores the transformative effect of small warfare on the international system, i.e. on the distribution of power and resources within the international sphere but also on institutions like norms or international law (Daase 2006). Furthermore, he defines small wars as asymmetric warfare between rebels and government forces and contrasts them with big and symmetrical inter-state wars. Sofsky speaks of “wildcat wars” that are, in line with the concept of New Wars, characterized by marauding bands, the increasing frequency of bloody massacres and systematic rape. However, Sofsky’s focus on irrational violence, confused rage and extreme blood lust “does not adequately grasp, or does not grasp at all, either the ideological or the economic aspect”. 13 In addition, Sofsky misses the interweaving of intra-state players with globalization processes. This also holds for Enzensberger’s concept of “molecular civil wars” or Trutz von Trotha’s model of “neo-Hobbesian wars”. 14 For a similar reason, Kaldor (2007, p. 2) opposes any equation of New Wars with “internal” or “civil wars”. According to her, this term would neither adequately capture their transnational connections, nor their non-state nature. Likewise, the term “privatized” or “informal” wars as for example used by David Keen (1995) also falls short of describing New Warfare where a clear distinction between private and public, non-state and state, informal and formal “cannot easily be applied” (Kaldor 2007, p. 2). According to Kaldor (2007, p. 2), “post-modern” warfare as proposed by Mark Duffield (1998) or Michael Ignatieff (1998) better captures the nature of New Wars but this concept has already been used to describe virtual wars and wars in cyberspace. Shaw introduced the related concept of “degenerate warfare” (Shaw 2000; Shaw 2003; Shaw 2007). The author argues that war in the global era is a degenerate form of total war, in which counterrevolution and genocide have become more prominent. In fact, New Wars are genocidal wars. They carry the logic of extremism in total warfare to the point where war is genocide (Shaw 2000). Thus, the term degenerate warfare is used to emphasize the similarities between total (inter-state) warfare, genocide and contemporary (inter-state and internal) wars. It serves well to draw “attention to the decay of the national frameworks, especially military forces” (Kaldor 2007, p. 2) and to the changing nature of violence. However, little attention is given to other dimensions of New Warfare. In addition, decisive differences between the concept of degenerate

---

13The same argument applies to van Creveld’s concept of low-intensity wars. According to him, low-intensity wars are marking the end of the “Clausewitzian Trinity” (the rigid static hierarchy and clear distinction between the people, the army and the government as present in classical, inter-state warfare) (Gantzel 2002, pp. 6–8; Creveld 1991).

14For these points of critique see Münkler (2005, p. 24). Where Trutz von Trotha speaks of “globalized small wars” he rather refers to acts of international terrorism (Gantzel 2002, pp. 8–10).
warfare and New Wars do exist. For instance, in degenerate warfare, the destruction of the enemy is extended to also include the destruction of the civilian population – but still as a means towards the defeat of the organized enemy. Degenerate warfare is described as breaching accepted standards of warfare, too, but still masks itself in the general legitimacy of war (Shaw 2007, Chapter 2).

Finally, critics of the concept of New Wars argue that the differences between old and new civil wars do not array themselves neatly and dichotomously around the end of the Cold War (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117; Ellis 2003, p. 32). Although they admit that the end of the Cold War “potentially affected the way in which wars are fought if not their frequency as well as their financing”, they criticize the concept of New Wars for not specifying any exact mechanisms. How the end of the Cold War and changes in funding affected the ways in which civil wars are fought remains largely unclear (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117; Berdal 2003, p. 478). In addition, those who contest the New Wars theses insist that it is less the nature of warfare but our understanding or perception of internal armed conflicts that changed profoundly with the end of the East-West controversy. “By removing coherent, if flawed, political categories and classificatory devices, the end of the cold war has led to an exaggeration of the criminal aspects of recent civil wars and a concomitant neglect of their manifold political aspects. It is highly possible that interpretations of recent civil wars that stress their depoliticization and criminalization are attributable more to the demise of the conceptual categories generated by the cold war than to the end of the cold war per se” (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117). Mary Kaldor (2007, p. 3) responds that by introducing the New Wars debate it was indeed her intention to change the prevailing but flawed perceptions of war, especially among policy makers. She wanted to emphasize the growing illegitimacy of contemporary wars and to argue in favor of a cosmopolitan

15Berdal (2003, p. 477) agrees that the Cold War shaped and distorted thinking in particular about civil and intra-state wars “whose local sources and regional dynamics were often overshadowed by a preoccupation with the central strategic balance and the competition for influence between East and West”. Thus, the end of the Cold War had a “liberating impact” on the study of conflict. Those engaged in Cold War analysis simply needed “new” objects to study (Pradetto 2004, p. 197). A similar distorting effect on the perception of warfare is attributed to the events of 9/11 which draw attention to “a number of inter-related phenomena, and especially international terrorist, militant and criminal networks, often with a distinct ethnic identity, that are linked to failed states, often on the rather inaccurate assumption that these are new formations” (Ellis 2003, p. 20). Brzoska (2004, p. 113) provides another explanation for the strong and sudden interest in New Wars in Germany. According to him, the distorted perspective of an increasingly violent world emerged because Germany started to militarily engage in out-of-area activity at the end of the 1990s (first in Kosovo in 1999, followed by several UN and EU peacekeeping missions). This “New Pacifism” needed to be politically justified (Schlichte 2006a, p. 123). In this regard, Pradetto (2004, p. 199) speaks of New Wars as a “marketing phenomenon” or “slogan”. In addition, the concept of New Wars links their incidence to globalization in a way that “nicely fitted the more general criticism of globalization” which became increasingly popular in Germany (Brzoska 2004, p. 114). Newman (2004, p. 179) adds that our understanding of the underlying dynamics of armed conflicts improved considerably which is why our perception of warfare has changed, too. “In addition, advances in communication and the media have undoubtedly brought realities of civil war – and especially the atrocities – to the public attention more than before”. Shifts in the causes, nature and impact of war are therefore simply more apparent than real. See also Gantzel (2002, p. 16) or Pradetto (2004, pp. 197–199).
political response that puts individual rights and the rule of law as the centerpiece of any international intervention. She also admits that there is “some truth” in the position that the dominance of the Cold War overshadowed the significance of small wars or low-intensity conflicts. Still, she insists that “the ‘new war’ argument does reflect a new reality”. Contrary to the belief of most of her critics, however, she explicitly adds that this new reality “was emerging before the end of the Cold War”. At the very beginning of her book, Kaldor (2007, p. 1) writes that New Wars already developed “during the last decades of the 20th century”. Elsewhere, she differentiates post-colonial from post-communist countries where crises of state authority and legitimacy – “the fundamental source of the new wars”- either became apparent as early as the 1970s or only after 1989 (Kaldor 2000, p. 4). Obviously, the end of the Cold War is just one among other factors (e.g. processes of globalization or the colonial legacy) that caused or at least aggravated state weakness even before 1989. Changes in the nature of warfare are and have always been slow, “often imperceptible” or “rather subtle” (Münkler 2006, p. 144). They did not suddenly follow after the end of the Cold War but need to be portrayed as a process – as much as the end of the Cold War itself was a process.

The above illustrates that the concept of New Wars sparked a lively theoretical debate. Although critics admit that civil wars differ from each other in many regard, they believe the differences to be far less pronounced than claimed by the advocates of the concept of New Wars. For instance, they believe that the importance of ideological motivations has been greatly overstated in old civil wars and greatly understated in New Wars while the opposite applies to the importance of economic motives. This leads to the objection that certain New Wars phenomena, e.g. warlordism or the massive killing of civilians, could already be observed in old warfare. Sometimes not only the novelty but the actual importance of phenomena is called into question, e.g. the financing of warring parties through remittances from diaspora communities or the diversion of humanitarian aid (Berdal 2003, p. 496). In addition, critics oppose the idea that differences between old and New Wars array themselves neatly and dichotomously around the end of the Cold War. Defendants of the concept of New Wars counter-argue that the end of the Cold War is a decisive but not the sole factor causing or aggravating a crisis of state authority and legitimacy which then associates with the outbreak of New Warfare. According to them, New Wars reflect a reality that was emerging before the end of the Cold War. At least theoretically, this leaves room for the occurrence of New Warfare before 1989. Furthermore, they insist that some features of old and New Warfare only appear similar at first sight while in fact their nature has changed significantly. Most importantly, however, advocates of the concept openly admit that new and old wars share certain characteristics.¹⁶ Some features of old warfare survived, changed their

¹⁶See e.g. Kaldor (2005, p. 3) who notes that New Wars “have much in common with wars in the pre-modern period in Europe, and with wars outside Europe throughout the period. It is even possible to identify some elements of what I have called ‘new wars’ within ‘old wars’”. Elsewhere, Münkler (2003, p. 21) writes that “[i]t looks as though, during the twenty first century, the chameleon of war will increasingly change its appearance to resemble in many respects the wars waged from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries”.

101
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

quantity and/or quality and, in combination with other features, define New Warfare. In this sense, New Wars are not fundamentally “new”. Instead, it is rather the coincidence of specific changes and values in already known dimensions or parameters of warfare that constitutes the fundamental novelty of New Wars. Reference to the prior occurrence of single dimensions of New Warfare in old wars is therefore insufficient in order to fundamentally shatter the concept. To a certain degree this even supports Henderson and D. Singer (2002) who claim that “many of the ‘new wars’ are simply amalgamations of various inter-state, extra-state, and intra-state wars – i.e., the ‘old wars’ – that have been lumped into a single category. The result is a hodgepodge of armed conflicts whose different correlates derive from their diverse morphologies rather than their novelty as wars unlike any we have experienced previously”.

Whether (or to what degree) New Wars are actually “new” is an ongoing debate that cannot be solved here. Instead of joining this debate, I adopt a more modest approach as proposed by Chojnacki (2006b). He argues against an entire dismissal of existing typologies of armed conflict but for the inclusion of the missing category of non-state or sub-state armed conflicts. Although it is common practice in quantitative civil wars research to differentiate armed conflicts according to the political status of their protagonists, most existing data collection efforts do not gather information on non-state armed conflicts. For this reason, this sub-category of internal warfare is absent from many commonly used conflict data sets and therefore from most empirical studies on the incidence and nature of contemporary internal warfare. The remainder of this book argues that this omission might lead to biased results if new (non-state) armed conflicts systematically differ from conventional (state-based) armed conflicts.

The warning is also well taken not to coin conceptual categories grounded in observations of current events rather than good theory (Kalyvas 2001, p. 117). For this reason, the previously presented comparison of new (non-state) and conventional (state-based) armed conflicts was theory-driven. Still, this comparison does not substitute for the development of an exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology. It is only a starting point for a sound conceptual categorization which even the main advocates of the concept of New Wars have failed to provide. Contrary to this study, Kaldor and her colleagues developed the term mainly in distinction to classic, inter-state wars (Heupel and Zangl 2010, p. 30). They applied a much broader and less precise definition of New Wars. As a consequence, not every case they refer as a New War also qualifies as entirely non-state warfare and therefore as a new or non-conventional war according to my understanding. However, every non-conventional (non-state) war to which I also refer to as a New War certainly qualifies as a case of New Warfare according to Kaldor’s understanding and that of most of her fellow colleagues.

I adopted this rather narrow understanding of New Wars and Conflicts as entirely sub-state or non-state internal armed conflicts mainly for analytical purposes. In addition, this definition allows for the conceptualization of New Wars and Conflicts as recurring and timeless phenomena. They are expected to emerge if a “window of opportunity” exists, i.e. in a context of failing or failed states. This and the presence of conflict resources enables non-state actors to take up arms and battle each other – whether before or after the end of the Cold War. I argued that countries affected by New Warfare were either born weak or turned weak over time. Some of the (internal and external) factors and processes causing state weakness have already been presented. However, the causes of New Warfare are not of main interest to this study. Instead, the remainder of this book focuses on the nature of new (non-state) internal armed conflicts as opposed to conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts.

I also agree with the critics that the concept of New Wars remains under-theorized. The New Wars’ relations to other contemporary forms of war are left un-clarified (Shaw 2000) and several key concepts (e.g. “state weakness” or “globalization”) are not adequately specified. According to Berdal (2003, pp. 479 sqq.), the term globalization is used as no more than a metaphor for a number of universal processes that are at best measured by a limited and random selection of indices. Others are more concerned about the unclear direction of relationships, e.g. between state weakness and the duration of warfare or in regard to the question whether people wage war in order to loot or vice versa. Likewise, globalization is presented as external to New Warfare. It contributes to the outbreak of New Wars through its weakening effects on state authority and legitimacy. It also reduces the resources available to governments to exercise state power while increasing the capacity of violent non-state actors to arm themselves and to finance warfare. At the same time, however, globalized war economies are a main feature of New Wars. Globalization is therefore also internal to this kind of warfare (Kaldor 2007, pp. 72 sqq.). Although many oppose a “hyperglobalization thesis”, nobody denies the reality of change in the world economy in terms of increasing financial liberalization and deregulation in cross-border flows of goods and services, the revolution in the field of communication and information technology or the internationalization of production. The question that remains is how these changes brought about by globalization relate to the nature and prevalence of intra-state armed conflicts. According to Berdal (2003, pp. 482 sqq.), the concept of New Wars only touches upon two different strands of argumentation. Firstly, globalization brought growth and prosperity to Western nations but increased poverty in developing countries and widened inequalities within these countries and globally. Secondly, a more open and deregulated international economy has enabled belligerents to develop and maintain a vested economic interest in continued conflict. Although the New Wars debate drew attention to these issues, it fails to explain when, where and how the tension and stress caused by globalization transmute into armed violence on a societal scale. This example illustrates the lack of theoretical work that deduces causal hypotheses from the concept of New Wars and specifies key mechanisms which explain the outbreak and causes of New Warfare.
9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

The main characteristics of New Warfare, such as weak states and self-funding, are only tautologically linked to other current phenomenon such as globalization (Brzoska 2004, fn 2, p. 108; Heupel and Zangl 2010, p. 28). This relates to an objection against the concept of New Wars which has not received much attention yet: The fact that a clear understanding is missing of how the single dimensions of New Warfare (a privatization, fractionalization and transnationalization of actors, an economization of motives, especially brutal strategies towards civilians and extensive fighting) interact with and reinforce each other. The third part of this book aims to provide a respective refinement of the concept of New Wars by asking to what extent differences between conventional and non-conventional internal armed conflicts in their actors (their nature, number and motives) can be linked with differences in the character and intensity of applied violence.

Because the concept of New Wars as presented by Mary Kaldor (2007) and others lacks a micro-foundation, it cannot be considered a real causal theory. Instead of formulating hypotheses that specify cause-effect relationships between at least two variables the concept of New Wars broadly defines or describes what constitutes New Warfare in comparison to other forms of violence. This comparison is based on subjective observation (Münkler 2006, p. 134). Critics dismissively refer to Kaldor’s book on “New and Old Wars” as a “travelogue” (Gantzel 2002, p. 3). They describe the New Wars debate as an attempt to comprehend changes in the pattern of armed conflict within and across societies “through empirical inquiry and philosophical reflection” (Berdal 2003, p. 477). The main methodological instrument is no more than an appeal to logic and common understanding of current events. The goal is to understand, not to prove.

In addition to the fact that causal paths are left unclarified, advocates of the concept of New Wars hardly ever investigate a thesis. Instead, they illustrate their point by giving case examples. Because the presented cases are hand-picked to match the profile of New Wars, they of course substantiate claims. They “are mined for facts that fit into the line of argument”. This leaves the propositions made by the advocates of the concept “vulnerable to methodological fallacies”. In addition, “[f]actual statements are pulled from analytical literature or journalistic accounts but seldom from primary sources”. As a result, a number of the central theses of the concept of New Wars do not stand up to empirical scrutiny (Heupel and Zangl 2004, p. 347; Brzoska 2004, p. 108). Critics specifically questioned that the incidence of New Wars has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. They refer to available data that show a marked decline in the number of internal wars at least since the second half of the 1990s (Brzoska 2004, p. 108; Newman 2004, p. 180). In defense of the concept of New Wars, I would like to repeat

---

18 A causal theory has been defined as a collection of statements that propose causal explanations for a phenomenon or set of phenomena (not single events). Any theory includes an interrelated set of causal hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses specifies a posited relationship between dependent variable(s) that shall be explained and independent variables that are expected to explain the dependent variable(s). Consequently, any hypothesis creates observable implications of the following kind: if the specified explanatory variables take on certain values, other specified values are predicted for the dependent variables (King et al. 1994, pp. 99 sq.).
that the decline in the incidence of conventional internal armed conflicts from the mid 1990s onwards reflects changes in the duration of warfare rather than an actual decrease in the rate of new onsets. Secondly, a quantitative decline in global internal warfare does not foreclose any qualitative change. Although there might be fewer internal wars, their nature might have changed significantly. Thirdly, armed conflicts short of war might still be on the rise. Most importantly, however, this and other points of critique are based on a misinterpretation of the concept of New Wars. Critics (as well as those defending the concept) simply and wrongly equate New Wars with conventional (state-based) internal wars although the advocates of the concept only believe a certain type of internal warfare to be rising. At first glance, Kahl and Teusch (2004, pp. 389 sqq.) avoid this mistake by dividing internal warfare into sub-types. They refer to a number of quantitative studies that also support a decline (instead of an increase) in ethnic or “ethno-political” conflicts, in “armed conflicts over self-determination”, in “violent intrastate nationalist conflicts” and in “minor armed conflicts”. Unfortunately, these studies only take conventional (state-based) conflicts into account. The same applies to other empirical studies that are referred to in order to support or disprove the concept of New Wars. For instance, Eck and Hultman (2007, p. 233) lend support to the thesis that within post-Cold War internal armed conflicts, rebels tend to be more violent than state actors. However, their analysis only explores direct and deliberate killings of civilians (so-called acts of one-sided violence) by state or non-state actors during the course of conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts. Acts of one-sided violence against civilians in non-state or sub-state armed conflicts are not included. Byman et al. (2001) find support for the thesis of dwindling state support and the increasing importance of non-state sources of funding in internal warfare (e.g. support from diaspora communities, refugees, foreign guerrilla group movements, religious organizations or rich individuals) after the end of the Cold War. Again, only actors involved in conventional insurgencies are studied while those engaged in non-state or sub-state armed conflicts are excluded. Harbom et al. (2008) provide some support for the thesis that the average number of warring parties per conflict is on the rise. However, the authors only count the number of dyads involved in conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts. Kahl and Teusch (2004, p. 393) also refer to a study by Hensel (2002), who did not find any support for a clear increasing trend in the share of battle-related civilian deaths in intra-state warfare. Reference to this study, however, is problematic for several reasons. First of all, Hensel (2002, p. 26, table 3) only examines the trend in battle-related, non-state deaths for conventional (state-based) internal wars as defined by the COW project. Entirely non-state as well as low-intensity armed conflicts are not taken into account. Secondly, he notes that in his data set non-state death figures are missing and cannot be imputed for over half of all intra-state wars (Hensel 2002, pp. 8, 26). Because access to data is particularly difficult in severe and internal war settings, this introduces a systematic bias. Finally, the data he uses only cover armed conflicts up to 1997.

19See e.g. Gantzel (2002, p. 2), who notes that “New Wars obviously means intra-state wars” or Münkler (2005, p. 15) himself, who at times uses the term “intra-state” warfare interchangeably with New Warfare.

20For the definition see Byman et al. (2001, pp. 4 sq.).
Lacina (2006) and Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006) clearly reject the assertion that overall, combat-related violence has remained constant or even gone up. Melander et al. (2006); Melander et al. (2009) agree and add some refinement: The authors clearly reject the assertion that overall, battle-related violence against civilians has increased. Instead, they find that the human impact of civil conflict (measured through battle-related deaths, the ratio of military to civilian battle-deaths and the number of displaced civilians) is considerably lower in the post-Cold War period (Melander et al. 2009, p. 505). Unlike their colleagues, all three studies at least refer to the concept of New Wars and take (most of) the post-World War II period (instead of only the post-Cold War era) into consideration. However, all three studies also per definition exclude the direct and indirect civilian and military victims of New Wars and Conflicts. The analyses are based on conventional conflict data sets that do not capture wars between non-state actors, taking place in a context of complete or partial state failure or within states that lack international recognition. Again, these studies only focus on a single dimension of New Warfare (the intensity/nature of violence). Finally, Melander and his colleagues fail to differentiate the nature of the perpetrators of violence. Therefore, they do not provide any answer to the question as to whether violence against civilians was committed by state actors or, as claimed by the advocates of the concept of New Wars, by non-state actors. This is important to note because the share of battle-related civilian deaths killed by non-state actors might still be increasing although the overall level of battle-related violence against civilians in intra-state warfare is on the decline.

I conclude that the argument about fundamental changes in the nature of intra-state armed conflict has been made without much systematic data-based analysis. The advocates or defendants of the concept of New Wars and their critics alike have relied on anecdotal evidence or evidence derived from single or comparative case studies only. Both can be criticized for making general propositions on the basis of reports from selected cases mostly without recourse to quantitative evidence (Brzoska 2004, p. 107). Given the global nature of their claims, however, even a comparison of a few selected cases does not suffice to support either side (Melander et al. 2009, pp. 506 sq.; Chojnacki 2006b, p. 48). This even holds for the most sophisticated, within-case comparison which has recently been published by Heupel and Zangl (2010). The authors investigate whether a fundamental transformation of modern intra-state warfare has taken place with the end of the Cold War, they make explicit the defining criteria implicit to the concept of New Wars, they claim to identify by means of process-tracing the causal mechanisms that underpin this transformation, and they find strong support for the New Wars theses: “in the 1990s, war economies based on criminal activities became more important and triggered the fragmentation of warring parties and the economization of their war motives. Moreover, in combination, the fragmentation of warring parties and the economization of their war motives facilitate the application of brutal violence against civilians” (Heupel and Zangl 2010, p. 26). However, they only investigate five

---

21E.g. Kaldor (2007); Münkler (2006); Heupel and Zangl (2010).
22E.g. Kahl and Teusch (2004); Schlichte (2006b); Kalyvas (2001); Ellis (2003); Berdal (2003).
cases: Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola (where profiles of internal warfare changed from conventional (state-based) warfare before the end of the Cold War to new (non-state) warfare afterwards) and Somalia and Sierra Leone (where New Wars broke out only after the end of the Cold War). They refer to their effort as a “plausibility probe” of the concept of New Wars. An appropriate test, of course, would require a large-N research design that allows inferences about general historical trends. A respective study would need to cover all regions over an extended period of time, it would need to include all cases of internal armed conflict (or a randomized or representative sample thereof) and it would need to comprise all sub-types of internal armed conflict. The few existing large-N-studies that explicitly claim to test at least some of the New Wars theses also fail to meet this last requirement. In addition, most of the empirical evidence against or in support of the concept of New Wars remains unconvincing because reliable and valid micro-level data and indicators still need to be collected and identified, e.g. on the nature and number of (direct and indirect) victims of new and conventional internal wars (per conflict and year). Data are also lacking on the location and size of new war zones and the production of conflict resources therein. The true motives of violent actors and determinants of mobilization are not only difficult to measure but also change over time which requires panel data. Data are also lacking on the involvement of certain “new” actors like PMFs. And how could we possibly measure and observe the extent to which children are involved in internal armed conflicts, whether violence is applied to win the war or to keep it running, whether troops are trained or just bands of warriors and what kinds of weapons are used? Up to now it is simply unknown in how far the distribution and number of small arms vis-à-vis heavier weapons changed over time (Brzoska 2004, p. 113). Especially “[…] operationalizing small arms sales for the purpose of a quantitative test designed to establish a causal linkage is extremely difficult”. Official statistics on arms sales to single countries are available but “they provide only a partial picture, given the extensive volume of the illicit arms trade market. Figures on this trade are difficult to obtain and notoriously unreliable; they fail to take into account indirect transfers through neighboring countries by rebel force purchases, and tend to omit long-term transfers resulting from past proxy wars” (Achvarina and Reich 2006, p. 137).

The empirical part of this study elaborates further on these data constraints but also presents new data sets that are available to test at least some of the hypotheses that can be deduced from the concept of New Wars. For the first time, the presented analyses include all cases of internal fighting, i.e. conventional (state-based) as well as non-conventional (non-state) internal armed conflicts. An initial descriptive analysis investigates whether new/non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts are indeed the dominant type of internal fighting or whether they are at least of increasing significance. I continue with a simple, bivariate analysis (comparing the context and nature of these two types of internal fighting) which is then followed by a multiple regression analysis on the linkages between the single dimensions of internal fighting.

9. Critical Discussion of the Concept

Beforehand, however, some clarification is required as to why it is theoretically plausible to expect a coincidence of the above mentioned characteristics. The focus therefore shifts away from the causes of New Warfare (the question why and how state weakness and the abundance of conflict resources lead to the outbreak of non-state armed conflict) towards the dynamics and nature of New Warfare (the question how the aforementioned features shape and reinforce each other).
Part III.

Refining the Concept of New Wars
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Non-State Conflicts

In order to identify micro-mechanisms linking the dimensions of New Warfare, the following third part of this book relies on theoretical work by Jeremy Weinstein. In his articles, which appeared in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, in the American Political Science Review and in his book “Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence”, Weinstein presents a theory which explains differences in violent strategies pursued by rebel organizations in civil warfare (Weinstein 2005; Weinstein 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006a). The author suggests that differences in how rebels treat civilians during warfare are due to variation in the initial conditions rebel leaders are facing. The kind of resources available to rebel leaders determines their recruitment strategy which shapes the membership profile of the emerging rebel group. The membership of the rebel organization explains the internal structure of the group as well as the kind of institutions it develops in order to govern the local population which then determine the patterns of violence applied against non-combatants.

Weinstein’s theory can explain why the level of applied violence against civilians varies between rebel groups. This is remarkable because neither the concept of New Wars, nor the greed or grievance models presented before have much to offer as to why rebel organizations abuse civilians in some contexts but not in others. Furthermore, Weinstein provides the missing micro-foundation linking a major context factor of New Warfare (the availability of economic resources) with one of the main outcome variables of the concept of New Wars (the level and character of violence committed during warfare). However, Weinstein’s theory was designed to apply to conventional civil warfare only. For this reason, a close look into his assumptions and major arguments is needed to figure out in how far the above logic applies to non-state armed conflicts as well. Secondly, Weinstein focuses on the extent of civilian victimization in internal warfare. How violence is applied – whether selectively or indiscriminately\(^1\) – is given less attention.

\(^1\)Selective violence personalizes threats. Certain individuals or groups are targeted for tactical purposes. Those who support the rebels can be relatively certain that cooperation is exchanged for the right to survive. In contrast, indiscriminate violence makes no distinction among potential victims. It neither protects supporters nor punishes defectors. It selects its victims irrespective of their individual actions on the basis of their membership in a certain group (based on ties of kinship, location, class, ethnicity etc.) that is perceived to be connected with the opposition. The lack of discrimination among targets according to their actions is usually caused by a lack of information and renders indiscriminate violence comparatively inefficient and ineffective. Indiscriminate violence is described as “usually
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians

Luckily, this question has been discussed elsewhere. In his book on “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”, Kalyvas (2006) argues that it is the type of sovereignty or control that exists in a given region which affects the violent strategies of political actors involved in armed conflict. Where violent state and non-state actors lack the military resources necessary to impose unilateral control, they are more likely to use indiscriminate violence against civilians as a means to shape collaboration and deter defection. Thus, the author specifies the conditions under which indiscriminate violence becomes more likely (despite the fact that indiscriminate force is generally perceived as counterproductive in conventional civil warfare). Again, it remains to be discussed whether the same logic explains the nature of violence against civilians in non-state armed conflicts.

Interestingly, the main independent variable specified by Kalyvas (the level of military control which a belligerent is able to exert over a contested territory) well relates to the explanatory factors identified by Weinstein (the quantity and quality of resources available to rebel organizations and the development of more or less effective and efficient structures of internal and external control and management). Both certainly impact upon the rebels’ chances of gaining and maintaining territorial control. In addition, I find Kalyvas’ argument quite helpful in order to link the specific nature and quantity of actors involved in New Warfare with the nature of applied violence. The more actors involved, the greater the competition and the less likely the establishment of permanent unilateral control which, according to Kalyvas, increases the risk of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Actors recruited outside of the conflict area who lack local knowledge might also find it more difficult to exert control over a given territory and for this reason use violence indiscriminately. Instead of presenting Kalyvas’ argument as an alternative explanation to Weinstein’s theory, I therefore consider the two theories complementary.

The following introduces Weinstein’s and Kalyvas’ mechanisms and explores their explanatory power beyond conventional civil warfare. This procedure is based on the observation that the intensity and the character of violence applied during armed conflict varies greatly between as well as within sub-types of internal armed conflict. Even conventional insurgent organizations that challenged the state and sought to remove undemocratic regimes “hacked, raped and pillaged their way through the countryside”, causing large numbers of civilian casualties (e.g. in Sierra Leone), while elsewhere (e.g. in Nepal), insurgents exhibited restraint, discipline and control. They transformed local structures of governance, mobilized large numbers of civilians and committed fewer civilian deaths – even over extended periods of warfare (Weinstein 2007, pp. 5 sq.). It therefore remains to be seen whether the same mechanisms explaining this variance in the level and nature of violence within the sub-category of state-based armed conflicts (i.e. between greed and grievance conflicts) also explain such variance within the late”, “often arbitrary”, “totally disproportionate” and “inconsistent and erratic”. Because threats are completely unpredictable and individuals have no way to react, indiscriminate violence produces a “paralyzing, turbulent and irrational fear” which “destabilizes social relations” and atomizes society through suspicion and apprehension of strangers and each other. This fear might push the population into “total passivity” (Weinstein 2007, p. 18; Kalyvas 2004, pp. 105, 97, 101–103, 118).

112
sub-category of non-state armed conflicts as well as between sub-types of internal armed conflict (i.e. between state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts). This approach suggests that “while the contexts may differ, the mechanisms might recur” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 10).

10.1. Weinstein’s Structuralist Mechanism

In the initial stages of rebellion, Weinstein (2007, p. 52) depicts rebel leaders as being in a race with each other to form the dominant rebel group. Because warfare is a high-risk collective action and because participants trade off the costs and benefits of their involvement, rebel leaders need to develop appeals that motivate individuals to engage in their respective group. They offer or at least promise material as well as immaterial selective incentives, i.e. benefits that only accrue to those who actively participate in warfare. In doing so, rebel leaders have three different strategies at their disposal. Sometimes they attract participants by offering material benefits. In other cases they appeal to existing ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological identities, beliefs and norms. This strategy works if potential participants “have been and believe they will continue to be engaged in repeated interaction with others from the group” and if they highly value such future interaction with each other.² As a third and related approach in recruiting soldiers, rebel leaders might try to actively change people’s beliefs by activating “a process orientation rather than one focused on potential ends”. They again draw on community norms “to make participation as important to individuals as any material rewards they might receive” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 99 sq.).

The above illustrates how rebel leaders’ recruitment strategies depend on the resources available to them. In the first case, rebel leaders are able to draw on economic endowments derived from natural resource extraction, taxation of local production, criminal activity or donations from external patrons and diaspora communities. In order to be easily mobilized and translated into selective incentives, such economic endowments should be concrete which means the rebels should be able to utilize them directly and immediately to purchase arms or ammunition and to pay their soldiers. The ability to draw on such economic endowments not only reduces the potential costs of participation but also improves the position of a rebel groups vis-à-vis its opponent(s). In addition, “the use of economic endowments minimizes the importance of trust in the unofficial contract between rebel leaders and recruits” because benefits can be delivered instantly instead of being only promised in the future (Weinstein 2007, p. 101). In order to be of such advantage, economic endowments should be lootable (i.e. a small group of individuals should be able to extract and transport these resources) and their extraction and trade should be difficult to obstruct (Weinstein 2007, pp. 47 sq.).

²See Weinstein (2007, p. 99) or Axelrod (1987) for the original argument.
Explaining Violence Against Civilians

If rebel leaders lack easy access to economic resources, they might alternatively draw on social endowments. This term refers to “distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks that can be mobilized in support of collective action”. Social endowments also serve as “a source of solidarity and moral commitment”, they help groups to overcome the barriers to organization and they can lower transaction costs by activating internalized norms of reciprocity between group leaders and their fighters and by fusing individual and collective interests (Weinstein 2007, pp. 48 sq.). Because the leaders and their potential followers are tied by means of ethnic, religious or ideological bonds (and therefore share beliefs, expectations and norms), the promises leaders make about the political agendas they will implement if they succeed in capturing the state are especially credible. In other words, shared identities and belief systems serve as the glue that is holding an organization together and help to generate trust across members. This enables rebel leaders to recruit soldiers by promising selective rewards that are only available in the future in case of a successful rebellion like the abolition of ethnic or religious discrimination of so far marginalized groups (Weinstein 2007, p. 9; Weinstein 2002, p. 3).

Those who decide to participate in such rebellions tend to be highly committed individuals, so-called “investors” or “die-hard activists”. These individuals are dedicated to the political cause of the rebel organization and willing to make costly investments (including risking their lives) today in return for future rewards. This willingness to make investments without receiving immediate private rewards prevents the organization from being flooded by opportunistic joiners. Weinstein calls the movements in which such highly-committed individuals are willing to engage “activist rebellions” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 9, 103; Weinstein 2002, p. 2).

An entirely different membership profile arises in cases where participation is less risky and individual fighters are motivated by economic endowments. Those who engage in such rebellions expect to be rewarded immediately for their engagement. They are described as low-commitment individuals, so-called “consumers”, who seek only short-term gains from participation. Those individuals are less productive for the rebel organization because their support depends on a continual expenditure of resources (Weinstein 2007, p. 102). Weinstein refers to this kind of organization as “opportunistic rebellions”.

In one of his earlier works Weinstein (2002, p. 2) presented the four situations in which rebel leaders might find themselves as depicted in fig. 10.1 on the facing page. Type A rebellions very much resemble New Wars and Conflicts. Leaders can draw on economic resources for financing which renders such rebellions cheap to build and maintain and relatively attractive to opportunistic recruits. Type B rebellions (e.g. grievance rebellions) lack such financing but are able to compensate for their lack of economic resources by drawing on social endowments. Type D rebellions are unlikely to emerge due to a lack of economic as well as social endowments while Type C rebellions can draw on both kinds of endowments and are therefore best equipped.
Figure 10.1.: Theoretical Possibilities of Rebel Organizations (Weinstein 2002, p. 2; Weinstein 2005, p. 602).

Of course, Weinstein (2007, p. 50) is aware of the fact that, in practice, rebel leaders mix economic and social endowments – an insight which emanates from his earlier case studies. The above typology only depicts theoretical or ideal situations to illuminate his argument that the kind of endowments or resources available to rebel leaders determines the membership profile of their rebel groups. Easier access to one endowment than to the other conditions the recruitment strategies of leaders and the kind of members they attract which shapes the type of organization that emerges and finally the kind of violence that is applied.

Weinstein argues that activist rebellions find it easier to maintain internal discipline and to decentralize power within their armies as they are build on shared norms, networks and trust. “Because they have clear guidelines about how combatants should behave and strong mechanisms for enforcing discipline, activist insurgencies are better able to selectively identify targets, implement attacks, and discipline the use of force” (Weinstein 2007, p. 10). Furthermore, activist rebellions need to obtain resources like

---

3 In 2006, Weinstein co-authored the first version of a study which two years later appeared in the American Journal of Political Science. This study explores why individuals choose to participate in the rebellion in Sierra Leone. The authors find that individual decisions to join a rebel organization are simultaneously shaped “by personal grievances, cost-benefit calculations, and social pressures that emerge from tight-knit communities”. More precisely, the risk of voluntary participation in warfare (either on the side of the rebels or in defense of the state) was significantly higher for poorer individuals with little or no education who were living in districts with adverse health conditions. Individuals were also significantly more likely to voluntarily engage in internal warfare if they were excluded from political participation, if they believed that participation would increase their personal security, if they had a personal connection to the fighting units and if they were offered material rewards. Interestingly, the latter holds for voluntary recruits as well as abductees and poor as well as less aggrieved individuals. Obviously, “[m]ultiple logics of participation can and do exist within the same conflict” so that “[p]articipation in Sierra Leone’s civil war can best be understood in the context of this diversity of motivations”. Models taking only into account one or two of these arguments (grievances, selective incentives or social sanctions) perform much worse than the combined, comprehensive model. In addition, the authors find that “distinct patterns of recruitment are apparent across different fighting factions” (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006b, p. 22; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, pp. 448, 451 sq.).
Explaining Violence Against Civilians

food, shelter, supplies and intelligence from the local population. Therefore, they often
strike cooperative agreements with civilians. This inhibits them from using indiscrimi-
nate violence against their own support base.4

Opportunistic rebellions are less dependent on civilian support in order to survive and
prosper. For financing they resort to natural resource extraction or support from an
external patron. For this reason, they lack local ties. This makes it much harder for
rebel leaders to identify potential defectors and to apply violence selectively. Instead,
they are “prone to make mistakes” on and off the battlefield. In addition, the “constant
demand for short-term rewards drives combatants to loot, destroy property, and attack
indiscriminately” (Weinstein 2007, p. 10). In fact, opportunistic rebellions must allow a
certain degree of indiscipline to maintain their membership. Sometimes, rebel leaders
explicitly encourage or at least permit the pillaging of civilians or the looting of natural
resources as a way of paying their soldiers. Such behavior was observed, for instance,
in the case of Renamo in Mozambique after the external patron (Rhodesia) collapsed
and South Africa failed to fully fill the gap. Although South Africa provided military
support, “the flow of salaries, clothes, and food that translated seamlessly into selective
incentives came to an end […] Renamo began to develop alternative sources of revenue
to replace the flow of resources from Rhodesia. Payoffs resumed as Renamo permitted
its soldiers to loot public and private property as part of their attacks on civilian areas.
[...] In addition, Renamo became involved in the cross-border trade of ivory, which
yielded [...] 13 million [US dollars] alone in 1988 [...] Renamo also obtained funds
through the extortion of multinational corporations in exchange for security guarantees”
that economic motivations can undermine the cohesion of a rebel group. In Columbia,
economic motivations “generated individualism and led to internal rift, disloyalty and
a weakened capacity of the group leaders to shape the behavior of their members”
(Weinstein 2007, p. 321). Finally, because opportunistic rebellions lack a foundation of
shared norms and identities, trust is missing among combatants within the organization
and in the rebels’ external relationship with civilians. This connects with the expectation
that opportunistic rebel organizations tend to employ coercive tactics simply “because
they cannot credibly commit to non-abusive behaviour” (Weinstein 2007, p. 10).

The author summarizes that “factors that raise or lower the barriers to organization
by insurgent leaders – in particular whether material resources to finance warfare can
be easily mobilized without civilian consent – shape the type of individuals who elect to

4The same argument has been made earlier, e.g. by Valentino et al. (2004, pp. 384 sq.) who also argue
that in the long term, abusiveness would be counterproductive as it would destroy the human and
physical base of the local community on which the rebels depend. The authors refer to Mao Zedong’s
famous saying that the relationship between the people and the rebels can be compared with the
relationship that exists between the water and the fish. Because the rebels depend on the people as
much as the fish depend on the water, they usually have strong incentives to avoid violence against
non-combatants. At least they try to be selective in their use of force in order not to alienate the
civilians.
participate, the sorts of organizations that emerge to fight civil wars, and the strategies of violence that develop in practice” (Weinstein 2007, p. 7). The fact that rebel groups abuse civilians in some contexts but not in others is not attributed to ethnic hatred or the fact that this kind of violence is of strategic benefit to the warring parties because it deters or threatens the military opponent. Instead, it is attributed to “dimensions of organization – including resources, membership, authority structures and internal rules” (Weinstein 2007, p. 27).

According to this argument, which is rooted in an older line of Resource Mobilization Theory, the dynamics of a rebel movement are in important ways conditioned by structural constraints, namely its resources and organization (Weinstein 2007, p. 46). “Violence becomes the natural outcome of a path of organizational evolution rather than a strategic choice made in response to changing conditions on the ground” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 11, 21). This argument entails a high degree of path dependency. It clearly emphasizes structure over agency. Weinstein (2007, p. 50) departs from the contention that the initial stock of economic and social endowments available to rebel leaders are – at least in the short run – relatively fixed and determined exogenously: The availability of natural resources is largely a function of geography while social endowments (identities and belief systems) are difficult and slow to change (Weinstein 2007, p. 50; Weinstein 2005, p. 602; Weinstein 2002, p. 2). Weinstein justifies the assumption of fixed endowments by referring to the enormous amount of analytical leverage it provides for understanding the different strategies which groups pursue. According to him, it is surprising how much variation in his dependent variable (the character and level of violence perpetrated by rebel groups) can be explained by his key independent variables (differences in the social and economic endowments available to rebel groups, their membership and their set of organizational practices and structures). Critics might counter-argue that a group’s economic and social endowments are not fixed but, for instance, a function of their leadership. Competent leaders might well be able to influence the endowments available to them by generating material resources or fostering social ties. Weinstein forecloses this objection and answers that although leadership is critical, the emergence of such competent leaders is itself endogenous to the process of group formation. It is shaped by factors similar to those that affect a group’s membership. In other words, “[d]ifferences in the viability of insurgency can account too for the leaders that come to the fore” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 21 sq., 51; Weinstein 2005, pp. 618 sq.).

Others might criticize Weinstein for being overly deterministic. For instance, Staniland (2012) doubts that resource wealth necessarily encourages the degeneration of violent groups into criminal and fractious, loot-seeking thugs as happened with the UNITA in Angola or the RUF in Sierra Leone. He argues that resource wealth at least bears the potential to also help insurgents in building disciplined and cohesive organizations. “Simply relying on drug money, state sponsors, or illicit smuggling has no single consequence for organizational cohesion and discipline: instead, resources are used in different ways by different types of armed actors” (Staniland 2012, p. 144). He reminds that the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
in Sudan all heavily relied on external funding and illicit economic gain but nevertheless forged and even improved their organizational effectiveness. This empirical diversity prompted Staniland to develop his “Social-Institutional Theory of Insurgent Organization”. According to the author, the structure of preexisting social networks or ties upon which an armed group is built determines the organizational integration or fragmentation of the group (whether robust institutions can be build to internally discipline and control the group members) which then shapes the effects of resource flows (whether resources are harnessed for organization building or whether they become linked to organizational degradation). Integrated institutions that are embedded within an overlapping social base, that are built on preexisting networks of collective action, on vertical ties to local communities and on horizontal ties among the organizers “can manage and contain the lures of resource wealth. These organizations use resources to improve their fighting power and internal control, rather than becoming greedy loot-seekers” (Staniland 2012, pp. 143, 152). Resource wealth provides such rebel organizations with political capital and social support because it is used to buy weapons, to bribe government officials, to pay fighters and to provide services to their families and to the civilian population. Even in cases of large and rapid increases in wealth “[t]his type of organization deploys resources for political and organizational tasks rather than becoming a band of greedy [fragmented and undisciplined] thugs” (Staniland 2012, pp. 148, 151, 153). In contrast, armed groups that are built upon socially divided networks are much worse in controlling and disciplining the use of resources. Like Weinstein, Staniland (2012, p. 154) argues that “[w]eak preexisting horizontal ties among leaders create internal cleavages that are likely to persist and discourage the creation of central institutions for making and implementing decisions. This makes future leadership splits and feuds more likely. Weak vertical ties undermine the creation of local institutions. Revolts, indiscipline, and defiance from below are the result”. Of course such fragmented groups react differently from integrated organizations to infusions of external aid, drug money or diamonds. Due to a lack of internal control and alternative ways of motivating fighters, resources will become “objects of contestation and sources of indiscipline”. Although resources flowing into these fragmented organizations “will not fundamentally change the organization’s structure [and] may initially be useful to hold together a loose coalition, […] over time they can exacerbate preexisting conflicts over control and distribution that lead to unrest and indiscipline within the group” (Staniland 2012, pp. 151, 154). Elsewhere, the author notes that “[i]n these fragmented organizations, resources are more likely to become linked to internal rivalries, parochial individual and local agendas, and purely profit-seeking behavior” (Staniland 2012, pp. 143, 152). According to this theory, “the social bases and consequent organizational structures of militant mobilization determine what happens when cash, guns, and narcotics begin to course through a group’s vain”. How resources are used then affects the insurgents’ fighting power, their vulnerability to counterinsurgency and their treatment of civilians (Staniland 2012, p. 143).
The statement that the effect of resource wealth on the organizational performance of rebel groups (i.e. on their level of internal discipline, cohesion and control) is conditioned by another factor (their social origins) is not at odds with Weinstein’s argument. Instead, it further specifies the relationship by introducing another intermittent variable or interaction effect. Both authors might slightly differ in their perspective. However, their theoretical arguments largely overlap. Weinstein asks how economic endowments contribute to the emergence of organizations with weak social bases in the first place and, in cases where organizational bases are already fragmented, contribute to a further disintegration. Staniland focuses on the second half of this chain of explanation by asking in how far the social bases of organizations (whether they are built on preexisting social networks of collective action or on socially divided bases) in return shape the flow of resources, the organizational form and behavior of insurgent groups. Staniland’s argument serves well to explain the vicious circle affecting fragmented but resource-rich armed groups: Due to their weak internal structures, such organizations will not be able to harness resources for organization building which further degrades their structural bases. Weinstein would agree that armed organizations with already weak internal structures/social bases cannot escape the resource trap but enter an institutional race to the bottom. Overall, Weinstein’s theory is as much a “Social-Institutional Theory of Insurgent Organization” as Staniland’s. As mentioned before, Weinstein’s concept of “social endowments” refers to “distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks that can be mobilized in support of collective action”. In other words: nothing other than the social base of an armed organization. For this reason, Staniland’s description of how integrated armed groups are coping with the inflow of resources resembles Weinstein’s description of activist rebellions that, in addition to their social endowments, have some natural resources at their disposal or receive financial aid from an external patron. Finally, both authors prioritize structure over agency. Staniland also notes that “[s]ocial innovation is constrained […] by the group’s social-organizational underpinnings. The pathways of likely change are determined by the original structure of the organization. Armed group leaders cannot make institutions as they please, even if these leaders are broadly popular, following ideological precedents, or facing a weak state” (Staniland 2012, p. 152).

In his book, Weinstein (2007) explores the violent strategies of four rebel organizations in more detail: the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) in Mozambique, Sendero Luminoso Nacional (the national organization of the Shining Path) and its regional committee of Alto Huallaga (CRH) in Peru. He presents a controlled comparison of these four cases and a large-N

---

5For this comparative study, he uses Mill’s Method of Difference. The research design chosen by the author is a Most Similar Systems Design which means the four cases exhibit similar characteristics in regard to alternative explanatory factors while they only vary in terms of the key independent variable. This variance then explains differences in the dependent variable. All four cases exhibit a similar level of state weakness. All four governments were unable to inhibit the formation of violent internal opposition groups and to control their entire territories. Still, they were able to finance and maintain an army more powerful than the rebel forces and “strong enough that […] the conflict was
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians

analysis comprising all civil wars between 1945 and 2000. Due to some methodological
and statistical shortcomings\(^6\), the author hesitates to draw any final conclusions. Still,
both analyses largely support the overall argument advanced in his book.\(^7\) Especially
the results of his more fine-grained comparative case studies confirm that those rebel
groups emerging in environments rich in natural resources or with external support of
an outside patron (Renamo and CRH) indeed committed higher levels of indiscrimi-
nate violence against civilians. In such cases, reports of large outflows of refugees and
insurgent-perpetrated massacres, rape, looting and forced recruitment of combatants
are also quite common. In contrast, movements that arose in resource-poor contexts
(the NRA and the national organization of the Shining Path) perpetrated far fewer
abuses and employed violence selectively and strategically. Furthermore, he finds that
the initial endowments of rebel organizations explain variation in their violent practices independently of state power (Weinstein 2007, pp. 7, 310 sq.).

Although Weinstein’s theory seems to suit New Warfare very well, a closer look uncovers several points of departure. Weinstein explicitly notes that he only investigates classical cases of asymmetric insurgency and that he excludes environments in which the state had ceased to exist.\(^8\) His understanding of violence “as the outcome of an inter-

\(^6\) For instance, Weinstein (2007, p. 326) notes that due to a lack of respective micro-level event data, this large-N analysis does not lend itself to an assessment of causal mechanisms but only explores macro-level relationships, i.e. the question whether there exists a statistically significant correlation between “access to material resources” and the level (not the character) of violence committed during warfare. The latter is measured through the number of military and civilian deaths which means killings perpetrated by rebel groups and government forces are conflated.

\(^7\) For instance, Weinstein (2007, pp. 308 sq.) finds that in conventional civil warfare, the use of contraband resources (including drugs and diamonds) to finance an insurgency is statistically associated with higher levels of overall violence. However, the author rightly notes that this outcome is also consistent with rival explanations (e.g. access to material resources might simply lead to a greater capacity to inflict harm on non-combatants through the purchase of more effective weapons).

\(^8\) See Weinstein (2007, p. 55); Weinstein (2005, p. 604, fn 7). Only at the very end of his book does Weinstein (2007, pp. 312 sq.) come close to depicting new (non-state) warfare. There, he argues that in situations of entire state collapse only a few barriers exist to the formation of rebel groups. This undermines the rebel’s incentives “to build a cohesive, national organization with an effective internal structure”. Furthermore, “the absence of state power, like the presence of material resources, reduces the dependence of military organizations on their constituents for the support needed to
action in which rebel groups act strategically in seeking support from non-combatants” is also tailored to conventional (state-based) internal warfare. Weinstein assumes that the “prospect of territorial control” and the “desire to govern [...] discipines the behavior of the rebel leadership and heightens the importance of developing sustainable mechanisms to supply an army and establishing constructive relationships with civilian populations”. Because rebels know that their interaction with civilians will be repeated in the future if they are successful, they refrain from applying violence indiscriminately (Weinstein 2007, pp. 17, 45, 55). In addition, Weinstein criticizes any distinction between wars based on the expressed motivations of belligerents (e.g. justice vs. loot-seeking). Instead, he allows for various motives and goals. He distinguishes three kinds of violent groups: those who seek to capture the center, those who want to secede and those who use violence but have no interest in achieving territorial control of any sort (Weinstein 2007, pp. 17, 55). The latter category explicitly refers to terrorist groups who – for the aforementioned reasons – I suggested to exclude from any study exploring armed conflict. These points of departure raise the question whether the mechanism identified by Weinstein also applies to bilateral and non-state armed conflict that is characterized by a rather symmetric distribution of military power among the adversaries and where the belligerents do not seek permanent control of the central state but only control of a certain region like a mining area to extract easily lootable resources which does not require the consent of the civilian population or the establishment of a cooperative relationship with them – neither in the short nor in the long term. I would answer this question in the affirmative. The restraining effect of a “desire to govern” on the use of violence against civilians drops out in the case of New Warfare. The belligerents do not seek control of the state but immediate, short-term and private gain. In accordance with Weinstein’s logic, advocates of the concept of New Wars expect this to increase the risk of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants. Secondly, the fact that conventional civil warfare is asymmetric in nature is irrelevant for Weinstein’s argument. A specific distribution of power amongst the adversaries is at no point of importance for the identified mechanism. Instead, Weinstein finds that his key independent variable (the kind of initial endowments available to rebel leaders) explains variation in the violent practices of rebel groups independently of the relative power of the adversary. Thirdly, the concept of New Wars shares with Weinstein’s theory the assumption that individuals act rationally (Weinstein 2007, p. 40). Weinstein, however, focuses not so much on material rewards but explicitly includes non-material payoff derived from participation in rebellion (such as prestige, acceptance or the opportunity to exercise agency). The advocates of the concept of New Wars touch upon non-material payoffs and more emotional motives, too.9 Taking non-material payoffs into account seems a reasonable expansion of the concept of New Wars instead of a contradiction. Fourthly, Weinstein’s theory offers a number of interesting and testable implications for non-state internal armed conflict. For instance, one might argue that the leaders of groups involved in non-state fighting are

---

9 See e.g. Kaldor (1999, pp. 19, 25).
also in a race with each other to form the dominant rebel group. Because easily available economic resources enable groups to get off the ground more quickly, rebel groups need to act fast and start competing for these resources. In a context “[…] where economic endowments can be mobilized, [those] rebel leaders who utilize them [first] are likely to emerge as the dominant players. Appeals to identity and ideology [simply] take much longer to develop and refine”. Thus, “[w]here economic resources are available to meet the start-up costs of rebellion, the extended process of shaping identities, mobilizing networks, and building ideologies is often cut short”. This explains why opportunistic rebel leaders emerged first and crowded out activists in contexts where resources permitted it (e.g. in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo/DRC) (Weinstein 2007, pp. 52, 328, 331 sqq.). Elsewhere, the author explains that “the marginal benefits of moving fast are much higher in resource-rich environments. Potential rebel leaders know that if they adopt a more time-consuming strategy of social mobilization, others might accept offers of external assistance, capture lootable resources, or beat them to the capital”. Weinstein (2007, p. 329) further adds that where barriers to the organization of insurgency are low due to the availability of economic resources or the collapse of state structures, more rebel groups will emerge. The greater number of challengers puts a further premium on speed in the process of organizational formation. These developments which through the above described dynamic lead to indiscriminate violence against civilians should in particular apply to new, non-state warfare where economic resources are more easily available and exploited by violent non-state actors due to state collapse.

For the same reason, rebel groups involved in New Warfare can be expected to particularly suffer from a problem of adverse selection. Weinstein explains that recruits are well aware of their true commitment to the organization while rebel leaders lack this knowledge. “A recruit’s type [whether he/she is low- or highly-committed] is private information, and individuals have a strong incentive to misrepresent their level of commitment”. Due to this lack of information and despite the fact that they might want to recruit only the most committed individuals, rebel leaders run the risk of attracting opportunists by offering short-term rewards that are higher than the actual opportunity costs for joining the rebellion (Weinstein 2007, p. 102; Weinstein 2005, pp. 603 sq.). This risk is especially prevalent in a context of New Warfare where selective material incentives are comparatively easy at hand while the opportunity costs to participate in warfare and the risks of individual engagement are comparatively low (because the state and its military and policing institutions are collapsing or already collapsed, because rebel groups are fighting each other instead of a militarily superior state army, because rebels avoid open battle in order not to disrupt their illegal economic activities or because alternative income generating options hardly exist).

---

10Weinstein’s statistical analysis later confirms that “[c]onflicts […] linked to resources exhibit significantly larger numbers of rebel groups” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 329 sq.).
Weinstein identifies three recruitment methods which can be used by rebel leaders to reduce their informational disadvantage to avoid adverse selection (Weinstein 2007, pp. 104 sq.; Weinstein 2005, p. 606). In order to figure out whether they are truly committed and trustworthy, rebel leaders can actively gather information about the recruits’ past behavior. Secondly, rebel leaders can only accept those new recruits who are invited to join the rebellion by current trustworthy soldiers who act as guarantors for their honesty and commitment. This strategy of “vouching” is of course only effective as long as those engaged in the rebellion care about their reputation within the organization. It worked, for instance, in the case of the NRA in Uganda where Museveni encouraged the Bataka to volunteer their sons for the cause. “The new recruits were thus in a position of needing to protect their reputation with the NRA and with their families” (Weinstein 2007, p. 110). Finally, rebel leaders can apply “costly induction”. In this case, new recruits have to pass a period of political indoctrination and study the political ideology of the rebel group followed by written or oral examination. Alternatively, access to weapons can be deliberately delayed. New recruits are then required to pass a period of “rebel apprenticeship” during which they actively engage in warfare without wearing a gun. The level of risk associated with this requirement would be unmanageable for low-committed individuals. This method was for instance used by the national organization of the Shining Path in Peru where full membership could be only achieved after recruits had passed a number of less popular stages. This assured that “the opportunity to hold a gun and wield real power was far down the road” (Weinstein 2007, p. 119).

Unfortunately, all three methods of recruitment (information gathering, vouching and costly induction) “can be employed only by groups rooted in shared identities or belief systems with networks that connect them to the civilian population”. This leads to the expectation that all three methods are more likely to be used by activist rebellions. Groups involved in New Warfare are among those who use material payoffs to attract soldiers. According to Weinstein, such groups do not or cannot screen out new members because they lack the respective networks necessary to obtain information on new recruits. Instead, they accept nearly all interested individuals who do not need to show any commitment to any superior goal (Weinstein 2007, pp. 106 sq.; Weinstein 2005, p. 607). In comparison with activist rebel groups, those organizations involved in New Warfare are therefore expected to be more heterogeneous in terms of identities or beliefs within their membership.

Finally, Weinstein’s logic implies “that the level of advanced education in groups that recruit using payoffs should be much lower than in groups that employ alternative approaches” because “[p]eople who place a higher value on rewards they might receive in the future are [also] far more likely to absorb the costs of investing in education”. Accordingly, the average level of education should be much lower among those engaged in New Warfare as opposed to those fighting conventional civil wars (Weinstein 2007, p. 106; Weinstein 2005, p. 607).
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians

Later on, Weinstein (2007, pp. 127 sq., 131) identifies three tools (investment in training, the nurturing of an organizational culture and the establishment of structures of hierarchy and delegation) which can be used by rebel leaders to solve problems of organizational control and management, e.g. principal-agent problems, or to avoid defection, defined by the author as actions taken by individual combatants to maximize their personal gains at the expense of the group’s broader objective. Again, efforts to solve problems of internal control and management are expected to be made by rebel leaders of activist rather than opportunistic rebellions because “[t]he groups’ membership both affects the magnitude of the challenge of maintaining control and constrains the set of tools leaders can employ in response” (Weinstein 2007, p. 128). In line with this reasoning, organizations involved in New Warfare can be expected to refrain from investments in the training of new recruits. At least they will not invest in political education but instead only focus on military training. In addition, they can be expected to not develop an organizational culture or shared sense of mission based on their ideological conviction. Consequently, a written Code of Conduct does not exist or is not enforced. In terms of their internal structures of management and control, such organizations are either characterized by extreme levels of decentralization or a very high degree of centralization. In cases where rebel leaders still exert some control over their inferiors, extreme levels of centralization might emerge as a characteristic as much as a response to high level of indiscipline, incoherence and inconsistency in the behavior of their combatants (Weinstein 2007, p. 159). In these cases, superiors avoid decentralization because it would worsen their informational disadvantage relative to their local units and further magnify incentives to defect. In cases where rebel leaders have already lost much of their internal control, weak or extremely decentralized internal structures emerge. As a consequence, combatants face at best arbitrary punishment in case of civilian abuse. Defection in the form of personal enrichment also goes largely unpunished or is even encouraged by leaders. In fact, it might become “the modus operandi” of such organizations (Weinstein 2007, p. 157).

The author notes that at least initially, activist rebellions tend to establish hierarchical structures, too, because these organizations “are shaped in powerful ways by first movers”. These first movers are the “initial core of leaders” who have “a great deal at stake and often demand significant control over the trajectory of the organization […] and who] will not relinquish control over the direction of the group”. At the beginning of the rebellion, these leaders might be convinced that clear lines of hierarchical control help them to operate effectively in environments of uncertainty and limited information. Such structures might appear helpful because “rebel organizations face a government adversary that is highly resourced, centralized and coordinated” and because “a fully

\[\text{11} \text{During armed conflict, principal-agent problems arise because the principal (i.e. the rebel leader) cannot directly observe, control and evaluate the agent’s (i.e. the combatant’s) actions. Principal-agent problems are aggravated by the fact that combatants operate under the command of multiple principals (the national leadership of the organization, regional commanders and local leaders), that operations are mostly decentralized and that most rebel groups have limited access to communications technology (Weinstein 2007, pp. 130 sq.).}\]
decentralized structure would [...] make it more difficult for rebels to take on the tasks of governance [...] and the effective rule of the state should they succeed in battle” (Weinstein 2007, p. 134). However, due to the kind of members they attract, their rigorous screening during the process of recruitment and various efforts to establish trust and cooperative arrangements between leaders and combatants, decentralization becomes an attractive option. As time passes, leaders may decide to share decision-making power with combatants (e.g. by creating forums in which soldiers can participate in discussions about the future direction of the movement) or rebel leaders may place constraints on their own capacity to supervise other members. In addition, training which not only focuses on weapons handling but also political education fosters a shared sense of mission, purpose and duty. Several rebel groups (e.g. the NRA in Uganda or the national organization of the Shining Path in Peru) even published a written Code of Conduct. Of course, mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating rebel behavior also need to be introduced. For instance, lower units within the national organization of the Shining Path in Peru were required to submit operational tactical plans in advance of each military operation. These plans assigned responsibilities to each individual engaged in the planned operation which allowed for evaluation afterwards (Weinstein 2007, p. 153). A system of (not necessarily immediate) rewards (e.g. promotion within the organization based on merit, performance and understanding of the purpose of the movement and its ideology) and punishments (e.g. public trials in cases of defection) further ensures cooperative behavior (Weinstein 2007, pp. 136 sqq.).

The above argued that opportunistic and activist rebel groups greatly differ in their internal structures as well as in their external structures to manage their relationships with civilians. Weinstein notes that all rebel organizations strive for (short or long term) control over (a smaller or larger part of) territory which requires the establishment of some sort of structure to manage their relationships with the local populations on whose support and compliance they depend to varying degree. In fact, “[t]he decision to control territory [...] necessitates the development of a strategy for governing non-combatants in the course of conflict” (Weinstein 2007, p. 195). Thus, all rebel groups need some sort of governance structures – understood as “informal and formal rules that define a hierarchy of decision making and a system of taxation” (Weinstein 2007, p. 164) – to mobilize support from non-combatants or to extract key resources. However, the external governance structures created by rebel groups differ in regard to two dimensions: Their degree of power-sharing (which determines the degree of responsiveness to the preferences of non-combatants) and their level of inclusiveness (which relates to the proportion of the civilian population which is entitled to participate in governance) (Weinstein 2007, pp. 155, 166). In some contexts, rebel leaders construct institutions that formalize power-sharing arrangements with civilian populations and ensure the participation of not only elites but all relevant segments of the respective communities. In other contexts, rebel groups and their leaders reject such power-sharing arrangements. Instead, they resort to unilateral military control, a structure that employs coercion in the organization of resources and the prevention of defection. Because only some civilians are provided with elite positions, a hierarchical structure of control emerges.
In order to illustrate the variety of governance structures established by rebel groups, Weinstein again refers to the NRA in Uganda which created institutions of grassroot democracy, so-called “resistance councils” (RCs), that were locally elected and used to organize the provision of food for the nascent insurgency. People who struggled to meet their own subsistence needs were not forced to contribute. The rebels always sought to pay for their food and provided public goods (security or health care services) in exchange for civilian contributions. The RC system enshrined power-sharing arrangements as it was explicitly designed to check formally the power of the military. The national leadership council of the rebel organization was composed of military and civilian members (leaders of the RC system, political supporters or intellectuals) (Weinstein 2007, pp. 175–180). Likewise, the national organization of the Shining Path in Peru built so-called “open people’s committees” which ensured a full incorporation of civilians into the rebel movement. The base force of the organization was made up entirely of community members who produced their own food. This rendered any forced or voluntary collection obsolete. In exchange for their support, civilians received education. The rebels also established a system of redistribution of wealth amongst those in need while the Sendero militiants themselves lived in absolute poverty (Weinstein 2007, pp. 186–192). Weinstein (2007, p. 187) summarizes that “[i]n rebel-held zones, the Shining Path built structures of governance that broadened participation beyond elite intellectuals; created overlapping institutions of control where power was shared between the military, the party, and the local administration; and drew resources from the civilian population in manageable and accepted ways”. In contrast, the regional committee of the Shining Path in the Upper Huallaga Valley used civilians for a single purpose, namely the production of coca leaves. Sendero-Huallago formed a centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian system of administration that maintained unilateral and military control over the coca market. But the production of coca requires extensive and sustained civilian labor. For this reason, an “odd form of inclusiveness” (a system of taxation that ensured civilians benefited sufficiently from this trade) was necessary in order to prevent defection to the other side (Weinstein 2007, pp. 192–195). The Renamo in Mozambique also established structures of hierarchical control in the villages it controlled by resurrecting traditional authorities. Power was returned to community-level chiefs (so-called régulos). Although this seems generous at first sight, it in fact limited a broad participation of civilians. In addition, the rebels worked only with cooperative régulos and simply appointed new régulos where it encountered resistance. “Régulos were not given political authority […]. No forum existed for constructive debate, civilian perspectives were rarely aired, and traditional leaders served at the will of the rebel army. Governance was not joint and did not involve powersharing. There was no formal check on the actions of the rebel leadership” (Weinstein 2007, p. 183). The national leadership council of Renamo was almost exclusively composed of senior military commanders and rebel soldiers. The system of hierarchical and unilateral military control and governance that was established by Renamo also involved a great deal of coercion. For instance “[n]o effort was made to distinguish between those who could afford to contribute [food to the rebels] and those who were unable” (Weinstein 2007, p. 185). Civilians rarely received public goods in exchange for their support and contributions (Weinstein 2007, pp. 181–186).
Weinstein (2007, p. 171) traces this great variance in the structures of governance established by rebel organizations back to the conditions present at the organization’s inception and the types of members who were attracted to participate. More specifically, he states that three factors determine the shape of governance structures: the resource endowments of rebel groups, the degree to which the resources a rebel group wishes to obtain require civilian labor to produce and the membership and organizational structure of the rebel group itself (Weinstein 2007, p. 196). This again leads to a number of empirical implications concerning the governance structures established by groups involved in New Warfare as opposed to those fighting conventional civil wars.

Conventional insurgencies largely depend on the productivity of and the support from the civilian population, and their members are characterized by a long term perspective. Such organizations are able to credibly commit themselves and their members to agreements with non-combatants due to the shared norms, rules and identities on which they are built. In addition, the rebels intend to take over the state and therefore expect that interaction between them and their future constituents will be repeated. Their shadow of the future is comparatively long. In order to realize long term rewards, the rebels might be even willing to establish institutions which constrain their own self-interested, short-term actions. In such situations, cooperative and trust-based arrangements with non-combatants (e.g. structures of joint governance, rule-making, management of resources and the provision of public goods) are not only a necessity but comparatively easy to establish and maintain (Weinstein 2007, pp. 167–169). In addition, the rebels are held in check and forced to cooperate with civilians through the capacity of non-combatants to punish coercive or exclusive rebel behavior by fleeing or switching sides. Both reactions would undermine the rebel’s ability to obtain the support and resources which they need to survive (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006a, p. 430). This puts non-combatants “in a position of power” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 170, 203) which they lack in New Warfare.

Opportunistic rebel groups involved in New Wars are able to draw on economic endowments to survive and prosper even if civilians withhold contributions. This means they are able to exist and enrich themselves independently of civilian support. Because they are unconcerned about the reactions of the civilian population, they cannot only afford to behave in a more predatory fashion (Weinstein 2007, pp. 171 sq.) but their leaders also have little incentive to share power with non-combatants (e.g. in order to jointly manage resources). From the perspective of the rebels, future benefits from cooperation with civilians are unlikely or insecure. In fact, rebel-civilian cooperation within a future state is not even intended. The rebels are characterized by a comparatively short shadow of the future. Trust as the basis of any cooperative arrangement between the rebels and the local population is lacking, too, due to a lack of shared norms and identities. The rebels also quickly develop a negative reputation because their weak internal structures result in high levels of defection and inconsistency in behavior. “[C]ivilians learn quickly that commitments [made by such groups] are not credible and promises cannot be trusted” (Weinstein 2007, pp. 172, 205). For these reasons, opportunistic rebels would fail to build
cooperative relationships with civilians even if they would try (Weinstein 2007, p. 196).
At the same time, civilians are unable to pay a bribe large enough to convince the rebels to restrain themselves or to establish more inclusive governance structures (Weinstein 2007, p. 172). Switching support to the other side does not help either because “the other side” (the remaining non-state actors involved in fighting New Wars) has similar incentive structures and is therefore unlikely to treat civilians much differently. A comparatively strong government which at least promises to provide security and to defend public interests does not exist. Civilians only have the option to flee which would make it even easier for the rebels to illegally extract resources in the area. Therefore, opportunistic rebel groups deliberately engage in forced displacement. Alternatively, civilians could actively resist warfare. This, however, would most certainly result in further repression and the establishment of more governance structures rooted in military control and coercion (Weinstein 2007, p. 172). In either case, the risk of violence against civilians increases.

A hybrid situation arises where opportunistic rebel groups heavily depend on civilian labor in order to produce the resources they wish to obtain. Sendero-Huallago has already been given as an example. The rebels needed non-combatants for the labor-intensive production of coca leaves. For this reason they established a highly centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian system of administration and unilateral military control that inhibited citizens from co-managing the rebellion but which was combined with some “odd form of civilian inclusion” in the distribution of benefits. “[W]here the realization of revenues from economic endowments requires civilian labor, rebel groups tend to build structures that are more broadly participatory, even if they lack mechanisms for sharing significant power” (Weinstein 2007, p. 173). According to Elwert (1997, p. 98), the same logic also affects the intensity of warfare: In cases where the exploitation of the conflict resource requires a lot of labor to extract, the rebels simply fear a war-induced shortage of labor: Very severe fighting which results in large numbers of direct and indirect military and civilian deaths would lead to a shortage of those who exploit the resources on behalf of the rebel commanders.12

The above already touches upon the final causal link specified by Weinstein. The author argues that the kind or quality of internal structures established by rebel leaders to control and manage their members and the kind or quality of institutions they develop to regulate their external relationships with the civilian population determine the level and kind of violence applied against non-combatants. Again, the implications for New Warfare as opposed to conventional civil warfare are straightforward.

---

12Elwert (1997, p. 98) adds that those engaged in new war economies need to fear a breakdown or decrease in the demand for the conflict resources they produce and therefore a shortage in money, arms and other goods which they receive in return and which they need for warfare. He therefore concludes that war economies will remain a “ephemeral phenomenon” because they are without much protection exposed to the cyclical nature of markets.
According to Weinstein (2007, p. 198), opportunistic rebel groups not only commit high levels of indiscriminate violence because their membership profile and internal structure inhibit leaders from policing defection within their ranks, but also because their external relationships with civilians are built on coercive instead of cooperative structures. Opportunistic groups simply lack networks of local ties that would otherwise enable them to solicit information from non-combatants which are needed to identify and punish defectors individually. The precondition for the selective use of violence (i.e. a capacity to obtain valuable and trustworthy information and to use it to direct violence without making mistakes) is heavily obstructed (Weinstein 2007, pp. 204 sq.).

In contrast, “[a]ctivist rebellions tend to have the institutions needed to choose targets carefully; as a consequence, such movements employ largely selective violence at much lower levels of intensity” (Weinstein 2007, p. 198). Avoiding indiscriminate violence renders activist rebellions more efficient in their use of force which also increases their effectiveness: Civilians know that in case of defection, punishment by the rebels will only target the defectors (i.e. violence is used efficiently). This implies that collaboration with the rebels ensures survival or at least protection from attacks by the other side which reduces incentives to defect (i.e. the rebellion becomes more effective) (Weinstein 2007, p. 204).

The four case studies again support these theses. The NRA in Uganda established mechanisms to include supportive forces and put in place mechanisms of internal control that guaranteed a rather consistent level of discipline within the organization even far from the center of rebel control. Its shared ideology and its tight linkages to local communities enabled the organization to carefully direct force and to limit the number of mistakes. The NRA worked through its local committees to identify traitors and gather evidence. If efforts to convert defectors failed, the rebels employed targeted assassinations, which were the dominant form of NRA violence against non-combatants. Overall, rebel groups were responsible for the smallest number of incidents of violence during this conflict (Weinstein 2007, pp. 220–229). The second activist group studied by the author, the national committee of the Shining Path in Peru, also applied force selectively against non-combatants. But, particularly in the later stages of the rebellion and in the zonas altas where the rebels encountered greater resistance and lacked the monitoring mechanisms that restrained abuses in the lowlands, large civilian massacres occurred. In these cases, however, civilians were collectively punished for their active resistance, violence was used strategically to send strong signals to the remaining civilian population and attacks were disciplined (Weinstein 2007, pp. 240–250). The two opportunistic rebel groups studied by Weinstein, Renamo in Mozambique and Sendero-Huallaga in Peru, which did not establish cooperative relationships with civilian populations and which lacked internal control and discipline, used coercive tactics. For the regional committee of the Shining Path in Huallaga, “[v]iolence became the toll of choice […] as it sought to maintain control of the drug trade” (Weinstein 2007, p. 251). The organization became increasingly indiscriminate in its use of violence over time and attempts by civilians to flee or to fight back were met with even more violence by the Sendero cadres (Weinstein 2007, pp. 240–250).
Renamo forces in Mozambique only used violence selectively to target Frelimo fighters but otherwise did not show much restraint in their use of force. The rebels were responsible for the vast majority of incidents of violence, large civilian massacres were a consistent feature of rebel behavior especially as the organization grew in size and spread geographically and the violence applied against civilians is described as “fairly indiscriminate” in nature. In contested zones, the rebels made no effort to identify the victims, their incursions were brutal and violence careened out of control. Renamo was even unable to protect its own supporters from its attacks. Far from the center, the level of violence was much lower, but the character of rebel behavior remained the same. In rebel-held areas, people experienced high levels of coercion on a daily basis (Weinstein 2007, pp. 230–239). Weinstein (2007, p. 239) identifies this abusiveness as an unintended by-product of the rebel organization’s recruitment strategy: The short-term, material motivations of Renamo fighters rendered the commanders unable to police defection within their units.

In summary, Weinstein argues that the initial endowments to which rebel leaders have access determine the membership of their rebel group. The profile of recruits then conditions the choices rebel leaders make about how to internally manage and control the behavior of their combatants. In addition, the kind of endowments available to rebel leaders determines the choices they make about how to govern the surrounding civilian populations. Both the quality of internal and of external structures of control and management shape the ways in which the rebels employ violence against non-combatants. The leaders of resource-poor organizations are forced to draw on social endowments (shared norms, beliefs and identity) instead of material incentives to mobilize and motivate their combatants. This yields a core of highly committed members. Members attracted to, selected by and raised during such rebellions are willing to endure enormous costs – even death – for rewards that are only available in the future if the rebels succeed in taking over the state. This enormous commitment is reinforced by respective systems of training, political education and promotion based on merit and understanding of the political message of the movement. Because highly committed combatants are more likely to follow the orders of their commanders, this membership profile allows leaders to decentralize operations and to more effectively control and manage their members. Rebel groups with such internal structures are better able to take on military targets and to exhibit discipline in liberated zones. In addition, the rebels intend to cooperate with civilians in the long term. For this purpose, they establish structures of governance within the areas they control that are responsive to the needs and interests of large segments of the civilian population. These institutions are characterized by high levels of inclusiveness and power-sharing with non-combatants. The rebels are able to build a reputation of restraint and to largely abstain from coercive measures and one-sided violence against civilians. If it is used, force against non-combatants is applied systematically, strategically and selectively to punish defectors. In contrast, access of rebel groups to economic endowments enables leaders to make appeals for participation that are rooted in short-term material incentives. Resource-rich groups tend to attract combatants who expect immediate payoffs and relatively low risks in comparison to re-
wards. Such membership does not allow for the use of the above mentioned tools to thoroughly select members and exert internal control.\footnote{Unlike activist rebellions that must grow in size to successfully challenge the government forces and to control the state, the leaders of opportunistic rebel groups involved in New Warfare might want to curb the growth of their organization because small organizations are “[t]he most efficient […] for committing crime” (Weinstein 2007, p. 128) and much easier to oversee. In New Warfare, even comparatively small and poorly organized groups (whose combatants avoid combat, attack civilian rather than military targets and who capture resources for themselves rather than for the group) may remain and prosper “because the market is not capable of disciplining them”. If the opponent non-state forces are sufficiently weak, such a group may even emerge as the victor (Weinstein 2007, pp. 132 sq.).} Due to the dearth of mechanisms for selecting committed recruits and sanctioning defectors, the organization that emerges operates on the basis of constant defection. Structures of delegation within the organization either “involve a high degree of centralization – because local units cannot be trusted to follow the orders of the central command – or significant decentralization, within only a loose alliance joining largely independent fighting units” (Weinstein 2007, p. 300). The organization becomes oriented toward maintaining the flow of rewards to their leaders and members through pillaging and looting. Soldiers avoid military engagement and instead attack civilian targets because this is less risky in order to capture resources (Weinstein 2007, p. 139). Within the zones they control, such opportunistic rebel groups not only exhibit indiscipline due to their weak internal structure but they also tend to establish institutions of governance that are little responsive to the needs and interests of civilians. Because the rebels do not depend on support from civilians, power-sharing with non-combatants does not exist or at best includes elites. Centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian systems of administration and unilateral military control emerge which often entail a high degree of coercion. Because they lack networks of local ties, such rebel organizations are unable to solicit information from non-combatants on individual defectors. For this reason, they are less able to direct violence and to avoid mistakes. This further increases the risk of indiscriminate use of force against civilians.

