What Changes Occur In Society When Influential Social Actors Receive Political Rents?

Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations
Their Socio-Economic, Social and Political Impact on Palestinian Society

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For Anna
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Abstract

What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents?

Non-Governmental Organizations are active participants in civil society. Many theoretical and empirical studies deal with the macroeconomic and social impact of NGOs. This thesis, however, focuses on micro-economic aspects of external western aid in terms of political rents, taking Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) as an example.

Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) play an important role in various social and economic spheres of Palestinian society. In order to understand the ongoing changes in the NGO-sector since the end of the 1980ies, I concentrate on looking inside the “black box NGO-employees” in PNGOs which are mainly funded by external western aid. The personal data of PNGO-employees are analyzed in the context of how international aid influences the particular personal situations of PNGO-employees and, by extension, how international aid which is transferred to the small number of PNGOs favored by the donors, and not to the Palestinian Authority (PA), influences the development of Palestinian society as a whole.

This is an empirical analytical study which builds on field research carried out in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs) between August 2010 and March 2011. It is based on both a quantitative and a qualitative study and provides data on personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, including salaries and also personal political attitudes in the past and present of a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to directors) in the West Bank and in Gaza.

The results of the data indicate a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO-sector and show that this sector is not immune to a globalized restructuring process of the work

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1 My interest focuses on the behaviour of the "black box". “Black box” is defined as an object whose internal structure and function is unknown. Of interest is mainly the black box’s behaviour. Normally in cybernetic or system theory, the inside is of no special interest. This model is used to reduce the complexity of an object.

2 I was responsible for the study design and implementation. The study was done in cooperation with the Democracy and Human Rights Program at Birzeit University from November 2010-December 2012.
force. This process results in an exploited labour force operating under precarious working conditions.

NGO-employees – divided into three groups and characterized as a “precariat”, an “aspiring middle class” and a “PNGO-elite”– benefit significantly from the current political and economic system. This results in their tacit or explicit support for the PA and therefore a stabilization of the ruling political system with the consequence that PNGOs can no longer be considered a part of independent civil society (in the sense of acting as a counterpart to government).
Acknowledgments

Abstract

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATAH</td>
<td>Palestinian National Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG(s)</td>
<td>Focus Group(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAMAS</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Israeli Shekel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTs</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oslo Accords</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASSIA</td>
<td>Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNGOs</td>
<td>Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>US Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>West Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB&amp;GS</td>
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1. **Chapter 1**

1.1 **Introduction**

At the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, development aid or humanitarian aid from international donors, which I here term *political rents* have undergone a paradigmatic shift. If the agenda in the 1970s and 1980s was based on the assumption that aid constituted help for social development, by the end of the 1980s the focus moved increasingly to economic development. International donors recognized the positive influence of civil society, mainly Non-Governmental Organizations, on economic development. Donors started to co-finance civil society autonomously parallel to target governments in order to support developmental goals. During the same time, critical literature started to observe and analyze NGO employees, former political activists, as social actors using the attributes *middle class, de-politicized and de-radicalized*.

The aim of the thesis is to find answers to the central research question *What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as NGOs receive political rents?*

To answer this question, I chose employees of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs), i.e. West Bank and Gaza. The OPTs represent a typical semi-rentier state and in focus are PNGOs and their employees as social actors, which are mainly funded by western aid.

The theoretical framework of the Rentier State Theory will guide the analysis. This theory was developed for the study of political, economic and social conditions of states in the Middle East in the nineteen-seventies. A rentier state is defined as a state whose budget is made up of at least 20% of oil rents; while a semi-rentier state should receive at least 20% of political rents as development aid. Rents are defined as state income without investment or labor. Characteristically the recipient state is free to use this state income as it
wishes; it is not subject to market conditions of reinvestment and it may be used to promote the interests of the rentier. Rentier states are marked by mainly neopatrimonial and centralized systems. The state as a rentier supports chosen social groups to secure its ruling system, as it blocks democratic movements and productive economic development.\(^3\)

In this research, political rents will be also used to describe development and humanitarian aid, paid by various international donors not to the state, but to PNGOs, as part of civil society. Against the background of classical rentier state theory, there are obviously two problems - The OPTs do not constitute a sovereign state, and Non-Governmental Organizations are not state actors, but rather part of civil society. In the OPTs (like in many other developing states) international donors pay political rents not only to the Palestinian Authority as a quasi state government, but also to PNGOs. Thus, PNGOs become part of the same rentier system as the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Palestinian government. The PA depends on the same donors as the NGO sector, i.e. World Bank, European Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF), USA, Norway, Japan etc. This poses a major question: how do civil society actors function within and as part of a rentier system, especially if they receive political rents from the same donors as their government?

The focus of this thesis is empirical, not theoretical. But obviously new empirical material can and should help in expanding and modifying rentier state theory. I hope to pose relevant questions which should later be taken up by theorists in further work on the rentier state theory. The central part of this thesis is made up of new data, collected through my own field-work in Palestine. This empirical material is then analyzed with the help of rentier state theory applied not to the state, but rather to NGOs as social actors within a semi-rentier “state”.

\(^3\) My argument here relies heavily on Peter Pawelka, Claudia Schmid, as well as Martin Beck. A more detailed analysis will follow in chapter two.
The above-mentioned paradigmatic change in development aid towards the end of the 1980s brought with it serious consequences for actors in civil society: former solidarity-based donor money changed into donor money with pre-defined conditions and a clear political agenda. By definition, political rents do not include nor do they derive from any productive effort. This kind of income, however, does require something in return. Donors are only willing to transfer political rents to PNGOs, if their agendas are in the fields of “good governance”, “human rights”, “democracy” and “education for peace”.

A rentier system results in a system of rent-seeking which imposes a very specific way of acting and behaving. The recipients of rents in this research are the PNGOs and I shall try to analyze their specific way of acting and behaving under these new conditions. Rent seeking is based on attempts to increase and to stabilize income. Rent seeking may involve tremendous efforts. Such efforts often involve and are supported by socio-political networks which individuals or groups create.

The following analysis focuses on the negative impacts of rent seeking such as the perpetuation of underdevelopment and the undermining of the willingness of those who benefit from rents to undertake any critical and creative intellectual and economic effort to counter this system. A detailed introduction into the theoretical framework, its application in the context of Palestine, and last but not least the development of PNGOs will follow in chapter two. There I will present my main research hypothesis.

My critical analysis of PNGOs is mainly empirical. It builds on field research carried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) between August 2010 and March 2011. It is based on quantitative data (1050 valid questionnaires from NGO-employees in 128 NGOs in the West Bank and 75 NGOs in Gaza) from NGO-employees in NGOs in the fields of women, youth, health, agriculture, human rights and peace training. It also provides qualitative data of six focus groups interviews in the West Bank and six in Gaza as well as data on personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, including salaries, but also personal political attitudes in the past and present of
a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to directors) in the West Bank and in Gaza.

These data document the everyday socio-economic impact of political rents and analyze the socio-economic, social and political impact of PNGOs on local populations in the West Bank and Gaza. This new material enabled me to analyze the personal data of PNGO-employees in two steps:
1. How does international aid influence the particular personal situations of PNGO-employees and, by extension,
2. how does international aid which is transferred to selected PNGOs instead of to the PA, influence the development of Palestinian society as a whole.

This provides a solid empirical basis for answering the main research question: What changes occur in society when influential social actors such as PNGOs receive rents?

This thesis hopes to contribute to research on NGOs with quantitative and qualitative data on PNGO-employees. It clearly points to and documents a neoliberal transformation of the PNGO-sector. In this process an exploited labour force is created, operating under very precarious working conditions. Political rents in the PNGO sector divide PNGO employees in groups, very much akin to classes. They are characterized and defined in this thesis as a “precariat”, an “aspiring middle class” and a “PNGO-elite.” Despite these clear divisions, all three groups clearly benefit from the current political and economic system. This results in their tacit or even explicit support for the PA and contributes therefore to a stabilization of the ruling political system with the consequence that PNGOs can no longer be considered a part of an independent civil society (in the sense of acting as a counterpart or an opposition to the government).
1.2 Chapter outline

The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one presents the general introduction to the guiding theoretical framework of the rentier state theory for analyzing the central research question: *What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as NGOs receive political rents* in context of the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs), i.e. West Bank and Gaza as a typical semi-rentier state. Palestinian non-governmental organization and their employees which are mainly funded by western aid are taking as an example for civil society actors.

Chapter two presents a detailed introduction, beginning with an overview of the historical and political development of NGOs in general, and the development of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in particular. Relevant terms of the rentier state theory such as rent and rent-seeking are introduced. At the same time and in particular in the Arab and Palestinian context, the neopatrimonialism paradigm will be introduced with the major terms of patron, clients and clientelism, as well as elites.

Chapter three introduces the methodology of the quantitative and qualitative study. The central part of this chapter is the comprehensive documentation of the quantitative and qualitative data material which has been collected in the research project that I designed and led at Birzeit University in Palestine between November 2009 and December 2011. The database was collected between August 2010 and March 2011 in the West Bank and in Gaza. The data are documented, and they are followed by detailed interim conclusions about personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, including salaries and also personal political attitudes in the past and present of a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to directors) in the West Bank and in Gaza. The interim conclusions show that we are dealing with a predominantly young and educated PNGO clientele. Women comprise 57.5% of the work force in the NGO sector and most come from urban backgrounds. PNGO employees
have a tendency to marry relatively late (compared to Palestinian society in general) and therefore to have fewer children.

The database on working conditions, wages and terms of employment shows a clear stratification of PNGO employment in the OPTs. There is a clear hierarchy: at the bottom remains a large group of PNGO workers, typically low paid, with no job security, having short term contracts or no written contract at all; then comes a ‘middle class’ and finally an elite with long-term contracts or permanent contracts and a level of income well above the Palestinian average. This indicates a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO sector and shows that this sector is not immune to a globalized, neo-liberal restructuring process of the work force. Along with this transformation, attitudes towards volunteering in PNGOs have changed and a generation gap between the first and the second Intifada generation can be observed. The majority of voluntary work has to be seen in a neo-liberal context – voluntary work represents a chance for future employees to enter “the first job market.” Sometimes, prospective NGO-employees go through seemingly endless volunteering experiences.

The data and the interim conclusions of chapter three are the basis for the analysis in chapter four. The broader socio-economic, social and political implications on Palestinian NGO employees and on Palestinian society, caused by political rents paid to the PNGO sector, will be analyzed in six successive steps:

1. With professionalization and institutionalization of PNGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, especially after Oslo (1993), PNGO employees formed a new group of clients. They transformed themselves into clients of primarily external donors.
2. A part of this new group of clients joined the middle class and now constitutes an elite, i.e. an NGO elite distinct from the NGO precariat.
3. The NGO sector, first defined and understood as a “third sector”, increasingly turned into a neo-liberally restructured working sector.
4. This neoliberal transformation of PNGOs changed the self-perception of PNGO and PNGO employees. The PNGO sector as part of civil society turned society into an object and "a vehicle" for individual interests, for example for a
job or a career. In this sense, many PNGOs have lost touch with society and society lost its trust and appreciation of PNGOs.

5. The creation of jobs in the mainly externally funded PNGO sector is possible, if social actors –willingly or unwillingly – accept, operate and position themselves within the existing political system.

6. In post-Oslo Palestine, this process has also led to the stabilization of the ruling system, represented by the PA and has also led to the stabilization of the persisting Israeli occupation.

In my final remarks, I conclude that political rents in the externally-funded PNGO sector imply a commercialization of this part of civil society. A commercialization of civil society however, contradicts the central principles of civil society. The thesis describes the contradiction between the self-proclaimed donor policy of strengthening civil society and the newly established reality on the ground. Precisely this contradiction may be creating new social actors on the ground, who are heading towards a social and political transformation beyond the well adapted neoliberal PNGO sector.
2. Chapter 2

The role of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in a semi-rentier state

The following chapter will present the historical and political development of NGOs in general, as well as of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in particular. The research question and hypothesis will be introduced along with relevant terms of rentier state theory such as rent and rent-seeking. The neopatrimonialism paradigm will be explained with the major terms of patron, clients and clientelism, as well as the concept of elites which will be developed and demonstrated in the Palestinian context.

In the text the acronym PNGOs will be used for Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations. When the focus is on NGOs worldwide, or on the Palestinian context including International NGOs, which are active in West Bank and Gaza, I use the acronym NGOs.

2.1 A short history of NGOs

Background: Non-Governmental Organizations – blessing, mixed blessing or bane?

Until the 1960s, Non-Governmental Organizations acted as small agencies to support poor people in their needs. Most of these agencies were based in the North. Agencies with a presence in the South were in general part of broader movements and also part of networks. They were based on voluntary work and combined charitable work with advocacy.

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4 The terms “northern NGOs” and “southern NGOs” include the geographical aspect of the location. "Northern" or "northern non-governmental organizations" are based in industrial countries and "southern" or "southern non-governmental organizations" are based in developing countries. In reality, southern NGOs are often supported by – or contracts of northern NGOs. That may result in dependence of the southern NGOs on the northern NGOs.
The state and the capitalist market were targets of criticism. The goal was to challenge the existing hegemonic structure or bring about systemic change.\textsuperscript{5}

Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, these organizations remained relatively small. They received a boost, however, when societies in the North, either on the level of Civil Society or on the level of the State started to co-finance NGO programs. NGOs in the South were well aware of this favorable geopolitical, historical moment and took full advantage of it. The number of southern NGOs, which were often politically on the left or connected with religious institutions, was growing. NGOs and their leaders (NGO activists) understood the need for cooperation and integrated activities between the North and the South as well as with other non-governmental actors such as political or social movements. At this time, the need for a different developmental model was realized. The term “alternative development” was created during this period.\textsuperscript{6}

Against the background of cooperation between northern and southern NGOs, social and political movements, as well as institutions supporting them, it was


Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin were the organizers of the fourth “Manchester” NGO conference. The first NGO conference in Manchester was held in the beginning of the 1990ies. Since then, academics, actors on the ground were discussing the topic NGO from all different aspect.


deemed possible by NGOs to join the struggle against oppressive regimes and structures such as those in El Salvador, Palestine/Israel, the Philippines, and South Africa. Samuel P. Huntington (1991) sets his “third wave of democratization” during this time, beginning with the “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal 1974, followed by the democratic transitions in South America in the 1980s and finally in Eastern Europe after the collapse of former Soviet Union.\(^7\)

The early 1980s constituted boom years for the NGOs. Their work became increasingly recognized and interest in their funding increased.\(^8\)

During the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank started to impose structural adjustment programs on many states in the South. At the same time, multilateral donors such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the European Union as well as individual donor countries started to support not only governments but also civil society.\(^9\) This double policy can be analyzed as part of this structural adjustment. The North focused not only on states as agents of change, but also on civil society, and in this context obviously on NGOs. Civil society was discovered as a useful investment – a convenient instrument for attaining developmental goals which

\(^7\) Huntington, Samuel P., 1991: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Critical voices argue countries who implement only competitive elections are not per se democracy. Such incomplete democracies can develop in different ways. They can complete democratization (accountability of governors, rule of law, civil society institutions etc.), or as Rose, Richard and Shin, Dog Chull, 2001: "Democratization Backwards: The Problem with Third-Wave Democracies", British Journal of Political Science 2001, 31, (02, April 2001), 331-354., analyse: “falling into a low-level equilibrium trap in which the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and expectations”; or at last, turn into an undemocratic alternative.


were mainly set by donor nations for the “developing countries”. An ever larger share of developmental aid was now being channeled through NGOs. In recipient countries, as the state's capacity to act diminished, NGOs often stepped into the breach, bringing about the privatization of social and developmental policies in these countries. This is analyzed by Anthony J. Bebbington, Samuel Hickey and Diana C. Mitlin (2008) when they write on “this was the period of the NGO 'boom', a boom that can only be understood in terms of its own relationship to transformations in this period in the structures of capitalisms North, South and globally. Indeed, it remains one of the central contradictions concerning NGO alternatives that the huge increase in NGO activity during the 1980s was driven to a significant extent by the unfolding neoliberal agenda and the new roles it gave to NGOs – the very agenda that development alternatives have sought to critically engage.”

Donors started to use NGOs as local actors on the ground in order to implement special intervention programs aimed at fulfilling their structural adjustment programs. On the whole, NGOs didn’t question the aims of such donor intervention. Rather, it was precisely during this period that NGOs gradually lost interest in searching for or proposing systemic alternatives. Meanwhile, however, social movements emerged in some countries, suggesting and working on alternative perspectives.\textsuperscript{11}

To summarize, political democratization took place not only as a response to the demands of civil society but perhaps even more so in correlation with neoliberalism and the developing neoliberal world system.\textsuperscript{12}

In playing a role in democratization, NGOs faced new realities. Newly democratic state institutions took up the alternatives that they suggested and promoted – and this process continues until today. This process has compelled NGOs to redefine their position towards the state.


\textsuperscript{12} The economist Friedrich Hayek created the term “neoliberalism” along with Wilhelm Roepke, Walter Eucken and others at a conference in 1938 in Paris. Neoliberalism is understood both as a concept of political economy and as a social-philosophical platform which seeks to minimize the influence of the state in the functioning of an economy. At the same time, it expects from the state to regulate and secure functional markets.

Historically there are three different concepts of neoliberalism: in Germany, the Freiburg School of Walter Eucken, Franz Boehm, Hans Grossmann-Doerth, Leonhard Miksch; in England, the London School of Economics with Edwin Cannan, and in the USA the Chicago School with Frank Knight and Milton Friedmann.

One of the consequences is that activists and NGO staff have moved into the reformed governments.\textsuperscript{13} In general, NGOs have always played a role in democratization. But if one takes a closer look, this process has often involved merely formal political changes which have not transformed the deeply rooted and complex relations between state and society or state and the capitalist market.\textsuperscript{14}

NGOs didn’t have the power to – or didn’t want to - challenge the current neoliberal order, because, as Craig and Porter (2006) described very clearly, neoliberalism took over their terminology concerning democracy, empowerment, human rights, participation, poverty and livelihoods. At the same time, massive financial support of the NGOs brought them into contact with national, international and multilateral organizations which had a strong impact on their political ideas.\textsuperscript{15} In contrast to developments in the North, NGOs in the South have been transformed into subcontracted service providers.\textsuperscript{16}

In the mid 1990s, the former positive image of NGOs gave way to public concern about their focus, their practice and the direction in which they were heading.


\textsuperscript{14} See also Schlumberger, Oliver, 2004: "PATRIMONIAL CAPITALISM. Economic Reform and Economic Order in the Arab World", Tübingen, http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/volltexte/2005/1947/pdf/complete.pdf. He concludes, opening markets creates only a superficial democratization, because existing structures are not touched.

\textsuperscript{15} See in Edwards, Michael and Hulme, David, 1997: NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort, New York: St. Martin's Press.; they are using the expression "too close for comfort".

\textsuperscript{16} See Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and Mitlin, Diana C., 2008: Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives, 14.; and as written in the introduction, externally financed NGOs appear as the stopgaps of privatization of social- and developmental politics in their countries.
During this time, an increasing diversification of NGOs took place. So called “developmental NGOs” turned into the biggest receivers of funds whereas charitable NGOs and NGOs dealing with different concerns became marginalized. NGOs which did not want to be “professional and institutionalized” or which refused to follow the policy of the donors lost the attention of donors respectively did not receive any support. This small number of NGOs continues, however, to develop alternatives in the shade of the big "developmental NGOs". Critical literature and studies—often country or area specific—began to appear which questioned the works of NGOs in general, as well as their ambivalent relation to donors. They posed such questions as: How independent are NGOs really? Who is legitimizing their work? Who do they rely on?

Anthony J. Bebbington, Samuel Hickey and Diana C. Mitlin (2008) argue that NGOs were turned into implementers of the reform agenda of the states and co-opted as enforcers of mainstream alternatives. They distinguish between three clear trends in the NGO sector: “… [the building of] either systematic or reformist alternatives: the continued deepening of the democratization-cum-neoliberalization agenda, the increasingly dominant poverty agenda in international aid; and the relatively more recent, hugely pernicious, security agenda, itself coupled in strange ways with the poverty agenda.”

Attention should be drawn to the one-sided view often found among donors, in the literature, and even expressed by certain powerful local NGOs that the

17 “Developmental NGOs” are defined by donors and their aim is to reduce human suffering, overcome injustice and assist people in developing countries to reach their full potential. Developmental NGOs are concerned with health, education, agriculture, human rights and women. For example, cooperatives, union and youth clubs are excluded from this definition. (see Kurt Bangert: http://www.worldvision-institut.de/_downloads/allgemein/Research%20for%20Development.pdf and see the World Bank report: World Bank and Bisan Center for Research and Development, 2006: "The role and performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and Agriculture", http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/10/05/000310607_20071005163344/Rendered/PDF/410440GZ0NGO0report01PUBLIC1.pdf; 21.

NGO sector is the embodiment of “the civil society”. This view proposes too narrow a definition of civil society and ignores the fact that civil society is not structured and defined exclusively by NGOs, even if most external Western aid is transferred to the NGO sector. Leyla Bahmad (2007) criticizes the narrow Western view in debates about civil society and the recognition of other civil societies and NGOs only in response to Western norms and ideas. She concludes that “… Western influences, which try to bump [sic] into the civil societies in the Arab states, may stir a little change but they cannot fully transform the Arab societies and with them the existing original systems. Or they might even ignite a conflict within society.”

Different societies and cultures do show different patterns of civil society which need to be recognized and analyzed both in their cultural and historical contexts.

In this thesis, NGOs are understood as one part of civil society. I will not dwell deeply on the different concepts, aspects and discussions in literature regarding the term "civil society", because the main research focus in the thesis is on how international aid influences the particular personal situations of PNGO-employees and, by extension, how international aid which is transferred to the small number of PNGOs favored by the donors, and not to the Palestinian Authority (PA), influences the development of Palestinian society as a whole. The concept civil society has changed over time and has been connected with a variety of often ambiguous concepts, beginning with the notion of civil society found in Aristotle who differentiates between social, political and

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19 See also Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 193.


21 For example, see Cooper, Frederik, 1997: "Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans and the Development Concept", in: Cooper, Frederik and Packard, Richard.

economic space. His thinking is dominated by state and civil society as a common unit which creates a peaceful living space. With his thoughts he inspired the ideas of Islamic philosophers like Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldoun, al-Farabi as well as al-Ghazali, about civil society in Islam. Thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau developed an understanding of civil society from the context of natural society with the introduction of civilization and civility, including the meaning of a progressive and positive development towards civil society, thinking civil society synonymous with the state. In the nineteenth century, the idea and the emergence of the modern state, also the process of industrialization "and the development of an increasing sphere of capitalist activities introduced us to the decisive idea of a clear distinction between civil society and the state." Hegel interprets civil society as one part of the state, while de Tocqueville distinguishes between civil society and political society, where political society complements the state and civil society. These thinkers influenced Marx who considers civil society to be a diversion in the context of economic and class distinction. He defines civil society as a part of the base which is separated in economic factors, manifested in the constitution (superstructure) of ideology and judicial power. Gramsci, an Italian Marxist of the early twentieth century, differentiates systematically between state and civil society. Gramsci views civil society as "... an important element of the superstructure, which becomes subordinating (Bobbio 1988:87) and which is necessary to impose and gain hegemony within society. Civil society, as the sphere of voluntary acceptance, is here opposed to political society (the sphere of coercion), and the oppressive state (Gramsci 2003).” Since the 1960s, the term civil society has been


26 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 27.
mainly used to conceptualize state-society relations, sometimes using a different expression like Habermas "public sphere".

As mentioned above, "civil society" is a term subject to change. The dominant definition is clearly rooted in European history and has developed connotations of progress and modernity. Terrier & Wagner (2006) demonstrate in social and political theory a widespread assumption that civil society is a metonym for modernity, as the sole desirable model for a modern society "to which all societies will gradually converge because of the higher rationality of its institutional arrangements." Eisenstadt (2003) stresses that there is no universal definition of modernity and that there are many ways to reach it.

In my thesis I rely on the normative concept of civil society, in the meaning of civil society as a free counterpart to the political and economical sphere. It can be described as a social entity located between the state, the economy and the private sphere, i.e. a sphere where social organizations and social actors operate. There is a clear separation between the state (political sphere), the economic sector (economical sphere) and civil society. As Cohen and Arato point out, actors of the political sphere or economic sphere "are directly involved with state power and economic production, which they seek to control and manage. They cannot afford to subordinate strategic and instrumental criteria to the patterns of normative integration and open-ended communication characteristic of civil society."}

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29 Gosewinkel, Dieter, "Zivilgesellschaft - eine Erschließung des Themas von seinen Grenzen her", 3.

2.1.1 In focus: Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations

In general, Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) do not differ in their historical development from NGOs in other parts of the world. The major difference is that they “have not emerged against the backdrop of an independent political authority and a sovereign state, but rather in conditions of confrontation with an occupying power that did not acknowledge the right of the Palestinian people to create political and social associations.”

PNGOs are popular with donors because they are seen as actors of civil society and therefore fit their categories of suitable recipients of aid. In Palestine today, i.e. since the end of the 1980ies, developmental NGOs are the most highly visible. They constitute around 20% of the NGO sector and receive the lion’s share of Western international aid. Their work is mainly concentrated in the fields of human rights, women’s rights, peace education, good governance, civil education, advocacy functions and knowledge production.

“Developmental NGOs” are the clear winners in getting support from international donors compared to other PNGOs – mainly charitable or Islamic organizations or various other organizations of civil society.

Benoit Challand (2009) drew a distinction between “two Palestines”. The “first Palestine” is built up by professional developmental NGOs, mainly advocated by a majority of international donors. The “second Palestine” is made up of mainly charitable organizations (where international funding is not so successful) and also includes the Islamic NGO sector. He highlights the fact that excluding PNGOs from the "second Palestine" defeats the purpose of civil society, i.e. the struggle for the implementation of democratic transformation. He explains clearly why, in the Western discourse, donors fail to recognize the achievements of this kind of civil society. It is “for the simplistic reason that is precisely ‘traditional’ or too communal in its way of organizing itself, and

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therefore not yet ripe for ‘modern’ forms of civil society support (namely institutional capacity building and the like).”  

The focus in this thesis is on PNGOs belonging to the “first Palestine” and on their employees and to consider the previously neglected area of the direct impact of financial support or political rents on Palestinian NGO employees.

### 2.1.2 In Focus: Palestinian NGO employees

The NGO sector is often called the *Third Sector*, because NGOs since the end of the 1980ies started to offer attractive and well paid jobs. The term Third Sector is also used in Palestine to designate the NGO sector. PNGO employees name different reasons that led them to work for and engage in PNGOs. They include ideological and religious motives or a need to improve socio-economic circumstances. It would be a mistake to neglect these factors by assuming a common motivation.

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33 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 17.

My research in this thesis focuses on employees in externally-funded (mainly defined as "developmental") NGOs. Concentrating on the income of PNGO employees and on the precise income structures, the direct economic, social and political influence of Western aid to PNGOs can be analyzed. This research approach is new and my study makes data available that allows this kind of analysis for the first time.

In my research approach PNGOs and their employees are understood as rent receivers. A rentier economy develops a system of rent-seeking which imposes a very specific way of acting by rent receivers. Rent seeking is based on attempts to improve and also to hold on to income. Rent seeking may involve tremendous efforts. Such efforts often involve and are supported by socio-political networks which individuals or groups create. Martin Beck (2002) refers to Gordon Tullock (1980) and Hartmut Eisenhans (1982; 1984: 288-300) and concludes: Rent seekers are actors who must often work extremely hard to generate their income: thus they need to maintain good relations in the long term with those who control the source of their rents. They set up and maintain complex sociopolitical networks which, from a capitalist perspective promotes corruption and waste. These networks are, however unavoidable to maintain a rent on a long-term basis.

This fact, leads to a central question: how and why PNGO employees who see themselves as actors for change act in a rentier state environment, as a special group of rent-seekers. Additional details and an in-depth analysis follow below.

