FEDERALISM, NATIONAL PLURALISM AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA: A Normative Interrogation of the Peace-Promoting and Integrative Function of Federalism in Nigeria

vorgelegt von

Yakubu Joseph, MSc, MA, BSc

Gombe/Nigeria

Tübingen

2014

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I alone wrote the doctoral work submitted here under the title

Federalism, National Pluralism and Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria: A Normative Interrogation of the Peace-Promoting and Integrative Function of Federalism, that I only used the sources and materials cited in the work, and that all citations, whether word for word or paraphrased are given as such. I declare that I adhere to the guidelines set forth by the University of Tübingen to guarantee proper academic scholarship (Senate Resolution 25.05.2000). I declare that these statements are true and that I am concealing nothing. I understand that any false statements can be punished with a jail of up to three years or a financial penalty.

Sign...

Tübingen, 21 November 2014

ABSTRACT

Federalism has been widely acclaimed as a form of political organisation that is most suitable for plurinational states because of its potential to foster unity in diversity and peaceful co-existence among the diverse and territorially concentrated groups in a state. By having the ability to accommodate the combination of shared rule and self-rule among federating units, federalism has the potential to mediate or overcome the centrifugal forces tending to pull a state apart. As a result of this binding effect, federalism functions as a centripetal force that is able to keep a state together. This highly-praised potential function of federalism appealed to many states that have embraced the federal formula, especially erstwhile colonial African states, which contain within their boundaries culturally diverse and disparate ethno-religious groups partitioned into one political territory by the "colonial masters" without regard to geographical contiguity and the historical backgrounds of the groups. Thus, federalism was considered a viable and necessary option for state-building. The preoccupation of this study was to understand why Nigeria, one of the African states that embraced federalism, has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having a federal system in place. Taking a normative approach, this mixed methods case study, driven by a qualitative priority, sought to understand that puzzle by interrogating how the prevailing political culture of federalism among the population harnessed or hindered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism in the country. The findings suggest that there was a dearth of peace-enabling federative culture in Nigeria. This conclusion highlights the disjuncture between the designed aspiration of federalism and its outcome, and the challenge of post-colonial state-building in Africa. Hence, it is argued that for Nigeria to overcome this challenge, its people have to understand, accept and internalize the values and principles of federalism.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Föderalismus wird weithin als ideale Staatsform für Vielvölkerstaaten angesehen, da ihr ein großes Potenzial zugeschrieben wird, die Einheit trotz Vielfalt und ein friedliches Zusammenleben zwischen den unterschiedlichen im Raum verteilten Gruppen eines Staates zu fördern. Durch die Möglichkeit, in diesem Konzept sowohl gemeinsames als auch eigenständiges Regieren der föderalen Einheiten zu vereinen, hat der Föderalismus das Potenzial zwischen den zentrifugalen Kräften zu vermitteln bzw. diese zu überwinden, die tendenziell den Staat zerbrechen lassen würden. Als Ergebnis dieser verbindenden Wirkung wirkt Föderalismus als Zentripetalkraft, die den Staat zusammenhält. Diese mögliche Wirkung des Föderalismus erschien vielen Staaten attraktiv, die das föderale Konzept übernommen haben. Darunter befinden sich insbesondere ehemalige Kolonialstaaten Afrikas, die innerhalb ihrer Grenzen kulturell vielfältige und unterschiedliche ethno-religiöse Gruppen beheimaten, die ohne Berücksichtigung räumlicher Grenzen und historischer Verbindungen der verschiedenen Gruppen durch die „Kolonialherren" in künstliche politische Einheiten eingeteilt wurden. Folglich wurde der Föderalismus als eine tragfähige und notwendige Konzeption für den Aufbau der neuen unabhängigen Staaten erachtet. Das zentrale Anliegen dieser Forschungsarbeit war es zu verstehen, warum Nigeria als einer der afrikanischen Staaten, die einen föderalistischen Staatsaufbau gewählt haben, trotzdem tief gespalten und anfällig für ethno-religiöse Konflikte blieb. Mit einem normativen Ansatz will diese methodisch breit angelegte Fallstudie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung qualitativer Ansätze Einblicke gewähren, wie die in Nigeria vorherrschende politische Kultur des Föderalismus die friedensfördernde und integrative Funktion dieses Konzepts im Land unterstützt bzw. behindert. Die Forschungsergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass keine föderative Kultur vorhanden ist, die den Frieden zwischen den unterschiedlichen Gruppen wirksam fördern würde. Diese Schlussfolgerung unterstreicht die Kluft zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit des Föderalismuskonzepts als Herausforderung der postkolonialen Staatenbildung in Afrika. Daher wird die Ansicht vertreten, dass das nigerianische Volk die Werte und Prinzipien des Föderalismus verstehen, akzeptieren und verinnerlichen muss, um die Einheit des Landes langfristig aufrecht erhalten zu können.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

CHAPTER TWO

STATE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE FEDERALIST IDEA

CHAPTER THREE

FEDERALISM AND STATE BUILDING IN NIGERIA

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

Figures

Tables

ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

ABU	Ahmadu Bello University
ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
ACP-EU	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in cooperation with the European Union
AFAN	Farmers Association of Nigeria
AG	Action Group
APA	American Psychological Association
ARG	Afenifere Renewal Group
BNRCC	Building Nigeria's Response to Climate Change
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
C of O	Certificate of Occupancy
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
CRK	Christian Religious Knowledge
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
ERC	Ethno-Religious Conflicts
EYN	Ekklesiyan Yan'uwa a Nigeria
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GPZ	Geo-Political Zone
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ID	Identification Number
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
LGAs	Local Government Areas
LGC	Local Government Council
LLB	Bachelor of Law
MAR	Minority at Risk
MBD	Middle Belt Dialogue
MMS	Majority-Minority Struggle
MNI	Member National Institute
NAHCON	National Hajj Commission of Nigeria
NC	North-Central
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NCPC	Nigerian Christian Pilgrim Commission
ND	National Diploma
NDA	Nigerian Defence Academy
NE	North-East
NEPU	Northern Elements' Progressive Union
NEST	Nigerian Environmental Study Team
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPLF	Northern Political Leaders Forum
NSCIA	Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs
NTA	Nigerian Television Authority
NW	North-West
NYM	Nigerian Youth Movement's

OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PRONACO	Pro National Conference Organisation
SAN	Senior Advocate of Nigeria
SE	South-East
SMS	Short Message Service
SNC	Sovereign National Conference
SPCL	Shari'a Penal Code Law
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SS	South-South
SSG	Secretary to the State Government
SW	South-West
UBEC	Universal Basic Education Commission
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	United States
USCIRF	United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
WASU	West African Students Union

Dedication

This work is dedicated to anyone who is willing to say and live by this:

I recognize that I belong to the family of [hu]mankind
Made up of all human beings of every race, colour, creed and ideology
Now living on this Planet Earth.

I understand that there can be no common good
Without an individual good.

I am responsible for myself and for all human beings
Who share this earth with me.
I know that our enemies are those among us
Who will not share the responsibility for our common good.
I accept my own personal responsibility:
    To replace darkness with light,
    To replace hatred with love,
    To replace suspicion with trust,
    To replace lies and hypocrisy with honesty,
    To replace abuse with kindness,
    To replace frustration with patience,
    To replace fear with understanding,
    To replace bias, prejudice and discrimination
        with tolerance,
    To replace ignorance with knowledge,
    To replace indifference with concern,
    And to replace apathy with action.
I believe that all men [and women] are entitled to equal opportunities
To live, to grow and to flourish as human beings
With dignity and respect.
I acknowledge that it is as important
To live and work for peace
As to die for peace.

As a member of the family of [hu]mankind
Now living on this Planet Earth
I thus commit myself
And challenge my children
And their children, with God's help,
To do as well.

BY Lou Torok, a prisoner at the Luther Luckett Correctional complex, LaGange, Kentucky.

ACKNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

1.1. Introduction

The motivation of this study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence. Through this mixed methods case study, the researcher sought to explore why in this context federalism has not been quite successful in delivering on its acclaimed peace-promoting and integrative function. Specifically, the study was inclined to look beyond the institutional design and structural arrangement of the Nigerian federalism and interrogate how the prevailing political culture of federalism among the people harnessed or hindered this said function of federalism. It was expected that the understanding generated from this research would offer new insights into the challenges and prospects of post-colonial state building in Africa with respect to the issue of managing unity in diversity in ethnically and religiously divided societies. The research employed a mixed methods case study design with a qualitative priority, placing emphasis on qualitative methods and using a quantitative technique in a supplementary role, to explore the phenomenon under investigation. The sources of data for this study included interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, direct and participant observation, and document analysis.

This chapter lays out the context and background that frames the study. This is followed by the problem statement, the purpose of the study, and the research questions.

The chapter also includes a discussion around the general approach of the research, and the researcher's perspectives and assumptions.

1.2.   Background and Context

In recent years, the issue of diversity and unity in federal states has increasingly cultivated the attention of scholars and practitioners across wide range of fields (Moreno & Colino, 2010; Caminal & Requejo, 2012). This growing interest stems from three developments: (1) the recognition that the state is no longer the domain of a homogenous, sovereign nation, but is marked by diversity and political complexity (Caminal & Requejo, 2012, p. 1); (2) the pervasiveness of federalism even in this twenty-first century, encompassing more than half of the world's space and almost half of its population (Watts, 2008, p. 1; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 11); and (3) the grim reality of the persistence of ethnic, religious and secessionist conflicts around the world today (Brancati, 2009). Consequently, the management of national pluralism is considered to be a critical challenge of state building in heterogeneous societies. The implication is that the maintenance of internal peace is to a large extent determined by how well the state is able to accommodate its territorially concentrated diversities – including ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic pluralism.

Federalism has gained popularity as a structural and institutional political innovation for addressing this need. It is widely hailed as having the ability to foster unity in diversity and, by the same token, to promote peaceful coexistence among the various sub-national social formations in a state. The renowned American scholar of federalism Daniel Elazar even concluded that federalism is the only safeguard for peace and stability in a fast changing world (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 11).

2

Many multinational states have embraced various models of federalism as a national unity enhancer and as an intrastate conflict mitigating mechanism (Brancati, 2009). Nigeria is among the countries that operate a federal system. In Nigeria, federalism was adopted as a mechanism for holding the country together to ensure that the various ethnic nationalities, religious groups and geographical regions transfer their loyalties to the state (Ayoade, 1986; Gana & Egwu, 2003b; Adibe, 2012). Adibe posited that: "Nigerians embraced federalism as a way for fashioning out 'unity in diversity' and managing the inevitable conflicts that result from the interaction of previously autonomous entities that were brought together into one state by the colonial order" (Adibe, 2012, p. 18). In this vivid description, Elaigwu and Garba summed up the imperative of the Nigerian federalism:

> Federalism was adopted in Nigeria as a mechanism for managing conflicts associated with the process of national integration. The current Nigerian State is a creation of British colonialism following the Berlin Conference of 1884. The artificial boundaries created by the European partitioning of Africa created culturally diverse states as they brought together strange ethno-religious groups into one political territory regardless of geographical contiguity or even historical backgrounds of these groups. (Elaigwu & Garba, 2014, p. 120).

Therefore, the underlying principle behind Nigeria's federalism is the quest to promote the idea of national unity and peaceful coexistence among the country's diverse population. This is why Rotimi Suberu asserted that: "Uniquely among African countries, Nigeria has consistently maintained a formal federal polity as a constitutional design for holding together this deeply divided society of three major ethnic groups, hundreds of smaller ethno-linguistic communities, and almost equal numbers of Muslims and Christians" (Suberu, 2009b).

In spite of this, Nigeria has remained a highly divided state characterised by ethnic, religious and regional contestations (Ifeka, 2000) that frequently produce episodes of violence. Since the country's transition from military dictatorship to democratic rule in 1999, communal conflicts have raged like wild fire claiming several thousands of human lives and taking a debilitating toll on the country (Lewis, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012). At least 700 incidents of communal violence have erupted in different parts of the country within this period (Lewis, 2012), most of which have been fought along ethnic and religious fault lines (Okafor, 2007; Marshall, 2008; Salawu, 2010). The conflicts usually involve adherents of the two main religions, Christians and Muslims, and because ethnic and religious identities overlap or crosscut each other (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005), such conflicts easily snowball into ethno-religious confrontations. This situation is compounded by the geographical dimensions of ethnic and religious distributions in Nigeria, which splits the country roughly into a Muslim dominated North and a predominantly Christian South.

Endemic ethno-religious conflicts have had appalling consequences on Nigeria and, coupled with other state dysfunctions, have crippled the "African giant." Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, and occupies a strategic place in international affairs as well as being a regional powerhouse. In the words of John Paden, an American scholar who has studied the country for decades, Nigeria is a "pivotal state" in the world (Paden, 2005; Paden, 2008). The country is endowed with vast natural and human resources, with huge oil reserves. Despite this endowment, development has continued to elude the country. As Suberu (2001, p. xii) opined, Nigeria may still be considered as a country with a turbulent and tragic political experience. This scenario was lucidly expressed by the Nigerian international law expert and Chairman of the Nigerian Human Rights Commission, Chidi

Anselm Odinkalu when he lamented: "How has a country so richly endowed blown the opportunities for itself and its generations yet unborn so spectacularly?" (Odinkalu, 2010, p. 14). In addition to the crippling impact of endemic corruption, institutional weakness and leadership failure (Achebe, 2000; Odinkalu, 2010; World Bank, 2011), pernicious cycles of ethno-religious and sectarian conflicts have become threats to the country's stability and human development. Tragically, the continuous assault on religious freedom has become a major setback to the country's socio-economic development (see Grim, 2009; Grim & Finke, 2011).

As most indexes have shown, Nigeria's records on human development and peace have either stagnated or slumped to frightening levels in the past few years. Nigeria still occupies a place among countries with low human development (153rd position out of 172 countries on the Human Development Report 2013).[1] With regard to peace and security, the picture is also dismal. The country was ranked 16 out of 178 countries on the Failed State Index 2013, clearly a condition of alert.[2] The country's quality of democracy equally received a very low rating, having a democracy rank of 96 out of 104 countries.[3] On the Global Peace Index 2014,[4] the country was close to the bottom with a rank of 151 out of 162, a less peaceful rating. Lastly, on the Global Terrorist Index 2013, Nigeria was ranked 4 out of 162, a very scary picture.[5]

Concerns about the fate of the country due to the rising tides of religiously-related violence have increased significantly both internationally and domestically (Schwartz, 2010;

---

[1]   URL: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2013_EN_Summary.pdf
[2]   URL: http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable
[3]   Democracy Ranking is an annual assessment of the quality of democracies (country-based democracies) worldwide. The Democracy Ranking 2012 is available at: http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?page_id=57
[4]   http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2014/NGA/OVER
[5]   URL: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/terrorism-index/2013/NGA/OVER

Bamidele, 2012). For example, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has in its 2013 Annual Report[6] reiterated its call, since 2009, for Nigeria's status to be changed from the USCIRF's Watch List and be designated as a "Country of Particular Concern" due to increased violation of religious freedom fuelled by unabated cycles of religious-related violence that go on with almost complete impunity. Similarly, the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States and the European Union adopted a resolution on 30 May 2012 condemning the ongoing sectarian violence in Nigeria (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 2012)[7] and echoed the UN Security Council's concern about the situation in the country (Security Council, 2011). In a recent press release the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that he has been and remains seriously concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria (Ki-moon, 2013).

Within the country there is a growing sense of apprehension and palpable fear about the future of the country among the population because of the upsurge of ethno-religious and sectarian violence. The Islamist group, Boko Haram has been waging a deadly insurgency in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram is an expression in Hausa which means Western education is an abomination. The group's real name is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). Boko Haram has been seeking to impose strict Shari'a and to create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. The spiralling violence caused by the insurgency, since 2009, have led to loss of thousands of lives (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2013), large internal displacement of people (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013) and outflow of refugees into neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2013). Boko Haram has

---

[6]   URL: http://www.uscirf.gov/images/2013%20USCIRF%20Annual%20Report%20(2).pdf
[7]   ACP-EU stands for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in cooperation with the European Union.

taken control of large swathes of territory, which it declared as a caliphate, and fighting to capture more towns and villages. As a consequence of these crises, a public debate, which has always been part of the political discourse, bordering on the propriety or otherwise of the country's federal system and its existence in the present form and shape with its current constituent units was escalated.

It has become common to read and hear, in both social and mainstream media as well as in academic discourses, Nigerians revisiting the question of the amalgamation of the country by the British in 1914, and referring to the Nigerian state as a forced marriage between incompatible partners. Secessionist agitations from some regions of the country have become louder in recent times. Mounting calls for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to decide on the country's future have been reverberating across the country (Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu, & Sule, 2012). For example, in a swift reaction to the declaration of state of emergency on three north-eastern states by Nigeria's President, Goodluck Jonathan in a bid to mob out Boko Haram insurgents from these areas, the Yoruba pan-cultural association Afenifere Renewal Group asserted that:

> Afenifere Renewal Group (ARG) would like to reinforce our position that the insurgency in the Northern parts of Nigeria is only a deep manifestation of the crises of nationhood bedeviling the country, which we have continually refused to fully address. There is no doubt that every part of this country is seething in anger for one reason or the other. The Yoruba people for instance, do not only feel insecure within Nigeria, we do not feel that Nigeria, as it is presently structured can allow the component nationalities and groups to find full expression for their aspirations. We the Yoruba are concerned and miffed that the present structure of the country is a hindrance to our developmental destination. We are constantly being constrained to move at the developmental pace envisioned since the advent of self-rule in the 1950s, therefore to project to a great future for our unborn generation is fast becoming a mirage. (Famoriyo, 2013, para. 3).

7

According to the group, the crises befalling the country provide a good opportunity for the various nationalities to come together and find ways to address the dysfunctionality of the present structure of the Nigerian state:

> The present situation in Nigeria is a watershed, which presents an opportunity to seek a lasting resolution to how we want to live and co-exist as a country of distinct nationalities, interests and priorities, within this beleaguered contraption called Nigeria. To this end, we hereby call on President Goodluck Jonathan to immediately declare a State of National Emergency, and proceed to the National Assembly with an executive bill, with a view to preparing the grounds for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference, which would bring all the peoples and ethnicities of Nigeria together at a roundtable to dialogue on the future of the country.
>
> We are fully convinced that this action will save this country before its current chapter ends with…. *there was a country* [emphasis added]. (Famoriyo, 2013, para. 4-5).

The call for the convocation of a sovereign national conference did not only come from ethno-religious groups and regional associations, but it was also deemed by some scholars as a plausible way to address the lingering 'national question' manifesting itself in the ongoing insecurity in the country. Such scholars argued that the conference is urgently needed in order to address the imbalances in the way the Nigerian state is currently constituted and to chart a new future (Paki & Cocodia, 2012, p. 32).

January 2014 marked exactly 100 years since the merger of the southern and northern protectorates to form the present day territory of Nigeria by the British colonial Governor-General of Nigeria, Frederick John Dealtry Lugard. A more detailed analysis of this amalgamation is discussed later. The Federal Government of Nigeria has unveiled a 20 month celebration plan christened "One People, Great Promise" (Federal Government of Nigeria, n.d.). Those in favour of the centenary celebration argued that minimally the fact that Nigeria still remains one country after 100 years calls for celebration; while those

opposed to it ask: Unity at what costs? Zasha and Shittu (2013) have analysed the juxtaposition of issues and the trend of the debates about the centenary celebration and their findings revealed how divided the country is. The questions still haunting the amalgamation of the country is revisited in subsequent chapters of this work.

The public debates and the agitations pertaining to the federal structure and unity of the country have brought to the fore what the American scholar, Dr. Peter Lewis referred to as the "sharp tension between Nigeria as a 'geographic expression' and a durable national idea" (Lewis, 2012, p. 19). This disjuncture also further poses another conundrum to state-building with regard to state-nation relations, which the Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka asked poetically: "Just when is a nation?" and "when is a nation not?" (Soyinka 2012). Against this backdrop, the need to interrogate the efficacy of a system put in place to foster unity in diversity and to serve as a conflict abating mechanism is quite compelling. As Hueglin and Fenna (2010, p. 55) have noted the jury is still out there on whether federalism fulfils this role.

1.3. Problem Statement

Nigeria adopted its present federal system as a way to foster national unity, forestall secessionist attempts by any section of the country and to ensure peaceful co-existence among its diverse people (Gana & Egwu, 2003b, p. xvii). It has also been suggested that "federalism has developed [in Nigeria] in response to the need for the accommodation of basic territorial ethnolinguistic or religious diversity" (Suberu, 2001, p. 3). Despite the adoption of federalism, Nigeria has remained a highly divided country (Suberu, 2006) and, in recent years, continues to be torn from within by violent conflicts, which are waged along ethnic and religious fault-lines, unabatedly claiming thousands of lives and taking a

debilitating toll on the social fabric of the society (Okafor, 2007; Marshall, 2008; Falola, 2009; Salawu, 2010). In addition to this human tragedy, Nigeria has cultivated the fascination of scholars due to its characteristically unusual brinkmanship (Suberu, 2009a; Campbell, 2011). For so long, the country shows palpable symptoms of state failure and dysfunctionality, yet it has continued to "dance on the brink" without falling off the cliff (Campbell, 2011). However, there is now a growing fear that the country's 'conflict-carrying capacity' is getting overwhelmed by a plethora of ethno-religious violence and the ongoing Boko Haram Islamic insurgency in the northern regions (Adesoji, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; Onuoha, 2011; Bamidele, 2012). By conflict-carrying capacity it is meant "the ability of the state to regulate intense internal conflict without loss of system integrity" (Jenkins & Bond, 2001, p. 4). Here, the loss of system integrity, according to Jenkins and Bond, includes "the development of sustained insurgency, widespread human rights violations, the breakdown of basic political order, and political revolutions that deprive segments of the population of basic political and economic rights" (p. 4).

A key factor that has, time and again, been alluded to as contributing to the country's conflict carrying capacity or its ability to restrain from succumbing to the "syndrome of state disintegration", which had befallen other multiethnic African states, is its federal structure (Suberu, 2001; Gana & Egwu, 2003b; Gana & Egwu, 2003a; Suberu, 2009a). There are also suggestions that that the federal system the country operates is either responsible for or has contributory effect on the recurrent ethno-religious and sectarian contestations and violence in the country (Ayokhai, 2009; Hassan & Issa, 2011; Paki & Cocodia, 2012; Omitola, 2012). If federalism works in Nigeria, why has the country remained, as Onuoha (2008, p. 40) described it, "a 'precarious' and 'unfinished' patchwork

in perpetuity"? This question reflects what Jonathan Rodden referred to as "a growing disappointment with decentralisation and federalism, especially among developing countries" (Rodden, 2004, p. 481).

There has been a resurgence of scholarly interest on the integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism (Gromes, 2010; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010; Moreno & Colino, 2010; Caminal & Requejo, 2012; Christin & Hug, 2012; Iff, 2013). This interest highlights the increasing need for research on the nexus between federalism and the management of diversity in plurinational states (cf. Bird, Vaillancourt, & Roy-César, 2010). By implication, it calls for depth-oriented studies that enable us to better understand the relationship between federalism, national pluralism and conflict within a particular context and its wider repercussions (cf. Hay, 2010, p. 86). Blindenbacher and Watts (2003) put forward a conceptual framework in which they outlined two dimensions of federalism that are important to research. They identified structural characteristics and political culture as two dimensions of federalism. The two dimensions are interrelated and interdependent (Douglas-Scott, 2002). However, unlike the institutional dimension, the normative dimension of federalism, in particular the political culture of federalism, has received inadequate attention from contemporary studies (Rocher, 2009; Máiz, 2013; Rocher & Fafard, 2013). As Ramón Máiz argued, "The implication of federalism reach beyond a particular design, or interactive sets of actors and institutions that articulate *decentralization* in decision-making and accommodation of ethnic or national diversity, to include interpretation or a *federal vision* of politics [emphasis in the original]" (Máiz, 2013, p. 83). "Yet much of scholarly literature on federalism and federations has a strong institutional bias" (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43).

11

Understandably, Nigerian federalism has received significant attention from scholars in recent years. Some of the recent publications on the Nigerian federalism, which delved into the issues of integration and peace, include: Metumara's (2010) "Democracy and the Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Interrogating Institutional Mechanics;" Aiyedele's (2011) "Federalism, power sharing and the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria;" Hassan & Issa's (2011) "Federalism and the Ethnic Violence in Nigeria: Past and Present Issues;" Fawole & Bello's (2011) "The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Nigerian Federalism;" Ejobowah's (2012) "Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation: Assessing Citizenship in Nigerian Federalism;" Aleyomi's (2012) "Ethno-Religious Crisis as a Threat to the Stability of Nigeria's Federalism;" Elaigwu's (2013) "The Practice of Federalism in Africa, the Nigerian Experience and the Way Forward;" Suberu's (2013) "Prebendal Politics and Federal Governance in Nigeria;" Iff's (2013) "Peace-Promoting Federalism: Making Sense of India and Nigeria;" Elaigwu and Garba's (2014) "Federalism and National Integration in Nigeria;" Omotso and Abe's (2014) "Federalism, Politics and Governance in Nigeria;" Ibrahim's (2014) "Towards an Integrative Federal Polity in Nigeria;" and Kendhammer's (2014) "Citizenship, Federalism and Powersharing: Nigeria's Federal Character and the Challenges of Institutional Design." The underlying denominator to all these studies on Nigerian federalism is the interrogation of the integrative and peace-promoting function of the Nigerian federalism.

These studies offer us great deal of insights into different aspects of the conundrum of national integration and the context of federalism in Nigeria. There appears to be a consensus that the federal idea is the most suitable mechanism for fostering unity and diversity in the context of ethnic, religious and regional pluralities of Nigeria. Thus, it can

be said that the potential of federalism to contribute to national integration and promote peaceful coexistence is widely recognised. The sample of studies listed above also acknowledged that the full potential of federalism has not been harnessed in this context. To explore this phenomenon, the studies generally interrogated the structural characteristics and institutional processes of federalism, regime character and actions, constitutional development processes, and social vices such corruption, ethnicity and religious bigotry. Few studies have touched tangentially on how the political culture of federalism among the people impacts on the integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism. Despite the call made by Daniel Elazar more than twenty five years ago that Nigeria offers excellent possibilities for the exploration of the political-cultural basis of federalism, it can be seen from the literature that, as is the case elsewhere, the federal political culture remains a "relatively unexplored territory" (Rocher & Fafard, 2013).

As Máiz (2013) called for more research into federal political culture in order to fill the gap in our understanding of how federalism works in a given context. This research is a contribution in this direction. Another missing link is the dearth of insights from political geography, which provide a framework of investigation that helps us to understand how territorial and spatial identities in Nigeria are built around a shared sense of religious and ethnic belonging, as well as "the historical constitution of religious and ethnic identities in space and place" (Brace, Bailey, & Harvey, 2006, p. 30). The need for this type of research orientation has been underscored by Harvey Starr:

> Even though there is no denying the significance of time and the temporal context in social science, analysts need to pay more explicit and extensive attention to the spatial elements, or the spatial contexts, of social phenomena. Why? It is becoming clearer that time and space are two of the primary ways in which we contextualize social behaviour and interactions. (Starr, 2005, p. 393).

13

1.4. Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this mixed methods case study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal system, which was purposely instituted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence. Specifically, the study sought to understand how the prevailing culture of federalism among the Nigerian population harnesses or hinders the potential integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism.

1.5. The Research Question

The motivating question behind this study is the puzzle: Why has the Nigerian state remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite having in place a federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence? This puzzle can be approached from several angles, but in this study I have chosen to explore it by interrogating how the prevailing culture of federalism among the population harnesses or hinders the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism in the country. Specifically, the study is driven by the following questions:

1. How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999?

2. What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues?

3. What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of federalism among the people?

14

4. Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular among Nigerians nowadays?

5. What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their country?

1.6. Research Approach

The researcher sought to understand in depth how the prevailing political culture of federalism among the Nigerian population harnesses or hinders the integrative function of federalism in the country by obtaining qualitative data from elite interviews, experts consultations, focus group discussions, direct observation, participant observation, documentary sources, and supplementing that with quantitative data from survey. This investigation represented a mixed methods case study, employing an embedded design driven by the qualitative strand. The quantitative strand was used in a supplementary role.

The whole research was divided into two parts. The first part was carried out as a desk study involving an extensive review of scholarly literature, including a very elaborate exploration of the development of key concepts of the research and the historical context and evolution of the Nigerian federalism. The desk study helped to set the stage for the overall research and to provide contexts, which is an essential key to understanding the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation. The second part was an empirical process carried out mainly during fieldwork in Nigeria. As a mixed methods case study, both the qualitative and the quantitative strands were carried out concurrently. In-depth interviewing, focus group discussions, direct observation, participant observation and questionnaires were the primary data collection methods. To gather background and context information as well as official, policy and statutory positions, the review of documents was used as a secondary data collection method. The data obtained from the primary and

15

secondary sources formed the overall basis of the findings of this study. Each interviewee, respondent and participant of focus group discussion was identified anonymously. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed word for word. To better address some of the research questions, quantitative data generated through questionnaires was used to support or reach certain findings. This allowed the researcher to achieve triangulation of data and to simultaneously reap the benefits of using a mixed methods procedure.

1.7.   Assumptions

This study was carried out based on the assumption that a well designed federal system with the proper institutional arrangement and processes in place possesses the potential to promote unity in diversity and peaceful plurinational coexistence, but for it to be successful in performing this function there has to be an enabling federative culture. That is, in the absence of federal thinking, federal vision, and shared values, norms, attitudes and sentiments that reflect the principles of federalism among citizens, such as shared rule, self-rule and respect and acceptance of unity and diversity, a particular federalism may not be worth its essence. This study, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that the recurrent ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, and sectarian violence, which Nigeria has been experiencing, were manifestation of a weak political culture of federalism or the lack of a federative culture among the population that would enable the federal system to perform its peace-promoting and integrative function optimally.

1.8. Significance of the Study

This study was intended to contribute to a better understanding of why Nigeria has remained a deeply divided state and characterised by ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, despite having in place a federal system specifically adopted as a mechanism of

fostering unity in diversity and plurinational co-existence. The study's normative approach would contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between designed aspiration of the Nigerian federalism and the political culture of federalism among the population. It is hoped that the insights generated from the study would also be useful to Nigerians, especially politicians, policymakers and the civil society as they continue to come to grips with the national integration conundrum and its debilitating consequences on the country. The insights generated from this case study would also add to the existing body of knowledge on the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism and the mutual interdependence between the institutional and normative dimensions of federalism.

1.9. Structure of the Report

The report is divided into six chapters. Chapter one serves as the orientation and problem statement. Chapters two and three are literature review. The literature review is divided into two chapters to deal with different aspects. Chapter two deals with the evolution of state political system and the foundations, origins and meaning of federalism. Chapter three focuses on the evolution and development of the Nigerian federalism. The extensive review of literature on the historical background of the Nigerian federalism is considered a major part of the investigation. Chapter four is the methodology chapter, which provides a description of the research design and procedure. Chapter five contains the results of the study. The discussion of the findings, summary, conclusion, suggestions for further research and recommendations are presented in chapter six.

CHAPTER TWO

STATE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE FEDERALIST IDEA

2.1. Introduction

The general preoccupation of this study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal system adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful plurinational coexistence. Specifically, the study focused on understanding how the prevailing political culture of federalism among the population harnesses or hinders the integrative and peace-promoting function of the federalism. In order to carry out this investigation, it was essential to conduct an extensive review of relevant literature. Consequently, this chapter and the next one have been dedicated to this purpose. This chapter provides insights into the historical, philosophical and theoretical foundations of federalism. A considerable attention has been given to the theological or covenantal roots of the federal idea because the study's focus of interrogation is on the normative dimension of federalism. The chapter begins with an in-depth exploration of the concept of "state," as a form of political organisation that emerged at a certain period in history, and how it evolved over time was explored in depth. The exploration of the literature also brought to the fore the emergence of federalism as a shift from statism to noncentralization, thereby underscoring the fact that the state is no longer a homogenous nation, but is defined by diversity. The implication of this for such concepts as "nation-state" and "nation" and national pluralism were examined as well. The chapter is organised under appropriate subheadings. From exploring global perspectives on federalism, the continues on the next chapter with a detailed examination of the background of the Nigerian federalism, including

the evolution of the Nigerian state as a colonial creation. Various historical antecedents that shaped the evolution of the federal solution, facilitated or hindered the development of a federative culture are explored from the literature.

This literature review process lasted from the preliminary phase of the work through the data collection, data analysis and synthesis stages of the study. To conduct this review of related literature, the researcher used multiple sources of information, including scholarly journals and working papers, conference proceedings, books, Internet resources, thesis and dissertations. These sources were accessed through Universitaetsbibliothek Tuebingen, ProQuest, Google Scholar, Scirus, Minority at Risk (MAR) Project, intute, and SciVerse ScienceDirect. Specific delimiting timeframe was not assigned to the search for literature, because of the importance of gaining an adequate picture of what is already known about the phenomenon under investigation and to ensure inclusion of substantial amount of relevant materials.

2.2. Historicity and Evolution of the State Political System

In order to understand federalism one needs to have a modicum of knowledge about the state political system. The whole basis of understanding federalism as a form of political organisation rests with how well one is conversant with the modern political system, state, which has become the "building block of the world system" (Stavenhagen, 1996, p. 2). The state has not always been here with us. It emerged at a certain period in human history. This section presents an extensive discussion of the emergence and development of the state political system.

2.2.1. Defining the State. Before going into a discussion of the nature and implications of the evolution of the state, it is important to clarify the term "state" itself. Michael Mann referred to the state as "undeniably a messy concept" because the majority of definitions contain two different levels of analysis in which the state is conceived either in terms of what it looks like or what it does (Mann, 1984, p. 187). For example, in his lecture to the Free Students Union of Münich University in 1918 around the period of the German Revolution, *Politik als Beruf* (Politics as a Vocation), Max Weber (1864-1920) argued that the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends, but only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, that is, the use of physical force (Weber, 1946 [1919]). Weber noted that although force is definitely not the normal or the only means of the state, but it is a means specific to the state. For Weber, the modern state is a "human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" (Weber, 1946 [1919], p. 78). Weber pointed out that institutions and individuals may have the right to use force only to the extent to which the state grants it. Therefore, the state is the only source of the right to use force. For Weber, therefore, politics is the act of "striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state" (Weber, 1946 [1919], p. 78). Weber saw the state as a coercive creation:

> ...the modern state is a compulsory association which organises domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolise the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. To this end, the state has combined the material means of organisation in the hands of its leaders, and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled these means in their own right. The state has taken their positions and now stands in the top place. (Weber, 1946 [1919], p. 83)

When one analyses the Weberian conception it would yield several salient features of the modern state, but can also be characterised as depicting a "heuristic, ideal type state" (Migdal, 2001, p. 14). For Mann (1984), Weber's notion of state was the more plausible approach compared to other scholars' because it is a mixed, but chiefly institutional, conception. Drawing from the Weberian conception, Mann (1984, p. 188) identified four features of the state, encompassing both institutional and functional elements:

a) a *differentiated* set of institutions and personnel embodying

b) *centrality* in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the centre to cover

c) a *territorially-demarcated* area, over which it exercises

d) a monopoly of *authoritative binding rule-making*, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.

Undoubtedly, Weber's classic definition and conception of state have had profound impact on twentieth-century social science, and even today maintain a wide currency in shaping the way the state is understood (Migdal, 2001). The Weberian idea of the state has continued to resonate with contemporary scholars. For instance, Pierson (2011) dissected the Weberian conception and added to the Mann's list above the so-called rational elements. According to Pierson, the most important defining features of the modern state based on the Weberian conception are (Pierson, 2011, p. 6):

1. Control (monopoly) of the means of violence;

2. Territoriality;

3. Sovereignty;

4. Constitutionality;

5. Impersonality;

6. The public bureaucracy;

7. Authority/legitimacy; and

8. Citizenship

9. Taxation (Pierson's own addition)

Both Mann and Pierson aligned themselves with the Weberian conception. In general, both embraced the Weberian conception of state, but differed in the aspects they emphasised. Both agreed that bureaucracy, territoriality, authoritative binding rule, and monopoly of the use of physical force are defining features of the state. Mann's use of the word "centrality" is very important for understanding the deviations between the Weberian ideal type state and many variants of it, such as the more decentralised or federalised political systems. In reality, "Actual states are deviations from the ideal or corrupted versions of the ideal" (Migdal, 2001, p. 14).

A contemporary definition in concurrence with the Weberian conception was given by Vujakovic (2005). Following the sociological theorist Anthony Giddens' conceptual approach, Vujakovic referred to the "state" as "a bounded space, or *territory*, which is controlled by a single sovereign power with a monopoly of the means of violence needed to achieve control" (Vujakovic, p. 153). Vujakovic explained that the sovereign power here refers to a formal government, which, ontologically, represents the state and has control over resources and population, and makes and implements laws that delineate the criteria for full membership of the state or citizenship.

The two definitions above are to be taken with a caveat – because of how states have evolved over time no single definition of the state is adequate – since "the state is multi-

faceted and contested" (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts & Whatmore, p. 723). The state is also to be taken as a normative ideological construction in that it thrives on: 1) the belief that states are legitimate and universal institutions endowed with unquestionable right to wield power over individuals; and 2) the fictitious historicised claim of "naturalness and historical permanency" (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 723).

One important point to note with the regard to the power of the state, as Mann (1984) and Penrose (2002) have posited, is the essentiality of the geographical concept of "territoriality" (cf. White, 2007). Territoriality involves asserting influence and control over people, phenomena and relationships by exercising claim over a geographical space backed by state sovereignty (Sack, 1983 & 1986; Smith, 1990). Or as Edward Soja defined it, territoriality refers to "a behavioural phenomenon associated with the organisation of space into spheres of influence or clearly demarcated territories which are made distinctive and considered at least partially exclusive by their occupants or definers" (Soja, 1971, p. 19). According to Rivera, such definition underlines the fact that territory is not fixed but a socio-political "construct where power is exercised" (Rivera, 2013, p. 28). As Rivera posited, territory is, therefore, produced, maintained, modified and reproduced concomitant with social context and historical process.

Territoriality is generally construed as a rational strategy (Sack, 1983; Sack, 1986; Smith, 1990; Vujakovic, 2005; Rivera, 2013). Some even argue that state territory is to all intents and purposes political (Rivera, 2013). Thus, the state's attempt to controls access to a defined space by invoking its sovereign power and deploying its assets of coercion (institutions, policies, and actors) is a means by which it can effectively monopolise, regulate and control the content (resources, population, infrastructure) of the territory

(Vujakovic, 2005; Rivera, 2013). To this extent, therefore, the state has been described as a "power container," with the ability to appropriate a broad range of social functions by exercising territorial control (Vujakovic, 2005). This implies that state territorial control is oriented toward the pursuit of the objectives of the state. State territoriality, therefore, is linked to the functions of the state. These functions are territorially and spatially bound. For instance, Mann (1984, p. 196) identified the multiplicity of state functions which include: a) The maintenance of internal order; b) Military defence/aggression; c) The maintenance of communications infrastructures; and d) Economic redistribution. Similarly, Vujakovic (2005) categorically asserted that the main functions of the state are: "the waging of war, the management of the economy, the propagation of national identity, and the provision of social services" (p. 154).

     2.2.2. Historicity and Evolution of the State. The state, which has become the dominant political unit of the past three centuries (Cerny, 1990; Storey, 2012) and the "building block of the world system" (Stavenhagen, 1996, p. 2), has undergone significant transformation (Cerny, 1990; Elazar, 1996b; Anderson B., 2006; Flint & Taylor, 2007; Antonsich, 2009). Increasingly, form and functions of the state are now being challenged and redefined (Gregory et al., 2009). For example, Ibrahim (2003) even stated categorically that the nation-state is in trouble. This development reinforces what Cerny (1990) meant by saying that states are not finished products. To be sure, states are human creations and not "natural" entities (Storey, 2012). As, Pierson (2011) and Storey (2012) have both noted, states, as it were, came into existence at certain points in human history and evolved over time. Therefore, it is important to note that:

     The state is not an eternal and unchanging element in human affairs. For the most of its history, humanity got by (whether more happily or not) without a state. For all its universality in our own

24

times, the state is a *contingent* (and comparatively recent) historical development. Its predominance may also prove to be quite *transitory*. ((Pierson, 2011, p. 28).

There were examples of different forms of states throughout history (Storey, 2012). The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, in his recent work, *The Origins of political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (2012) has given an extensive exposition of how the world's basic political institutions developed. He explained that, contrary to the widely held understanding that "the primordial human social organisation was tribal", the first form of political system among hunter-gatherer societies was the preagricultural family-and-band level political organisation (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 53). According to Fukuyama, the transition from band level societies to tribal societies was facilitated by "the emergence of settled societies and the development of agriculture around nine thousand years ago" (p. 53). Fukuyama pointed out that the preagricultural band societies were not characterised by political inequality because there was no private ownership of property as obtained in the modern time. Therefore, territoriality and land annexation were not pronounced in preagricultural societies. Further, he argued that band societies also did not have systems that resemble modern economic exchange and modern individualism. Fukuyama described the state of affairs in band societies as follows:

> There was no state to tyrannise over the people at this stage of political development; rather, human beings experienced what the social anthropologist Ernest Gellner has labelled the "tyranny of cousins." That is, your social world was limited to the circles of relatives surrounding you, who determined what you did, whom you married, how you worshipped, and just about everything else in life. Both hunting and gathering are done on a group basis by families or group of families. Hunting in particular leads to sharing, since there is no technology for storing meat, and hunted animals must be consumed immediately. (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 54).

25

The moral rules of such societies does not revolve around preventing individuals from stealing other people's property, but chastising those who refuse to share food and other necessities because the refusal to share under conditions of scarcity was deemed threatening to collective survival (Fukuyama, 2012). Wilson (2003) has enumerated a number of studies that showed how some hunter-gatherer societies function as moral communities and how they have used the mechanism of religion to establish regulatory apparatus that fosters collective welfare.

The egalitarianism of hunter-gatherer societies also has ramifications that go beyond food sharing to social relationships (Wilson, 2003). Wilson posited that in such societies, the request "take me to your leader" would elicit great bewilderment among hunter-gatherers because, as Fukuyama also noted in the quotations above, there are no leaders besides "those who have earned the respect of their peers by being models of good conduct, and who can only advise and not dictate" (Wilson, 2003, p. 21).

> Band-level societies are highly egalitarian. The major social distinctions are based on age and sex; in hunter-gatherer societies, the men hunt and the women gather, and there is a natural division of labour in reproductive matters. But within the band, there is relatively little differentiation between families, no permanent leadership, and no hierarchy. Leadership is vested in individuals based on qualities like strength, intelligence, and trustworthiness, but it tends to migrate from one individual to another. Apart from parents and their children, opportunities for coercion are very limited. (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 54).

For example, a study carried out by the British anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard in the 1930s among the traditional Nuer people of South Sudan revealed the social organisation of the people to be segmentary (Fukuyama, 2012). Evans-Pritchard's attempt to identify leaders among the Nuer people yielded a surprise – the people pointed someone who was

called a leopard-skin chief that turned out to be simply a specialist in conflict resolution (Wilson, 2003).

The lessons that can be learned from such social organisation are relevant to understanding the nature politics in Nigeria today. For instance, Gana & Egwu (2003) argued that the political economy of a society has to be interrogated in order to understand the challenge of managing diversity and plurality in a state. Empirical evidence exists in support of the postulation that "the new pattern of accumulation, especially the transformation of the agrarian based state into a rentier state, following the oil boom of the seventies, has accentuated the struggle for ethnic ascendance, geo-political advantage, personal accumulation and class consolidation" (Gana, 2003, p. 23).

As highlighted earlier, the transition from band to tribes was made possible by the emergence of settled societies and agriculture. Tribal societies emerged as the next level above the band (Fukuyama, 2012). According to Fukuyama, the two common characteristics of this second level of social organisation of human society are: 1) they were segmentary and 2) based on the principle of common descent (p. 56). The term "segmentary" was employed by the sociologist Emile Durkheim to describe societies that are "based on replication of identical small-scale social units, much like the segments in an earthworm" (p. 56). Fukuyama explained that such societies had no overall centralised political structure, were characterised by what Durkheim referred to as "mechanical solidarity," and, as such, had no high degree of functional differentiation like the modern division of labour. The form of segmentary differentiation obtained in such societies has been described as a kind "where every social subsystem is the equal of, and functionally similar to, every other social subsystem" (Buzan & Albert, 2010, p. 318). As Durkheim argued, societies

27

characterised by "mechanical solidarity" are held together and defined by a collective conscience, which embodies the totality of shared beliefs and sentiments common to the people and exists as an independent structure across space and time (Durkheim, 1997 [1893]; Buzan & Albert, 2010). As Buzan and Albert posited, this totality is what forms the basis of social formation or identity, transcending the individual.

It has been suggested that religion has existed in and shaped society since time immemorial. For example, Fukuyama (2012) posited that religion played a part in shaping the form of social organisation that took hold across human societies. He noted that the worship of ancestors began in band-level societies. According to him, however, later religion became progressively complex and institutionalised that it shapes other institutions including leadership and property. Thus, the role of religion in shaping social relationships and political affairs has a long history: "It is belief in the power of dead ancestors over the living and not some mysterious biological instinct that causes tribal societies to cohere" (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 60). Although religion and kinship are intimately connected in tribal societies, religious beliefs have had far-reaching impact on all social formation and identity building. It has been noted, for example, that religious belief in dead ancestors has had a huge social binding effect on individuals in tribal societies, where religion is more entrenched, than in family or band-level societies. Religion, therefore, expanded the scope of one's social world beyond the circle of relatives, and led to the formation of community:

> The "community" is not only present members of the lineage, clan, or tribe; it is the whole rope of descent from one's ancestors to one's unborn descendants. Even the most distantly related kin feel they have some connection and duties toward each other, a feeling that is reinforced by rituals that apply to the community as a whole. Individuals do not believe they have the power of choice to

constitute this kind of social system; rather, their roles are defined for them by the surrounding

society before they are even born. (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 62).

This means religion is a great binding force; it binds people (community) together. For example, in his classical study of religion, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim referred to religion as "an eminently collective thing" (Durkheim, 1954 [1912], p.47). His famous classical definition of religion underscores this binding characteristic: "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community ..., all those who adhere to them" (Durkeim, 1954 [1912], p. 47). As a consequence of its ability to mobilise people on a large scale, religion is believed to have made tribal societies militarily more powerful than in band level societies (Fukuyama, 2012). Thus, the relationship between religion and power in tribal societies was located in the former's ability to facilitate large scale collective action.

Tribal societies, according to Fukuyama, are created at particular historical juncture and thrived under certain environmental conditions, and are preserved on the basis of certain religious beliefs. Fukuyama argued that if those beliefs are altered as a result of the introduction of a new religion, in that case the tribal form of social organisation will break down and be replaced by "more flexible and scalable forms of organisation," as witnessed in barbarian Europe after the advent of Christianity (p. 63). As Fukuyama noted, tribal societies evolved from their strict adherence to genealogical basis of segmentary lineage to cognatic tribes and tribes that included members that have no actual kinship or lineal connection. In this sense, a tribe can be broadly defined as a human grouping that includes "not just kin claiming common descent but also patrons and clients linked through reciprocity and personal ties" (p. 78). According to Fukuyama, even when this change took

place, tribalism subsists as "one of the great constants of political development". Tribalism (tribal ties) and patronage (who scratches whose back) exist in developing countries and advanced democracies respectively in this twenty-first century (Fukuyama, 2012; Ornstein, 2014).

The transition from tribal societies to state-level political organisation represented a remarkable political development – "we exit out of kinship into the realm of political development proper" (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 81). It is, however, to be noted that tribal societies did not evolve automatically into the form that modern states have taken. Several precursors of the modern state are known throughout history. Storey (2012) has noted that Ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome as well as other parts of the world had early examples of states. These precursors of the modern state were small city-states and large empires. For instance, Greece had series of city-states (*Polis)* and Rome was organised as a spatially extensive empire (Storey, 2012). As already mentioned, such political organisations existed in different parts of the world. In precolonial Africa, for example, the political institutions were "existing in innumerable lineage and clan groups, city-states, kingdoms, and empires without any fixed boundaries" (Boahen, 1987, p. 95). Many scholars, including historians, have acknowledged that before European colonialism, Africa consisted of a wide variety of very large and very small states (Boahen, 1987; Herbst, 1997; Herbst, 2000; Diertz & Foeken, 2001; Reid, 2012).

Fukuyama (2012, p. 80-81) has delineated what distinguished state-level societies from tribal ones. The characteristics that distinguish the state from a tribal-level society include:

1. Possesses a centralised source of authority that enforces rules on the whole of society, trumps all other authorities within its territory, and therefore, is sovereign. The source of authority is presided over by a King, president or prime minister supported by hierarchy of subordinates. Lower administrative levels including lesser chiefs, prefects or administrators draw their authority from the sovereign.

2. The source of authority is backed by the monopoly of the means of coercion. That is, having control over the police and the military. Thus, the state has the means of coercion to prevent or suppress segments, tribes, or regions from seceding.

3. The authority of the state is territorial and not kin based. This means membership in a state is not contingent on kinship and, therefore, it can outsize a tribe.

4. States have more pronounced social stratification and inequality than tribal societies, often manifested in the rulers and their administrators, who in some instances become hereditary elite, detaching themselves from the rest of the society. It was suggested that slavery and serfdom thrived more under the aegis of states than in tribal societies.

5. States are legitimated and undergirded by far more elaborate forms of religious belief. Hence, a distinct priestly class exists as the guardian of the state. The relationship between the priestly class and the state differ from one instance to the other. If the priestly class takes power directly, then the state is a theocracy; when the state is controlled by a secular ruler, then it is labelled caesaropapist; and a hybrid scenario is obtained where power sharing between the priestly class and secular rule exists.

How do states come into being? Anthropologists and archaeologists have grappled with this question. Two basic types of state formation namely, primary (pristine) and secondary (competitive) state formation, are broadly identified (Chase-Dunn & Inoue, 2012; Fukuyama, 2012). Primary (pristine) state formation is the emergence of new state out of a tribal-level society or in the context where there are no pre-existing states. Secondary (competitive) state formation occurs where a stateless polity that is in interaction with one or more already-existing states – states are typically much better organised and powerful than stateless polities – becomes a state as a result of either being conquered or absorbed, or by emulating extant states in order to avoid getting conquered. Chase-Dunn & Inoue have noted that pristine state formation is much more challenging, from organisational and resource points of view, because it occurred in regions that had no prior knowledge of managing large settlement (a city) and without pre-existing states to emulate.

Newton & Deth (2010) have identified three general patterns of state formation. First, there are states that arose on the gradual transformation of existing political units. This pattern is referred to as *Transformation.* According to Newton and Deth, Medieval monarchies became states in this way. This pattern began in the Middle Ages and the development of states that underwent this pattern took several centuries. Britain and France are examples of this pattern. The second pattern identified by Newton and Deth is called *Unification* and occurred mainly in the nineteenth century. Here, states emerged through the unification of independent political units. Germany and Italy are examples of this pattern. Lastly, states also arose from *Secession* or break-up of independent political units such as empires and large multinational states into one or more states. This is the pattern that was witnessed after the First World War with the breaking up of Austro-Hungarian Empire and

the Ottoman Empire. Newton & Deth also noted that secession was the means through which several states in Africa and Asia came into existence following decolonisation after the Second World War. It is important to note that this is also the pattern that has produced states in recent times. For example, South Sudan was formed after it seceded from Sudan in 2011 (Rothfuss & Joseph, Forthcoming).

Many explanations have been adduced in an attempt by scholars to account for what gave rise to state formation. Fukuyama (2012) has synthesised the various explanations of the factors that influenced or led to state formation into the following categories:

1. "The State as a Voluntary Social Contract" – as implied in the ideas of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the state is viewed as the outcome of agreement entered in by individuals to surrender their rights to a sovereign.

2. "The State as a Hydraulic-Engineering Project" – proponents of this explanation argue that state formation was driven by the need for large-scale irrigation in which a central bureaucracy was deemed necessary (Karl Wittfogel's "hydraulic" theory of the state).

3. "Population Density" – population increase and population densities, considered as drivers of technological innovation, large-scale irrigation, high-yielding crop cultivation, and development of modern tools, promoted state formation by allowing specialisation and division of labour between elites and non-elite groups (this view was advanced by the demographer Ester Boserup).

4. "State as the Product of Violence and Compulsion" – this view is shared by those who believe that all human societies have engaged in violence, and therefore hierarchy and the state emerged when one tribal segment conquered another one and

exerted control over its territory. Thus, it was the imperative of sustaining this political control over the conquered territory that compelled "conquerors to establish centralised repressive institutions, which evolved into an administrative bureaucracy of a primitive state" (p. 85).

5. "Circumscription and Other Geographical-Environmental factors" – the protagonist of this view, anthropologist Robert Carneiro argued that warfare might have universally and necessarily, but not sufficiently, influenced state formation. According this position, state formation was rather brought about by increases in productivity that take place in a geographically circumscribed area, such as places bounded by a river valley, ocean, desert or mountain valleys, where the option of moving away did not exist.

6. "The State as the Product of Charismatic Authority" – this is an alternative view to the materialistic explanations that regard environment and level of technology as contingent factors in state formation. Proponents of this position argue that cultural factors such as religion were instrumental in state formation. Charismatic leaders – the Greek term *charisma* means "touched by God" – were believed to possess the religious authority that enabled them to unite a group of autonomous tribes and "create a centralised military machine that can conquer recalcitrant tribes as well as ensure domestic peace and security" (p. 87). Fukuyama suggested that once this conquest is achieved a new form of religion that overcomes the particularistic forms of the uniting tribes would develop to consolidate the emergent state-level organisation.

The various explanations above have to be considered with a caveat because they are not resting on conclusive anthropological and archaeological evidence (cf. Fukuyama, 2012). Furthermore, "States originate in many different ways and their development follows no single pathway" (Newton & Deth, 2010, p. 23). As earlier suggested, states are not universal because they failed to emerge in certain parts of the world, and tribal societies still persist in some regions (Fukuyama, 2012; Storey, 2012). The types, patterns and the precipitating factors of state formation highlighted above have not adequately captured the role of colonialism in imposing the state political system on some parts of the world. As discussed in the subsequent chapter, the Nigerian state, like many erstwhile colonies, was created by European imperial fiat.

Although early or ancient states existed in different parts of the world (Held, 1989; Storey, 2012), the history of the modern state can be traced back to between the twelfth and the sixteenth century in medieval Europe (Newton & Deth, 2010). The modern state system first emerged in Europe "as a sort of intermediate form between small city-states and larger empires" (Storey, 2012, p. 34). This development has been attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 at the end of Europe's Thirty Years War (Hassan D. , 2006; Straumann, 2008; Newton & Deth, 2010; Storey, 2012). The Treaty of Westphalia "helped set the scene for a territorial apportionment of land between European rulers" (Storey, 2012, p. 34). According to Storey (2012), it was from this point onward that territorialisation or the politicisation of space became entrenched, and space became subjected to, or to put it in another way, "amenable" to, measurement, mapping, demarcation, control, and bordering practices (Elden, 2007). This set the stage for the compartmentalisation of territories into polities (Storey, 2012). Thus, it can be said that the modern state emerged as a by-product of

the political order engendered by the Treaty of Westphalia (Held, 1989; Newton & Deth, 2010; Vaughan, 2011; Storey, 2012). The role of geographers and others in shaping this process and developing theories of state formation and evolution has been well acknowledged (Driver, 1991; Storey, 2012).

However, it is important to note that there was a lengthy and broad historical transition from the early or traditional states to the modern states (Pierson, 2011). Traditional states had "generally lacked conception of sovereignty, monopolistic authority, nationality, constitutionality and so on" (Pierson, 2011, p. 31). They were also not conscious of their existence as states among other states, which is an important attribute of the state in modernity. A cursory look at the forms or clusters of state systems identified by Held (1992) will help one to appreciate the evolution of the modern state from the early forms that are considered its precursors. The stages identified by Held are presented in *Figure 1* as the timeline of the evolution of the modern state from its precursors.

State systems	Centuries																				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Empires	▬▬▬▬▬▬ →Decline of Roman Empire																				
Feudalism (systems of divided authority)							▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▪▪▪▪▪														
Papacy*							▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▪▪▪														
Holy Roman Empire*							▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪														
Polity of estates														▬▬							
Absolutist states															▬▬▬						
Modern states																		▪▪▪▬▬▬▬			

Figure 1. Timeline of the Emergence of the Modern State. State forms and historical periods from the early precursors of the modern state to its emergence through the centuries (adapted from Held, 1992, p. 78). *Part of the feudal system at certain stages.

According to Held, the absolutist states were the direct precursors of the modern state, and it was the fundamental crisis which befell absolutism and religious tradition that paved the way for political transformation of the state (see also Pierson, 2011). As Held (1992) has argued, the divine rights of the monarch and the treatment of individuals as subjects, whose duty is to obey the ruler without question, had to be overturned:

> The idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order, that is, a legally circumscribed structure of power with supreme jurisdiction over a territory, could not have predominate while political rights, obligations and duties were closely tied to property rights and religious tradition. Similarly, the idea that human beings as 'individuals' or as 'a people' could be active citizens of this order – citizens of their state – and not subjects of a monarch or emperor could not develop under such conditions. (Held, 1989, p. 11).

In a later publication, Held described the fundamental changes that ushered in the modern state political order:

> The proximate sources of the modern state were absolutism and the interstate system it initiated. In condensing and concentrating political power in its own hands, and in seeking to create a central system of rule, absolutism paved the way for a secular and national system of power. Moreover, in claiming sovereign authority exclusively for itself, it threw down a challenge to all those groups and classes which had had a stake in the old order (the polity of estates), and to all those with a stake in the new developing order based on capital and the market economy. It forced all these collectivities to rethink their relationship to the state, and to re-examine their political resources. In addition, the myriad battles and wars fought out in the interstate system altered fundamentally the boundaries of both absolutist states and the emerging modern states - the whole map of Europe changed as territorial boundaries progressively became fixed borders.

> Although the transition from the absolutist to the modern state was marked by dramatic events and processes such as the English (1640-88) and French (1769) Revolutions, an exclusive focus on these hinders an understanding of the way in which the absolutist state itself was crucial in the development of modern political rule. It was the confluence of 'internal' transformations in

European states with shifting geopolitical relations and forces which provided a, if not the, key

impetus to the formation of the modern state. (Held, 1992, p. 87).

Held has also catalogued other factors that have precipitated the transformation of absolutist

states into modern states. The historical developments that facilitated this process

represented a watershed in the political transformation of the modern state. Held posited

that:

The historical changes that contributed to the transformation of medieval notions of politics were

complicated. Struggles between monarchs and barons over the domain of rightful authority; peasant

rebellions against the weight of excess taxation and social obligation; the spread of trade, commerce

and market relations; the flourishing of Renaissance culture with its renewed interest in classical

political ideas (including Athenian democracy and Roman law); changes in technology particularly

military technology; the consolidation of national monarchies (notably in England, France and

Spain); religious strife and the challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism; the struggle between

Church and State – all played a part. (Held, 1992, p. 83).

It is important, for our purpose here, to note that all modern states, which emerged between

the eighteenth and twentieth century, are nation-states (Held, 1992). The next section

examines briefly the rise and crisis of the nation-state.

2.3. Nation-State and National Unity: Myths and Realities

The foregoing discussion has focused on the development of the state political system and

the emergence of the modern state. A look at the nation-building project and its spread from

the West to the entire world may help us to understand better the challenge of diversity and

conflict to the modern state, and to also appreciate why federalism came to be increasingly

viewed and embraced as a viable alternative to the nation-state. The Norwegian political

scientist and sociologist Stein Rokkan (1921-1979) identified two processes associated with

this development; they are state building and nation building (Rokkan, 1999). State building

is mainly concerned with the creation of state institutions, bureaucracy and a system of government, while nation building involves "welding the population of the state into a single 'people' with a shared sense of belonging that often comes from a common language, religion, education, historical heritage and culture" (Newton & Deth, 2010, p. 24). The fusion of state building and nation building represented one of the political escapades of the modern history. As Linz (1993) noted, state building has to do with the creation of what is artificial. He argued that the state is not associated with the idea of nature or of being born, but it is simply created. Linz further argued that the creation of the state went on for centuries before the idea of the nation caught the imagination of intellectuals and the rest of the people. For example, Rokkan noted that the crucial phase of state-building was from around the eleventh to the eighteenth century (Rokkan, 1999, p. 150). It is noteworthy to mention that there is no precise origin of nation building; although there is a suggestion that it emerged from the second half of the nineteenth century (Linz, 1993). Even though it has been noted that proto-national sentiments in form of a strong identification with a state or loyalty to the monarchies by subjects was witnessed even by early sixteenth century in Europe (Greenfeld, 1992 & 2003), the idea of nation building, which began in Europe and spread to many parts of the world, only became entrenched in the last two centuries (Linz, 1993; Greenfeld, 2003). Rokkan's assertion that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars planted a time bomb in form of the idea of the nation-state and popular sovereignty supports this historical account (Rokkan, 1999).

The phenomenon of nation-building has impacted on the political development of African states in significant ways (Gana & Egwu, 2003a and 2003b). This is why it deserves to be given attention in a study focused on the Nigerian state. For instance, Linz noted:

"African states were created on the basis of colonial boundaries and the complexity of building nations on the homogeneous ethnic, linguistic and tribal basis has led African politicians to agree to defend the inviolability of state boundaries" (Linz, 1993, p. 357). Ironically, African leaders chose to turn their backs on the diversities of political organisations that characterised pre-colonial Africa (Herbst, 2000, p. 99). In *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, Basil Davidson captured this quite vividly:

> Broadly, the educated elites in West Africa – for a long time, it would be much the same in South Africa – saw Africa's own history as irrelevant and useless ... when it came down to brass tacks, to the question of who should take over from the British when the British withdrew, they demanded a more or less complete flattening of the ethnic landscape. (Davidson, 1992, pp. 102-103).