Unfortunately, opportunistic rebellions have little flexibility to adapt their internal organizational structures due to the above mentioned pressure to maintain their membership through a constant and immediate flow of material incentives. Combatants’ access to material rewards obtained through violent means must continue if an organizational collapse is to be prevented. Alternatively, one might argue that the cost of increasing discipline is especially high in resource-rich environments because the temptations for rebels to line their own pockets are greater. This decreases the willingness of rebel leaders to invest in discipline and might therefore also explain the persistence of violent strategies (Weinstein 2007, p. 329 fn 2). Still, opportunist groups involved in conventional greed rebellions might realize that economic endowments are only initially a blessing while at some point they result in a rebel “resource curse” because they attract recruits who are “possibly ill-suited to the long term goal of capturing state power” (Weinstein 2005, pp. 598, 600). In addition, opportunist groups involved in conventional greed rebellions become aware of the fact that in the long run opportunistic approaches are counterproductive to achieve their overall goal because early missteps in the use of
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians

force generate civilian resistance and defection. Groups involved in New Warfare who in the first place do not aim to capture state power and who do not compete for the loyalty of civilian populations can be expected to be much less sensitive in this regard. Although indiscriminate violence against civilians is likely to generate civilian opposition, too, the rebels are willing and able to reply with ever greater levels of coercion over time. Because they are well aware of the fact that it is not an attractive option for non-combatants to switch support to the other side, violence spirals out of control. Therefore, opportunistic rebel organizations involved in New Wars are least likely to change their behavioral patterns – except in the case of external shocks that threaten the structure and coherence of the involved organizations and alter their membership. Such external shocks include massive battlefield losses as well as military successes or changes in endowments (because external patrons lose or gain interest in the conflict due to altered geopolitical considerations or because rebels conquer new territories carrying valuable resources) (Weinstein 2007, pp. 260 sqq.). Patterns of indiscriminate violence against civilians do not only tend to persist but even reproduce themselves because the unremitting exposure to violence “desensitizes” soldiers (and civilians) and destroys the “psychosocial mechanisms of self-sanctioning” that serve as guides for conduct and deterrents of mischief during peaceful times (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 55–62). The experience of violent conflict itself – whether as a victim or perpetrator – but also the length of this experience leave their marks. New Wars that are “[…] not intended to secure a swift military resolution nearly always end in the loss of discipline. The men under arms increasingly go over to using war as a means to personal enrichment and guns as an instrument for the acting out of fantasies of omnipotence and sadism” (Münkler 2005, p. 44).

10.2. Kalyvas’ Mechanism of Contestation

Weinstein’s argument that insurgent violence against civilians follows on from an organization’s material strength seems to stand in sharp contrast with alternative theoretical arguments linking such violence to the relative weakness of an insurgent group. For instance, Eck and Hultman (2007) state that losing rebel groups tend to commit violence against non-combatants in order to signal resolve. The authors explain rebel violence against civilians through dynamics of contestation instead of environmental factors (the kind of resource endowments available) or instead of organizational features (the internal characteristics of rebel groups). In contrast to Weinstein’s exclusive focus on the insurgent side, this requires an investigation of both parties to the conflict and moves the distribution of power among the adversaries to the center of analysis. The latter also holds for Kalyvas (2006), who points to the role of territorial control in order to explain violence against civilians during civil warfare. His argument of contestation shall now be presented in more detail.
Like Weinstein, Kalyvas (2004, p. 97) departs from the puzzle why we sometimes do observe instances of indiscriminate violence against civilians during civil warfare\footnote{With his theory, Kalyvas (2006, pp. 19 sq.) aims to explore a certain kind of violent event during civil warfare, namely the \textit{intentional} and \textit{direct} infliction of \textit{physical harm} (first and primarily violent death or homicide) on \textit{civilians} (i.e. those who are not full-time members of an armed group).} even under conditions that make this strategy counterproductive. His approach, however, differs from Weinstein, who always poses this question with regard to the violent behavior of rebel groups. Kalyvas (2004, pp. 108–110) instead notes that indiscriminate violence against civilians during civil warfare tends to be empirically associated with the incumbent forces (i.e. government troops) rather than insurgents.\footnote{Valentino et al. (2004) agree and explain that mass killing by government forces is substantially more likely than mass killing by insurgent groups because guerrilla forces are difficult to defeat directly. For this reason, governments facing major guerrilla insurgencies (i.e. guerrillas that receive high levels of active support from the local population and pose a major military threat to the regime) have strong incentives to target the guerrillas’ civilian base of support. This is comparatively easy because state military organizations have a greater capacity for violence. They are usually larger and better equipped in terms of weaponry than the rebels. For the same reason, state forces can devote greater resources to defending their own civilian supporters while guerrillas seldom can afford to engage in the static defense of specific territories because this would expose their forces to direct combat with militarily superior government troops. Thus, insurgents are less capable of killing government supporters in large numbers, less able to defend their own supporters and more fearful of massive state reprisals (Valentino et al. 2004, p. 385). Kalyvas (2004, pp. 108–110) adds that government armies are more likely than insurgents to indiscriminately attack civilians because they tend to establish a less permanent presence in an area and therefore lack the kind of information necessary to identify individual defectors and to apply violence more selectively. In contrast, the insurgents are “almost always the first movers” who set up local institutions which they can use in order to collect the information required for targeted attacks.} Like Weinstein, he therefore identifies the factors that make indiscriminate violence attractive for violent actors in the first place before mentioning the reasons why rebel forces can be expected to nevertheless refrain from using this strategy at least in the long run. In addition, he identifies the reasons and conditions that render indiscriminate violence counterproductive from the perspective of government forces.

Already in his earlier work, Kalyvas argues that government forces can afford to apply violence indiscriminately only as long as their opponents, the rebels, are comparatively weak and unable to protect their supporters against such attacks. Then, civilians are left with no other choice but to cooperate with the attacking forces as this seems to be their only chance to survive. In cases, however, where the rebels are strong enough to defend their support base against attacks, the incumbent’s long term interest to also govern and not to alienate the civilian population renders indiscriminate violence unsustainable. The use of indiscriminate violence would then be counterproductive from the perspective of the incumbent forces because it would “trigger an intense emotional reaction \cite{[ranging from ‘ill will’ to ‘visceral anger’]} making people more risk-seeking and hence more likely to play an active role in the rebellion under a previously unacceptable risk” \cite{kalyvas2004, 114 sq}. Later, Kalyvas (2004, p. 117) refers to this problem as the failure of indiscriminate violence to generate “a clear structure of incentives for non-collaboration with the rebels”. Instead, indiscriminate violence by government forces...
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians

“may even produce strong incentives for collaboration with [the rebels] – thus generating defection rather than deterring it”.16 The indiscriminate use of force simply decreases the opportunity costs of collaboration with the rival actor (Kalyvas 2006, p. 144). The inconsistent nature of indiscriminate violence may also cause shock and confusion or signal weakness which might contribute to a further alienation of the civilian population from the government and increasing support for the rebels (given the existence of a relatively strong rebel organization which catalyzes emotions into actions) (Kalyvas 2004, p. 118). This relates to another reason which renders indiscriminate violence counterproductive from the perspective of government forces, namely the fact that it might help the rebels “to solve their collective action problem by turning the protection of the civilian population into a selective incentive […]. [S]urvival-maximizing civilians will collaborate with the political actor who credibly offers them a way out – as opposed to the political actor that leaves them no option” (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 120 sq.). Furthermore, indiscriminate violence turns out to be counterproductive from the perspective of government forces if it produces “reverse discrimination” against non-rebels or anti-rebels. The author explains that especially those individuals who consider themselves innocent because they never engaged in any rebellion against the state might fail to protect themselves. This might result in the ironic situation that indiscriminate attacks by government forces most likely hit those who feel no need to flee or hide instead of those who associate with the opposition forces (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 118 sq.). Finally, indiscriminate violence against civilians by government forces is not very effective or even counterproductive if the strength of ties between the rebel forces and the civilian population are much weaker than assumed by the government. In cases where civilians lack any influence on the rebels and where the rebels care little about their civilian support base, the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by government forces will not succeed in pressuring the rebels into compliance. This seems to be the case quite often. At least insurgents are “usually aware of the risk they force on the civilian population […] and are generally unwilling to stop fighting because of them” (Kalyvas 2004, p. 123).

Obviously, a number of reasons exist which render the use of indiscriminate violence by incumbent forces inefficient, ineffective or even counterproductive. Still, this violent strategy is frequently applied during civil warfare, a fact which Kalyvas attributes to the following reasons. At the individual level, certain emotions emerge during warfare (e.g. pleasure in killing people or stress, fear and personal frustration as a result of the exposure to danger and death, anger or a desire for revenge) that induce actors to follow this sub-optimal strategy.17 Secondly, at the collective level, mere ignorance or organizational incompetence allow the free reign of these emotions. Oftentimes, the military is also overly optimistic as to its own chances of defeating the rebels quickly because the threat posed by a rebellion is believed to be negligible. This incorrect perception combines with inadequate training. Regular armies are not prepared to deal with the ab-

---

16Kalyvas (2006, p. 104) defines defection as “active collaboration with the rival actor” in the form of non-compliance, information sharing with the opponent or switching side.

17However, “it is also unclear whether emotions and attitudes […] are the causes, the correlates, or the results of using indiscriminate violence” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 161).
sence of clear front lines, and they fundamentally misunderstand the nature of irregular warfare as they are usually trained to fight inter-state wars. In addition, inappropriate organizational features like authoritarian structures within regular armies as well as their weak institutional memory and their resistance to learning (e.g. due to institutional distortions like fast rotation periods for military personnel) might explain why incumbents do not refrain from using indiscriminate violence although the deleterious effects of this strategy seem obvious (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 126–133). Even in the presence of knowledge about its counterproductive effects, indiscriminate violence might be used because it is much cheaper than selective violence which requires “a complex and costly infrastructure” to identify, locate and kill the enemy one by one. “Most incumbents realize quickly that they lack the necessary resources” to proceed in such a targeted manner (Kalyvas 2004, p. 130). Finally, Kalyvas (2004, pp. 124–126) notes that the apparently frequent use of indiscriminate violence against civilians might simply be an artifact or the result of a selection bias. He suggests that selective violence is much more likely to be missed or miscoded by those who engage in data collection. Oftentimes, patterns in violence go unnoticed. Violent acts are coded as indiscriminate although they are only indiscriminate on the surface. In addition, research tends to focus on those acts of violence that are or appear to be indiscriminate in nature while ignoring the numerous instances where actors refrain from using this strategy although they had the ability to do so (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 160 sqq.).

In summary, Kalyvas states that during conventional civil warfare, the likelihood of indiscriminate violence is greatly increased under steep imbalances of power and (local) information between the competing actors. In such circumstances, governments face a major rebel movement that seriously threatens the regime but which is not strong enough to defend its own civilian support base against violent attacks by the government. Theoretically, such a situation allows the incumbents to be indifferent about the type of violence they apply. Practically, however, they most likely resort to indiscriminate violence as this is their least expensive option. Likewise, rebel forces can afford to be indiscriminate when incumbents are close to defeat. If parity emerges over time, both parties to the conflict develop strong incentives to change their strategies from an indiscriminate to a more selective use of force. They eventually learn that the indiscriminate use of force is counterproductive to their long term interests. In situations of balanced power, indiscriminate violence only alienates civilians who then defect and refuse to cooperate (e.g. to share local information) because they fear counter attacks by rival forces. This leads to the expectation that “given a balance of power between competing actors, indiscriminate violence is more likely at early rather than late stages” of conventional, state-based internal warfare (Kalyvas 2004, pp. 97, 135, 138).

In his book “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”, Kalyvas (2006) elaborates further on the question of how processes of contestation and the distribution of power among violent actors affect the nature of violence applied during warfare. He develops a microfoundational theory of conventional civil warfare which consists of two strands (a model of selective violence and a model of indiscriminate violence). The latter presents a
more formalized version of the above argument that an imbalance of power and local information between belligerents associates with the indiscriminate use of force. The underlying logic of this argument is useful to understand the practice of indiscriminate violence during new, non-state warfare, too. In addition, Kalyvas’ argument combines well with Weinstein’s theory.

Kalyvas (2006, p. 18) departs from the notion that warfare produces situations of divided or dual sovereignty. In the former case, one of the warring parties manages to establish exclusive control and to dispel the opponent from a certain area. This corresponds to the overall aim of warring parties involved in conventional civil wars: To entirely and unilaterally control a certain territory and its population. Thus, during conventional civil warfare areas of segmented or divided sovereignty are likely to emerge where two or more political actors exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the territory. In contrast, New Warfare lacks mutually exclusive claims to authority. It is characterized by fierce competition over conflict resources and the absence of a comparatively strong opponent which might otherwise require cohesive and joint action by internal opposition groups. This renders the emergence of war zones more likely where several warring parties compete for control. Situations of dual or overlapping sovereignty emerge. In these cases, territory is fragmented, i.e. two or more political actors exercise limited sovereignty over the same area (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 88 sq.).

Kalyvas continues by arguing that the type of territorial control and sovereignty that exists in a given region (whether fragmented or segmented) determines the kind of violent strategy followed by warring parties. As mentioned above, actors who manage to establish unilateral territorial control “can protect civilians who live in that territory – both from their rivals and from themselves, giving survival-oriented civilians a strong incentive to collaborate with them, irrespective of their true or initial preferences. In this sense, collaboration is largely endogenous to control” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 12, 124). The author adds that if control is exercised for a longer period of time, it produces “mechanical ascription”, e.g. it “generates cascades of support because the families of fighters tend to support the armed factions where their younger members are fighting”. This links with the notion that especially long term control signals credibility, military strength and eventually victory, which might also cause collaboration (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 125–128). In this context, Kalyvas (2006, p. 129) speaks of a self-reinforcing dynamic. In some cases, control by a certain political actor creates the impression that the controlled population is indeed loyal to this actor. After a while, this reputation might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy by generating new and enduring political identities of the controlled. In addition, actors who control a certain territory also control its resources which they might use in order to “buy” collaboration. Especially in a context of scarcity, however, control over a certain territory and its population also enables actors to enforce collaboration through coercive means. Only the imposition of control allows the effective use of violence to deter defection. “[T]he effectiveness of threats hinges on control” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 117, 124). The less coercive version of this argument emphasizes the fact that control enables actors to better monitor and sanction the local civilian
population, e.g. through the establishment of a system of administration or through the establishment of a network of agents who are constantly present on the ground (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 128, 183–192). Whatever the exact causal mechanism might be: “the higher the level of control exercised by a particular actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor [and vice versa]” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 111). A high level of civilian collaboration generally reduces the need for coercive means (as there will be less defection) and brings about private information (e.g. through denunciation) that is needed by belligerents to better target attacks. Kalyvas (2006, pp. 195, 145) argues that individuals are more likely to denounce their fellows if the actor to whom they are denouncing is able to shield them from retaliation or counter-denunciation. Thus, the provision of local information through denunciation (and therefore the determination of whether violence can be applied selectively or indiscriminately) is a function of control exercised by belligerents in a given region.

But if collaboration is endogenous to control, what determines the distribution of control? Kalyvas (2006, pp. 132–138) replies that control hinges largely on military effectiveness which is often determined by geography (e.g. the distance of the area from military bases, local administrative centers, urban areas, roads or borders). I add that the capacity of any violent actor to gain and maintain military control over a contested territory depends on the quantity and quality of resources available to the group as well as on the development of more or less effective and efficient internal and external structures of control and management. The capacity to exert permanent and unilateral military control over contested territory is endogenous to the process described by Weinstein. More precisely, the kind of resource endowments available to rebel leaders conditions their recruitment strategy and the membership profile of the emerging rebel group which determines the group’s internal structure as well as the kind of external institutions the rebel organization establishes in order to govern the civilian population (see Weinstein’s argument). Both impact upon the capacity of the rebel organization to establish and maintain territorial control which, according to Kalyvas, then shapes the level and kind of violence applied against civilians (see Mechanism 2, fig. 10.3 on page 143). Violent groups which lack internal discipline and deny civilians any influence (e.g. on the distribution of local resources) are more likely to face high levels of defection within the organization and opposition from non-combatants which both render such organizations ineffective. In addition, such organizations are inefficient in their use of force. Violence is used indiscriminately because locals withhold the kind of information necessary to apply violence in a more targeted manner. It is plausible to expect that such ineffective and inefficient organizations also find it more difficult to achieve military successes like the establishment of unilateral and permanent territorial control. According to Kalyvas, this further increases the chances of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In contrast, rebel organizations with tight internal mechanisms of control and management, high levels of power-sharing with civilians and high levels of inclusiveness of non-combatants face lower levels of defection and less opposition from the local population. They are able to apply violence more selectively as they enjoy access to local networks and information.
10. Explaining Violence Against Civilians

Because they are also more effective due to low levels of defection, they find it easier to defeat competitors and to establish unilateral territorial control which further decreases the risk of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

In addition, one might argue that access to certain natural resources as well as non-material resources (like trust by civilian populations) quickly and easily transfers into military strength, e.g. through the purchase of weapons or the acquaintance of important strategic information. Thus, the quantity and kind of resources available to rebels immediately impact upon their relative military power. This relates to the level of territorial control these groups are able to exert which finally shapes their violent strategies towards non-combatants. Organizations that can draw on plenty of valuable conflict resources like gemstones or ivory find it easier to purchase weapons, to quickly set up an army, to defeat competitors and to establish unilateral and permanent military control over a contested territory (see Mechanism 3, fig. 10.3 on page 143).

Obviously, Kalyvas’ theory was (again) designed to apply to situations of conventional civil warfare where power asymmetries matter. Changes in the distribution of power among violent actors are a decisive factor in his theory. More precisely, the author depicts five possible constellations which might arise during state-based civil warfare. In the first case, either the government or the insurgent forces are able to dispel their opponent from a certain territory over which they gain full control. No defection takes place because civilians do not enjoy access to the other party and because the group in control of the area credibly protects its supporters against attacks from the rival. Denunciations only take place at low rates because nobody dares to oppose the occupying forces. Low levels of defection and high levels of collaboration render the use of force against civilians obsolete. If violence occurs, it is indiscriminately applied by the rivals who, due to their lack of control, do not possess local information necessary to better target their attacks. Alternatively, situations might arise where one of the belligerents exercises secure but incomplete control over a certain territory. The opponent is still present in the surrounding area and makes sporadic visits during night time. Defection increases, as civilians enjoy access to rival forces. Denunciation also takes place more often. Thus, the dominant actor has an incentive as well as the ability to apply violence selectively. Again, indiscriminate force only takes place on behalf of the militarily inferior rivals. Finally, a situation of balanced power might arise where high levels of defection to the other side are accompanied by a “nondenunciation equilibrium”. Civilians are unwilling to supply private information to the belligerents due to high costs. Neither side has the power to protect their collaborators which causes fears of counter-denunciation and inhibits collaboration. For this reason, both belligerents lack private information to attack selectively. Still, they refrain from indiscriminate violence because this would result in even higher rates of defection. Thus, during conventional civil warfare, the most contested areas are an “oasis of peace” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 195–209).

For a definition of “full control” and “secure but incomplete control” see Kalyvas (2006, p. 211).
If anything, indiscriminate violence is used by one side only (the militarily inferior forces) and is never applied as a long term strategy. In addition, coercive violence during conventional civil warfare – even if it is applied indiscriminately – is neither necessarily gratuitous, wanton or solely vengeful nor necessarily massive. Instead, civil warfare implies low levels of violence because “[c]oercion fails if it merely destroys the subject whose compliance is sought” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 26 sq., 150).

The question re-emerges whether the same reasoning also applies to new, non-state armed conflict which lacks the severe power asymmetries eminent in conventional civil warfare between government forces and insurgent troops. According to the above logic, the rather balanced distribution of power among New Wars Actors should decrease the likelihood of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, in New Warfare, violent actors do not depend on the support of the local population to survive and prosper. The perpetrators of violence do not intend to govern these people in the future and therefore do not seek their loyalty. The aim of violence is not to induce civilians into compliance. Instead, violence is used to exterminate an entire group, for the pleasure of terrorizing people or as a calculated economic strategy (to enrich oneself through the compulsory acquisition of resources) rather than a calculated military strategy (to achieve political ends). Oftentimes, New Wars violence remains entirely non-instrumental and is conducted with an indifference to consequences (e.g. when it happens as a by-product of looting). Most importantly, there are no rival forces who would treat civilians much differently and who would be willing to establish for them a safe zone of permanent sovereignty. Therefore, defection to the other side is not an option for non-combatants. This renders civilians rather powerless and, from the perspective of the combatants, indiscriminate violence the cheapest, most efficient and most effective option – even in the long run and even in a situation of balanced power. We should therefore not observe a shift toward a more selective use of force as the conflict waxes on. Even if New Wars Actors would wish to apply violence more selectively, the context of fragmented sovereignty would render them unable to obtain local information necessary for a more targeted use of force. Finally, the indiscriminate use of force against non-combatants further decreases civilians’ incentives to collaborate with the rebels. Because the rebels can afford to reply with even more indiscriminate violence, a vicious circle sets in.

Kalyvas (2006, pp. 23–26) differentiates the non-instrumental from the instrumental use of violence. **Non-instrumental violence** is “completely independent from the intentions of the main actors and materializes as a by-product of their action, such as looting or certain forms of revenge”. It follows simple, expressive motives, is often described as “anomic” or “nihilistic”, combines with identity or sectarian violence and is “conducted with an indifference to consequences”. In contrast, **instrumental violence** is used to either exterminate an entire group or to control the civilian population (e.g. through physical destruction, mass deportation or ethnic cleansing). If violence is applied coercively to control the civilian population, it “[…] becomes a resource rather than the final product […] [and] performs a communicative function with a clear deterrent dimension”. In this case, “[…] at least one political actor intends to govern the population it targets for violence; an empirical indicator of this intention is whether the targets of violence have the option to surrender.” 139
Advocates of the concept of New Wars stress the context of state failure as an additional reason for especially high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians. At first sight, this seems to be at odds with Kalyvas (2006, pp. 17 sq.), who defines the kind of violent event under study as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities”. In new, non-state warfare, this sovereign entity has ceased to exist already at the onset of fighting. While civil warfare might lead to an effective “breakdown of the monopoly of violence by way of territorially based armed challenge” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 88), this is where New Warfare starts. Later on, however, Kalyvas explicitly links a context of state failure with high levels of indiscriminate violence “because [in such circumstances] no actor has the capacity to set up the sort of administrative infrastructure required by selective violence”. He adds that in this sense, high levels of “eliminationist violence […] could be endogenous to state failure” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 171).

Elsewhere, he labels the kind of violence applied in such a context “reciprocal extermination” and the corresponding kind of intra-state and bilateral warfare “symmetric non-conventional”. In such warfare, “neither political actor intends to govern the population it targets for violence”. Instead, all belligerents “hold symmetrical intentions to exterminate each other’s civilian basis”. This can either be the case in multilateral, inter-state warfare or in intra-state warfare where any institution with a legitimate claim to governance disappeared. Accordingly, reciprocal extermination often associates with state collapse and the dissolution of government forces which also provides the opportunity to rivaling armies to “equip themselves by plundering the arsenal of the disbanded state army” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 31, 171, 68). Although Kalyvas does not explicitly use the term “New Warfare”, his understanding of symmetric non-conventional warfare comes very close to the understanding of new or non-conventional (non-state) internal fighting presented here. In this kind of internal armed conflict, the entire breakdown of the political (and social) order enables undisciplined and armed non-state actors to transgress established norms and rules. The absence of professional armies and structures causes a breakdown in military discipline which enables “decentralized looting, banditry, and all kinds of violence against civilians” to an extent not seen in conventional civil warfare (Kalyvas 2006, p. 68). Like in “symmetric non-conventional” warfare, clear front lines hardly exist which causes a feeling of the enemy’s presence behind one’s back. This might cause emotional reactions (e.g. the rise of frustration, fear or anxiety or even panic among those involved in warfare) which then lead to preemptive violence and a brutalization of warfare. Likewise, uncertainty about who is guilty (and part of the opponent’s military force) and who is an innocent civilian has been shown to facilitate preemptive violence or “trigger-happy reactions” of those bearing arms. “[I]n an environment where it is impossible to tell civilian from enemy combatants apart it pays to be violent”. Accordingly, in symmetric non-conventional wars “the warriors’ honor is to be replaced with barbarism” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 68 sq.).

20See also Snow (1996, p. 68) who notes that New Wars “[…] are not wars for the hearts and minds of men, but naked attempts by one group to subjugate or destroy another” (Snow 1996, p. 68).
By asking whether the political actors intend to govern the targeted population and whether violence is produced unilaterally or bilaterally/multilaterally, Kalyvas arrives at the four-fold “Typology of Mass Political Violence” presented by table 10.1 on the current page. This typology contrasts the kind of violence applied in “symmetric non-conventional” internal wars (reciprocal extermination or New War Violence) with 1.) violence applied in conventional civil wars, 2.) with state terror and 3.) with genocide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production of Violence</th>
<th>Aims of Violence: Intention to govern the targeted population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Terror</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral/Multilateral</td>
<td>Civil War Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New War Violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.1.: Types of Violence in Warfare. Based on Kalyvas (2006, p. 29).

### 10.3. Summary of Mechanisms

While past civil war research largely focused on the causes of internal armed conflict, more recent studies aim to explain the scale and character of violence applied during such warfare. Some of these studies consider certain context factors (e.g. the relative isolation of a conflict region or the availability of conflict resources) decisive to understand patterns of abusiveness during warfare while others stress the importance of characteristics of the adversaries (e.g. their political ideology, military culture or underlying social basis), of local factors (e.g. local tactics to resist violence or leadership strategies), of international factors (e.g. the kind and extent of external assistance or prevailing international norms) or of individual reactions (e.g. emotional responses). To complicate things further, these factors might interact with each other and have reciprocal effects (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 3, fn 2 and 3, 8). Whatever the key independent variable might be: all of these studies share the insight that the level and practice of violence changes with dynamics that are internal to warfare. Identifying the reasons for the initial outbreak of violence (e.g. greed or grievance factors) does not suffice to understand the application or escalation of violence during warfare. For this reason “the causes of violence in civil warfare cannot be subsumed under the causes of civil war; hence a theory of civil wars cannot be a theory of violence in civil wars – and vice versa” (Kalyvas 2006, p. 20).

This reasoning prompted Stathis Kalyvas to remain entirely ambivalent about the causes and goals of warfare and the individual’s motivation for joining one of the armed groups. In his effort to uncover the logic of violence in civil warfare, he simply drops the
Explaining Violence Against Civilians

Assumption that preferences are stable. He only assumes that launching and winning a rebellion requires the commitment of a significant part of the population, regardless of their individual motives, regardless of whether this commitment results from persuasion or coercion and regardless of the fact that individuals might change the level and direction of their commitment over time. Instead of specifying the single or most dominant motivation for joining warfare, he specifies the reasons to apply a certain violent strategy (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 17, 100 sq.). This approach is refreshing after the greed vs. grievance debate has been discussing the most dominant motivations for joining rebellions to the point of exhaustion. Furthermore, this discussion detracted from the fact that the mechanisms explaining the scale and nature of violence applied during different sub-types of internal armed conflict might in fact concur.

In order to identify these mechanisms, I introduced theories designed by Weinstein and Kalyvas to explain the scale and nature of violence in conventional (state-based) civil warfare. I continued to argue that both approaches apply to new, non-state warfare as well. They are helpful to link the context of state failure, the availability of conflict resources and the specific nature and quantity of New Wars Actors with the scale and nature of the applied violence. Once more, fig. 10.2 on this page depicts Weinstein’s structuralist mechanism, which states that the kind of resource endowments available to rebel leaders conditions their recruitment strategy and the resulting membership profile of the emerging rebel group. This determines the group’s internal structure (its mechanisms of internal control and management) and the kind of external institutions it establishes in order to govern the civilian population (the degree of power-sharing and the degree of inclusiveness of civilians) which then shape the rebels’ violent strategies towards the local population (Mechanism 1).

![Mechanism 1 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conflict.](image)


In contrast, Kalyvas predicts high levels of (indiscriminate) violence against civilians in places where insurgent or government groups are dominant but unable to unilaterally control the territory. Weinstein repeatedly presented and explicitly tested this argument as an alternative hypothesis to his own theory. I, however, consider the two theories complementary because Weinstein’s explanatory factors (the quantity and quality of available resources and the development of more or less effective and efficient structures of internal control and external governance) well relate to Kalyvas’ main independent variable (the capacity of belligerents to gain and maintain permanent and unilateral...
Mechanism 2 and Mechanism 3 therefore combine ideas presented by both authors (see fig. 10.3 on the current page).

Mechanism 2 argues that the quantity and quality of resources available to any military organization shape the organization’s membership profile which conditions the development of more or less effective and efficient internal and external structures of control and management. The latter determines the organization’s capacity of gaining and maintaining territorial control which then shapes the level and kind of violence applied against civilians. Rebel organizations with tight internal mechanisms of control and management, high levels of power-sharing with civilians and high levels of inclusiveness of non-combatants face lower levels of defection. They are able to apply selective violence as they enjoy access to local networks and information. Because they are also more effective due to low levels of defection, they find it easier to defeat competitors and establish unilateral territorial control which decreases the risk of high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In contrast, organizations characterized by a lack of internal discipline and low levels of inclusiveness of non-combatants are likely to face high levels of defection within the organization and non-collaboration by civilians. Locals withhold private information necessary to apply violence in a more targeted and efficient manner. Such ineffective and inefficient organizations find it difficult to achieve military successes like the establishment of unilateral control over contested territory. Instead, control over territory remains fragmented. During conventional civil warfare, this offers non-combatants the option to defect and join the other side. Because both sides depend on civilian support and intend to govern these people in the future, the belligerents respond to increasing defection with efforts to better target their violent attacks. But in the case of New Warfare, neither condition is met. For this reason and because indiscriminate violence is much cheaper to apply, New Wars Actors instead turn more coercive and repressive if facing defection. Even if the belligerents would want to better target their violent attacks, this is difficult in situations where control over territory is fragmented. In such a context, groups tend to have imperfect information about who is collaborating and who is defecting which renders the use of selective violence less likely while the risk of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants increases.
While Mechanism 2 links the availability of conflict resources with the establishment of less efficient and effective rebel organizations, with a reduced capacity to establish and maintain territorial control and with high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians, Mechanism 3 argues in favor of the opposite. It states that access to conflict resources might also quickly and easily be transferred into relative military strength (e.g. if revenues from these resources are used to purchase weapons, to hire and pay more soldiers or to acquire important strategic information) which then enables violent actors to gain territorial control which finally shapes their violent strategies towards civilians. In other words, the availability of conflict resources might associate with low levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians if such resources are used to improve the organization’s military performance and to establish unilateral military control over a contested territory. This argument is in line with Staniland (2012, p. 152), who notes that “[r]esources do not dictate their use, people do”. Applying this argument to New Warfare leads to the expectation that New Wars Actors allocate a comparatively small share of their resource wealth to institution building. They are more concerned about lining their own pockets than willing to invest in the organization’s military performance because defeating their enemies is not their main intention. If profits derived from the exploitation of conflict resources are reinvested to purchase additional or more lethal weapons, this only stabilizes their violent strategies and results in even more indiscriminate violence against non-combatants. In addition, Staniland (2012) argues that the extent to which resource wealth is harnessed to militarily strengthen armed organizations is a function of the social-organizational underpinnings of armed groups. “[P]roxy armies, undisciplined looters, and groups abandoning revolutionary purity for the lures of wealth arise not because of resources per se, but because of the relationships between resources and social bases. When social ties are insufficient to build strong organizations, resources become linked to preexisting conflicts and cleavages” (Staniland 2012, p. 155). Resources entering such organizations create new internal rivalries and reinforce preexisting cleavages. This, and a lack of internal control, causes fractionalization. Armed groups involved in new, non-state wars belong to this group of organizations that are badly equipped to harness resource wealth for institution building because they are built upon socially divided networks. A sudden and massive inflow of funding during later stages (e.g. provided by an external patron, the Diaspora or through the discovery or conquest of additional mining sites) further degrades their internal structure so that the problem worsens over time. Armed groups involved in conventional (state-based) internal warfare might also exploit natural resources (e.g. in the case of greed conflicts) or receive financial and/or material support from an outside patron (e.g. in grievance conflicts). Nevertheless, the social bases of these integrated armed groups allow them to use resource wealth for institution building. Their comparatively strong horizontal ties among leaders (who share the same vision in terms of ideology and the overall political goal) and their comparatively strong vertical ties to local populations (on whose support they depend) provide an institutional basis for the establishment of robust lines of social and organizational loyalty and monitoring to discipline and mitigate the lures of material gain and to control violent action.
The notion that New Wars Actors are more likely to fractionalize reconnects with Kalyvas and the simple argument that the higher the level of factionalization, the more actors involved and the more contested a territory will be, the less likely the establishment of permanent and unilateral control. According to Kalyvas, this increases the risk of indiscriminate violence against civilians (fig. 10.4 on this page). In such a context, the selective use of violence becomes more difficult because warring groups tend to have imperfect information about who is collaborating and who is defecting. High levels of fragmentation and large numbers of involved actors also increase the options to defect and join the other side which might associate with high levels of indiscriminate use of force, too (Weinstein 2007, pp. 203–206). Both arguments well accommodate New Warfare, where violent groups tend to disintegrate into multiple but similar rivaling factions.

Likewise, actors recruited outside of the conflict area lack local knowledge and networks. This not only increases their chances of making mistakes on and off the battlefield but also decreases their capacity to permanently and unilaterally exert territorial control which both result in high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians (fig. 10.5 on the current page). Again, this reasoning especially well applies to New Warfare which is supposed to be characterized by a transnationalization or internationalization of violent actors.

All of the above mechanisms expect a comparatively high level of indiscriminate violence against civilians in new, non-state warfare. While it is counterproductive, ineffective and inefficient in conventional civil warfare, indiscriminate violence against civilians is the most effective and efficient strategy in new, non-state warfare – also in the long

---

Figure 10.4.: Mechanism 4 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction based on Kalyvas (2006).

Figure 10.5.: Mechanism 5 Explaining Civilian Abuse in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction based on Weinstein (2007) and Kalyvas (2006).
run and even in a situation of balanced power. The dynamics which according to Kalyvas and Weinstein lead to indiscriminate violence against civilians in particular apply to new, non-state warfare because economic resources are comparatively easy at hand and exploited due to state collapse (which explains the emergence of opportunist rebel groups) and because non-combatants find themselves in a comparatively powerless position (as neither party to the conflict intends to govern them and switching support to the other side is not a real option). Whether New Warfare is also likely to result in comparatively high numbers of battle-related *military* deaths shall be discussed in the following.
11. Explaining Military Deaths in Non-State Conflicts

Especially three theoretical arguments that are usually used to understand barbarity during conventional civil warfare\(^1\) appear suitable to also explain the scale of battle-related, military death during new, non-state warfare.

The first argument links the context of state failure not only with high numbers of civilian but also military deaths because the entire breakdown of political and social order reveals or creates a culture of generalized brutalization amongst soldiers that is otherwise contained by the state’s security institutions or by social norms. For this reason, the disintegration of the professional army and the emergence of militarily undisciplined non-state forces are expected to come along with acts of barbarity against non-combatants as well as enemy forces. The breakdown of the justice system results in a spiral of retaliation and generates security concerns that might even result in preemptive violence. The removal of social controls and sanctioning institutions during warfare (e.g. through the destruction of social hierarchies) further decreases the costs of violent activity. As soon as barbarity establishes itself as a feature of warfare, self-reinforcing effects set in because, and as already mentioned, their unremitting exposure to violence “desensitizes” soldiers and destroys the “psychosocial mechanisms of self-sanctioning” that otherwise serve as guides for conduct and deterrents of mischief (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 55–64).\(^2\)

Secondly, barbarity during New Warfare might result from identity politics. In this case, violent entrepreneurs play upon real or perceived divisions (e.g. ethnic or religious differences) to demonize the enemy and legitimize the most extreme and atrocious measures against non-combatants as well as combatants on and off the battlefield (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 64–66).

\(^1\)For an overview of these arguments see Kalyvas (2006, pp. 52–86).

\(^2\)This, however, does not mean that a breakdown in political order results in random or anomic acts of violence. Revenge, for instance, “tends to be implemented by organized political actors” and is far from being random or anomic. It also does not mean that undisciplined non-state armed forces are the only ones capable of brutal attacks against civilians. “In numerous civil wars […] the greatest proportion of violence was produced by highly disciplined regular troops rather than insurgent irregulars. Indeed, mass killing tends to be associated with order rather than disorder” (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 71, 73). See also the previous chapter on this topic.
11. Explaining Military Deaths

Finally, it might be argued that New Wars involve irregular armies on both sides. Like in conventional civil warfare, the absence of clear front lines and the presence of enemy forces behind one’s back might cause emotional reactions (e.g. endemic uncertainty, fear or panic) which facilitate preemptive violence or “trigger-happy reactions” of those bearing arms (Kalyvas 2006, p. 69). According to this argument, the specific technology of New Warfare might correlate with comparatively high numbers of direct military deaths.

Alternative hypotheses, however, seem reasonable, too. New Wars might cause rather low numbers of military deaths because direct military encounters among the warring parties is rare. As mentioned before, Kaldor (2006a, p. 7) attributes this to the equalisation of military technology in New Warfare which renders open battle just too dangerous for all opponents. Secondly, fierce competition amongst the warring factions over conflict resources might not necessarily translate into high levels of direct battle-related military deaths because New Wars Actors do not intend to win but to realize private gain during warfare and for these economic reasons wish to avoid intense warfare. Severe fighting would be counterproductive because it would interrupt or at least complicate the exploitation of conflict resources as well as their transnational (illegal) black-market trading (e.g. through the destruction of infrastructure and production sites or the killing of those who exploit the resources on behalf of the rebels). On the contrary, small-scale battle with sometimes even temporal disruption sufficiently destabilizes states to offer opportunity for private gain. A context of limited fighting even allows for collaboration between enemy forces for the sake of exploiting resources. Constant instability but low-scale fighting suffices to guarantee a steady flow of revenue from the otherwise illegal exploitation of lootable resources. At the same time, small-scale fighting ensures that the rebels are facing little competition from other peace-time actors (e.g. artisanal miners and mining companies) while their individual chances of being injured or killed are minimized (Addison et al. 2001; Addison et al. 2003; Buhag et al. 2005; Lujala 2009).

In fact, the chances of surviving New Warfare might be even higher among combatants than among civilians of the same gender and age groups. This reduces the costs of recruitment and facilitates the formation of armed and violent groups. The expectation of only minor or intermediate armed conflict – at least in cases where economic reasoning dominates because identity politics are not or cannot be applied – is in line with Berdal (2003, p. 486), who notes that in civil wars where economic agendas play an important role, the opposing parties acquire a shared interest in reaping the benefits of war and, “if local conditions permit, avoid costly and drawn-out battle. Where chains of command are weak and the scope for plunder is particularly great, fighting may assume an almost ritualistic quality serving instead as a cover for looting and plunder” Münkler (2006, pp. 145 sqq.), who distinguishes between ideologically-loaded “resources wars” (the New Wars), “wars of pacification” (military interventions by external actors in New Wars) and “wars of destruction” (terrorism), also describes New Wars as low intensity armed conflicts.
11.1. Summary of Mechanisms

The above presented three mechanisms arguing in favor of comparatively high numbers of battle-related military deaths in new (non-state) warfare. Mechanism 6 expects the breakdown of political and social order (especially the disintegration of the professional armed forces, the breakdown of policing institutions and the justice system and the removal of social controls and sanctioning mechanisms) to associate with real and perceived impunity on (and off) the battlefield. In addition, the breakdown of these institutions gives cause for serious security concerns that can be used to justify preemptive violence against enemy forces. Because the experience of brutal warfare further desensitizes soldiers, a spiral of retaliation might set in which also contributes to an emerging culture of generalized brutalization among soldiers (see fig. 11.1 on this page). Secondly, Mechanism 7 attributes high numbers of military deaths to the fact that identity politics are applied. This turns New Wars into zero sum games. Killing off the enemy becomes an affair of the heart which leads to barbarity on the battlefield (see fig. 11.2 on the current page). Finally, Mechanism 8 stresses the technology of New Warfare (especially the fact that clear front lines do not exist and irregular forces battle each other). Among those bearing arms this might cause emotional reactions (like endemic uncertainty, fear and panic) leading to trigger-happy reactions and high numbers of military deaths (see fig. 11.3 on the following page).

Figure 11.1.: Mechanism 6 Explaining High Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction.

Figure 11.2.: Mechanism 7 Explaining High Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction.
11. Explaining Military Deaths

Figure 11.3.: Mechanism 8 Explaining High Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction.

On the other hand, I mentioned the following alternative mechanisms that speak in favor of comparatively low numbers of battle-related military deaths in new (non-state) warfare: Mechanism 9 states that due to the equalization of military technology in New Warfare, the rebels avoid open and risky battle. In addition, opportunistic rebel groups might try to avoid severe battle because intense warfare would be counterproductive to their economic interests (Mechanism 10). In either case, the result is low numbers of battle-related military deaths (see figs. 11.4 and 11.5 on the current page).

Figure 11.4.: Mechanism 9 Explaining Low Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction.

Figure 11.5.: Mechanism 10 Explaining Low Numbers of Military Deaths in Internal Armed Conflict. Source: own depiction.
12. Interim Summary II: Beyond the Concept of New Wars

So far, this book has described major shifts in the patterns of warfare. Old wars – inter-state wars as well as conventional (state-based) internal wars (greed or grievance conflicts) – have been contrasted with New Wars as first described by Mary Kaldor (1999). For this purpose, I specified the context and dimensions of New Warfare. Despite being private in nature, advocates of the concept describe New Wars as being fought between numerous and often transnational warring parties who follow economic rationale. Over their comparatively long duration, New Wars are said to result in large numbers of direct and indirect civilian deaths and to occur in especially weak and poor countries. Some believe such kind of warfare to emerge as the dominant type of internal warfare within the post-Cold War era. After 1989, the New Wars advocates therefore expect to observe a privatization, fractionalization and transnationalization of violent actors involved in internal warfare as well as an economization of their motives, a brutalization of violent strategies, more extensive fighting and a tendency of internal wars to increasingly happen in the weakest and poorest states. The first theoretical part of this book concluded with a critical discussion of the concept of New Wars and of the current State of the Art. I defended the concept of New Wars against unjustified or unfair points of critique but also presented the major concerns that have been put forward. I added my own points of criticism and argued in favor of some adjustments in order for the concept to serve as a useful theoretical basis of this analysis.

Firstly, I distanced myself from Mary Kaldor, who sometimes lists state actors amongst the adversaries of New Warfare.\textsuperscript{1} In contrast, I defined New Wars and Conflicts more narrowly as entirely non-state armed battle between two politically organized groups. This includes former soldiers, breakaway units of the army or remnants of the national military and police forces who are fighting each other in circumstances where the state and its security institutions have already collapsed. They also do not qualify as state actors anymore because they are following their own, private motives – either individually or as a group – instead of defending the common good or otherwise defined state interest.

\textsuperscript{1}E.g. when insisting that New Wars are fought by “networks of state and non-state actors” (Kaldor 2005, p. 3). Elsewhere, her wording remains at least imprecise, e.g. when noting that New Wars are fought by mixtures of remnants of the state, bits of the army, militias, criminal gangs and non-state actors (Kaldor 2006a, p. 5).
Secondly, Kaldor sometimes emphasizes the political character of New Wars that are held together by “an extreme political ideology based on the exclusive claim to state power on the basis of identity” (Kaldor 2001; Kaldor 2000). These identity politics appear like true political demands. However, Kaldor (2000) also notes that “[a]s the state becomes privatised […] it shifts from being the main organisation for societal regulation towards an instrument for the extraction of resources by the ruler and his […] privileged networks”. Access to or control over the state in that sense only means access to or control over resources. In these cases “the claim to the attributes of state power […] is merely a continuation of booty-hunting by other means” (Münkler 2005, p. 17). Thus, I consider New Wars to be driven primarily by economic instead of political interest. In a context where state institutions are non-existent or failing, political control of the Ministry of Mining becomes relatively irrelevant while physical control of mining spots matters. In addition, identity politics are only one “important organizing principle” that is “usually, but not actually always” applied in New Wars (Kaldor 2006a, p. 6; Kaldor 2000). If identity politics are not or cannot be applied, New Warfare remains purely predatory.

Thirdly, Kaldor (2006a, p. 5) objects to the notion that New Wars are internal or intra-state in nature because their actors and geographical scope transcend state borders. Münkler also emphasizes that in New Warfare, state boundaries no longer play a role. “This type of war crosses national borders without being waged as a war between states” (Münkler 2003, p. 20). In contrast, I aimed to clearly differentiate New Wars from warfare between states. New Wars and Conflicts have been described as a sub-type of internal armed conflict also because the stated incompatibility (what the parties are or claim to be fighting over) lies within the state. The term internal warfare neither excludes the possibility of warfare spreading to another country nor does it exclude the possibility of external involvement. In most cases of intra-state warfare, a certain degree of internationalization of actors can be observed. If information on the degree of external interventions is provided, this can be treated as an interesting variable.

Fourthly, I distanced myself from Kaldor (2001) and Münkler (2005) who at times describe (international) terrorism as a form of (new) warfare. Instead, I argued in favor of a clear distinction between terrorism and warfare (as two distinct forms of organized violence) and between terrorism (as a strategy to achieve political, religious or ideological goals) and indiscriminate, senseless or even unrelated acts of terror applied in all kinds of warfare.

The fact that Münkler (2005, p. 131) identifies international terrorism as a kind of New Warfare relates to my fifth point of departure: According to the author, New Wars are asymmetric in nature.2 He notes that New Wars are characterized by a “greater
asymmetry of military force, so that the adversaries are as a rule not evenly matched”. He states that the course of New Wars is in the hands of players “for whom war as a contest between like and like is an alien concept” and speaks of a “clash of military strategies and political rationale […] which are in principle dissimilar from each other” (Münkler 2005, pp. 3, 30 sq., 135, 137). These claims only hold true if New Wars are either understood as violent conflicts between rebels and government forces (situations which I described as conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts) or if New Wars are understood as violent conflicts between armed rebels and largely defenseless civilians as their unequal “opponent”3 (a situation I would refer to as one-sided violence against civilians instead of bilateral warfare). According to my understanding, New Wars and Conflicts are rather symmetric in terms of the distribution of military power amongst the adversaries and in terms of the weapons used. This symmetry is a major point of distinction between New Wars that are fought amongst rather similar non-state armed groups and conventional internal armed conflicts that are fought amongst militarily superior government forces and one or several inferior internal opposition group(s) who try to weaken the government forces in order to arrive at an equilibrium only throughout warfare, by a tactic of withdrawal and dispersion. In addition, New Wars and Conflicts are symmetric in terms of incentives. Both sides fight for access to or control over power and riches. Civilians either join such violent groups and become part of one of the fighting fractions or they are directly or indirectly affected by non-state warfare. In the latter case, they do not actively engage in fighting but are the victims of New Warfare. Thus, I only agree insofar as the overall costs of New Warfare are unevenly distributed between the actual combatants and the civilian population. “[T]he new wars are highly lucrative for many of the participants, because in the short-term the force used in them yields more than it costs – and the long term costs are borne by others”. The profits of New Warfare are privatized while the costs and losses are socialized (Münkler 2005, p. 92; Münkler 2003, pp. 15 sq.).

Despite these objections, I mainly criticized the concept of New Wars for not clearly specifying some of its main concepts (e.g. state weakness). Later, when the issue of measurement arises, this shall be discussed further. In addition, the concept of New Wars remains under-theorized. I argued that a clear understanding is missing of how the single dimensions of New Warfare interact with each other – especially because the advocates of the concept of New Wars claim that the coincidence of the above mentioned characteristics constitutes the fundamental novelty of New Wars. It remains virtually

3 According to Münkler (2005, p. 75) “new wars are not waged against a similar armed enemy but mainly employ long-term violence against large parts of the civilian population”. Elsewhere he speaks of New Wars as “a confrontation between soldiers and civilians, not between soldiers and soldiers” (Münkler 2005, p. 90).
unclear why it is plausible to expect a privatization of warfare, a transnationalization of violent actors and an economization of their motives to come along with a brutalization of strategies or more extensive fighting. After a comparison of the concepts of conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts, the second theoretical part of this book therefore aimed to identify respective mechanisms linking the political context of New Warfare, the nature and number of New Wars Actors and their economic motives with the kind and intensity of the applied violence. I arrived at a number of mechanisms expecting a comparatively high level of indiscriminate violence against civilians in non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts. At the same time, I remained undecided as to whether non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts also result in significantly higher numbers of direct, military deaths. At least it seems equally reasonable to argue in favor of the contrary.

The theoretical arguments outlined so far allow for the deduction of the following main trends and hypotheses. Some of these shall be refined later. Given the availability of suitable data, I also intend to supplement and test further hypotheses which, for this reason, will be presented at the end of the data section: First of all, the New Wars advocates state that over time (and especially in the post-Cold War era), non-conventional (non-state) internal fighting became the dominant type of internal fighting [Hypothesis 1] or is at least of growing significance [Hypothesis 1a]. The increasing importance or significance of non-state armed conflicts can be measured through respective changes in their total number or in their share in overall internal armed conflicts as well as in changes in their spatial expansion (as indicated by the number or share of affected countries). Unfortunately, for an extended period of time, estimates of the actual scope of conflict zones are only available for conventional (state-based) armed conflicts.

Because I use the above mentioned narrow definition of New Wars and Conflicts, violent non-state groups per definition constitute the dominant (yet only) type of warring party. However, non-state actors are also involved in conventional (state-based) civil wars where they are fighting the respective government. For this reason, I would like to explore whether there exists a significant difference in the quantity of involved groups of actors between the two sub-types of internal warfare. The respective hypothesis expects that the number of national armed groups involved in non-conventional (non-state) internal wars is significantly higher than in conventional (state-based) civil wars [Hypothesis 2].

The advocates of the concept of New Wars would also claim that over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, national paramilitary groups became the dominant actors as well as the main perpetrators of violence in internal armed conflict. They would expect the number of involved paramilitary groups (as well as the share of battle-related casualties that can be attributed to these groups) to be significantly higher in New Wars

---

4See e.g. Buhaug and Gates (2002) who draw on the UCDP/PRIO “Armed Conflict Dataset” for the 1946-2000 period to determine the location of all battle-zones for all conventional (state-based) armed conflicts in this time period, thereby identifying the geographic extent and the center point of each conflict.
as compared with conventional civil wars. Similarly, advocates of the concept of New Wars claim that over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, child soldiers became increasingly involved in fighting internal wars. Again, they would argue that this trend is mainly driven by the comparatively frequent recruitment of child soldiers in New Wars. The number of involved child soldiers is therefore expected to be significantly higher in New Wars as opposed to conventional civil wars. Empirical testing of these hypotheses requires data on the presence of certain violent groups, their relative strength (e.g., their group size) and their military impact (e.g., in terms of people killed). Unfortunately, such data on the perpetrators of violence are not available beyond single cases, over an extended period of time and by type of armed conflict. However, information on the involvement of mercenaries might be available soon through the “Mercenaries and War Dataset” (see chapter 13 on page 169). This data set intends to measure the military activities of mercenaries and private military companies in state-based and non-state internal wars (that resulted in at least 1,000 military or civilian deaths over their duration) since 1946.

Because the “Mercenaries and War Dataset” promises to deliver data on the involvement of external mercenaries as well, it is also eagerly awaited to investigate whether there exists a significant difference in the quality of involved groups of actors between the two sub-types of internal armed conflict. More precisely, the New Wars advocates state that over time (and especially in the post-Cold War era) external actors became increasingly involved in internal warfare. The likelihood of an external military intervention in non-conventional (non-state) internal wars is expected to be significantly higher compared with conventional (state-based) internal wars [Hypothesis 3]. “External military intervention” will later be defined as active violent interference in ongoing warfare by outside state or non-state forces who, in the case of New Warfare, are expected to be mostly driven by economic interests or security concerns. The indicator seems to be a rough but valid measure in order to capture an “internationalization” of internal warfare as predicted by the New Wars advocates and explicitly excludes non-military interventions (like humanitarian interventions) and peacekeeping or peace enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to also expect (UN) peacekeeping and peace enforcement troops to be more often deployed in cases of non-conventional (non-state) internal warfare as opposed to conventional (state-based) internal wars. It has been mentioned that the end of the Cold War lifted ideological barriers within the UN Security Council and similar institutions which for this reason should be able to more easily and swiftly agree on peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in general. In addition, it might be argued that due to global media reporting, the public knows more about patterns of violence in internal warfare than it used to. This increases the level of public pressure on democratic governments to save lives and defend human rights particularly in New Wars cases where civilian suffering assumes especially horrifying proportions. Empirically, UN peacekeepers and peace enforcement missions are indeed more often deployed in “difficult” cases, i.e., in conflict areas where warfare has become protracted, where strong and stable institutions do not exist, where there is no clear winner and where no formal peace treaty was signed. Especially Chapter VII enforcement missions
are more likely in cases where severe and brutal fighting left a fatal legacy and where three or more factions were involved in warfare. The preliminary results of a recent study using disaggregated data on the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces and the location of (state-based) conflict events confirms this outcome at the sub-national level. Within already difficult cases, UN peacekeeping forces tend to be deployed to difficult areas, i.e. areas where actual fighting takes place, where the conflict started and where a civilian population exists that needs protection (though peacekeepers are less likely to reside in conflict areas that are in the periphery of the country or far from the capital) (Ruggeri et al. 2011). This seems to justify the expectation that external intervention in the form of UN peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions is more likely during or after New Wars which qualify as difficult cases due to their intensity in terms of civilian casualties and their specifically long duration. In addition, New Wars should rank first amongst the hard-to-solve cases because of “[…] the absence of effective governance by whatever government is in power, combined with the absence of any form of coherent governing alternative among the insurgents” (Snow 1996, p. 90). In order to investigate whether (UN) peace enforcement or peacekeeping is indeed more likely in the case of non-conventional (non-state) as opposed to conventional (state-based) armed conflict, (geographically disaggregated) data would be desirable on all international peacekeeping missions by agency and type of involvement, for all kinds of internal armed conflicts, everywhere, before as well as after the end of the Cold War. A first step to collect such data is made at the University of Essex where the “Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset (PKOLED)” is being compiled. This data set promises to deliver geographically and temporally disaggregated data (on a monthly basis and at the level of province) on at least UN peacekeeping missions that have been deployed in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts after 1989.

See e.g. DeRouen and Sobek (2004, p. 311); Gilligan and S. J. Stedman (2003); Fortna (2008); Fortna (2004). The latter concludes that “[…] the answer to the question where do peacekeepers get sent is quite complicated. It depends on whether we are talking about UN peacekeeping or missions by other actors, and it depends on what type of peacekeeping we are interested in. We do not have a highly predictive model of peacekeeping deployment. But to the extent that there is a pattern, we can see that, in several respects at least, consent-based peacekeepers tend to get sent to the hard cases rather than the easy ones. Peace is generally more stable after decisive victories than after wars that end in a tie, and peacekeepers are usually deployed where there was no clear winner in the war. Moreover, peacekeepers are no more likely to deploy when belligerents have signaled their will for peace in a formal treaty; if anything, just the opposite is true. If renewed conflict is less likely in states with large armies […] the fact that peacekeepers tend to shy away from militarily strong states also strengthens the conclusion that peacekeepers go where they are most needed rather than where peace is easy to keep in any case. […] Just as sicker patients are more likely to receive medical care, places in which the danger of another war is higher are more likely to receive peacekeeping” (Fortna 2004, p. 281).

Ruggeri et al. (2011) examine the spacial deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in eight sub-Saharan African countries (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan). For single case studies on the question where peacekeepers are deployed see e.g. Dorussen and Raleigh (2009); Costalli and Moro (2010).

See Dorussen (2007); Ruggeri et al. (2011). The latter already rely on PKOLED data for their comparative study of eight sub-Saharan African countries.
Despite these differences in the quantity and quality of their actors, non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts and conventional (state-based) armed conflicts are expected to significantly differ from each other in regard to the role of conflict resources which motivate violent actors and finance warfare. Accordingly, New Wars advocates expect conflict resources to be found and produced significantly more often in countries experiencing non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts as opposed to countries involved in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. Likewise, at the war, the conflict and the conflict episode level, conflict resources are expected to be found and produced significantly more often prior to or during non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts as opposed to conventional (state-based) armed conflicts [Hypothesis 4]. According to the New Wars advocates, the financing of warfare and private enrichment through the exploitation of conflict resources is a major characteristic of new, non-state warfare though the phenomenon certainly also exists in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. However, the universe of state-based internal armed conflicts comprises greed-based insurgencies (where conflict resources also matter) and grievance-based insurgencies (where the exploitation of conflict resources constitutes just one source of financing warfare in only a fraction of all cases). This justifies the expectation of a greater relevance of conflict resources in New Wars countries and in cases of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflict. In order to explore this relationship, at least the occurrence and production status of conflict resources everywhere (not only in war-torn countries) need to be known. In the ideal case, geographically disaggregated data on these resources as well as the location of battles would be available to detect whether fighting actually occurs close to important mining sites or major trading routes. Data would also be desirable on the identity of those who exploit the resources, on the extent to which these resources are reinvested into warfare as well as on the extent to which the war effort depends not only on the exploitation of valuable resources but also on local predation (e.g. through robbery and pillage, hostage taking, the establishment of check points and blockades or the collection of protection money) and on external financial support (e.g. from neighboring governments or diaspora communities). This detailed information is difficult or impossible to obtain for all kinds of conflict resources and cases of internal armed conflict. The fact that black-market trading in conflict resources is not captured by any data set constitutes another major obstacle. It is, however, possible to explore whether certain kinds of conflict resources are more often found and produced in New Wars countries and whether there exists a temporal overlap between the production of these resources and internal fighting. The refined hypotheses on this matter shall be presented later.

The concept of New Wars also offers some arguments in favor of the thesis that New Warfare is especially brutal in terms of battle-related deaths. I relied on Weinstein and Kalyvas to identify respective theoretical arguments and mechanisms (Mechanisms 6-8). However, I also presented two plausible explanations that are not at odds with the concept of New Wars but speak in favor of comparatively low numbers of military deaths in non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts (Mechanisms 9 and 10). Whether there exists a significant difference in the scale of violence (in terms of battle-related deaths) between conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) internal
armed conflicts therefore remains to be seen. At least most New Wars advocates believe that the severity of fighting (in terms of direct, battle-related deaths) is significantly higher in non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts as compared with conventional (state-based) armed conflicts [Hypothesis 5].

However, others emphasize that it is less the scale but the quality of violence that significantly differs between new and conventional civil wars. They claim that over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, the strategies of internal warfare became increasingly directed towards civilians. The extent of conflict-related suffering of civilians is expected to be significantly higher in New Wars as compared with conventional civil wars. Again, I relied on Weinstein and Kalyvas to specify respective mechanisms (Mechanisms 1-5). So far, however, data constraints inhibit a systematic large-N analysis of any hypothesis on the nature of violence or the patterns of abusiveness seen in state-based vs. non-state internal armed conflict. In order to measure the extent of conflict-related suffering of civilians, data on the total number of civilian battle-related deaths or the ratio of civilian to military battle-deaths would be needed. This information is again not available for every case and both kinds of internal armed conflict which also holds for alternative and more indirect measures of lethal as well as nonlethal conflict-related violence against civilians. Otherwise, the number, frequency or intensity of conflict-related attacks on civilian targets (people, infrastructure or historic monuments), the number of refugees and conflict-related internally displaced people, the number of people who suffer and/or die from war-related famines or diseases or the number of victims of war-related rape and sexual abuse would be valid measures, too.

Because the New Wars advocates suggest that New Wars are also especially long-lasting, I also explore whether there exists a significant difference between conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts in the duration of fighting. According to the New Wars advocates, the duration of internal warfare has been increasing – especially within the post-Cold War era. At the war or conflict level, they expect the duration of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts to be significantly longer as compared with conventional (state-based) armed conflicts [Hypothesis 6]. Unfortunately, the concept of New Wars only casually implies a specifically long duration of New Warfare. For this reason, I would like to briefly summarize the main arguments. Theoretically, the long duration of New Wars has been explained by the high level of fractionalization and the large number of violent groups involved in this kind of armed conflict. This renders the drafting and implementation of cease-fire agreements or peace treaties difficult. At least negotiated settlements become less likely because the interests of all relevant actors need to be satisfied and because the coordination and cooperation costs amongst the negotiators increase with their number. In this regard, Chojnacki (2004, p. 10) notes that a fragmentation of conflict parties enhances the problem of incomplete information and evokes commitment problems, thereby increasing the complexity of conflict [and post conflict] situations. In addition, the non-state nature of violent actors helps to explain the supposedly long duration of New Wars. Defective behavior from non-state groups during peace negotiations is little constrained by public
pressure. They cannot be sanctioned through elective mechanisms for behavior that deliberately causes setbacks, a retardation of the peace process or even a resumption of warfare. UNITA serves as an example. This rebel organization delayed its demobilization efforts in order to build up a criminalized New War Economy that would guarantee the organization’s survival (and rearmament) in case of failure of the peace process. Income derived from diamond exploitation later allowed UNITA to boycott the Lusaka peace process (Heupel and Zangl 2003, p. 21). This links with the economic motives of New Wars Actors and the establishment of New War Economies which further contribute to a long duration of warfare. It was explained earlier that the end of the Cold War reduced the willingness and ability of former superpowers to influence and moderate the conduct of internal wars. Because strategic partnerships became less important, they withdrew their support to client regimes and for this reason lost much of their leverage on the warring factions. In order to compensate for this loss of income, violent actors intensified their illegal exploitation of conflict resources to finance warfare and to enrich themselves. This led to the emergence of independent criminal war economies. In New Wars, all actors involved have a vested economic interest in the functioning of these economies and therefore in the continuation of warfare. Only a state of war guarantees them private profit that could not be maintained in peaceful and stable environments with a working state authority enforcing law and order. Consequently, the higher the expected private profit from a continuation of fighting, the longer the duration of warfare. This expectation is in line with the “Rebellion as Business” model postulated by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) or the idea that a “mutually hurting stalemate” as envisioned by Zartman (2001) is difficult to reach in a situation where warfare allows the belligerents, who do not intend to take over the state, to enrich themselves and to continue fighting while the risk of being killed as a soldier might be rather low. It is also in line with the findings of a number of empirical studies which explore the effect of natural resources wealth on the duration of conventional civil wars. For instance, a large-N analysis by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), covering the period from 1960-2000, confirms that increases in the profitability of warfare, measured through increases in the prizes of primary commodities (consisting of cash crops and fuel exports) that a country exports, significantly lengthen the duration of warfare. Ross (2006) criticizes this measure for being imprecise and endogenous to civil warfare but still finds that the exploitation of contraband resources (all kinds of gemstones, timber and narcotics) by rebel forces is robustly linked to conflict duration. Buhaug et al. (2009, pp. 561 sq.) start with a de-

---

8 According to this theoretical argument “[r]ebellions will occur where and only where they are profitable (although they need not be motivated by profit). They will be profitable where revenues during conflict are atypically high and costs atypically low. [...] [T]he rebellion-as-business approach assumes that rebel revenue exceeds costs” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, p. 256).

9 This concept centers on the parties’ perception of a “mutually hurting stalemate” (MHS) which refers to a situation where unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result through continued warfare are blocked and the parties to the conflict feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. They find themselves “locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily to equal degree or for the same reasons)”. Therefore they seek a way out. They are ready to grab on a proposal for solution that usually has been in the air for a long time and only now appears attractive (Zartman 2001, p. 8).
scriptive analysis revealing “that lootable gemstones were available in 26 percent of all intrastate conflicts and 38 percent of all conflict years since 1946. Similarly, 15 percent of the conflicts and 21 percent of all conflict years occurred in areas with significant narcotics cultivation. For petroleum, the figures are 44 and 52 percent, respectively. The fact that a larger share of the observations (conflict years) than the conflicts include these resources tentatively indicates a positive association between local resource wealth and conflict duration”. For their subsequent quantitative analysis, the authors use data on the production/extraction of three types of valuable resources in zones of conflict at the time of conflict outbreak: secondary diamonds and other gemstones, petroleum (oil and gas) and drugs (coca, opium and cannabis). They find “that intrastate conflicts in areas with gemstones and petroleum production are significantly more durable than the reference group”. Because they do not find support for a similar systematic relationship between drug cultivation and the duration of conflict, they conclude that a distinction between types of resources is important. Only recently, Lujala (2010, p. 16) found that the presence of secondary diamonds, other gemstones or hydrocarbons within the actual conflict zone more than doubles the conflict duration while resources located outside the conflict region do not have a prolonging effect on the duration. Although the direction of relationship between resource wealth and the duration of state-based civil warfare remains somewhat obscure, more and more evidence emerges in support of a positive correlation. Keeping peace in a context where the illegal exploitation of natural resources has been an established way of income during prior wartime also seems especially challenging. Downs and S. Stedman (2002, pp. 44, 57) report that “[...] no civil war peace agreement has been fully, successfully implemented in a context where [valuable, easily marketable commodities such as timber and gemstones] are present”.

10 Hydrocarbons include oil (petroleum), gas, and condensate. Condensate exists in gaseous form in the reservoir but changes from gas into liquid when the hydrocarbons are produced. In most cases the condensate occurs only as a small proportion of total reserves and production volume (Lujala, Rod, et al. 2007, p. 240, fn 1).

11 The author refers to an early study by Fearon (2004), who was the first to code conflicts in which rebels are known to have exploited lootable resources (gemstones and drugs) and who found that such conflicts tend to last substantially longer. However, Fearon (2004) failed “to account for cases where lootable resources were available in the conflict region but, for one reason or another, rebels did not exploit them” (Lujala 2010, p. 18). For other early studies on this matter see e.g. Lujala and Gates (2002) or Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005) who first found support for a lengthening effect of secondary diamond production on the duration of civil warfare or Ross (2004) who reviewed 14 cross-national econometric studies and many qualitative studies and concluded that “lootable” commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make the outbreak of armed conflict more likely but tend to lengthen existing conflicts.

12 “[...]it is possible that contraband is involved in prolonged conflicts precisely because they are long and the rebels are forced to exploit natural resources; use of natural resources may be merely an indication of prolonged conflict but not the cause” (Lujala 2010, p. 18). See also Ross (2006, pp. 292 sq.) who informs that in many cases rebel groups did not begin to sell contraband until many years after the conflict started. He presumes that they simply needed some time to establish their production and trading networks. In addition, he explains that longer-lasting conflicts are simply more likely to continue from the era when contraband was less important to the era when the former superpowers started to withdraw their support and contraband became more important.

13 The authors investigate sixteen cases of peace implementation between 1980 and 1998.
According to the authors, the successful implementation of a peace agreement not only hinges upon the willingness of third parties to provide the necessary resources and troops (based on their own national security interests) but also on the degree of difficulty of the implementation environment (whether spoilers are present who oppose the peace agreement and who use violence to undermine it, whether neighboring states exist which funnel resources to potential spoilers and, last but not least, whether valuable, easily marketable commodities are available). The leaders of rebel groups who used to finance their warfare and to enrich themselves through the exploitation of conflict resources will only agree to stop fighting and looting if they receive some kind of compensation, e.g. if they are credibly promised a powerful political position within the new regime, like the position of the Minister of Mining, which grants them control over natural resources or other riches and which in more or less peaceful but corrupt settings offers alternative opportunity for personal enrichment.

Furthermore, it has been argued that expected economic gain strengthens group identity. This provides a fertile breeding ground for identity politics which either serve to legitimize the criminal economic activities of private actors and to stabilize the New War Economies (and through this mechanism contribute to a long duration of warfare) or which serve to legitimize violent strategies that systematically and permanently target civilians. Especially brutal attacks cause hatred, demand revenge, desensitize soldiers and – as long as no side prevails – for these reasons also contribute to a long duration of New Warfare. Thus, where identity politics are applied and a brutalization of violence takes place, an extension of warfare can be expected. This is in line with the empirical finding that armed conflicts causing large numbers of civilian casualties and armed conflicts involving ethnic or religious factors are especially difficult to settle, face a higher risk of renewed warfare and are of a specifically long duration.\(^\text{14}\) Still, assuming a simple linear relationship between the severity and the duration of warfare might be overly simplistic. At least in the case of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts, fighting might be severe at the beginning so that the just mentioned prolonging mechanisms apply. This, however, levels off as the number of potential military targets decreases alongside with increasing severity. The initial high level of violence simply cannot be sustained forever. In fact, the more severe the conflict in terms of battle-related military deaths at its beginning, the sooner this leveling-off process will take place. In addition, the more severe the conflict, the more likely the international community gets involved. A quick intervention at least bears the potential to stop otherwise endless warfare. Both arguments speak in favor of a non-linear relationship between the severity and the duration of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts: With an increasing severity the duration is expected to increase (and vice versa). Though, very severe fighting depletes the number of potential military targets and prompts the international community to intervene.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{14}\) See Doyle and Sambanis (2000, pp. 786 sq.), Hartzell (1999), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) or Valentino et al. (2004, pp. 381 sq.).

\(^{15}\) See Fearon (2004) who finds that very severe warfare correlates with a short duration or Lacina (2006) who models a logarithmic relationship between the severity and the duration of civil warfare.
If, however, Mechanism 9 and 10 (see section 11.1 on page 149) hold true, non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts result in comparatively low numbers of battle-related military deaths. In this case, the above described leveling-off process never sets in (or only sets in later). Instead of battling each other, New Wars Actors deliberately attack non-combatants whose number is virtually infinite. Therefore, this kind of warfare is likely to last very long despite its intensity in terms of civilian casualties. Furthermore, the above argued that difficult (i.e. severe and protracted) conflict situations prompt the international community to intervene. Unfortunately, “[…] the more intervention is needed, the less likely it is to be effective” (Snow 1996, p. 88). This leads to the expectation that although UN interventions might be more likely in the case of New Warfare, such interventions are also likely to be less effective due to the difficult nature of the conflict situation. If the UN is significantly more likely to fail in its effort to stop fighting and to establish lasting peace in New Wars settings, this further contributes to a long duration of warfare even if warfare is intense in terms of civilian casualties.\footnote{Of course, the success or effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions depends on many factors. Despite the character of the conflict situation itself, the willingness of a third party to credibly guarantee the safety of the adversaries during the critical implementation phase of a peace agreement is important (e.g. by sending a strong enough peacekeeping force in terms of numbers and mandate) (Walter 1997; Walter 2002). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also found that the type of peace operation and the peacekeeping agency makes a difference while others consider the deployment of peacekeeping soldiers plus the extent of institutional guarantees provided in the peace agreement decisive (e.g. the extent of power-sharing mechanisms) (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Ruggeri et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of the exact location of peacekeepers within a conflict-ridden country. For an overview of different schools of thought on third-party intervention see Hampson (2001).}

Finally, “weak statehood” affects the duration of internal warfare because weak or failing states might act less timely and take less rigorous measures to stop ongoing fighting between non-state forces. If states entirely collapse, non-state fighting and rent-seeking behavior of violent non-state actors happen without any hindrance. In addition, weak statehood facilitates the mobilization of fighters based on ethnic or religious grounds and in this way links with the use of identity politics and a long duration of warfare. “Systems of attributing meaning transmitted from generation to another, even if in an amended form, are vectors of historical memory and of social and political identity. They are particularly important in this respect in the absence of a state that is something close to a monopoly of violence, powerful and self-confident. […] Where states have lost their ability to govern through bureaucracies, political mobilization has increasingly taken an ethnic form. Where national armies have lost any pretension to a monopoly of coercion, ethnic militias or other private armies arise” (Ellis 2003, pp. 36 sq.). All of this supports the expectation that the weaker the state, the longer the duration of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts.
The level of state weakness not only affects the duration of warfare. According to the New Wars advocates, it also increases the risk of outbreak of New Warfare. They explain their reasoning while blinding out that the risk of conventional (state-based) armed conflict also increases with rising state weakness. In addition, the New Wars advocates explain how macro-factors (increasing globalization and the end of the Cold War) weakened states “from above” and how the emergence of violent non-state actors contributes to state weakness “from below”. However, the relationship as such between state weakness and political instability is taken as a given. Therefore, I also wish to briefly recall the main theoretical arguments linking state weakness to the outbreak of internal armed conflict. These arguments are neither startling nor late-breaking. For instance, state weakness can be linked to armed conflict through its negative effect on economic variables (e.g. growth rates and foreign direct investment) that are known to increase the risk of internal warfare. Öberg and Melander (2010, pp. 8 sq.) present a direct and more sophisticated argument borrowed from bargaining theory. They consider high level of state capacity (as indicated by high bureaucratic quality) decisive in order to process information, e.g. on grievances. According to them, high bureaucratic quality “reduces the information asymmetry between the parties and/or enables them to communicate resolve credibly, [which] will reduce the risk that a conflict escalates to war”. They argue that especially in autocratic regimes (where citizens lack the right to openly express their grievances and to organize themselves to pursue their interests), political leaders depend on “a professional bureaucracy that […] has the integrity and autonomy to speak truth to the leaders” in order to obtain “estimates of popular grievances”, to gather information on the “true state of public opinion” or “on the nature and strength of potential rebel’s preferences”. This information helps the government to avoid rebellion by reacting on time either through redistribution or repression. The same point has previously been made in order to explain inter-state warfare. The most common thesis linking state weakness to political instability is rooted in relative deprivation theory and centers around the grievances generated by state weakness thus providing incentive for rebellion. More precisely, it is argued that weak states are lacking extractive capacity and are therefore unable to deliver the basic services they are supposed to. In addition, they lack administrative capacity. The fact that unprofessional bureaucrats are systematically directing state resources to their kin groups also often is a root problem (Kocher 2010, p. 142). This bears the danger that “populations might perceive [such] weak, corrupt or ineffective governments as the source of their expectations-ability discrepancy” (Hegre and Nygard 2012, p. 3) and for this reason start to question state legitimacy. Furthermore, weak states lack coercive capacity. Their authority is limited or only arbitrarily exercised. Due to these obstacles, weak states are neither able to control their territories and societies through coercive means (i.e. repression) nor through accommodative responses (i.e. cooperation or co-optation). This means people

17 See e.g. Fearon (1995) or Råby and Teorell (2010). The latter find “that the impact of quality of government, most notably corruption, on the risk of interstate conflict by large amounts trumps the influence of democracy” (Råby and Teorell 2010, pp. 2, 12 sq.).

18 For an empirical study on the linkage between the quality of government and state legitimacy see Gilley (2006).
are not only willing but also able to support armed action to address the issue. The risk of a grievance-based rebellion increases.\textsuperscript{19} In an attempt to regain order, weak states often respond with violence to the violence and protests caused by their own failures which intensifies the grievances. At least armed conflict often leads governments to induce martial law and to limit political rights which also increases the risk of a renewed outbreak of grievance-based violence oftentimes in connection with upcoming elections (Hegre and Nygard 2012, pp. 26–28).

A political opportunity model also lies at the heart of the alternative argument that the weaker the state, the less likely it is to defend its resources, the less likely it is to effectively participate in warfare if attacked itself and the less effective it is in stopping non-state actors from fighting each other. This not only motivates and enables violent groups to rise and to fight the state for control over resources (which increases the risk of conventional greed-based rebellions). It also motivates and enables non-state actors to rise and to fight each other over resources (leading to non-conventional (non-state) armed conflict). While the above mentioned grievance-based rebellions happen in a context where the state is weakened but still exists and oftentimes behaves repressively, such non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts are at least more likely to cluster at the lower end extreme of state fragility. This leads to the hypothesis that non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts tend to emerge in situations of extreme state weakness or even state collapse while conventional (state-based) armed conflicts also happen in weakened but comparatively stable and repressive states. Accordingly, the New Wars advocates expect that over time (and especially in the post-Cold War era), internal warfare increasingly occurred in the context of failing or failed states. The degree of state weakness is believed to be significantly worse in countries experiencing non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts as compared with countries involved in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. Likewise, at the war or conflict level, the degree of state weakness is expected to be significantly worse prior to or at the outbreak of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflict as opposed to conventional (state-based) armed conflict [Hypothesis 7].