35 Nowadays NGOs show a mixed funding of multilateral and also bilateral funding. The difference between multilateral funding and bilateral funding is their way of money it takes till it reaches the NGO. Multilateral funding flows through an international organization (for example UNWRA, UNICEF or the World Bank) comparing to bilateral funding where the donor country or a donor organization pays directly to the aid recipient. See Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 74.


"Rent-Seeker sind Akteure, die häufig durchaus hohe Anstrengungen unternehmen müssen, um ihre Einkommen zu generieren: so müssen sie dauerhafte gute Beziehungen zu denjenigen pflegen, die an den Rentenquellen sitzen. Sie errichten und pflegen komplexe soziopolitische Netzwerke, die aus capitalistischer Sicht der Korruption dienen - und damit Verschwendung gleichkommen -, aus rentenpolitischer Logik aber unerlässig sind um die Rente auf eine dauerhafte Basis zu stellen."
2.2 Current state of research

Doing research on civil society, focusing on Non-Governmental Organizations in Palestine, in the Arab world and beyond the Arab world, I discovered considerable current research in various disciplines. In the following section, I define the terms used in my thesis. I will also discuss how it is possible and why it is useful to transfer rentier state theory from the state level to the level of civil society.

2.2.1 Rents

The terms rents and rentier state theory are used in the context of states and governments. The state may be a receiver of rents. Political rents are defined as “budget transfers between states”. Rents represent income that is obtained without investment or labor. Rents are free for disposition and are not subject to market conditions of reinvestment. By definition, political rents do not include nor do they derive from productive effort but that does not mean that this kind of income requires nothing in return.37 As written above, the existence of a rent system brings about rent-seeking, i.e. the active effort to acquire further rents. This effort includes a special way of acting and re-acting of the rent receivers in order to receive further rents.

The reality in the OPTs is that donors pay not only political rents to the Palestinian Authority, i.e. the “State”, but also to the non-governmental organizations’ sector. Therefore PNGOs become part of the same rentier system as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA, just as the PNGO sector, is depending on the same donors like World Bank, European Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF), USA etc. In rentier state theory, the behavior of state actors is in focus together with the social groups they co-opt. The question therefore arises how other parts of society act in a rentier economy: for

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example those civil society actors who receive autonomously political rents from the same donors as their government, and who nevertheless consider themselves to be a free counterpart to the government.  

Are they right to consider themselves free from the influence of their sponsors? Are they in any way freer in their behavior than the Palestinian Authority? I assume that we have "two groups of rent recipients" in one state (the occupied Palestinian territories are treated as a single state here), the PA, i.e. the "state", and the non-governmental sector, or civil society, here made up of PNGOs. Rents to both groups of rent recipients are delivered with clear pre-conditions. According to rentier state theory as argued by Beck, the Palestinian Authority with its neopatrimonial system supports its "own political clients" to stabilize its power in Palestinian society.  

Donor countries pursue a clear political goal, namely the stabilization of the region and the maintenance of the "peace process" with Israel. This raises the questions. Whose clients are to be found in the NGO sector and what agenda do they follow?

2.2.2 Short review on rentier state theory, rents and patrimonial capitalism

*Rentier state theory* was developed in connection with the oil price revolution of the nineteen-seventies and became one of the key analytical concepts for the

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38 See for example the mission statement of the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network on their homepage (about us): "Empowering and protecting the autonomy of the Palestinian society, consolidating its role in the national struggle and democratization process bases on the principles of democracy, social justice, rule of law, tolerance, and respect of human rights."; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network, http://www.pngo.net/viewdetails.aspx?id=20133.

study of the political, economic and social conditions in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{40} Rentier states those whose budgets owe at least 20\% of their income to external rents.\textsuperscript{41} A rent is defined as income obtained without investment or labor. It is free for disposition and it is not subject to market conditions of reinvestment. It is subject to the interests of the rentier. Rentier states are defined as ‘classic rentier states’ through, for example, oil rents or, ‘semi-rentier states’ which receive political rents in the form of development aid. These states are typically characterized by considerable financial autonomy within their societies and by unrestricted political power over their citizens.\textsuperscript{42} They can be classified as neopatrimonial and centralized systems, combined with powerful state bureaucracies, where democratic movements and productive economic development are blocked. Support from various social groups secures the ruling system. In this process, the ethnic, religious and social backgrounds of supporting groups are of secondary importance. Primary is their role in securing the ruling system.\textsuperscript{43} Since the mid-nineteen-eighties, other work in this field assumes that the decline of rent income can cause an economic crisis. And indeed, an increased vulnerability of rentier states is observed with a decline of rent income of up to


20%. These crises often force economic restructuring. Normally these circumstances force an opening towards economic and political liberalization and should increase the chances of a democratic process. A similar line of argument is found in the democratization and transformation debate at the beginning of the nineties in the writings of Rex Brynen (1992). Work by Steven Hydemann (1993) and Holger Albrecht, Peter Pawelka and Oliver Schlumberger (1997) on Syria and Egypt, however, modify the parallelism of market-economic transformation and political democratization. They argue that this approach ignores certain basic social patterns in the Middle East. Oliver Schlumberger (2004) proposed that this variation of the classic Rentier state should be recognized as a new system, which he called *patrimonial capitalism*. Patrimonial capitalism is understood as a modern economic structure based on patrimonialism with patronage and an informal hierarchy. Despite liberalization and economic opening, traditional political systems remain stable due to the structures of patronage and informal hierarchy. Rents, whether they are classic oil rents or equivalent political rents, contribute to the modernization of the economy. However, traditional political systems remain, in the context of an authoritarian political order, a key factor in maintaining non-democratic patronage and clientelism.

In my research, I deal with the question whether it is reasonable to consider the NGO sector and its employees as clients and, if so, whose clients they are and how they perform as clients.

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**Excursus**

A short analysis of the terms clients, clientelism, neopatrimonialism and elite

Since Palestine receives up to 68% of its GNP in form of political rents – mainly humanitarian and development aid – Palestine has the characteristics of a ‘semi-Rentier state’. In this context ‘client’ and ‘elite’ are important and inter-related terms which will now be considered.

**Patron and client**

A client in this sense of the word is always defined as the counterpart to a patron and exists only in a patron-client relationship. Ergun Oezbudun (1981) stresses three major aspects of a patron-client relations, relying on Alex Weingrod (1968), John D. Powell (1970), René Lemarchand and Keith Legg (1972), James C. Scott (1972) and Karl H. Landé (1973)48:

1. Inequality in terms of wealth and influence
2. Reciprocal exchange of services for “goods”
3. Face-to-face relationship, without being defined in a more detailed manner.49

René Lemarchand and Keith Legg (1972) define the nature of patron-client relationships as “a more or less personalized relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth status, or

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influence based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions.\textsuperscript{50} This kind of relationship has two forms: first, the traditional form of clientelism (for example land ownership, religious status) and second, a political (party) form is possible. Peter Pawelka (1985) observes that in patrimonial or neopatrimonial systems, client relations are on one hand a short running alliance, calculating and manipulative and on the other hand involve personal forms of cooperation in the pursuit of political relevance.\textsuperscript{51}

In a political milieu, systems of patron-client-relations are unstable, because the elites who have power to allocate authority and job related positions – are also in an unstable situation. This is an important aspect for the rent-seeking behavior of such elites (see below in more detail). At the end of the 1960s and with the beginning of the 1970s new light was shed on this phenomenon. The discourse was always affected by debates about patronage and clientelism. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1973) in \textit{Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism}, and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) in \textit{Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange}, stressed the consequences of such relationships in the context of modernization and political development.\textsuperscript{52} Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) argue that Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1973) was the first who used the term “neo-patrimonialism” in this context.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Lemarchand, René and Legg, Keith, 1972: "Political Clientelism and Development", 69.

\textsuperscript{51} Pawelka, Peter, 1985: Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten, Heidelberg: Müller, 21.


\textsuperscript{53} In Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All Concept", German Institute of Global and Area Studies, GIGA working papers, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/working-papers?field_year_value=8.
Neopatrimonialism and political clientelism

I follow Erdmann and Engel (2006) when they define Neopatrimonialism as both a patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic type of domination, with both types of domination in an uneasy co-existence. Officially and formally there is a differentiation between the private and public realms but in daily reality this differentiation is not made.

These two systems are not really isolated from each other, “….quite to the contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and effects. That is, informal politics invade formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in various ways and by varying degrees; and this particular mix becomes institutionalized as suggested by Bratton and van de Walle (1997:63).”

An important characteristic is insecurity regarding the behaviour and role of state institutions (and agents). This has the consequence that it is insecurity which promotes the reproduction of the system. How does it work? State operations are not calculable. To overcome the insecurity, actors operate on the formal and on the informal level. This relationship between formal and informal creates the cycle of reproduction of the system.

Politics and policies are dominated by particularistic interests and orientations. This lies in the structure of social and political relations. Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) see a correspondence between neopatrimonialism and authoritarian politics as a rent-seeking culture. Democracy and a market economy are dominated by legal-rational correspondence.


55 See more details how the mechanism is function in Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All Concept", 18-19.

Political clientelism

Peter Pawelka (1985) defines political clientelism as Herrschaftsbeziehung, a power relationship between unequal individuals or groups. It serves as an analytical tool for political subsystems in the third world. Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) include in political clientelism the notion of client networks. Clientelist networks offer protection in insecure neopatrimonalistic structures. On one hand they offer “protection” for its people on the other hand they support the reproduction of the system or oppression: "Political clientelism in both forms is a child of uncertain prospects. A client needs a patron for protection either to avoid something or to assist in gaining what otherwise would not be obtainable. In short, developing a clientelist network it is a means to gain protection and to achieve goals in a situation of societal uncertainty created by public institutions which may behave in ways that are not calculable. Clientelism clearly contributes to the reproduction of the institutional uncertainty that is designed to overcome ... In other words; clientelism is to be understood as an answer to the institutional uncertainty created by neopatrimonial rule. However, the situation created by widely used clientelist strategy is not necessarily one of chaos because if officials or official institutions are confronted with competing clientelistic demands, they can take refuge in the formal rules that they are supposed to exercise.”

Clientelism – Neopatrimonialism and consequences

There are differing views about the connection between clientelism and neopatrimonialism. René Lemarchand and Keith Legg (1972) assume that clientelism and patrimonialism are conflated. In contrast, Jean Francois

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Médard (1982) suggests “clientelism and neopatrimonialism are two competing models for explaining the “politics of underdevelopment”59 Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) use clientelism (also nepotism, corruption and tribalism) not only as categories for an underdeveloped state, they extend these terms to describe the politics of a neopatrimonial state.

Under neopatrimonialism, with the reality of rent and rent-seeking, a rentier economy exists de facto. Catherine Boone (1990) defines Rentier activities as “politically mediated opportunities for obtaining wealth through non-productive economic activity”.60 Rent seeking is based on attempts to improve and also to hold on to income.61 Rent seeking may involve tremendous efforts. Such efforts often involve and are supported by socio-political networks which individuals or groups create. Analysis built on the rent seeking approach refers to the negative impacts of this activity. Peter Pawelka (1994) concludes, that international rents actually maintain underdevelopment and also undermine the willingness of those who benefit from rents to undertake an intellectual and economic effort.62 Erich Weede (1985) argues that rent and rent-seeking “keeps poor people poor”. To acquire rents needs a high standard of professional competence which socially weaker people do not necessarily possess. He concludes that, under these circumstances, overcoming underdevelopment is not possible.63


In fact, a rentier economy reinforces neopatrimonial governance. The difference between rents and rent-seeking lies in the fact that rents can decline while rent-seeking is increasing.

**NGOs – whose clients?**

The Palestinian Authority, the PNGO sector and also the private sector (financed to some extent by external political rents) receive political rents from donors. In the case of Palestine, a rentier economy has long been a reality. As mentioned above, the income of rents always produces rent-seeking.

Is it possible - and can the data of the study verify - to consider PNGOs, just like the PA, as a state structure in the context of a rentier state economy? Can one conclude further that PNGOs have come to behave like the state and are now rent seekers? Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) include clientelistic networks in the meaning of political clientelism. Clientelism and clientelistic networks offer protection in insecure structures and at the same time they support the reproduction of the system (see in this paper, excursus: political clientelism). Can we conclude that clientelism and client networks offer protection in insecure structures for NGOs just as for states and that at the same time they support the reproduction of the system? Do they also induce rent-seeking in the NGO sector?

**Some reflections about elites**

In public perception, in contrast to the terminology of the social sciences, the term elite is often understood as an ‘elite of values’ (Wertelite), a minority endowed with moral and ethic qualities. Nowadays social sciences consider the distinctions between functional elites (Funktionseliten). In modern society,
functional elites act in various spheres where they act as important decision makers.\(^{65}\)

Without going in depth into elite theory reaching back to Gaetano Mosca (1950) through Vilfredo Pareto (1955), Charles Wright Mill (1956), to the more modern writings of Pierre Bordieu (1982, 1987, 1998) and Morus Markard (2005); we are now accustomed to distinguish between elites and the mass of the people they serve while considering the influence of each on the other. Elites take upon themselves in contrary to the mass of the population, a societal function and they have a higher power potential. This potential allows elites to influence structures and development of their society.\(^{66}\)

Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) argue that in the OPTs there exists a “globalized elite” in the NGO sector.\(^{67}\) They attribute to the Palestinian globalized elite in the NGO sector the following four characteristics:

1. actors who are informed by global agendas
2. a particular position on the Middle East peace process
3. an urban elite, since donor funding is concentrated in Palestinian cities and
4. a professionalized elite\(^{68}\)


\(^{68}\) Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 248-249.
In this thesis, I am in particular interested in the aforementioned possibility of NGO elites influencing the structures and the development of a society. My major research question therefore is: how and in which fields does the NGO elite influence the structure and development of Palestinian society?

Changing elites in the Arab world

A discussion about elites in the Arab world implies the above-mentioned facts. Such elites may be considered as those people in a particular country who wield power and influence insofar as they make strategic decisions on a national level, thus taking part in the development and definition of political norms and values, or help shape the definition of what counts as the national interest or who influence the public debate over strategic matters.69

This discussion also involves being aware and analyzing reciprocity between the changing elites and the economic process of adaptation. One must bear in mind regional and international relationships and include possible new actors of political, economic and social modernization. A widely used model for the Arab world is the ‘circle model’, introduced by Peter Pawelka (1985), which explains neopatrimonial rule and political elites in Egypt during the period of Anwar as-Sadat. Volker Perthes (2002) modified it as a heuristic tool for analyzing political relevant elites presenting them by means of three circles.70

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69 Perthes, Volker, 2002: "Elitenwandel in der arabischen Welt und Iran", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin; 7. „…jene Personen, die in einem bestimmten Land Macht und Einfluss ausüben, indem sie strategische Entscheidungen auf nationaler Ebenen treffen, an der Entscheidungsfindung darüber teilhaben, die Definition politischer Normen und Werte oder die Definition dessen, was als “nationales” Interesse gilt, mitbestimmen oder die öffentliche Debatte über strategische Themen maßgeblich beeinflussen.”

The first circle includes the core-elite. The second circle includes parliamentarians, businessmen, the military leadership, tribal elites, religious elites, civil servants, and the third circle comprises intellectuals, the military leadership, tribal elites, unionists, religious elites, civil servants, businessmen and civil actors (circles can overlap). In the case analyzed in this study, using this heuristic model, societal actors should be placed in the third circle. Obviously it is a very challenging question to find out, when and under which conditions an NGO elite will move into the second or first circle. However this question will not be taken up in the context of this thesis. For this research, PNGO employees, from service personnel to the director were the subjects of quantitative and qualitative studies.

As mentioned above, elites have in contrary to the broader public, a societally determining function and they have a higher power potential. This potential allows elites to influence structures and the development of a society. So, bearing in mind, that PNGO personnel are in principle engaged in a form of alternative social development, the following questions are addressed in this research:
- What kind of power potential does the PNGO elite possess?
- What are the consequences for PNGO employees and for Palestinian society as a whole?
- How can PNGO employees be usefully classified?
- Do PNGO-elites use their power potential to either change or maintain the status quo?

In securing and extending their own power bases, do these elites seek to stabilize the dominant political system or do they use their influence to bring about progressive economical, cultural and political development / change for all members of society?

Excursus finished

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2.2.4 A brief history of political rents in Palestine

After the ‘Oslo peace agreement’, precise: Declaration of Principles’ in September 1993, the World Bank expected that Palestine (Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank) would develop into a capitalist system with democratic structures. A precondition for this development was a rapid implementation of the 2-state solution and close economic cooperation with Israel (Paris Protocols of 1994)). The Palestinian Authority received massive support from international donors. Muriel Asseburg (2002), saw a fatal connection between a lack of progress in the peace process and the marked lack of economic development. As a result of the political and economic stagnation during the Oslo years (1993-2000) and after, the rentier-character of the system became more deeply entrenched. After 1993, the Palestinian Authority was generously supported by international donors through payments which should best be analyzed and understood as political rents, as argued by Martin Beck.

Donors reacted rapidly to the impact of the Second Intifada (since 2000, but especially after 2002) with short-term humanitarian assistance programs. These are essential for the Palestinian population; they promote, however, a long-term dependence on external aid. Anne Le More (2005) analyzed the impact of


73 Net current transfers to the OPT (mainly donor support) were US$ 2.4 billion in 2011. see http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdb59d2_en.pdf
international aid on the political level. She argues that international financial assistance is often used as a substitute for political action. For the Palestinians, the strategy 'Aid for Peace' has extremely negative consequences: "...by sustaining such high levels of funds over such a long period, donors also bankrolled a poorly run and increasingly disliked Palestinian regime, subsidized Israeli military occupation, and indirectly encouraged the continuing colonization and fragmentation of the OPTs, as well as the broader process of Palestinian dispossession."  

2.2.5 Political rents and the Palestinian Authority

Martin Beck (2002) uses rentier state theory to explain key aspects of political and economic development in Palestine. He succeeds in showing clearly why and how the Palestinian Authority has used external assistance payments for their political needs. The PA has developed with the help of a de-politicization strategy a dependent monopoly sector and built an extensive client network. Oliver Schlumberger (2004) explains the debilitating effect of rents on the process of democratization in the Arab world, and shows how they have strengthened neopatrimonial ruling structures.

Though Western donors had an interest in tying rents paid to the PA to certain political demands, the results wished for or intended for did not come about. The reasons are related to the priorities of the donor countries: the maintenance of political stability in the Middle East and the promotion of the Israeli / Palestinian peace process. This led to a skewing of the terms under which aid was to be granted, the origins of which Anne Le More (2008) traces back directly to the Oslo accords. The strategy of Israel with its blockade of the occupied Palestinian territories has also seriously hindered the development of the Palestinian economy. Also, geographical divisions of the occupied

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Palestinian territories have been particularly disruptive. After 1993, the West Bank and Gaza were separated in an increasingly strict way, despite the provisions of the Oslo treaties. As for the West Bank, Oslo divided the West Bank geographically into zones A, B and C. Roadblocks set up in 2002 between the various zones have greatly hindered the flow of goods and people. With the beginning of 2003, Israel constructed a wall, which it called “a separation barrier”, along and within the border line of 1967. It separates communities from their land, forcing farmers to spend many hours each day in waiting for permission to tend their own fields.

The relentless expansion of illegal Israeli settlements deprives the Palestinian economy of resources such as water and land. Independent and progressive economic development is thus rendered extremely difficult if not impossible.  

2.2.6 Political rents in the PNGO sector

Since the start of the Oslo process Western donors have assumed that with their massive financial support for the PA and the PNGO sector, Palestinian society can be strengthened in building a civil, democratic system.

The research of Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) focuses on the NGO sector supported by Western donors. They agree with Martin Beck (2002) and Rex Brynen (1996) that Western financial assistance to the PA is intended in the first place for the preservation of political stability in the region and for the promotion of the peace process with Israel. In their studies, they have noticed a change in the type of financial support of the Western donors towards PNGOs. Until 1993, NGOs in the Palestinian territories were supported by ‘international solidarity funds’. With the Oslo Accord and the establishment of

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the Palestinian Authority, donors’ politics have come to be dominated by "donor funding with predefined concerns".76 The promotion of democracy, human rights, women’s issues, and the health sector are given priority. David S. Brown, Christopher J. Brown and Scott W. Deposato (2008) provide an overview over the consequences for NGOs which are supported by international donors. In their study on the possibility of political change by funding NGOs, they conclude that political change through cooperation of heterogeneous local NGOs is still possible.77 Sarah L. Henderson (2002), Robert D. Putman (2000), Pauline J. Luong and Erika Weintal (1999), Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn (2002) and Ian Smillie (1995) acknowledge (with Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) on Palestine) a substantive reorientation of NGOs through "donor funding with predefined concerns".78

The consequences are changes in internal organization and notable impacts on their work in the field. Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) see these changes as affecting the entire Palestinian NGO structure. Not all NGOs can (or want to) meet the required criteria for this emerging “NGO market.” The consequences are described in the following way “Selection of donor resources, the emergence of large NGOs and ... the circulation of knowledge within aid channels and the emergence of a 'development discourse' created new terms of legitimacy for local NGOs. Despite the language of participation and empowerment, only a narrow, educated elite could effectively participate

76 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 205.


in this discourse and thereby control resources. We refer to this group as a ‘globalized elite’ and we observe that they dominated the Palestinian NGO (PNGO) sector before the collapse of PNA institutions during the Israeli re-occupation which began in 2000”.

2.3 Research question

I have used the analyses of Martin Beck (2002), Oliver Schlumberger (2004) and Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) as the basis for my research. Like Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) I examine the PNGO sector, but unlike Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar and other researchers, I focus in my theoretical and empirical analyses on the micro-economic impact of political rents. Based on a quantitative and qualitative survey of working histories, salaries and income structures of PNGO-employees, I try to document the everyday socio-economic impact of political rents. These new data enable me to analyze the socio-economic, social and political impacts on local populations in the West Bank and Gaza. This leads to clear answers to the major research question What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents?

As already mentioned above, Palestinian NGOs in general do not differ in their development from NGOs in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, some aspects of the history of Palestinian NGOs must be highlighted and analyzed under the aspect of the continuing Israeli occupation. In the case of Palestine, we have to consider three actors which NGOs have to deal with: first Israel as the occupying power, second the Palestinian Authority (since 2007 divided into one in Gaza led by Hamas and another in the West Bank led by Fatah – both ruling authorities without a state) and third international donors who support a peace process on hold and treat the Palestinian territories politically as a “post-conflict zone” which implies that the political conflict is over – although this clearly is not the case.

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The results of the quantitative and qualitative study can answer the main research question and verify my working hypothesis.

Main questions and working hypothesis:

1. What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents?

The study will clarify the influence of Western aid, which is transferred to certain PNGOs, not to the PA, and aims to analyze the impact on the individual level of PNGO employees, but also the more general changes taking place in Palestinian society.

2. Do external political rents establish and support a “globalized elite”? My new quantitative data can corroborate the thesis of Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) of an emerging, globalized elite which has developed out of the PNGO sector and detached itself from the base of the Palestinian population.

3. What kind of NGO employee landscape does exist in Palestine?

NGO employees have already been observed and analyzed in the literature as middle class, de-politicized and de-radicalized, forming a globalized NGO elite.\(^8\)

My new quantitative and qualitative data can show if this characteristic is valid for all PNGO employees and can document all varieties of working realities, not only of an elite, in the PNGO sector.

4. *Do subsidies in the PNGO sector engender a pro-western client group which supports PLO / Mahmoud Abbas politics?*

Externally funded PNGOs who receive western money are seen in public as influenced by western cultures and policies. My analyses based on the new data collection sheds light on this fact and considers whether PNGOs may still be seen as a free counterpart to the government of the PA.

5. *Are externally-funded NGOs reducing the brain drain of people with higher education by financing suitable jobs in the occupied territories?*

NGOs (international and Palestinian) in general offer jobs with good salaries, especially for fresh university graduates, compared to other working sectors. The data will document the reasons why people are working in the NGO sector and can show, if being able to find work in a NGO reduces emigration.

6. *Does the thesis of Anne Le More (2005, 2008) regarding impacts in the political sector also hold true for the NGO sector? Does this imply that external western donors’ decision to support the NGO sector extensively does not strengthen but rather debilitates civil society?*

My data analyzes, along with references to other research results can answer this question.

2.4 Sources and methodology

NGOs have drawn a lot of attention and much (a huge amount of literature) has been written about them. Most studies and evaluations are qualitative and concentrate on PNGOs themselves and the results of their changing internal processes of organization (Rema Hammami (1995), Sari Hanafi and Linda
Tabar (2005)), on PNGOs’ relationship with their donors (Benoit Challand (2005, 2009), and finally on the donors’ influence on the agendas of NGOs.

I take this previous work as a starting point. This research is thus based in the first stage on a quantitative study and in the second on a qualitative study. It provides data on personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, including salaries, and also personal political attitudes in the past and present of a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to directors) both in the West Bank and in Gaza. The field research was carried out in the occupied Palestinian territories, between August 2010 and March 2011. A detailed introduction to the methodology of the quantitative and qualitative study follows in chapter 3, in the report of the study results.

This analysis also builds on secondary literature and available comparative data from other researchers and research centers.

As noted above, Benoit Challand (2009) has drawn a distinction between “two Palestines”. The “first Palestine” is built up by professional developmental NGOs, mainly supported financially by a majority of international donors. The “second Palestine”, covers mainly charitable organizations (where international funding is not so big, or relevant or successful) and also includes the Islamic NGO sector. Islamic NGOs are not included in this study. They show different structures concerning external funding, and also in terms of voluntary work in their organizations. Sara Roy (2011) provides a detailed insight into the Islamic NGO sector with its religious background and orientation. As a matter of fact, a comparison between these two types of NGO worlds would be very helpful in analyzing their different standing in society and thus their different input in transformation of society. But this would be beyond the limits of this dissertation.

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81 Concerning my research, it is important to note that this study explicitly does not deal with the objective and measurable results of NGO projects since there has been done much research on this issue.

82 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 15.

The field study was done in cooperation with the Birzeit University Human Rights and Democracy Program. I designed the research and was responsible from November 2009 until December 2011 for the complete process of the study. The project was financed by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Ramallah.

In the following chapter three the methodology of the study will be introduced and the newly collected data will be documented and analyzed in interim conclusions. In chapter four, the interim conclusions will be developed to a full analysis.
Chapter 3


Mindful of the need to avoid unfounded generalizations, an important aim of this study is to support any assertions with quantitative data. Parts of the study and analyzes written in chapter three and four have already been published by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Ramallah.


and printed version:

/ أثرها الاجتماعي المنظمات غير الحكومية الفلسطينية :ملخص عن الحراسة الاقتصادية / رامالله 2013 والاجتماعي / السياس م من المجتمع الفلسطيني مؤسسة روزا لكسومبورخ

Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations. Their socio-economic, social and political impact on Palestinian society, Ramallah, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2013;

/Publication in Arabic, abridged English work

As mentioned at the beginning of chapter one, when Palestinian NGOs are discussed in context as international NGOs the acronym NGOs is used.

In this chapter, I will do something unconventional in academic writing and change from the first person singular, "I" to the plural, "we". Although I am the only person who is responsible for the idea, the design, results and writing of this study, the outcome of a quantitative and qualitative study always relies on a research team and the academic environment in which it is embedded and without which it would not have been possible.
3.1 Methodology / research standards for the quantitative and qualitative field research

3.1.2 Operational definition of NGO

We used 3 main characteristics to define a Non-governmental Organization. An NGO must be:

1. independent, being institutionally separate from the government.
2. a non-profit-organization
3. officially recognized and have an administrative and financial system.

The methodology of this study is multi-staged, combining quantitative data followed by qualitative data obtained during field research using focus group interviews and involving different statistical data resources for comparison. Data collection took place in four stages.

3.1.3 Quantitative research

Stage 1: Background preparation for quantitative field research

1. Reviewing local, Arabic and international literature on surveying PNGOs.

2. Preparation of the quantitative research questionnaire:
   As the questionnaire is the basic tool of our quantitative study, we took time to develop the questionnaire to formulate the questions appropriately. The questionnaire was discussed in a workshop at Birzeit University.

   The questionnaire was divided in 4 parts:
1. information about the PNGO the person is working in and private information,
2. working history,
3. living standard and salary and
4. personal and political attitude in present, past and future.