The leaning of African elites towards nation-statism, as Davidson described above, was problematic. As Laitin (2007, p. 88) argued, majority of the post-colonial states in Africa, like Nigeria, have arbitrary boundaries, which do not reflect national cultures, and, hence, are suspect as nation-states. Antonsich (2010) described the claim of spatial congruence between the state and nation by national political elites as fictitious and also as a powerful hegemonic discourse employed as a means to legitimise the coexistence of the state and nation. In what follows, an attempt is made at examining how the concept of nation-state has been deconstructed in the literature before returning to its implications for African states like Nigeria.

The premise that the boundaries of the nation and the state should become commensurate (Laitin, 2007), has informed the conception of: "A state based on the acceptance of a common culture, a common history and a common fate, irrespective of whatever political, social and economic differences may exist between the members of the

40

nation-state" (Newton & Deth, 2010, p. 23). Thus, the thesis of commensurability of the state and nation has been described as a myth, so also has the conception of the nation-state come under barrage of attacks. For instance, David D. Laitin referred to one of the myths of the nation-state as the belief that "states are natural, in the sense of correctly encompassing well-defined nations within the boundaries of a recognized state" (Laitin, 2007, pp. 82-83). Laitin asserted that: "The classical nation-state, one where a nation and state are commensurate, in which the national will is embodied in a state of its name, is today largely a nostalgic myth" (Laitin, 2007, p. 100). In his famous exegesis on nationalism, *Imagined Community*, Benedict Anderson portrayed the nation-state as a myth. He described nation as a "historical fatality" and an "imagined political community – and imagined both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Anderson considered the idea of the nation, which is moving progressively down and up history, as specifically analogous to the notion "of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time" (Anderson, 2006, p. 26). For Anderson, nations are inventions of imagination. He argued that nations are imagined, modelled, adapted and transformed, and they command a sense of attachment among peoples. At the same time, "nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love" (Anderson, 2006, p. 141). Anderson conceded that it is hard to explain how people develop such an attachment with the inventions of their imaginations and are willing to die for the inventions. Despite privileging the newspapers in Europe as the basis of his analysis, Anderson's "framework of bound in relationship to unbound seriality allows him to discuss the complicated forces acting upon the construction of national identity in postcolonial contexts" (Birth, 2013, p. 217). Anderson's argument, therefore, insisted that processes of nation building, which emerged in Europe and spread throughout the world by

colonialism, have become "constitutive of collective identities in the process of decolonization and in the formation of identities after independence was achieved" (p. 217.). Thus, the idea of the nation-state became so powerful that it impacted on the political trajectories of states in many parts of the world. For example, as Laitin (2007) explained, the nation-state project was grounded in a strong vision shared by its protagonists:

> In the mid-nineteenth century the German romantics saw the reconciliation of the state and nation as the fulfilment of a natural historical process. After World War I, the US President Woodrow Wilson saw the equation of the state and nation as the key to democracy and peace. And after the Russian civil war of 1917-23, the Communist victors saw recognition of national republics as a necessary step on the route to communism. In the waning moments of World War II, the national project was central to anticolonial mobilization in South Asia and subsequently Africa. (Laitin, 2007, p. 81)

Beyond being a myth, the nation has implications both as a concept and in practice. As a concept, the nation is a fluid and malleable, quite distinct from the notion of the state (Smith A. D., 2003; White, 2007). As earlier highlighted, the state is a spatialised "power container" (Vujakovic, 2005). On the other hand, the nation delineates the cultural association between people and geographic locations and territories (Vujakovic, p. 161). For instance, White argued that:

> Using the term nation as a synonym for such words as country and state rather as a human group identity, and country and state as a politically organised territory shows that human identity is closely tied to place and territory. Indeed, the term nation-state reflects the intimate bonds of people and place. (White, 2007, p. 3).

Noting the difficulty associated with defining the nation, Adam D. Smith posited that the attempt to define a nation has to involve the construction of an ideal-type based on the visions of the nationalists and the processes involved in forming the kind of human association that are referred to as nation, such as myth-making, memory selection,

42

territorialisation, cultural unification, to name a few (Smith, 2003). Taking these into account, Smith argued that the nation "is neither 'natural', nor 'essential'; indeed, it does not constitute a once-for-all goal, or fixed target, but a series of processes towards a goal that ever eludes its pursuers" (Smith, 2003, p. 24). Hence, Smith referred to a nation as "a named human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members" (p. 24). This definition brings out the difficulty that a state like Nigeria is bound to encounter when it adopts the nation-state project. National identity is inherently conceived, according to this definition, as a solvent that dissolves diversity. Just like the term nation, national identity is also a contested, if not elusive, concept (Smith, 2003; Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 2009). Smith again described "national identity" as the "maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of the individuals with that heritage and its patterns" (Smith, 2003, p. 25). It is important to note that self-definition matters here because nations define themselves in varying ways (White, 2007). Symmons-Symonolewicz made the attempt to come up with a blended definition that knits the nation, national identity and national unity together. Symmons-Symonolewicz's definition brought out the quest of nations to have sovereignty over a territory and to pursue self-government:

> A territorially-based community of human beings sharing a distinct variant of modern culture, bound together by a strong sentiment of unity and solidarity, marked by a clear historically-rooted consciousness of national identity, and possessing, or striving to possess, a genuine political self-government. (Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1985, p. 221).

Symmons-Symonolewicz's definition is a reminder that the modern nation is not just a myth; it is real in the challenge that it poses to the state. As nations aspire to assert

themselves and seek to control a territory in order to craft their own laws to protect their culture, conflict is bound to creep in (White, 2007). This challenge has become the bane of the nation-state, which has historically been construed as a sovereign state inhabited by a group of people who viewed themselves as one (Connor, 1972; Ma, 1992; Murphy, 1996). The fact that many so-called sovereign states are ethnically and nationally heterogeneous, even if they seek to fashion themselves otherwise, makes the nation-state project problematic (Murphy, 1996).

As earlier noted, Africa's experience with the nation-building project has been marked by grim outcomes. In his widely cited article, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," Walter Connor argued that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, "The prime cause of political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments of the population" (Connor, 1972, p. 353). "As a consequence of the opportunistic and arbitrary way in which colonial powers assembled their possessions, most of these states brought together disparate cultures and communities" (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 55). Thus, as Connor (1972) pointed out, in such states primordial loyalties tend to be stronger than loyalty to the state, and even political parties are mere means of masking primordial rivalries. A number of African countries, including Nigeria, had experienced civil war as a result of this phenomenon (Connor, 1972; Murphy, 1996). Antonsich (2010) has described the manifestations of the crisis of the nation-state as the "crisis of the hyphen." The "crisis of the hyphen", that is, "the increasingly problematic convergence between nation and state" is a worldwide phenomenon (Antonsich, 2009, p. 790).

For example, Gana (2003), drawing from Deutschian tradition – based on the notion of stages of nation-building popularised by Karl Deutsch and some historically oriented

political scientists in the mid twentieth century – posited that the Nigerian state appears to have failed to realise K. C. Wheare's (1970) dream that that the federal formula will propel a state to attain the stage of integration – "a stage at which regional, religious and ethnic walls collapse and a pan-Nigerian identity is on the verge of consolidation" (Gana, 2003, p. 29). The persistence of conflict along regional, religious and ethnic lines in Nigeria has not only cast shadow on the country's federalism, but remains a stark reminder of the unrelenting and vexatious National Question, which squarely and continuously puts the very formation of the Nigerian state in the crucible of political discourse. About a decade ago, a Nigerian writer, Jibrin Ibrahim described this as an African crisis and wrote this prognosis:

> The crisis of the state, nation, community and contesting cultures is particularly profound in contemporary Africa and the continent must confront the necessity of redesigning and saving its political future or face the risk of systemic collapse. For a very long period, African ruling classes have been propagating the virtues of national unity and the necessity of developing the nation-state. The reality of the continent, however, is that commitment to and identity (sic) with the state has always been very low. Indeed, the post-colonial state is currently undergoing an existential crisis. The African continent has been subjected to such terrible forces of repression, of exclusion of ethnic and religious groups, of destruction of her human and natural resources, that anarchy, ethnic cleansing, warlordism and the decomposition of political communities have become integral part of the political agenda for many countries. That is the path of despair and hopelessness that must be averted. The way forward is the struggle for renewal in which democracy is a critical instrument that could lead to the reconstruction of politics and the state, culture, economic organisation and production. At the heart of that search for democratic renewal, in the context of rising identity conflicts, is the question of federalism. (Ibrahim, 2003, pp. 116-117).

This vivid depiction of the political reality of Africa, and Nigeria in particular, clearly shows the failure of the nation-state project on the continent.

Anthony D. Smiths pointed out that "two of the nation's most important cultural resources and traditions are constituted by 'ethnicity' and 'religion'" (Smith, 2003, p. 25), which are intertwined (Smith, 1978; Smith, 2003). For instance, Joseph Raune and Jennifer Todd posited that religion and ethnicity intersect, and each can act as a powerful basis for identity, group formation and communal conflict. (Ruane & Todd, 2010a). In another work, Ruane and Todd (2010b) highlighted the importance of ethnicity and religion in state-building and nation-building. Ruane and Todd pointed out the ubiquitousness of ethnicity and religion in today's conflicts. The fusion of ethnicity and religion, and their role in the formation of national identity make them important resources for group mobilisation, contestation and conflict, especially in multinational state like Nigeria (Bruce, 2003; Ruane & Todd, 2010a).

The bifurcation of the concept of nation into a cultural-ethnic ensemble and a civic vocabulary has been adopted as an innovative way of overcoming the crisis that has befallen the nation-state (Antonsich, 2009). In their quest to create "national unity," Western politicians have embraced a concept of nation that is "based on a legal-political community, common culture and a civic ideology" (Vujakovic, 2005, p. 161). The Western model emphasises common values (such as passion for liberty, sense of duty, commitment to tolerance and fair play), shared interests and upholding the place of vital common institutions (Antonsich, 2009, p. 792). On the other hand, the non-Western model defines the nation in cultural-ethnic terms: "the nation as a community of common descent, a 'super-family' or a 'folk' (Vujakovic, 2005, p. 161). The commonality between the two models is that they are each grounded in the idea of a national territory or homeland; their major difference is that while the civic model permits the transfer of allegiance between

46

nations, the 'folk' model does not. The next section looks how federalism became a

practical mechanism of managing the challenge of diversity.

2.4. Paradox of Federalism: Blending Unity and Diversity

In his article, "From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift" (1996), Daniel Elazar noted

that the nation-state was undergoing a significant transformation, which he characterised as

a paradigm shift. The old paradigm, according to Elazar, was portrayed in the manner that,

"states strove for self-sufficiency, homogeneity, and with a few exceptions, concentration of

authority and power in a single centre" (Elazar, 1996, p. 419). Conversely, "under the new

paradigm all states have to recognise as well their interdependence, heterogeneity, and the

fact that their centres, if they ever existed, are no longer single centres but parts of a multi-

centred network that is increasingly noncentralised" (p. 419). Elazar acknowledged that the

paradigm shift does not eliminate completely the challenge that comes from ethnic conflicts.

He accepted the inevitability thesis of social conflict by arguing that the potential for ethnic

groups to have conflict with the state and with each other always exists. Elazar observed

that ethnic conflicts have received increasing attention as a result of the horrendous

consequences that they have produced at the time. For example, the genocide in the former

Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, which claimed an estimated two hundred thousand lives, and

Rwandese genocide in 1994 in which nearly a million died, were examples of how ethnic

nationalism reared its ugly head in recent history (Brancati, 2009; Prunier, 2009; Stein,

2012).   Elazar contended that the resurgence of ethnic strife, in defiance of the hope that

modernisation will usher in an era in which primordial attachments will be abandoned, gave

rise to a widely shared belief in federalism as antidote to ethnic conflicts. However, Elazar

also noted the dialectical relationship between ethnicity and federalism – while ethnic

cleaves and agitations make federalism necessary, in some way render it especially difficult and less likely to be successful. According to Elazar, proponents of ethnic self-determination and of federalism have to confront this paradox and its "polar" realities. Is the Federal Republic of Nigeria a quintessence of these "polar" realities? This is the question at the heart of this study.

2.5. Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Federalism

Despite the large volume of published studies on federalism, there is a seeming underappreciation of the history of its roots in theological-political tradition (McCoy & Baker, 1991; Elazar, 1996 and 2000; Baker, 2000; Lépine, 2012). Majority of writings about the origins of federalism, like those of William Riker and many of his contemporaries as well as present-day writers, tend to start and end with a consideration of the circumstances and motives behind the creation of modern federations. Few scholars have delved into the legacy of Reformed and post-Reformed theology on modern federalism. This omission prompted Charles McCoy and Wayne Baker to ask whether it is due to amnesia or deliberate attempt to deny religion the credit it deserves for laying a foundation of what is central in shaping the modern society (McCoy & Baker, 1991). Perhaps, this might have been informed, as David Elazar opined, by the attempt of modern theorists and practitioners to secularise the borrowed covenant idea that served as the kernel of modern federalism (Baker, 2000, p. 25). In defence of the omission of religion in scholarly analysis, Max Frenkel, for example, argued that religious elaboration of federalism was no more relevant because its ideological point of departure is too restrictive (Frenkel, 1986).

In their groundbreaking work, *Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenantal Tradition*, McCoy and Baker (2000) took on the task of tracing the origin of

political federalism to its original roots in covenantal thought in the religious and theological traditions, in particular to the Reformed and post-Reformed tradition of the Christian faith. McCoy and Baker's work was an attempt to help scholars, as they put it: "to overcome whatever it is that blocks out an understanding of this movement which is so important for understanding our history, our society, and our own existence" (McCoy & Baker, 1991, p. 9). McCoy & Baker explained how federal theology tradition inspired federal political philosophy and served as the foundation of modern federalism. They traced the intellectual foundation of the federal movement to Heinrich Bullinger's treatise *De testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno* (1534), translated as *The One and Eternal Testament or Covenant of God* (McCoy & Baker, 1991, p. 9). McCoy & Baker asserted that, contrary to what is generally held, the basic ideas of human nature on which Western societies are founded did not spring out from liberal individualism but from federal tradition which had predated it. For example, Johannes Althusius, who was the first systematic expositor of the federal political philosophy, underscored the symbiotic nature of humans and spoke of humans not as individuals but as *symbiotes*. McCoy & Baker posited that the very ideas of government based on covenant or compact was entrenched in the federal tradition before Hobbes and Locke came up with what may likely be considered as later variants of federal thought (see also Baker, 2000, p. 26). Even the ideas of division of powers and the need for checks and balances attributed to Montesquieu were well-articulated in the federal tradition before his widely quoted formulation of them. Although Montesquieu is also regarded as the first to pioneer and conceptualise the idea and semantics of federalism in modern political thought through his *The Spirit of Laws* (1748) (Lépine, 2012, p. 30), it was the great transformations spurred by the Reformed

Protestantism resting on covenant theology in the sixteenth century that inspired a

revolution in political philosophy (Elazar, 1996). Therefore, the influence of covenant

theology of early Reformed Protestantism can be said to even surpass that of ancient and

medieval contributions as the basis for the development of modern federalism (Elazar 1996;

Baker 2000).

McCoy and Baker described Bullinger's treatise as the "point of origin or the

fountainhead of federalism" because it is the first attempt to organise "the understanding of

God, creation, humanity, human history, and society around the covenant" (McCoy &

Baker, 1991, p. 9). To understand how the concept of federalism is related to the idea of

covenant requires a close look at the etymology of federalism. The word "federal" is a

derivative of the Latin *foedus*, which means covenant. Thus, McCoy and Baker asserted: "A

covenantal order is federal. A federal order is covenantal" (McCoy and Baker, 1991, p. 12).

They also noted that while the concepts of "federalism" and "covenant" are intertwined,

political thought has appropriated the former and biblical studies and theology have isolated

the latter as a purely biblical concept and a Reformation and post-Reformation Christian

doctrine. This bifurcation has blurred the commonality of federal terminology, including

such words as covenant, compact and contract, to both theological and political writers.

Disciplinary borders, even as they are today, are not water-tight. McCoy and Baker

highlighted this by pointing out that between the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries when the institutions of the modern world began to take shape, federal theologians

delved into political and ecclesiastical issues and political philosophers were concerned with

both societal covenants and religious issues. For example:

> Heinrich Bullinger and Samuel Rutherford were primarily religious leaders but did not hesitate to
>
> spell out the political implications of their theological federalism. On the other hand, political

thinkers like Johannes Althusius and Thomas Hobbes focused on the political order but included

much that now would be regarded as in the domain of theology. All four are deeply immersed in the

covenantal or federal tradition. (McCoy & Baker, 1991, p. 12).

Bullinger's treatise, albeit not conceived as a political philosophy, contains the four

out of the five elements of later federalism, namely: 1) envisions of society formed on the

basis of the covenant; 2) views human nature as the imperative for the covenant; 3)

emphasises the collectivity or community; and 4) upholds the need for the community to be

governed by God's laws (Baker, 2000, p. 27). Baker observed the absence of checks and

balances in Bullinger's system. Instead, Bullinger assumes faithfulness in the covenant on

the part of the community and its leaders, and makes only a suggestion of a check to the

authority exercised by the magistrate through the threat of divine punishment. However,

Phillippe du Plessis Mornay advocated the idea of strong check by asserting that any ruler

who violates the covenant loses legitimacy and should be deposed. Mornay's (1579)

Defense of Liberty against Tyranny: or of the lawful power of the prince over the people,

and the people over the prince (*Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: sive, de principis in populum,*

populique in principem, legitma potestate) demonstrates his belief that in both religious and

political covenants, the civil ruler is both accountable to God and to the people (Baker,

2000, p. 28). Mornay's position was that political sovereignty resides with the citizens

(Hall, 1997). Clearly, Mornay's covenantal thought has a conjoined view of religious and

political life within the federal framework. Although he talked about obedience to God as a

source of legitimacy, Mornay's idea of popular sovereignty radically conceives of ultimate

political sovereignty in the citizens (Baker, 2000). Mornay raised and answered some

pertinent questions, which led him to propose a framework of justification for striping a

ruler of his authority based on the violation of the covenant (Hall, 1997, p. 9):

51

- Are kings themselves above the law?

- May the prince make new laws, or are they made by the people?

- Does the ruler have power of life and death over his subjects?

- May the king ignore the law in granting pardon to those found guilty?

- Does the property of the people belong to the king?

- Is the king the lawful owner of the kingdom?

- May the king use the property of the people for his own ends?

These questions, whose answers very obvious, establish the limit of the authority of the ruler and affirm the people's sovereignty. Here Mornay's position aligned with John Locke's thesis of the revocability of the social contract in contrast to Thomas Hobbes' absolutizing arbitrary will of the sovereign (cf. Hall, 1997, p. 9; Stanlis, 2003, p. 23).

At this point, a brief exposé on the covenantal logics of federalism is worthwhile. McCoy and Baker (1991) use six arguments to show the covenantal logics of federalism. This is summarised as follows:

1. First, the term "federal" and "covenant" are closely related and interchangeable. The word "federal" is a derivative of the Latin *foedus*, which means covenant. Federalism is therefore a covenant.

2. Second, federalism is explained in terms of the relationship between God, humans and nature (land) based on covenant. Biblically, humans enter into a covenant in order to shape economic, political and familial relations. "The relation of God with the creation and with humanity is depicted in covenantal terms" (p. 12). Biblical examples this covenantal relationship: God's covenant with Noah, all humanity, and nature after the flood; God's covenant with Abraham and his descendents; and God's covenant with

52

Hebrew people after their deliverance from captivity in Egypt. Thus, a parallel can be drawn between the conceptions of covenant in federal theological thought and federal political philosophy. For instance, just as federal theologians assert that "God's covenant is originally with nature, and with humans in creation and that subsequent covenants continue, renew, and respond to the compact by which the world was created" (p. 13) so also do federal political philosophers affirm this pattern in varied forms. McCoy and Baker cited the example of the Hobbesian genesis of the state. In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes "understood the state as created by human compact in way parallel to God's covenantal fiat creating the world" (p.13). There are even federal thinkers who understand the Trinity, that is, the relations within the Godhead among the three persons, The Father, The Son and The Holy Spirit, as social, federal or covenantal relations. In federal perspective, the most deep-seated affirmation about God for Christians is that God is always faithful and keeps covenants.

3. Third, federalists understand the inner nature of social groups and the relationships among members as covenantal. For example, primary social groups such as families, congregations, occupational groups, and community organisations live by virtue of the unspoken and explicit compacts defining relations among their members and committing them to the group. In the case of a political organisation the compact is among the collectivities that make up the larger entity – for a example, a town is based on a compact among families, a province is based on a compact among towns, a commonwealth is based on a compact among provinces, and international relations is based on a compact among commonwealths. "The element of voluntary participation, of the rights and responsibilities of membership, of commitment to the group and its

53

patterns of governance, and of holding leaders to their covenanted obligations are central to the federal order whether ecclesiastical, economic, or political" (p. 13).

4. Fourth, division of powers is a concomitant component of federalism. Federalism insists on division of powers at and between all levels of organisation. This is to ensure: 1) check and balances in order to guide against excessive concentration and misuse of power; 2) functional efficiency; and 3) appropriateness of action. It appears that the concept of division of powers and check and balances have dominated the understanding of federalism and relegated other aspects, blurring the broader and more accurate picture.

5. Fifth, federalism and federal relations are to be regarded as dynamic concepts rather than static pattern or design. Therefore, federalism is, first and foremost, a process of federalizing a political community – a process that brings a number of political communities into a compact in order to solve problems, adopt joint policies and make decisions on problems that affect them. It is also a process that brings about the differentiation of a unitary political community into a federally organised whole. Since federal relations are dynamic it is, therefore, incumbent on every federally organised community to brace itself with the instrumentalities for continuing improvement. The implication of this is, no federal design is perfect and timeless; adapting to changes and improvements make it work.

6. Sixth, federalism, implicitly or explicitly, subscribes to the view that human nature and history are intertwined. McCocy and Baker explained this logic in a rather philosophical manner:

> Both humanity and history are understood developmentally, as moving toward fulfilment, and humans are understood as social and covenantally shaped and committed. The mix of good and evil

54

in history and the compound of original goodness and fallen sinfulness in human nature eliminates

the possibility of an easy optimism or a notion of automatic progress with reference to the future. Yet

there is, among federalists from Bullinger to Jahannes Althusius, John Winthrop, and James

Madison, a strong element of hope within republics shaped for the federal perspective.   (McCoy

& Baker, 1991, p. 14).

While some of the ideas above may seem to espouse what Frenkel (1986) feared as

the restrictive ideological point of departure of federal theology, they have nevertheless

informed the underlying logic of modern federalism. A number of scholars have affirmed

the influence of these ideas even on seemingly more secular federations (Elazar, 1996; Hall,

1997; Everett, 1997; Elazar, 2000; Baker, 2000; Freitas & Raath, 2009).

Daniel J Elazar's "From Biblical Covenant to Modern Federalism: The Federal

Theology Bridge" (2000) has collaborated McCoy & Baker's attempt to fill the missing link

between federal theology and modern federalism. Elazar has argued that covenant or federal

theory was not the exclusive domain of philosophers, theologians and intellectuals alone,

but has had wide adaptations and applications in public enterprise including the creation of

unions, governments and corporations. Elazar pointed out numerous classical examples in

which Americans made covenants to create new civil societies regularly. The examples cited

by Elazar have one common denominator: they are analogous to and inspired by biblical

concept of covenant.

The examples cited by Elazar (2000, p. 2-3) include:

The Mayflower Compact 1620:

In The name of God, Amen. We whose names are under-written,... Having undertaken for the Glory

of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage

to plant the first colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and

mutually in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a

civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid.

Virginia Bill of Rights 1776:

[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which,

when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity,

namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of property, and pursuing and obtaining

happiness and safety.

The Vermont Declaration of independence 1777:

We,...the inhabitants, [of the New Hamshire grants] are at present without law or government, and

may be truly said to be in a state of nature; consequently a right remains to the people of said Grants

to form a government best suited to secure their property, well being and happiness.

The Constitution of Massachusetts written by John Adams 1779:

The body politics is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social compact by which

the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be

governed by certain laws for the common good. It is the duty of the people, therefore, in framing a

Constitution of Government, to provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for

impartial interpretation and faithful execution of them, that every man may, at all times, find his

security in them.

Lyndon Johnson's Inaugural Address 1965:

They came here – the exile and the stranger, brave but frightened – to find a place where a man could

be his own man. They made a covenant with this land. Conceived in justice, written in liberty, bound

in Union, it was meant one day to inspire the hopes of all mankind; and it binds us still. If we keep

its terms, we shall flourish.

Elazar used the above excerpts to demonstrate how the covenant principle has

underpinned the foundation of American politics. According to Elazar, while the

interpretations of the covenant principle may differ among theologians, there are broad

areas of agreement among political leaders, who had been inspired by religious principles

56

and those within a secular political setting. All those who subscribed to the covenant

principle based on either religious or secular persuasions agree on: "the importance of

popular or republican government;" the necessity to diffuse power;" "the importance of

individual rights and dignity as the foundation of any genuinely good political system;" and

"the existence of inalienable rights was not an excuse for anarchy just as the existence of

ineradicable human passions was not an excuse for tyranny" (Elazar, 2000, p. 4).

Although Elazar used the American examples to drive his point home, he

acknowledged that the relationship between covenant and politics is as old as political life

itself. He traced the origin of the use of covenant in politics to over four thousand years ago

in ancient Mesopotamia. He credited the advancement of the political idea of covenant,

where polities are created based on cooperative partnership, to the Jewish people. In the

Jewish sense, covenant, which is called *brit* in Hebrew, "signifies a voluntary partnership,

often meant to be perpetual (or "until death do us part") between peoples or parties having

independent, though not necessarily equal, status" (Elazar, 2000, p. 5). The purpose of such

association, according to Elazar, was to "provide for joint action or obligation to achieve

defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect which protect

the individual integrates of all the parties" (p. 5).

Implied in the writings of Elazar, the medieval and ancient background of

contractualism are important insofar as they help us to understand the original ideas of

covenantal politics, but "the basis for the development of modern federalism was the

covenantal theology of early Protestantism" (Baker, 2000, p. 25). Thus, Elazar's opinion

was that modern theorists and practitioners of federalism basically embraced the theological

covenantal idea and secularised it. Elazar, like McCoy and Baker, acknowledged Bullinger

as the first to lucidly elaborate a theology of conditional covenant and to utilise it as a framework for the Christian community. Some of the early attempts to introduce the covenant idea to civil politics, according to Elazar, were made by: Oecolampadius (1525), who talked about a Natural Law Covenant predicated on the love of God that was to form the basis for civil covenant; Theodore Beza (1574), who advanced the notion of civil covenants to justify resistance to tyranny and insisted that rulers must obey God's covenants and civil covenants with the people; and Phillipe du plessis-Mornay (1579), who advocated a tripartite notion of covenant between God, the king and the people and advanced the ideas of religious and civil liberties (Elazar, 2000, p. 8). However, Elazar noted, it was in Johannes Althusius' (1603) work that the concept of civil covenant attained "its fullest expression" (p. 8). It was Althusius that was credited with the conceptualisation of proper human relationships, including the family and the creation of polities, in terms of covenants.

To summarise the foregoing discussion on the philosophical and intellectual origins of political federalism, we turn to Baker (2000). Baker identified the epochal and intellectual faces of federalism in six sequential orders as follows:

1. Bullinger's *One and Eternal Testament or Covenant of God* as "The original face of federalism" – Bullinger was the first to develop the concept of covenant or federal theology in 1525 in Zurich.

2. Mornay's *Defense of Liberty against Tyrants* as "The early political face of federalism" – For Mornay, religious and political covenants made civil rulers accountable to both God and people, and ultimate political sovereignty resides with the people.

3. Althusius' *Politics* as "The bridge between the religious covenant and political federalism" – Althusius made the first connection between religious covenant and political federalism.

4. Hobbes' *Leviathan* as "The dark face of federalism" – Hobbes had a dark view of human nature and believed that the absolute state personified by the "mortal god" was the only guarantee of peace and order in society.

5. Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* as "A new face of federalism" – Locke's political theory encapsulated the basic elements of federalism including the necessity of a social covenant or compact to bind political community and the indispensability of political sovereignty, which is subject to revocability where the sovereign authority becomes tyrannical.

6. "The American face of federalism" – the covenant made by the Pilgrims aboard the Mayflower in 1620 and the sermon of John Winthrop in 1630 in preparation for the establishment of the colony of Massachusetts represented a "rudimentary theory of social compact to build a political community on the religious covenant" and Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence was "a more sophisticated theory" ushering the new American face of federalism.

Two salient points are worth mentioning here. First, covenantal federal ideas had deep roots in early federations such as in Switzerland (1291). Second, contractual political theorists tried to secularize covenantal federal principles, but have not succeeded in obliterating it completely. In spite of the attempt by social contract theorist such as Hobbes (1151), Locke (1690), Montesquieu (1748), Rousseau (1762) and others to secularize covenant, covenant political principles became the basis of formation of latter federations

such as the United States (Elazar, 2000). The next chapter would help one to judge whether or not covenantal political principles influenced Nigeria's federal bargain, considering the fact that the British effectively governed the country into federalism (Ajayi, 1962). In what follows, the factors that motivate states to adopt federalism are examined.

2.6 Motives behind the Adoption of Federalism

The work of William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (1964), has been acknowledged by several scholars as one of the most influential contributions to the study of federalism (Volden, 2004; Rodden, 2004; Filippov, 2005; Burgess, 2006; Kleinerman, 2009). Riker was widely regarded as one of the founders of the methodology of rational choice in the study of politics (Filippov, 2005; Kleinerman, 2009). He insisted that political phenomena should be studied through the application of scientific methodology. In *Federalism,* Riker sought to demonstrate the promising application of scientific methodology to research on federalism; and, by doing so, he was prepared to stir up a new controversy among his contemporaries. Riker's scientific approach in *Federalism* aimed at reaching tested and testable conclusions about the conditions under which federations are created. First, he agreed that each "federal bargain" was shaped by "unique historical contexts" (Burgess, 2006, p. 77), but insisted that there are generalisable conditions or common factors to the origins of federations. Riker analysed the "bargain invented at Philadelphia" and examined all cases of creation of a federation from 1786 to 1964. This led him to formulate two propositions that, according to him, constitute the two conditions behind the bargain of federalism: 1) the expansion condition and 2) the military condition (Burgess, 2006, p. 77; Volden, 2004, pp. 91-92; Dikshit, 1971, p. 182). In Riker's own words, the two predispositions that are always present in the "federal bargain" and are

60

conditions that are necessary for the creation of any federalism are (as cited in Volden, 2004, p. 91-92):

> 1. The politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control, usually either to meet an internal military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement. But, though they desire to expand, they are not able to do so by conquest, because of either military incapacity or ideological distaste . . . .
>
> 2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. Either they desire protection from an external threat or they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the federation.

Riker's assumption in the statement above was that "federalism is an outcome of institutional bargaining among politicians" (Filippov, 2005, p. 95). As Burgess (2006) observed, Riker's approach had a rational view of political actors – "that men in politics behave rationally in making bargains that involved mutual benefits" (p. 78).

Riker was not the first and the last to mention the importance of military and expansion conditions in the origins of federations. Some scholars before him, including H.R.G. Greeves, William P. Maddox, and K.C. Wheare also advanced arguments highlighting a military condition or external threat in the origins of federalism (Volden, 2004; Dikshit, 1971). However, Riker's position differed from the one they espoused. While the others argued that the military and expansion conditions are two of the many efficient agents in the creation of federalism, Riker was obviously the first to pinpoint that they are "necessary" but "not sufficient" conditions for the origins of federalism (Volden, 2004, p. 91; Dikshit, 1971, p. 182). Riker's assertion that the two conditions were necessary for the creation of federations triggered further debate on the motives behind the creation of federations (Burgess, 2006, p. 78). For example, Anthony Birch reassessed Riker's

propositions with reference to Nigeria, East Africa and Malaysia. Birch contradicted Riker's account that the ambition of Ghana through Nkwame Nkrumah's emphasis on pan-Africanism was an external threat to the Western region of Nigeria (Dikshit, 1971, p. 183). Birch, who served as the legal consultant for the Western region of Nigeria during the federal negotiations, countered Riker by pointing out that the negotiators at the time neither had any concern of external threat from Ghana nor entertained any sympathy for Nkrumah's ambitions. Likewise, in the case of Malaysia, Birch argued that Riker looked only at "the possibility of Indonesian aggression as the only threat," and ignored the presence of internal threats. Based on these two disconfirming cases, Birch came to the conclusion that the desire to deter internal threats and external threats are relevant to the formation of federalism (Volden, 2004, p. 93; Dikshit, 1971, p. 183). Hence, Birch expanded Riker's conditions to include (1) the desire to deter internal threats and (2) the willingness to have them deterred (Burgess, 2006, p. 78; Volden, 2004, p. 93).

Birch's argument did not seem to weaken the Rikerian thesis. Some even suggested that it rather reinforced it (Dikshit, 1971). For example, Ramesh Dikshit observed that Birch himself has acknowledged that Indonesia posed an apparent threat to Malaysia, even if the threat was not as potent as was portrayed by Riker. In the case of Nigeria, Dikshit suggested that the external threat was not ruled out. The mere fact that the three regions of Nigeria were surrounded by the French cultural empire in West Africa was enough to constitute an external threat. Dikshit opined that:

> This geographical location may well have prompted some sense of solidarity and of the need for union at least among the elites. Because of the strongly divisive elements in their politico-geographic makeup, however, these units could not form a unitary state, so they chose instead the federal form of organisation. (Dikshit, 1971, p. 184).

Geoffrey Sawer, on his part, was not comfortable with what he considered as Riker's overemphasis on the military condition (Volden, 2004) and viewed Riker's 'defence-and-diplomacy' as "rather over-stressed" and based on quite a loose conception of federalism (Burgess, 2012). This concern was also shared by Dikshit, who cited the lack of compelling evidence of the military conditions in the cases of Germany and Austria. Dakshit (1971) offered two negative proofs against Riker's military interpretation of federal constitutions and his claim that the two conditions he named must be present before any federation will be established under all circumstances. Dakshit, like other scholars, accepted that external threat may be one of the most compelling agents in the creation of a federation, but objected to the Rikerian thesis of the necessity of the military and expansion conditions. According to Dikshit, the experience of two post-World War II European federations, Germany and Austria appear to disagree with Riker's necessity hypothesis. Dikshit provided an elaborate analysis of the German and Austrian federal bargains to question the Riker's necessity hypothesis of military and expansion conditions in the origins of federalism. Dikshit's conclusion was that:

> Federalism is in fact a complex structure born in response to a set of peculiar spatial arrangements and shaped by the interactions of economic, political, and cultural factors. To single out any one of these sets of factors to explain the whole structure is bound to give results that are only partially true. Federalism is an integrated phenomenon, and it should be seen in its entirety if we want to arrive at valid conclusions. (Dikshit, 1971, p. 189).

Dikshit further argued that there is a considerable difference between the raisons d'être of earlier federalism and modern federalism. According to him, while the raisons d'être of earlier experiments with federalism may necessarily be predicated on the need for military alliance against a common enemy, modern federalism, on the other hand, arose

from multiplicity of needs and not just military security. In a nutshell, he argued that: "The primary objective of modern federalism is to create a body politic—an integrated and fully functioning political unit. Hence the purposes that bind the prospective partners together cannot be narrowly political or military" (Dikshit, 1971, p. 189).

Burgess (2006) attempted to synthesise the various arguments on the motives behind the origins and formation of federation. He critically analysed the different postulations that had been advanced by early authorities including Wheare, Deutsch, Riker, Birch and Watt. First, Burgess noted that generally scholars tend to identify two predominant motives behind the origins of federalism, which are "defence and security" and "economic and commercial" motives. The defence and security goals have led to the formation of a defence union for military purpose (a *Kriegsverein*), and the economic and commercial objectives gave rise to a customs union for economic benefits facilitated by increased flow of trade and commerce (a *Zollverein*) (p. 76). Burgess also observed that the defence and security consideration was regarded by majority of scholars as the critical factor in the origins of both confederations and federations. Burgess went a step further by attempting to synthesise the ideas of previous contributors to the debate on the origins of federation. He proposed what he described as "a set of historical factors that pertain in various ways to every modern federation in its origins and formation and that contain sufficient scope and flexibility to facilitate, in each case study, a different hierarchy of causes" (Burgess, 2006, p. 99). His proposal began with a classification of these historical factors into two broad categories, namely, "perceived common interests" and "real or imagined external and/or internal threats." Burgess produced a list of the constitutive elements of the two categories by largely drawing from the contributions of previous scholarship. The constitutive elements of

64

the "Common Interest" category include: shared political values; expectations of stronger economic ties and associated benefits; a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions; the desire for political independence; prior political association; strategic (territorial) consideration; geographical proximity; common cultural-ideological factors, such as nationalism, religion and inherited traditions and customs; political leadership and a broadening of the political elite; similarity of social and political institutions; the appeal of federal models; the culmination of historical processes that were founded upon prior political commitments. The "External and /or Internal Threats" comprise of the following constitutive elements: A sense of military insecurity real or imagined; a sense of economic insecurity real or imagined; a sense of cultural insecurity real or imagined; and a perceived threat to the stability of the existing political order.

Although Burgess has claimed that his schema of circumstantial causation would apply to every modern federation since 1789, he admitted that the debate was far from being over. What he was able to achieve was to establish a ground for the rejection of Riker's federal bargain hypothesis of the necessity of military and expansion conditions in the origins of federations. Burgess' historical analysis of selected case studies led him to conclude that "a complex amalgam of socio-economic, historical and political variables were present at the creation" of every modern federation (Burgess, 2006, p. 101). Burgess' proposed theory of circumstantial causation contains what he referred to as "sufficient scope and flexibility" that allows for the determination of hierarchy of causes in the formation of every federation. However, his exclusion of old Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil and Nigeria because of their experience with military rule posed a challenge. He asserted that: "Such coercive unions certainly exhibited federalism but were not real federations" (p. 98). He

further argued that "Federations are voluntary unions based upon liberal democratic notions of constitutional government" (p. 98).

This delineation raises an implication for the meaning of federalism and federation. It can also be said, for example, that Nigeria's federalism "died" when the military struck (cf. Alli, 2003, p. 71), but "resurrected" when the country returned to a democratic dispensation in 1999 (cf. Watts, 2008). Another challenge inherent in the Burgess' conception is that it is also problematic to claim that all federations are formed as voluntary unions because: "Many multinational states are formed not by voluntary bargains but by the vagaries of conquest and colonialism. A federal bargain becomes necessary to hold the multinational state together and assuage fears of interethnic exploitation" (Rodden, 2004, p. 489).

Finally, Ronald Watts shifted attention from the classical debate on motives to interrogating the contemporary relevance of federalism. Watts (2008) offered numerous explanations for the contemporary appeal of the federal idea. Watts observed that the concept of nation-state, developed in the seventeenth century, is increasingly regarded as obsolete by a growing number of people around the world. The indication of this, according to Watts, is that "we appear to be moving from a world of sovereign nation-states to a world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a constitutionally federal character" (Watts, 2008, p. 4). The reasons suggested by Watts, as responsible for the increased international appeal of federalism and devolution within states, are summarised as follows (pp. 5-7):

1. Modern developments in areas such as transportation, social communications, technology and industrial organisation have posed a challenge to both larger and smaller

66

political organisations. The larger political units in both Western and non-Western societies are facing pressure from their people's desire for better life, social justice and influence in an increasingly interconnected world, where advanced technology makes both mass destruction and mass construction feasible. Smaller political units on their part have the desire to increase government's responsiveness to the individual citizen and to increase recognition for primary group attachments such as linguistic, cultural ties, religious connections, historical traditions and social practices, which are necessary for ensuring a community's sense of identity and aspiration for self-determination. As a consequence, more and more people worldwide have come to see federalism as the answer to these dual pressures because it allows for a combination of shared rule (for defined common purpose) and self-rule (by constituent units in order to maintain regional diversity). Federalism, therefore, is embraced as an institutional framework better adapted to accommodating the multicultural and multidimensional complexities of today's world.

2. The global economy has unleashed both economic and political forces that simultaneously reinforce international and local pressures that undermine the traditional nation-state. Global communications and comsumership have triggered the desire in even the remotest places around the world for access to good and services obtainable in the global marketplace. Consequently, governments are faced with the growing desire of their people to be at once *global* consumers and *local* citizens. This phenomenon has been referred to as glocalisation. This phenomenon makes it increasingly difficult for the nation-state, which ironically appears both too small and too large, to fulfil its citizens' desire. Thus, the traditional nation-state appears inadequate to: cope with recent

development of the global market economy; meet the aspirations of its people for better living standards and job security; and allow people control over decisions that significantly affect them. In this context, "federalism with its different interacting levels of government has provided a way of mediating the variety of global and local citizen preferences" (p.6).

3. The expansion of market economies is engendering socioeconomic changes that are compatible with the federal political principle. These new conditions include emphasis on: contractual relationships; recognition of the non-centralised nature of a market economy; entrepreneurial self-governance and consumer rights awareness; markets that adapt to diversity rather than homogeneity, embrace interjurisdictional mobility, and foster both competition and cooperation; and the recognition that differences do not hinder exchange of mutual benefits. In the light of this third reason, there is a claim of strong nexus between federalism and market economy. It has been suggested that federal states are more likely than non-federal ones to have a market economy.

4. Technological changes have generated new models of industrial organisation that are more decentralised and based on horizontal non-centralised interactive networks. Such models have inspired attitudes that are more favourable to federal (non-centralised) political organisation.

5. The principle of subsidiarity (the idea that a higher political body should only carry out actions that lower political bodies cannot accomplish on their own) has been gaining increasing popularity from the public. Thus, the decentralised orientation of the subsidiarity principle has influenced a growing interest in federalism.

6. Classical federations, such as the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia as well as Germany, have shown resilience, flexibility and adaptation to changing conditions. These federations are testaments of the enduring character of the federal political model. While these federations have maintained constitutional and political stability over a long period of time, the same cannot be said of other federal states like Nigeria.

7. Eight federations have maintained positions among the top 21 of 174 countries in the United Nations annual human development ranking, which is based on the assessment of economic welfare, human rights and quality of life in each sovereign state. This has given credence to the idea that the federal model is better oriented to foster human development than non-federal one. However, this claim has a limitation because a number of federal states like Nigeria have dismal records of human development.

To this point, the debate about the precipitating factors in the formations of federalism has remained unresolved. A detailed examination of the of the historical context and factors that influenced the formation of Nigerian federalism in the next chapter would be a modest contribution of this case study to the undestanding of the origins of federalism. In order to gain a deep insight of the meaning and dimensions of federalism, the next section looks at how the term "federalism" has been deconstructed by various scholars.

2.7. Deconstructing "Federalism"

Federalism has several implications in meaning and practice. To bring out these implications, various deconstructions of the meaning of federalism are examined below. Beyond adopting federalism as a system of shared rule and self-rule, it compactual or covenantal nature imposes on it some implications that have real significance in the operation and understanding of federalism in a given context.

2.7.1. Federalism as social solidarity. An elaborate discussion of the roots of the political principle of federalism in federal (or covenant) theology was presented at the beginning of this chapter. Etymologically, "federalism" was derived from the Latin word *foedus* (Elazar, 2000; Rodden, 2004; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). Hueglin and Fenna (2010) gave the English equivalent of *foedus* as a league, treaty or compact. They asserted that "the most far-reaching yet often least appreciated dimension of federalism is its inherent commitment to social solidarity" (p. 51). They argued that as opposed to a liberal contract, *foedus* is a partnership, a mutual aid, a protection or cover for all irrespective of which part is stronger or weaker. This compassionate view of federalism view it as distinct from the unhealthy competition implied in a liberal contract. According to Huegelin and Fenna, in liberal contract "you only get what you can pay for" and "you can choose whether you want to share or not" (p. 51).

Hueglin and Fenna further elaborated how the notion of social solidarity relates to federalism and the political process. They pointed out that the original idea of a federal compact is based on the recognition that different federating units have different endowments (fortunes and resources) and a federal "commonwealth" fosters social sharing as part of the political process. The idea of social solidarity as implied by federal compact is quite distinct from the idea of the modern welfare state in that "social solidarity is not extended to individuals but to spatial collectivities – regions, provinces, states, *Länder*, or cantons." This distinction is very important. It implies that federalism is primarily concerned with people groups rather than individual rights. Therefore, it is argued that:

> What the social compact dimension of federalism guarantees is the collective social and cultural well-being of the people living in different parts of the country. The constituent members of a federal system acquire a right to economic viability and social stability (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, pp. 51-52).

It is however important to note that the recognition of group identity does not eliminate the concern with individual rights. Federalism has been noted to guarantee more individuals rights than other forms of political systems (cf. Kincaid, 2005). For example, Moreno & Colino argued that the federalism of the United States has very little to do with group rights instead:

> Liberal individualism, the protection of individual rights, and the construction of robust national defence were the main principles behind the US federal Constitution. In recent decades, the public-choice model of federalism has put the emphasis on aggregations of individual preferences rather than on collectives' diversities. (Moreno & Colino, 2010, p. 7).

Michael Burgess has provided a more integrative answer to this question. Burgess posited that federalism "recognised the inherent human condition of both individual and shared needs and identities (Burgess, 2006, p. 3). He further stressed that federalism is "concerned with specific forms of human association, with how we organise human relations in order to achieve welfare" (Burgess, 2006, p. 3).

Hueglin and Fenna (2010) identified a number of federalist commitments that are reflective of the principle of social solidarity. First, federations create larger markets while at the same time maintain regional autonomy. Larger markets are more efficient in generating wealth and growth. However, such benefits are unevenly distributed. Yet, the desire to belong to and remain in a federal union would depend on an equitable distribution of its benefits for all. For this reason, the federal principle is essentially committed to the pursuit of a common good, albeit the commitment to a common good is not peculiar to federal states. Some unitary states are also committed to the common good. For example, Hueglin and Fenna observed the case of the Scandinavian welfare states that seem to be even more egalitarian due to their commitment to individual and social welfare rather than

territorial bias. According to Hueglin and Fenna, territorial bias of federal states may includes deliberate policies of development and fiscal redistribution that are regionally and territorially focused without a concern about how the policies shape income distribution and welfare of persons within the respective sub-national units. This attempt to promote even development and equitable distribution is predicated on the premise that the greater wealth generated by the federal union creates more common wealth. This is however, a challenge for rentier states, like Nigeria, where due to mismanagement of the common wealth regions that are endowed with the resource, such as oil, accounting for the bulk of the country's foreign earning, clamour for resource control. George Anderson has characterised this challenge in the following way:

> In many countries, oil is at the centre of national politics and economic policy, but managing oil wealth presents challenges that have sometimes made it more a curse than a blessing. The success of a country in meeting these challenges will depend on many factors, including the nature of its political institutions, one of which can be a federal system. (Anderson, 2012, p. 1).

Secondly, in keeping with the idea and principle of social solidarity and sharing, a federal state is supposed to be committed to "Regional Equality" by adopting a multi-centred approach to the distribution of public services and career opportunities (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). Hueglin and Fenna contrasted the case of a unitary welfare state like France and that of federal Germany. In France, there is a dominant centre, Paris: "Almost inevitably, a successful education and career requires relocation to Paris" (p. 52). However, in Germany, there is no such dominant centre; opportunities are not concentrated in one place. It is this commitment to the provision of equitable life chances and decent living conditions in all parts of a country that underscores the concept of social solidarity behind the meaning of federalism.

Thirdly, according to Hueglin and Fenna, federal states demonstrate their commitment to the principle of social solidarity by also adopting Fiscal Equalisation policies, which is aimed at ensuring that citizens in all parts of the federation have comparable access to social amenities and vital infrastructure. Therefore, the federal government has to adopt measures to share and distribute financial resources in order to avoid lopsidedness in the access of different parts of the federation to public services and social amenities. This sort of commitment to fiscal redistribution varies from one federation to the other.

A fourth expression of commitment to social solidarity, according to Hueglin and Fenna, is the development of Regional Policy that is designed to even out the disparities of regional economic strength due to unequal resource endowment, peripheral location, and disparities in population size. Such a commitment would also seek to address the imbalances and inequalities that a capitalist market economy may typically create. Regional Policy may be pursued through the development of certain regional development strategies including sharing and joint financing of social development projects. "The ultimate goal, however, is not individual income stabilization but the socio-economic empowerment and stabilization of subnational collectivities" (p. 53). This, Hueglin and Fenna noted, is perhaps the most contentious aspect of federalism because such spatial equalisation policies in a federal system may undermine the principle of comparative advantage, which is part of the market allocation of resources. It is also feared that a commitment to sustained payments of substantive regional transfer as part of a spatial equalisation policy is likely to engender "transfer dependency" and make peripheral governments and populations less enthusiastic about finding self-sufficient development options and, hence, "even indulging in a kind of self-inflicted culture of poverty" (p. 53). On the contrary, Hueglin and Fenna argued, in the

73

absence of equalising transfers, people living in peripheral regions may migrate to more endowed locations. Since federalism inherently seeks to guarantee spatial integrity, such equalising transfer may serve as a way of making people able to maintain social and cultural connection to their home territory. As Hueglin and Fenna opined, within a reasonable limit, social solidarity in a federation is an entitlement.

2.7.2. Federalism as a Morally Binding Agreement. Daniel Elazar offered insights into the moral dimension of federalism. According to him, the word *foedus* from which "federalism" was derived from refers to a covenant. He noted that covenant has several applications; but in politics it signifies "a voluntary establishment of a people and body politic" (Elazar, 1998, p. 29). Here, Elazar affirmed the voluntaristic character of covenant. People enter into covenant by their own will and not compelled by others to do so. This assertion has to be tampered with a caveat. As Rodden (2004) and Hueglin and Fenna (2010) noted, there are exceptions to this voluntaristic thesis. Many states, like Nigeria, are products of conquests and colonialism, and the decision to adopt a federal political system was not entirely without the interference of an annexing external power. Or the choice of federalism seemed to be the only alternative to coping with the anomaly created by the colonisers. Hueglin & Fenna describe this phenomenon in the following way:

> A century ago, there were a mere nine federations in the world; there are now 26 ... Much of what has been called the 'federalist revolution' of the twentieth century had to do with the breakdown of colonial empires and the formation of a multitude of newly independent states after 1945. As a consequence of the opportunistic and arbitrary way in which colonial powers had assembled their possessions, most of these states brought together disparate cultures and communities. Federalism seemed to be the most promising way to accommodate this incongruence of colonial territory and plural identity. (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 55).

Notwithstanding the above exception, as Elazar asserted, federal unions are, under normal circumstances, supposed to be voluntarily established. Elazar cited the example of the American Declaration in which the different inhabitants of the colonies coming together consented to become one people. In his opinion, Abraham Lincoln captured it vividly when he described federalism as analogous to marriage. In a marriage the partners are committed to the covenant that binds them together and strive to make it work, albeit there are ups and downs.

Furthermore, Elazar explained the relationship between covenant and constitution. He asserted that "covenants beget constitutions almost as a matter of course but also influence every dimension of constitutionalism" (Elazar, 1998, p. 29). To elaborate this point, he marked out what he described as the three dimensions of every political system, based on Aristotelian political doctrine, namely: its moral constitution; its socioeconomic constitution; and its frame of government. According to him, the moral basis of the constitution defines the generally accepted ideas of how citizens of a given political entity should live and the widely held conception of justice as well as the general understanding of what is politically and socially right and good. The socioeconomic basis of the constitution refers to the ways that citizens live in reality. "It includes such things as class structure, ethnic composition, type of economy, and the actual distribution of power; in other words, who is important and influential and why" (Elazar, 1998, p. 29). Lastly, the frame of government pertains to the institutions and structures that the government is made up of as well as statutory documents that define the institutions of government, establish the scope and limitation of their power, and specify who shall have authority and the criteria for choosing who shall occupy the position of authority. Elazar argued that only covenant

addresses all three dimensions of the political system because it defines the system's moral foundation, provides mechanism for building the institutional system's frame of government, and put forward a behavioural dynamic that shapes the system's socioeconomic basis.

Elazar has also tried to shed more light on what he described as the ambiguous relationship between covenant, compact and contract. He noted that both compact and contract are related to and derived from covenant. Although the three terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they have differences worth clarifying. According to Elazar, both compact and contracts are derived from covenant. He observed that covenant and compact are constitutional and public in character, whereas contract is private. For this reason, "covenantal or compactual obligation is broadly reciprocal;" and parties "bound by one or the other are obligated to respond to each other beyond the letter of the law rather than limit their obligations to the narrowest contractual requirements" (Elazar, 1998, p. 31). Herein then lies the differences between covenant and compact, on the one hand, and contract, on the other. Elazar opined that covenant and compacts have essentially dual character – being flexible in certain respects and firm in other areas. Conversely, contract, as an expression of private law, is characteristically interpreted as narrowly as possible in order to set a limit to the obligations of the contracting parties. Therefore, while contract can be revoked unilaterally by one of the parties, covenant and compact require mutual consent before they can be annulled, because they are "designed as they are to be perpetual or of unlimited duration" (p. 31).

Despite their similarities, covenant and compact have differences as well. Elazar explained that, unlike in a compact, the morally binding dimension of a covenant has

primacy over its legal dimension. Therefore, a compact rests heavily on legal ground, albeit still indirectly dependent on a moral (or ethical) base. Therefore, it safe to say that compact is a secular synonym of covenant in modern politics. As Elazar noted, "compact" gained a widespread use around the mid-eighteenth century during the spread of Enlightenment secular thought of the Revolutionary epoch. This is how Elazar described the phenomenon that shaped this development:

> Those who saw the hand of God in political affairs in the United States continued to use the term *covenant,* while those who sought a secular grounding for politics turned to the term *compact.* While the distinction is not always used with strict clarity, it does appear consistently. (Elazar, 1998, p. 31).

Furthermore, Elazar posited that social contract, a highly secularised concept with less moral undergird than covenant and compact, was popularised by the Rousseauistic and Jacobinistic intellectual movements flourishing during the revolutionary period, particularly in France but received with less enthusiasm in the United States. However, eventually "social contract" became the dominant political concept worldwide. Notwithstanding this development, Elazar argued, covenant has remained the foundation of political order.

Kincaid (2005) has subscribed to Elazar's conception of the moral dimension of federalism. For Kincaid, a covenant signifies a binding partnership among coequal partners who have agreed to create a new identity while at the same time retaining their individual identity and integrity. He asserted that in a body politic, the constitution serves as the supreme legal framework, which defines this partnership and the political organisation. He argued that because federalism is a covenant, it is a morally binding commitment that behoves on the parties to treat each other according to the spirit of the law and not just the letter of the law. Also, according to Kincaid, Federalism is not a momentary creation because: "A covenant commits the parties to an enduring, even perpetual, relationship and

77

to an obligation to cooperate to achieve the ends of the agreement and to resolve peacefully

the conflicts that invariably arise in every relationship" (Kincaid, 2005, p. 8). Burgess

(2006) has also affirmed the moral dimension of federalism. He viewed the fundamental

purpose of the federal principle as essentially moral. He argued that: "Its *raison d'être* is to

furnish the basis for order and stability but in a framework that formally acknowledges,

protects and promotes human dignity, difference and diversity. This is its moral content and

purpose" (Burgess, 2006, p. 3).

2.7.3 Federalism as Decentralisation? Federalism and decentralisation are so

intertwined that, in political discussion, the two concepts are easily conflated (Rubin &

Feeley, 2008). There is also the tendency to define federalism as a degree of

decentralisation. This is why Osaghae (1990) asserted: "To conceive of federalism as an

unqualified degree of decentralisation is to say that every governmental system is a variant

of federalism" (p. 84). As Hueglin and Fenna (2010) and Blume and Voigt (2011) pointed

out, both decentralisation and centralisation may exist in unitary, federal and confederal

states. Hueglin and Fenna cited the following examples to buttress this point: 1) The United

Kingdom has been traditionally a very decentralised unitary state; 2) Sweden is a

decentralised unitary state; 3) France is a unitary and centralised state; 4) Germany

embodies both centralisation and decentralisation, and therefore is sometimes referred to as

a "unitary federal state;" 5) Australia is a very centralised federal state; 6) Canada is

remarkably a decentralised federal state; and 7) the European Union is very much

decentralised (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, pp. 35-36). This is, therefore, why it has been argued

that the fundamental difference between the two opposites, unitary and federal states, is not

defined by the scope of decentralisation, but by "the constitutional guarantee of autonomy

for the constituent governments in the responsibilities they perform" (Watts, 1998, p. 124), "their constitutional division of powers" (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 36) or "the allocation of fundamental competence" (Blume & Voigt, 2011). For example, in the case of a unitary state, because ultimate decision-making power resides with the central government it can, at will, rescind the decision to decentralise (Watts, 1998; Blume & Voigt, 2011). Conversely, federalism creates geographic subdivisions with constitutionally allotted jurisdictions, that is, the central (federal) government has no right to usurp the decisions that are reserved to the sub-national governments (see Rubin & Feeley, 2008).

Blume & Voigt have, therefore posited that the most basic distinction between federalism and decentralisation is that the former is "a constitutional-level characteristic," while the latter is "a policy choice at the post-constitutional level" (Blume & Voigt, 2011, p. 242). This distinction was highlighted by Osaghae, who argued that "decentralisation is best applied and understood in relation to federation when its usage is restricted to the policymaking and administrative aspects rather than the legal and constitutional aspects of federalism" (Osaghae, 1990, p. 84).   According to Blume & Voigt, the implication of this is that a federal structure can be leveraged to implement a decentralisation policy because the two are not mutually exclusive, but a federal structure does not automatically guarantee the necessary condition for the implementation of decentralisation. For Rubin & Feeley (2008), "Decentralisation is a managerial strategy by which a centralised regime can achieve the results its (sic) desires in a more effective manner" (p. 171). Ghanaian decentralisation expert, Kwamena Ahwoi, has thrown light on the essence of decentralisation as a managerial strategy. He described decentralisation as a tool of public administration, which involves the transfer of roles, responsibilities, power, skills, competences, means and

resources to lower governmental tiers or other spheres of governance. He illustrated this

idea with the different typologies of decentralisation being implemented in his country:

> In Ghana's decentralisation programme, local authorities are the destinations of the decentralised
>
> functions. The programme seeks to transfer functions and powers in a programme of political
>
> decentralisation; to transfer skills and competences in a programme of administrative decentralisation
>
> and decentralised planning; and to transfer means and resources through a programme of fiscal
>
> decentralisation. (Ahwoi, 2010, p. 5).

To be sure, decentralisation is not the opposite of centralisation as the two can exist

simultaneously in any political system. Hence, some scholars have suggested that the term

"noncentralisation," which is the antithesis of centralisation, should be considered as a more

appropriate defining feature of federalism (Elazar, 1987; Osaghae, 1990; Elazar, 1997).

Elazar (1997) explained that in an ideal type federal model, there is no centre; it operates as

a noncentralised and multifaceted framework. Elazar was quick to add that in practice there

may be differences. He noted that: "In the comparison between unitary and federal systems,

we are dealing not only with different forms of polity but with different ideal types, each of

which has its own integrity and emphases as well as its own weaknesses and deficiencies"

(Elazar, 1997). Apart from reflecting the noncentralised and diffused nature of federalism,

the concept of noncentralisation also captures the essence of federalism because it best

expresses the legal and constitutional aspects of it (Osaghae, 1990). Osaghae argued that

any attempt to reduce federalism to decentralisation and to divorce federalism from the

principle of noncentralisation is counterproductive to its essence. Osaghae delineated

decentralisation as simply a "dispersal of power from a central government to other units or

agencies of government" (Osaghae, 1990, p. 84). He categorised decentralisation into two

types: 1) *Discretionary decentralisation*, in which decentralisation is not constitutionally

guaranteed but is entirely contingent on the grace of the central authority and its consideration of expediency; and 2) *Constitutionally guaranteed decentralisation*, wherein the dispersal of power to constituent parts is obligated by the constitution. Osaghae noted that it is the second kind of decentralisation that falls within the purview of federalism.

Both Elazar and Osaghae believed that decentralisation accentuates a "core-periphery" dichotomy or a "hierarchical" model that inherently implies the existence of a powerful central authority from where power flows to the subordinate governmental levels. Noncentralisation, on the other hand, entails that regardless of how certain powers are divided between the central and constituent governments at any point in time, the authority to exercise such powers cannot be withdrawn from either without their mutual agreement (Elazar, 1987, p. 166). To sum it up, it can thus be said that "federalism involves both centralisation/decentralisation and noncentralisation" (Osaghae, 1990, p. 85). Osaghae posited that, however, it is noncentralisation that appropriately expresses the constitutional arrangement in a federal political system because of its non-hierarchical power sharing orientation.

This chapter has presented a general review of literature on federalism, the development of the state political system, and the challenge of managing diversity. It can be seen from the review that federalism is more than just an institutional design or political organisation. Its concept goes beyond the latter of the constitution, which specifies the federal arrangement. Federal political system, thus, has a compactual basis, where the commitment of the parties to it embraced not only the legal wordings but also the spirit of the compact. Hence, federalism is a morally binding arrangement. Federalism is also a social solidarity. By coming together, federating units stand together with one another,

pulling resources together to support the weak and by so doing become strong together. Through noncentralization, the federating units maintain their regional autonomy; while at the same time participating in the unity that the federal union creates. This is the genius of the federal formula. This is why it is considered to be better suited for managing unity in diversity, especially in plurinational polities. The next chapter is considered to be a significant component of this investigation in that it explores from the literature the background of the Nigerian federalism, from the evolution of the Nigerian state as a colonial creation to the many historical antecedents that defined and shaped the Nigerian federal experiment. The global and theoretical perspectives gained in the present chapter are intended to serve as lenses to aid a reading of the Nigerian federal experiment.

<div align="center">

CHAPTER THREE

FEDERALISM AND STATE BUILDING IN NIGERIA

A Chequered History or a Wobbly Coexistence Project?