The theoretical argument nevertheless lacks the power to convince. If the relationship between state weakness and the kind of internal armed conflict that arises is a matter of degree of state weakness, a theoretically sound argument is missing as to what level of state weakness we are talking about in order to expect the outbreak of non-state armed conflict. In addition, linking extreme state weakness and state failure to the outbreak of non-state warfare runs the risk of being tautological because a state actor who could participate in internal warfare does not exist any more. If collapsed state structures are even included in the definition (and the measurement) of non-state warfare the argument turns entirely absurd.

\textsuperscript{19}For a formalized version of this argument see Azam (2001), who also states that violent conflicts in Africa are due to the failure of governments to redistribute public resources within and among ethnic groups which generates grievances and incentives for rebellion.
In light of these theoretical weaknesses, I will later propose a slight modification of the argument which states that the *nature* (instead of the degree) of state weakness is important in order to explain the kind of warfare that emerges.

Overall, empirical testing of the above mentioned main trends and hypotheses across a large number of cases, all types of internal armed conflict and over an extended period of time never took place. This is partly due to the fact that the concept of New Wars has mainly been discussed within the qualitative literature. Partly, however, the lack of large-N empirical analyses is due to a lack of suitable data. Only recently, scientists at the Free University of Berlin and the UCDP started to collect systematic data on sub-state or non-state armed conflicts. After all, some data on the production of certain conflict resources and zones of warfare are also available. The following analytical part of this book describes the available data sets and indicators measuring the incidence, the nature and the context of non-state and state-based internal armed conflicts. While these data sets are chosen because of their advantages over other existing data sets, their limits shall also be mentioned. After having clarified the potential of available data sets the section closes with a listing of all trends and hypothesis (including the above mentioned) that shall and can be tested within the subsequent empirical analysis.
Part IV.

Data
13. Data on Internal Fighting and Armed Actors

13.1. The “New List of Wars”/“Consolidated List of Wars”

In July 2005, Sven Chojnacki and his colleagues from the Free University of Berlin published the first edition of their “New List of Wars”. For data collection, the authors relied on existing and well-accepted quantitative data sets but also identified their weaknesses. Consequently, they proposed and applied some changes in defining criteria which shall now be elaborated further.

The authors of the “New List of Wars” criticize conventional armed conflict data sets for only gathering information on conflicts taking place within or between recognized members of the international state system. Conflicts happening in de facto independent entities which lack international recognition but nevertheless constitute relatively autonomous entities over some territory (e.g. conflicts within the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or the Republic of Somaliland) are not considered. The same holds for armed conflicts taking place in post-colonial quasi-states or in situations of state failure.

Secondly, the authors of the “New List of Wars” criticize that conventional conflict data sets per definition exclude cases of non-state fighting (e.g. rebel on rebel violence or warfare between warlords). In order to close this gap, Chojnacki and his colleagues add the missing category of “sub-state wars” to their data set. These are defined as 

\[
\text{wars between non-state or non-recognized quasi-state groups, whether within or across formal state boundaries. This definition of a “sub-state war” is consistent with what I have been}
\]

\text{1Data sources are the Correlates of War Project, UCDP, data from the “AG Kriegsursachenforschung” (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), the State Failure Task Force, the Armed Conflict Database from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Armed Conflict Report from the Project Ploughshares, Keesing’s Record of World Events and the “Archiv der Gegenwart” (Chojnacki and Reisch 2008, pp. 2, 3).}

\text{2A political entity which is classified as a member of the post-Word War I state system must be a member of the League of Nations/the United Nations or it must have a population greater than 500,000 and received diplomatic missions from two major powers. This definition by the Correlates of War Project is widely accepted within the research community. See Codebook of the Correlates of War Project 2008: State System Membership List, v2008.1., online at http://correlatesofwar.org (visited on 2010-11-25) or Chojnacki (2006b, p. 54).}

\text{3Quasi-state groups are left-overs from regular armed forces or from governmental security forces as}
Data on the Incidence and Actors

labeling a “new”, “non-conventional” or “non-state” war. For this reason, the following
continues to use these terms interchangeably. In addition, the authors also suggest that
sub-state actors are able to fight bloody intra-state wars amongst each other because
a functioning monopoly of violence of the affected state(s) does not exist because the
state(s) collapsed or is/are unwilling to enforce it against combating local groups (e.g.
in Nigeria or parts of Pakistan), because the monopoly of violence is restricted to the
capital or narrowly defined territories (e.g. in Chad or Afghanistan) or because it is
temporally not enforced in the conflict region (e.g. in Somalia and Lebanon) (Chojnacki
2006b, pp. 60 sq.).

Thirdly, Chojnacki (2006b, p. 55) criticizes existing efforts of data collection for only
counting direct military deaths. According to him, this leads to a bias favoring classical,
state-sanctioned forms of violence. He does not consider this practice effective or satis-
factory to determine the intensity of armed conflicts in which civilians are the strategic
targets of sustained combat. Therefore, his “New List of Wars” explicitly counts battle-
related military and civilian deaths. At least 100 people need to be killed per year on
both sides in order to qualify as bilateral armed conflict. This criterion rules out sporadic
and one-sided acts of violence (e.g. terrorist attacks or genocide).

In order to determine whether the observed case constitutes “warfare” (generally un-
derstood as the most extreme type of military violence between at least two politically
organized groups), any quantitative data set needs to identify a certain threshold of vi-
olence.4 The “New List of Wars” uses a comparatively low overall threshold of violence
of at least 1,000 (military and civilian) battle-related deaths over the entire duration of
combat while others have chosen the rather high number of 1,000 battle-related military
deaths per year in order to speak of warfare. Chojnacki (2006b, p. 60) argues that the
latter threshold is appropriate to capture intensive inter-state wars but misses many of
the comparatively low-intensive internal armed conflicts.

The criterion of 1,000 battle-related deaths during the entire conflict (vs. per year)
also is the main distinguishing feature between the “New List of Wars” and a seem-
ingly similar data set: The “Non-State Wars Dataset” of the Correlates of War (COW)
Project, which since the end of the 1990s, has tried to better include non-state wars
in its data collection effort, too. For the sake of completeness, this data set shall at
least be mentioned. Version 4.0 of COW’s “Non-State-Wars Dataset” lists wars among
non-state entities, i.e. quasi-state actors (troops of non-recognized geopolitical units

---

4The determination of such a threshold to distinguish minor or intermediate conflicts from intense
warfare is common practice in quantitative conflict research. For more information see Chojnacki
such as dependencies or non-state autonomous entities, that do not meet the criteria of system membership), between troops of non-territorial entities or between non-state armed groups that have no defined territorial base.\(^5\) All non-state wars mentioned in the data set take place outside the territory of a recognized state. They either happen between non-state entities on non-state territory, i.e. territory that is in pre-state formation, a colony or other dependency (so-called “type 8 wars”) or they happen between non-state entities across state borders (so-called “type 9 wars”). The authors of the data set point out that wars between non-state actors appear within the COW category of conventional intra-state wars, too, and in this case are referred to as inter-communal or regional internal wars. Contrary to the type 8 and type 9 non-state wars, these wars between non-state actors take place within recognized states. This leads to the objection that the COW Project sometimes differentiates types of civil warfare according to the motives of the combatants (e.g. intra-state wars for central control vs. intra-state wars for local issues) while at the same time it differentiates in regard to the political status of entities involved in warfare (e.g. intra-state wars vs. non-state wars). This renders a comparison of and clear distinction between sub-types of civil warfare difficult. In addition and as already mentioned, COW’s “Non-State-Wars Dataset” only reports battle-related deaths among combatants (civilian fatalities are excluded) and like all other COW data sets applies the rather high threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.\(^6\) For these reasons, I prefer to rely on the above presented “New List of Wars” which uses a lower threshold of violence, includes battle-related civilian deaths and clearly differentiates non-state from state-based armed conflicts according to the actors’ political status.

The “New List of Wars” also provides information on external, military interventions in ongoing conflicts. Again, the practice of an established data set, the UCDP/PRIO “Armed Conflict Dataset”, is criticized. This data set distinguishes between “internal armed conflicts” and “internationalized internal armed conflicts” where the government, the opposition or both receive support from other governments. According to Chojnacki and Reisch (2008, p. 4) such a strict distinction is problematic for at least two reasons. “Firstly, from the moment when outside interventions occur, wars which obviously have similar internal causes and conditions fall into different categories. Secondly, military interventions can occur in different war constellations (e.g. intra-state, extra-state or inter-state)”. Accordingly, the “New List of Wars” does not treat unilateral or multilateral military interventions as a distinct type of warfare but as a “special form of

---

\(^5\) A Non-State Armed Group (NSA) “can be considered a war participant if it either commits 100 armed personnel to the war or suffers 25 battle-related deaths. Thus non-state wars involve combat between two or more non-state armed groups that are organized for combat, are capable of effective resistance, and commit a minimum of 100 troops to the war or suffer 25 battle-related deaths”. See the codebook v4.0 for the “Non-State War Data Set” which is available online at http://correlatesofwar.org (visited on 2013-07-02).

\(^6\) For more information on the COW “Non-State-Wars Dataset” see Sarkees and Wayman (2010) or Chojnacki (2006b, pp. 54 sq.). The “Non-State Wars Data Set” (v4.0) and Codebook (as well as general information on the COW typology of war) are available online at http://correlatesofwar.org (visited on 2013-07-02).
13. Data on the Incidence and Actors

conflict behavior” which can be combined with or occur in any kind of warfare. Military interventions are defined as “active violent interferences (involving military personnel and combat action) in an ongoing war from outside by at least one member of the state system” (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 57). This definition excludes humanitarian interventions, UN-mandated peacekeeping or peace-enforcement efforts, non-military interventions (e.g. military training, supplies and financial support) by external actors, actions that are exclusively directed or assisted by intelligence services, military interventions by non-members of the state system and military interventions by external non-state actors.

In order to supplement data on the latter kind of intervention, the “Mercenaries and War Dataset” might be helpful. A first version of this data set measures the military activities of mercenaries in all kinds of internal wars between 1946 and 2003 (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, p. 14). Mercenaries are defined as individual soldiers or groups of fighters who receive rewards to actively engage in fighting a particular armed conflict. They are driven by a desire for private gain, recruited locally or abroad and they are not part of any regular armed forces. This definition includes employees of private military companies (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, pp. 4–6). Within the annex of their paper which relies on these data, Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster (2009) list 43 (out of 126) state-based and non-state internal wars that happened between 1946 and 2003 and where one or the other warring faction hired mercenaries. So far, however, data beyond 2003 are not publicly available, information is lacking on military involvement of mercenaries in internal armed conflicts that do not reach the intensity of warfare and more fine grained information is also missing (e.g. on the number of intervening troops/the size of the intervention). But a first version of the “Private Security Database” is now available covering the period from 1990 to 2007. This data set contains information on the use of private security companies (by public actors and in areas of limited statehood) which are also believed to be often deployed in New Wars.7 Likewise, data on the involvement of (UN) peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions (at least in conventional state-base civil wars) could be added as soon as the earlier mentioned “Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset (PKOLED)” becomes available. In the meanwhile, the “IPI Peacekeeping Database” has been launched which, however, only also covers a short period of time.8

For now, I rely on the “New List of Wars” and an unpublished but consolidated version of this data set (described in more detail below) which contains information on external interventions (unilateral, multilateral and UN interventions) in state-based as well as non-state internal wars.

---

7For the more information, the data and codebook see, http://www.conflict-data.org/psd/index.html (visited on 2014-11-03) or Branovic (2008).
8The dataset provides information on the total uniformed personnel contributions of each contributing country by month, by type (troop, police, or expert/observer) and by mission, from November 1990 to the present. See http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/ (visited on 2014-11-03).
It remains to be said that the “New List of Wars” does not include indirect civilian and military deaths who lost their lives due to the consequences of war (e.g. due to diseases or hunger). Although these victims might be relevant in order to determine the overall brutality of warfare, this and other available conflict data sets for practical reasons count direct, battle-related deaths only. Finally, the “New List of Wars” does not provide any information on the exact geographical location of active warfare and only measures the most severe type of armed conflict. Conclusions drawn from any analysis using these data do not necessarily apply to conflicts with less than 1,000 battle-deaths over their entire duration.

Nevertheless, this new data set greatly adds to our understanding of internal warfare. It clearly discriminates between four types of warfare: 1.) inter-state wars (fought between internationally recognized states), 2.) extra-state wars (between a state and one or more non-state groups outside its territorial boundaries), 3.) conventional intra-state wars (between a government and one or more non-state parties within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state) and 4.) “new”, sub-state wars (between non-state or non-recognized quasi-state groups, whether within or across formal state boundaries). The authors rightly claim that this categorization adds a missing part to the puzzle of possible combinations of state and non-state actors. Through this data set, wars between sub-state armed groups are made accessible for empirical and systematic analyses (Chojnacki 2006b, p. 56). Their list of sub-state wars includes cases which have previously and wrongly been categorized as conventional (state-based) civil wars (despite their non-state nature) as well as cases which prior data collection failed to include at all. In addition, the above categorization leaves room for the dynamic nature of warfare because any case can move from one to another type of warfare over time given “substantial change in the structural conditions of statehood and in the constellation of actors”. Besides mentioning the names of the involved actors, the “New List of Wars” also informs about external military interventions and the duration of state-based and non-state internal wars in years.

The latest (and for the time being last) public version of the “New List of Wars, version 1.3” covers the period from 1946 to 2006. An unpublished re-check of the post-Cold War cases further extended the temporal reach of the data set up to 2009.

---

9 The use of existing and well accepted quantitative data sets supports the reliability of the “New List of Wars”. In addition, every case of warfare was observed and coded by at least two project staff members. A third independent person consolidated the data. Event data gathered by the “Event Data Project on Conflict and Security (EDACS)” allowed for further alignment especially in regard to the number of victims (of non-African wars, too) (Chojnacki and Metternich 2007; Chojnacki, Ickler, et al. 2012). The project director finalized the coding process by again comparing the data with battle-deaths data compiled by well established conflict research institutes (most importantly IISS and UCDP).

10 Chojnacki and Reisch (2008, p. 3). For examples from Somalia, Angola or Columbia see Chojnacki (2006b, pp. 57, 59 fn 20).

11 See Chojnacki and Reisch (2008) and http://www.conflict-data.org/colow/about/ (visited on 2014-08-07) for information on the history of this data project.
13. Data on the Incidence and Actors

This consolidated version of the “New List of Wars”, which is also referred to as the “Consolidated List of Wars (CoLoW)” (version 1.1, November 2009), was made available upon request by the authors and, with some reservations\(^\text{12}\), shall be used within the following empirical analysis. In comparison with the earlier “New List of Wars” (v.1.3), the “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) extended the duration of ongoing cases of warfare up to 2009, corrected some start and/or end dates of warfare and added five additional recent cases of internal warfare. The “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) also informs more clearly on the number of parties to the conflict. Especially relevant in the context of this study is the information whether third parties with unclear positions exist who follow their own interests instead of supporting side A or B. Information on foreign military interventions has also been updated and changed in a number of cases.\(^\text{13}\) Finally and unlike any earlier version of this data set, the “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) gives a minimum and maximum estimate of the total number of civilian and military battle-related deaths at least for most of the post-Cold War cases. This information is necessary in order to figure out whether state-based and non-state internal wars differ in terms of their intensity.

13.2. The “Non-State Conflict Dataset”

The above described “New/Consolidated List of Wars” only captures wars, i.e. very intensive fighting in terms of battle-deaths. This does not hold for UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset”.\(^\text{14}\) This data set defines a non-state conflict as the use of armed force between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per warring dyad.\(^\text{15}\) Thus, like the “New List of Wars”, this data set covers non-state or sub-state fighting amongst militias, rival

---

\(^{12}\)The “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) is compiled on a conflict-year basis. Although annual data on battle-deaths and the involved actors has been mostly re-checked, many data points are still missing. If yearly information is available, it is often marked as “critical” because only a few (and even contradicting) sources exist, because the case is extremely complex or because data for the year 2009 is still missing and the re-check of the data is incomplete. Annual (and total) numbers of battle-deaths for cases of warfare before 1990 are entirely missing. Due to these shortcomings, the later analysis only uses the more reliable aggregate figures of overall battle-deaths and the total number of involved actors per conflict (instead of conflict-year).

\(^{13}\)Please see appendix A on page 379 for a summary of the changes and additions that were made.

\(^{14}\)The most recent update of this data set (v. 2.5-2014) covers the 1989 to 2013 period. For the latest presentation of the data see Sundberg, Eck, et al. (2012). The data set and codebook are available online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_non-state_conflict_dataset/ (visited on 2014-11-02). For earlier versions see Eck, Kreutz, et al. (2010), Sundberg (2010), Pettersson (2010), Kreutz and Eck (2005) or Kreutz, Eck, et al. (2005).

\(^{15}\)The “use of armed force” to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict includes the usage of arms which can be of any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks or stones (Sundberg 2010, p. 2).
guerrilla groups, clans, warlords or organized communal groups. However, contrary to the “New List of Wars”, it includes low intensity, non-state fighting (in the following also referred to as “new” or “non-conventional” internal armed conflicts). In addition, this data set estimates the number of battle-related deaths for each non-state armed conflict. Country names and the regional contexts of the conflicts are also given though information on the exact geographical locations or zones of conflict is again not provided. Such geographically disaggregated data would be desirable, e.g. to match the occurrence of non-state armed conflicts with the production of conflict resources.

Information on the exact geographical location of non-state fighting cannot simply be imputed by using one of the currently available georeferenced conflict event data sets, namely PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)”, data compiled by the “Event Data Project on Conflict and Security in Areas of Limited Statehood (EDACS) at the Free University of Berlin or UCDP’s “Georeferenced Event Dataset” (GED), because these data sets are of only limited temporal and geographical coverage and/or do not fully include non-state armed conflicts. ACLED only covers all African countries from 1997 to the end of 2013 (version 4) and just disaggregates UCDP/PRIO’s conventional (state-based) armed conflicts into their constituent (violent and non-violent) conflict events. Rebel-on-rebel violence is explicitly included as long as it happens within the context of a conventional (state-based) armed conflict. Because there is no causality minimum necessary for inclusion, ACLED also collects informa-

---

16 Organized groups consist of 1.) formally organized groups (defined as any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force against another similarly formally organized group) and 2.) informally organized groups (defined as any non-governmental group of people without an announced name who uses armed force against another similarly organized group and where the violent activity meets the following requirements: there is a clear pattern of violent incidents that are connected and in which both groups use armed force against the other). Only recently, the definition of an “organized group” has been modified to make the categories of non-state conflict and one-sided violence mutually exclusive and to better include conflicts between very broad groups such as religious collectives. For more information see Pettersson (2012a) or Sundberg (2010, pp. 2–4).

17 For a comparison of the event data quality, the data collection and coding processes of these three data sets see Chojnacki, Ickler, et al. (2012).

18 Some real-time data (i.e. weekly or monthly updates) are available for a number of additional non-African countries (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, p. 3). An earlier version of this data set covered slightly different and less countries but a longer period of time (1960-2006). Seven types of conflict events were listed: battles where either rebels or governments win the control of a location, the establishment of rebel bases/headquarters, non-violent rebel presence (e.g. recruitment or partial control of territory at night), gain of territory by the rebels at an unknown date and one-sided violence by rebels or government forces on unarmed civilians (PRIO/CSCW 2006). An update of the data set covered more recent conflict events but only from 1997 onwards. Some countries were dropped and the categorization of conflict events slightly changed. Since then, events of rioting/protesting, battles where territorial control did not change and events of non-violent transfer of territorial control are included (PRIO/CSCW 2010). A battle is defined as “a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location”. Because the authors cannot verify the fatality numbers reported from their sources, they refrain from using fatalities as the basis for event inclusion (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, pp. 8, 16). See also Raleigh and Hegre (2005); Raleigh, Linke, and Hegre (2009); Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen (2010).
13. Data on the Incidence and Actors

tion before conflicts are coded as being active in other conflict data sets. This means that only “occasionally” ACLED includes information on rebel-on-rebel violence that is not listed elsewhere (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, p. 17). The fact that ACLED disaggregates state-based armed conflicts into their constituent conflict events relates to another limitation in light of this analysis: ACLED emphasizes the political nature and intentions of its violent non-state actors. The EDACS data set is also of limited value to this study because so far it only contains geographically disaggregated data on violent events in seven sub-Saharan African countries (Somalia, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda) between 1990 and 2009 (Chojnacki, Ickler, et al. 2012, p. 4). However, and contrary to ACLED, this data set includes violent conflict events between two or more non-state armed groups – whether they occurred within conventional civil warfare or not. UCDP’s most recent and innovative data project, the “Georeferenced Event Dataset” (GED) delivers event-based and georeferenced data on state-based armed conflicts, non-state armed conflicts and acts of one-sided violence (through the “UCDP GED Point Dataset”) as well as geographically mapped data on the respective conflict areas (through the “UCDP GED Conflict Polygons Dataset”). Again, however, the latest version of this data set (v.1.5.-2011) only includes all African countries from 1989 to 2010.21

Unfortunately, the temporal reach of UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” remains restricted, too. The version I am relying on (v.2.4-2012) only covers the post-Cold War era (1989 to 2011). But this data set provides global coverage. In those years when UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” and the previously described “Consolidated List of Wars” overlap (1989-2009), the coding of cases also mainly concurs. Countries that experienced non-conventional (non-state) wars according to the “Consolidated List of Wars” also experienced at least one non-conventional (non-state) armed conflict accidents.

19For instance, rebels are defined as “political organizations whose goal is to counter an established national governing regime by violent acts” and who “have a stated political agenda for national power”. Militias are included insofar as they are “operating in conjunction or in alliance with a recognized government, political elite, and rebel organization or opposition group”. Militias are “typically supported, armed by, or allied with a political elite and act towards a goal defined by these elites or larger political movements”. A small category called “other” actors includes hired mercenaries, security firms and their employees, UN or external forces who, like all other actors recorded in this data set, need to have “an official name, a political purpose and use violence or protest for political means. […] Further, the events in which they are involved must be connected to each other as a means to achieve a larger political purpose” (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2012, pp. 4 sq.).

20EDACS collects information on the dates, exact locations, military actors and targets of individual violent events, i.e. fighting between two or more organized armed groups and one-sided attacks aimed at civilian or military targets that result in at least one casualty from the direct use of armed force. See the EDACS Codebook (version 3.7 from November 2012), available online at http://www.conflict-data.org/edacs/downloads/EDACS_Codebook_Version3_7_20121128.pdf (visited on 2014-11-02) , Chojnacki, Ickler, et al. (2012) or Chojnacki and Metternich (2007). Data can be downloaded at http://www.conflict-data.org/edacs/downloads/ (visited on 2014-11-02) .

21See Melander and Sundberg (2013) for the latest presentation, Sundberg, Lindgren, et al. (2010) for the codebook of the UCDP “GED Point Dataset”, and Croicu and Sundberg (2012) for the codebook of the UCDP “GED Conflict Polygons Dataset”.

176
cording to UDCP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” within the respective time frame. The other way round, several countries (and even entire regions) exist that have not been involved in non-state wars but nevertheless experienced a significant number of low-intensity non-state conflicts. For example, the Americas did not see any non-state war between 1946 and 2009. But, according to UCDP, the region has almost continuously been involved in low-intensity non-state armed conflicts within the post-Cold War era. Non-state conflicts took place in Columbia, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica and Canada. The two most hard-hit countries in this region are Mexico and Columbia, where UCDP estimates that 23 and 13 such non-state conflicts resulted in over 7,000 and 2,000 deaths respectively between 1989 and 2011. Likewise, single countries (e.g. South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia or Sudan) have not experienced non-state warfare since the Second World War but, within the post-Cold War era, have seen 17, 23, 52 and 72 non-state armed conflicts respectively. (Although these high numbers of non-state armed conflicts are somewhat put into perspective if one keeps in mind that UCDP compiles its data at the dyad level. Every violent conflict mentioned by the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” might therefore split up into several dyadic violent events in UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” between two non-state actors each.)

22 Only in five cases, the coding significantly differs: The “Consolidated List of Wars” reports non-state warfare in Bosnia (1992-1995), Sierra Leone (1991-2000) and Tajikistan (1995-1996) while UCDP classifies violent conflicts in these countries during the respective years as state-based armed conflicts. In Chad, the “Consolidated List of Wars” reports non-state warfare between 1978 and 1993. UCDP counts several non-state conflicts only later (in 2000, 2006 and 2007) and reports state-based armed conflict during the 1990s. In the case of Pakistan, non-state warfare happened from 1994 to 1995 and 2001 to 2009. In the latter case, both data sets concur (i.e. UCDP also reports multiple non-state conflicts). During the early 1990s, however, UCDP only reports state-based armed conflicts. In other cases, minor differences between the two data sets exist. For instance, the “Consolidated List of Wars” codes a non-state war in Indonesia (Maluku Islands) from 1999 to 2002 while UCDP reports non-state armed conflicts only in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001. For the year 2002 (and subsequent years), UCDP only reports state-based armed conflicts in Indonesia. These discrepancies might be due to differences between both data sets in the coding of start and end dates of fighting. In addition, the two data sets seem to disagree on the role of the Indonesian army in this otherwise non-state conflict between Muslim and Christian groups. The Project Ploughshares informs that state troops were fighting alongside non-state Muslim militias. Private, economic interests also seem to have played an important role. See http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/indonesia-molucca-maluku-islands-1999-2006/ (visited on 2013-02-16). For information on the privatization or outsourcing of security functions to non-state actors by the Indonesian state see Heiduk (2005). Another case to illustrate minor differences between both data sets is the DRC. While the “Consolidated List of Wars” reports non-state warfare from 1993 to 1994 and from 1998 to 2009, the non-state conflicts listed by UCDP only partly cover these periods. In 1994, 2005, 2006 and 2009, UCDP fails to report non-state armed conflicts in the DRC. However, at least in one of these years (in 2006), state-based armed conflicts occurred. Again, the role of the state as an actor to this conflict might be disputable. The “Consolidated List of Wars” mentions “government leftovers” as one party to the 1998-2009 case of non-state warfare. In addition, UCDP might classify this case as an internationalized state-based internal armed conflict. Overall, only a comparison of the actors and exact locations of fighting would help to clarify whether both data sets capture the exact same cases.

23 Among rivaling motorcycle gangs.
13. Data on the Incidence and Actors

Last but not least, UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” not only mentions the names of the involved actors but also indicates the level of organization of each dyad. The data set differentiates dyadic conflicts between *formally* organized groups from conflicts between two kinds of *informally* organized groups. The organizational level of formally organized groups is comparatively high. They have announced a name for their group and use armed force to promote the group’s general position in a conflict (i.e. they are permanently organized for combat). Every actor engaged in conventional state-based armed conflict has to fulfill these criteria to be included in UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Dataset”.

Within the “Non-State Conflict Dataset”, the category of formally organized groups comprises unrecognized states and formally organized rebel groups. In contrast, informally organized groups do not have an announced name but also use armed force against a similar organized group. They are composed of members or supporters of political parties or of members of broader categories of identifications, such as clans, ethnic or religious groups. In either case, the informally organized groups are not permanently organized for combat but use their organizational structures for such purposes only at times.\(^{24}\)

This distinction between formally and informally organized groups is especially interesting in the context of the study at hand which argues that the internal structures of armed organizations might help to explain the kind and level of violence seen in internal warfare. For instance, these data could be used to explore whether non-state armed conflicts between *informally* organized groups result in significantly more or less battle-related deaths than non-state armed conflicts between *formally* organized groups. The implicit assumption would be that informally organized groups (whose members have not even agreed on a name and who lack permanent structures) also exhibit comparatively weak internal structures of management and control which affects the level and nature of the applied violence. UCDP’s “Actors Dataset” even lists the organizational level of all state and non-state actors who have been involved in every kind of organized violence compiled by the institute (i.e. state-based armed conflicts, non-state armed conflicts and acts of one-sided violence). In addition, this data set informs about how non-state armed groups came into existence (e.g. whether they were created by breaking away from another actor listed in UCDP’s data sets or by a temporary split in the original movement).\(^{25}\)

\(^{24}\)Within UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset”, formally organized groups are assigned an organizational level of 1. Informally organized groups are either assigned an organizational level of 2 or 3. Level 2 groups are composed of “supporters and affiliates to political parties and candidates” who at times fight similar organized groups. “This level of organization captures fighting between political parties/candidates and lethal electoral violence”. An organizational level of 3 is assigned to informally organized groups who share a common identification along ethnic, clan, religious, national or tribal lines. Again, these groups are not permanently organized for combat but only at times organize themselves along these lines to engage in fighting. “This level of organization captures aspects of what is commonly referred to as ‘communal conflicts’, in that conflict stands along lines of communal identity” (Pettersson 2012a).

\(^{25}\)I am using v.2.1-2012 of UCDP’s “Actor Dataset”. All data (including the most recent update, v.2.2-2014) and the codebook are available online at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/)
in different kinds of internal armed conflicts, UCDP’s coding rules have to be taken into account. As already mentioned, UCDP requires actors in state-based armed conflicts (as well as those who committed acts of one-sided violence) to be formally organized in order to be included in its data sets while actors involved in non-state armed conflicts can also be informally organized. For this reason, the organizational level of groups involved in state-based armed conflicts exhibits zero variance and per definition surpasses the organizational level of actors involved in non-state armed conflicts. Still, the above mentioned data could be used to explore whether non-state armed conflicts between formally organized dyads resulted in significantly more or less battle-related deaths than state-based armed conflicts (that are also fought between formally organized groups). In addition, it would be possible to investigate whether factionalization (e.g. measured through the share of actors who broke away from another armed group or emerged after a temporary split) is more common amongst formally organized actors involved in non-state armed conflicts (as opposed to formally organized actors involved in state-based armed conflicts). Or these data could be used to figure out whether formally organized actors who have been involved in non-state armed conflicts are more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians than formally organized actors who have been involved in state-based armed conflicts.

First and simple descriptive analyses using UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” were published by the Human Security Center in its 2005 Human Security Report and the 2006 Human Security Brief. Although both analyses only covered the periods from 2002 to 2003/2005, they nevertheless provided some interesting hints. They revealed that many actors had been involved in several non-state conflicts, that most of the non-state conflicts were active for a rather limited period of time, that non-state conflicts seemed to cluster in relatively few and often African countries and that, contrary to common beliefs, the number of non-state conflicts declined instead of increased – especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This declining trend in the number of non-state conflicts is especially surprising because structural factors increasing the risk of armed conflict (e.g. poverty, low growth rates or lack of state capacity) have changed little or even worsened (HSC 2006, p. 2). One reason for this trend might be the increasing effectiveness of international conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts. This, however, remains pure speculation.

ucdp_actor_dataset/ (visited on 2014-11-02). The version I am relying on covers all actors who have been involved in state-based armed conflicts (between 1946-2011), in non-state internal armed conflicts (between 1989-2011) or in acts of one-sided violence against civilians (between 1989-2011), i.e. all actors included in UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Dataset v.4.2012”, UCDP’s “Dyadic Conflict Dataset v.1.2012”, UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset v.2.4.2012”, UCDP’s “One-sided Violence Dataset v.1.4.2012” and UCDP’s “Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5.2012”.

The number of non-state conflicts dropped from 34 in 2002 to 25 in 2005 while there was only little change in the number of conflicts involving a government. Thus, the net effect of 15 percent less armed conflict worldwide and throughout the entire 4 year period seems to be largely driven by a decrease in the global number of non-state armed conflicts. Interestingly, sub-Saharan Africa experienced the most important decline: between 2002 and 2005 the number of state-based conflicts declined by about 60 percent (from 13 to five) and the number of non-state conflicts declined by about 42 percent (from 24 to 14). See HSC (2006, pp. 2, 6 sq., 10).
as long as information on the outcome (success or failure) and exact target location of interventions and support efforts is not given. Even if the settlement of armed conflicts can be attributed to more successful international efforts, it remains to be proven whether peace is durable. Alternative explanations might stress decreasing prices in certain resources that had been financing non-state armed conflicts (which would render fighting less profitable and peace more likely). After all, sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world to see such a clear decline in the number of state-based and non-state armed conflicts within the respective period of time (HSC 2006, p. 2). This illustrates how global figures mask regional differences or even contrary regional trends. Furthermore, changes in the (relative) intensity of non-state armed conflicts might be of greater interest than changes in their absolute numbers. In order to contrast the intensity of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts with the intensity of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts, comparable (dyadic) cases of state-based armed conflicts need to be identified as well as indicators to measure the intensity of fighting. Such data are also provided by UCDP and shall now be discussed in more detail.
14. Data on the Intensity of Internal Fighting

By now, several data sets exist that are measuring the intensity of internal armed conflicts. UCDP’s “Battle Deaths Dataset” certainly is the most comprehensive and widely used data set in this field of research. The Human Security Center relied on these data for its Human Security Brief 2006. This report informs that between 2002 and 2005 the overall worldwide battle-death toll did not increase but declined by as much as 40 percent. In 2005, there were fewer battle-deaths than in any year since 1946. Again, sub-Saharan Africa experienced the greatest decline. The estimated state-based battle-death toll in the region for 2005 was only 2 percent of the highest post-Cold War battle-death toll measured in 1999. Two regions (Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa) accounted for over 60 percent of the global toll in battle-deaths in 2005. This was largely due to the conflict in Iraq, which caused almost 20 percent of the worldwide battle-deaths. Central and South East Asia suffered both the greatest number of state-based conflicts and the greatest number of associated battle-deaths. Still, the death toll from state-based armed conflict in this region was at its lowest point since 1984 (HSC 2006, pp. 2–8). I used v.5-2012b of UCDP’s “Battle Deaths Dataset” which provides information on the number of military and civilian battle-related deaths (per conflict- and dyad-year) for every state-based armed conflict between 1989 and 2011 (Sundberg 2008; Sundberg 2012).

New data and ideas on how to measure changes in the severity of fighting at the sub-state level were also presented, e.g. by Restrepo et al. (2006) in their case study on the Columbian Conflict. Others came up with alternative, national-level data. For instance, Milton Leitenberg (2003) reports death figures for wars and conflicts which happened between 1945 and 2000. None of these data sets, however, counts the casualties of non-state armed conflicts. In addition, they either exclude armed conflicts below the level of warfare and/or focus on military deaths only.

---

1 See Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005) and Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006) who first presented and used these data for their statistical analyses.

2 The most recent update (v.5-2014) covers the 1989-2013 period and is available online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/ (visited on 2014-11-02).
The question how to better account for civilian casualties inspired several other data collection efforts. Again, the most comprehensive and widely used data set which aims to capture the worldwide extent of intentional deadly violence against civilians is UCDP’s “One-Sided Violence Dataset”. This data set by now also covers the period from 1989 to 2013 (v.1.4-2014). It counts the number of deadly campaigns as well as the associated fatalities perpetrated by either the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians per country-year. At least 25 civilians must be killed in the course of a calendar year and by the same violent actor for the event to be included in the data set (Pettersson 2012b; Sundberg 2009). According to Eck and Hultman (2007), this data set contributes significantly to the present state of quantitative research on violence against civilians for the following three reasons: firstly, it provides actual estimates of civilians killed during one-sided acts of violence, secondly, data are collected annually and, thirdly, data are provided for both governments and rebel groups. The authors relied on this data set for their analysis which was published in the Journal of Peace Research. They found that the post-Cold War era (1989 to 2004) was characterized by periods of fairly low-scale violence against civilians punctuated by occasional sharp increases. Rebels were more violent on the whole while governments committed relatively few one-sided acts of violence against civilians except in those few years which had seen mass killings. In addition, they identified a U-shaped correlation between regime type and one-sided violence indicating that while autocratic governments undertake higher levels of one-sided violence than other regime types, rebels are more violent in democratic countries. Simple descriptive statistics of this data set read as follows: The number of intentional violent campaigns against civilians increased by more than half (55 percent) between 1989 and 2005. There is a sharp increase in the number of violent campaigns against civilians in the Middle East and North Africa that began in the new millennium and that is mostly driven by Iraq and Darfur. Still, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region which endured the most campaigns of one-sided violence against civilians (143 cases) between 1989 and 2005, committed by fifty-three different actors in 19 different countries (HSC 2006, p. 13). The most fatalities from acts of one-sided violence against civilians have also been concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. This holds true even if the huge death toll from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is excluded. However, despite the fact that more attacks are taking place, the data also show a clear, albeit very uneven, decline in reported deaths from one-sided violence since the mid-1990s (HSC 2006, pp. 3, 11, 13 sq.). Again, particularly sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a steep, though uneven, decline in civilian deaths since the Rwandan genocide. Thus, while the number of campaigns of one-sided organized violence against civilians recently increased, their average brutality in terms of fatalities has been decreasing or at least remained constant. Though, without comparable figures for the Cold War and pre-Cold War era it remains unclear whether civilians are indeed less likely victimized after 1989/1990. At least one pattern does not seem to change much: one-sided acts of violence against civilians remain strongly associated with armed conflict. “The data show that three quarters of the perpetrators of violent campaigns against civilians were also involved in ongoing state-based armed

---

3For this interpretation see HSC (2006, p. 14).
conflicts. Civil wars and assaults on civilians are strongly interrelated” (HSC 2006, p. 12). The puzzle remains why the number of campaigns of intentional low-level violence against civilians has increased while the number of state-based armed conflicts (with which such campaigns are so often associated) has declined by as much as 40 percent between 2002 to 2005. A compelling explanation is still missing. This study suggests that part of the answer might lie in the emergence of a new kind of internal armed conflict that very much associates with one-sided acts of violence against civilians but has been overlooked so far. While data on the number of armed conflicts systematically excludes this new kind of armed conflict, data on one-sided acts of violence probably capture some of the civilian victims of bilateral non-state warfare as well as the civilian victims of acts of one-sided violence committed during non-state armed conflicts.

The above described data certainly help to better picture the scale and quality of violence applied in internal armed conflicts. I nevertheless refrain from using UCDP’s “One-Sided Violence Dataset” to measure the intensity of armed conflicts due to the following weaknesses: Firstly, UCDP’s definition of one-sided violence explicitly includes “incidents considered to be ‘terrorist’ in nature (such as the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center)” if they are directed towards civilians (Eck and Hultman 2007, pp. 235 sq.). Secondly, UCDP’s definition of one-sided violence against civilians does not necessarily require such attacks to happen within the context of armed conflict. In order to determine and then compare the severity of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts with the severity of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts, a separation would be needed between conflict-related acts of one-sided violence and acts of one-sided violence that happened within the same country and year but were not conflict-related. A similar difficulty arises if a country experiences multiple but different kinds of internal armed conflicts simultaneously. This would require separating acts of one-sided violence that happened within the context of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts from those that were committed during conventional (state-based) warfare. In other words, the fact that a specific rebel group committed acts of one-sided violence against civilians in a certain country and year neither tells us whether this violence occurred within (or was related to) a situation of warfare (of any kind) nor does it tell us whether these acts of violence were committed within the context of conventional (state-based) or non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts. For these reasons, UCDP’s “One-Sided Violence Dataset” is of limited use for this study.5


5UCDP has also been criticized for its stringent coding rules that most likely result in under-counting. For instance, the perpetrators of acts of one-sided violence must be identified before the deaths of their civilian victims can be recorded, and UCDP requires the perpetrators to be formally organized in order to include their acts of one-sided violence in the data set. In addition, “in war zones many deaths go unreported or unrecorded, often because reporters are physically denied access to the killing zones, or are intimidated from publishing what they know” (HSC 2006, p. 16). While this point of critique applies to every data collection effort in zones of conflict, the fact that insurgents and militia
14. Data on the Intensity

The “Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset” (KOSVED) seems to overcome some of these constraints by providing information on the exact locations of acts of one-sided violence. This new and ambitious project aims to collect geographically disaggregated data on acts of one-sided violence perpetrated by either a rebel organization or government troops against a group of unarmed noncombatants which result in the immediate physical harming or death of more than one noncombatant. Unfortunately, KOSVED only covers acts of one-sided violence that are perpetrated during major internal armed conflicts or internationalized internal conflicts as defined by UCDP/PRIO, i.e. during conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. The authors’ initial intention has been “to construct an event-based dataset which covers at least two dozen recent civil wars” (Bussmann et al. 2008, p. 8). At the end of 2013, KOSVED only covered 17 cases of conventional civil warfare Schneider and Bussmann (2013).

In order to capture the severity of internal warfare, the “Genocide/Politicide Dataset”, as originally compiled by Barbara Harff and now published by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), is also worth considering. This data set covers trends in genocides and politicides defined as sustained campaigns of political mass murder directed primarily against civilians and intended to exterminate in whole or in part a communal or political group. Politicide refers to situations where civilians are targeted because of their political convictions rather than their ethnicity and religion as in the case of genocides. The tactics that are used to achieve genocides and politicides (massacres, unrestrained bombing and shelling of civilian inhabited areas, starvation by prolonged interdiction of food supplies, forced expulsion or ethnic cleansing accompanied by extreme privation and killings) very much resemble Kaldor’s description of the violent strategies and tactics applied in New Warfare. The authors of the data set also emphasize that genocides and politicides are distinct from state repression and terror. In the latter cases, only a few members of a group are attacked in order to terrorize the majority of the group into passivity or acquiescence while in the case of genocide and politicide “enough (but not necessarily all)” members of a group are perpetually targeted in order to physically exterminate that group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to the rule or interests of the perpetrators (Marshall, Gurr, et al. 2013, p. 15). Several parts of this definition, however, are difficult to operationalize. How sustained are these policies of physical extermination of a certain group supposed to be in order to qualify as genocide or politicide? What is a substantial portion of a communal group that needs to be targeted? The authors of the data set note that “[t]he physical destruction of a people fighters rarely wear uniforms (which renders the task of distinguishing civilian from combatant bodies almost impossible) might be a source of bias especially in the context of New Warfare.

6“Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non communal group. […] In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups” (Marshall, Gurr, et al. 2013, pp. 14,15).

requires time to accomplish: it implies a persistent, coherent pattern of action. Thus, only sustained episodes that last six months or more are included in the final data set”. Still, they admit that this six month requirement is “to a degree arbitrary” (Marshall, Gurr, et al. 2013, pp. 10, 15). In addition, the “Genocide/Politicide Dataset” has been criticized for including at least some non-violent civilian deaths from war-exacerbated diseases and malnutrition in its genocide death counts (HSC 2006, pp. 14, 17). Finally, genocides and politicides are again often conflict-related but also happen outside of warfare. Separating conflict-related acts of genocide/politicide from those that were not conflict-related again comes with the above mentioned practical difficulties. Still, the HSC (2006, p. 14) believes the “Genocide/Politicide-DataSet” to mirror the recent decline of high-intensity civil conflicts because most genocides and politicides take place in the context of heavy internal warfare and because the number of genocides was declining sharply from 1989 onward. Up to 2005, their number had dropped by 90 percent when only one genocide (in Sudan/Darfur) was taking place (HSC 2006, p. 2).

Besides the UCDP data and the “Genocide/Politicide Dataset”, the Human Security Brief 2006 relies on the “Terrorism Knowledge Base” to measure the intentional killing of civilians and therefore the changing nature of internal warfare. This online portal, which was compiled at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), contained information on thousands of domestic and international terrorist incidents, leaders, groups and related court cases but ceased its operations in March 2008. However, it shall nevertheless be mentioned because New Wars are often conflated with (new forms of) terrorism. The data set’s profiles of terrorist organizations are now hosted by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland which itself maintains the “Global Terrorism Database”. This open-source data base includes information on more than 125,000 cases of domestic and international terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 2013. The data set provides information on the dates and locations of the incidents, the weapons used and the nature of the targets, the numbers of casualties and the groups or individuals responsible. These and other terrorism data sets count many of the same events as the previously mentioned one-sided violence data sets but exclude the killing of civilians by governments. However, in order to measure the intensity of armed conflicts (i.e. battle-related violence) they are inappropriate as well. The fundamental differences between one-sided acts of violence (like terrorism, genocide or politicide) and bilateral acts of warfare have been laid-out in chapter 8. Others noted that the available terrorism data sets are “likely to undercount civilian deaths perpetrated by rebel groups in rural insurgencies” (HSC 2006, p. 16).

8The “Terrorism Knowledge Base” coded and collated data that was provided by the RAND Corporation. The data set contained two separate terrorist incident databases, the RAND “Terrorism Chronology” (1968 to 1997) and the RAND-MIPT “Terrorism Incident Database” (1998 to 2008). While the former tracked acts of international terrorism, the latter included both domestic and international attacks. The “Terrorism Knowledge Base” contained historical information on terrorism dating back to 1968, with over 29,000 incident profiles, 900 group profiles and 1,200 leader biographies. See Houghton (2008) and http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/ (visited on 2013-02-21).
The Human Security Brief 2006 still refers to these data to once more support the claim of a declining risk of death in battle. The report argues that from 1968 to 1991, MIPT’s trend data reveal a fourfold increase in international terrorist incidents, followed by an almost fourfold decline and a renewed increase starting in 2001. In 2005 there were three times as many terrorist incidents as in 2002 causing five times as many fatalities (HSC 2006, p. 2). However, this increase was primarily driven by incidents in only two regions (the Middle East and South Asia) and one country (Iraq). When terrorist incidents in these regions are deleted from the global data, it becomes apparent that the decline in the number of international terrorist incidents in the rest of the world that started in 1991 has continued (HSC 2006, p. 16). In addition and compared with civil conflict, international terrorism has, on average, killed relatively few people over the past four decades (HSC 2006, p. 16). The report concludes that these developments contradict those who link today’s warfare with increasing (international) terrorism. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the global, overall death toll from terrorism has been rising over the years (although it remained low in comparison to the number of deaths caused by armed conflicts). Today, there are fewer but increasingly lethal terrorist incidents.

Certainly, more indirect measures to capture the degree of civilian victimization in internal warfare would also be desirable. For instance, the number of war-related refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) could be taken into account. However, organizations collecting respective data (most importantly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian Refugee Council) only gather annual data on those forced migrants who are falling under their mandate. Geographically disaggregated information is missing all together. Where available, UNHCR’s annual report mentions the names of major locations (cities or provinces) where populations of concern to the agency resided at the end of the respective year. Such detailed information on the major locations of origin (which could then be matched with the incidence of armed conflicts in these areas) are not provided. In addition, UNHCR’s data on IDPs only cover a fraction of the entire IDP population (UNHCR 2010, p. 23). Because UNHCR does not have a mandate to protect or assist all IDPs, the number of IDPs and people in IDP-like situations who directly or indirectly received protection and assistance from UNHCR (and who were counted by the organization) stood at only 15.6 million out of an estimated total of 27 million IDPs at the end of 2009. UNHCR was helping these IDPs mainly through the so-called “Cluster Approach”. Within this approach, UNHCR took over the lead role in the protection of conflict-induced IDPs in situations meeting the UN criteria for “com-

9See e.g. UNHCR (2010, table 15, Annex).
10Similar aggregated data on the number of refugees hosted by/originating in a certain country and year is also provided by the “Forcibly Displaced Populations Dataset” compiled by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace (online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (visited on 2014-11-02). This data set is based on the World Refugee Survey (Annual Series) of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) and, in its latest version, covers the period from 1964 to 2008.
plex humanitarian emergencies” only.\textsuperscript{11} Non-emergency situations with nevertheless significant numbers of conflict-induced IDPs and protracted displacement crises remain beyond its scope.\textsuperscript{12} Data provided by the IDMC at least cover all conflict-induced IDPs. However, this institution has been collecting data on internal displacement situations caused by armed conflict or generalized violence since 1998 only. Its IDP database features “some 50 countries”.\textsuperscript{13} So far, reliable indicators on conflict-induced refugees and IDPs on a conflict level and by type of warfare are not collected (Benz and Hasenclever 2010). Likewise, efforts to count those dying in the aftermath of armed conflicts due to conflict-related injuries or war-exacerbated diseases are in their fledgling stages.\textsuperscript{14}

This also holds for more innovative ideas on how to capture the extent of violence against civilians in internal warfare, e.g. as proposed by Lidow (2010). He uses satellite images of crop land from various stages of Liberia’s civil war in order to analyze the spatial variation in civilian abuse within territories controlled by three of Liberia’s rebel groups. Lidow argues that these satellite imagery “can shed light on the situation on the ground. Crop land is a suitable proxy for civilian abuse because the incentive to clear crop land depends on the security of the surrounding area: a farmer will not spend the energy to clear land if he expects his crops to be looted upon harvest or if he might be killed or displaced in the meantime” (Lidow 2010, p. 19). Where signs of crop land use cannot be detected, the author assumes a higher level of civilian abuse (which he by the way also attributes to the failure of rebel group leaders to exert control over their commanders due to group-level characteristics). Although the approach of this study is promising, the kind of data used is neither publicly available nor manageable for research that reaches beyond a single or a few cases.\textsuperscript{15}

Due to these data constraints and the above mentioned objections against existing data sets, the following analysis is left with no choice but to rely on the number of battle-related (civilian and military) deaths as the best available indicator to measure the intensity of bilateral state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts. I stick to UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset”, which provides information on the number of battle-deaths in non-state armed conflicts at least for the post Cold War era.

\textsuperscript{11}For a definition of this term see IDMC (2009, p. 31, fn 29).
\textsuperscript{12}IDMC expects the Cluster Approach to be applied to a maximum of around 20 countries considered by the UN as conflict-related humanitarian emergencies (IDMC 2008, p. 20).
\textsuperscript{13}The Global Overview 2014 report of the IDMC just covers 58 countries (IDMC 2014, p. 6).
\textsuperscript{14}See Ghobarah et al. (2003), Iqbal and Zorn (2010) or Plümper and Neumayer (2006) for quantitative analyses. An early overview of the theoretical relationship and empirical studies is provided by Murray et al. (2002) and D. Davis and Kuritsky (2002).
\textsuperscript{15}Lidow (2010) complains about the lack of reliable micro-level data which hinders continued progress in this field of analysis. See also Kalyvas who notes that “[m]ost available indicators of political violence tend to be unreliable and inconsistent across nations and over time; and, the available data are overly aggregate”. He complains about the fact that “[d]ata on the exact circumstances surrounding the violence (who, where, when, how, by whom) is usually missing” although “research that proceeds in a disaggregated manner – in terms of the data it uses as well as theory building” – is mostly needed (Kalyvas 2006, pp. 48–51).
14. Data on the Intensity

Because of the varying certainty of fatality reports, low, best and high estimates of battle-related deaths are given for each year. The authors of the data set emphasize that due to their coding procedure it is possible that there are more fatalities than their high estimate, but it is very unlikely that there is fewer than their best estimate (Kreutz and Eck 2005, p. 4). UCDP’s best estimates can therefore be considered conservative. Luckily, compatible data on the intensity of state-based armed conflicts are provided through the dyadic version of UCDP’s “Battle Deaths Dataset”.

Earlier versions of both data sets were first compared by the Human Security Project. This comparison revealed that non-state conflicts have been much less deadly than state-based armed conflicts causing only a quarter as many battle-deaths between 2002 and 2005. The average death toll in 2005 for each non-state conflict was just 82 (compared to 388 for state-based conflicts) (HSC 2006, p. 9). As over half of all non-state conflicts in this period took place in sub-Saharan Africa, the region also accounted for the majority of deaths from this type of conflict. It has already been mentioned that the number of non-state conflicts declined by as much as 42 percent between 2002 and 2005. Surprisingly, however, there was an even more dramatic 80 percent decline in the death toll from non-state armed conflict in the region within the same period of time. Although the number of non-state conflicts remained almost constant in Central and South Asia, this region experienced an even greater decline with the corresponding death toll dropping some 88 percent. This, however, might be related to the fact that the Sudan/Darfur is included in the Middle East and North Africa region instead of the sub-Saharan African region (HSC 2006, p. 9). Overall, the Human Security Brief 2006 informs that “there was a 71 percent [worldwide] decline in the number of reported and codable deaths from non-state conflict between 2002 and 2005”. However, these figures should be treated with caution “given the challenges in counting and coding battle deaths, particularly in Iraq” (HSC 2006, p. 10) and given the rather short period of time covered by this study.

In addition to the UCDP data and as already mentioned, I wish to again rely on the “Consolidated List of Wars” to measure the intensity of internal warfare. At least for the post-Cold War era, this data set provides the overall numbers of fatalities for state-based as well as non-state internal wars.

Overall, the following analysis is taking its information on the number and nature of actors and the intensity of state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts from the “New/Consolidated List of Wars”, UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” and UCDP’s data sets on state-based armed conflicts compatible therewith. Both, UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” and the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” also contain information on the duration of fighting which shall now be discussed.
15. Data on the Duration of Internal Fighting

The “New/Consolidated List of Wars” and UCDP’s data sets on non-state and state-based armed conflicts provide more or less precise information on the start and end dates of fighting. According to the “New List of Wars” the start of any internal war (whether sub-state or state-based) is the first year in which at least 100 military or civilian battle-related deaths occurred. Accordingly, a war is rated as having ended only if the intensity of warfare has remained below this threshold of violence for a certain period of time (for at least two years), if actors give up fighting or if an effective peace agreement is signed. A new war start is coded if a main party to the conflict drops out or a regime collapses but the fighting continues. The data set reports multiple ongoing wars if fighting occurs in distinct regions and between different rebel groups (Chojnacki and Reisch 2008, p. 4).

While the information provided by the “New List of Wars” and its consolidated version can only be used to count the duration of internal warfare in years, UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” (v.2.4-2012) is more ambitious in measuring the exact duration of active fighting. In addition to the year of observation of any dyadic non-state armed conflict, this data set provides a precise start date (a year, month and day) which corresponds to the first time when the dyadic conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. This original start date remains the same for all years in which the conflict has been active (regardless of whether the conflict has been active in several episodes or not). Even the level of certainty for this date is reported. In the following, every conflict might experience episodes of inactivity.¹ If this is the case for at least one year, a “conflict-episode” is ending and the last date of recorded combat is reported – again as precisely as possible (Sundberg 2010, pp. 5 sq.). The same holds for any subsequent instance when violence re-erupts.² Thus, every dyadic non-state armed conflict might split into several conflict episodes for which precise start and end dates are reported. Communal conflict in Nigeria between Christians and Muslims serves as an example. Within UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset”, this dyadic conflict (which holds the ID number 373) was observed in 1991, 1992, 2000, 2006 and 2011. The first conflict-episode between these two groups took place between the 22nd of April, 1991 and the 13th of March, 1992 (causing 158 battle deaths in 1991 and 200 in 1992). The conflict cooled

¹Non-activity means that the criteria with regard to incompatibility, level of organization and 25 battle-related deaths are not met.
²See the “StartDate2” variable in the data set.
15. Data on the Duration

down but intensified again in the year 2000. On one single day (the 24th of May) 53 people died on the battle field. Later, between the 20th and the 24th of February 2006, UCDP reports a third conflict-episode between this dyad which resulted in the killing of 149 people. The last conflict-episode started on the 17th of April, 2011 (and was reported ongoing as of December 30th, 2011 when the data set had been compiled). Since then another 830 people had died. This example illustrates that the data provided by UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” can be used to calculate the duration of every non-state conflict-episode in months or even days (given precise start and end dates are available). Because the year of observation of armed conflict is provided, this data set can also be used to simply count the number of calendar years in which a non-state conflict was active (i.e. when it caused at least 25 battle-related deaths per year) regardless of whether fighting took place every day of the year or just happened during a few and not necessarily consecutive days.

For the purpose of comparison, compatible information on the precise start and end dates of state-based conflict episodes is needed. Up to the year 2009, this information can be taken from UCDP’s “Conflict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1, 1946-2009) which is available at the dyad level.³ Again, violence might have stopped because a peace treaty or different kinds of cease-fire agreements were signed, because one side is defeated, eliminated or otherwise succumbs to the power of the other, because conflict activity continues but does not reach the required threshold with regard to fatalities, because the conflict does not fulfill the UCDP criteria anymore with regard to organization or because one dyad ceases to exist as an independent organization, e.g. in order to form a new, joint organization (Kreutz 2010).

At first sight, the above data on the duration of internal armed conflict rather contradict the concept of New Wars. An early empirical analysis by Chojnacki (2006a) uses the first version of his “New List of Wars”⁴ which identified a total of 164 wars between 1946 and 2002. During this period, only 23 inter-state wars with a very short average duration of 2 years and 17 extra-state wars with an average duration of 8.5 years took place. The remaining two-thirds of all wars were internal in nature. Within this period,

³See Kreutz (2010). In order to analyse the precise duration of armed conflict, this data set is superior to the dyadic version of UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Dataset” which would also be available up to the year 2011 but fails to provide precise end dates of state-based conflict episodes (see Themnér and Wallensteen (2014) for the latest presentation of the data, N. P. Gleditsch et al. (2002) for the original version and Harbom et al. (2008) for the dyadic version. UCDP’s “Georeferenced Event Dataset” is neither a viable alternative. It mentions the start and end dates for all its events of organized violence (state-based armed conflicts, non-state armed conflicts and acts of one-sided violence) but only covers African countries within the post-Cold War era. Please also note that the dyadic versions of UCDP’s “Conflict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1) and UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Dataset” (v.4-2012) do not seem to be fully compatible – not even in those years (1989-2009) where both data sets overlap. The numbering of some dyads varies (see e.g. dyad ID 42, 110, 112 or 338) and in some cases the names of actors differ (see e.g. dyad ID 307, 793, 128, 770 or 771). Due to these inconsistencies I will later stick either to the one or the other data set when switching between levels of analysis.

⁴See Chojnacki (2005).
the average duration of a non-conventional (sub-state) war was 6.6 years. Whether that is significantly different in a statistical sense from the slightly higher average duration of conventional (state-based) internal warfare remains to be tested.\footnote{The data set’s coding rules for a war start and ongoing warfare differ between inter- and intra-state warfare. Inter-state wars need to result in at least 100 military deaths in order to be coded as started and ongoing while internal warfare needs to result in at least 100 military or civilian deaths. This renders a comparison of the average duration of inter- and intra-state warfare problematic. However, the coding criteria for different kinds of internal warfare concur which enables a comparison of the average duration of non-state internal warfare with the average duration of state-based internal warfare.} UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” does not seem to support the claim, either, that non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts are of a particularly long duration. At least the Human Security Report 2006 informs that only about a quarter of the 25 non-state armed conflicts in 2005 had already been active the year before. An exception among the more recent armed conflicts is the one between FARC and AUC forces in Columbia which had already been ongoing for some years (HSC 2006, pp. 4, 9).
16. Data on Conflict Resources

In order to explore the hypothesis of an “economization of motives”, the role of conflict resources in internal warfare needs to be measured. Gilmore et al. (2005) define conflict resources as those materials that are of high economic value, that are of strategic importance and that are mentioned in the conflict literature. In addition, conflict resources must be lootable, which means they need to be of high value-to-weight ratio, they need to be easy to transport and they must not require skilled labor and sophisticated equipment to be exploited. Apart from diamonds, the authors identify gold, other gemstones, chromites, tantalites (coltan: tantalum and columbium), oil, oil pipelines, natural gas, timber and drugs as conflict relevant resources (Gilmore et al. 2005, pp. 259 sq.). Due to a lack of systematic data on many of these resources, I exemplarily rely on a data set which measures the occurrence and production of diamonds.¹ Later, I will supplement data on other gemstones, hydrocarbon deposits and drugs.

PRIO’s “Diamond Dataset (DIADATA)” delivers geographically disaggregated data on 1,175 diamond deposits in 53 countries that have been reported between 1946 and 2005 (Gilmore et al. 2005, p. 264). Because DIADATA focuses on this single resource, it avoids a lumping together of different kinds of conflict resources. Furthermore, DIADATA distinguishes between the mere occurrence and the actual production or exploitation of diamonds. Decisive dates (the discovery year and the first year of production) and the mining status are also provided. Most importantly, however, DIADATA distinguishes between non-lootable diamonds (primary diamonds mined through kimberlite shafts or offshore sites) and lootable diamonds (mostly secondary diamonds from alluvial deposits or beach sites).² This differentiation is especially important for conflict research because the production of lootable, secondary diamonds is less capital- and technology-intensive than the production of non-lootable, primary deposits. Secondary diamonds are scattered over alluvial plains and can be extracted by small teams of artisanal miners. For the same reason, they are also easily and cheaply looted by rebels, child soldiers or small

¹Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster (2009, p. 11) also focus on diamonds (and oil). They justify this choice by referring to empirical evidence derived from case studies showing that these resources have been used to finance rebel organizations and to remunerate mercenaries. In addition, there is sufficient variation in the occurrence of these resources to get decent estimates of their impact. Both resources do not only occur in a few countries, they have been available throughout the entire time period under study and good data are available.

²In the following, the term “lootable diamonds” is used interchangeably with the term “secondary diamonds” and the term “non-lootable diamonds” is used interchangeably with the term “primary diamonds”.

193
groups of forced laborers during wartime and therefore more likely to promote conflict (Gilmore et al. 2005, pp. 262 sq.). Of the 1,175 diamond deposits reported in the data set, 247 are categorized as non-lootable and 844 as lootable diamond deposits. Due to insufficient information 84 records were classified as Errata.3

In 2005, Lujala et al. published a first statistical analysis using DIADAT A. This study explores whether the outbreak and duration of conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts correlates with the occurrence and production of diamonds. The authors argue (and find support) for oppositional effects of non-lootable and lootable diamonds especially on the duration of internal conflicts. In addition, they run their model separately for ethnic wars, and they study whether the impact of diamonds has increased after the end of the Cold War. Results concerning the incidence or duration of civil wars suggest that even though ethnicity and secondary diamond production do not increase the risk of conflict onset, they form a dangerous mix that prolongs conflicts. In a country where secondary diamond production and ethnic heterogeneity are present, this may provide both the financial means for fighting and an ethnic pool from which the rebel organization can draw new recruits. The authors argue that the latter assures a better cohesion of rebel groups while the presence of lootable, secondary diamonds and the promise of rents further strengthens group identities (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 552). When replicating their analysis for ethnic conflicts only, the authors again find that the production of lootable diamonds significantly increases the duration of ethnic warfare while the production of non-lootable diamonds has a decreasing effect (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 556). Thus, the real effects of the two geological forms of diamonds pull into opposite directions. The authors explain this opposite effect as follows: Non-lootable, primary or “kimberlite diamonds” occur in underground rock formations and are often mined by large (multinational) companies that are able to bear the investment costs and risk involved in underground mining. In terms of their geographical distribution, primary diamonds are point resources. Their concentration makes it easy for the government to control the site. The revenue flow is therefore likely to support the (often corrupt and repressive) regime which uses the revenues from these resources to better defend itself and to crush possible uprisings. This actually decreases the risk for rebellion. Even if the prospects of primary diamonds might motivate the rebels to start a rebellion, they have to overthrow the government to exploit the diamond riches. An enduring conflict would be an obstacle to the rebels: the longer the conflict, the longer they would have to wait to get the diamonds under their control. The government, on the other hand, depends on providing a secure environment to the foreign diamond companies to ensure their presence in the country and to tax them.

3Four subsets of the original “Diamond Dataset” are available and used in the following analysis: a subset which comprises non-lootable diamond sites (primary and offshore sites) (DIANL), a subset which contains non-lootable diamond sites with known production (DIANLyp), a subset which comprises lootable diamond sites (mostly secondary and beach sites) (DIAL) and a subset which comprises lootable diamond sites with known production (DIALyp). The empirical analysis also includes Errata cases if all information that is needed for this study is available on the respective records.
This gives an incentive to the government to squash possible rebel movements fast and effectively. Therefore, rebels have an incentive to overthrow the government as quickly as possible, while the government has an incentive to quickly pacify the country to avoid scaring away foreign investors (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 544). Thus, the expected duration of any civil war in the context of primary diamond production is rather short. Contrary to this, secondary diamonds are easy to loot by the rebels. Their presence strengthens the opportunity element especially in a conflict motivated by ethnic grievances or in a context of poverty. In countries with low per capita income, rebel groups may use revenues from secondary diamond mining to hire or attract potential rebel soldiers that have very low opportunity costs to join the rebel movement (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 545). Thus, the outbreak of violence becomes more likely.

As revenue flows from lootable diamond production are more likely to go to the rebels, the already mentioned war-logic applies which positively correlates with the expected duration of fighting. In summary, the geological form of the diamond deposits matters a great deal when explaining the duration of fighting. In addition, Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005) find that the lengthening effect of secondary diamond production on the duration of civil warfare is dependent on the income level of the country and decreases the more economically developed the country is (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 556). Finally, the effect of secondary diamond production on the duration of warfare is especially strong for a certain sub-type of internal armed conflict (ethnic civil wars) taking place within the post-1985 period.

These interaction effects and findings lend some support to the New Wars theses. However, this and similar studies only take conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts into account. Whether these results can be upheld if new (non-state or sub-state) armed conflicts are included in the analyses remains to be tested. In addition, the conflict data set used by Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005) excludes internal armed conflicts with less than 1,000 combat deaths and instead focuses on civil warfare only. Finally, the authors do not fully take advantage of the disaggregated nature of DIADATA. Instead of using the spatial and temporal information provided by this data set, they measure diamond production at the country level. Only the recent analyses by Lujala control for the spatial and temporal overlap of resources and conflict (Lujala 2009; Lujala 2010). The author also adds newly collected location data on other gemstones (e.g. rubies, sapphires and jade) and on hydrocarbon localities. The results of these studies confirm that secondary diamond production and other gemstones are related to the duration and the severity of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. In addition, these studies point to the importance of disaggregating resource data – geographically, temporally and in terms of their geological form.  

Lujala (2010) finds that the location of resources is crucial to their impact on conflict duration. If the resources are located inside the actual conflict zone, the duration of warfare is doubled (while the resources are seemingly unrelated to the duration if their occurrence/production is measured at the country level). Again, the author finds that secondary diamond production increases the risk of conflict onset by more than 40 percent. The effect of secondary diamonds (measured at the country level) on conflict onset is especially salient for low-intensity conflicts. This result contrasts with other
The Diamond Dataset itself also has some limitations. For instance, information on the size of the mines or deposits is lacking. Likewise, no information is provided on the diamond quality and therefore on the value of the deposits which varies by a factor of more than eight, ranging from the industrial diamonds of Ghana (sold for 25 US dollars a carat in 2001) to the high quality gemstones of Namibia (sold for a prize of 215 US dollars in the same year) (Ross 2006, p. 277). In addition, only the first years of production are reported regardless of whether production has been continuous or intermittent since that time. Production end dates are missing. This might be problematic as closures of mining sites might be due to a declining market value of the diamonds, to the depletion of the reserve but also to armed conflict. This renders the production end dates endogenous to the dependent variable in conflict research. Generally, listings of mining activities are poor for less developed, conflict-ridden countries, for rebel held areas and for remote rural areas. Illegal diamond production and smuggling are also not covered. Finally, falsification of records is prevalent in many countries. This is indicated by the fact that several countries with insignificant diamond deposits (e.g. Congo-Brazzaville) have been exporting substantial quantities of diamonds that came from war-torn neighbors (the DRC). Governments may also misrepresent the potential of a diamond deposit (e.g. in order to attract foreign investment). Some countries simply do not widely release information on their mineral production. Finally, the authors of the data set complain that language barriers are hindering their data collection efforts (Gilmore et al. 2005, pp. 265 sq.). Despite these limitations, however, DIADATA delivers disaggregated resource data. This data set allows for studying whether (and if yes, which type of) diamond deposits occur and are produced in war-torn countries in general and in New Wars countries in particular.

Three additional and already mentioned data sets could be used to complement the above presented diamond data. Firstly, the “Gemstone Site Dataset” (GEMDATA) delivers information on gemstone deposits throughout the world. The data set includes 1022 gemstone sites in 61 countries of the following kinds: ruby, sapphire, emerald, aquamarine, heliodor, moganite, goshenite, nephrite, jadeite, lapis lazuli, opal, tourmaline, periodit, topaz, pearl, garnet, zircon, spinel, amber and quartz. Again, deposits are accompanied by latitude and longitude coordinates, information on the type of gem-

quantitative studies which failed to distinguish between primary and secondary diamonds and for this reason did not find such a link. Lujala (2009) finds that the availability of natural resources also affects the total number of combat-related deaths and the average combat death rate (the intensity) of internal armed conflicts. Again, the location of the resources as well as the type of resources are crucial. Drug cultivation (coca bush, opium poppy and cannabis) inside the conflict area associates with less severe conflicts while gemstone mining more than doubles the total number of combat deaths (which is explained by the longer duration of these conflicts) but does not necessarily relate to more intensive conflicts as measured by the average combat death rate. Most violent are secessionist conflicts in regions with hydrocarbon production. Interestingly, oil and gas production that is located offshore or outside the conflict zones is related to less severe conflicts. Measured at the country level, none of the resource variables has an effect on conflict severity.

5 All three data sets are available online at http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/Paivi.Lujala/home/DataProjects.htm (visited on 2014-11-02) .
stone found, the discovery year and the first year of production. Unfortunately, this data set only reflects information that was available in 2004 when the data set was originally compiled. In addition, there is some bias in the number of localities recorded because the quality of reporting varies between countries and regions and end dates of production are again not reported. Still, including information on gemstones other than diamonds adds value to this study. If they occur inside conflict zones, gemstones are easy prey for all kinds of violent actors because they are simple to loot. “[M]any of the deposits can be mined [...] with the help of a pick, spade, shovel and basket. Gem gravels are exposed either by removing the topsoil or, if located more than a couple of metres deep, by digging shallow shafts (up to 10 metres or more) to access gems. Gems are also located in existing riverbeds. Naturally, more sophisticated methods can be and are used, but most deposits can be mined with more primitive methods as well” (Lujala 2010, p. 19, fn 7). Exploiting gemstones requires little technology and skills. Thus, “[i]n gemstone mining, there are usually very few impediments to production starting” also during times of conflict (Lujala 2009, p. 65). Because gemstone sites are scattered, they are difficult to control (and to tax) for governments even during peacetime. For this reason and at least in comparison with oil fields and pipelines, state actors are expected to show little interest in pacifying or defending these production areas “because part or most of the revenue flows would not accrue to [them] anyway” (Lujala 2009, p. 54). This renders the exploitation of secondary diamonds and other gemstones especially attractive to non-state forces involved in conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts.

Drugs have been mentioned as another conflict-relevant resource on which some systematic data are available through the “Drug Cultivation Dataset” (DRUGDATA). This data set contains information on coca bush, opium poppy and cannabis cultivation throughout the world. Besides the locations or cultivation areas, the data set lists the approximate year when large-scale commercial/export-oriented production in the region started as well as the approximate year when significant cultivation ended. The latter information is indispensable in order to measure whether drug cultivation had been ongoing during armed conflict. Only if production end dates are available it can be ruled out that production had already ended before armed conflict started. In addition, the “Drug Cultivation Dataset” informs whether there has been traditional production for local use prior to intensive export-oriented cultivation. Again, however, the “Drug Cultivation Dataset” has not been updated since 2002. Because drugs classify as conflict resources, they of course share certain characteristics with diamonds and other gem-

---

6For more information on the data set see Lujala (2009).
7For instance, the larger the gemstone producer, the more information is available due to better documentation by commercial actors (Flöter et al. 2005, p. 11).
8For all the other resources covered by this analysis, production end dates are not available. For this reason, these data only allow to figure out whether the production of these resources had been ongoing prior to or during armed conflict). In other words, at least the case can be ruled out that production only started after armed conflict had already ended.
9For more information on this data set see Buhaug and Lujala (2005).
16. Data on Conflict Resources

stones. For instance, drug cultivation and gemstone mining both require low capital investments and yield high value-to-weight products that can be stored and that are easy to transport and smuggle even in a context where streets have not been developed or are destroyed due to warfare. However, drugs and gemstones also differ in some important regard which affect their impact on armed conflict. Unlike gemstone production, drug cultivation is extremely labor intensive and requires some skill. In addition, drug cultivation is very dependent on the time of the year when the plants can be harvested. Any interruption of the rather short harvesting seasons leads to a massive decline in revenues. Therefore, drug cultivation needs a more stable environment than gemstone mining and a tighter collaboration with the local population. This leads to the expectation that drug cultivation rather relates to low-intensity internal armed conflicts. In addition and unlike gemstone mining, drug cultivation is always strictly illegal. Like any illicit activity, it very much profits from the lawless environment created by conflict and entirely remains beyond a state’s taxation control. Drug cultivation is also difficult to control for the government because it can relocate easily, because many areas are suitable for production and because it covers large areas (Lujala 2009, pp. 54 sq.; Lujala 2002). This renders drug cultivation as a source of income during warfare especially attractive for non-state actors involved in low-intensity non-conventional internal armed conflicts and operating in a context of state failure with little interest in challenging the state.

Finally, global data on crude oil and natural gas reserves are made available through the “Petroleum Dataset” (PETRODATA), which covers the period from 1946 to 2003 (v.1.2.). The data set contains information on the discovery years, the first years of production and the exact locations of 890 onshore and 383 offshore areas in 114 countries. Oil and gas are actually produced in 92 of these countries. Again, the data set has some known shortcomings that are discussed in more detail by Lujala, Rød, et al. (2007, pp. 248 sq.). For instance, it does not provide estimates for reserve sizes and production volumes because this information is either lacking or inaccurate for a number of fields. Once more, end dates of production are not reported and the allocation of offshore fields to a specific country was also sometimes difficult, e.g. in cases where sea boundaries are contested or where fields are operated jointly by several states. In terms of theory, the point-source character of hydrocarbon deposits matters. It increases the state’s capacity to control and tax production which explains the special value of these resources to states – at least in comparison with other conflict-relevant resources (e.g. secondary diamonds) where production sites are scattered and more difficult to control. In addition, insecurity will scare away foreign companies who in most cases are extracting the hydrocarbons and who are paying substantial amounts of taxes. Therefore, governments are likely to use their military force more intensively to defend hydrocarbon production sites during conventional civil conflicts. From the perspective of violent non-state actors, keeping civilians out of diamond mining fields claims less military deaths than securing control over oil and gas reserves which are vigorously defended by superior government forces (Lujala 2009, p. 55). Even in a context where the state has collapsed, hydrocarbon deposits are less likely to be exploited by non-state actors who are lacking the neces-
Hydrocarbon “production requires significant investment in production technology and transport, and in many cases involves large multinational companies. This makes it almost impossible for rebels to commence production during a conflict for the first time” (Lujala 2009, p. 65). For these reasons, I expect hydrocarbons to be especially relevant as a source of income in (comparatively short but intensive) state-based internal armed conflicts. Theoretically, hydrocarbons might contribute to the outbreak and duration of such conflicts directly (because they provide incentives and opportunities to violent actors) and indirectly (because their production might adversely impact state institutions). Still, the possibility of accumulating wealth through the looting of pipelines or the extortion of oil companies as well as the promise of future revenues, e.g. after a successful secession, might associate with the emergence of greed-based movements fighting conventional state-based as well as non-state armed conflicts. If hydrocarbon production negatively affects economic growth, if it results in a political Dutch disease or if it causes environmental degradation, grievance-based insurgencies might also emerge. Rebel organizations with objectives that are entirely unrelated to the availability or production of these resources might also resort to oil and gas deposits as a source of funding if they manage to overcome the government (Lujala, Rød, et al. 2007, p. 240).