A cross-reading by three experts in quantitative field research and familiar with research on NGOs in Palestine followed, also a test-run in five different PNGOs. The test run was important to check the contents of the questionnaire and to ensure that the language would be understandable to participants. The expert feedback was discussed and modified accordingly. The test run was also helpful in identifying problems a field worker might face.

Training of researchers at Birzeit University: Five fieldwork researchers for the West Bank were trained in workshops: contacting PNGOs, conducting fieldwork, coding and data entry. Two fieldwork researchers from Gaza were unable to participate because of the closure.

Stage 2: Organizing the field work

In July 2010 the PNGOs were selected. First PNGOs were contacted by telephone, followed by a written invitation introducing the survey and asking for their support in the research.

Outline:

1. **Target group:** PNGO employees mainly in external, western funded NGOs.

2. **The governorates in West Bank and Gaza** were treated equally. West Bank is divided in North West Bank with Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem.
(Tubas), Salfit, Qalqilia, Central West Bank with Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Jericho and Jerusalem, South West Bank with Bethlehem and Hebron. Gaza is divided in North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah.

3. **Coverage:** Five NGO fields – health, agriculture, women, human rights / peace education and youth.

4. **Location of the NGO:** urban, rural and refugee camps

5. **Size of NGO:** we classify NGOs with up to three employees as small, NGOs having from four to ten employees as middle-sized and NGOs with above 11 employees as large.

6. **Taken into account:** gender considerations

The questionnaires were delivered personal by a research team, consisted of a woman and a man. This method makes possible a personal contact between the people of the institution and the researchers. If necessary, open questions concerning the study could then be answered.

To maintain anonymity, each questionnaire was packed in an envelope with a stamp from Birzeit University on the back. If after answering the questions the envelope was properly closed, nobody could subsequently open the envelope without our noticing. The single envelopes were collected in a big envelope. After two days, or sometimes later, the completed questionnaires were collected by a research team.
Sample

A total of 203 PNGOs were surveyed. 1099 questionnaires were received from 128 PNGOs in the West Bank and from 75 PNGOs in Gaza.

49 questionnaires had to be excluded for several reasons:
- some came from non-salaried volunteers
- some were returned unfilled without explanation.
- some were returned unfilled with an explanation. In this case, non-respondents gave the following reasons:
  “no time to fill out the questionnaire”,
  “the questions are too personal”,
  “the subject is uninteresting”,
  “the questionnaire helps the world spy on Palestinian people”,
  and
  “lack of work experience makes answering the questions difficult”.

We sought to choose PNGOs equally in the sectors of health, agriculture, women, human rights / peace education and youth. In some districts it was not possible to find PNGOs meeting the requested criteria either because they did not exist or because suitable PNGOs were unwilling to participate in the study. In this case, we tried to fill up the numbers of PNGOs randomly until 15 PNGOs per district were reached. Nevertheless, in some districts of the West Bank, the number of 15 PNGOs could not be reached.

The following NGO fields were represented: Women 40%, Youth 32%, Health 30%, Agriculture 18%, Human Rights 6% and Peace Training 5%. The total is more than 100% since some NGOs work in more than one field.

Size of NGO / Number of employees:
1-3 employees: 7%, 4-7 employees: 25%, 8-20 employees: 32% and 21 and above employees: 30%, 6%: data missing.
PNGO quantitative survey

Six fieldworkers, four in the West Bank and two in Gaza distributed and collected questionnaires.

West Bank: from August 4. – September 15. 2010
Gaza: from August 18. – August 30. 2010

Summary of field work preparation

The issue of a unique PNGO list:
With all official PNGO lists, for example lists from the Ministry of Interior or PNGO-network, we faced the problem that they were not up-to-date or were incomplete.

Getting a documentation of supported PNGOs by the EU from the Technical Assistance Office in Jerusalem was a long procedure which led nowhere. The EU itself officially committed (in their documents) to transparency seemed to be either unable or unwilling to pass on lists of supported PNGOs in the period 2004-2010.

In 2006/2007, the United Nations published a two-volume Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank 2006 and in Gaza 2007. Even if the publication is now somewhat out-of-date, it is very helpful and detailed. Having being informed about the existence of this publication, however, it was impossible to get a printed version or an electronic copy from the United Nations Office in Jerusalem.

Easy to get and helpful in finding addresses of PNGOs is the Palestinian Yellow Pages. The problem in this case was that the PNGOs listed had often ceased to exist or their telephone number was out of order.
Summary of field work experience:

In general the research teams in West Bank and Gaza found an open and friendly atmosphere in working with the PNGOs. The fact (mentioned by PNGO-employees) that the University of Birzeit is a well respected institution, opened many doors. To sum up the experience of working in various districts, the district of Ramallah / Al-Bireh, Jericho and East Jerusalem presented the greatest difficulties: PNGOs agreed at first to participate in the research and then decided against doing so or they returned questionnaires late (research assistants had to go two or three times to collect the questionnaires.)

Stage 3: Data coding and data entry

Data coding and data entry was done for the West Bank between September 20 and November 13, 2010 and for Gaza November between 3 And 15 December 2010.

The process of data coding and data entry was supervised by an expert in SPSS.

Data viewing

The first data analysis revealed a clear dataset without the need of a rerun. It showed the expected differences between the West Bank and Gaza, female and male and between age groups in connection with stable or unstable contracts.

To deepen the analysis, we decided to follow up the quantitative research with a phase of qualitative research based on focus groups (FGs). Building from an analysis of the quantitative data – main demographic and employment distinctions were uncovered that formed the framework for forming the various focus groups in which deeper and more targeted understanding of the dynamics and issues uncovered in the quantitative survey could be assessed.
3.1.4. Qualitative research

Stage 4: Preparation of Focus Group Interviews

In a qualitative research workshop at Birzeit University held on February 10, 2011, we discussed the results of the data. The data revealed obvious differences between respondents from the West Bank and Gaza, between female and male. There were differences based on the age (generation) of employees and differences in the types of contracts, in terms of job security and salary levels. The qualitative research consisted of six focus groups in the West Bank and six in Gaza.

For the West Bank:

1. female, age: 40 years and above in Birzeit (central WB)
2. male, age: 40 years and above, in Birzeit (central WB)
3. female, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts” in Nablus (North WB)
4. male, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts”, in Nablus (North WB)
5. female, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Bethlehem (South WB)
6. male, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Bethlehem (South WB)

For Gaza:

1. female, age: 40 years and above in Gaza City
2. male, age: 40 years and above, in Gaza City
3. female, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts” Khan Yunis
4. male, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts”, Khan Yunis
5. female, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Rafah
6. male, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Rafah
“good contracts”: no part time job, contract more than 1 year, permanent contract
“bad contracts”: part time job, contract less than 1 year, or no written contract

**Organization of the field work:**

PNGOs were telephoned and asked to participate and to send employees fitting the different categories to the focus groups (FGs).

In Gaza the focus groups were held from 19.-21 February 2011 and in the West Bank from 21 February - 3 March 2011.

In the West Bank we faced more difficulties in organizing the focus groups than in Gaza. For example, in our focus group female, 40 years and above, scheduled on 23 February 2011 in Ramallah, 6 women agreed to attend the meeting. An obligatory reminder by telephone followed the day before, but no women showed up for the focus group. This also happened with our focus group entitled male, 30 years and below with “good contracts” in Bethlehem. Only one man attended. In this case we changed our concept to in-depth, individual interviews and scheduled additional meetings for the two focus groups who failed to attend. It is interesting that participants in focus groups who had bad or poor contracts were more motivated to attend our sessions.

All focus groups were recorded; a transcription and an English translation were prepared.
Secondary Data Collection

The impact of external aid, which is transferred directly as wages or salaries, can be analyzed comparatively, where existing data concerning Palestinian society are available. Whenever necessary, the data sources to be used for comparison are referenced through the text. Pure sources were the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the Ministry of Planning and the Administrative Development database (MOP), major studies from Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), World Bank and other material in the form of the annual reports of other organizations.

3.2 Available cash – impact of international aid on the daily lives of NGO employees and on Palestinian society itself

3.2.1 Background information about the Palestinian Labor Market

The study was carried out between August 4, 2010 and March 3, 2011. PCBS, Labor Force Survey Report Series, April-June 2010 estimated the labor force participation rate to be 41.5%. In other words, 980,400 people of 15 years and above from a working age population of 2,365,000 comprised the Palestinian labor force. 58.5% or 1,384,600 people of working age remained outside the labor force. Reasons for being outside the labor force are mainly housekeeping (47.7%), studying or training (36.5%) and age or illness (10.1%).

Women’s labor force participation in the formal labor force at 15.2% (WB 17.6%, GS 11%) is one of the lowest rates in the world. Women with higher education are represented at 43%. According to PCBS, 25% of the female labor force was unemployed in June 2010.

The rate of unemployment stood, according to PCBS, in June 2010 at 22.9%. The West Bank rate was 15.2% and that of Gaza 39.3%. According to this study, the rate of unemployment in the age group 15-24 was the highest, especially among females at 47%. Paradoxically among women, the rate of unemployment increases with higher education, but decreases among men. Compared with the rate of unemployment in 2008, the rate in 2010 was significantly higher both for males and females. See Tables and Graphs 1, below.

---

# Labour force unemployment by governorate and sex 2010-1999

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<tr>
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<td>38.5 %</td>
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<td>34.7 %</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31.8 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
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<td>33.6 %</td>
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<td>23.7 %</td>
<td>33.2 %</td>
<td>25.5 %</td>
<td>32.9 %</td>
<td>27.7 %</td>
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<td>12.4 %</td>
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<td>35.9 %</td>
<td>33.6 %</td>
<td>36.6 %</td>
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<td>34.4 %</td>
<td>21.6 %</td>
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<td>47.9 %</td>
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<td>29.8 %</td>
<td>27.1 %</td>
<td>21.1 %</td>
<td>19.9 %</td>
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<td>18.7 %</td>
<td>15.3 %</td>
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<tr>
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<td>32.2 %</td>
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<td>28.0 %</td>
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<td>18.7 %</td>
<td>19.3 %</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>22.3 %</td>
<td>24.4 %</td>
<td>23.8 %</td>
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<td>33.5 %</td>
<td>27.1 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>26.8 %</td>
<td>26.4 %</td>
<td>24.2 %</td>
<td>19.1 %</td>
<td>20.3 %</td>
<td>22.2 %</td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
<td>18.2 %</td>
<td>17.0 %</td>
<td>13.8 %</td>
<td>12.4 %</td>
<td>13.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 1: source: PCBS labor force survey, annual report 2010
3.3. Basic facts about Palestinian NGO employees

3.3.1 Personal background

PNGO employees can be characterized as follows:
57.5% are female and 42.5% male; 71% are aged 17-37 years. The age group 26-37 years has the highest representation with 48% of employees, followed by the age group 17-25 years with 23% employees. 88% were born in Palestine and 82% (WB 74% GS 96%) have a Palestinian passport. The permanent residence of employees in the NGO sector mirrors the Palestinian population almost exactly: 76.5% urban, 16.5% rural and 7% refugee camp. An higher education background is shared by 90% of PNGO employees (59% BA, 19% Diploma, 12% MA and 1% PhD; primary, preparatory and secondary school education 10%) and 41% of NGO employees do take part in improving their education and in training courses. For their attendance in training programs, 47% of the employees are funded by the PNGOs and 46% pay for themselves. National and international foundations pay for 7% of NGO employees to attend such programs.

In private life there is a tendency to postpone marriage and there is a tendency to have fewer children. Comparing the West Bank with Gaza, PNGO employees in the West Bank tend to send their children to private schools. In the West Bank 42% (including 8% who send some to private and some to governmental schools) and in Gaza 14% (also including 8% who send some to private and some to governmental schools).

59% (WB 68% GS 47%) of NGO employees have a partner who is working. The majority of PNGO employees perceive their living standard and their wages to be above average.

The following chapter presents this information in more detail.

86 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011, Jerusalem: PASSIA, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 329.: urban 73.7%, rural 17% and camps 9.3%, page 329.
3.3.2 Gender participation in the PNGO sector

In the PNGO sector most employees are women: 57.5% female (WB 58%, GS 56%) and 42.5% male (WB 42%, GS 44%) employees.\(^8\)

3.3.3 PNGO employment rate by age groups

NGO employment rate by age groups

![Bar chart showing employment rates by age groups](chart)

Table 2: PNGO employment rate by age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>17-25</th>
<th>26-37</th>
<th>38-45</th>
<th>46-55</th>
<th>55-77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Rate</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age group 26-37 years has the highest representation with 48% (WB 46%, GS 50%) of employees, followed by age group 17-25 years with 23% (WB 19%, GS 28%) of employees. These two age groups are often described in the

\(^8\) Also see comparison with the study of MAS, 2007: Mapping Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Ramallah: MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 43.: 54.8% female and 45.2% male.
literature as the Second Intifada generation, born in the eighties. Members of the age group 38-45 years with 16% (WB 19%, GS 13%) and 46-55 years with 10% (WB 12%, GS 7%) and known as the First Intifada generation were born in the sixties and seventies.

We compared the age-group data of the West Bank and Gaza. In Gaza, the age group 17-25 years shows a clearly higher percentage with 28% than 19% in the West Bank. This difference can be explained through the special implementation of job creation programs through donors and also through the Hamas PA, mainly funneled through the NGO sector. 50% in Gaza and 46% in West Bank are in the age group 26-37 years. The age group 38-45 years may be considered a “transitional age group”; here the West Bank leads with 19% compared to 13% in Gaza. Those in the age group 46-55 years in the West Bank stood at 12% compared with 7% in Gaza. Membership of the age group 55-74 years is similar in the West Bank and Gaza with 4% in the West Bank and 2% in Gaza.

3.3.4 Place of birth / Nationality/ Passport

Popular perceptions in Palestinian society say that the majority of Palestinian NGO employees are born abroad or have a foreign passport. This assumption is not justifiable. 88.5% Palestinian NGO employees were born in the OPTs. 9% were born in other Arab countries and 3% were born in USA/Europe. 82% (WB 74%, GS 96%) of Palestinian NGO employees have a Palestinian passport and 12% have a passport from “another country”. “Another country” is divided into: other Arab countries (including Jordanian) 92%, Southern Africa (countries below the Sahara) 3%, North America 2% and Israeli document 3%.
3.3.5 Urban / Rural / Refugee Camp

Urban, rural, refugee camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestinian NGO employees</th>
<th>Passia Data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>76.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>16.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee camp</td>
<td>7.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 3: population distribution/ NGO employees/ Palestinians
(Source of Passia data in Passia 2011, p.329, Palestinian population distribution by place of living)

The population distribution by place of residence in Palestine in 2010 was: 73.3% urban, 17% rural and 9.3% in refugee camps.\(^{88}\) The permanent place of residence of employees in the NGO sector is practically identical with the Palestinian population at large: 76.5% urban, 16.5% rural and 7.1% refugee camp.

3.3.6 Level of Education

The majority of 59% PNGO employees have a Bachelor’s degree. 19% of NGO employees have a two year Diploma and 12% a Master’s degree. Primary, Preparatory and Secondary school education are represented with 10% and 1% have a PhD. 90% of PNGO employees have had a higher education. The highest Bachelor’s rate is found in the age group 17-25 at 70% and age group 26-37 at 65% compared to other age groups.

The place of birth has an influence on the level of education, see table no.4 below. The highest percent for a Bachelor’s degree at 74% is among those who

were born abroad, followed by Gaza 61%, West Bank 55% and East Jerusalem 50%.

**Level of education, place of birth**

![Graph showing the level of education and place of birth](image)

Students with academic degrees from abroad have better chances to get a job immediately after studying than students with a degree from Palestinian universities or from other Arab countries.\(^9\)\(^9\) Being the owner of a Jerusalem Identity Card or another non-Palestinian passport means better job opportunities for an administrative position.

\(^9\)PCBS 2005, table 121/p.171
The major field of study is dominated by humanities, economics and education with differences between the West Bank and Gaza (see Table and Graphs: 5, below).

A major study field does not necessarily determine the actual work of an PNGO employee.

**Major field of study/West Bank**

![Bar chart showing major field of study in the West Bank](chart.png)

*Tables and Graphs 5: major field of study / West Bank*
Concerning the West Bank and Gaza: women (64%) men (62%) in Gaza are higher presented with Bachelor degrees than their West Bank counterparts with female 57% and male 53%. In Diploma certificates women (22%, WB 23%, GS 21%) rank before men (14%, WB 15%, GS 13%). Men show a much higher percentage with Master’s degrees (17%, WB 20%, GS 13%) than women (7%, WB 10%, GS 4%). There are no great differences between Primary / Preparatory or Secondary in the two regions. PhDs are dominated by men. Women lead in the Bachelor’s category and in diploma degrees, while men preponderate among those with further academic education.
NGO employees / training courses / further education

Living and working in a fast changing world demands flexibility, advanced vocational training and familiarization with new methods and techniques. 41% of PNGO employees (WB male: 48%, female 39%, Gaza male 46%, female: 39%) do take part in further education and training courses, 57% have so far not taken part in a training course.

Participation in training/educational programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>17–25</th>
<th>26–37</th>
<th>38–45</th>
<th>46–55</th>
<th>55–74</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Yes count</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>27.2 %</td>
<td>44.1 %</td>
<td>15.1 %</td>
<td>12.4 %</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age group</td>
<td>50.5 %</td>
<td>39.1 %</td>
<td>39.6 %</td>
<td>52.1 %</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
<td>42.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>11.5 %</td>
<td>18.7 %</td>
<td>6.4 %</td>
<td>5.2 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>42.4 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No count   | 108   | 277   | 93    | 46    | 25    | 549   |
| % within   | 19.7 %| 50.5 %| 16.9 %| 8.4 % | 4.6 % | 100 % |
| % within age group | 49.5 %| 60.9 %| 60.4 %| 47.9 %| 83.3 %| 57.6 %|
| % of total | 11.3 %| 29.1 %| 9.8 % | 4.8 % | 2.6 % | 57.6 %|

Tables and Graphs 7: participation in training / educational programs

The highest participation rate is in the age group 26-37 years at 44%, followed by age group 17-25 years at 27%, decreasing in the age group 38-45 years to 15 % and 12% in the age group 46-55 years.

Gender aspect:
Female employees show the same high interest in taking training courses if they have an academic degree or school education secondary and below. For males, as the level of education increases, the participation in courses
increases. Looking at the type of work, administrators are in first place with 34% taking training courses, then office employees 17%, trainer, supervisor 16%, coordinator 15%, researcher 6%, service employees 6% and others 6%. Training courses are mainly taken to improve computer skills 19%, education in health 18%, capacity building 13% and political awareness 12%.

The PNGO as an institution itself pays in 47% of cases for training programs of their employees. 46% of the PNGO employees pay for training courses themselves and 7% of PNGO employees are funded by foundations.

3.3.7 Family status / Marital status

In Palestinian society 92% of females are married in the age between 15-29 years. 29% of women are married under 18 years. The median age at first marriage for females is 19.5 years and for males 25.4 years. The fertility rate in 2010 was 4.2 births (WB: 3.8, GS 4.9 births)

Palestinian families have an average household size of 5.8 persons (WB 5.5, GS 6.4 persons) in 2010.

Concerning PNGOs, 59% of NGO employees are married, 35% of PNGO employees are single, 1% are separated, 2% divorced, and 1% widowed. (2% did not answer the question) For further analysis a recode was done of ‘not married’ and ‘ever married’: 64% of PNGO employees were ever married (male 75%, female 56%) and 36% of PNGO employees were not married (male 25%, female 44%).


Marital status
Single, ever married

<table>
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<th>Sex cross tabulation</th>
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<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Single</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>256</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever married</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

Tables and Graphs 8: marital status: single / ever married

“Being single” under the aspect of gender / female

Marital status
Age groups, Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
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<th>Male Single</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17–25</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–37</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38–45</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46–54</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–75</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 9: marital status: age groups / single /gender

In our study we have slightly different age categories as shown above, 17-25 years and not 15-29 years. Comparisons have to be drawn carefully. If we
compare these categories we find in the age group female 17-25 years, 69% are single and 31% are married. In the age group female 26-37 years, 40% are single and 60% are married.

In the age group 55-74 years: 25%, in the age group 38-45 years: 23% and in the age group 46-55 years: 13% are single. This indicates for female PNGO employees a trend towards later marriage and / or the free choice to stay single. Being aware, that this result can be viewed either positively or negatively. Highly educated women with working experience are often above the average marriage age and this fact can also be a “burden” for women in Palestinian society who seek a partner. Studies show that, in general – and not only in Palestine, men tend to marry younger women who are less well educated as themselves.

Results of our focus groups show that young men (30 years and below) prefer that their sisters and wives work in the public and private sectors, because NGO work for women is not yet judged respectable at every level of society. By contrast, Rema Hammami and Amal Syam (2011) discovered in their study _Who answers to Gazan women. An economic security and rights research._ (2010), for which they undertook female focus groups in Gaza, that women working in NGOs are becoming more attractive on the ’marriage market’, because they earn good wages in a desolate economical situation.⁹²

Conclusion: The PNGO sector can be also seen as a working sector for highly educated, unmarried women

A more detailed analysis of gender roles and relations follows in chapter 3.3 ‘PNGO sector- a female gendered working field?’

---

3.3.8 Working partner

Our data above showed, 64% of PNGO employees are married and 36% are single. Married PNGO employees were asked, if their partner was working or not and if the partner was working, in which sector?

Working partner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working partner</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>90 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>41 %</td>
<td>55 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 10: working partner

Working place of partner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working sector</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO-sector</td>
<td>17 %</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO-sector</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>54 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 11: working place of partner

In Gaza: 35% of men and 13% of women answered that their partner was working in the NGO sector. 40% male and 61% female employees had a partner working in the governmental sector. 25% male and 26% female employees had a partner working in the private sector. In Gaza, PNGO men are more likely to have wives working in NGOs than their West Bank employees.
counterparts. Female NGO workers in Gaza tend to have husbands working in the government sector (the largest single employer in Gaza) compared with the West Bank where women tend to have spouses working in the private sector (the private sector in the West bank is larger than in Gaza).

61% of male partners are working in the governmental sector in Gaza. This is a fairly high percentage in comparison with 37% in the West Bank. In July 2007, Gaza fell under the control of Hamas whereas the West Bank continued to be administered by Fatah. The fact that employees of the “old Fatah governmental sector” in Gaza still get paid from the Fatah PA in the West Bank has to be taken into account. Also relevant here is that the public sector in Gaza is the largest employer. These factors help explain the high percentage of male partners working in the governmental sector.

Also to be considered is the possibility that, after the complete closure of Gaza, the Hamas administration expanded working opportunities in the governmental sector to absorb unemployed men and women who had previously worked in Israel.

The research shows that it is relatively uncommon for both partners to be working in the NGO sector (bearing in mind that the NGO sector covers around 10% of the Palestinian labor force). The majority of partners work in the governmental or private sectors. As mentioned in the FGs in the West Bank and Gaza, the governmental sector seems to guarantee longer working contracts and therefore more job stability.

Results of focus group interviews concerning women show on one hand, the majority of women prefer to work in NGOs because the employment is interesting, diversified, and professional with an open working atmosphere and the possibility of a career. On the other hand, women mentioned preferences for the governmental sector because it seems to offer job security and more

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compatibility with family life (FGs, female < 30 years). The governmental sector offers working hours from 8am-3pm, a vacation, and a pension among other benefits.

Young men (FGs, male till 30 years) prefer their wives and sisters to work in the governmental sector, arguing that “in the NGO sector women are exposed to work which is in society not so well respected, for example fieldwork or working with men in one room.” In FGs male > 40 years didn’t mention a preference, “Each woman should decide what she wants.”

3.3.9 Children

41.3% (WB 39.4%, GS 44.4%) of the Palestinian population is younger than 14 years. 86% of NGO employees have children. 35% have one or two children, 39% have three or four children and 26% have more than four children. The birth rate in Palestine is closely connected to the marital status of women. The trend among women to marry later mirrors a tendency to bear children later in life. This often implies not having so many children.

Another string of argumentation heard was the modern notion of a nuclear family – a couple might have just one or two children who then would have a better chance of a good education.

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95 Age 15-29: 29.4%, Persons with the age 60 and above make 3 % of the total population; see (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "PCBS Migration Survey in the Palestinian Territory 2010", PCBS, Ramallah, http://82.213.38.42/PCBS_NADA3.1/index.php/catalog/112.; Main results

96 An average a Palestinian woman gives birth to 4.6 children and women in the age between 15-29 years have the highest contributing rate. See MAS, 2010: "Economic and Social Monitor 22"; see also slightly different numbers in the (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012: Statistical Yearbook 2011, Ramallah; PCBS.; total fertility rate lies by 4.2 births (WB 3.8, GS 4.9)
3.3.10 Education of children

The Palestinian education system is based on Grades 1-10, followed by two years of secondary school. The first ten grades are divided into Preparation Stage (grades 1-4) and Empowerment Stage from grade (grades 5-10). After the tenth grade, an optional secondary education covers grades 11-12 with the school-leaving examination, Tawjihi. Only those who take the Tawjihi have the option of a general higher education.

Children in Palestine can go to governmental and private schools and if they are registered as refugees, they may attend UNWRA schools for the elementary cycle. Governmental and UNWRA schools are free; in private schools, fees are charged.

People send their children to private schools for several reasons:
- private schools have a better reputation for offering a quality education than do governmental schools
- religious aspect: an Islamic or Christian-orientated education is valued by some parents
- teachers rarely strike
- private schools offer foreign languages and trips abroad

### Education of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Palestine Total</th>
<th>West Bank Total</th>
<th>Gaza Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 12: education of children / type of school
In the West Bank and Gaza, 86% of PNGO employees have children, 60% of them having school age children. Of those with school age children, 44% of PNGO employees send their children to governmental and UNWRA schools and 22% to private schools. 8% send their children to both (mixed). There is a big difference between the West Bank and Gaza concerning “paid” and “free” schools. PNGO employees from the West Bank are six times more likely to send their children to fee-paying schools than PNGO employees in Gaza. This difference depends on: 1. affordability and 2. infrastructure (the infrastructure of private schools in Gaza is less developed). In the West Bank: 34% of PNGO employees send their children to private (paid) schools, 35% to unpaid (UNWRA schools 3%, governmental schools 32%) and 8% to both types of school.
In Gaza: 6% of PNGO employees send their children to private schools, 55% to unpaid schools (UNWRA schools 40%, governmental schools 15%) and 8% to both types of school.

**Education – University**

A small percentage of PNGO employees with children who are attending university educate them outside Palestine, mainly in other Arab countries. While this field-work did not succeed in generating relevant data, future field work might concentrate on the question, if there is a difference between average Palestinians and elite-NGO leaders concerning where their children study.

**Monthly expenditure on education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employee % of income</th>
<th>Up to 10 %</th>
<th>Up to 20 %</th>
<th>Up to 30 %</th>
<th>&gt; 31 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 13: percent of monthly wage spent on children’s education
35% of PNGO employees spend money on school education. 16% spend 10% of their monthly wage on education, 9% acknowledged 20%, 5% spend 30% and 5% above 30% of their monthly wage on education. PCBS reported 2010 (April-June) that the average Palestinian monthly household’s expenditure on education (including personal care and recreational activities) is 27 JD / 147 NIS (general), 21 JD / 114 NIS (WB), 16 JD / 87 NIS (Gaza). Our study result indicates that 35% of PNGO employees invest more money into the education of their children than average Palestinians.

### 3.3.11 Interim conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction, if general, when Palestinians talk about NGO employees, it is well known – or at least the popular conception is – that NGO employees are better paid then others, that they are born abroad, that they are young, professionalized and career-orientated, that they have a lot of key benefits compared to the average Palestinian, that they don’t think politically anymore and work only in their own interest etc.

The research has shown so far:
- 71% of PNGO employees are in the age between 17-37 years. PCBS stated 2010 that the highest unemployment rate was in the age group from 20-24 years at 39.4% (WB 24.9%, GS 66.6%). In this sense, the PNGO sector can be viewed as a job market for the young and highly educated: 90 % of the PNGO employees have a higher education degree.
- The majority of 88% were born in Palestine and 82% of PNGO employees hold a Palestinian passport. The concept that the majority were born abroad is thus incorrect. However it should be noted, being the owner of a Jerusalem ID or additional another non-Palestinian passport implies better job opportunities for those working in an administrative position.