</div>

3.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter examines at great length the historicity and the evolution of the state

political system and the development of the federal idea. This chapter zooms in on Nigerian

federalism and the national integration conundrum befalling the country by exploring

historical accounts, analyses and the conclusions of previous studies. The chapter begins by

looking at the historical background of Nigerian federalism, giving snapshots of major pre-

and post-Independence historical developments. The chapter also examines the challenges

of integration that the Nigerian federation continues to grapple with. Sources of disunity and

contention, including ethno-religious conflicts, are discussed.

3.2. Historical Antecedents of Nigerian Federalism

One obvious characteristic of the literature on Nigerian federalism is the inescapable

interest of scholars in the history of state building and its impact on the origin and trajectory

of the federal system. The late Nigerian novelist and poet, the author of *Things Fall Apart*, a

widely read book on modern African literature, Professor Chinua Achebe, has explained the

reason for this inescapable interest in history in a proverbial manner by asserting that "a

man who does not know where the rain began to beat him cannot say where he dried his

body" (Achebe, 2012, p. 1). This statement figuratively illustrates the importance of history

when it comes to understanding the present. The Danish philosopher and theologian Søren

Kierkegaard (1813-1855) underscored the primacy of history when he stated that: "Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards" (quoted in Mills, 2013, p. 279) The relevance of history to the understanding of contemporary political systems and social phenomena is not confined to one state alone, but it applies to every polity in the world (cf. Fukuyama, 2012). However, for Nigeria, and other countries that were created by colonial fiat, history had had a different and decisive role in shaping its contemporary political trajectory. Again, Achebe used the rain analogy in a satirical manner to argue that:

> The rain that beat Africa began four to five hundred years ago, from the "discovery" of Africa by Europe, through the transatlantic slave trade, to Berlin Conference of 1885. That controversial gathering of the world's leading European powers precipitated what we now call the Scramble for Africa, which created new boundaries that did violence to Africa's ancient societies and resulted in tension-prone modern states. It took place without African consultation or representation, to say the least. (Achebe, 2012, p. 1).

In the above statement, Chinua Achebe bravely indicted the colonial history of Africa in creating what he referred to as "tension-prone modern states." This means that any interrogation of the crisis of statehood bedevilling African states that overlook the nexus between this history and political developments is an exercise in futility. For example, the historian Richard J. Reid of the School of Oriental and African Studies argued that "Africa's twentieth century cannot be understood in isolation from its nineteenth century" (Reid, 2012, p. 1).

It is therefore imperative, for the purpose of this study, to explore the historical antecedents that shaped contemporary political developments in Nigeria. This imperative was underscored by Alli (2003) when he argued that "The foundation and general outcome

of what we have today as Nigerian federalism was laid in the colonial era" (p. 85). In what follows, such historical antecedents are discussed in relation to the Nigerian federalism.

3.2.1. Establishment of British Colonial Rule. As Chinua Achebe asserted, European colonialism had had a decisive role in the histories of modern African states. At the official end of the British transatlantic slave trade in 1807, Britain and other European powers devised what they deemed to be a more profitable strategy, that is, using African labour in Africa to extract and supply raw materials to Europe's growing industries, and, consequently, they established colonies by late nineteenth century (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008). Thus, the abolition of slave trade was followed by emerging interest in pursuing "legitimate" trade or commerce (Falola & Heaton, 2005). Reid (2012) described the shift from slave trade to "legitimate" commerce, where the export of human beings was supplanted by meeting the European demand for raw materials, natural resources and agricultural produce, as a "conquest." Indeed, the so-called "legitimate" commerce was questionable and consequential in not only economic but also political and moral terms:

> It was assumed at the outset of the nineteenth century that "legitimate" commerce would bring stability and peace to Africa, and that the doctrine of "free trade" (rather loosely interpreted, admittedly) would allow the economic exploitation of Africa with minimum of political commitment. But it was increasingly clear that this was not the case, and that if trade was to flow freely, if resources were to be profitably exploited, if Africa was to constitute a stable market for European products, if capital investment was to be protected, then political control was required. Again, this linked with burgeoning racial thought, which now assumed that Africans were childlike and irrational, incapable of modernizing themselves, or of stabilizing their war-torn, bloodied, and splintered kingdoms and societies. It was, again, the most extraordinary exercise in objectification... (Reid, 2012, p. 116).

As Reid explained in the above quoted statement, the economic and political drives of European incursion into Africa were intrinsically intertwined. Through "legitimate" commerce, European colonial powers extended their interest from coastal areas to hinterlands, and targeted areas with fertile agricultural land, places that are rich in mineral deposits, and settlements with large populations that could provide a source of labour (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008; Turaki, 2010). It was the ardent of competition for territory and resources that led to what is notoriously known as the Scramble for Africa among European powers (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008; Achebe, 2012).

At the Berlin Conference in 1884-85, European powers partitioned Africa, except for the West African coastal state of Liberia, which was inhabited by former slaves from United States, and the East African state of Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) that successfully repelled the early attempt of Italy to colonise it (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008). This partitioning has been described as responsible for the "demarcation of some of the most bizarre territorial entities in modern global history" (Reid, 2012, p. 117). The boundaries and territorial divisions imposed by the European colonisers are said to be at the roots of many of the current problems of Africa (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008). Another source of contention is the fact that, "the major consequence of such [European] involvement was the creation of centralised, essentially mercantilist states, characterised by their fusing of political and economic power, and territorial expansion at the expense of smaller, weaker or stateless communities" (Reid, 2012, p. 26). This convergence of economic and political interests was inspired by the principle of the "dual mandate" agreed upon by the European conferees at the Berlin Conference – "that the interest of both Europe and Africa would be best served by maintaining the free access to Africa for trade and in turn providing the continent with

the benefits of 'European civilization'" (Adibe, 2012, p. 11). It can be gleaned from the elaboration of the conception of the dual mandate by the British High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria who later became the Governor-General of Nigeria, Lord Frederick J.D. Lugard, in his *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Lugard, 1922), that the dual mandate was rather a philosophy of benevolent imperialism. This is how Lugard described the dual mandate:

> Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate. (Lugard, 1922, p. 617).

In the Scramble for Africa, Nigeria ended up as a possession of Britain. The communities that inhabited the territories that came to be known as Nigeria were effectively made subjects of the British Empire by the end of the nineteenth century (Ayandele, 1980). The period between 1861 and 1903 was a watershed in the effort of the British to establish colonial rule over the territories and to turn the inhabitants into subjects of the crown (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The Nigerian historian Toyin Falola posited that: "Colonialism was achieved in Nigeria either by the use of war or by surrender because of the threat of war" (Falola, 2009, p. 1). The instrumentality of violence was legitimised by the colonial intruders, who had to employ their superior power of force to break the back of any resistance from the indigenous peoples, especially local rulers who had opposed the ensuing political, economic and social order (Afigbo, 1980; Falola, 2009; Reid, 2012). Falola's (2009) *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria* chronicles the long list of casualties that colonial invaders inflicted on indigenous communities, who were resisting the intrusion of

87

the colonisers into their societies. For this reason, Falola asserted that "Modern Nigeria is, to a large extent, a product of violence" (p. 2). Falola further noted that violence was deployed, in greater portion, as a tool of domination by the colonial intruders, and, to a lesser extent, as an instrument of resistance against colonial rule by indigenous communities. Also, the colonial administration employed violence in maintaining control over the colonial state:

> Colonial states aimed to establish territorial hegemony, which meant the ability to exercise practical political sovereignty – in effect the possession of a legal monopoly on the use of force – within a defined area. *The militarism of the colonial state was inherent, in most cases flowing directly from the violence involved in the creation of the state itself* [emphasis added]... Violence, or threat of it, was the means by which control was maintained... (Reid, 2012, p. 117).

The picture painted in the above quotation by Reid on how the "colonial masters" generally employed violence to invade and establish dominion over African territories agrees with Tamuno's description of the use of violence by the British colonisers in Nigeria:

> A succession of British officials used coercion and diplomacy in former Northern and Southern Nigeria to reduce African opposition to a minimum. By 1914, Britain has succeeded in making herself the new paramount ruler over most of Nigeria. Pockets of resistance continued after 1914... These and other instances of relentlessness under increasing colonial rule were forcibly suppressed with assistance of the military and police resources at the disposal of the government. *British rule in Nigeria was in the final analysis buttressed by force or by the threat of using it* [emphasis added]. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 394).

It is worth noting that British officials used both coercion and diplomacy to neutralize any African opposition. The diplomatic overtures of the British officials helped them to induce African rulers and brought them on their side against their own people (cf. Reid, 2012, p. 118). However, as Maier (2002) and Momah (2013) noted, the kind of

diplomacy that the British used was "gunboat diplomacy" – where the British invaders subdued the local chiefs by using, at once, inducement and a conspicuous display of the threat of force. Richard J. Reid has even argued, without discounting the superiority of the colonialists' brutality, that Europeans may not have succeeded in establishing colonial rule over vast swathes of the African continent without the cooperation of Africans, who adopted the colonial system to their own ends (Reid, 2012, pp. 117-118). Falola (2009) gave a detailed account of the various roles played by indigenous "collaborators" in aiding the British invaders. However, the role of these so-called "collaborators" and the notion of "voluntary surrender" are to be considered with a caveat. The British had clearly an upper hand for their military superiority. The supply of millions of gallons of cheap gin to induce indigenous leaders (Maier, 2002, p. 10), a classic example of bribe, was not adequate to fetch the loyalties of "collaborators" and secure "voluntary surrender" if the British did not possess military superiority (see Falola, 2009, p. 16-25). Therefore, it can be argued that while it is true that some indigenous leaders, traders and other greedy individuals sided with the British invaders for reasons of personal economic advantages and the lure of power, there is no doubt that the fear of facing brutality, which had befallen other territories that resisted the British invasion, was the overriding wisdom behind the actions of the "collaborators" and those who surrendered "voluntarily."

Remarkably, the "collaborators" did not only aid and abet the intruders, but they also remained under the tutelage of the British and began to learn the rule of the game. It is in this regard that Richard Reid asserted that: "Ultimately, European intrusions were absorbed into long-term African processes of internal change" (Reid, 2012, p. 118). For Nigeria, it is

believed that one area that this reality is manifest is in the entrenchment of the colonial legacy of violence as a strategy of politics till the present time:

> The colonial system thrived on the use of violence; the postcolonial era sees the monopoly of violence as a tool for creating a stable nation-state. Unresolved issues including the conflicts they generated, have a bearing on contemporary problems and their attendant revolts and other violence. (Falola, 2009, p. 181).

For example, the ubiquitousness of ethno-religious conflicts in the country may be viewed as a manifestation of the enduring legacy of violence. This view was expressed by Falola when he argued that: "The fragmentation of Nigeria's nationalism into ethnic and religious nationalisms has ensured the continuity of violence" (p. 181). This phenomenon has had grave implications for the making of modern Nigeria, and for state building and the country's democratic experience (Aluko & Ajani, 2009).

Another key feature of British colonialism in Nigeria, which also impacted on state and citizens relations, is its ability to adapt to the disparate spatial contexts of the colony. For instance, Ayandele (1980) noted that the colonial intruders adopted varied patterns of intrusion, which were largely contingent on geographical location and historical accident, across the country:

> Thus the Niger Delta peoples, within reach of the gunboat, were the worst hit. They had no choice but to painfully accept the new order of things, under which the European intruders began to subvert indigenous culture, bully the rulers and interfere in purely political affairs. Thus Yorubaland became the biggest theatre of the whiteman's intrusion and intervention in the interior of Nigeria in the pre-Scramble era, thanks to their geographical proximity to the sea, the bitter inter-state and internecine wars they went on fighting, leading to large-scale sale of themselves across the Atlantic and the return of the *Saro* elements to their fatherland. Thus the luckiest peoples in the interior were those situated north of the Niger-Benue, thanks to their remoteness from the sea and the anti-infidel

prejudices that had been fostered in them for a long time by the Islamic religion. (Ayandele, 1980, p. 368).

The British, therefore, had the task to overcome the peculiar challenges posed to the colonial project by the different territories, and they did that effectively as it suited them. It can, thus, be said that the creation and administration of the colony conformed to geographical, economic and political exigencies, and to the desire of the British to establish effective occupation and secure full international recognition for their "acquisition" (Ayandele, 1980; Turaki, 2010; Adibe, 2012; Reid, 2012).

Having removed all visible indigenous opposition to the imposition, expansion and consolidation of their rule over the territories, from 1898 onward the British began to establish and maintain a colonial state in Nigeria (Tamuno, 1980). This process was initiated with the merger of several protectorates, which were under the charter of the Royal Niger Company into two main Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria (Abubakar, 1980; Turaki, 2010; Adibe, 2012). The Royal Niger Company was "a mercantile company chartered by the British government in the nineteenth century, which formed the basis of the modern state of Nigeria" (Adibe, 2012, p. 12). By 1900, the British formed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, although the former was only on paper until couple of years later when it was brought under British control through military campaigns led by Lugard (Abubakar, 1980b, p. 449). The latter was carved out from the merger of the Niger Coast Protectorate, which was established earlier in 1891 as Oil Rivers Protectorate, with territories chartered by the Royal Niger Company below Lokoja on the River Niger (Tamuno, 1980). Then in May 1906 Lagos Colony and Protectorate was merged with the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Tamuno, 1980; Olusanya, Constitutional

91

Development 1861 - 1960, 1980b). As Jideofor Adibe asserted, in effect, the formation of these protectorates signified the bringing of the regions into "a viable territorial unit under effective British political control" (Adibe, 2012, p. 12).

The British adopted two systems of rule to govern the two protectorates, Direct and Indirect Rule. In the South, the British initially experimented with Direct Rule, but later resorted to Indirect Rule system. However, in the North, the British used mainly Indirect Rule (Turaki, 2010; Adibe, 2012). The British adopted Indirect Rule on the Northern Protectorate because even though they had conquered the Sokoto Caliphate and the Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu, which used to be "the largest and most powerful Islamic states in West Africa" (Turaki, 2010, p. 114), the challenge of governing such a vast region was gigantic. Turaki pointed out that the British decided that it was more convenient to work with existing structures since the Muslim states had already centralised and bureaucratic institutions and governments. He also noted that the British's decision to administer the region through the role of indigenous chiefs or rulers was a pragmatic consideration. The British tampered with their plan to bring about radical social and political reforms by embracing the philosophy of "gradualism," that is, pursuing social and political change in a gradual manner. Dudley (2012) supported Turaki's position when he argued that: "If 'Indirect Rule' was a product of circumstances, the decision politically to separate the two protectorates of Nigeria was consciously taken" (Dudley, 2012, p. 18) According to Dudley, the adoption of Indirect Rule was in furtherance of the policy of preserving what has been described as "the very special identity" of the North, considered poles apart from that of the South. It has been suggested that contemporary inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts have roots going back to periods before and during colonialism (see Harnischfeger, 2008;

Turaki, 2010). This issue is explored further later within a broader discussion of how colonialism shaped inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the country. In what follows, the merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorates to form the territorial entity Nigeria is examined.

3.2.2. Amalgamation. The formation of two main protectorates, the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria by the British has been described as a scripted and choreographed move towards the creation of a single territorial entity. Tamuno (1980), for instance, noted that a special committee set up by the colonial government had in August 1898 already recommended the amalgamation of the "Niger Territories," – this was the name given to what later became Nigeria – and that amalgamation was carried out gradually, beginning with the merger of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and Lagos Colony and Protectorate to form the Protectorate and Colony of Southern Nigeria in 1906. The year 1914 has been described as a watershed in Nigeria's history (Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014; Ogbogbo, 2014; Oyeweso, 2014). On 1 January 1914, the British colonial government amalgamated the Northern and Southern Nigeria, a decision that was exercised through a colonial fiat without consulting Nigerians (Tamuno, 1980, p. 394).

It is important to step back a little and take a good look at the background and the context leading to the amalgamation. First, this is necessary in order to understand how the amalgamation impacted on the relations between Northern and Southern Nigeria even to the present time. Secondly, doing so will shed light on the colonial foundations of Nigerian federalism. The amalgamation of the Northern Protectorate and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria has been characterised as a "'marriage of convenience' contrived for the disparate nationalities that were brought together under the new arrangement" (Adibe, 2012, p. 13).

British economic interest was the main driving force behind the amalgamation: "When the British took power in Nigeria, they saw their job to create an administrative superstructure that would preserve law and order, serve British economic interests and ultimately become financially self-supportive" (Falola & Heaton, 2005, p. 6). For example, Tamuno (1980) contended that the British motive for the amalgamation of 1914, as the one in 1906, was economic:

> The primary aim of the government in 1906 was economic – to use the better financial position of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria to cover the costs of administration and development in the financially weak Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, then saddled with the while elephant of a railway in need of extension since 1901. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 394).

Similarly, the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 has been attributed to the consideration of the British colonial administration to "bail out" the north, which was operating on a budget deficit and grappling with serious financial challenges:

> Compared with the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria proved a relatively poor neighbour. Without direct access to the sea, with a larger area and population, with costly railway construction and river dredging projects, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria experienced serious financial difficulties only slightly relieved by the annual grants-in-aid from the Imperial Treasury. Northern Nigeria's annual share (about ₦140,000 since 1906) of customs receipts collected by Southern Nigeria and the loan of over ₦2 million from the latter for railway developments in the north did not, and could not, end its financial embarrassment. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 394)

The above view of the economic motive for the unification was echoed by Karl Maier in his *The House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* as he opined that:

> In 1914 he [Lugard] amalgamated the northern and southern territories in the name of the British Crown, setting the borders of what became Nigeria. The joining was not for the purpose of nation-

building. The simple reason was that the north's colonial budget was running at a deficit and only a link with the profitable south could eliminate the needed British subsidy" (Maier, 2002, p. 10). Further, it has been suggested that the British undertook the amalgamation not only for the aforementioned economic reasons but also for administrative convenience (Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014). Oyeweso (2014, p. 2), for example, contended that the British had to resort to the merger because they had insufficient manpower to administer the huge and well endowed colonial territory of Nigeria.

It is at this juncture appropriate to highlight a few points regarding the amalgamation, which are germane to this study. The points to be established here underscore the assertion of Fwatshak & Ayuba (2014, p. 1), in a symposium to mark the one hundred years of Nigerian amalgamation organised by the Historical Society of Nigeria, that the amalgamation remains an "unsettled issue." First, regardless of the rationale behind the amalgamation, it ushered in the modern state of Nigeria and cemented the fate of its diverse inhabitants (Oyeweso, 2014). Chinua Achebe underscored this when he asserted that: "If the Berlin Conference sealed her fate, then the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates inextricably complicated Nigeria's destiny" (Achebe, 2012, p. 2). As earlier noted, it was rather bizarre that the British colonial administration took such a significant and consequential decision without the agreement of the indigenous inhabitants of the fused territories (Tamuno, 1980; Achebe, 2012). Even the name "Nigeria" was an imposition by the "colonial masters." The name is widely credited to Miss Flora Louise Shaw, a British journalist and writer, who was the colonial editor of *The Times* (Chuku-Okereke, 1997; Maier, 2002; Campbell, 2011; Kwarteng, 2012; Momah, 2013). It has been suggested that although the words "Nigeria" and "Nigerians" were first used between 1859 and 1860 by a Liverpool trader, William Cole to refer to events, things and the people that inhabited the

area watered by the Niger, it was Flora Shaw who canvassed, in her article on 8 January 1897, that the name "Nigeria" be applied to the Royal Niger Company Territories (Chuku-Okereke, 1997). In her own book, *A Tropical Dependency*, Flora Shaw gave an insight into the flippant and blasé attitude, with which the name was adopted, and its meaning and implications:

> Nigeria – as we call our latest dependency – is not properly a name. It cannot be found upon a map that is ten years old. It is only an English expression which has been made to comprehend a number of native states covering over 500,000 square miles of territory in that part of the world which we call Western Soudan. (Shaw, 1905, p. 7).

As Flora Shaw revealed in the above statement, the name itself was applied in an attempt to make sense of a complex acquisition that contrasts with the geographical, cultural and political diversities the British had encountered in other parts of Africa. However, as Flora Shaw acknowledged, the name had become a reality:

> England, in general, knew as little of Nigeria and its possibilities at the end of the nineteenth century as it knew of India sixteenth century. The territories over which these powers were granted were at first known by the name of the "Territories of the Royal Niger Company." A little later this title was changed for the more convenient name of Nigeria. (Shaw, 1905, p. 356).

By perfect coincidence, Flora Shaw later, in 1902, married the first colonial administrator of amalgamated Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, and from then she became well known as Lady Lugard (Kwarteng, 2012; Momah, 2013). Lady Lugard dedicated her book to her husband, a gesture that he reciprocated later when he published his own book, *The Dual Mandate* in 1922.

The second point to highlight is the so-called idea of "voluntary consent of natives" obtained by the "colonial masters" who laid the foundation of the modern state of Nigeria. No one has given an honest account of what actually transpired in this regard than the very

architect of the amalgamation, Lugard himself. In *The Dual Mandate*, Lugard noted that the Berlin Conference gave a tacit approval of the proposal of the principle of voluntary consent put forward by the American delegate, Mr. Kasson, whereby the powers can establish "effective occupation" by securing the consent of natives, whose country is taken possession of, provided they (the natives) have not provoked the intruders' aggression (Lugard, 1922). Lugard revealed the fraudulent manner in which the so-called treaties were made. For examples, Lugard admitted that: "The civilised nations entered for the competition [Scramble for Africa] with avidity. Treaties were produced by the cartload in all the approved forms of legal verbiage – impossible of translation by ill-educated interpreters" (Lugard, 1922, p. 15). It can, thus, be said that the verbosity and creative ambiguity with which the treaties were laden represented a grand act of deception. Lugard explained how this scheme had worked against the natives:

> It mattered not that tribal chiefs had no power to dispose of communal rights, or that those few powerful potentates who might perhaps claim such authority looked on the white man's ambassador with contempt, and could hardly be expected to hand over their sovereignty and lands or other assets had they understood what was asked of them. (Lugard, 1922, p. 15). The Sultan of Sokoto, for instance, regarded the subsidy promised to him by the chartered company as tribute from a vassal.

Besides the ambiguity of the texts, the treaties were also made under fraudulent circumstances. Lugard stated that the treaties were sealed by a cross, purporting to represent the assent of the native chiefs. He also confessed that, in some cases, the native chiefs were induced to assent to the treaties by gifts of a pair of boots, bottles of gin, and opera-hats. This is a classic example of bribery. Sadly, this foundation of corruption that was laid by the "colonial masters" and the local chiefs has normalised and elevated to a way of doing business in Nigeria even today. In other instances, the "colonial masters" obtained the

"assent" of the natives through coercion, and by making nebulous promises that were not recorded and later simply retracted or ignored (Lugard, 1922, p.16).

Third, it has been pointed out that the British introduced the European approach to territorialisation and spatial organisation based on the nation-state model, which is alien to pre-existing indigenous societies. For example, Asiwaju (1997) analysed the impact of the colonial logics of territorialisation and spatial organisation on Nigerian cultures. Asiwaju argued that:

> ...the new rulers' radically different approach to spatial organisation with particular reference to the making of new political and administrative boundaries led, in certain cases, to a virtual dissolution of the interconnection that had served to mediate, if not eliminate, cultural differences; and, in other cases, the new boundary arrangements functioned to force incompatible and, sometimes, mutually antagonistic groups into common administrative units. Above all, colonial rule in particular led to an unprecedented politicisation of culture, especially the conversion of distinct cultures into "tribes" at the local level and, at the overall territorial level, the forging of the "tribes" into a single "nation". (Asiwaju, 1997, p. 31).

Several writers have shared the concern raised by Asiwaju in the above quoted statement. The manner in which the British "colonial masters" peopled Nigeria as a political unit, as depicted in Asiwaju's words above, can be gleaned from the work of Nigerian scholar, Gloria I. Chuku-Okereke. Chuku-Okereke (1997) explained that prior to the advent of colonialism, the inhabitants of the territories that later became Nigeria were organised as "various nationalities, states, empires, emirates, chiefdoms, kingdoms and village-groups, each operating as an independent and autonomous functional socio-political entity" (Chuku-Okereke, 1997, p. 1). Chuku-Okereke argued that:

> In the pre-colonial times, what we had were myriads of groups, some of which spoke variants of the same language and possessed certain common or similar cultural traits. But, identity or similarity of language and culture did not result in common political action as a matter of routine.

Chuku-Okereke reinforced Asiwaju's claim that the European intervention in identity formation, among the hitherto independent socio-cultural groups that occupied the geographical area that came to be known as Nigeria, introduced a new notion of political organisation and territorialisation:

> It could be argued that the origin of the names for such Nigerian peoples as the Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Efik, Ibibio, Ijo, Tiv, Idoma, Ebira, Igala, Itsekiri, Jukun, Bini, Esan, Isoko, Urhobo and so on, are traceable to the emergence of the colonial state of Nigeria. These peoples did not begin to identify themselves in the above terms; but it was European visitors, traders and writers who first began to refer to the whole conglomerate in terms of the language they spoke. Thus, when they referred to the Yoruba or Hausa, they meant those who spoke Yoruba or Hausa languages respectively, and not a single politically-coherent group. This is why it is argued that "Nigerians" are essentially linguistic and cultural groups... (Chuku-Okereke, 1997, p. 2).

Chinua Achebe, for instance, wondered why the British bundled cultures, which are distinct from each other, together: "Animists, Muslims and Christians alike were held by a delicate, some say artificial, lattice" (Achebe, 2012, p. 2). Karl Maier also expressed the same opinion with regard to the cultural incongruity of the ethnic ensemble or amalgam of Nigeria:

> For Nigeria, like the other modern African states with the exception of Ethiopia, was the bastard child of imperialism, its rich mosaic of peoples locked into a nation-state they had had no part in designing. Before the European conquest, Nigeria was home to an estimated three hundred ethnic groups of sometimes widely differing languages and systems of internal rule. Although its constituents had traded and often lived among each other for centuries, the land of Nigeria had never

existed as one political unit. The peoples gathered within its borders had different cultures and stood at very unequal levels of development... (Maier, 2002, pp. 7-8).

The American scholar and diplomat, John Campbell, who served in Nigeria as a political counsellor from 1988-1990, and as ambassador from 2004-2007, wrote in his *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink* that the indigenous empires and kingdoms in territories that later became Nigeria made no effort at wielding the peoples into a single political unity and did not try to create an overarching cultural unity among the hundreds of disparate ethnic groups that became part of the state of Nigeria (Campbell, 2011). Campbell argued that "The nation and the concept of a Nigerian national identity are British creations without indigenous roots" (p. 1). Again, the man who implemented the amalgamation, Lugard also admitted this: "They were vaguely demarcated by lines of longitude and latitude regardless of tribal limits, or by reference to physical features which later exploration sometimes proved to be scores of miles from their supposed position, and even non-existent" (Lugard, 1922, p. 12). As the architect of the amalgamation, Lugard, divulged, the arbitrariness of the colonial boundaries portended conflict right from the start.

Lugard's wife, Flora Shaw gave a preview into the diversity – political and cultural incongruity – that existed among the peoples that inhabited the territories that became Nigeria. Her characterisation of the difference between the peoples of Hausaland and Bornu of Northern Nigeria gave a startling revelation that can help one to deduce or imagine the wider cultural and political gaps among different provinces. Although heavily laden with racist and vilifying words (that an attempt has been made here to filter), Lady Lugard's description helps us to appreciate the incongruence that existed between even those living in proximity of each other:

Although lying in geographical juxtaposition between the parallels of 9° and 14° N. latitude, *and now united within the limits of the British protectorate*, Bornu and Haussaland are *two very distinct countries inhabited by people of wholly different race*, having their own traditions and their distinct history. Except when, as a consequence of border wars, there has been a temporary overlapping of the frontier, *they have always possessed their distinct territories…* he [Hausa] has nevertheless continued to preserve a clearly defined *political individuality*. He [Hausa] has always been merchant, peasant, soldier, and artisan… According to circumstances his territory has contracted or expanded, but in the *Haussa nation* the life of the individual appears to have been so little dependent on the political development of the race… [emphasis added]. (Shaw, 1905, pp. 237-238).

A fourth point that has been raised with regard to the amalgamation was its impact on political culture and organisation of the regions. Before examining this point, a brief discussion of the pre-colonial political experiences of the territories that were later united under the colonial state of Nigeria is worthwhile. It has been suggested by several Nigerian historians that perhaps amalgamation was on course among some of the territories that formed the present state of Nigeria even before the intervening period of colonialism. For instance, the Oyeweso (2014) and Ogbogbo (2014) have both argued that some processes of amalgamation or merger among the territories that later became Nigeria was on course even prior to the advent of British colonialism. Oyeweso pointed out that, for example, the Oyo Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate were established through the merger of several states that were conquered by warfare. The Benin Empire, according to Oyeweso, evolved from the merger of Edo, Urhobo, Yoruba and some Igbo speaking peoples. Similarly, Ogbogbo noted that the emergence of empires in Oyo, Nupeland and Igalaland was part of the process of agglomeration taking place before colonialism. It has also been emphasised that Usman dan Fodio Fulani jihad of the 19th century, which played a major role in "pulling together hitherto autonomous groups under one political umbrella called the Sokoto Caliphate,"

served as "a major building block in the march towards what came to be known as Nigeria" (Ogbogbo, 2014, p. 4).

Looking back at these processes of merger, some scholars have contended counterfactually that multi-national states would still have emerged even without the intervention of the British (Asiwaju, 1997; Ogbogbo, 2014; Oyeweso, 2014). Assuming that this counterfactual scenario was the case, it was unlikely that the mergers would have led to the creation of a large single state that is co-extensive with the present state of Nigeria; because it can be argued that the so-called mergers that occurred before the advent of colonialism did not point to a direction in creating a single political unit. As Maier (2002, p. 7-8) noted, despite the trade relations and interactions among the constituents of Nigeria for centuries, they had, by and large, remained autochthonous and autonomous. Maier noted that the regional groupings that emerged, such as empires and the Caliphate, can be said to have only consolidated regional cultural and political differences, but not a complete unification of all the regions. The only pattern of agglomeration that has been observed took roughly a regional dimension (Maier, 2002, p. 8). The word "roughly" is key here because the so-called three regions, north, east and west, which Maier alluded to as largely defining independent Nigeria, were not homogenous and unified. Chinua Achebe described the regional and sub-regional differences in the following words:

> The northern part of the country was a seat of several ancient kingdoms, such as the Kanem-Bornu – which Shehu Usman dan Fodio and his jihadists absorbed into the Muslim Fulani Empire. The Middle Belt of Nigeria was the locus of the glorious Nok Kingdom and its world-renowned terra-cotta sculptures. The southern protectorate was home to some of the region's most sophisticated civilisations. In the west, the Oyo and Ife kingdoms once strode majestically, and in the Midwest the incomparable Benin Kingdom elevated artistic distinction to a new level. Across the Niger River in the East, the Calabar and the Nri kingdoms flourished. (Achebe, 2012, pp. 1-2).

102

Achebe (2012) argued that the uniqueness of the different cultural groupings would have been maintained had they not been pulled together by British colonialism.

For example, although a bulk of the north housed peoples that were "linked culturally, religiously, and economically," and particularly connected by Islam, which was brought by the Arabs from North Africa, the region was far from being unified (Maier, 2002, p. 8). The Sokoto Caliphate, a huge Islamic state, was created through the instrumentality of the Fulani led jihad, a "holy war," of 1804-1808 (Abubakar, 1980a). Abubakar's (1980a) contribution in the *Groundwork of Nigerian History* and Turaki's (2010) *Tainted Legacy* contain very detailed studies of the influence of the Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. The Sokoto Caliphate was a theocratic empire organised around the Islamic principles of government and ruled by Shari'a law, albeit it was based on religion it had strong social, economic and political motivations (Turaki, 2010). The emirates that the Caliphate brought under its sphere of influence included; Gobir, Zamfara, Kebbi, Daura, Katsina, Kano, Kazaure, Ngourma, Gwandu, Wase, Zaria (Zauzzau), Sokoto, Hadeja, Katagum, Gombe, Bauchi, Fombia, Hamarua, Agei, Lapai, Lafiagi, Yawuri, Nupe, Ilorin, Misau, Jama'are, Azare, Pategi, Muri, Kontagora, and Adamawa (Fombina) (Abubakar, 1980a; Turaki, 2010). It has been argued that "Islam served as a political ideology that united these multi-ethnic states across a vast geographical region of West Africa" (Turaki, 2010, p. 70).

Not all the states listed above were conquered during the Fulani jihad of 1804-1808; the processes of expanding the frontiers of the Caliphate continued into the late 1850s (Abubakar, 1980a). Besides those that were conquered, the rest of the emirates were brought under the influence and authority of the Caliphate through the surrender or submission of

103

their emirs to the Caliph symbolised by obtaining his blessings and flags (Abubakar, 1980a; Turaki, 2010). Despite its vast penetration into the northern territories, the Caliphate did not cover all the territories that later became delimited as Northern Nigeria by British colonial rule. Several parts of the north, particularly the territories that are referred to as the Middle Belt, which formed a separation between the far-north and south, were not under the influence and authority of the Caliphate (Abubakar, 1980a; Maier, 2002; Truaki, 2010). For instance, Turaki noted that: "The areas that resisted the Fulani jihads and claimed independence were Abuja, Argungu, Maradi and Damagaram (Niger), parts of Gbagyiland, Plateau, some parts of southern Zaria, some parts of Bauchi, Adamawa, Benue and the Niger Valley" (Turaki, 2010, p. 70). Shaw (1905) and Lugard (1922) both consistently, in their rather condescending manner, referred to the autochthonous and autonomous territories of the central Nigeria region as independent pagan countries that were quite distinct from the Islamic areas of the north.

A recent work by Professor Monday Yakiban Mangvwat, "The Middle Belt and Lugard's Amalgamation: A Centenary Reflection" provides insights into the peculiarity of the Middle Belt in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times. The Middle Belt, according to Mangvwat (2014), was a constant target of, and bastion of resistance against, trans-Saharan slave trade from around the fifteenth century, trans-Atlantic trade from the eighteenth century and domestic slave raiding from the jihadist forces of the Caliphate in the nineteenth century. Remarkably, the Middle Belt was able to stand its ground against these destabilising forces and even put up a good opposition to British occupation. As Mangvwat noted, "The Sokoto jihad which founded the Sokoto Caliphate at the beginning of the 19th Century had not been able to successfully penetrate the Middle Belt except in a

few instances – Wase, Kanam, Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa, and Illorin – due to the stiff resistance from the communities of the Middle belt" (Mangvwat, 2014, p. 6). Mangvwat argued that the Middle Belt was even able to put up stronger resistance to colonial invasion than the bigger and more powerful states in the north:

> This in part, was because once the armies of the centralized state systems were defeated, the whole edifice collapsed whereas with the independent numerous mini-states, chieftets and chiefdoms in the Middle Belt, the British army had to conquer these village by village since no community owed allegiance to one another thereby prolonging the conquest of the region beyond surrender of the bigger state systems. (Mangvwat, 2014, p. 5).

Furthermore, Mangvwat argued that the enduring legacy of the Middle Belt communities was their fierce "resistance to alien rule and domination by whatever means" (p. 6). It was against the backdrop of their characteristic desire to maintain their cultural and political independence by resisting alien rule that the "colonial masters" looked upon them with distain. Turaki (2010) and Mangvwat (2014) gave heart-rending descriptions of the jihadist and colonial perceptions of the Middle Belt respectively. Turaki explained that as a result of the jihad there was a bifurcation of the north into *Dar al-Islam* (house of God) and *Dar al-Harb* (house of war, or areas belonging to *kuffar*, that is, unbelievers or infidels). Turaki argued that this binary distinction led to the following scenario:

> ...in Northern Nigeria the Middle Belt was designated *Dar al-Harb* and Hausaland as *Dar al-Islam*. The Muslim Hausa-Fulani lived in the *Dar al-Islam*, while the non-Muslims lived in the *Dar al-Harb*. The Hausa-Fulani colonies that scattered throughout the Middle Belt were seen as little pockets of *Dar al-Islam*. (Turaki, 2010, p. 52).

The mischaracterisation of the Middle Belt appeared to have been sustained by the "colonial masters" due to the unyielding attitude of the Middle Belt communities to domination (Mangvwat, 2014). Mangvwat (2014) argued that, as a result of their resistance

to alien rule, the Middle Belt polities incurred negative colonial perception, and were in certain instances placed "under nearby emirate systems thereby sowing the seeds of future discord and resentment" (Mangvwat, 2014). Lady Lugard and her husband gave insights into the colonial mischaracterisation of the Middle Belt communities (see Shaw, 1905; Lugard, 1922).

The foregoing discussion has focused at length on the Sokoto Caliphate because of the suggestion by the historian J. F. Ade-Ajayi and other scholars that the:

> Uthman dan Fodio jihad of the 19th century with its consequence of pulling together hitherto autonomous groups under one political umbrella called the Sokoto Caliphate represents a major building block in the march towards what came to be known as Nigeria (Ogbogbo, 2014, p. 4).

In a nutshell, the Sokoto Caliphate, which was the largest pre-colonial empire in Nigeria, was not successful in bringing all the territories of the north under its sphere of influence. In addition, several scholars have described the Sokoto Caliphate as a loose ensemble of polities (Abubakar, 1980a; Campbell, 2011; Turaki, 2010). Like the Sokoto Caliphate, none of the other empires, such as Oyo and Benin, indicated the tendency or demonstrated the capacity to colonise or merge their neighbouring independent polities to form a single state. Campbell argued this point of view clearly:

> Ancient civilisations and empires shaped the peoples where they held sway. But none of the early empires incorporated into a single political unit all the territory of the present state – nor was there an overarching cultural unity among the hundreds of different ethnic groups that were later found in the state of Nigeria. The nation and the concept of a Nigerian national identity are British creation without indigenous roots.
>
> For administrative expediency in 1914, the British cobbled together their Nigeria colony out of three disparage but adjacent territories they had acquired over a century as they moved inland from the Gulf of Guinea and the older Lagos colony. (Campbell, 2011, p. 1)

106

Thus, as Campbell asserted, the empires that existed on the territories that became present Nigeria prior to British colonialism cannot be said to have served as precursors of the modern state of Nigeria. This is because the modern state of Nigeria was built on the European modern concept of the state system "without indigenous roots" (Campbell, 2011, p. 1). The colonial administrator who presided over the amalgamation and became the first Governor-General of the state of Nigeria, Lugard, did not shy away from this fact: "The advent of Europeans has brought the mind and methods of Europe to bear on the native of Africa for good or for ill, and the seclusion of ages must perforce give place to modern ideas" (Lugard, 1922, p. 5). To drive home this view point, Lugard smugly asserted that:

> In brief, we may say that the eighteenth century was chiefly remarkable for the acquisition of large and almost uninhabited portions of the earth, situated in the temperate zone." The nineteenth century saw the development of these great colonies into nations enjoying self-government. (Lugard, 1922, pp. 5-6).

Lugard's statement underscored the primary role of Britain in creating the state of Nigeria over disparate indigenous polities. It is in view of the fact that the state of Nigeria was a British creation based on European political ideas that the previous chapter was devoted to understanding the European state system and political organisation in relation to federalism.

The fifth and final point with regard to the impact of the amalgamation is the system of rule employed by the colonial administration in governing the colonial state of Nigeria. As earlier highlighted, the partition of Nigeria brought together disparaged polities that were hitherto independent nationalities, and created a state that "bore little or no relationship to the pre-existing polities" (Boahen, 1985). The partition could best be described as former Prime Minister of Britain, Lord Salisbury, characterised it: haphazard and disorganised (Kwarteng, 2012). As the British gained "effective occupation" of the territories that formed

the present state of Nigeria they "overlaid it with colonial administrative grid" (Betts, 1985). In his contribution, "Methods and Institutions of European Domination" in the *General History of Africa VII*, Betts (1985) provides a detailed elaboration of the colonial system of administration. According to Betts, the point of departure of Europeans' colonial policy in Africa, as opposed to at any other time or in any other place, was the adoption of what they referred to as "native policy." The term meant, in theory and practice, that "colonial rule could only be effectively secured through the use of indigenous personnel and institutions in some complementary or supportive function" (Betts, 1985, p. 312). Betts argued that what the "colonial masters" conceived as official policy was simply a corpus of practices based on administrative expediency.

In line with the "native policy," the "colonial masters" employed a colonial administrative approach referred to as "conjunctive administration," which was termed as "indirect rule" (Betts, 1985). Betts defined Indirect Rule as a system of administration "which joined African authorities, in traditionally-held or European-imposed political roles, to the colonial government, but in an obviously subordinate capacity" (p. 315). Betts listed several reasons that informed the choice of this system of rule by the British: 1) historical pattern of the late nineteenth-century colonial acquisition was a formative factor, and size added a new dimension to the challenge of colonial rule; 2) internal penetration of Africa rapidly outpaced the available number of European personnel to administer the acquisition; 3) since European penetration extended into many regions that were not reached by European cultural contact, direct rule would be abruptly strange and impractical in such context; 4) direct rule, which initially was applied in smaller coastal possessions, was dropped in favour of indirect rule of interior possessions; 5) the termination of rule by

chartered companies precipitated the establishment of national control to strengthen colonial grip over extensive territories; 6) the principle of empire "on the cheap" – limiting or avoiding direct cost to the metropolitan state; and 7) the belief that by adopting indirect rule social dislocation will be minimal and hence the cooperation of natives can be assured (p. 315). By and large, the "colonial masters" also believed that it was important in order to command success and promote the welfare of the people that colonial methods and institutions are deeply-rooted in the latter's traditions and prejudices. Furthermore, as Betts noted, the failure of the assimilation project in the nineteenth century due to the cultural resistance of the African peoples in places like Lagos, and the attendant conflicts and tension it generated, snuffed out the enthusiasm of British "colonial masters" in direct rule. Under this scenario, Betts noted, the colonial administrators decided to engage "native authorities" as allies or agents through whom they exercised alien rule effectively over their colonial subjects.

The way the British interpreted the above principles and policies of colonial administrative policy in Nigeria before and after the amalgamation has been described as consequential (Maier, 2002; Achebe, 2012; Kwarteng, 2012). In spite of the great diversities of the polities that formed the British possession that came to be known as Nigeria, the British reduced these complexities by dividing the territory into a politico-cultural tripod. Kwarteng (2012) describe this phenomenon in the following way:

> In the eyes of the British the country which we would later know as Nigeria was, like Julius Caesar's Gaul, split into three parts. In simple terms the British understood, there was a northern region, which was predominantly Muslim, a western region, which was dominated by the Yoruba tribe, and an eastern region, where the Igbo were the predominant ethnic group. This was an oversimplified view, but it informed British attitudes about Nigeria. (Kwarteng, 2012, p. 284).

Tamuno (1980) gave a vivid description of the fallacy of ethnographic congruence relied on by the British to divide Nigeria into the three provinces, northern, western and eastern:

> From April 1939, the government split the former Southern Provinces into Eastern and Western Provinces. Bernard Bourdillon, the governor at the time, justified this change on three principal grounds. He and his staff, he said, had experienced delays consequent on increased work and transport difficulties in correspondence between Lagos and Enugu. Though these arguments were tenable the other was not. Bourdillon maintained that ethnographical considerations led him to believe that the lower Niger provided neat administrative line dividing the people of the former Southern Provinces. Bourdillon refused to split the Northern Provinces at the same time. He argued that unlike Enugu, in the Southern Provinces, Kaduna provided a more central capital for the Northern Provinces. Besides, he believed that the people of the Northern Provinces were more homogenous in culture than those in Southern Provinces. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 395).

The justification given by Bourdillon was undoubtedly pranky. As Turaki (2010) and Mangvwat (2014) have pointed out, Northern Nigeria was heterogeneous, and it was inconceivable that Bourdillon could refer to it as culturally homogenous. In addition, the Northern Provinces made up more than two thirds of the country's land mass (Coleman, 1971), and that should have even justified the need for splitting it.

Apart from being a complicated oversimplification, the division of the country into three regions created the so-called ethnic tripod (Osaghae, 1991). This so-called ethnic tripod refers to the division of the country in reference to the three dominant ethnic groups in each of the regions, that is, the Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east (Agbese, 2003). These three ethnic groups by this tripodal conception became the well-known majorities, and groups that do not belong to any of these well-known majorities are called minorities (Aku, 1982 cited in Agbese, 2003, p. 239). Osaghae (1991) described this in terms of core-periphery dichotomy:

110

> Each region had a 'core' comprising the majority group (Yoruba in the West, Igbo in the East and Hausa-Fulani in the North) and a 'periphery' which comprised the minority groups which were territorially located in as follows: Mid-West in the West, Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers provinces in the East and middle-belt, Southern Zaria and Borno areas in the north. (Osaghae, 1991, p. 239).

The delineation of "minorities" by the colonial administrators and scholars who define the concept of ethnic minorities as simply numerically inferior linguistic groups or only in reference to the three dominant ethnic groups (Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba) has been criticised as misrepresentation (Osaghae, 1991; Agbese, 2003). Osaghae has argued that another factor that complicates the majority-minority distinction, in the case of the north, was (and remains) the Islamic factor:

> Largely because the Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslims, the Islamic faith has usually been considered one of the characteristics of the majority group. But there were also non-Hausa-Fulani Muslims, thanks to the *jihad* of the early 19th century and official British support for the Islamization of the North. Under the circumstances, there were, and continue to be, two distinct, even hierarchical, categories of minority groups. The first (higher) category comprised Muslim minorities who were in many instances, part of the privileged 'Northern system' in terms of benefits and identification. The second category was made up of the 'proper' minorities who were both non-Hausa speaking and non-Muslims. (Osaghae, 1991, pp. 239-240).

This religious aspect highlighted by Osaghae is examined at length in the next section. A third category of minorities delineated in terms of their location are called the "marginal." The term "marginal" was employed by Peter P. Ekeh as a sociological description of the so-called minorities in Nigeria that by the vagaries of colonial regional boundaries have been caught off from a majority ethnic group that they are related with (Ekeh, 1972).

Overall, the division of the country into three regions by the British created several challenges, some of which have been highlighted above. This division significantly

111

impacted and was impacted by the colonial system of indirect rule. The three regions were very different. For example, "The north was dominated by feudal, Islamic lords known as emirs" (Kwarteng, 2012, p. 284). The dominant political system of Northern Nigeria was organised around the emirates which submit to political and spiritual overlordship of the Sultan of Sokoto (Osaghae, 1991). The south-west was dominated by the Yoruba, who were prior to the colonial engineered merger organised in several independent polities. "They had kings (Obas), supported by chiefs, who control the economy and resources of the state...Yoruba *Obas* had power over life and death, but these powers were subject to control through a system of checks and balances..." (Oyeweso, 2014, p. 4). An illustration of how this worked was given by Maier:

> The Oyo monarchy ruled through a complex system of checks and balances that involved a council of notables, the Oyo Mesi, and the secretive Ogboni society made up of eminent political and religious figures. The Oyo Mesi could depose the Alafin, the king, when their prime minister, the Bashorun, told him: "The Gods reject you, the people reject you, the earth rejects you." (Maier, 2002).

It can, therefore, be argued that the socio-political systems of the Yoruba societies were democratic in nature (Oyeweso, 2014). The Igbo and the other ethnic groups in the south-eastern region were widely known to be: less feudal (Kwarteng, 2012, p. 284), democratic and maintained highly republican political traditions devoid of a centralised authority (Maier, 2002, p. 9). Despite the obvious respective internal peculiarities of the three regions and the dissimilarities of their political traditions, the colonial administration applied the Indirect Rule across the country. It has been noted that this singular act undermined the indigenous political cultures and ushered in a new political tradition with grave consequences (Asiwaju, 1997; Achebe, 2012).

Afigbo (1980), Asiwaju (1980) and Abubakar (1980b) gave detailed accounts of colonial rule in the eastern, western and northern provinces respectively. The focus here is on the infamous system of Indirect Rule and its consequences on the regions. Afigbo (1980) asserted that the overriding goal of the British colonial rule in the eastern provinces was to maintain a degree of law and order that is necessary to guarantee the most effective exploitation of the natural resources in the area. Afigbo noted that, the provinces, divisions and districts, which made up the administrative structure through which the central government organises and carries out its work, were effectively in the hands of British colonial officers. However, at the local government level, as a result of the shortage of European staff and the inadequacy of communications and means of transport, which were required to administer the vast territory and large population, local rulers were engaged (Afigbo, 1980). These two proximate factors and, perhaps, those enumerated by Betts (1985), which were highlighted earlier, informed the imposition of Indirect Rule in the eastern provinces. For example, Afigbo explained that not only was Indirect Rule considered cheaper and germane to ensuring administrative continuity, "but it was believed to soften the shock which the introduction of Western ideas was believed to administer to a 'primitive' people" (Afigbo, 1980, p. 416-417). Afigbo further noted that the desire of the British to govern the conquered peoples through their indigenous institutions did not mitigate the ultimate goal of foisting an alien political system on them.

The most bizarre aspect of the Indirect Rule in the eastern region was how those that became agents of British rule were chosen. Given the republican nature of the eastern communities, it was difficult for the British to determine who were the traditional heads of

the villages and village-groups. Afigbo described the confusion that ensued in the following

way:

> Where the people were consulted they more often than not misunderstood the purpose of the request
> and pushed forward as their chiefs people who had no special status in traditional society.
> Communities which thought that those they presented would be killed or sold into slavery presented
> slaves or criminals or ne'er-do-wells as their chiefs, while others who thought the whitemen needed
> messengers sent able young men. In many places the administration chose chiefs without reference to
> anybody and made similar mistakes. (Afigbo., 1980, p. 417).

Afigbo, however, noted that not all those that were chosen as chiefs were nonentities or

rogues; many of the selected local agents were the traditional heads of their villages.

Nonetheless, the new power conferred on these chosen rulers was far beyond what any

political leaders were accorded in pre-colonial period. Afigbo noted that the new crop of

leaders, both those that were hitherto holding traditional political positions and the

nonentities that ascended to the new local rulership, were corrupt and oppressive. These

leaders were issued a certificate called a "Warrant" by the colonial administration and they

became popularly known as Warrant Chiefs. The Warrant Chiefs had another class of chiefs

called the minor chiefs or headmen as their representatives at the ward and village levels,

and the latter had the possibility to succeed the former. In a nutshell, the Warrant Chief

System has been described as a political disaster for the eastern provinces because it was

incompatible with the decentralised political system of the Igbo (Asiwaju, 1997, p. 32). This

is why Achebe referred to the Indirect Rule experiment in the eastern region as "a deeply

flawed arrangement that effectively confused and corrupted the Igbo democratic spirits"

(Achebe, 2012, p. 2). A recent work by Oriji (2013), *Political Organisation in Nigeria since*

the Late Stone Age: A History of the Igbo People, gave a similar commentary on the dismal effects of the Indirect Rule in Igboland in great detail.

British Indirect Rule in Western Provinces was equally problematic. Asiwaju (1980) described the region as culturally complex. The Yoruba, who were the predominant group in the region, Edo and Itsekiri peoples had commonality of political institution, that is, the kingship, and were organised into kingdoms with Oba, Olu or Obi traditional stools; while the Urhobo and the Kwale Igbo were more or less organised into clans (Asiwaju, 1980). According to Asiwaju, the overriding objective of colonial administration in Yorubaland at the initial phase was just to keep the peace required to ensure that British trade flourishes. Asiwaju noted that militarisation and authoritarianism characterised British colonial administration in western Nigeria prior to 1914. He argued that, as a consequence of this, there "was a drastic and widespread erosion of the Yoruba traditional political authority" (Asiwaju, 1980, p. 437). The indigenous rulers that had hitherto wielded power within the limit of traditional checks and balances lost status and prestige under the pre-1914 British arrangement (Oyeweso, 2014). Rev. Samuel Johnson's (2010) *The History of the Yorubas*, a posthumous work recompiled by his brother, Dr. Obadiah Johnson, and first published in 1921, gives an elaborate account of the pre-colonial political organisation of Yorubaland.

The year 1914 had dual significance for the western provinces. Firstly, as earlier explored, just like the rest of the country, the region was affected by the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates. Secondly, it was in this epochal year that the first administrator of the newly created state of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, extended the infamous Indirect Rule to the Southern Provinces (Asiwaju, 1980; Oyeweso, 2014). In Yorubaland, the colonial administration took advantage of the kingship or monarchical

115

institutions by superimposing Indirect Rule on the Obaship institution in order to consolidate British colonial control of the Yorubaland (Asiwaju, 1980). To some extent, this has helped to restore the lost glory of some of the recognized *Obas* and *baales* (Oyeweso, 2014). In the easterly provinces of the western region, particularly in Benin, similar phenomenon also occurred, albeit the Indirect Rule encountered problems there due to the pre-1914 British coercive erosion of the indigenous political structures of Benin and Delta through a direct type of rule, and the complications that arose from the introduction of the unpopular Warrant Chief system to the quite politically segmentary Urhobo, Kwale Igbo and Itsekiri societies (Asiwaju, 1980). By and large, Asiwaju observed, the existence of a kingship system in place ensured the relative success of Indirect Rule in Yorubaland and, to a limited extent, in non-Yoruba speaking western provinces.

British Indirect Rule achieved even more considerable measure of success in Northern Nigeria (Asiwaju, 1980; Maier, 2002; Campbell, 2011). Success here means traditional rulers acted in subordination to British administrators and indigenous political institutions served the purpose of colonial administration (Asiwaju, 1997). As highlighted earlier, before the advent of the twentieth century the place that was known as Northern Nigeria, or later called Northern Provinces, was made up of numerous independent entities (Abubakar, 1980b). There were empires, states, chiefdoms, chieflets, and various polities of varying scales (Abubakar, 1980b; Mangvwat, 2014). Abubakar (1980) noted that prior to the British conquest there was no centralized authority wielding political power over the entire expansive Northern Provinces, but a huge part of the region was under the Sokoto Islamic empire. It can be deduced from a number of sources that the motive of British for the

conquest of the northern region and the system of rule they employed to govern the vast

territory were paradoxical. For example, Campbell (2011) noted that:

> British motives for the conquest of the North were a mix of commercial, strategic, and altruistic
> concerns, including suspicion of the French intentions in that part of the Sahel and the desire to
> suppress the slave trade: by the turn of the twentieth century, *the Sultanate of Sokoto was probably*
> *the largest slaveholding empire remaining in the world* [emphasis added]. (Campbell, 2011, p. 2).

Once the British had conquered Northern Nigeria, they were faced with the challenge of

establishing colonial administration over such a massive territory. Confronted with the

inadequacy of staff and materials, which were needed to govern the vast territory of

Northern Nigeria through a direct type of rule, the British set aside their initial reservations

about the emirate system, which they had judged as "corrupt, oppressive and grossly

inefficient," and decided to use it to establish control over the region (Abubakar, 1980b, p.

450). It was, therefore, ironic that, in spite of the unsavoury reputation of the Caliphate as a

slaveholding empire and the British critique of it, the colonial administrators allied

themselves with the local rulers:

> The once 'corrupt and oppressive' Fulbe were hailed as born rulers whom the British had to maintain
> at all cost; their long established system of government was fit to be utilised by the British. So, the
> emirate system of the Sokoto Caliphate became, for the British, a good model for local government
> in the Northern Provinces. Consequently, the system was patronised and eventually extended even
> over non-Muslim groups. (Abubakar, 1980b, pp. 450-451).

Three salient observations can be made about Sa'ad Abubakar's statement above: the British

elevated the Fulani or Fulbe as born rulers; the emirate system of the Sokoto Caliphate

became a model for local government for the entire northern region; and non-Muslim areas

were subjected to the emirate rule, which was based on Islam. Despite the acclaimed success

of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, it created political upheavals in the Middle Belt due to

the incompatibility of the emirate system with the political culture of the peoples

(Abubakar, 1980b). Turaki (2010) and Mangvwat (2014) contended that the ramifications of

these controversial actions of the British are felt up to the present time.

Abubakar (1980b) argued that, contrary to what many studies have maintained, the

Indirect Rule, which came to be associated with its main architect, Frederick Lugard, and

known as the "Lugardian system," had degraded the emirate set up in the region. According

to him, the emirs were reduced to mere agents of the British. Abubakar opined that the

conquest weakened the power of the emirs, and the Islamic empire did not wield the kind of

power it had prior to the nineteenth century. Besides weakening the central authority of the

Caliph, the British colonial administration proclaimed new policies on slavery, justice and

taxation that negatively affected the emirate government, which had hitherto relied on the

[objectionable] "benefits" of keeping slaves (Abubakar, 1980, p. 454). Lugard's account of

how the emirate system faired under British rule concurred with Abubakar's position:

> ... for there are very many cases on record in Nigeria, extending from the earliest beginnings of
> British rule in the north up to the present day, where not only the highest officials of the native
> administration have been deprived of their positions and subjected to the rigours of the law for
> misconduct, but even Emirs and principal chiefs have been deposed for misrule. (Lugard, 1922, p.
> 224).

However, while the Muslim emirs were subordinated to the British colonial administrators

and had to swear the oath of allegiance in the name of Allah and the Prophet of Islam to the

British Crown and the representative of the Crown, the High Commissioner (Abubakar,

1980b, p. 452), it has been argued that, nevertheless, Indirect Rule gave preferential

treatment to the Muslim rulers at the detriment of non-Muslims in the region (Osaghae,

1991; Turaki, 2010; Mangvwat, 2014). For example, Maier (2002) and Campbell (2011)

observed that it was rather paradoxical that after defeating the Caliphate, the British went ahead to sustain it:

> The British administered northern Nigeria through a system called indirect rule that allowed the traditional authorities, the sultan and the emirs, to continue running things more or less as they saw fit. For the most part, the Islamic legal code, Sharia, was allowed to operate, except for cruel punishments such as amputation... It suited the emirs, who were allowed to maintain their power and at times even extend it over smaller pagan communities that they had never before controlled. (Maier, 2002, p. 11).

Campbell shared similar perspective on the effect of Indirect Rule on the emirate system in the Northern Provinces:

> He [Lugard] looked to preserve, transform, and thereby strengthen the defeated caliphate's "traditional" Islamic authorities... A consequence was that the Sokoto caliphate has continued to evolve from establishment by Sultan Dan Fodio in 1804 to the present despite its defeat. Indirect rule preserved much that was precolonial and premodern in Northern Nigeria. (Campbell, 2011, p. 3).

It can, therefore, be argued based on the arguments of Abubakar (1980b), Maier (2002), Turaki (2010), Campbell (2011) and Mangvwat (2014) that the Islamic emirate system incurred some losses and gains as a result of the Indirect Rule, but it was clearly in a far more advantageous position than the non-Muslim polities and communities in the north, and it was imposed as a hegemon on the rest of the Northern region that it had no influence and authority over before the advent of British colonialism.

The structure of colonial administration in the Northern Provinces was similar to those already enumerated under the Eastern and Western Provinces. In the judicial sphere, however, the British maintained the position of *Qadis* courts, which operated on the basis of *Maliki* law, and established parallel English type of courts operating at three tiers

(Abubakar, 1980b). Even with oversight over *Qadis* courts, the British administrators had a daunting task ensuring that judgements passed by *Qadis* complied with British standards:

> Although in the *Qadis* courts the Residents and the District Officers played no part, they had access to the records of the proceedings and were directed to see that certain canonical punishments – such as amputation of limps for theft, stoning to death of fornicators – were not implemented. There were serious departures from the sharia' (sic), which most *Qadis* found difficult to abide by, hence, some used to pass double judgements, one in court abiding by dictate of the Nasara (Europeans) and the other at home based on Shari'a. (Abubakar, 1980b, p. 455).

In general, unlike in the Southern Provinces, Indirect Rule proved successful as far as the British had made the attempt to use the pre-existing emirate system in the north and to work out compromise that sustained the Islamic and cultural traditions of the ruling class even at the detriment of the numerous non-Muslim peoples of the region. It was, thus, the instrumentality of the emirate system – being cheap and compatible with the exploitative nature of colonialism – that guaranteed the greater success of the Indirect Rule than anywhere else.

3.2.3. Nationalist Movements. Various studies have given account of how the tripartite administrative arrangement, which divided the country into West, East and North regions, gave rise to the phenomenon of regionalism. Before exploring these studies, it is important to first of all interrogate the roots of nationalist currents in modern Nigeria. The purpose of doing this is to locate the main factors that had unifying influences on the hitherto disparate polities that came to be known as Nigeria. In one of his widely respected works, *Milestones in Nigerian History*, Professor J. F. Ade Ajayi identified four epochal factors that had unifying influences in the history of modern Nigeria: Fulani jihad; Christian mission; British colonial administration; and nationalist movements (Ajayi, 1962). In line with

Ajayi's position, Olusanya argued that the roots of nationalist ideas in Nigeria are long and varied:

> The emergence of Nigerian nationalism pre-dated the establishment of effective British rule over the whole country known as Nigeria. This is because the various areas which now constitute modern Nigeria were acquired at different times and certain forces and conditions favouring the emergence of the nationalist idea were already at work before 1914 when Nigeria became an administrative unit. (Olusanya, The Nationalist Movements in Nigeria, 1980a, p. 545)

Here, each of the four epochal factors that, according to Ajayi (1962), have had integrative influence on modern Nigerian history is discussed. First, the Fulani Islamic jihad of 1804-1808, which was led by the Islamic scholar Usman dan Fodio, was instrumental in creating an overarching political agglomeration called the Caliphate, which subsumed numerous independent polities in the geographical area that later became known as Northern Nigeria under British colonial rule. Hence, it has been suggested that: "By bringing together such a large area under one single political unit, the jihad paved the way for the emergence of a greater Nigeria" (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 545). It can, thus, be argued that the jihad created spatial and territorial identity at two levels. First, the geographical extent of the caliphate covered an area that embraced more than half of the present day Nigeria (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 545). Second, the jihad reinforced the fusion of Islam and politics, and created a synonymity between the entire territory under the influence of the Sokoto Caliphate and Islam thereby spatialising and territorialising religious identity.