Early empirical studies, e.g. by Fearon and Laitin (2003), DeSoysa (2002), or Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found that oil dependent states indeed face a greater risk of civil war onset. Though the measures used have been criticized for good reason,10 this finding is mostly confirmed by more sophisticated studies which distinguish between the effects of onshore and offshore deposits and fully use the temporal and the spatial information provided by the Petroleum Dataset. According to Lujala (2010, p. 16) and Lujala, Rød, et al. (2007, p. 254), onshore oil production increases the risk of conflict onset by 50 percent (while offshore production does not seem to have an effect). A corresponding duration analysis finds that oil and gas production inside the conflict zone makes conventional civil conflicts over governmental control longer (while having no effect on the length of state-based conflicts that are fought over territory). Interestingly, “production is not necessary for the adverse effect on duration; it is enough that hydrocarbon fields are located in the conflict region” (Lujala 2010, p. 23). Finally, Fjelde (2009b, p. 18) finds that in Nigeria, areas with onshore oil production have a higher risk of non-state conflict events than locations without onshore oil production. In her empirical analysis, she uses GIS software and new, unique event data bases at the sub-national level in order to

---

10E.g. reverse causation needs to be taken into account. Arm ed conflict (or even approaching armed conflict) might have an “substantial effect on production volumes and exports. For example, a government may increase the production to finance the military. A corrupt government may simply increase production to reap personal income as fast as possible in the face of a looming regime change. In addition, most studies [exploring the relationship between hydrocarbons and armed conflict] use relative measures for oil and gas production and normalize production volume, exports, or rents by the size of total economy or total exports. Approaching conflict, however, is likely to have a negative impact on GDP and trade, making the country look more resource dependent. Therefore, the causality between [oil] dependency and conflict may run both ways” (Lujala, Rød, et al. 2007, p. 242). For more points of critique see Lujala, Rød, et al. (2007, pp. 241 sq.).
explore the local determinants of non-state conflicts in this single country between 1991 and 2005. Interestingly, the risk of conventional (state-based) armed conflict is rather low in Nigeria despite the fact that the country scores high on a number of predictors of civil conflict, including a high level of corruption which normally associates with an increased likelihood of political instability. Fjelde (2009b, pp. 5–7) describes how the Nigerian political elite “used the oil rents to bribe and domesticate the leaders of strong [oppositional] groups” which explains the absence of a strong, nationally-based armed opposition group. For this reason, no major civil war has occurred since the end of the Biafran war. However, non-state armed conflict is very common in Nigeria and, since the early 1990s, has claimed the lives of more than 8,000 people. While the political elite manages to stay in power thanks to its “carefully crafted clientelist systems” built on oil money, the country seems prone to non-state armed conflict which the author attributes to the possibility of high local pay-offs from predation: In Nigeria, the illegal tapping of oil-pipelines by sub-state actors (also known as “oil bunkering”) has an estimated value of hundreds of billions of dollars every year. The BBC reports that illegal oil-bunkering in Nigeria is a 60 million dollar per day business and describes how it relates to non-state armed conflict in the region. For instance, “[i]t is likely” that the tankers which are supposed to up-load the bunkered oil “arrived partly loaded with guns, cocaine to be trafficked into Europe and cash, which [the buyers] will use to pay for the oil”. It is also mentioned that “the bunkering syndicates operate under the cloak of the conflict between militants and oil companies in the Niger Delta”. The government in the Delta “armed militias to carry out widespread rigging during the 2003 elections. But the militiamen say they were abandoned, so they turned to oil theft to fund their activities. […] Although they are referred to in the media as ‘militants’, there are few coherent groups. […] Most are gangs, led by commanders who are perpetually at war with each other” (BBC NEWS/Andrew Walker 2008). In addition to the oil-bunkering, Fjelde (2009b, pp. 8 sq.) notes that the sheer presence of international companies also associates with spoils that are up for grab among locals. “Direct compensation to affected areas comes in the form of infra-structural investments etc. representing high-value to elites in the benefiting societies”. The author refers to Fearon (2005) when stating that “previous research has questioned the appropriability, and thus the direct value of oil for non-state actors […]. The Nigerian case illustrates, however, that oil [more precisely, oil-pipelines] can be a lootable resource”.

The results from these and other more fine-grained analyses speak in favor of my suggestion to distinguish between the effects of certain kinds of conflict-relevant resources. Some of them (e.g. secondary diamonds, other gemstones, oil-pipelines and drugs) are easily accessible to rebel exploitation and for this reason especially important in non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts. Such resources can be produced or looted by individuals using simple means without requiring greater expertise. Production sites are spread over larger territories which means these resources are difficult to control and to tax for governments even during peacetime. Therefore, these resources are of comparatively low extraction value to states. At least states are expected to more vigorously defend point-source resources (e.g. primary diamond or offshore oil and gas deposits).
that are easier to control and to tax. In addition, these resources are difficult to loot for non-state actors especially in failed states because exploitation requires technical expertise and advanced technology. For these reasons, secondary diamond production, gemstone production, the looting of oil-pipelines/onshore oil deposits and drug cultivation are expected to provide a lucrative source of income to non-state actors involved in non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts and, to a lesser extent, to non-state actors involved in conventional (state-based) armed conflicts, while primary diamond deposits and offshore oil deposits should, if anything, be associated with conventional (state-based) civil warfare. The above even gave some hints in regard to the nature of relationship: The relationship between resource-wealth derived from point resources and the incidence of conventional (state-based) armed conflict is expected to be non-linear in nature because governments that are richly endowed with such resources are able to use this source of revenue to effectively avoid violent opposition. From a certain point on, wealth in point-source resources helps to stabilize regimes. In addition, these resources are often produced by foreign companies paying large amounts of taxes. This requires a certain level of stability that needs to be provided by the national security apparatus (sometimes assisted by external security agencies). Thus, the more strategically important and lucrative these resources are, the more able and willing the government to provide national security to enable national and foreign actors to produce these resources. In contrast, the relationship between easily lootable conflict resources and the risk of outbreak of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflict seems to be more linear in nature: The more possibility of private enrichment, the more violent rent-seeking behavior amongst non-state actors. Even the governments of resource-rich states have little incentive to take costly measures to suppress this kind of fighting as long as it does not threaten the existence of the state.11

Overall, the following empirical analysis relies on the “Diamond Dataset”, the “Gemstone Site Dataset”, the “Drug Cultivation Dataset” and the “Petroleum Dataset” (v.1.2.) in order to assess whether conflict resources in general (and certain kinds of conflict resources in particular) are especially relevant within non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts. Besides the discovery years and the start years of production (and, in the case of drugs, the end years of production), these data sets assign geographic coordinates to every hydrocarbon reserve, gemstone deposit and area of drug cultivation. If similar geographic information would be available on the conflict zones of state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts, even the extent of the geographical overlap between the occurrence and production of these resources and the occurrence of internal armed conflicts could be studied. Unfortunately, data on the exact locations of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts are not provided – neither by the “Non-State Conflict Dataset” nor by the “New/Consolidated List of Wars”.

11Because the argument relates to the issue of state weakness and corruption levels, I am going to elaborate further on this matter below when discussing state fragility data. For a large-N quantitative analysis (1985-1999; N=123) on this matter see Fjelde (2009a).
16. Data on Conflict Resources

Even for cases of conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts, data on zones of conflict are only available for the post Cold War era only.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, the following analysis only relies on country-level resource data. It is, however, possible to assess whether there exists a temporal overlap between the occurrence and production of conflict resources and the occurrence of internal armed conflicts. In most war-torn countries this differentiation is crucial. For instance, although Bolivia and Kenya possess gemstone deposits, internal warfare in these countries during the 50s and 60s cannot be linked in any meaningful way with the occurrence or production of this specific conflict resource because at that time gemstones had neither been discovered nor produced in both countries. If ever, it only makes sense to argue in favor of a linkage between internal warfare and the production of gemstones in Kenya in the later cases of internal warfare (1991-1993, 2007-2009) after gemstone deposits had been discovered and production had started. In the case of Guatemala, gemstones had already been discovered when the first internal war took place in 1954. However, at that time, Guatemala had not entered commercial production yet. Only during the second Guatemalan internal war (1962-1995) were gemstone deposits known and also produced. Although internal warfare in Zimbabwe (1973-1979 and 1983-1984) happened at times when primary diamonds had already been discovered, the production of non-lootable diamonds only started later in 1992. Linking the early cases of internal warfare in the DRC to the occurrence or production of onshore oil or gas deposits does not make much sense, either, because DRC’s onshore oil and gas deposits were only discovered in 1972. Onshore oil exploitation started even later in 1979. Of course, other kinds of natural resources (copper, cobalt, uranium or gold in the province of Katanga or diamonds in the South Kasai region) already mattered a great deal during the so-called Congo Crisis in the 1960s. In Jordan, onshore oil or gas deposits had neither been discovered nor produced when the civil war happened in 1970-1971. In India, drugs (opium) had already been produced on a large-scale basis when warfare took place during the 50s. Later cases of internal warfare, however, are unlikely to be related to the commercial production of opium which, according to the “Drug Cultivation Dataset”, had stopped by 1960. These examples demonstrate that although conflict resources are known to occur in many war-torn countries, in several places production simply never started (which is, for instance, the case with primary diamonds in Liberia and Mozambique or secondary diamonds in Colombia, Nigeria and Paraguay). Other countries that are by now known to possess and also exploit such resources had not yet discovered their deposits at the time when warfare happened. In these cases, production only started after warfare had already ended.

\textsuperscript{12} An extension of UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Dataset”, the “Conflict Site Dataset” (v.3) provides coordinates for the conflict zones of conventional (state-based) internal armed conflicts which happened between 1989 and 2008, only. The conflict zones are coded with center-point coordinates plus a radius variable to denote spatial extent (see Hallberg (2012)). Data on the exact location of state-based armed conflicts, non-state armed conflicts and acts of one-sided violence are also provided by the already mentioned “Georeferenced Event Dataset” (GED) which, however, only covers African countries and the time period from 1989 to 2010.
Many countries which experienced several internal wars had been aware of the existence of deposits or produced these resources only during some of their wars (mostly the more recent cases of warfare). In order to figure out whether warfare is fought over (or financed through) conflict resources, each case of internal warfare needs to be evaluated separately. Only a conflict or a war level analysis (instead of a country level analysis) can figure out whether secondary or primary diamonds, other gemstones, drugs or oil/gas deposits had actually been known or exploited prior to or during warfare (see Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b).
17. Data on the Political Context of Internal Fighting

This section presents a number of indicators and indices which shall later be used to measure the concept of state weakness. Again, I am going to argue in favor of my selection of indices and indicators without neglecting their weaknesses. For the sake of completeness, I also mention alternative but inferior measures before turning to the state of the art within peace and conflict research.

While there seems to be much agreement on the aforementioned theoretical arguments linking state weakness to the outbreak of internal armed conflict, things get a bit fuzzier when it comes to the issue of measurement. As mentioned earlier, Kaldor (1999, p. 92) believes New Wars to emerge in “weak states” that, according to her, are characterized by “a loss of control over and fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion” and a narrow functional and geographic reach of political institutions. This explains all sorts of government inefficiencies, e.g. the inability of weak states to properly collect taxes which affects their ability to provide public services and to effectively counter economic decline, high levels of corruption and criminality. The author also speaks of a “downward spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder and military fragmentation” that create the context in which New Wars arise. According to this understanding, state weakness primarily means the failure of state institutions. Others believe New Wars to emerge in situations where the coercive power of the state is weak and where “consensual values” or a “sense of national unity” do not exist, i.e. in weak societies (Snow 1996, p. 35). This corresponds with the common practice in development policy to refer “to two different entities as fragile: states and their institutions on the one hand, and societies as a whole on the other” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 5). According to this understanding of state weakness, it would be insufficient to only measure the quality of (formal and informal) governmental institutions. Indicators e.g. on the strength of civil society institutions and shared core values would be desirable, too, in order to capture the context of New Warfare.

In general, the New Wars advocates seem to disagree on the background concept of state weakness and the comprehensiveness of the term – as does the entire research community. This results in the term being used interchangeably with related concepts like “weak state capacity”, “state fragility”, “state failure”, “state collapse”, states with “bad governance”, “states in crisis”, “rogue” and “poorly performing states” or “low
income countries under stress” (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008, pp. 21 sq.). Of these terms, I am going to use the most encompassing, namely “fragile states” or “state fragility”, in order to refer to the political context of New Warfare. Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, p. 2) define fragile states as all countries with “dysfunctional, deteriorating, or collapsed central authorities”. Thus, the concept includes weak, failing and failed/collapsed states that represent different stages along the fragility spectrum. Still, this definition remains comparatively narrow. Unlike other definitions, it avoids a lumping together of the characteristics and the socio-economic consequences of state fragility. For instance, the OECD defines state structures as fragile when they are unwilling or unable to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights for their populations. Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, pp. 2 sq.) comment that measuring such a concept is not only problematic because very different countries will receive the same scores on a respective index (e.g. strong and unwilling states vs. weak and willing states). The inclusion of economic and social indicators that are thought to be causally related to fragility also restricts the application of such an index in research. “[O]rigins and consequences of fragility are already assumed in the [index] which can thus not be used to investigate these relationships”. The following analysis intends to explore the relationship between state fragility and the outbreak of (a certain kind of) internal armed conflict. In line with the above concern, this requires a measure of state fragility which does not itself contain violent conflict as one dimension in order to avoid circular argumentation. Otherwise, any correlation between state fragility and (new) warfare would be “trivially true” because the theoretical argument would reduce itself to the claim that “an insurgency broke out because the state lacked the capacity to prevent an insurgency” (Kocher 2010). In this sense, the fact that violent conflict is often conceptualized as a cause, a symptom or a consequence of state fragility and therefore included in most state fragility indices hampers the search for a meaningful index. Several institutes, however, publish data on the single dimensions of their state fragility indices. Thus, it is possible to disaggregate some of these indices into their constituent parts and then to choose only those sub-indices or single indicators that seem most appropriate. This strategy has also been proposed by Kocher (2010) in order to circumvent circular argumentations and tautologies of the above presented kind. In addition, the decision to disaggregate existing measures and to use multiple different indices is based on the empirical finding that existing indices seem to measure rather different things. “[A] comparison between different instruments expose[s] a troubling lack of convergence. Countries that rank high in one index may be absent from another, and even in regard to the same dimensions […] there are huge differences”. Only “a few states score high on more than a few dimensions of state fragility […] [S]tates are very uneven across different dimensions and seldom show signs of fragility across the board” (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008, pp. 25, 23).1

---

1See also Hegre and Nygard (2012, pp. 13 sq.) for a correlation and scatter plot matrix of seven widely used governance indices or Hendrix (2010), who compares 15 different definitions and operationalizations of state capacity that are used within the civil wars literature. He critically assesses these measures on the basis of construct validity and employs principal factor analysis to identify their underlying dimensionality. His results indicate that state capacity is characterized by low di-
Another source of bias when using state fragility indices stems from the fact that most of them rely on social and socio-economic data that are usually derived from household surveys or produced by governments. While the former are difficult to conduct in failing or failed states, the latter requires functioning state institutions. “[I]n fragile settings, […] factors such as widespread social mistrust, hidden dynamics and agendas, regime secrecy and lack of infrastructure and capacity seriously hamper any attempt to gather reliable and representative information” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 16). Thus, the more fragile a country, the more likely data is missing which results in a systematic selection bias.2

One of the most popular indices, the “State Fragility Index (SFI)”, to some degree circumvents this problem by using content analysis of electronic media to generate its data. The SFI is produced at the George Mason University’s Center for Global Policy. The version I am using within the upcoming analyses covers all independent countries with a total population greater than 500,000 between 1995 and 2011.3 The index comprises 14 indicators measuring state fragility on an overall scale from zero to 25 (best to worst). A state is defined as fragile and likely to fail if it lacks effectiveness and legitimacy in four “performance dimensions”: security, political, economic and social.4 The authors of the SFI note that according to their understanding a country’s fragility is “closely associated with the state capacity to manage conflict, make and implement public policy and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life, responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development” (Marshall and Cole 2014, p. 7). The attempt to capture the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions very much resembles Kaldor’s understanding of state weakness as a “downward spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder and military fragmentation”. To distinguish between these

---

2 Missing data on single indicators and different methods to deal with this problem also effect the reliability and validity of the overall measure. “Any fragility index will most probably be confronted with missing data in one or more of [its] indicators. To maintain a sufficiently large sample, indices either impute missing data, that is, estimate missing observations with available ones through statistical models or expert judgments, or they delete missing observations case-wise. […] If missing data is imputed, the reliability of an index suffers, as values for certain countries rely on guessing. If missing data is deleted case-wise, the validity of an index suffers, as certain attributes considered relevant are not included in the overall scoring of some countries.” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 16).

3 See Marshall and Cole (2011b) for this interim version of the just published 2014 update which covers the 1995 to 2013 period.

two dimensions is considered a major strength of this index as well as the fact that its sub-categories remain relatively parsimonious (using one to three indicators each). In addition to the overall SFI score, the Center for Global Policy also publishes each country’s scores on the single performance dimensions (i.e. on security effectiveness, political effectiveness, social effectiveness, economic effectiveness, security legitimacy, political legitimacy, social legitimacy and economic legitimacy). Those who use a more narrow concept of state fragility are therefore able to pick their most favorite indicator(s) or to construct their own sub-index. For the following empirical analysis, the SFI provides all necessary information to construct “SFI sub-Index I” that contains all dimensions of the SFI (legitimacy as well as effectiveness scores\(^5\)) with the exception of “security effectiveness” in order to keep the measure conceptually independent from armed conflict.\(^6\) Likewise, it is possible to build “SFI sub-Index II” which – in comparison to the overall SFI score and the “SFI sub-Index I” – is based on a more narrow concept of state fragility. It remains conceptually independent from armed conflict and from social and economic phenomena by also excluding the economic and social indicators. The measure only combines the security legitimacy score with the political effectiveness and legitimacy scores.\(^7\) Finally, I wish to include a “SFI State Legitimacy Index” (which just combines the legitimacy scores) and a “SFI State Effectiveness Index” (which only covers the effectiveness scores – again with the exception of security effectiveness). I also did not touch the weighting decision of the original SFI (which means the economic dimension is given more weight). For this reason, the “SFI State Effectiveness Index” ranges from 0 (best) to 3.33 (worst) while the “SFI State Legitimacy Index” ranges from 0 (best) to 3 (worst). Luckily, the SFI data cover a comparatively high number of countries (165 in 2011) and – at least in relation to other fragility measures – a long period of time (1995 to 2011). The scoring system of the SFI, however, has been criticized for being not as user friendly as, for instance, a zero to ten scale. In addition, the parsimonious operationalizations of the sub-categories renders them comparatively vulnerable to data problems. Finally, it is difficult to assess the reliability of this index because information on the level of uncertainty is not provided Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, pp. 73–75).

\(^{5}\) The index includes the SFI “security legitimacy” score (which captures the level of state repression), the SFI “political legitimacy” score (which measures the level of regime/governance inclusion), the SFI “economic legitimacy” score (which measures the share of export trade in manufactured goods) and the SFI “social legitimacy” score (which relates a country’s actual level of human capital care (as indicated by the infant mortality rate) to the expected value given its poverty level). In addition, the index includes the SFI “political effectiveness” score (which captures the level of regime/governance stability), the SFI “economic effectiveness” score (which is measured by GDP per capita) and the SFI “social effectiveness” score (which captures the degree of human capital development as indicated by a country’s score on the Human Development Index).

\(^{6}\) The authors of the SFI explain that their security effectiveness score is in fact a country’s “residual war” score which captures the number of involved wars, the length of interim periods of “no war” between armed conflicts and the years spent in peace after warfare had ended (Marshall and Cole 2014, p. 8).

\(^{7}\) Thus, the “SFI sub-Index II” only includes a state repression measure and measures for regime/governance stability and inclusion.
In 2005, the SFI was the first cross-country index on state fragility to gain worldwide attention. At the end of 2010, Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010) already list eleven global fragility indices – including some that do not explicitly claim to be fragility indices but which are used as such (e.g. the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment” of the World Bank) and some that only measure closely related concepts (e.g. the “Global Peace Index”).

One of these “widely quoted and used” fragility indices is a sub-index (the “BTI Statelessness Index”) of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). Every two years, the BTI is produced at the Center for Applied Policy Research of the University of Munich on behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation. It consists of two rankings, the “Status Index” (which ranks countries according to the state of their democracy and market economy) and the “Management Index” (which ranks countries according to their political leadership’s management performance). In order to produce both indices, country experts are asked to conduct in-depth assessments on a total of 130 countries “that have yet to achieve a fully consolidated democracy and market economy, have populations of more than two million (excepting eight states chosen as particularly interesting cases), and are recognized as sovereign states” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 4). In their assessment, the experts use 17 criteria that are subdivided into 49 questions. The “Status Index” inter alia aims to identify each country’s “Democracy Status”. In order to do so, each country is judged on its level of “statelessness” and four other dimensions. The Bertelsmann Foundation explains that “statelessness” is seen as a precondition to political transformation and therefore included in the BTI’s definition of democracy. The level of stateness is examined through four questions/indicators. Question number one asks for an evaluation of the extent to which the state’s monopoly on the use of force covers the entire territory of the country. The second question examines the prevalence of a state identity, i.e. the extent to which all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate. The third question assesses the extent

---

8 State fragility only entered mainstream foreign policy and development discourses after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 when failed states were identified as security threats to Western nations (because they provide an ideal breeding ground for national and international terrorism, organized crime and armed conflicts that might destabilize entire regions). The issue of state failure also gained further attention in light of the recent financial crisis and with the increasing attention to other transnational problems that require effective international governance (e.g. climate change). This resulted in a “re-emergence of ‘the state’ as a central actor in developing countries” and, in return, a growing concern for situations where functioning states do not exist. See Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, p. 2); Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, foreword, p. 6 sq.).

9 The authors describe the concepts and methods behind these eleven indices and compare their results. For a list of controversially rated countries on these different indices see Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, p. 3). For an alternative listing of the “leading conceptualizers of state weakness” see Rice and Patrick (2008, pp. 5–7).

10 These are “political participation”, “rule of law”, “stability of democratic institutions” and “political and social integration”. The overall democracy status is derived from assessments made in response to 18 individual questions on these five dimensions.

11 The question seeks to assess the extent to which major groups in society accept and support the official/dominant concept of the nation-state and the extent to which access to citizenship and nat-
17. Data on the Political Context

to which the legal order and political institutions are defined without interference by religious dogmas while question number four explores the existence of basic administrative structures, i.e. the provision of jurisdiction, tax authorities and law enforcement, the administration of communication, transport and basic infrastructure like water, education or health (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 16). Since 2003, the Bertelsmann Foundation publishes the combined stateness scores as well as each country’s scores on the individual indicators. As part of its management assessment, the BTI also asks its experts to evaluate the “level of difficulty” a country’s leadership is facing when instilling political reform and change. They are asked to do so by assessing the extent to which there are traditions of civil society. More specifically, they are asked whether there has been a “long-term presence of public or civic engagement” and whether there exists “a civic culture of participation in public life”, “numerous and active civic associations” and “social trust (social capital)” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 35). This shall later be referred to as the “BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator”. Concrete numbers of civil society organizations per country (N=190) or per million inhabitants (N=169) have been collected by Grimes (2008). Depending on the baseline concept, the above mentioned indicators can be used to build more comprehensive measures of state fragility that also capture the weakness of society as well as rather parsimonious measures with a narrow focus on the functioning of central state authority or basic administration.

The Bertelsmann Foundation itself uses the BTI data to construct the “BTI Failed State Index”, which is based on only two of its four questions assessing the level of stateness. Each country is assigned the arithmetic mean of its scores on the questions assessing the existence and scope of a monopoly on the use of force and basic administration. With equal weight, the “BTI Failed State Index” therefore only covers two dimensions (the security and political dimension) as opposed to the four-dimensional “State Fragility Index (SFI)” or the five-dimensional overall “BTI Status Index” (which also take social/societal, economic and (environmental) sustainability aspects into account). Because the index is conceptualized as independent from other socio-political phenomena, it “is a valid measure of state fragility in a narrow sense and may thus be used to investigate the relationship with phenomena that other, more broadly designed indices include into their very concepts of fragility” Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 45).

---

12 “This question seeks to examine whether the basic civil functions of a state apparatus are fulfilled in terms of regulation, administration and implementation. It does not refer to basic security functions like keeping the peace or maintaining law and order, and it does not address the quality of the administrative structures, solely their existence and scope” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a, p. 17). For more information see also the website of the BTI project at http://www.bti-project.org/index/methode/ (visited on 2013-05-21).

13 Both indicators are available through the Quality of Government (QoG) Project at the University of Gothenburg (QoG Institute 2013, pp. 201 sq.) and in the following referred to as the “Grimes measures”.

14 I rely on BTI data for the period from 2003 to 2012. These data (and the most recent 2014 update) are available online at http://www.bti-project.org/index/ (visited on 2014-11-02).
The “BTI Failed State Index” assigns values on a scale from one to ten from worst to best (with minimal steps of plus-minus 0.5). Countries with values of less than three on the index are categorized as failed states. As in the case of other fragility indices, this threshold to determine the categories of failing vs. failed states is neither theoretically nor empirically justified. In addition, the authors do not provide any information on country-specific uncertainty (but at least publish the comprehensive country reports that serve as the basis for all BTI numerical scores). The fact that this index is based on expert surveys minimizes the previously mentioned problem of missing data in fragile contexts. However, the risk of expert bias increases. Subjective judgments that cannot be controlled for probably influence the scoring of the experts. Finally, critics argue that an ideological bias exists because “[t]he BTI overall publication assumes that market oriented democracy is the best system to be adopted by all countries. This might influence coders’ judgments on those two questions used by the BTI State Weakness Index [aka BTI Stateness Index]” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 45).

Ideology certainly also matters in regard to measures provided by the World Bank. For instance, the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment/IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA/IRAI)” – another widely used and quoted fragility index – is criticized for being “a strongly value-oriented index where a particular set of policies (e.g. trade liberalization) and a distinct state model are encouraged” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 52). Also, the index is criticized for its strong focus on poverty and for covering only those countries eligible for assistance under the Bank’s International Development Association (Rice and Patrick 2008, p. 6). This is hardly surprising given the fact that the

---

15Failed states are defined as “countries in which the state’s monopoly on the use of force and basic administrative structures are either lacking overall or encompass only a part of the territory or population, so that the government is severely limited in its capacity to act (the average of scores given for questions 1.1 and 1.4 is less than three)”. See http://www.bti-project.org/index/methode/ (visited on 2013-05-21) or the BTI Report 2012 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b, p. 139).

16Another example would be the “Failed States Index (FSI)” produced by the Fund for Peace. Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 20) accuses the producers of “arbitrary categorization [that] can mislead users. In its presentation in the Foreign Policy magazine, the FSI categorizes countries into ‘critical’, ‘in danger’, ‘borderline’, ‘stable’, and ‘most stable’. A table shows the top sixty countries with the highest risk. The top twenty countries are critical, the following twenty in danger, no matter what the scores are. This procedure is misleading in at least two ways: first, the overall risk of the international system appears to be constant, as there are always twenty critical states listed. Second, a country with a certain score in one year (Yemen, 95.4 in 2008) may be termed ‘in danger’ while a country with a lower score in a previous year had been termed ‘critical’ (Timor-Leste, 94.9 in 2007), even though scores are intended to be time invariant and thus allow comparison over time”. See also Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2010, p. 3).

17“The BTI Country Assessments are expert surveys, which makes them naturally vulnerable to expert bias. The risk of bias is increased due to the limited number of experts involved. Reliability is further decreased by the phrasing of the questionnaire which leaves considerable room for interpretation by the coders. The risk of bias increases even more when using only a limited number of indicators from an expert survey since different understandings of specific concepts cannot level out as they might with a large number of indicators. This is the case for the BTI Failed States Index, which relies on only two questions from the survey. In this aspect, validity and reliability rival each other out” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 45).
index is produced by the World Bank for corporate purposes. Nevertheless, external actors (e.g., the European Commission and single governments) also rely on it for aid allocation purposes in fragile settings. The CPIA/IRAI “assesses the extent to which a country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth, poverty reduction, and the effective use of development assistance” (Hegre and Nygard 2012, p. 12). It comes with the advantage of conceptual independence from armed conflict but covers much more than the functioning of state institutions. Because the following analysis primarily aims to capture Kaldor’s narrow understanding of state fragility, I prefer the World Bank’s “Government Effectiveness Indicator”, which is part of the “World Governance Indicators (WGI)”. The WGI version I am relying on provides aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies and the period from 1996 to 2011. The indicators cover six dimensions of governance (“voice and accountability”, “political stability and absence of violence-terrorism”, “government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, “rule of law” and “control of corruption”). In order to measure these dimensions of governance, the World Bank uses several hundred individual variables from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations (QoG Institute 2013, pp. 121–123; Teorell et al. 2013). The “WGI Government Effectiveness Indicator” captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Its estimates range from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best). It has been criticized that this indicator (as well as all the other WGI) is measured relative to the global mean in each time period which would make it extremely difficult to use them for comparisons over time. However, the authors of the WGI replied to this and several other points of critique and convincingly argued that these objections are either based on misinterpretations of their indicators or of the empirical evidence involving them (Kaufmann et al. 2007). Overall, the geographical and temporal coverage of the data set, the availability of most of the single indicators/sources and the transparent and professional way of constructing the measures speak in favor of the WGI.

Freedom House collects similar data as part of its annual “Freedom in the World Survey”. However, the overall purpose of this survey is not to assess state fragility but to rate countries according to their state of freedom. The index therefore aggregates seven sub-indices measuring basic political rights and civil liberties. One of these sub-indices, 18

18For this and other points of critique see e.g. Hanson and Sigman (2013, p. 9) and Kaufmann et al. (2007).
19For each country and estimate, the WB provides standard errors and the number of sources. The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. For detailed information on the WGI see http://www.govindicators.org (visited on 2013-05-28) and Kaufmann et al. (2010). All data are available online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx (visited on 2014-11-02). The 2014 update of the data set covers the 1996 to 2013 period.

212
the “FH Functioning of Government Index”, focuses on a single aspect of government effectiveness as defined above by the WGI: the degree to which governments operate independently of undue influences and pressures. More precisely, the “FH Functioning of Government Index” assesses whether a freely elected head of government and a national legislative representative determine the policies of the government, whether the government is free from pervasive corruption, whether it is accountable to the electorate between elections and whether it operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded on a scale from 0 (worst) to 12 (best). The data I am using cover the period from 2005 to 2012 and a total of 193 countries. They are available through the Quality of Government (QoG) Project at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden or can be downloaded from the website of Freedom House.\footnote{The original data set by Freedom House covers slightly more countries (195 countries and 14 “related” and “disputed territories”). Although the “Freedom in the World Survey” has been published annually since 1972, the sub-category scores have been made available for the last nine years, only. The latest version covers the 2006 to 2014 period. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores (visited on 2014-11-02).}

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) publishes data on the functioning of government institutions, too, as part of its “Index of Democracy”.\footnote{This index is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped into five sub-categories: “civil liberties”, “democratic political culture”, “electoral process and pluralism”, “functioning of government” and “political participation”. Each sub-category is measured by a separate sub-index ranging from 0 to 10 (worst to best). The overall “Index of Democracy” is the simple average of the five sub-indices.} In addition to expert assessments and if available, the EIU uses public opinion data from surveys\footnote{The World Values Survey, Gallup polls, the Eurobarometer surveys, the Asian and the Latin American Barometer, the Afrobarometer and national surveys.} to evaluate the functioning of governments.\footnote{The respondents are asked to assess the level of public confidence in the government, the extent to which freely elected representatives determine government policy free of undue influence by the military and the security services, by certain groups or by foreign powers and organizations, whether there exists an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority, whether the government’s authority extends over the full territory of the country, whether corruption is pervasive or whether the civil service is willing and capable of implementing government policy. For more information see EIU (2013).} Because this index covers fewer countries and years it remains, however, inferior to the above described Freedom House measure.\footnote{The “EIU Functioning of Government Index” covers 165 independent states plus two territories (excluding micro states) and has first been produced for the year 2006, with updates for 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.} Furthermore, the purpose of the overall index is to rate countries according to their state of democracy. The sub-index therefore also runs the risk of being value-driven. At the same time it is important to keep in mind that despite some conceptual similarity, the concepts of democracy and state fragility are not congruent: Flawed democracies or even autocracies are not necessarily fragile countries. The other way round, the most stable countries are not necessarily the most democratic. For instance, Taiwan is one of the most stable countries in the world according to the “State Fragility Index (SFI)”, covering the period from 1995 to 2011. However, it is not a full democracy but ranked only number 35 on the “EIU Democracy Index”. Likewise, the most autocratic countries
17. Data on the Political Context

(e.g. North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria or Turkmenistan) are strong states that manage to control (or repress) their populations and territories. At least none of these countries are considered to be extremely fragile. On a scale from 0 (best) to 25 (worst) on the SFI they rank somewhere in the middle (9 to 10 points). The other way round, East Timur and India (and to a lesser degree Uganda and Malawi) are doing comparatively well in terms of democracy but still remain rather fragile.\(^26\)

Finally, the “ICRG Quality of Government Indicator” shall at least be mentioned. This measure is based on data provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. It ranges from zero to one (with higher values indicating higher quality of government) and is composed of the mean values of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality”. The latter component aims to capture the level of autonomy, the stability and professionalism of the bureaucratic systems (QoG Institute 2013, p. 92). Including this dimension of state fragility as a separate measure would be interesting. However, the single ICRG component variables are not available free of charge.\(^27\) Only the overall “ICRG Quality of Government Indicator” is available through the Quality of Government (QoG) Project. It covers a comparatively long period of time (1984 to 2012) but just 146 countries. For these reasons, I consider the above presented “WGI Government Effectiveness Indicator” and the “FH Functioning of Government Index” superior which cover the same three dimensions.

Corruption levels (or the effective control of corruption by government institutions) are included in all of the above mentioned indices measuring the effectiveness, quality or functioning of governments (which are themselves common dimensions of state fragility).\(^28\) Within the following empirical analysis, I therefore intend to include a corruption measure to assess the separate effect of this widely accepted dimension of state dysfunction on the risk of internal armed conflict. For this purpose, I rely on the most widely used, national-level corruption index: The “Corruption Perception Index (CPI)” published by Transparency International (TI). Since 1995, the CPI ranks countries according to the perceived level of public sector corruption as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.\(^29\) In 2012, the index covers 176 countries and territo-

\(^{26}\)For the same argument and further examples see Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 14).

\(^{27}\)They can be purchased at [http://www.prsgroup.com](http://www.prsgroup.com) (visited on 2013-05-28). For an empirical analysis using this indicator see Hegre and Nygard (2012). See also Hendrix (2010) on the validity of this measure.

\(^{28}\)The “WGI Government Effectiveness Indicator” of the World Bank is the only exception. In this case, corruption is covered by a separate measure of the WGI (the “WGI Control of Corruption Indicator”).

\(^{29}\)“The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public [...]” (QoG Institute 2013, pp. 116 sq.).
ries around the world with corruption scores ranging from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). The 2012 scores comprise data from 13 different sources, including several of the above mentioned indices. Although data are available for eighteen consecutive years, the samples and methodology of the index have changed over time. Year to year comparisons will only be possible from 2012 onwards. For this reason, the following analysis just includes the 2012 score instead of the 18 years average. Unfortunately, information on the single indicators used for this index is also lacking.

As briefly mentioned, the World Bank (WB) publishes an alternative measure: the “WGI Control of Corruption Indicator” which is again part of the “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”. This index “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”. The estimate ranges from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 and, in the version I am using, covers 215 countries between 1996 and 2011.

The example of corruption very well demonstrates how state weakness in general (and corruption as one indicator thereof) links with armed conflict through negative effects on economic variables. High levels of corruption not only scare away foreign investors but also undermine the ability of governments to implement public policies that generate economic growth. Corruption often leads to unrealistic or inefficient policies (e.g. in the form of controls on the state economy) and a flourishing black market which means further loss of tax revenue (Le Billon 2003; Fjelde and Soysa 2009; Fjelde 2009a). Those who argue in favor of a linkage between corruption and the outbreak of violent conflict in addition refer to the bureaucratic inefficiency and the loss of public welfare that associate with corrupt practices like the soliciting or offering of bribes and extortion. Such practices also compromise popular faith in the legitimacy of the involved state institutions and cause real grievances that might lead to demands for change. The “greatest risk” in corruption is “that […] at some time [it] will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, so as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of

---

30 In prior years, the scale ran from 0 to 10.
33 Two research papers which appeared in the European Physical Journal in 2007 and 2008 examine the economic consequences of corruption perception as defined by the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI)” of Transparency International (TI). Both papers found that the lower the level of perceived corruption the higher long-term economic growth. More specifically, for the period of 1999 to 2004 and for all countries in the world, a unit increase in a country’s CPI score results in an increase of GDP per capita growth rates of 1.7 percent. In addition, the authors find a statistically significant power-law functional dependence between foreign direct investment and corruption: low levels of corruption relate to high levels of direct foreign investment per capita. See Shao et al. (2007); Podobnik et al. (2008).
the country’s political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable” (QoG Institute 2013, p. 91). Morris (1991, pp. 17 sq.) agrees that “the constant abuse of authority has the potential to undermine authority to such an extent that there may no longer be authority, that is legitimate power, to abuse”. Countries with high levels of corruption might well be in a pre-stage to state failure. From the opposite perspective, the rents generated by corruption might be a tempting prize for those who are willing to topple the government.

Empirical support for a positive relationship between corruption and internal armed conflict comes from Fjelde (2009a). Her large-N quantitative study finds that increasing corruption from the 5th to the 95th percentile more than triples a country’s risk of conflict onset. However, the author also detects the aforementioned conditional effect, namely that the relationship between corruption and the outbreak of state-based armed conflict is different in oil-rich countries where public money derived from oil production can easily be used to buy off key segments of society that might otherwise challenge the state and its authority (Fjelde 2009a). The author finds this interaction effect to be significant, consistent across different models and robust to a number of changes in specifications. She concludes that “[p]olitical corruption has prolonged poverty and bred economic and political inequality in many oil-rich states, but it has also helped cement powerful alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes” (Fjelde 2009a, p. 199).

Morris (1991, pp. 17 sq.) argued that corruption might contribute to organizational stability “by helping foster accommodation, a stable, ‘co-optive system of spoils’, and by discouraging the mobilization of opposition”. He has already noted that in order to have a stabilizing effect, “corruption must be maintained within certain limits” and that “the abundance and availability of resources condition corruption’s contribution to stability” because “[a] large pool of resources not only provides the spoils needed to sustain the system, but a growing economic pie [also] determines the degree of public acceptance of corruption” (Morris 1991, p. 19). Further support for a more complex relationship between corruption and violent conflict comes from single or comparative case studies according to which different forms of corruption have different effects on society or the political system. For instance, Morris (1991, p. 16) reports that in Mexico, extortion helped to solidify the elite and enhance centralized control while bribery undermined elite unity and political stability. Similarly, Khan (1998) shows that different forms of corruption have had very different economic outcomes across Asian countries (India, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea). In some North East Asian countries, widespread corruption has accompanied decades of very high growth. In others, e.g. the South Asian countries, corruption associated with relatively low growth. In South East Asia, high levels of corruption came along with moderately high long-run growth rates (Khan 1998, p. 16). The author attributes these varying effects to the different types of patron-client networks within which different forms of corruption are embedded in this region. Finally, Bardhan (2006) mentions that high levels of political corruption do not always go together with high levels of bureaucratic corruption.\footnote{See Morris (2011, pp. 10 sq.) for a summary of categories of corruption and a distinction between...}
This variance again offers room for the argument that different kinds of corruption might be associated with different kinds of internal armed conflict. In line with the grievances argument, upper-level corruption (that is practiced by the political elite and perceived as a waste of public welfare and injust by the remaining societal actors) might especially be related to the outbreak of conventional (state-based) armed conflict at least in countries without large oil revenues that could be used to buy off the opposition. While political corruption refers to the corrupt practices of a small, policy-making elite, lower-level bureaucratic corruption or systemic corruption affect larger segments of society. Such kinds of corruption might be an indicator of the inability or unwillingness of governments to control this and other kinds of criminal behavior including the illegal exploitation of mineral resources by non-state actors as well as fighting among them over the rents derived from resource extraction. Governments might be willing to accept such conditions as long as non-state fighting remains of low intensity and is carried out in remote rural areas so that it does not destabilize the entire country or as long as the survival of the state does not depend on control over these resources. Alternatively, the state might be already weakened to such an extent that it is simply unable to defend strategically important mining sites. High levels of bureaucratic or even systemic corruption can then be interpreted as signs of wider state weakness and are expected to be significantly and positively correlated with the incidence of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts—especially in countries where easily lootable conflict resources occur and are produced. Unfortunately, existing large-N data sets on corruption are far from allowing the necessary distinction between political and administrative, petty or grand/systemic corruption. Despite these data constraints, research on the nature and direction of the relationship between corruption (or state fragility in general) and armed conflict continues to confront a number of theoretical and methodological challenges. Some of the difficulties stem from the fact that the relationship runs in both directions: corruption might lead to the outbreak of armed conflict as much as political instability—the entire break-down of law and order during warfare—advantages the spread of corruption. Furthermore, recent empirical research suggests that the effect is conditioned by other factors and varies between different forms of corruption.

Lastly, the following analysis includes a “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” as the most parsimonious measure of state fragility. This single indicator is part of the Polity IV project data series compiled at the Center for Global Policy of George Mason University.

“upper-level” and “lower-level” corruption. The former, which is also referred to as political corruption, involves “presidents, ministers, members of the legislature, governors and other high-ranking officials” (i.e. corruption at the policymaking stage), while “lower-level” corruption (also referred to as “bureaucratic” or “administrative” corruption) relates to the implementation of policy carried out by lower-level civil servants. Other categorizations of corruption distinguish between the direction (“bribery” vs. “extortion”) or between the size and frequency of the transaction (“grand corruption” vs. “petty corruption”).

“Much of the corruption literature exploring the underlying causes and consequences of corruption fail[s] to differentiate forms of corruption. Corruption [...] is treated generically as a singular class of political behavior. This is especially true of the bulk of the quantitative, cross-national studies because of the way corruption is normally measured” (Morris 2011, p. 12).
which serves as a source of data for several of the above mentioned indices. The 2012 update of this data project informs about global and regional trends in governance in 167 countries. The “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” codes “the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive)” Unfortunately, Polity IV has collected data on polity fragmentation only since the year 2000.

Of course, many other measures of state fragility exist besides the above mentioned. Most alternatives, however, remain either restricted in terms of their geographical coverage (e.g. the “Index of African Governance” of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University or data provided by the “World Value Survey” and the World Economic Forum) or in terms of their temporal coverage (e.g. the “Fragility Index” of the “Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)” produced at Carlton University). Country rankings of the latter index only cover the years of 2010, 2011 and 2012 (preliminary findings). Disaggregated data below the level of the six categories included in the “CIFP Fragility Index” are also not provided which prevents users from modifying and replicating the index (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 49). In addition, the fact that this index uses over eighty single indicators in order to measure state fragility points to a much broader understanding of state fragility than applied in this study. For a similar reason, the above also leaves aside the “Global Peace Index” which is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace and developed by the EIU in collaboration with a

---

36E.g. various Polity IV measures (also the “Polity Fragmentation Indicator”) are used to capture the political effectiveness and political legitimacy dimensions of the “State Fragility Index (SFI)”.

37The coding excludes local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities. Cases with “no overt fragmentation” are assigned a value of 0, “slight fragmentation” exists in cases where “less than ten percent of the country’s territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime” and assumes a value of 1. “Moderate fragmentation” exists where “ten to twenty-five percent of the country’s territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime” and is assigned a value of 2. “Serious fragmentation”, where “over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country’s territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime” assumes a value of 3. Polities that cannot exercise relatively effective authority over at least 50 percent of their established territory are necessarily considered to be in a condition of “state failure”. See Marshall, Jaggers, et al. (2013, pp. 12 sq.). The 2014 update of the Polity IV data series (the time-series data as well as the polity-case format covering the 1800 to 2013 period) is now online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (visited on 2014-10-24)

38So far, the “World Value Survey” has conducted six waves of data collection. An aggregated data file is published online and includes the surveys conducted from 1981 to 2012 in 87 societies. Individual-level data provided by the “World Value Survey” could be used to calculate any country’s mean of the variables included in the survey. In order to measure the strength of a state or its society the following indicators included in this survey might be of interest: the indicator measuring the level of public confidence in the armed forces, in the government, in the civil service or in the police as well as the variables measuring the level of interpersonal trust and the level of corruption. See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (visited on 2014-11-02) . The World Economic Forum provides similar data, e.g. on the level of trust in politicians and the reliability of police services for 142 countries.
panel of international experts. This index does not measure state fragility but only the related concept of “negative peace”. Very broad measures of state fragility have also been left aside but, for the sake of completeness, shall at least be mentioned. Institutes like the World Bank (through its “World Development Indicators”) or the World Economic Forum publish data on the percentage of the population with access to adequate sanitation and improved water source, the quality of overall infrastructure, electricity supply, primary education or infant mortality rates. Such indicators certainly capture the degree to which governments (or other actors) are able and willing to provide public goods and services. However, as already mentioned, indices that include such indicators conflate the symptoms and consequences of state weakness and are based on a much broader concept of state fragility than intended by this study. Other available measures very much resemble one of the selected indices without performing much better in terms of the countries and years covered or in terms of the availability of data. An example would be the “Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger” which is produced at the University of Maryland. Earlier versions of this index were authored by the same person (Monty G. Marshall), who is now in charge of the above described “State Fragility Index (SFI)” at the Center for Global Policy of George Mason University. The underlying concepts of these two indices mostly concur (Hewitt 2012, pp. 5–7). The “Index of State Weakness” of the Brookings Institution and the “Failed States Index” of the Fund for Peace are both very similar to the SFI, too. However, the “Index of State Weakness” only covers 141 developing countries (Rice and Patrick 2008). At least in this regard, the “Failed States Index” seems superior (as it includes 178 countries in 2013). But its temporal reach (2005-2013) remains comparatively limited. Furthermore, the Fund for Peace uses content analysis to generate its own data on the same four dimensions as the SFI that are divided into 12 sub-dimensions. Although a list of the indicators measuring these sub-dimensions is published online, data on the single indicators are again not provided. Disaggregating the overall index is therefore impossible. Furthermore, the “Failed States Index” again mixes causes and consequences of state failure. For instance, in order to measure the social dimension of state failure the index aims to capture the level of “demographic pressure”. For this purpose, it includes “measures related to natural disasters” (a possible cause of state failure) as well as “measures related to food and water scarcity” or “mortality” (possible consequences of state failure). In addition, “armed conflict” directly or indirectly flows into several dimensions of this index. For instance, “refugees and IDPs” are mentioned as one indicator capturing the social dimension of state failure. Another social indicator, “group grievance”, is captured by measures “related to ethnic or religious violence”. Likewise, the “political and military” dimension of the index contains a sub-dimension called “security apparatus”. In order to measure the extent to which the security apparatus enjoys a monopoly on the use of legitimate force, indicators “related to internal conflict, rebel activity or fatalities from conflict” are taken into account.39

“State capacity” is another related concept which broadly overlaps with state fragility and which has enjoyed some prominence in peace and conflict research. The term has been defined as a three-dimensional concept covering the extractive, coercive and administrative capacity of states (Hanson and Sigman 2013). Though it only captures one of these dimensions, the “most widely acknowledged” single proxy for measuring state capacity is the tax ratio which, for this reason, is also considered “an interesting proxy indicator for the state capacity dimension of state fragility” (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 17). It is argued that governments must be able to extract tax-based revenue to implement their policies, e.g. to raise an army, to maintain law and order or to provide other public goods and services like education or health care. Thus, the ability to collect and manage taxes and to ensure popular compliance with tax policy is a sign of state capacity as much as it is a precondition in the fulfillment of state functions and therefore a precondition for high levels of coercive and administrative state capacity. To some degree, taxation might also represent the willingness on the part of the population to transfer private resources to the government. For this reason, high levels of tax-revenue might reflect high levels of state legitimacy which ensures political stability. The main point of critique that has been put forward against this measure of state capacity is that different kinds of taxes require different levels of state capacity. “Taxing trade is relatively easy from a bureaucratic standpoint, while taxing personal and corporate income requires significant administrative sophistication” (Hanson and Sigman 2013, p. 15). “Mineral production or oil profits are [also] an easy target for revenue for a government that does not require imposition of cost on the population” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007, p. 6). This explains why the tax ratio of fragile but resource-rich states (such as Iraq, Angola and Equatorial Guinea) is surprisingly high. These countries collect approximately 35 percent of their GDP in tax (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 17). In addition, endogeneity is again of concern: state capacity rests “on a set of social, economic and political factors that are difficult to distinguish analytically from the concept itself” – most importantly armed conflict (Hanson and Sigman 2013, p. 10). Political instability and especially open warfare affect countries’ ability to extract revenue as much as weak state capacity as indicated by the inability to extract tax revenue can be linked with the emergence of armed conflict. Likewise, it is important to consider alternative explanations: For instance, lower tax revenues in wealthier countries might not be due to a lack of capacity to collect taxes but rather due to political difficulties of raising taxes (Hanson and Sigman 2013, p. 11). These concerns have been taken seriously by Arbetman and Kugler (1997), who came up with an alternative measure which has been recently updated by Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007). Their measure of “Relative Political Capacity” expresses the actual level of tax revenue as a percentage of the expected level of tax revenue which they construct by taking those variables into account that determine potential tax collection (i.e. income levels and the economic structure of a country). More precisely, in predicting the expected level of tax revenue the authors consider a country’s level of industrialization and its shares of crude oil exports, mining and total exports in GDP.\footnote{See Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007, pp. 6 sq.) or Hanson and Sigman (2013, pp. 6, 16).} Again, the idea is that “efficient govern-
ments are able to meet or exceed their expected extractive capabilities [while] inefficient governments fail to reach their expected extraction levels” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007, p. 2). The major advantage of this measure of state capacity is that it “allow[s] for an assessment of the efficiency and performance of a government (in relation to its expected performance) that does not reflect resource allocation and is not tied to institutional design” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007, p. 4). Highly capable political entities are not necessarily stable and democratic systems (i.e. free, representative, participatory etc.) as implicitly assumed by many other capacity and fragility measures. Unfortunately, there is seldom reliable data on taxation in countries that are most fragile (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009, p. 17). The problem of incomplete data is also mentioned by Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 8) as a major obstacle in regard to data on tax-collection capacity. Hanson and Sigman (2013, pp. 14, 9, 10) complain that data on taxation “are quite sparse for years prior to 1972”. In general, “available data on state capacity cover only small groups of countries or small periods of time”. For this reason, they pessimistically conclude that “there is little possibility at present to conduct meaningful quantitative research”.

Another dimension of state capacity, the coercive capacity of states, is usually operationalized as military spending or military personnel per capita. Unlike any of the so far presented indicators, this proxy is endogenous to the risk of internal armed conflict. The level of military expenditure always reflects expectations of future violence. For this reason, plausible theoretical arguments exist linking higher levels in military expenditure and employment to more political stability and an enhanced repressive capacity as well as to higher levels of corruption and therefore to less political stability. A large and expensive military might reflect a strong coercive capacity of the state as much as the necessity of a huge and costly military apparatus is a sign of weakness/a situation of instability. Accordingly, the results of studies that are predicting the outbreak, incidence or duration of internal armed conflict and that are including these measures as independent variables are mixed or even contradictory.

The above intended to provide an overview of existing efforts to measure state fragility. Because an internationally accepted definition of state fragility is still missing, multiple understandings of the concept as well as instruments to measure it have emerged – not without their limitations. The background concepts (i.e. the basic understandings of “state” and “fragility”) of these measures differ as much as their comprehensiveness. More precisely, existing measures disagree on whether fragility refers to society as a whole or to the state only (and if yes, whether it refers to the functioning of state institutions or includes ideas of good governance, democratic rule and extensive public service provision). At least a simple and agreed upon working definition of state fragility seems to be emerging which stresses the fact that fragile states lack core state functions like

41See e.g. DeRouen and Sobek (2004); Mason and Fett (1996); Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000); J. Li (2002); Walter (2006); Walter (2009, Chapter 4); Henderson and D. Singer (2000).

42For an overview of the pitfalls of this measure and the State of the Art see Hendrix (2010, pp. 274, 277).
the maintenance of security and basic administration (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008, p. 22). Therefore, they are unable to provide basic public services which in turn undermines their legitimacy. According to Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, p. 6), all existing definitions of state failure identify weaknesses or failure in regard to one or several of the following “central attributes of the state: Effectiveness (referring to the question how well state functions are performed), authority (understood as the enforcement of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force) and legitimacy (public, non-coercive acceptance of the state)”. Agreement also exists on the fact that state fragility can be present to a greater or lesser degree and therefore needs to be measured as a continuum. The recognition of this gradation allows for the creation of indices of state fragility. An index seems to be the most appropriate instrument to measure state fragility given the multidimensional nature of the concept. Of course, this comes with the general difficulties associated with the construction of indices, i.e. the question which dimensions should be taken into account, how the individual indicators that are coming from different sources can be brought to a certain range of values (standardization), how they are then again combined by mathematical operators (aggregation), how great the impact of single indicators or dimensions of state fragility should be on the final score (weighting), how one should indicate the precision of measurement so that the user can judge the reliability of the index or whether the final scores should be used to categorize countries according to their fragility, e.g. in failing vs. already failed states. The latter requires the identification of (theoretically or empirically justified) thresholds to determine the respective categories. 

In light of the ongoing discussion on how to define and measure the concept of state fragility, I refrain from identifying “the best” indicator. Instead, the following empirical analysis relies on several of the most widely used indices (or sub-indices and single indicators thereof). In order to select the most appropriate measures, I used four criteria: Firstly, each indicator is supposed to at least capture what Kaldor (1999) defines as weak or fragile statehood. Secondly, the data are available publicly and free of charge with, thirdly, a proximate worldwide geographical coverage and a maximum temporal reach. This implies a preference for narrow and direct measures of state fragility (e.g. indicators of the effectiveness of government institutions or the quality of the bureaucracy) instead of indirect ones (e.g. high levels of undernourishment or low literacy rates) which capture the consequences of such inefficiencies. I argue that such development indicators might indirectly provide information on the effectiveness of state institutions as much as they measure the effectiveness of local, national and international non-governmental actors – especially in a context where states are unwilling or unable to provide public services to their citizens and where the international community or private actors are stepping in. Rice and Patrick (2008, p. 17) address the same concern when noting...
that especially in post-conflict countries with an international peacekeeping presence, measures of state fragility are likely to reflect the support these countries are receiving from international institutions or foreign governments in fulfilling one or more government functions. Obviously, without appropriate controls broad and indirect measures of state fragility such as development indicators are likely to overestimate the capacity and governance performance of fragile states. Finally and as mentioned before, I am looking for indices that do not themselves contain violent conflict as one dimension of state fragility because otherwise a correlation between state fragility and warfare would be bound to occur. For the same reason, I avoid state fragility indices that include strongly correlated indicators (e.g. numbers of refugees and internally displaced people or the level of military spending and employment).

Applying these criteria resulted in the selection of the following measures that shall be included in the empirical analysis: Firstly, the “State Fragility Index” (the overall index score and several sub-indices that are measuring more narrow concepts of state fragility). Secondly, two sub-indices of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI): The “BTI Stateness Index” and the “BTI Failed State Index”. Thirdly, two measures of the effectiveness and the functioning of governments (the “WGI Government Effectiveness Indicator” and the “FH Functioning of Government Index”) and two corruption measures (the “Corruption Perception Index” and the “WGI Control of Corruption Indicator”) to capture these specific aspects of state dysfunction. Amongst the most parsimonious measures I wish to use are two indicators capturing the weakness of society (the number of civil society organizations as counted by Grimes (2008) and the “BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator”) as well as one single indicator measuring polity fragmentation (the “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” of the Polity IV project). Data on these measures are either made available through the Quality of Governance (QoG) Project at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden⁴⁵ or through the websites of the immediate authoring institutions. An overview of these selected fragility measures is given in table D.1 on page 404.

Using these direct measures of state fragility is a major improvement in comparison with earlier studies which mostly relied on all sorts of proxies. Within the discipline of peace and conflict research, examples range from Fearon and Laitin (2003) who use GDP per capita to measure the overall administrative, police and military capabilities of states⁴⁶, to DeSoysa (2002) who uses the level of trade over GDP to capture state capacity service. In addition to foreign and international actors, national and local actors and structures (e.g. kinship networks, religious organizations and even armed groups) might also provide authority and public services in collapsing states or regions (Maedl et al. 2011, p. 64).

⁴⁵I used the QoG time-series version from 30 April 2013; see Teorell et al. (2013).
⁴⁶Some major points of objection against this measure have already been mentioned. Obviously, state fragility cannot simply be equated (or necessarily correlates) with poverty. The Economist (2011) reports that more than a quarter of countries on the World Bank’s lower-middle income list also appear on the OECD’s list of fragile and failed states. A number of “once-poor states have grown richer, but no more functional”. The Economist refers to this “new category of countries that mixes modest affluence with miserable governance” as “MIFFS” (middle-income but failed or fragile states).
17. Data on the Political Context

ity, to Buhaug (2010) who relies on the above mentioned “Relative Political Capacity” measure to capture state strength. Nevertheless, even the selected more valid and direct measures of state fragility come with some obstacles – especially for large N-analyses. So far, the temporal and geographical coverage of most available state fragility indices is very limited. Time-series data are at best available for single indicators and the post-Cold War era.\footnote{The data situation only seems a little better when it comes to related concepts, e.g. the concept of “good/bad governance”. In their time-series analysis Hegre and Nygard (2012) are able to use seven disaggregated governance indicators to explore the effect of governance on the risk of conflict recurrence between 1960 and 2008. Hanson and Sigman (2013) note that “taken together” their annual measures of state capacity span 48 years (1960-2008) and 191 countries. A closer look, however, reveals that none of their 24 indicators in fact includes 191 countries. Nine measures cover less than 88 countries (one just 34) which is why they latter drop or impute a large number of missing cases (Hanson and Sigman 2013, pp. 12–15).} Furthermore, existing measures of state fragility (including all of the above presented indices) are limited to countries as their fixed unit of analysis which means they are unable to capture variance in state fragility at the sub-national level. Only very recent and innovative research heads towards geographically disaggregated measures of state fragility. For instance, to explore the variation in state failure in Somalia, Maedl et al. (2013) use micro-level data derived from quantitative interviews with more than 8,000 (male and female) ex-combatants from all regions and all sorts of militias (Sharia, warlord, business and other kinds of militias). Their local and individual-level indicators of state failure capture the existence of flourishing grey and black markets, the availability of narcotic drugs (khat, hash, alcohol, banji seeds, sniffing substances and tablets) and levels of drug consumption, levels of education and personal health and the degree of disbelief of citizens in the benevolence of state authorities. The authors find large and significant regional differences in these measures of state failure (especially the Northern parts of Somalia are less failed than the Southern regions) and conclude that “micro-level data are indispensable to understand key players within failed states” (Maedl et al. 2011, p. 75). The idea that state strength is not uniform across national territories is also central to Camber Warren’s research. He explores the relationship between state capacity and armed conflict by relying on new, geo-coded data (satellite recorded images of nighttime light emissions and data on the reach of broadcast communication technologies) which capture geographic variation in the level of state penetration. Preliminary results indicate that groups living in peripheral regions with weak state penetration face a heightened risk of armed conflict even if previously used national-level indicators would categorize the entire state as rather strong. When using the disaggregated measures of state capacity, national-level indicators cease to be significant in statistical and substantive terms.\footnote{Camber (2010). See his personal website at \url{http://www.camberwarren.net/} (visited on 2014-08-07) for more information on additional draft papers, e.g. Camber and Schutte (2012).} By now, Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007) have also developed a sub-national version of their “Relative Political Capacity” measure. Johnson (2007) uses these data in her dissertation and finds that regions where state capacity is low and declining are the most likely to experience the most severe conflict. Unfortunately, Fjelde (2009b, p. 24) lacks such sub-national data on the variations in governance in her analysis of the sub-national determinant of non-state armed conflicts in Nigeria. Others
rely on more innovative country-level indicators in order to capture the reach or capacity of states. For instance, Holtermann (2012, p. 56) finds his measures (road density, telephone density and the percentage of the urban population) to be more powerful than depth of poverty and lowered economic opportunity costs in order to explain why civil wars tended to occur in economically less developed countries during the post-Cold War era. Within his study, the well-known negative association between GDP per capita and civil war risk disappears when controlling for state reach.

These outcomes are mostly supported by the results of prior studies using national-level data on state fragility or related concepts. These studies found high bureaucratic quality to be strongly associated with civil peace in autocratic regimes (Öberg and Melander 2010), with the ability of governments to avoid rebel victory but also with a long duration of fighting (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Hegre and Nygard (2012) report that especially informal aspects of good governance (the quality of the bureaucratic apparatus and the level of political corruption) significantly affect the risk of a renewed outbreak of internal armed conflict, Fjelde (2009a) concludes that increasing corruption associates with an increased risk of conflict onset (except in oil rich states) while others find high levels of political corruption to be related to political instability (Le Billon 2003; Mauro 1995). So far, research has also found high levels of state capacity (especially extractive and administrative capacity) to reduce countries’ risk of internal armed conflict (Fjelde 2009a) and to determine the location of internal warfare: the stronger the state (in terms of relative political capacity), the further away from the capital the civil war will be located (Buhaug 2010). High levels of state capacity also help to avoid that a state will become infected by a civil conflict occurring in neighboring territories (Braithwaite 2010) and high levels of state capacity link with economic factors, e.g. increasing growth rates, high levels of private investment and decreasing inflation, that have been found decisive in reducing the risk of armed conflict.

Because all of these studies only cover conventional (state-based) armed conflicts, it again remains unclear in how far their results change if all kinds of internal armed conflict are included. The following empirical analysis therefore aims to contribute to this state of the art by studying whether state fragility correlates with the incidence of a certain kind of internal armed conflict. More precisely, I expect that the more fragile a country the more likely the outbreak of non-conventional (non-state) internal armed conflict. Because increasing levels of state fragility can be plausibly linked to both state-based and non-state armed conflicts, because the New Wars concept remains imprecise in this regard and because prior research suggests that different types of state fragility exert different effects on political stability, I have announced a slight modification of the above hypothesis. The argument is based on the aforementioned observation that countries score surprisingly different on single state fragility indicators/dimensions. For instance, the Philippines perform above average on the political and social welfare components of statehood but within the bottom quintile in terms of security as measured by the

49See Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007, p. 3) for an overview.
17. Data on the Political Context

State Weakness Index of the Brookings Institutions in 2008 (Rice and Patrick, 2008, p. 20). Back then, the countries’ overall state weakness score (and its GNI per capita) almost equaled that of Syria. However, in terms of social welfare Syria belonged to the top quintile and its security score is comparatively good while it ranked among the bottom quintile in terms of the economic and political dimensions of state weakness.

Obviously, the nature of state weakness greatly varies between these two countries despite their equal aggregate scores. Ignoring this variance means a lumping together of rather diverse cases of state weakness. A more sophisticated way of theorizing the relationship between state fragility and armed conflict which takes this variance into account argues that the nature of state fragility might be important in order to explain the kind of warfare that emerges. Accordingly, certain dimensions of state fragility are especially decisive in order to explain the outbreak of the one or the other kind of internal armed conflict: Failure to provide public services and goods and the resulting lack of state legitimacy are expected to be necessary conditions for the outbreak of conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. In such contexts, armed groups even aim to replace state authorities. Within the territories they control, they build infrastructure, collect taxes and provide public goods and services. Maedl et al. (2011, p. 64) add that they might mediate conflicts and have international representations, be involved in extensive legal and illegal international trade networks and sponsor “diplomatic” relationships with sovereign states and other movements. The local population starts to sympathize with the insurgency, which uses its growing legitimacy to mobilize fighters. Initially, the situation might stabilize until the insurgency has grown big enough to move to the next stage (the guerrilla warfare stage). A different conflict scenario might arise in states that are doing fairly well in terms of the provision of public goods and services and enjoy legitimacy but fail to fully provide security. In such a context, popular support for a grievance-based insurgency is comparatively low. However, the lack of state effectiveness and authority in combination with the occurrence of conflict resources might be sufficient for the emergence of non-state violent actors and fighting between them, e.g. over the rents derived from resource extraction. Although some of these warlords might start collecting taxes, too, they do so for the purpose of private enrichment instead of the provision of public goods and services.

Two sub-indices of the State Fragility Index (SFI) are especially suitable to explore whether certain dimensions of state fragility relate to certain types of internal armed conflict. In line with the above stated, I expect a lack of overall state legitimacy and functionality (as measured by the “SFI State Legitimacy Index” and the SFI sub-Index II) to be significantly and positively correlated with the incidence of conventional (state-based) armed conflict while the “SFI State Effectiveness Index” (which measures the

---

50 The Philippines rank 58 and Syria 59 (out of 141 states) on this index.
51 See http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/02/weak-states-index (visited on 2013-08-20).
52 E.g. Maedl et al. (2011, p. 65) report that warlords in Somalia “were able to collect taxes and tolls from the local population in the areas under control. However, most of them were not committed to providing any public goods and services in return”. 

226
overall level of state effectiveness and authority independent from armed conflict) should be significantly and positively related to the incidence of non-conventional (non-state) armed conflict. The “BTI Failed State Index” and the Polity IV “Polity Fragmentation Indicator” measure the existence and scope of a state monopoly on the use of force. For this reason, both seem valid measures of a lack of authority and state effectiveness, too, and are also expected to especially relate to the outbreak of non-state armed conflicts.

I would like to close this section on state fragility measures with some remarks on the issue of reverse causation. The fact that state fragility and armed conflict are endogenous to each other has repeatedly been mentioned as a theoretical challenge. Endogeneity, however, also violates the core assumptions of regression models and for this reason affects any empirical analysis on this matter. Research exploring the effect of state weakness on armed conflict needs to include an “instrumental variable”, i.e. a measure of the explanatory variable (state fragility) that remains entirely independent from the outcome variable (e.g. conflict experience, the duration of warfare etc.) in order to rule out reverse causation. A more simple and common solution to the problem is the introduction of a sufficiently large time-lag between both variables and to assume that the lagged variable does not anticipate civil warfare and adjusts accordingly. If one wishes to study the effect of state fragility on armed conflict this means to measure state fragility prior to/at the outbreak of armed conflict.

Only some quantitative studies in this field of research are taking the matter of endogeneity seriously and are choosing the appropriate statistical technique to adequately address the issue. The results of these studies are mixed. For instance, Hegre and Nygard (2012) intend to work with a 20-year time-lag between their formal institutions index and their conflict measure. Because back in time they are lacking governance data, they are forced to switch to an alternative index. Their final results indicate that the endogeneity bias in their original model is only “moderate”. They “reach the same conclusions using the instrumented governance variable” (Hegre and Nygard 2012, pp. 28 sq.). Thies (2010) also argues that common measures of state capacity (the total revenue/GDP ratio, the total tax/GDP ratio and relative political capacity) could be endogenous to conflict. For this reason, he employs a simultaneous equations model with the result that his state capacity measures are not significantly related to civil war onset any more.53

---

53 Prior research by the same author found that fiscally-based measures of state capacity do not affect civil war onset but civil war onset reduces state capacity. In addition, state capacity reduces civil war incidence just as civil war incidence reduces the capacity of states. Finally, “with the exception of the oil exporter dummy variable, primary commodities play almost no direct role in civil war onset or incidence. Instead, primary commodities work their direct effects on state capacity in models of civil war onset or incidence” (Thies 2007, p. 2).
17. Data on the Political Context

The requirement of measuring the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of internal armed conflict greatly reduces the number of possible state fragility indices and affects the temporal reach of the respective analysis. Only two of the above presented state fragility measures (the SFI and the World Governance Indicators) cover a more extended period of time. Both measures are available from 1995/1996 onwards. Relying on these measures means a confinement of the sample to those cases of internal armed conflicts which happened afterwards (i.e. between 1996/1997 and 2011). I still follow this approach – at least at the (dyadic) conflict and at the conflict episode level where the sample sizes nevertheless remain impressive.
18. Interim Summary III: The Master-File

Part IV of this book presented and discussed the available data sets that shall be used within the upcoming comparative analysis. Data on the incidence and nature of non-state and state-based internal *wars* are taken from the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” compiled at the Free University of Berlin. Similar data on state-based and non-state internal *armed conflicts* (including low-level violence) are provided by UCDP. Thirdly, I wish to rely on several resources data sets (compiled at the PRIO or by Päivi Lujala and her colleagues) which contain information on the occurrence and production status of diamonds, other gemstones, hydrocarbons and drugs. Finally, I have identified seven state fragility measures which I will use in order to capture the political context of internal armed conflict/warfare.

Merging data from these various sources required substantive formatting because some of the original data sets were available on a dyad- or country-year basis while others were collected on the (dyadic) conflict level or country level. Inconsistent coding of dates and typing errors in the original data sets also had to be set aright.¹ At last, I arrived at the “Master-File” which provides the basis for the following empirical analyses. All conflict

¹The start and end dates of conflict episodes in UCDP’s “Conflict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1) and in UCDP’s “Non-State Conflicts Dataset” (v.2.4-2012) are formatted inconsistently. Opening the original files with Excel caused further changes in the format. I counted five different formats (31-12-2011, 12-31-2011, 2011-12-31, 2011-31-12 and 31-Dec-2011) which I standardize into ISO 8601, i.e. YYYY-MM-DD (the internationally agreed way to represent dates). This is important in order to correctly calculate the duration of episodes in days. In addition, the start and end dates of five conflict episodes were mixed up in the original data sets which I corrected (this concerned the first episodes of the state-based conflict with the dyad ID 251 and the non-state conflicts with the conflict IDs 155, 379, 174 and 33). Furthermore, the number of episodes was incorrect in the case of the state-based conflict with the dyad ID 433. This conflict splits in two episodes (instead of one) which I also corrected manually. Typing errors resulted in incorrect information about the precision of start dates in three cases of state-based armed conflict (see dyad ID 209, 411 and 243). The respective parameters have been set aright and now assume the values of 5, 2 and 1 (instead of 15, 12 and 11). Another manual change I made concerns the non-state armed conflicts with the conflict IDs 150, 128 and 378. In two of these cases, the location of fighting shifted to a neighboring country over time: Fighting between the Toposa and Turkana started in Sudan and later erupted in Kenya while the Ogaden and Sheikal Clans first fought each other in Somalia and later in neighboring Ethiopia. In the third case, fighting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks continued in Kyrgyzstan (in 2010) after the original location of fighting in 1990 (the Soviet Union) had ceased to exist. In all three cases, the dyads involved in fighting stayed the same which is why the dyad IDs do not change. In order to account for the changes in location, I introduced a “country2” variable which contains the additional country names while the “country” variable now mentions the location of origin of all conflicts.
and resources data sets used in this analysis depart from K. S. Gleditsch and Ward (1999, p. 398) list of independent states. For this reason, the Master-File also contains all independent states (175 at the end of 2012\(^2\)) defined by these authors as polities (excluding so-called “microstates” with less than 250,000 inhabitants) that enjoy “an independent and relatively autonomous administration over some territory” and that are “considered a distinct entity by local actors or the states they are dependent on.”\(^3\)

I then added information on the incidence of internal warfare at the country level. I used the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.3/v.1.1) to count the number of state-based and non-state internal wars a country has been involved in, the number of country-years spent in state-based and non-state internal warfare as well as the temporal overlap of different kinds of internal warfare (i.e. the number of country-years spent in multiple state-based internal wars or in both kinds of internal warfare) between 1946 and 2009. For each independent state and the post-Cold war era (1989-2009), I added UCDP data on the incidence of armed conflicts. More precisely, I relied on UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” (v.2.4-2012) and UCDP’s “Battle-Related Deaths Dataset” (v.5-2012b)\(^4\) to count the number of state-based and non-state dyadic armed conflicts a country has been involved in and to obtain the corresponding (best, high and low)

\(^2\)From Gleditsch/Ward’s list of independent states I excluded more than thirty historical cases that had ceased to exist before 1946 (e.g. Prussia 1816-1945 or Orange Free State 1854-1910). Six formerly independent states (Zanzibar 1963-1964, Tibet 1913-1950, The German Democratic Republic 1949-1990, The People’s Republic of Yemen 1969-1990, The Republic of Vietnam 1954-1975 and Czechoslovakia 1919-1992) ceased to exist during the period under study. By now, the territories of these states are part of the countries of Tanzania, China, Germany, Yemen, Vietnam and The Czech Republic and included as such. The Former Republic of Yugoslavia 1918-2006 is included in the Gleditsch/Ward’s list of independent states as well as the smaller states into which this nation disintegrated in 2006. Cases like Greenland (an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark), French Polynesia and French Guiana (overseas regions of France), Hong Kong (a special administrative region of China), Puerto Rico (an unincorporated territory of the US), several semi-autonomous small islands that remain under foreign administration (e.g. American Samoa, Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands or Martinique) as well as West Bank and Gaza are per definition excluded from the Gleditsch/Ward list of independent states. Newly independent states with more than 250,000 inhabitants (South Sudan 2011-present, Kosovo 2008-present, Montenegro 2006-present, Serbia 2006-present and East Timor 2002-present) are covered by the Gleditsch/Ward list and part of this study as well.

\(^3\)This understanding of an independent state is slightly more encompassing than UCDP/PRIO’s definition of a sovereign state. According to UCDP/PRIO, “a state” is either an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory (see e.g. the UCDP/PRIO “Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, v.4-2014", at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (visited on 2014-07-20) ). If microstates are taken into consideration Gleditsch/Ward’s list of independent states and UCDP/PRIO’s list of sovereign states mostly concur. Only the sovereignty dates differ in a few cases and UCDP/PRIO include one additional microstate (Hyderabad) which Gleditsch/Ward do not consider independent as they were unable to find evidence of any states recognizing this polity. For version 5.0 of the Gleditsch/Ward list of independent states see http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html (visited on 2013-06-25) . This version is updated through 31 December 2012 and was posted on 14 March 2013.

\(^4\)I used the dyad-year version of this data set and included internal armed conflicts only.
estimates of battle-related deaths per country. I again included indicators measuring
the duration of both kinds of internal armed conflict and their temporal overlap (i.e. the number of country-years affected by (at least one) state-based armed conflict, the number of country-years affected by (at least one) non-state armed conflict and the number of country-years affected by both kinds of internal armed conflict). Despite the conflict data, I added PRIO data on the occurrence and production of conflict resources (primary and/or secondary diamonds, other gemstones, drugs and onshore and offshore oil/gas) also at the country level. Dummy variables indicate whether these resources were known to occur or produced within the respective country prior to/during the occurrence of the first internal war (of any kind). Finally, each country was assigned its level of state weakness as provided by the averages of the above-mentioned measures.

The war-level version of the Master-File is based on data provided by the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” and covers all cases of internal warfare between 1945 and 2009. Dummies indicate whether warfare was non-state or state-based in nature and whether government troops or leftovers are mentioned as one of the violent actors. Minimum and maximum estimates of the number of battle-related deaths are available for most of the post-1989 cases, only. In addition, the number of involved actors (and their names) as well as the number of parties to each case of internal warfare are given. The duration of warfare is also provided (in years) in addition to information on the level of state fragility in the country where warfare took place (I again used the average values of the available indicators) and information on the occurrence and production of conflict resources. At this level of analysis, it is possible to account for a temporal overlap between the known occurrence or the actual production of conflict resources and the incidence of internal warfare. The data set therefore captures whether conflict resources had been known to occur or had been produced prior to/during each case of internal warfare.

The conflict-level version of the Master-File contains UCDP/PRIO data on all (dyadic) internal armed conflicts happening between 1989 and 2011. Dummies indicate whether an internal armed conflict belongs to UCDP’s category of a non-state, state-based or internationalized state-based armed conflict. Best, high and low estimates of battle-related deaths measure the intensity of fighting. Again, the data set provides information on the occurrence and production of conflict resources at the national level and prior to/during each case of internal armed conflict. Information on the level of

---

5Data on the occurrence and production of conflict resources is entirely missing for five newly independent states (South Sudan, Kosovo, East Timor, Montenegro and Serbia). I added information at least on oil/gas and diamond deposits by relying on the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and, in the case of East Timor, more detailed information provided by the Revenue Watch Institute (http://www.revenuwatch.org/countries/asia-pacific/timor-leste/extractive-industries).  
6Again, SFI data on one newly independent state (South Sudan) was entirely missing. I imputed the average value of the country (Sudan) from which South Sudan has broken away in 2011.  
7State weakness data do not reach back to the 1940s. For this reason, it is impossible to identify the level of state weakness prior to/at the outbreak of each case of internal warfare.
state fragility is also given – if data allow one year prior to the outbreak of fighting to minimize the possibility of reverse causation. Finally, the data set gives the actors’ names, their organizational level and for each case of internal armed conflict counts the active years of fighting.