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97 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011, 349.

98 Note: if Palestinians have only a foreign passport and no residency status, they are less likely to be hired because employers fear that they might be unable to remain in the country.
women at 57.5% form a substantial part of the workforce in the PNGO sector.
- the majority are urban, but this reflects Palestinian society as a whole
- seeking education (improving skills, taking training courses) was popular
- there is a tendency to later marriage
- there is a tendency to have fewer children
- in the West Bank as opposed to Gaza, there is a trend to educate children in private schools
- 59% of PNGO employees have a working partner (WB: 68%, Gaza: 47%).

3.4 Palestinian NGO sector: neo-liberal restructured working sector: Working reality of Palestinian NGO employees

In June, 2010, the official unemployment rate was 23% (WB 15%, GS 39%), according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

The West Bank and Gaza are still occupied territories and suffer under the general closure and separation policy of Israel. The reality is a never ending economic crisis in the occupied territories with underdeveloped industry, an agriculture sector without development because of the reasons mentioned above and restricted access to natural resources. The Palestinian economy is dominated by services. The West Bank and Gaza depend totally on external help. Having a job in uncertain political and economic times means “having a future” (FG, male <30 years, GS and see also World Bank (2010)).

Where do Palestinian women and men find work?
PCBS undertakes regular labor force surveys (LFS) according to the International Labor Organization (ILO) methodology. Data on key labor market indicators: age, education, wage levels, sector and occupation of work are documented.
The NGO working sector, with approximately 10% of jobs for the Palestinian labor market, is categorized under ‘services and other branches’ (see table below).

## Economic activity and sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Both sexes</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, fishing, forestry</td>
<td>14.9 %</td>
<td>17.5 %</td>
<td>12.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, quarrying, manufacturing</td>
<td>12.1 %</td>
<td>14.5 %</td>
<td>4.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>10.8 %</td>
<td>14.1 %</td>
<td>0.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, restaurants, hotels</td>
<td>19.8 %</td>
<td>20.6 %</td>
<td>17.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, storage, communication</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services and other branches</td>
<td>38.2 %</td>
<td>30.9 %</td>
<td>61.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Males                                           |           |           |       |
| Agriculture, fishing, forestry                  | 11.0 %    | 11.6 %    | 9.2 % |
| Mining, quarrying, manufacturing                | 12.9 %    | 15.4 %    | 5.2 % |
| Construction                                    | 13.4 %    | 17.7 %    | 0.4 % |
| Commerce, restaurants, hotels                   | 22.9 %    | 24.0 %    | 19.5 %|
| Transportation, storage, communication          | 5.1 %     | 5.1 %     | 5.2 % |
| Services and other branches                     | 34.7 %    | 26.2 %    | 60.5 %|
| Total                                          | 100 %     | 100 %     | 100 % |

| Females                                         |           |           |       |
| Agriculture, fishing, forestry                  | 30.7 %    | 31.3 %    | 28.0 %|
| Mining, quarrying, manufacturing                | 9.2 %     | 11.1 %    | 1.1 % |
| Construction                                    | 0.4 %     | 0.5 %     | 0.0 % |
| Commerce, restaurants, hotels                   | 7.1 %     | 7.9 %     | 3.7 % |
| Transportation, storage, communication          | 0.5 %     | 0.6 %     | 0.0 % |
| Services and other branches                     | 52.1 %    | 48.6 %    | 57.2 %|
| Total                                          | 100 %     | 100 %     | 100 % |

Source: PCBS 2008

Tables and Graphs 14: economic activity and gender

The following chapter analyzes the working realities of the PNGO sector.
3.4.1 Personal working history

PNGO employees are mainly in the age group 26-37 years (48%) and between 17-25 years (23%), born at the beginning of the 'eighties and known as the second Intifada generation. The first Intifada generation, born in the 'sixties and seventies' – nowadays between 38-45 years – amounts to 16% and the age group between 46 and 55 years stands at 10%.

PNGO employees between 38 and 55 years were often involved in establishing PNGOs. Employees belonging to the second Intifada generation and with higher education generally find work after volunteering, going to interviews and/or by exploiting personal relations.

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99 The group 15-24 years is the age group with the highest unemployment rate: 42.5%. Age group 25-34 years: 28%, 35-44 years: 16.6% and 45-54 years: 18.2%. See MAS, 2011: “Economic and Social Monitor 23”, MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, Ramallah, http://www.mas.ps/2012/node/266#.Ulu10fOa5So..7.
3.4.1.2 Moving in the NGO sector

Employees coming from other sectors

For 41% of PNGO employees, the PNGO in which they are currently working is their first place of work. 23% of employees have worked previously in NGOs. 22% of employees have moved from the private sector and 7% from the governmental sector into the PNGO sector. 7% of employees have experience in more than one sector.

In Gaza, for 44% of PNGO employees, their current workplace is their first, compared with 39% in the West Bank. Considered by gender: Among female PNGO employees in Gaza, 48% are working in their very first job. Among the
same group in the West Bank, the figure is 41%. For 38% of male PNGO employees in Gaza, their current job is their very first. 35% of male PNGO employees in the West Bank are in their first job.

3.4.1.3 Ways to find a Job in the NGO sector

The governmental sector must publish their job offers in the public media. By contrast, NGOs, like the private sector, may publish their job offers in newspapers and/ or in the internet, but they are not obliged to do so. ¹⁰⁰

Possibilities to find a job in the NGO sector

Finding a job in the NGO sector

42% of PNGO employees land a job through the help of friends (31.1%) and relatives (10.4%). This high percentage diminishes if PNGO employees have already held one or two positions in the NGO sector. 23% of PNGO employees make use of relationships formed in previous employment. Finding a job in this way increases with a longer previous employment history. 14% of PNGO employees say they found work through public advertisements and 11% through a personal interview. 6% of PNGO employee’s found work through doing voluntary work. There is a contradiction in the results of the focus group interviews where the majority (< 30 years) claimed they found their job through voluntary work. Many (GS, female and male <30 years) felt that a good education was not enough to secure a job, “[both] high education and wasta are needed to get a job.” The Arabic word wasta means using connections to get what you want.

3.4.1.4 Interim conclusion

In 2010, a typical PNGO employee: has a higher education (90%), has volunteer experience in several institutions or NGOs and often uses connections to land a job in an NGO. For 41% of PNGO employees, their current PNGO is their first place of work. 23% of PNGO employees have previously worked in an NGO.
Type of job: full time/part time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of job</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full time</td>
<td>68 %</td>
<td>84 %</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part time</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data show full time employment of 68% and part time employment of 32% in the occupied Palestinian territories. We need to differentiate between full time and part-time jobs. In the West Bank full time employment is 84%; part time employment is 16%. In Gaza, there is a remarkable difference between full time employment at 47% and part time employment at 53%.

3.4.2.2 Working contracts and level of income

NGOs must face the reality of short term projects, limited in time by donors and also specially developed short term employment programs for the OPTs. For example, between 2007 and 2009, the NGO development center received 6 million Euros to fund job creation projects in the West Bank and Gaza from the French Development Agency.

“The Job Creation Project in the West Bank and Gaza aims to alleviate the financial burdens of the poorest and most marginalized Palestinian families by financing temporary employment opportunities through the execution of infrastructure micro-projects and improving public assets operated by NGOs. Through this project, NDC expects to offer
assistance to over 50 NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza, and create approximately 140,000 working man-days.”

Since 2006, international donors and agencies, as well the Hamas government increased the level of funding for social support, channeling these through NGOs and the public sector in order to relieve an ongoing humanitarian crisis. After the 2008-2009 Gaza war, both needs and funding intensified.

The majority of these part-timers or short termers in Gaza are beneficiaries of these job creation programs without having a long term perspective. Most jobs can be characterized as training or semi-voluntary. The pro and contra of implementing such short term or part time contracts in the special situation of the Gazans will be not discussed at this point.

Part time contracts are considered in Palestinian society to be “bad contracts”. In focus groups in the West Bank and in Gaza, employees explained “having a part-time contract means working full time for half of the salary”. The impression of many PNGO employees with part time work is of “having no rights”. Employers are said to be in a position “to force you to work more hours than part time, because you don’t want to lose your work” (FGs in WB&GS <30 years with ‘bad contracts’).

Working part time is mainly not a free choice. In the majority of cases, it is what job applicants get offered. Of employees questioned in Gaza, 84% are working according to their written or verbal contract part time because they have “no choice” (FGs male and female below 30 years, WB&GS). The economic situation in Gaza is forcing people to take any job that is available. Young employees are looking for work experience and better job


conditions. For that a variety of different certificates of experience is needed. (GS, female < 30 years, ‘bad contracts’) In this sense, working part time can offer the opportunity to have more than one job and collect different and more working experience, which in the long run can make it easier to find a job with better conditions (also mentioned in FGs in GS <30 years with ‘bad contracts’).

PNGO workers have adapted to the difficult reality that most contracts on offer are part time or temporary. Their proactive response has been to be continually on the look-out for employment with better conditions and taking what is on offer as soon as it is available – sometimes meaning they are working in one NGO before their contract with their previous employer has ended.

In contrast, women in the focus group female >40 in Gaza describe ‘working experience’ as an empty term, saying “we all go through an experience nightmare”. They mean that long term work experience in a job, for example for 6-8 years, no longer has any value. Job applicants with many and varied certificates are preferred, even if the working or volunteer experience period amounts to no more than one month. Also mentioned was having to sign a contract offering a salary of US$ 800 and receiving US$ 150, without knowing where the rest of the money would go. This was mentioned more than once.  

Also in focus groups, men and women reported working without a written contract and below 500 NIS a month (FG, female and male below 30 years). “Working without a written contract” is, according to Palestinian labor law, possible and according to the law people would have the same protection as with a written contract. The reality is rather different.

103 Only employees from one single NGO said that their NGO has a transparent policy of job sharing. One person signs a contract but two do the work and share of the salary. The others said they knew nothing about such schemes.
Two internal contradictions in retrospect:

1. **Part time work in Gaza** – “We don’t have any part time contracts in Gaza. I am sure.” (FG GS male >40 years)

   The topic of part time or temporary jobs was discussed in 12 focus groups. Eleven focus groups discussed the negative impact of part time jobs very enthusiastically. Focus groups below 30 years with “bad contracts” mentioned their hope, that through being able to talk about their bad working situations and conditions, these might be improved.

   The results of one focus group (male > 40 years in GS) was in a complete contradiction to the quantitative results and to the results of the other 11 focus groups in the West Bank and in Gaza. All participants of this focus group (who were mostly PNGO directors) denied that part time contracts existed in Gaza.

2. **40% of PNGO employees have “no written contract”**

   In this research, over 60% of the PNGOs rely on external funding by the EC or other European countries. In general, external funded PNGOs have to write a financial report, supported by a financial audit for their donors. In financial reports it is assumed that all employees working for a project and paid from its budget have a written contract. This formal, correct procedure is, however, not always followed.

   As mentioned above through the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the NGO environment in Gaza differs from its West Bank counterpart. International donors and agencies, set up huge “job creation programs” which have been run and managed through NGOs in Gaza. NGOs are explicitly funded from donors to hire young people on short part time trainings schemes with no contracts, no guarantees and low salaries. This may explain the 43% of PNGO employees “with no written” contract in Gaza comparing to 38% in the West Bank. In the West Bank 38% without a written contract under “normal” aid conditions is a very high percentage. In some cases in the West Bank and in Gaza PNGOs may benefit from grants without being responsible for financial reports.
One might expect that these irregular working arrangements and precarious conditions should motivate trades unions to take active counter-measures.

### 3.4.2.3 Type of work

#### Type of work

![Bar chart showing the percentage distribution of various type of work categories: Administrator, Office employee, Teacher/Supervisor, Services, Coordinator, Researcher, Others.]

**Tables and Graphs 18: type of work**

We classify as administrator those responsible for:

1. helping define the objectives, build a strategic plan and general policies for the institution, and participating in decision making
2. supervising the implementation of programs and following up the operational plan
3. working on proposals for the development of the administration and structure of the institution
4. supervising the preparation and the agenda, identifying annual vacancies in coordination with the appropriate authorities
5. overseeing the implementation of all procedures concerning employees’ affairs
6. supervising the preparation and updating of job descriptions for all functions of the institution
7. overseeing the preparation of a training plan in all its aspects
8. supervising and reviewing preparation of the budget
9. supervision and auditing of annual reports
10. participating in management of knowledge

Gender aspect of job distribution:

Type of work: male/female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of work</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office employee</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer/ supervisor</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 19: gender aspect of job distribution

Being aware that Women’s PNGOs (those with a main focus on women’s matters) are represented in the study at 40% and female participation in PNGOs is 57.5%, the sex ratio of administrative positions shows (at 37% male and 27% female) no gender equality. (For a more detailed discussion of this see chapter 3.3, NGO sector- a female gendered working field?)
20% of office employees work in PNGOs, 24% in the West Bank and 13% in Gaza. The rate in the West Bank is 11% higher than in Gaza. In the West Bank being an office employee is a domain for women (30% female, 17% male). In Gaza it is nearly equal (14% female, 13% male).

3.4.2.4 Types of contract / duration of contracts

In a globally-oriented world short term contracts for one year or less are fashionable in various working sectors. PNGO employees have mainly short term contracts with a possibility of extension. This does not guarantee, however, the same working conditions (type of work, type of job, level of income etc.).

In the OPTs 37% of PNGO employees have a contract of 1 year or less. 10% of employees have a contract for more than 1 year and 13% have a permanent contract. 40% of PNGO employees have no written contract at all.
See the differences between West Bank and Gaza in the table below.
Duration of written contract

(<=1 means having a contract for 1 year or less, >1 means having a working contract more than 1 year in duration)

Tables and Graphs 20: duration of contracts (including ‘no written contract’)

Tables and Graphs 21: duration of contract / age groups
## Duration of contract/age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>17–25</th>
<th>26–37</th>
<th>38–45</th>
<th>46–55</th>
<th>55–74</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% within duration of contract</td>
<td>27.4 %</td>
<td>50.1 %</td>
<td>12.4 %</td>
<td>7.7 %</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age group</td>
<td>45.4 %</td>
<td>38.6 %</td>
<td>27.5 %</td>
<td>28.9 %</td>
<td>36.4 %</td>
<td>37.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
<td>18.7 %</td>
<td>4.6 %</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
<td>0.9 %</td>
<td>37.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within duration of contract</td>
<td>22.1 %</td>
<td>48.8 %</td>
<td>19.8 %</td>
<td>8.1 %</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age group</td>
<td>9.3 %</td>
<td>9.5 %</td>
<td>11.1 %</td>
<td>7.8 %</td>
<td>4.5 %</td>
<td>9.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>2.1 %</td>
<td>4.6 %</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>0.1 %</td>
<td>9.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within duration of contract</td>
<td>10.0 %</td>
<td>45.8 %</td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
<td>22.5 %</td>
<td>1.7 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age group</td>
<td>5.9 %</td>
<td>12.5 %</td>
<td>15.7 %</td>
<td>30.0 %</td>
<td>9.1 %</td>
<td>13.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
<td>6.0 %</td>
<td>2.6 %</td>
<td>3.0 %</td>
<td>0.2 %</td>
<td>13.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within duration of contract</td>
<td>22.2 %</td>
<td>47.4 %</td>
<td>19.2 %</td>
<td>8.2 %</td>
<td>3.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age group</td>
<td>39.3 %</td>
<td>39.3 %</td>
<td>45.8 %</td>
<td>33.3 %</td>
<td>50.0 %</td>
<td>40.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>8.9 %</td>
<td>19.0 %</td>
<td>7.7 %</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
<td>40.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within duration of contract</td>
<td>22.5 %</td>
<td>48.4 %</td>
<td>16.8 %</td>
<td>9.9 %</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age group</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Duration of continuous contracts

Short term contracts in PNGOs can be extended. Looking at table and graphs 22, below; we see how long an PNGO employee stays in the current PNGO.
As mentioned above, short term contracts may be extended. 31% of PNGO employees have contracts lasting 1 year or less. 36% work in the same PNGO for up to 5 years, 17% up to 10 years and 17% for more than 10 years. The 31% with contracts of 1 year and less are identical with so called new comers, employees who start work after finishing their education or who come from other working sectors. For differences between the West Bank and Gaza see Table and Graphs 23, below.
This graphic shows clearly the difference between the West Bank and Gaza. Here we see the consequences of the donor policy of “job creation programs” in Gaza – the implementation of short term jobs with a working time of one year or less which leads to many workers dropping subsequently out of the NGO sector.

Short term contracts, even when extension is possible, do not provide job security. Human beings differ in their needs for stability in life. Some need more job security, some less. The factors of age and being responsible for a family also play a role.

In focus groups it was clearly mentioned that an unstable political situation and job insecurity lead to emigration especially among young people (FGs male <30 years). This is a phenomenon that has been increasing since the second Intifada.
The PCBS Migration Survey in the occupied Palestinian territory found out, that in the period 2007-2009, 22,000 people emigrated. Not included are the families who emigrated together. The main reasons behind the desire to emigrate were: 39.3% wished to improve their living conditions, 15.2% found no job opportunities and 18.7% sought education and a chance to study. The significant difference in the distribution of main reasons behind the desire to emigrate between those in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was the lack of security (13.8% in the Gaza Strip compared to 5.6% in the West Bank).”

3.4.2.5 NGO tracking

Working in different NGOs

For 46% of PNGO employees the current employer was the first NGO they had worked for. If we compare Table & Graphs: 24 above, we conclude that, 31% with contracts of 1 year and less were newcomers: employees who started working after having finished their education or having come from other sectors. 15% had already been longer than 1 year in the same PNGO. 54% had

104 (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "PCBS Migration Survey in the Palestinian Territory 2010"., Main Results.
moved by force or by chance internally in the NGO sector. 20% of employees had worked in one other NGO. 17% already worked in two other NGOs and 17% of NGO employees had already worked in more than two other NGOs (some in up to five). With more working experience in NGOs hopes for “a better chance” (better position, long term or permanent contract, higher salary etc.) increased.
3.4.2.6 NGO tracking by force or by chance

Objective and personal reasons to leave or change former NGO

**Reasons to leave or change former NGO**

![Bar chart showing reasons to leave or change former NGO]

**Tables and Graphs 25: reasons to leave or change former NGO**

---

105 The word ‘tracking’ is used in the sense of ‘following a track’ ~ having a goal in mind, which you want to reach.
Objective and personal reasons to leave former NGO by gender / region:
(Results quantitative survey)

Reasons to leave former NGO by gender/region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract finished</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project finished</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO closed</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= by force</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (personal)</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better chance</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 26: reasons to leave former NGO by region / gender

The reasons why NGO employees leave (or have to leave) their jobs, were clarified in various focus groups and are presented below in regard to:
(1) the NGO employees,
(2) the employers – the NGOs who describe why they offer part time contracts, short term projects, low paid jobs etc., and
(3) the donors - whose investment decisions lead to this situation

1. Employees’ reasons
An NGO employee faces one or more of the following situations (FG in WB & GS)

- The contract or project is finished;
- working conditions are bad;
- a better opportunity with a long term contract presents itself;
- an opportunity with a better position and income providing pension and insurance coverage becomes available;
- an opportunity occurs offering more experience in different fields;
- the employee finds a different job because he/she does not accept new working and payment conditions in the offer of a renewed contract; (typically, the current project finishes and another job is offered in a different project but with different working conditions)
- the employee seeks a job offering a better chance of improving personal skills and self development;
- changing for personal reasons “I want to change”;
- changing because of not accepting the policy of the NGO
- gender aspect: familial and financial security may allow the employee to change (FG >40 years, GS)
- changing as a result of being harassed at work

2. Employers’ attitudes
NGO employer’s actions may be considered under the following aspects:

- policy of the organization: to employ more people in the light of the high unemployment rate;
- employers create a competitive atmosphere, “to squeeze more out of people” (FGs, female and male < 30 years, GS);
- employers are sometimes corrupt (employees sign contracts with a salary of US$ 450 but receive only US$ 250 without an explanation. Nobody knows what happens to the rest of the money. (FGs, GS female and male, <30 years);

3. The donors - whose investment decisions lead to this situation

- Employees tend to look for new jobs while working on their current project.
- Employees leave the project before it ends.
- The two above mentioned points influence the success of a project. If a worker leaves before the project ends, somebody else must take the job over. Knowledge, time, and effectiveness are lost – and this influences the project outcome negatively.

Legitimate questions arise: If donors wish to support the building up of a functioning, viable and independent state, if they want “to take the jobless off the streets”, why do they implement short term projects which bring little benefit rather than long-term projects to develop sustainability? Why do PNGOs accept such conditions?

**Tracking in an NGO-community**

NGO tracking – the fact that contracts are mainly short (without job security) creates a community. Moving from one job to another, NGO workers are always on the run to find another or a better job. Formal, professional working networks as well as informal networks strengthen this development. The admission ticket for the community is post secondary education / a university degree and/or *wasta*. Requirements to stay in the NGO community with short term contracts are flexibility and further training.

Flexibility and training enable NGO employees to extend their contracts or to find another job if they are required to leave their current employment (59%) or because they have received a better job offer – “by chance” (33%).

Tables and Graphs: 22 above shows the duration of contracts in the current working PNGO. It reveals that 25% of employees stay between 6 and 15 years in the same PNGO. Staying long term in an PNGO or practicing NGO-tracking by necessity or because of a better opportunity, leads to a better knowledge of the aid business and the ability to use this know-how. Having the knowledge and ability to operate in the aid sector includes the power to create jobs
(sometimes well-paid jobs) in a country with an unemployment rate between 23% and 28% in a desolate economy.

3.4.2.7 Motivation to work in an NGO

Responses by PNGO employees to questions about their motivation for working in an NGO can be broadly sorted under the headings economic, individual and political background.

Economic (personal) is acknowledged by 27% of PNGO employees because of “better income” 13%; “better position” (connected with a better income) 12% and “better benefits” 2%.

Economic (political): for 25% PNGO employees, the offered work in the PNGO was the only job available (WB 17% male, 18% women; GS 30% male, 34% female) “It is not a question of choice, you take what you get” (FGI Gaza, male <30).

28% of PNGO employees with BC, Diploma and PhD would only find work abroad (14%) or in the NGO sector (14%). That indicates that external funded NGOs seem to prevent a drain of qualified employees and academic educated people.

Individual: 23% of PNGO employees gave their reasons as “wishing to contribute something to society” and 18% felt “more independent at work” as well as “preferring to work in an open atmosphere between men and women”

In focus groups, a strong argument was working on a professional level. NGOs offer different work experience and the chance to acquire skills through training courses and the diversity of work experience. All these factors support self-development and provide professional stability. Professional stability increases the chance of achieving job security such as long-term contracts or permanent contracts not necessarily in the NGO sector.
Also mentioned were the importance of the geographical aspect: a working place near to home (7%) and the political personal aspect: working in an NGO does not imply or require support of the Palestinian Authority.

**Individual working goals**

PNGO employees were asked to emphasis their individual goals. Most cited “supporting civil society” and “gaining money” in first position with 31%, “gaining skills and experiences” in second position and “helping to change society” in third position.

82% said they had achieved their individual goals, 18% suggested that, to achieve their goals, the NGOs needed to be improved. This would involve changing institutional strategy (35%) and the improvement of political (25%) and job security (19%).

**3.4.2.8 Disadvantages of working in a PNGO**

As disadvantages of working in a PNGO was mentioned by 52%: “not having a permanent job” (WB 43%, female 44%, male 40%; GS 64%, female 68%, male 60%) “working in short projects” by 33% (WB 29%, female 30%, male 28%; GS 38%, male 41%, female 30%), “not helping the people on the ground” 9% (WB 10%, female 11%, male 9%; GS 8%, male 10%, female 7%) and 6% others.

“Not having a permanent job” was cited by over half of PNGO employees. Comparing the West Bank with Gaza: the Gaza’s PNGO employees with 64% (female 68% and male 60%) reflect the donors’ policy in Gaza of short term job creation programs without offering a long-term perspective (FG <30 years, male and female). Gaza’s women at 68% suffer from this situation the most compared to their West Bank female counterparts at 44%.
3.4.2.9 Interim conclusion

In the West Bank, 84% of jobs are full-time and 16% are part-time, in contrast with Gaza, where just 47% of jobs are full-time jobs and 53% part-time.

In the OPTs 37% of PNGO employees have contracts lasting 1 year or less. 10% have contracts more than 1 year and 13% have a permanent contract. 40% of PNGO employees have no written contract at all. Attention must be drawn to the fact that for over 43% PNGO employees in Gaza and 38% PNGO employees in the West Bank, their PNGO job is their first employment at all. 40% of PNGO employees in the West Bank and Gaza are working without a written contract. Short term contracts in an NGO may be extended in the same NGO in another project. If this is not possible, employees often practice NGO tracking to get another job or to improve their job prospects. If finding another job in the NGO community is not possible, unemployment often follows.

Looking at wages and terms of employment, we notice a clear stratification of PNGO employment in the OPTs. We see a clear hierarchy: at the bottom remains a large group of PNGO workers, typically low paid, with no job security, having short term contract or no written contract at all; then comes a ‘middle class’ and finally an elite with long-term contracts or permanent contracts and a level of income well above the Palestinian average.

This indicates a neo-liberal transformation in the NGO sector and shows that this sector is not immune to a globalized, neo-liberal restructuring process of the work force. This process is bringing about deleterious and precarious working conditions. Short term projects (WB 51% and GS 72%), PNGO employees are forced to leave their jobs because their contracts end or for other reasons, low paid jobs (<500US$ in WB 28%, GS 62%) etc. are increasing insecurity which demoralizes PNGO workers who must work in such an
environment and renders them too weak or docile to challenge their conditions.\footnote{106}

\section*{3.4.3 Living standard – wages and lifestyle}

\subsection*{Basic information about household size, monthly expenditure and monthly income.\footnote{107}}

In 2010 the average Palestinian household size comprised 5.8 persons (WB: 5.6 persons, GS: 6.3 persons).\footnote{108} An average monthly wage amounted to 2.300 NIS (WB 2.600 NIS, GS 1.500) and for monthly household expenditures 4.700 NIS were needed in the WB and 3.420 NIS in the Gaza Strip (including rent).\footnote{109}

\subsection*{3.4.3.1 Monthly salaries of Palestinian NGO employees}

Being aware, how sensitive it is to talk about personal income and how difficult it would be to get an answer – we didn’t offer in our questionnaire a blank space to fill in the monthly income. We took the advice of experienced Palestinian researchers and chose the classifications US$ 500 or less, US$ 501-US$ 1000, US$ 1001-US$ 1500 etc.

\footnote{106}{I would like to thank Rema Hammami and Linda Tabar for stressing this point in discussion with me.}
\footnote{107}{Resources for comparative analysis use different currencies: JOD, NIS and USD. In this research the currency used is NIS. Only monthly salaries of NGO employees are noted in USD. The exchange rate of OANDA on June 30, 2010 has been used throughout: 1 JD = 5.44 NIS, 1 JD = 1.40 USD, 1USD= 3.88NIS source: http://www.oanda.com/lang/de/currency/converter/}
\footnote{108}{Source PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011, 366.}
\footnote{109}{Source: (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "Labour Force Survey (April-June 2010)". Average monthly wage is defined as the average of monthly wages from professionals and service.}
Monthly wage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In US $</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th></th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>42.5 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>36 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-1500</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>11.5 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501-2000</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2500</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>0.5 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501-3000</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>0.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000-4000</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
<td>0.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 4000</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>0.5 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 27: monthly wages of PNGO employees


57.5 % of PNGO employees with an income of US$ 600 (US$ 501-US$ 1000 and up) earn more than the average Palestinian income. Analyzing the level of income, we have to consider the differentiation of a full time versus a part-time job and the differential rates of pay for each. The data show full time employment of 68% and part time employment of 32% in the occupied Palestinian territories. In the West Bank, full time employment is 84%; part time employment is 16%. In Gaza, there is a tremendous difference between full time employment at 47% and part time employment at 53%.