Although Islam was introduced into Nigeria from the eleventh century through the state of Kanem (Bornu) via the proselytising work of Arab trans-Saharan slave traders and merchants, who doubled as itinerant preachers, and Islamic scholars and clerics (Falk, 1997; Hunwick, 2006; Turaki, 2010), it was the nineteenth century Fulani jihad that unified a vast

region of the north (Ajayi, 1962; Olusanya, 1980a; Turaki, 2010; Ogbogbo, 2014). It is important to note that Arab Trans-Saharan Slave Trade had linkage with European Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade; the former was a major source of slaves not only to the Arab states and the Ottoman sultanate, but also to the European slave markets until the Europeans discovered new routes to acquire direct access to the human "commodity" (Falk, 1997; Hunwick, 2006). Early contact of West Africa with Islam through North Africans from the Maghreb in about mid eighth century did not crystallise in the adoption of the Islamic faith by the people, but it was until the eleventh century that Islam started having a foothold in West Africa when a number of rulers of states formally accepted the Islamic faith and the success of the militant Islamic movement, Almoravids (derived from the Arabic *al-murābiṭūn* – warriors for the faith), which arose among the nomads of the Sanhaja of Western Sahara, that paved the way for the spread of Islam in West Africa (see Falk, 1997; Hunwick, 2006; Turaki, 2010). The link between the almoravidist movement and the coming of Islam into Nigeria is tenuous. In large part, Islam came into Nigeria through Muslim merchants and clerics, and the migration and dispersal of Muslims, for example, the migration of the Fulani or Fulbe was believed to have played a role in the spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria:

> The most significant migration in the region was that of the Fulani or Fulbe from the Futa Toro in the Senegal in the nineteenth and fourteenth centuries. They migrated from Western Sudan to places beyond Central Sudan and Northern Nigeria. Later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this mobile group was responsible for founding Islamic states in many parts of West Africa. (Turaki, 2010, p. 39).

It can, nevertheless, be argued that in the early years of Islam in Northern Nigeria, the kingdoms that converted to Islam and their rulers remained autonomous until the Usman dan

Fodio led Fulani jihad swept across the region and brought a vast swath of territories under the Caliphate, which exerted a unifying influence in the region.

The second epochal factor that had unifying influence in modern Nigerian history was Christian mission. The introduction of Christianity into Africa south of the Sahara occurred in phases associated with three waves of Christianity on the continent: Christianity in Mediterranean Africa, Nubia and Ethiopia in ancient times; Portuguese early attempt to establish Christianity among coastal areas of Africa, fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries; and the modern missionary movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although the presence of Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa is often associated with the advent of Europeans, its history goes farther back to periods before that. Professor Yusufu Turaki was quite categorical in asserting that Christianity even predated Islam in West Africa (Turaki, 2010, p. 35). For example, it has been suggested that the early contact of Sub-Saharan Africa with North Africa, where Christianity was well established from its beginning before the Islamic conquest, might have provided the channel for the spread of the Christian faith among black Africans (cf. Falk, 1997; Hunwick, 2006). Dr. Peter Falk, for example, noted in his *The Growth of the Church in Africa* that: "West Africa has had sustained contact with the civilization of North Africa since the time of Christ" (Falk, 1997, p. 69). In her very comprehensive work, *A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present*, Professor Elizabeth Isichei traced the origin of Christianity in Africa to the thriving times of the church in North Africa and Nubia, and the important place of the church in Ethiopia in the history of African Christianity (Isichei, 1995). Apart from the possible spread of Christianity into West Africa through the region's contact with the churches in Egypt, Nubia

and Ethiopia, the Christians of North Africa, who were fleeing from rampaging jihadist forces were said to have also brought Christianity into West Africa:

> The Christians of North Africa crossed the Sahara in flight from Islamic jihads and brought Christianity to the region. Today's Tuaregs and Garamantes are said to be descendants of the Christian communities in the Sahara, who spoke the Old Libyan Punic language... Christian names and relics of Christianity were traceable among the Tuaregs for some centuries. (Turaki, 2010, p. 35).

However, it has been noted that the religion of Christianity waned or became obliterated in most of Sub-Saharan Africa during the intervening periods of Islamic conquest of North Africa (Falk, 1997; Turaki, 2010).

The second wave of Christianity in Africa occurred between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. It followed several expeditions undertaken by Portuguese explorers, who were spurred by the invention of the compass, the new knowledge and skills of navigation, and the emergence of larger and stronger vessels that enabled people to explore the unknown (Falk, 1997). From 1402-1772, the Portuguese expedition provided a platform for Roman Catholic missions to the black people of the West African coast. The motivation of the Portuguese missionaries, according to Falk (1997), was: to bring the gospel to the people, who had not yet heard about it; and to build a buffer against, or to thwart, the expanding power of Muslims by nurturing alliance with African Christian churches that were thought to be in existence in the West African coast. With the decline of Portuguese influence in the coast of West Africa at the end of the eighteenth century, the Roman Catholic missions slowed down.

Lastly, the third wave of Christianity, which has been characterised as the modern missionary movement or modern missionary Christianity in West Africa, occurred between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Isichei, 1995; Falk, 1997; Turaki, 2010). Christian

124

revival in Europe and North America brought about new conceptions of social justice that made some Christians to be appalled by the evils of the slave trade and to engage in exposing this inhumane act in the public, and this eventually led to the abolition of the nefarious slave trade in 1808 in Britain, and officially adopted by other Western powers in 1833 (Falk, 1997). The anti-slavery campaigns opened the door for Christian missions, as liberated ex-slaves, including those from Nova Scotia in Canada, were resettled along the coast of West Africa (Isichei, 1995; Falk, 1997). Many slaves were later returned from Sierra Leone to western Nigeria, particularly to the Yorubaland (Falk, 1997, p. 124). The summary given in the next paragraph is based on the detailed exposés of Isichei (1995) and Falk (1997).

Most of the liberated African slaves that were returned to the coast of West Africa were already Christianised. The first building they constructed was a church, to demonstrate their gratitude to God for liberating them (Falk, 1997, p. 105). Some of the ex-slaves had already received education and others were even preachers, who played prominent roles in proclaiming the gospel to their fellow Africans along the coast and in the interior (Isichei, 1995; Falk, 1997). For example, the first African Anglican bishop, Samuel Ajayi Crowther, was a liberated Yorubaman who played a prominent role in evangelising among the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria. However, these former slaves were by the experience they went through uprooted from their African culture, and hence, had difficulty blending with the rest of the African populations. However, "gradually, as the latter acquired education and accepted the Christian faith, the differences between the two groups diminished; they developed into a more homogeneous unit and were called Creoles" (Falk, 1997, p. 104).

Western Christian agents and the government felt a moral obligation to provide humanitarian support and the benefits of Western civilisations, including education, to the liberated Africans, who were socially uprooted from their African culture, and to the rest of the black Africans. Thus, the modern mission movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was motivated by this desire, and the mission impulse of nurturing the Christian faith of the liberated Africans and bringing the gospel to the rest of the black people from the coast to the interior. The movement was dominated by Evangelical Protestants from Europe and North America, who established many mission societies for outreach to the Africans, albeit the Roman Catholic Orders also continued to establish African missions during the period. The liberated slaves, who returned to their own people in western Nigeria, started evangelising among their people, and invited the Church Missionary Society to fertile mission field that they had just discovered. From the 1840s onwards, Christian missions began in western Nigeria and spread through the years to the rest of the southern region of the country.

The point that is being established here is that Christian mission also acted as a unifying factor in Nigeria. Christian missionaries were able to dissolve the rivalry and suspicion among liberated African Christians and their fellow African converts (Falk, 1997); the missionaries strove to encourage "amongst their converts the idea of the creation of a modern state which would take its rightful place in the comity of nations" (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 545). Acording to Olusanya, through their activities, which covered the whole present day southern Nigeria, the missionaries succeeded in breaking down ethnic prejudices and creating an overarching identity that transcended ethnic boundaries.

The third epochal factor that has had a unifying influence in modern Nigerian history is British colonial administration. There is no need to go into details about British colonialism again here; it has already been explored in the preceding section. Colonial rule brought together erstwhile disparate polities and tried to forge a sense of common identity among Nigerians. For instance, Olusanya posited that: "The bringing together of the various groups by the British themselves within a common administrative unit fostered the spirit of oneness and a sense of unity – 'the unity of common subjection'" (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 545). The late Nigerian literary icon, Chinua Achebe characterised the bond of unity among Nigerians engineered by the British through the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates as a delicate and artificial lattice (Achebe, 2012, p. 2). For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that the amalgamation of Nigeria by the British had far-reaching consequence for the state system that was put in place:

> The unification of Nigeria led to the centralization of the army and police, making the centre responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the country. The central government has the sole responsibility to deploy the military against insurrection and opposition against its policies and persecute aggression against the state. The control of the military forces further enhanced the power of the government at the centre over those at the regions. (Oyeweso, 2014, p. 6).

The fourth and last epochal factor that had a unifying influence in modern Nigerian history was nationalist movements. Here, attempt is made to distil from the literature the nationalist currents in modern Nigerian history into two: pan-Nigerian nationalism and regionalist nationalism. This distinction is necessary in order to capture the context and content of nationalist movements in modern Nigerian history. Anti-colonial nationalism is used here as a concomitant of colonial rule. Its genesis in Nigeria can be traced to the beginning of British invasion. Olusanya (1980), for instance, noted that the various

127

indigenous polities that were brought together under the banner of British colonial rule had

had a common strong desire for self-rule and opposed foreign control. Olusanya explained

how colonialism sowed the seed of its own destruction:

> This desire was strongly expressed in the resistance of the indigenous population to British conquest
> and domination, a resistance which continued long after the establishment of British control and
> which expressed itself not only in the sporadic outbreak of violence, but in a more subtle,
> psychological form. There was also the fact that British rule carried with it racial intolerance and
> discrimination, limited opportunities for Nigerians in the administrative machinery, and open
> economic exploitation of Nigerians in the administrative enterprise with connivance of the British
> colonial administration. (Olusanya, 1980a, pp. 545-546).

As Olusanya posited, the common suffering of subjugation, racial discrimination, and

exploitative treatments that Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic origins, were exposed to

in the hands of the British colonisers created "the unity of common subjection." This

awareness helped Nigerians to see themselves not as separate ethnic nationalities, but as one

group confronted by a foreign group, the British colonisers. It was against this backdrop that

Nigerians founded organisations "whose main purpose was to mobilize not only a particular

class or group, but the entire population of Nigeria against the oppressive British colonial

rule" (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 546). To be sure, this was the moment that generated what may

be described as pan-Nigerian nationalism, which in all respect was a widespread expression

of anti-colonial sentiment.

Falola's (2009) *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria* dedicates a chapter to the anti-

colonial nationalism witnessed in Nigeria. Professor Toyin Falola described the different

faces of the anti-colonial nationalism that characterised the independence struggle by

Nigerians. The different polities that were brought together by the British to form the

Nigerian state had individually resisted British conquest and failed. After the amalgamation,

the period 1914 to 1939 witnessed a collective, anti-colonial nationalism by Nigerians, led by Western-educated elites, in forms of: "Demands for reform, political agitation, and complaints about imperial exploitation" (Falola, 2009, p. 132). In general, according to Falola, the elites led agitations were peaceful; they articulated their nationalist sentiments through writing, and tampered their demands for reform with a willingness to accept incremental change. It can, thus, be said that anti-colonial nationalism and reform nationalism went hand in hand. The 1940s and 1950s witnessed a more nuanced approach by the Western-educated elites, but also some violent protests and cracks in the fold of the nationalist (cf. Falola, 2009; Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014). Two strands of anti-colonial nationalism emerged during the period of the 1940s to 1950s: "militant criticism of the colonial order that demanded independence and messianic nationalism that asserted that a Nigerian hero and leader was ready to take over" (Falola, 2009, p. 133). It is important to note that the anti-colonial protests were not only carried out by Nigerian Western-educated leaders that emerged during the period, but even by less famous people, including market women, labour unions and grassroots politicians (Falola, 2009). The anti-colonial discourses of this period were intellectually rich, but also sometimes laden with confrontational tones (Falola, 2009; Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014). Three snippets of the anti-colonial discourses are presented below:

Osita Agwuna, a member of Zikist Movement, Kano Branch, 1946 had this to say in protest to colonial rule:

> We the enslaved peoples, know certainly well that imperialism and African irredentism are two irreconcilables. We know also that the redemption of Africa lies in the hands of Africans themselves and must be achieved by either violent revolution or by non-violent revolution. (quoted in Falola, 2009, p. 131).

Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1909 – 1987), first Premier of the Western Region (1952 – 1959) and opposition leader in the federal parliament (1959 – 1963), made the following assertion in his first address as the President of the Action Group, 28th April 1951, to the Conference of Party Members at Owo:

> In our view, the rule of one nation by another is unnatural and unjust. It is maintained either by might or by complete subordination, through crafty means, of the will and self-respect of the subject people to the political self-aggrandizement of the tutelary power. There can be no satisfactory substitute for self-rule. (Awolowo, 1951).

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904 – 1996), second and last Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria (1960 – 1963), first President of Nigeria (1963 – 1966), former President of the Nigerian Senate, former Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and a foremost nationalist, made the declaration below on the National Day of Mourning, 4th July 1950, in memory of twenty-one miners who were killed at Enugu on 18th November 1949, at the order of a British Police Officer:

> Let there be no mistake about our future; we are determined to be free, and history is on our side. It is not whether Nigeria is right or Britain is right; it is what is right for Nigeria. In these days of struggle for national survival, let us not be bitter; let us bear no malice; let us be charitable and stand firm in the cause of justice and righteousness. God knows we hate none on account of race or colour, but we love our country, and we want our country to be free, and we shall be free. (Azikiwe, 1961, p. 52).

The above expressions fall under the category that Coleman (1971) described as "primary resistance," which was a typical opposition of African groups to colonial rule.

While anti-colonial nationalism played a role in creating a sense of "common destiny" among the various Nigerian groups, like elsewhere in Africa, it was the movements to create new political nationalities that actually gave rise to pan-Nigerian nationalism and

regionalist nationalism. Coleman's (1971) *Nigeria: Background to* Nationalism, considered

as one of the most solid early works on the development of nationalism and the nationalist

movements in Nigeria (first published in 1958) delineated the political nationalities that the

movements sought to identify themselves with as: Nigeria; Western Region; Eastern

Region; and Northern Region (Coleman, 1971, p. 4). The group that this study refers to as

pan-Nigerian nationalists were more concerned with "national unity," that is, broad unity

among Nigerians, and sought to create a nation-state. Coleman (1971) used the term

"modern nationalism" as a synonym for the form of nationalism expressed by the pan-

Nigerian nationalists. The concept of modern nationalism, according to Coleman, consists

of: "sentiments, activities, and organisational developments aimed explicitly at the self-

government and independence of Nigeria as a nation-state existing on a basis of equality in

an international state system" (Coleman, 1971, pp. 169-170). It is important here to state

that this desire was inspired by the appeal of European model of the nation-state. Coleman

identified the distinguishing characteristics of the pan-Nigerian or modern nationalism as

follows:

> ... (a) the explicit goal of Nigerian self-government; (b) the concept of Nigerian unity; (c) the
>
> predominance of westernized elements in leadership groups; (d) the development of permanent
>
> political associations to pursue nationalist objectives; and (e) the predominance of modern political
>
> values and ideals. (Coleman, 1971, p. 170).

The excerpt below from Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik) in which he affirmed the unity of

Nigeria in a very personal and unequivocal term reflected vividly the sentiment of pan-

Nigerian nationalism:

> I was born in Northern Nigeria, where the boundaries of the country lie on the verges of the Sahara
>
> Desert, and where the majority of the inhabitants worship God according to the tenets of Islam, and

where the camel caravans still ply to and fro in their various missions across the desert to the Middle

East.

I was educated in Lagos, the capital of Nigeria and a great seaport, where the ships of

various nations anchor to trade with us. When the Ministerial system of government was introduced

into Nigeria, I represented Lagos in the Legislature of Western Nigeria, where I still reside, in spite

of my temporary absence in Eastern Nigeria.

My parents are natives of Eastern Nigeria, the arsenal of republicanism in Nigeria.

Although I am Ibo, yet I speak Yoruba and I have a smattering of Hausa. I am now Premier of

Eastern Nigeria, the land of my fathers, which lies five hundred miles from Lagos and almost a

thousand miles from the place of my birth in Zungeru, in Northern Nigeria. Each of our three

Regions is vastly different in many respects, but each has this in common: that, despite variety of

languages and customs or difference in climate, all form part of one country which has existed as a

political and social entity for fifty years. *That is why we believe that the political union of Nigeria is*

destined to be perpetual and indestructible [emphasis added]. (Azikiwe, 1961, p. 20).

As Zik conveyed in the above statement, it can be argued that the sentiments of pan-

Nigerian nationalism were in consonance with what may be categorised as a "civic model"

of nationalism as opposed to ethnic/cultural nationalism (see Shulman, 2002; Vujakovic,

2005; Jaskulowski, 2010). The distinction between the two conceptions of nationalism has

been highlighted in the previous chapter.

Although pan-Nigerian nationalism was an integrative force in the political

development of Nigeria, it was later challenged by another type of nationalism that emerged

during the late 1940s and the years leading to independence (Coleman, 1971; Fwatshak &

Ayuba, 2014). Whereas the former had emphasised pan-Nigerian unity, the latter form of

nationalism put a high premium on regionalism as the focal point of Nigerian nationalist

development (Coleman, 1971, p. 319). This latter type of nationalism is described in this

study as regionalist nationalism. It may roughly fit in the category of "ethnic/cultural

model" of nationalism. However, this dichotomy between civic and ethnic/cultural

nationalism needs to be taken with a caveat (Shulman, 2002; Jaskulowski, 2010). This is

because the nation is an "imagined community" (Anderson, 2006), and, as Burszta &

Jaskułowski (2005) argued, nationalism has a metonymic side. The metonymic dimension of

nationalism is explained as follows:

> Nationalism regardless of its apparent civic or ethnic type refers to magical type of thinking enabling
> mental access to abstract and complex notions such as nation or national territory by means of a
> system of metonymy – concrete and closer to people's experiences and easier to grasp. (Jaskulowski,
> 2010, p. 301).

It is worth noting that a number of factors were responsible for the regionalisation of

nationalism. One of the drivers of the regionalisation of nationalism was the fear and

tension created by the amalgamation, which was taking full effect towards the late 1960s.

The political at the time conveyed the sentiments behind the regionalist nationalism that was

taking roots in the country. In their article, "Discordant Voices in the House that Lugard

Roofed: Amalgamation Discourses in Nigeria's First Centenary," Fwatshak and Ayuba

(2014) catalogued the nature of the debates in a chronological framework. They described

the amalgamation discourses as robust and aggressive:

> Serious discourses among Nigerians on the amalgamation began in the 1940s. The main issue was
> whether or not a united Nigeria was desirable or workable. The parties were the politicians, and the
> masses." The trends were both intellectual and the use of physical violence. (Fwatshak & Ayuba,
> 2014, p. 5).

As Fwatshak and Ayuba (2014) described in the above statement, the nationalist currents of

the 1940s onward differed radically from those from the pre-1939. The pre-1939

nationalists, who were political parties and leaders chiefly based in Lagos, pursued

reformist goals and criticised colonialism with guardedness (Falola, 2009, p. 134). In the

1940s and 1950s, however, "ethnic nationalism and regional divisions triumphed over the forces of unity in Nigerian politics" (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 568). Coleman (1971), Olusanya (1980) and Falola (2009) provided detailed analysis of these factors, including the activities of political parties and the constitutional developments in the periods leading to independence. In a nutshell, the nationalists that were no longer favourably disposed to the idea of a united Nigeria embraced sub-state loyalties. A few snippets of the anti-Nigerian unity or regionalist nationalist discourses are presented below.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo's characterisation of "Nigeria":

> Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no "Nigerians" in the same sense as there are "English" "Welsh", or "French". The word "Nigerian" is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. (Awolowo, 1947, pp. 47-48).

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1912 – 1966), the only Prime Minister that Nigeria has had (1960 – 1966), made the following statement at a Legislative Council debate:

> Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite... Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country. (Balewa, 1948, p. 227).

It is necessary to point out that the nationalists were not simply divided into pan-Nigerian and regionalist camps, but some were dangling between the two poles and flip-flopped as political exigencies dictated. To be sure, some demonstrated a fervent commitment to *pan-Nigerianism*, while at the same time were strong advocates of their regions (cf. Coleman, 1971).

There was no doubt that the creation of the three administrative regions in 1939 and the struggle for influence and regional alignments by political parties contributed in

generating fierce debate and violence (Coleman, 1971; Nwaubani, 2002; Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014). The Kano riots of 1953 offered an example of how regional nationalism reared its ugly head sometimes. In this instance, according to the Reports on the Kano Disturbances, for four consecutive days, from May 16 to 19, 1953: "Southerners and Northerners in this bustling commercial capital of the Northern Region were attacking each other, burning and pillaging each other's property, mutilating bodies of victims and committing the most violent atrocities on one another..." (Northern Regional Government, 1953, p. 10). The next section looks at how federalism came to be employed as a mechanism for mediating regional contestations and divergent forms of nationalism, and to hold the country together.

3.3 Long and Bumpy Road to Federalism

The year 1954 is often described as "a watershed in Nigeria's evolution to statehood" because it was the date Nigeria became a federation (Gana, 2003, p. 17). Gana argued that the current crisis of legitimacy of the Nigerian state cannot be properly grasped and resolved without reference to the epoch-making event of that year, where the colonial administration and the Nigerian nationalists, mostly of competing political persuasions, entered into a "federal bargain" and reached a consensus that federalism was the best option for the soon-to-be independent state of Nigeria. However, some believed that the year 1947 in which the constitution, popularly known as Richards Constitution, came into effect was the actual defining moment in Nigeria's match towards independence and statehood (Irukwu, 2005). For example, Irukwu posited that it was a constitution designed to promote national unity, but it was believed to have achieved the exact opposite.

Here, an attempt is made to interrogate the socio-political circumstances of Nigeria, at the time the decision to federate was taken in 1946 – 1954, and the precursory events leading up to 1946. Afigbo (1991) delineated two analytical approaches to this endeavour: 1) a synchronic approach which focuses on the analysis of the socio-political circumstances of Nigeria at the time of the federal bargain; and 2) a diachronic approach that seeks to identify the steps leading up to the beginning of the intense debate about the propriety of a federal solution. Proponents of the synchronic approach locate the roots of Nigerian federalism in what has been described as the "primordial geography or cultural complexity of the country's society," (Suberu, 2001, p. 20) or "primordial federal features of indigenous Nigerian society" (Afigbo, 1991, p. 13). Afigbo (1991) distinguished between three forms of pluralities: the plurality of economic and geographic regions, the plurality of ethnic nationalities, and the plurality of colonial administrative traditions. This has been illustrated here in *Figure 2*. Afigbo grouped the first two pluralities under the primordial federal features of indigenous Nigeria. The third plurality, according to Afigbo, was more or less the impact of colonial administrative regionalism. Synchronic analysis places emphasis on the primordial federal features of indigenous Nigerian society. Scholars who adopt this analytical approach argue that Nigeria's expansive geographic size and its ecological, economic, and cultural complexities and variations were crucial factors that informed the adoption of federalism. However, this claim has been challenged on the ground that Nigeria has never been a federation of natural, geographical and/or economic regions, and there was no evidence that the geographic size and ecological diversity have had any influence on the decision to adopt a federal system as opposed to other forms of political arrangements (Afigbo, 1991).

Sleeping Volcano

Plurality of Economic and Geographic Regions

Primordial federal features of Indigenous Nigeria

Plurality of Ethnic Nationalities

Federalism

Decision

Powers Delegated to the Federal Government

Shared Powers

Powers Reserved for the three federating regions (member-states)

British sociopolitical engineering

Plurality of Colonial Administrative Traditions

Influencing Factor

Figure 2. An illustration of the competing pluralities present at the time the decision to adopt the federal option in Nigeria was made. This figure illustrates Afigbo's (1991) argument that British sociopolitical engineering influenced the decision to adopt federalism in the country.

In contrast, those who adopt the diachronic analytical approach argue that the process of sociopolitical engineering employed by the British colonial administration in effect made the federal option inevitable (Afigbo, 1991, Suberu, 2001, and Gana, 2003). Proponents of the second approach argue that the legacy of British colonial administration, including administrative regionalism or the "colonial divide-and-rule syndrome" were the main forces behind the country's federalism (Suberu, 2001, p. 20). As Suberu noted, the scholars in this category argue that the configuration of the three-region federation was not

137

determined by the so-called natural boundaries of the country's constituent ethnic communities, but was an offshoot of British colonial domination and the structures of colonial administration. It is in view of this study's leaning to the diachronic approach that already a considerable attention has been given to the British colonial rule and colonial socio-political engineering from the beginning of British colonial enterprise in the Niger Territory, which we now know as Nigeria. Therefore, only a summary of the key colonial wrought forces that played critical part in the decision to endow Nigeria with a federal system will be presented here.

In his diachronic analysis of the federal features in the Colonial State, Afigbo (1991) identified three key factors that played a critical role in the evolution of a federal system in Nigeria. First, the haphazard manner in which the British established territorial control over Nigeria led to the emergence of a tripartite administrative arrangement wherein each of the three separate administrative units evolved its own traditions and identity. As earlier stated, the delineation of the three regions was done as a matter of administrative convenience rather than borne out of a consideration of the primordial federal features of indigenous Nigerian society (Afigbo, 1980; Osaghae, 1991; Asiwaju, 1997; Achebe, 2012; Kwarteng, 2012). The second factor, according to Afigbo (1991), was the method, patterns and politics of amalgamation employed by the colonial administration from 1906 to 1914, which reinforced and sustained the incongruity among the administrative units. Through amalgamation, the British unified the Nigerian territory and established full dominion over it, while at once reinforcing the differences between the administrative units. Again, as Afigbo argued, the overriding considerations for the British colonial administration with regard to the amalgamation has to do with administrative convenience rather than any

138

sensitivity for the primordial federal features of Nigeria. Policies such as the infamous

Indirect Rule and schemes of divide-and-rule, which have been explored in great details in

the preceding section, helped in deepening the differences among the regions. The third

factor identified by Afigbo was the administrative politics of the post-amalgamation

colonial Nigeria. He argued that it was not shaped by the primordial federal features of

indigenous Nigerian society, but rather it leverages the rivalry between the regions and the

personal animosities among the leading regional actors. It should be noted that Afigbo did

not dismiss the potency of the primordial federal features completely, but contended that it

was only after the aforementioned factors had manifested their influence through the

emergence of the epoch-making Richard's constitution that the primordial federal features

began to manifest in form of convergence of geography and ethnicity, and became an

audible voice on the political scene. Therefore, while British socio-political engineering was

the crucial factor that influenced the decision to adopt federalism, the primordial federal

features became a sleeping volcano that erupted later (see *Figure 2*). It could, therefore, be

argued that subsequently the Nigerian federalism has been shaped by myriads of factors as

described by Alli in the following way:

> The character of Nigerian Federalism has however been moulded by several critical factors, namely
> the class character and configuration of class forces of the Nigerian state, and the dominant capitalist
> mode of production and multinational, multiethnic and multi religious nature of the Nigerian society.
> (Alli, 2003, p. 73)

A cursory look at the constitutional developments that culminated in the adoption of

federalism is worthwhile at this point. All the pre-Independence constitutions of Nigeria

came to be known or associated with the names of British colonial officials, who were at the

helms of affairs at the time the constitutions came into force. To a large extent, each of the

139

constitutions represented an attempt to address certain sociopolitical, or better "nation-building" challenges that the "colonial masters" had to grapple with; and to a lesser extent, the constitutions also reflected the mindset or principles upheld by their main architects (cf. Coleman, 1971; Alli, 2003).

The man who replaced Lord Lugard in 1919 as Governor-General of Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, was a controversial figure in the annals of Nigerian constitutional development. Clifford was critical of the amalgamation carried out by his predecessor. He proposed to the Colonial Office in London to allow him to implement a proper amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates. His idea was to restructure the country by abolishing the two lieutenant-governorships and creating a strong central administrative organ that would ultimately unite Nigeria, but the Colonial Office turned down his first proposal of getting rid of the positions of the two lieutenant-governors and only approved the creation of a centralised bureaucracy for the country (Afigbo, 1991¸ Alli, 2003). In a dramatic u-turn, Clifford declared that every homogenous community was free to aspire to be an autonomous nation (Coleman, 1971; Nwabughuogu, 1996; Alli, 2003). Clifford believed that: 1) the idea of a Nigerian nation was inconceivable, and averred that the government was opposed to its development; 2) the concept of national self-government was only applicable to "self-contained and mutually independent Native States" and not a modern state; 3) true patriotism and nationalism were sentiments that only applied to "natural" units; and 4) the issue of ultimate control of the superstructure binding these independent native states together in a modern political entity was outside the realm of permissible discussion (Coleman, 1971, p. 194). The Clifford Constitution, which was passed in 1922, introduced elective principle and created the Nigerian Legislative Council,

whose jurisdiction was limited to the Southern Provinces, and its local non-official members were elected from Lagos and Calabar (Alli, 2003). Under this constitution, the Governor continued to serve as the legislative authority for the Northern Provinces (Olusanya, 1980b; Aghalino, 2006). It has been noted that the elective principle introduced by the Clifford constitution stimulated political activities in Lagos and other parts of the country, and consequently paved the way for the emergence of political parties (Olusanya, 1980b; Aghalino, 2006).

With all its inherent shortcomings, the Clifford constitution was in force for a quarter of a century (Ezera, 1959; Olusanya, 1980b). However, the interwar period presented a unique challenge for Nigeria for which the search for a new instrument of rule was imperative (Olusanya, 1980b). Nigerian nationalists were displeased with the constitution because it conferred enormous powers on the Governor and made the national non-official members of the Legislative Council as mere "lame ducks." The agitation for more active political representation and self-government by Nigerian nationalists increased as a result of the impact of the two world wars (see Coleman, 1972; Olusanya 1980b). Olusanya, for example, described the development in the following words:

> The old constitution under which the country had been governed for 25 years came up constantly for strong criticisms. Moreover, the British themselves, partly as a result of the spontaneous help offered by the colonial peoples and the realization that the war had let loose forces that could not be contained without some political concessions... were convinced that a more radical approach to colonial problems was needed. Consequently, they were more prepared to grant political and constitutional concessions to the colonial nationalists.
>
> In Nigeria itself the political awakening stimulated by the war brought into existence a political organisation which was to play a very important role in the history of the country. This was the NCNC, formed mainly as a result of the initiative of the King's College branch of the Nigerian

Union of Students, in August 1944. The emergence of this organisation heralded an era of more decisive battle with the colonial administration

The colonial administration was sensitive to the early indications of the 'wind of change' and decided to take time by the forelock. (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 524).

The Clifford constitution was replaced by the Richards constitution in 1946. Sir Arthur Richards was the Governor at the time the constitution was passed, although a great deal of its content was prepared by his predecessor Sir Bernard Bourdillon, whom he took the Governorship from in 1944 (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003). According to Coleman (1971), the Richards constitution was an attempt by the Colonial Office and the Nigerian colonial government to devise ways of addressing the unignorable demands of Nigerian students abroad and nationalist leaders at home stemming from the wartime influences – West African Students Union's (WASU) agitation for immediate internal self-government and Nigerian Youth Movement's (NYM) clamour for educated Nigerians to be given more role in the government – that were getting louder and clearer towards the beginning of the postwar period. As pointed out previously, the thrust of the Richards constitution was to promote national unity. The first concern of the architects of the constitution was to "reconcile the native authority system, as the primary unit of African self-government, with a parliamentary system of government at the central territorial level" (Coleman, 1971, p. 271). Their second concern was "how to give the centrally-minded nationalists a larger role in the government without relinquishing ultimate imperial authority" (Coleman, 1971, p. 272). These dilemmas presented a number of problems to the British colonial administration (Coleman, 1971, pp. 271-273; Olusanya, 1980b, pp.524-525; Alli, 2003, p. 74;): 1) the need to promote an amount of unity at the central territorial level of the state that would not compromise or jeopardise the imperial authority; 2) the need to provide within that unity for

a level of accommodation of the yearning of the diverse elements that make up the country

for self-government; and 3) the need to find a political formula that would anticipate the

ultimate political destiny of Nigeria in view of the obvious reality of the inevitability of

ultimate self-government, which was already unfolding in some parts of the Common

Wealth. As Alli (2003) asserted, the first two factors foreshadowed a federal arrangement. It

can, therefore, be argued that the Richards constitution laid the foundation for federalism.

Thus, the Richards constitution changed the units that Governor Bourdillon

designated as provinces to regions, and established separate Regional Councils and Houses

of Assembly in each of the three regions, and in addition a House of Chiefs was created for

the Northern Region (Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b). The regional legislative bodies

were meant to consider local questions and to appropriately advise the Lieutenant-

Governors (Olusanya, 1980b). It also provided for a new expanded Legislative Council

whose jurisdiction was to cover the entire country (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003). It has,

however, been observed that the concept of regionalism was the most distinguishing

innovation in the Richards constitution (Coleman, 1971). James Coleman posited that this

outcome was a necessary compromise:

> ...the regional plan emerged as a compromise from wartime discussions between regional separatists,
>
> who envisaged the creation of three separate states, and strong federalists, who wanted to link the
>
> native authority system with a central parliament but were troubled about the problem of an
>
> unofficial majority in a large unwieldy council. (Coleman, 1971, p. 276).

The Richards constitution has also been described by scholars as a landmark in the

constitutional development or evolution of Nigeria into statehood (Olusanya, 1980b;

Irukwu, 2005). Although the Southern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated in

1914 by Lugard, it was the Richards constitution that finally brought together Southern and

143

Northern Nigeria through the creation of a Legislative Council empowered to deliberate on matters concerning the entire country, a step that has been described as paving the way for "Nigerian unity" (Olusanya, 1980b). It was remarkable that the concept of regionalism was rather a stratagem of "breaking to build" in forging "unity," as Governor Bourdillon, one of the main architects of the constitution, in responding to the accusation that the Richards constitution deliberately encouraged separatism through regionalism divulged that:

> But in fact *this measure represents, not the division of one unit into three, but the beginning of the fusion of innumerable small units into three and from these three into one* [emphasis added]. The tripartite grouping of provinces of Nigeria which already exists for purely administrative purposes, and which the new budgetary regionalisation follows, has a sound climatic and sociological basis, but the unit of political consciousness is still the individual native authority area, or even smaller. The Northern Provinces, for all their isolationism, or perhaps because of it, have gone much further on the road of "regional thinking" than the Western or Eastern. The annual Emirs' Conference has become a very lively affair, and the Northern Native Authorities have already learned to pool their resources for some purposes. The Chiefs' Conference in the West Provinces is a much later institution, and is only just beginning to widen the horizons of its members. The Eastern Provinces are not yet beginning to become a unit in the minds of their inhabitants, though a spontaneous desire to federate village councils into group councils and group councils into clan councils is beginning to emerge. There can be little doubt that the work of the Houses of Assembly will encourage, not only a very useful interchange of ideas, but the beginning of that widening of the social, economic and political horizon which is essential if the unity of Nigeria is ever to have any real meaning to its inhabitants. (Bourdillon, 1946, p. 92).

It can be seen from the long quotation above that the colonial administration introduced regionalism in the Richards constitution as a stratagem of gradual forging of unity, through a policy of *divide et impera* (divide and rule), in a bid to build a nation-state. Olusanya explained the Bourdillon's calculus, as reflected in the Richards constitution, in this way:

144

> ... since the unit of political consciousness was still the native authority, the establishment of the regional councils was to promote a wider consciousness of a regional basis which he [Bourdillon the architect of the constitution] envisaged would be the necessary pre-requisite for the growth of national consciousness. (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 527).

It was also glaring from Bourdillon's revelation that the Eastern Provinces, which were by tradition largely republican, had a hard time succumbing to the British stratagem. It is also important to note that the Northern Provinces did not feel compatible to be part of the union because they had no direct experience with parliamentary processes since the region was governed through proclamations, and the northerners were not sufficiently integrated into the official English language used in the rest of the country and were afraid of being taken advantage of by their more educated southern colleagues (Olusanya, 1980b). Therefore, as Bourdillon admitted, the stratagem was meant to give the regions a semblance of autonomy while gradually eroding the primary base of political consciousness, which was the native authority, and at the same time unobtrusively forging a national consciousness as a sociological consequence of a nested politico-territorial interaction engendered by the Richards constitution.

The Richards constitution suffered from barrage of criticisms from Nigerian nationalists for the following reasons: it was considered an imposition because Governor Richards went ahead to present it to the British parliament for approval without consulting and seeking inputs from Nigerians; it was viewed as a divide and rule legislation; the grouping of the country into three regions was perceived to have reinforced the existing North and South and East and West divisions, exposing the ethnic division in the country; the constitution was seen as defective because it allowed the Northern component unit to be twice as big as the two other units, Southern and Eastern regions; it was blamed for creating

a minority-majority dichotomy and its corollary subordinate-superordinate relationships within regional boundaries; Nigerian nationalists faulted the constitution for paying lip-service to their demands for responsible and inclusive government by only giving them greater participation in the *discussion* rather than the *management* of their own affairs; and many nationalists claimed that the constitution laid the foundation for regionalism and tribalism, in sharp contrast to its supposed objective of promoting the unity of Nigeria (Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b; Osaghae, 1991; Afigbo, 1991; Alli, 2003; Irukwu, 2005). Despite the attacks the constitution suffered from Nigerian nationalists, it evoked the thinking among many of them that perhaps federalism was the only way forward for Nigeria (Alli, 2003).

Notwithstanding these perceived shortcomings, the Richards constitution has been considered a landmark because it foreshadowed what was to come, a federal system. It is, however, noteworthy to mention that the federal system was not the only option for the country at that point; two, three or more countries would have been formed, but the colonial power decided that Nigeria should be kept one. The following statement reflects the scenario at the time:

> Obviously at that point in time, there were several directions into which Nigeria could have developed. It was possible to have had three countries made up of northern[,] eastern and western regions. It was possible also to have had the north form a country, while the south also would have formed another. But no doubt for reasons of convenience for the colonial power, it was decided that Nigeria should be kept together as one, while the component units were to be granted some degree of autonomy within the emerging federal structure. (Alli, 2003, p. 75)

In response to the relentless condemnation of the Richards constitution by Nigerian nationalists and their supporters, the British government was compelled to initiate a review

of the constitution in order to produce a constitution that would be more popular and acceptable to the majority of Nigerians (Irukwu, 2005). Sir Arthur Richards' successor, Governor Sir John Stuart MacPherson, who was saddled with the responsibility of working out a new constitution, set up a Select Committee of the Legislative Council to carry out wide consultations starting from the village level to a General Conference comprising of unofficial members of the Legislative Council and representatives of each Regional Council (Olusanya, 1980b). The following summary of the extensive process that produced the new constitution is based on the works of Olusanya (1980b), Alli (2003) and Irukwu (2005). Two questions were laid down before Nigerians, which were to be answered by the Native, Provincial and Regional Authorities:

1) Do we wish to see a fully centralized system with all the legislative and executive power concentrated at the centre, or do we wish to develop a federal system under which each different region of the country would exercise a measure of internal autonomy?

2) If we favour a federal system, should we return to the existing Regions with some modifications of the existing regional boundaries, or should we form regions on some new basis such as the many linguistic groups in Nigeria? (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 530).

Regional conferences were held in Ibadan, Enugu and Kaduna, the three Regional headquarters, and those questions were considered. The Regional Conferences generally agreed on a federal system of government, but each had recommended some modifications. The Western Region recommended a federal system in which the constituent units, states, are formed on the basis of ethnic and/or linguistic delineation. The Western Region conceded that the three existing regions are to form the interim member-states of the federation, since the delineation of the ethno-linguistic states and boundaries would be a time demanding exercise. The Eastern Conference leaned toward a strong central

147

government with Central and Regional Legislatures, wherein the latter would carry out legislative functions as may be delegated to it by the former. The East and the West were on the same page with regard to the idea of having a Central Legislature comprising of elected members and a limited number of officials, and a Central Executive Council of largely elected members to be vested with ministerial powers. The Northern Conference agreed with the idea of having Central and Regional Legislatures, but opposed the proposal of having a Central Executive Council. Instead, the North recommended having an advisory central council. The North also differed from the East and West regarding the proposal of having Executive Councils and a ministerial system at the regional levels. While the East and West preferred that arrangement, the North recommended instead that the Chief Commissioner be allowed to continue to exercise executive powers and receive advice from the Regional Executive Council, whose function should be merely advisory.

Another thorny issue was the question of voting eligibility and electability. The Eastern region advocated universal adult suffrage instead of tax-payers' suffrage, but the North wanted to introduce a provision whereby only Northern Nigerian males of 25 years and above and resident in the Region for at least three years should be eligible for election into the Northern House of Assembly (Olusanya, 1980b). In a minority report, as a contribution to the recommendations of the General Conference, representatives of the Eastern Region, whose many of its natives were well established in other parts of the country, expressed strong opposition to this Northern recommendation whereby southerners would be made ineligible to stand for elections into the Northern House of Assembly (Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b). This is the position of the minority report submitted by representatives from the Eastern Region:

148

It is in our view invidious that any Nigerian could under a Nigerian constitution be deprived of the right of election to the House of Assembly in any region in which he for the time being – or permanently – has his abode merely by reason of the accident of birth or ancestry.... In the last analysis the unity of Nigeria is the unity of individuals in it. The individuals are bound together by political ties of nationality. Identical nationality of any country must surely carry with it identical political rights... (cited in Coleman, 1971, p. 339).

Coleman noted that this discriminatory provision proposed by Northern representatives was unanimously supported by representatives of the Western Region, which means the pan-Nigerian vision was "a more emphatic objective of the Ibo and others from the Eastern Region because the growth and the institutionalisation of regional separatism might well have affected the careers and future opportunities of large numbers of easterners resident abroad [in other parts of the country]" (Coleman, 1971, p. 339). The discriminatory provision proposed by the Northern representatives and supported by Western representatives was an early example of what has been plaguing Nigeria to the present time, the so-called Indigene-Settler phenomenon.

The status of Lagos was also a bond of contention. The Western Region insisted on having Lagos as part of it against the recommendation that it should be designated as a Federal Capital Territory (Alli, 2003). Olusanya posited that the different regional positions on many issues revealed once again the gap between the regions; and he attributed that to "uneven constitutional development" (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 530).

A Constitution Drafting Committee received the recommendations of the Regional Conferences, and in turn prepared and presented a consolidated series of recommendations to an All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference, which was convened in Ibadan in January 1950. The Conference considered the recommendations and made the following

constitutional proposals: 1) a federal system with the three existing Regions should be established; Lagos should be conferred with the status of an independent municipality; 2) the Regions should be transformed from mere administrative regions to political regions with the powers to legislate within their respective boundaries; 3) regional legislation may not require the approval of the central legislature, but a caveat be put in place wherein the regional legislation might be debated on the floor of the central legislature, House of Representatives, and where majority of members of the House of Representatives oppose the proposed regional legislation then it should not take effect. A Select Committee of the Legislative Council considered the proposals of the Conference and the contentious issues, and came up with its own recommendations, which were submitted to the Secretary of Colonies for the approval of the British Government.

During the constitutional debate between 1948 and 1951, several sociocultural organisations and political parties sprang up. These organisations have been described as "ethnic socio-political organisations wearing the garb of cultural associations" (Alli, 2003, p. 75). Three major political parties, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the Action Group (AG) and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) were prominent. The parties became aligned along regional interests, the NPC was a northern party, the AG was a western party, and the NCNC ended up being an eastern based party. It was, therefore, observed that: "Instead of Nigerian nationalism, what prevailed was ethnic or tribal nationalism as represented by the three dominant political parties" (Irukwu, 2005, p. 8). However, one point needs to be stressed here:

> ...despite the intensity of the debate over the nature of political and administrative structure, and despite the passion for the promotion of ethnic identity and goals, none of the groups considered at that point to opt out of the emerging Nigerian nation. Rather, the major political associations,

including the NCNC, saw the future of their communities in a federal arrangement that allows for

active participation of all component communities. (Alli, 2003, p. 76).

In line with Afigbo's (1991) position that British socio-political engineering walked

Nigerian into federalism by default rather than by design, one can further argue here that the

consensus among Nigerian nationalists and the various socio-political organisations to

remain in one Nigeria was a programmed decision in which political discourse was

following the direction charted by the colonial administration.

After the long deliberative process the Macpherson constitution was finally passed at

the end of 1951; and it was by and large well received by Nigerian politicians and

nationalists. As described above, the process of consultation that produced the constitution

was unprecedented – involving deliberations by the whole people of Nigeria from the

village, district, divisional, provincial, regional and national levels. The Macpherson

constitution provided for the establishment of a House of Representatives as the Central

Legislature with 148 members, out of which 136 were to be elected by the Regional

Legislative Houses, and 13 members to be nominated. The North was granted 68 seats,

while the West and the East received 34 seats each. The constitution established a Council

of Ministers to be headed by the Governor. The constitution also gave the Governor

reserved powers to circumvent legislative process and pass any bill into law that he deemed

in the interest of public order and good government, if the House of Representatives is

reluctant to pass such bill. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was endowed with the

discretionary power to even nullify any law passed by the House of Representatives and

assented to by the Governor. The constitution provided for the conversion of the regional

councils into Regional Houses of Assembly with legislative powers. Thus, the Regions were

transformed into political entities, and each Region was endowed with "the powers to make

laws for the peace, order and good government of its area of jurisdiction" (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 532). In addition to the Houses of Assembly, the North and West got Houses of Chiefs. Olusanya noted that a House of Chiefs was not set up in the Eastern Region because the Chieftaincy system did not take roots there as in the North and West. As earlier highlighted, the Eastern communities, especially the Igbo, were traditionally more republican in their political organisation.

A significant feature of the constitution is the devolution of authority from the Centre to the Regions, which was meant to be a step towards developing a federal system. The Macpherson constitution, despite being a homemade product and well received by Nigerians, fell short of satisfying Nigerian political leaders (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003; Irukwu, 2005). The constitution was blamed for institutionalising primordial (or identity) politics because the members of the Central Executive Council were basically to be elected from the three regional parties, the NPC (North), the AG (West), and the NCNC (East), as a consequence, each representative invariably maintained primary allegiance to his region and the party (Irukwu, 2005). This is why Olusanya (1980b, p. 533) argued that the Macpherson constitution "ushered in an era of ethnic nationalism and regional divisions." Olusanya explained the implication of this for the unity of the country:

> Under the 1951 [constitutional] arrangement it was difficult to establish a principle of collective responsibility or promote the spirit of national unity because the Ministers considered themselves representatives of the respective Regions and placed the interests of their Regions over and above national interests in their approach to problems. (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 537).

Another criticism levelled against the 1951 constitution was that it created imbalance "by having three unequal regions knit together by a central legislature" (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 533).

The crack that the constitution created in the ranks of Nigerian political leaders and the seeming irreconcilable differences between the Regions, especially the North, on one hand, and the East and West, on the other, about many issues led to tension and riots, which claimed lives (Alli, 2003). The "litmus test" for the Macpherson constitution was the elections into the regional Houses of Assembly and Chiefs in December 1951, and the elections into the House of Representatives in July 1952. For instance, Dr. Azikiwe (Zik), an Igbo pan-Nigerian nationalist leader, contested the election in his place of residence, Lagos, which had five seats in the Western House of Assembly because of its status as a federal capital. Zik and his NCNC party knew that the Action Group dominated Western Regional House would be unlikely to elect him into the House of Representatives, as a direct consequence of the politics of ethnicity and regionalism that was becoming entrenched in Nigeria (Olusanya, 1980b). Zik's fear was confirmed, the Action Group displayed ethnic chauvinism and he was defeated in his bid to go to the House of Representatives. In view of the circumstances of his defeat, Zik was not magnanimous and he took the result as a strong message reminding him of where he came from rather than his vision of a united Nigeria.

Consequently, there was a backlash from the Eastern Region as its representatives threatened to boycott the House of Representatives in protest to the exclusion of their leader, but eventually accepted to remain there and be part of the next constitutional review (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003).

Coleman's (1971) analysis of the development and its implications for Nigerian politics was very thorough and revealing. He observed that the strategy that gave the Action Group advantage over Zik's NCNC was inventing and popularising a theory that "under the

circumstances then prevailing in Nigeria the only certain avenue to power was a regional political party" (p. 350). For that reason, according to Coleman, the Action Group ran a campaign that was largely anti-Zik and anti-Igbo domination in a possible unitary system. The NCNC reacted by using tribalism to court the support of the Western minority and non-Yoruba ethnic groups in the Western Region against the Action Group. This development has been described as a negative turning point for Nigerian politics:

> The victory of the Action Group over the NCNC by a sizeable margin in the 1951 elections in the Western Region was the triumph of regional nationalism.
>
> These, then, were the steps in the evolution of subgroup nationalism from a vague awareness of differentiation to a sentiment employed as a conscious instrument in politics. Certain basic underlying differences in history, culture, temperament, and levels of development and acculturation provided the classical setting for intergroup friction. The net effect of British policy was to aggravate these differences. (Coleman, 1971, p. 351).

Coleman's characterisation located the problem of regional nationalism or identity politics in Nigeria largely in certain primordial factors and only slightly apportions blame on British socio-political engineering. Coleman failed to appreciate that British colonialism created Nigeria and colonial policies instigated the kind of group dynamics at play at the time. This does not, however, entirely vindicate Nigerian nationalists of their missteps. For example, Azikiwe and his supporters blamed his electoral misfortune on the Macpherson constitution for its failure to allow Lagos direct and unfettered representation in the Central Legislature instead of granting it seats through the Western Region (Coleman 1971). Coleman himself acknowledged this when he asserted that: "There can be little doubt that the implementation of the Constitution of 1951 accelerated the drift toward subgroup nationalism and tribalism" (Coleman, 1971, p. 352).

It is important to emphasize that this uneasy relationship between the Yoruba and Igbo was mainly a consequence of the regional nationalism institutionalised in the Macpherson constitution and to a certain extent an outcome of the "cold war" of 1948, where the pan-Igbo (Igbo Federal Union) and pan-Yoruba (Egbe Omo Oduduwa) became politicised, and began to act as rival ethnic movements in the country (Coleman, 1971). Again, the tension following the elections brought to the fore the question of Indigene-Settler divide and the integration challenge before the soon-to-be independent country.

Besides the East-West tense relationship, there was also a larger problem between the North and the South. It is important to reiterate that besides its huge size, being twice the combined sizes of the East and West, and the integrative effects of Islam and the Fulani Islamic Empire, the North is geodemographically more complex than the other Regions. Coleman (1971, p. 354) classified Northern Nigeria into three areas, namely: 1) the predominant Muslim areas (Muslim North), which is inhabited mainly by the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri ethnic groups; 2) parts of the Middle Belt inhabited by peoples who were subjects in the Fulani Islamic Empire and "who have been, or are being, assimilated to the culture of the Muslims North;" and 3) parts of the non-Muslim Middle Belt which did not fall to the Fulani conquest, and have been significantly influenced by Christian missionaries and Western education, and are not fully integrated into the dominant northern culture. On the basis of this classification, when the North is mentioned it generally invokes the identity and position of the Muslim North. The part of the Middle Belt that has been assimilated into the Muslim culture of the Muslim North is often likely to go with the position of the Northern Region; whereas the non-Muslim part of the Middle Belt would seldom share the

political views of the Muslim North. As earlier pointed out, this point has been well underscored by Osaghae's (1991) "Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria."

One characteristics of the North, from the time of the amalgamation in 1914 to the period before the Macpherson constitution came into force in 1951, was its determination to maintain isolationism or separatism (Bourdillon, 1946; Olusanya, 1980b). In fact, as highlighted previously the British colonial administration did attempt to sustain the North's isolationism for the purpose of administrative convenience. However, as Bourdillon revealed, the British strategy was to adopt the principle of gradualism in unifying the whole territory of Nigeria, overcoming the North's isolationism through regionalism and interaction. Thus, the creation of a Central Legislature vested with the powers to legislate for the whole country by the Macpherson constitution made the North to entertain the fear of the threat of southern domination, since the North was lagging behind in education and parliamentary experience (Coleman, 1971). Coleman noted that this fear brought about northern awakening, which was characterised by anti-southern sentiment and a great sense of urgency for reform. The North began to realize that in the new political arrangement, it can no longer fit in with a *go slow* approach, whereas the other Regions felt frustrated that they are slowed down by the North. This view was expressed by the Northern Elements' Progressive Union (NEPU), which emerged with a dissenting voice challenging the "Family Compact rule of the so-called [Northern] Native Administration in their present autocratic form" (Coleman, 1971, pp. 364-365). However, the conservative elements held sway and this made the North and South to move at different paces: "The southern political leaders were impatient for further progress, while the Northern leaders felt that too much progress

had already been made and that time had come to rest and be thankful" (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 534).

For example, a big blow against the Macpherson constitution occurred in March 1953 when Mr. Anthony Enahoro (later Chief), a member of Action Group in the House of Representatives, moved a motion that the House should devote itself primarily to the attainment of self-government by 1956 (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003). Northern politicians were irked by the motion, and they mounted a strong opposition to it, having being convinced that the Northern Region was not ready for independence since that would mean the domination of the country by Southerners (Olusanya, 1980b). Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was also the leader of the NPC, moved a motion for amendment in which the "1956" would be replaced by "as soon as practicable," because he believed there was lack of national unity in the country and that it was suicidal for the North to support the call for independence now, when clearly the country would become dominated by the South (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 535). As a result of this disagreement, there was a sharp division in the House of Representatives between the North and the South, which led to a walk-out by members representing Western and Eastern Regions, and four AG members resigned from the Cabinet (Olusanya, 1980b). According to Olusanya, Northern politicians felt in turn frustrated with the attitude and behaviour of their Southern counterparts; and the southern press did not help matters by carrying out a vituperative campaign against the Northerners, calling them names. In reaction to this development, the Northern House of chiefs and the Northern House of Assembly passed an Eight Point resolution demanding for the dissolution of the Federal Government and the adoption of a confederal system (Alli, 2003). This move by the North has been described as a secession attempt (Olusanya, 1980b).

To make matters worse, the Action Group took an unwise decision to undertake what it termed as an "educational tour" of the North, starting with Kano, to enlighten Northerners on the issue of self-government, but that turned into a bloody riot, where 50 people were killed and more than 200 were injured. At this point it became very clear to the colonial uuthorities that all was not well with the Macpherson constitution. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Oliver Lyttleton reported to the British House of Commons on May 20, 1953 that recent events in Nigeria had proved that "it was impossible for the three Regions of Nigeria to work effectively in a federation so closely knit as the existing one" (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 536). Hence, the British government convened a Constitutional Conference in London from July to August, 1953, where Nigerian political leaders and representatives of the British government met to address the grievances of the Regions, the defects of the Macpherson constitution and the question of self-government (Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b).

The gap between the three Regions was once gain brought to the fore during the negotiations. The North, represented by its main political party, the NPC, was "still unhappy with the effects and uncomplimentary remarks of many of the southern politicians about its ideas, and was prepared to accept only a loose federation" (Alli, 2003, p. 77). The South, jointly represented by Action Group and the NCNC, who were the leading parties of the West and East respectively, was "prepared to demand the creation of a federation of east and west" (Alli, 2003, p. 77). The London Conference, however, was able to adopt a federal system for Nigeria. On October 1, 1954 the new constitution popularly known as the Lyttleton constitution came into force (Coleman, 1971). In essence, Nigeria finally became established as a three-region federation in 1954, that is, four decades after its formal

amalgamation under British colonial rule in 1914 (Suberu, 2001). Figure 3 shows the first

component units of the Nigerian federation.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 3. First component units of the Nigerian federation (1954). The

Nigerian federation was at the beginning comprised of three regional

federating units.

According to Suberu, under the Macpherson constitution, Nigeria existed as a quasi-federal

entity. However, the 1954 constitution granted "the country's three large but unequal

regions substantial powers over internal policy and administration, while leaving external

affairs and interregional issues largely to the centre" (Suberu, 2001, p. 19). The constitution provided for the allocation of specified subjects to the federal government, specified list of concurrent subjects to the federal and regional governments jointly, and residual powers to the regional governments (Coleman, 1971). Other features of the constitution, according to Coleman, included: position of three regional premiers; position of Governor-General of the Federation; regional public services, judiciaries and marketing boards; Lagos was excised from Western Region and given the status of a federal capital territory; full internal self-government in 1956 for regions that wish to have, and independence for all Nigeria undecided; and a review conference for the new constitution was scheduled for August 1956.

It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the choice of a federal system in Nigeria was a compromise between competing internal geopolitical interests, which implicated and were implicated by British colonial socio-political engineering. It can also be gleaned from the review of the process through which Nigerian federalism evolved that there was no covenantal dimension to the federal bargain. It was simply and squarely a political compromise or agreement by rival regional actors to accept a structural arrangement that allows them to co-exist as competing rivals within the Nigerian state. Consequently, even with the 1954 constitution the drift to regionalism festered and political parties continued as regional loyalists (Coleman, 1971). The minority question was also a thorny issue – the fear of minority ethnic groups about the dominance of the three regional-based ethnic majority groups, the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo (the so-called WAZOBIA elements) – that prompted the appointment of a commission, the Sir Henry Willink's Commission, to enquire into the fears of minorities in the federal system (see Ezera, 1959;

Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b; Irukwu, 2005). Subsequent constitutional conferences dwelt on the so-called unresolved issues including the minority question and the most important issue of self-government.

3.4 Overview of Nigerian Federalism after Independence

This section takes a brief look at the Nigerian federalism after the country was granted independence by the British. Nigeria became an independent state on 1st October 1960 with the three regions as the federating units and a bicameral legislature comprising of House of Representatives and the Senate (upper chamber), and operated a Westminster model of parliamentary democracy (Elaigwu, 2005). At independence, the division between the federal government and the three regions guaranteed the autonomy of the regions, but latter constitutional development brought about by the 1960 and 1963 Constitution altered that arrangement by providing for three legislative lists: exclusive list (powers allocated to the federal government), concurrent list (powers allocated to both federal and regional governments), and residual list (powers allocated to the regions)" (Elaigwu, 2005, p. 54). This substantive allocation of subject matters or competence between the regions and the federal government, as Elaigwu observed, deepened the rivalry between the three regions as they strove at once to guard their autonomy and to compete for control of the federal government. It has been argued that this allocation of competence between the federal and regional governments made the centre economically and politically more attractive to the regions, and, hence, the regions developed strong desire to control the centre (Falola, 1988, cited in Alli, 2003). Rotimi Suberu has succinctly explained this development and its implication for federation:

Federalism in the First Republic was dominated by two contradictory trends: the growing economic and political ascendency of the federal government and the vitiation of this centripetal current by the strengthening of the centrifugal pressures inherent in the federation's unwieldy structure and regionalized party system. (Suberu, 2001, pp. 26-27).

Another constitutional development which took place was the creation of the Midwest Region from the minority Mid-West area in 1963, which transformed Nigeria into a four-component federal structure (Alli, 2003) as shown in Figure 4.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 4. The Regions of Nigeria 1963-1967.

The creation of the Midwest Region did not significantly improve what has been described as an "imperfect federal arrangement" (Alli, 2003, p. 79). The history of Nigerian federalism from 1960-1965 can be summarised as characterised by a concentration of economic and political power at the federal centre, struggle and rivalry by the regions to control the lucrative centre, increasing economic dependence of the regions on the centre, ethnoregional politics, minority rebellion, prolonged crisis in the West, and a federal government beginning to overreach itself (Suberu, 2001; Alli, 2003; Elaigwu, 2005).

On 15 January 1966, the First Republic was toppled in a bloody coup by a group of military officers of relatively junior ranks, who were predominantly Igbo (Suberu, 2001). Adewale Ademoyega, one of the three masterminds of the coup, gave a detailed account of the first military intervention in his *Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup* (Ademoyega, 1981). One of the coup leaders, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, gave a speech in which he described their grievances:

> Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles; those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds. (cited in Ademoyega, 1981, p. 125).

The first coup triggered reaction in the North because majority of the key people killed, including the Prime Minister, were from the North. The feeling that the North had lost its power at the centre grew and, few months after the coup, riots broke out wherein southerners were attacked and the North was threatening to secede (Madiebo, 1980). Subsequently, a bloody countercoup was staged by officers from the North in July 1966

(Suberu, 2001). By 1967, the crisis of the newly independent state had reached calamitous magnitude and, at the centre of it, the integrity of the Nigerian federalism was being tested. The Eastern Region, under the leadership of Col. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, in reaction to the killing of Igbo in the North and the return of many Igbo to the East due to the attacks in the North and frustration with the federal government, attempted to secede by declaring Biafra Republic and the Federal Government, led by the Head of State General Yakubu Gowon, opposed the move (Madiebo, 1980; Harnischfeger, 2008). The newly independent country fell into a sad civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970. Madiebo (1980) gave a firsthand account of the war in detail. At the end of the war, the military government dissolved the Regions and created twelve states in order to avert a repeat of regional secession. Figure 5 shows the 12 states that replaced the four regions. Presently, Nigeria is a federation of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 5. The 12 States 1967-76. At the end of the civil war, regional

structure was abandoned and these states became the federating units.

3.5. Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this study was to understand why Nigeria has remained a deeply

divided state and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal system,

which was specifically instituted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful

coexistence. The key themes and concepts of the study have been explored through an

extensive review of relevant scholarly works. The concepts of state, nation, nationalism and

165

federalism have been examined from numerous perspectives from the literature. In addition, key historical developments that highlight the evolution of the Nigerian federal state have been also delved into from a wide range of scholarly perspectives in the literature. Such in-depth explorations have helped to generate a broad understanding and appreciation of the phenomenon under investigation. At this point, therefore, a theoretical framework needs to be adopted to guide the empirical aspect of the inquiry.