In order to measure the duration of fighting, the latter, however, is a rather rough indicator. It ignores that within a conflict or war-affected year, active fighting often only happens during one or several short period(s) of time – sometimes just a few days. In many cases, fighting between two actors quickly results in 25 battle-related deaths and reaches the yearly threshold in order to be included in UCDP’s data sets. After a short while fighting levels-off though it might re-escalate later. Each dyadic conflict then splits into several conflict episodes (as defined by UCDP’s “Conflict Termination Dataset”) of various length. For each dyadic conflict, I therefore count the number of conflict episodes and, in a next step, further disaggregate each case of dyadic armed conflict into single conflict episodes in order to more precisely measure the duration of fighting. For this purpose, I use the exact start and end dates of state-based conflict episodes and the respective precision variables provided by UCDP’s “Conflict Termination Dataset” (v.2010-1). Compatible information on the exact duration of non-state conflict episodes is provided by UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” (v.2.4-2012). Unfortunately, the former data set has not been updated since 2009 which is why the conflict-episode version of the Master-File only covers the period from 1989 to 2009. Because the data file also indicates whether fighting is non-state or state-based in nature, it can later be used to compare the duration (in days, months and years) of state-based and non-state conflict episodes which happened during these twenty years. Again, the names of both actors involved in each conflict-episode and their organizational levels are reported. Besides, the data set informs about the occurrence and production of conflict resources prior to/during each conflict-episode and, if available, the level of state weakness prior to/at the outbreak of each conflict-episode.

The SFI and WGI measures of state weakness fairly cover the post-Cold War era and can therefore be used to provide for this kind of information at the conflict level where the corresponding Master-File only covers the 1989-2011 period.

Several cases of internal armed conflict were still ongoing at the point of time when the original UCDP data had been compiled. I assigned December 31st, 2009 as the episode end date to all ongoing state-based conflict episodes because the source (UCDP’s “Conflict Termination Dataset”, v.2010-1) covers such cases up to the end of 2009. Likewise, I assigned December 31st, 2011 as a fictive episode end date to all ongoing non-state conflict episodes because the source (UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset”, v.2.4-2012) covers such cases up to the end of 2011. One month/year lasts for 30/365 days. If a state-based conflict-episode is assigned a start and end date with a precision of one, the quality of data allows for the calculation of the duration of this conflict-episode in days. If both precision variables assume a value of three (or lower), the duration can at best be calculated in months. Any value above allows for the calculation of the duration of state-based conflict episodes in years, only. If a non-state conflict-episode is assigned a start and end date with a precision of one, three (or lower) or five (or lower), the quality of data allows for the calculation of the duration of non-state conflict episodes in days, months or years. In the remaining cases (if the precision variables assume a value of six or seven) even the year is assigned based on subjective judgment or entirely missing. For information on the coding of the precision variables see the respective codebooks.
Lastly, some information on internal armed conflicts is available at the actor level through UCDP’s “Actor Dataset” (v.2.1-2012). The **actor-level version** of the Master-File lists all violent groups that have been involved in at least one state-based internal armed conflict, in at least one non-state internal armed conflict as well as those violent groups who have committed one or several acts of one-sided violence between 1989 and 2011. The data set reports the actors’ names, the country/countries where they had been active and their levels of organization. In addition, the data set provides information on how these actors were created (whether they broke away from another violent group, whether they were created by a temporary split in the original movement or whether they had entered into an alliance with another non-state actor). I supplemented data on the political context in which these actors were operating, i.e. on the national and average level of state weakness of the country/countries where they had been fighting. Finally, dummies indicate whether a violent group had been active in at least one country where conflict resources occur or are produced.

Overall, the Master-File contains five sub-sets of data that differ in terms of their level of analysis. This conditions the number of observations and the kind of variables they include. The country-level version of the Master-File covers the period from 1946 to 2009 and 175 independent states, the war-level version of the Master-File covers the period from 1946 to 2009 and 138 cases of internal warfare, the conflict-level version of the Master-File covers 690 cases of dyadic internal armed conflict between 1989 and 2011, the conflict-episode version of the Master-File includes 815 conflict episodes happening between 1989 and 2009 and the actor-level data set provides information on 1,110 violent groups who have been involved in internal armed conflict and/or acts of one-sided violence between 1989 and 2011. Several variables are only available at certain levels of analysis (e.g. only the war-level version counts the number of parties to each case of internal warfare and includes a dummy indicating whether an external military intervention took place while information on the organizational level of the involved actors can only be provided at the conflict, at the conflict episode and at the actor level. Information on the exact duration of fighting in days, months and years is only included in the conflict-episode version of the Master-File). Of course, all observations contained in the Master-File and its sub-sets are assigned unique identifiers (e.g. war names or conflict, dyad or actor IDs) and the regional affiliation of each country, war, armed conflict, conflict episode and violent actor is reported. A codebook of all variables and indicators that are included in the Master-File is given by appendix D.1 on page 385 while appendix D.2 on page 398 lists all data sources.

---

10UCDP requires all actor who engaged in state-based armed conflict and who committed acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians to be formally organized in order to be included in its data sets. The level of organization therefore only varies for those actors who engaged in non-state armed conflict.

11In cases where violent groups had been active in several countries, I used the respective averages of these two countries. However, more than 90 percent of the violent non-state groups had been active in one country, only.

12In addition, the conflict-episode version of the Master-File contains 234 state-based episodes happening before the end of the Cold War.
Part V.

Hypotheses
Data on armed conflicts are currently collected and analyzed on the basis of well-established criteria like the participation of an (internationally recognized) state as one of the warring parties, a political objective and the exchange of violence in battles. Recent trends in warfare, however, imply that the importance of all three elements is decreasing. Today, fighting is often taking place between non-state actors in failing or already failed states, the objectives of warfare and low-intensity armed conflicts are often economic instead of political and warring factions are frequently targeting unarmed civilians instead of military opponents. The recognition of these phenomena or changes not only lead to the development of new theoretical concepts as discussed earlier but also gave rise to the collection of new data sets on non-state or sub-state wars and conflicts, on the occurrence and production of conflict resources, on one-sided violence against civilians and state failure. These data which I have also described and discussed in detail significantly improve scientific research in this field of study – though major gaps in data collection persist.

The following empirical analysis uses two of these innovative data sets that provide information on the incidence of violent battle between exclusively non-state actors. If there is some truth to the concept of New Wars, these non-conventional (non-state) armed conflicts should rather match the ideal type of New Warfare as compared with conventional (state-based) armed conflicts. This should hold for their political context as well as for all dimensions of internal fighting because New Wars and Conflicts are believed to be characterized by the coincidence of specific characteristics. More precisely, the following empirical analysis tries to uncover whether non-conventional (non-state) internal wars and conflicts tend to occur in more fragile states, whether they are characterized by a comparatively high number of involved actors whose nature (e.g. their level of organization) also differs, whether they stand out in terms of economic motives, whether they are more brutal in terms of overall battle-deaths, whether violence is especially directed against civilians and whether they last significantly longer compared with conventional (state-based) internal wars and conflicts. In addition, the above presented new data sets are used to investigate changes over time, e.g. in the incidence and significance of non-state and state-based internal fighting. Does the downward trend in the incidence and intensity of internal armed conflict between the mid-1990s and the beginning of the 21st century as indicated by conventional conflict data sets reflect a genuine worldwide decline or is it a reflection of the definition and codification of internal armed conflict? Does it persist if all kinds of internal armed conflict, state-based and non-state, are taken into account? Along the way, I have also refined some of the main theses of the concept of New Wars and aimed to better link the dimensions of New Warfare. This resulted in several additional associative hypotheses which are part of the now following full list of trends and hypotheses that shall and can be explored within the upcoming empirical analysis (for an overview see table C.1 on page 383).
Main Trend and Comparative Hypotheses

Overall Trend

H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state internal wars/conflicts/conflict episodes became the dominant kind of internal fighting [H1] or are at least of growing significance [H1a].

Comparative Hypotheses on the Quantity and Quality of Violent Actors

H2 The number of national armed groups involved in non-state internal wars is significantly higher as compared with state-based internal wars.

Hypothesis 2 only applies to the war level, because at the conflict and at the conflict episode level an internal armed conflict is defined as “dyadic”, i.e. the number of involved groups of actors always equals “2” and displays no variance.

H3 The likelihood of an external military intervention is significantly higher in non-state internal wars as compared with state-based internal wars.

H3a Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conflict emerged significantly more often by breaking away from another violent group or by a temporary split in the original movement as compared with formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal conflict.

Violent non-state actors who engaged in non-state conflict per definition differ from those who have been involved in state-based fighting: UCDP requires the latter to be formally organized in order to be included in its data sets whereas the level of organization of those actors who engaged in non-state conflict varies between informally and formally organized groups. In order not to compare apples with oranges, it is therefore necessary to restrict Hypothesis 3a to formally organized non-state actors only.

Comparative Hypotheses on the Role of Conflict Resources

H4/H4a Conflict resources (especially easily accessible and lootable conflict resources like secondary diamonds, other gemstones or drugs) occur/are produced significantly more often in countries that are experiencing non-state fighting as compared with countries that are experiencing state-based fighting. Conflict resources (especially easily accessible and lootable conflict resources) are known to occur/produced significantly more often prior to or during non-state fighting as compared with state-based
Violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conflict are significantly more likely to operate in a country/countries where conflict resources (especially where easily accessible and lootable conflict resources) occur or are produced as compared with violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal conflict.

**H4b** Conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydrocarbons) occur/are produced significantly more often in countries that are experiencing state-based fighting as compared with countries that are experiencing non-state fighting. Conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot are known to occur/produced significantly more often prior to or during state-based fighting as compared with non-state fighting. Violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal conflict are significantly more likely to operate in a country/countries where conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot occur/are produced as compared with violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conflict.

### Comparative Hypotheses on the Scale and Nature of Violence

**H5** Non-state fighting results in significantly more direct, battle-related deaths as compared with state-based fighting.

Within the data section I have mentioned that information on the nature of applied violence is mostly lacking especially if one wishes to study a large number and all kinds of internal armed conflict. The share of *civilian* battle-related deaths in overall battle-deaths remains unknown as well as the number of *indirect* victims as opposed to direct ones. Only at the actor level, UCDP informs whether violent groups committed acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians during or besides their engagement in state-based or non-state internal armed conflict. Because UCDP just counts acts of one-sided violence if they are committed by formally recognized and permanently organized violent groups, Hypothesis 5a again restricts itself to this kind of actors:

**H5a** Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state armed conflict commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians significantly more often as compared with formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in state-based armed conflict.

### Comparative Hypothesis on the Duration of Fighting

**H6** Non-state fighting lasts significantly longer as compared with state-based fighting.
Comparative Hypotheses on the Political Context

**H7** The degree of state fragility is significantly worse in countries experiencing non-state fighting as compared with countries experiencing state-based fighting. | The degree of state fragility is significantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of non-state fighting as compared with state-based fighting. | Violent non-state actors who engage in non-state conflict are operating in significantly more fragile countries as compared with violent non-state actors who engage in state-based conflict.

Furthermore, I suggested that the nature of state fragility matters in order to explain the kind of internal warfare that arises. This leads to Hypotheses 7a and 7b:

**H7a** The degree of state fragility in terms of state effectiveness and authority is significantly worse in countries experiencing non-state fighting as compared with countries experiencing state-based fighting. | The degree of state fragility in terms of state effectiveness and authority is significantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of non-state fighting as compared with state-based fighting. | Violent non-state actors who engage in non-state conflict are operating in significantly more fragile countries in terms of state effectiveness and authority than violent non-state actors who engage in state-based conflict.

**H7b** The degree of state fragility in terms of state functionality in the delivery of public goods and services and state legitimacy is significantly worse in countries experiencing state-based fighting as compared with countries experiencing non-state fighting. | The degree of state fragility in terms of state functionality in the delivery of public goods and services and state legitimacy is significantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of state-based fighting as compared with non-state fighting. | Violent non-state actors who engage in state-based conflict are operating in significantly more fragile countries in terms of state functionality in the delivery of public goods and services and state legitimacy than violent non-state actors who engage in non-state conflict.

At times, I have already dared to take a first and quick glance at the data sets that are available in order to systematically explore the above presented hypotheses. The results of earlier studies neither seem to speak in favor of the overall trend nor do proposed differences between sub-types of internal armed conflict find much support. Contrary to the concept of New Wars the number of non-state armed conflicts seems to be declining (most notably in sub-Saharan Africa) and numbers of battle-deaths are decreasing particularly (but not exclusively) for non-state armed conflicts which also do not seem to last very long. Nevertheless, caution is appropriate given the fact that these insights are derived from empirical studies that are not only of a limited temporal reach but also tend to report highly aggregate figures. Worldwide averages might mask real differences within and across regions. In addition, earlier empirical research only
investigates some of the trends and theses of interest to this analysis, it almost exclusively relies on UCDP or PRIO data and rarely is comparative in nature. To overcome these shortcomings, the following aims to tap the full potential of popular\textsuperscript{13} and less popular new data sets\textsuperscript{14}, experiments with the measurement of variables and concepts and covers different levels of analysis.

**Associative Hypotheses Linking the Dimensions of Fighting**

Two of the above theses (H1 and H1a) are predicting temporal trends. The others are specifying differences in means between sub-groups of countries, actors, wars, armed conflicts or conflict episodes (e.g. between non-state and state-based internal wars) in regard to a single dimension of internal fighting. These hypotheses will be explored within the comparative cross-sectional study presented below. A long the road, however, I have also mentioned a couple of associative or even causal hypotheses that are specifying the relationship between at least two variables (one dependent and at least one independent variable) representing different dimensions of internal fighting. These hypotheses will be subject to regression analysis later on and are kept as general as possible. Only if they include the “level of organization” or “acts of one-sided violence” as the dependent or independent variable they restrict themselves to sub-sets of actors or conflicts, i.e. to formally organized groups who have been involved in state-based and/or non-state internal armed conflicts or to formally and informally organized groups who engaged in non-state armed conflict, only. These restrictions are again due to UCDP’s coding rules. As already mentioned, UCDP’s data sets only cover state-based armed conflicts between one (or several) formally organized non-state actor(s) and government troops while the organizational level of those who engage in non-state armed conflict is allowed to vary between “1” (formally recognized rebel groups who are permanently organized for combat), “2” (informally and non-permanently organized groups composed of members or supporters of political parties and candidates) and “3” (informally and non-permanently organized groups composed of members of broader categories of identification, e.g. clans, ethnic or religious groups). A similar bias in the data arises from the fact that UCDP only counts acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians if they are committed by formally organized groups. Such data cannot be used to explore whether informally organized armed groups are more likely to engage in acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally organized armed groups.

\textsuperscript{13}UCDP/PRIO’s data on violent actors, non-state and state-based internal armed conflicts, diamond deposits and oil/gas reserves.

\textsuperscript{14}The “New/Consolidated List of Wars”, data on gemstones other than diamonds and drugs, as well as various state weakness measures.
If the nature of applied violence constitutes the dependent variable, the analysis therefore needs to be confined to formally organized groups. Then, it is however possible to explore whether formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/countries where conflict resources occur or are produced are more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/countries where no such resources occur or are produced (Hypothesis 8). The level of state-weakness serves as an alternative explanation because the weaker the state in which formally organized violent non-state groups are operating, the more likely they might be to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (Hypothesis 9).

**Associative Hypotheses Explaining the Nature of Violence**

**H8** Formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/countries where conflict resources occur/are produced are more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/countries where no such resources occur/are produced.

**H9** The weaker the state in which formally organized violent non-state groups are operating, the more likely they are to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians.

In addition, I suggested that the level of state fragility impacts upon the duration of internal fighting – though the effect might differ between kinds of conflict. So far, two reasons have been mentioned supporting the expectation that the more fragile the state, the longer the duration of non-state armed conflicts (Hypothesis 10). I argued that weak states act less timely and take less rigorous measures to stop ongoing fighting between non-state forces. In addition, weak statehood facilitates the mobilization of fighters based on ethnic or religious grounds and in this way links with the use of identity politics and a long duration of warfare. The effect of state fragility on the duration of fighting might, however, be different in the case of state-based armed conflict where state fragility is more than just a context factor. There, weak states are an active party to the conflict. Thus, the weaker the state, the shorter the duration of state-based armed conflicts (Hypothesis 10a) because weak statehood increases the chances for the rebels to win quickly. The weaker the government, the sooner the rebels dare to openly attack state forces in their effort to topple the government whereas in situations where they face strong governments they apply their hit and run tactic. If they suffer setbacks they retreat and regain strength. Their inability to beat the relatively strong government once and for all, combined with their strong motivation to keep on fighting until they finally win, then explains the long duration of conventional (state-based) internal armed
Despite the level of state fragility, the occurrence and production of conflict resources might also explain the duration of internal fighting. Especially countries with a known occurrence or production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources are expected to spend significantly more time in internal fighting as compared with countries without a known occurrence or production of such resources. Likewise, wars, armed conflicts or conflict episodes are expected to last significantly longer if at the same time conflict resources are known to occur or are produced within the respective country (Hypothesis 11). Thirdly, the number of involved groups of actors might matter in this regard: the larger the number of national armed groups involved in an internal war, the longer the duration of warfare (Hypothesis 12). Finally, the organizational level of the involved groups of actors has previously been linked with the duration of fighting. Due to the above mentioned bias in the data, the corresponding hypothesis restricts itself to non-state internal armed conflicts or conflict episodes which I expect to be of a significantly longer duration if they are fought amongst informally organized groups as opposed to formally organized groups (Hypothesis 13).

Associative Hypotheses Explaining the Duration of Fighting

H10 The more fragile a state before/at the outbreak of fighting, the shorter the duration of state-based internal wars, conflicts or conflict episodes [H10] but the longer the duration of non-state internal wars, conflicts or conflict episodes [H10a].

H11 At the war level, the (dyadic) conflict level and at the conflict episode level, internal fighting lasts significantly longer if at the same time conflict resources are known to occur/produced within the respective country.

H12 The larger the number of national armed groups involved in an internal war, the longer the duration of warfare.

H13 Non-state internal conflicts or conflict episodes are of a significantly longer duration if they are fought amongst informally organized groups as opposed to formally organized groups.

The organizational level of actors might also help to explain the scale of applied violence. More precisely, I expect non-state internal armed conflicts between informally organized groups to be significantly more intense than non-state internal armed conflicts between formally organized groups (Hypothesis 14).

15“Paradoxically, [...], a strong army, or state, may increase the chances that the rebels will decide to quit engaging in direct combat, which prolongs the war and limits the ability of the government to gain a decisive victory. [...] In addition, a strong army may increase the grievance against the government, which increases the viability of the rebels. This translates into state capacity having a limited effect on the probability of government victory, while it increases the duration to that outcome” (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, pp. 307 sq.).
18. Interim Summary III

**Associative Hypothesis Explaining the Intensity of Fighting**

**H14** Non-state internal conflicts between informally organized groups are significantly more intense (in terms of battle-related deaths) as compared with non-state internal conflicts between formally organized groups.

Lastly, the *quality and quantity of involved actors* are interesting dependent variables themselves that well connect with the political context of internal fighting as well as with structural factors like the occurrence or production of conflict resources. This leads to the expectation that non-state conflicts or non-state conflict episodes which are happening at times when conflict resources are known to occur or produced are significantly more likely to be fought amongst informally organized dyads as compared with non-state armed conflicts or non-state conflict episodes which are happening at times when no such resources are known to occur or produced. Likewise, violent non-state groups who are fighting non-state armed conflicts in a country/countries where conflict resources occur or are produced are significantly more likely to be informally organized as compared with violent non-state groups who are fighting non-state armed conflicts in a country/countries where no such resources occur or are produced (Hypothesis 15). In addition, the level of state weakness is expected to be positively correlated with the number of involved violent actors: the weaker the state where internal warfare is taking place, the larger the number of national armed groups involved in warfare (Hypothesis 16).

**Associative Hypotheses Explaining the Quality and Quantity of Violent Actors**

**H15** Non-state conflicts or conflict episodes which are happening at times when conflict resources are known to occur/produced are significantly more likely to be fought amongst informally organized dyads as compared with non-state conflicts or non-state conflict episodes which are happening at times when no such resources are known to occur/produced within the conflict-affected state. Violent non-state groups who are fighting non-state conflicts in a country/countries where conflict resources occur/are produced are significantly more likely to be informally organized as compared with violent non-state groups who are fighting non-state conflicts in a country/countries where no such resources occur/are produced.

**H16** The weaker the state where internal warfare is taking place, the larger the number of national armed groups involved in warfare.
Part VI.

Analyses
19. Methods of Analysis

For the most part, the following presents the outcome of a comparative cross-sectional study. This class of research method involves two subsets of a population (e.g. non-state internal wars vs. state-based internal wars) which are at the same point of time compared with respect to different independent variables (e.g. their intensity or duration of fighting). Depending on the level of measurement of the independent variables and the number of observations in the sample, I calculate non-parametric or parametric tests (Student t-Tests for two independent groups with unequal and equal variances, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, Chi-squared-tests or F-tests)¹ in order to figure out whether differences in means between the two subsets of the population are statistically significant, e.g. whether non-state fighting is characterized by a significantly larger number of involved actors, whether it happens significantly more often in a context where conflict resources are known to occur or are produced, whether it happens in significantly weaker states, whether it causes significantly more battle-related deaths or whether it is of a significantly longer average duration as compared with state-based internal fighting.

Later on, (OLS or logistic) regression analysis is used in order to explore the relationship between variables (in this case the linkages between dimensions of internal fighting, e.g. the question whether the number of involved actors significantly and positively correlates with the duration of internal warfare).²

¹For two independent groups, the means of continuous variables are compared by Student t-Tests. This parametric test requires at least interval data, assumes that the data are normally distributed and that the variances of the two sub-samples are sufficiently similar. If these assumptions are not met because data are not normally distribute they can be normalized by transformation (in the case of positively skewed data, the logarithmic values of the observations are taken and in the case of negatively skewed data, the squared values of the observations are taken). If an acceptable level of normality cannot be achieved through transformation or in the case of small samples, a non-parametric test of significance can be performed (e.g. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Tests, also known as Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test or Mann-Whitney U-Test). Non-parametric tests make no assumption of the distribution of the data and at least requires ordinal data (i.e. data that can be ranked). If the two groups that shall be compared are not independent from each other, a paired t-test is used. This is the appropriate statistical method to compare a change in outcomes before and after a treatment is applied. If more than two group means shall be compared an analysis of variance (ANOVA) would be the appropriate statistical method for interval/ratio variables (and a Kruskal-Wallis H-test for ordinal variables). The means of discrete or dichotomous variables are compared by Chi-squared tests. In these cases the observed frequency of a measurement is compared with the expected frequency if the null hypothesis were true. Because the test is inappropriate for small samples, a Fisher’s Exact Probability Test (F-test) is used in cases where the expected frequencies are very low (< five percent).

²Regression analysis is applied in order to explore the relationship between a dependent variable and
For all tests, the respective null hypothesis states that there is no statistical difference in means between the two groups being compared or that there is no statistically significant correlation between the dependent and the respective independent variable. Unless otherwise noted, p-values $< 0.05$ are referred to as statistically significant. All empirical outcomes are provided within the Appendix at the very end of this study.\(^3\) Stata/SE 8.0 is the statistical software package used for all data analyses.\(^4\)

Before presenting the results of the comparative and regression analyses, the empirical part of this book starts by tracking changes over time in the incidence and significance of different kinds of internal fighting with the purpose of figuring out whether non-state internal wars, armed conflicts or conflict episodes are the dominant type of internal fighting or at least of growing significance. In order not to lose sight of them, the corresponding hypotheses are mentioned again at the beginning of each of the belonging chapters or paragraphs.

\(^2\)For an overview of the descriptive statistics supporting or disproving Hypotheses 1 and 1a see table E.1 on page 409 (continuing on the following pages). A schematic overview of the results in support of (or against) all the remaining hypotheses see table H.1 on page 420 (continuing on the following page). The regression results in numbers of the selected final models are presented in table G.3 on page 416 (continuing on the following pages). A schematic overview of the significance of the regression results of all baseline models and of all refined models (the selected final models and their variations) are given in table G.1 on page 414 and table G.2 on page 415.

\(^3\)During the analysis I installed several add-ons (e.g. a program called collin to detect multicolinearity) which can be downloaded from within Stata by using the findit command. See \url{http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/} (visited on 2014-08-05).
20. Descriptive Analysis

20.1. The Incidence and Significance of Non-State Wars

H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state internal wars became the dominant kind of internal warfare [H1] or are at least of growing significance [H1a].

The dominance of non-state internal warfare will be measured by the absolute number of non-state internal wars and the number of countries affected by this kind of internal fighting within the respective study period as opposed to the number of state-based internal wars and the number of countries affected thereof. Changes in the share of non-state internal wars capture the growing significance of this kind of internal warfare over time.


However, this rather rough statement can be put into perspective by considering changes over time in the share of non-state internal wars in all annually ongoing internal wars (instead of only looking at the absolute number of non-state wars within the entire study period). A regional analysis as well as a comparison of the pre- and post-Cold War periods also slightly adjusts the above impression.

1This measure does not take country or population sizes into account and considers the total number of countries as a fixed unit. To study the true spatial expansion of non-state fighting (whether it affects single provinces or the entire nation) data on the size of the war or conflict zones would be needed.
20. Descriptive Analysis

Despite their small number, the increasing significance of non-state internal wars, measured by their share in internal warfare, cannot be denied (see fig. 20.1 on the current page). This trend started before the end of the Cold War.

Figure 20.1.: Share of Non-State Internal Wars in All Annually Ongoing Internal Wars (1946-2009), in percent and worldwide. Source: own calculation.

After the end of the Cold War, the significance of non-state internal wars increased stepwise: Between 1989 and 1993 the share of non-state wars in internal warfare grew drastically because this type of warfare gained ground – in absolute as well as relative terms. This supports Hypothesis 1a. In 1995, the share of non-state internal wars reached its all time high of 24 percent. Afterwards it shortly dropped (to 13 percent in 1997) but increased again (to 23 percent in 2002). These more recent developments are not only explained by increasing numbers of annually ongoing non-state wars but also by the decreasing or stagnating incidence of conventional state-based civil wars: The number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars sharply and continuously fell (from 32 in 1992 to 21 in 1996/97) and afterwards stabilized at around 24 while the number non-state wars per year remained high until the mid 1990s, shortly dropped but experienced the just mentioned second phase of growth: Between 1997 and 2002 the number of non-state internal wars per year more than doubled (from three to seven) while the number of state-based internal wars had rarely changed since the mid 1990s.
A comparable leveling-off process in regard to non-state internal wars only set in after 2003. Since then, 14 to 15 percent of internal warfare is non-state in nature (see figs. 20.1 and 20.2 on pages 251–250). Worldwide and during the entire post-Cold War period, about 17 percent of all annually ongoing internal wars have been carried out amongst non-state actors.

Figure 20.2.: Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Wars and Affected Countries (1946-2009), by type of warfare and worldwide. Source: own calculation.

2 After the end of the Cold War, the number of annually ongoing non-state internal wars increased from two (in 1989) to seven or eight in (1992-1995). It again dropped to three (in 1997) before reaching a second high in 2002 of seven ongoing cases. Afterwards, the global number of non-state internal wars per year stabilized at four.

3 In comparison, before the end of the Cold War (between 1946 and 1988) only three percent of all annually ongoing internal wars have been non-state in nature.
20. Descriptive Analysis

After the end of the Cold War, most non-state internal warfare happened in sub-Saharan Africa and in Central and South Asia. Within these two regions, decreasing or stagnating numbers of annually ongoing state-based internal wars at the beginning or mid 1990s were accompanied by simultaneously increasing numbers of non-state internal wars (see fig. 20.3 on the facing page). Still, even in these two regions, the total numbers of annually ongoing non-state wars stayed comparatively low.

At the global level, within the entire post-Cold War period and in every single country-year between 1989 and 2009, the number of annually ongoing non-state internal wars remained far from the number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars. Only in two country-years (1993 and 1996) in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of ongoing non-state wars equaled the number of ongoing state-based wars. If the incidence of state-based internal wars continues to decrease in this region while the number of non-state internal wars stabilizes or even increases, this might be the future scenario. At least in sub-Saharan Africa, non-state internal wars might then dominate internal warfare.

After the end of the Cold War, on average 67 percent of the worldwide and annually ongoing non-state internal wars but only 28 percent of the annually ongoing state-based internal wars happened in sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the end of the Cold War (within the 1946 to 1988 period), both average annual shares stood at about 17 percent (see fig. 20.4 on page 254). Differences in pre- and post-1989 numbers are also grave in the case of Central and South Asia: Before the end of the Cold War, five percent of the annually ongoing state-based internal wars happened in Central and South Asia. For the period from 1989 until 2009, the region’s average annual share stands at 28 percent. In addition, during the post-Cold War era and on average 23 percent of the annually ongoing non-state internal wars took place in this region which experienced its first non-state internal war only in 1992 (in Afghanistan). The rather high average share in annually ongoing non-state wars of the Middle East and North African region prior to the end of the Cold War is due to the non-state war in Lebanon (from 1975 to 1990). Just one other long-lasting non-state war (the one in Chad from 1978 to 1993) and two short non-state wars (one in Cyprus in 1964 and one in Burundi from 1972 to 1973) also affected the pre-1989 era.

4In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of non-state internal wars per year grew from one to six between 1989 and 1993 (while the number of state-based internal wars remained high but mostly constant) before it declined again (to just two ongoing cases in 1997) and stabilized around three to four ongoing cases per year. In Central and South Asia, the number of non-state internal wars per year increased from zero (between 1989 and 1991) to three in 1995. It then also dropped (while the number of state-based internal wars had already started to decline in 1992). Despite the years of 2001 and 2002, the region has seen just one non-state internal war per year since 1997.

5Within the post-Cold War era, the world has seen just 5 non-state (but 23 state-based) internal wars per year on average. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen 3.2 non-state (but 6.5 state-based) internal wars per year on average, Central and South Asia has seen 1.2 non-state (but 6.4 state-based) internal wars per year on average, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania and Europe have seen 0.2 non-state (but 4.5/1 state-based) internal wars per year on average, the Middle East and North Africa has seen 0.1 non-state (but 4 state-based) internal wars per year on average and the Americas have seen zero non-state (but 2.1 state-based) internal wars per year on average.
Figure 20.3.: Numbers of Annually Ongoing Internal Wars and Affected Countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in Central and South Asia (1946-2009), by type of warfare. Source: own calculation.
Figure 20.4.: Average Regional Shares (1946-1988 vs. 1989-2009) in All Annually Ongoing Internal Wars, by type of warfare and in percent. Source: own calculation.
This explains why on average 20 percent of the annually ongoing non-state wars took place in the Middle East and North Africa before the end of the Cold War while after the end of the Cold War the region’s average share stands at four percent, only.

Obviously, the small number of observations – particularly of non-state internal wars happening before 1989 – does not allow for a deduction of real patterns over time. Still, the above examination well reveals a post-Cold War concentration of especially non-state internal wars in sub-Saharan Africa (and to a lesser extent in Central and South Asia). This impression is confirmed by other indicators: For instance, after the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan African countries accounted for 66 percent of all country-years spent in non-state internal warfare while the region’s 1946-1988 share stood at 46 percent only. Again, Central and South Asia is also of concern: this region’s share in country-years spent in non-state internal warfare increased from zero percent (1946-1988) to 24 percent (1989-2009) while the regional share of the Middle East and North Africa decreased from 50 percent prior to the end of the Cold War to two percent afterwards. Though sub-Saharan Africa’s share in new outbreaks of non-state wars appears less dramatic it still is comparatively high: Before and after 1989, the region accounted for 50 percent of the new outbreaks while Central and South Asia’s share increased from 25 percent (1946-1988) to 36 percent (1989-2009). The Middle East and North Africa accounted for 25 percent of the new outbreaks before 1989. After the end of the Cold War, the region has not experienced any further non-state war. Finally, within sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia the shares of non-state internal wars in all annually ongoing internal wars are also steadily increasing or remain comparatively and constantly high (see fig. 20.5 on the following page). Obviously, empirical developments in these two regions determine the overall – and therefore not at all global – trend in the incidence of non-state warfare.
After the end of the Cold War, the regions most hit by non-state internal warfare also experienced the most *state-based* internal wars. In addition, state-based internal wars tend to cluster within certain countries. Between 1946 and 2009, 36 out of 120 state-based internal wars happened in 18 sub-Saharan African states, only 24 took place in the Middle East and North Africa (within ten countries), 21 in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania (in eight countries), 19 in Central and South Asia (in eight countries) and 15 in the Americas (in 12 countries). The average number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars in Central and South Asia almost equals that of sub-Saharan Africa (6.4 versus 6.5). In fact, the number of annually ongoing state-based wars in this region seems to be on a long-term rise while in sub-Saharan Africa it has been decreasing since 2002 (see also fig. 20.5). Accordingly, the regional share of Central and South Asia in the global number of annually ongoing state-based internal wars has been constantly growing while that of sub-Saharan Africa recently declined (see fig. 20.6).

6If UCDP’s regional coding is used, Africa has seen 40 state-based wars (in 19 countries), Asia 27 (in 14 countries), the Middle East 20 (in eight countries), the Americas 15 (in 12 countries) and Europe eight (in six countries).
Since 2004, Central and South Asia is seeing most state-based internal wars per year in the world. Indonesia and Iraq both experienced seven state-based internal wars which is more than the total number of European civil wars (five within four countries) during the entire post-WW II period.

Figure 20.6.: Regional Shares in the Number of All Annually Ongoing State-Based Internal Wars (1946-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.

Because geographic clustering seems to be a common phenomenon, the following discusses the likelihood of a simultaneous experience of several internal wars (of the same or of different type) within a certain country. Between 1946 and 2009, approximately half of all war-torn countries (33 out of 63) experienced more than one internal war. Thirteen states have seen both sub-types of internal warfare (state-based as well as non-state internal wars) while 20 countries experienced several but exclusively state-based internal wars. Especially non-state warfare seems to go hand in hand with state-based internal warfare. Out of those 60 states that have been involved in at least one state-based war, 22 percent experienced at least one additional non-state war. Contrary to this, 81 percent of those 16 countries with non-state war experience have also been involved in at least one state-based internal war. Without implying an immediate temporal sequence, in almost every of these cases a conventional state-based war preceded non-state warfare.\footnote{Only Liberia and Burundi had experienced non-state internal wars before state-based wars broke}
20. Descriptive Analysis

Just one third of those countries that have been involved in several internal wars have seen these wars being carried out simultaneously (i.e. with a temporal overlap of at least one year). However, more than half of those states that experienced both types of internal warfare have been involved in these wars at the same time. Countries which have seen simultaneous state-based and non-state internal warfare remained in this condition for three to four years on average. Contrary to this, states which have been involved in several but exclusively state-based internal wars at the same time have experienced this kind of condition for a comparatively long average duration of ten to eleven years. Within the period of examination, three countries (Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Cyprus) have been involved in non-state warfare only. No single country experienced several non-state wars at the same time.

These results do not support Münkler (2003, p. 21) who, like his colleagues, suggests that New Wars will “determine the course of violence in the twenty-first century in many parts of the world”. Non-state internal wars are not the dominant type of warfare. However, in comparison with conventional state-based internal wars their significance is increasing – especially within post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa. This supports Hypothesis 1a although a global validity seems questionable. In addition, non-state wars often emerge in post-war environments. In such contexts, violent actors are able to resort to already established structures, e.g. (illegal) channels of supply and trade, (ethnic or religious) hatred, weapons, well-trained and war-experienced soldiers as well as new recruits facing low opportunity costs. In such situations state structures might also have collapsed or are at least severely weakened which facilitates the emergence of non-state violent actors who battle each other for the control over resources.

out. Afghanistan, Chad, DRC, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan started with one or several state-based internal wars, then experienced non-state warfare and afterwards either continued with or experienced a new outbreak of one or several state-based internal wars. Lebanon, Somalia and Tajikistan have first seen state-based warfare, than non-state warfare but afterwards no more wars. Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tajikistan experienced a temporal overlap of at least one year of non-state and state-based internal warfare. In Chad, the DRC and Somalia non-state wars broke out immediately (i.e. within one year or less) after conventional state-based wars had ended. Burundi, Kenya, Lebanon and Liberia experienced both types of warfare though never within the same year and with a more extensive period of time in between.

In 1995 and 1996, Tajikistan has been involved in one non-state and one state-based internal war while Afghanistan has experienced the same scenario twice (in 1992 and 2002). Each year from 1999 to 2002, Indonesia experienced a state-based and a non-state internal war (and, for an overall period of six years from 1976 to 1978 and from 1990 to 1992, has been involved in several state-based internal wars). State-based and non-state internal wars also happened at the same time in Nigeria for a total of eight years (from 2002 to 2009) and in Pakistan for a total of four years (from 2006 to 2009). India is the only country that has experienced several state-based internal wars at the same time with non-state warfare (in 2002). This country has been involved in multiple state-based internal wars for 21 years without interruption (from 1989 to 2009). The Philippines, Ethiopia and Sudan are also especially hard-hit in this regard. They carried out two or more conventional civil wars at the same time for as much as 38, 16 and 7 consecutive years.

The “New List of Wars” categorizes Bosnia as a case of non-state warfare (fought between national as well as external militias with military interventions by Serbia and the NATO). This is in line with Kaldor (2007, pp. 33-71) who treats Bosnia as a sample case of New Warfare.
Kreutz (2005) specifically refers to the close linkage between state-based and non-state armed conflict in Africa. He explains that oftentimes competing parties in civil conflicts were organized along ethnic or geographically distinct dividing lines. Both sides to the conflict not only fought their military rival but also committed acts of one-sided violence. As a response to these attacks many local communities formed self-defense militias. The formation of these armed groups has often been encouraged by the governments as a low-cost means to fight the insurgencies. Later, these self-defense units also turned against each other. For instance, “[d]uring the conflict in southern Sudan, the government created or armed at least 25 different militias to fight the SPLM, creating numerous non-state conflicts [. . . ]. [Another] example of the possible consequences of such an approach is the situation in Darfur region. Following one-sided attacks by SPLM on ‘Arabs’ in Gardud in the mid-1980s, local communities started forming self-defense militias. The government started supporting these militias a few years later when ‘African’ tribes in the region complained about the lack of response to famine. After government deliveries of arms to the ‘Arab’ militias, these started attacking civilians of the critical Fur, Zagawa, and Mazalit tribes in the region. These groups quickly responded by forming ‘African’ self-defense militias and both non-state conflict and one-sided violence escalated throughout the following decade” (Kreutz 2005, p. 155). Elsewhere, the author notes that for decades, African governments have relied on military force and local allies with shared ethnic, political or geographic connections in order to impose their policies. As a consequence, the primary focus of new rulers has been on revenge for previous atrocities and to attack potential rivals. Again, such attacks “tend to create new self-defense militias, and possible non-state conflict, as well as the formation of new rebel groups and state-based conflict” (Kreutz 2005, p. 156). Even though the argument seems plausible, Kreutz (2005, p. 157) rightly stresses the need to further explore the mechanisms explaining why and when state-based conflict can lead to one-sided violence and non-state conflict (and vice versa).

20.2. The Incidence and Significance of Non-State Conflicts

**H1/H1a** Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state internal conflicts became the dominant kind of internal fighting [H1] or are at least of growing significance [H1a].

The above analysis relies on the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” which only captures very intensive fighting in terms of battle-deaths. For this reason, the number of observations (especially of non-state wars) is very low. In the following, I therefore compare state-based with non-state armed conflicts as defined by UCDP’s “Non-State Conflict Dataset” and UCDP/PRIO’s “Armed Conflict Dataset”. Armed conflicts included in these data sets resulted in as little as 25 or more battle-deaths per year and warring dyad. Unfortunately, the data only allow to trace changes in the incidence and significance of internal armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War until the end of 2011.
Within this period, however, non-state armed conflicts were a lot more common than state-based armed conflicts: UCDP counts 271 state-based armed conflicts affecting 53 countries as opposed to 419 non-state armed conflicts within 76 countries. If these conflicts were evenly distributed throughout the world, each independent state would have experienced 2.4 non-state armed conflicts on average as opposed to just 1.6 state-based armed conflicts. Thus, non-state internal fighting seems to dominate the picture if low intensity conflicts are taken into account.

This impression is reinforced by the fact that over time the global annual number of new outbreaks of state-based armed conflict decreased enormously while the number of new outbreaks of non-state conflicts per year tripled within the first decade after the end of the Cold War and recently seems to be rising again (see fig. 20.7).

Accordingly, the share of non-state conflicts in all new outbreaks of internal conflict increased from about 30 percent in 1990 to almost 90 percent in 2000 and still 70 percent in 2011 (see fig. 20.8 on the next page) while the share of state-based conflicts in all new outbreaks of internal conflict decreased from 71 percent in 1990 to just 12 percent in 2000 and 30 percent in 2011.

Figure 20.7.: Number of New Outbreaks of Internal Armed Conflict (1990-2011), by type of armed conflict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.

I on purpose excluded the year 1989 from this part of the analysis which is the first year covered by the UCDP data. Within this specific year, it is impossible to differentiate truly new outbreaks of internal conflict from ongoing cases which had started before.
Already since the early 1990s and especially since 1998, new outbreaks of non-state armed conflict are much more frequent than new outbreaks of state-based armed conflict. Within the entire post-Cold War era (1990-2011) and on average, two thirds of all new outbreaks of internal armed conflict have been non-state in nature.\textsuperscript{12} This also speaks in favor of Hypotheses 1 and 1a.

![Figure 20.8: Share of Non-State Internal Armed Conflicts in All New Outbreaks of Internal Armed Conflict (1990-2011), in percent and worldwide. Source: own calculation.](image)

Though non-state armed conflicts are superior in terms of their total number within the entire post-Cold War period and in terms of new outbreaks of armed conflict, they are again in the inferior position when it comes to the number of annually ongoing cases. This relates to their short duration in comparison with state-based armed conflicts that tend to stretch over several years or even decades. The longer the duration of fighting, the more likely a situation where multiple armed conflicts overlap within certain country-years. Thus, numbers of annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts pile up more easily and score impressively high.

\textsuperscript{12}The post-Cold War average share of non-state conflicts in new outbreaks of internal armed conflict within the single regions is especially high in sub-Saharan Africa (72 percent) and the Americas (71 percent), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (62 percent), Central and South Asia (59 percent), East and Southeast Asia and Oceania (44 percent) and Europe (19 percent). Country years without any new outbreak of internal armed conflict are excluded from this calculation. Over time, the respective numbers/shares fluctuate greatly. Real (increasing) trends are only observable in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia.

261
20. *Descriptive Analysis*

In this sense, “the number of annually ongoing armed conflicts” as an indicator privileges the longer-lasting state-based armed conflicts over the short-lived non-state armed conflicts. Still, between 1989 and 2011 the numbers of annually ongoing state-based and non-state internal armed *conflicts* are much closer to each other than the above given numbers of annually ongoing state-based and non-state internal *wars* (see figs. 20.2 and 20.9 on pages 262–251). In 2003, the world has even seen as many non-state armed conflicts as state-based armed conflicts.

![Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conflicts and Affected Countries (1989-2011), by type of armed conflict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.](image)

Figure 20.9.: Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conflicts and Affected Countries (1989-2011), by type of armed conflict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.

Furthermore, the annual number of state-based internal armed conflicts has been declining while the number of non-state internal armed conflicts per year does not seem to follow such a clear downward trend. Until the year 2000 it was increasing, decreased again until 2007 before another increase set in – though numbers fluctuate greatly between years.
Again, worldwide developments are not mirrored by the developments in every of the single regions. Interestingly, in more than half of the country-years within the post-Cold War era (in 57 percent), sub-Saharan Africa has seen more annually ongoing non-state armed conflicts than state-based armed conflicts. The number of annually ongoing non-state armed conflicts rapidly increased from 12 to 33 between 1997 and 2000/2003 before decreasing again to as little as six in 2007. The number of annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts experienced a similar decline though less pronounced and earlier (from 1998 till 2005). Recently, both curves have been rising. In 2011, 11 state-based and 15 non-state internal armed conflicts were ongoing in this region. Numbers of yearly ongoing non-state and state-based internal armed conflicts are also converging in Central and South Asia and in the Americas (where recently stable or decreasing numbers of state-based internal armed conflicts are facing increasing numbers of non-state armed conflicts) and in the Middle East and North Africa (where state-based and non-state armed conflicts have been on the rise throughout the last ten years) (see fig. 20.10 on the following page).
Figure 20.10.: Number of Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011), by type of armed conflict and region. Source: own calculation.
Despite the rapid decrease in non-state armed conflicts between 2003 and 2007, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the worldwide largest number of annually ongoing non-state conflicts at the end of the decade (see fig. 20.11 on the current page) and the region with the by far greatest share in the number of annually ongoing non-state conflicts and affected countries within the post-Cold War era (see figs. 20.12 and 20.13 on pages 266–267).

Figure 20.11.: Number of Annually Ongoing Non-State Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011), by region. Source: own calculation.

Between 1989 and 2011, the whole region experienced four to 33 non-state conflicts per year which affected three to 11 countries. In 2003, 33 non-state conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa happened in seven countries only (seven in Somalia, six in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda and the DRC and one in Ivory Coast and Burundi). Thus, within Africa most of the non-state conflicts are concentrated in three sub-regions: the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa (if Sudan is included) and West Africa. In fact and until 2011, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and the DRC had experienced the most non-state conflicts of all countries in the world, namely 59, 47, 44, 36, 26 and 22. The average post-Cold War number of yearly ongoing non-state armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa is as high as 16. Also on average, these non-state conflicts affected 6.52 sub-Saharan African countries per year.
Interestingly, the Middle East and North Africa is the region with the second-highest average number of annually ongoing non-state armed conflicts (5.04) affecting 2.26 countries per year (mostly Sudan and Iraq), followed by Central and South Asia (where Afghanistan and Pakistan have seen 15 and 18 non-state conflicts between 1989 and 2011), the Americas (where especially Mexico and Columbia are affected by this kind of internal armed conflict), East and Southeast Asia and Oceania and finally Europe. With the exception of 2010, the latter region has been free of non-state conflict since the mid-1990s.

While the regional affiliation of most of the above mentioned countries is clear, the Sudan can either be included in a “Middle East and North Africa” region (as done above and by PRIO) or it can be included in an “all-Africa” region (as done by UCDP). Due to the sheer number of non-state conflicts in this single country, the decision on how to categorize Sudan affects the results of any regional analysis:

See the above numbers or the 2012 Human Security Report which also notes that between 1989 and 2009, “Sudan alone, with less than 1 percent of the world’s population, has experienced nearly a fifth of all reported global battle deaths attributable to non-state conflicts. Many of the conflicts in Sudan were caused or exacerbated by its government’s deliberate strategy of weakening opposition groups by pitting them against one another” (HSC 2012, p. 194).
If the world is divided into five UCDP regions (namely Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and the Americas) instead of the above six PRIO regions, the concentration of non-state internal fighting within Africa and Asia becomes even more apparent. Without Sudan, however, the Middle East is primarily plagued by state-based conflict. The remaining regional shares are not substantially affected by a change from PRIO’s to UCDP’s regional coding (see fig. 20.14 on the following page).

Figure 20.13.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Internal Armed Conflicts and Affected Countries (1989-2011 averages, PRIO regional coding). Source: own calculation.

14Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP’s Middle East region has seen 91 state-based conflicts (mostly in Turkey, Israel, Iran and Iraq) and 18 non-state conflict (mostly in Iraq and Lebanon).
The clustering of non-state armed conflicts in (sub-Saharan) Africa is again confirmed by other indicators. On average, a sub-Saharan African country has experienced 5.7 non-state armed conflicts within the entire post-Cold War era as opposed to 3.3, 3.1, 0.8, 0.7 and 0.2 non-state armed conflicts per country in Central and South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, the Americas, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania and finally Europe. Finally, between 1989 and 2011 ten non-state conflicts crossed international borders. For instance, rival ethnic groups battled each other in an area joining Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya during the 1990s and 2000s. Fighting between two rebel forces in Liberia also spilled over into neighboring Ivory Coast in 1994 and 1995. Most of these non-state conflicts that affected additional countries have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, too.

---

If UCDP’s regional coding is used, these numbers read as follows: 5.9 non-state armed conflicts per African country (including Sudan), 1.8 per Asian country, 1.2 per Middle Eastern country (without Sudan), 0.8 per American country and 0.3 per European country.
It provides for a certain amount of relief that this hard-hit region has at least seen a short-lived but dramatic decline in the number of annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts. Between 1998 and 2005, their number dropped from 22 to just five ongoing cases. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that experienced such a steep cut in the number of state-based armed conflicts per year.

Within the same period of time, the numbers of yearly ongoing state-based armed conflicts only decreased slightly in Central and South Asia (from 13 to 10), remained comparatively low and stable in three other regions (the Americas, Europe and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania) or even increased rapidly (in the Middle East and North Africa from 6 in 1998 to 15 in 2006). Due to these more recent developments, other regions even got ahead of sub-Saharan Africa (see figs. 20.15 and 20.16 on pages 269–270). Since 2010, most state-based armed conflicts per year are happening in the Middle East and North African region, e.g. in (South) Sudan, Libya, Yemen or Turkey.

![Figure 20.15: Number of Annually Ongoing State-Based Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011), by region. Source: own calculation.](image-url)
Within the entire post-Cold War period, however, sub-Saharan Africa still holds the largest share in all annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts – though other regions are coming comparatively close: on average 27 percent of the annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts that happened between 1989 and 2011 took place in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. 13.65 state-based conflicts affecting 9.22 countries per year and on average), followed by Central and South Asia with a post-Cold War average share of 24 percent (i.e. 12 state-based conflicts affecting 4.87 countries per year on average), the Middle East and North Africa with a share of 21 percent (i.e. 10.04 state-based conflicts affecting 6 countries per year on average) and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania with a share of 15 percent (i.e. 7.35 state-based conflicts affecting 3.74 countries per year on average) (see fig. 20.17 on the next page).

The average numbers of state-based armed conflicts per country in each of the six PRIO regions also differ comparatively little: Within the entire post-Cold War era, each Central and South Asian country has experienced three to four state-based armed conflicts on average, outperforming the Middle East and North Africa which ranks second (with 2.3 state-based armed conflicts per country) as well as sub-Saharan Africa (with an average of 2.2 state-based armed conflicts per country).
East and Southeast Asia and Oceania ranks fourth (with 1.3 state-based armed conflicts per country), followed by the Americas (0.7) and Europe (0.6).\textsuperscript{16}

Figure 20.17.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Internal Armed Conflicts and Affected Countries (1989-2011 averages, PRIO and UCDP regional coding). Source: own calculation.

\textsuperscript{16}Using UCDP’s regional coding results in the usual regional ranking of 2.3 state-based armed conflicts per African country (including Sudan), 2.1 per Asia country, 1.9 per Middle Eastern country (without Sudan) and 0.7 per American and per European country.
These numbers indicate that state-based armed conflicts are spreading more evenly between countries and regions than non-state armed conflicts. Nevertheless, both kinds of armed conflict favor the same world regions and oftentimes the same countries. Whether the ranking of regions in terms of their affectedness differs between kinds of internal armed conflict, however, depends on the regional coding that is used. Thirdly, the ranking of affected countries within the single regions differs between types of internal fighting: During the post-Cold War era (1989-2011), most non-state armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa happened in Somalia (59), Nigeria (47) and Ethiopia (36) while most state-based armed conflicts in this region took place in Chad (17), Somalia (9) and Ethiopia (8). Within Central and South Asia, most non-state armed conflicts happened in Pakistan (18), Afghanistan (15) and India (8) while India ranks first within this region (and worldwide) in terms of state-based armed conflicts (20), followed by Afghanistan (9) and Pakistan (6). In the Middle East and North Africa far most non-state armed conflicts happened in Sudan (44) followed by Iraq (8) and Lebanon (6) while most state-based armed conflicts took place in Sudan (11), too, followed, however, by Israel (9) and Iraq (7). Most non-state armed conflicts in the Americas happened in Mexico (12) while most state-based armed conflicts in this region took place in Haiti (4). In both cases, Columbia ranks second. Most non-state conflicts in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania are counted in the Philippines (5) while Myanmar ranks first in terms of state-based conflicts (15). In Europe, most non-state armed conflicts took place in Russia (6) while most state-based armed conflicts happened in Bosnia (5). In either case Serbia comes second.

It remains to be said that within the post-Cold War period, countries are again likely to face both kinds of internal armed conflict. As previously, however, only every second state that has been involved in at least one state-based armed conflict also experienced at least one additional non-state armed conflict (41 out of 76 states) while 77 percent of those countries with non-state armed conflict experience have also been involved in at least one state-based armed conflict (41 out of 53 states). Eight countries have been involved in internal armed conflict throughout the entire post-Cold War period. India serves as an example. The country has experienced multiple state-based armed conflicts in every of the 23 years between 1989 and 2011. Multiple non-state armed conflicts at the same time happened in India within 6 years out of the 23 years period. Below the line 15 country-years have been affected by both kinds of internal armed conflict – in this case even by multiple state-based and at least one or several non-state armed conflict(s).

17If UCDP’s regional coding is used, both non-state and state-based armed conflicts seem to favor African countries over Asian countries over Middle Eastern countries. If PRIO’s regional coding is applied, the ranking of regions differs between kinds of internal fighting: Sub-Saharan Africa ranks first in terms of the average number of non-state armed conflicts per country, followed by Central and South Asia and then the Middle East and North Africa while Central and South Asia ranks first when it comes to state-based armed conflicts, followed by the Middle East and North Africa and thirdly sub-Saharan Africa.

18Columbia, Turkey, the Philippines, Somalia, Afghanistan, Israel, Sudan and India.
The global averages of these indicators\textsuperscript{19} are masking great regional divergence: (sub-Saharan) African countries spent the most country-years in non-state internal fighting (three to four years on average within the study period) as well as the most country-years in multiple non-state conflicts (almost two years on average) – which is in both cases about twice as much as the respective global average. The Middle East (with or without Sudan) also performs above average in terms of country-years lost in internal armed conflict in general and in state-based armed conflict in particular. In addition, the latter kind of internal armed conflict tends to overlap especially in this region.\textsuperscript{20} Whole of Asia only stands out in terms of its average number of country-years spent in both kinds of internal armed conflict at the same time while the numbers of Central and South Asia are much more eye-catching: this PRIO sub-region scores first in the average number of country-years spent in multiple state-based armed conflicts or in both kinds of internal armed conflict as well as in the average number of country-years affected by state-based conflict and internal armed conflict in general. Because the issue again touches upon the duration of internal fighting it shall be discussed in more detail later.

This section concludes by presenting changes in the significance of non-state armed conflict over time (see fig. 20.18 on the following page). With some ups and downs the share of non-state internal armed conflicts in overall internal armed conflicts increased from 20 to 44 percent between 1989 and 2011. Thus, Hypothesis 1a also finds support at the conflict level. As mentioned before, every second internal armed conflict in the world was non-state in nature in 2003. Worldwide and within the entire post-Cold War period, 30 percent of all internal armed conflict were fought amongst non-state actors, only.

\textsuperscript{19}Worldwide, within the post-Cold War era and on average any country has spent 4.5 years in internal armed conflict (3.7 years in state-based and 1.7 years in non-state armed conflict), has seen multiple state-based conflicts for an average duration of 1.5 years, multiple non-state conflicts for an average duration of 0.8 years and both kinds of internal armed conflict for an average duration of just one year.

\textsuperscript{20}On average, a Middle Eastern country has spent more than seven years of the post-Cold War era in internal armed conflict (as opposed to the global average of 4.5 years), 6.6 years in state-based armed conflict (as opposed to the global average of 3.7 years) and 2.5 years in multiple state-based armed conflicts (as opposed to the global average of 1.5 years).
20. Descriptive Analysis

![Graph showing the share of non-state conflicts in all annually ongoing internal armed conflicts from 1989 to 2011.

Figure 20.18: Share of Non-State Internal Armed Conflicts in All Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011), in percent and worldwide. Source: own calculation.

Furthermore, the shares of non-state conflicts in all internal conflicts are rising within most of the world’s regions. In Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa the significance of non-state conflicts has been clearly growing since 2000/2001. Despite a sharp drop in 2006, the share of non-state conflicts in all internal conflicts has also been increasing in the Americas since the mid 1990s reaching almost 80 percent in 2011. Up to 2005, non-state conflicts assumed about the same level of significance in sub-Saharan Africa. Though the share of non-state conflicts in all internal conflicts dropped in 2007 it quickly recovered. At the end of 2011, almost 60 percent of all internal conflicts in this region were non-state in nature (see fig. 20.19 on the next page).

This explains why the post-Cold War average share of non-state conflicts in all internal conflicts is as high as 52 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly impressive numbers are reported for three other regions. In Central and South Asia, in the Middle East and North Africa and in the Americas, 22, 32 and 30 percent of all post-Cold War internal armed conflicts had been carried out amongst non-state actors. Thus, at this level of analysis the overall global trend seems to be driven by empirical developments in more than just one or two world regions.
Furthermore, I have mentioned that the annual share of non-state conflicts in all new outbreaks of internal armed conflict has also been rising enormously over the years. Like much of the above, such developments do not support the claim of an increasingly more peaceful world.\textsuperscript{21} This assertion can only be maintained if certain indicators are used and if low-intensity fighting, non-state armed conflicts and/or the more recent empirical developments are not taken into consideration. Moving the analysis to the conflict episode level, the smallest unit of analysis in the context of this study, confirms this impression.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure20.19.png}
\caption{Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conflicts in all Annually Ongoing Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011), in percent. Source: own calculation.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{21}See e.g. Straus (2013); HSC (2006); N. P. Gleditsch (2002).
20. Descriptive Analysis

20.3. The Incidence and Significance of Non-State Conflict Episodes

H1/H1a Over time, especially in the post-Cold War era, non-state conflict episodes became the dominant kind of conflict episodes [H1] or are at least of growing significance [H1a].

At the conflict episode level the above results more or less repeat themselves: The total number of non-state conflict episodes within the entire post-Cold War era (between 1989 and 2009) by far exceeds the total number of state-based conflict episodes: UCDP counts 366 state-based conflict episodes that can be attributed to 242 dyadic state-based armed conflicts (i.e. 1.5 episodes per state-based conflict). During the same period of time, 449 non-state conflict episodes are reported that are attributed to 380 different non-state armed conflicts (1.2 episodes per non-state conflict). Because non-state conflicts are of a shorter average duration than state-based conflicts, it is hardly surprising that they are less likely to split into multiple conflict episodes. Having this in mind, the difference in the above mentioned average numbers of episodes per conflict appears even strikingly small.

Again, within the post-Cold War era (1989-2009) the large majority of all annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes happened in sub-Saharan Africa (56 percent, 1989-2009 average), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (19 percent) and Central and South Asia (14 percent). In comparison, the geographical distribution of state-based conflict episodes is more even. The most hit region is Central and South Asia where on average one third of all annually ongoing state-based conflict episodes took place (30 percent), followed by sub-Saharan Africa (24 percent), the Middle East and North Africa (16 percent), the Americas (14 percent) and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania (12 percent) (see fig. 20.20 on the facing page). Changing from PRIO’s to UCDP’s regional coding again points to the influential role of Sudan. It clearly reveals a concentration of non-state conflict episodes first in Africa (68 percent) and second in Asia (17 percent) and of state-based conflict episodes first in Asia (41 percent) and second in Africa (29 percent) (see fig. 20.21).

To arrive at these numbers I used the episode version of the Master-File from which I excluded state-based conflict episodes with an end date before 1989. The remaining sample then includes state-based and non-state conflict episodes affecting the period from 1989 to 2009, i.e. episodes happening entirely within this period, episodes starting before 1989 but still ongoing in 1989 or later as well as episodes starting 2009 or earlier but continuing beyond this date. This approach is based on the impression that UCDP’s coding of non-state conflict episodes (that I merged with the state-based episodes and that need to be compatible therewith) follows the same reasoning.

Within the entire post-World War II era, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania scores first. The regions average share in the number of annually ongoing state-based conflict episodes is 33 percent, followed by sub-Saharan Africa (17 percent), the Middle East and North Africa and Central and Southeast Asia (both 16 percent) and finally the Americas (13 percent) (PRIO regional coding).

Within the entire post-World War II era, almost half of all annually ongoing state-based conflict
episodes happened in Asia (49 percent), 21 percent took place in Africa (including Sudan) and 13 percent in the Middle East and in the Americas (UCDP regional coding).
Figure 20.21.: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State/State-Based Conflict Episodes and Affected Countries (1989-2009 averages, UCDP regional coding). Source: own calculation.
Throughout the years, however, there seems to be quite some variation in the regional shares of at least three world regions: Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the global number of annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes increased enormously from just 27 percent in 1989 to as much as 85 percent in 2003. Afterwards, it decreased equally rapidly to 32 percent in 2007 and since then varies between 30 and 50 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s recent decrease is counter-balanced by about the same level of increase in the combined shares of Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In 2000/2001, only zero/three percent of all annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes happened there. Eight years later, Central and South Asia accounts for over 20 percent of the annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes while in 2007/2009 around 40 percent of the world’s annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes happened in the Middle East and North Africa (see fig. 20.22 on the current page).

Figure 20.22.: Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing Non-State Conflict Episodes (1989-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
Compared to this, state-based conflict episodes have always been more equally distributed amongst regions. In addition, the regional shares in annually ongoing state-based conflict episodes remained rather stable over time (see fig. 20.23 on this page).

Figure 20.23.: Regional Shares in All Annually Ongoing State-Based Conflict Episodes (1989-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
Changes in the absolute numbers of annually ongoing state-based and non-state conflict episodes also mirror that of state-based and non-state armed conflicts. The global number of annually ongoing state-based conflict episodes sharply increased from less than ten ongoing episodes per year during the mid 1950s to as many as 74 in 1990/1992. After the end of the Cold War, it decreased significantly (to 49 in 2005) before rising again (to 58 in 2009) (see fig. 20.24 on the current page).

Figure 20.24.: Number of All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes and Affected Countries (1946-2009, state-based/1989-2009 non-state), by type of armed conflict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.
Comparable numbers on the incidence of non-state conflict episodes only exist for the post-Cold War period. Between 1989 and 2000, the worldwide number of annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes grew from 15 to 42, then dropped (to 19 in 2007) but also seems to be on the rise again. Due to greater fluctuation in recent numbers it is, however, difficult to detect a similar clear trend as seen in the case of state-based conflict episodes. Still, it is evident that the initially steady and rapid increase in the number of annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes lasted a bit longer. The global number of non-state conflict episodes per year was still rising when the number of annually ongoing state-based conflict episodes had already started its decrease (see fig. 20.25 on this page). This explains the growing significance of non-state conflict episodes especially between 1989 and 2003 (see fig. 20.26 on the next page).

Figure 20.25.: Post-Cold War Numbers of All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes and Affected Countries (1989-2009), by type of armed conflict.

Source: own calculation.
Within regions, non-state conflict episodes have been of growing significance in sub-Saharan Africa (between 1989 and 2005) as well as in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa (throughout the last ten years of the study period). These developments are due to increasing numbers of annually ongoing non-state conflict episodes at times when numbers of state-based episodes had been decreasing, stagnating or only modestly increasing (see figs. 20.27 and 20.28 on pages 284–285). In the Americas, the share of non-state conflict episodes in all annually ongoing conflict episodes has also been rising (from zero percent in 1989 to 36 percent in 2001 and still 30 percent in 2009) though the overall annual numbers of conflict episodes remain comparatively low.
20. Descriptive Analysis

Figure 20.27.: Inner-Regional Shares of Non-State Conflict Episodes in All Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes (1989-2009), in percent. Source: own calculation.
Figure 20.28.: Number of Annually Ongoing Conflict Episodes (1989-2009), by type of armed conflict and region. Source: own calculation.
21. Interim Summary IV: Main Results of the Descriptive Analysis

The above challenges the optimistic messages of the 2005 Human Security Report and the 2006 Human Security Brief which used the same UCDP data but only covered the 2002 to 2003/2005 periods. Due to its limited temporal scope the latter report comes to the conclusion that worldwide decreasing numbers of internal armed conflicts were mainly due to decreasing numbers of non-state conflicts, in particular in Africa. The update report (the 2012 Human Security Report) still misses the two most recent years (2010 and 2011) covered above. The authors refrain from deducing a clear trend in the incidence of non-state fighting but still note that the number of non-state armed conflicts per year “does not appear to be increasing overall”. They again conclude optimistically that there is “no real support for claims that non-state conflicts are becoming more widespread than state-based conflicts” (HSC 2012, p. 186).

In contrast, I would like to emphasize the fact that the number of annually ongoing non-state conflicts has not experienced the same downward trend as the number of state-based conflicts per year which has declined clearly and substantially since 1989. This in itself is concerning as much as the fact that only the global number of annually ongoing non-state armed conflicts appears rather stable. In the Americas, in sub-Saharan Africa, in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa numbers of annually ongoing non-state armed conflicts have been clearly rising throughout the last five to ten years. Because numbers of annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts increased less rapidly, remained stable or even decreased at the same time, the numbers of non-state and state-based armed conflicts per year are converging in these four out of six world regions. Furthermore, the most affected region (sub-Saharan Africa) has seen more non-state than state-based armed conflicts/episodes per year during the entire post-Cold War era and in most of its single country-years. After 1989, sub-Saharan African countries have also spent more years on average in multiple non-state armed conflicts than in multiple state-based armed conflicts. Both empirical findings are surprising given the comparatively short duration of non-state armed conflicts and therefore their reluctance to pile up within country-years over extended periods of time. I have raised the general concern that the number of yearly ongoing conflicts as an indicator privileges the more extensive state-based armed conflicts over non-state armed conflicts. Yet, it is the indicator of choice of the above mentioned publications. At least other measures clearly speak in favor of a dominance of non-state over state-based armed conflicts.
For instance, the overall numbers of non-state armed conflicts and episodes within the entire post-Cold War era are immense and much higher than the numbers of state-based armed conflicts and episodes. Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP identifies almost twice as many non-state as state-based internal conflicts. Though non-state armed conflicts might be comparatively short and less intense, their overall and relative number is remarkable. Another indicator which takes the size of the world’s regions into account (the number of armed conflicts per country) also speaks in favor of a dominance of non-state internal fighting – worldwide, in sub-Saharan Africa, in the Americas and in the Middle East and North Africa – as do the numbers of new outbreaks of non-state versus state-based armed conflicts. Already since 1992, the world is seeing (far) more new outbreaks of non-state than state-based armed conflicts per year.

However, non-state armed conflicts/episodes have to give in when it comes to their geographical reach (the number of affected countries) due to their greater (and increasing) tendency to cluster within certain regions and countries. In addition, there is little danger of a dominance of non-state internal fighting at the war level. During the entire post-World War II era, in every single country-year between 1946 and 2009, globally speaking and in every single world region, non-state warfare has been far less frequent than state-based warfare and affected far less countries. The global and the regional average numbers of non-state wars per country are also much smaller than the average numbers of state-based wars per country. Anyways, non-state warfare seems to be a phenomenon which is mostly confined to post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, non-state warfare is not the dominant type of internal warfare – no matter which indicator is used and not even in the most affected regions. In addition, it is noteworthy that non-state internal wars tend to follow state-based internal wars – oftentimes with a (short) temporal overlap.

Overall, a dominance of non-state fighting seems debatable (or at least depends on the geographical perspective, the indicator used and the level of analysis). The growing significance of non-state fighting (at all levels of analysis, worldwide and within most single regions) is, however, undeniable. Furthermore, the above leads to the conclusion that covering not only internal wars but low-intensity internal armed conflicts is decisive in catching the entire picture. It allows for interesting since partly contradictory insights. Patterns in the incidence of non-state and state-based internal wars do not necessarily seem to be identical with patterns in the incidence of non-state and state-based internal armed conflicts. For instance, non-state warfare did not happen in every world region – not even if the entire World War II period is taken into consideration – while after 1989 non-state conflicts happened in all six regions of the world. Only if both levels of analysis are taken into consideration the overall number of non-state conflicts (419 in 53 countries between 1989 and 2011) appears impressively high and sharply contrasts with the relatively low number of non-state wars (18 in 16 countries between 1946 and 2009). Only then it becomes apparent that non-state warfare has been far less frequent than state-based warfare while non-state conflicts/episodes by far outnumbered state-based conflicts/episodes also in their average numbers per country.
This holds worldwide and within most of the world’s regions, i.e. in sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and – depending on the indicator – also in the Americas. Only if low-level violence is considered, it becomes evident that the post-Cold War numbers of annually ongoing non-state and state-based internal conflicts have always been much closer to each other than the numbers of annually ongoing non-state and state-based internal wars. In other words, the share of non-state internal conflicts in all internal conflicts has always been much higher than the share of non-state internal wars in all internal wars – worldwide as well as within the single regions. At both levels of analysis, the non-state shares are however increasing. Finally, non-state wars almost exclusively happened in sub-Saharan Africa where their recent annual numbers remained rather stable or even decreased. In contrast, the number of non-state armed conflicts per year has been on the rise within the last five to ten years not only in sub-Saharan and North Africa but also in Central and South Asia and to a lesser extent in Southern America. Empirical developments in these regions in the incidence of non-state fighting are critical and deserve further attention.
22. Comparative Analysis

22.1. Comparison of the Quantity and Nature of Actors

Contrary to conventional civil wars where the number of parties had always been clear, the authors of the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” were unable to identify clear lines of opposed parties for about one third of all non-state internal wars. This relates to the fact that non-state wars are much more likely to involve third parties (who neither support side A or B but follow their own agenda\(^1\)) and it links with the expected number of groups of actors involved in fighting. The corresponding hypothesis reads as follows:

H2 The number of national armed groups involved in non-state internal wars is significantly higher as compared with state-based internal wars.

Within the 1946-2009 period and on average, the “New/Consolidated List of Wars” reports six groups of national actors (median 4) per non-state internal war (N=18) but only 3.75 groups of national actors (median 3) per state-based internal war (N=120).\(^2\)

The difference in means is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). Thus, non-state internal wars are characterized by a significantly higher average number of involved groups of national actors. This especially holds if extreme outlier cases\(^3\) are dropped.

\(^1\)Just about 13 percent of all state-based wars but 56 percent of all non-state wars involved such third parties (p-value < 0.01).

\(^2\)The “New/Consolidated List of Wars” does not claim to provide a complete list of actors who have been involved in state-based and non-state internal wars. Systematic differences between the two types of warfare in the data collection cannot be detected. Regular state troops always constitute one group of national actors in conventional civil warfare. Quasi-state actors (i.e. left-overs from the national army or splinter groups thereof) are mentioned as an actor in 61 percent of all non-state internal wars.

\(^3\)Observations with values equal or beyond the third quartiles by one-and-a-half interquartile ranges are deemed outliers. Out of all 18 non-state wars, the one in DRC (1998-2009) that involved 17 groups of national actors is identified as such an extreme case. Out of all 120 state-based wars, 13 cases that involved seven or more national groups of actors qualify as extreme outliers. These are the state-based war in Myanmar (1948-2009, involving 17 groups), four state-based wars in India (1992-2009, 1990-2009, 1989-2009 and 1996-2009 involving 16, 11, 11 and 7 groups), the state-based war in Uganda (1987-2009, involving 11 groups), in Iraq (2004-2009, 8 groups), in Ivory Coast (2002-2005, 8 groups), in Sudan (1983-2009, 8 groups), in Chad (1997-2009, 8 groups), in Colombia (1965-2009, 7 groups), in the Philippines (1972-2009, 7 groups) and in Ethiopia (1976-1991, 7 groups). An exclusion of these cases reduces the average number of groups of national actors involved in both types of warfare to 5.35 per non-state war and 3.03 per state-based war (p-value < 0.01).
from the analysis (see fig. 22.1 on this page), it holds worldwide within the entire study period but also if only those internal wars are considered that were ongoing after the end of the Cold War\(^4\) or that only erupted in 1989 or later (if four extreme outliers are excluded)\(^5\).

**Figure 22.1.:** Outliers in the No. of Involved National Armed Groups, by type of warfare (1946-2009) and worldwide. Source: own calculation, stata 8.0 Graph.

The latter is especially remarkable because the average number of actors involved in state-based civil wars also increased with the end of the Cold War or even earlier\(^6\): On average, conventional state-based wars that ended before 1989 (N=57) had been fought amongst 2.53 (median 2) groups of national actors, only. In 1989 or later, 41 state-based internal wars broke out which on average involved 4.39 (median 3) groups of national actors. For the same period of time, 14 non-state internal wars are reported that on average involved 5.5 (median 4) groups of national actors.

---

\(^4\)The overall sample then contains 79 internal wars that either erupted in 1989 or later or that had erupted earlier but were still ongoing in 1989 or later. Differences between non-state and state-based wars in the average number of involved groups of national actors are significant (p-value< 0.1).

\(^5\)The overall sample then contains 51 cases of internal warfare. The four identified outliers are the non-state war in the DRC (1998-2009, involving 17 groups) and three state-based wars in India (1990-2009, involving 11 groups; 1992-2009, involving 16 groups and 1989-2009, involving 11 groups). Differences between non-state and state-based wars in the average number of involved groups of national actors are significant (p-value< 0.1).

\(^6\)See also Harbom et al. (2008) for a quantitative study.
Mean differences in the quantity of actors between the two sub-types of internal warfare are particularly large and statistically significant in sub-Saharan Africa (p-value < 0.1). Other regions either have not seen both kinds of internal warfare or the respective differences in means stay statistically insignificant due to great variances and very small sample sizes. For this reason, the following results on the quality of involved actors also primarily apply to sub-Saharan Africa.

Firstly, I wish to explore whether external actors are more likely to engage in non-state as opposed to state-based internal wars. The transnational character of internal warfare shall be proxied by the likelihood of an external military intervention, previously defined as active violent interference (involving military personnel and combat action) in ongoing warfare from outside by at least one member of the state system (Chojnacki and Reisch 2008, p. 4). The corresponding hypothesis reads as follows:

**H3** The likelihood of an external military intervention is significantly higher in non-state internal wars as compared with state-based internal wars.

Throughout the entire period from 1946 to 2009 and worldwide, military interventions by external forces in internal wars have been rather unlikely: 64 percent of all internal wars (N=138) did not see such interventions. However, every second non-state internal war but only every third state-based internal war experienced an external military intervention. This seems to support the concept of New Wars (Chojnacki 2006b, pp. 52, 63–66). The difference in these numbers is, however, statistically insignificant – also if only those internal wars are taken into account that were ongoing that broke out after the end of the Cold War. Even more so, the numbers are blending in. External military interventions in state-based internal wars are getting more likely while the chances of such an intervention in non-state internal warfare seem to decrease. About 41 percent of the state-based and 43 percent of the non-state internal wars with an outbreak in 1989 or later have seen external military interventions (as opposed to the above mentioned one third versus 50 percent if the entire 1946-2009 period or those cases that had happened before 1989 are considered).

Furthermore, there exist large regional differences. Because most internal wars took place in sub-Saharan Africa, this region also experienced by far the most external military interventions. Throughout the entire period from 1946 to 2009, external military forces intervened in 44 percent of all sub-Saharan African internal wars (i.e. in 20 out of 45 cases of internal warfare). This figure increases to 59 percent if only those internal wars with an outbreak in 1989 or later are taken into consideration. Thus, within the entire study period and after the end of the Cold War the chances of an external military intervention in any kind of internal warfare are higher in this region as compared with the global changes of 36 percent (1946-2009) and 43 percent (1989-2009).

In sub-Saharan Africa, only three percent of all state-based wars (N=36) were fought amongst ten or more groups of national actors. Contrary to this, one third of this region’s non-state wars involved ten or more groups of national actors; just one third involved less than four groups.

---

In sub-Saharan Africa, only three percent of all state-based wars (N=36) were fought amongst ten or more groups of national actors. Contrary to this, one third of this region’s non-state wars involved ten or more groups of national actors; just one third involved less than four groups.
Within the entire post-World War II period, 42 percent of the sub-Saharan African state-based internal wars and 56 percent of the non-state internal wars have seen an external military intervention. Both shares increase if only those cases with an outbreak of violence after the end of the Cold War are compared. However, the chances of an external intervention in state-based internal wars have grown disproportionately fast leading to the finding that now external military interventions are even a little bit more likely in state-based than in non-state internal wars (60 percent likelihood of intervention versus 57 percent). Still, the difference remains marginal and statistically insignificant.

External military interventions are less frequent in the other regions where internal warfare in general is comparatively seldom. The small number of cases does not allow for a meaningful comparison of means and a final judgment. It shall, however, at least be mentioned that Europe seems to take a special position. There, external military interventions in (both kinds of) internal warfare are extremely likely whereas the opposite applies to Asia. In the latter region, over 70 percent of all internal wars have seen no external military intervention. The shares of state-based internal wars with such an intervention (around 30 percent throughout the entire period and even less if only post-Cold War outbreaks are considered) are much smaller than the respective sub-Saharan African shares of 42 percent (for the entire period) and 60 percent (for cases with an outbreak in 1989 or later).