Gender aspect of monthly wages (without full time and part time division)

62% of PNGO employees in Gaza earn US$ 500 or less compared with 28% in the West Bank. Women in Gaza have the lowest wages. 73% of them earn an income below US$ 500 compared to 48% of their male counterparts. In the West Bank, only 34% of women PNGO employees earn below US$ 500 (a more detailed discussion will follow in chapter ‘Gendered Working Field’).
46% of PNGO employees in the West Bank earn between US$ 500 and US$ 1000 compared with 28% in Gaza. In the West Bank, male and female are represented at 47% and 46%. In Gaza, there is difference of 15% between males (36%) and females (21%) who earn between US$501 and US$1000.

16% in the West Bank earn US$ 1001-US$ 1500 in comparison to 6% of PNGO employees in Gaza. Just 3% are women are at this income level in comparison to 11% for men. In the West Bank 21% are male and 11.5% female.

Salaries and satisfaction

Asking PNGO employees if they are satisfied with their salaries, incentives and privileges which they get in return for their work: 27% were in agreement (5% strongly agreed, 22% agreed), 39% answered with ‘to some extent’ and 34% expressed dissatisfaction (10% strongly dissatisfied and 24% dissatisfied).

51% of PNGO employees agreed with the opinion, that people who are working in NGOs “are getting good salaries” (45% agreed, 6% strongly agreed), 29% don’t know and 21% disagreed (18% disagreed, 3% strongly disagreed). If we look at the percentages above, we find the income percentages are reflected. 57.5% earn above US$ 500. With US$ 600 and above an NGO employees lies above the average Palestinian monthly wage. As we also know from above, if one breadwinner is in the family and he or she is earning the average Palestinian monthly wage, that means the family is in reality living under the relative poverty line (59% have a working partner, WB 68%, GS 47%).

Although many junior PNGO workers live at or even below the relative poverty line, many view their income quite positively, perhaps comparing it with those who are in a worse situation. Why is this happening? Our study can not provide answers to this question – only further questions. Are people happy to have a job at all? Perhaps, even if a wage is average and close to the relative
poverty line – it may nonetheless amount to more than in other sectors and can help keep the employee’s head above water.

3.4.3.2 Interim conclusion

If we follow PCBS standards for the Palestinian average monthly wage, NGO fulltime and part time employees with an income of US$ 600 and more are above the Palestinian average of US$ 600 = 2340 NIS. 66% of NGO employees are ‘satisfied’ or ‘kind of satisfied’ about their wages.

Note the differences between the West Bank and Gaza in this regard.
62% of Gazan PNGO employees earn below the national monthly average in the OPTs. Female Gazan PNGO employees are losing out specifically, with 73% earning below US$ 500 a month compared to 34% of female workers in the West Bank. Overall, West Bank PNGO workers make more than the national salary average.

A striking contradiction: PCBS defines poverty using the ‘deep poverty line’ and the ‘relative poverty line’. The poverty definition is based on using the budget of a standard household of two adults and four children.

The deep poverty line is defined for a standard household as having a monthly budget below 1870 NIS to cover food, clothing and housing costs.

The relative poverty line is defined for a standard household as having a monthly budget below 2278 NIS to cover food, clothing, housing, health care, transport and housekeeping supplies.110

This implies that, if an PNGO employee is the only family breadwinner and earns below US$ 500, that family is classified as living below the deep poverty

line. An PNGO employee earning US$ 600 who is the only breadwinner of the family is classified as living under the relative poverty line.\textsuperscript{111}

For comparison see below

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & \textbf{Poverty line (NIS)} & \textbf{Poverty Rates in OPT (\%)} & \textbf{Poverty Rates in WB (\%)} & \textbf{Poverty Rates in GS (\%)} & \textbf{Poverty line (NIS)} & \textbf{Poverty Rates in OPT (\%)} & \textbf{Poverty Rates in WB (\%)} & \textbf{Poverty Rates in GS (\%)} \\
\hline
2005 & 2,143 & 29.5 & 22.3 & 43.7 & 1,907 & 24.3 & 24.3 & 28.4 \\
2006 & 2,300 & 30.8 & 24 & 50.7 & 1,981 & 24 & 23.3 & 30 \\
2007 & 2,362 & 30.3 & 19.1 & 51.8 & 2,017 & 31.2 & 22.3 & 49.5 \\
2009 & - & 45.7 & 37.9 & 65.1 & 2,278 & 21.9 & 17 & 33.2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Poverty levels in the OPT according to the old and new methodologies}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{112}Tables and Graphs 28: poverty levels in the OPT (Source: MAS (2011))

\textbf{3.4.3.3 Living standard - Personal evaluation of NGO employees}

Of PNGO employees invited to evaluate their own living standard, 51% (WB 57%, GS 45%) described their living standard as good (very good and good), 38% (WB 46%, GS 42%) as medium and 10% (WB 9%, GS 13%) as bad (bad and very bad).

This result reflects more or less the 50% of PNGO employees who are above the relative poverty line.

\textsuperscript{111}Thanks to Linda Tabar for the discussion to stress the point between income and poverty line.

\textsuperscript{112}It is very interesting to compare the poverty rates of the UN and PCBS. A personal impression is, it seems PCBS is routinely trying to underestimate poverty, using a comparative methodology. The new methodology introduced from PCBS in 2009 reduced poverty even further (see Tables and Graphs 28: poverty levels in the OPTS). The reason can be assumed that the UN and also the World Bank are trying to convince donor 'to give money to the poor Palestinians'. The PCBS, belonging to the PA, is trying to say that the Palestinians already have a functioning economy.
Living standard
Personal evaluation of NGO employees

PNGO employees in the West Bank are more satisfied with their living standard compared with their colleagues in Gaza. In Gaza, 46% of more male PNGO employees consider their living standard to be medium than female PNGO employees (39%). In Gaza 17% women and 7% men consider they have a bad standard of living. In comparison with the West Bank, 12% men and 7% women consider they have a bad standard of living.

Living standards above the Palestinian average
Asking PNGO employees if they think working in a PNGO, their living standard is above average: 53% agreed, 28% did not know and 19% disagreed.
Living standard above average

53% of Palestinian PNGO employees have the impression, based on their work in an PNGO, that their living standard is better than it is. Basically the definition of living standards includes “a level of material comfort as measured by the goods, services, and luxuries available to an individual, group or nation.”\footnote{in \textit{The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language} (Houghtoun Mifflin Company, 2010).} Nowadays living standard is not only measured by international or specific country codes, it is also measured by the life-styles of individuals or of a group they represent. The expression ‘life-style’ appeared in literature a

3.4.3.4 Interim conclusion
Living standard – actual living standard and ‘perceived living standard’
generation ago and explains social values and behavior such as ways of living, attitudes towards education, mobility (traveling), cultural activities such as theatre and concerts, clothing, driving certain kinds of cars etc. People are often willing to take loans to live a certain life-style.

One should note, however, that people in Palestine take out loans for several reasons: building work, wedding, education, cars etc. or because they are out of work and need funds to survive. They are not only used to achieve a particular life style.

It is notable that 32% of PNGO employees are in the process of paying back personal loans and in addition 12% are paying back car loans. This must be also seen in the context of the neo-liberal policy of the World Bank and other donors, to implement special credit programs all over the OPTs. These special credit programs make the availability of credit, especially for young people much easier than it used to be. Also there have been especially good credit conditions for those who wish to invest in a new car in the West Bank. In the West Bank, 17% of PNGO employees are paying back car loans in comparison to 4% in Gaza.

It is too early to draw conclusions about any differences between PNGO employees in other sectors regarding real and perceived living standards. There was no attempt to quantify information on additional benefits from working with an NGO. These can include: private use of an NGO car, special checkpoint passes, use of a mobile telephone, etc. It is also unclear if such privileges differ very much from those available in the private or public sectors. It is not yet clear if there an objective or merely a subjective difference between NGO employees and employees in other working sectors in this regard.

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114 See background and interesting political details in Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement".
3.4.4 Controversial settings of voluntary work in the NGO sector: Volunteering in the light of changing times

Before Oslo in 1993, voluntary work was an essential part of PNGOs, charitable organizations and popular committees as a meaning of fighting Israeli occupation and as contribution to support Palestinian society. Voluntary work began with the organization of various political parties. People did this work unpaid in addition to their work as pupils, students, employees, housewives etc. Because voluntary work was and remains an essential part of PNGO-work, the study tries to shed light on the attitudes of PNGO employees towards personal voluntary work.

3.4.4.1 Who is volunteering?

31% of PNGO employees (40% male, 20% female) do volunteer work in addition to their official work, 69% do not. Most of those (31%) who volunteer do so as administrators, followed by coordinators 19%, supervisors 13%, service employees 12%, office employees 5%, researchers 4% and others 4%. 59% of PNGO employees who wanted “to contribute something to my society” do voluntary work. In addition, 54% of PNGO employees who declared their personal goal in working for an PNGO as “feeling independent” do voluntary work.
3.4.4.2 Volunteering and age

Volunteering in another institution/age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you do volunteer work in other institution?</th>
<th>Age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17–25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong> % within age group</td>
<td>31.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong>  % within age group</td>
<td>68.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> % within age group</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some 53% of 46-54 year olds do voluntary work. Participation decreases to 38% in the age groups 55-74 and 38-45. Some 32% of PNGO employees in the age group 17-25 do voluntary work but in the age group 26-37, the participation rate drops to 24%.

3.4.4.3 Character of voluntary work

Most do their voluntary work in educational and cultural activities (52%). Others are involved in training activities (39%) or supporting charitable organizations and providing technical assistance (14%).

Because the categories “training activities” or “providing technical assistance” do not specify for whom the work is done, we are careful in drawing conclusions here. We can assume that these categories are closely connected with an NGO worker’s profession. It can be taken to mean either “it is sharing my own personal knowledge with Palestinian society” or “training activities and providing technical assistance in NGOs for NGO employees.” This could

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115 The possibility of answering “being a member of a board of trustees” was excluded
also be aimed at improving the PNGO community, improving the network and improving personal job prospects.

3.4.4.4 Professional Palestinian NGOs and the impact of a generation gap

“Do any of you volunteer in addition to work?”
“No, now we are employees.”

The results of focus groups, revealed different attitudes towards volunteering between the first Intifada generation (38 years or more) and second Intifada generation (17-37 years).

First Intifada Generation

In focus groups (WB&GS, female and male, 40 years and above) the topic was enthusiastically discussed.

• Being aware that times have changed; changes in attitudes towards voluntary work came with the Oslo agreements and the changing policies of external donors.
• Voluntary work was and remains patriotic and it is done for the people in addition to labor and without payment
• Voluntary work was and remains patriotic in the sense of fighting against Israeli occupation
• Voluntary work was mainly initiated and organized through political parties – today it is no longer a party matter.
• Today, voluntary work is mainly done in the expectation of getting something in return: experience and employment.
Second Intifada Generation

Generalizations are seldom useful and they sometimes miss the voice of minorities in the group described. Voluntary work was rarely considered to be unpaid work in and for the benefit of society.

The majority saw voluntary work as a means of:

- gaining experience, especially immediately after graduation from university
- improving job prospects
- acquiring experience in different fields which improves one’s chances of achieving a long term or permanent contract. Having job security and not having to contend with permanent short term contracts means stability in life and that implies “having a future” (FGs <30 male and female, WB&GS).
- providing travel opportunities and money to pay for study.

Contrasting the younger generation with the argument of the older generation, the argument of the younger generation was: “today the economic situation is much worse”, “the general unemployment rate in the OPTs is higher than back in the eighties”, “the political situation is different, even worse”, – these statements are reflecting on one hand that most of the younger generation have no good contracts and on the other hand, being worried about their future comparing to the older generations which is established in their jobs and in society.

3.4.4.5 Interim conclusion

31% of PNGO employees do voluntary work outside their jobs. A greater percentage of the first Intifada Generation see themselves as doing something as a part of society for society, which was originated in the historical context of PNGOs in fighting against occupation (FG >40 years). They admit, however,
that this context has changed. Following the argument of a changed context, some questions need to be raised, especially set against the background of how Islamic oriented organizations and NGOs include voluntary work in their self image:

What does the act of volunteering consist of? Is it a self-legitimating form of self-justification? Has it become depoliticized; is it merely civic in nature, stripped of broader national-political significance? Is it a way of vicariously reliving the principles of the first Intifada which the NGOs were partially responsible for destroying? Could it be that NGO workers are attempting here to resist the broader transformations that have taken place and to uphold ideals such as sacrifice, voluntarism, and national responsibility?

Comparing voluntary work between religious and secular, Islamic orientated organizations and NGOs might reveal that people have different philosophies and concepts of themselves and of society; but this will be touched upon only shortly in this paper. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that nobody has to do voluntary work as a contribution to society and age is irrelevant in this respect.

Sara Roy writes in her new book *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza. Engaging the Islamist Social Sector*, about islamist social institutions and their attitude to voluntary work and comes to the conclusion: Islamist Social Institutions (ISI) base their self understanding on Islam as a comprehensive system including material, spiritual, societal, individual, political and personal matters in life. By building up a continuous framework for powerless and excluded people and also giving them the possibility of participation, individuals become empowered. The approach is simple: if you or your child is taking part in a program – you are at the same time also a volunteer in the organization. This implies that the organization gets supported with your manpower according to your skills and at the same time, you as an individual person are elevated in a context where understanding and appreciation of human beings is based on common cultural values.
“indeed, the elements of choice and participation were important parts in an ongoing effort among ISIs to (re)-create a sense of the ordinary in an environment – characterized by Israeli occupation and PNA control – that was anything but. In this sense, I believe, many ISIs implicitly understood that what unites people is far more powerful than what divides them. This meant focusing on people’s everyday concerns by embedding programs in local norms and understandings.”

Voluntary work is seen as being a part of a functioning society where people give and take for themselves and as part of the community.

It is generally assumed, and it has been noted in the literature that the majority of western funded PNGOs have lost ground compared with Islamic NGOs. The environment characterized by Israeli occupation – which dominates the daily lives of most of the people – and the reality that attempts to build up state structures in an ongoing occupation are extremely difficult if not doomed to failure (see Salam Fayyad, *Ending the occupation, establishing the state, program of the thirteenth government, August 2009*). Even a territory with “independent state structures” remains under occupation – a marionette controlled by the occupiers. A minority, certain elites, might profit from this situation: business elites, the PA-elite, the academic-elite and the NGO elite. All these enjoy privileges that are not available to the average Palestinian.

The majority of voluntary work in international funded NGOs should be seen in a neo-liberal context – voluntary work is the chance for future employees to enter “the first job market”. Sometimes, prospective NGO-employees go through seemingly endless volunteering experiences. This explains why the answer to our question “do any of you volunteer in addition to work?” was “No, now we are an employee.” (FG WB < 30 years). The concept of voluntary work as social and political activism, as seen through the eyes of the first Intifada generation needs to be considered in different socio-political contexts.

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PNGO employees do not form an entirely homogeneous group. The study shows interesting contradictions and revealingly different orientations. The aid business is not a uni-directional process, and those who work in this sector are not merely actors consumed with finding work and maintaining a middle class existence. NGO employees are on the one hand being pushed – on the other hand they pull in different directions. Under different circumstances, people might choose to act in very different ways. NGO employees are required to adapt to the current political situation in Palestine and to the Palestinian labor market. Some PNGOs and PNGO employees resist neoliberal ideology and create alternatives while others adapt themselves to it.

3.4.5 Types of Palestinian NGO employees

PNGO employees who remain a long time in the PNGO sector are able, through international networking to work abroad. In the study research, PNGO employees who have left the country, either for experience of living abroad or for a better position, are not included.

PNGO employees who remain for the long term or have permanent jobs enjoy better chances of careers and of achieving executive positions compared with persons with short term contracts and earning below US$ 500. The majority of PNGO employees are confronted with short term contracts (1 year or less) because PNGO work is mainly project-based. Projects by definition are limited in time. ‘Short term contracts’ can be found in all different age categories and also at all level of career status. However, one can succeed in winning one project after another. This means that a skillful player is able to remain in employment through means of successive engagements but the contracts themselves remain limited in time.

PNGO employees offer a differentiated picture depending on:
Working conditions, contract level: short term employees, long term employees/permanent employees, project-based employees, income
We characterize the NGO community as follows:

The characteristics of precariat, aspiring middle class and NGO-elite can be found in (1) different age categories and (2) at different levels of career status.

### Types of NGO Employees

1. Different age categories
2. Different level of career status

- **NGO-precariat**
- **Aspiring middle class**
  - NGO careerists
- **NGO-elite**
  - NGO careerists
  - NGO actors

Tables and Graphs 32: types of PNGO employees

#### 3.4.5.1 Precariat (casual workers, insecure and exploited)

**Young Urban and professional – and being among the precarious**

This group is young (between 17 and 37 years), urban (76.5%) and professional (90% have a higher education and 41% have undertaken further training courses / improving skills). But this does not guarantee good jobs in the labor market. Often it means being low paid (under the Palestinian average, close to the poverty line), having a short term contract or no written contract at all.

The ‘Precariat’ are PNGO employees who take virtually any job on offer, because they have no freedom to choose the sector in which they want to earn a living. 14% (WB 12%, female 15%, male 9%; GS 17%, female 17%, male 17%) stated that the NGO sector is the only possibility to find work apart from finding work abroad (14%, WB 13%, male 17%, female 11%; GS 15%, male
Others stated, in a desolate economic situation and high unemployment “It is not a question of choice, you take what you get” (FGs Gaza, male <30).

### 3.4.5.2 Aspiring middle class -

#### Young, urban and professionals – as NGO careerists

30% can be characterized as ‘young careerists’

Young careerists or the aspiring middle class (30%) have the chance to find a better job in the NGO sector and generally enjoy a better career status, a higher salary and long term contracts (WB 40%, male 38%, female 38%; GS 24%, male 31%, female 17%) of NGO employees. They have achieved a middle class lifestyle or are aspiring to it, i.e. through debt, status markers, and as mentioned above they have more job security than those on a 1-2 year contract.

### 3.4.5.3 NGO elite

NGO careerists or NGO actors

In the Palestinian NGO elite we have on one hand PNGO careerists and on the other hand PNGO-actors. PNGO-actors come mainly from the generation of the First Intifada which set up the PNGOs. They have the most privileges and retain progressive self images and maybe even progressive values despite the stratification and realities inside the PNGOs.

Verified through quantitative research young careerists are in the sense of Hanafi and Tabar a part of the *professionalized elite*, which has undergone a shift at the level of language, categories, discourse, projects and interventions in Palestinian society. They became somewhat detached from the national movement and became shaped by donors’ concepts of power, knowledge and discipline.
For a young careerist, personal and economical advantage matters, ‘gaining money’, “and gaining skills and experiences”, “self-development”. “Supporting civil society” becomes a vehicle for the realization of one’s own interests. “Supporting civil society” is often taken to mean using society as a target in need of instruction. And a commonly-heard approach is “all problems can be solved” by undertaking social engineering work. In these kinds of interventions a process of individualization is embedded and a collective agency is undermined. As a consequence, the national movement, the struggle against colonialism and against gender domination is weakened.  

**PNGO actors**

These are NGO employees, mostly from the First Intifada generation who continue to engage in voluntary work outside their jobs ‘to support Palestinian society’, or have taken up such work again. As described above, before Oslo in 1993, voluntary work was an essential part of the activities of PNGOs, charitable organizations and popular committees as a means of fighting against Israeli occupation and / or as an effort to support Palestinian society. This analysis has to been seen in the context of the history of Palestinian NGOs and their withdrawal from the grass roots movements. We need to consider the impact of institutionalization and professionalization and their consequences in changing the self perceptions of PNGOs.

This part of the PNGO elite went through this institutionalization process and often actively supported it. Now well established in society – and now survivors of a more political generation in the PNGO sector. They stand out among other NGO employees, with a radically different background of past political activism and ideas. As stated in FGs, (female and male above 40

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117 See also existing literature of Kuttab, Eileen, 2008: "Palestinian Women's Organizations: Global Cooption and Local Contradiction", Jad, Islah, 2004:”The "NGOization” of the Arab Women's Movement”, in: Institute of Women's Studies, Birzeit University. They have analyzed ‘institutionalization’ and ‘professionalization’ in this context.
years) “times have changed.” This group also accepts this fact: “Our generation believed in voluntary concepts, community serving, civil society, democracy and human rights. Meanwhile there is a generation now, which looks at the issue from financial and job aspects only.”

The landscape of PNGOs is divided. Some PNGOs resist the ideology of neoliberalism and developed or are developing alternatives to break out of the roles imposed on them by international donors. They seek to return to models of self-reliance. Others, (for example in the agriculture sector, or ‘Stop the wall’, ‘Badil’, etc.) clearly work to advocate Palestinian national rights, and struggle against Israeli colonial and apartheid oppression.

In general, the goal of the most PNGOs today is not to change Israeli politics of apartheid and to stop the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The majorities of NGOs are no longer political actors, and take no part of a liberation struggle. They are “political actors” alongside the PA in the sense of building up state structures.118

Transforming itself from a broad grass-roots movement into a group of professionals, this cadre, which once took a leading role in the political class, dissolved itself through individualization with the consequences of de-politicization, de-radicalization and demobilization of a formerly powerful political opposition.

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118 See also introduction, page 14 in: World Bank and Bisan Center for Research and Development, 2006: "The role and performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and Agriculture".
3.5 NGO sector – a female gendered working field?

As we know from other studies, the gender gap in education is closing at all levels. Women and men have reached parity, but this improvement has not reached the formal labor market yet. Women’s participation in the formal labor market in Palestine is at 16% one of the lowest in the region and in the world.\(^{119}\)

The study shows that the participation of female employees in the PNGO sector stands at 57.5% (WB 58%, GS 56%) compared with male employees at 42.5% (WB 42%, GS 44%).\(^{120}\) Having their very first job, women in Gaza are better represented at 48%, compared to women in the West Bank at 41%.

3.5.1 Women – presence in the Palestinian NGO working sector by age

Women dominate in the age groups 17-25 years (female 65%, male 35%), 26-37 years (female 60%, male 40%) and 38-45 years (female 55%, male 45%). Men dominate in the age group 46-55 years (male 58%, female 42%) and 55-74 years (male 73%, female 27%).

\(^{119}\) It has been steadily rising since 1995 at 11.2%, 2002 at 10.4% and 2008 at 16%.

\(^{120}\) Also compare with the study of MAS, 2007: Mapping Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 43.: 54.8% female and 45.2% male.
3.5.2 Female and the aspect of job distribution:

Being female or male does not demonstrate any effect on whether the employee has a full-time or a part-time job. It does, however, affect an employee’s chances of getting a higher position such as that of administrator.

Type of work: male/female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of work</th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Female %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office employee</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer/ supervisor</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 33: type of work: male/female

37% of men have a job as an administrator compared to 27% of women. This result conforms to the results of a recent World Bank study which estimates that women in the service sector tend to hold lower-status jobs.

20% (WB 24%, GS 13%) of office employees work in NGOs. The rate in the West Bank is 11% higher than in Gaza. In the West Bank, being an office employee is a domain for women (30% female, 17% male), in Gaza the percentage is nearly equal (14% female, 13% male). This result can be explained by the higher unemployment rate in Gaza and by the fact that Gazan

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121 In our questionnaire was offered: administrator, office employee, trainer/supervisor, services, coordinator, researcher, others/specify. Employees didn’t use “others/specify” for differentiation for jobs in higher level. According to an average job description, an administrator is a person with responsibilities in different matters.

122 World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse".
men are forced to take any job on offer, even if secretarial employment is generally considered suitable only for women. Being aware that PNGOs which focus on women are represented in the study at 40% and also that female employment in NGOs stands at 57.5%, the administrator category, with 37% of posts held by men as against 27% by women demonstrates no gender equality.

3.5.3 Female and higher education

Our research shows that the PNGO sector is a working sector for highly educated, young women.

Women’s participation in the labor force is concentrated both “at the top end of the scale – professionals, technical staff and clerks (service sector)” – but also “toward the lower end of the scale – namely un-skilled agriculture.” An entry requirement for women into the service sector is a high level of education, and as shown in numerous studies, women without a university education in the OPTs have a much harder time getting access to the labor force at all. At the same time, the lack of growth of job opportunities in the economy as a whole means that very many women (especially young university graduates) are unable to access work in the service sector – thus women with a university education also make up the largest number of unemployed women in both West Bank and Gaza. In the past, women would enter the labor force then, after a few years, drop out because of domestic responsibilities and thus create an opening for new entrants into the labor force. With the decline in the economic situation, however, married women are staying in the labor force rather than dropping out. Female graduates are

123 See in World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse". “General assumption” and “Basic facts about women and labor market trends in the WB and GS”


entering the labor force but many of the jobs they seek are taken.\textsuperscript{126} It can also be observed that the trend of married women to work is increasing. This trend is taking place not only because more women want to work. One major reason is the massive rise in male unemployment since 2006.

Summing up the results of our study: the public sector is occupied by women who have been in the labor market; for some time; so the NGO sector could be seen as a chance for young women with a higher education to enter the labor market. This goes along with the findings of a UN study on women in Gaza which shows that, for many young new labor entrants in Gaza, the PNGO sector is easier to access than the public sector, even though some of the young women would prefer to work in the latter.

The policy of donors of seeking to empower women seems to be a positive sign for women in the labor market.\textsuperscript{127} The attempt to empower women for higher and therefore better paid positions has made little or no progress.

Overall, it looks like that a different role understanding, a shifting in traditional gender roles is touching the ground. We may be witnessing the beginning of a shift in perceptions gender roles. Increasingly, today investment in education for girls is seen as bringing either a good job or a “good marriage”.\textsuperscript{128}

It should be noted that the positive aspect of more opportunities for women to find work in the labor market, society, family structures remain mostly traditional and patriarchal gender norms remain salient. These mandate that only women are responsible for house and children. Working outside the house thus places a double burden on women. The participation of women in the


\textsuperscript{127} Because male unemployment rates have remained fairly constant since 1996, the women's unemployment rate rose until 2007, see in World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse", table at p. 29.

labor market does mark a degree of empowerment but it is not per se an indication of a progressive change from patriarchal norms and gender based inequalities.

3.5.4 Women and marital status

In Palestinian society, 92% of women marry between 15 and 29 years, 29% of women before their eighteenth birthday. The median age at first marriage for females is 19.5 years and for males 25.4 years. The fertility rate in 2010 was 4.2 births (WB: 3.8, GS 4.9 births). The average household size of a Palestinian family is 5.8 persons (WB 5.5 and GS 6.4 persons) in 2010.

59% of NGO employees are married, 35% of NGO employees have the marital status single, 1% are separated, 2% divorced and 1% widowed (2% did not answer the question). For further analysis, a recode was done in ‘not married’ and ‘ever married’, see Tables and Graphs: 33, below.

129 MAS, 2010: "Economic and Social Monitor 22".

130 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2012, 385.
Marital status
Single, ever married

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex cross tabulation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 34: marital status, ever married / single / gender

64% of NGO employees are or have been married (male 75%, female 56%) and 36% of NGO employees are not married (male 25%, female 44%).
Gender: age groups and single status

Marital status
Age groups, Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Female Single</th>
<th>Male Single</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17-25</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-37</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-45</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-54</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-75</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In our study we do have slightly different age categories as mentioned above, 17-25 years and not 15-29 years. Comparisons have to be drawn carefully. If we compare these categories we find in the age group female 17-25 years, 69% are single and 31% married. In the age group female 26-37 years 40% are single and 60% are married. In the age group 38-45 years: 23%, aged 46-55 years: 13% and aged 55-74 years: 25% are single. This indicates a trend to later marriage among female PNGO employees and / or the free choice to remain single. Highly educated women with working experience are often above the average marriage age and this fact can also be a “burden” for women in Palestinian society who are seeking a partner. Studies done at an international level show in general, men tend to marry younger women and that their spouses have a lower level of academic achievements. Results of our focus groups also show that young men (WB&GS 30 years and below) prefer their sisters and wives to work in the public and private sectors, because NGO work for women is still not considered respectable in all sections of society. The study Who answers to Gazan women? An economic security and rights
research. (2010) were talking with women in women focus group interviews and found out, that women working in NGOs are getting more attractive on the ‘marriage market’, because they earn good wages in a desolate economical situation.