Before explaining what a theoretical framework means, it is important to define the term theory. The definition of theory is quite varied among scholars. For instance, Fred L. Kerlinger defined a theory as "a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena" (Kerlinger, 1986, p. 9). In this sense, therefore, a theory consists of three properties: 1) it is a set of propositions; 2) provides a systematic view of the interrelations among constructs (variables); and 3) by explaining the way constructs (variables) are related in a phenomenon allows predictions to be made about the behaviour of certain variables from the understanding of others (Thomas, 2006, p. 64). Such conception of theory is essentially positivistic in that it views theory as embodying "key assumptions about the way in which the social world can best be analysed (into variables) and how social events are to be explained (by causal analyses of interrelationships among variables)" (Thomas, 2006, p. 66). Thus, a social phenomenon is conceived as an event which is covered by law. However, the social scientist Herbert Blumer, challenged the positivist scheme, which seeks to reduce human group life or social phenomenon to variables and their relations. Blumer argued that "the crucial limit to the successful application of variable analysis to human group life is set

by the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in human groups ... [which] give a character to human group life that seem to be at variance with the logical premise of variable analysis". (Blumer, 1956, p. 685). Blumer did not reject variable analysis, but acknowledged that they are applicable in "those areas of social life and formation that are not mediated by an interpretative process" (p. 689). According to Blumer, there is also complementarity between variable analysis and the interpretative approach because "in the area of interpretative life variable can be an effective means of unearthing stabilized patterns of interpretation which are not likely to be detected through the direct study of the experience of people" (pp. 689-690). Leaning towards Blumer's position, Paula F. Silver asserted that any attempt to come up with a formal definition of theory robs it of its true beauty, emotional significance, and its importance to everyday life (Silver, 1983). Nevertheless, Silver went ahead to define theory as a unique way of perceiving reality, expressing someone's profound insight into some aspects of nature, and a new and different understanding of some aspect of the world.

Abend (2008) has distinguished seven different usages of the word theory. He classified the multiple meanings of theory into: $theory_1$; $theory_2$; $theory_3$; $theory_4$; $theory_5$; $theory_6$; and $theory_7$. By $theory_1$ meaning a theory is a general proposition or logically connected system of proposition that establishes a relationship between two or more variables. In the sense of $theory_2$, a theory means an explanation offered about a particular social phenomenon. $Theory_2$ offers explanation about something. Such explanation should "identify a number of 'factors,' and 'conditions,' which individually should pass some sort of counterfactual test for causal relevance, and whose interaction effects should be somehow taken into account" (p. 178). $Theory_3$ also says something about an empirical phenomenon

in the social world, but it does not seek to answer the question what *x* causes *y*? Instead,

given a certain phenomenon of *P* (certain fact, relation, process, and trend) what does it

mean? Here theory$_3$ seeks to make sense of or shed light on the development or outcome *P*.

Abend posited that:

> ...what theories$_3$ offer is an original 'interpretation,' 'reading,' or 'way of making sense' of a certain
> slice of the empirical world. They may shed light on an empirical problem, help one understand some
> social process, or reveal what 'really' went on in a certain conjuncture. Unlike theory$_1$, theory$_3$ does
> not view *P* as the value of a variable *y*, which in turn is related to other variables in such a way that
> can be described by a function *y = F(x$_1$, x$_2$...., x$_n$)*. Unlike theory$_2$, theory$_3$ *may or may not* causally
> explain *P*. (Abend, 2008, p. 178).

Theory$_4$ refers to the study of the celebrated works of great philosophers by way of

'interpretations,' 'analyses,' 'critiques,' 'hermeneutical reconstructions' or 'exegeses.' This

involves the study of the real meaning of what a philosopher has written, that is, what s/he

wanted to say in a particular text. Typically, the great philosophers write complex

arguments using a style that is equally complex. Theory$_4$ seeks to identify the logic behind

the complex ideas put forward by such great authors as well as the relevance, significance,

usefulness and applicability of the text. Theory$_5$, according to Abend, is a *Weltanschauung,*

that is, a general perspective from which one sees and interprets the world. Therefore,

unlike the first four types of usage, which are about the social world, theory$_5$ is simply about

how to look at, grasp and represent the social world. This consists of our positionality, the

lexicon and syntax by which we talk about the social world, the nature of our conceptual

scheme, the categories into which we group things, and the logical relations between the

concepts we use. The word 'theory' etymologically came from the late Latin noun '*theoria,*'

and the Greek noun and verb '*theōria*' and '*theōrein*' respectively, which mean "to look at,"

"to observe," "to see," or "to contemplate" (Abend, 2008, p. 180). Abend argued that these

connotations imply detachment, spectatorship, contemplation, and vision. However, where

in addition to these connotations the usage of the word 'theory' also includes a fundamental

normative component, it falls under what Abend classified as theory$_6$. Critical theory,

feminist theory and postcolonial theory are examples of such theories with explicit

normative components. Lastly, theory$_7$ refers to discussions about the social construction of

reality. Theory$_7$ includes an element of theory$_4$, that is, the reconstruction of what the great

philosophers said or would have said about a problem under consideration. Theory$_7$ and

theory$_5$ also have some similarity, but the former does not include a general

Weltanschauung, that is a way of looking at or representing the social world.

Having clarified the different meanings of 'theory,' it is helpful to attempt to also

define the meaning and usage of a theoretical framework in this study. Theoretical

frameworks are more popular in quantitative research, but they are nowadays becoming

increasingly used in qualitative research as well (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). In a quantitative

research, a theory is used deductively, while in a qualitative research a theory is used

inductively (Creswell, 2014). In this mixed methods study, theories have been used as

'theoretical lenses.' Therefore, the theoretical framework served as a set of 'lenses' that

allowed the inquirer to "see" and understand certain aspects of the phenomenon under

investigation (Anfara & Mertz, 2006, p. xxviii). There is a caveat here to be noted:

"theoretical framework alone cannot provide a comprehensive explanation on the issue

being studied" (Tavallaei & Talib, 2010, p. 573). Nevertheless, Tavallaei & Talib avowed

that "the high diversity and richness of theoretical frameworks give researcher a valuable

opportunity to see what could seem familiar through a new and distinct perspective"

(Tavallaei & Talib, 2010, p. 573). In their book, *Political Geography*, Martin Glassner and Chuck Fahrer underscored the importance of using multiple theoretical lenses when they asserted that:

> No responsible scholar would suggest that any theory describes exactly the real world of territorial political behaviour. Neither do any combination of them nor all of them together provide answers to our innumerable questions about the state and state behaviour. They are, after all, more like impressionist paintings than photographs... Nevertheless, they all provide compact descriptions, clues to explanations, and tools for more and better work. They should inspire us to challenge them, extract their valid and useful elements, apply them to real and important problems... (Glassner & Fahrer, 2004, p. 54).

This study drew from the meaning of 'theory' connoted by theory$_3$ and theory$_6$. By the implication of theory$_3$ meaning, the study sought to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite the adoption of federalism as a device for fostering unity in diversity. As Abend posited, in a theory$_3$ sense, the ultimate goal is not to establish causal relevance, but to offer an original 'interpretation,' 'reading' or 'way of making sense' of a certain slice of the phenomenon under investigation. Adopting a theory$_6$ usage, the study also approached the phenomenon under investigation from a certain perspective. Here the perspective serves as a way of looking at or representing the phenomenon being studied. It fits into Abend's theory$_6$ because of the normative component of the study. Finally, the adoption of theory$_7$ meaning has allowed the inquirer to use an approach that renders the social construction of reality by the research participants intelligible. Hence, the study uses an interpretive framework, which allows the inquirer to gain understanding of the phenomenon from the meaning and experience of the people. In what follows these various usages of theory that form the theoretical framework of the study are presented.

This study, first and foremost, draws from the Hartshorne functional model. Richard Hartshorne, one of the outstanding geographers of the twentieth century, in his presidential address delivered before the Association of American Geographers on April 7, 1950 at Worcester, Massachusetts, proposed that the functioning of the state was the primary preoccupation of political geography. He appealed to political geographers to view the state and other political entities in terms of structure and function. Although Hartshorne developed this model more than sixty years ago, it is still applicable to contemporary political geographical processes and situations (Reményi, 2012). This is why Glassner and Fahrer suggested that Hartshorne's ideas "still warrant a careful reading today" (Glassner & Fahrer, 2004, p. 56). Recent publications point to a continuous interest in the Hartshorne model and its contemporary relevance (see Kumar, 2011; Reményi, 2012; Berg, 2013; Mileski, 2013). Reményi supported the contemporary application of the Hartshorne model by arguing that it was "a well constructed and long standing theory on its own" (Reményi, 2012, p. 130). Reményi also considered the theory to be relevant because, despite processes of globalization, the growing importance of territorial entities can be observed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Hence, the importance of territoriality remains prominent in political geographical processes. Reményi summed up his support of the relevance of the functional, territorial integration model with this compelling practical argument:

> Ordinary people live their lives within the framework of states and subnational territorial entities. These are the systems of reference of everyday life; the framework of socialization, so they are the territorial features to which the strongest identity is linked. This phenomenon seems to be growing today; when the belief in the exclusivity of positive effects of globalization is increasingly labile, and the role of the states in the socio-economic processes of the world is becoming more important. In

171

the light of the factors stated above, it is argued that the functionalist model of the effective state – of course with the use of a critical approach – may be suitable to analyse the performance of territorial-political formations even at the beginning of the 21st century. (Reményi, 2012, p. 130).

Similarly, Kumar (2011) argued that the functional approach is still promising in the politico-geographical studies of contemporary phenomena because it "still holds its objective relevance in the analysis of the 'internal', political geography of States, which are badly shaken by dissension, secessionism, and centrifugalize (sic), causing concern to their viability and political stability" (p. 138).

This study subscribes to the relevance of the Hartshorne model to contemporary political geographical studies. Territorial integration, Hartshorne argued, is the fundamental function of any state: "The fundamental function of any state, as an organisation of a section of land and a section of people... is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse regions of the state-area, into a single organised unit" (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 104). According to Hartshorne, the state is able to succeed in this primary function when it overcomes the centrifugal forces that tend to break it apart with the binding (or cohesive) effect of the centripetal forces present in the state. Therefore, as Reményi (2012) put it simply, the forces keeping the state together are what Hartshorne referred to as centripetal forces, while those pulling it apart are called centrifugal forces.

Hartshorne considered the centripetal forces as a necessary ingredient for the existence of a state. He argued categorically that:

> The fact that a country has a name and a government, that an international treaty recognizes its existence as a state and defines its territorial limits – all that does not produce a state. To accomplish that, it is necessary to establish centripetal forces that will bind together the regions of that state, in spite of centrifugal forces that are always present. (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 110).

172

For Hartshorne, the basic centripetal force that must be present if a state is to "truly" exist is some concept or idea justifying the existence of the state and its incorporation of the various regions that make it up. Hartshorne further insisted that a state must have a raison d'être, that is, reason for being or reason for existing. Although Hartshorne rejected Friedrich Ratzel view of the state as an organism, he nonetheless borrowed the concept of a "state-idea" from Ratzel, who conceptualized state "as a section of land and a section of humanity organised as a single unit in terms of a particular, distinctive idea" (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 110). Drawing discretely from this Ratzelian conception, Hartshorne posited that once the original idea behind the establishment of a state has lost its validity a new state-idea will be required to keep the state functioning. He maintained that although a particular state, whose original raison d'être has withered may not quickly succumb to disintegration due to "forces of inertia, vested interests, and fear of the consequences of change," its chance of ultimately surviving is contingent on evolving a new state-idea (p. 111).

How is the Hartshorne model employed in this study? First, Hartshorne posited that territorial integration is the primary function of a state. Hartshorne asserted that the primary function of a state "is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse regions of the state-area, into a single organised unit" (p. 104). The notion of territorial integration, which Hartshorne referred to as uniting the diverse territorial parts and regions of the state into a single polity, is in this study construed in an integrationist sense. Unlike the assimilation model, which seeks to cause differences to disappear, the integrationist perspective considers "the recognition of diversity as a defining characteristic of the polity" (Simeon, 2008, p. 58). Second, Hartshorne explained that political geographers need to pay attention to the forces that keep a state together, the centripetal forces. He argued that for a state to

173

survive or function effectively the centripetal forces must prevail over the centrifugal forces that tend to pull it apart. In this study, therefore, Nigerian federalism is viewed as a centripetal force, put in place to hold the ethnically and religiously diverse peoples and geographical regions of Nigeria together. "Generally, federalism is interpreted as the most practical of Hartshorne's centripetal forces in that it has to be consciously designed to fit a particular situation of diversity" (Flint & Taylor, 2007, p. 132). In his *Federal Theory,* Max Frenkel elaborated the functional aspects of federalism. Frenkel viewed federalism as having the potential to reduce social tension and to promote integration in a state as a model of accommodating unity and diversity (Frenkel, 1986). In recent years, there has been a growing discussion about the peace-promoting function of federalism (Iff, 2013). While this study shares the assumption that federalism could serve as a mechanism for promoting unity in diversity and peace, it approaches it with a caveat. The mere fact of having a federal institutional design is not enough. For example, Daniel Thürer explained this when he argued that: "Characterizing federalism as an essentially technical approach to managing diversity overestimates the potential of legal and political engineering in areas of public life that are deeply rooted in history, human beliefs and even geography" (Thürer, 2008, pp. 1-2). Therefore, in employing this functional approach the study has to decide on what is to be its focus of analysis in evaluating the peace-promoting function of federalism.

Hartshorne's concepts of raison d'être and state idea are considered relevant in evaluating the peace-promoting function of the Nigerian federalism. Hartshorne asked a key question regarding the reason for the existence of the state: "Under what concept, for what purposes, are these particular regions to be bound together into one political unit, absolutely separate from every other political territory?" This question is considered germane to an

attempt to interrogate the peace-promoting function of Nigerian federalism. In what follows, the epistemological and ontological considerations of the study with regard to this theoretical framework are elaborated.

More than fifty years ago, Professor K. W. Robinson described a federation as "the most geographically expressive of all political systems" (Robinson, 1961, p. 2). It is, therefore, not surprising that the federal idea has become increasingly important in the contemporary world (Blindenbacher & Watts, 2003; Watts R. L., 2008; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010), and no wonder federalism has attracted a lot of political geography research (Flint & Taylor, 2007; Caminal & Requejo, 2012). Despite the corpus of literature on federalism, researchers still have to face the question put forward by Rocher and Fafard (2013): what is the optimal way to study federalism? To this end, Raoul Blindenbacher and Ronald L. Watts proposed a conceptual framework for federalism research. They delineated two major dimensions of the study of federalism: analysis of structural characteristics and analysis of elements relating to political culture. Most studies in the past tended to focus on analysing federalism's political and institutional dimensions (Rocher, 2009; Rocher & Fafard, 2013; Máiz, 2013). For example, the general tendency among scholars in the past was to concentrate chiefly on the legal frameworks of federalism (Blindenbacher & Watts, 2003). Institutional biased studies may also focus on analysing "how federal institutions work in the light of division of powers, the degree of intergovernmental collaboration or competition, and, ultimately, the ability of multiple governments to govern effectively" (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43). Such analytical focus that dwells on the institutional dimension reduces federalism to a mere mode of organisation and a formula for sharing of jurisdiction (Rocher, 2009).

However, there is a growing awareness that a merely legal and institutional study of federalism cannot sufficiently explain political patterns within a federation, and, therefore, scholars writing about federalism have become more conscious of the social forces underlying a federal system (Blindenbacher & Watts, 2003). More than fifty five years ago William S. Livingston advocated that attention be given to the sociological aspects of federalism. He argued that:

> The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology but in the forces – economic, social, political, cultural – that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary... The essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of society are articulated and protected. (Livingston, 1956, pp. 1-2).

Several scholars have added their voice to Livingston's by calling for a greater attention to the sociocultural aspects of federalism. For example, Máiz (2013) noted that it is important to look beyond the institutional design of federalism or the interactive set of actors and institutions by taking into account the *interpretation* or a *federal vision* of politics. Máiz pleaded with scholars to give a fresh attention to this "somewhat neglected interpretative dimension of federalism" (Máiz, 2013, p. 83). Similarly, Rocher and Fafard (2013) emphasised the relevance of the cultural and additional factors that shape federalism. They showed the importance of taking into consideration the existence, strength and implications of federal political culture. It is, however, to be noted that call for a greater attention to be paid to the social forces underlying federalism does not presuppose that the institutions or formal framework of a federal system are to be downplayed in a study (Douglas-Scott, 2002). Douglas-Scott stressed the need to be cognisant of the complex relationship between institutions and societal behaviours, which is commutative in nature. He posited that:

176

"Common feelings may not only produce federal societies but may themselves in turn be fostered by the institutions and superstructures themselves" (p. 195). On this ground, Douglas-Scott hypothesised that most successful federations are likely to exhibit the strong social forces and carefully crafted political institutions that work symbiotically together.

This study sought to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided, despite having in place a federal system specifically adopted to promote unity in diversity, and as Gana and Egwu (2003a) noted, to mitigate intergroup conflict. Instead of evaluating the institutional dimension, that is, the structural characteristics of Nigerian federalism, the inquirer decided to explore the phenomenon under investigation by focusing on its normative political dimension, that is, the political culture of federalism in Nigeria. The theoretical implications of this approach are variegated. First, the approach is based on the adoption of a normative political theory. "Traditionally, the scientific study of politics has been associated with a value-neutral approach to politics" (Gerring & Yesnowitz, 2006, p. 102). This value-neutral approach, also referred to as a "positive" science, seeks to uncover *what is*, not *what ought to be* in the political realm (Gerring & Yesnowitz, 2006; Gregory et al., 2009). Positive theorists are concerned with identifying the characteristics of polities in terms of causes and effects, without going into moral judgement of what is good or bad and right or wrong. Therefore, a positive theory strives to make descriptive and explanatory inferences on the bases of empirical information about reality (Porta & Keating, 2008). In contrast, normative theory involves an evaluative or moral appraisal – dealing with the questions of how things *should be* or *ought to be*, what is good or bad, and what is right or wrong. From its very beginning in Ancient Greece, normative theorists have preoccupied themselves with the question "about the common good realized through political

community, the legitimacy of political authority, the rights and freedoms of those living under such authority and the nature and binding force of political obligations" (Bauböck, 2008, p. 41). In a nutshell, on the surface, positive theory is about facts, while normative theorising (that is, political theory) is about values (Gerring & Yesnowitz, 2006).

However, the fact/value dichotomy that has bifurcated political theory into positive and normative theory, and kept asunder those who self-identify as positivists and interpretivists is no longer an irreconcilable problem between political philosophy and political science or within the broad field of social science. For example, David Held argued that a consideration of social institutions and political arrangements, without taking into account the proper principles of their ordering, might yield an understanding of their functioning, but it will not enable us to arrive at a judgement as to their adequacy, appropriateness and desirability (see Held, 1989, p. 5). David Harvey was even more categorical in rejecting what he called the artificial separation of empirical and normative approach. He described the dualism that arose from this separation in the following words:

> From this separation flows a tendency to regard facts as separate from values, objects as independent of subjects, "things" as possessing an identity independent of human perception and action, and the "private" process of discovery as separate from the "public" process of communicating the results. (Harvey, 2009, pp. 11-12).

The mixed methods approach of this study underscores the increasing appreciation of the complementarities and interdependence between positive (deductive) and normative (inductive) approaches. As Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006) have noted: "Normative theorising must deal in facts just as empirical work must deal in values, they do not inhabit different worlds" (p. 108). Gerring and Yesnowitz argued that the traditional segregation of

positive and normative theory is crippling because it is untenable since both approaches rest on an implicit understanding of the other's territory.

The application of a normative approach in this study served the purpose of choosing what aspects of federalism to be analysed in an attempt to understand the integrative and conflict management function of Nigerian federalism and its constraints. By adopting a normative approach, the study's focus of analysis was on the political culture of federalism instead of the operation of federal institutions and processes. The underlying premise of this approach is that:

> ... in order for federations to operate in a manner that results in policies and programmes that are considered fair and just by both citizens and the federal partners, they must be evaluated and understood in the light of the values they promote and their ultimate purpose: balancing self-rule and shared rule. (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43).

For this reason, therefore, Rocher and Fafard posited that beyond the analysis of institutional organisation and processes, the strength or weakness of the political culture – that is, the values, norms and views underpinning citizens' views of federalism – equally deserves consideration in evaluating the success of federalism in any particular context (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43). Daniel Elazar, for example, has this to say about the cultural dimension of federalism:

> True federal systems manifest their federalism in cultural as well as constitutional and structural ways. That is, the idea that society is made up of a series of interrelated covenants and compacts, which allow parties to them to unite for common purposes while retaining their respective integrities, is deeply embedded in the national cultures of authentic federal systems. (Elazar, 1987, p. 78).

The above assertion by Elazar has an ontological implication. It means federalism exists insofar as a federal culture also exists. The underlying proposition here is that federal institutions are created by people, but "they only exist when there is a shared belief in them"

179

(Máiz, 2013, p. 86). Therefore, an analysis of the integrative and peace-promoting function of Nigerian federalism cannot be limited to analysis of structural characteristics, but must also be linked to an analysis of citizens' understanding of federalism (cf. Rocher & Fafard, 2013). This means the study recognises that "it is not just institutional arrangements which are indicative of federalism" (Douglas-Scott, 2002, p. 194). After all, the separation of the concepts of structure and culture are only for analytical purpose because the two are, in reality, inherently interdependent (Rocher & Fafard, 2013). This is why Máiz argued that, "normative elaboration should always take place in a close contact with empirical and comparative political science research and the positive political economy theory of federalism" (Máiz, 2013, p. 100).

This also implies that the study subscribes to the normative idea that the best institutional arrangement and legal framework will not guarantee the success of a federal system in the absence of a federative political culture (political culture of federalism). Hence, the study views federalism as something more than just a set of institutions and actors, but also "*a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and civic dispositions*" (Máiz, 2013, p. 85). Daniel Elazar has aptly described what federalism means in this sense: "In this respect, federalism implies a posture and attitude toward social as well as political relationships, which leads to human interactions that emphasize coordinated rather than superior-subordinate relationships, negotiated cooperation, and sharing among parties" (Elazar, 1987, p. 78). Elazar even took a step further by postulating that "the viability of federal systems is directly related to the degree to which federalism has been internalized culturally within a particular civil society" (p. 78). This view was recently echoed by Máiz when he asserted that: "Just as a democracy cannot exist without democrats – citizens infused with civic

culture – *federalism cannot develop without a solid federative culture* [emphasis added]"
(Máiz, 2013, p. 86).

The definition and usage of the concept of 'federal culture,' 'federative political
culture,' or 'political culture of federalism' in this study draws from the *International*
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), Rocher and Fafard (2013) and Máiz (2013). The
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines political culture as:

> ... the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and
> which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It
> encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the
> manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A
> political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories
> of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences.
> (*International Enclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968, p. 218).

For Rocher and Fafard, political culture of federalism refers to the modes of representation
of federalism and its ideational dimensions. They define culture as "a set of ways of
thinking and of grasping reality and is constituted by norms, values, and codes which
contribute to guiding actions as well as developing judgements regarding different social
objects" (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 45). According to Rocher and Fafard, culture plays a
role in building solidarity within a group, and shapes the expectations, wishes, and needs of
people. By doing so, Rocher and Fafard posited, it allows a "meaning" in terms of the
preferences and behaviours that ought to be shared; it is this spirit, therefore, that gives
expression to the notion of 'political culture.' The elaboration of federal political culture by
Máiz (2013) has also guided this study. Máiz identified the attitudinal dimension of federal
political culture to include "specific emotional aspects of empathy and solidarity, habits and
capacity for tolerance, mutual respect, and reciprocity," and the cognitive aspects, which

include distinct beliefs and values (shared and self-government, unity in diversity, equality, negotiation, and pacts)..." (Máiz, 2013, p. 100).

The overarching approach of this study is the employment of a geographical perspective. Braden and Shelley (2014) defined geography as simply "the systematic study of location and place" (p. 5). They explained that the question of where and why various phenomena are located and distributed is the preoccupation of professional geographers. Hence, geographers pay considerable attention to the study of place, both individual place and regions. "A region can be defined as a set of places with common attributes. The common attributes characteristics of regions in the world today can include culture, economy, political system, language, religion and many others" (p. 6). As a consequence, this study pays attention to the subnational characteristics reflected in the political culture of federalism in Nigeria. Since Nigeria is divided into six semi-official geopolitical regions, namely, North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South, regional variations with regard to federal culture are examined. By using a mixed methods approach, regional variations and patterns have been explored both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The study is situated within the political geography subdivision of human geography. In a broad sense, political geography is concerned with "the relationships between politics and geography at spatial scales ranging from local to international" (Braden & Shelley, 2014, p. 7). "Political geographers are interested in how power relations build spaces and places and how, in turn, spaces and places mediate politics and conflict" (Flint & Taylor, 2007, p. 4). Therefore, in this attempt to understand how the prevailing political culture of federalism harnesses or hinders the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism

182

against the backdrop of entrenched ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, and pernicious cycles of sectarian violence, the study recognizes this interrelationship between spatial and locational contexts and politics and conflict.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

The purpose of this case study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious contestations and conflicts despite having in place a federal system, which was specifically adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and plurinational coexistence and peace. The study sought to contribute to unravelling this puzzle by interrogating how the prevailing political culture of federalism in the country harnesses or hinders the supposed peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism. The researcher believed that a better understanding of this phenomenon would allow policy makers and practitioners to appreciate the relationship between the institutional and normative dimension of federalism, and to strive at closing the gap between designed aspirations of federalism and political culture of federalism among citizens. In seeking to understand how the political culture of federalism among the Nigerian population harnesses or hinders the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism, the study addressed five research questions: (1) How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999? (2) What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues? (3) What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of federalism among the people? (4) Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular

among Nigerians nowadays? (5) What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their country?

This chapter provides a description of the study's research methodology and includes discussions around the following methodological areas: (1) rationale for research approach; (2) sampling strategy; (3) summary of information needed; (4) overview of research design; (5) methods of data collection; (6) data analysis; ethical considerations; and (7) delimitation of the study.

4.2. Rationale for Mixed Methods Research Design

This study employed a mixed methods research design. A mixed methods research combines the dominant research traditions, quantitative and qualitative methods, in one study. Mixed methods emerged as a formal field of research in the 1980s (Guest, 2012). Mixed methods research has gained increasing popularity among researchers in recent years (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Cameron, 2011), and has been variously described as: "the third methodological movement" (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008; Cameron R. , 2009); "a research paradigm whose time has come" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004); and "an intellectual and practical synthesis" (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Mixed methods research has been defined "as the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17). Cresswell and Plano Clark gave a more comprehensive definition of mixed methods research:

> Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in

185

the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone. (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 5).

John, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 123) have come up with a composite definition of mixed methods research after synthesising 19 different definitions by leaders in the field:

> Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purpose of breadth and depth of understanding and collaboration. (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 123).

Every study's choice of a methodological approach implies a certain philosophical grounding. This is why Cameron asserted: "Methodological choice does not exist within a philosophical void" (Cameron R. , 2011). Julia Brannen, for example, argued that a researcher's choice of methods is essentially driven by philosophical assumptions, which have both ontological and epistemological implications, and frame the research or serve as the researcher's frame of reference (Brannen, 2005).

The difference between quantitative and qualitative research approaches stems from the philosophical positions each of them is grounded in. As a result, the advocates of the two approaches have engaged in an "ardent dispute" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14) or what some have termed as "paradigm wars" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14; Cameron, 2011, p. 78). This so-called "paradigm wars" has produced two sets of purists, who are poles apart. On one hand, quantitative purists (also called positivists) insist that social science should be objective, researchers must eliminate their biases and be emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of their study, and research is a process that involves testing of hypothesis and arriving at empirically verifiable conclusions

186

(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). On the other end of the spectrum, qualitative purists (also referred to as constructivists and interpretivists) reject positivism and embrace "constructivism, idealism, relativism, humanism, hermeneutics, and, sometimes, postmodernism" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14). The position of qualitative purists is that

> ... multiple-constructed realities abound, that time- and context-free generalizations are neither desirable nor possible, that research is value-bound, that it is impossible to differentiate fully causes and effects, that logic flows from specific to general (e.g., explanations are generated inductively from the data), and that knower and known cannot be separated because the subjective knower is the only source of reality. (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14).

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie drew the above summary from the work of Egon G. Guba's, "The Alternative Paradigm Dialog" (Guba, 1990). Guba provided explicit elaboration of the debate between positivists and constructivists or interpretivists. Cresswell and Plano Clark (2011) noted the implications of the two positions as follows:

> One might argue that quantitative research is weak in understanding the context or setting in which people talk. Also, the voices of participants are not directly heard in quantitative research. Further, quantitative researchers are in the background, and their own personal biases and interpretations are seldom discussed. Qualitative research makes up for these weaknesses. On the other hand, qualitative research is seen as deficient because of the personal interpretations made by the researcher, the ensuring bias created by this, and the difficulty in generalizing findings to a large group because of the limited number of participants studied. (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 12).

The emergence of mixed methods research, as a third research paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), has not put to rest the disagreement between quantitative and qualitative research paradigms. Instead, it recognizes that both paradigms are important and useful (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Hence, mixed methods research enables a

researcher to reap simultaneously the benefits of quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In stressing the benefits of mixed methods research, Cresswell and Plano Clark noted that:

> Mixed methods research encourages the use of multiple worldviews, or paradigms (i.e., beliefs and values), rather than the typical association of certain paradigms with quantitative research and others for qualitative research. It also encourages us to think about a paradigm that might encompass all of quantitative and qualitative research, such as pragmatism...
>
> Mixed methods research is "practical" in the sense that the researcher is free to use all methods possible to address a research problem. It is also "practical" because individuals tend to solve problems using both numbers and words, combine inductive and deductive thinking, and employ skills in observing people as well as recording behaviour. *It is natural, then, for individuals to employ mixed methods research as a preferred mode for understanding the world* [emphasis added]. (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 13).

In this study, I opted for a mixed methods approach with a qualitative priority. The overall leaning of the study, therefore, was towards qualitative research, while the quantitative strand was used in a complementary or auxiliary role. It was my contention that qualitative methods were more likely to elicit the rich data necessary to offer insights into the research questions and the normative nature of the issues under investigation. In my view, the fact that qualitative research is grounded in constructivist philosophy makes it suitable as the priority or major strand of this mixed methods research. The constructivist philosophy allows the researcher to understand a research problem from the perspectives of the local population and, hence, offers the advantage of generating culturally specific and contextually rich data (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005, p. vi). Further, the choice of qualitative methods to drive this mixed methods study was predicated

on its suitability to the issues under investigation. Mack et al. (2005) underscored this suitability when they asserted that:

> The strength of qualitative research is its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research issue. It provides information about the "human" side of an issue – that is, the often contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals. Qualitative methods are also effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue may not be readily apparent. (Mack et al., 2005, p. 1-2).

The use of quantitative methods in a secondary role in this study allowed the researcher to use descriptive statistics to bring out the basic features of the data. Descriptive statistics differs from inferential statistics. The former simply describes what the data is or shows, while the latter is used for the purpose of reaching conclusions that would allow generalization beyond a given sample. The study was also designed as a concurrent mixed model design wherein the qualitative and quantitative strands were carried out at the same time.

4.3. Rationale for Case Study Methodology

Within the framework of a mixed methods approach, the study was most suited for a case study. A case study, as a methodology, is an intensive study of a spatially bounded phenomenon over a delimited period of time (Gerring, 2004). For example, Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg, (1991, p. 8) noted that: "Since the case study seeks to capture people as they experience their natural, everyday circumstances, it can offer a researcher empirical and theoretical gains in understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions, and motives."

4.4. The Research Sample

A purposeful sampling procedure was employed to select the sample for this study. Purposeful sampling has been well acknowledged as a suitable sampling strategy for a case study type of methodology. For example, Patton (1990) pointed out that: "The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth" (p. 169). Purposeful sampling, according to Patton, is identifying and working with information-rich cases, which gives the researcher great deal of lessons about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research. The reason for using purposeful sampling is, therefore, "to select information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study" (Patton, 1990, p. 169). The researcher also utilised snowballing sampling to locate individuals that are able and willing to discuss the research issues in various states across the country. Snowballing here refers to a process whereby respondents are asked to refer the researcher to other individuals whom they knew to be quite conversant with the issue under study and may be willing to share their opinions (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). Purposeful sampling enabled the researcher to draw samples from across various locations all over Nigeria. The criteria for selecting respondents were as follows:

- All respondents were Nigerians and resident in the country.

- All respondents were 16 years and above.

- Respondents for the questionnaire were all literate, that is, able to read and write in English.

Three distinct samples were collected for the different methods of data collection used. A sample of 354 respondents was used for a questionnaire survey, a sample of 40 respondents was used for interviews expert and key informant interviews, and a sample of

43 participants took part in the focus groups. The total number of sample for the study was, therefore, 437. The use of purposeful sampling allowed for representation based on certain criteria such as region, religion, gender and professional background.

4.5. Research Procedure

The following steps were followed in carrying out the research:

4.5.1. Literature Review. A continuous review of relevant literature was conducted to inform the study. Due to the nature of the research problem, the literature review was extensive and elaborate. The literature review was divided into two parts and carried out successively. The first part delved into the foundations of political organisation, historicity of the state system and, then, dwelt extensively on exploring federalism, which is the key concept of the study. The second part of the literature focused on colonialism, the evolution of the Nigerian state and the evolution of the Nigerian federalism. The focus of the second part of the literature review was to gain a better understanding of the background of federalism and the historical developments that shaped the political culture of federalism in Nigeria.

4.5.2. Methods of Data Collection. Multiple methods of data collection were employed in this study in order to obtain in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. This triangulation of data collection methods added depth, richness and rigour to the study. The study also triangulated the types used. Primary data were obtained from survey, interviews, focus group, and observation, while secondary data were gathered through document analysis. Data triangulation refers to "the use of multiple data sources in the same study for validation purposes" (Hussein, 2009, p. 3). As Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) noted, triangulation helps the researcher to be more confident of their results. Yeasmin & Rahman,

(2012, p. 159) pointed out that triangulation is useful because it "provides richer and more comprehensive information because humans share more candidly with an independent third party than they do with someone they know or they think they know. Using several methods together also helps to rule out rival explanations."

1. **Survey**

Nigeria is made up of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The country is divided into 6 so-called geo-political zones (GPZs). For the purpose of the survey, three states were selected from each GPZ. In the case of the North-Central GPZ to which the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, belongs, two states, Plateau and Nassarawa, were selected and added to the FCT to make up three survey sites in the zone. For the North-West GPZ, Kano, Zamfara and Kaduna States were chosen. In the North-East GPZ, Borno, Bauchi and Adamawa States were selected. In the South-South GPZ, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Edo were picked. For South-East, Enugu, Ebonyi and Abia were selected. Lastly, for the South-West, the states picked were Lagos, Oyo and Ondo. The 18 survey sites were allocated 20 questionnaires each, which made the total number of questionnaires allocated for the whole study to be 360. However, only 354 questionnaires were administered, filled and returned. *Figure* 6, *Figure* 7 and *Figure* 8 show the demographic characteristics of the survey respondents. The questionnaire was designed with both close-ended and open-ended questions in keeping with the mixed methods orientation of the study.

Figure 6. Composition of respondents by educational qualification.

Figure 7. Composition of respondents by sex.

Figure 8. Composition of respondents by age.

Due to the nature of the research topic, majority of respondents that filled the questionnaires

had at least a bachelor degree. It was discovered during the test run of the survey that

having respondents fill the questionnaire themselves was a safeguard against interference by

survey assistants, who might have strong feelings about some of the questions, and to allow

respondents to be heard in their own voice. Although efforts were made to ensure equal

gender representation, this target could not be achieved in several sites. The age

composition of the respondents was more inclusive, although there were no respondents

above 65 years of age. However, the triangulation of data has allowed some of these

shortfalls to be compensated. There were people older than 65 years old, who took part in

the interviews and focus groups

     I had to engage survey assistants in each of the 18 sites due to the vastness of the

survey sites and the long distances separating them. I recruited 12 survey assistants to cover

7 sites. I was able to get 5 people to administer questionnaires in 5 sites pro bono (on voluntary basis), and I covered one state myself. All the survey assistants had a minimum qualification of a bachelor degree. The survey assistants and volunteers were introduced to the criteria and the ground rules of the survey to ensure uniformity in the process and to safeguard the integrity of the data. The whole survey was meant to complement other methods of data collection because of the qualitative priority of the study.

2. Interviews

The interview was the primary method of data collection because of the qualitative research leaning of the study wherein the generation of thick and rich description was essential. The interviews allowed me to gain the perspectives of different respondents about the phenomenon under study. In conducting the interviews, I was guided by phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy enabled me to capture the lived experiences of the respondents and to unearth their different perceptions. The study, therefore, followed the phenomenological doctrine of *Verstehen*, which is based on the premise that "human beings can and must be understood in a manner different from other objects of study because humans have purposes and emotions; they make plans, construct cultures, and hold values that affect behaviour" (Patton, 2002, p. 52).

I conducted the interviews over a period of two and half years during several field trips to Nigeria from 2011 to 2014. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the people that were interviewed by category.

Table 1 *Composition of Interviewees.*

Attributes of interviewees	Number
Christian leaders	10
Muslim leaders	13
Traditional rulers	1
Youths	4
Academics	5
Other professionals	7
TOTAL	40

There were heads of major mainline churches and leaders of Christian umbrella organisations among the Christian leaders. The Muslim leaders comprised Imams and leaders of Muslim umbrella organisations. The traditional ruler interviewed was among the most prominent traditional leaders in the country. Two of the four youths were leaders of Muslim and Christian groups respectively, and the other two were students. All the 5 academics that I interviewed were professors; one among them was a former head (Vice Chancellor) of one of the first generation universities in the country. The other professionals I interviewed included 3 legal practitioners and 4 journalists. Two types of interviews were conducted, semi-structured and open-ended interviews. It was easier to conduct in-depth, open-ended interviews with top leaders than to use a semi-structured format. Hence, I started such interviews with open-ended questions that would allow the respondents to speak freely in the course of the interview. For such elite interviews, I discovered that flexibility in terms of format and timing was essential.

3. Focus Group

Six focus groups, with a total of 43 participants, were held in the course of the research fieldwork. The focus group allowed the researcher to use elements of interview and participant observation. The groups that participated in focus group discussions included Muslim youths, Christian youths, Christian women, Muslim women, grassroots Christian leaders and grassroots Muslim leaders. The focus group discussions allowed the researcher to understand group's perspectives about the phenomenon under study, and gave participants the space to engage in joint reflections.

4. Observation

I employed two types of observations in carrying out this study. I used direct observation in some instances where I observed events and happenings that were relevant to the study as an onlooker or bystander. In this case, I did not participate in the happenings that I observed. I undertook direct observation by unobtrusively listening to people conversing about issues related to the phenomenon under investigation. I also made direct observation of behaviours and events that occurred at different times in the course of my field work. The second type of observation I employed was participant observation. As a Nigerian, I had the opportunity to take part in many interactions and discussions with individuals and groups, either on the basis of acquaintance, affiliation and instantaneous encounter in several locations across the country. My extensive network and itinerant life during the fieldwork exposed me to occasions where I had the opportunity to participate in discussions and activities that allowed me to gather considerable lessons about the phenomenon under study. Apart learning from the discourses of those I observed, both types of observation allowed me to capture nonverbal communication and body language of

197

people, such as emotion, expression of discomfort or gesticulation that might have meaning within the a given cultural context.

5. Document Analysis

Over a period of three years, I undertook the collection and analysis of Nigerian newspapers, both print and electronic versions. I selected the newspapers based on contents relevant to the phenomenon under study. The newspapers collected provided me the opportunity to learn about the perspectives of opinion leaders, political leaders, religious and ethnic associations, militias, and other major players in the country. The newspapers also gave me access to third party interviews (mainly interviews conducted by journalists), which enabled me to learn from the opinion of leaders I could not interview them myself. Through a large network of informants, using communication technology, I was continuously able to follow developments in the country that were relevant to the study, including the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and political issues, to complement other sources that I had. The newspapers also allowed me to understand patterns of public discourse, media narratives and the perspectives and behaviour of government officials, although I was mindful of their positionality.

4.5.3. Methods of Data Analysis. The data gathered from the survey was codified and saved in a retrievable Excel database created by the researcher. First, I gave each of the returned 354 questionnaires a serial identification number (ID). On the database, I created headings for all the close-ended questions on the questionnaire. I also added new fields such as geo-political zone (GPZ) in order to assign each questionnaire to its respective GPZ. The coding allowed me to assign numbers to each possible answer for the close-ended questions. After the entry of all data in the database, the data was statistically analysed using SPSS

software (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). Univariate and bivariate analyses were conducted on the data. The qualitative data from the questionnaire was processed manually. It was combined with qualitative data from other data collection methods. I manually transcribed the qualitative data from interviews and focus groups. Due to the length of time of the interviews and time constraints I was able to transcribe only the most relevant half of the total number with the assistance of a volunteer. I devised a modified content analysis to process the information from newspapers. I use the word "modified" because I simply identified relevant issues and took excerpts from the papers, and put them under the themes and categories that they fit to collaborate the primary data.

4.5.4. Ethical Considerations. Given that this research is a mixed methods case study with a qualitative priority, the researcher was aware, as Patton (2002) pointed out, that in qualitative research the researcher is the instrument. This is because the researcher as a human instrument possesses the capacity, which no other investigative instrument has, to understand the meaning of the interaction that takes place in the course of carrying out a research in a natural setting. As a consequence, this places a great responsibility on the researcher with respect to the validity and credibility of the investigation. Patton identified three essential ingredients that can help the researcher, namely: Skill, competence, and rigor of the person doing fieldwork (Patton 2002, p. 14). The researcher was aware of the sensitivity of the phenomenon under study and, therefore, tried to protect the identity of respondents. To this end, I have tried to follow the internationally well recognised American Psychological Association's (APA) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, Including 2010 Amendments, as much as possible.

Being a Nigerian gave the researcher the advantage to demonstrate empathy, which was necessary in order to comprehend the motives and feelings of the people in a socio-cultural context (Patton, 2002, p. 52). At the same time, the researcher was conscious of the tendency that bias, value and judgement may affect the study negatively, if scholarly and ethical protocols of research are not adhered to. As a safeguard, the researcher was guided by the principles of 'phenomenological epoché' and 'empathic neutrality.' Edmund Husserl introduced the term 'phenomenological epoché' to mean that the researcher will bracket himself and suspend his judgement to examine the phenomenon as it occurs (Moran, 2005). This 'phenomenological attitude', according to Finlay (2008), implies that the researcher will at once retain a wonder and openness to the world and reflexively retain pre-understandings. This means the researcher must simultaneously bracket pre-understandings and exploit them as a source of insights (Finlay, 2008).

The second principle is 'empathic neutrality'. Patton (2002, p. 51) coined it as a pragmatic solution to the debates about subjectivity versus objectivity. For Patton, the language of qualitative research has shifted from subjectivity versus objectivity to 'trustworthiness' and 'authenticity'. Empathic neutrality can be achieved through a commitment to understanding the phenomenon in its natural setting, accepting complexities and diverse perspectives as they emerge, and reporting both confirmatory and disconfirming evidences with regard to any hypothesis. The researcher in this case maintains neutrality by not starting out to prove a particular perspective or manipulate the data to arrive at an inclined truth. However, neutrality does not presuppose detachment. The researcher learned about the phenomenon through empathy, that is, by interaction with the people. I had cause to shed tears during some of the interactions I had with victims of Boko Haram insurgency.

I was also moved by compassionate stories that I heard from respondents. For example, I wept when a respondent told me how her brother came out to save someone that was going to be killed during one of the crises in the country. The brother told his friends, who wanted to kill a person from another religion in their neighbourhood, that life would cease to mean anything to him if they go ahead to kill the person they were attacking. For his compassionate stance, the person apprehended was spared and allowed to go. I am also not a dispassionate observer because I have experienced personal losses and pain as a result of the effect of the phenomenon under study. I have lost loved ones and I know people still living with the scars of ethno-religious conflicts. It was my interest to see that peace prevails in Nigeria that motivated me to undertake this academic endeavour.

4.5.5. Delimitations of the Study. This study has certain limitations, which are worth pointing out. Being a mixed methods case study driven by a qualitative priority automatically exposed the study to specific weaknesses of qualitative research methodology. Although the study contains a quantitative strand, it was only used in a complementary way.

4.5.6. Problems Encountered. In carrying out this project, I encountered numerous challenges. I would highlight few of them here. Doing a study that covered an entire country presented a challenge to me because Nigeria is a very large and diverse country. The task of travelling within the country from one location to the other was time consuming, expensive and risky due to long distances, poor public transport systems and security risks on the roads. The financial support of the University of Tübingen via our Research Group, "Human Geography and Development Studies," subsidised some of my travel costs. Another challenge that I encountered during this research was sensitivity of the issues that were relevant to the study. It was difficult to get people to talk about issues for which they were

bitter about or they considered too sensitive. In spite of these challenges, I have learned a

lot from this endeavour, and it is hoped that readers would find the report worthwhile.

CHAPTER FIVE

IS THERE A PEACE-ENABLING POLITICAL CULTURE OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA?

5.1. Introduction

This mixed methods case study sought to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite having in place a federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence among its regionally, ethnically and religiously diverse population. This puzzle, therefore, has put the widely acclaimed integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism on trial, at least in this particular case. This study was an attempt to understand and shed some light on a phenomenon that has had debilitating consequences on the Nigerian state and its people, and left some gaps in our knowledge of the circumstances that harness or hinder the integrative and peace-generating function of federalism in Nigeria.

Chapters two and three of this report have been dedicated extensively to understanding the concepts that are central to this study and to the background of the Nigerian federalism respectively from previous scholarly works. The empirical part of the study narrowed the scope of investigation to interrogating how the prevailing political culture of federalism harnesses or hinders the integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism in Nigeria. Specifically, the empirical study sought to find answers to the research questions: (1) How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the

peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999? (2) What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues? (3) What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of federalism among the people? (4) Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular among Nigerians nowadays? (5) What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their country?

The data obtained through the various research instruments have been analysed and presented in this chapter as the findings of the empirical part of the study. Qualitative data in form of thick descriptions and direct quotations are complemented with quantitative data where appropriate, being a mixed methods study driven by the qualitative strand. The findings are discussed under themes and categories that deal with the research questions.

5.2. Ethno-Religious Contestations and Conflicts

A federal system is expected to foster unity in diversity by promoting harmonious coexistence among the diverse inhabitants of a state and mitigating potentially damaging conflicts. However, for Nigeria, this supposed integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism has been called to question as a result of persistent ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, which have become manifestations of disunity in the country in recent times. The study sought to understand why in this instance federalism has not been able to fully fulfil its acclaimed integrative and peace-promoting function by interrogating the prevailing political culture of federalism among the Nigerian population. Therefore, to be able to tell whether there is a federative culture, and if there is, whether it is weak or strong, the study has enumerated the so-called centrifugal forces (divisive issues), which have generated or are bringing about ethno-religious contestations or conflicts in some parts or whole of the

country from 1999 to 2013, and the positions and perceptions of the public on them. The presentation and analysis of the data under each divisive issue helps to bring to the fore the attitudes, values, actions and ideas that make up the kind of political culture prevailing among the Nigerian population. The presentation and analysis of the data have been done in a way that the research questions are addressed simultaneously.

5.2.1. Indigene-Settler Divide. One issue that has been observed to become a serious source of contention in Nigeria is the so-called indigene-settler divide, which has been blamed for several ethno-religious violent confrontations in different parts of the country. The study observes that the ethno-religious dimension of the indigene-settler divide poses a great challenge to the principles of federalism and appears incompatible with the provisions of the federal constitution of Nigeria. For example, the Nigerian Constitution clearly demonstrates, in the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, that:

> Accordingly, national integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited.
> For the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the State to –
> (a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the Federation;
> (b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation;
> (c) encourage inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties; and
> (d) promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other barriers. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Chapter II, Section 15(2-3)).

The study tried to know if these laudable principles and objectives resonate with the people, that is, if the constitutional ambition for national integration enjoys a corresponding sentiment among the population.

The study found that there are no official definitions of "indigene" and "settler," although the term "indigene" has been mentioned in the constitution. The federal character provision of the constitution requires "compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Third Schedule, C). The idea of the federal character was intended "to promote national unity, and also to command loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Section 14(3)) in the government or any of its agencies. The constitution explicitly requires equal proportion of indigenes of the states of the federation in all government appointments and public service, including the armed forces and the police. The study found that the interpretation of the federal character idea by the citizens has resulted in an indigene-settler phenomenon, by which Nigerians tend to divide residents of a state of the federation into us/them dichotomy, with a practice of territoriality that gives rise to a socio-spatial differentiation of insiders and outsiders, and inclusion and exclusion with regards to citizenship rights.

To find out what the constitution and federal character principles mean to the population, the study asked a focus group to describe why the constitutional desire for national unity does not seem to find expression in the current state of affairs. One

respondent, a human rights lawyer, suggested that the constitution is not popular among the people because they feel it was handed down to them by the military:

> One of the biggest conceptual flaws with it [the constitution] is the concept of 'we the people.' In actuality it was not so much the people that put the constitution together, it was the military. It should actually read, 'we the military.'

The comment made by this respondent was shared by the rest of the participants of the focus group. The study observed that it has become common to hear, from time to time in private conversations and public discourse, people disowning the constitution. For example, Law Mefor, an author, forensic psychologist and national coordinator of Transform Nigeria Movement stated that: "Many informed Nigerians have therefore contended that the 1999 Constitution is purely a military legacy and contains many flaws that have made it far more unitary than federal" (Mefor, 2013, para. 5). The Deputy President of the Senate, who is also a lawyer and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Review, affirmed that Nigeria needs a more people-oriented constitution (Ekweremadu, 2012). A newspaper columnist, for example, commenting on the request by the Senate Committee for the public to submit memoranda on the proposed amendment of the current constitution, stated that:

> However, many Nigerians, including this columnist, are not swayed by the whole noise about constitutional amendment. This is because the truth of the matter is that *what Nigeria really needs now is not constitutional review but a people's constitution* [emphasis added] – the one that will emanate from the Nigerian people. (Odepeju, 2012, para. 2).

A group called Pro National Conference Organisation (PRONACO) also averred a similar view when its spokesperson was reported by Channels Television saying that:

> ...though the National Assembly, by the provisions of section 8 and 9 of the 1999 constitution, can amend the constitution and also make laws thereof, unfortunately, *what Nigerians want at this point*

is a brand new constitution that can be initiated, owned and defeated by them [emphasis added].

(Okunniyi, 2012, para. 1).

A foremost constitutional lawyer and Igbo leader, Professor Ben Nwabueze, who has been canvassing for a people's constitution affirmed, in an interview with journalists, that "We need the people's constitution whose source of authority derives directly from the people" (*Vanguard*, 2013, August 30). He argued that while the contents of the constitution are important, they are not as important as the source of the authority the constitution.

Despite the perception that the 1999 constitution is not truly reflective of the people's wishes and the feeling that it is not a "people' constitution," the study observed even those who described it as "flawed" conceded that no constitution is perfect. One respondent,a lawyer and human rights activist, argued that:

As imperfect as the constitution is, it provides a good framework for national unity, national integration, religious freedom, etc, but these concepts appear not to be entrenched in the mentality or psyche of the people. The constitution is an aspirational document, it encapsulates our aspiration.

A professor of social ethics expressed a similar view during an interview by asserting that: "We don't have the moral and the ethical understanding to implement the constitution. The constitution states the ideals, but they are only on paper."

The ongoing constitutional review has triggered a public debate on the issue of indigene-settler divide. There are two options before Nigerians: "state of origin" or "state of residence." The former is what is practiced presently where those who live outside their "state of origin" are considered settlers in their state of residence. Since this has been generating conflicts, a proposal was put forward that "state of origin" which confers indigeneity to individuals or groups be replaced with "state of residence," where every Nigerian citizen would be entitled to equal rights wherever she or he resides in the country.

The special adviser (media) to the Deputy Senate President announced through the media that the Senate Committee on Constitutional Review has created an online poll, where the public was asked: "Should state of origin be replaced with state of residence in the constitution?" (Anichukwu, 2013, January 6). The people were asked to vote "Yes" or "No" to the short code 20052 or visiting a stipulated Web site to answer the question. It was observed that during the public debate triggered by the poll, people began to circulate text messages (SMS) vigorously campaigning against the proposal. The researcher received several of such messages via SMS from several people. The people that circulated these messages cut across the different ethnic groups, religions, regions and social classes. The poll was later discontinued.

This study followed up on this question by asking respondents to indicate their preference between "state of origin" and "state of residence" and to justify their choice on the questionnaire. The data obtained indicates a stronger support for "state of residence" (61.3%) than for "state of origin" (38.7%) among the 323 respondents who answered the question (see *Figure 9*).

Figure 9. Respodents' choice between "state of residence" and "state of origin."

The responses were grouped into the six so-called geopolitical zones (GPZs) of the country, namely, South-South (SS), South-East (SE), South-West (SW), North-East (NE), North-West (NW), and North-Central (NC) as shown in Figure 10. The respondents were assigned to a particular GPZ, where their indicated state of origin belongs to, without prejudice to whether the respondent was considered an "indigene" or "settler" in that state.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 10. Geo-Political Zones of Nigeria.

The support for "state of residence" across the GPZs is as follows: SS (53.1%); SE (56.9%); SW (71.9%); NE (77.2%), NW (50.8%); and NC (61.8%). While the support for "state of origin" across the GPZ are these: SS (46.9%); SE (43.1%); SW (28.1%); NE (22.8%), NW (49.2%); and NC (38.2%). Figure 11 shows the differences in the preference for "state of residence" and "state of origin" across GPZs.

Figure 11. Choice between "state of origin" and "state of residence." This
figure illustrates the regional breakdown of support for the choices.

In general, there is no much difference in the amount of support for both "state of
residence" and "state of origin" between the north (NE, NW and NC) and the south (SS, SE
and SW). However, there are big disparities between the individual GPZs. The highest
support for "state of residency" was obtained in the NE (77.2%) followed by the SW (71.9),
while the highest support for "state of origin" was found in the NW (49.2%) followed by the
SS (46.9%).

The justifications of respondents for their choice of either "state of origin" or "state of residence" were elicited through an open-ended question on the questionnaire. A collection of selected responses are given below in the respondents' own words: Reasons given by respondents in favour of "state of origin" in their own words:

- The seed of tribalism is already deeply rooted in the Nigerian mentality that it is almost impossible to force the populace to forget what tribe they come from. The only feasible solution I think is to embrace our individuality, respect it and learn to respect the individuality of other tribes like the South Africans are doing.

- Indicating state of origin will go a long way to determine your root and your identity.

- Northerners do not enjoy socio-political and economic freedom in southern Nigeria compared to what the southerners enjoy in the north. Imbalance exists in terms of accommodation, with northerners disadvantaged.

- Every individual citizen of the federation must know his forefather's background and this will show his or her identity.

- In my opinion, citizenship should stick to state of origin respecting each other's religious and traditional values.

- The state of origin matters a lot to be able to identify where one comes from. So every individual in the country is supposed to have an origin as long as he or she is a citizen of the country.

- State of origin gives one a full right in his state and any attempt to grant the same right to residents will bring imbalance in the polity.

- You are born into a family, in that family you are from one ethnic group, in that ethnic group you are from a state before you are a Nigerian. The problem of Nigeria is not the state of origin, but the state of corruption, state of disunity, state of wickedness.

- It is easy to address the issue of federal character and other minority issues.

- I favour state of origin because there will be no fairness in administering state of residence.

- Nigeria is a nation of minorities with an overly large 3 majority ethnic groups. Minorities must be protected as seen in all the work and treaties of the UN. To remove the issue of state of origin would

213

be to sound the death knell of ethnic minorities in the exercise of their rights to govern themselves. If this happens in a matter of eight years all states' executives and legislatures in all states of the federation will be taken over by Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa people; while minorities will not be able to make significant inroads into elective positions. The issue of state of origin and its removal is not an issue of economics as Nigerians are living and conducting their business in states other than their states of origin, it is an issue of political power and the quest to dominate minorities and take over the country by a group of people in majority ethnic groups who are not contented with intermarriages that have reduced numbers of minority groups, killed local languages where insensitive men and women marry into larger ethnic groups and do not teach their children minority language nor give them names.

- To protect minorities, state of origin should remain the basis of identity within a country and citizens must know why it got there in the first place, and why representatives of minority groups insisted on it. People need to be able to counter the useless arguments that use America as an example. America is a classical example of why state of origin must remain given the fact that original owners of America, the Indians, are in reserves and nowhere to be seen in the socio-economic and political life of America.

- State of residence will introduce complications. An individual may be resident in more than one state; which shall he be known with?

- Those living in the same state of origin though practising different religions share the same culture and tribe. It's highly probable they will stay together peacefully. But state of residence means different cultures, different tribes, different norms, etc. These could lead to conflict and no peace.

- When you open the constitution for state of residence to prevail, the major tribes would outrightly suppress the minority for example in the north, where religion seeks to eliminate the state borders.

Reasons given by respondents in favour of "state of residence" in their own words:
- The "state of origin" issue is one of those strategies of the Nigerian system to keep foreigners out of the "scarce" political-cum-economic largess of the country. "Fence them off and the resources will be for us only syndrome."

214

- Every Nigerian should be allowed to lay claim to indigeneship status wherever he or she resides in the country and their children accorded the same. Political and economic power should also not be denied to non indigenes wherever they reside in the country.

- State of origin is the main root of Nigeria's problem; it gives room for selfishness, domination and corruption.

- If we really want unity we need to stop using state of origin to identify ourselves. It divides us. People who have lived in a place for a specified period of time should be given citizenship of that state.

- Unless we start seeing ourselves as one people in this country regardless of where one comes from (state of origin), the unity that we advocate for will remain far from us.

- I opted for state of residence because I know it will promote citizenship rights in a federal structure like Nigeria where citizens seem to lack any benefits as people are treated on the basis of indigeneship status, which is inherently discriminatory to non-indigene who might have resided in a particular state for long and have contributed to its development. I believe that state of residence will strengthen our federalism by fostering the much desired unity in diversity as well as strengthen our democracy.

- Citizens are productive, pay taxes and contribute to the development of their state of residence and should have all the rights and privileges. That is the spirit of true federalism in most parts of the world.

- The use of state of origin as the pedestal upon which a person's citizenship stand makes bogus the constitutional provisions for free association, freedom of residency and freedom of mobility. And it is also anti-integration and a source of disunity.

- A man [and woman] must be accorded all the rights and privileges he [or she] deserves from his [or her] place of residence because by the single fact of residence, because he [or she] contributes to the economic, social, infrastructural and political development of his [or her] place of residence and not his [or her] place of origin.

- I have lived in Borno State for over 25 years and all my children were born there, yet they cannot benefit from Borno State scholarship neither can they get meaningful employment there.

215

- A citizen of Nigeria can live in any part of Nigeria, and it is expected that the place has become his or her legal place of abode. So any where a Nigerian finds himself or herself must be accommodated. That keeps us united and we should see ourselves as one people.

- State of residence will overshadow the ills of state of origin, which include favouritism, sectionalism, tribalism, etc.

- Your state of residence is where you pay your tax and exercise other duties as a citizen of the country. It is also where you enjoy most of the services of government. Therefore, it is only normal that you should be entitled to all rights given to you under the constitution in the same place you exercise your duty.

- State of residence would eradicate inter-ethnic conflict and reduce religious bigotry.

- I am an indigene of Anambra living in Enugu. If I apply for a job or an appointment in my state of residence, I will be less favoured than an indigene of that state. I believe as a Nigerian living in any state I should have equal rights as the indigene of that state.

Despite the stronger support for "state of residence" as the statistics indicate, the study observed several instances where the application of "state of origin" generated controversy and conflict. For, example, one issue that has recently brought the indigene-settler divide to the front banner was the so-called "deportation" of Nigerians within Nigeria. In July 2013, the Lagos State Government undertook the clearing of street of beggars and destitute, and "deported" 67 persons to the Upper Iweka Bridge, Onitsha in Amambra State (Adekunle, 2013, August 8). This incident generated controversy and public debate about the constitutionality and moral basis of the action of the Lagos State Government. Although the Lagos State Government explained that the action did not amount to a deportation because its intention was to help reunite the alleged destitute with their family and community, the pan-Igbo cultural organisation, Ohanaeze Ndigbo, described the action as deportation carried out without even a human face. The Ohanaeze

Ndigbo's position was divulged by its national publicity secretary, Tony Oganah in an interview:

> In the case of what happened in Lagos, the people were not even given the luxury of the provision of the 1999 Constitution that if you are accused of wrongdoing, you must be given a fair trial. We even have information that all the people were not Igbo people, even the Igbo among them were not even from Anambra State. They were not given a chance to say goodbye to their loved ones, they were not given a chance to carry their bags; they were not given a chance to explain themselves. They were summarily arrested and deported in the same country. Everybody carries Nigerian passport and up till now, there is no law that says any Nigerian cannot live and work in any part of Nigeria. The Igbo are known for being adventurous and entrepreneurial; anywhere we settle down is our second home. We invest anywhere; we build houses anywhere. For this to happen is shocking. Something tells us that there is a political undertone to all of this. (Oganah, 2013, August 4, para. 1).

There is presently a suit at the Federal High Court in Lagos challenging the deportation of Igbos, which was on 20 October 2014 adjourned to 10 February 2015 (*Vanguard*, 2014, October 20). The Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Fashola, has, despite insisting that the action of the state government was misunderstood, gone ahead to apologize to the Ndigbo and the Anambra State Government (Akoni, Olowoopejo, & Egole, 2013, September 26). It is worth noting that Governor Fashola had appointed "non-indigenes," including Igbos, into key positions in his government. One commissioner in his cabinet was even from Anambra State. One commentator, Tony Iredia, even argued that Governor Fashola was far ahead of all the other governors in terms of broadmindedness because he has many different tribes in his cabinet, government departments, and judiciary. Tony Iredia asked: "why is everyone angry with the Lagos State Government for doing what we all do?" (Iredia, 2013, August 18, para. 3).