Overall, only disaggregated data will help to fully clarify the role and significance of certain actors in internal warfare. We do not only need to know who has been involved in fighting, but also when, where and how this involvement took place. Furthermore, the significance of certain groups of actors is better measured by the actual size of their troops, their relative strength/their share in overall troops or their active participation in fighting (rather than their mere presence). For a large number of cases, all kinds of actors and both types of warfare such data are dreams of the future. Despite these data limitations, however, the above allows some interesting first insights in regard to the number and nature of actors involved in (both kinds of) internal warfare. In accordance with the concept of New Wars, compared with state-based civil wars and on average, non-state internal wars involve a significantly larger number of national groups of actors. The significance of mean differences is rather robust. But, non-state internal wars do not seem to be especially transnational in terms of their actors. At least external military involvement is also very likely in conventional state-based civil wars with an outbreak of violence after the end of the Cold War. Thus, at the war level, Hypothesis 2 finds support while Hypothesis 3 needs to be rejected.

I close this section with a comparison of the structure and origin of armed groups. This moves the analysis from the war to the actor level. First of all, I exclude 157 formally organized state armies from the actor-level version of the Master-File which is based on UCDP’s “Actors Dataset (v.2.1.2012)”.

294
This reduces the sample to a total of 953 non-state armed groups who have been involved in state-based armed conflicts (between 1946 and 2011) and/or in non-state armed conflicts (between 1989 and 2011) and, in many cases, also in acts of one-sided violence against civilians (between 1989 and 2011). More precisely, 487 of the 953 non-state armed groups have been involved in non-state internal conflicts only, 387 exclusively engaged in state-based internal conflicts and 79 have been involved in both kinds of internal fighting.

Just one third (32 percent) of those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conflicts were formally organized while the remaining 68 percent were informally organized. This raises the conjecture that groups involved in non-state fighting are especially likely to be informally organized. Unfortunately, their level of organization cannot be compared in any meaningful way with other groups of non-state violent actors (i.e. with those who engaged in both kinds of internal fighting or with those who engaged in state-based armed conflict, only) because UCDP/PRIO’s coding rules do not allow for any variance in their level of organization. Groups who engaged in state-based conflict always need to be formally organized in order to be included in the respective data sets. For this reason it remains an interesting but unresolvable question whether fighting formally organized government armies actually correlates with (or even requires) some degree of formalization on the side of the rebels whereas non-state conflicts tend to be fought by informally organized groups or whether this impression is just due to heavily biased data. At least in theory, there might exist informally organized non-state armed groups who are fighting formally organized governments whose armed struggle simply does not qualify to be included in UCDP/PRIO’s data collection effort. What is known from the above data is that 331 of the 953 non-state actors were informally organized groups (who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conflict) and 622 were formally organized groups (who either engaged in state-based internal conflicts or in non-state internal conflicts or in both kinds of internal fighting).

In addition, only 115 (12 percent) of all 953 non-state armed groups were created by breaking away from another actor listed in UCDP’s data sets or by a temporary split in the original movement. Thus, a “history of factionalization” is rather unlikely. Though, it might be more or less common amongst certain sub-groups of violent actors which leads to Hypothesis 3a:

**H3a** Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state conflict emerged significantly more often by breaking away from another violent group or by a temporary split in the original movement as compared with formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in state-based conflict.

---

8The vast majority (104 of the 115 cases) emerged by breaking away from another group while just 11 emerged by a temporary split in the original movement.
22. Comparative Analysis

A first look at the data reveals that about the same percentage (11 percent) of actors had emerged by breaking away from another group or by a temporary split in the original movement if those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conflict are compared with those who exclusively engaged in state-based armed conflict. A history of factionalization is only more frequent amongst actors who had been involved in both kinds of internal fighting (22 percent). Again, however, the above mentioned bias comes into play because these sub-groups of violent actors do not only differ in their history of factionalization and in the kind(s) of conflict they engaged in. They also differ in their level of organization. Hypothesis 3a therefore controls for this intervening factor by just comparing formally organized non-state armed groups. This reduces the number of observations to 543 formally organized non-state armed groups who either engaged in non-state or in state-based armed conflict. If the level of organization is controlled for, the results clearly speak in favor of Hypothesis 3a: A “history of factionalization” is significantly more likely amongst those formally organized groups who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conflict (N=156) as opposed to those formally organized groups who exclusively engaged in state-based armed conflict (N=387) (p-value< 0.01). About 35 percent of the former but just 11 percent of the latter had broken away from another armed group or had emerged after a temporary split in the original movement.  

22.2. Comparison of the Role of Conflict Resources

After having explored the number and nature of actors involved in certain kinds of internal warfare, the following section is dealing with the role of conflict resources at various levels of analysis. Hypothesis 4 states that

\[ \text{H4} \text{Conflict resources occur/are produced significantly more often in countries that are experiencing non-state fighting as compared with countries that are experiencing state-based fighting.} \]
\[ \text{Conflict resources are known to occur/produced significantly more often prior to or during non-state fighting as compared with state-based fighting.} \]
\[ \text{Violent non-state groups who engage in non-state internal conflict are significantly more likely to operate in a country/countries where conflict resources occur/are produced as compared with violent non-state groups who engage in state-based internal conflict.} \]

These results more or less stay the same if the 79 formally organized groups who engaged in both kinds of internal fighting are included in the analysis, i.e. if actors who exclusively engaged in state-based armed conflict are compared with those actors who engaged in non-state armed conflict (sometimes in addition to state-based fighting).
Hypothesis 4a and 4b modify the above thesis by restricting it to certain kinds of conflict resources: those that are easy to access and to loot (secondary diamonds, other gemstones or drugs) and those that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or offshore oil/gas). The former are expected to especially matter in the context of non-state fighting (Hypothesis 4a) while the latter are expected to be more relevant in state-based fighting (Hypothesis 4b). In the following I present and summarize the main results in regard to Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b by level of analysis starting with the actor level.

Most of the violent non-state actors who are listed in UCDP’s “Actors Dataset” and who engaged in some kind of internal armed conflict have been operating in a country/in countries where some kind of conflict resource occurs or is produced. Of those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conflict, 99 percent were operating in a context where conflict resources are known to occur or produced as opposed to 94 or 91 percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conflict. Though the difference between these two sub-groups of actors appears small in real numbers, it is highly significant (p-values < 0.01). Thus, violent non-state actors who engaged in non-state fighting are significantly more likely to operate in a country/in countries where conflict resources occur or are produced as opposed to those actors who engaged in state-based fighting.

If only easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (secondary diamonds, other gemstones or drugs) are taken into consideration, the difference between these two groups of actors further increases: about 86 (or 85) percent of the non-state actors who engaged in non-state fighting were operating in a context where such resources are known to occur (or are produced) as opposed to 76 (or 74) percent of those actors who engaged in state-based armed conflict (p-values < 0.01). This result seems to be mostly driven by gemstones and drugs. Against expectation, the occurrence and production of (secondary) diamonds is not especially related to involvement in non-state internal fighting. Even in the contrary: A significantly larger share of those actors who have been engaged in state-based armed conflict were operating in a country/in countries where (secondary) diamonds occur or are produced.

More precisely, 97 percent have been operating in a context where some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, gemstones or oil/gas) occurs and 95 percent have been operating in a context where some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) is produced. In a few cases information is lacking on the occurrence or production of conflict resources within the country/countries where a violent actor had been active. These cases are treated as true missings and dropped from the respective analysis. Depending on the resource, the number of missings varies between zero and 14 (out of 953 non-state actors). If actors who engaged in both kinds of internal conflict are excluded from the analysis, the overall sample comprises 874 groups of violent actors (minus missings).

Seventy percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict (but just 49 percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conflict) were operating in a country/in countries where gemstones occur and are produced (p-values < 0.01). Fifty-five percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict (but just 46 percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conflict) where operating in a drug producing country/countries (p-value < 0.01).

Forty-six/fourty-one percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conflict but just
Differentiating the mere occurrence from actual production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources does not really affect the results which is hardly surprising given the fact that little is required to also produce these resources once they are discovered. This changes if resources that are rather difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydrocarbons) are considered: In comparison with those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based fighting, those who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict are significantly more likely to be operating in a context where such resources occur (91 versus 85 percent; p-value< 0.01). This contradicts Hypothesis 4b. But, they are significantly less likely to be operating in a context where primary diamonds or hydrocarbons are actually produced (66 versus 74 percent; p-value=0.013). The latter is in line with Hypothesis 4b and the expectation that these resources are of special value to states – at least in comparison with other conflict-relevant resources – because their point-source character makes it easier for states to control and to tax production. In any case, the exploitation requires know-how and technology that violent non-state actors are lacking. Point-source resources are therefore often produced by foreign companies or at least by large national enterprises. Because insecurity scares away these businesses, the governments use their tax revenue to stabilize the country and to vigorously defend these resources in the unlikely event that non-state actors dare to arise and to challenge the state.\footnote{38/24 percent of those who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict were operating in a context where diamonds occur/are produced (p-value< 0.05/p-value< 0.01). Forty-five/thirty-nine percent of those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based conflict but just 37/24 percent of those who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict where operating in a context where secondary diamonds occur/are produced (p-value< 0.05/p-value< 0.01).}

Most of the above supports Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b: Compared with the group of violent non-state actors who exclusively engaged in state-based fighting, those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict are significantly more likely to operate in a context where 1.) some kind of conflict resource occurs or is produced, 2.) where easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (especially gems and drugs) occur or are produced and 3.) where oil/gas deposits are known to exist. Furthermore, actors who engaged in state-based fighting are significantly more likely than actors who engaged in non-state fighting to operate in a country/in countries where those conflict resources are produced that are difficult to access and to loot (i.e. primary diamonds or (offshore) oil/gas). Obviously, a distinction between the kind of conflict resource and between the mere occurrence and actual exploitation/production does make sense. Some outcomes, however, are also against expectation: those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state conflict are significantly more likely than those actors who exclusively engaged in state-based fighting to operate in a context where conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot occur. Excluding onshore oil helps to adjust the direction of relationship which, however, stays insignificant.\footnote{If onshore oil/gas reserves are excluded from the measure, the effect persists: In comparison to actors who exclusively engaged in non-state armed conflict, a significantly larger share of actors who exclusively engaged in state-based armed conflict was operating in a country/countries where primary diamonds or offshore oil/gas are produced (41 versus 47 percent; p-value=0.061).}
Also against expectation, those actors who exclusively engaged in non-state fighting are significantly less likely to operate in a context where diamonds occur (whether both kinds of diamonds are grouped together or analyzed separately) and they are significantly less likely to operate in a context where (secondary) diamonds or (onshore) oil/gas are produced.

Some of these conflicting results might vanish within the following section which moves on to the next level of analysis. At the war, conflict and conflict episode level the quality of measurement significantly improves because the timing of fighting can be matched with the dates of discovery and first production of conflict resources. This is important as most of the mechanisms linking the occurrence and production of conflict resources with the incidence of (certain kinds of) internal fighting are assuming that both happened at about the same time. Only if conflict resources are known to occur at times of internal fighting the two factors can be linked with each other in a meaningful way. Likewise, it does not make much sense to directly link the exploitation of conflict resources with internal fighting if the production of such resources only started within the conflict- or war-affected country after fighting had already ended. This reasoning seems especially justified at the war level where the data set covers the entire post-WWII period and, without this constriction, would include many cases of internal warfare that happened before conflict resources had even been discovered or produced within the respective countries.\textsuperscript{14} This leads to the refined question whether conflict resources (and especially easily accessible and lootable conflict resources) are known to occur or produced significantly more often prior to or during times of non-state fighting (H4, H4a) whereas conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot are again expected to be known to occur or produced significantly more often prior to or during times of state-based internal fighting (H4b).

\textsuperscript{14}The number of such cases, however, greatly varies depending on the kind of resource. For instance, just one internal war happened in a country where secondary diamonds are in fact produced but where the exploitation of this resource only started after warfare had already ended. In regard to the production of primary diamonds, gemstones (other than diamonds), drugs, onshore oil/gas and offshore oil/gas this applies to 5, 6, 19, 11 and 18 cases of internal warfare out of a total of 138 internal wars.
The data indicate that of all internal wars between 1946 and 2009 (N=135) 83 percent happened at times when some kind of conflict resource (i.e. diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) had already been discovered within the respective countries. In the remaining 17 percent of all cases of internal warfare, conflict resources either do not occur at all within the respective countries or they occur within the war-affected countries but were only discovered after the fighting had been over.

Differentiating the known occurrence from the actual production of conflict resources during times of warfare again matters – at least in regard to certain conflict resources and at the regional level (especially in sub-Saharan Africa): 53 percent of all sub-Saharan African internal wars happened at times when diamonds had been discovered but only 37 percent took place at times when they were actually produced. In the case of secondary diamonds the latter figure drops to 27 percent, only. One third of all sub-Saharan African internal wars happened at times when primary diamonds had been discovered while only about one fourth happened at times when they were actually produced within the war-affected countries. Finally, about every second sub-Saharan African internal war happened at times when (onshore) oil/gas had been discovered while only about one third happened at times when (onshore) oil/gas was actually produced within the respective countries. Of all internal wars that happened between 1946 and 2009 (N=134) 83 percent happened at times when some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, other gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) had been produced within the respective countries.

---

15 Three cases – the non-state war in Bosnia (1992-1995) and the state-based wars in Paraguay (1947) and Vietnam (1960-1975) – needed to be dropped. These wars happened in countries that possess some kind of conflict resource (onshore oil/gas in the case of Bosnia and Vietnam and secondary diamonds in the case of Paraguay) but the discovery dates of these resources are unknown. Therefore, it is impossible to figure out whether conflict resources had already been known to occur during times of internal warfare. In the following, the number of missing cases varies between zero and ten depending on the kind of resource(s) whose production is considered.

16 Of all sub-Saharan Africa internal wars (N=45) 76 percent happened at times when conflict resources were known to occur within the respective countries while the same applies to 71 percent of the American internal wars (N=14), to 67 percent of the European internal wars (N=6), to all of the East and Southeast Asian and the Central and South Asian internal wars (N=22 and 24) and to 76 percent of the Middle East and North African internal wars (N=25).


18 Especially diamonds and oil/gas: Within the entire study period and worldwide 35 percent of all internal wars happened at times when secondary diamonds had been discovered but only 27 percent happened at times when they were actually produced within the respective countries. Only 18 percent of all internal wars happened at times when primary diamonds had been discovered and just 10 percent happened at times when primary diamonds were actually produced. Likewise, 65 percent of all internal wars happened at times when onshore oil/gas deposits had been discovered but only 57 percent happened at times when onshore oil/gas was actually produced. Finally, 36 percent of all internal wars happened at times when offshore oil/gas had been discovered but only 25 percent happened when offshore oil/gas was actually produced.

19 Four cases – the wars in Oman (1946), in Somalia (1992-2009; 1988-1991) and in Ethiopia (1976-1983) – were dropped due to missing information on the production dates of at least one of the conflict resources that are considered (diamonds, other gemstones, drugs or oil/gas).
The remaining 17 percent of all internal wars, happened at times when conflict resources were not produced within the respective countries – either because production had already stopped or only started later\textsuperscript{20} or because production never started, e.g. because these resources do not occur within the respective countries.

In regard to the main research question, however, significant differences between subgroups of internal wars cannot be detected or are based on unacceptably small sample sizes.\textsuperscript{21} Non-state internal wars are not significantly more likely than state-based internal wars to take place at times when conflict resources were already discovered or produced within the respective countries – neither worldwide, nor within certain regions, neither within the entire study period, nor within certain sub-periods thereof, neither if all kinds of conflict resources are taken into consideration nor if the analysis confines itself to certain kinds of conflict resources. One rare exception are post-Cold War internal wars in sub-Saharan Africa: In this region, about two thirds of all state-based internal wars but every non-state internal war that erupted after the end of the Cold War (N=22) or that was ongoing in 1989 or later (N=30) happened at times when conflict resources (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) were known to occur within the respective countries (p-values $< 0.01$; Chi-squared tests). Still, F-tests fail to reach an acceptable level of significance as does a comparison which is based on UCDP’s instead of PRIO’s regional coding.

Worldwide and within the entire study period, 66 percent of all internal wars (N=130) happened at times when easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (secondary diamonds, other gemstones or drugs) had been produced.\textsuperscript{22} Again, however, non-state internal wars are not significantly more likely than state-based internal wars to happen at times when easily accessible and lootable conflict resources were produced. This only changes if the analysis is confined to post-Cold War cases: Worldwide 64 (or 72) percent of all state-based internal wars but 92 (or 93) percent of all non-state internal wars that erupted after the end of the Cold War (or that were ongoing in 1989 or later) happened at times when easily accessible and lootable conflict resources were produced within the respective countries (p-values $< 0.01$; Chi-squared and F-tests). Significant results are also obtained for sub-Saharan African internal wars with an outbreak in 1989 or later (N=19). Finally, state-based internal wars are never significantly more likely than non-state internal wars to happen at times when conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydrocarbons) were produced.


\textsuperscript{21}All internal wars in East and Southeast Asia and in Central and South Asia happened at times when conflict resources had already been discovered. Therefore, a distinction between kinds of internal warfare does not make any sense. Zero, just one or two non-state internal wars took place in the Americas, the Middle East and North Africa and in Europe.

\textsuperscript{22}The corresponding regional numbers are 71 percent for sub-Saharan Africa, 96 percent for Central and South Asia, 100 percent for East and Southeast Asia, 46 percent for the Americas, 29 percent for Europe and 21 percent for the Middle East and North Africa.
Thus, at the war level there is at best modest support for Hypotheses 4 and 4a while nothing speaks in favor of Hypothesis 4b. This changes within the next paragraph. There, the analysis is moving from the war to the conflict level which brings about two important modifications: First of all, low-level violence is now taken into account which significantly increases the sample size although, secondly, the temporal scope of the analysis is shrinking from the entire post-Wold War II period (1946-2009) to the post-Cold War era (1989-2011). Again, the timing of armed conflict can be matched with the discovery and production dates of the resources to assure that the latter had already been known to occur or were even produced during times of internal fighting.

As before, most internal armed conflicts (91 percent of a total of 682 cases[^23]) happened at times when some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) had already been discovered within the respective countries. For instance, between 1989 and 2011, 352 internal armed conflicts took place in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these, 88 percent happened at times when at least one of the above conflict resources was known to occur within the respective countries. The same applies to 79 percent of the American internal armed conflicts (N=42) and to 93 percent of the Middle East and North African internal armed conflicts (N=114). Because all of the Asian and European internal armed conflicts took place at times when some kind of conflict resource had been discovered, a distinction in this regard between kinds of internal armed conflict becomes obsolete. However, in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas non-state armed conflicts were significantly more likely than state-based armed conflicts to happen in countries where conflict resource had been discovered.[^24] In the Middle East, the opposite applies but only if UCDP’s regional coding is used, i.e. if the Sudan is excluded from the subsample.[^25] These contrary regional effect explain why at the global level, the difference between state-based and non-state armed conflicts in this regard remains insignificant.

If the focus of the analysis moves to the actual production of conflict resources (instead of their mere occurrence) or to the production of certain kinds of conflict resources, the significance of results improves considerably. Now and worldwide, non-state armed conflicts were significantly more likely than state-based armed conflicts to happen at times when conflict resources were produced within the respective countries (96 versus 87 percent; p-value < 0.01), when easily accessible and lootable conflict resources were

[^23]: Eight cases of internal armed conflict needed to be dropped due to missing data. In the following, the size of the global sample varies between 562 and 690 cases, depending on whether the production or the occurrence of conflict resources is analyzed and which kind of conflict resource(s) is/are considered. Most data are missing on the occurrence of gemstones during times of armed conflict. The least data are missing on the production of drugs during times of armed conflict.

[^24]: In sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas 81 and 61 percent of all state-based internal armed conflicts (N=97 and 18) but 91 and 92 percent of all non-state internal armed conflicts (N=255 and 24) happened at times when some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) was known to occur within the respective countries (p-values=0.018 and 0.017).

[^25]: This reduces the sample size to just 47 cases of internal armed conflict (29 state-based and 18 non-state armed conflicts). A significantly larger share of the state-based armed conflicts happened at times when conflict resources were known to occur (93 versus 67 percent; p-value=0.019).
exploited (79 versus 63 percent; p-value < 0.01), when drugs were produced (44 versus 25 percent; p-value < 0.01) and when gemstones other than diamonds were produced or just occurred within the respective countries (54 or 55 percent versus 38 or 39 percent; p-values < 0.01). These highly significant results are echoed at the regional level within sub-Saharan Africa but also in most cases within the Americas and Central and South Asia. This strongly supports Hypotheses 4 and 4a.

At the global level, Hypothesis 4b also holds: State-based internal armed conflicts were significantly more likely than non-state armed conflicts to happen at times when conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydrocarbons) were produced within the respective countries (p-value < 0.01). However, a closer look reveals that this relationship is primarily driven by the Middle East and North African region. Within sub-Saharan Africa the difference between state-based and non-state armed conflicts in this regard stays insignificant while even the opposite applies within the Americas and Europe: there non-state armed conflicts occurred significantly more often in countries where primary diamonds or hydrocarbons were produced (p-values = 0.027 and 0.067). If the more restrictive measure is used (i.e. if resources that are difficult to access and to exploit are defined as primary diamonds and offshore oil/gas, only) things are equally confusing: Within two world regions (in sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas), non-state armed conflicts were significantly more likely than state-based armed conflicts to happen at times when primary diamonds and/or offshore oil/gas was produced within the respective countries (p-values < 0.05) while in two other regions (in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa) state-based armed conflicts turn out to be the kind of internal armed that happened significantly more often in such a context (p-values < 0.01). These inconsistencies repeat themselves if oil/gas is analyzed separately. At the global level and in the Middle East and North Africa, state-based conflicts were significantly more likely than non-state conflicts to occur at times when oil/gas in general and onshore oil/gas in particular had been produced within the respective countries (p-values < 0.01 and < 0.05; Chi-squared and F-tests). This speaks in favor of Hypothesis 4b. In the Americas and in Europe (UCDP regional coding), however, the opposite applies (p-values < 0.05 and < 0.1) while no significant results are obtained for sub-Saharan Africa. When it comes to the production of offshore oil/gas the difference between state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts stays insignificant even at the global level. Contrary effects within the single regions seem to offset each other entirely. 26 Likewise, at the global level the mere occurrence of oil/gas is not significantly related to a certain kind of internal armed conflict. Again, this seems to be the result of contrary effects within the single regions: In sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas non-state conflicts are significantly more likely than state-based

26 In sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas, non-state internal armed conflicts were significantly more likely than state-based internal armed conflicts to happen at times when offshore oil/gas was produced (p-value < 0.01 and < 0.05; Chi-squared and F-tests) while in the Middle East and North Africa and in Asia (UCDP regional coding) 20 and 40 percent of all state-based armed conflicts happened in such a context as opposed to just 2 or 18 percent of all non-state armed conflicts (p-values < 0.01 or < 0.05; Chi-squared and F-tests).
Conflicts to happen at times when onshore and/or offshore oil/gas had been known to occur while the opposite applies in the Middle East and North Africa (if UCDP’s regional coding is applied) and in Central and South Asia (at least in regard to offshore deposits). More consistent but still unexpected are the results in regard to diamonds: State-based internal armed conflicts were significantly more likely than non-state armed conflicts to happen in countries where diamonds in general but also secondary diamonds had been produced. This holds at the global level (p-values < 0.01) as well as within sub-Saharan Africa (p-values < 0.01) and within Central and South Asia (p-values < 0.05). Just Europe is falling out of line.

Carrying the analysis to the episode level increases the size of the global sample from a total of 690 armed conflicts (419 non-state and 271 state-based) between 1989 and 2011 to a total of 815 conflict episodes (449 non-state and 366 state-based) that were ongoing between 1989 and 2009. In many cases, the above results nevertheless repeat themselves. However, several additional significant effects in support of the hypotheses are also found – within single regions (mostly the Americas) as well as if the entire sample is used. Only in rare cases, significant outcomes at the conflict level turn out to be insignificant at the episode level.

The number of 366 state-based conflict episodes includes 44 cases that were still ongoing in 1989 or later but that had erupted earlier. Due to missing data, the size of the global sample varies between 653 and 815 conflict episodes, depending on whether the production or the occurrence of conflict resources is analyzed and which kind of conflict resource(s) is/are considered. The most and the least missing cases again occur when measuring the known occurrence of gemstones and the production of drugs during conflict episodes.

The outcomes at the conflict level and at the conflict episode level are basically equivalent in regard to the following variables: the production of some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, other gemstones, drugs or oil/gas), the discovery and the production of diamonds, the discovery and the production of secondary diamonds and the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (secondary diamonds, other gemstones or drugs).

In the Americas a significantly larger share of non-state than state-based conflict episodes happened at times when some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, other gemstones or oil/gas) had been discovered within the respective countries, when oil/gas had been known to occur or when (onshore) oil/gas had been produced, when offshore oil/gas had been discovered or produced and when conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or (offshore) oil/gas) had been produced. In the Americas and in Central and South Asia a significantly larger share of non-state than state-based conflict episodes happened at times when gemstones other than diamonds had been known to occur or were produced. Likewise, in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East (UCDP regional coding) a significantly larger share of non-state than state-based conflict episodes took place at times when drugs where produced within the respective countries. Finally, in sub-Saharan Africa a significantly larger share of state-based than non-state conflict episodes happened at times when (onshore) oil/gas was produced. In all of these cases, the respective outcomes had remained insignificant at the conflict level.

Primary diamonds are known to occur significantly more often during state-based conflict episodes as opposed to non-state conflict episodes. Likewise, offshore oil/gas is known to occur and also produced significantly more often during state-based conflict episodes as opposed to non-state conflict episodes. These differences had remained insignificant at the conflict level.

In sub-Saharan Africa and in the Americas, the known occurrence of oil/gas is not any more significantly related to a certain kind of conflict episode. Likewise, in sub-Saharan Africa the production of conflict resources that are especially difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or offshore
The following summary of results therefore applies to the conflict, and even more so, to the conflict-episode level: In line with Hypotheses 4 and 4a, conflict resources (especially easily accessible and lootable conflict resources, gemstones other than diamonds and drugs) are produced significantly more often prior to or during non-state fighting as opposed to state-based fighting. The effects are highly significant at the global level, robust against changes in the regional coding and mostly consistent across regions. If analyzed separately, however, the production of (secondary) diamonds is – against expectations – observed significantly more often during state-based instead of non-state fighting. Hypothesis 4b also finds support at the global level: Conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or (offshore) oil/gas) are produced significantly more often prior to or during state-based internal fighting. However, this effect seems to be mainly driven by oil/gas (the production of primary diamonds itself fails to be significantly related to a certain kind of internal fighting) and by the Middle East and North African region while it remains insignificant or even contrary in other areas of the world.

This section concludes with presenting the results of a country level analysis investigating whether conflict resources in general (and easily accessible and lootable conflict resources in particular) are significantly more likely to occur or to be produced in countries experiencing non-conventional (non-state) fighting as compared with countries experiencing conventional (state-based) fighting (Hypotheses 4 and 4a). Conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds and hydrocarbons) are again expected to be significantly more likely to occur or to be produced in countries experiencing conventional (state-based) fighting as opposed to non-conventional (non-state) fighting (Hypothesis 4b).

Examining these questions at the national level comes with a major advantage in comparison to the above: at the country level, independent states without conflict experience can be taken into consideration. This avoids a selection bias that is inherent in the above analyses which only cover instances of internal fighting or armed groups who in any case engaged in armed battle. Conflict resources, however, often occur and are produced in countries which have not seen any internal armed conflict. Whether peaceful states are in fact more likely to possess or to exploit conflict resources than countries that have been involved in a certain kind of internal fighting cannot be studied if such cases are excluded from the overall sample. The downside of a country level analysis is a mat-

---

32 Only the Middle East and North Africa steps out of line.
33 With the only exception of Europe.
34 In regard to the production of offshore oil/gas, sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas at least share the same direction of relationship as opposed to Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa on the other side. In regard to the production of onshore oil/gas the dividing line seems to run between sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa on the one hand and Europe and the Americas on the other. Reasons for these diverging outcomes might be differences in the production status or differences in the relative importance and in the actual value of the production for the local and national economies.
Comparative Analysis

The discovery and production dates of conflict resources cannot be matched any more with the timing of internal fighting. Thus, neither the geographical nor the temporal availability of conflict resources to violent actors is guaranteed even if conflict resources and armed conflict might significantly correlate with each other at the national level. In addition, the size of the global sample shrinks to 175 independent states which impedes a meaningful comparison at the regional level.

Worldwide, however, much seems to speak in favor of the main research question. First of all, countries that have seen (any kind of) internal warfare are significantly more likely than countries without any internal war experience to produce some kind of conflict resource (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas), to possess and to produce secondary diamonds or gemstones other than diamonds, to produce drugs and to produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (secondary diamonds, gemstones or drugs) (all p-values< 0.01). Likewise, countries that have seen internal armed conflict are significantly more likely than countries that have not experienced any internal armed conflict to possess conflict resources (diamonds, gemstones or oil/gas) (p-value=0.056), to possess and to produce secondary diamonds (p-values< 0.01) and gemstones other than diamonds (p-values< 0.05) as well as to produce drugs, easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (secondary diamonds, gemstones or drugs) or conflict resources in general (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) (p-values< 0.01).

Significant differences between sub-groups of countries in regard to the occurrence and production of conflict resources also exist. I compared the following groups of independent states: Firstly, countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state fighting as opposed to countries that have been involved in exclusively state-based internal fighting. Secondly, countries that have seen non-state internal fighting (sometimes in addition to state-based fighting) as opposed to countries that have not engaged in this kind of internal fighting (because they just experienced state-based fighting or no internal fighting at all). Thirdly, countries that have seen non-state internal fighting (sometimes in addition to state-based fighting) as opposed to entirely peaceful countries that have not seen any kind of internal fighting.

This comparison reveals that a significantly larger share of those countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state armed conflicts possess and produce gemstones as opposed to those countries that engaged in state-based armed conflict only (67 percent versus 27 and 29 percent, p-values=0.019). Half of all countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state armed conflicts engage in drug production. The corresponding

---

35 Countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state internal wars (N=3) or armed conflicts (N=12) are compared with countries that have been involved in exclusively state-based internal wars (N=47) or armed conflicts (N=35).

36 Countries that have seen non-state internal wars (N=16) or armed conflicts (N=53) are compared with countries that have not seen any non-state internal war (N=159) or armed conflict (N=122).

37 Countries that have seen non-state internal wars (N=16) or armed conflicts (N=53) are compared with countries that have not seen any kind of internal war (N=112) or armed conflict (N=87).
number for those countries that just experienced state-based armed conflict is significantly smaller (23 percent) (p-value=0.076). Thirdly, 83 percent of all countries that have been involved in exclusively non-state armed conflicts produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources as opposed to just half of those countries that engaged in state-based armed conflict only (p-value=0.044).

A number of additional significant outcomes are obtained if those countries that have seen non-state fighting (sometimes in addition to state-based fighting) are compared with those countries that have not seen this kind of internal fighting: 91 percent of those countries that have seen non-state internal armed conflict produce at least one kind of conflict resource as opposed to just 69 percent of those countries that have not experienced non-state internal armed conflict (p-value=0.002). The former are also significantly more likely to possess and to produce gemstones other than diamonds (51 percent versus 27 percent; p-values< 0.01), to produce drugs (43 percent versus 11 percent; p-value< 0.01) and to possess and to produce diamonds (42 percent versus 24 percent; p-values=0.018) – though the latter outcome is entirely driven by secondary diamonds (38 percent versus 18 percent; p-values< 0.01). The production of drugs is also significantly more likely in those independent state that have seen non-state internal warfare as opposed to those states that have not experienced this kind of internal warfare (38 percent versus 19 percent; p-values< 0.1). In addition, the former are significantly more likely to possess and to produce secondary diamonds (44 percent versus 20 percent; p-values< 0.05). Overall, 81 percent of those countries that have seen non-state warfare and 74 percent of those that have experienced non-state internal armed conflict produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources as opposed to just 45 and 37 percent of those states that have not seen this kind of internal warfare and armed conflict (p-values< 0.01).

Similar outcomes are obtained if those countries that have seen non-state internal fighting are compared with those countries that have not seen any internal fighting. Countries that experienced non-state internal armed conflict are significantly more likely than entirely peaceful states to possess and to produce at least one kind of conflict resource (87 and 91 percent versus 74 and 67 percent) (p-values=0.064 and 0.002). In addition, countries that have seen non-state internal armed conflict are significantly more likely than entirely peaceful states to possess and to produce diamonds in general (42 percent versus 23 percent) (p-values=0.020) and secondary diamonds in particular (38 percent versus 13 percent; p-values=0.001), to possess and to produce gemstones other than diamonds (51 percent versus 26 percent) (p-values=0.003), to produce drugs (46 percent versus 6 percent) (p-value=0.000) and to produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (74 percent versus 32 percent) (p-value=0.000). The last four findings also hold if those countries that have seen non-state internal warfare are compared with those countries that have not seen any kind of internal warfare: 44 percent of the former but only 15 percent of the latter possess and produce secondary diamonds (p-values=0.007), 50 percent of the former but only 27 percent of the latter possess and produce gemstones other than diamonds (p-values=0.057), 38 percent of the former
but only 11 percent of the latter produce drugs (p-value=0.000) and 81 percent of the former but only 38 percent of the latter possess and produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (p-value=0.001).

All of the above country-level results strongly support Hypotheses 4 and 4a. Involvement in non-state internal fighting significantly correlates with the occurrence and even more so with the production of conflict resources in general and easily accessible and lootable conflict resources in particular. Only the production of conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds and onshore or offshore oil/gas) is not significantly correlated with a certain kind of internal armed conflict or warfare – no matter which countries are compared with each other and independent from the fact whether these resources are grouped together or analyzed separately. In fact, these resources are about as often produced in war-torn as in peaceful countries. Thirty-eight percent of those countries that experienced non-state internal warfare produce conflict resources (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) as opposed to 89 percent of those countries that experienced state-based wars only (p-value=0.007 Chi-squared test; p-value=0.048 F-test). Because just three countries engaged in non-state wars only, I handle this outcome with care.

Overall and in tendency, more significant outcomes are obtained if the categorization of sub-groups of countries that are compared with each other is less restrictive (i.e. if countries that experienced non-state internal fighting are compared with those that have not seen this or any kind of internal fighting instead of a comparison of countries that engaged in exclusively non-state internal fighting with those that engaged in exclusively state-based internal fighting). Secondly and as before, the significance of differences improves if the production of conflict resources is analyzed instead of the mere occurrence and, thirdly, if easily accessible and lootable conflict resources are considered (especially gemstones, drugs or secondary diamonds) instead of oil/gas or primary diamonds. Finally, the significance of results improves if low-level violence is taken into consideration, e.g. if countries are compared that have seen different kinds of internal armed conflict instead of internal warfare. This provides some support for the thesis

38For instance, conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or hydrocarbons) are produced in 68 percent of those countries that experienced internal warfare but also in 60 percent of those countries without any war experience. This difference is statistically insignificant. Primary diamonds occur in about 20 percent of those countries with internal conflict or war experience but also in 20 percent of those countries without conflict or war experience.

39Thirty-three percent of those countries that engaged in exclusively non-state internal warfare produce conflict resources (diamonds, gemstones, drugs or oil/gas) as opposed to 89 percent of those countries that engaged in state-based wars only (p-value=0.007 Chi-squared test; p-value=0.048 F-test). Because just three countries engaged in non-state wars only, I handle this outcome with care.

40For instance, countries that have only seen non-state internal armed conflict are not significantly more likely to produce some kind of conflict resource than countries that have only seen state-based armed conflict. However, countries that have seen non-state internal armed conflict (maybe in addition to state-based armed conflict) are significantly more likely to produce some kind of conflict resource than countries that have not engaged in this kind of internal armed conflict (because they just experienced state-based armed conflict or no internal armed conflict at all).

41For instance, countries that have been involved in non-state internal wars are not significantly more likely than countries that have not engaged in this kind of internal warfare to produce some kind of conflict resource. However, countries that have been involved in non-state internal armed conflict are
that fights over natural resources rather manifest themselves as low intensity struggles instead of intense or bloody warfare. It also leads to the main conclusion that the level of analysis matters in regard to the question whether conflict resources associate with a certain kind of internal fighting. In other words: the above presented findings are only partly consistent across levels of analysis. Some effects are statistically significant at certain levels of analysis, only. For instance, at the country level secondary diamonds are produced significantly more often in countries that experienced non-state internal armed conflict as opposed to countries that have not seen this kind of internal fighting. If only countries are compared that engaged in the one or the other kind of internal fighting, the effect remains insignificant. In contrast, at the actor, the conflict and the conflict episode level the production of secondary diamonds clearly and significantly associates with state-based internal fighting. Another example are conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot. At the country level, their occurrence and production neither significantly associate with a certain kind of internal fighting nor with internal fighting in general. At the conflict and at the conflict episode level, however, such resources have been produced significantly more often during times of state-based internal fighting as opposed to non-state internal fighting. Overall, most findings at the actor, the conflict, the episode and the country level speak in favor of the concept of New Wars. Despite some exceptions, especially the outcomes in regard to hypotheses 4 and 4a are (highly) significant and rather robust against changes in the regional coding or in the categorization of groups of countries that are compared with each other. However, at the country level, no significant effects are found in terms of Hypothesis 4b while at the war level even Hypothesis 4 and 4a are mostly failing. An explanation for these diverging outcomes that immediately comes to mind are the different time periods covered by the corresponding analyses. But even if the war level analysis is also confined to the post-Cold War era, significant global effects do not appear.

This section closes by reminding the reader that a significant bivariate correlation must not be mistaken for a causal relationship. In addition, a statistically significant and robust effect is not necessarily large or important. This in particular applies to the study at hand. Bilateral internal fighting, especially intense warfare, is a rare event while conflict resources are comparatively often found within countries. For this reason, around 75 percent of those countries that have not seen any internal armed conflict or war nevertheless possess conflict resources and about two thirds of all peaceful countries also produce them.\footnote{See also Ross (2006, pp. 286 sq., 296) who finds a robust association between (primary) diamonds and state-based internal warfare but also warns that small changes in the data can alter the statistical significance of the correlation because civil warfare in diamond producing states is a rare event. Only 12 of the 90 civil wars that began between 1960 and 1999 took place in countries that produced diamonds in non trivial quantities (measured by the value of diamonds produced per capita in the year of war onset).} Obviously, the occurrence and production of conflict resources not necessarily correlates with internal fighting. The destabilizing effect of conflict re-

42
sources might rather depend on the significance, the size or the quality of the deposits or other, interacting variables such as the level of economic development or political factors (Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. 2005, p. 556). The quality of the available resources data also remains an issue that has been discussed elsewhere. At least the above used data sets provide spatial information. In theory, this allows for measuring the distance between the deposits/production sites and decision-making centers, boundaries or actual conflict zones. In practice, however, information on the exact locations of state-based and non-state internal armed conflicts is to a large extent missing. In addition, geographically disaggregated data is lacking on the occurrence and production of other conflict resources (e.g. coltan). Due to these data constraints, the above only accounts for whether conflict resources are technologically available to violent actors (i.e. whether they are easily accessible and lootable or not) and whether they were actually known to occur and produced within the respective countries during times of internal fighting. If the resources are also geographically available (i.e. if they are located in areas where the rebels are in control of) remains unknown despite the fact that the theoretical argument is of course only fully plausible if all three of these conditions are met. This relates to another difficulty, namely the fact that countries often experience both kinds of internal fighting at the same time. Without geographically disaggregated data it is impossible to study in which of the wars, armed conflicts or conflict episodes conflict resources were available to and extracted by violent actors. In the past, the lack of geographically disaggregated conflict data prompted researchers to forgo already available, geographically disaggregated diamond data. Instead they used simple dummy variables which only indicate whether a country possesses or produces diamonds. The very few analyses that rely on geographically disaggregated conflict and diamond data only capture conventional (state-based) conflicts. This also holds for the more recent and sophisticated large-N analyses published in this field of research by Lujala (2009); Fjelde (2009b, p. 18) explores the sub-national determinants of non-state conflict in Nigeria. She uses geographically disaggregated data on oil deposits and finds that “areas with on-shore oil-production have a higher risk of non-state conflict events than locations without oil-production” which points to the importance of oil-bunkering in Nigeria. Whether oil is equally important in explaining state-based armed conflicts within this country cannot be ruled out due to the design of this study. It also remains a matter of future research to figure out whether this and other kinds of conflict resources are equally important in explaining non-state fighting elsewhere. Earlier large-N studies on the question in how far natural resource wealth increases the risk of outbreak as well as the duration of civil warfare are also of little help. They cover state-based internal wars, only, and yielded ambiguous evidence.

43See e.g. Gilmore et al. (2005) and Lujala, N. P. Gleditsch, et al. (2005).
44See e.g. Buhaug et al. (2005) and Lujala (2005).
22.3. Comparison of the Scale and Nature of Violence

The following section investigates whether the scale of violence differs between kinds of internal armed conflict. The direction of relationship is left undefined:

| H5 | Non-state internal fighting results in significantly more/less direct, battle-related deaths as compared with state-based internal fighting. |

The intensity of bilateral fighting is generally measured by the number of military and civilian battle-related deaths per conflict or conflict-year.\textsuperscript{46} The consolidated version of the “New List of Wars” added this kind of information at least for those internal wars that were ongoing or just erupted after the end of the Cold War. Because the authors of the data set themselves describe the quality of their yearly data as “critical”, the following just relies on the total numbers of battle-related deaths per war. However, even these aggregate figures are missing for most of the non-state internal wars. Only four cases are covered which over their entire duration and on average resulted in 76,173 battle-related deaths at most as opposed to a maximum average number of 83,144 battle-related deaths per state-based internal war (N=51).\textsuperscript{47} Due to the small numbers of observations and great variances the difference in means stays insignificant.

Luckily, UCDP’s “Non-State Conflicts Dataset” is also counting battle-related deaths and, in addition to cases of minor and intermediate non-state armed conflict, covers all of the above missing cases of non-state internal warfare. Compatible data on the battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts are available through UCDP’s “Battle-Deaths Dataset”. These data reveal that non-state internal armed conflicts are in fact \textit{less} intense than state-based internal armed conflicts.

\textsuperscript{46}According to Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005, pp. 152 sq.) this is the best available indicator to measure the scale of violence especially in comparison to combatant deaths because it is oftentimes impossible to distinguish between military and civilian victims of internal fighting. In addition, they argue that private military companies are involved in many contemporary internal wars whose personnel are not combatants in a classical sense. Thus, “a focus on combatant deaths rather than battle-deaths could seriously underestimate the scope of military combat in many, if not most, of today’s wars” (Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch 2005, p. 148).

\textsuperscript{47}The minimum estimate of the total number of battle-deaths is 16,946 per non-state war (N=4) and 28,379 per state-based war (N=54).
Worldwide (and also in every single world region), the average number of battle-deaths per non-state internal armed conflict is significantly lower than the average number of battle-deaths per state-based internal armed conflict: Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP’s best estimates of battle-deaths are available for 419 non-state and 271 state-based internal armed conflicts that caused a total of 102,172 and 682,755 civilian and military battle-deaths. The average number of battle-deaths per non-state armed conflict is therefore as low as 244 compared to 2,519 battle-related deaths per state-based internal armed conflict (p-value < 0.01). If extreme outliers on both sides are excluded, the difference in means is shrinking but remains highly significant. The same applies if the comparatively intense internationalized state-based armed conflicts are removed from the sample. Furthermore, the result is robust against changes in the regional coding and equally holds if UCDP’s low or high estimates of battle-deaths are used.

Controlling for the duration of fighting confirms the above outcome. The average number of battle-deaths per conflict-year is also significantly lower for non-state as opposed to state-based armed conflicts. This holds worldwide (whether extreme outliers are excluded or not) and for most of the regional sub-samples. The global average number of people that died per non-state conflict-year is 121 while the corresponding number for state-based armed conflicts stands at 498 (best estimates; p-value < 0.01). In sub-Saharan Africa state-based armed conflicts cost between 674 and 1,093 battle-related deaths per conflict-year while just 99 to 199 people died per non-state conflict-year (low and high estimates; p-values < 0.01). Interestingly, the best estimate of the average number of battle-deaths per non-state conflict-year in sub-Saharan Africa (of 125) barely reaches the global average (of 120). The average number of battle-deaths per non-state conflict in sub-Saharan Africa even lies below the world average (214 versus 244). Non-state armed conflicts are most intense in the Americas and in the Middle East and North Africa.

The corresponding low and high estimates are 92,556 and 150,725 worldwide battle-related deaths from non-state armed conflicts and 636,329 and 981,246 from state-based armed conflicts. UCDP reports 2,153 battle-deaths per regular state-based armed conflict (N=231) and 4,635 battle-deaths per internationalized state-based armed conflict (N=40). This difference in means is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01; t-Test equal variances and p-values < 0.05; Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test and t-Test with unequal variances). If the duration of fighting is taken into account, internationalized state-based armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (N=21) are especially intense with 1,051 battle-related deaths per conflict-year (as opposed to a global average of 861).

It holds for those armed conflicts that happened in sub-Saharan Africa, in Central and South Asia, in Europe, in the Middle East and North Africa (PRIO regional coding) and in the Americas (if the high estimates for battle-related deaths are used). The results are less significant or insignificant only for armed conflicts that happened in the Middle East (UCDP regional coding without Sudan), in East and South East Asia and Oceania and in the Americas (if the low and best estimates for battle-related deaths are used).

The best estimates for the number of battle-deaths per state-based and per non-state conflict-year are 702 versus 125 for sub-Saharan Africa, 515 versus 81 for Central and South Asia, 599 versus 92 for Europe and 362 versus 140 for the Middle East and North Africa (p-values < 0.01 or at least < 0.05).

In both regions, the post-Cold War average numbers of battle-deaths per non-state conflict (412 and 358) and per non-state conflict-year (130 and 140) are much higher than the respective world averages (of 244 and 120). Non-state conflicts are least intense in Central and South Asia and Europe.
Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa holds the by far greatest share (53 percent) in the overall number of battle-deaths from *non-state* internal fighting simply because the vast majority of non-state armed conflicts happened in this area (see fig. 22.2 on the current page).

![Figure 22.2: Post-Cold War Average Regional Shares in All Battle-Deaths (1989-2011 averages), by type of internal conflict and in percent. Source: own calculation.](image)

When it comes to *state-based* conflicts, Central and South Asia’s regional share in the total number of battle-deaths from this kind of internal fighting is as large as sub-Saharan Africa’s share. Both regions account for about one third of all battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts (see also fig. 22.2 on this page) – though for different reasons: Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the most state-based internal armed conflicts (N=98), each of a medium intensity and duration, so that their battle-death numbers simply add up. Central and South Asia experienced far less state-based armed conflicts (N=52) than sub-Saharan Africa. However, state-based armed conflicts in this region were almost twice as intense and long. Thus, most battle-deaths *per* state-based conflict occurred in Central and South Asia. Still, if differences in the *duration* of fighting are taken into consideration, state-based armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa were the most violent. There, 702 people died per state-based conflict-year as opposed to 599 in Europe, 515 in Central and South Asia and 498 worldwide.

---

53 UCDP reports 4,249 battle-deaths per state-based conflict in Central and South Asia as opposed to 2,519 worldwide or 2,339 in sub-Saharan Africa.
22. Comparative Analysis

If the number of battle-deaths would have been equally spread throughout the post-Cold War era, state-based internal fighting in sub-Saharan Africa would have caused almost 10,000 battle-related deaths each year between 1989 and 2011 as opposed to an average annual number of 2,368 battle-deaths from non-state internal armed conflicts. In this region and in the Americas, state-based armed conflicts resulted in four times as many civilian and military deaths than non-state armed conflicts. In the Middle East and North Africa, in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, in Central and South Asia and in Europe, the total numbers of battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts are even five, seven, twenty-five and thirty-nine times as high as the total numbers of battle-deaths from non-state armed conflicts (see fig. 22.3 on the current page).

![Average Annual Number of Battle-Deaths from Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011), by type of conflict and region](image)

Figure 22.3.: Average Annual Number of Battle-Deaths from Internal Armed Conflict (1989-2011), by type of internal conflict and region. Source: own calculation.

Because UCDP’s battle-death data are available on a yearly basis, some changes over time in the annual numbers of total battle-deaths from both kinds of internal fighting and in the annual average numbers of battle-deaths per non-state/state-based armed conflict shall be briefly mentioned.
Throughout the post-Cold War era, the worldwide number of annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts varies greatly (between 39 and 65) as does the total annual number of battle-related deaths that can be attributed to these conflicts. The least battle-deaths per state-based conflict are reported for 2005 when 38 state-based conflicts caused a total of 11,457 battle-deaths (i.e. 302 per conflict on average). The most battle-deaths per state-based conflict occurred in 1990 when 65 state-based armed conflicts killed 79,513 people (i.e. 1,223 per conflict on average). Worldwide and in every single year between 1989 and 2011, the corresponding numbers for non-state armed conflicts are much lower: UCDP counts between 15 and 42 non-state armed conflicts per year. The total annual number of battle-deaths from these conflicts varies between 1,897 (in 2007) and 10,466 (in 1993). The most battle-deaths per non-state conflict and year (338) are reported in 1993 while the least battle-deaths per non-state conflict and year (69) occurred in 2005 (see fig. 22.4 on this page). This confirms the main finding of the above cross-sectional analysis: Non-state armed conflicts cost less battle-deaths than state-based armed conflicts not only at the conflict level and within the entire post-Cold War era, but also in every single country-year throughout this time-period.

Figure 22.4.: Deadliness of State-Based vs. Non-State Internal Armed Conflicts (1989-2011). Source: own calculation.

54This number is due to very deadly non-state conflicts in Sudan, in the DRC and in Nigeria.
Secondly, time-series data reveal that the deadliness of both kinds of internal fighting decreased over time. However, state-based internal armed conflicts turned less violent comparatively fast: the annual worldwide number of battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts (almost continuously) decreased by 86 percent between the all time high in 1990 and the lowest value in 2005. The decrease in the corresponding number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conflict is equally impressive. These developments are mainly due to the fact that outbreaks of high intensity state-based conflicts became less frequent.\textsuperscript{55} The total number of battle-deaths from all state-based armed conflicts and the average number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conflict in 2011 were only half of what they had been in 1989 (see the upper part of fig. 22.5 on the next page).

The global number of battle-deaths from non-state armed conflicts (as well as the average number of battle-deaths per non-state conflict) also decreased by about 80 percent between 1993 and 2007. Again, especially high intensity non-state armed conflicts became less frequent over time.\textsuperscript{56} Since 2005/2007, however, the global number of battle-deaths from non-state armed conflicts more than tripled. In comparison to the 1989 value, the 2011 figure is almost twice as high while the average number of battle-deaths per non-state armed conflict came close to reaching the 1989 value (see the lower part of fig. 22.5 on the facing page). These more recent developments are concerning.

\textsuperscript{55}Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP counts 92 state-based armed conflicts that resulted in at least 1,000 battle-deaths over their entire duration. Fifty-nine of these broke out between 1989 and 1994, 25 between 1995 and 2004 and just eight after 2005. Outbreaks of medium or low intensity state-based armed conflicts also became less likely but at a slower rate (85 outbreaks between 1989 and 1994, 48 outbreaks between 1995 and 2004 and still 46 outbreaks after 2005).

\textsuperscript{56}Between 1989 and 2011, UCDP counts 19 non-state armed conflicts that resulted in at least 1,000 battle-deaths over their entire duration. Eleven of these broke out between 1989 and 1994, six between 1995 and 2004 and just two after 2005. The 2012 Human Security Report uses a different definition of “high intensity” but still finds that “[…] there have been fewer high intensity non-state conflicts [with at least 1,000 reported battle-related deaths for at least one of the active years] since the mid-1990s than in the earlier years [… ] and none at all since 2005” (HSC 2012, p. 191). Outbreaks of medium or low intensity non-state armed conflicts do not follow the same downward trend: 85 of these broke out between 1989 and 1994, 194 between 1995 and 2004 and 121 after 2005.
Figure 22.5.: Battle-Deaths from/per Internal Armed Conflict (1989-2011), by type of armed conflict and worldwide. Source: own calculation.

The late increases in the annual numbers of battle-deaths from/per non-state armed conflict are primarily driven by developments in the Americas (almost exclusively in Mexico), in the Middle East and North Africa (mostly in Sudan but also in Iraq) and to a lesser extent in Central and South Asia (mainly in Pakistan). An equally clear and recent upward trend in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be detected due to great fluctuations in numbers. Europe and East and South East Asia and Oceania have only seen very few (but intense) non-state armed conflicts during the 1990s. Since then, non-state fighting in these regions as a whole is negligible (see fig. 22.6 on the next page).
The above findings are mostly consistent with prior quantitative studies. Lacina (2006), Lacina, Russett, et al. (2006), Lacina and N. P. Gleditsch (2005) and Melander et al. (2006) all report a decreasing trend in the severity of internal fighting especially after the end of the Cold War. The authors therefore explicitly or implicitly claim to disprove the concept of New Wars. Unfortunately, their analyses per definition exclude non-state internal armed conflicts. The 2012 Human Security Report aimed to close this gap in research. The seventh chapter of the report depicts changes in the number of battle-deaths from non-state fighting between 1989 and 2009 and for this purpose also uses UCDP data. The above outcomes therefore mirror at least the main findings of the 2012 Human Security Report. For instance, I agree that throughout the post-Cold War period, the overall death-toll from internal armed conflict has been declining enormously. This trend is mainly due to a large decrease in the total number of battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts. In addition, the above showed that the annual average number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conflict has also rapidly declined over the years. This holds for non-state armed conflicts, too – though the decrease was less pronounced. Decreasing numbers of battle-deaths for both kinds of internal armed conflict especially in sub-Saharan Africa throughout most parts of the post-Cold War period are giving hope.
The long-term developments in other regions, however, are less clear, greatly influenced by extreme outliers and partly even contrary.\footnote{For instance, in Central and South Asia, the numbers of battle-deaths from/per state-based armed conflict increased over time. In 2009, both indicators reached their all time maximum due to intense conflicts in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. In the Americas, the numbers of battle-deaths from/per non-state armed conflict seem to be rising over the long-run (due to non-state fighting in Mexico, Columbia and sporadic violent non-state fighting in other countries) while the intensity of state-based armed conflicts in this region reached a local high in 2001 (due to the beginning of the state-based armed conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda and state-based fighting in Columbia).}

The cross-sectional comparative analysis presented above comes to the conclusion, too, that conflicts involving a government are on average many times deadlier than fighting amongst non-state groups. That non-state internal fighting causes more direct victims than state-based internal fighting also holds for every single country-year between 1989 and 2011 if the global numbers of battle-deaths from/per state-based armed conflict are compared with the global numbers of battle-deaths from/per non-state armed conflict. But at the regional level some exceptions do exist: For instance, in the Americas, the total number of battle-deaths from non-state conflicts (almost entirely in Mexico) exceeded the total number of battle-deaths from state-based conflicts in 2008, 2010 and 2011. In every country-year since 2008, more people died per non-state conflict than per state-based conflict in this region. This has also been the case in East and South East Asia and Oceania in nine out of the 23 years that are covered by this study. In sub-Saharan Africa, the total number of battle-deaths from non-state armed conflicts was higher than the total number of battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts in 1992, 1995, 2002, 2003 and 2004. The average number of battle-deaths per non-state armed conflict almost equaled the average number of battle-deaths per state-based armed conflict in another five years out of the 23-years period.
I further agree that sub-Saharan Africa has suffered a lot from non-state internal fighting. This region has seen the most non-state armed conflicts and (together with Central and South Asia) holds the largest share in the overall number of battle-deaths from this kind of internal fighting. However, sub-Saharan African non-state armed conflicts are not the most violent non-state armed conflicts – neither in terms of battle-deaths per entire conflict nor in terms of battle-deaths per conflict-year. The same discrepancies exist at the regional and at the country level. The latter is illustrated by table 22.1 on the facing page which is ranking countries according to their values on different indicators that are measuring the deadliness of non-state and state-based internal fighting. Somalia serves as an example. This country instantly comes to mind when thinking about non-state conflict and, without doubt, has been heavily affected by this kind of internal fighting – at least in terms of the overall number of non-state armed conflicts (59) that happened in this failed state between 1989 and 2011. However, Somalia only ranks third when it comes to the overall number of battle-deaths from non-state internal fighting, fifteenth in terms of battle-deaths per non-state armed conflict and fourth in terms of the average number of battle-deaths per country-year that has been affected by this kind of internal fighting. Amongst the top-ten states on these indicators are the usual suspects (e.g. the DRC and Somalia), but also some African countries that are rarely discussed in terms of non-state fighting (Ghana and South Africa) and quite a number of non-African states (Mexico, India, Indonesia, Columbia, Myanmar, Iraq and Pakistan). Whether sub-Saharan Africa as a region (or single sub-Saharan African countries) is (or are) the hardest-hit in terms of the deadliness of non-state internal fighting depends on the perspective (e.g. a country level versus conflict level perspective) and the indicators that are used. At least other regions that are barely mentioned within the 2012 Human Security Report (or single countries therein) deserve more attention.

When it comes to the more recent years, especially the developments in Mexico, Sudan and Pakistan are concerning. Recent changes in the incidence, the duration and the deadliness of internal armed conflicts in these countries to a large extent explain the recent global figures: Since 2005, the worldwide numbers of state-based and non-state armed conflicts per year have been increasing.\(^58\) As a consequence, the overall annual numbers of battle-deaths from both kinds of internal fighting but also the annual average numbers of battle-deaths per state-based and non-state armed conflict have been rising. Again, the increases are comparatively large for non-state armed conflicts. Whether these changes mark the beginning of a renewed upward trend in the intensity of internal fighting in general and of non-state internal fighting in particular remains a matter of future research.

---

\(^{58}\) The number of annually ongoing state-based armed conflicts grew from 38 in 2005 to 49 in 2011. The number of annually ongoing non-state armed conflicts grew from 29 in 2005 to 38 in 2011.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total battle-deaths</td>
<td>battle-deaths per conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Sudan (17582)</td>
<td>Indonesia (684)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>DRC (11679)</td>
<td>Ghana (606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ethiopia (5539)</td>
<td>India (539)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>India (4312)</td>
<td>DRC (531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Liberia (2958)</td>
<td>Iraq (401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kenya (2587)</td>
<td>Sudan (400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Ghana (2412)</td>
<td>Lebanon (285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Pakistan (2170)</td>
<td>Nigeria (211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Indonesia (2053)</td>
<td>Somalia (188)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22.1.: Ranking of Countries by the Deadliness of Internal Fighting. Source: own calculation.
Comparative Analysis

In any case, the above insights only apply to the 1989 till 2011 period. Extending the analysis to the entire post-World War II era is impossible due to a lack of battle-deaths data for non-state armed conflicts prior to 1989. In addition, indirect victims of internal fighting are not covered. The full scale of applied violence therefore remains unknown. Studying the quality of internal fighting is even more challenging due to missing information on the extent of civilian victimization as indicated by the ratio of civilian to military battle-related deaths. The following therefore only explores whether formally organized non-state actors who engage in non-state conflict are significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against civilians (as compared with formally organized non-state actors who engage in state-based armed conflict) (Hypothesis 5a):

H5a Formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in non-state conflict more often commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally organized violent non-state groups who engage in state-based conflict.

About 14 percent of the formally organized non-state actors who exclusively engaged in non-state conflicts (N=387) and 12 percent of those who exclusively engaged in state-based conflicts (N=156) committed acts of one-sided violence against civilians. This difference is not only small in real terms but also statistically insignificant.

This changes if a less restrictive categorization of actors is applied, i.e. if formally organized actors without any non-state conflict experience (N=387) are compared with formally organized actors who engaged in this kind of internal fighting (sometimes in addition to state-based internal fighting) (N=235). Now, formally organized actors who have been involved in non-state internal conflict are significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against civilians as compared with formally organized actors who did not at all engage in this kind of internal fighting. The difference between these two groups is substantial and highly significant (25 percent versus 12 percent; p-value < 0.01). Obviously, the now-included group of formally organized actors who engaged in both kinds of internal armed conflict (N=79) seems to make a difference: 47 percent of them engaged in acts of one-sided violence as opposed to just 13 percent of those formally organized actors who have been involved in the one or the other kind of internal fighting (N=543) (p-value < 0.01).

At this point it remains unknown why this group of actors is especially prone to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians. Only the level of organization of armed groups has been controlled for and therefore drops out as an explanatory factor. Regional effects seem out of question, too, since the above difference is significant across most world regions. Another independent factor coming to mind is conflict resources. Compared with those formally organized actors who did not engage in non-state internal armed conflicts, the group of formally organized actors who did engage in this kind internal fighting is not only significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence but also significantly more likely to operate in a country/countries where especially easily accessible and lootable conflict resources occur and are produced. In addition,
they tend to operate in states that are significantly weaker. Both factors, access to conflict resources and the quality of state institutions, have previously been linked with the scale and kind of violence applied in internal warfare. The later multiple regression analysis therefore controls for these alternative explanatory factors.

When interpreting the above results it is also important to keep the following measurement issues in mind: Firstly, the timing and the location of acts of one-sided violence are left undefined. It therefore remains unknown whether violent groups committed acts of one-sided violence during times of bilateral internal fighting (or at some other point in time) and within zones of internal conflict (or somewhere else). Secondly, UCDP only collects data on attacks on civilians by formally organized armed groups. For this reason, existing data do not allow to explore whether informally organized groups who engaged in non-state armed conflict are more or less likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against civilians than the above studied formally organized groups who engaged in non-state fighting. Thirdly, the above does not permit any statements regarding the actual number and magnitude of acts of one-sided violence. Finally, the above only compares non-state violent actors who engaged in different kinds of internal armed conflict in regard to their likelihood of also committing acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians although many (and very bloody) acts of one-sided violence against civilians are of course committed by state actors.

Overall, the above still speaks in favor of Hypothesis 5a and the concept of New Wars: Formally organized actors who engaged in non-state internal armed conflict (and especially those who engaged in both kinds of internal fighting) are significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with those formally organized actors who did not engage in non-state internal fighting. Furthermore, I presented a comparison of the scale of direct, battle-related violence. The results in this regard were also very clear: Worldwide and within all regions, non-state internal armed conflicts are significantly less brutal than state-based internal armed conflicts. This outcome is robust against changes in the regional coding, it holds if low, best or high estimates of battle-deaths are used and stays significant if extreme outliers or the group of internationalized state-based armed conflicts are dropped from the analysis.

59 This will be elaborated further below within the paragraph on Hypothesis 7 and at the end of this study within the multiple regression analysis.
22. Comparative Analysis

22.4. Comparison of the Duration of Fighting

The following section addresses differences in the duration of fighting at the war, the conflict and the conflict episode level. In line with the concept of New Wars, Hypothesis 6 expects non-state internal fighting to be of a significantly longer average duration as compared with state-based internal fighting.

| **H6** Non-state fighting lasts significantly longer as compared with state-based fighting.

At the war level this expectation just finds limited support. The data provided by the “New List of Wars” show that between 1946 and 2009 non-state internal wars were of a slightly shorter average duration than conventional state-based civil wars (7.3 vs. 8.5 years). However, the difference in means remains statistically insignificant. In addition, six extreme outliers (as previously defined) bias the average duration of state-based wars (N=120).60 Deleting these cases is moving the outcome closer to the concept of New Wars. The average duration of state-based wars decreases to 6.8 years though the difference in means still is insignificant. Considering the post-Cold War era, only, also helps. Non-state wars with an outbreak of violence after the end of the Cold War (N=14) lasted for 6.9 years on average. During the same period, conventional civil wars lasted for a shorter average duration of 5.3 years but only if five extreme outliers are excluded.61 The difference in means nevertheless stays insignificant.

Because most internal warfare happened in sub-Saharan Africa a quick glance at this specific region seems worth the effort. And indeed: Unlike the global outcome, non-state wars in sub-Saharan Africa with an outbreak after the end of the Cold War are of a significantly longer average duration when compared with the region’s post-Cold War state-based internal wars (p-value < 0.01).62 In Central and South Asia, the opposite seems to be true, although the very small number of cases demands a careful interpretation of the result.63 In general, the average duration of state-based and of non-state internal wars varies greatly from region to region.64

---

60Extreme outliers are state-based wars with a duration of more than 24.5 years, i.e. the wars in the Philippines (1970-2009, 40 years and 1972-2009, 38 years), Colombia (1965-2009, 45 years), Myanmar (1948-2009, 62 years), Sudan (1983-2009, 27 years) and Guatemala (1962-1995, 34 years). Two-thirds of all state-based internal wars lasted for 11 or less years and half of them for just five or less years.

61These are state-based wars with a duration of more than 14.5 years, i.e. the wars in India (1989-2009, 21 years; 1990-2009, 20 years; 1992-2009, 18 years), Algeria (1991-2009, 19 years) and Burundi (1993-2008, 16 years). Two-thirds of all state-based internal wars with an outbreak of violence in 1989 or later last for eight or less years and half of them for just three or less years.

62The seven post-Cold War non-state internal wars lasted for nine years on average while the 15 state-based internal wars only lasted for 5.7 years on average.

63The five post-Cold War non-state internal wars in this region lasted for five years on average while the 12 post-Cold War state-based internal wars lasted for 9.4 years on average. However, the difference in means stays insignificant (also if the entire World War II period is taken into account).

64For a quantitative analysis see Fearon (2004) who also refers to the great regional variance in the
Obviously, at the war level Hypothesis 6 finds support with major temporal and geographical limitations, only. Just those non-state internal wars that erupted after the end of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa are of a significantly longer average duration as compared with the corresponding cases of state-based internal warfare.

Interestingly, the above war level results sharply contrast with the outcome at the conflict level. During the post-Cold War era, UCDP counts 271 state-based and 419 non-state internal armed conflicts that on average lasted for 5.4 as opposed to just 2.3 years. Thus, non-state internal fighting turns out to be of a much shorter average duration if minor and intermediate armed conflicts are taken into consideration. The difference in means is highly significant whether extreme outliers or the group of internationalized state-based internal armed conflicts are included or not. In addition, it holds within each of the single PRIO as well as UCDP regions.

Investigating the issue at the conflict episode level comes with a major improvement in terms measurement: If the precision of the start and end dates allows, the duration of each conflict episode can be indicated in affected months or even days instead of affected years, only. Data on the precise start and end dates of fighting are available for 114 state-based and 162 non-state conflict episodes that on average lasted for 1,375 days as opposed to just 146 days. In fact, half of all non-state conflict episodes lasted for six or even less days while the median duration of state-based conflict episodes is 453 days. The longest non-state conflict episode is reported for South Africa where supporters of the ANC and the IFP fought each other between the 4th of September 1989 and the 28th of December 1996. Differences in the mean duration between state-based and non-state conflicts are substantial in real terms and highly significant – with and without extreme outliers and also within most of the single world regions (p-values < 0.01).

Measuring the duration of conflict episodes in affected months does not require the same precision of start and end dates. Data are therefore available for many more cases (164 state-based and 402 non-state conflict episodes). Again, the state-based conflict episodes were of a significantly longer average duration as compared with the non-state conflict episodes. On average, the former affected 47 and the latter eight months.

duration of state-based internal wars. In addition, he identifies sub-categories of state-based civil wars that are of an extremely long duration. Between 1945 and 1999, he identifies 21 so called “Sons of the Soil Conflicts” and 17 “Resources Wars” that on average lasted for 33.7 years (median 48.2) and 28.1 years (median 28.1). Coups or revolutionary wars, anti-colonial wars or civil wars in Eastern Europe only lasted for 8.5 years on average (median 5.8) (Fearon 2004, p. 284).

Internationalized state-based internal armed conflicts (N=40) lasted a bit longer than conventional state-based internal armed conflicts (N=231) (namely 5.9 as opposed to 5.3 years on average).

With the exception of Europe where the differences in means stay insignificant.

If extreme outliers are excluded, the average duration in days of state-based conflict episodes (N=93) still stands at 494 days (median 272 days) while non-state conflict episodes (N=131) only lasted for 31 days on average (median one day).

Differences in means are less significant in the Americas, in Europe and in the Middle East (without Sudan) which relates to the small sample sizes.

The median is 15 months in the case of state-based conflict episodes and just one month in the case...
Given the above outcome, the number of affected calendar years appears especially inappropriate in order to measure the duration of non-state internal fighting. UCDP reports 73 non-state conflict episodes (but only eight state-based conflict episodes) that lasted for only a single day. Using the less precise measures (in this case one affected mouth or one affected year) therefore results in a systematic overestimation of the duration of non-state conflict episodes. But, the less accurate the measure, the more cases are covered by the data. This affects the significance of the obtained results. The overall outcome nevertheless persists: If the duration of conflict episodes is measured by the number of affected calender years, state-based conflict episodes (N=362) were again of a significantly longer average duration as compared with non-state conflict episodes (N=449). This holds for the global sample as well as all regional sub-samples (no matter which regional coding is used).

Once more this supports the 2012 Human Security Report which also found internal armed conflicts between non-state actors to be much shorter than state-based internal conflicts. However, in comparison to the 2012 Human Security Report (where internal armed conflicts are the basic unit of analysis) the above also compares the duration of state-based and non-state conflict episodes and of state-based and non-state internal wars. The former allows to measure the duration of internal fighting in days or at least in affected months (instead of affected years, only). Using these more precise measures reveals that most non-state conflict episodes just lasted for a few days. If measured in days, the average duration of state-based conflict episodes is about ten times higher than the average duration of non-state conflict episodes. The less precise the measure, the smaller the difference in the average duration: If measured in affected months or years, the average duration of state-based conflict episodes is “only” about eight or five times higher than the average duration of non-state conflict episodes. In other words, measuring the duration of internal fighting in years results in a systematic overestimation of the duration of non-state internal conflicts and in an underestimation of the difference in means between sub-types of internal fighting. In any case, the average duration of state-based conflict episodes is much (and significantly) longer than the average duration of non-state conflict episodes. In addition, I found non-state internal wars that erupted after the end of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa to be of a significantly longer average duration when compared with the corresponding cases of state-based internal warfare. This outcome is missed by the 2012 Human Security Report which fails to differentiate high intensity internal wars from minor or intermediate internal armed conflicts. This outcome, however, might suffer from the above-mentioned systematic overestimation of the duration of non-state internal wars which at the war level can only be captured in affected years.
Because data on the duration of internal fighting oftentimes run the risk of being censored \(^{70}\) I confined the analysis to those cases of internal armed conflict that happened entirely within the study period, i.e. cases of internal fighting that erupted in 1990 (the earliest) and ended in 2010 (the latest). This results in the deletion of 153 cases of internal armed conflict (65 percent state-based and 35 percent non-state armed conflicts). Running all tests for the reduced sample does not change the overall outcome. This speaks against a systematic underestimation of the duration of a certain kind of internal armed conflict due to censored data. Still, the simple bivariate correlation presented above neither implies causation nor can it account for the complexity of the causes underlying the correlation. Differences in the average duration between non-state and state-based internal armed conflicts might be due to a number of factors that are either internal to the kind of armed conflict (e.g. the nature, number and motives of the involved actors or the severity of fighting) or that are external to the kind of internal fighting (e.g. structural conditions, the existence of prior tensions, the content of a previously reached peace treaty, or the more or less proactive role of the international community to intervene). Any empirical study investigating whether and why the duration of fighting significantly differs between the two sub-categories of internal armed conflict needs to include as many as possible control factors.

22.5. Comparison of the Political Context of Fighting

The comparative cross-sectional analysis concludes with an examination of the political context in which internal fighting takes place. The corresponding hypothesis applies to all levels of analysis (the country level, the war level, the conflict level, the conflict episode level and the actor level) and reads as follows:

\[ \textbf{H7} \text{ The degree of state fragility is significantly worse in countries experiencing non-state fighting as compared with countries experiencing state-based fighting.} \]

\[ \text{The degree of state fragility is significantly worse prior to/at the outbreak of non-state fighting as compared with state-based fighting.} \]

\[ \text{Violent non-state actors who engage in non-state conflict are operating in significantly more fragile countries as compared with violent non-state actors who engage in state-based conflict.} \]

In addition, I presented Hypotheses \(7a\) and \(7b\) which focus on the quality of state weakness. They suggest that different kinds of state fragility might associate with different kinds of internal fighting.

\(^{70}\) The duration of conflicts that were still ongoing at the end of the study period is censored if these conflicts in fact lasted beyond these dates. The same applies to conflicts which were ongoing in 1989 but in fact had already started earlier. The latter disproportionately often concerns state-based internal armed conflicts while the former also hits non-state internal armed conflicts. In either case, the actual duration of the conflicts is only partially known and for this reason tends to be underestimated.
22. Comparative Analysis

More precisely, the levels of state effectiveness and authority are expected to be comparatively worse in the context of non-state internal fighting (Hypothesis 7a) while state functionality in the delivery of public goods and services and state legitimacy are expected to be especially lacking in a context of state-based internal fighting (Hypothesis 7b).

Exploring these hypotheses requires indicators that are indeed measuring the different dimensions of state weakness. For this reason, the section starts by presenting the correlation matrix of all fragility measures included in the following analysis (see table 22.2). This well displays the great convergence (as indicated by high correlations) between fragility indicators that are measuring the same or similar theoretical constructs as well as a clear discrimination (lower correlations) between indicators that are measuring different baseline concepts or dimensions of state weakness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI Corruption</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGI Corruption</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGI Gov. Eff.</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH Func. Gov.</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI Failed State</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Sub-Index 2</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Effectiveness</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Sub-Index 1</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Overall Score</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Stab.</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Legitimacy</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Civil Society</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grimes Civil Society</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Fragment</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22.2.: Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures. Source: own calculation.

---

A correlation matrix describes correlations among M variables. It is a square symmetrical M*M matrix with the (ij)th element equal to the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (r) between the (i)th and the (j)th variable. The closer the coefficient is to either -1 (a perfect decreasing linear relationship) or +1 (a perfect increasing linear relationship) the stronger the correlation between the variables. Correlation coefficients of +/-0.80 or larger are generally referred to as strong correlations (Schnell et al. 1999, p. 154). The diagonal elements (correlations of indicators with themselves) are always equal to +1. See table F.1 for a pairwise correlation matrix of all fragility measures (which in addition to the pairwise correlation coefficients includes information on the number of observations used for the calculation of r and the levels of significance).
Narrow measures of state weakness that are focusing on the effectiveness, the functioning or the quality of state institutions (the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator, the BTI Failed State Index, the SFI effectiveness score, the overall SFI score and the SFI sub-Index I) are strongly correlated with each other. Only the Freedom House Functioning of Government Index stands out in this regard. The degree of convergence is low between this and the above mentioned narrow measures of state weakness as well as most other indices. This is hardly surprising given the fact that Freedom House intends to capture a distinct overall concept (the state of freedom instead of state weakness) and in doing so focuses on one specific aspect of state weakness (the degree to which governments operate independently of undue influences and pressures). The overall index correlates strongly with just one other state weakness measure, namely the BTI Traditions of Civil Indicator in such a way that higher values on the BTI indicator (more numerous and active civic associations, a stronger civic culture of participation in public life and higher levels of social trust) associate with lower values on the FH Functioning of Government Index (a less independent but also a less accountable, open and transparent government) \( r=-0.76 \). At least in regard to the first and main dimension of the Freedom House measure this makes sense: The more public pressure, the less independent the government. In addition, the formation of civil society organizations might come in response to closed, nontransparent and unaccountable government practices (at least in states where opposition is tolerated) which might explain the significant but negative correlation between the two measures. Finally, the two corruption measures, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International and the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator, are strongly correlated with each other \( r=0.86 \) and therefore could be used interchangeably. Because corruption is a central dimension of state dysfunction and often included even in the most parsimonious indices of state weakness, both corruption measures also strongly correlate with narrow measures of state weakness (the BTI Failed State Index \( r=0.71/0.72 \) and the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator \( r=0.78/0.91 \) which on purpose is kept conceptually distinct from corruption). High correlations between overall indices and their sub-indices (e.g. between the BTI Stateness Index and the BTI Failed State Index or between various SFI measures) are of course self-explaining.