3.5.5 Women’s salaries (full time and part time together)

### Monthly wage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In US $</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th></th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>42.5 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001-1500</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501-2000</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2500</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2501-3000</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000-4000</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 4000</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>0.5 %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62% of PNGO employees in Gaza earn less than US$ 500 in comparison to 28% in the West Bank. Women in Gaza have the lowest wages. 73% of them earn less than US$500 compared to 48% of their male counterparts. In the West Bank only 34% of female NGO employees earn below US$ 500. Concerning women in Gaza: according to the report “Checkpoints and Barriers” young educated women with a university degree show much more flexibility and openness “to a variety of poorly paid and temporary work opportunities (especially within the aid economy) than young men with higher education. Normative gender roles probably account for this; young men still perceive themselves as principle breadwinners with aspirations for jobs in the
formal labor market. They are therefore more selective about the type of work that best meets their needs. Young women’s employment, on the other hand, is still perceived as secondary, and ultimately not their primary gender role. This illustrates how deeper patriarchal gender norms remain salient, even when they are being challenged by new needs and patterns of behavior. Thus, women’s participation in the labor market does not automatically result in changing deeply seated gender-based inequalities.”

3.5.6 Gender and aspects of being not successful in Palestinian NGO work

NGO employees explain factors hindering their success
Stratified by region/sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough time</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors policy negative</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution policy/strategy negative</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation hinders</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table and Graphs 36: gender / factors hindering their success of NGO work

Gender aspect:
‘There was not enough time’. Women find that the time allotted to projects or the time they are given to complete their own tasks within them is too short. In the West Bank, 20%, in Gaza 35.5% of women complained about “not having

---

enough time”. This is notably higher than their male counterparts (WB 14%, GS 7%).

The high percentage among Gaza’s women could be explained by the fact that women in Gaza have to contend with more part time or short term contracts than women in the West Bank. 26% of male employees in Gaza judged the policy of donors to be ‘negative’; 20% of their female colleagues in the West Bank agreed.

The argument that institutional policy or strategy has a negative impact is mentioned by 37% of women in the West Bank compared to Gaza males at 18.5%; their male counterparts in the West Bank followed with 17%. Finally, 10% of women in Gaza shared this negative evaluation.

West Bank women think too a much higher degree, that the institution policy is working against changes comparing to Gaza’s women. More (19%) of Gazan women think that the ‘political situation hinders’ compared to their female counterparts in the West Bank at 11%. Male NGO employees in the West Bank (38%) and Gaza (41%) do not show this big gap.

These surprisingly different results raise some questions about the different life situations of women in the West Bank and Gaza. Gaza’s women state with 19% the negative impact of the ‘political situation’, living under occupation, living under siege, living under international boycott, still coping with the internal struggle of Fatah and Hamas – ending in an ongoing humanitarian crises and with a high unemployment rate. To survive in such conditions means ‘having a job’, taking any job you can find to be the breadwinner or to support your family. ‘Institutional strategy’ and other aspects of life at work are in this respect irrelevant because what counts is to survive on a daily basis. Criticizing ‘ideological structures’ would be a luxury and may undermine the privileged status of having a job.
3.5.7 Interim conclusion

The PNGO sector can be seen as a working sector for highly educated unmarried women. As we heard in focus groups, women and men can act ‘normally’ and egalitarian relations inside the PNGO world are possible (see more details in the next chapter). This open working atmosphere could be an important reason why the NGO working sector is more attractive for unmarried women. The fact that donors force the implementation of gender equality is important in this regard.

The study shows clearly that, even if women's presence in the PNGO sector is higher than their male counterparts, they are under represented in higher positions and over represented in the West Bank in PNGO office work. They remain at the bottom end of the wage scale especially in Gaza.

Female participation decreases with age. The question arises: are older women, supported by the income of a partner, choosing to reject the double burden of work and family/household or are they being denied access to senior positions in a patriarchal system? Another important influence on women’s' lives is increasing access to maternity leave. Many take full advantage of this and often drop out of the labor market, taking up a job again later. Such career interruptions are evident world wide. Some possible causes for women's under-representation at higher professional levels have been outlined here but further research with focus groups is needed to shed more light on this phenomenon.
3.6 Palestinian NGOs as political actor

PNGOs – What kind of background do they have? How do they evaluate themselves?

3.6.1 Historical background

Relation: Organization/political party

Palestinian NGOs have encountered several turning points in their long history. What all the different periods have in common is that Palestinian NGOs are operating in an occupied country. Charitable societies began to emerge during
the British mandate. They can be described as elite based, representing the values and politics of the older ruling classes, with a welfare approach. In the late 'seventies (Camp David Accords 1977) and the beginning of the 'eighties (Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 1982) the national movement was growing again in the light of widespread resistance to the situation engendered by the accords and to implementation of the accords and to the occupation of Israel. PNGOs which had their roots in political mass mobilization, flourished. Theoretically and actively organized by the left, in the beginning PNGOs were originally cross fractionally organized but after a view years became increasingly factional. For those PNGOs which were allied with the PLO, their factional stance brought with it financial support. At this time, PNGOs began to engage with foreign donors. In the beginning of the first Intifada in 1987, the voluntary and non-factional spirit of the late 'seventies returned. With the experience and skills of PNGOs, popular committees were able to form the successful frontline of the uprising.

Rema Hammami reinterprets the “nostalgic view” of this period, describing a backlash of grass roots movements in 1990 when the process of institutionalization re-emerged and PNGOs turned into professionally based and foreign funded institutions again. A positive aspect of foreign funding was that it made PNGOs independent of political factions; a negative aspect remains the dominant agenda of the donors.

Meanwhile a growing demobilization of the population became evident as, through the PLO stance towards the Gulf war, it lost much of its financial support mainly from Arab countries and thus for all the institution that depended on them – political factions and mass organizations.

After Oslo, foreign donor money increased with NGOs acting and promoting themselves as “the civil society”. ‘Professionalized NGOs’ headed by figures from leftist factions became a vocal lobby for criticism of the PA. In the mid-nineties the World Bank created a Palestinian NGO trust fund, a project that clearly had a major impact on the way the PA began to perceive NGOs as
competitors that it had either to co-opt, control or undermine.\textsuperscript{132} By the end of 1997, the PA became more and more intrusive into NGO affairs and took repressive measures. The NGO law which was signed 2000 remained, however, a victory for the NGOs.\textsuperscript{133}

In retrospect, the shift in the political economy of western aid to the PNGOs marked a major external intervention. This produced new internal forms of social and political capital but therefore also new forms of exclusion. Charitable societies and popular committees lost out and were subsequently marginalized. As a consequence Hanafi & Tabar analyze the entry of local NGOs into aid channels as “a process of new subject formation as well as changes in the conceptual and institutional foundations of NGOs.”\textsuperscript{134} This includes adopting neo-liberal development paradigms and international standards – which were not developed in the local context. These new paradigms influence the local context, however, and, along with the emerging relations between state and society. Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour analyze the role of NGOs in their article ‘Neoliberalism as Liberation’ very clearly: “From the start of the Oslo process, they were among the first sectors in Palestinian society to embrace neoliberalism, and they have acted as an important conduit of its development paradigm. [55]. Moreover, the "development industry" (and its local partners) have acted – wittingly or otherwise – as an "anti-politics machine" that has depoliticized Palestinian society, sustained the occupation, and initiated a long march toward neoliberal hegemony that has found its most elaborate manifestation to date in the PA statehood plan [56].”\textsuperscript{135} The majority


\textsuperscript{133} This short historical review is mainly based on the article Hammami, Rema, 1996:"Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo. From NGO Politics to Social Movements?", in: Beinin, Joel and Stein, Rebecca L. (ed), 84-93.

\textsuperscript{134} Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 26.

of NGOs incorporate these neo-liberal development goals in order to survive in the competition for donor money. Some PNGOs do not resist this neo-liberal agenda at all and some do.

**NGOs today**

If PNGO employees think politically about NGOs and their work within them and if they consider that they and their leaders should play a political role in society, questions for further research present themselves. These concerns:

1. Opinion about democratic structures inside PNGOs
2. Opinion about the role of PNGOs in society
3. Personal political background

### 3.6.2 Democratic structures inside Palestinian NGOs

80% of PNGO employees attest their PNGO affords basic democratic structures within the limits of a working hierarchy, in words such as: “we can freely express our opinions, but we cannot change the policy of the organization.” (FGs GS male <30 years with “good contracts”). Working atmosphere and working relations are predominantly characterized as open between employees. In FGs 30 years and below we may read between the lines that, along with good working relations there appear a natural, aggressive form of competition - regarding who gets the next job in the following project. Women above 40 in Gaza mentioned this tension exists not only between young people (30 years and below) but also between the generations. Those in the generation of 40 years and above, fear losing their jobs to younger employees.
3.6.3 Gender aspect: the world of work versus the world of society

Focus group results in the West Bank and Gaza, female and male 30 years and below mentioned very strongly, specially in Gaza that women and men can act “normally”. This implies that the sexes work together on an equal footing. This situation starts on entering the PNGO offices and stops on leaving. Women found their working conditions in this respect to be “an excellent fraternity relationship. Let me tell you why. Because your boss imposes on you a relationship of integrity, understanding and equality.”

Men: “Our relationship with our female colleagues is excellent.”

“There are limitations that rule the relationship. Outside the organization, there is a great caution because the community does not have mercy.”

“The relationship is over at the entrance of the organization.”

3.6.4 Institutions versus programs in support of political liberation

We asked two questions concerning PNGOs and their possible impact on supporting Palestinian society in its effort to free itself from occupation. First, we asked PNGO employees if the PNGO itself, and if their working in an PNGO supports the process of liberation from occupation 37% disagree, 32% don’t know and 31% agree.

In comparison, we asked if the programs and services offered by PNGOs positively support the liberation process. 52% agreed, 28% did not know and 20% disagreed.

Gaza and the West Bank show differences between male and female in the results concerning training programs and courses. More Gaza male’s feel that they do, followed by females in both the West Bank and Gaza. West Bank males at 54% are least likely to feel that training programs contribute to the liberation process (Tables and Graphs 37, below).
Do NGO training programs promote the liberation process?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th></th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>49 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>55 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables and Graphs 38: do PNGO training programs promote the liberation process?

An interesting division appears between the overall role of the institution in the liberation process. The institution itself is rather limited regarding a revolutionary orientation but the activities of the NGO, educational in particular, do make a contribution. 52% believe that education in the form of training courses, and courses offered to bolster empowerment and consciousness building support the liberation process. This result agrees with the 61% (22% don’t know, 17% disagree) of NGO employees who believe that programs and workshops impact positively in building a more democratic society. The variation between West Bank and Gaza is not statistically significant.
3.6.5 Palestinian NGOs – playing a political role

Opinion of Palestinian NGO employees about whether Palestinian NGOs are political

In all focus groups, the direct question, whether PNGOs should play a political role or should be a political actor in Palestinian society was answered with yes or no, a position “I don’t know” didn’t appear.

Why and how they are playing a political role:

- **Yes** – they do play a political role.
  - PNGOs represent Palestine internationally
  - PNGOs are part of the community – working in and for the community helping to change unequal laws affecting women, handicapped people, etc. in the direction of equality.
  - PNGOs are the counterpart of the government – and through acting on the ground, are necessarily political

- **No** – they should not play a political role because:
  - PNGOs should be neutral
  - PNGOs should be social and not political
  - PNGOs, in playing a political role, weaken political parties.
  - Some PNGOs have lost their connections to their social base. Their interest is principally to stay in existence.

3.6.6 Opinion of Palestinian NGO employees about Palestinian NGOs' playing a political role in the public sphere

**PNGO employees / leaders role in public sphere (quantitative results)**

- 53 %: PNGO leader should play a political role
- 70 %: PNGO leaders’ being represented in parliament is positive
• 53 %: PNGO leaders are in a better position to reach important political or parliamentary positions
• 52 %: PNGO leaders have succeeded in this respect

In general, PNGO employees think PNGO leaders have through their profession and working experience a better understanding of the reality of Palestinian people and a better understanding and practice of democracy than the average Palestinian.

There is a difference in this argumentation between region, female and male. West Bank male 38%, female 23%; Gaza female 32%, male 26%. More West Bank males and Gaza females feel PNGO leaders have an important role to play in public sphere while Gaza males and West Bank females support this notion less.

It seems that the attitude towards being a member of parliament is seen more positively (70%) than merely being politically active (53%).

3.6.7 Palestinian NGO employees – and their membership in political parties

Being a member of a political party is not as common as it was during the 1970s and 1980s. 37% of PNGO employees have been members of a political party. Strongest is the age group 46-55 years at 48%, with a decreasing trend 38-45 years 47%, 26-37 years 38% and 17-25 years at 28%. Currently 24% (WB 23%, GS 24%) are members of a political party and 16% (WB 15%, GS 18%) are active members.

37% of PNGO employees still feel loyalty to a party which they have left.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{136} All these questions were valid with 991 answers, 59 missing.
This graphic shows the distribution of 24% PNGO employees in different political parties. 76% PNGO employees which are not members in a political party are not included.

PNGO employees were also asked for their opinion, if they were currently not members of a political party, which party would best work for liberation of Palestine. 137 53% stated ‘no party’, 25% Fatah, 7% PFLP and 6% Hamas. 9% other parties (parties which received support from fewer than 5% of respondents).

In the West Bank the National Initiative party was better represented than in Gaza.

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137 888 answers are valid (85%), 162 are missing (15%)
Tables and Graphs 40: party most likely to achieve liberation of Palestine

500 answers to a question concerning participants’ votes in the 2006 election were valid but another 550 answers were missing. We must therefore interpret the result with caution.

Tables and Graphs 41: vote in the election 2006

Approximately 48% of 1050 participants answered

Pie chart showing the distribution:
- Fatah: 55%
- PFLP: 12%
- Hamas: 11%
- Peoples Party: 7%
- National Initiative: 6%
- Others: 9%

3.6.8 Palestinian NGO employees and their votes in the 2006 election

The strongest vote with 55% of PNGO employees was for Fatah followed by the PFLP at 12% then Hamas at 11%. 7% of PNGO employees voted for the People’s Party, 6% for the National Initiative and 9% for others.

According to polls from the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (15 February 2006) taking care about education: “support for Fatah drops considerably among the illiterates (34%) and increases to 43% among those with 6-12 years of education, and remains at the same level (42%) among those with two or more years of college education. Support for Hamas increases among the illiterates (50%), and drops to 43% among those with 6-12 years of education, and remains at the same level (44%) among those with two or more years of college education.”

Concerning profession, “support for Fatah decreases considerably among merchants (28%) and increases among professionals (36%), laborers (37%), housewives (42%), students and employees (44% each) and the unemployed (51%). Support for Fatah is weaker among employees in the private sector (37%) compared to employees in the public sector (43%).

Concerning working sectors, support for Hamas increases among merchants (49%) followed by housewives (47%), professionals (46%), laborers (45%), students (42%) and employees and the unemployed (41% each).” Support for Hamas is slightly higher in the private sector (45%) than in the public sector (42%).

Support for the other parties’ increases among merchants (23%), laborers and professionals (18% each), students and employees (14% each), housewives (12%) and the unemployed (9%). Support is slightly higher in the private sector (18%) compared to 16% in the public sector.

3.6.9 Support for a two-state or one-state solution

56% of PNGO employees support a 2-state solution, 44% don’t. There is no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza. A One-State solution (one state for Palestinians and Israelis) is supported by 12% while 88% reject this. There is no significant difference in this regard between the West Bank and Gaza.

3.6.10 Interim Conclusion

Two aspects should be borne in mind regarding this chapter. With the pre-selection of western funded PNGOs in this study, Islamic NGOs and their employees were not in focus and secondly the environment is affected internally by the Palestinian Authority and externally by donors.

Considering votes in the election of 2006 (55% Fatah, 12% PFLP, 11% Hamas, 7% Peoples Party, 6% National Initiative and 9% others) and also looking at political affiliations of party members (53% Fatah, 18% PFLP, 11% Peoples Party, 7% National Initiative, 4% Hamas, 7% others) I assess how far donor organizations were able to influence the NGO employees’ political environment and therefore promote the political aims of the NGOs. Western-initiated restrictions regarding the dispensation of aid were introduced in 2002 and were intensified in 2006 when Hamas won the election. USAID and the EC implemented new, tougher guidelines which affected both the PNGOs themselves and their employees. Typical was a requirement to sign a document condemning terror (the so-called Anti-Terror-Clause) as a pre-condition for employment or for the receipt of donor funding. In Palestine today, talking about politics or political opinions demands considerable trust in advance. “Paper is patience, why should I trust interviewers from a research team I don’t know? Is there any reason to be honest?”

Why were only half of the PNGO employees willing to answer a question about their political affiliation? Is it because politics are a private matter nowadays, or are employees afraid to be open about this subject?

A majority of 76% of PNGO employees have no formal political affiliation. Of these, those who answered the question ‘which party is best for a progressive liberation process’ a majority of 53% answered: no party; followed by Fatah 25%, PFLP 7% and Hamas 6% and 9% others.

24% of PNGO employees are party members. Fatah is dominant at 53%, PFLP 18%, Peoples Party 11%, National Initiative 7%, Hamas 4% and others 9%. Concerning party membership, there are no comparative studies with other working sectors.

If, however, we look at the study of voting patterns by education, profession and work sector done by Khalil Shikaki of the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research concerning the election for the second Palestinian Parliament in 2006, the NGO employees which were willing to answer are following the trend of 2006.\(^\text{140}\)

\(^{140}\) Palestine Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH, "Results of PSR's PLC Exit Poll," http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/exitplcfulljan06e.html.
4. Chapter 4
The role of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations who consider themselves agents of social change: the social and political consequences of PNGOs' engaging in neoliberal reality, especially regarding the working conditions of their employees

Chapter four concludes my thesis with a compact data analysis – *What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as NGOs receive political rents* – in six steps. The analysis builds on the literature debate in chapter one and two and the data and interim conclusions in chapter three.

The following analysis will not go deeply into the literature debate again. The focus lies on arguments 1-6 and I will demonstrate how these arguments rely on one other. If, for the understanding of a following argument, a more detailed review of the literature debate is desirable it will be shortly recapitulated otherwise it will merely be mentioned in argumentation. If data from other sources are used, this will be noted.

External political rents which have been paid to social actors in Palestine for some twenty years, have affected the ways in which these actors work and their understanding of their work. I will summarize a number of major disruptions to Palestinian political life and therefore to civil society before I highlight my proposed mechanism of six steps and describe the impact of these actors on Palestinian society and how they influence power structures in Palestine.

4.1 The political reality of Palestinians

Lisa Taraki (2006) reminds us “… that the political reality must be the basic backdrop against which we examine the routines of life and the small drama of daily life; it thus foregrounds the salient aspects of the enduring and ubiquitous conditions of war, near-war, threat, instability, and vulnerability experienced
by the Palestinians for over five decades, especially in the latest phase of the confrontation with the Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{141}

Some aspects of political reality, starting in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, which caused major disruptions for Palestinians, are:

- the Balfour Declaration of 1917. After the end of the Ottoman Empire 1918, the British civil administration started in 1920 and de facto British rule which was transformed by the League of Nations into a British mandate in 1922. After the Second World War, the United Nations reauthorized the mandate.

- the revolt and general strike of 1936-39 by Palestinians against Jewish immigration and the British mandate, with the consequence that leading figures of the strike were expelled from Palestine by the British mandate authorities;

- the establishment of the State of Israel on 14th May, 1948 followed in the same year by the first Arab-Israeli war. Before, during and after this war 531 villages and 11 districts were emptied of their Arab populations and many destroyed. Some 750,000 Palestinian refugees were thus created.\textsuperscript{142}

- the June War of 1967 leading to the occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza;

- the First Intifada in 1987, followed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and, in 1993, the Oslo Accords with the Paris Protocols 1995 which stipulated binding agreements for the parties; following an interim period, the final status was meant to be agreed;

- the Second Intifada in 2000 led to the re-occupation by Israel of Palestinian towns (Areas A) which lasted from June 2002 till April 2003. In 2003 Israel started building a separation wall which severely

\textsuperscript{141} Taraki, Lisa (ed.), 2006: Living Palestine, Family Survival, Resistance and Mobility under Occupation. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press., see introduction XII

restricts Palestinian movement and economic activity. When the separation wall is completed, "some 85% of the route will run inside the West Bank, rather than along the Green Line, isolating 9, 4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem." 143

The Oslo Accords, as mentioned above, were meant to finalize a negotiated agreement between Israelis and the Palestinians within 5 years. Decisions about political issues such as Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the rights of Palestinian refugees, international borders and security arrangements should have been solved during this interim period. By 2013 the agreed negotiation period had passed without any decisions concerning these issues having been made. Palestinians are now confronted with a fragmentation of the OPTs into Gaza, East-Jerusalem and the West-Bank. The West Bank is itself divided into Areas A (under full civil and security control of the PA), B (the PA nominally maintains civil order while security is controlled by Israel) and C (covering over 60% of the West Bank, which remains under the complete civil and security control of Israel).

During the entire Oslo period, Israel has never stopped building new settlements. Israeli settlements are cover more than 69% of the land (of which 42% represents settlements while a further 27% of the West Bank has been declared by Israel to be public or “state land” and allocated for settlements). Since 1993 the number of Israeli settlers has nearly doubled (from 262,500 in 1993 to over 520.00 in 2013). As B’Tselem reported in 2013: "There are an estimated 515,000 settlers in the West Bank. This figure is derived from two sources: According to data provided by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), at the end of 2011, 325,456 people were living in the settlements of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem. According to data provided by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the population of the Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem numbered 190,423 people at the end of

Palestinians in East Jerusalem have to struggle to live in their own homes. In 2013, OXFAM reported: "Approximately 540 internal checkpoints, roadblocks and other physical obstacles impede Palestinian movement within the West Bank; these obstacles exist primarily to protect settlers and facilitate their movement, including to and from Israel." Since 2006, Gaza has been under siege, largely cut off from the outside world. The fast-growing population has nowhere to go. Unemployment has soared from less than 10% at the beginning of the 1990s to over 32% in 2013. Israel controls all Palestinian water resources. As Israel's per capita GNP is booms, in Palestine it is stagnating.

Following Lisa Taraki (2006) I want to stress here that Palestinian society, as any other society, continues to react towards external and internal challenges, as well as to political, economical and cultural change. PNGOs are one part of this dynamic. In general, different interest groups of society, which evolve continuously, react to these challenges, according to their roles and positions within society.

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Many influential social groups, such as former actors in grassroots movements or in political parties, are today active in NGOs. When such groups reconsider and change their positions profoundly, they move away from the former spirit of collectivism and from their previous overt opposition to the continuing occupation and to the PA. When these actors accept the donors’ neo-liberal narratives of a “post-conflict zone” and actively implement the donor agenda, this has the effect of weakening the resolve of society as a whole to bring about meaningful political change and to oppose the occupation effectively. The process of transformation in PNGOs can be clarified in six steps as follows.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{147} I am talking about the majority of external funded PNGOs. There are some external funded PNGOs on the ground they do resist the neoliberal agenda and their self understanding is political.
4.2 Structural changes in the PNGO sector and their impact on Palestinian society

4.2.1 With professionalization and institutionalization of PNGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, especially after the Oslo Accords, PNGO employees have become new clients of the North.

Basic facts on the ground that allowed this development to took place:

4.2.1.1 PNGOs and the leader generation of PNGOs, starting in the pre-Oslo period, formed a new, politically active educated elite

Political circumstances on the national level as well as on the international level shape individuals’ biographies as well as the life-history of a whole generation – their movements, their ideas and their goals. This process is, of course, ongoing. When considering PNGO employees, we must take into account their heterogeneity and differences in their political biographies.\footnote{What the majority of the NGO-generations since the 1980s have in common is their educational background of higher education, with college or universities degrees.}

It is important to acknowledge that the "older generation" in this study (where the classification “older” starts at 40 years) constituted the founder generation for many PNGOs. The political background of people in this group was established in grassroots movements or political parties and in their participation in the First Intifada. If they have an affiliation with political parties this dates from that period and often continues to this day.\footnote{See short review about NGOs and their history in the introduction part and also the fact, that 37% have been members of a party, 24% are currently members of a party and the members who left their party are still loyal to the party they have left.}

Former leaders of leftist organizations, as well as many activists of the First Intifada, benefited from a university education. They earned their degrees abroad or in Palestinian universities in very difficult political circumstances and under the extreme conditions of an oppressive Israeli military rule. This group can be considered a new educated elite. Their higher education
contributed to the institutionalization and professionalization of PNGOs and of PNGO work.

It is important also to acknowledge that many of this generation reached adulthood in the political atmosphere of the 1970s and 1980s, an atmosphere affected by international solidarity towards liberation movements. In this period, as already mentioned in chapter two, solidarity groups and political organizations from the North started to co-finance PNGO-work on a solidarity basis. This solidarity-based international financial support from various organizations was generally paid to Non-Governmental Organizations and not to political parties. Therefore, if people - with or without party affiliation - wanted to raise money internationally for the struggle against occupation, one possible route was to establish a PNGO. Party members, when becoming active as founders of new PNGOs, would in general not emphasize a connection with their party, simply in order not to risk losing potential funding.

Founding a PNGO could also mean independence from parties, their money and their hierarchical structures. A new PNGO could be used to develop alternatives and to strengthen those structures of civil society which the founder considered desirable. At the same time, through being member of parties, many founders were familiar with the structures and with the functioning of institutions and with professional work in general.

For example, there are many PNGO founders who have a similar biography like Mustafa Barghouti. His political development can therefore serve as a paradigmatic example.

Mustafa Barghouti was born in 1954 in Jerusalem and educated in the former Soviet Union as a physician. Later on, he earned a degree in management at Stanford University where he is a Sloan fellow. As a member of the Communist Party of Palestine (after the end of the Soviet Union, it changed its name to “the Palestinian People’s Party” or PPP) he established the “Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees” (UPMRC) in 1979 and later on the “Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute” (HDIP) which is a
Palestinian think tank, mainly focusing on community health and supporting a network of NGOs in health care.

In 2001 he was one of the founders of “Grassroots International Protection for Palestinian People” (GIPP). This is an organization which struggles via peaceful resistance of international civilians for the protection of the Palestinian people. In 2002 he left the Palestinian Peoples Party and established, together with Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ibrahim Dakkak und Edward Said, the “Palestinian National Initiative” (Al Mubadara Al Wataniyya Al Filistiniyya – المبادرة الوطنية الفلسطينية).

After Arafat’s death, Barghouti ran in the presidential elections and achieved a surprise second place with an unexpected 19.8% of the votes. For the legislative elections in January 2006, he was the top candidate of the list “Independent Palestine”, also known as the “Third Way” – a coalition of independents and NGO members. Their goal in the 2006 elections was to oppose the authoritarianism and corruption associated with the Fatah party and to reject the fundamentalism of Hamas. The list got 2.7% of the votes and Barghouti and one other member were elected as deputies to the Palestinian Legislative Council. During the Palestinian “Unity Government” from March until June 2007, he was minister of information. He refused to continue to be minister under the interim government of Salam Fayyad, because he considered this government to be illegal.

Typical in his biography is his higher education, his activism in a political party, his founding of a NGO in the late 70s, his taking part in the First and Second Intifada and later his linkage with politics at the parliamentary level. What is not representative for the majority of NGO founders of his age is that he left his party in 2002 and created another party, the “Palestinian National Initiative” (Al Mubadara Al Wataniyya Al Filistiniyya – المبادرة الوطنية الفلسطينية), together with Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ibrahim Dakkak und Edward Said which ran for election. That Mustafa Barghouti was able to garner good results has to do with the fact that the majority of NGO employees (and I assume some other parts of the population) believed, "that NGO leaders are more close to the reality of the daily life than politicians". My quantitative
study shows that NGO employees think that NGO leaders have a better understanding of the reality of Palestinian life and practise democracy more than the average Palestinian. Also 53% of PNGO employees maintain that PNGO leaders should play a political role. 70% think that a representation in parliament of PNGO leaders is desirable and 53% believe that PNGO leaders have better chances for important political or parliamentary positions. 52% of PNGO employees are of the opinion that PNGO leaders have succeeded in this respect, see detailed chapter 3.6.6.