The "deportation" of Nigerians from their state of residence to their state of origin

had also been carried out by other State Governments. A renowned human rights lawyer and

Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Femi Falana, listed many instances where deportations

of Nigerians within Nigeria occurred (Falana, 2013, August 12). Anambra State, which was

irked by the Lagos' "deportation" of its own indigenes, was reported to have "deported 29

beggars to their states of origin, Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi States. Lagos had previously

deported 129 beggars of Oyo origin, who were from the same Yoruba ethnic group as

indigenes of Lagos, and left them at Molete in Ibadan, the Oyo State capital. In 2012, the

Abia State Government was reported to have purged its civil service of "non-indigenes,"

and many of the victims were fellow Igbos from other SE states. The Federal Capital

Territory had also been reported to have deported 129 beggars to their respective states of

origin in 2011, and in 2013 it carried out a further street clearing of beggars where it

expelled hundreds from Abuja. In 2013 also, the Rivers State Government deported 113

Nigerians from the streets of Port Harcourt to their states of origin. Femi Falana (SAN)

observed that internal deportation appears to becoming a trend, and asserted that such

forceful deportation of people, regardless of their socioeconomic status in society is illegal,

unconstitutional and violates the fundamental rights of such citizens as enshrined in the

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. Further, Falana argued

that, the deportation runs counter to the provisions of section 15 of the constitution, which

has imposed duty on the state to promote national integration and to "secure full residence

rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation" (Constitution of the Federal Republic

of Nigeria 1999, Chapter II, Section 15(3b)).

The disengagement of the services of "non-indigenes in the civil service by state governments, as pointed out above, has generated row between the states implementing the policy and the state, whose citizens were affected. For example, the Abia and Imo State Governments were embroiled in a feud over their disengagement of each other's indigenes in their civil service. The Imo State Government, speaking through its Commissioner of Information and Strategy, Dr. Obinna Duruji, described the Abia State Government's policy of "sacking of non-indigenes on its payroll" as "anachronistic and patently obsolete in Nigeria's present realities... [and] completely reprehensible" (*Vanguard*, 2011, October 4, para 3). Dr. Duruji stated that "the irrational act would compel us to retaliate, so as to accommodate our citizens forced out of the Abia civil and public service" (para. 4). The Abia State Government responded through its own Commissioner for Information and Strategy, Chief Don Ubani, by questioning the moral basis of the Imo State Government's lamentation on the Abia State Government's "policy of transfer of non-indigenes in her public service when the Imo State Government had carried out a policy decision that "led to the summarily, unnotified unceremonious and most cruel dismissal of all Abia indigenes who were her public servants in 2000" (Ubani, n.d., para. 7). Both State Governments decried the action of each other as injurious to the unity of the Igbo ethnic group, Ndi Igbo, to which indigenes of both states belong to.

A final example of the indigene-settler divide that the study looked into was the Plateau situation. This particular case has been responsible for several violent clashes between the so-called indigenes, who are predominantly Christians, and the so-called settlers that are mainly Muslims, since 2001. The former belong to smaller ethnic groups that are considered natives of Plateau State, while the latter belong to the larger Hausa and

Fulani ethnic groups, which as a result of their intertwined history and culture are collectively referred to as the Hausa-Fulani. In order to understand whether the attitudes and perceptions of the two sides are compatible or against the principles of federalism, the study conducted interviews and focus group discussions among purposefully sampled respondents from the two groups in Jos. It was outside the scope of this study to establish the veracity of the claims of each side. What the study presents here are opinions and perceptions of the respondents, which the study considers indicative of the attitudes, values and norms of the parties that constitute what may be termed a strong or weak federative culture.

In a focus group discussion, one leader of the Hausa-Fulani community in Jos described the indigene-settler crisis in the state as a product of religious misunderstanding that has to do with patronage. The community leader decried that the "Plateau State Government does not seem to be sympathetic to Muslims." In agreement with the focus group, the community leader stated that the populations of Muslims and Christians in the state are 40% and 60% respectively. However, the group suggested that the population of Muslims in Jos North Local Government is 800,000, that is, 80%, while Christians make up the remaining 200,000, which is 20%. The group maintained that there are three Local Government Areas (LGAs) out of the seventy in the state in which Muslims are the majority, namely, Jos North, Wase and Kanam, and in five other LGAs there are large numbers of Muslims. The participants averred that presently and for a very long time, Muslims are grossly underrepresented in political appointments in the state. They decried that there are presently two Muslim commissioners out of twenty three in the State Executive Council. One participant, an elderly community leader, pointed out to the inquirer that:

> It would surprise you to hear that the Governor is a Christian, Deputy Governor is a Christian, SSG [Secretary to the State Government] is a Christian, Speaker [of House of Assembly] is a Christian, and the Chief Judge is a Christian. Leaders of the top organs of government are all Christians. Therefore, the Speaker is a Christian, the Chief Whip is a Christian, the Majority leader is a Christian, and only the Minority Leader is a Muslim on the basis of party affiliation.

The participants expressed the opinion that the lopsidedness in appointments makes the Muslim community unhappy. They claimed that in other places that have similar proportions of Muslims and Christians, the Governor and the Deputy Governor usually are from different religions. The group decried that as a result of this lopsidedness, the Muslim community has been disenfranchised and denied participation in decision-making, and that the government does not even consider that there are Muslims in the state, "who deserve to have their own share," as one participant put it. This scenario, one participant argued, is responsible for why "Jos is regarded as the headquarters of Christians in the north, even though there are more Christians in Benue more than what we have here." The participant pointed out that it can be observed that major decisions and meetings of Christians take place in Jos and not in Benue. The group suggested that this is so because the behaviour of Christians in Benue is different from that of Christians in Plateau State, and that this is why the misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims is more on the Plateau than anywhere else in northern Nigeria or even Nigeria as a whole.

One of the leaders of the Hausa-Fulani, who participated in the focus group, described the ethno-religious dimension of the indigene-settler divide by narrating a story about a Hausa man, who supposedly did not suffer the same discrimination because he is a Christian. The community leader gave the story as follows:

> Hausas or Hausa-Fulani are regarded as 100% Muslims, but there was a Hausa man, who was getting his appointment with the name of Plateau State, although he is from Kazaure or Daura. But because

221

he is a Christian, Plateau State has been sponsoring him for outstanding appointments at the federal level. The man became Upper Area Court judge in Plateau here. And when he finished from the public service here, he was appointed chairman of the Public Complaints Commission. He took over from Maitama Sule, who was the first to be appointed by Murtala. When the man finished that service he was given the Chairmanship of the Code of Conduct Bureau. The thing is that he is a Hausa man, but because he was Christian nobody went against that appointment. The government, which is Christian in outlook, recommended him. But if you go round, you would hear here on the Plateau if you are a Muslim no matter how qualified you are you will not get appointment under the state government.

The participants shared the view, as one of them decried, that: "What brings problem all over the country is wrong patronage. Muslims contribute towards the development of Plateau State, but when it comes to patronage they would not get their own share." There was also a suspicion among the Hausa-Fulani Muslim community that because the Plateau State Government is purportedly dominated by Christians, churches are being financially empowered. One participant, who is also a spokesperson of a Muslim association in the state, stated this suspicion like this:

All the organs of government are occupied by the Christians; that is why the Muslims have the feeling that most of the churches and the vehicles owned by the Christians are usually financed by the government secretly, but personally we Muslims have nothing against Christians. Muslims and Christians live in peace; there are even families where you can find Christians and Muslims. Instead of the State Government to show people how to interact, how to be friends, it is the same government that creates misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims.

The Hausa-Fulani Muslim community in Jos divulged that they suffer discriminatory treatment in terms of access to social services. For example, in an interview, a Hausa-Fulani politician, who was a member of the Plateau State House of Assembly, claimed that Muslims in Plateau State: pay higher charges than Christians in government hospitals; have

222

less educational opportunities; and have less government projects sited in their community. This is how the respondent described the situation:

> The issue is becoming a complex situation in the sense that we Muslims we are paying different charges in government hospitals. If you go there your charges Christians and Muslims receive vary. Two, admission into the government school, be it at the secondary or tertiary level, is also a complex situation, where you don't have a free opportunity or privilege as that of a Christian brother. Even if you are opportune to be admitted into, for instance, state poly[technic], you are paying different charges from a Christian. Today also if you [as a Muslim] are not coming from Kanam, Quanpam or Wase, you have no access to Plateau scholarship. You cannot even have access to their form. Simply for you to have that your name must follow a kind of traditional name in combination with your Muslim name before you receive that form. In essence, the segregation is going deeper and deeper, which adds a lot of mistrust, misunderstanding and creates conflict. In a situation where one pays a different charge in the hospital, a different charge at the school, you cannot even think of govt to site a project in your community. Right from 1999 when we have democracy or when we started electing our leaders up to today most of the Muslim communities or areas you hardly see any development project. You go to Jos North, we are more than 80% in population, out of the 1226 workers at the Local Government Council (LGC) there are no up to 30 Muslims working in there. These are some of the issues that I feel you should know. The government of the day is working very hard to see that the segregation is getting bigger, and unless the government decides to carry everybody alone then there will not be peace. Because there is a correlation between justice and peace; so also there is a correlation between injustice and violence.

The views and perceptions of the Christian community in Jos on the indigene-settler divide were also elicited through interviews and focus group discussions. A Christian respondent described the indigene-settler divide as simply an "expansionist tendency" by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims. The views of the respondent are as follows:

> Unfortunately, the settlers in majority are Muslims. When I talk of Muslims I want to make an exception. You mix freely with Yoruba Muslims settlers, but the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are the issue.

223

During crisis houses are set ablaze and property looted. So people started running. As people ran away the Hausa-Fulani were occupying their houses. You know when they started the Christians didn't fight back because of the teaching that if someone slaps you turn you the other cheek. Is that not expansionism? And then when people were tired of running they said they have only two cheeks, so they had to fight for self-defence. Up to now those who have their houses along Bauchi Road, Nassarawa, and Anguwan Rogo cannot go there. I don't even go there because silent killing is still taking place. (A leader of a women Christian group).

A similar view was expressed by another respondent, a Christian youth leader, in an interview when he asserted that:

The Muslim community came and settled among us. We even gave them the land. They don't have titles of the land. But we notice they are trying to use crisis to expand and take over. What if we wake up one day without a single Christian on the land? So we sometimes react the way we do because we no longer trust these people. People that we accommodated for a long time, those people that we even gave opportunity to work, and they want to take everything. I want to just say that lack of trust and suspicion are causing this problem, because we don't want to see other people taking over everything.

In a focus group discussion with Christian leaders, the participants also gave their breakdown of the populations of Jos and Plateau State. According to the group, Muslims make up 25% and Christians are 75% of the population of Jos North. They put the population of Muslims in the state at 10%, while that of Christians at 90%. The question ownership of Jos was considered central to the issue of indigene-settler divide by majority of Christian respondents. For example, in another focus group, a participant argued that "Jos was never conquered by the jihadists, so how come the Hausa-Fulani are claiming it as their own?" The Christian community claimed that the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are demanding rights in Plateau state that are not accorded to settlers in Hausa states. One participant, a community leader, articulated this argument in the following way:

224

If your state is my state then my state can be yours. But when yours is yours and mine is yours that is the problem. They want to have their own and they want to have our own. No matter how weak you are, you cannot sit down and allow someone to take away your land. Land is a heritage. And they know where they come from. From Katsina, from Kano, from Bauchi, from Jigawa; they know where they actually come from. And they would bring in mercenaries and they would settle here. If you look so many people from Chad are here, so many people from Niger, and they have better claims to Jos than me the indigene.

Respondents from the Christian community in Jos claimed that the indigene-settler divide is peculiar to the Hausa-Fulani because people from other parts of the country, like the people from the South-South, who purportedly settled in Jos before the Hausa-Fulani, have never laid claim to Jos. For example, a respondent, who hails originally from the South-South, put forward the following claim:

I believe everybody has a right to worship whatever. Apart from Christians and Muslims there are other people. They also have rights. Yoruba Muslims are more tolerating. In the North they don't to see any other person apart from their own religion. In the south we live and mix freely. But Hausa-Fulani everywhere they go they want to rule. They want to carry everything. That is not right. You should allow other people to also exercise their right. The South-South people were the first to come to Plateau, but they are not laying claims to the place. We all know where we come from. I have been here for 36 years; most of my children were born here. I never claim this place. The Hausa came after the South-South, and they are claiming everything. We know where we come from and we have lineage. We go to our states of origin for Christmas, but is not so with the Hausa people.

Another respondent, a pastor living in Jos, gave his personal feeling about the Christian claim of domination in the following words:

You see for me, I am pastor, and I am still praying to be able to trust a Hausa man, especially Hausa Muslim. Because where they settle they want to dominate. They have that spirit of domination. I am from Adamawa; the Muslims are not the majority there. They are only in large number in Yola, but they don't want non-Muslim to be a governor. They came from other places, but they want to

225

dominate. They want to rule the whole of the nation. That is why they always settle along the major highways, the major entrance of the town.

Participants of a focus group were posed the questions: Why is the indigeneship issue so divisive, after all, in other parts of the world you can move to a new state and, with time, even aspire to become the governor? What does it add to you that you are holding to it so tightly? The participants pointed out that if the right the Hausa-Fulani are claiming is not universal it would not work. One of them argued that: "They [Hausa-Fulani] say their own is their own and my own is still their own. Shouldn't that right be universal? You lay claim to your own and yet my own is your own? Impossible [chorused the group]!"

The study found that both sides were aware of the usual examples of what is obtained in different states cited by the other to justify their claim. The respondents cited the example of what happens in other states to justify their stance on the indigene-settler issue. For example, a Christian respondent claimed that the Hausa-Fulani's (of Anguwan Rogo in Jos North) pointing of Kano as a Hausa state where non-indigenes are allowed to participate in politics and enjoy equal rights with the indigenes is tenuous. According to the respondent, it is true that people, who are not *Kanawa* [indigenes of Kano], who have settled there recently, are allowed to hold important political posts in the state, but it is a game of religion. The respondent, a priest, cited one case as an example to buttress this claim:

A Plateau man held a position of commissioner or something [in Kano]. So the Muslims in Anguwan Rogo in Jos North have been using that to claim the same rights here. And now I started enquiring, and I discovered they were right. The man came from Plateau and settled in Kano not in a very distant past and integrated in the political system, but I discovered that this is a matter of religion than anything else. There are Kano indigenes that are Christians and would not be given key positions, nothing at all. It was an anathema for them to be given anything.

226

The Christian respondents also point at what they claimed as discriminatory practices against even Christian indigenes of Hausa-Fulani, Muslim-majority states to justify the opposition to the rights that Hausa-Fulani "settlers" are claiming in Plateau State. A respondent, a Christian leader from Plateau State, gave a story to illustrate the claim of discriminatory practices against Christian indigenes in Hausa-Fulani Muslim-majority states:

> There is an area in Kano that we have a church branch, and 100% of the members are Hausa. The state government would not even build a primary school there. So it is our church that is taking care of education needs of the people. Some of their children have become professionals in different fields, but because they are Christians they don't get anything. So our church decided that if they are baptizing their children, they would no more insist on changing their names to Christian names because their native names are Hausa names, such as Mohammed, Isa, etc, so the church now has accepted those children should be baptised with their local names so that they would be accepted in the society based on their names. Their Christian names attract the discrimination. Once they don't have a Muslim name no matter their education, they can't have opportunity. They can't get anything from the state. So see a Bamaguje Christian, whose origin is Kano cannot get anything there because of his name, Albert. The name Albert is not a Kano name. So which situation is better, the Plateau or Kano? You people [Hausa-Fulani Muslims] are even discriminating against yourselves.

Other Christian respondents claimed that Christians in Hausa-Fulani, Muslim-majority states are: denied land and Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) to build churches; not given a fair access to the media; discriminated when it comes to admission and employment; and not allowed to enjoy full political participation. A top Muslim leader, who was interviewed, shared a personal story about the issue of church building permits as a commissioner in one of the states in the North-West,

> When the Certificate of Occupancy of one church was just about to expire, the church people came to me about three months before it was to expire. I was in my state then the Commissioner for Works,

227

Land and Housing. Before they came a group of business people came to me that they are happy the Certificate of Occupancy of the church is expiring, so 'Honourable Commissioner, we want you to help us allocate this land. You see that land is a juicy area now. So help us.' So I said okay, and they went out. When the pastor and his members came they were very jittery because they have already given up. I looked at it and I now asked myself a question: If this is mosque what can I do? I slept over the issue. I checked the file records, which dated back to the colonial time. I now recommended the renewal of the Certificate of Occupancy of the church. When the approval was out, I called the Permanent Secretary and asked him to convey the approval, and was shocked. He asked me, 'How can you do that?' I told him the Chief Executive [Governor] has already approved it. So later, when the church got a letter that their renewal has been approved, the pastor and their senior members came to my office. I asked them what is your purpose of coming since your application was approved? They said they got the letter of approval, but they don't know what to say. Do you know the pastor and those who came along with him were shedding tears? That already they had given up, and even the local business people were coming around to which part of the land was affected. They [church] got their certificate from that period for 99 years.

When a group of Christians in a focus group were told that Muslims in Plateau State complained that they are deprived employment in the civil service and grossly underrepresented in political appointments, the group claimed that what the Muslims enjoy in Plateau State is more than what should have been their fair share. One participant, a youth leader, asserted that:

> If they say they are not employed, they are not telling the truth. I think they should be grateful because presently the SEMA [State Emergency Management Agency] Secretary is a Muslim, and that is the Plateau State Emergency Management Agency, and a Muslim for that matter. They have a commissioner. They have a member at the House of Assembly, and even a member at the House of Representatives. They should be grateful. This is not the first time. Some people are saying that they are getting a lot compared to some of the Christians that are in other Muslim states.

On the other hand, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim respondents argued that there is no basis for comparing other Hausa-Fulani, Muslim-majority states with Plateau state becomes demographic differences. A Muslim leader illustrated this position with this personal story:

> Some boys came to me and said Alhaji, we understand that Muslims are not happy because they are not getting what they are supposed to get in Plateau, but a Christian doesn't feel happy in Kano, why should a Muslim be happy on the Plateau? I gave them an example, that these two things are not comparable. I asked them what is the population of Kano? They say over 10 million. What is the population of Plateau? Is about 3.2 million people. Then I told them of these 10m people you would hardly get 1000 pure Kano men who are Christians, but here on the Plateau every Local government among the 17 Local Governments there are Muslims.

The issue of indigene-settler has been acknowledged by experts as a key driver of conflicts in Nigeria. The positions of the experts and elites that were interviewed on this indigene-settler phenomenon were equally varied. For example, a professor, who has published extensively on the history of Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria, was interviewed and his perspective was that unlike the Native Authority system, which recognized where one is born, the Local Government reform and state creation created the indigene-settler divide. According this expert, The Local Government reform and state creation ushered in a practice whereby an individual is identified as belonging to a certain ethnic group, who belongs to a certain Local Government within a particular state. Another expert observed that a Nigerian has been defined right from the colonial time not as an individual, but as an ethnic, who belongs to a territory, and, therefore, to solve this problem requires changing that across the federation. A respected journalist and Civil Society activist, who has attended the prestigious National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies and holds revered title of MNI (Member National Institute), who was interviewed described the indigene-settler divide as the most important driver of conflicts in the country. The

expert argued that it is unfair that people that have lived for a long period of time in a place are called settlers. The expert gave this perspective on the matter:

> People lived for three hundred years in a place and you call them settlers. So when do you become an indigene? The issue is we all came from somewhere. The whole history of humanity is about migration, settlement and mobility. Imagine you lived for three hundred years in a place and you are called a settler. It is injustice, discrimination and stereotyping. By the time I live in a place for three hundred years, I don't know where my original home is. I don't know anywhere else except that place, but you say I am a settler. Where do I go? This is a violation of the Constitution of Nigeria that says I have a right to settle anywhere. So once you violate this grand norm of justice, equity, non-discrimination and accommodation, you have problem. You are bound to have ethnic conflicts and crisis. When the settler also belongs to another religion and those who call themselves indigene belong to another religion then people add the religious angle to it so that they can make mileage.

According to the above expert, once religion is brought into it by people saying "Look at what Christians or Muslims are doing to us," then other people are dragged into the indigene-settler struggle. Consequently, this transforms the indigene-settler divide into a wider conflict, drawing in more parties. The indigene-settler divide is not confined to people who are from different religions. For example, a professor and a pastor, who hails originally from one of the North-Central states, described a personal experience of the intra-religious dimension of the indigene-settler divide in the South-East, a predominantly Christian region:

> I lived in the East for six years, yet majority of the Igbos could not accept me as a Christian because they say, 'You are Hausa.' And I always tell them that your culture and language are closer to me than the Hausa and Fulani. They don't differentiate.

Similarly, a Muslim interviewee shared a personal experience of this intra-faith dimension of the indigene-settler divide by stating that being a Muslim from the south living in a Muslim community in the north does not spare one from being seen as an outsider.

230

5.2.2. Majority-Minority Relations. The study looked into how the issue of majority-minority relations reflects the kind of culture of federalism that is obtained in Nigeria. As a result of how ethnicity and religion crosscut each other in Nigeria, majority-minority relations have been seen to have an ethno-religious dimension. For example, when asked whether majority-minority struggle is one of the drivers of ethno-religious conflicts in the country, majority of respondents (60.2%), as indicated in Table 2, either strongly or simply agreed that the contestations between the so-called majority and minority groups is one of the drivers of ethno-religious conflicts in the country. The views across religious affiliations also shows that majority of the adherents of the two major religions in the country, Christians (61.8%) and Muslims (57.3%), share the opinion that majority-minority struggle is one of the drivers of ethno-religious conflicts in the country.

Table 2 *Nigerians' View on Whether Majority-Minority Struggle (MMS) is a*

Driver of Ethno-Religious Conflicts (ERC)

			Religion				
			Christian	Muslim	Non-Religious/ Religiously unaffiliated	Other	Total
MMS drives ERC?	Strongly agree	Count	55	18	1	0	74
		% within Religion	23.6%	16.4%	25.0%	0.0%	21.2%
	Agree	Count	89	45	1	1	136
		% within Religion	38.2%	40.9%	25.0%	50.0%	39.0%
	Undecided	Count	50	23	2	1	76
		% within Religion	21.5%	20.9%	50.0%	50.0%	21.8%
	Disagree	Count	31	17	0	0	48
		% within Religion	13.3%	15.5%	0.0%	0.0%	13.8%
	Strongly Disagree	Count	8	7	0	0	15
		% within Religion	3.4%	6.4%	0.0%	0.0%	4.3%
Total		Count	233	110	4	2	349
		% within Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note. Percentage breakdown of respondents' views according to religious affiliations on whether majority-minority struggle is a driver of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.

The data obtained from participant observation, interviews and focus group discussions provide insights into the majority-minority struggles. The study observed that when Nigerians talk about majority and minority they are referring to two kinds of group delineations in relation to ethnicity. At the federal level, three ethnic groups, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, are considered the majority, while all other ethnic groups are collectively referred to as minorities. The Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are nowadays referred collectively as one large group called Hausa-Fulani, and they are considered jointly as one of the three majorities at federal level. The second kind of majority-minority delineation is employed to classify ethnic groups as majorities and minorities at the subnational levels, state and local

government levels. The classification of ethnic groups into majority and minority is based on comparison of the relative compositions of the ethnic groups in the population of a particular political administrative area. In some instance, the study found that members of a national majority ethnic group, that is a majority at the federal level, may become minority at a certain subnational level, where their population is smaller than other local groups. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 12. The study also observes that in certain instances majority-minority delineation has a religious dimension to it because members of a majority ethnic group may belong predominantly to one religion and the minority to another.

Figure 12. Majority-Minority Configurations in different contexts. This illustrates the different scenarios that are obtainable in Nigeria.

Over the years, successive Nigerian governments have created states and Local Governments. For example, the Deputy Senate President, Ike Ekweremadu, in a speech entitled "Constitution Amendment, and State Creation" observed that Nigeria started as a federation with three regions as federating units in 1954, but "From then on, Nigeria has been on a roller coaster of steady splinter into the 36 federal units" (Ekweremadu, 2012) the country operates today. There are presently 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and 768 Local Government Areas and 6 Area Councils of the FCT (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The driving force behind the creation of many states

over the years, according to several experts interviewed, was the agitations from sections of the country that felt marginalized. The Deputy Senate President, Senator Ike Ekweremadu, who is also the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitution Review, gave credence to the experts' explanation in the above mentioned speech. The Senator confirmed that during the 6th National Assembly (2007-2011) alone 45 memoranda of requests for state creation were submitted by several state creation movements from various parts of the country (Ekweremadu, 2012). One expert observed that the creation of new administrative units has simply produced new minorities.

In order to understand how the majority-minority struggle acts as a source of disunity and one of the driving forces behind ethno-religious conflicts in the country, the study looked into the relationship between Hausa-Fulani and northern Christian minorities. The northern Christian minorities, especially those located in the North-Central, tend to identify themselves as Middle Belters rather than Northerners. Figure 13 shows the geographically indeterminate area referred to as the Middle Belt. Through participant observation for three years as a member of one of the Middle Belt movements, which is both a physical and an online community, the inquirer learned about the perceptions and views of the northern Christian minorities about their Hausa-Fulani neighbours. Although the Middle Belt is characterised by diversities of culture and religion, vast majority of those who call themselves Middle Belters also identify themselves as Christians. As a result, the Middle Belt region is considered the home of the northern Christian minorities. The Middle Belt movement observed by this study comprises of hundreds of academics, technocrats, business men and women, politicians, journalists, civil servants, and other professionals, who self-identify as Middle Belters wherever their locations are in the world. A person

becomes a member of the group by enlisting to the group's listserv, usually through the recommendation of an active member. The group has a secretariat in one of the country's main cities, and maintains a web site. In the past, the group had undertaken some relief work to assist victims of ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle Belt. The group is currently involved in media advocacy to champion the cause of the Middle Belt.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 13. The Middle Belt area of Nigeria. The Middle Belt is a geographically indeterminate socio-cultural area inhabited by diverse minority ethno-linguistic groups, forming a separation between the core Islamic North and the majority Christian South.

The general feeling among the group members is that the Middle Belt is a home to northern ethnic minorities, who as a result of being non-Muslims have suffered domination in the hands of the ethnic majority Hausa-Fulani. At the initial stage of the group's formation, the conversation was to deconstruct the concepts of "Northern Nigeria" and "One North." According to the Middle Belt movements, Northern Nigeria was created by the "colonial masters" to unite the disparate nationalities and cultural groups under the domination of the Hausa-Fulani for administrative convenience. The group claimed that the idea of "One North" was a device used by the Hausa-Fulani majority to achieve political dominance at the federal level by claiming that the north, which makes up about twice the size of Southern Nigeria, are one people, speaking with one voice. The group claimed that while the idea of *Arewa* (One North) was used to mobilize all groups in the northern territory, when it comes to sharing the benefits, only those who belong to the core Muslim North are counted as the real *Yan Arewa* (Northerners). This view of the Middle Belt movements was articulated in a newspaper report like this:

> The non-Muslims, non-Hausa/Fulani of the 19 northern states, who choose to be identified as Middle Belters, have risen to insist that they are in the majority in the enclave that once boasted as "one monolithic, indivisible North".
>
> The Middle Belt people say they have been unfairly treated by the Hausa/Fulani, used and dumped as second rate citizens when it comes to matters of national security, welfare, politics, economics even in social relationships such as marriages. (Binniyat, 2013, August 18, para. 2-3).

Hence, the Middle Belt movements promote the idea that Middle Belters are not part of *Arewa*, and, as the National Youth Leader of the Middle Belt Forum, Jonathan Asake, a former member of the House of Representatives asserted in an interview, Middle Belters

237

insist that collectively they are the majority in the north (Binniyat, 2013, August 18). For example, in an interview with reporters, former Plateau State Military Governor, Major-General Lawrence Onoja, a Middle Belt, had this to say about the Middle Belt and the idea of One North:

> There is a misconception. The North of the sixties when Sarduana was alive is no longer the same North today. Let me correct that misconception. I am from the Middle Belt, which is a geographical reality today. I am an active member of the Congress for Equality and Change, which is a non-political association. I am also a member of the Middle Belt Forum. So, if you say I am from the North, and you are referring to the old North yes, I am from the North. But now, the Middle Belt is a geographical reality and I am a member of the Biddle Belt. I am not from the core North. (*The Nation*, 2013, August 20, para. 5).

In recent years, the movements have also made efforts to create a Middle Belt identity. Hausa language is the *lingua franca* in most parts of northern Nigeria, and is widely spoken across the Middle Belt. It serves as the bridge language among the various ethno-linguistic groups of the region due to the varying degree of mutual intelligibility between the numerous Middle Belt languages. The Middle Belt movements now encourage Middle Belters to teach their children their native language. In some instances, where the parents are not able to teach the children their native language, they resort to speaking only English to their children at home, since it is the language of instruction at schools and the main official language of the country. Middle Belters have also tried to develop a dress code. Despite the push for the adoption of a single dress code for the Middle belt, there has not been one yet in place. However, the general practice is to either wear variants of the Hausa *kaftan*, making it shorter and sometimes with short sleeves, or to use Western-style clothes. Plateau State is viewed by Middle Belters as a rallying point for the Middle Belt movement. For instance, one respondent, an active member of the group asserted, during an interview,

that: "Plateau State has been a bastion of Christianity. And we consider it the capital of Middle Belt. There is no doubt about it."

A common theme in the interviews conducted with Middle Belters was the claim of Hausa-Fulani domination. The following statement by a respondent reflects the perception of Middle Belters:

> We were colonized by Britain, and our documents of independence were prepared in Sokoto. Some of us have read and we know where they are coming from, particularly the Hausa-Fulani. They are claiming that Nigeria was handed over to them by the Britons. And that no Christian would ever rule Nigeria because it was handed to them. I don't know what the British can do now to correct that. That act alone that they went to Sokoto and they did the ceremony for independence before coming out to do the real thing, they handed over Nigeria to Sokoto. Why did they [British] do that? That is what they [Hausa-Fulani] are holding to. We thought that we were being set free from the colonial masters. We didn't know that they were handing us over to a black colonial rule in the name of Islam. This is very unfortunate.

It was outside the scope of this study to establish the veracity of the above claim. However, it is taken here as a perception that is shared by majority of Middle Belters. Also the study observed that the Middle Belt movements claim to be resistance movements. A majority of respondents claimed that they are now doing what they can to resist the Hausa-Fulani "hegemony." Middle Belters view what they refer to as "Hausa-Fulani hegemony" as the imposition of Islamic dominance over the territory. This is how one respondent, a community leader, put it:

> They manipulated the government and took over all Christian missionary schools, but government didn't take over a single Islamic school. They saw Christianity as going hand in hand with conversion. We are liberal and you can come to our school and retain your identity. Thank God the government is planning to return schools. They did this because they wanted to catch up. One thing in their favour is that they have vision. What they would do in 50 years they have already pencilled

239

down and they would follow it. And unfortunately because the Christian is too trusting and anything you do he would think is good, God takes care of everything. We thank God, God has not disappointed us. God takes care of everything even when we just resign. And they take undue advantage of that trust. And that oneness that we felt we are one to their advantage. Now people are enlightened and you cannot come today and cheat me. We now know our right. This is why people are resisting.

The Hausa-Fulani have a different account of the colonial legacy on their relationship with non-Muslim minorities, especially Christians in the north. According to many respondents, they are not trying to dominate the non-Muslim minorities, but are simply trying to protect their culture and their religion, which is a complete way of life from the incursion of Western influence and Christianity. For example, one respondent, a Muslim leader, described this view as follows:

One problem is historical marriage from colonial rule. There were some historical inconveniences. The Muslims had their religion and had their various levels of education, culture and good leadership. And their way of life was Islam and Arabic was the language they used. It was so beautiful that [when the] colonial people came they had to borrow the leadership. And what they used is what is called indirect rule. They could not have any means to cancel or distort it, so they had to use it for easy control. But then at the other level, there were new Christians and there was some kind of allergic-ness by both parties. The colonial missionaries while trying to remove the Muslims were speaking against their historical belief. And then our *ulamas* [Islamic scholars], because they were scared of the Christians, they felt the incursion of this new religion into their place or the issue of Western school around that time may end up giving their children to the missionaries. The missionaries arrived first before the colonial invasion. Their initial intention was to convert everybody to Christianity. This was resisted by our parents and ancestors because they thought anything foreign is going to change their life forever. This kind of problem was the beginning of fear among the Muslims.

240

Another Muslim leader explained that "new generation" churches that are springing up everywhere in the north and engaging in "radical evangelism" have become a source of concern to the Muslim majority in the north:

> These denominations that are springing up in terms of radical evangelism and what have you, they would set the target by saying that by 2015 Northern Nigeria must be delivered for Christ. The kind of banners that you see everywhere; they send palpable fears in the minds of Muslims. So it is difficult for Muslim leaders all over the country to manage this. I would tell you an instance, in Borno-Yobe axis that we are having problem of insurgency and what have you, there was a day we went for conference, and one of our elders in the Muslim community said, 'Look I am coming into this place and I know this is a predominantly Muslim place, but on the entrance to the city a very large banner was there, almost three of them, saying Christian *kaza* [this and that].' The elder said that, 'I know Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people and in the Christian dominated areas nobody can do that.' Go to Muslim areas, go to Sokoto, and that would prove to you that indeed Muslims are tolerant of other's views.

The study observed that all over the country, including in the core Muslim areas with the exception of places overran by the Boko Haram insurgents, one could see conspicuous display of bill boards and banners advertising churches, pastors and spiritual events. In the course of the fieldwork, the study observed that even in the core Hausa-Fulani states, there were many churches, especially in the predominantly Christian, "settlers' quarter" called *Sabon Gari* (New Settlement) in major Hausa-Fulani cities like Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Gusau, Birnin Kebbi and Dutse. However, the study also observed that the visibility of Christian programmes in the core Muslim north has reduced since the Boko Haram insurgents began targeting churches.

As depicted in Figure 12, the majority-minority struggle has different configurations. The study found that the majority-minority dichotomy also exists among national ethnic

minorities, who even predominantly belong to the same faith. For example, the Tiv and the Idoma ethnic groups are both classified as national minority ethnic groups and both are predominantly Christians. In Benue State, the Tiv are the majority, while the Idoma are the minority. The Idoma complain of being marginalized by the Tiv. One Idoma respondent illustrated this by claiming that:

> And the Tiv have ensured systematically that, even though the Idomas went to school way ahead of them, that the Idomas do not occupy certain positions. A Tiv would rather go and hire someone from another state than give it to an Idoma, who is an indigene in that state.

This is a scenario where the majority and the minority belong to the same religion. As one expert observed, the majority-minority dynamics are abounding at all geographical scales.

5.2.3. Farmers and Herders' Conflict. Farmers and herders' conflicts have become one of the sources of ethno-religious tension and violence in Nigeria. The incidence of conflicts between farming and pastoralist communities has become more widespread and frequent in the past three years, and has occurred in all geographical zones of the country (Shuaib, 2012, September 8). However, the study observed that the North-Central zone has been witnessing more frequent and more violent episodes of such conflicts than other parts of the country.

The farmers and herders' conflict easily assumes an ethnic and, sometimes, religious dimension, because the herders are predominantly Fulanis and Muslims. When the clash occurs between the Fulanis and a community that is predominantly non-Muslim or Christian then it tends to assume a religious colouration. Two categories of Fulani pastoralists have been observed by the study: settled Fulani herders, who confine the wandering of their livestock within one location; and nomadic Fulani that engage in seasonal migration (transhumance) based on the dictates of climatic conditions. Not all Fulanis are nomadic

242

pastoralists. The Fulani (Fula or Fulbe) are a transnational ethnic group found across Africa, predominantly in West African countries. According to the Fulani umbrella organisation, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, the Fulanis are found in the following countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Niger, Togo, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and in eastern part of Sudan (Miyetti Allah [Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria] Web site). The Miyetti Allah Web site gave the estimate of the population of Fulani in Nigeria as 18% and the Hausa and Fulani together make up 29% of the Nigerian population. It is worth noting that Nigeria has census data on ethnicity and religion.

The conflict between farmers and herders revolves around the issue of grazing land. The farmers often complain that their farm crops are destroyed by stray cattle. Most farms are not fenced. For example, the chairman of Jos North Branch of Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), Mr. Sako Danboyi, in an interview with reporters of *Sunday Trust* newspaper, described the farmers' concern as follows:

> Even when they [cattle breeders] don't go out to make their cows damage crops, they can be quite careless. They, at times just watch their cows do whatever they wish, including chopping off crops.
>
> Sometimes, they allow their small children to lead the cows and small children are usually not careful enough; they even lack the capacity to lead cows and stop them from doing harm to crops.
>
> So, I believe that a considerable way to avoid clashes between cattle breeders and crop farmers would be for cattle breeders to watch their grazing cows in the hands of their children who are too young to effectively lead the cows. (Danboyi, 2013, June 9, p. 10).

The cattle breeders also have their concerns and explanation for the conflict. For instance, in an interview with a reporter of *Sunday Trust*, a cattle breeder, Malam Idris Musa, explained

that the cattle breeders do not intentionally let their cattle into a farm to destroy crops. This is how the cattle breeder explained the standard practice:

> As a matter of rule of practice, a cattle breeder would not willingly let his cattle destroy crops. But in situations where a Fulani man's cattle destroys a farmland, we have our own internal arrangement of handling it. When such happens, we immediately report to the 'Wakili' even before taking the case to Ardo, and all our people here that move with cattle know about the guidelines and rules and we usually remind our people about it.
>
> Whoever gets into a farmland and destroy people's crops is punished. Apart from paying for what he destroys, we hand him to security agents for prosecution and for negligence. In accidental situations, we have our own way of handling the matter in order to prevent clashes with our neighbours.
>
> But here in our area now, some of our neighbours are handling the matter. By the power of guns, they either kill the cattle or the owner, paving way for cattle stealing. Back to the question of wilful destruction of crops, anyone with the fear of Allah will not go into any farmland and destroy people's crops. Whoever does that has no fear of God. (Musa, 2013, June 9, p. 11)

Concerning the complaint of cattle breeders that some farmers take the law into their hands when their crops are destroyed, farmers said that the normal practice is for a farmer, whose crops have been destroyed by cattle, to report the matter to the police. According to the chairman of AFAN, Jos North:

> You don't take the law into your hands, whatever your grievance may be. Stealing or killing cows that stray into your farm is a criminal offence. You may seek justice from the law and fail but taking the law into your hands could very easily become your own undoing. (Danboyi, 2013, June 9, p. 10).

There are other issues that relating to the farmers and herders' conflict that have come up recently. Middle Belters view the clash between Fulani cattle breeders and their kins, who are farmers, as part of a grand scheme by the Fulanis to expand into the

predominantly Christian Middle Belt area. For example, one Middle Belter explained during a focus group discussion that:

> The stage for this misunderstanding and crisis we have was set by our historical antecedents, as far back as 1804 when Usman dan Fodio launched his jihad. That to my understanding laid the foundation and vision. That mission is a global vision of Islamisation.

This kind of perception has increased among Middle Belters since the clashes between farmers and herders took a more deadly dimension in the past two to three years. The natives of the Middle Belt claim that the Fulanis are seeking to dispossess them of their land (*Nigerian Tribune*, 2014, October 27). A Middle Belter claimed during an interview that the Fulani strategy is to conquer, establish and dominate.

On the other hand, the Fulanis claimed, according to Malam Idris Musa, a cattle breeder, that the conflicts are a result of blockage of cattle routes and grazing areas, and sources of water (Musa, 2013, June 9). Musa also blamed the crisis on discrimination against the Fulanis by the government; that also Fulanis are deprived of privileges that other groups in the Middle Belt enjoy from the state. Apart from that, Musa maintained that some of the ethnic groups in the Middle Belt are saying the Fulanis must leave and stop grazing, and "some disgruntled elements" among them are rustling their cows, and sometimes shoot Fulani boys or the cattle or take them away. In an interview with the *Leadership Weekend* newspaper, Saleh Bayari, the protem national secretary of the Miyetti Allah asserted that: "The Fulani man has been at the receiving end of insecurity in this country. To say that the Fulani are marginalised is an understatement" (Bayari, 2012, September 8, p. 5). Bayari explained that Fulani cattle breeders have no representatives in government, who would address their plight because they have no children as councillors at the lowest tier of

government; they do not have Local Government Chairmen or representatives in the State House of Assembly, who are from their nomadic community.

The study observed that the majority of clashes between farmers and cattle breeders in the North-Central zone are taking place in areas that already have ongoing or not fully resolved ethno-religious conflicts. Besides the clashes in the North-Central zone, there are several other locations across the country, including the southern parts of the country where violent conflicts occurred between farmers and Fulani cattle breeders in recent time.

According to environmental experts the conflict between farmers and herders is environmentally-induced, that is, a consequence of environmental degradation and possibly climate change. For example, the Building Nigeria's Response to Climate Change (BNRCC)/Nigerian Environmental Study Team (NEST), observed that Nigeria is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. The experts observed that: "Climate change will significantly affect vulnerable groups because of a variety of factors, including low adaptive capacity, limited resources, and poverty. In general, climate change tends to exacerbate differences among various groups" (Building Nigeria's Response to Climate Change [BNRCC] Project, 2011, p. iv). The national policy on Environment has acknowledged the vulnerability of the entire semi-arid zone of Nigeria to desertification:

> The entire semi-arid zone of Nigeria lies approximately between latitude 110N and 140N and is affected by desertification. This zone has consistently and adversely been affected by all recorded droughts in the country's recent history. The situation is aggravated by the activities of an increasing human population – over-grazing, over-cultivation, and deforestation, which severely stress the natural support system. In many areas, sustainable-yield threshold of the vegetation and soils have been breached. (National Policy on Environment, 1999, p. 27).

246

Three separate bills for an act to establish a national grazing route and reserve commission for managing grazing routes and reserves in all parts of the federation and other matters related therewith had been brought before the National Assembly (House of Representatives Web site). However, the proposed Act has generated public debate; with many groups protesting that the government should have no business in taking and converting it to a grazing route or reserve. Although Land Use Act vests all land in the hand of the state (Land Use Act, 1990), ethnic groups see the land in their territory as a collective heritage. Hence, those protesting argue that the proposed Act would give the Fulani access to the land belonging to other ethnic groups. The conflict between farmers and cattle breeders has continued to claim many lives, and is widely viewed as a divisive issue because of the sensitivity of religion and ethnicity in the country.

5.2.4. Introduction of Islamic Banking. The introduction of Islamic banking in Nigeria recently sparked off public debate and controversy between Muslims and Christians in the country. The dust seemed to have settled down and "Nigeria's first licenced Islamic bank, Jaiz Bank, has commenced full operations of non-interest commercial banking in Nigeria from three branches in Abuja, Kaduna and Kano" (*Vanguard*, 2012, February 15, para. 1). The study looked at how the issue of Islamic banking became divisive and brought to the fore the question of religious pluralism within a federal system. In particular, the positions of the two main religious communities, Christians and Muslims, on the matter were generally diametrically opposed to each other. The Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) Guidelines for the Regulation and Supervision of Institutions Offering Non-Interest Financial Services in Nigeria classified non-interest banking and finance into two categories: 1) Non-interest banking and finance based on Islamic commercial jurisprudence;

247

and 2) Non-interest banking and finance based on any other established non-interest principle. According to the guideline (Central Bank of Nigeria, n.d., p. 3):

> Islamic banking as a model of non-interest banking, serves the same purpose of providing financial services as do conventional financial institutions save that it operates in accordance with principles and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence that generally recognizes profit and loss sharing and the prohibition of interest, as a model.
>
> Other non-permissible transactions include those involving any of the following:
>
> - uncertainty or ambiguity relating to the subject matter, terms or conditions;
> - gambling;
> - speculations;
> - unjust enrichment;
> - exploitation/unfair trade practices;
> - dealings in pork, alcohol, arms & ammunition, pornography and;
> - other transactions, products, goods or services which are not compliant with the rules and principles of Islamic commercial jurisprudence.

The former Governor of the CBN, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who is now the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II, championed the introduction of Islamic banking in Nigeria during his tenure at the apex bank. The then CBN governor spoke at several fora on the benefits of the non-interest banking and finance system, which Islamic banking is a part of. According to the governor, Islamic banking would bring about the inclusion of large numbers of unbanked and under-banked populations, particularly Muslims into the organised financial sector. The governor noted that "The efficacy of the Islamic finance in attracting liquidity to national economies especially through the Sukuk instruments structured for infrastructure development has also shown the contribution that Islamic finance can give to developing economies in building their much needed infrastructure"

(The Nation, 2013, November 6, para. 6). The CBN governor also stressed that although the Islamic banking would be based on Shari'a its financial products would be accessible to all, including non-Muslims. (Balogun, 2013, November 8). The Chairman of Jaiz Bank (the first Islamic bank in Nigeria), Alhaji Umar Mutallab, also urged Christians to see the bank as belonging to all Nigerians:

> We hope our brothers from the divide will see it as an ethical bank which is not meant to promote a particular religion. It is for all Nigerians and not Muslims alone. Once you have a viable project proposal which is ethical, which doesn't cater for such things as liquor, gambling etc, it becomes a halal (lawful) project and would be looked into by the bank. (*Vanguard*, 2012, February 15, para. 8).

Those who opposed the introduction of Islamic banking, especially Christian groups, argued that it violated the secularity of the Nigerian state (Komolafe, 2011, July 11). For example, the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) stated that:

> ...we have continued to frown at the way the CBN governor who is paid by tax payers' money is championing the course of Islamic banking in isolation of other non-interest banking as though that is the only form of non-interest banking. It is against the spirit of the Nigerian constitution. (Eyoboka & Latona, 2011, July 30, para. 8).

Using a questionnaire, the study tried to find out the perceptions of respondents regarding whether Islamic banking was in line with the need to accommodate diversity in a federal system.

Table 3 *Perceptions of Nigerians on Whether Islamic Banking was Designed*

to Expand the Influence of Islam in the Country.

			Religion				
			Christian	Muslim	Non-Religious/ Religiously unaffiliated	Other	Total
Introduction of Islamic banking was an attempt to expand the influence of Islam in the country	Strongly agree	Count	96	10	1	1	108
		% within Religion	41.6%	9.2%	25.0%	50.0%	31.2%
	Agree	Count	74	4	1	0	79
		% within Religion	32.0%	3.7%	25.0%	0.0%	22.8%
	Undecided	Count	23	13	0	1	37
		% within Religion	10.0%	11.9%	0.0%	50.0%	10.7%
	Disagree	Count	25	36	2	0	63
		% within Religion	10.8%	33.0%	50.0%	0.0%	18.2%
	Strongly Disagree	Count	13	46	0	0	59
		% within Religion	5.6%	42.2%	0.0%	0.0%	17.1%
Total		Count	231	109	4	2	346
		% within Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note. Breakdown of respondents' perceptions according to religious affiliation on whether the introduction of Islamic banking in Nigeria was an attempt to expand the influence of Islam in the country.

As shown on Table 3, a large majority (73.6%) of Christian respondents suggested that the introduction of Islamic banking was an attempt by their Muslim compatriots to expand the influence of Islam in the country. In contrast, a huge majority of Muslim respondents (75.2%) suggested that the motive behind the introduction of Islamic banking had nothing to do with the idea of expanding the influence of Islam in the country.

When respondents were asked whether the introduction of Islamic banking was a religious solution to the problem of corporate greed in the financial sector the responses, once again, show disagreement between Muslims and Christians as indicated on Table 4. A great majority of Muslim respondents (76%) believed that Islamic banking is a religious

solution to the problem of corporate greed. On the other hand, 55.4% of Christian

respondents disagree with the view that Islamic banking is a religious solution to corporate

greed. It is noteworthy to point out that 25% of Christian respondents could neither agree

nor disagree with the purported potential impact of Islamic banking on corporate greed.

Table 4 *Nigerians' Views on Whether Islamic Banking is an Ethical Device for Fighting Corporate Greed*

			Religion				
			Christian	Muslim	Non-Religious/ Religiously unaffiliated	Other	Total
Islamic banking is a religious solution to the problem of corporate greed in the financial sector	Strongly agree	Count	18	60	0	0	78
		% within Religion	7.8%	55.6%	0.0%	0.0%	22.6%
	Agree	Count	27	22	4	1	54
		% within Religion	11.7%	20.4%	100.0%	50.0%	15.7%
	Undecided	Count	58	11	0	0	69
		% within Religion	25.1%	10.2%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	Disagree	Count	80	7	0	0	87
		% within Religion	34.6%	6.5%	0.0%	0.0%	25.2%
	Strongly Disagree	Count	48	8	0	1	57
		% within Religion	20.8%	7.4%	0.0%	50.0%	16.5%
Total		Count	231	108	4	2	345
		% within Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note. Breakdown of respondents' views by religion on whether Islamic banking is a solution to corporate greed.

Respondents' answers to an open-ended question that asked them to justify their support or opposition to Islamic banking in the country also yielded opposing views from Christians and Muslims. For example, one respondent, a Christian, argued that:

> Its title "Islamic banking" is one of the foremost issues because to a layman it empowers the Muslims. If you want to introduce an interest free banking or push out corporate greed in the financial sector, why would you call it "Islamic" banking? Why not "Christian" banking also? So no matter the idea behind it we should be careful of issues like this so as not to offend others.

Another Christian respondent expressed the following opinion on the introduction of Islamic banking in the country:

In sharp contrast to the above views, a Muslim respondent argued that: "The current

banking system is Western/Christian; so Islamic banking is also to find a space in the same

country." Another Muslim respondent argued that: "The introduction of Islamic banking is a

way of propagating and complying with the laws guiding Islam as a way of life of

Muslims." A third Muslim respondent maintained that Islamic banking is in tandem with:

"The constitutional right for all citizens to pursue happiness, including the less harmful

financial services options."

5.2.5. Shari'a Crisis. The adoption of Shari'a Penal Code Law (SPCL) by twelve states in

northern Nigeria generated debate and violent clashes between Muslims and Christians from

1999 onwards. Figure 14 shows the twelve states in where Shari'a is effectively in force.

The application of Shari'a Islamic jurisprudence relating to civil matters involving questions

of Islamic personal law is enshrined in the Constitution of Nigeria. The Shari'a laws passed

by the state Houses of Assembly extended the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts beyond personal

law to cover other offences. Two experts gave this reflection on the new Shari'a laws

adopted by the twelve states:

The Shari'a courts in these states have jurisdiction over several new offences beyond personal law,

including theft, unlawful sexual intercourse, robbery, defamation, and drinking alcohol. The Shari'a

courts may impose punishments, pursuant to the provisions of the Shari'a Penal Code Law (SPCL),

that include death; forfeiture and destruction of property; imprisonment; detention in a reformatory;

fine; caning (flogging); amputation; retaliation; blood money; restitution; reprimand; public

disclosure; boycott; exhortation; compensation; closure of premises; and warning, among others.

(Ibrahim & Lyman, 2004, pp. 3-4).

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 14. The Twelve Shari'a States in Nigeria.

The study observed that Shari'a has remained one of the issues that are, time and again,

discussed among Nigerians as a challenge to Muslim-Christian relations in the country. The

ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, which is delved into later, has brought the question of

Shari'a once again to the front burner. In order to gauge whether the Shari'a issue has been

handled according to the spirit of federalism, the study posed series of questions with five

possible answers on a Likert scale. The first question asked respondents whether they agree

254

or disagree that the adoption of Shari'a by 12 states in northern Nigeria was in line with the principle of federalism.

Table 5 *Views of Nigerians on Whether New Shari'a Law is In Line with Principle of Federalism*

			Religion				
			Christian	Muslim	Non-Religious/ Religiously unaffiliated	Other	Total
Shari'a is in line with principle of federalism	Strongly agree	Count	10	43	0	0	53
		% within Religion	4.3%	39.4%	0.0%	0.0%	15.3%
	Agree	Count	27	23	2	0	52
		% within Religion	11.6%	21.1%	50.0%	0.0%	15.0%
	Undecided	Count	54	17	1	0	72
		% within Religion	23.3%	15.6%	25.0%	0.0%	20.7%
	Disagree	Count	63	15	1	2	81
		% within Religion	27.2%	13.8%	25.0%	100.0%	23.3%
	Strongly Disagree	Count	78	11	0	0	89
		% within Religion	33.6%	10.1%	0.0%	0.0%	25.6%
Total		Count	232	109	4	2	347
		% within Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note. Breakdown according to religious affiliation of respondents' view on whether the adoption of new Shari'a law is in line with the principle of federalism.

As shown in Table 5, majority (60.8%) of Christian respondents viewed the adoption of the new Shari'a law by the twelve northern states as incompatible with the principle of federalism, while a majority of Muslim respondents (60.5%) were of the opinion that it was in line with the principle of federalism. When asked whether Shari'a undermines the religious freedom of non-Muslims, respondents were divided in their opinions as shown in Table 6. Majority of Christian respondents (75.9%), out of which about half (49.6%) strongly, were of the opinion that Shari'a undermines the religious freedom of non-Muslims,

while majority of Muslim respondents (65.8%) did not think Shari'a infringes on the religious liberty of non-Muslims.

Table 6 *Nigerians' Views on Whether Shari'a Undermines Religious Freedom of Non-Muslims*

			Religion				
			Christian	Muslim	Non-Religious/ Religiously unaffiliated	Other	Total
Undermines Religious Freedom of non-Muslims	Strongly agree	Count	115	17	1	2	135
		% within Religion	49.6%	15.7%	25.0%	100.0%	39.0%
	Agree	Count	61	8	1	0	70
		% within Religion	26.3%	7.4%	25.0%	0.0%	20.2%
	Undecided	Count	30	12	0	0	42
		% within Religion	12.9%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	12.1%
	Disagree	Count	19	30	2	0	51
		% within Religion	8.2%	27.8%	50.0%	0.0%	14.7%
	Strongly Disagree	Count	7	41	0	0	48
		% within Religion	3.0%	38.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.9%
Total		Count	232	108	4	2	346
		% within Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note. Breakdown according to religious affiliation of respondents' views on whether Shari'a undermines the religious freedom of non-Muslims.

The study also examined respondents' perception about the motive behind the adoption of Shari'a by the twelve states. Again, the result, as shown in Table 7, indicates divergent views between Christians and Muslims. A significant majority (76.6%) of Christian respondents perceived that the motive behind the adoption of the new Shari'a law by the twelve states was to expand the influence of Islam in the country, while a majority of Muslim respondents (63.0%) did not agree that this was the motive behind the implementation of Shari'a by the twelve states.

Table 7 *Nigerians' Perception on Whether the Motive of the New Shari'a Law was to Expand the Influence of Islam in the Country*

| | | | Religion | | | | Total |
			Christian	Muslim	Non-Religious/ Religiously unaffiliated	Other	
Shari'a meant to expand the political influence of Islam	Strongly agree	Count	98	11	1	1	111
		% within Religion	42.4%	10.2%	25.0%	50.0%	32.2%
	Agree	Count	79	9	1	0	89
		% within Religion	34.2%	8.3%	25.0%	0.0%	25.8%
	Undecided	Count	26	20	2	1	49
		% within Religion	11.3%	18.5%	50.0%	50.0%	14.2%
	Disagree	Count	18	34	0	0	52
		% within Religion	7.8%	31.5%	0.0%	0.0%	15.1%
	Strongly Disagree	Count	10	34	0	0	44
		% within Religion	4.3%	31.5%	0.0%	0.0%	12.8%
Total		Count	231	108	4	2	345
		% within Religion	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note. Breakdown of respondents' perceptions according to religious affiliations on whether the motive behind the adoption of new Shari'a law was to expand the influence of Islam in the country.

As the Shari'a debate in the country has sometimes been framed around the question of whether Nigeria is a secular or non-secular state, the study asked respondents whether the adoption of Shari'a was a pushback against secularism and Western influence. As Figure 15 shows, overwhelming majority of Christian respondents shared the view that the adoption of the new Shari'a law by the twelve states was a strategy aimed at pushing back against the incursion of secularism and Western cultural influence. Muslim respondents were split on this question, with 41.6% agreeing, 34.3 disagreeing and 24.1% undecided on the suggestion that the adoption of the new Shari'a law was a pushback against secularism and Western cultural influence.

Figure 15. Nigerians' Perceptions according to religious affiliations on whether the adoption of new Shari'a law was a pushback against secularism and Western Influence.

5.3. Boko Haram Insurgency. Boko Haram is the name given to an insurgent group, which claimed to be fighting to establish proper Shari'a according to the injunctions of the Quran, and to create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. The group's real name is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). The group's existence became known around 2002, although it was widely believed that the group's formation might have begun even few years earlier. The study has observed the development of the Boko Haram insurgency and the challenge it posed to the Nigerian federalism in the last three years. This effort involved talking to

258

people living in the locations affected by the insurgency, including several respondents in the spiritual home of Boko Haram, Maiduguri, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The opportunity to speak directly with victims of the insurgency, and to participate in channelling relief materials and facilitating resettlement of victims, irrespective of their religious affiliations, through the Madagali-Gwoza Relief Efforts coordinated by Mr. Markus Gamache, a staff of the Church of the Brethren, Nigeria [Ekklesiyan Yan'uwa a Nigeria – EYN], with the support of the S.H.A.R.E. Foundation and the Balingen District Church, Germany, gave the researcher insights into the devastations inflicted on communities by the Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, the study examined the Boko Haram phenomenon by following the coverage of the insurgency in both mainstream and social media as well as watching videos occasionally released to the public by the group.

Boko Haram has metamorphosed from a little known sect to a dreaded insurgent group that has not only sustained fighting, but has also captured large swathes of territory and declared a caliphate (*Punch*, 2014, August 15). Boko Haram abducted more than 200 young secondary school girls from Government Secondary School, Chibok in Borno State. More than six months since the news of the abduction shocked the world, 219 of the school girls remain missing. The efforts of the Nigerian Government and the international community have failed to secure the release of the girls. In a recent video released by the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, he claimed that the girls, most of them Christians, have converted to Islam and were married off (*Daily Trust*, 2014, October 31).

Boko Haram was transformed from a sect to a terrorist group after 2009. Dr. Ahmad Murtada of the Islamic Studies Department of Bayero University, Kano, has produced a

document, Boko Haram in Nigeria: Its Beginnings, Principles and Activities in Nigeria," in which the scholar gave the most extensive background and analysis on Boko Haram that the study came across. Dr. Murtada's work was based on the analysis of Boko Haram's original writings, audio and video statements, in Arabic and Hausa. Boko Haram declared that its mission was to overthrow the Nigerian state, create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria governed by strict Islamic Shari'a law, abolish Western mode of education and eradicate Western influence. Dr. Murtada enumerated the following as the main principles of Boko Haram extracted from the teachings of the group, especially its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed extra-judiciaally in hands of the police during the groups first major confrontation with security forces in Maiduguri in 2009 (Murtada, 2012, p. 16-18):

- Affirming *Hakimiyyah* for Allah only (highest political, legal and supreme authority belongs to God), and that democracy totally conflicts with Islam. Thus, the group holds politicians who participate in the democratic process as kuffar (infidel).

- Members of the Boko Haram movement view themselves as the *Firqat un-Naji'ah* (the saved sect), and are convinced that "they are reviving the spirit of jihad in Nigeria."

- Prohibit studying in the educational system because they believe: (a) the schools were established by missionaries as means of propagating Christianity in Nigeria. They argue that Islamic system of education had predated Western education in Nigeria, but it was relegated to the background after colonialists took over the country. Hence, Western influence has taken over all aspects of life, especially the education system, and Muslims are gradually corrupted by it

260

to become unbelievers. (b) The Western educational system allows mixing of the genders and un-Islamic mode of dressings. (c) Certain subjects, ideas and theories, such as Darwinist theory of evolution and the idea that rain is formed through the precipitation of condensed atmospheric water vapour, conflict with the teachings of Islam.

- Boko Haram forbids employment under the present democratic Nigerian government in any capacity, including working for the security services or public service. Working for the government amounts to a total obedience to a system that is not in line with Allah's teachings.

In several interviews, Mohammed Yusuf affirmed those principles. For example in an interview with the BBC before he was killed, Mohammed Yusuf upheld those principles outlined by Murtada.

Boko Haram has now assumed a dimension that Nigerians described as "mysterious." Since the killing of the sect's founder in 2009, the movement resurfaced as a terrorist group carrying out attacks in different parts of northern Nigeria: they launched a wave of attacks against government and security targets; carried out bombing attacks against Christian churches and killing Christian worshippers; targeted and attacked Christian homes and pastors residences; attacked mosques and killed Muslim clerics, who spoke against their activities; planted bombs and killed unsuspecting members of the public, irrespective of religion, in major cities across the north and the FCT; bombed the UN building in Abuja; attacked the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja; staged several jail breaks to free their detained members; and engaged in intercepting and attacking motorists and commuters on

highways. The transformation of Boko Haram from an Islamic to fundamentalist movement to a full blown insurgent group, as observed by the study, is shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Boko Haram model of insurgency. This illustrates the mission and changing patterns of operation of the group from 2010 to 2014.

The Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of many people across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the insurgency has spilled over of refugees into neighbouring Cameroon and Niger, where more than thousands of Nigerian refugees have sought asylum (UNHCR, 2014, October 31). Further, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has reported that as at 5th June 2014, over 250,000 people had been internally displaced by the

262

Boko Haram insurgency (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013, June 5). The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) would have increased considerably since between July and November 2014 Boko Haram captured more territories and forced more people to flee.

The relentlessness of the insurgents and their ability to hold ground against the Nigerian military have made many Nigerians to think that there is more to it than meets the eye. There are many speculations making round in private and public discourse that include suggestions that Boko Haram: is now a franchise used by sundry groups to pursue different objectives; was created by politicians who at one time needed the support of the group to propel themselves to political positions and later dumped the group; may be a tool in the hand of northern politicians, who have vowed to make Nigeria ungovernable for President Jonathan for violating the ruling party's power rotation agreement between the north and south; may be a device used by the government to wreak havoc on the north; may be part of an Muslims' agenda of getting rid of Christians in the north; and may be part of a global jihad waged by Islamists in different parts of the world. Study observed that the targets of the insurgents and patterns of their operation only cast cloud of mystery than prove any of the speculations right. The Nigerian federation is today territorially divided, with some portion of the country under the occupation of the insurgents, while government forces continue to battle to regain control.

5.4. Ethno-Religious Identity Politics. Another area that the study examined to understand the prevailing political culture of federalism was identity politics. Identity politics has been observed to be a source of inter-group tension and violence in Nigeria. It is not a new phenomenon, but recent trends have been observed to heighten disunity among

Nigerians. Through participant observation, the study gained insights into the views of Nigerians concerning the implication of identity in Nigerian politics. The study observed in private and public conversations that in many instances when people expressed their preference for a particular candidate they based their support or choice on such identities as religion, ethnicity and region. This trend was observed specifically with regard to general elections in which candidates vie for positions at the federal level. This situation was observed in the political discourse leading to the 2011 presidential election and the results, and the post-election violence that occurred.