In comparison, the degree of convergence tends to be much lower between the narrow and the more comprehensive measures of state weakness (e.g. between the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator and the BTI Stateness Index which includes a societal dimension) as well as between the narrow instruments and those that cover legitimacy aspects (e.g. between the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator, the SFI effectiveness score, the corruption measures or even the BTI Failed State Index on the one hand and the SFI sub-Index II and the SFI legitimacy score on the other). Obviously, these groups of measures cover distinct aspects of state weakness which justifies their inclu-

---

72 Pearson’s correlation coefficients \( (r) \) are ranging from +/-0.71 to +/-0.91.
73 Pearson’s correlation coefficients \( (r) \) are ranging from +/-0.41 to +/-0.56.
74 Pearson’s correlation coefficients \( (r) \) are ranging from +/-0.60 to 0.73.
sion in the upcoming empirical analysis. Especially relevant in this context is the rather low correlation between the SFI legitimacy measure and the SFI effectiveness measure (r=0.68) indicating that high scores on the former dimension of state weakness do not necessarily go hand in hand with high scores on the latter. For instance, Vietnam, Lesotho or Gambia are doing comparatively well in terms of state legitimacy but are scoring comparatively low on the state effectiveness measure. The opposite applies to Saudi Arabia, Columbia and Turkey which are rather effective states that are nevertheless lacking state legitimacy. The countries with the greatest discrepancy between their SFI legitimacy and their SFI effectiveness scores are presented by table 22.3 on the next page.

Finally, the Polity Fragmentation Indicator, the Grimes measure and the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator just capture fractions of, or entirely different concepts than, the more comprehensive measures of state weakness as well as than the narrow instruments that are focusing on the functioning of central state authority and basic administration. The low correlation between the Grimes indicator (the total number of civil society organizations within a country) and the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator (r=-0.22) deserves special attention. Obviously, the presence of a large number of civil society organizations in itself must not be mistaken for a long-term presence of public and civic engagement, a strong culture to participate in public life and high levels of social trust.

Using these diverse indicators in order to explore the above mentioned hypotheses produces the following outcomes: Violent actors who engaged in non-state internal armed conflict were operating in significantly more fragile countries than those violent actors who engaged in state-based armed conflict, only. In contradiction with Hypothesis 7b, this equally holds if those indicators are used that are capturing the level of state functionality and legitimacy. The differences in state weakness are highly significant for almost all of the fourteen state weakness indicators (p-value< 0.01). Insignificant differences in means are only obtained if the FH Functioning of Government Index or the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator are used. Thus, at the actor level much speaks in favor of Hypothesis 7 and 7a while Hypothesis 7b is rejected.

\footnote{For instance, the correlation coefficients between the Grimes indicator and all other state weakness measures are ranging from +/-0.10 to +/-0.26.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SFI State Legitimacy*</th>
<th>SFI State Effectiveness*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* SFI legitimacy: +++ ≤ 1; ++ > 1 ≤ 2; + > 2 ≤ 3; scale 0 (best)-3 (worst)
SFI effectiveness: +++ ≤ 1.11; ++ > 1.11 ≤ 2.22; + > 2.22 ≤ 3.33; scale 0 (best)-3.33 (worst)

Table 22.3.: Countries with the Greatest Discrepancy between State Legitimacy and Effectiveness. Source: own calculation.
This repeats itself at the country level. Although state-based internal fighting happens in fragile states, too, countries which have seen non-state internal warfare or non-state internal armed conflict (sometimes in addition to state-based fighting) are significantly weaker than those states that have not at all experienced this kind of internal fighting and instead engaged in state-based internal wars or armed conflicts, only. Mean differences in the level of state weakness between groups of countries that engaged in the one or the other kind of internal fighting are especially large if narrow measures like the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator, the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator or the Polity Fragmentation Indicator are used. Countries which have seen non-state internal fighting are also significantly more fragile than states that remained entirely peaceful (which of course applies to the group of war-torn or conflict-experienced countries in general). Again, differences in means are significant for all state weakness measures with the exception of the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator. Against expectation, traditions of civil society are even significantly better developed in war-torn or conflict-experienced states as compared with entirely peaceful countries (p-values < 0.05). Countries which engaged in non-state internal fighting also receive significantly better values on the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator as compared with those states that have seen state-based internal fighting, only. The differences in means are, however, less significant (p-values < 0.1). I abandoned the idea of using a more restrictive categorization of countries, i.e. to compare the level of state weakness of those countries that engaged in exclusively non-state internal wars or armed conflicts (just 3 or 12 countries at maximum) with those that engaged in exclusively state-based internal wars or armed conflicts (47 or 35 countries at maximum) as this would reduce the sizes of the samples to an non-acceptable extent.

The group of countries that engaged in non-state warfare/armed conflict (N=16/53) receives an average value of -0.88/-0.64 on the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator as opposed to a mean of -0.01/0.15 for those countries which exclusively engaged in state-based warfare/armed conflict (N=152/115) (p-values < 0.01). The group of countries that engaged in non-state warfare/armed conflict (N=16/53) receives an average value of -0.88/-0.67 on the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator as opposed to a mean of -0.03/0.14 for those countries which exclusively engaged in state-based warfare/armed conflict (N=158/121) (p-values < 0.01). Both indicators are ranging from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best). The average level of fragmentation as captured by the Polity Fragmentation Indicator also differs considerably between these groups of countries: the indicator assumes an average value of 0.86/0.4 for the group of countries that engaged in non-state warfare/non-state armed conflict (N=16/53) as opposed to an average value of 0.15/0.1 for those countries that engaged in state-based warfare/armed conflict, only (N=152/115) (p-values < 0.01). The overall scale of this indicator ranges from 0 (best) to 3 (worst).

For instance, countries which have not seen any internal war between 1946 and 2009 (N=102) receive an average value of 7.3 on the SFI sub-Index I as opposed to an average value of 11.3 for countries that engaged in exclusively state-based internal wars (N=47) and an average value of 15 for countries that have seen non-state internal wars. The index ranges from zero (best) to 22 (worst). The corresponding averages are 8.1, 7.2 and 5.6 on the BTI Stateness Index which ranges from one (worst) to ten (best) or 48.4, 33.7 and 28.5 on the Corruption Perception Index which ranges from zero (worst) to 100 (best).
At the war level, the results are more mixed and less significant. In comparison to their state-based counterparts, non-state internal wars tend to take place in a national context where especially the level of state effectiveness and authority (as measured by the SFI effectiveness score, the BTI Failed State Index, the Polity Fragmentation Indicator but also the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator) is significantly worse ($p$-values $< 0.1$ or at least $< 0.5$). This at least speaks in favor of Hypothesis 7a. The BTI Stateness Index which is based on a broader theoretical concept also performs as expected. However, if the other state weakness measures are used the mean differences remain insignificant.\footnote{The SFI (overall score), the SFI sub-Index I, the FH Functioning of Government Index, the CPI, the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator, the Grimes measure and the SFI legitimacy score.}

This changes considerably when moving to the conflict and conflict episode level. Non-state internal armed conflicts and conflict episodes are happening in significantly more fragile states as compared with state-based armed conflicts and state-based conflict episodes. With the exception of the usual subject (the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator at the episode level), differences in means of all state weakness measures are extremely significant.\footnote{In case of the FH Functioning of Government Index $p$-value $< 0.05$; in all other cases $p$-values $< 0.01$.} This clearly supports Hypothesis 7 and 7a while Hypothesis 7b again needs to be rejected.

Because low-intensity armed conflicts are now included in the analysis the samples are quite large. Unfortunately, time-series data on state fragility are only available for a short period of time (and for six of the fourteen state fragility indicators or indices\footnote{These are the SFI and WGI measures which cover the years from 1995 or 1996 until 2011.}). Measuring the degree of state fragility prior to the outbreak of internal fighting therefore cuts the samples in half.\footnote{Depending on the indicator, the number of non-state conflicts then varies between 298 and 312 cases and the number of state-based conflicts varies between 110 and 122 cases. The number of non-state conflict episodes then varies between 323 and 338 cases while the number of state-based conflict episodes varies between 173 and 192.} In addition, the significance of results slightly drops at the conflict level. Still, the average level of state weakness (as measured by the SFI sub-Index I, the SFI effectiveness and legitimacy scores and the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator), prior to the outbreak of non-state armed conflicts is significantly worse compared with the average level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of state-based armed conflicts. At the episode level, highly significant results in this regard are obtained for all of the available state fragility measures (i.e. the above measures plus the SFI sub-Index II and the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator).

However, at both levels of analysis the global outcomes are mainly driven by two single regions, namely Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In these two regions, non-state internal armed conflicts and non-state conflict episodes indeed happen in significantly more fragile states as compared with state-based internal fighting. This outcome is very consistent across different state weakness indicators. It also persists if the average levels of state weakness prior to the outbreak of state-based and
non-state conflicts or conflict episodes are compared with each other—though sensitivity in regard to the regional coding is an issue.\textsuperscript{82} Contrary outcomes or at least insignificant differences in the average levels of state weakness between kinds of internal armed conflict or conflict episodes are found for the Americas as well as for East and Southeast Asia and Oceania. In these two regions, state-based internal armed conflicts and state-based conflict episodes seem to happen in equally or even more fragile contexts than non-state internal fighting (though the differences in means are less significant). Finally, the results for Europe and (sub-Saharan) Africa remain mixed. There, it depends on the indicator used whether the political context of non-state armed conflicts and non-state conflict episodes is comparatively and significantly worse in terms of state weakness. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa (PRIO regional coding) non-state conflicts/conflict episodes tend to happen in states that are on average significantly more corrupt (p-value < 0.05/p-value < 0.1), that receive significantly worse values on the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Index (p-values < 0.01) and the BTI Stateness Index (p-value < 0.05/p-value < 0.1) and whose polities are significantly more fragmented (p-values < 0.01). If UCDP’s regional coding is applied (so that Sudan is part of an all-Africa region) the significance in mean differences tends to increase and some SFI measures can be added to this list.\textsuperscript{83} Comparing the average levels of state weakness prior to the outbreak of internal fighting nevertheless yields insignificant results. This is, however, little surprising given the limited temporal scope of such an analysis and therefore the small number of state-based and non-state armed conflicts or conflict episodes that can be compared with each other—even within this most conflict-ridden region.\textsuperscript{84}

The above confirms that the political context of conventional (state-based) and non-conventional (non-state) internal fighting differs as proposed by Hypothesis 7. I found the average level of state fragility to be significantly worse in those countries that experienced non-state internal fighting (as compared with those countries that engaged in state-based internal fighting, only). The degree of state fragility is also significantly worse prior to the outbreak of non-state internal armed conflicts or conflict episodes (as compared with state-based armed conflicts or conflict episodes). Furthermore, violent non-state actors who engaged in non-state armed conflict tend to operate in significantly more fragile countries (as compared with those violent non-state actors who engaged in exclusively state-based armed conflict). The corresponding differences in means are statistically significant especially if low-intensity fighting is taken into consideration (i.e. at

\textsuperscript{82}For both regions, the significance of effects decreases if UCDP’s regional coding is used (especially at the conflict level and if state weakness is measured prior to the outbreak of internal fighting).

\textsuperscript{83}The SFI sub-Index II at the conflict level and the SFI (overall score), the SFI sub-Index I and the SFI legitimacy score at the episode level.

\textsuperscript{84}For sub-Saharan Africa and the period from 1995/1996 until 2011, data on the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of fighting are available for 201 (229) non-state and 57 (81) state-based armed conflicts (conflict episodes) if the SFI measures are used and for 193 (221) non-state and 52 (75) state-based armed conflicts (conflict episodes) if the WGI measures are used. For the Americas, these numbers are as low as 19 (14) non-state and 4 (8) state-based armed conflicts (conflict episodes) if the SFI measures are used and 19 (14) non-state and 3 (7) state-based armed conflicts (conflict episodes) if the WGI measures are used.
the conflict and at the conflict episode level) and if state-weakness is (in accordance with Hypothesis 7a) narrowly defined. Because levels of state functionality and legitimacy also tend to be significantly worse in a context of non-state internal fighting, Hypothesis 7b is rejected. There is no indication of opposing effects in such a way that different dimensions of state weakness relate to different kinds of internal fighting. Both, the average level of state effectiveness and authority on the one hand and the average level of state legitimacy and functionality in the delivery of public goods and services on the other hand, are significantly worse in the context of non-state internal fighting. Real differences in the level of state weakness nevertheless vary from indicator to indicator. Especially at the country level, differences in the average level of state fragility (between those countries that have seen non-state internal fighting and those countries that did not engage in this kind of internal fighting) are not only statistically significant but also substantial – in particular if narrow measures of state weakness (the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator, the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator and the Polity Fragmentation Indicator) are used. Though the overall outcome holds at all levels of analysis and is largely robust against changes in the operationalization of state weakness, its global validity has been put into question. At least at the conflict and at the episode level, the global results turned out to be mostly driven by Central and South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and (depending on the state fragility measure used) by sub-Saharan Africa. Sensitivity to regional coding remains an issue, too. I also found the overall outcome to hold even if the level of state fragility is measured prior to the outbreak of fighting. Unfortunately, this attempt to account for reverse causation remains very limited in its temporal scope (so that the sizes of the samples are greatly reduced) due to a lack of time-series data on state fragility. Finally, some results are unexpected. Especially the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator yields insignificant or inconsistent results across levels of analysis and regions.85 Because the Grimes measure (the number of civil society organizations within a country) constitutes one dimension of the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator it might help to clarify this matter. The empirical results in regard to this single indicator are straightforward: Non-state internal fighting tends to happen in a context where the average number of civil society organizations is significantly larger. Though the global outcome seems mostly driven by Africa, it equally holds at the country, the conflict and the episode level. The average number of civil society organization is also much higher in war-torn/conflict-experienced countries as opposed to entirely peaceful states.86 Theoretically, however, the issue is

85 Differences in means stay insignificant at the war, the actor and the country level. At the conflict and at the conflict episode level they are highly significant but are pointing into different directions: Non-state armed conflicts tend to happen in a national context where traditions of civil society are significantly less developed (as compared with state-based armed conflicts) while the opposite applies at the episode level.

86 The average number of civil society organizations within countries that experienced internal warfare between 1946 and 2009 (N=61) lies at 171 as opposed to just 117 within those countries that did not see any internal war throughout this period (N=108). The average number of civil society organizations within countries that experienced internal armed conflict between 1989 and 2011 (N=84) lies at 183 as opposed to an average number of just 90 within those countries that did not see any internal armed conflict throughout this period (N=85).
less clear. At the one hand, high numbers of civil society organizations could be a sign of state strength because the formation of such organizations and their participation in politics requires a certain level of openness, transparency or even democracy. On the other hand, a large number of civil society organizations could be a sign of state weakness if such actors emerge in response to government inefficiencies or corruption. Oftentimes their creation is pro-actively supported by the international community in a context where state institutions are non-existent, ineffective or inefficient. Thus, large numbers of civil society organizations could also be interpreted as a consequence or sign of state weakness. These ambiguities are eminent in the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator which includes the number of civil society organizations along other indicators capturing traditions of civil society, the level of social trust and the existence of a culture to participate within societies.

The validity of this and other similar measures as well as the issue of reverse causation certainly deserve more attention and further research. It also remains to be tested whether higher levels of state weakness still significantly correlate with a higher risk of (a certain kind of) internal fighting if alternative explanations or intervening variables (e.g. the organizational level of violent actors) are taken into consideration. My first attempt to control for this factor confirms the overall outcome: Formally organized groups who engage in non-state internal fighting tend to operate in significantly weaker states as compared with formally organized actors who engage in state-based internal conflict, only. This holds no matter how state weakness is measured. Out of all fourteen available indicators, non-significant differences are only obtained if the Grimes measure and the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator are used. Alternative dependent variables are also coming to mind. For instance, higher levels of state weakness might be correlated with a larger number of non-state/state-based internal armed conflicts at the country level or a larger number of involved actors at the conflict or episode level. Finally, the strength of state institutions might also impact upon the duration of internal fighting or the decision of violent actors to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians and therefore the kind (and scale) of violence that is observed. Some of these thoughts shall be addressed within the final multiple regression analysis of this study.  

---

87Some preliminary empirical findings on the question whether the level of state weakness and the production of (easily accessible and lootable) conflict resources significantly correlate with the number of (non-state/state-based) armed conflicts/wars or with the number of country-years spent in (non-state/state-based) armed conflict/warfare are presented in table G.1 on page 414.
23. Interim Summary V: Main Results of the Comparative Analysis

Among peace and conflict analysts, the concept of New Wars sparked theoretical debate for quite a while. The methodological limitations of the concept and especially the question whether New Wars are truly “new” in nature have been discussed up to the point of exhaustion. Due to a lack of data, however, (large-N) empirical analyses remain rare. Only recently, some research institutes started to collect information on non-state or sub-state wars and conflicts that allow for systematic tests. I relied on these data for an initial descriptive and a simple bivariate comparative analysis which explored some of the global trends and theses that can be deduced from the concept of New Wars.

Overall, I found non-state internal wars, armed conflicts and conflict episodes, as well as countries and actors who engaged in this kind of internal fighting, to significantly differ in various respects from state-based internal wars, armed conflicts and conflict episodes and from those counties and actors who not at all engaged in this kind of internal fighting. In tendency, hypotheses on the quantity of involved actors, on their origin (the way how they emerged) and on the kind of violence they apply find strong support. With some geographical and/or temporal limitations, the same applies to those hypotheses that are specifying the role of conflict resources. Especially the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources (in particular gems and drugs) relates to non-state fighting at the actor, the conflict, the episode and the country level. Mixed outcomes are obtained for conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot. But, in line with the respective hypothesis, the production of such resources rather associates with state-based fighting at least at the actor, the episode and the conflict level. Finally, I do not find support for the claim that different kinds of state weakness associate with different kinds of internal fighting. Instead, the political context of non-state fighting seems to be worse compared with the political context of state-based fighting no matter how state weakness is measured. A significantly higher average level of state fragility (specially a lack of state effectiveness and authority) associates with non-state fighting at all levels of analysis. This also holds if state fragility is measured prior to the outbreak of internal fighting.

All of the above speaks in favor of the concept of New Wars as much as the increasing significance of non-state internal wars, armed conflicts and conflict episodes. Worldwide, the total numbers of post-Cold War non-state conflicts and episodes even surpass the
total numbers of their state-based counterparts. If other indicators are used, however, non-state fighting still has to give in. In any case, non-state internal wars are not the dominant type of warfare and they are not characterized by a particularly transnational nature of actors. Also in contrast with the concept of New Wars, non-state internal fighting is of a significantly shorter average duration and significantly less intense than state-based internal fighting. A theoretical explanation for the latter finding has already been given. I have argued that very intense warfare negatively impacts on the realization of economic interests. While severe fighting might interrupt or at least complicate the exploitation and the (illegal) black-market trading of conflict resources, small-scale battle sufficiently destabilizes states to offer opportunity for private gain (Addison et al. 2001; Buhaug et al. 2005). Thus, New War Economies might be better realized through low-level violence. This provided ground for an alternative hypothesis which states that the privatization of actors, the economization of motives and the establishment of New War Economies eventually result in minor or intermediate non-state armed conflicts rather than intensive and extensive warfare. At least the bivariate outcome presented above speaks in favor of this expectation.
By now, the issue of intervening factors and alternative explanations has been mentioned several times. As far as the available data allow, it shall be addressed within the following multiple regression analysis. Through this method it is possible to explore in how far the value of a dependent variable changes when a key independent variable is varied while other relevant independent variables are held fixed. For instance, at the actor level, this method of analysis allows to study whether worsening levels of state weakness still correlate in a statistically significant way with engagement in non-state fighting if other predictors (e.g. whether the violent group is operating in a country where easily accessible and lootable conflict resources are produced) are controlled for. Multiple regression analyses allow to study whether internal wars, armed conflicts or conflict episodes are significantly more likely to be categorized as non-state if they are happening in weaker states, or if they are taking place in (sub-Saharan) Africa, or if they are carried out in countries that produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources while all other independent factors are held constant at their means. At the country level, this method of analysis can be used to explore in how far levels of state weakness, the production of conflict resources or an interaction of both factors significantly contribute to predict the experience of non-state internal fighting. Through multiple regression analyses it is also possible to study the linkages between dimensions of internal warfare as specified by the aforementioned associative hypothesis. Which factors explain the number of actors involved in internal warfare, whether they are formally or informally organized, the intensity or the duration of internal fighting or the nature of applied violence? Does the significance of the respective coefficients or the strength of effects differ if certain sub-samples (e.g. state-based or non-state armed conflicts) are analyzed separately? Or if the entire sample is taken into consideration: does the “type of internal fighting” significantly correlate with the dependent variable independently of its effect through other predictors that are included in the same model? For instance, is the number of involved actors still significantly higher in non-state wars as opposed to state-based wars if the duration of fighting, the level of state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources within the war-affected country are controlled for and therefore drop out as explanatory factors? What happens to the coefficients of these other independent variables if the type of warfare is included as an additional control factor?
In order to answer these questions I specified baseline models for each dependent variable. A schematic overview of the significance of the regression results of these basic models is given in table G.1 on page 414 which also provides information on all dependent variables (given in the rows) and independent variables (given in the columns) that are included in the corresponding analyses. For several of these variables alternative measures are available. I greatly reduced their number and just included those indicators which the above comparative analysis identified as the most promising in terms of their temporal scope and validity. For instance, the duration of fighting is measured in days and in months (instead of years) at least at the episode level where these more precise measures are available. The resources argument is captured by dummies indicating the production (instead of the occurrence) of conflict resources or, alternatively, the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources. To figure out whether effects are robust against changes in measurement, all models that include the level of state weakness as an independent variable have been calculated several times using one of the narrow measures of state fragility (the Polity Fragmentation Indicator or the BTI Failed State Index) or one of those indicators that capture the degree of state weakness prior to/at the outbreak of violence (the SFI sub-Index I, the SFI effectiveness score, the SFI legitimacy score, the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator or the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator). In order to account for regional effects, I calculated each model first with a sub-Saharan Africa dummy and second with an all-Africa dummy. A stepwise variation of these indicators resulted in a very large number of slightly different regression models representing all possible combinations of independent variables and their different measures. This approach (to formulate all thinkable models and see which one best describes the data) is generally referred to as an exploratory data analysis (as opposed to a confirmatory data analysis).

Out of these various baseline models and for each dependent variable, I selected the model(s) with the highest R-squared values (which in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression represents the proportion of variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the model) or with the highest MacFadden’s pseudo-R-squared values (a likelihood-ratio index which in a logistic regression model compares the likelihood for the intercept only model to the likelihood for the model with the predictors). The higher the values of these “coefficients of determination”, the better the statistical model fits the data.
The selected models were then further refined. I mean-centered all metric variables and afterwards included interaction terms between the respective mean-centered state weakness measures and the dummies indicating the production of (easily accessible and lootable) conflict resources. This allows to study whether the effect of state weakness is different in a context where such resources are produced or not (i.e. in a context where both worsening state weakness and the production of such resources can be observed). I used likelihood-ratio tests for nested models to explore whether the interaction term adds to the overall model fit and also dropped other variables that did not meet this requirement. This includes the “type of conflict” which at this stage of the analysis was also included as an additional control factor.

I checked the level of multicolinearity for all models by calculating variance inflation factors (vif) and used graphical methods to detect non-linear relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables (which I then tried to account for by transforming the respective independent variables). Dependent variables have also been transformed if an OLS regression model turned out to suffer from heteroscedasticity. These transformations happen for statistical reasons and largely go unnoticed.

---

1This refinement process and the following regression diagnostics follow Kohler and Kreuter (2001) as well as the instructions (and rules-of-thumb for numerical tests) given at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/ (visited on 2014-08-05) (Regression with Stata, Chapter 2 and Logistic Regression with Stata, chapter 3) and http://www.philender.com/courses/categorical/notes3/fit.html (visited on 2014-08-03).

2Centering a variable involves subtracting the mean (of only those observations that are included in the respective model) from each of the scores and then using the mean-centered independent variable instead of the original one. If interaction terms are included in the analysis, mean-centering the involved metric variables helps to avoid collinearity problems. Oftentimes, mean-centering also facilitates the interpretation of results.

3Nested models are models that can be obtained by restricting a parameter (in this case the interaction term) in a more complex model to be zero.

4To decide on this matter I additionally used the fitstat command in stata which computes a variety of measures of fit that can be used to compare nested and non-nested models.

5Multicolinearity occurs when two or more independent variables in a model are approximately determined by a linear combination of other independent variables included in the same specification. The higher the level of multicolinearity, the more difficult to obtain a unique estimate of regression coefficients as long as all the independent variables are part of the same model. Severe multicolinearity largely increases the standard errors of the estimates which themselves become unreliable or unstable.

6Variables with a vif > 10 merit further investigation.

7Augmented-component-plus-residual plots (in the case of OLS regressions) and locally weighted mean regressions with a locally weighted scatterplot smoother (in the case of logistic regressions)

8All OLS regression models assume that the residuals are homoscedastic (i.e. have constant variance). A violation of this assumption (heteroscedasticity) does not cause OLS coefficient estimates to be biased but it might result in biased OLS estimates of the variance of the coefficients (and therefore in biased standard errors). Because biased standard errors lead to biased inference, the results of hypothesis tests are possibly wrong. I tested this assumption of the linear regression model via graphical methods (by graphing symmetry plots of the dependent variables and by plotting the residuals versus the predicted values, so-called residual-versus-fitted plots). If the assumption is met and the model is well fit, there should be no pattern to the residuals plotted against the fitted values. In addition, I computed Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests to detect heteroscedasticity. Because OLS regression
though the interpretation of the respective regression outputs slightly changes.\(^9\) For both kinds of regression models I also tried to identify observations with substantial impact on the goodness of fit of the entire model or on the parameter estimates. To detect observations that stand out away from all the other data points I used scatterplot matrices. For all OLS regression models, I examined the studentized residuals as a first means for identifying outliers.\(^10\) In addition, I looked at the leverages to identify cases with a great influence on the regression coefficient estimates.\(^11\) Leverage-versus-squared-residual plots have been used to display observations with both, a large residual and a great leverage. These are potentially the most influential points. Finally, I calculated Cook’s d to identify multivariate outliers.\(^12\) For logistic regression models, similar measures are available to detect unusual and influential covariate patterns. I calculated the standardized Pearson residuals, deviance residuals, the Pregibon leverages, Pregibon’s dbeta (which is similar to Cook’s d in OLS regressions as it provides summary information on the influence of a single observation on all parameter estimates) and Hosmer and Lemeshow’s delta-Chi-squared (which measures the change in the Pearson Chi-squared fit statistic if the specific observation is excluded from the analysis) and plotted these statistics against the predicted probabilities or simply against case numbers.

The analysis closes with tests for model specification errors\(^13\) and some robustness checks. I computed all final models without multivariate outliers (i.e. observations with Cook’s d > 4/n or delta-Chi-squared > 4) to see whether the results are sensitive to outliers. In addition, I ran all OLS regression models with robust standard errors (a method that can effectively deal with minor problems of normality, heteroscedasticity or unusual and influential observations) and also used the robust regression command

models also assume that the residuals are normally distributed, I graphed standardized-normal-probability (P-P) plots of the residuals, plotted their quantiles against the quantiles of a normal distribution (Q-Q plots), overlaid kernel density plots of the residuals with a normal distribution and computed Shapiro-Wilk W Tests).

\(^9\)For information on the interpretation of regression outputs where the dependent variable, an independent variable(s) or both have been log-transformed see [http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/sas_interpret_log.htm](http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/sas_interpret_log.htm) (visited on 2014-08-19).

\(^10\)Observations with especially large residuals (r > 2 or r < -2) are identified as outliers.

\(^11\)A leverage greater than \((2k + 2)/n\) should be carefully examined (where k is the number of predictors and n the number of observations). In addition, added-variable plots (also known as partial-regression leverage plots) helped to detect individual data points with great influence on the estimation of a coefficient. These plots show the relationship between the dependent variable and one independent variable after both have been adjusted for all other predictors in the model.

\(^12\)The conventional cut-off point for this statistic is 4/n.

\(^13\)For all models I computed link tests for model specification and, for all OLS models, in addition regression specification error tests for omitted variables (RESET). Both tests are based on the idea that if a model is properly specified one should not be able to find any additional independent variable that is significant except by chance. The link test creates two new variables (the variable of prediction and the variable of squared prediction) which are then included as predictors. If the model is specified correctly, the former should be significant (because it is the predicted value) while the latter should not have much explanatory power and should therefore remain insignificant. A RESET works similarly. It also creates new variables based on the predictors and includes them in the model to see whether they turn out to be significant.
(which assigns a weight to each observation with higher weights given to better behaved observations and lower weights given to outlier cases). Finally, I explored in how far the results of the final models are changing if alternative measures are used, if additional controls are included (that had previously been dropped) or if the regression is run separately for certain sub-samples (e.g. only state-based or non-state conflicts).

As usual, R-squared and MacFadden’s pseudo-R-squared serve as the overall measures of fit for the final OLS and the final logistic regression models. In addition, I computed (adjusted)-Count-R-squared and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for all logistic models which inform about the proportion of correctly classified covariate patterns (beyond that by guessing the largest marginal).  The regression outputs in numbers of all final models are given in table G.3 on page 416, table G.4 on page 417 and table G.5 on page 418 while table G.2 on page 415 provides a schematic overview of the significance of the results obtained by all refined models (i.e. the final models and their variations).

Through all these graphical methods and numerical tests, I checked if the basic assumptions underlying the regression models are met. Otherwise the obtained results might be misleading. I aimed to properly specify the models (to include all available relevant variables and to exclude all irrelevant variables), to detect unusual and influential observations that exert undue influence on the model fit and the estimated coefficients and to avoid multicollinearity. Still, the regression diagnostics as described above and the efforts to address violations of basic assumptions remain basic. Especially the issue of non-linearity needs further attention. In several cases, influential observations and important but omitted control factors remain a matter of concern, too. Despite the fact that there is room for further improvement of the models, some outcomes are, however, very clear and consistent across specifications and levels of analysis. The below summary of results rather focuses on such tendencies and patterns in outcomes instead of discussing the results of “the” perfect and final model. Each chapter again starts by mentioning the associative hypothesis (or hypotheses if several were tested within the same specification) that is (or are) discussed in the following.

---

14 In a binary model it is possible to correctly categorize at least 50 percent of all cases without using any information from the independent variables simply by choosing the outcome (0 or 1) with the largest percentage. Adjusted-Count-R-squared takes this into account and only reports the proportion of correct guesses beyond that by guessing the largest marginal. Hosmer-Lemeshow tests are believed to be the more appropriate index of fit (as compared with MacFadden’s pseudo-R-squared) if the number of covariate patterns is large relative to the number of observations.

15 OLS regression models assume a linear relationships between the predictors and the outcome variable, errors should be identically and independently distributed (i.e. the errors associated with one observation are not correlated with the errors of any other observation) and the variance of errors should be constant (Kohler and Kreuter 2001, pp. 198 sqq.). Logistic regression models assume that the true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the independent variables, that the model is properly specified, that the independent variables are measured without error, that the observations are independent and that the independent variables are not linear combinations of each other (see http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/ Logistic Regression with Stata, chapter 3).
24. Multiple Regression Look-Out

24.1. Multiple Regression Results Concerning the Associative Hypotheses

Explain the Nature of Applied Violence

**H8/H9** Formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/in countries where conflict resources are produced are significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians as compared with formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a country/in countries where no such resources are produced [H8]. In addition, the weaker the state in which formally organized violent non-state groups are operating, the more likely they are to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians [H9].

I started the analysis by formulating baseline models testing both hypotheses simultaneously. Although these first and simple models differ in the regional dummies, the state weakness measures and the resources variables they include, their results are very similar: None of the independent variables exerts a significant effect that persists across variations of the baseline models despite the variable measuring the origin of the violent group (whether an actor had emerged by breaking away from another violent non-state group).

During the refinement process of the most promising baseline model, I added an interaction term between the level of state weakness within the country/countries where the actor is operating in and whether this country produces conflict resources. Because the interaction term itself as well as the main effects of both participating variables are significant and because a likelihood-ratio test indicates that the interaction term adds to the overall model fit, I decided to keep it in the final model. In addition, I included dummy variables indicating the “type of conflict involvement” of an actor (whether it engaged in non-state conflict, in state-based conflict or in both types of internal fighting).

If an actor’s engagement in non-state conflict is controlled for, the splinter group indicator turns insignificant. I therefore conclude that involvement in non-state fighting is a decisive intervening factor that correlates with both, an actor’s likelihood of engaging in acts of one-sided violence against civilians (the dependent variable) as much as it relates to an actor’s origin as a splinter group (one of the independent variables). If the model includes both independent variables (engagement in non-state fighting and the splinter group indicator), the former captures the effect of the latter which for this reason loses its significance. “Engagement in state-based conflict” also increases an actor’s chances of committing acts of one-sided violence against civilians. However, the just mentioned effect of non-state conflict engagement tends to be substantially larger and more significant: A formally organized violent actor’s chances of engaging in acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians are 2.5 times greater if it engaged in non-state conflict.
*state* internal fighting (p=0.000) but only 1.4 times greater if it belongs to the group of actors who engaged in *state-based* internal fighting (all else being equal). The latter effect even stays insignificant (p=0.174) if the exact same model is used.\footnote{These results are not reported in table G.3 on page 416 but included in the log-files. The model used is the final model presented in table G.3 on page 416 with either “engagement in non-state conflict” or “engagement in state-based conflict” as the variable measuring the “type of internal fighting”.} The by far greatest effect, however, is found for the dummy indicating engagement in both kinds of internal fighting (see the final model presented in table G.3 on page 416). Involvement in non-state as well as state-based internal fighting turns out to be the most substantial, significant and stable factor in predicting formal actors’ engagement in acts of one-sided violence. A formally organized violent non-state group’s chances of committing acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians are six to seven times larger if the group engaged in both kinds of internal armed conflict (as opposed to just one type of internal fighting). The effect holds independently of the other explanatory variables.

On its own, the production of (easily accessible and lootable) conflict resources within the country/countries where the actor is operating in is less (or even non-) significantly related to the dependent variable. However, there is mild support for an interaction effect between this factor and the level of state weakness (as measured by the BTI Failed State Index). Thus, Hypothesis 8 cannot be entirely rejected.

Controlling for the type of conflict engagement also comes along with an increase in the significance of the state weakness measure. But, the stronger the state/states where formally organized violent actors are operating in, the greater their odds to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (especially if they are operating in a country/countries where conflict resources are produced). Dropping the interaction effect from the final model only reduces the size of the coefficient of the state weakness variable, which stays highly significant. The direction of the effect still contradicts Hypothesis 9, which therefore needs to be rejected. If anything, the opposite seems to be true: formally organized non-state armed groups are more likely to attack unarmed civilians if they are based in relatively stronger states. The reasons behind this violent behavior remain pure speculation. The state weakness variable is especially significant if the analysis is confined to those actors who engaged in *state-based* internal conflict. Maybe violent non-state armed groups who battle relatively strong government troops more often engage in such kind of violent behavior to punish civilian collaboration with the enemy (which is more likely in such situations), to relieve stress or to signal strength. Across variations of the final model, however, the results in this regard remain mixed. If alternative state weakness measures are used the significance of the effect of this variable on the nature of applied violence turns out to be unstable. Because it can only be observed if state weakness is measured narrowly (through the above BTI Failed State Index, the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator or the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator) table G.2 on page 415 only reports a mildly significant effect contradicting Hypothesis 9.
The significance of the regional dummies also depends on the specification of the model. According to the final model, formally organized violent groups who are operating in Africa are about twice as likely to engage in acts of one-sided violence against civilians. However, if the level of state weakness is measured differently and/or if the sub-Saharan Africa dummy is used, the outcome is mixed.\textsuperscript{17}

Overall, even the final model does not fully account for all relevant regional factors. In addition, certain kinds of conflict engagement (in particular involvement in both types of internal fighting but also engagement in non-state conflict in general) systematically relate to the kind of violence applied by formally organized violent actors. This points to decisive but omitted explanatory factors that relate to the kind of conflict engagement independently of those factors that are already included within the model. Most importantly, however, the final model entirely neglects group-level characteristics that are certainly important in order to predict the behavior of violent actors. Indicators on the internal structures of armed groups, their size or their (ethnic) composition are either not available or cannot be included in the analysis because the available UCDP data are biased. For this reason, the overall fit, even of the final model remains low. Lastly, non-linearity remains an issue that needs to be addressed in the future.

**Explaining the Duration of Fighting**

\textbf{H10–H13} The more fragile a state before/at the outbreak of fighting, the shorter the duration of state-based internal fighting [H10] but the longer the duration of non-state internal fighting [H10a]. In addition, non-state internal conflicts or conflict episodes are of a significantly longer duration if they are fought amongst informally organized groups as opposed to formally organized groups [H13]. In general, internal fighting lasts significantly longer if at the same time conflict resources are produced within the respective country [H11]. Finally, the larger the number of national armed groups involved in internal warfare, the longer the duration [H12].

To investigate the above hypotheses I again formulated simple baseline models representing all possible combinations of independent variables and their various measures. Out of these baseline models I selected the ones with the largest R-squared values for further refinement. This refinement process resulted in the final models given in table G.3 on page 416. Because Hypotheses 10 and 10a assume opposing effects of the

\textsuperscript{17}Because the number of observations is large at this level of analysis, I calculated sub-sample analyses of only those formally organized actors who engaged in non-state fighting and of only those who did not engage in this kind of internal fighting. This allows for some interesting additional insights. For instance, if the analysis is confined to formally organized actors who did not engage in non-state internal fighting, the splinter group variable, the state weakness measures and the lootable resources dummy are significant more often. The above presented effects of these variables seem to be mostly driven by this sub-group of formally organized violent actors. The regional dummies turn out to be significant more often if only those formally organized actors are considered who engaged in non-state internal fighting.
state weakness measure on the duration of fighting for certain sub-samples of armed conflict, the final models differ in their dependent variable: They predict the duration of all kinds of internal fighting, of just state-based or of just non-state internal armed conflicts, episodes and wars. Although the final models appear similar, a comparison of effects across these three sub-samples of armed conflict or across levels of analysis is not possible. Even if the dependent variable concurs, the explanatory factors included at the various levels of analysis sometimes differ. Although some of the models cover the same variables, they might rely on different measures and therefore do not necessarily include the same cases. In order to contrast effects I therefore computed comparable models based on the exact same model specification. The results of these comparable models (which are reported in the log-file) might slightly differ from the outcomes of the final models given in table G.3 on page 416.

The following starts with presenting the episode-level results (before moving to the conflict- and finally the war-level outcomes). At this level of analysis, the dependent variable (the duration of fighting) can be measured in days. Because this variable is heavily skewed to the right, the final episode-level models presented in table G.3 on page 416 include the log-transformed instead of the original values of their dependent variables to account for the existence of heteroscedasticity. The more precise duration measures come with the advantage of higher R-squared values but lower numbers of observations that can be included in the analyses. In addition, the indicators measuring the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of fighting are only available for a very limited period of time and, like the measure indicating the production of conflict resources during times conflict, are missing for a number of cases. Because Stata excludes the entire observation if it detects a missing value on any of the variables included in the specification, the number of cases covered by the final models is much smaller than the total number of conflict episodes within the Master-File.

The model which explains the duration of all kinds of conflict episodes only covers 174 cases (105 non-state and 68 state-based episodes) but reaches an R-squared value of 0.41. Whether an episode is non-state or state-based in nature is the most reliable and significant predictor of the duration of fighting even if the model already controls for the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of violence, whether fighting happens in sub-Saharan Africa and whether conflict resources are produced within the respective country. Non-state conflict episodes are significantly and much shorter than state-based conflict episodes. Of these control variables, only the regional dummy is highly significant, too. Conflict episodes that happen in sub-Saharan Africa are of a significantly shorter duration compared with those conflict episodes that take place outside the region. The effect holds independently of the other explanatory factors and is mostly driven by the non-state episodes in the overall sample.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\)Across variations of the final models, the regional dummies stay insignificant when predicting the duration of state-based episodes but are highly significant if the duration of non-state episodes constitutes the dependent variable.
resources dummy is similar and also negative but less significant. Only if the type of conflict is dropped from the specification does the marginal effect of the resources dummy more than double and its coefficient becomes highly significant. Obviously the two variables (non-state fighting and the production of conflict resources) co-vary and therefore capture each others’ effects if included in the same specification. Accordingly, the sub-sample analysis reveals that conflict episodes in general and non-state conflict episodes in particular which are happening in countries where at the same time (easily accessible and lootable) conflict resources are produced are significantly shorter than (non-state) conflict episodes that are happening in countries where no such resources are produced. This outcome is entirely at odds with Hypothesis 11 which expects the opposite. If alternative specifications are used, the direction of the effect switches but the significance also disappears. Overall, no reliable results can be obtained in this regard. At the episode level, I also do not find much support for Hypothesis 13. The nature of the involved dyad (whether the actors are formally or informally organized) failed to contribute to the overall fit of the model and is therefore absent from the final specification predicting the duration of non-state fighting. If this variable were included in the final model, it would stay insignificant. Variations, however, reveal that the significance of the effect is sensitive to the specification (especially to the inclusion of a regional dummy which in the final model probably captures parts of the effect). Table G.2 on page 415 which considers the results of the final models and their variations therefore reports a mixed outcome in this regard. Lastly, the level of state weakness neither significantly correlates with the duration of all kinds of conflict episodes nor with the duration of state-based conflict episodes. If the duration of non-state conflict episodes is the dependent variable, the state weakness indicator (the SFI Effectiveness Score measured prior to the outbreak of fighting) is only mildly significant.\(^{19}\) A one-unit increase in the level of state weakness above the average (which in this case means less state effectiveness) prior to the outbreak of a non-state conflict episode associates with a 76 percent decrease in the duration of fighting. Overall, these results contradict Hypothesis 10a (which predicts the opposite, namely a significantly longer duration of non-state fighting with worsening levels of state weakness) while also failing to support Hypothesis 10 (which expects a significantly shorter duration of state-based fighting).

But if the analysis moves to the conflict level, the obtained effects and their sizes become theoretically more meaningful. At this level of analysis the duration of fighting can be measured in years, only. This, however, comes with the advantage of much larger sample sizes. The final model which explains the duration of all kinds of internal armed conflicts covers 408 cases (248 non-state and 110 state-based armed conflicts) and reaches an R-squared value of 0.35. In addition, a decisive intervening variable (the intensity of internal fighting) can be controlled for. For these reasons, the conflict-level analysis probably yields the more reliable results. I include the logged values of the intensity measure to model a non-linear relationship between this independent variable and the

\(^{19}\)If just non-state armed conflicts amongst formally organized dyads are taken into consideration the significance of the state weakness coefficient tends to increase.
duration of fighting. The highly significant and positive coefficient obtained for the intensity measure is hardly surprising given that the direction of the relationship is not accounted for and runs both ways: The longer the duration of internal armed conflicts, the larger the number of overall battle-related deaths and vice versa. No matter if all kinds of internal armed conflict are taken into account or if the duration of just non-state or just state-based internal armed conflicts is predicted: a one percent increase in the total number of battle-related deaths associates with an increase in the duration of fighting of approximately 1/100 years (i.e. about four days) if comparable models are used. There is no indication of decisive but omitted regional factors and no indication of decisive explanatory factors that are describing the type of internal fighting and that are not already covered by the control variables: Neither the duration of all kinds of conflicts nor the duration of the two sub-types of internal fighting differ significantly or systematically between (sub-Saharan) African states and countries outside this region if the other explanatory factors (the intensity of fighting and the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of fighting) are controlled for. In most cases, both regional dummies stay insignificant even if the final models are varied. The dummy indicating whether a conflict is non-state or state-based in nature also remains insignificant and is therefore not included in the final conflict-level model predicting the duration of all kinds of internal fighting. The resources dummies (and their interaction with the state weakness measures) tend to stay insignificant, too, especially if the analysis is confined to non-state conflicts. In the other cases (if all kinds of conflict or if just state-based conflicts are taken into consideration) the effects of the resources dummies on the duration of fighting remain sensitive to the specification of the model. Therefore, Hypothesis 11 still fails at the conflict level. Within the final model that predicts the duration of all kinds of internal armed conflict, the main effect of the state weakness variable, however, is highly significant: An increase in the level of state weakness (in this case measured by the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator) of one unit above the average (i.e. more effective governance) prior to the outbreak of fighting results in an increase in the duration of fighting of about half a year (p< 0.01). The effect is clearly driven by the state-based conflicts within the overall sample. If the exact same model is used to either predict the duration of state-based or the duration of non-state internal fighting, the effect of the state-weakness measure is about twice as large in the former case. If the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator is used instead, the outcome is even clearer: An increase in the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator of one unit above the average prior to the outbreak of fighting significantly increases the duration of state-based internal fighting (by more than one year, p< 0.01) while the same change in the level of state weakness does not

20Because the dependent variable is in its original metric and the independent variable log-transformed, the interpretation has the following format: a one percent increase in the intensity of fighting increases the duration by (coefficient/100) units (i.e. years). See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/ (visited on 2014-08-05) .

21An increase in the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator of one unit above the average prior to the outbreak of fighting results in an increase in the duration of state-based conflicts of 0.67 years (about 8 months) and an increase in the duration of non-state conflicts by 0.37 years (about four and a half months) (p-values< 0.05) given that the model also includes the number of battle-related deaths per conflict and the sub-Saharan Africa dummy as control factors.
significantly correlate with a change in the duration of non-state internal armed conflicts. The coefficient is not only insignificant but again comparatively small. Within the final model predicting the duration of non-state fighting presented in table G.3 on page 416, the state weakness measure (the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicator) barely reaches an acceptable level of significance though it is still positive. All these results speak in favor of Hypothesis 10 and the expectation that the stronger the state where fighting is taking place, the longer the duration of state-based armed conflicts. Unfortunately, the effect turns out to be unstable if alternative state weakness indicators (especially the SFI measures) are used. Therefore, I only report mixed results in this regard within table G.2 on page 415, which summarizes the outcome of all refined models (i.e. of the final models plus their variations). For the sub-sample of non-state armed conflicts the exact opposite (a negative effect of improving levels of state weakness on the duration of fighting as proposed by Hypothesis 10a) can not be observed. But, the effect is much smaller and tends to be less significant even across minor variations of the final model. This difference in the effect between the two sub-types of armed conflict is still interesting and deserves further attention. In addition, the results of the final model presented in table G.3 on page 416 suggest that the organizational level of the involved dyad does not significantly correlate with the duration of non-state internal fighting if the other explanatory variables in the model (the intensity of fighting, the regional affiliation, the level of state weakness and whether easily accessible and lootable conflict resources are produced within the conflict-affected state) are held constant at their means. In other words, the level of organization does not significantly contribute to explaining the duration of non-state fighting independently of its effect through these control variables. The following section suggests that the indirect effect of the level of organization on the duration of non-state fighting especially runs through the intensity measure which in the current case certainly captures parts of its effect. It is also important to keep in mind that the number of informally organized dyads is low amongst those non-state conflicts that are included in the final analysis. Heteroscedasticity remains an issue, too.\footnote{Even a log-transformation of the dependent variable did not yield satisfactory results.} Lastly, the effect of the level of organization on the duration of non-state fighting at times turns significant and carries the expected negative sign if alternative measures – especially alternative state-weakness measures – are used. Considering the results of all refined models once more adjusts the outcome of the selected final model. At the conflict level, table G.2 on page 415 therefore again reports mixed results in regard to Hypothesis 13 which expected non-state internal armed conflicts to last significantly longer if they are carried out amongst informally organized actors.

Hypothesis 12 can only be examined at the war level where the number of involved groups of actors is known. The final model which explains the duration of internal warfare and which is presented in table G.3 on page 416 once more includes the logged-values of the dependent variable (again measured in years). In addition, I model a logarithmic relationship between the key independent variable (the number of involved groups) and the dependent variable (the duration of internal warfare) to account for a
diminishing marginal effect with larger numbers of actors. The results of the final model speak in favor of such an effect: a one percent increase in the number of involved actors increases the duration of internal warfare by 115 percent. This highly significant effect still holds if a number of alternative explanations are controlled for (namely the type of warfare, whether the war-torn country produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and whether the war took place within a sub-Saharan African country). Two of these alternative explanations are significant themselves: Firstly, non-state internal wars are of a significantly and much shorter duration than state-based internal wars. Changing the type of internal warfare from state-based to non-state cuts the predicted duration of fighting in half. Secondly, the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources during times of internal warfare significantly correlates with more extensive fighting. If a war happens within a country that produces such resources this increases its duration by 40 percent – again if the above mentioned factors are controlled for. The effect is sensitive to the resources measure that is used and clearly speaks in favor of Hypothesis 11. Given the small number of non-state wars in the sample it is, however, reasonable to expect that the effect is mainly driven by the state-based cases of internal warfare. Three other independent variables (the level of state weakness, the interaction between this variable and the production of lootable resources and whether the war had seen an external military intervention) failed to contribute to the overall fit of the final model. As soon as the type of warfare is included, the regional dummy also turns insignificant indicating that the model then accounts for all relevant regional effects. A model specification error cannot be detected. The above outcome is robust against the inclusion of the alternative regional dummy, it holds across all state weakness measures and does not change considerably if robust regression techniques are applied. The final model explains 41 percent of the variation in the logged duration of internal warfare. Still, the number of observations at this level of analysis is very small (N=130). In addition, more precise measures of the duration of warfare would be desirable as well as information on the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of warfare and on the intensity of fighting which at this level of analysis cannot be controlled for.

**Explaining the Intensity of Fighting**

**H14** Non-state internal conflicts between informally organized groups are significantly more intense than non-state internal armed conflicts between formally organized groups.

Information on the intensity of internal fighting is only available at the conflict level. Therefore, internal armed conflicts are the unit of analysis within the following section. Because the number of observations at the conflict level is large, I run the analysis first for the entire sample of all internal armed conflicts and secondly for the sub-samples of state-based and of non-state internal armed conflicts. Only in the latter case can

---

23 The production of conflict resources in general does not significantly correlate with the duration.
the key independent variable of Hypothesis 14 (the formal vs. informal nature of the involved dyad) be included due to the biased nature of the data. In addition, the three final models predicting the intensity of internal fighting use different state weakness measures. In order to compare effects across the three sub-samples I therefore again computed comparable models that are based on the exact same model specification. As mentioned previously, their results might slightly differ from the outcomes of the final models presented in table G.3 on page 416.

As always, I started with formulating general baseline models that aim to explain the intensity of (all kinds of) internal conflict as well as the intensity of just state-based or non-state internal fighting. Only the duration measures significantly correlated with the dependent variable across all variations of these baseline models. The effects of other explanatory variables just stabilized and turned significant during the refinement process. To attenuate the problem of heteroscedasticity I transformed the dependent variable. In addition, I included the logged values of the duration measure to model a non-linear relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable (assuming that the longer the duration, the weaker this variable’s marginal positive effect on the total number of battle-deaths per conflict). Again, these transformations affect the interpretation of results. Controlling for the “type of conflict” (non-state vs. state-based fighting) significantly improves the overall fit of the refined model explaining the intensity of all kinds of internal fighting. Neither the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources within a conflict-affected state nor the interaction between this variable and the level of state weakness contributed to the overall fit of the models and are therefore not included in the final specifications.

The results presented in table G.3 on page 416 support a logarithmic relationship between the duration of fighting and the intensity of internal conflicts. The positive sign of the coefficients indicates that the longer the fighting, the larger the total number of battle-related deaths per conflict though the marginal change in the dependent variable diminishes with an increasing duration of fighting: A one percent increase in the duration results in an increase of the total number of battle-related deaths by 120 percent. I also find the effect of the duration measure to be larger if the analysis is run for state-based conflicts only (as opposed to non-state conflicts only) if the exact same independent variables and measures are used for both of these sub-samples. Unusual and influential observations cannot account for this finding because the difference in the size of the effect still exists if the respective multivariate outliers are excluded.

24 Because the dependent variable (UCDP’s best estimates of the number of battle-related deaths) is heavily skewed to the right, the refined models include the log-transformed values.
25 A one percent increase in the duration of non-state (or state-based) fighting results in an increase in the total number of battle-related deaths by 101 (or 158) percent all else being equal. The corresponding models are reported in the log file.
Furthermore, the type of conflict matters in order to explain the intensity of internal fighting in general. A change from state-based to non-state internal fighting results in an 80 percent reduction of the overall number of battle-related deaths per conflict. The effect is large and highly significant even if the duration of fighting, the regional affiliation of the conflict (whether it happens in Africa) and the level of state weakness within the conflict-affected country are controlled for. This outcome strongly supports the previous (but only bivariate) finding that non-state internal armed conflicts are significantly less intense than state-based conflicts.

Those models predicting the intensity of (all kinds of) internal conflict and the intensity of state-based internal conflicts also report highly significant effects for the state weakness measures. The stronger the state (as measured by the WGI Governance Effectiveness or the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator) prior to the outbreak of fighting the less battle-related deaths per internal conflict and, all else being equal, even lesser battle-related deaths per state-based internal conflict. The significance of this effect holds across variations of the final models and, with very few exceptions, across different state weakness measures. In contrary, the coefficient of the state weakness variable stays insignificant if the analysis is run for non-state conflicts only – no matter if the exact same model is used or if the key independent variable of Hypothesis 14 (the formal vs. informal nature of the involved actors) is included as an additional control factor (as done by the final model presented in table G.3 on page 416). The variable capturing the nature of the involved actors is highly significant itself. Against all odds, however, non-state internal armed conflicts amongst formally organized actors are significantly more intense than non-state conflicts amongst informally organized actors. The final model predicts 20 percent more battle-deaths per non-state conflict if the fighting is carried out by formally recognized and permanently organized armed groups. The effect holds independently of the level of state weakness of the affected country and independently of the duration of fighting. It also holds if alternative state weakness measures are used but at times turns insignificant if a regional indicator (especially the sub-Saharan Africa dummy) and/or a resources dummy is added to the model (which then simply capture parts of the effect). Overall, Hypothesis 14 needs to be rejected: Though the nature of actors significantly correlates with the scale of violence applied during non-state internal fighting the direction of the effect runs against expectations.

26 A one unit increase above the average in the WGI measures (i.e. more effective governance or better control of corruption) prior to the outbreak of fighting yields a 24 to 34 percent decrease in the total number of battle-deaths per internal conflict (if all kinds of fighting are included in the sample) and a 56 to 60 percent decrease in the total number of battle-deaths per state-based conflict (if only this kind of internal fighting is considered). The size of the effect varies with the specification of the model (the WGI measure that is used and whether the model controls for the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and/or the regional affiliation of the conflict-affected country in addition to the duration of fighting).
Overall (and even if a regional dummy would be added), the final model predicting the intensity of non-state conflicts is not fully specified. The goodness-of-fit is also higher in those models explaining the intensity of (all kinds of) internal fighting and the intensity of state-based internal fighting. The final models presented in table G.3 on page 416 explain 51 and 54 percent of the variance in the transformed dependent variable. In both cases, robust regression methods yield similar results. Specification errors cannot be detected either. The fact that the regional dummies mostly stay insignificant indicates that all important regional factors are taken care of by these models. Nevertheless, future studies might want to control for population sizes (e.g. by using the number of battle-deaths per 10,000 population as the dependent variable) and, as the previous section suggests, use more precise measures of the duration of armed conflicts.

Explaining the Quantity and Quality of the Involved Actors

H15/H16 Violent non-state groups who are fighting non-state conflicts in a country/in countries where conflict resources are produced are significantly more likely to be informally organized as compared with violent non-state groups who are fighting non-state conflicts in a country/in countries where no such resources are produced. Likewise, non-state conflicts or conflict episodes which are happening at times when conflict resources are produced are significantly more likely to be fought amongst informally organized dyads as compared with non-state conflicts or conflict episodes which are happening at times when no such resources are produced within the conflict-affected state [H15]. And, the weaker the state where internal warfare is taking place, the larger the number of national armed groups involved in warfare [H16].

The final models presented in table G.4 on page 417 support Hypothesis 15 at all levels of analysis: Of those violent actors who engage in non-state armed conflicts the ones who are operating in a country/countries where conflict resources are produced are significantly less likely to be formally organized (and are therefore significantly more likely to be informally and non-permanently organized armed groups). Likewise, non-state armed conflicts or conflict episodes that take place in countries where at the same time easily accessible and lootable conflict resources are produced are significantly less likely to be carried out by formally organized violent groups. The significance of the effect holds even if other alternative explanations or possible intervening factors (i.e. the regional affiliation and the level of state weakness within the affected country) are controlled for. Although the immediate mechanism(s) between the two variables cannot be tested, this outcome lends some support to the concept of New Wars and to the initial steps of Weinstein’s structuralist argument that the kind of conflict endowments available to rebel leaders conditions their recruitment strategy and the membership profile of the emerging violent group which then determines the group’s internal structure, e.g. its organizational level (as proposed by Mechanism 1-3).
At the actor level, a worsening of state weakness (as measured by the Polity Fragmentation Indicator) of one unit above the average doubles the chances of those violent actors who engage in non-state fighting of being formally recognized and permanently organized rebel groups. Obviously, the weaker the state the more easy it gets for these actors to establish themselves as an active force and persistent source of internal instability. This finding would repeat itself at the conflict and episode level if no interaction term were included in the corresponding final models. At both levels of analysis, however, the interaction effect between state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources significantly contributes to the overall fit of the model and is therefore carried through the analyses. The state weakness measures themselves stay insignificant while the interaction term is (highly) significant even across variations of the final model, i.e. if the alternative regional dummy and/or other state weakness indicators (the WGI Governance Effectiveness Index and the SFI Sub-Index I which are available prior to the outbreak of violence) are included: A one unit increase above the average level of state weakness significantly and greatly increases the odds of a non-state conflict or non-state conflict episode to be carried out amongst formally and permanently organized rebel groups if the conflict-affected country at the same time produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources. Although the size of this interaction effect varies greatly with alternative specifications of the model, its significance pertains. Thus, the results support a significant and larger marginal effect of worsening levels of state weakness on the nature of violent actors involved in non-state internal conflicts (more precisely on their likelihood of being formally organized) in such countries that are producing this kind of conflict resources.

Finally, the regional dummies are highly significant and strong predictors of the dependent variable across all levels of analysis and variations of the final models. Actors who engage in non-state conflicts in (sub-Saharan) Africa are significantly less likely to be formally organized. Likewise, dyadic non-state conflicts or conflict episodes happening in this region are significantly less likely to be carried out amongst formally recognized and permanently organized violent groups. This outcome indicates that the models still fail to account for some significant regional effects. In general, sensitivity to the regional dummies that are used remains an issue. Whether “sub-Saharan Africa” or “all-Africa” is included affects the overall fit of the models (which tends to be lower in the former case) as well as the significance and size of the resources dummy. Nevertheless, the models investigating Hypothesis 15 at the conflict and episode level display relatively high pseudo-R-squared values (up to 0.38). The proportion of correct guesses beyond that by guessing the largest marginal (the adjusted-Count-R-squared value) is as high as 0.50 in the case of the episode-level model.

Hypothesis 16 which expects worse levels of state weakness to significantly correlate with larger numbers of actors involved in internal fighting can only be analyzed at the war level where it finds strong support. In this case the outcome varies greatly between the first baseline models and the selected and refined models due to a number of changes during the refinement process.
The results of the final OLS regression model presented in table G.4 on page 417 are based on an analysis that uses a transformed dependent variable to account for heteroscedasticity, that controls for the type of conflict and that models a non-linear relationship between the dependent variable and the duration of warfare in years. The final model accounts for an impressive 0.43 percent of the variance in the logged dependent variable.

The type of warfare, the level of state weakness of the war-affected country and the duration of fighting in years turn out to be significant predictors of the number of actors involved in internal warfare. Although the transformation of variables complicates the interpretation of results, the direction of effects and their level of significance can easily be derived from the regression output as presented in table G.4 on page 417. The number of actors involved in internal warfare is significantly larger in non-state as opposed to state-based internal wars, it significantly increases with a longer duration of warfare, and it significantly decreases with improving state strength (as measured by the BTI Failed State Index). More precisely, the number of actors involved in non-state internal wars is 33 percent larger than in state-based internal wars, a one percent increase in the duration of fighting increases the number of involved actors by 30 percent and a one unit increase in the level of state weakness above the average (which in the case of the BTI measure means a stronger state) yields a five percent decrease in the number of involved actors. The latter effect turns highly significant if the type of warfare is controlled for and holds independently of two other alternative explanations or possible intervening factors: whether the internal war takes place in (sub-Saharan) Africa and whether the war-affected country produced (easily accessible and lootable) conflict resources during times of warfare. Both of these variables (and the usual interaction term) remain insignificant themselves across variations of the final model and, because they failed to significantly contribute to the overall fit of the model, were dropped from the final specification.

Lastly, robust regression methods yield very similar results. Excluding multivariate outliers only slightly reduces the level of significance of the variables capturing the type of warfare and the level of state weakness. But the low number of cases at the war level (N=135) should be kept in mind as well as the fact that the duration can only be measured in years. Available time-series data on the level of state weakness just cover the post-Cold War era. Measuring the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of warfare therefore greatly reduces the size of the sample. Thus, the above only uses national level averages and does not account for reverse causation between the level of state weakness and the number of involved actors. Despite the effort, heteroscedasticity also remains an issue and even the final model is not fully specified. The persisting problem of model specification might be caused by omitted variables (other than regional factors) or an improper transformation of predictor variables.

27 Because the dependent variable (the number of actors involved in internal warfare) is heavily skewed to the right, I include the log-transformed instead of the original values of the dependent variable.
28 I used the logged values of the duration measure.
24.2. Multiple Regression Results on the Incidence and Nature of Non-State Fighting

The level of state weakness significantly correlates with a country’s chances of experiencing (any kind of) internal warfare. A worsening of state fragility (as measured by the SFI Sub-Index 1) of one unit above the average increases the odds of a country to experience internal warfare by a factor of 1.21, to experience state-based internal warfare by a factor of 1.24 and to experience non-state internal warfare by a factor of (just) 1.10 (if the exact same model would be used). A further increase in the level of state weakness from one unit to two units above the average would result in another multiplication of the chances by these factors and so on. Slightly different model specifications (other state weakness measures and/or no interaction term) yield similar results as demonstrated by the final models predicting the experience of state-based or of non-state internal warfare presented in table G.4 on page 417. In almost any case, the effect of state weakness is highly significant even if alternative explanations (most importantly the production of easily accessible conflict resources during times of warfare) are controlled for. Because the significance of the state weakness effect also does not vanish if regional dummies are included in the models it appears to be more than just a (sub-Saharan) Africa effect. Still, worsening levels of state weakness increase countries’ chances to experience state-based or non-state internal warfare to about the same extent.

The regional dummies themselves are only significant if a country’s “experience of state-based internal warfare” and if “experience of internal warfare in general” are to be explained. This indicates that the corresponding models do not fully account for all relevant regional factors explaining these dependent variables. While this finding is hardly surprising, the direction of the effect (the size of the odds ratios) of the regional dummies is unexpected: a country’s chances of experiencing internal warfare in general and state-based internal warfare in particular are significantly (and much) lower for sub-Saharan African countries (as opposed to the rest of the world) if the level of state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resource are controlled for. Independent from these two explanatory factors, little remains from the region’s special proneness to conventional civil warfare.

29Without the interaction term, a worsening of state fragility (as measured by the SFI Sub-Index 1) of one unit above the average increases the odds of a country to experience state-based internal warfare by a factor of 1.29, to experience non-state internal warfare by a factor of 1.28 and to experience internal warfare in general by a factor of 1.28 if the exact same model would be used in all three cases. An improvement of state fragility (as measured by the BTI State Fragility Index, again without the interaction term included in the model) of one unit above the average decreases the odds of a country to experience non-state internal warfare by a factor of 0.59, to experience state-based internal warfare by a factor of 0.64 and to experience internal warfare in general by a factor of 0.64 if the exact same model would be used.
If a country produces lootable conflict resources this raises its chances of experiencing internal warfare even by a factor of 2.33. Its chances of experiencing state-based internal warfare almost triple (if the exact same model is used) or more than triple if the model is slightly modified.\footnote{For instance, if the model does not include the interaction term as done by the final model explaining the experience of state-based internal warfare presented in table G.4 on page 417.}

I find modest support for an interaction effect between state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources if “experience of any kind of internal warfare” constitutes the dependent variable. The level of significance of this interaction effect is low but holds across variations of the final model. The effect itself indicates that the impact of state weakness on a country’s likelihood of experiencing internal warfare is greater (increases by an additional factor of 1.14) if the country at the same time also produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources. In other words: if the level of state fragility worsens (i.e. increases by one unit above the average) a country’s chances of experiencing internal warfare increase by an overall factor of 2.35 if the state also produces lootable resources while the chances of a country that experiences the same change in the level of state fragility without producing such conflict resources only rise by the above mentioned factor of 1.21. Using the exact same model specification to predict state-based internal warfare would yield an insignificant effect for the interaction term between state weakness and the production of easily accessible conflict resources. At first sight, this interaction seems to matter more if a country’s engagement in non-state warfare is predicted. At least the coefficient is slightly larger and more significant (than the above discussed effect found by the model predicting “experience of any kind of internal warfare”). However, the corresponding confidence intervals for the odds ratios again contain the value one. Even the main effect of the resources variable on a country’s chances of experiencing non-state internal warfare turns out to be sensitive to the specification of the model and at times stays insignificant.\footnote{The significance and size of the effect depends on whether the interaction term is included as well as on the state weakness measure and the regional dummy that is used.}

This, however, changes if low-intensity fighting is taken into consideration. Now, the results of the final models presented in table G.5 on page 418 indicate that the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources significantly increases the odds of a country to experience non-state armed conflict while it does not significantly increase a country’s chances of experiencing state-based armed conflict or of experiencing internal armed conflict in general. Neither did it significantly contribute to explaining countries’ experience of non-state warfare. Thus, the significant effect of lootable resources production on a country’s chances of experiencing non-state internal fighting can only be detected if low-intensity battle is taken into consideration. The significance of the effect holds if the exact same model is applied, but also if sub-Saharan Africa instead of Africa is included as the regional dummy and if the level of state weakness is controlled for (by using the BTI Failed State Index). Likelihood-ratio tests for nested models confirm the significant contribution of the resources variable to the overall fit of the model.
Again, the regional dummies themselves are insignificant if engagement in non-state fighting constitutes the dependent variable. Thus, the regional dummies neither significantly correlate with experience of non-state armed conflict nor with experience of non-state internal warfare. Decisive but omitted regional factors are of no concern. At least this outcome contrasts with the highly significant effects of the regional dummies in those models predicting countries’ experience of state-based internal warfare or, to a lesser extent, predicting countries’ experience of state-based internal armed conflict.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, the level of state weakness again significantly correlates with internal fighting. The stronger the state the less likely it is of experiencing non-state, state-based or any kind of internal armed conflict. If the same specification is used, the effects turn out to be much larger compared with the effects of state weakness on a country’s chances of engaging in internal warfare.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, if low-intensity fighting is taken into consideration it becomes clear that an equal improvement in the level of state fragility lowers a country’s chances of experiencing state-based internal armed conflict to a greater extent.\textsuperscript{34} This contradicts the concept of New Wars. Theoretically it still makes sense because the state constitutes one party to the conflict in conventional (state-based) fighting. If its strength improves this should lower its risk of being attacked by non-state forces while an equal improvement in the level of state strength might affect the decision of non-state armed groups to battle each other comparatively less.

All final country-level models presented in table G.5 on page 418 successfully passed tests for model specification errors. The models predicting countries’ experience of non-state, state-based or any kind of armed conflict display remarkably high measures of model fit.\textsuperscript{35} The fact that non-state armed conflict is much more frequently observed at the country level than intense non-state warfare certainly contributes to the predictive power of these models.\textsuperscript{36} Still, the numbers of observations are low.\textsuperscript{37} In addition, the issue of reverse causation between state weakness and internal fighting cannot be taken into account at this level of analysis. Engagement in armed battle impacts upon countries’ levels of state weakness as much as weak statehood contributes to the outbreak of violence in the first place.

\textsuperscript{32}In the latter case, the effect of the regional dummy is less significant and depends on the specification of the model.
\textsuperscript{33}An improvement of state fragility (which is measured by the BTI State Fragility Index in all three of the final models presented in table G.5 on page 418) of one unit above the average decreases the odds of a country to experience non-state conflict by a factor of 0.39.
\textsuperscript{34}The respective factor is only 0.32 (or even 0.30 if sub-Saharan Africa is included) whether the model contains the resources dummy.
\textsuperscript{35}Their adjusted Count R-squared values range between 0.42 and 0.61. Their pseudo R-squared values range between 0.36 and 0.38.
\textsuperscript{36}The Count R-squared value of the model explaining experience of non-state warfare is as low as 0.13 while the Count R-squared value of the similar model explaining experience of non-state armed conflict is 0.42.
\textsuperscript{37}Due to several missing cases on the state weakness measures and on the dummy measuring the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources, the final country-level models presented in table G.4 on page 417 and table G.5 on page 418 only cover between 129 and 164 states.
Luckily, both of these shortcomings can be addressed by moving the analysis from the country to the conflict or to the conflict-episode level where the degree of state weakness can be measured prior to the outbreak of violence, where the numbers of observations significantly increase and where additional control factors can be included. Now, the dependent variable is the nature of internal fighting (more precisely the chances of an internal armed conflict or conflict episode being categorized as non-state in nature). At both levels of analysis the initial baseline models changed considerably during the refinement process. The final models account for non-linear relationships between the dependent and several independent variables. Their results, which are mostly robust across variations, indicate that the chances of a conflict or conflict episode being non-state in nature significantly and greatly increase if the affected country at the same time produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and if the fighting is taking place within an African state.

Again, worsening levels of state weakness significantly correlate with greater chances of being categorized as a non-state conflict or non-state conflict episode. The final conflict-level model even supports an interaction effect. A worsening level of state weakness (in this case measured by the Polity Fragmentation Indicator) of one unit above the average increases a conflict’s chances of being non-state in nature by a factor of 2.28 if fighting is taking place within a country that does not produce easily accessible and lootable conflict resources while an equal increase in the level of state weakness raises a conflict’s chances of being non-state in nature by a factor of 2.72 (2.28 plus 0.44) if the fighting happens within a country which at the same time produces such resources. These effects hold even if the regional context, the intensity and the duration of fighting are controlled for.

The number of battle-related deaths also significantly correlates with the dependent variable. The direction of the effect corresponds to the previous finding that non-state fighting tends to be comparatively less intense: the larger the number of overall battle-related deaths, the lower an internal armed conflict’s chances of being categorized as non-state in nature. The duration of fighting exerts a similar decreasing effect at the episode level only. This might be due to the more precise measure of duration (in months) available at this level of analysis (which comes with the disadvantage of a much lower number of observations covered by the analysis) or it might be due to different model specifications (the additional interaction term and the inclusion of the intensity measure which is only available at the conflict level).

---

38I used the logged duration (in months) at the episode level and the logged intensity measure as well as the squared term of the state weakness measure (the BTI Failed State Index) at the episode level.

39The chances of a conflict or conflict episode being non-state in nature are about 2.6 times larger if the affected country at the same time produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and about four to five times larger if it is taking place within an African state (as opposed to a non-African state). See odds ratios given in table G.4 on page 417.

40A one unit increase in the logged number of overall battle-related deaths halves an internal armed conflict’s chances of being categorized as non-state in nature.
Another important control factor, the number of involved actors, can only be included at the war level where this variable is allowed to vary. There, it turns out to be the most significant factor in predicting the nature of internal warfare. If the number of actors increases by one group above the average, this raises the chances of a case of internal warfare being categorized as non-state in nature by one-third. Again, an increase in the duration of warfare of one year above the average significantly decreases the chances of an internal war being categorized as non-state. Both effects are significant even if the model controls for the level of state weakness and whether a country produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources during times of warfare. These alternative explanations, however, stay insignificant at the war level. Interestingly, the resources dummy would turn significant if the number of actors were dropped from the specification. This indicates that both factors relate to each other and, if both are included in the model, capture each others effects. Models that fail to control for the number of actors might therefore partly measure the effect through their resources variable (which might turn insignificant otherwise). Apart from this insight, the final war-level model suffers from a low number of observations and from the fact that non-state internal wars are rare events. The pseudo R-squared value is very low. Thus, even the highly significant results of the final model should be treated with caution. In many respects the above presented conflict- and episode-level analyses appear to be superior.

Finally, at the actor level improving levels of state fragility (measured by the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator) greatly and significantly reduce an actor’s chances of engaging in non-state fighting.\(^{41}\) The opposite applies if the country in which the violent group is active in, produces (any kind of) conflict resources or is an African state. Both variables significantly increase a violent actor’s chances of engaging in non-state conflict. The respective odds ratios are extremely large. I nevertheless refrain from an interpretation of effect sizes because even the refined model remains weak.\(^{42}\) In part, this is due to measurement issues. The above presented actor-level model predicts the behavior of violent groups (their decision to engage in a certain kind of internal fighting) at a specific location and at a certain point in time by relying on cross-sectional and aggregate, national-level data. Political and economic context factors certainly impact the violent behavior of armed groups. Besides the relevant context factors, however, group characteristics need to be covered. So far, only whether a violent actors was created by breaking away from another violent actor or by a temporary split in the original movement has been taken into consideration. Even across various specifications this factor never significantly contributed to explaining an actor’s engagement in non-

---

\(^{41}\) The interaction effect between state weakness and the production of conflict resources is only mildly significant and unstable across variations of the final model. For these reasons, I do not discuss this result.

\(^{42}\) Effects are sensitive to (multiple) influential covariate patterns (outliers), the measures of model fit (pseudo R-squared and Count R-squared) are relatively low, the model fails the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test and multicolinearity remains an issue if the interaction term is included (even if the involved metric variable, the state weakness measure, is mean-centered). At least a misspecification of the model cannot be detected and the number of observations included in the model is large (N=873).
state fighting. The organizational level of armed groups (whether they are formally or informally organized) also drops out as an explanatory factor. The analysis needed to be restricted to formally organized groups due to the biased nature of the available UCDP data (which does not allow for any variance in the level of organization of armed groups that engage in state-based internal fighting). Because UCDP only covers acts of one-sided violence against civilians if they are committed by formally organized actors, data on the nature of the applied violence is equally biased. These coding rules have to be taken into account and greatly restrict any analysis. New and more fine grained data on the internal structures of violent groups that engage in state-based as well as non-state internal fighting are only slowly emerging. The “Organizational Structure of Armed Movement Dataset” (OSAM) is a first and very promising step. So far, the author of this data set collected information on 70 armed movements (on their recruitment strategies, their level of hierarchy and the level of commitment of their active members) via an expert survey.43 A group’s current degree of internal fragmentation also appears to be an interesting indicator in this regard. Only recently, a new concept of group fragmentation that spans along three dimensions (the number of organizations in the movement, the degree of institutionalization across these organizations and the distribution of power among them) has been put forward by Bakke et al. (2012).

25. Interim Summary VI: Main Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis

Besides the just mentioned data constraints (the general lack of group-level indicators and the biased nature of some of the available large-N data), the above empirical analyses oftentimes reached the boundaries of the available state weakness measures. The political context of non-state and state-based internal fighting not only deserves more attention in terms of theory-building but also much better data. Because the temporal and geographical coverage of most available state fragility indices is very limited, variance in the level of state fragility across time and space can rarely be taken into account. Some exceptional studies in this regard have already been mentioned.\(^1\) Especially the use of nighttime light satellite imagery to capture sub-national variances in the level of state reach or capacity is gaining ground also within peace and conflict research. For instance, Camber (2010) uses such data to explore whether groups living in areas with low levels of “state penetration” are at greater risk of experiencing armed conflict. Witmer and O’Loughlin (2011) rely on nighttime light imagery to detect the effects of the war between Russia and Georgia, Shortland et al. (2013) analyze the impact of armed conflict on incomes (proxied by electricity consumption and measured through nighttime light emissions) in Somalia, and Hodler and Raschky (2014) study the effects of economic shocks (measured by nighttime light intensity and instrumented by lagged rainfall and droughts) on civil conflict also at the sub-national level.\(^2\) Relying on “terrestrial data collection” is especially tempting in this field of research because state fragility and armed conflict prevent the collection of reliable and more direct indicators on the ground. The validity of the indicator (e.g. whether it captures the capacity or rather the willingness of states to reach certain areas) needs further debate. In addition, data on the exact locations of non-state and state-based armed conflicts are not (yet) available on a global level and for an extended period of time. This kind of information is needed, however, in order to match the locations of armed conflicts with the actual production sites of conflict resources and with the local (or at least regional) levels of state weakness. Systematic differences between types of internal fighting in the availability and quality of conflict-related data also remain to be discussed by future research.