Meanwhile PNGOs such as the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) and the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) form part of national and international networks and have therefore become well known worldwide. Mustafa Barghouti is invited as a Palestinian speaker on an international level.

Already in the 1970s a well-respected activist (with the General Union of Palestinian Students), Hanan Ashrawi developed in a similar direction. Having served on the Intifada Political Committee and as spokesperson for the Palestinian delegation to the Oslo peace process, she remains politically active, being both a member of parliament and of the PLO's executive committee, responsible for culture and information. Following her early activism, she also branched out into the NGO sector, founding the PNGO MIFTAH – The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy.

4.2.1.2 Changing Donor reality: Distribution of aid in the pre-Oslo period to PNGOs and, following the Oslo Accords, to the new Palestinian Authority and to PNGOs

In the post-Oslo years, donors started to transfer rents to the newly established PA which, based on the Oslo Accords, acted as and was institutionalized as a quasi-government. Until 1993, governments of donor countries had no government on the Palestinian side to which they could transfer political rents.
Before the Oslo Accords, donors could therefore officially distribute aid only to international NGOs, PNGOs and political parties in the OPTs.

The paradigm shift of the donors in the late 80s, i.e. from social development to mainly economical development and the start at the same time co-financing civil society autonomously parallel to target governments in order to support developmental goals under neoliberal order (see introduction 1.1) and the designation of the Occupied Territories as a "post conflict zone" resulted in profound changes in the funding of PNGOs: only if existing PNGOs and newly-created PNGOs adjusted to the agendas which donors proposed for a "post conflict zone" they could continue to receive funds. These new donor agendas are driven by the donors understanding of “good governance”, i.e. democratization, accountability, transparency, efficiency, fairness, participation, and ownership, as well as their support of human rights, women’s rights, peace education, civil education, advocacy functions and knowledge production. “Resistance” as well as any activities against the ongoing occupation did not qualify for donor funding. Donors emphasized the necessity of "building up a society". This was meant to lay the basis for a state with functioning institutions and a neoliberal socio-economic agenda. Rema Hammami (1995) demonstrates how external donor funding played a key role in the transformation of parts of the mass movement into an NGO community and argues that it has to be understood as a complex process. “Foreign funding began to impose a new set of constraints on organizations, however. Long-term planning, measurable objectives, and reporting requirements meant that organizations had to develop skills in the language.

culture, and methodologies of NGO projects. Most importantly, NGO activities had to meet developmental, rather than political, goals.”

4.2.1.3 Rent-seeking

Receiving political rents engenders rent-seeking behavior and therefore dependency. This develops into a vicious circle which is hard to break, when there is on the one hand an elite – an aspiring middle class which profits in terms of wages, contracts and social status — and on the other hand, a precariat which is too weak and docile to resist.

In the PNGO sector after Oslo, the increasing flow of foreign donor money led also to adroit PNGOs who succeeded in obtaining money from different donors for the same project. This led to a feeling among the donor community that they were being hoodwinked. In reaction they centralized their aid and sent it to a central Palestinian address, i.e. to the Palestinian Authority, hoping that aid money would thus be treated more carefully and distributed more fairly.

As a reaction to these changes in the flows of donor money, two trends can be observed: First, PNGOs who ran out of money appealed to international NGOs for financial support, and second, donor states soon realized that the Palestinian Authority was not distributing aid in the balanced way they had hoped for. Meanwhile donors found ways to balance their aid spent between PA and PNGOs through developing different mechanisms of control.

One major question however, remains to be answered: How did PNGOs start enter in the first way the slippery slope to neoliberalism? I would agree with the analyses of Bebbington et al, that Neoliberalism adopted the terminology of NGOs (see chapter 2.1). I also like to stress that the majority of NGOs missed

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151 Hammami, Rema, 1996:”Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo. From NGO Politics to Social Movements?”, in: Beinin, Joel and Stein, Rebecca L. (ed),86. This development can also be witnessed, both in South America and in Asia (which parts of Asia)

152 This was discussed with Helga Baumgarten in a personal talk. See for example the details of EU funding and their special funding mechanism since the Oslo Accords; as described in Le More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, wasted money.
the opportunity to oppose the neoliberal economic and political mainstream, with its transformation of societal and economical changes into 'individual problems' which can logically only be solved on an individual level. This, however, is undermining a collective agency which used to be the approach of PNGOs before Oslo (see also 3.4.5.3).

4.2.1.4 Political economy and the impact on PNGOs

In retrospect, the shift in the political economy of Western aid to the PNGOs – analyzed and understood by Rema Hammami, Lisa Taraki, and Benoit Challand as a major external intervention and considered in my thesis as a paradigm change documented in chapter two and argued above in 4.2.1.2 – resulted in the development of new forms of internal social and political capital, coupled, however, with new forms of exclusion. Other civil society organizations such as charitable societies and grassroots organizations lost out and were subsequently marginalized. Other PNGOs had to compete for donor money in order to survive.153

The current data in chapter three (3.3 -3.4.5) clearly demonstrate that PNGO employees can be characterized as clients of northern donors. The relationship between donors and aid recipients we witness demonstrates a classic patron-client relationship (see chapter two, excursus).

In this context, I can usefully employ Max Weber’s concept of the Idealtypus (ideal type) to distinguish between varying aspects of reality more clearly. This helps us to better understand the implications of empirically-described facts for society.154

With my new data it is possible to sketch the characteristics of an ideal type of employee (or “client”) in externally-financed PNGOs determined by:

153 see chapter 2.2.1

• age (71% of PNGO employees are between 17 and 37 years),
• higher education,
• professional skills, (90% have a higher education degree and 43% are improving skills and taking further courses),
• motivation for working in the PNGO sector
• involvement in voluntary work (to enter the NGO community it needs volunteer experience in several institutions or NGOs),
• a tendency to use *wasta* to land a job (42%)
• practicing NGO - Tracking to find a better job.
• On the private level a tendency to later marriage, and to have fewer children who are more likely to be educated in private schools (a trend in the West Bank).

Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) and Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour (2011) describe the consequences of this process very convincingly. Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) analyze the entry of local PNGOs into aid channels as “a process of new subject formation as well as changes in the conceptual and institutional foundations of NGOs.” This new development strongly influences the local context, especially concerning the developing relations between state and society. Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour (2011), in turn, analyze the role of NGOs in their article ‘Neoliberalism as Liberation’ very critically: “From the start of the Oslo process, they were among the first sectors in Palestinian society to embrace neoliberalism, and they have acted as an important conduit of its development paradigm. Moreover, the “development industry” and its local partners have acted – wittingly or otherwise – as an “anti-politics machine” that has depoliticized Palestinian society, sustained the occupation, and initiated a long march toward neoliberal hegemony that has found its most elaborate manifestation to date in the PA

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statehood plan.” (PA statehood plan refers to the plan presented by the PA and Salam Fayyad in August 2009 with the express aim of reaching a Palestinian state by mid 2012)

The majority of externally funded PNGOs integrate these neo-liberal development goals into their agenda, explicitly or at least implicitly. Still, a differentiation is necessary. Some PNGOs (not the majority) develop critical capacities, especially if they are led by people from the left with a long tradition of resistance and organization and participation in resistance activities. Examples of such organizations include Badil, the Alternative Information Center (a joint Palestinian/Israeli NGO), and Stop the Wall.

The questions why and how some PNGOs resist and why others do not, why some accept the donors' programs or why they do not insist on their own programs, what kind of personal, ideological or socio-economical reasons play a role, was not a subject in my empirical study. I cannot therefore provide any data on this issue and I am not in a position to enter into this debate without new material.

My fieldwork shows that the majority of PNGO employees, independent of their age, are college or university graduates. The institutionalization and professionalization of PNGOs has led PNGO leaders and administrators to require certain skills from their employees. In order to represent the organization as well as for the purpose of international networking, PNGOs are forced to hire people who are fluent in foreign languages and who are familiar

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157 For example Badil which receives financial support from the same donors as other PNGOs. Their main focus is on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. Their argumentation in fundraising is based on UN resolutions and international law.
with the key concepts and the jargon of funding. Such skills are obtained mostly through higher education and/or special training.\textsuperscript{158}

As shown above, the possibility of establishing a PNGO with external donor money also set in motion a process which made some PNGO leaders financially independent of the political parties to which they owed and perhaps continue to owe allegiance. This process led to a new situation in which it was no longer a political party but rather the donor agenda which determined how money was to be spent.

Still, one benefit must clearly be pointed out, namely that external donor money has provided and provides regular salaries for people in need of jobs. This is obviously very important in an economy with very high unemployment rates and no significant development.\textsuperscript{159}

In general, however, the economic situation has not improved for the majority of the Palestinian population, and unemployment rates remain extremely high. Officially it is estimated in WB&GS 2013 at 23 to 30\%, unofficially it is thought to have been around 40\% in 2012.\textsuperscript{160} In such an environment, obviously working for an NGO, accepting the donor agenda and thus acquiring donor aid brings with it a job with a regular salary.

\textsuperscript{158} For example; Birzeit University offers a BA in Public Administration with courses for example in NGO management, and in fundraising for NGOs.

\textsuperscript{159} OXFAM is relying in its publication on a report from B'Tselem, July 2010: "While Israel's GNP has boomed, Palestine's has stagnated. Since 1993 the Israeli GNP per capita has risen from around US$ 13,800 to over US$ 32,000 today. At the same time the West Bank GNP per capita has gone from roughly US$ 2,000 in the early 1990s to US$ 2,093 today, while Gaza's has decreased from US$ 1,230 to US$ 1,074. If productivity had continued to increase at pre-Oslo levels, real GNP per capita in the OPTS would be an estimated 88 percent higher." B'Tselem, By Hook and By Crook, 2010: "Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank"., and see also the critical article of Khalidi, Raja, 2012: "After the Arab Spring in Palestine: Contesting the Neoliberal Narrative of Palestinian National Liberation".

Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, the Israeli military reoccupied the major West Bank cities in Zone A (June 2002), without making any provision for the care of the occupied Palestinian population. Donor nations were forced to change development aid into short term humanitarian aid to support the basic needs of Palestinians. Even after Zone A was returned in April 2003 to partial Palestinian control, the Palestinian economy has not fully recovered and it is hard to expect it will under the dictate of the Protocol of Economic Relations (known as Paris Protocols) and the ongoing occupation by Israel.

4.2.2 A part of these clients expands the middle class and constitutes a new elite.

The PNGO elite versus the PNGO precariat

In argument one I was able to show that with professionalization and institutionalization of PNGOs in 1980s and 1990s, especially after Oslo, PNGO employees have become new clients of the North. My data document PNGO and PNGO employees as clients, the existence of a PNGO community, as well

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According to international law and the Geneva conventions, an occupying power is responsible for the wellbeing of an occupied population. Israel denies that occupation is covered by the 4th Geneva Convention.

162 See the Paris Protocol which is an Appendix to the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the PLO on April 29, 1994.; see also paper presented by Mohammad Mustafa, chairman and chief executive officer, Palestine Investment fund, in: United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the Palestinian People, in Rome 27./2.2013.
as structures of PNGO-internal labour hierarchies (chapter three, 3.3-3.4.5.3). The results validate What kind of NGO employee landscape exists in Palestine? NGO workers have already been observed and analyzed in the literature as middle class, depoliticized and de-radicalized, forming a globalized NGO elite and can characterize different types of PNGO employees. As it validates question and hypothesis two: Do external political rents establish and support a “globalized elite”? My new quantitative data can corroborate the thesis of Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) of an emerging, globalized elite which has developed out of the PNGO sector and detached itself from the base of the Palestinian population.

Working conditions, contracts and wages in a typical PNGO work-place have led to the creation of a PNGO precariat, a PNGO middle class and an PNGO elite. It can therefore be argued that the PNGO sector itself sets an PNGO elite and an aspiring middle class against an PNGO precariat in a neo-liberally restructured working sector (see results in chapter three, 3.4.5).

In the following section, the focus will be on the different types of PNGO employees, the PNGO precariat, the PNGO middle class, and PNGO elite. The PNGO sector as a neo-liberally restructured working sector will be discussed further under argument three.

Basic facts on the ground that allowed this development to take place:

4.2.2.1 Requirements of making a career in a NGO community

To enter the PNGO sector as an employee, PNGO employees go through a selection process. There is no difference between the different job offers or, subsequently, when a classification is undertaken into precariat, aspiring middle class, and elite. The criteria are (mainly) young, respectively high educational background with language skills, orientated towards professions and education skills and/or *wasta*. To successfully remain on a long term basis (under the short term contract system) in the NGO sector, the determining factor is the ability to move around in the community network and a willingness to undertake further training.

Given their work, PNGOs are part of formal international and national networks. Informal networks accompany formal networks. The existence of mainly short term contracts (without job security) creates a special and separated community in the NGO sector. “People know each other,” in their community (FGs in WB&GS). This fact, irrespective of the belonging to either the precariat, the middle class or the elite - as in any other sector, makes finding a new job easier. Looking for another job in the NGO sector, when “no extension of the ongoing contract is possible” (59%) or looking for a working place which offers better conditions such as a long-term contract, better payment, a pension, insurance etc., is target oriented. The motivation is the desire to improve one’s personal situation through finding another, better working place and job security.

The determining factor for making a career in terms of what kind of working position an employee can achieve, i.e. the possibility of being middle class or elite, is above all the know-how to raise funds and create jobs. However, we should not ignore the role of *wasta* or of “just having luck”, i.e. being in the right place at the right time and meeting the right people.

The use of the terms aspiring middle class and elite is not only confined to NGO leaders. Administrators in business, in finance and in project
management in PNGOs nowadays have the same knowledge as experience in fundraising as NGO directors.

4.2.2.2 Types of PNGO employees: PNGO precariat, aspiring middle class and elite

Both the quantitative and the qualitative research show clearly that PNGO employees are not a homogeneous group. Here, a clear stratification of PNGO employees in West Bank and in Gaza can be observed and this substantiates my main research question: What kind of changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents? The study will clarify the influence of Western aid, which is transferred to certain PNGOs, not to the PA, and aims to analyze the impact on the individual level of NGO employees, but also the more general changes taking place in Palestinian society, - in the sense that this Western influence leads to a clear stratification of PNGO employees.

PNGO employees offer a differentiated picture depending on working conditions, contract level and wages. The following types of PNGO employees can be distinguished:

1. Precariat, approximately 60% (casual workers, insecure and exploited, duration of working in an PNGOs up to five years, monthly wage below 500 US$).

2. Aspiring middle class. approximately 30% (PNGO careerists: leading a middle class lifestyle or aspiring to this, i.e. through debt, status markers) have more security than those on a one to two year contract, they show a duration of work between six-fifteen years (25%, including the employment group of working four till five years in a PNGO would be 38%), monthly wage above 500 US$ up to 1500 US$ (50%).
3. PNGO elite, approximately 10% (PNGO careerists and also PNGO actors, the generation of the first Intifada who set up the NGOs. They have the most privileges (permanent contract 13%, duration of work in an PNGO: between sixteen and 35 years, monthly wage above 1500 US$) and retain a progressive self image and maybe even progressive norms despite the stratification and realities inside the NGOs.)\textsuperscript{164}

The borders between the precariat, aspiring middle class and elite are blurred. The numbers of 60% precariat, 30% aspiring middle class and 10% elite rely mainly on cross tabulation of Table & Graphs 20, 22, 25, 27 in chapter three.

Talking about an elite always implies the question of power. The power tool of the PNGO elite is “job creation”. Statistics from MAS show, that approximately 10% of jobs are generated in the NGO sector (see for example also tables and graphs no. 14 in chapter three. NGO jobs are subsumed under "services and other branches"). In this sense, external Western aid creates a new interest group in the already existing middle class and concurrently a globalized elite, based on higher education and on work in NGOs.\textsuperscript{165} Apart from the elite, the new group of the Palestinian middle class, Western aid also creates a PNGO precariat. Pierre Bordieu (1998) developed the theory of the precarity in which he described a "new mode of dominance" resulting from restructuring of the economy that "forced workers into submission". The term precariat is replacing the traditional proletariat and defines a vulnerable and mobile labour pool (part-time, contract, seasonal as informal jobs).

\textsuperscript{164} Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite., use the term "Palestinian globalized elite" for an NGO elite. They characterize them as actors who are informed by global agendas, with a very specific positioning in the Middle East peace process. They describe it as an urban elite, since donor funding is concentrated in Palestinian cities, with a high level of professionalization

\textsuperscript{165} See Taraki, Lisa, 2008: "Urban Modernity on the Periphery. A New Middle Class Reinvents the Palestinian City"
Bourdieu argues that globalization and fragmentation of the labor market created a new, generalized and permanent state of insecurity among workers.\textsuperscript{166} Guy Standing (2011) in his turn argues that workers in a precarious situation now "form a distinct social class with separate conditions and interests from other workers."\textsuperscript{167} Generally speaking, PNGO employees with long term contracts or permanent jobs enjoy better career chances and are able to achieve executive positions compared with employees with short term contracts and an income below US$500.

This is also the result of long-term processes of institutionalization and professionalization with a high level of employment stratification in the NGO sector.

The older, founding generation reaps the highest benefits in terms of income, job security and having "spare time" to undertake voluntary work outside their employment. The aspiring middle class make more money than the rest of the population but have more limited job security than the founding generation. The last group, the poorly paid precariat, is essentially an exploited labor caste – most of them are to be found in Gaza. Obviously the economic logic of PNGOs has become increasingly like the logic of any private sector business – where there is a growing gap between a small elite of privileged workers with full rights and benefits and a growing group of workers, flexible and compliant by necessity, with few if any benefits or rights.

4.2.2.3 The PNGO elite and the PNGO middle class generate jobs for Palestinians.

The ability of elites to generate employment is an important tool to regenerate their own jobs and thus to support and perpetuate the NGO middle class and


the NGO elite within the NGOs. This reflects the changing social and political ethos of PNGOs, and illustrates how economic dynamics have distanced them structurally from their stated goals of social justice and egalitarianism.

4.2.3 NGO sector – a neo-liberally restructured working sector

The developments described in argument one and two, make clear that the PNGO sector has become a neo-liberally-restructured working sector – just like any other sector of the market economy, offering jobs and careers to employees as well as services to the public.\footnote{168}

As already mentioned in argument two, a clear hierarchy can be observed: at the bottom remains a large group of PNGO workers, typically low paid, with no job security, having a short term contract or no written contract at all; then comes a ‘middle class’, and finally an elite with long-term or permanent contracts and a level of income well above the Palestinian average. This indicates a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO sector and shows that this sector is not immune to a globalized, neo-liberal restructuring process of the work force. These precarious working conditions push PNGO employees into NGO-tracking (see chapter three, 3.4.2.6: NGO tracking by force or by chance), mainly because of short term projects (WB 51% and GS 72%). NGO employees are forced to leave their jobs because their contracts end or for other reasons such as low remuneration (<500US$ in WB 28%, GS 62%). Contracts of this kind increase insecurity which demoralizes NGO workers who have to work in such an environment (see chapter three, 3.4.2.9 and argument two in this chapter).

\footnote{168 See chapter three: 3.4.2, NGO sector: working reality of NGO employees. Also compare with literature of Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement".}
4.2.3.1  “Neoliberal” Volunteering

Social or political activism through (unsalaried) volunteering is replaced by “volunteering” for money or in order to increase the chances of finding a job (see chapter three, 3.4.4.).

So voluntary work, also in internationally-funded NGOs, has to be seen in a neo-liberal context. Voluntary work is a chance for future employees to enter the job market. Quite often, prospective PNGO-employees go through seemingly endless volunteering experiences until they land a job. This explains why the answer to the question in the qualitative study “do any of you volunteer in addition to work?” was: “No, now we are employees.” (FG WB < 30 years).

This new and important result of my data indicates that the concept of voluntary work needs to be redefined in a different socio-political context.

4.2.3.2  Preventing the brain drain …?

28% of NGO employees with a Diploma, BA, MA, or PhD, stated they could find work only in the NGO sector (14%) or abroad (14%). At first sight, this appears positive: they are making a living in their home country and are not facing unemployment or emigration. So one might conclude that Western aid is preventing a wholesale brain drain of people with higher education.

As the study shows, NGO staff is mainly educated in the humanities or social sciences and economics. This raises the following questions:

- Do they find work because they are educated above the average in certain fields, or because the public and private sectors cannot provide jobs for them?
• Do people decide to study certain specializations, because externally-funded NGOs in the country promise a career and a good income? 169

• Do educated people and intellectuals in general prefer such work because the professionalization and institutionalization of NGOs has created positions associated with status, privilege, international exposure and power in society?

• Do NGO employees really have the chance to emigrate? And if so, would they emigrate or would they be ready to take a lower paid job locally in a different sector?

• Do educated people and intellectuals working in PNGOs see the possibility of providing a platform for Palestinians (through courses, seminars, workshops etc.) to bring about social change?

It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion regarding NGOs’ roles in preventing or reducing the brain drain and to answer hypothesis 5: Are externally funded NGOs reducing the brain drain of academics by financing suitable jobs in the occupied territories? NGOs (international and Palestinian) in general offer jobs with good salaries, especially for fresh university graduates, comparing to other working sectors. The data will document the reason, why people are working in the NGO sector and can show, if the possibility of working in a NGO prohibits emigration.

The study cannot provide any clear answers to these relevant questions.

Some tentative conclusions could be drawn, however, from the data about motivation of working in an NGO/PNGO. Some 23% of PNGO employees chose the answer "wishing to contribute something to society." This agrees with the finding that 52% of PNGO employees believe seminars and workshops, (not the NGO per se), help the Palestinian population to improve their lives. Also the high percentage of women who work in the PNGO sector –

many of whom are unmarried –and the perceived egalitarian relationship between women and men inside the PNGO (see chapter three, 3.5.7). These data suggests that the PNGO sector also tends to be a working sector for people who wish to see or bring about social change. This differs from the private sector with its focus on economic success and the public sector which seeks to develop structures for a functioning state.

The development of clientelism (with new client patron relationships) and elitism (the creation of a new kind of elite) as well as the neoliberal transformation of the NGO sector have changed internal PNGO structures. This slow process has undermined the ethical principles of people leading NGOs or working in them. It remains unclear whether they are actually aware of this. At the same time, NGO people’s relationships to their own society, as well as the perception of the NGO sector in Palestinian society have clearly changed. These questions will be discussed in argument four.

4.2.4 This neoliberal transformation of PNGOs changed the self-perception of PNGO and PNGO employees. The PNGO sector, originally acting as part of civil society, was transformed into a vehicle for the realization of individual interests, for example to secure a job or advance a career. In this sense, many PNGOs have lost touch with society and society has lost its trust and appreciation of PNGOs.

Basic facts on the ground that allowed this development to took place:

4.2.4.1 Who sets the agenda for NGOs?
Since the 1990s, the agenda of Palestinian NGOs has depended on donor money and therefore on donor agendas, which are seldom developed in a local context and in dialogue with the native population (result from FGs in West Bank and Gaza). One result is a growing distance between the people for
whose benefit the agenda was designed and the PNGOs and PNGO employees who transfer and implement the agenda on the ground.

It is important to note here, that the majority of Palestinians, who have lived for decades under occupation, consider democratization, the respect of human rights, the empowerment of women and peace education as an essential part of state formation (FGs WB&G all ages. But as mentioned above, the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict imposes a harsh daily reality on Palestinians. Normal life is severely restricted by the ongoing Israeli occupation, by their economic dependence on Israel and on foreign donors, by the geographical division between the West Bank and Gaza, by an unemployment rate close to 30% and by the political weakness of the Palestinian Authority.

In such a context, when Western donors impose agendas Palestinians tend to look very critically if not cynically at their professed aims. This became more obvious in and after 2006, when Hamas won a democratically run election. The international community refused to accept the result and started a boycott of the Hamas-government. It seems for Palestinians (and not only for them), that international donors have double standards in their understanding of the concepts of active democracy, secure statehood and freedom of movement. If this is the case, the idea of “teaching” democracy degenerates into an empty phrase. This was an argument especially in focus groups with interviewees below 30 years and a 'bad contract' in West Bank and Gaza. This empirical result from my focus group interviews has led me to the conclusion that the implementation of PNGOs' agendas has led to their

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170 See for example polls from Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research: "88% support and 11% oppose a democratic system with the following characteristics: periodic elections, a president with a limited term in office, freedom to form political parties, free press without censorship, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights"; http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p6a.html

increasing isolation from the communities they were set up to serve. If they and their employees earn their money through implementing these “donor agendas”, but the agendas bring about no improvement on the political level, many ordinary Palestinians see PNGOs as no longer representing them. This negative perception extends to all PNGO people from the elite to the precariat.

As indicated in the introduction, the World Bank estimated in 1993, that the political system in Palestine (Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank) would eventually develop into a capitalist system with democratic structures. Rapid implementation of the two-state solution, involving close economic cooperation with Israel (Paris Protocols 1994) was seen as a condition intended to guarantee this process. As Muriel Asseburg (2002), Martin Beck (2002), Rex Brynen (1996 and 2000), Mushtaq Husain Khan, George Giacaman and Inge Amundsen (2004) have shown, there is a fatal connection between too little progress in the peace process and the lack of economic development. Even if the World Bank, EU and USA are officially, to this day, committed to this development, they cling to their failed policies.172

4.2.4.2 Object society

The NGO-isation of a grassroots movement increases its dependency on donors with the outcomes as desired by these very donors.173 As already mentioned, this transforms the previous collective approach into an individual issue. Rema


173 NGO-isation is a term first used by Michael Warschawski in an article in "newsfromwithin" in 1990. For an analysis about NGO-isation see also the PhD thesis of: Ghandour-Demiri, Nada, 2012: "Disciplining Popular Resistance: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories."
Hammami diagnoses a changing focus in the work of PNGOs and uses for this kind of behavior the term ‘social engineering’. 174

A PNGO as a professionalized and institutionalized institution with a mandate that includes for example the teaching of democracy or the empowerment of women is responsible for achieving a positive outcome – otherwise the project with its employees will receive no further funds. In this context, it is hardly surprising that PNGO employees might view their clients as objects to be dealt with rather than seeing them as people under an occupation (like themselves) which denies them their rights, dignity and perspectives.

The problem lies in the changed basic assumption that it is no longer appropriate to resist, fight and work collectively against occupation which is after all the main reason for most political and economical difficulties. “Normalization” where no normality exists skews the social context. In a political entity under occupation, where there is neither secure statehood, nor freedom of movement, and where genuine freedom of speech does not exist, the stage is set for elites to take advantage of the prevailing circumstances.

Inevitably, those who will not or cannot join the neoliberal money-go-round are sidelined and lose political influence.

4.2.4.3 Employer PNGO

This growing split between PNGOs and society at large feeds the disillusionment of people with the PNGO sector. Many PNGOs grew out of the grassroots movement in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, forming an important part of civil society and trying to offer an alternative way of practicing politics. But since the 1990s, Palestinian society has come to see PNGOs increasingly and almost exclusively as employers.

Some members of society benefit significantly from this change, a change that is limited to individual success, with this success in turn tied to a certain world

174 Rema Hammami used this expression in a personal conversation with the author in 2009, making use of the expression originally used by Karl Popper. PNGOs are engaging in social engineering - sometimes in the place of state actors. There endeavors are goal oriented and take place in a technocratic framework
A minority of PNGO employees gain clear material advantage, when becoming part of the elite or the middle class. Their income is above average, as are their status in the organization (they are often issued with a special pass to travel abroad) and their social status. But most importantly, they have the power of job creation. Since Oslo, the PNGO sector has been able to create jobs only if their elite and middle class agree to operate under the new political hegemony, as will be shown in argument five.

4.2.5 The creation of jobs in the mainly externally funded PNGO sector is possible, when social actors – willingly or unwillingly – accept, operate and position themselves within the existing political system.