Figure 17. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election according to states won

by leading candidates.

The results of the 2011 presidential election shown in Figure 17 indicate the following

patterns: The candidate of the ruling party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), who was

the winner of the election, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan (58.89%), won all the states in southern

Nigeria, except Osun State, and got seven states in the north as well as the FCT. The

candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), who came second with 31.98%,

General Mohammadu Buhari (rtd), a former military Head of State, won all the 12 Shari'a

states in the north. Osun State was won by the candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria

(ACN), a retired police officer and former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. President Jonathan is a Christian from the Ijaw minority ethnic group in the country's oil-rich South-South, while Buhari is a Muslim from the Fulani ethnic group of the North-West.

As soon as the results were announced that Jonathan has won the presidential election, riots broke out in the twelve Shari'a states. A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented that more than 800 people were killed (Human Rights Watch, 2011, May 17). A senior researcher at the HRW, Corinne Dufka, drew this conclusion about the elections: "The April elections were heralded among the fairest in Nigeria's history, but they also were among the bloodiest" (Human Rights Watch, 2011, May 17, para. 3). The HRW's report on the post-elections violence gave the following account of what happened:

> The presidential election divided the country along ethnic and religious lines. As election results trickled in on April 17, and it became clear that Buhari had lost, his supporters took to the streets of northern towns and cities to protest what they alleged to be the rigging of the results.
>
> The protesters started burning tires, and the protests soon turned into riots. The rioting quickly degenerated into sectarian and ethnic bloodletting across the northern states. Muslim rioters targeted and killed Christians and members of ethnic groups from southern Nigeria, who were perceived to have supported the ruling party, burning their churches, shops, and homes. The rioters also attacked police stations and ruling party and electoral commission offices. In predominately Christian communities in Kaduna State, mobs of Christians retaliated by killing Muslims and burning their mosques and properties. (Human Rights Watch, 2011, May 17, para. 4-5).

During the electioneering campaigns, the study observed that political discourses were laced with ethnic, religious and sectional sentiments. The background of this situation goes back to 2010 when President Umaru Musa Yar'adua died in office. President Yar'adua was a Muslim and a Fulani from Katsina State in the North-West. Following Yar'adua's

266

death, the then Vice President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, was sworn in as President on May 6, 2010. Some northern politicians and groups found this development unsettling and protested that the tenure of Yar'adua was a northern slot, and a northerner should have been made his replacement rather than Dr. Jonathan. For example, a leading politician from the north, who was a former Minister of Finance and Agriculture, Mallam Adamu Ciroma, insisted that under the agreement on rotational presidency, a northerner should have completed Yar'adua's tenure. Ciroma was quoted in the *Punch* newspaper reiterating his position (Isenyo, 2014, August 9, para. 4-5):

> I was there when the party was moving the presidency between the north and the south. And this President was there when General (Olusegun) Obasanjo presided over the agreement in the PDP, which agreed that the movement of the Presidency from the North to South should be based on two terms.
>
> President Obasanjo did his two terms on behalf of the South, and Yar'adua was doing his first term on behalf of the North but unfortunately, he died. And the PDP leaders, instead of agreeing on somebody from the North to complete Yar'adua's term, they all went to ensure that the Vice President became the President; and since the leaders we made agreement with departed from this agreement, I lost interest in Nigerian political affairs.

As President Jonathan declared intention to contest election to seek full term in the presidency, opposition by northern groups continued to grow. A group led by Mallam Adamu Ciroma, Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLF), sought and came up with a northern consensus candidate, the former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, a Muslim and Fulani from Adamawa State, as their anointed aspirant (*Vanguard*, 2010, November 22). The NPLF appointed a committee of "wise men" to screen northern presidential aspirants of the ruling party and to select a consensus candidate. The committee vetted the following contenders before arriving at the choice of one: former military President, Ibrahim

267

Babangida; former National Security Adviser and now Minister of Defence, Aliyu Gusau; former Kwara State Governor and a serving senator, Bukola Saraki; and Atiku Abubakar.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 18. The official North-South political division of Nigeria.

The opposition of the NPLF to Mr. Jonathan's presidential aspiration and their decision to field a northern consensus candidate irked politicians from other parts of the country. For example, a group known as Goodluck Jonathan for Nigeria 2011 decried the action of the NPLF as capable of worsening the North-South dichotomy. The political division of the country into North and South is shown in Figure 18. In a news conference, the Chairman of the group in the FCT, Engr. Charles Ezeani, described the NPLF's action as

"retrogressive" and counterproductive to the vision of a united and indivisible Nigeria.

Ezeani had this to say about the NPLF's action, according to a *Sunday Trust* report

(Lazarus, 2010, December 5, para. 4):

> [I]t is lamentable that 50 years after independence, some unpatriotic and reactionary elements
>
> masquerading as Northern leaders are dragging the nation backwards because of their selfish design
>
> to wield power. These crop of ethnic jingoists have held Nigeria hostage, destroyed our quest for
>
> progress and innovation. Malam Ciroma has worsened the North/south divide by his action.

Ezeani asserted that his group viewed the idea of a northern consensus candidate as a

reminder of Nigeria's colonial past (Lazarus, 2010, December 5, para. 5): "sadly, we regard

the clamour to rotate the presidency in the PDP between North and South as a carryover of

Lord Lugard's evil and selfish amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914." Similarly, in an interview

with a reporter of *The Nation* newspaper, Senator Chris Ukpabi, a Second Republic

lawmaker and PDP member from Abia State, described the NPLF's agitation for power shift

to the north as part of a historical calculation of the north:

> It is a laughing matter. They are merely playing out a script, which had been handed over to them by
>
> that our respected leader from the North, Sardauna of Sokoto. That is the script they are playing out.
>
> On the 12th of October, 1960, that highly respected sage said this nation called Nigeria is their own
>
> private property bequeathed to them by their great grandfather, Usman Danfodio, and that they will
>
> resist any change in power. Take note, he said they will resist any change in power; that the
>
> minorities of the North will be manipulated while the South will be regarded as conquered territory.
>
> This is the script they are playing out. Unfortunately, they cannot do that. How can they be
>
> talking about this now after how many years of Nigeria's independence? The Northerners have ruled
>
> for 38 years. Others are entitled to be there. You can't rule for 38 years and expect others to continue
>
> to look at you. Nobody will take it. (Ukpabi, 2013, August 29, p. 49).

The notion of a northern consensus candidate was not subscribed to by groups from

the Middle Belt. As Figure 17 shows, President Jonathan got significant support from the

Middle Belt during the 2011 election. Some Middle Belt groups were even claiming that the insecurity in the Middle Belt was a revenge being meted to them for supporting a Christian southerner against a northern Muslim:

> They also sees (sic) the unprecedented killings of non-Muslims in places of worship by Islamists in the North, and incessant raids on their communities by alleged Fulani herdsmen as some kind of retaliation against them for voting, almost in one bloc, for President Jonathan Goodluck, in 2011. (Binniyat, 2013, August 18, para. 4).

A recent statement in the media by a Middle Belt group, through one of its members, Aminu Zang, also made the same claim (*The Nation*, 2014, March 20):

> The Middle Belt Dialogue (MBD) yesterday reviewed the attacks on its communities by supposedly Fulani herdsmen and accused the North of carrying out a vengeance on the zone over its loss of power to a southerner in the 2011 presidential election.
>
> In a statement by Aminu Zang, for the MBD secretariat, the group claimed to have come to the conclusion that its "people are being punished for asserting their right to make free choice".
>
> It claimed to have heard from a leading Fulani analyst that the 'North' would not forgive the middle belt for taking sides with President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, to defeat General Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner, in the 2011 presidential elections.
>
> The group alleged an attempt by the Miyettt Allah Cattles breeders, of plans to cower people of the Middle Belt into submission by either voting for Buhari or displacing them from the middle belt so that they would not be able to participate in the 2015 elections.

It was outside the scope of this study to ascertain the veracity of the above claims that there is a correlation between the incessant attacks on Middle Belt communities and the support the people of the area gave to the incumbent President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan.

A renowned Islamic cleric, Sheik Ahmad Gumi acknowledged in an interview that northern Christians should rule out the support of northern Muslims in the event that a particular political party fields a northern Christian as its candidate in the 2015 elections.

270

Sheik Gumi gave the following reason: "Because the Northern Christians, unfortunately for them, during the 2011 election … all went to Jonathan, they need to build the confidence back for the northerners to show that they believe in being northerners before they will be taken seriously" (*Blueprint*, 2014, February 17, para. 3). The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the FCT and the 19 northern states then replied Sheik Gumi by claiming that northern Christians have good reason to take the stance that they took because they are marginalized by their Muslim counterparts when it comes to appointment into public offices (*National Mirror*, 2014, February 20). The Executive Secretary of CAN for the 19 northern states and the FCT, Professor Daniel Babayi, made the following statement in reaction to Sheik Gumi's utterance:

> Federal Government institutions in the Northern states have since become nogo areas for northern Christians. We call on the Federal Character Commission members to visit places like the Ahmadu Bello University Teaching Hospital, the Police Colleges and Academy's in the North and they will marvel at the degree of marginalisation of Christians in such institutions. (*National Mirror*, 2014, February 20, para. 6).

In interview with Professor Daniel Babayi on 2nd September 2014, the researcher probed the CAN reaction to the Gumi's statement. This question was posed to the CAN official: Does CAN realize that Sheik Gumi might have stated the obvious going by what happened in 2011 and the current political reality in the north? Babayi acknowledged that yes, unfortunately, that is the sorry state of relationship between northern Christians and northern Muslims, but that the statement credited to Gumi should not have come from him as a cleric rather such matter should be left in the hands of politicians.

Again, as the 2015 general elections drew near, the drums of identity politics were getting louder. The former president of Ijaw Youth Council and leader of the Niger Delta

Volunteer Force and ex-militant, Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo, responding to threats

credited to some northern politicians that if power does not shift to the north Nigeria will be

made "ungovernable" also issued a threat this threat in an exclusive interview with reporters

posted on You Tube:

> Goodluck Jonathan will complete his tenure of two terms whether they like it or not. To us they don't
>
> even exist. Because we pay them; he who pays the piper dictates the tune. We pay them; we feed
>
> them. They are parasites; they are a burden on us. They have no reason to be with us. They have no
>
> reason whatsoever to be with us... these invaders must be expelled from our land. (Dokubo, 2013,
>
> May 12).

Dokubo claimed that the Niger Delta, the region that produces most of Nigeria's oil has the

right to have its own, President Jonathan, to rule the country for eight years. *Figure 19*

shows the Niger Delta region of the country.

Data Source: Nigeria boundaries (GADM, modified), other boundaries (ArcWorld Supplement), rivers (DeLorme)

Figure 19. Constituent states of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is defined by

the bill establishing the Niger Delta Development Commission as

synonymous to oil producing states.

In reaction to Dokubo's threat that "there will be no peace in the country, if Jonathan is

denied a second term," a northern politician and former member of the House of

Representatives, Farouk Adamu Aliyu, in an interview with *Leadership* newspaper insisted

that "it is either a northerner as President in 2015 or there will be no more Nigeria" (Aliyu,

2013, May 7). Northern groups are still insisting that the presidency must rotate to the north

in 2015 (The Nation, 2014, June 1). As President Jonathan has indicated intention seek re-

election (Adetayo, 2014, October 25), northern groups, notably the Northern Elders Forum

and the Arewa Consultative Forum, have renewed their opposition to his bid for re-election.

The study observed that political discourse in the country in both private and public

domains tend to focus more on the identity – religion, ethnicity and geographical region – of

the aspirants to the office of the President rather than who is able to do the job effectively.

5.5. Muslim-Christian Power Struggle. Another area that the study examined with

regard to the religious dimension of the prevailing political culture of federalism in Nigeria

was Muslim-Christian power struggle. Nigeria is a multi-religious state, with Christianity

and Islam as the major religions, and there are numerous traditional religions. There was no

census data on the religious compositions of the Nigerian population. As a result, the

estimates that were out there are contestable. Hence, it has become common to see each of

the two major religious communities, Christians and Muslims, claiming to be the majority.

It has been observed that it was in view of the sensitive nature of this contestation over

which religious community is the majority in the country that the federal government

decided to leave out religion and ethnicity in the last general census, which was conducted

in 2006 (Otaru, 2014, October 20).

Several interviews with various social groups, including heads of churches and

mosques, leaders of Christian and Muslim umbrella organisations, and women and youth

groups, gave insights into the nature of Christian-Muslim relations and power struggle in the

country. A senior leader of one of the major Muslim umbrella organisations described the

situation as: "The sorry state of relationship between Muslims and Christians in this

country." Many respondents divulged that in the past the relationship between the adherents

of the two major religions was not always characterised by tension and conflicts as it is

today. The same religious leader who described the relationship today as a "sorry state" of affairs, also characterised the past relationship as generally "amicable and affable," with both sides "accepting the plurality of the Nigerian community." For this leader, and many other respondents, it was the return of the country to a democratic dispensation in 1999 that ushered in an era of politics wherein the "quest for power," "quest for economic dominancy" and "competition between the two major faiths" have become the order of the day. Many Christian leaders also agreed that the relationship between the two faiths had been quite cordial and peaceful in the past. However, there were other respondents that claimed that Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria had always being characterised by mutual suspicion and the desire by one religion to dominate and proselytise.

The study inquired into the understanding of each religious community of what has made Muslim-Christian relations more problematic nowadays. The concerns and perceptions of each side are presented here. For instance, a respondent, a Bishop of one of the oldest denominations in the country, claimed that Muslims have an agenda to Islamize the country. The study found this perception to be common among majority of Christian respondents. The Bishop, for example, expressed his perception as follows:

> I believe that there is a target they are working towards achieving. The truth of the matter is that what we have seen in recent time is Islamization of Nigeria. That agenda of Islamization of Nigeria is working. And I think we must be able to build trust, peace and give level plain ground for Muslims to play their religion and for Christians to play their religion. Otherwise, where one person thinks he must dominate, we are in problem. We are all aware of the issue of OIC [Organisation of Islamic Cooperation]. We are all aware Nigeria registered as a member of OIC, and that is the indication of Islamization agenda.

There was also a perception among Christians that the country was being projected as a Muslim country, and that Muslims were seeking to impose their religion on the country. For

275

instance, in a newspaper article entitled "Minister Nurudeen's 'Islamic Republic of Nigeria,'" Ochereome Nnanna, a columnist and deputy chairman of the Editorial Board of *Vanguard* newspaper, argued that the registration of Nigeria as a member of the OIC effectively creates the image that Nigeria is an Islamic country (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 2-4):

> The surreptitious, nocturnal, and unconstitutional enrolment of Nigeria into that Islamic forum effectively put this country out as an "Islamic country", at least by perception, though our Constitution is unequivocal that we are multi-religious without an official state religion.
>
> The more appropriate thing was for our Moslem community, perhaps through the Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, NSCIA, with the Sultan of Sokot (sic) as its head, to register with the OIC, attend its meetings, participate in its conventions and pocket all the benefits it is touted to heap upon its members.
>
> That way, non-Muslims would not be bothered since the Christians also have their own international affiliations through their various church organs.

Nnanna was commenting on the misunderstanding that arose after the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nurudeen Mohammed, was alleged to have made a statement at a meeting of OIC in Saudi Arabia to the effect that Nigeria is an "Islamic State with the largest Christian population." Christians, led by CAN President, condemned the purported statement. However, Dr. Mohammed clarified his position on the matter by stating that he was misquoted (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 8):

> What I did say rather (among other things) was, 'The King had extended invitation to the fifty seven-member states of the OIC, including his colleague and brother, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who mandated the Vice President to sit in for Nigeria…*we are the largest Islamo-Christian country* [emphasis added] in the world…

The newspaper columnist was not only unsatisfied with the clarification given by the Minister, but found it even unsettling that the Saudi King and President Jonathan were referred to as brothers (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 10):

> Describing Jonathan as the king's "brother and colleague" reminds one of Boko Haram's demands that Jonathan must convert to Islam before they will stop their cowardly campaigns of terror. That Jonathan has become a "brother" to the king of the Muslim world could only be inferred from Nigeria's membership of the OIC! In other words, though Mohammed denies calling Nigeria an Islamic nation, he names our President as one of the Muslim brothers! That does not look to me like much of a denial!

Again, Nnanna raised issue with the Minister's description of Nigeria as an "Islamo-Christian country," and insisted that Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state (para. 11):

> Mohammed's description of Nigeria as an "Islamo-Christian country" is a total misnomer and negation of our Constitution. He has dressed this country in borrowed robes. *Nigeria is a secular country* [emphasis added], not in the sense that it does not believe that God reigns in its affairs but in the sense that it has no official state religion. Nigeria is a country where all religions that respect our constitutional sovereignty are welcome to practice freely, but with a special preferential treatment for Christianity and Islam, the two majority religions. That does not make her an "Islamo-Christian" country, whatever the Minister means by that!

In a focus group with a state leadership of a Christian umbrella organisation, one respondent, a lawyer and an official from the south, put the claim that Muslims were trying to impose their religion on the country as follows:

> The projecting that the whole Nigeria is a Muslim country, disregarding that the Middle Belt is Christian and the south is predominantly Christian, would not bring peace to this country. Since Nigeria got independence, there are lots of signs that you can make reference to that one religion wants to impose itself on the country.

Another issue that Christians also point out as indicative of the dominance of Islam in the country is the occurrence of the words "Islamic" and "Shari'a" in the Nigerian Constitution. For example, a leader of a Christian group, asserted that:

> The truth is, I can see, that there is basically something wrong with our constitution. If you check it most of the mention about religion has to do with Shari'a, but you would hardly hear anything about Christianity. So it means that Christians are second class citizens. Why must it be so? Because they are still insisting that Nigeria must be an Islamic country.

The perception that the Nigerian Constitution was skewed in favour of Muslims took a centre state during the recently concluded National Conference. It was reported in local media that two representatives of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Bishop of Kafachan Diocese of Catholic Church, Joseph Bagobiri and Pastor Emmanuel Bosun from Ogun State contended that the way the constitution was skewed in favour of Islam and Muslims is unfair to Christians and Christianity in the country (Ogundele & Olokor, 2014, April 3). The Christian leaders decried that the Nigerian Constitution did not have a mention of the words "Christianity" and "church," but "Islam" was repeatedly mentioned. The Christian argument was rebutted by Muslims, who argued that the Nigerian Constitution itself was a Christian document. For example, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Argungu Usman Mohammed, contended that the Christian's claim was baseless because, in his opinion, all courts in Nigeria, with the exception of Shari'a and customary courts, applied the Christian law. The media report quoted Justice Mohammed's argument as follows (Ogundele & Olokor, 2014, April 3):

> When the British conquered northern Nigeria, they met two religions in that part of the country. Islamic and the customary religions were in place. They introduced their own common law. Common law is of Christian origin. They also introduced statute of general application which is also Christian law. They made these three laws to work together. They brought some provisions of the Islamic and

Customary laws which they said were contrary to principle of natural justice, equity and good conscience. The laws have continued to exist together.

I became a magistrate in 1966 and rose up to Supreme Court. I am an Islamic scholar. As a magistrate, I worked with the common law. As a High Court Judge, I worked with the common law.

I was at the Court of Appeal as a Justice of the common law and a justice of the Shariah.

A misleading report was given yesterday. To say that Nigerian constitution is an Islamic law is absolutely wrong. Nigerian Constitution is Christian.

Another divisive issue brought up by several Christian respondents was the question of *almajiri* model schools supported by the federal government. The *Almajiri* is a term that is used in northern Nigeria to refer to a Quranic pupil or student, who has been sent to another location to acquire Islamic education under a Quranic teacher. The children, who are often quite young, are sent hundreds of kilometres far from home and entrusted into the custody of Quaranic teachers (*mallams*). The *almajiris* are taught how to memorise the Quran. The description below by a reporter gives the background to why government stepped in to modernise the *almajiri* system:

Normally, the Mallam or Islamic teacher is given a number of children to be tutored in Islamic knowledge: He moves these children away to a distant community in the urban centre. Thus, with the use of the whip and religious indoctrination by the Mallam, assisted by the old pupils, the Almajiris are made to quickly adjust to the new realities of their lives. The Almajiri, who is equipped with a bowl and clad in dirty clothing, move around begging for alms and food on the streets.

Similarly, the almajiri boys till the Mallam's farms and feed his livestock and sometimes render domestic services and menial chores to various households in exchange for food and stipends. But the system was abused because when a child is in need, the Mallam sends him out to fend for himself and look for food and these kids engage in all sorts of things. These children are exposed to a different way of life and this exposure is happening to these Almajiris at a period when they are most vulnerable. So, left at the mercy of the vagaries of the streets, these adolescent kids with no parental

or social guidance are more likely to become social misfits with the likelihood of drifting into a life of crime.

> The Mallam is not equipped financially to handle the functional needs of these kids, who are mostly between the ages of five and 15. The sheer number of the kids under him has already overwhelmed him and this is where the social disconnect sets in. (Aminu, 2012, April 12, para. 3-5).

It was due to the concern about the welfare and safety of the children that are enrolled in the *almajiris* system and the social problems associated with the *almajiri* phenomenon that some northern States and the Federal Government decided to introduce initiatives of creating modern *almajiri* schools. President Goodluck Jonathan supported the initiative and inaugurated the Almajiri Model Primary School in Sokoto. During the inauguration, the President declared the reason behind the initiative as follows (Aminu, 2012, April 11, para. 6):

> We feel that we must modernise the almajiri system. The fact that majority of these children do not attend conventional education makes it worrisome. It was in view of that that I directed the minister of education to design an intervention programme for the Federal Government and states to address the issue.

The President also noted that that there were about 9.5 million children in the *almajiri* system in the country, out of which the North-West alone accounts for more than 60% of the total population of *almajiris* in the country. The executive secretary of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), Dr. Dikko Suleiman stated on 16th September 2014 that so far, the federal government has spent ₦8.5 billion (five billion naira) in equipping 154 *Almajiri* schools, and that the annual *Almajiri* school enrolment stood at 17,000 (*Vanguard*, 2014, September 16).

Many Christian respondents decried that the *almajiris* are vulnerable and likely to be used by conflict instigators, but they also opposed the initiative of the federal government in

helping to modernize the system and to take the children out of the streets. The Christian respondents that opposed the initiative insisted that since the federal government was putting resources into the initiative, the gesture should also be extended to their community, even though there is no similar system from the Christian side. For example, one respondent put their demand as follows:

> That the *almajiri* schools should be introduced in the north; we are saying what about our children? We have our children that are also less privileged. Christian children also need attention; and nothing has been done about it. I think it is a serious conflict driver. Why should they institute something in the north, and the Christians too have less privileged children that need such attention, and nothing has been done?

In an interview with a newspaper, the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, also expressed similar view about the *almajiri* school project (Oritsejafor, 2013, July 27, para. 8):

> Actually, in my opinion, Christians are being treated as second class citizens in virtually every way! Let me give you some examples because if I begin to tell you everything, you will not even have space to publish it. In the education sector, Almajiri schools are being built everywhere in many states of the North. I don't know how many of such schools, but everybody knows that in 2012, the Federal Government spent N5 billion to construct Almajiri schools.
>
> The Almajiri schools are exclusively for Muslim children. There are millions of Christian children who cannot go to those schools. How are we giving those Christian children the same opportunity to be educated? So automatically they have been made second class citizens.
>
> Don't forget that the schools which Christians used their money to build were taken over by government and the same government is using public funds to build special schools for Almajiri Muslims. That shows that Christians are just second class citizens.
>
> Government is running all those schools taken from Christians the way they want. Both Christians and Muslim go to those schools but the Almajiri schools are exclusively for Muslim children only.

According to the executive secretary of UBEC, besides the ₦8.5 billion that the federal government spent on *Almajiri* Model Schools, the government also spent ₦12 billion on building and equipping 30 schools under the girl-child education programme, and ₦6.4 billion was spent on 74 schools for out of school boys (*Vanguard,* 2014, September 16). The girl-child and out of school education programmes are meant for everyone irrespective of religion. However, the Christian respondents did not acknowledge that, and raised issue with the *almajiri* school initiative.

Other complaints of marginalization of Christians raised by the CAN leader in the interview with *Vanguard* included: underrepresentation of Christians in government owned media houses, particularly the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA); "illegality" of Islamic banking; discrimination against Christians in admission into tertiary schools; ban on teaching of CRK (Christian Religious Knowledge) in public schools in some northern states; abduction and forceful conversion of Christian girls; and denial of Christians of the VC chair (Vice Chancellor position) of Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria. There were also some people who also point at the Arabic inscriptions on the Nigerian currencies as indication of Islamic influence on the country. For example, Nnanna argued that "the Arewa figurines and Arabic inscriptions (Ajami) on our N100, N200, N500 and N1000 currency notes; inscriptions known only to Northern Muslims which, for all I know, are making constitutionally objectionable proclamations" (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 13).

Muslim respondents also expressed concern about some issues with regard to Muslim-Christian relations in the country. For example, some Muslim respondents asserted that Christians have a tendency to dominate in the area of politics. One respondent, a leader of a state chapter of a Muslim umbrella organisation, stated this:

It seems that from the Christian side there is always a tendency to dominate in terms of politics. May be they know the importance of governance, government and what it means in terms of patronage and what have you. Already key sectors like the security forces, the economy, and what have you, everything is completely in the hands of the Christians. I am giving all this to tell you the palpable fear in the minds of Muslims generally.

In 2013, the House of Representatives had to intervene by ordering its Committee on Defence to look into the allegations of religious and ethnic lopsidedness in admission into the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). The Committee was ordered to carry out a forensic audit of admission process at the NDA for the past 10 years with a view to determining the veracity of the allegations that the Muslim community was "short-changed" (House of Representatives, 2013, October 24).

In a joint statement published in the *Daily Trust* newspaper, the Supreme Council of Shariah in Nigeria and the Council of Imams and Ulama of Kaduna State chapters decried that: "The result clearly shows that Muslims of Nigeria were systematically marginalized, a plan we foresee is intended to gradually get rid of our Muslim youths from the armed forces and other security agencies in Nigeria" (Krish & Sule, 2013, October 24, para. 4).

The Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) released a rebuttal on the 8th October 2013 to the claim of marginalization of Christians by the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). In that statement, the highest Muslim umbrella organisation in the country, repudiated the claim by the CAN President, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, that Christians were marginalized in key appointments in the country (NSCIA, 2013, October 8). NSCIA claimed that Muslims were the ones marginalized, citing examples of what the group described as: lopsidedness of recent recruitment in the Nigerian Defence Academy in favour of Christians – "The composition of that list through which

Christians dominate such admission list even in predominantly Muslim States is a clear reminder of 'Rwanda Experience'" (para. 9); dominance of Christians in the composition of the Board of the Nigerian Television Authority; and the absence of a Muslim from southern Nigeria in the cabinet of the current federal government (Federal Executive Council). The NSCIA issued this warning to CAN:

> Given this dangerous trend and the random deliberate provocation by the current CAN President to add insult to injury; the NSCIA is left with no choice than to join issues with CAN by updating Nigerian Muslims with unassailable facts. Having tolerated CAN's irritation for so long in the interest of peace and without any reciprocation, we are compelled to say **ENOUGH IS ENOUGH** [emphasis in original] and to henceforth resist any unwarranted bullying and intimidation of Nigerian Muslims by the President of CAN... Why would anyone who claims to be a religious leader want to lead Nigeria into the ugly spectre of a religious war through belligerent utterances and false allegations just to gain vainglorious self-assertiveness? (NSCIA, 2013, October 8, para. 12).

The Sultan of Sokoto and president-general of the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) was reported in the media as saying, during a national prayer session organised by the NSCIA on the security situation in the country, that (The Nation, 2014, May 26, para. 8):

> The Muslims feel rightly so marginalised, the Muslims feel not being treated equally as equals in this country. Therefore, the Muslims want and also demand being treated with equality, justice and fairness and *Insha Allah*, things will turn around and be better for our country.

The statement credited to the Sultan drew reaction from both the Muslim and Christian side. The *Sunday Independent newspaper* sampled the opinion of eminent Muslim and Christian leaders on the matter. For example, Dr. Mahfouz A. Adedimeji, the secretary-general of the University of Ilorin Muslim Community, defended the Sultan's position by asserting that the

marginalization of Muslims in the country was obvious. Adedimeji argued that (*Sunday Independent,* 2014, June 8, para. 21-23):

> Muslims who constitute 50 per cent of the Nigerian population, according to the current edition of the CIA World Factbook, are about 38 per cent of the delegates in the ongoing national Conference. At a programme in Kaduna about two months ago, the Vice-President on behalf of the President said the membership would be reviewed or reconstituted to address the actual marginalization and lopsidedness in the composition.
>
> This followed the complaint of the Muslims under the aegis of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). Nothing has been done since then. The Federal Government itself knows that Muslims are being marginalised.
>
> Muslims feel it though others may not think so. Horace Walpole said, "Life is a tragedy for those who feel but a comedy to those who think". So those who do not think Muslims are marginalised do [not] feel what they are undergoing, how their communities are turned to battle-fronts, how 3,335 corpses were deposited, as reported by the *Associated Press*, in only one hospital by the military in the first half of a year in Maiduguri.

Other complaints of marginalization of Muslims, according to Adedimeji, included: underrepresentation of Muslims in the appointments of special advisers and heads of federal government agencies and parastatals; replacement of Muslims in positions in many sectors by Christians – "when a Muslim completes his tenure in a position, he is often replaced by a Christian" (para. 25); underrepresentation of Muslims in appointments for chairmanship and membership of Boards of parastatals, such as Nigerian Television Authority, Voice of Nigeria, Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, National Orientation Agency and Nigerian Films Corporation.

Another concern that was brought up by several Muslim respondents was what they described as the competition between the two religions. For example, one respondent, a Muslim leader, described the competition in the following way:

285

Islam is a complete way of life. There are certain things the Quran and the Hadith asked us to do, which are not in Christianity, but by the time you start to do them they would create conflict. Take for example, Muslims are supposed to pray five times a day whether we are at home or at work. So there are times when you are working in a place and you want to have a place, mosque, to pray. And that one can create conflict. Some Christians pray in the morning and some don't bother to pray even in the afternoon, but because of that jealousy now they start look for a place to pray. So in attempt to get a place for Muslims to pray it creates problem. There is now an issue in one of the universities in the south, where there are more than five churches with pastors. They deny the Muslims place to build their mosque, just a place where they are going to pray.

Another area that Muslims perceived competition was pilgrimage. Muslims go to Hajj, while Christians go to Jerusalem. One Muslim respondent, an official of a Muslim umbrella organisation, asserted that:

Look at pilgrimage alone. We are enjoined to visit Hajj at least once in our life time. There is nowhere in the Bible they [Christians] are asked to go to Jerusalem. Is not there, but because of jealousy they have also come up with a justification to look for government sponsorship to visit Jerusalem. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, it was not there; of recent they had to come up with the idea that since Muslims are going to Hajj let us find way so that we can visit Jerusalem. So if you obstruct that process there would be crisis. And they use state resources to do their own, even though we are hardly or not even using government resources to do Hajj.

When some Christian leaders in a focus group discussion were asked if it was obligatory for Christians to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, they could not give a unified answer. One participant asserted that it was obligatory and that those who thought otherwise were ignorant of the Bible. Some participants tried to give justifications outside the position of the Bible, while others were not sure of the answer.

It was observed by the study that all tiers of government, including local Government councils, state governments and federal government, have been sponsoring citizens to go on

pilgrimage with state resources. At the state level, there are Pilgrims' Welfare Boards. In some instances, there are separate Christian Pilgrim Welfare Board and Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Board. At the federal level, there are National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) and Nigerian Christian Pilgrim Commission (NCPC), which were both established by Acts of the parliament and fully funded by the Nigerian State. The two bodies report to the President of the Federal Republic. The study observed that despite the laid down procedure for sponsoring pilgrims, especially the application of the federal character, the selection of beneficiaries was at the discretion of the chief executive of each tier of government and those within the corridors of power. The study also observed that majority of the beneficiaries tend to be: politicians, their families and associates; religious leaders and their families; traditional rulers; and members of the society, who are directly or indirectly close to government's functionaries. The governments usually pay for airlifting of pilgrims and living costs in the Holy Lands, and give them pocket allowance. The Appropriation Bill 2014 of the Federal Government allocated the sum of ₦1,800,000,000 for Muslim and Christian pilgrimage (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2014). This amount did not include the cost that each of the 36 State Governments, Federal Capital Territory and Local Government Councils would spend on pilgrimage from their respective budgets.

The study also observed that apart from the spending on pilgrimage, governments spend money on the celebration of religious festivities. For example, political officeholders give out gifts to religious leaders and religious communities during Christmas and Eid al-Fitr celebrations. The study observed that some of the items given out by politicians during the religious festivities include rice, cows, money and clothes. In one office of the Christian Association of Nigeria, the study observed many bags of rice, which bore the logo of one of

287

the political parties and the picture and name of a Muslim State Governor in commemoration of the end of the Ramadan, were stored. Christian Governors also reciprocate the gesture. Few examples of the government spending on religious festivities and activities reported in the media include: "Plateau Government Spends ₦42 Million on Eid-el-Kabir Gifts for Muslims" (*Leadership*, 2013, October 15); "Sokoto Government Earmarks ₦175 Million for Ramadan Feeding" (*Vanguard*, 2014, June 20); "Sallah: Borno to Slaughter 540 Bulls for the Poor" (*Vanguard*, 2013, October 11); "Okorocha celebrates Imo Workers, Offers Xmas Packages, Two Weeks Break" (*Newswatch Times*, 2013, December 19); "Bauchi Distributes Christmas Gifts Worth ₦34 Million to Christian Women" (*Punch*, 2013, December 25); "EFCC quizzes Kano govt officials over N50m Sallah gift" (*Vanguard*, 2010, January 20); "Jonathan's [Christmas] cow gift to Bakare stirs debate" (*Punch*, 2013, December 31); and "Ilorin Sallah [Gift] Stampede: Death Toll Rises to 20" (*This Day*, 2013, October 18). In a recent newspaper write-up entitled "Christmas Corruption; Stop 'selective' charity; 'A 2014 Cell phone Anticorruption Drive?'" the author lamented on the connection between the gifts public officials hand out during Christmas and corruption:

> Can we have a list of the bonuses presents, and cost, given and received this Christmas by all Nigeria's top 5000 government employees –in the Presidency, NASS, State, LGAs, Directors in each ministry and agency. Even the private sector is involved. Christ's name is now being used for a new massive corruption –'Christmas Corruption'– the siphoning of funds for 'Christmas Cheer'. (Marinho, 2014, January 1, p. 21).

The question of how Muslims and Christians perceive each other based on outer appearance was also brought up as a divisive issue. For example, some Christian respondents said that they are discriminated by Muslims in the north when they do not

appear in ways that are in line with Islamic dressing code. For example, one respondent, an official of a Christian umbrella organisation, claimed that in public universities in Muslim majority states, Christian girls are "forced" to adopt Islamic dress code, such as wearing hijab. Muslims also expressed concern concerning how they are perceived because of the way they dress. One Muslim leader, for example, shared this story:

> Again, there are some Christians actually in the south that once you appear like this, if you wear a cap and kaftan, they have a perception that you are not an educated man. In Abuja here, few years ago, I went to a place in Area Eleven; I was looking for a hotel where someone I came to see was lodging, and I met a child, just about 7-8 years. I asked the child, "Where is this hotel?" I can't remember the name. The boy looked at me and said I can't speak Hausa. The boy told me he doesn't speak Hausa. I was speaking English to him, oh! But because of the way I was dressed he believed that I cannot speak English. There was also a time I was approached by a newspaper vendor. He just came to me and showed me papers. I was looking at the Guardian. After I looked at the Guardian and didn't buy he removed it and brought out a local Hausa newspaper. And I now asked him why are you doing this? He said may be I don't understand English. These things are there for a long time, particularly, Christians down south the way they look at Muslims.

The divisive issues enumerated above and the manners in which they were handled or perceived by Nigerians demonstrate the kind of prevailing political culture of federalism in the country. However, the study also examined the aspiration of Nigerians with regard to the future of their country and the search for common ground. The final section of this chapter presents the data on this aspect of political culture.

5.6. Searching for a Common Ground: Interfaith Dialogue

The former secretary-general of the Yoruba Council of Elders, Dr. Kunle Olajide observed in an interview with *The Nation* newspaper, that "Nigeria is more divided now than in 1960" (Olajide, 2014, August 4). Within this context, the study examined the

aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of the country. In an open-ended question on the questionnaire, respondents were asked to express their wish for the future of the country and where they would like to see the country in the next 5 to 10 years. One Christian respondent, aged between 25-34 years, for example, stated that: "My future wish for Nigeria is that I hope to see Nigerians will identify themselves as Nigerians not by their state or local government of origin." A Muslim respondent from the North-East, aged between 45-54 years, wished to see: "A Nigeria where ethnic nationalism and religious bigotry are truly a thing of the past. To attain this almost utopian state, we must change the nature of people's loyalty and sense of belongingness in favour of a corporate Nigeria." Another Muslim respondent from the North East, aged between 25-34 years, stated this wish: "I wish that in the next 5-10 years Nigeria will become a peaceful nation and terrorism will be obsolete. I also hope that our political leaders will be less corrupt than they are at present." A Muslim respondent from the North-East, with a bachelor degree qualification and aged between 35-44 years, stated: "I wish to see Nigeria become one of the greatest nations in the world, a country that treats its own citizens as equal, a country without poverty, injustice, corruption, unemployment, free education, and good social amenities."

A Christian respondent from the South-South, with a PhD qualification and aged between 45-54 years, expressed the following wish:

> I wish to see a corrupt free Nigeria where there is respect for the rule of law, strong visionary leadership, where the will and intent of the masses count in elections, where ethno-religious conflicts are none existent and where there is true federalism with the federating units being strong to drive development at their own pace with the resources available to them.

A Christian respondent from the North-Central, aged between 55-64 years, with a master degree qualification, had this to say about his dream for Nigeria:

> If only our leaders have the mind of development, Nigeria will be a better place. We always cry that our colonial masters have cheated us or did wrong, but how long shall we continue to mourn after 53 yrs? The good thing is that, with good mobilization and enlightenment, there will be positive change within 5-10 yrs as from now.

A Muslim respondent from the North-Central, with a law (LLB) degree and aged between 45-54, wished Nigeria to be corruption free, have improved economic situation and a purposeful leader: "My wish for my country Nigeria is to be free from corruption and have economic boost. I hope Nigerians could vote for a godly candidate that will re-align Nigeria our country." A Muslim respondent from the North-West, with a master degree qualification and aged between 45-54 years, had this vision for the country:

> Nigeria should remain united forever, each region should cater for the needs of its people. The northern poverty has not been addressed by oil wealth and only independence from oil can liberate us from the malaise of laziness and initiate industry.

A Muslim respondent from the North-West, with a National Diploma (ND) qualification and aged between 18-24 years, outlined these wishes:

> The wish to see that every citizen is employed.
>
> The wish to see that electricity is constant.
>
> The wish to see that women are given the right to rule.
>
> The wish to see that poverty is being eradicated.
>
> The wish to see that education has circulated everywhere.
>
> In the 5-10 years, I will like to see that Nigeria is among the best countries in the whole world.

The wish of a Christian respondent from the South-East, with a bachelor degree qualification and aged between 35-44 years, is see that Nigerians work to change the country:

Just as the Americans will say "God bless America" so we are saying God bless Nigeria, but we will

have to make it work by not being self-centred in all that we do both as leaders and followers. I wish

to see a Nigeria where my children and grandchildren will be loved and cared for, a country that will

stop killing innocent people, a country where the love for money will not surpass the love for a

person. A country where if anyone is in danger even in the darkest and thickest forest he or she

believes that someone out there, that is "Nigeria," will find them and keep them safe like the

Americans do. No citizen of America is ever forgotten no matter the situation. And the only way to

do this is to first get the youths involved and think about them always, how to make laws by which

they will benefit from and to financially and morally empower them.

The study also observed that in spite of the contestation and conflicts, there were

many ongoing efforts in search for peace by civil society organisations, religious leaders

and individuals. The study observed quite a good number of examples of tolerance and

accommodation demonstrated by some Nigerians. There were many stories about some

Christians and Muslims protecting each other during communal violence. There were also

stories about good neighbourliness and friendship between Christians and Muslims.

However, in general the divisiveness has permeated the social fabric of the Nigerian society.

 Innumerable number of workshops, seminars and symposia had been organised in

the country to promote understanding between Christians and Muslims, but the relationship

between the two religious communities has become rather more problematic in the last few

years. The researcher observed several peace promoting activities, including interfaith

dialogue, as a participant or facilitator over the years. These initiatives have brought

adherents of the two major faith groups in the country together and have helped to connect

people at all strata of the society. Such relentless efforts in search of common ground have

made modest difference, despite the increasing tension and conflicts. However, the study

also found many instances where those taking part in such interfaith engagements held

views that contradicted the ones they professed in public. Through participant observation, the researcher discovered that even people who professed to be peacemakers were not immune from the bigotry and divisive sentiments that are common in the society, when they are in their comfort zone.

The next chapter attempts to make sense of what the findings of the study reveal and imply in relation to the research questions.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

6.1. Introduction

The aim of this mixed methods case study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal system, which was specifically adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence among its ethnically, religiously and regionally diverse population. Taking a normative approach, the study inquired into how the prevailing political culture of federalism among Nigerians harnessed or hindered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism in the country. It was hoped that a better understanding of the perceptions, actions and attitudes of the population would provide insights about how a political culture of federalism shapes the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism.

This study used a naturalistic inquiry approach to collect qualitative data using interviews, focus groups, document analysis and observation. The qualitative strand of the research was complemented by the use of quantitative data obtained from survey. Open-ended questions on the questionnaire also generated qualitative data. The data were analysed and organised by categories and themes. The study was driven by the following five questions:

1. How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-

promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999?

2. What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues?

3. What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of federalism among the people?

4. Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular among Nigerians nowadays?

5. What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their country?

The previous chapter presented the results of this study by organizing the data from various sources into categories and themes to produce a readable narrative or thick descriptions. This chapter seeks to offer interpretative insights into these findings. The interpretation and discussion of the findings of the research is done in the light of what was already known about the peace-promoting function of federalism and political culture of federalism in the literature. The implications of these are intended to provide new understanding or fresh insights about how political culture of federalism shapes the supposed peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism. The chapter also includes a note concerning the effect of possible researcher bias in the interpretation of the findings. In addition, the strengths and limitations of this thesis are considered and suggestions for further research are presented. The chapter concludes by outlining the implications of the findings for peace and integration related federal theory, policy making and practice.

6.2. Findings of the study

1. The primary finding of the research suggests that the values, attitudes, actions and perception of the people with regard to issues that were ethno-religiously contentious reinforced the centrifugal forces that tend to pull the state apart rather than strengthen federalism, which normally would act as a centripetal force binding the state together. This finding emanates from the expressed descriptions and indicated perspectives of respondents as well as the data obtained from other sources about several contentious issues enumerated in the previous chapter. As the results have shown, the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions exhibited by majority of respondents and those observed among the study population generally reflected inclinations to primordial cleavages.

2. The second finding is that there is a widespread perception of federalism as a zero-sum game among the people. This was revealed by how respondents justified the claims and positions of their group about issues without due consideration to the views of others. For example, the claims and positions of Christians and Muslims over the contentious issues enumerated in the previous chapter tended to be mutually exclusive and devoid of analytic empathy. Similar traits were found among groups that are differentiated into "indigenes" and "settlers" as well as "majority" and "minority."

3. The third finding is that federalism appeared to be embraced more as a competition than cooperation. This was highlighted by the power struggle between Christians and Muslims, the different regions and diverse ethnic groups. Identity politics accompanied by episodes of violence like the one during the 2011 presidential election was a manifestation of this unhealthy competition and rivalry engendered by the power

struggle between Muslims and Christians. From the perspectives of the respondents analysed in the previous chapter, this struggle for power is driven by two key factors: 1) a political economy characterised by deeply entrenched neopatrimonialism and political culture of patronage; and 2) the fraught relationship between religion and state wherein the collision of religious values and demands constitute a challenge to secular constitutional democracy.

4. The fourth finding is that there is an increasing culture of taking the law into one's hand with regard to inter-group conflicts. Several respondents had no hard time justifying their violent stance and desire for revenge, if they would have the opportunity. From the perspectives of respondents, this tendency of taking the law into one's hand is as a result of: a low confidence in the adjudicatory role of the judiciary in the face of perceptible sanctioned impunity; a long and sad history of accepting violence as a means of negotiation; and the religious indoctrination of violence as avenue of punishing direct or vicarious perpetrators of perceived provocation against one's religion.

5. The fifth finding is that the spatial differentiation of ethnic and religious identities and the discursive construction of indigene/settlers, majority/minority and Christian/Muslim dichotomies are in dissonance with the spirit of federalism, which normally upholds the rights of minorities, and go not only against the letters but also the spirit of the constitution. The tendency of majority groups to dominate minorities at different geographical scales and the reimagining of past misadventures and fear of domination by minorities sustains historic grievances and mistrust. For example, Middle Belters continued to feel that they need to resist the perceived hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani, who they considered as a ruling clan crowned by the British "colonial masters." The

297

resurgence of ethno-religious violence in the north is also creating the reimagining of the Sokoto jihad among Christians in the north, who perceived the events as a continuation of the jihad waged by the Fulanis under the leadership of Usman dan Fodio.

6. The sixth finding of the study is that as ethno-religious tension and conflict increase, the lamentations over what many people perceived as a "forced marriage" between the disparage groups that make up Nigeria by the British became louder. For example, the centennial celebration kicked off by the Federal Government in January 2014 to mark the 100 years of the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates to form present day Nigeria by the British in 1914, sparked debates on the question of whether the political union created by the British was appropriate.

7. The seventh finding is that religious nationalism appeared to be rising and assuming a trajectory of reducing the Nigerian federalism to a union of two religious communities, Christians and Muslims, and overshadowing the federating units. This development has reached a stage that the Federal Government must navigate this sensitive religious terrain carefully and make sure all its policies and legislations get the stamp of approval of the Christian and Muslim religious communities, without much to bother about the position of the federating units. With Muslims and Christians sometimes taking divergent positions on certain issues, as revealed by the data, it is certainly a delicate situation.

8. The eighth finding of the study is that the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency is a direct violation of not only the federal constitution and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state, but an affront to all the values, norms, principles and ideals of federalism. Boko Haram's rejection of Nigerian constitution and democracy, and avowed intention of

298

creating an Islamic state constitute a direct and major threat to Nigerian federalism. Already Boko Haram started following through on this threat by taking over towns and villages, and declaring a caliphate. Apart from the loss of territory to this armed terrorist group with a declared religious motive, the atrocities committed by the group, including the abduction of hundreds of innocent and defenceless school girls, women and young men, plundering of communities, killing of civilians, unprecedented displacement of people in the North-East region, forceful conversion of people into Islam, and carrying out of executions and amputations in the name of Shari'a, are despicable and unfathomable.

9. The ninth and last finding of the study is that despite the contestations and divisiveness that characterise inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, there are many Nigerians who share the aspiration for a better life for themselves and for others, and dream of a future in which all citizens would co-exist peacefully. While a majority of respondents expressed the aspiration for a better Nigeria, their perceptions and views about most issues put forward to them to respond on revealed ethnic, religious or sectional parochial interests.

6.3. Conclusion about Each Research Question

The first research question sought to know how the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999. The primary finding of the research suggests that the values, attitudes, actions and perception of the people with regard to issues that were ethno-religiously contentious reinforced the centrifugal forces that tend to pull the

state apart rather than strengthen federalism, which normally would act as a centripetal force binding the state together. This finding relates to Hartshorne's (1950) functional model wherein he posited that: "The fundamental function of any state, as an organisation of a section of land and a section of people... is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse regions of the state-area, into a single organised unit" (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 104). According Hartshorne, the state is able to succeed in this primary function when it overcomes the centrifugal forces that tend to break it apart with the binding (or cohesive) effect of the centripetal forces present in the state. As Flint and Taylor (2007, p. 132) noted, "Generally, federalism is interpreted as the most practical of Hartshorne's centripetal forces in that it has to be consciously designed to fit a particular situation of diversity." In this case, therefore, Nigerian federalism can be likened to Hartshorne's centripetal force. However, those values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of respondents and those observed among the study population driven by parochial and primordial sentiments were antithetical to federalism because they led to poor handling of disagreements, uncompromising posturing and confrontations, with negative and destructive consequences. This scenario confirms what Elazar (1987) meant when he argued that for a federal polity to be truly worth the name its people's must "think federal."

The fourth finding again addresses research question 1. The increasing culture of taking the law into one's hand with regard to inter-group conflicts and the justification of violence are indications of low confidence in the adjudicatory role of the judiciary, an institution that is vital for the functioning of federalism. Such violent tendencies by groups, particularly religious zealots, ethnic militias and political thugs, have exacerbated tension and deepened division among the population.

The second and third findings of the study speak to research question 2. The question sought to know the common understandings of federalism among citizens. These understandings drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues and shape federalism. As Máiz (2013, p. 84) posited, federalism requires a set of attitudes and values, which are embodied in the shared political understanding that provides civic support for the federal system. The second finding of the study reveals that there is a widespread perception of federalism as a zero-sum game among the Nigerian people. This understanding was reflected in the mutually exclusive claims and positions of territorially concentrated, social, groups. The third finding of the study is that as a result of this view of federalism as a zero-sum game, federalism has been embraced more as a competition rather than cooperation. Unfortunately, the kind of competition that ensued among the different ethnic, religious and regional groups is not a healthy one that would spur innovation and progress, but unhealthy inter-group rivalry. It was real that many groups and individuals have suffered as a result of the actions and attitudes of other people. However, in the claims and counter-claims about groups' grievances, the common trait was mutual attributions and blaming of the *other*. No side demonstrated analytic empathy and the willingness to take its respective responsibility for what went wrong. In the absence of analytic empathy, each side held to its subjective understanding of conflicts that arose. This hindered the prospect for reflexive reframing of conflicts wherein the different subjective accounts of conflicts would be merged into an inter-subjective understanding, and by arriving at a common ground conflict parties could cooperatively engage in problem-solving towards an integrative solution that addresses their respective needs and aspirations (cf. Rothman, 1997).

The understanding of federalism as a zero-sum game is a translation of the understanding of politics as a zero-sum game. The understanding of federalism as a zero-sum game stemmed from citizens' characterization of it as a political arrangement designed for the maintenance of the political economy. The centralization of the political economy, endemic corruption, neopatrimonialism and political culture of patronage feed and nurture the zero-sum understanding of federalism. Further, the fraught relationship between religion and state, which is manifesting in the struggle between Christians and Muslims in the country, is another factor behind the understanding of federalism as a zero-sum game. These understandings of federalism as a zero-sum game and as competitive rather than cooperation are at variance with federal political culture. For example, Frenkel (1986) argued that the willingness to consider politics not as a zero-sum game, where the alternatives are complete power and total powerlessness, is an essential element of political culture. Thus, Frenkel posited, that federalism is to be seen as a game of toleration, where each group must accord the others the non-interference it claims for itself, and embrace compromise and power-sharing as appropriate mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. Another scholar also shared the view when he asserted that "federalism implies a posture and an attitude toward social as well as political relationships, which leads to human interactions that emphasize coordinative rather than superior-subordinate relationships, negotiated cooperation, and sharing among parties (Elazar D. J., 1987, p. 78). The view of politics as a zero-sum game and the perception of federalism as competition rather than cooperation among Nigerians deviate from the deeper meaning of federalism as social solidarity, as explicated by Hueglin and Fenna (2010).

The third research question sought to know the historical events and experiences that shaped political culture of federalism in Nigeria. Political culture is not developed in isolation of history and people's experiences. Drawing from Afigbo (1991), this study has embraced a diachronic approach in tracing the roots of Nigerian federalism, and subscribes to the thesis that British socio-political engineering led Nigeria into federalism. By the same token, the study contends that the prevailing political culture of federalism among the Nigerian population has been shaped by historic events and experiences of the people. The fifth finding reveals that spatial differentiation of identities and the discursive construction of indigene/settlers, majority/minority, and Christian/Muslims as strategies of inclusion and exclusion, have underlying historical basis. These asymmetrical power relations have deep historical roots that remind people of, and perpetuate, domination and subjugation. This finding supports the position of Osaghae (1991) on the ethnic and religious discriminations associated with majority-minority dichotomy in Nigeria. The reimagining of the jihad and the colonial practice of indirect rule has become common among non-Muslim groups in the Middle Belt. This finding supports Turaki's (2010) position that the fear and mistrust left behind by those historical events are still implicated in present conflicts. The sixth finding of the study also relates to research question 3. Nigerians have continued to revisit the amalgamation of 1914. For example, it has become common to hear individuals or groups blaming their woes as a result of the present state of affairs in the country on the British amalgamation of the Nigerian territories to form a single plurinational state. Among these voices of lamentations, there are those say that the country is maintaining unity at a high cost. The perception and lamentations that Nigeria is a product of a "forced marriage"

303

between incompatible partners got louder as ethno-religious tension and conflicts heightened (cf. Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014).

Research question 4 sought to know if the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity is popular among Nigerians nowadays. The paradox of federalism is that it seeks at once to foster unity and diversity. Through federalism a union is created among federating units. Thus, the notion of pan-Nigerian unity implies loyalty to both the federating unit one belongs to and the federal union. As the literature has shown the concept of unity in a federal system is not to cause differences to disappear, but "the recognition of diversity as a defining characteristic of the polity" (Simeon, 2008, p. 58). The seventh finding of the study contributes to answering the research question 4. The finding shows that religious nationalism appeared to be rising and assuming a trajectory of reducing the Nigerian federalism to a union of two religious communities, Christians and Muslims, and overshadowing the federating units. As the literature acknowledged, in the past there were two types of nationalism, that is, pan-Nigerian and regionalist nationalism. This study found that nowadays the two major religious communities are behaving like the three regions were acting during the colonial period. Although federalism is designed to recognise group diversity, including ethnic, religious and regional differences, the federating units are supposed to be territorially defined groups that have special role in central decision making and possess certain autonomy (Frenkel, 1986). Therefore, in order for the religious communities to exert influence on the state, each appeared poised to claim space through spatialisation of religious identity.

The eighth finding also addresses research question 4. The Boko Haram Islamist insurgency and the group's declaration of a caliphate over swathes of territory they captured

in the North-East region are an indication that the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity is an unsettled issue because groups like this are opposed to a federal system that recognizes religious diversity. Findings seven and eight, therefore, reveal that a civic concept of nation, which would serve as a rallying point for unity among Nigerians remains farfetched. The findings have brought to the fore the conclusion made by several studies on the role of religion and ethnicity in state-building. For example, Anthony Smith posited that "two of the nation's most important cultural resources and traditions are constituted by 'ethnicity and religion'" (Smith, 2003, p. 25). Similarly, Raune and Todd (2010a; 2010b) concluded in their study that religion and ethnicity intersect each other, and each can act as a powerful basis for identity, group formation and communal conflict. The works of Antonsich (2009) and Vujakovic (2005) shed light on the concept of nation. On one hand, there is a civic model of nation, which emphasizes common values (such as passion for liberty, sense of duty and commitment to tolerance and fair play), shared interests and upholding of the place of vital common institutions. On the other hand, there is a primordial or non-civic model, which defines a nation in ethno-religious terms. Drawing from this distinction, the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity rests on the development of the civic model, which has so far evaded the country.

Lastly, research question 5 sought to know the aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of the country. The ninth finding addresses this question. The finding reveals that despite the contestations and divisiveness that characterise inter-group relations, there are many Nigerians who share the aspiration for a better life for themselves and for others, and dream of a future in which all citizens would coexist peacefully. However, for many respondents, when it came to taking a stand on issues, ethnic, religious and sectional

parochial interests took the centre stage. It can, therefore, be contended that there is a disjuncture between aspirations and the political culture that people are socialized into.

6.4. Conclusion about the Research Problem

The main preoccupation of this study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite having in place a federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence among its regionally, ethnically and religiously diverse population. Based on the findings of the study in relation to the research questions, it can be concluded that there is a gap between the prevailing political culture of federalism and the designed aspiration of federalism for peace and integration in Nigeria. This is because there is an absence of a federative culture that can enable federalism to fulfil its peace-promoting and integrative function. The study, therefore, concludes that for federalism to succeed in the Nigerian context there has to be a peace-enabling federal political culture among the population. As the literature highlighted, federalism is more than just a constitutional and structural arrangement for shared rule and self-rule among territorially concentrated groups, but it is also a compact, a social solidarity, a way of thinking, and a way of doing things. As a compact, it is a morally binding agreement that demands the parties to be committed to it beyond the letters of the law (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). As a social solidarity, it implies compassion and sharing (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). As a way of thinking it requires the population to "think federal" (Elazar, 1987). As a way of doing things, it requires citizens to internalize the values, principles, attitudes and norms that underlie a federal political culture, and act in ways that uphold those normative elements (Elazar, 1987; Rocher, 2009; Máiz, 2013; Rocher & Fafard, 2013).

306

6.5. Limitations of the Study

This research was undertaken as a case study of Nigerian federalism. While the case study design allowed considerable insights about the research problem to be gained, it can only permit transferability rather than generalization to other contexts. Also, being a mixed methods case study driven by a qualitative priority, implied a bias towards an inductive rather than deductive approach. Hence, the research was not oriented to establishing any causality, but was just focused on gaining new insights about the problem under investigation. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the findings, despite the complementary use of quantitative techniques, only provide the basis for developing tentative hypothesis and not general conclusion on any hypothesis.

6.6. Suggestions for Further Research

1. There is a need for future research to investigate the nature of religious nationalism in Nigeria and its challenge to the federal idea.

2. There is a need for future research to look into the impact of global resurgence of Islamism on religion and state relations as well as Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria.

3. There is also a need for research that would explore the relationship between Pentecostalism and religion and state relations as well as Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria.

4. Since Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999, the country has become more deeply divided and more prone to violent conflicts. Future research may need to look into the relationship between federalism and democracy in the Nigerian context.

5. The limitation of this study as a case study foreshadows the need for comparative and multi-case studies in order to obtain generalizable conclusions about the relationship between political culture of federalism and the peace-promoting and integrative role of federalism, especially among erstwhile colonial African states.

6.7. Implications for Policy and Practice

The findings of the research have implications that Nigerian policy makers and practitioners need to take into account. Therefore, the study offers the following recommendations to policy makers and practitioners:

1. First, Nigerian policy makers need to pay greater attention to the normative dimension of federalism. As the findings of this study show, a well crafted legal document, which establishes a federal system and espouses values and principles of federalism, needs to resonate with the Nigerian people and be matched with a corresponding federal political culture. To this end, there is a need to start a national conversation about the values and principles of federalism. This conversation could be promoted through several avenues: schools, religious institutions, mainstream and social media, and civic society programmes.

2. Nigeria is a colonial creation and Nigerian federalism emerged as a necessity for holding the disparate regions and peoples together. As this study notes, colonialism is often blamed for the problems that emerged in contemporary Nigeria. This is not out of place, but it has to be stated that British colonialism also brought many good things that if Nigerians had used very well the story would have been different today. The contribution of Nigerian leaders to the problem of state-building from the colonial, post-independence and present time has steadily increased for the worse. It

308

is high time Nigerian leaders undertook a soul-searching reflection and change their greedy and parochial attitudes to state affairs. Nigerian people must begin to hold their leaders to account.

3. The relationship between religion and the state needs to be re-examined. Increasingly, as the study's findings have shown, the two main religions, Christianity and Islam, are competing with each other in trying to increase their influence on the state. This development seems to be taking the shape of religious nationalism. As the study found, the two major religions appeared to be acting as the federating units and the voices of the states are becoming increasingly relegated. There is also the move by religious zealots to erode the secular character of the Nigerian state by trying to impose their own religious ideology and vision that are at variance with the principles of liberal democracy. There is, therefore, a need to safeguard the Nigerian state from the overreaching activities of religious zealots and to ensure that Nigeria remains a secular, civil and democratic state, which is the only framework that would be suitable for the country's religious pluralism.

4. Nigerian religious communities, including Christians, Muslims and adherents of traditional religions and nonreligious, should come together and develop a *Nigerian Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms* by learning from the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms.

5. The report of the just concluded National Conference should be subjected to a referendum. Nigerians should agree on a framework of coexistence that recognizes the plural character of the Nigerian state and the need for shared values.

6. Closely related to the second recommendation, the Nigerian government should repeal the laws establishing the pilgrimages commission, stop funding pilgrimage with public funds, and allow private the sector to facilitate the annual pilgrimages. Government officials should use their own personal money to sponsor themselves for pilgrimage.

7. The findings of the study have shown that by the nature of the Nigerian political economy, the federalism is highly centralized. The struggle by ethnic, regional and religious groups to gain power at the centre at all cost is driven by this centralization of the political economy. This as well as patronage, neopatrimonialism and clientelism are driving corruption and fuelling inter-group conflicts. The political economy of dependence on oil is hurting the Nigerian state. There is a need to begin to explore ways of diversifying the Nigerian economy than maintaining it as a rentier state as it is now.

8. The study found that there are historic grievances among Nigerians due to unresolved conflicts of the past or their scars. The memorialisation and reimagining of these painful experiences are affecting inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. There is need for a genuine reconciliation among the people. Justice Oputa Panel, which was commissioned by the Olusegun Obasanjo government to look into the human rights violations during the military, did not succeed in bringing total reconciliation as the recent happenings are indicating. Nigerian leaders need to get together and come up with a strategy for addressing grievances among the people. Such strategy should include avenue that would not be hijacked and turned into a theatrical play or party for the elites.

9. The relationship between northern "minorities" and the "majority" Hausa-Fulani partly holds the key to peace in the country. This relationship needs to be looked into. A conversation between the two groups needs to take place to increase understanding and remove mutual suspicion and mistrust between the two. The various northern associations that have become too politicized are not in position to facilitate this. There is a need for new apolitical platforms to be formed to facilitate such conversation.