\(^1\)See e.g. Maedl et al. (2011); Camber and Schutte (2012); Johnson (2007).

\(^2\)For an overview see Ghosh et al. (2013) who review pioneering studies using nighttime satellite imagery as a proxy for human well-being or X. Li et al. (2013) who investigate the potential of nighttime light images in evaluating global armed conflicts and for this purpose develop a nighttime light variation index.
25. Interim Summary VI

But despite the fact that there is room for improvement of the data and the models, several of the above outcomes are rather clear and consistent across specifications and levels of analysis. Non-state internal fighting significantly differs from state-based internal fighting—sometimes as proposed by the concept of New Wars. At times, however, the differences in the context and the nature of these two sub-types of internal fighting are less pronounced or even contrary to the expectations of the concept of New Wars. Likewise, some of the concept’s expectations on the linkages between single dimensions of internal fighting find support while others of the associative hypotheses clearly need to be rejected. In light of the abundance of presented data and levels of analysis covered by the corresponding models, it is difficult to draw a final and overall conclusion. The following summary of results therefore focuses on the unambiguous outcomes. A summary of all results that can be derived from the descriptive, comparative and regression analyses in support (or against) the proposed overall trend (H1 and H1a), the comparative hypotheses (H2-H7b), the associative hypotheses (H8-H16), and the main research question\(^3\) is provided by table H.1 on page 420 and table H.2 on page 421 in the appendix. This schematic overview of accepted and rejected hypotheses serves as the basis of this final summary, and, in a condensed version, appears as follows:

---

\(^3\)This term refers to the question of which factors predict engagement in (or categorization as) non-state internal fighting (at the actor, the episode, the conflict and war level) or a country’s risk of experiencing non-state armed conflict and warfare.
The results of the descriptive analysis clearly spoke in favor of an increasing significance of non-state internal fighting (H1). Whether this kind of internal fighting dominates the picture depends on the geographical perspective, the measure that is used and the level of analysis. At least non-state internal wars are not the dominant type of internal warfare. Secondly, the results of the bivariate comparative analysis clearly supported Hypothesis 2: Non-state internal wars are indeed fought amongst a significantly larger number of actors than state-based internal wars. This effect holds if alternative explanations are controlled for within the multiple regression analysis. With some limitations, the outcome of the bivariate comparative analysis further supported the hypotheses on the role of conflict resources. At the actor, the episode and the conflict level, (engagement in) non-state internal fighting occurs significantly more often in a context where conflict resources in general (H4) and easily accessible and lootable conflict resources in particular (H4a) occur or, even more so, where such resources are produced. In line
with Hypothesis 4b I also found conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot (primary diamonds or (offshore) oil/gas) to be produced significantly more often prior to or during state-based internal fighting. The significance of this effect (which is mainly driven by oil/gas and by the Middle East and North African region) is, however, less stable across levels of analysis. The multiple regression results again support these rather clear bivariate results. Across all refined regression models, the dummy variables indicating the production of conflict resources tend to be more significant if they are confined to the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources. At times, however, significant effects are only obtained if low intensity battle is taken into account. For instance, the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources significantly increases a country’s odds to experience non-state armed conflict while it does not significantly increase a country’s chances of experiencing state-based armed conflict or internal armed conflict in general. Neither is there much support for an equally significant and strong effect between the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and the experience of non-state internal warfare. I therefore concluded that the significant effect of lootable resources production on a country’s chances of experiencing non-state internal fighting can only be detected if low-intensity battle is taken into consideration. In this regard the focus of the New Wars debate on New Warfare is misleading. In addition, the changes of a violent actor to engage in non-state fighting significantly increase if it is operating in a context where conflict resources are produced. This, however, in no way means that all non-state fighting is entirely or mainly predatory in nature. Both state-based and non-state conflicts can be greed and/or grievance-based. In fact, a large number of grievance-based non-state conflicts are fought between competing sectors of society (e.g. between pastoralists and agriculturalists or ethnic groups) around issues of land-ownership, economic inequality and ethnic affiliation. Finally, the chances of a conflict or conflict episode being non-state in nature significantly and greatly increase if the fighting is happening within a country which at the same time produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources. This conflict-level effect once more holds independently of decisive control factors (most importantly from the level of state weakness, but also the intensity or duration of fighting). I therefore agree with Humphreys (2005, p. 508) that the “impact of natural resources on conflict cannot easily be attributed entirely to the weak states mechanism, and in particular, the impact of natural resources is independent of state strength”.

Very clear but opposed to the concept of New Wars are the bivariate as well as multivariate results in regard to the duration and intensity of fighting (H5 and H6): Non-state internal armed conflicts are significantly and much less brutal than conventional, state-based armed conflicts and they are significantly shorter than their state-based counterparts even if alternative explanations are controlled for. In addition, the bivariate

---

4The 2012 Human Security Report lists a number of recent quantitative studies that examine the causes of non-state internal fighting. According to these studies, non-state armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are especially likely to arise in places where acute soil degradation meets extreme population density, where levels of rainfall are changing, or where people are facing unequal access to economic benefits or regime change (HSC 2012, pp. 195 sqq.).
results as well as the multiple regression outcome indicate that non-state wars are not characterized by a particularly transnational nature of actors. At least they are not significantly more likely to see an external military intervention which is why Hypothesis 3 also needs to be rejected. Hypothesis 3a asks whether a “history of factionalization” is significantly more likely amongst those formally organized groups that (exclusively) engaged in non-state armed conflict as opposed to those formally organized groups that exclusively engaged in state-based armed conflict. The bivariate outcome supported this hypothesis. However, if other factors explaining actors’ engagement in non-state internal fighting are controlled for, the dummy indicating whether an actor was created by breaking away from another actor or by a temporary split in the original movement stays insignificant. Based on the multiple regression outcome I therefore reject Hypothesis 3a.

Finally, the bivariate outcome in regard to the political context clearly spoke in favor of Hypotheses 7 and 7a but disproved Hypothesis 7b. I did not find any support for the claim that different kinds of state weakness associate with different kinds of internal fighting (H7b). Instead, the bivariate comparative analysis suggested that both the average level of state functionality and legitimacy as well as the average level of state effectiveness and authority are significantly worse in those countries that experience non-state internal fighting (as compared with those countries that engage in state-based internal fighting only). Almost independently of the state weakness measure that is used, the degree of state fragility is also significantly worse prior to the outbreak of non-state (as compared with state-based) conflicts or conflict episodes. Finally, violent non-state actors who engaged in non-state armed conflict operate in significantly more fragile states (as compared with those violent non-state actors who engaged in exclusively state-based armed conflict). Again, differences in means were especially significant if low-intensity fighting was taken into consideration (i.e. at the conflict and at the conflict episode level) and if state-weakness was narrowly defined as proposed by Hypothesis 7a. The multiple regression results mostly confirm these bivariate outcomes. At almost all levels of analysis the state weakness measures stay highly significant even if alternative explanations or intervening factors are controlled for: Worsening levels of state weakness significantly correlate with greater chances of a conflict or conflict episode being categorized as non-state (instead of state-based) in nature. At the conflict level I even find support for an interaction effect between state weakness and the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources. Both the main state weakness effect and the interaction effect are significant even if the regional context, the intensity and the duration of fighting are controlled for. Worsening levels of state fragility also greatly and significantly increase the odds of an actor to engage in non-state fighting. Finally, at the country level, the multiple regression analysis confirms that the weaker the state the more likely the experience of non-state internal fighting. At first, this country-level outcome appears to support the concept of New Wars. However, the worse the level of state fragility the more likely is the experience of state-based internal fighting, too. At the war level worsening levels of state weakness increase countries’ chances of experiencing state-based or non-state internal warfare to about the same extent. However, if low-intensity fighting is taken into consideration it becomes clear that an equal worsen-
ing in the level of state fragility increases a country’s chances of experiencing state-based internal armed conflict even more than it increases its chances of experiencing non-state internal fighting. This outcome points to the usefulness of a comparison of effect sizes instead of just contemplating the direction of the effects which in any case supports the concept of New Wars – not least because of reverse causation. Measuring the level of state weakness prior to the outbreak of fighting (to rule out at least some endogeneity) is just possible at the conflict, the episode and the war level.

All the above discussed models only reveal correlations amongst variables. The underlying causal mechanisms cannot be tested and therefore remain unknown. Nevertheless, some mechanisms appear to be more plausible than others given the above empirical findings. The outcome that non-state internal fighting is significantly and comparatively less intense indicates that an equalization of military technology and the absence of clear front lines in non-state fighting rather result in the avoidance of open and risky battle (as proposed by Mechanism 9) instead of massive “emotional over-reactions” due to endemic uncertainty, fear and panic which would lead to high numbers of military deaths (as proposed by Mechanism 8). The empirical results rather speak in favor of Mechanism 10 (which argued that opportunistic rebel groups avoid severe battle as this would be counterproductive to their economic interests) than in favor of Mechanism 7 (which expects high numbers of military deaths in non-state fighting due to identity politics). These economic interests even appear to be strong enough to counter-balance the positive effect of weak state institutions on the intensity of fighting. Mechanism 6 argued that a breakdown of political and social order associates with higher numbers of battle-related deaths (e.g. because real and perceived impunity and/or security concerns might justify preemptive violence or acts of retaliation which in return spur a culture of generalized brutalization among soldiers). This does not seem to play out in non-state fighting. However, Mechanism 6 still serves to explain the difference in battle-deaths between the two types of internal armed conflict because changes in the level of state weakness appear to matter a great deal when it comes to the intensity of state-based internal fighting. This already touches upon the main results of those multiple regression models examining the linkages between single dimensions of internal fighting.

Again, some of the associative hypotheses find strong support while others clearly need to be rejected. In line with Hypotheses 12 I find higher numbers of involved actors to significantly increase the duration of internal warfare (and vice versa). This highly significant effect holds independently of a number of alternative explanations that are controlled for (namely the type of warfare, whether the war-torn country produces easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and whether the war took place within a sub-Saharan African country). Secondly, I find clear support for Hypotheses 15 (especially at the conflict and episode level). Non-state armed conflicts or conflict episodes that take place in countries where at the same time easily accessible and lootable conflict resources are produced are significantly less likely to be carried out amongst formally organized violent groups. Again, the significance of the effect holds even if other alternative explanations or possible intervening factors (i.e. the regional affiliation and the level of state
weakness within the affected country) are controlled for. This supports the concept of New Wars and Weinstein’s structuralist mechanism. However, if the production of such resources goes hand in hand with a worsening of state fragility, the positive effect of the state weakness measure on the nature of the involved dyad prevails. In such a situation, non-state conflicts or episodes amongst formally and permanently organized rebel groups are more likely. Obviously, the weaker the state the easier it gets for violent non-state groups to establish themselves as active forces and persistent sources of internal instability. This interaction effect is interesting in its own right and certainly deserves further attention. Thirdly, the multiple regression outcome clearly speaks in favor of Hypothesis 16. The number of actors involved in internal warfare significantly decreases with improving state strength even if the type of warfare is controlled for alongside the regional affiliation of the war-affected state and whether the war-torn country produces (easily accessible and lootable) conflict resources during times of warfare.

As much as the above supports the concept of New Wars, the following outcomes are at odds with the associative hypotheses that can be derived from the concept: The multiple regression outcome fails to support Hypothesis 9, which expects that formally organized non-state armed groups are more likely to attack unarmed civilians if they are based in weaker states. Instead, the opposite seems true: The stronger the state in which such actors are operating, the more likely they are to engage in acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians.\(^5\) Because the effect is mainly driven by those formally organized non-state actors who fight state-based internal conflicts, I suggested that they engage in such kind of violent behavior to punish civilian collaboration with the enemy (which is more likely the stronger the state), to relieve stress or to signal strength especially in an otherwise hopeless situation where they are facing a strong opponent. Secondly, I find mild support for the claim that worsening levels of state fragility correlate with a shorter duration of state-based armed conflicts (H10) but no indication of an opposing effect for the sub-sample of non-state armed conflicts (H10a). Instead, worsening levels of state fragility also tend to associate with a shorter duration of non-state fighting though the effect is much smaller and less significant. Finally, the outcome in regard to Hypothesis 13 is mixed (non-state internal fighting does not necessarily last significantly longer if it is carried out by informally organized dyads). But the organizational level of the involved actors significantly correlates with the scale of violence applied during non-state internal fighting. The direction of the effect, however, runs counter to the expectation of Hypothesis 14: Non-state internal armed conflicts amongst formally organized actors are significantly more intense than non-state conflicts amongst informally organized actors. The effect is robust but its level of significance varies with alternative specifications of the model. The latter also applies to the resources measures, which co-vary with a number of other independent variables and for this reason sometimes fail to reach an acceptable level of significance. For instance, the results remain very mixed when it comes to the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and its effect on the duration of internal armed conflicts or conflict

\(^5\) At least if state weakness is narrowly defined.
episodes (H11). This is surprising and runs against the commonly shared view and prior empirical finding that the occurrence or production of conflict resources associates with a longer duration of state-based internal fighting.\(^6\) However, Humphreys (2005) finds the exact opposite and provides a plausible theoretical explanation that is also in line with the resource curse argument.\(^7\) Obviously, conflict resources can be theoretically linked with both a shorter as well as longer duration of fighting which might account for the mixed outcome of the study at hand. In addition, I only find mixed results when it comes to the production of easily accessible and lootable conflict resources and its effect on the nature of applied violence (H8). There is no clear indication that formally organized violent non-state actors who are operating in a context where conflict resources are produced are significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians. At least if taken on its own, the resources variable does not seem to be systematically related to this kind of violent behavior. Still, I do not entirely dismiss Hypothesis 8 because there is mild support for an interaction effect (between the production of conflict resources and the level of state weakness) on the nature of applied violence.

When it comes to this specific dependent variable, “involvement in non-state internal fighting” and especially “involvement in both types of internal fighting” significantly increases a formal actor’s chances of committing acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians. In fact, the second kind of conflict engagement is the most substantial, significant and stable explanatory factor within the multiple regression analysis. Formally organized non-state armed groups that engage in both types of internal conflict are significantly more likely to commit acts of one-sided violence against civilians as compared with those actors that just engage in the one or the other kind of internal fighting. The significance of the effect holds even if important intervening factors (the level of state weakness, the production of conflict resources, the origin of the violent group and its regional affiliation) are controlled for. Some of these alternative explanations have been mentioned in an earlier attempt to explain the similar bivariate outcome (see H5a). The results of the multiple regression analysis are helpful in order to answer the question why this sub-group of actors is especially prone to engage in such kind of violent behavior. For instance, future research might wish to explore the political context of these actors (especially whether they tend to operate in comparatively strong states which at the same time produce certain conflict resources) and how exactly the level of state weakness in interaction with the resources variable impacts upon their violent strategy. Maybe actors who engage in both kinds of internal fighting stand out in terms

---

\(^6\)For quantitative studies see e.g. Fearon (2004) or Collier, Hoefller, and Söderbom (2004). For an overview of the theoretical arguments and empirical findings see Hegre (2004).

\(^7\)Humphreys (2005) finds that natural resources associate with shorter wars which the author attributes to the fact that such wars are more likely to end with a military victory. In addition, this scholar suggests that external actors have a greater incentive to bring wars to a close when natural resource supplies are threatened. The latter argument, however, does not seem to apply well in the case of non-state internal warfare (as external military intervention is not particularly likely in non-state warfare).
of their origin. They might be especially likely to have emerged by breaking away from another armed group. Their origin as a splinter group then explains why they engage in state-based conflict with the government and in non-state conflict with their rival parent organization or other non-state competitors. The timing of these conflicts (whether they are carried out simultaneously) and their intensity might be important in order to assess their effect on the organization’s strength and resources which might then explain the group’s violent behavior (e.g. whether it carries out acts of one-sided violence to signal strength in a desperate situation or as a measure to deter defection).  

Again, the dummy capturing an actor’s kind of conflict engagement is highly significant even if the above mentioned factors are controlled for. Obviously, actors that engage in both types of internal fighting (and, to a lesser extent, those that engage in non-state internal conflict) share some characteristics (apart from those that are already included in the model) that are important in order to predict their chances of committing acts of one-sided violence against civilians. The same interpretation applies to the highly significant “type of conflict” dummies which I included within the regression models testing the remaining associative hypotheses. Although these effects are in line with the concept of New Wars, they also indicate that the models are not fully specified in the sense that some unknown characteristics of non-state internal fighting exist that are decisive in order to explain the dependent variables and that are not already taken care of by the control variables. Otherwise, the “type of conflict” dummies would stay insignificant. Decisive but omitted regional factors remain an issue, too, as indicated by the highly significant regional dummies in several of the models.

An interesting empirical study that clearly relates to this matter has recently been published by Fjelde and Nilsson (2012). The authors claim to provide “the first global study on the determinants of inter-rebel violence”. They depart from the question why rebel groups that already confront the government frequently sacrifice their scarce resources to become engaged in additional violent struggles with other non-state groups. They find that “inter-rebel conflict is more likely when the rebel group fights in an area with drug cultivation, when the group is in control of territory beyond government reach, when the group is either militarily strong or weak in relation to other rebels, and where state authority is weak.” This outcome is partly in line with the above findings. However, the dependent variable is different (the authors do not examine the kind of violence applied by these actors) and they exclude inter-rebel fighting amongst groups who just battle other non-state actors (i.e. who do not fight the government).

I found that changing the type of a conflict episode or war from “state-based” to “non-state” results in a significant decrease in the duration of fighting. Likewise, changing the type of an internal conflict from “state-based” to “non-state” results in a significant decrease in the intensity of fighting. Finally, changing the type of an internal war from “state-based” to “non-state” results in a significant increase in the number of actors involved in fighting.

These are 1.) the models predicting the odds of an actor to engage in non-state conflict, 2.) the models predicting the odds of an episode, a conflict or a war to be non-state in nature, 3.) the models predicting the quality of violence applied by formally organized violent non-state groups, 4.) the models predicting the intensity of (all kinds of) internal armed conflicts and the intensity of non-state armed conflicts, and 5.) the models predicting the duration of (all kinds of) conflict episodes and the duration of non-state conflict episodes.
Overall, this study yields strong or at least weak support in favor of twelve hypotheses. Strong rejection (highly significant but opposing effects) or non-significant outcomes are obtained for eight hypotheses while the outcome remains mixed in regard to four hypotheses. Although the causal mechanisms underlying these hypotheses cannot be tested directly, the empirical outcome of this study nevertheless provides some ideas on the plausibility of a number of causal mechanisms explaining the scale and nature of violence applied in (non-state) internal fighting. In addition, the results of the above study are giving some hints on how the single dimensions of internal fighting might possibly line up in a causal chain, i.e. whether effects run both ways (e.g. between the duration and the intensity of fighting or between the number of involved actors and the duration) and whether effects are of a direct and/or more indirect nature. For instance, the (formal vs. informal) nature of actors indirectly impacts upon the duration of fighting through its effect on the intensity: Conflicts amongst formally organized dyads are more intense which correlates with a longer duration. The level of state weakness also indirectly impacts upon the duration of warfare through its effect on the number of involved actors: The weaker the state, the more actors are involved in internal warfare which correlates with a longer duration of fighting. In some cases, I modeled non-linear relationships which significantly improved the predictive power of the corresponding models. For instance, I found that the longer the fighting, the larger the total number of battle-related deaths per conflict though the marginal change in the overall scale of violence diminishes with an increasing duration of fighting. Similarly, the larger the number of actors involved in warfare the longer the duration (or vice versa) though the marginal effect on the duration again diminishes with larger numbers of actors. Because non-linear relationships need to be build-in, the corresponding models changed considerably during the refinement process. This is one reason why the results of the first and simple baseline models at times differs greatly from the outcome of the final or the refined models (which do not only account for non-linearity but sometimes also include interaction effects and additional control variables). To enable the reader to follow effects through the entire refinement process (from the simple baseline models to the selected final regression models), to compare the bivariate results with the outcome of the multiple regression models, and to better judge on the robustness of effects (e.g. across levels of analysis) a number of different tables and overviews of results are given in the appendix. Even the results of the final regression models have been put into perspective by considering the outcome of all refined models (the final models and their variations).

---

11 I find mostly strong and highly significant effects supporting H1a, H2, H4, H4a, H7, H7a, H12, H15 and H16, weaker but still mostly significant effects in support of H4b, H5a and H10, strong and highly significant effects contradicting H5, H6, H9, H10a, H14, no support (mostly non-significant outcomes) for H3, H3a and H7b and mixed results for H1, H8, H11 and H13.

12 An overview of the descriptive statistics on the incidence and significance of (non-state) internal fighting, a schematic overview of the regression results of the simple baseline models and of all refined models, and the actual regression output in numbers of the final models.
Conclusion

No matter if they support or disprove the concept of New Wars: The above identified differences between non-conventional (non-state) and conventional (state-based) internal fighting are real, oftentimes substantial and in a statistical sense significant. It is precisely because they differ from state-based internal fighting that non-state internal wars and conflicts must be taken into account by quantitative research exploring the causes, the context, the nature and the consequences of bilateral internal fighting. So far, most empirical analyses per definition exclude this sub-type of internal fighting. This leads to the concern that as long as non-conventional (non-state) internal armed conflicts are not taken into account by these studies, their results and our understanding of contemporary internal fighting might be biased. Large-N replication analysis of existing quantitative studies are needed to see whether the identified effects and trends in internal fighting are changing or are robust against the inclusion of non-state armed conflicts within the respective data sets. For instance, Harbom et al. (2008) report rising numbers of warring parties in internal warfare since the 1970s. However, the authors only count the number of dyads in state-based internal fighting. To what extent the outcome of this study changes if non-state armed conflicts are included remains to be answered. According to Eck and Hultman (2007), non-state violent actors are more violent than state actors. Again, the authors only consider acts of one-sided violence against civilians committed during state-based internal armed conflicts within the post-Cold War era. These results might change as well if those violent actors that engaged in non-state internal fighting are included in the analysis. Likewise, it would be interesting to know whether the results obtained by Buhaug et al. (2009) equally apply to non-state internal fighting. The authors explain the duration of state-based internal conflict and for this purpose draw on precisely dated duration data and geographically disaggregated information on the exact location of fighting. They find that conflicts located at considerable distance from the main government stronghold, along remote international borders and in regions with valuable minerals (a description that also applies to many if not most of the non-state conflicts) last substantially longer.

In order to prevent and solve non-state conflicts it is crucial to identify and understand their incidence, their specific context and their nature. So far, little research has been conducted on what works and what does not work as a solution to New Warfare. Mary Kaldor’s idea of establishing a “new form of cosmopolitan politics” within New Wars countries supplemented by “cosmopolitan law enforcement” at the international level
remains more of a vision than a concrete plan for action. The recommendations of others are derived from a handful of selected cases of non-state warfare (Heupel 2005; Heupel and Zangl 2010). The few existing large-N studies dealing with non-state armed conflicts focus on their causes instead of their termination and often remain limited to non-state fighting in post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa. Some lessons learned from ending state-based greed conflicts might be transferable to non-state conflicts while other proven instruments might be of little help or even counter-productive if applied to non-state fighting. Even Weinstein (2007, pp. 343, 350), who pessimistically notes that the capacity of the international community to influence the actions of violent non-state groups is “limited” and “has seen innovation only at the margins”, agrees with Mary Kaldor that addressing the main context factors of non-state fighting (starving rebel organizations off the resources they use to finance warfare and measures to enhance state-building) are the only options to better protect civilians from non-state warfare.

This recommendation fits well with the commonly shared view that non-state internal conflict is mostly greed-based and almost necessarily associates with state failure (or vice versa). It also matches well with the rather deterministic assertion of Robert Bates mentioned at the very beginning of this book that violent non-state groups fighting over diamonds are simply the logical consequence of state failure. Though the results of the above study are not at odds with this claim, they paint a more nuanced picture which puts emphasis on the geological form of conflict resources (whether they are easily accessible and lootable) and on their production status, which indicates that the level of analysis matters and that low-intensity armed conflicts should be taken into account.

Kaldor (2000) suggests focusing on the restoration of legitimate authority, the strengthening of secular, non-nationalistic, non-religious and moderate actors (e.g. through their inclusion in peacemaking efforts), and on the creation of legitimate sources of employment (to increase the opportunity costs for joining rebel movements). Instead of seeing the New Wars actors as enemies or legitimate participants in negotiations (which gives them political status) she finds it “quite a good idea to see them as outlaws, disturbers of the peace, and to use the methods of policing and intelligence” rather than the methods of old warfare (Kaldor 2005: 10). This approach needs to be supplemented by “cosmopolitan law enforcement”, i.e. humanitarian intervention aimed at stabilization, prevention, and the protection of civilians rather than victory (Kaldor 2005, p. 9; Kaldor 2007, pp. 60 sqq.).

A few years ago, a seven-volume book series was published which provides more than 150 peer-reviewed case studies and analyses on post-conflict natural resource management successes, failures and ongoing efforts in more than 55 conflict-affected countries. One of the books addresses the key challenges faced by post-conflict countries in transforming high-value natural resources in ways that contribute to economic recovery, reconciliation, jobs, and sustainable livelihoods (without creating new grievances) (Lujala and Rustad 2012).

For instance, efforts of naming and shaming will not help in cases where rebel groups do not care much about their human rights reputation or where leaders do not have the capacity to reverse the course of behavior of their members (Weinstein 2007, pp. 344 sq.). Around sanctions, money-making schemes are likely to grow up that might feed into New Wars Economies (e.g. the selective granting of lucrative licenses for exports/imports) (Berdal 2003, pp. 487 sq.). According to Weinstein (2007, pp. 346 sq.) targeted sanctions are only effective if on-the-ground monitoring is available and if major states and transnational corporations are cooperative. If such measures cut off groups from their regular flow of resources, predation might even increase, armed groups might turn even more violent, and trade might simply shift to another, not yet targeted, rebel group.
I emphasized the importance of a comparative perspective in order to avoid selection bias while also pointing out that the categorization of cases that are compared with each other is of importance. I agree with Heupel and Zangl (2010) that “the notion of old and new wars is justified, because […] the individual criteria of the transformation of warfare tend to travel together rather than separately from each other”. The single dimensions of non-state fighting, however, relate to each other in multiple and diverse ways. Interaction effects, non-linear and indirect linkages need to be taken into account while it is important not to lose sight of the problems that might arise from biased and still poor data.
Part VII.

Appendices
A. The New vs. the Consolidated List of Wars


A. The New vs. the Consolidated List of Wars

2008), Chad (1997-2009), Croatia (1991-1995), India (1990-2009), India (1992-2009), Liberia (2000-2003) and Sri Lanka (1983-2001). In the following cases where the numbers and/or names of actors involved in warfare also differ between the two versions of this data set, I rely on the information given in the earlier “New List of Wars” (v.1.3) because in these cases warfare had already started before 1990: Angola (1975-1995), Myanmar (1948-2009), South Africa (1984-1994) and Sudan (1983-2009). In the cases of Nepal (1996-2006) and Sri Lanka (2005-2009) the names of actors mentioned in the two versions of the data set also differs. This, however, did not result in a change in the overall number of involved actors because the “Consolidated List of Wars” v.1.1 added as many new actors as it deleted.


Another improvement to this study concerns an additional variables that has not been given in earlier versions of the data set: The (minimum and maximum) total number of (civilian and military) battle-related deaths. With the “Consolidated List of Wars” (v.1.1) this variable is now available for at least most of the post-Cold War cases.
**B. List of Non-State Wars, 1946–2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>EOKA vs. Türk Mukavement Tskilati &amp; Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>Hutu Militias vs. Tutsi Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1978-1993</td>
<td>FAN, FAT, FAP, Islamic Legion, MPS, Mosanat, CSNPD, FARF, MDD, FNTR, CNR, FNT, MDJT &amp; Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1990-1996</td>
<td>NPFL, INPFL vs. ULIMO vs. Liberia &amp; Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Turkana Community vs. Borana Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>RUF, AFRC, Kamajors vs. Sierra Leone Army &amp; Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1992-2009</td>
<td>USC, UCS factions, SDM, SDA, SNA, SSNM, SNF, RRA, SRRC, several warlord militias &amp; Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo/Zaire</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>Banyamulenge Militias, Tutsi FPR Guerrilla, Interahamwe Militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>MQM, PPP, PML, SSP, TJP, MQM Haqiqi vs. Militias, Pakistani paratroops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2001-2009</td>
<td>TJP, SMP vs. SSP, LeJ vs. Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>Laskar Jihad, Mujahedeen KOMPAK vs. FKM, Republic of South Maluku group vs. Armed Forces of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Sangh Parivar (family of Hindu nationalist organizations) vs. Muslim groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Tajikistan vs. UTO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Hypotheses

Bivariate Comparative Analysis:

H1 dominance of non-conventional (non-state) internal fighting
H1a increasing significance of non-conventional (non-state) internal fighting
H2 quantity of actors
H3 nature of actors (external military intervention)
H3a nature of actors (origin/fractionalization)
H4 conflict resources
H4a conflict resources that are easy to access and to loot
H4b conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot
H5 scale of violence
H5a nature of violence (acts of one-sided violence against civilians)
H6 duration of fighting
H7 state fragility
H7a state fragility (lack of state effectiveness and authority)
H7b state fragility (lack of state functionality and legitimacy)

Multiple Regression Analysis:

H8 conflict resources $\rightarrow+ \text{ one-sided acts of violence against civilians}$
H9 state fragility $\rightarrow+ \text{ one-sided acts of violence against civilians}$
H10 state fragility $\rightarrow+ \text{ duration of non-conventional (non-state) fighting}$
H10a state fragility $\rightarrow- \text{ duration of conventional (state-based) fighting}$
H11 conflict resources $\rightarrow+ \text{ duration of fighting}$
H12 quantity of actors $\rightarrow+ \text{ duration of fighting}$
H13 informally organized actors $\rightarrow+ \text{ duration of non-state fighting}$
H14 informally organized actors $\rightarrow+ \text{ intensity of non-state fighting}$
H15 conflict resources $\rightarrow+ \text{ informally organized actors in non-state fighting}$
H16 state fragility $\rightarrow+ \text{ number of actors involved in warfare}$

Table C.1.: Overview of Hypotheses. Source: own depiction.
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

D.1. Codebook Master-File


Time-Series Data/Indicators

- Worldwide no. of state-based/non-state conflicts or episodes, per year
  Coding:
  - sum_sb_confl/sum_ns_confl
  - sum_epi_sb/sum_epi_ns

- No. of state-based/non-state conflicts, per country and year (1989–2009 or 2011)
  Coding:
  - ns_num_dyads_1989 (till 2011)
  - sb_num_dyads_1989 (till 2011)

- No. of state-based/non-state conflicts or episodes, per year and by region
  Coding:
  - sum_sb_confl_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - sum_ns_confl_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - sum_sb_confl_UCDP_1 (till 5)
  - sum_ns_confl_UCDP_1 (till 5)
  - sum_epi_sb_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - sum_epi_ns_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - sum_epi_sb_UCDP_1 (till 5)
  - sum_epi_ns_UCDP_1 (till 5)

- Regional shares in state-based/non-state conflicts or episodes, per year
  Coding:
  - share_sb_confl_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - share_ns_confl_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - share_sb_confl_UCDP_1 (till 5)
  - share_ns_confl_UCDP_1 (till 5)
  - share_epi_sb_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - share_epi_ns_PRIO_1 (till 6)
  - share_epi_sb_UCDP_1 (till 5)
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

- share_epi.ns.UCDP 1 (till 5)

- Worldwide no. of countries affected by state-based/non-state conflicts or episodes, per year
  Coding:
  - sum_sb_countr
  - sum_ns_countr
  - sum_countr_sb
  - sum_countr_ns

- No. of countries affected by state-based/non-state conflicts or episodes, per year and by region
  Coding:
  - sum_sb_countr_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - sum_ns_countr_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - sum_sb_countr_UCDP 1 (till 5)
  - sum_ns_countr_UCDP 1 (till 5)
  - sum_countr_sb_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - sum_countr_ns_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - sum_countr_sb_UCDP 1 (till 5)
  - sum_countr_ns_UCDP 1 (till 5)

- Regional shares in countries affected by non-state/state-based conflicts or episodes, per year
  Coding:
  - share_sb_countr_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - share_ns_countr_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - share_sb_countr_UCDP 1 (till 5)
  - share_ns_countr_UCDP 1 (till 5)
  - share_countr_sb_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - share_countr_ns_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - share_countr_sb_UCDP 1 (till 5)
  - share_countr_ns_UCDP 1 (till 5)

- Worldwide no. of countries affected by (all kinds of) conflicts or episodes, per year
  Coding:
  - sum_countr_confl

- No. of countries affected by (all kinds of) conflicts or episodes, per year and by region
  Coding:
  - sum_countr_confl_PRIO 1 (till 6)
  - sum_countr_confl_UCDP 1 (till 5)

Country-Level Indicators

- Name of the country affected by fighting
  Coding:
  - country
• Name(s) of additional countries where fighting spread to
  Coding:
  • country2

• PRIO regional coding (1=Sub-Saharan Africa, 2=Americas, 3=Central and South Asia, 4=East
  and Southeast Asia and Oceania, 5=Europe, 6=Middle East and North Africa)
  Coding:
  • region_PRIO

• UCDP regional coding (1=Europe, 2=Middle East, 3=Asia, 4=Africa, 5=Americas)
  Coding:
  • region_UCDP

• Dummies indicating whether a country has seen (any kind of) war or conflict within the entire
  study period
  Coding:
  • Internal_Warfare_46_09
  • Internal_Armed_Conflict_89_11

• No. of state-based/non-state wars within the entire study period, by country
  Coding:
  • No_NS
  • No_SB

• No. of state-based/non-state conflicts between 1989-2009 (or –2011), by country
  Coding:
  • ns_sum_dyads_2009 (or 2011)
  • sb_sum_dyads_2009 (or 2011)

**War-Level, Conflict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators**

• Unique identifiers (name and obs. no., by war or dyad ID, by conflict and by episode)
  Coding:
  • War_Name, No_Obs
  • dyad_id, conflict_id
  • dyad_id

• Running no. of episodes, by conflict
  Coding:
  • ep_count

• Location of origin of a war, conflict or episode
  Coding:
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

- country

- Name(s) of additional countries where the conflict spread to
  Coding:
  - country2

- Region as defined by UCDP and by PRIO where the war, conflict or episode happened
  Coding:
  - region_PRIO, region_UCDP

- Dummies indicating whether fighting is state-based/non-state in nature
  Coding:
  - NS_war/SB_war
  - nonstate
  - nonstate/statebased

- Dummy indicating whether a state-based conflict is categorized as an internationalized internal conflict by UCDP/PRIO
  Coding:
  - int_statebased

D.1.2. Number & Nature of Violent Actors

War-Level, Conflict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators

- Dummy indicating an external military intervention
  Coding:
  - Military_Intervention

- No. of parties, by war
  Coding:
  - No_Parties

- Dummy indicating whether a clear no. of parties is identified, by war
  Coding:
  - No_Parties_Clear

- Dummy indicating whether the government, the national army or government leftovers is/are mentioned as one party to the conflict, by war
  Coding:
  - Gov_Party
• Min. no. of involved national actors, by war
Coding:
  • Min_No_Nat_Fractions

• Names of the violent actors involved in fighting, by conflict or episode
Coding:
  • side_a, side_b

• Organizational level of the involved dyad, by conflict or episode
Coding:
  • org

**Actor-Level Indicators**

• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor was created by breaking away from another violent non-state actor, by a temporary split in the original movement and whether he entered into an alliance with another violent non-state actor
Coding:
  • Splinter
  • Split_temp
  • Alliance

• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor has been involved in one or several non-state/state-based conflicts
Coding:
  • NonStateConf
  • StateBasedConf

• Actor name and unique actor ID
Coding:
  • ActorName
  • ActorID

• Organizational level, by violent actor
Coding:
  • Org

• Name(s) of the country or countries and region(s) as defined by UCDP and by PRIO (see above) where a violent non-state actor has been active
Coding:
  • countries
  • region_PRIO
  • region_UCDP
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

D.1.3. Scale and Nature of Applied Violence

Time-Series Data/Indicators

- Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths from state-based/non-state conflicts (1989–2011), per year

Coding:
  - sb\_fat\_best\_1989 (till 2011)
  - sb\_fat\_low\_1989 (till 2011)
  - sb\_fat\_high\_1989 (till 2011)
  - ns\_fat\_best\_1989 (till 2011)
  - ns\_fat\_low\_1989 (till 2011)
  - ns\_fat\_high\_1989 (till 2011)

Country-Level Indicators

- Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths from state-based/non-state conflicts between 1989–2009 (or –2011), by country

Coding:
  - sb\_sum\_fat\_best\_2009 (or 2011)
  - sb\_sum\_fat\_low\_2009 (or 2011)
  - sb\_sum\_fat\_high\_2009 (or 2011)
  - ns\_sum\_fat\_best\_2009 (or 2011)
  - ns\_sum\_fat\_low\_2009 (or 2011)
  - ns\_sum\_fat\_high\_2009 (or 2011)

War-Level and Conflict-Level Indicators

- Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths per conflict (1989–2011)

Coding:
  - fat\_best, fat\_low, fat\_high

-----------------------------------------------

- Min. and max. estimates of the total no. of (civilian and military) battle-related deaths per war (1990–2009)

Coding:
  - Total\_Deaths\_Min, Total\_Deaths\_Max

Actor-Level Indicators

- Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor committed one or several acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians

Coding:
  - One\_Sided\_Viol


Country-level Indicators

- Start and the end year of the first and the last war or conflict (of any kind) within the entire study period, by country

Coding:
• Start.Year.first_Internal.War
• End_year.last_internal_war
• year_first
• year_last

• No of country-years affected by warfare or conflict (of any kind), by country
Coding:
• Years_Warfare
• af_years

• No. of country-years affected by at least one non-state/state-based war or conflict, by country
Coding:
• Years_NS/Years_SB
• ns_af_years/sb_af_years

• Cumulative no. of country-years affected by non-state/state-based warfare or conflict between 1945–2009/1989–2009 (or –2011), by country
Coding:
• Years_NS/additiv
• Years_SB/additiv
• sb_sum_af_years_2009 (or 2011)
• ns_sum_af_years_2009 (or 2011)

• Dummy indicating whether a country has seen state-based and non-state warfare simultaneously
Coding:
• Overlap_Dummy

• No. of country-years with simultaneous warfare (of any kind)
Coding:
• Overlap.All

• No. of country-years with simultaneous non-state and state-based warfare
Coding:
• Overlap_NS_SB

• No. of country-years with multiple state-based wars or conflicts ongoing
Coding:
• Overlap_multiple_SB
• mult_sb_af_years

• No. of country-years with multiple non-state conflicts ongoing
Coding:
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

- `mult_ns_af_years`

- No. of country-years with at least one non-state war and multiple state-based wars ongoing
  Coding:
  - `Overlap_NS_multiple_SB`

- No. of country-years with multiple state-based and multiple non-state conflict ongoing
  Coding:
  - `mult_mix_af_years`

War-Level, Conflict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators

- Start and end year of a war, conflict or episode
  Coding:
  - `year_first`
  - `year_last`

- Duration in years, by war
  Coding:
  - `Duration_Years`

- Precise start and end dates, by episode
  Coding:
  - `ep_start_date`
  - `ep_end_date`

- Duration in days, months and years, by episode
  Coding:
  - `duration_days`
  - `duration_months`
  - `duration_years`

- Level of precision of dates, by episode
  Coding:
  - `ep_start_prec`
  - `ep_end_prec`

D.1.5. Occurrence and Production of Conflict Resources

Country-Level Indicators

- Dummies indicating the occurrence of any kind of conflict resources, of diamonds, of primary diamonds, of secondary diamonds, of gemstones other than diamonds, of oil and/or gas, of onshore oil and/or gas or of offshore oil and/or gas in a country
  Coding:
• Conflict_resources
• DIA, PDIA, SDIA
• Gems Deposits
• OilGas, OilGas_onshore, OilGas_offshore

• Dummies indicating the production of conflict resources (see above) plus drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) in a country
Coding:
• DIAProd, PDIAProd, SDIAProd
• GemsProd
• DrugsProd
• OilGas_onshoreprod, OilGas_offshoreprod

• Year of discovery of the first deposits of conflict resources (see above), by country
Coding:
• SDIADisc_year, PDIADisc_year
• GemsDisc_year
• OilGas_onshoreDisc_year, OilGas_offshoreDisc_year

• First year of production of conflict resources (see above, including drugs), by country
Coding:
• SDIAProd_year, PDIAProd_year
• GemsProd_year
• DrugsProd_Start_year
• OilGas_onshoreProd_year, OilGas_offshoreProd_year

• Last year of large scale drug production (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis), by country
Coding:
• DrugsProd_End_year

• Dummies indicating whether conflict resources (see above) had been known to occur within a country prior to the outbreak of (or during) the first war or conflict (of any kind)
Coding:
• DIADisc_wartimes, PDIADisc_wartimes, SDIADisc_wartimes
• GemsDisc_wartimes
• OilGasDisc_wartimes, OilGas_onshoreDisc_wartimes, OilGas_offshoreDisc_wartimes
• DIADisc_conflicts, PDIADisc_conflicts, SDIADisc_conflicts
• GemsDisc_conflicts
• OilGasDisc_conflicts, OilGas_onshoreDisc_conflicts, OilGas_offshoreDisc_conflicts

• Dummies indicating whether conflict resources (see above, including drugs) had been produced within a country prior to the outbreak of (or during) the first war or conflict (of any kind)
Coding:
• DIAProd_wartimes, PDIAProd_wartimes, SDIAProd_wartimes
• GemsProd_wartimes
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

- Gems and DIAProd wartimes, Gems or DIAProd wartimes
- OilGasProd wartimes, OilGas_onshoreProd wartimes, OilGas_offshoreProd wartimes
- DrugsProd wartimes
- DIAProd confltimes, PDIAProd confltimes, SDIAProd confltimes
- GemsProd confltimes
- Gems and DIAProd confltimes, Gems or DIAProd confltimes
- OilGasProd confltimes, OilGas_onshoreProd confltimes, OilGas_offshoreProd confltimes
- DrugsProd confltimes

War-Level, Conflict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators

- Year of discovery of the first deposits of conflict resources (see above) within the country where the war, conflict or episode took place
  Coding:
  - SDIADisc_year, PDIADisc_year
  - GemsDisc_year
  - OilGas_onshoreDisc_year, OilGas_offshoreDisc_year

- First year of production of conflict resources (see above, including drugs) within the country where the war, conflict or episode took place
  Coding:
  - SDIAProd_year, PDIAProd_year
  - GemsProd_year
  - DrugsProd_Start_year
  - OilGas_onshoreProd_year, OilGas_offshoreProd_year

- Last year of large scale drug production (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) within the country where the war, conflict or episode took place
  Coding:
  - DrugsProd_End_year

- Dummies indicating whether a war, conflict or episode happened at times when conflict resources (see above) had been known to occur within a country
  Coding:
  - DIADisc wartimes, PDIADisc wartimes, SDIADisc wartimes
  - GemsDisc wartimes
  - OilGasDisc wartimes, OilGas_onshoreDisc wartimes, OilGas_offshoreDisc wartimes
  - DIAProd confltimes, PDIAProd confltimes, SDIAProd confltimes
  - GemsDisc confltimes
  - OilGasDisc confltimes, OilGas_onshoreDisc confltimes, OilGas_offshoreDisc confltimes

- Dummies indicating whether a war, conflict or episode happened at times when conflict resources (see above, including drugs) had been produced within a country
  Coding:
  - DIAProd wartimes, PDIAProd wartimes, SDIAProd wartimes
  - GemsProd wartimes
  - Gems and DIAProd wartimes, Gems or DIAProd wartimes
  - OilGasProd wartimes, OilGas_onshoreProd wartimes, OilGas_offshoreProd wartimes
• DrugsProd_wartimes
• DIAProd_conftimes, PDIAProd_conftimes, SDIAProd_conftimes
• GemsProd_conftimes
• Gems_and_DIAProd_conftimes, Gems_or_DIAProd_conftimes
• OilGasProd_conftimes, OilGas_onshoreProd_conftimes, OilGas_offshoreProd_conftimes
• DrugsProd_conftimes

**Actor-level Indicators**

• Dummies indicating whether a violent actor was operating in a country/in countries where conflict resources (see above) are known to occur

**Coding**:

• DIA, PDIA, SDIA
• Gems deposits
• OilGas, OilGas_onshore, OilGas_offshore

• Dummies indicating whether a violent actor was operating in a country/in countries where conflict resources (see above, including drugs) are produced

**Coding**:

• DIAProd, PDIAProd, SDIAProd
• Gems_prod
• DrugsProd
• OilGas_onshoreprod, OilGas_offshoreprod

**D.1.6. Political Context: Level of State Weakness/Fragility**

**Country-Level Indicators**

• Extent to which a functioning government exists (2005–2012 average of the FH Functioning of Government Index), by country

**Coding**:

• fh_fog

• Extent to which an effective government exists (1996–2011 average of the WGI Government Effectiveness Indicator), by country

**Coding**:

• WGI_Gov_Eff_1996_2011

• Level of corruption (1996–2011 average of the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator and the 2012 score of the Corruption Perception Index), by country

**Coding**:

• WGI_Control_Corr_1996_2011
• cpi_2012

• Degree of state fragility: broadly defined (overall score of the State Fragility Index, SFI), independently defined from armed conflict (overall SFI score minus the SFI security effectiveness score) and narrowly defined (SFI security legitimacy score plus the SFI political effectiveness and legitimacy scores) (1995–2011 averages of the SFI measures), by country
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

Coding:
- sfi
- sfi_sub_index_1
- sfi_sub_index_2

- Degree of government effectiveness and government legitimacy (1995–2011 averages of the SFI measures), by country
  Coding:
  - sfi_effectiveness
  - sfi_legitimacy

- Degree of polity fragmentation (2000–2012 average of the Polity IV Fragmentation Indicator), by country
  Coding:
  - fragment

- Strength of civil society (2006–2012 average of the BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator and the no. of civil society organizations in 2008 as measured by Grimes(2008)), by country
  Coding:
  - BTI_civil_soc_2006_2012
  - grimes_cso

- Level of state weakness (2003–2012 average of the BTI Stateness Index), by country
  Coding:
  - BTI_Stateness_2003_2012

- Degree of state failure (2006–2012 average of the BTI Failed State Index), by country
  Coding:
  - BTI_failed_state_2006_2012

War-Level, Conflict-Level and Episode-Level Indicators

- Level of state weakness/fragility (as measured above) of the country where the war, conflict or episode is happening
  Coding:
  - fh_fog
  - cpi_2012
  - sfi, sfi_sub_index_1, sfi_sub_index_2, sfi_effectiveness, sfi_legitimacy
  - fragment
  - grimes_cso

- Level of state fragility, government effectiveness or legitimacy and corruption (as measured above) within a country prior to the outbreak of the conflict or episode (at t-1 or -2, depending on the
availability of data)

Coding:
- \( \text{sfi}_{t-1}, \text{sfi}_{\text{sub index}1}_{t-1}, \text{sfi}_{\text{sub index}2}_{t-1}, \text{sfi}_{\text{effectiveness}}_{t-1}, \text{sfi}_{\text{legitimacy}}_{t-1} \)
- \( \text{wgi}_{\text{gov eff}}_{t-1}, \text{wgi}_{\text{contr corr}}_{t-1} \)

**Actor-Level Indicators**

- Level of state weakness/fragility (as measured above) of the country/countries where a violent actor is operating

Coding:
- \( \text{fh fog} \)
- \( \text{WGI Gov Eff 1996-2011}, \text{WGI Control_Corr 1996-2011} \)
- \( \text{cpi 2012} \)
- \( \text{sfi, sfi}_{\text{sub index}1}, \text{sfi}_{\text{sub index}2}, \text{sfi}_{\text{effectiveness}}, \text{sfi}_{\text{legitimacy}} \)
- \( \text{fragment} \)
- \( \text{BTI civil soc 2006-2012}, \text{BTI Stateness 2003-2012}, \text{BTI failed state 2006-2012} \)
- \( \text{grimes cso} \)
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

D.2. Variables and Data Sources


- Dummies indicating whether fighting is state-based/non-state in nature (by war, conflict, episode) and whether a state-based conflict is categorized as an internationalized internal conflict by UCDP/PRIO
- Dummies indicating whether a country has seen any kind of a temporal overlap in fighting (by country)
- No. of state-based/non-state wars or conflicts (by country)
- No. of conflict episodes (by conflict)
- Country name(s), region(s) and unique identifiers (e.g. obs. no., conflict or dyad IDs) (by country, war, conflict, episode)

Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
- New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011 (dyad version)
- UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, v.2010-1, 1946-2009
- Regional coding: Lacina et al. (2005: Appendix B) and World Map at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php (visited on 2014-06-19)

Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
- New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009
- UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011
- Regional coding: Lacina et al. (2005: Appendix B) and World Map at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php (visited on 2014-06-19)

D.2.2. Number & Nature of Violent Actors

- Dummy indicating an external military intervention (by war)
- No. of parties (by war)
- Dummy indicating whether a clear no. of parties is identified (by war)
- Dummy indicating whether the government, the national army or government leftovers is/are mentioned as one party to the conflict (by war)
- Min. no. of involved national groups of actors identified by name (by war)
- Names of violent actors on both sides (by war)

Source(s):
- New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009

Name of violent actors (by conflict, episode)
Organizational level of involved actors (by conflict, episode)

Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011
- UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, v.2010-1, 1946-2009

Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
- UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011

Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state group was created by breaking away from another violent non-state group
Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor was created by a temporary split in the original movement
• Dummy indicating whether a violent non-state actor entered into an alliance with another violent non-state actor
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor has been involved in one or several non-state/state-based conflicts
• Actor Name, Actor ID
• Organizational level of a violent non-state actor
• Name(s) of the country/countries and region(s) where the violent actor has been active in

Source(s):
• UCDP Actor Dataset, v.2.1-2012

D.2.3. Level of Violence in Internal Wars (1990-2009) and Conflicts (1989-2011)

• Best, low and high estimates of the total no. of (military and civilian) battle-related deaths (by conflict, country)

Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
• UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011

Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
• UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011

• Min. and max. estimates of the total no. of (civilian and military) battle-related deaths (by war, country)

Source(s):
• Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009

D.2.4. Nature of Applied Violence by Actors

• Dummy indicating whether a violent actor committed one or several acts of one-sided violence against unarmed civilians

Source(s):
• UCDP Actor Dataset, v.2.1-2012

D.2.5. Duration of Internal Wars (1946-2009), Conflicts (1989-2011) and Conflict Episodes (1989-2009)

• No. of country-years affected by warfare of any kind (by country)
• No. of country-years affected by non-state/state-based warfare (by country)
• Cumulative no. of country-years affected by non-state/state-based warfare (by country)
• No. of country-years with multiple wars ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with one non-state and one state-based war ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with multiple state-based wars ongoing (by country)
• No. of country-years with at least one non-state and multiple state-based wars ongoing (by country)
• Start and end year (by war)
• Duration in years (by war)

Source(s):
• New List of Wars v.1.3, 1946-2006 / Consolidated List of Wars v. 1.1., 1990-2009

• Start and end year (by conflict)
• Years affected by conflict, comma separated list (by conflict)
• Duration in years (by conflict)
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

- No. of country-years affected by conflict (by country)
- No. of country-years affected by non-state/state-based conflict (by country)
- First year of conflict (by country)
- Last year of conflict (by country)
- No. of country-years with multiple non-state/conflicts ongoing (by country)
- No. of country-years with multiple state-based conflicts ongoing (by country)
- No. of country-years with non-state and state-based conflicts ongoing (by country)

Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
- UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, v.5-2012b, 1989-2011

Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
- UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011

- Precise start date (by episode)
- Precise end date (by episode)
- Duration in days, months and years (by episode)
- Level of precision of dates (by episode)

Source(s) State-Based Fighting:
- UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009

Source(s) Non-State Fighting:
- UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, v. 2.4-2012, 1989-2011

D.2.6. Occurrence and Production of Conflict Resources

- Dummies indicating the occurrence/production of diamonds (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) (by country)
- Year of discovery of the first lootable/non-lootable diamond deposit (by country)
- First year of lootable/non-lootable diamond production (by country)
- Dummies indicating whether diamond deposits (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) had been known to occur/produced prior to/during the first war (by country)
- Dummies indicating whether diamond deposits (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) had been known to occur/produced prior to/during times of fighting (by war, conflict, episode)
- Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where diamonds (any kind of/lootable/non-lootable) occur/are produced (by violent actor)

Source(s):
- PRIIO Diamond Dataset, 1946-2005

- Dummies indicating the occurrence/production of gemstones other than diamonds (by country)
- Year of discovery of the first gemstone deposit (by country)
- First year of gemstone production (by country)
- Dummies indicating whether gemstones (or gemstones and/or diamonds) had been known to occur/produced prior to/during the first war (by country)
- Dummies indicating whether gemstones had been known to occur/produced prior to/during times of fighting (by war, conflict, episode)
- Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where gemstones occur/are produced (by violent actor)

Source(s):
- Gemstone Site Dataset, 1946-2004

- Dummy indicating the cultivation of drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) (by country)
• First year of large scale drug production (coca, opium and/or cannabis) (by country)
• Final year of large scale drug production (coca, opium and/or cannabis) (by country)
• Dummy indicating large scale production of drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) prior to/during the first war or conflict (by country)
• Dummy indicating large scale production of drugs (coca bush, opium poppy and/or cannabis) prior to/during times of fighting (by war, conflict, episode)
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where drugs (coca, opium and/or cannabis) are produced (by violent actor)

**Source(s):**
- Drug Cultivation Dataset, 1946-2002

• Dummies indicating the occurrence/production of oil or gas (any kind of/onshore/offshore) (by country)
• Year of discovery of the first onshore/offshore oil or gas deposit (by country)
• First year of onshore/offshore oil or gas production (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether oil or gas deposits (any kind of/onshore/offshore) had been known to occur/were produced prior to/during the first war (by country)
• Dummies indicating whether oil or gas deposits (any kind of/onshore/offshore) had been known to occur/were produced prior to/during times of fighting (by war, conflict, episode)
• Dummies indicating whether a violent non-state actor was operating in a country where oil or gas deposits (any kind of/onshore/offshore) occur/are produced (by violent actor)

**Source(s):**
- Petroleum Dataset, v.1.2. 1946 to 2003

**D.2.7. Political Context/State Fragility**

• The level of state weakness (by country)
• The level of state weakness independently defined from armed conflict (by country)
• The level of state effectiveness (by country)
• The level of state legitimacy (by country)

**Source(s):**
- State Fragility Index (SFI) (overall score), Center for Global Policy, George Mason University
- SFI sub-Index I (SFI overall score minus SFI security effectiveness score)
- SFI effectiveness score minus SFI security effectiveness score
- SFI legitimacy score; SFI sub-Index II (SFI security legitimacy score plus SFI political effectiveness and legitimacy scores)

• The degree of state failure (by country)

**Source(s):**
- Stateness Index and Failed State Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Bertelsmann Foundation/Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich

• The functioning of government (by country)

**Source(s):**
- Functioning of Government Index, Freedom House (FH)

• The effectiveness of government (by country)

**Source(s):**

401
D. Codebook, Data Sources and Measures

- Government Effectiveness Indicator, World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank

- The level of corruption (by country)
  Source(s):
  - Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Transparency International (TI); Control of Corruption Indicator,
  - World Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank

- The degree of polity fragmentation (by country)
  Source(s):
  - Fragmentation Indicator, Polity IV Project Data Series, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University

- The strength of society/no. of civil society organizations (by country)
  Source(s):
  - Traditions of Civil Society Indicator, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Bertelsmann Foundation/Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich; Grimes (2008), available through the Quality of Government Project (QoG), Gothenburg University

- The level of state fragility (see above) within the country where fighting took place (by war, conflict, episode)
  Source(s):
  - All above indicators

- The level of state weakness, government effectiveness and corruption within the country where fighting took place prior to the outbreak of fighting (by conflict, episode)
  Source(s):
  - All SFI and WGI measures

- The (average) level of state fragility (see above) within the country (the countries) where a violent non-state actor had been active (by violent actor)
  Source(s):
  - All above indicators
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX, AUTHOR</th>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>SCALE</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATE FRAGILITY INDEX (SFI), Center for Global Policy, George Mason University</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI (overall score)</td>
<td>State fragility (broadly defined)</td>
<td>security, political, social, economic</td>
<td>0 (best)-25 (worst)</td>
<td>1995-2011 (annually)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Sub-Index 1</td>
<td>State fragility (indep. from conflict)</td>
<td>security, political, social, economic</td>
<td>0 (best)-22 (worst)</td>
<td>1995-2011 (annually)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Sub-Index 2</td>
<td>State fragility (narrowly defined)</td>
<td>security, political</td>
<td>0 (best)-9 (worst)</td>
<td>1995-2011 (annually)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Legitimacy</td>
<td>State legitimacy</td>
<td>security, political, social, economic</td>
<td>0 (best)-3 (worst)</td>
<td>1995-2011 (annually)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Effectiveness</td>
<td>State effectiveness (indep. from conflict)</td>
<td>political, social, economic</td>
<td>0 (best)-3.33 (worst)</td>
<td>1995-2011 (annually)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX (BTI), Bertelsmann Foundation/Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich University</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Stateness Index</td>
<td>State Weakness</td>
<td>security, political, societal</td>
<td>1 (worst)-10 (best)</td>
<td>2003-2012 (biannually)</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Failed State Index</td>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>security, political</td>
<td>1 (worst)-10 (best)</td>
<td>2006-2012 (biannually)</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Traditions of Civil Society Indicator</td>
<td>Difficulty of Political Leadership</td>
<td>societal</td>
<td>1 (worst)-10 (best)</td>
<td>2006-2012 (biannually)</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WGI), World Bank (WB)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WGI Control of Corruption Indicator</td>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>political</td>
<td>-2.5 (worst)-2.5 (best)</td>
<td>1996-2002 (biannually), 2003-2011 (annually)</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FREEDOM IN THE WORLD SURVEY, Freedom House (FH)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH Functioning of Government Index</td>
<td>Functioning of government</td>
<td>political</td>
<td>0 (worst)-12 (best)</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX (CPI), Transparency International (TI)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI (overall score)</td>
<td>Perceived level of corruption</td>
<td>political</td>
<td>0 (worst)-100 (best)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITY IV PROJECT DATA SERIES, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Fragmentation Indicator</td>
<td>Degree of polity fragmentation</td>
<td>political</td>
<td>0 (best)-3 (worst)</td>
<td>2000-2012</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEAK SOCIETY MEASURE, Grimes (2008)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of civil society organizations</td>
<td>societal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. Descriptive Statistics
E. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS ON THE INCIDENCE OF INTERNAL FIGHTING</th>
<th>BOTH KINDS</th>
<th>NON-STATE</th>
<th>STATE-BASED</th>
<th>HYP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of internal wars (1946-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of internal armed conflicts (1989-2011), worldwide</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of conflict episodes (1989-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of countries affected by internal warfare (1946-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of countries affected by internal armed conflict (1989-2011), worldwide</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of countries affected by conflict episodes (1989-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of internal wars per country (1946-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of internal armed conflicts per country (1989-2011), worldwide</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>H1 ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.65, 2.57, 2.09</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>29.4, 4.9, 23</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>9.16, 6.36, 2.8</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>9.7, 3.2, 6.5</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>1.59, 0.66, 0.93</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>2.1, 0.2, 1.0</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>8.73, 3.2, 5.53</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>7.6, 1.2, 6.4</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>2.96, 0.78, 2.17</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>4.7, 0.2, 4.5</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.83, 0.24, 0.6</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>1.2, 0.2, 1.0</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>5.81, 3.24, 2.57</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
<td>4.0, 0.1, 4.0</td>
<td>H1, H1, H1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- H1 indicates high priority
- H1, H1 indicates high priority, but not significant
- H1, H1, H1 indicates high priority, significant, and robust
### E. Descriptive Statistics

#### Indicators on the Significance of Non-State Internal Fighting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-STATE INTERNAL FIGHTING</th>
<th>SHARE</th>
<th>HYP.</th>
<th>TREND</th>
<th>HYP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-state wars in all annually ongoing internal wars (1989-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-state conflicts in all annually ongoing conflicts (1989-2011), worldwide</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-state episodes in all annually ongoing conflict episodes (1989-2009), worldwide</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-state conflicts in new outbreaks of internal conflict (1990-2011), worldwide</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>H1 X</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>H1a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Additional Indicators

- Share of war-experienced countries ...
  - ... that have seen more than one internal war, 1946-2009 (33 out of 63) | 52%
  - ... that have seen both kinds of internal warfare, 1946-2009 (13 out of 63) | 21%
  - ... that have seen exclusively state-based internal warfare, 1946-2009 (47 out of 63) | 75%
  - ... that have seen several but exclusively state-based internal wars, 1946-2009 (20 out of 63) | 32%
  - ... that have seen exclusively non-state internal warfare, 1946-2009 (3 out of 63) | 5%
  - Share of countries with non-state internal war experience that have also seen state-based internal warfare, 1946-2009 | 83%
  - Share of countries with state-based internal war experience that have also seen non-state internal warfare, 1946-2009 | 22%
  - Share of countries with non-state conflict experience that have also seen state-based internal conflict (1989-2011) | 77%
  - Share of countries with state-based conflict experience that have also seen non-state internal conflict (1989-2011) | 54%
  - Share of countries with several wars that have seen simultaneous warfare, 1946-2009 (12 out of 33) | 36%
  - Share of countries with several wars that have seen simultaneous warfare of different kinds, 1946-2009 (7 out of 13) | 54%
  - Ø overlap (in years) of different kinds of internal warfare (non-state and state-based warfare), 1946-2009 | 3.5
  - Ø overlap (in years) of the same kind of internal warfare (multiple state-based wars), 1946-2009 | 10.5
  - Share of non-state wars in all annually ongoing internal wars, 1946-1988 vs. 1989-2009 % | 3%
  - Regional shares in all annually ongoing non-state internal wars, 1946-1988 vs. 1989-2009 % | 4%

408
### Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics on the Incidence and Significance of (Non-State) Internal Fighting. Source: own depiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional shares in all annually ongoing state-based internal wars, 1946-1988 Ø vs. 1989-2009 Ø</th>
<th>17%</th>
<th>28%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional shares in all country-years spent in non-state internal warfare, 1946-1988 Ø vs. 1989-2009 Ø</th>
<th>46%</th>
<th>66%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Shares in new outbreaks of non-state internal warfare, 1946-1988 Ø vs. 1989-2009 Ø</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Americas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Central &amp; South Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- East &amp; Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Since 2000/2001. 2 Up to 2005, dropped in 2007 but increased again afterwards. 3 Since 1991. 4 If country years without any new outbreak of internal armed conflict would be excluded from this calculation, the shares of non-state conflicts in all new outbreaks of internal armed conflict within the Americas and within Europe would increase significantly (from 55 to 71 percent and from 8 to 19 percent) while in Central & South Asia and East & Southeast Asia and Oceania they would increase only modestly (from 56 to 59 percent and from 34 to 44 percent). 5 If country years without non-state internal warfare would be excluded from this calculation, the regional shares of sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and the Middle East & North Africa in all annually ongoing non-state internal wars within the 1946 to 1988 period would increase from 17 to 44 percent, from 2 to 6 percent and from 20 to 50 percent. 6 If country years without internal warfare would be excluded from this calculation, the post-Cold War average share of non-state wars in all annually ongoing internal wars in Europe would increase from 8 to 9 percent. ✓= supporting Hypotheses 1/1a; X= disproving Hypotheses 1/1a.
## F. Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures

Table F.1.: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of State Weakness Measures. Source: own calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI Corr.</td>
<td>1.00*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGI Corr.</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VGI Gov. Eff.</td>
<td>0.95*</td>
<td>0.95*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95*</td>
<td>0.95*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH Func. Gov.</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Failed State</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Sub-index 2</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Overall score</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75*</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Sub-index 1</td>
<td>-0.37*</td>
<td>-0.37*</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Overall score</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Civil Soc.</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Legp.</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI Civil Soc.</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grimes Chal Soc.</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Frag.</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pearson Correlation Coefficient. Number of observations used for the calculation: *p < 0.05
G. Significance of Regression Results
### G. Significance of Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS (BASELINE MODELS)</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES &amp; CONTROL FACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATE WEAKNESS (various measures)</td>
<td>PROD. OF CONFL. RES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DURATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INENSITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FORMAL ACTORS(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPLINTERGROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUMBER OF ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILITARY INTERVENTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: NATURE OF VIOLENCE APPLIED BY FORMALLY ORG. GROUPS (H8, H9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actor level</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: DURATION OF FIGHTING</td>
<td>NON-STATE FIGHTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>episode level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: INTENSITY OF INTERNAL FIGHTING</td>
<td>NON-STATE FIGHTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: QUALITY OF ACTORS IN NON-STATE FIGHTING / FORMALLY VS. INFORMALLY ORG. (H15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: NUMBER OF ACTORS (H16)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: ENGAGEMENT IN / CATEGORIZATION AS NON-STATE FIGHTING (Overall Research Question, ORQ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actor level</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>episode level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict level</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war level</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL WARFARE</td>
<td>NON-STATE WARFARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT</td>
<td>NON-STATE CONFLICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: NUMBER OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS</td>
<td>NON-STATE CONFLICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: YEARS SPENT IN INTERNAL WARFARE</td>
<td>NON-STATE WARFARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Independent variables marked as missing (·) are either not included for theoretical or statistical reasons (e.g. due to colinearity issues), are unavailable at the respective level of analysis or constitute the dependent variable in the respective specification. Independent variables separated by dotted lines are alternative measures and as such never simultaneously included within the same model. Key independent variables are surrounded by bold lines. X = mostly highly significant effects, < < weaker but mostly significant effects, < mixed results, X = mostly non-significant effects. Dummies indicating the kind of conflict engagement of a violent non-state actor: non-state (0/1), state-based (0/1) or both types of conflict engagement (0/1). Without interaction term highly significant.

Table G.1.: Overview of the Significance of the Regression Results of all Baseline Models.

Source: own depiction.
Table G.2.: Overview of the Significance of the Regression Results of all Refined Models.

Source: own depiction.
### G. Significance of Regression Results

#### Table G.3:

Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES &amp; CONTROL FACTORS</th>
<th>REGRESSION RESULTS IN NUMBERS FINAL MODELS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATE WEAKNESS (various measures)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROD. OF CONFLICT RES.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROD. OF LOOTABLE RES.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAKNESS X CONFLICT RES.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEAKNESS X LOOTABLE RES.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DURATION (in days/year)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTENSITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL ACTOR(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH. INTEGRATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF ACTORS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPE OF INTERNAL FIGHTING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(pseudo) R-SQUARED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEP. VAR.: NATURE OF VIOLENCE APPLIED BY FORMALLY ORG. GROUPS (H8, H9)**

- **actor level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: -2.82 / -10.70
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.1058

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: -41.34 / -1.45
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.5405

**DEP. VAR.: DURATION OF FIGHTING (H10, H10a, H11, H12)**

- **episode level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.14 / -1.25
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.3542

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: -0.47
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0370

**DEP. VAR.: DURATION OF NON-STATE FIGHTING (H10a, H11, H13)**

- **episode level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.32
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0307

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: -0.40
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0132

**DEP. VAR.: DURATION OF STATE-BASED FIGHTING (H10, H11)**

- **episode level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.10
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0307

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.10
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0307

**DEP. VAR.: INTENSITY OF INTERNAL FIGHTING**

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.12
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0307

**DEP. VAR.: INTENSITY OF NON-STATE FIGHTING (H14)**

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.15
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0307

**DEP. VAR.: INTENSITY OF STATE-BASED FIGHTING**

- **conflict level**
  - β-Coeff. / Odds: 0.15
  - Sign: - - - - - - - -
  - p: 0.0307

Table G.3.: Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.
Table G.4.: Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGRESSION RESULTS IN NUMBERS FINAL MODELS</th>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES &amp; CONTROL FACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATE WEAKNESS (various measures)</td>
<td>PROD. OF CONFL. RES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROD. OF LOOTABLE RES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WEAKNESS x CONFL. RES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WEAKNESS x LOOTABLE RES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DURATION (in days/months/years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTENSITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FORMAL ACTORS()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPI INTERGROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUMBER OF ACTORS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE OF INTERNAL FIGHTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[PSEUDO] R-SQUARED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: QUALITY OF ACTORS IN NON-STATE FIGHTING / FORMALLY Vs. INFORMALLY ORG. (H15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actor level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>** 2.02 .28 X X X - - - - X .17 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** * X X X - - - - X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>episode level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.66 X .22 X 9.35 - - - - - X .09 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. ns X *** X *** - - - - X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.70 X .38 X 7.75 - X - - - - X .09 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. m X *** X *** - - - - X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: NUMBER OF ACTORS (H16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.05 X X X X .30 - - - - X X .32 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** X X X X *** - - - - X X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: ENGAGEMENT IN / CATEGORIZATION AS NON-STATE FIGHTING (Overall Research Question)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actor level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.02 9.88 X 27.53 X - - X - X X 3.21 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** ** X * X - - X - X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>episode level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.99 X 2.66 X X .48 - - - - - X 4.54 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. * X *** X X *** - - - - X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.28 X 3.65 X .44 .96 .55 - - X X 4.18 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** X *** X *** ns *** - - - X *** -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.90 X 3.33 X X .88 - - - 1.33 X 1.58 X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. m X ns X X * - - - ** X ns X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL WARFARE (Overall Research Question)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.21 X 2.33 X 1.14 - - - - - - 13 X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** ** X * - - - - - ** *** X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF NON-STATE INTERNAL WARFARE (Overall Research Question)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.59 X 3.64 X X - - - - - - 1.50 X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** X ns X X - - - - - ns X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF STATE-BASED INTERNAL WARFARE (Overall Research Question)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country level</td>
<td>B-Coeff. / Odds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.29 X 2.95 X X - - - - - - 14 X -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sign. *** X *** X X - - - - - *** X -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table G.5: Regression Results in Numbers of the Final Models. Source: own calculation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (Overall Research Question)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>country level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β-Coeff. / Odds</td>
<td>0.39 X 2.52 X X - - - - - X 1.11 - 0.3565 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign.</td>
<td>*** X * X X - - - - - X ns -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEP. VAR.: EXPERIENCE OF NON-STATE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (Overall Research Question)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>country level</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β-Coeff. / Odds</td>
<td>0.30 X X X - - - - - - 0.35 X - 0.3622 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign.</td>
<td>*** X X X - - - - - * X -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In this case, the dummy indicates whether a violent non-state actor engaged in both kinds of internal armed conflict (1) as opposed to just one type of internal armed conflict (0). Independent variables marked as missing (-) are either not included for theoretical or statistical reasons (e.g., due to collinear issues), are unavailable at the respective level of analysis or constitute the dependent variable in the respective specification. Independent variables/measures that were dropped/not selected during the refinement process (e.g., because they did not contribute to the overall model fit or because they were inferior to alternative measures) are marked with an X. Independent variables separated by dotted lines are alternative measures and as such never simultaneously included within the same model. Key independent variables are surrounded by bold lines. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
H. Hypotheses, Tests and Overall Outcome
HYPOTHESES & METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Overall Trend:

H1 Dominance of non-state internal fighting
H1a Increasing significance of non-state internal fighting

Comparative Hypotheses:

H2 By type of conflict: Quantity of actors
H3 By type of conflict: Nature of actors (external military intervention)
H3a By type of conflict: Nature of actors (origin/fractionalization)
H4 By type of conflict: Conflict resources
H4a By type of conflict: Conflict resources that are easy to access and to loot
H4b By type of conflict: Conflict resources that are difficult to access and to loot
H5 By type of conflict: Scale of violence
H5a By type of conflict: Nature of violence (acts of one-sided violence)
H6 By type of conflict: Duration of fighting
H7 By type of conflict: State fragility
H7a By type of conflict: Lack of state effectiveness and authority
H7b By type of conflict: Lack of state functionality and legitimacy

Associative Hypotheses:

H8 Nature of violence (acts of one-sided violence)
H9 Nature of violence (acts of one-sided violence)
H10 Duration of state-based fighting
H10a Duration of non-state fighting
H11 Duration of fighting
H12 Duration of fighting
H13 Duration of non-state fighting
H14 Intensity of non-state fighting
H15 Quality of actors in non-state fighting (informal)
H16 Quantity of violent actors

MAIN RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>actor level</th>
<th>episode level</th>
<th>conflict level</th>
<th>war level</th>
<th>country level</th>
<th>overall outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Bivariate Comparative Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table H.1: Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results. Source: own depiction.
## HYPOTHESES & METHODS OF ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Research Question:</th>
<th>Dep. Variables</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>MAIN RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H7</strong> Engagement in non-state internal fighting</td>
<td>+ ε State weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of (easily lootable) conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of conflict resources x state weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Nature of actors (origin/fractionalization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε (sub-Saharan) Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Categorization as non-state internal fighting</td>
<td>+ ε State weakness (if available at t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of easily lootable conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of conflict resources x state weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of easily lootable resources x state weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Duration (if available in days or months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Scale of violence/intensity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Quantity of actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Nature of actors (external military intervention)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε (sub-Saharan) Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H6</strong> Experience of non-state internal warfare</td>
<td>+ ε State weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of easily lootable conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of easily lootable resources x state weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε (sub-Saharan) Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong> Experience of non-state internal conflict</td>
<td>+ ε State weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of easily lootable conflict resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε Production of easily lootable resources x state weakness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ ε (sub-Saharan) Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table H.2.** Overview of Hypotheses, Tests and Results. Source: own depiction.

✓ = strong support (significant effects/differences in means supporting the hypothesis), X = strong rejection (significant effects/differences in means contradicting the hypothesis), + = weak support (mildly significant effects/differences in means supporting the hypothesis), / = mixed results (significant and insignificant effects/differences in means), ε = no support (mostly insignificant effects/differences in means).
Glossary

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AKUF Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung
ANC African National Congress
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BTI Bertelsmann Tranformation Index
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIFP Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
COW Correlates of War
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CPIA/IRAI Country Policy & Institutional Assessment/IDA Res. Allocation Index
CSI Child Soldiers International (former CSUCS)
CSUCS Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EDACS Event Data Project on Conflict and Security
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
ELI Environmental Law Institute
ERPAC Colombian Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorist Army
EU European Union
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army
FSI Failed States Index
GDP Gross domestic product
GED Georeferenced Event Dataset
GIS Geographic information system
GNI Gross national income
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRG International Country Risk Guide
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP Internally displaced person
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
Glossary

IMF  International Monetary Fund
IO  International Organization
KOF  Konjunkturforschungsstelle
KOSVED  Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
LURD  Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MHS  Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MIFFS  Middle-income but Failed or Fragile States
MIPT  Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
MODEL  Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-governmental organization
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA  National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NSA  Non-State Armed Group
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS  Ordinary least squares
OSAM  Organizational Structure of Armed Movement Dataset
PITF  Political Instability Task Force
PKOLED  Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset
PMF  Private military company
PRIO  Peace Research Institute Oslo
PRS  Political Risk Services Group
RAND  Research ANd Development corporation
RUF  Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SDA  Serbian Defence Army
SFI  State Fragility Index
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLM  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
START  National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TI  Transparency International
TO  Territorial Defense Unit
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program
ULIMO-J  United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Johnson faction
ULIMO-K  United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy – Kromah faction
UN  United Nations
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US  United States of America
USCRI  United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
WB  World Bank
WGI  World Governance Indicators
Bibliography


Bibliography


Davis, D.R. and Joel N. Kuritsky (2002). “Violent conflict and its impact on health indicators in sub-Saharan Africa: 1980 to 1997”, research paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 24-27 March 2002, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. url: ftp://192-0-136-179.cpe.teksavvy.com/AiDisk_a1/FIRELITE%2040MB/Transfer%20Between%20Computers/Transferred%20from%2098SE%20VIAO/end%20in%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%2


Bibliography


433
Bibliography


– (2002). ““New W ars” and Rumors of “New W ars””. In: Internation Interactions 7 (2) (cit. on pp. 98, 102).


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Straus, Scott (2013-01). “Africa is becoming more peaceful, despite the war in Mali. The continent is stereotyped as being violent and increasingly unstable, but a closer look suggests that conflict is declining”. In: African Arguments/the Guardian Africa Network. URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/30/africa-peaceful-mali-war (visited on 2014-02-12) (cit. on p. 275).


Bibliography