This results mainly in jobs for young, highly-educated people and perpetuates a long term dependency on external aid. The main reason for dependency is the simple fact that donors focus mainly on short term aid. Furthermore, aid flows to a large extent into civil society – a non-productive sector rather than into productive areas such as the industrial, agricultural or private sectors. To help Palestinians become independent from external donors in the future, a rejection of short-terminism is needed. A balanced and sustainable external aid supply to all sectors, as well as fair economic- and tax agreements with Israel, would help significantly. Last but not least, donors are needed who offer not only financial but also political support through diplomacy by treating the Palestinian government as equal to the Israeli government, obviously a very idealistic idea at this point in time and in the context of a highly asymmetric conflict configuration.

4.2.5.1 Capturing ‘human capital’ and long term dependency

Eighty per cent of NGO employees in the study asserted that it would be more effective to support productive sectors such as agriculture, industry and sustainable development projects and education rather than the NGO sector.
If the majority of PNGOs and the PA obey the dictates of the donors, external aid will in the long run capture human capital. Higher wages in the civil society sector will encourage educated individuals not to work in community of municipal work centers or in other working sectors. Dependency on political rents generates rent seeking behaviour. As already mentioned, this is a vicious circle difficult if not impossible to break. It leads to a long term dependency on aid with serious consequences such as a poorly functioning economical system and political deadlock in a neo-patrimonial rentier state which is required by donors to adopt neoliberal strategies for running state and society.

Following this argument, the question arises, why the majority of professional PNGO employees do not use their knowledge and experience on the ground – their formal and informal networks and their ability to raise funds – to signal or force donors to support productive sectors of the Palestinian economy, or to develop alternative models with the aim of becoming independent of external aid? There are some organizations which have started to change their financial models to build more on community support and their members. To probe this question further, however, more empirical research is needed.

The academic education of PNGO employees generally does not match the type of work they do. Private sector, industry, agriculture and universities do offer jobs but they do not offer such good salaries as PNGOs. Recently (2012) the private sector has started a campaign in universities to introduce the needed skills for new types of jobs, based on the current reality where university education teaches theory but most often not the skills required for employment.

The NGO sector (Palestinian and international) is, however, not only attractive because of higher wages. It also offers the possibility of (mainly) free training.

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175 MAS published a study in 2007 dealing with “Wage Differentials in a Fast-Changing Environment: A Sectoral Analysis.” The results show higher wages in the NGO sector than in the private sector and a higher payment in the private sector than in the public sector. MAS appeal to the NGO sector was to understand the impact of driving wage inflation and to point out for all sectors, to reach a greater responsibility of “balanced financial incentives” across all sectors of the economy. MAS, 2007: “Wage Differentials in a Fast-Changing Environment: A Sectoral Analysis”, MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, Ramallah, http://www.mas.ps/2012/search/node/Wage%20Differentials., p. xiv.
courses to improve the professionalism of their employees. Finally, the existence of a NGO community, along with the existence of official and unofficial networks and NGO tracking for a better job, keep people in the NGO sector.

So what would happen to those 41% of graduates, mainly educated in humanities, if the PNGO sector was not able to offer well-paid jobs? After all, these people are not educated for productive work in other sectors. As stated in the survey, they would face unemployment or emigration – or a less well paid job. The idea of emigration is raised, but it might be assumed that this is not a realistic option (see chapter 4.2.3.2). The 72% of PNGO employees who stated they would be able to find work in the governmental, public or private sectors have chosen to work in the PNGO sector because of the higher wages.

The ability of the ‘aspiring middle class’ and the PNGO elite to generate employment means not only the creation of new jobs for the Palestinian population. It is also a tool to re-generate their own jobs and thus to support and perpetuate the PNGO middle class and the PNGO elite itself.

4.2.5.2 Donor policy and the input for the Palestinian Authority

Donor countries encourage Fatah and the Palestinian Authority to engage with Israel, particularly by means of aid. Anne Le More (2008) proposed that, in the Palestinian case, major structural defects are embedded in the peace process itself. The consequence of the aid dependency of the PA and the donors’ use of aid as a substitute for politics, without having any serious political strategy for ending the conflict, is that the transformative impact of aid is close to zero.176 She argues: “Aid has performed a critical emergency relief function and temporarily acted as a social and political valve. But by sustaining such high level of funds over such a long period, donors also bankrolled a poorly run and increasingly disliked regime, subsidized Israeli military occupation, and

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indirectly encouraged the continuing colonization and fragmentation of the oPt, as well as the broader process of Palestinian dispossession.”

I agree with Anne Le More in her analyses which are also relevant for the PNGO sector. A substantial amount of aid for the WB&G has been channeled through PNGOs. The formation of the externally financed PNGO sector as a client of the North, its transformation into a neo-liberally restructured working sector and the existence of a precariat, aspiring middle class and an PNGO elite lead me to conclude, in agreement with Anne Le More, that since the end of the 1990s, the neo-liberal agenda promoted by donors in the PNGO sector, has led to the stabilization of both the repressive Israeli system of occupation and the coercive rule of the Palestinian Authority. The stabilization of the PA will be analyzed in more depth in the following argument six.

4.2.6 In post-Oslo Palestine this process has also led to stabilization of both the ruling system, represented by the Palestinian Authority and of the ongoing Israeli occupation.

As noted in the introduction, the reality in the occupied Palestinian territories (as in many other developing countries) is that political rents are paid by donors to the recognized Fatah-Palestinian Authority, while additional financial support is given independently to the PNGO sector. Political rents enjoyed by the PA enables it to co-opt their own political clients (to discuss the conflict between Fatah and Salam Fayyad is beyond the scope of this thesis). As previously mentioned, the PNGO sector co-opts academics, creating a globalized PNGO elite and an aspiring middle class alongside a precariat. In fact, all groups in the PNGO sector benefit from the political status quo, being part of a client group receiving rents which lead to relatively "stable

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177 Le More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, wasted money, 173.

employment" through the acceptance of depoliticizing preconditions. This simple socio-economic equation helps stabilize the political system of the PA and supports question and hypothesis four. *Do subsidies in the PNGO sector engender a pro-western client group which supports PLO / Mahmoud Abbas politics?* External western funded PNGOs are seen in public as influenced by western cultures and policies. My analyses based on the new data collection can shed light on this fact and can show if PNGOs still can be seen as a *free counterpart* to the government of the PA.

The explanation is straightforward. The payment and receipt of political rents is explicitly linked to donor policies for civil society and these are linked to the general donor policy of supporting the Middle East peace process based on the Oslo Accords and the two-state solution. In this process, the security of Israel has priority. The Fatah/PA receives political rents if they act within the constraints of donor policies. PNGOs, as part of civil society and seen as playing an active part in establishing a future Palestinian state, receive political rents from the same donors. These rents are obviously conditional on their accepting and implementing donor policies and adopting the donors' perception of Palestine as a post-conflict zone. It is also expected that NGO actors will support the political positions of Fatah regarding the desirability of a two state solution and go along with their neoliberal economic policies.

The new data collected in my field-work in Palestine, confirm the usefulness of my approach based on the traditional rent paradigm. I assume that in the occupied Palestinian territories there are two groups which political rents with clear preconditions. On the state level there is the PA and on the civil society sector level the PNGOs which have been transformed into a PNGO-client group. By receiving political rents and accepting them under the same pre-conditions as the Palestinian Authority, the PNGO stabilizes the ruling political system and thus leads to the stabilization of the continuing Israeli occupation.
4.3 Final remarks: the consequences of external political rents paid to social actors

4.3.1 A commercialization of the PNGO sector

Several external and internal facts, which all have been analyzed in this thesis, lead not only to a stabilization of a neopatrimonially ruled semi-rentier state; they also lead to the commercialization of the PNGO sector. In retrospect, a major external intervention impacting PNGOs was the shift in the political economy of western aid from the end of the 1980s, especially after 1993.

The financial reality and the need to ensure the professional and institutionalized survival of PNGOs engender rent-seeking behavior by PNGOs. This can be characterized as “the aid business as usual”: dependency, compromise of principles and de-politicization. On the positive side, however, it can be argued that PNGOs' through accepting the pre-defined donor agendas can secure a remarkable 10% of the job market in return - and this in a country where 31% of the working population is unemployed.

Focusing on argument four in this chapter and on my data results concerning employment structure and hierarchies, we can see a re-organization of the social fabric into a precariat, an aspiring middle class and elite dependent on foreign donors and their policies. This neoliberal development has turned the externally western funded PNGO sector in a “free market model without

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180 See newest data in OCHA Atlas 2012
accompanying social provision.”181 Political rents reinforce a commercialization of the externally-funded PNGO sector.182

This neoliberal development of the PNGO sector has involved the suppression of the ethical principles of civil society, which saw itself traditionally as being independent and a free counterpart to the ruling system. After all, this sector was originally focused on social justice, the respect for human rights, dignity, democracy and tolerance.183

In question and hypothesis six I had asked: Does the thesis of Anne Le More (2005, 2008) regarding impacts in the political sector also hold true for the NGO sector? Does this imply that external western donors’ decision to extensively support the NGO sector does not strengthen but rather debilitate civil society? My data analyzes, as referring on other research results can verify this question. The analysis of my data shows that a weakening of civil society has certainly taken place.

My data indicate the existence of a PNGO precariat, an aspiring middle class and an elite. In such an environment, it is obvious that “class matters”.184 A PNGO elite is playing a leading role in civil society, not only influencing attitudes within civil society – they also, as third sector actors, affect and

181 The expression “free market model without accompanying social provision” was used by Oliver Schlumberger in discussion with me.

182 The term commercialization describes the propagation of the market and an economic logic of action in other areas of society. This framing as commercialization was the result of a discussion with Oliver Schlumberger. This fact is documented in my thesis with data material from Palestine. It is expected that similar data material will be found in other development countries. Therefore should this theoretical approach more studied in a comparative study across different regions of the world. Also this development has to be seen in context of donor countries politics towards development countries. Donor countries are imposing and forcing development countries to implement structural adjustment programs. This forces these countries into: deregulation, currency depreciation, privatization of state owned enterprises, cancellation of subventions, promotion of production for export etc. The commercialization of civil society shown in this thesis can be seen as one consequence of such structural adjustment programs.

183 see for example the vision and mission of the Palestinian Non-Governmental Network: Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network. It is a Network where ca. 130 developmental NGOs belong to.

184 Citation from Joe Beilin at the MESA's 46. Annual Meeting 2012 in Denver, Colorado during a discussion about the ongoing changes in the Arab world.
change the structure of society itself. I propose that the new data, together with data from other fields could form the first step towards a class analysis of Palestinian society. Although it would be interesting to discuss and elaborate a theoretical framework for a solid class analysis, but this would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

Members of focus groups stressed in their discussions the problems resulting from short term projects and the consequences of short term contracts which can be interpreted as one reason for the development of a class system in the PNGO sector. Focus groups were not asked what kind of latitude directors (who belong to the elite) have to react to such a development. Do they implement donors' demands without questioning or do they develop and practice alternatives?

Neither did the question whether any progressive, solidarity-based alternative is in sight form part of focus group discussions which were aimed mainly at determining the current situation and its ramifications. Some PNGOs have attempted to play the system. There is for example a PNGO in Gaza which quite openly divides a full-time job into two part-time jobs, so two people can be employed. On the other hand, in discussions in focus groups about the misery of part-time jobs (which are often taken since there is no alternative), one focus group in Gaza, comprising men over 40 years, mainly in director positions, denied the existence of part-time jobs in Gaza. This is in stark contrast to the other eleven focus groups in the West Bank and Gaza. It was not possible to determine why these men denied the existence of part-time jobs, even though such jobs exist in their PNGOs and despite their being aware of the quantitative results of the study (53% of part time and 47% full time jobs in Gaza – see Table and Graphs 17).

The question remains, how does a PNGO elite act and react in implementing imposed labor conditions?
4.3.2 Commercialization and the possibility of strengthening civil society?

As I have argued in chapter two, society has to be understood as a *work in process*. PNGOs as part of civil society must be seen in a constant process of change. The development described above contradicts the general perception of civil society. Here it seems we reach a basic contradiction between the discourse espoused by donors and by PNGOs on the ground.\textsuperscript{185}

It would be too easy to fall into the trap of an argument of either “black” or “white”.

On one hand, externally-funded PNGOs stabilize the political system of a neo-patrimonial semi-rentier state while they themselves are undergoing a neoliberal process of commercialization which contradicts the self understanding and ethic principles of NGOs. On the other hand, given the nature of the semi-rentier state in which they operate, PNGOs offer through their programs, seminars, and workshops some scope for development to their people on the ground. In a neo-patrimonial rentier or semi-rentier state this free space normally does not exist. It would not be so freely available in Palestine in this form if donors were not to support civil society separately from the government (with all the negative impacts discussed in this thesis).

Therefore it should also not be ignored that PNGOs in various spheres such as human rights, women's rights, democratization, and agriculture provide an opportunity through their meetings, training sessions and workshops to support the development of political and social awareness among Palestinians. This

happens despite the fact that PNGO-agendas are predetermined by donors. Preconditions for a widening scope for this potentially positive impact would be that such sessions should be open for all and located wherever the average Palestinian has access to them.

This obviously leads me in my argumentation to the central problem: a Palestinian citizen, responsible and informed and coping with living in the occupied Palestinian territories well understands the contradiction between the social and political content which PNGOs have traditionally espoused and the reality of their being part of the aid system and hence the ruling political system. Informed citizens are also aware of the effects of this paradox on PNGO employees and on society as a whole.

How this influences the opinions or behavior of individuals remains unclear and is definitely not under the control of donors or PNGOs (even if they wished to exercise influence). This *moment of liberty* might provide space for the development of new groups, including groups of former PNGO employees acting beyond the PNGO sector who refuse further to conform to prevailing neoliberal ideology. Emerging, independent social movements can already be observed in the growing numbers of non-violent popular resistance groups. For example, the settlement of Bab Al-Shams by Palestinian activists in early 2013 in reaction to the illegal Israeli expansion into the E1 sector showed a willingness to think out of the box in opposing occupation and

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186 See Ghandour-Demiri, Nada, 2012: "Disciplining Popular Resistance: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories," 228-229. She analyses various ways of disciplining popular resistance. And one way of disciplinary process is carried out by Palestinian NGOs and foreign donors. "This form of disciplining dissent, although separate from the previous ones, is important in the way nonviolent resistance against the Israeli occupation is being practiced, controlled and perceived. The NGO-ization that took place in the post-Oslo period led to the mushrooming of many advocacy NGOs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Some of these NGOs focused on the promotion of nonviolence. In this context, however, nonviolence was to be promoted, based on donors’ guidelines, as a value that needs to be taught to Palestinians as part of an effort to develop and empower Palestinian society, rather than as a strategy to resist the occupation. This understanding and promotion of nonviolence by NGOs ended up disciplining popular resistance in two ways: first, nonviolence was to be performed and articulated in very selective and conditional ways based on foreign donors’ political agendas; second, it led to the fragmentation of Palestinian activism by dividing it into those working in the NGO industry and promoting this version of nonviolence and those working in grassroots groups and who use nonviolence explicitly as a strategy of resistance and their main aim is not internal empowerment but the end of the occupation."

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encouraging resistance. The varied and inventive strategies of resistance to forced relocation by the villagers of Al Araqib in the Negev also show how political life beyond the dictate of the western donors’ club can change local and international opinion. In 2014, the attempts by ousted Palestinians to repopulate their villages in the Jordan valley in the face of considerable odds, show how a reserve of resistance to occupation exists after decades of continuous Western financial pressure aimed at snuffing out rebellion.

Here is another field where in-depth research is needed into the composition and aims of such organizations. PNGOs can provide space for the growth of awareness, resulting in a change of perspective. In this sense, donors (through their funding) and PNGOs (through their social awareness) could in time bring about a positive outcome, enabling positive developments in civil society.

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عنوان الدراسة

أخي المحترم/ أختي المحترمة

معهد الديمقراطية و حقوق الإنسان بعمل دراسة - تقوم جامعة بيرزيت

تتعلق بالمساعدات الدولية المقدمة للشعب الفلسطيني.

الهدف الرئيسي من البحث هو التعرف على ما تحقق من هذه المساعدات

للفرد من جهة أخرى، و بعض المجتمع الفلسطيني ككل من جهة، و

نظرة عن هذه التغييرات التي كانت إيجابية أو سلبية، و في نفس

الوقت، معرفة مدى تأثيرها و تأثرها بالجوانب السياسية و

الاقتصادية للفرد و المجتمع في فلسطين.

نحن نحاول فهم كيفية تأثير المساعدات الدولية على وضع الأفراد

بتطوير إمكانات - احقل ذلك بطريقة ما بشكل خاص، و ارتباط

المجتمع الفلسطيني ككل.

لماذا يحظى هذا الموضوع بأهميته؟

المجتمع الفلسطيني، والفلسطينيون كأفراد وشعب، مضطرون للعيش تحت ظروف قاسية جداً، و لذلك فالهدف المقصود من المساعدات الدولية هو إعطاء الفلسطينيين بعض

التنمية من أجل التغلب على هذه الظروف الاستثنائية وفرض

المعيشية الفاشية.

نريد ببساطة أن نعرف إن كان الهدف من هذه المساعدات يتحقق على

أرض الواقع أم لا.

تحتوي هذه الاستمارة على بعض الأسئلة التي تتعلق بك بشكل

خاص، و بعض الجوانب الاقتصادية و السياسية لكن و للمؤسسة

م، ستأخذ من وقتك حوالي 20 دقيقة، مشاركتك مهمة، و أريدك تشكشك عا

ضروري.

للك الحريات العامة في الإجابة عن أسئلة هذه الاستمارة، ونركز هنا على

أن كل المعلومات سستبقى سرية، ولا يوجد فيها ما يشير إلى

شخصك، و لن يتلقى علينا أحد من غير الباحثين، و لن نستخدم إلا

ذلك العلمي. فهل أنت موافق على الإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة؟ لأغراض البح
لاستخدام فريق البحث
الرقم المتسلسل
غير موافق ☐ موافق ☑
1. ☐
إن كنت غير موافق، الرجاء شرح السبب

شكرا لتعاونكم

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ثانيًا: معلومات شخصية

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<td><strong>P9</strong> مجال التخصص في الدراسة</td>
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<td><strong>P10</strong> هل التحقت أو انضمت الآن ميلتق/ة في برنامج تعليمي أو تدريبي</td>
<td>1. <strong>نعم</strong></td>
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<td>2. <strong>لا</strong></td>
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<td><strong>P10_1</strong> كم عدد السنوات التي العمل فيها من حسابي الشخصي</td>
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<td>2. من حساب آخر</td>
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<td><strong>P10_2</strong> إذا كانت الإجابة <strong>نعم</strong>. <strong>حدد</strong> البرنامج. <strong>W1</strong></td>
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<td><strong>P11</strong> 1. متزوج/ة</td>
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<td>5. منفصل/ة</td>
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<td><strong>P12</strong> هل شريك/ة حياتك يعمل تعمل أيضا؟</td>
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<td><strong>P12_1</strong> 1. <strong>NGO</strong></td>
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<td>3. القطاع الخاص</td>
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<td><strong>P13</strong> إذا كنت متزوج/ة أو سبق لك الزواج، هل لديك أولاد</td>
<td>1. <strong>نعم</strong></td>
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<td>2. <strong>لا</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>P13_1</strong> عدد الأطفال</td>
<td><strong>W1</strong> (إذا كنت أعزبا/ عزباء، أرجو الإجابة على الأسئلة P12، عن الأمثلة إذا كنت متزوج/ة، أرجو الإجابة (W1) إذا كنت أعزبا/ عزباء، أرجو الإجابة)</td>
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<td><strong>P14</strong> عدد الأطفال في سن أقل من سن الذهاب إلى المدرسة</td>
<td><strong>W1</strong> (إذا لم يوجد أولاد انتقلت إلى القسم الثاني، لا يوجد الأولاد)</td>
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أولاً، الكليات التعليمية
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2. مدارس خاصة
3. مدارس حكومية
4. مدارس الوكالة

P15/ عدد الأولاد الذين يدرسون في جامعة فلسطينية في حالة عدم وجود أولاد يدرسون أو درسوا في الجامعة، الرجاляضع الرمز 100

P16/ عدد الأولاد الذين يدرسون في جامعة خارج فلسطين في حالة عدم وجود أولاد يدرسون أو درسوا في الجامعة، الرجاляضع الرمز 100

P16_1/ الدول/ الدوافع التي توجد بها الجامعة/ات خارج فلسطين

القسم الثاني: معلومات عن العمل

W1/ وظيفة الوظيفة
1. وظيفة كاملة
2. جزئية
3. مستشار

W1_1/ مدة عقد العمل الخاص (بالسنوات) وإذا لا يوجد إن وجد عقد ضعيف/ي الرمز 102

W2/ طبيعة العمل
1. إداري
2. موظف/ة مكتب
3. مدرب/ة أو مشرفة
4. خدمات
5. مسنق/ة
6. باحث/ة
7. أخرى/ حدد/ي 

W3/ هذه مدة العمل في المؤسسة غير الحكومية (الNGO) بالسنوات، إذا كانت المدة أقل من سنة 1 فضي

W4/ هل عملت في مؤسسات أخرى قبل الجالية (كلما اقتراحي) (نطبق)
1. نعم حكومية
2. نعم خاصة
3. نعم غير حكومية (NGOs)
4. هذه أول مؤسسة أعمل فيها
| W4_1 | في كم مؤسسة عملت. | 1. الصحة □  
2. الزراعة □  
3. الديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان □  
4. رأي عام □  
5. الشاب □  
6. مؤسسة تنريب على السلام □  
7. التشاير □ |
| W4_2 | وماذا تركت العمل مع المنظمة غير الحكومية (NGO) السابقة؟ (اختياري كل ما ينطبق) |
| W4_3 | 1. انتهاء العقد □  
2. انتهاء المشروع □  
3. حصلت على فرصة أفضل □  
4. اغلق المؤسسة السابقة □  
5. أسباب آخر/ي/ي □  |
| W5 | ما هو سبب اختيارك للعمل في المنظمة غير الحكومية (ال NGO) بشكل عام؟ (اختياري/ي/ي)  
1. مكان الإقامة □  
2. الامتيازات والحوافز أفضل □  
3. لعدم حصولي على عمل آخر □  |
| W6 | لا يوجد حافز □  
1. راتب جيد □  
2. تعلوسي □  
3. اختياري كل ما ينطبق □  
4. أمري صح □ |
| W7 | كيف حصلت على وظيفتك؟ (ليهم وليس الحصول على السماح منها)  
1. عن طريق علاقاتي في عملك السابق □  
2. عن طريق إصدقاء □  
3. عن طريق القراء □  |
| W8 | كم ساعة تمضين في سعة العمل في الأسبوع □  
1. نعم □  
2. لا □ |
<p>| W9 | هل تقوم/ científico بعمل تطوعي في مؤسسة أخرى؟ |
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<tr>
<th>W9_1</th>
<th>إذا كانت الإجابة تتم في السؤال المسبق (W9) متحركة، اقم ثلاث خيارات مرتبة حسب الأهمية باستخدام ترتيب 1-3</th>
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| W10 | بشكل عام: ما الجيد في العمل لدى المنظمات غير الحكومية (NGOs)؟ (حدد/أيما) 3 خيارات مرتبة حسب الأهمية باستخدام ترتيب 1-3 |

| W11 | ما هي سلبيات العمل في مثل هذه الوضعيات؟ (حد/أيما) ما ينطبق |

| W12 | إذا لم تجد/ي عملاً في المنظمات غير الحكومية (قطاع NGO)، في أي قطاعات تفضل أن تعمل؟ عملاً؟ |

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<td>مع العائلة أعيش</td>
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<td>أجراء</td>
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القسم الثالث: مستوى المعيشة

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<td>% إجرة منزل</td>
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<td>دفع قسط الشقة</td>
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<td>دفع قسط المنزل</td>
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<td>دفع قسط السيارة</td>
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<td>للتسهيل الصحي</td>
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<td>الجامعات</td>
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<td>الروضة</td>
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<th>هل تقفون أن الرجال يحصلون على راتب جيد بالمقارنة مع النساء</th>
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<td>2. المساعدة في بناء الدولة فلسطينية ديمقراطية</td>
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<td>5. الحصول على خبرات ومهارات متعددة وجميلة</td>
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<td>PA3</td>
<td>هل كنت ناجحاً في تحقيق هدفك من خلال العمل في المنظمات غير الحكومية (NGO)?</td>
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|     | 2. لا  |
| PA3-1 | إذا كانت اجابة PA3 لا، وضح/ي لماذا؟ |
|     | 1. الوقت لم يكن كافياً  
|     | 2. سياسة المسؤول/ون لم تدعمي في ذلك  
|     | 3. سياسة المؤسسة التي تعمل بها لم تساعدني  
|     | 4. الوضع السياسي في البلد لم يساعدني على ذلك  
|     | 5. مشاكل الاتصال الداخلي (داخل المؤسسة) لم تساعدني  
|     | 6. اخرى |

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<th>PA4</th>
<th>ممثلاً في اجتماع تقرير廉价ه تحقق/تكيفكم تحقق/تكيفكم هدفك ممكن؟</th>
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|     | 2. أعتقد  
|     | 3. لا أعرف  
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|     | 5. لا أعتقد بشدة |

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<th>هل توجد حمل استخدامات غير الحكومية (NGOs) في المنظمات غير الحكومية؟</th>
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<p>|     | 5. لا أعتقد بشدة |</p>
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<th>PA9</th>
<th>هل تعقد/ين أن كل هذه البرامج، التدريب، ورشات العمل، الديمقراطية والحكم الصالح والمجتمعات لهيئة تأثير إيجابي في تحرير فلسطين؟</th>
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<td>هل تعقد/ين بأنه يجب لعب على المسؤولون الدور السياسي؟</td>
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<td>إذا كانت إجابة PA12 واضحة، لماذا؟</td>
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<td>هل دخول المسؤولين الـ NGO للبرلمان مقبول؟</td>
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<td>هل تعقد/ين أن المسؤولين يُلاحظون في دخول الـ NGOs إلى البرلمان أو الحصول على مناصب حكومية؟</td>
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<td>هل انت مع الراي الذي يقول بأن عمل المنظمات غير الحكومية يخدم بصورة أو بأخرى الاحتلال الإسرائيلي من ناحية أن الخدمات التي توفرها هذه المنظمات تكون من معاينة المجتمع الفلسطيني وضد القضية نفس الوقت وتعيد سياسة الاحتلال؟</td>
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<td>هل تعقدت/نين أنه من الأجمل دعم القطاعات الناجحة أخرى كالزراعة، الصناعة أو مشروعات التنمية المستدامة</td>
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<td>إذا كان جواب السؤال PA16 نعم، حدد/ي القطاعات الأكثر أهمية</td>
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<td>إذا لم تكون/ تكون عضواً في أحد الأحزاب السياسية من تعقد/ين أن سياساتهم الأفضل لتحصين فلسطين</td>
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انتهى
Much of the land behind the Barrier is Area C. In parts that have been declared "seam zone", Palestinians wishing to reside in their houses or access their land in the closed area must apply for a permit from the Israeli authorities.
Gaza Strip: Areas Restricted for Palestinian Access

- **Mediterranean Sea**: Fishing Limit since January 2009
  - Oslo Accords, 1995: (20 nautical miles)
  - Bertini Commitment, 2002: (12 nautical miles)

- **October 2006**: (6 nautical miles)

- **ISRAEL**
  - EREZ
    - OPEN, six days a week for aid workers and humanitarian cases only.
  - KARNI
    - CLOSED
  - Erez Crossing Point
  - Closed Crossing Point

- **EGYPT**

- **Nahal Oz fuel pipeline**: CLOSED

- **Kerem Shalom**: CLOSED

- **Rafah**: PARTIALLY OPEN for the movement of a number of authorized persons, Palestinian medical and humanitarian cases only.

**United Nations**

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, occupied Palestinian territory

**Gaza Strip: Areas Restricted for Palestinian Access**

**Oct. 2011**