10. There is need to change the way politics is done in Nigeria. The political parties should be made to come together and sign a code of conduct that using religion and ethnicity to divide people is not acceptable, and there should be penalty for violating that code.

11. Increasing violent dispositions appeared to be driven by a political culture in which grievances and agitation could only be addressed by government when groups resort to taking arms against the state or against one another. In order to save the country from the crisis plaguing it, this must be changed. To allow every region, every ethnic group and every religion to have a militia in order to secure its interest in the Nigerian state is a dangerous trend. The second factor driving a violent culture is the prevailing climate of impunity for those that violate the charter of mutual coexistence and inflicted pain on others. Federalism without rule of law is an aberration. Public office holders should demonstrate both physical and moral courage by subjecting themselves to the rule of law as well as enforcing it.

12. The federal and state governments should convene a national emergency meeting, as a matter of urgency, to discuss ways of mobilizing all the resources at their disposal

to end the ongoing Boko Haram Islamist insurgency and to begin the process of rebuilding the affected areas.

13. The federal and state governments should leverage the commitment of civil society organisations, individuals and development partners in peacebuilding. There is a need for real investment in peace-generating efforts, processes and systemic supports. The few Nigerians that are involved in peacebuilding and in promoting inter-religious understanding should not give up, but strive to move beyond carrying out one-off events and media attracting activities to deep and sustained engagement.

References

Abend, G. (2008). The Meaning of 'Theory'. *Sociological Theory, 26*(2), 173-199. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9558.2008.00324.x

Abubakar, S. (1980a). The Established Caliphate: Sokoto, the Emirates and their Neighbours. In O. Ikime (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (pp. 304-326). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Abubakar, S. (1980b). The Northern Provinces under Colonial Rule: 1900-1959. In O. Ikime (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (pp. 449-481). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational books.

Achebe, C. (2000). *The Trouble with Nigeria* (Reissue edition ed.). Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co.

Achebe, C. (2012). *There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra.* Penguin Books: London.

ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. (2012, May 30). Resolution on the situation in Nigeria with regard to security. *ACP-EU 101.170/fin*. Horsens, Denmark. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/2012_horsens/pdf/ap_101.170_cc_en.pdf

Adekunle, M. (2013, August 8). Fashola Must Apologise to Igbos over Deportation – Ex-Minister. *Daily Times*. Retrieved from http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/article/fashola-must-apologise-igbos-over-deportation-%E2%80%93-ex-minister

Ademoyega, A. (1981). *Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup.* Ibadan: Evans Brothers.

Adesoji, A. (2010). The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum, 45*(2), 95-108.

Adetayo, O. (2014, October 25). Jonathan to declare re-election bid on Nov.11. *Punch*. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/jonathan-to-declare-re-election-bid-on-nov-11/

Adeyemi, O. O. (2012). The Nigerian State and politics of State and local governments creation: A critical appraisal. *International Journal of Education Administration and Policy Studies, 4*(4), 96-107. doi:10.5897/IJEAPS11.098

Adibe, J. (2012). *Nigeria Without Nigerians: Boko Haram and the Crisis in Nigeria's Nation-Building Project.* Abuja: Adonis and Abbey Publishers .

Afigbo, A. E. (1980). The Eastern Provinces under Colonial Rule. In O. Ikime (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (pp. 410-428). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Afigbo, A. E. (1991). Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State. *Publius, 21*(4), 13-29. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup

Agbese, P. (2003). Federalism and the Minority Questions in Nigeria. In A. T. Gana, & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), *Federalism in Africa: The Imperative of Democratic Development* (Vol. II, pp. 237-261). Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press.

Aghalino, S. O. (2006). Dynamics of Constitutional Development in Nigeria, 1914 - 1999. *Indian Journal of Politics, XL*(2 & 3), 49-62.

Ahwoi, K. (2010). *Local Government & Decentralisation in Ghana.* Accra: Unimax Macmillan.

Aiyede, E. R. (2012). Federalism, power sharing and the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. *Journal of African Elections, 11*(1), 31-53. Retrieved from http://reference.sabinet.co.za/sa_epublication_article/eisa_jae_v11_n1_a5

Ajayi, J. F. (1962). *Milestones in Nigerian History.* Ibadan: University College Press.

Akoni, O., Olowoopejo, M., & Egole, A. (2013, September 26). Deportation of Igbos, Fashola tenders unreserved apology. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/deportation-igbos-fashola-tenders-unreserved-apology/

Aku, A. (1982). Zoning, Rotation and the Stability of Nigeria. Text of a Lecture Delivered at the Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, April 27, Zaria, Nigeria.

Aleyomi, M. B. (2012). Ethno-Religious Crisis as a Threat to the Stability of Nigeria's Federalism. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 14*(3), 127-140.

Alfonso, H. D. (1997). Political Decentralization and PopularAlternatives: A View from the South. In M. Kaufman, & H. D. Alfonso, *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life* (pp. 170-188). London: Zed Books.

Aliyu, F. A. (2013, May 7). 2015: It's Either A Northerner or No More Nigeria - Farouk Aliyu. *Newsacross*. (Leadership, Interviewer) Retrieved from http://www.newsacross.com/2015-its-either-a-northerner-or-no-more-nigeria-farouk-adamu-aliyu/

Alli, W. O. (2003). The Development of Federalism in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective. In A. T. Gana, & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), *Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question* (pp. 71-87). Trenton: Africa World Press.

Aluko, M. A., & Ajani, O. A. (2009). Ethnic Nationalism and the Nigerian Democratic Experience in the Fourth Republic. *African Research Review, 3*(1), 483-499. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/afrrev.v3i1.43593

Aminu, M. (2012, April 22). Almajiris: Towards Creating Brighter Future for the Street Kids. *This Day*. Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/almajiris-towards-creating-brighter-future-for-the-street-kids/114304/

Aminu, M. (2012, April 11). Here Comes the Primary School for Almajiris. *This Day*. Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/here-comes-the-primary-school-for-almajiris/113459/

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities.* London and Brooklyn: Verso.

Anderson, G. (2012). Introduction. In G. Anderson (Ed.), *Oil & Gas: In Federal System* (pp. 1-6). Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Anfara, V. A., & Mertz, N. T. (2006). Introduction. In V. A. Anfara, & N. T. Mertz (Eds.), *Theoretical Frameworks in Qualitative Research* (pp. xiii-xxxii). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Anichukwu, U. (2013, January 6). Senate and the Quest for a People's Constitution. This Day. Retrieved from News: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/senate-and-the-quest-for-a-people-s-constitution/135484/

Antonsich, M. (2009). On territory, the nation-state and the crisis of the hyphen. *Progress in Human Geography, 33*(6), 789-806. doi:10.1177/0309132508104996

Asiwaju, A. (1980). The Western Provinces under Colonial Rule. In O. Ikime (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (pp. 429-445). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Asiwaju, A. I. (1997). The Evolution of Nigerian Culture. In A. Osuntokun, & A. Olukoju (Eds.), *Nigerian Peoples and Cultures* (pp. 22-42). Ibadan: Davidson Press.

Awolowo, O. (1947). *Path to Nigerian Freedom.* London: Faber & Faber.

Awolowo, O. (1951). *Freedom for All.* First Address of Chief Obafemi Awolowo As President of the Action Group on 28 April to the Conference of Party Members at Owo.

Ayandele, E. A. (1980). External Relations with Europeans in the Ninetenth Century: Explorers, Missionaries and Traders. In O. Ikime (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (pp. 367-389). Heinemann Educational Books: Ibadan.

Ayoade, J. A. (1986). Ethnic Management in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. *The Journal of Federalism, 16*(2), 73-90. Retrieved from http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/2/73.full.pdf+html

Ayokhai, F. E. (2009). The Niger Delta Conflict and the Practice of True Federalism in Nigeria; 1999-2009. 6th Annual National Conference of NASHER on Leadership and Accountability in Nigeria, 15-18 July, (pp. 1-15). University of Abuja, Abuja.

Azikiwe, N. (1961). *Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe (Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria, formerly President of the Nigerian Senate, formerly Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria).* London and New York: : Cambridge University Press.

Baker, J. W. (2000). Faces of Federalism: From Bullinger to Jefferson. *The Journal of Federalism, 30*(4), 25-41. Retrieved from http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/4/25.full.pdf

Balewa, A. T. (1948). Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's speech. *Legislative Council Debate(March 4)*.

Balogun, I. (2013, November 8). Islamic banking can turn Nigeria into major int'l financial hub – Sanusi. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/11/islamic-banking-can-turn-nigeria-major-intl-financial-hub-sanusi/

Bamidele, O. (2012). Boko Haram Catastrophic Terrorism -An Albatross to National Peace, Security and Sustainable Development in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa , 14*(1), 32-44. Retrieved from http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/Vol14No1-Spring2012A/PDF/Boko%20Haram%20Catastrophic%20Terrorism.Oluwaseun%20Bamidele.pdf

Bauböck, R. (2008). Normative political theory and empirical research. In D. d. Porta, & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in Social Science* (pp. 40-60). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bayari, S. (2012, September 8). 12m Fulani Herdsmen Demand Land Rights. *Leadership*, 5. (S. Shuaib, Interviewer)

Berg, E. (2013). Merging Together or Drifting Apart? Revisiting Political Legitimacy Issues in Cyprus, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Geopolitics, 18*(2). doi:10.1080/14650045.2012.717238

Betts, R. F. (1985). Methods and Institutions of European Domination (Revised by M. Asiwaju). In A. A. Boahen (Ed.), *General History of Africa VII: Africa under*

Colonial Domination 1880-1935. Paris and London, 312-331: UNESCO and Heinemann.

Binniyat, L. (2013, August 18). 2015: Core North, Middle Belt fall apart. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/2015-core-north-middle-belt-fall-apart/

Bird, R., Vaillancourt, F., & Roy-César, É. (2010). *Is Decentralization "Glue" or "Solvent" for National Unity?* Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Atlanta; Georgia: Georgia State University.

Birth, K. (2013). Calendars: Representational Homogeneity and Heterogeneous Time. *Time & Society, 22*(2), 216-236. doi: 10.1177/0961463X11408251

Blindenbacher, R., & Watts, R. L. (2003). Federalism in a Changing World – A Conceptual Framework for the Conference. In R. Blindenbacher, & A. Koller (Eds.), *Federalism in a Changing World: Learning from Each Other* (pp. 7-25). Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Bloomberg, L. D., & Volpe, M. (2012). *Completing Your Qualitative Dissertation: A Road Map from Beginning to End* (2 ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Blueprint. (2014, February 17). 2015: APC's Northern Christian Candidacy Won't Work — Gumi. *Blueprint*. Retrieved from http://www.blueprint.ng/2014/02/17/2015-apcs-northern-christian-candidacy-wont-work-gumi/

Blume, L., & Voigt, S. (2011). Federalism and Decentralisation - a critical survey of frequently used indicators. *Constitutional Political Economy, 22*(3), 238-264. doi:10.1007/s10602-011-9105-0

Blumer, H. (1956). Sociological Analysis and the "Variable". *American Sociological Review, 21*(6), 683-690. Retrieved October 2, 2014, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2088418

Boahen, A. A. (1985). Africa and the Colonial Challenge. In A. A. Boahen (Ed.), *General History of Africa VII: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935* (pp. 1--18). Paris and London: UNESCO and Heinemann Educational Books.

Boahen, A. A. (1987). *African Perspectives on Colonialism.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Bourdillon, B. (1946). The Nigerian Constitution. *African Affairs, 45*(179), 87-96. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/718090

Brace, C., Bailey, A. R., & Harvey, D. C. (2006). Religion, place and space: a framework for investigating historical geographies of religious identities and communities. *Progress in Human Geography, 30*(1), 28-43. Retrieved from http://phg.sagepub.com/content/30/1/28

Braden, K. E., & Shelley, F. M. (2014). *Engaging Geopolitics.* Oxon: Routledge.

Brancati, D. (2009). *Peace by Design: Managing Instrastate Conflict through Decentralization.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Brannen, J. (2005). Mixed Methods: A discussion paper. In *NCRM Methods Review Papers.* ESRC National Centre for Research Methods. Retrieved from http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/89/1/MethodsReviewPaperNCRM-005.pdf

Bruce, S. (2003). *Politics and Religion.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Building Nigeria's Response to Climate Change [BNRCC] Project. (2011). *National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria [NASPA-CCN]*. BNRCC/NEST. Retrieved from http://nigeriaclimatechange.org/naspa.pdf

Burgess, M. (2006). *Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice.* Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Burgess, M. (2012). *In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Comparative Empirical & Theoretical Perspectives.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burszta, W. J., & Jaskułowski, K. (2005). Nationalism as Metonymical Thinking. *Sprawy Narodowościowe-Seria Nowa*(27), 7-21.

Buzan, B., & Albert, M. (2010). Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to international Relations Theory. *European Journal of International Relations, 16*(3), 315-337. doi:10.1177/1354066109350064

Cameron, R. (2009). Mixed methods: the third methodological movement. *Research Today, 5*, 2. Retrieved from http://avetra.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/May-Issue.pdf

Cameron, R. (2011). The Five Ps of Mixed Methods Reseach. In M. Ashwin (Ed.), The Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Research Methodology for Business and Management Studies (pp. 76-83).

Caminal, M., & Requejo, F. (2012). Democracy and federalism in plurinational societies. In F. Requejo, & M. Caminal (Eds.), *Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic Constitutionalism: Theory and Cases* (pp. 1-13). New York: Routledge.

Campbell, J. (2011). *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink.* New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Central Bank of Nigeria. (n.d.). *Guidelines for the Regulation and Supervision of Institutions Offering Non-Interest Financial Services in Nigeria.* Retrieved from

http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2011/pressrelease/gvd/Non-

Interest%20Banking%20Guidelines%20June%2020%202011.pdf

Cerny, P. G. (1990). *The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the*

Future of the State. London: SAGE Publications.

Chase-Dunn, C., & Inoue, H. (2012). Accelerating Democratic Global State Formation.

Cooperation and Conflict, 47(2), 157-175. doi:10.1177/0010836712443168

Christin, T., & Hug, S. (2012). Federalism, the Geographic Location of Groups, and

Conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 29*(1), 93-122.

doi:10.1177/0738894211430280

Chuku-Okereke, G. I. (1997). Evolution of Nigeria as a Political Unit: An Historical

Analysis. In C. A. Ndoh, & C. E. Emezi (Eds.), *Nigerian Politics* (pp. 1-16). Owerri:

CRC Publications.

Coleman, J. S. (1971). *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Library Reprint ed.). Berkeley,

Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Connor, W. (1972). Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? *World Politics, 24*(3), 319-355.

doi:10.2307/2009753

Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2007). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and*

Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oarks, California: Sage

Publications.

Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods*

Approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oark, California: SAGE Publications.

Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2007). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods*

Research. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.

Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2011). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research* (2 ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.

Daily Trust. (2014, October 31). Shekau Dismisses Ceasefire Claim in New Video... Says 219 Chibok Girls "Now Married". *Daily Trust*. Retrieved from https://dailytrust.com.ng/daily/top-stories/38346-shekau-dismisses-ceasefire-claim-in-new-video-says-219-chibok-girls-now-married

Danboyi, S. (2013, June 9). Hersmen need to guide their cattle away from crops. *Sunday Trust*, 10. (O. Alao, & H. Ibrahim, Interviewers)

Davidson, B. (1992). *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-state.* New York: Three Rivers Press.

Diertz, T., & Foeken, D. (2001). The Crumbling of the African State System. In G. Dijkink, & H. Knippenberg (Eds.), *The Territorial Factor: Political Geography in a Globalising World* (pp. 177-200). Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA.

Dikshit, R. D. (1971). Geography and Federalism. *Anals of the Association of American Geographers, 61*(1), 97-115. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.1971.tb00768.x

Dikshit, R. D. (1971). Military Interpretation of Federal Constitution. *The Journal of Politics, 3*(1), 180-189. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2128538

Dokubo, A. (2013, May 12). Exclusive Interview With Asari Dokubo On Jonathan's 2015 Re-election. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lef8DzRgDo0

Douglas-Scott, S. (2002). *Constitutional Law of the European Union.* Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

Driver, F. (1991). Political geography and state formation: disputed territory. *Progress in Human Geography , 15*(3), 268-280. doi:10.1177/030913259101500302

Dudley, B. J. (2012). *Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria.* New York: Routledge.

Durkeim, E. (1954 [1912]). *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.* (J. Swain, Trans.) New York: The Free Press.

Durkheim, E. (1997 [1893]). *The Division of Labour in Society.* (W. D. Halls, Trans.) New York: The Free Press.

Ehrenberg, V. (2013). *The Greek State* (Routledge library editions: Political science ed., Vol. 23). London: Routledge.

Ejobowah, J. B. (2012). Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation: Assessing Citizenship in Nigerian Federalism. *Publius, 43*(4), 728-747. doi:10.1093/publius/pjs049

Ekeh, P. P. (1972). Citizenship and Political Conflict: A Sociological Analysis of the Nigerian Crisis. In J. Okpaku (Ed.), *Nigeria: The Dilemma of Nationhood* (pp. 76-117). Riverside, Connecticut.: Greenwood Press.

Ekweremadu, I. (2012). Constitution Amendment, and State Creation. Retrieved from: http://senatorekweremadu.org/index.php/component/content/category/16-speeches

Elaigwu, J. I. (2005). *The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria.* Jos: Aha Publishing House.

Elaigwu, J. I. (2013). *The Practice of Federalism in Africa, the Nigerian Experience and the Way Forward.* Arc. Goddy Jidenma Public Lecture held on Tuesday, 12 November at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. Retrieved from http://jidenmafoundation.org/wp-content/THIRD%20ARC%20GODDY%20JIDENMA%20PUBLIC%20LECTURE%20NOTE%20copy.pdf

Elaigwu, J. I., & Garba, A. A. (2014). Federalism and National Integration in Nigeria. In J. I. Elaigwu (Ed.), *Federalism and Democracy in Nigeria: Fifty Years After* (pp. 120-142). Jos: Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR).

Elazar, D. J. (1987). *Exploring Federalism.* Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.

Elazar, D. J. (1996). *Covenant & Common Wealth: From Christian Separation through the Protestant Reformation* (The Covenant Tradition in Politics ed., Vol. 2). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Elazar, D. J. (1996b). From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift. *International Political Science Review, 17*(4), 417-429. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601278

Elazar, D. J. (1997). Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems. *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique, 18*(3), 237-251. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601342

Elazar, D. J. (1998). *Covenant & Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations & Jewish Expressions.* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Elazar, D. J. (2000). From Biblical Covenant to Modern Federalism: The Federal Theology Bridge. In D. J. Elazar, & J. Kincaid (Eds.), *The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology to Modern Federalism* (pp. 1-15). Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.

Elden, S. (2007). Governmentality, Calculation, Territory. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 25*, 562-580. doi:10.1068/d428t

Everett, W. J. (1997). *Religion, Federalism, and the Struggle for Public Life: Cases from Germany, India, and America.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Eyoboka, S., & Latona, O. (2011, July 30). Oritsejafor replies Sultan, gives conditions for Islamic banking. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/oritsejafor-replies-sultan-gives-conditions-for-islamic-banking/

Ezera, K. (1959). Nigeria's Constitutional Road to Independence. *The Political Quarterly, 30*(2), 131-140. doi:10.1111/j.1467-923X.1959.tb01907.x

Falana, F. (2013, August 12). The Lagos Deportation and the Law: Deportation of Dissidents. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/the-lagos-deportation-and-the-law-deportation-of-dissidents/

Falk, P. (1997). *The Growth of the Church in Africa.* Jos: African Christian Textbook.

Falola, T. (1988). The Evolution and Changes in Nigerian Federalism. In R. A. Olaniyan (Ed.), *Federalism in a Changing World* (pp. 50-72). Lagos: The Presidency.

Falola, T. (2009). *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria.* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Falola, T., & Heaton, M. (2005). Introduction. In A. E. Afigbo, & T. Falola (Ed.), *Nigerian History, Politics and Affairs: The Collected Essays of Adiele Afigbo* (pp. 1-14). Trenton, NJ and Asmara: Africa World Press.

Falola, T., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). *A History of Nigeria.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Famoriyo, K. (2013). Emergency rule is not a panacea for peace, ARG warns. *Press Release*. Retrieved October 16, 2014, from http://argusachapter.org/press

Federal Government of Nigeria. (2014). *Appropriation Bill 2014.* Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget Office of the FederationBudget Office of the Federation.

Federal Government of Nigeria. (n.d.). *Concept Document for the Nigeria Centenary.*
Retrieved from http://fmi.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Concept-Document-
for-the-Nigeria-Centenary.pdf

Filippov, M. (2005). Riker and Federalism. *Constitutional Political Economy, 16*(2), 93-
111. doi:10.1007/s10602-005-2230-x

Finlay, L. (2008). A Dance Between the Reduction and Reflexivity: Explicating the
"Phenomenological Psychological Attitude". *Journal of Phenomenological
Psychology, 39*(1), 1-32. doi:10.1163/156916208X311601

Flint, C., & Taylor, P. (2007). *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and
Locality* (5th ed.). Essex: Pearson Education.

Freitas, S. d., & Raath, A. (2009). The Reformational Legacy of Theologico-political
Federalism. In A. Ward, & L. Ward (Eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to
Federalism* (pp. 49-68). Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.

Frenkel, M. (1986). *Federal Theory.* Canberra : Center for Research on Federal Financial
Relations, the Australian National University.

Fukuyama, F. (2012). *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French
Revolution.* London: Profile Books.

Fwatshak, S. U., & Ayuba, J. M. (2014). Discordant Voices in the House that Lugard
Roofed: Amalgamation Discourses in Nigeria's First Centenary. Paper presented at
the Historical Society of Nigeria Colloquium on the Amalgamation and Centenary,
19 February, Abuja, Nigeria.

Gana, A. T. (2003). Federalism and the National Question in Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration. In A. T. Gana, & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), *Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question* (Vol. I, pp. 17-45). Trenton: Africa World Press.

Gana, A. T., & Egwu, S. G. (2003a). The Crisis of the Nation-State in Africa and the Challenge of Federalism. In A. T. Gana, S. G. Egwu, A. T. Gana, & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), *Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question* (Vol. I, pp. xv-xxvii). Trenton, NJ, Eritrea: Africa World Press.

Gana, A. T., & Egwu, S. G. (2003b). The Crisis of the National-State in Africa and the Challenge of Federalism. In A. T. Gana, & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), *Federalism in Africa: The Imperative of Democratic Development* (Vol. II, pp. xv-xxvii). Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Gerring, J. (2004). What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *American Political Science Review, 98*(2), 341-354.

Gerring, J., & Yesnowitz, J. (2006). A Normative Turn in Political Science? *Polity, 38*(1), 101-133. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300054

Glassner, M. I., & Fahrer, C. (2004). *Political Geography* (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Greenfeld, L. (2003). *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gregory, D., Johnston, R., Pratt, G., Watts, M. J., & Whatmore, S. (2009). *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (5th ed.). Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing.

Gromes, T. (2010). Federalism as a Means of Peace-Building: The Case of Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 16*(3-4), 354-374. doi:10.1080/13537113.2010.526918

Guba, E. G. (1990). The Alternative Paradigm Dialog. In E. G. Guba (Ed.), *The Paradigm Dialog.* Newbury Park, California: SAGE Publications.

Guest, G. (2012). Describing Mixed Methods Research: An Alternative to Typology. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 7*(2), 141-151. doi: 10.1177/1558689812461179

Hall, D. W. (1997). The Reformation Roots of Social Contract. *Religion and Liberty, 7*(4), 8-10. Retrieved from http://www.acton.org/sites/v4.acton.org/files/pdf/rl_v07n4.pdf

Harnischfeger, J. (2008). *Democratization and Islamic Law: The Shaia Conflict in Nigeria*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

Hartshorne, R. (1950). The Functional Approach in Political Geography. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 40(2), 95-130. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2560998

Harvey, D. (2009). *Social Justice and the City (Geographies of Justice and Social Transformation 1)* (Revised ed.). Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press.

Hassan, D. (2006). The rise of the territorial state and the treaty of Westphalia. *Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence, 9*, 62-70.

Hassan, D., & Issa, A. S. (2011, June). Federalism and Ethnic Violence in Nigeria: Past and Present Issues. *Journal of Research in National Development, 9*(1), 305-312.

Held, D. (1989). *Political Theory and the Modern State.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Held, D. (1992). The Development of the Modern State. In S. Hall, & B. Gieben (Eds.), *Formations of Modernity* (pp. 71-125). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Herbst, J. (1997). Responding to State Failure in Africa. *International Security, 21*(3), 120-144. doi:10.1162/isec.21.3.120

Herbst, J. (2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.* Princeton: Princetone Univesity Press.

House of Representatives. (2013, October 24). House to Investigate Process of Recruitment into NDA. *House News*. Retrieved from House of Representatives: http://www.nassnig.org/nass2/news.php?id=263

House of Representatives. (n.d.). *House Bills.* Retrieved from House of Representatives: http://www.nassnig.org/nass2/legislation2.php?search=grazing&Submit=Search

Hueglin, T. O., & Fenna, A. (2010). *Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2011). *Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800.* Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800

Human Rights Watch. (2012). *World Report 2012: Nigeria.* Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-nigeria

Human Rights Watch. (2013). *World Report.* Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf

Hunwick, J. (2006). *West Africa, Islam, and the Arab World.* Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Hussein, A. (2009). The use of Triangulation in Social Sciences Research: Can qualitative and quantitative methods be combined? *Journal of Comparative Social Work, 1*(1), 1-12.

Ibrahim, H., & Lyman, P. N. (2004). *Reflections on the New Shari'a Law in Nigeria.* Africa Policy Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Ibrahim, J. (2003). Ethno-Religious Limits to the Construction of Federalism in Africa: Yogoslavia and Nigeria Compared. In A. T. Gana, & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), *Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question* (Vol. I, pp. 115-140). Trenton: Africa World Press.

Ibrahim, S. (2014). Towards an Integrative Federal Polity in Nigeria. In J. I. Elaigwu (Ed.), *Federalims and Democracy in Nigeria: Fifty Yeas After* (pp. 110-119). Jos: International Institute of Governance and Social Research.

Ifeka, C. (2000). Ethnic 'Nationalities' , God and the State: Whither the Federal Republic of Nigeria? *Review of African Political Economy, 27*(85), 450-459. Retrieved from http://www.roape.org/085/08.html

Iff, A. (2013). Peace-Promoting Federalism: Making Sense of India and Nigeria. *Publius, 43*(2), 227-250. doi:10.1093/publius/pjs031

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2014, June 5). Nigeria: Fleeing Boko Haram's relentless terror. *Briefing Paper*. Retrieved from http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2014/201406-af-nigeria-boko-haram-brief-en.pdf

International Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2013). *Global Overview 2012: People internally displace by conflict and violence.* Norwegian Refugee Council. Retrieved from http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-overview/pdf

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (1968). New York: Macmillen. Retrieved October 9, 2014, from http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Political_culture.aspx

Iredia, T. (2013, August 18). Is Governor Fashola Different from Governor Obi? *Sunday Trust*. Retrieved from http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/point-blank/14055-is-governor-fashola-different-from-governor-peter-obi

Irukwu, J. O. (2005). *Nigeria: The Last Chance.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Isenyo, G. (2014, August 9). A northerner shoud have completed Yar'Adua's term -Ciroma. *Punch*. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/a-northerner-shoud-have-completed-yaraduas-term-ciroma/

Isichei, E. (1995). *A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present.* Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing.

Jaskulowski, K. (2010). Western (Civic) versus Eastern (Ethnic) Nationalism. The Origins and Critique of the Dichotomy. *Polish Sociological Review, 3*(171), 289-303. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41275158

Jenkins, J. C., & Bond, D. (2001). Conflict-Carrying Capacity, Political Crisis, and Reconstruction: A Framework for Early Warning of Political System Vulnerability. *Jouranl of Conflict Resolution, 45*(1), 3-32. Retrieved from http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/45/1/3.full.pdf+html

Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. *Educational Researchers, 33*(7), 14-26. doi:10.3102/0013189X033007014

Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a Definition of Mixed Methods Research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1*(2), 112-133. doi:10.1177/1558689806298224

Johnson, S. (2010). *The History of the Yorubas: From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate.* (O. Johnson, Ed.) New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kauzya, J.-M. (2005, September). Decentralisation: Prospects for Peace, Democracy and Development. *DPADM Discussion Paper.* New York: DPADM. Retrieved from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021510.pdf

Kauzya, J.-M. (2007). Political Decentralisation in Africa: Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa. *Discussion Paper.* New York: DPADM. Retrived from http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan028411.pdf

Kendhammer, B. (2014). Citizenship, Federalism and Powersharing: Nigeria's Federal Character and the Challenges of Institutional Design. *Ethnopolitics, 13*(4), 396-417. doi:10.1080/17449057.2014.906150

Kerlinger, F. N. (1986). *Foundations of Behavioural Research* (3rd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Ki-moon, B. (2013). *UN chief 'very concerned' about deteriorating security situation in northeastern Nigeria.* UN News Centre. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44922#.Ue_pu9KotgE

Kincaid, J. (2005). Introduction. In A. Griffiths, & K. Nerenberg (Eds.), *Handbook of Federal Countries, 2005* (pp. 3-14). Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Kleinerman, B. (2009). William Riker's "Rationalist" Federalism. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism* (pp. 413-424). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.

Komolafe, B. (2011, July 11). Islamic banking: Before the legal actions begin. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/islamic-banking-before-the-legal-actions-begin/

Krish, M. A., & Sule, I. K. (2013, October 24). Reps to X-Ray NDA Admission Process. *Daily Trust*. Retrieved from http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/top-stories/8404-reps-to-x-ray-nda-admission-process

Kumar, R. (2011). An Analysis of the Viability of the South Asian States: A Study in Political Geography. *Geopolitics Quarterly*, 137-160.

Kwarteng, K. (2012). *Ghosts of Empire: Britain's Legacies in the Modern World.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Laitin, D. D. (2007). *Nations, States and Violence.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Land Use Act. (1990). *Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.* Retrieved from http://www.nigeria-law.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm

Lazarus, S. (2010, December 5). Consensus Candidacy Worsens North-South Dichotomy - Group. *Sunday Trust*. Retrieved from http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sunday/index.php/news/10255-consensus-candidacy-worsens-north-south-dichotomy-group

Leadership. (2013, October 15). Plateau Government Spends N42 Million on Eid-el-Kabir Gifts For Muslims. *Leadership*. Retrieved from

http://leadership.ng/news/325641/plateau-government-spends-n42-million-eid-el-kabir-gifts-muslims

Lépine, F. (2012, Spring). A Journey through the History of Federalism: Is Multilevel Governance a Form of Federalism? *L'Europe en formation, Printemps 2012*(n° 363), 21-62.

Lewis, P. (2012). Borders and Bargains: Managing Nigeria's Fractious Society. In J. Herbst, T. McNamee, & G. Mills (Eds.), *On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions Within Societies.* London: Profile Books.

Linz, J. J. (1993). State building and nation building. *European Review, 1*(04), 355-369. doi:10.1017/S1062798700000776

Livingston, W. S. (1956). *Federalism and Constitutional Change.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lugard, F. J. (1922). *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (4th ed.). Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/cu31924028741175

Ma, S.-Y. (1992). Nationalism: State-Building or State-Destroying. *The Social Science Journal, 29*(3), 293-305. doi:10.1016/0362-3319(92)90023-B

Mack, N., Woodsong, C., MacQueen, K. M., Guest, G., & Namey, E. (2005). *Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector's Field Guide.* Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: Family Health International.

Madiebo, A. A. (1980). *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafra War.* Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing.

Maier, K. (2002). *The House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis.* London: Penguin Books.

Máiz, R. (2013). Beyond Institutional Design: The Political Culture of Federalism (A

    Normative Approach). In A. L. Basaguren, & L. E. Epifanio (Eds.), *The Ways of*

    Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain

    (Vol. I, pp. 83-102). Heidelberg: Springer.

Mangvwat, M. Y. (2014). The Middle Belt and Lugard's Amalgamation: A Centenary

    Reflection. *Paper presented at the Historical Society of Nigeria Colloquium on the*

    Amalgamation and Centenary, 19 February, Abuja, Nigeria.

Mann, M. (1984). The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and

    Results. *European Journal of Sociology*, 185-213. doi:10.1017/S0003975600004239

Marinho, T. (2014, January 1). Christmas Corruption; Stop 'selective' charity; 'A 2014

    Cellphone Anticorruption Drive?'. *The Nation*, p. 21. Retrieved from

    http://thenationonlineng.net/new/christmas-corruption-stop-selective-charity-a-2014-

    cellphone-anticorruption-drive/

Marshall, P. A. (2008). *Religious Freedom in the World.* Lanham, MD: Rowman &

    Littlefield Publishers.

McCoy, C. S., & Baker, J. W. (1991). *Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and*

    the Covenantal Tradition. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press.

Mefor, L. (2013, May 16). Ekweremadu…Seeking a People Oriented-constitution. *This day*.

    Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ekweremadu-seeking-a-people-

    oriented-constitution/147653/

Metumara, D. M. (2010). Democracy and the Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism in Nigeria's

    Fourth Republic: Interrogating Institutional Mechanics. *Journal of Peace, Conflict*

and Development(15), 92-106. Retried from: http://www.bradford.ac.uk/ssis/peace-conflict-and-development/issue-15/6-Article1Final.pdf

Migdal, J. S. (2001). *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mileski, T. (2013). Macedonia through the Theory of Territorial Integration: One Hundred Years Before. *Security Dialogues, 4*(2), 45-58. Retrieved from http://sd.fzf.ukim.edu.mk/pdf/SD%20Vol.4,%20No.2%202013%20(2).pdf

Mills, A. (2013). *A Pathologist Remembers: Memories of Childhood and Later Life.* Bloomington: Author House.

Miyetti Allah [Cattle Breaders Association of Nigeria]. (n.d.). *Who Are the Fulani People & Their Origin?* Retrieved from http://www.miyattiallah.com/who_we_are.html

Momah, S. (2013). *Nigeria Beyond Divorce: Amalgamation in Perspective.* Ibadan: Safari Books.

Moran, D. (2005). *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Moreno, L., & Colino, C. (2010). *Introduction: Diversity and Unity in Comparative Perspective.* (L. Moreno, & C. Colino, Eds.) London: McGill-Quee's University Press.

Murphy, A. B. (1996). The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations. In T. J. Biersteker, & C. Weber (Eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct .* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murtada, A. (2012). *Boko Haram in Nigeria: Its Beginnings, Principles and Activities in Nigeria.* (A. al-Ashanti, Trans.)

Musa, I. (2013, June 9). Both cattle breeders and farmers should restrain their youths. *Sunday Trust*, 11. (H. Ibrahim, Interviewer).

National Mirror. (2014, February 20). CAN decries Sheikh Gumi's comment on APC Christian candidate. *National Mirror*. Retrieved from http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/can-decries-sheikh-gumis-comment-on-apc-christian-candidate/

National Policy on Environment. (1999). Retrieved from Federal Ministry of Environment: http://environment.gov.ng/index.php/downloads/6-national-policy-on-environment

Ndegwa, S. N. (2002, November). Decentralization in Africa: A stocktaking survey. *Africa Regional Working Paper Series No. 40*. World Bank. Retrieved April 4, 2013, from http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp40.pdf

Ndegwa, S. N. (2003). *Decentralisation in Africa: Emerging Trends and Progress.* Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved April from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9726/266040PAPER0 Findings0229.pdf?sequence=1

Newswatch Times. (2013, December 19). Okorocha celebrates Imo workers, offers Xmas packages, two weeks break . *Newswatch Times*. Retrieved from http://www.mydailynewswatchng.com/okorocha-celebrates-imo-workers-offers-xmas-packages-two-weeks-break/

Newton, K., & Deth, J. W. (2010). *Foundations of Comparative Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs [NSCIA]. (2013, October 8). *A Rebuttal of CAN President's Claims.* Retrieved from Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic

Affairs (NSCIA): http://www.nscia.com.ng/index.php/news-room/33-a-rebuttal-of-

can-president-s-claims

Nigerian Tribune. (2014, October 27). Sacked by gunmen, abandoned by government.

Retrieved from Nigerian Tribune:

http://www.tribune.com.ng/quicklinkss/features/item/19690-sacked-by-gunmen-

abandoned-by-government

Nnanna, O. (2012, August 30). Minister Nurudeen's "Islamic Republic of Nigeria".

Vanguard. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/08/minister-

nurudeens-islamic-republic-of-nigeria/

Northern Regional Government. (1953). *Report on the Kano Disturbances, 16th, 17th, 18th

and 19th May, 1953.* Kaduna: Government Printer Nigeria.

Nwabughuogu, I. A. (1996). Unitarianism versus Federalism: A British Dilemma, 1914 -

1954. In J. I. Elaigwu, & G. N. Uzoigwe (Eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism*

(pp. 39-59). Abuja: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations.

Nwaubani, E. (2002). Constitution-Making and the Nigerian Identity. In T. Falola, & A.

Oyebade (Eds.), *The Transformation of Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola*

(pp. 73-112). Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press.

Odepeju, K. (2012, November 29). Nigeria needs a people's constitution. *Daily

Independent*. Retrieved from http://dailyindependentnig.com/2012/11/nigeria-needs-

a-peoples-constitution/

Odinkalu, C. A. (2010). Corruption and Governance in Africa: How do we break the cycle

in Nigeria? *Corruption and Governance Challenges in Nigeria. Monograph Series.

No 7*, pp. 14-42. Lagos: CLEEN Foundation. Retrieved from

http://cleen.org/Corruption%20and%20Governance%20Challenges%20in%20Nigeria%20-%20Final%20Version.pdf

Oganah, T. (2013, August 4). Deporting the Igbo from Lagos insulting – Ohanaeze. (A. Okpi, Interviewer) Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/politics/crossfire/deporting-the-igbo-from-lagos-insulting-ohanaeze/

Ogbogbo, C. B. (2014). 100 Years of the South-South Zone in the Political Economy of Nigeria: The Pains and Gains. Paper presented at the Historical Society of Nigeria Colloquium on the Amalgamation and Centenary, 18-19 February, Abuja, Nigeria.

Ogundele, K., & Olokor, F. (2014, April 3). Confab: Muslims fault Christian leaders' position on constitution. *Punch*. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/confab-muslims-fault-christian-leaders-position-on-constitution/

Okafor, E. E. (2007). Sociological Implications of Communal and Ethno-Religious Clashes in New Democratic Nigeria. *Journal of Tribes and Tribals, 5*(1), 35- 45.

Okunniyi, O. (2012, July 30). Nigeria needs brand new peoples' constitution, not constitutional review – PRONACO. *Channels Television*. Retrieved from http://www.channelstv.com/2012/07/30/nigeria-needs-brand-new-peoples-constitution-not-constitutional-review-pronaco/

Olajide, K. (2014, August 4). Nigeria more divided now than in 1960. *The Nation*, 48. (B. Oladele, Interviewer)

Olusanya, G. O. (1980a). The Nationalist Movements in Nigeria. In O. Ikime (Ed.),
Groundwork of Nigerian History (pp. 545-569). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational
Books.

Olusanya, G. O. (1980b). Constitutional Development 1861 - 1960. In O. Ikime (Ed.),
Groundwork of Nigerian History (pp. 518-544). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational
Books.

Omitola, B. (2012). Terrorism and the Nigerian federation: The challenges of disintegration
in the Fourth Republic. *African Security Review, 21*(4), 4-16.

Omotso, F., & Abe, T. (2014). Federalism, Politics and Governance in Nigeria. *Public
Policy and Administration Research, 4*(7), 64-69. Retrieved from
http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/PPAR/article/view/14385/14693

Onuoha, F. C. (2011). The audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, analysis and emerging
trend. *Security Journal, 25*(2), 134–151. Retrieved from http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/sj/journal/v25/n2/abs/sj201115a.html

Oriji, J. N. (2013). *Political Organization in Nigeria since the Late Stone Age: A History of
the Igbo People.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oritsejafor, A. (2013, July 27). Nigerian Christians are treated as second class citizens –
Oritsejafor. *Vanguard.* (L. Binniyat, & S. Eyoboka, Interviewers) Retrieved from
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/nigerian-christians-are-treated-as-second-
class-citizens-oritsejafor/

Ornstein, N. (2014). What's Wrong with Washington? Tribalism. *Governance: An
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 27*(2), 179-183.
doi:10.1111/gove.12085

Orum, A. M., Feagin, J. R., & Sjoberg, G. (1991). The Nature of the Case Study. In J. R.

    Feagin, A. M. Orum, & G. Sjoberg (Eds.), *A Case for the Case Study* (pp. 1-26).

    Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Osaghae, E. E. (1990). A Reassessment of Federalism as a Degree of Decentralisation.

    Publius, 20(1), 83-98. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330364

Osaghae, E. E. (1991). Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria. *African Affairs,*

    90(359), 237-258. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/722781

Osaghae, E. E., & Suberu, R. T. (2005). *A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in*

    Nigeria. Oxford University, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and

    Ethnicity. Oxford: CRISE.

Otaru, T. (2014, October 20). Census should capture ethnic, religious differences, says

    IPCR. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from

    http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/national-news/183651-census-should-

    capture-ethnic-religious-differences-says-ipcr

Oyeweso, S. (2014). Perspectives of the South-West on the Centenary: The Gains and Pains

    since Amalgamation and the Agenda for the Future. Paper presented at the Historical

    Society of Nigeria Colloquium on the Amalgamation and Centenary, 19 February,

    Abuja, Nigeria.

Oyugi, W. O. (2008). Editorial Introduction: Decentralisation in Africa. *Regional*

    Development Dialogue, 29(2), v-ix.

Paden, J. N. (2005). *Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution: The Challenge of*

    Democratic Federalism in Nigeria. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.

Paden, J. N. (2008). *Faith and Politics in Nigeria.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Paki, F. A., & Cocodia, J. (2012). Trapped in Disintegration? Post-2011 Presidential Elections Violence and Implications for National Security in Nigeria. *Africana, 6*(1), 1-39.

Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods* (3 ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Penrose, J. (2002). Nations, States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought. *Nations and Nationalism, 8*(3), 277-297. doi:10.1111/1469-8219.00051

Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. (2006). *Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals.* Retrieved September 27, 2013, from http://www.pewforum.org/2007/03/21/nigerias-presidential-election-the-christian-muslim-divide/

Pierson, C. (2011). *The Modern State* (3th ed.). New York: Reutledge.

Porta, D. d., & Keating, M. (2008). How many approaches in the social science? An epistemological introduction. In D. d. Porta, & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Science* (pp. 19-39). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Prunier, G. (2009). *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Pulsipher, L. M., & Pulsipher, A. (2008). *World Regional Geography: Global Patterns, Local Lives* (4th ed.). New York: WH Freeman.

Punch. (2013, December 25). Bauchi distributes Christmas gifts worth N34m to Christian women. *Punch*. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/bauchi-distributes-christmas-gifts-worth-n34m-to-christian-women/

Punch. (2013, December 31). Jonathan's cow gift to Bakare stirs debate. *Punch*. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/i-punch/jonathans-cow-gift-to-bakare-stirs-debate/

Punch. (2015, August 25). Boko Haram Declares a New Caliphate in North-Eastern Nigeria. *Punch*. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/video-boko-haram-declares-caliphate-in-north-eastern-nigeria/

Reid, R. J. (2012). *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Reményi, P. (2012). The Statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Hartshorne Model. *Historia Actual Online, 27*, 129-140. Retrieved from http://www.historia-actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/viewFile/677/642

Renan, E. (1990). What is a Nation? In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.), *Nation and Narration* (M. Thom, Trans., pp. 8-22). Oxon: Routledge.

Riker, W. H. (1964). *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Riker, W. H. (1975). Federalism. In F. Greenstein, & N. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Science.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Rivera, L. G. (2013). *Territories of Violence: State, Marginal Youth, and Public Security in Honduras.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

344

Robinson, K. W. (1961). Sixty years of federation in Australia. *Geographical Review, 51*(1), 1-20. doi:10.2307/212483

Rocher, F. (2009). The Quebec-Canada Dynamic or the Negation of the Idea of Federalism. In A.-G. Gagnon (Ed.), *Contemporary Canadian Federalism: Foundations, Traditions, Institutions.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Rocher, F., & Fafard, P. (2013). Is there a political culture of federalism in Canada? Charting an unexplored territory. In G. Skogstad, D. Cameron, M. Papillon, & K. Banting (Eds.), *The Global Promise of Federalism* (pp. 43-68). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Rodden, J. (2004). Comparative Federalism and Decentralisation: On Meaning and Measurement. *Comparative Politics, 36*(4), 481-500.

Rokkan, S. (1999). *State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan.* (P. Flora, S. Kuhnle, & D. W. Urwin, Eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rothfuss, R., & Joseph, Y. (Forthcoming). The Role of Religion in the Formation of a New State on the World Map: South Sudan. In S. D. Brunn (Ed.), *The Changing World Religion Map: Sacred Places, Identities, Practices and Politics.* Springer.

Rothman, J. (1997). *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: In Nations, Organizations, and Communities.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Ruane, J., & Todd, J. (2010a). Ethnicity and Religion. In K. Cordell, & S. Wolff (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict.* London: Routledge.

Ruane, J., & Todd, J. (2010b). Ethnicity and Religion, Redefining the Research Agenda. *Ethnopolitics, 9*(1), 1-8. doi:10.1080/17449050903557377

Rubin, E. L., & Feeley, M. M. (2008). Federalism and Interpretation. *Publius, 38*(2), 167-191. doi:10.1093/publius/pjn004

Sack, R. D. (1983). Human Territoriality: A Theory. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73*(1), 55-74. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.1983.tb01396.x

Sack, R. D. (1986). *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History.* Cambridge: University Press.

Salawu, B. (2010, March). Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies. *European Journal of Social Sciences, 13*(3), 345-353. Retrieved from http://www.eisf.eu/resources/library/ejss_nigconflict_1.pdf

Schwartz, S. (2010, June 16). Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? *USIP PeaceBrief 27*. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Retrieved from http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/28908

Security Council. (2011, December 27). Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria. *SC/10507, AFR/2309*. New York: News and Media Division, Department of Public Information. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10507.doc.htm

Shaw, L. F. (1905). *A Tropical Dependency: An Outline of the Ancient History of the Western Soudan with an Account of the Modern Settlement of Northern Nigeria.* London: James Nisbet. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/tropicaldependen00luga

Shuaib, S. (2012, September 8). 12m Fulani Herdsmen Demand Land Rights in 36 States. *Leadership*, p. 5.

Shulman, S. (2002). Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism. *Comparative Political Studies, 35*(5), 554-585. doi:10.1177/0010414002035005003

Siegle, J., & O'Mahony, P. (2006). Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy. *Paper prepared for USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance, September 2006.*, 73. http://dai.com/news-publications/publications/assessing-merits-decentralization-conflict-mitigation-strategy

Silver, P. F. (1983). *Educational Administration: Theoretical Perspectives on Practice and Research.* New York: Harper & Row.

Simeon, R. (2008). Managing Conflicts of Diversity. In R. L. Watts, & R. Chattopadhyay (Eds.), *Unity in Diversity, Volume 1: Building on and Accommodating Diversities* (pp. 54-69). New Delhi: Viva Books . Retrieved from http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/IntConfFed07/IntConfFed-India-2007-Vol-1.pdf

Smith, A. D. (2003). *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, D. M. (1990). introduction: The Sharing and Dividing of Geographical Space. In M. Chisholm, & D. M. Smith (Eds.), *Shared Space/Divided Space: Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organisation* (pp. 1-21). London: Unwin Hyman.

Smith, T. L. (1978). Religion and Ethnicity in America. *The American Historical Review, 83*(5), 1155-1185. doi:10.2307/1854689

Soja, E. W. (1971). The Political Organization of Space. *Commission on College Geography resource Paper No. 8.* Washington: Association of American Geographers .

Solzhenitsyn, A. (2000). Interview with Der Spiegel. The Guardian (UK), March 18, 2000.

Stanlis, P. J. (2003). *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law.* New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Starr, H. (2005). Territory, Proximity, and Spatiality: The Geography of International Conflict. *International Studies Review, 7*, 387-406. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699756

Stavenhagen, R. (1996). *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State.* London: Macmillan.

Stein, S. (2012). The UN and Genocide: A Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. In F. Attina (Ed.), *The Politics and Policies of Relief, Aid and Reconstruction: Contrasting Approaches to Disasters and Emergencies.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Storey, D. (2012). *Territories: The Claiming of Space* (2nd ed.). New York: Reutledge.

Straumann, B. (2008). The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution. *Constellations, 15*(2), 178-188. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2008.00483.x

Suberu, R. T. (2001). *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Suberu, R. T. (2006). Federal Dilemma in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective. *CRISE Conference on Federalism, Decentralisation and Conflict.* University of Oxford.

Suberu, R. T. (2009a). Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective. *Ethnopolitics, 8*(1).

Suberu, R. T. (2009b). Religion and Institutions: Federalism and the Management of

    Conflicts over Sharia in Nigeria. *Journal of International Development, 21*(4), 547–

    560. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.1572/pdf

Suberu, R. T. (2013). Prebendal Politics and Federal Governance in Nigeria. In W.

    Adebanwi, & E. Obadare (Eds.), *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria : Critical*

    Interpretations (pp. 79-102). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sunday Independent. (2014, June 8). Are Nigerian Muslims truly Marginalised? Retrieved

    from

    http://dailyindependentnig.com/?s=Are+Nigerian+Muslims+truly+Marginalised%3F

    &x=0&y=0

Symmons-Symonolewicz, K. (1985). The concept of Nationhood: Toward a Theoretical

    Clarification. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 12*(2), 215-222.

Tamuno, T. N. (1980). British Colonial Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth Century.

    In O. Ikime (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (pp. 393-409). Ibadan:

    Heinemann Educational Books.

Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2008). Quality of Inference in Mixed Methods Reseach:

    Calling for an Integrative Framework. In M. M. Bergman (Ed.), *Advances in Mixed*

    Methods Research: Theories and Applications (pp. 101-119). London: SAGE

    Publications.

Tavallaei, M., & Talib, M. A. (2010). A General Perspective on Role of Theory in

    Qualitative Research. *The Journal of International Social Research, 3*(11), 570-577.

The Nation. (2013, August 20). 'Middle Belt 'll not support power shift to North'. *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/middle-belt-ll-not-support-power-shift-to-north/

The Nation. (2013, November 6). CBN urges Islamic financial institutions on innovative products. *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/cbn-urges-islamic-financial-institutions-innovative-products/

The Nation. (2014, June 1). 2015: North to insist on presidency, zoning. *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/2015-north-to-insist-on-presidency-zoning/

The Nation. (2014, March 20). Attack on Middle Belt communities by 'Fulani', a vengeance by North, says group. *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/attack-middle-belt-communities-fulani-vengeance-north-says-group/

The Nation. (2014, May 26). Sultan to govt: address injustice against Muslims. *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://thenationonlineng.net/new/sultan-govt-address-injustice-muslims/

This Day. (2013, October 18). Ilorin Sallah Stampede: Death Toll Rises to 20. *This Day*. Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ilorin-sallah-stampede-death-toll-rises-to-20/161984/

Thomas, A. B. (2006). *Research Concepts: For Management Studies.* Oxon: Routledge.

Thürer, D. (2008). Managing Conflicts of Diversity. In R. L. Watts, & R. Chattopadhyay (Eds.), *Unity in Diversity, Volume 1: Building on and Accommodating Diversities* (pp. 97-102). New Delhi: Viva Books.

Turaki, Y. (2010). *Tainted Legacy: Islam, Colonialism and Slavery in Northern Nigeria.*
McLean: Isaac Publishing.

Ubani, D. (n.d.). The Unjustifiable Attacks on Abia State Government over the Transfer of
Non-Indigenes. Abia State Government. Retrieved from Abia State Government:
http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/news/the-unjustifable-attacks-on-abia-state-government-
over-the-transfer-of-non-indigenes-by-chief-don-ubani-hon-commissioner-for-
informations-and-strategy/

Ukpabi, C. (2013, August 29). Agitation for power shift to North is laughable. *The Nation*,
49. (E. Oladesu, Interviewer).

UNHCR. (2013, June). Nigeria's crisis sees more than 6,000 people displaced into
neighbouring countries. *Briefing Notes*. The UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved from
http://www.unhcr.org/51b6fe189.html

UNHCR. (2014, October 31). Nigeria crisis: border insecurity hampers relocation of
refugees to camp in Cameroon. *Briefing Notes*. Retrieved from
http://www.unhcr.org/54536a2a9.html

Vanguard. (2010, November 22). Atiku is Northern Consensus Candidate. *Vanguard*.
Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/atiku-is-northern-consensus-
candidate/

Vanguard. (2010, January 20). EFCC quizzes Kano govt officials over N50m Sallah gift.
Vanguard. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/01/efcc-quizzes-kano-
govt-officials-over-n50m-sallah-gift/

Vanguard. (2011, October 4). Imo blasts Abia govt over sack of non-indigenes. Retrieved from Vanguard: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/10/imo-blasts-abia-govt-over-sack-of-non-indigenes/

Vanguard. (2012, February 15). Nigeria's first Islamic bank begins business in three branches. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/nigerias-first-islamic-bank-begins-business-in-three-branches/

Vanguard. (2013, August 30). Nwabueze to Jonathan: Be a national hero, don't contest 2015 election. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/nwabueze-to-jonathan-be-a-national-hero-dont-contest-2015-election/

Vanguard. (2013, October 11). Sallah: Borno to Slaughter 540 bulls for the Poor. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/sallah-borno-slaughter-540-bulls-poor/

Vanguard. (2014, September 16). FG spends N27bn to mop up out of school children. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/fg-spends-n27bn-mop-school-children/

Vanguard. (2014, October 20). FHC adjourns suit challenging deportation of Igbos to Feb. 10, 2015.

Vanguard. (2014, June 20). Sokoto Government Earmarks ₦175 Million for Ramadan Feeding. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/sokoto-govt-earmarks-n175m-ramadan-feeding/

Vaughan, M. (2011). After Westphalia, Whither the Nation State, Its people and Its Governmental Institutions? *The International Studies Association Asia-Pacific*

Regional Conference, 29 September, 1-22. Retrieved from

http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:266787

Volden, C. (2004). Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of William H.

Riker. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 34*(4), 89-108. Retrieved October 2,

2013, from http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/34/4/89.full.pdf+html

Vujakovic, P. (2005). Nation States and Super-States: The Geopolitics of the New World

Order. In M. Phillips (Ed.), *Contested Worlds: An Introduction to Human Geography*

(pp. 153-188). Hants and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.

Ward, A., & Ward, L. (2009). *The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism.* (A. Ward,

& L. Ward, Eds.) Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing.

Watts, R. L. (1998). Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations. *Annual Review

of Political Science, 1*, 117-137. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.117

Watts, R. L. (2008). *Comparing Federal Systems* (3rd ed.). McGrill-Queen'S University

Press: Montreal.

Weber, M. (1946 [1919]). Politics as a Vocation. In H. H. Garth, & C. W. Mills (Eds.),

From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (H. H. Garth, & C. W. Mills, Trans., pp. 77-

128). New York: Oxford University Press.

Wheare, K. C. (1970). *Federal Government* (4th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

White, G. W. (2007). *Nation, State, and Territory: Volume 1: Origins, Evolutions, and

Relationships* (Vol. 1). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wilson, D. S. (2003). *Darwin's Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society*

(Paperback ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Wodak, R., Cillia, R. d., Reisigl, M., & Liebhart, K. (2009). *The Discursive Construction of National Identity.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

World Bank. (2011). *World Development Report 2011: Conflicts, Security and Development.* Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Yeasmin, S., & Rahman, K. F. (2012). 'Triangulation' Research Method as the Tool of Social Science Research. *BUP Journal, 1*(1), 154-163. Retrieved from http://www.bup.edu.bd/journal/154-163.pdf

Appendix

Survey Questionnaire

Dear sir/madam,

I am a doctoral candidate undertaking a research project to understand the factors hindering the ability of Nigeria's federalism to foster unity in diversity and to mitigate ethno-religious conflicts and divisive tendencies. To this end, I kindly request you to complete the following short questionnaire regarding your perception, opinion, attitude and preferences about federalism and national pluralism. It should take about 15 minutes of your time. Although your response is of the utmost importance to me, your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary.

Please do not write your name or contact details on the questionnaire. The questionnaire remains anonymous, and information provided by you will be solely used for the purpose of this research.

The result of this research will be published according to the University guideline for doctoral thesis.

Yours sincerely,

Doctoral Researcher

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY CHOOSING THE RELEVANT OPTION(S) OR WRITING DOWN YOUR ANSWER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.

Section A – Background/biographical information[8]

This section of the questionnaire asks for background or biographical information. Although the researcher is aware of the sensitivity of such questions, the information in this section will make possible to compare group of respondents. Again, the researcher wishes to assure you that the responses will remain anonymous. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Please mark your choice with a cross (x)

1. Gender

1	Male	
2	Female	

2. Age

1	Under 18	
2	18 – 24 years	
3	25 – 34 years	
4	35 – 44 years	
5	45 – 54 years	
6	55 – 64 years	
7	65 years or older	

3. What is your religious affiliation?

1	Christian	
2	Muslim	
3	Traditional Religion	
4	Non-Religious/Religiously unaffiliated	
5	Other (specify)	

---

[8] It is considered culturally more polite in this research setting to begin with asking for biodata before eliciting the respondent's views on issues.

4. Please fill in the information below:

1	State of Origin	
2	State of Residence	

5. Your highest educational qualification?

1	Primary school certificate or lower	
2	Secondary school certificate	
3	National Diploma/NCE	
4	HND/Bachelor Degree	
5	Master Degree	
6	PhD	

Section B

This section of the questionnaire explores your opinion and perception with regard to federalism in

Nigeria.

6. Do you agree or disagree that there is a need for a national conference to address the seeming
disunity in the country? Please indicate your answer with a cross (x). (Mark one option only).

1	Yes	
2	No	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	

7. In your opinion, which of the following are the sources of disunity in the country? Please indicate your choice by marking a cross (x) in the appropriate boxes.

		Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Undecided 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5
1	Political power sharing					
2	Economic imbalance and poverty					
3	Revenue allocation and resource sharing.					
4	Muslim-Christian rivalry and struggle for supremacy.					
5	Resource control Agitations.					
6	Poor leadership.					
7	Corruption					
8	Violent religious extremism					
9	Ethnic chauvinism (a belligerent belief in the superiority of one's ethnic group and looking down on others)					
10	Other (please specify)					

8. Arrange the following five identities in order of their importance to you.

Allocating a 1 to the most important identity, a 2 to the second-most important and continue in this way until you allocate a 4 to the least important identity. Use each number only once.

Identity	Rank
Continent	
Nationality	
Ethnic Group	
Religion	

9. Which of the following **are the reasons** for recurrent ethno-religious conflicts in the country? (Mark a cross (x) to indicate your choice in the appropriate boxes.

		Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Undecided 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5
1	Struggle for political domination					
2	Struggle for access to economic resources					
3	Desire to assert supremacy over other ethnic groups					
4	Desire to impose one religion over a part or the whole of the country					
5	Majority-minority struggle					
6	Other (please specify)					

10. In your opinion, why are ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria mainly concentrated in the North?

……

……
……
………

11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding federalism and the introduction of Islamic banking? Indicate your choice with a cross (x) in the appropriate box.

		Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Undecided 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5
1	The introduction of Islamic banking is in line with the need to accommodate diversity in a federation					
2	The introduction of Islamic banking is an attempt to expand the influence of Islam in the country					
3	Islamic banking is a religious solution to the problem of corporate greed in the financial sector					
4	Islamic banking is part of a broad attempt to Islamize the country					

12. What other reason(s) do you have for your support or opposition to Islamic banking in the country?
……
………………………………………………………………………………………………………...................................
....

13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding federalism and the adoption of sharia law in Northern Nigeria?

		Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Undecided 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5
1	The adoption of sharia by 12 states in Northern Nigeria is in line with the principle of federalism					
2	The adoption of sharia undermines the religious freedom of non-Muslims who are resident in those states					
3	The adoption of sharia penal code has increased tension between Muslims and Christians					
4	The adoption of sharia by the 12 states was meant to expand the political influence of Islam					
5	The adoption of sharia was a pushback against secularism and Western influence					

Section C

This section explores your attitude and preferences regarding key issues about federalism and the future of the country

14. To what extent do you **favour** or **oppose** maintaining the present federal structure of Nigeria? Please indicate your choice with a cross in the appropriate box. (Mark only one option)

Strongly favour 1	Favour 2	Undecided 3	Oppose 4	Strongly oppose 5

361

If your answer to question 14 is **'Oppose' or 'Strongly oppose'** kindly recommend what you would

like to see as its replacement

……

…………………………………………………………………………………………………….........

....

....

....

15. In the light of the recent debate on Citizenship and State of Origin, what is your preference? Please
select one by marking a cross (x) in the appropriate box.

1	State of Origin	
2	State of Residence	

Kindly give your reason for your answer to this question

……

……

……

……

……

…………………………………………………………………………………………………..

16. Please express your wish for the future of Nigeria and where you would like to see your country in
the next 5 to 10 years

………………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………..

Thank you very much for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire. Kindly return the questionnaire

as specified in the cover letter.

362

Focus Group Discussion Guide

Researcher opens the meeting with the following remark:

Welcome and thank you for joining this group discussion, where we would talk about federalism and the question of unity in this country. This is a good opportunity for me to learn from your views and knowledge about these important issues. Your contributions to this discussion would also help others to better understanding these issues. Everything you say will be treated in confidence. Any reference or quotation of what has been said here would exclude the name or any description that would give clue of the person who said it.

Before we begin to talk about these, may I kindly ask you to introduce yourself, your name, occupation and where you live?

After the introduction:

What are those things that you think hold Nigerians as one people?

What are those things that you think tend to cause division and conflicts?

The researcher continues probing and focusing the discussion so that information relevant to the research questions are obtained. The researcher would ensure everyone in the group has the chance to speak. The researcher would monitor the participants' body language and sensitivity to make sure that the interaction is friendly, frank and credible.

Wrap up:

This has been a very fruitful and educative discussion. I thank each one of you for sparing your time to be here and for the important views that you shared here.