Transgovernmental Networks and Regional Integration in Europe and South America

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For my father,

a man who always fought for Peace

*In memoriam*
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
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Regional integration processes play an important role in international politics. The spread of regional organizations in the aftermath of the Cold War exemplifies the importance of studying the causes and impacts of those organizations in international politics. According to the WTO (World Trade Organization), 546 regional trade agreements have been notified until January 2013 (compared to 265 in 2003), and only three WTO members were not part of such agreements (Macau, Mongolia and Taipei). However relating only to trade agreements these numbers represent the increasing importance of regionalism and regional integration to international politics. In fact, the existence of trade agreements shows that the parties are keen to have peaceful relations. Moreover, many trade agreements have a political background. These regional organizations vary greatly in their institutional form and performance. The most notable example of a highly institutionalized region in terms of overlapping governance mechanisms is the European Union (EU). The EU member-states are much more prone to transfer political authority to supranational institutions, even in highly sensitive areas such as human rights (Acharya and Johnston, 2007). While the European Union is the leading example of an advanced regional integration process, it has to be remembered that it was influenced by, built with, and merged to other institutional dynamics in the European continent such as the Council of Europe (CoE), Western European Union (WEU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. In this sense, this intertwine with other institutions influences the high level of institutionalization of EU politics. These other European institutions contributed in security and defence issues in the EU with expertise, and this culminated in the development of the EU’s second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP/ European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP). The EU is also the oldest regional integration experience of its

1 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm

2 The pillarization structure of the EU started with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and was abolished with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon.
genre. Some other regional organizations follow the European experience more explicitly such as the African Union (AU), Southern Common Market (Mercosul), Central American Integration System (SICA), and Caribbean Community (CARICOM), etc. Other integration processes follow a different pattern which is less institutionalized, more open and sometimes exclusively commercial, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc. The emerging importance of those regional integration processes for international politics and their contribution to promote peace and stability in their respective regions and beyond are not to be underestimated.

Regional integration processes that have developed a political dimension (generally referred to as new-regionalism) are characterised by a “multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social, and cultural aspects and therefore goes far beyond the goal of creating region-based free trade regimes or security alliances, and instead, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence and identity seems to be of primary importance” (Hettne, 1999: XVI). In this sense we observe how regional integration processes move beyond simply commercial/economic regimes and security alliances and learn why and when regional organizations develop political integration. Moreover, we are interested in investigating why and how this integration occurs in areas of high-politics where sovereignty should be playing an exclusive role. Therefore, in order to answer these questions we focus on political

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3 Especially if we start counting the beginning of the European integration process with the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949. However, for Historians the European integration begins with the Rome Treaties in 1957, and the exclusive political coordination forum started in 1970 with the Luxembourg Treaty.

integration in the areas of Foreign and Defence policies of member-states and how these policies became increasingly entangled and mutually dependent.

1.1 The research puzzle

Political integration, especially in the field of security and defence, is a very rare phenomenon. Security and defence traditionally represent the hard core of national sovereignty. Historically we can observe a great variety of cooperation in this area, most commonly in \textit{ad hoc} military alliances to counter a common external threat. However, not many of these military alliances remained alive and were deepened enough to be called integration. The dawn of European integration was irradiated mainly from two former historical rivals: Germany and France. Besides, in Europe the political integration process achieved its main drive in the aftermath of the Cold War when the Soviet threat was already part of the history books. The integration process in South America is no different. Argentina and Brazil, two former historical rivals, put aside their rivalry in order to deepen their economic and political ties, albeit with the inexistence of a common external threat.

In these two cases in Europe and South America we can observe the evolution of regional security governance. The establishment and development of mechanisms for regional security governance constitute one of the main research puzzles in IR Theory and Integration Studies in the 21st Century (Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini; 2007). According to Risse and Lehmkuhl (2006), this puzzle is raised by the fact that most research on governance in Social Sciences is done by taking into account modern and highly developed democratic States. In this sense: “The inapplicability of one of the key terms of social sciences to two thirds of the states in this world, however, creates not only theoretical but also eminently political and practical problems” (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2006: 4). We therefore want to understand regional security governance
beyond Europe. Looking to how South Americans organize their issues of security and defence may shed a light on how a regional security governance approach works beyond Europe. For this purpose we understand regional security governance as: “formal and informal structures of authority that manage collective security problems of states in a delineated region or common efforts of these states to promote security and stability outside their region. The uni-, bi-, and multilateral structures of authority can be codified in formal and binding institutional forms, but they may also be found in norms of behaviour and action informally accepted amongst the regional states” (Flemes and Radseck, 2009: 7).

However, the study of systems of regional security governance focuses mainly on the EU and ignores similar processes in other regions. But how can we explain the development of similar phenomena in other parts of the world? Most Integration Studies (also known as EU Studies) argue that each integration process in the world is so specific that they have to be analized with their own body of semi-hermetic theories. If that is the case it shows the impossibility to compare the findings of an inter-regional comparison. The idea that a separated, semi-hermetic body of theories is needed in order to study the EU has hindered theoretical progress by closing its doors to analytical innovations in the field of International Relations (IR) and Comparative Politics (CP).

During the 20th Century, the IR Theory debate centered in the rationalist debate between (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism. While the theoretical approaches emanating from the liberal camp were more able to deal with the questions of integration due to its focus on international cooperation and transnational links, realists tried to explain integration in terms of the geopolitical interests of major states and as a result of a specific historical moment. In this sense regional integration has been a challenge in IR theorizing, both in explaining why states give up their sovereignty and whether integration is a good thing (Diez, Bode and da Costa; 2011: 189). For Steve Smith
(2000: 34), 20th Century IR theorizing was either not able or not willing to grasp the complexity of the emerging and developing dynamics of regional institutions, with the rationalist mainstream debate focusing on the materialistic and atomized units in an anarchic international system by measuring the theories according to their ability to inform the relationship between empirical realities. Moreover, the study of the European foreign policy cooperation and its contribution to understanding the international system was neglected. Only some specialized literature in IR tried to tackle how the international system influenced the foreign policy coordination in Europe. Therefore most of the IR field in the 20th Century took axiomatic or radical positions on EU foreign policy, thereby oversimplifying it at the maximum level possible. When combined, those two perceptions led to a divide between IR and European Studies that was only recently overcome, mainly due to the convergence between the neoliberal – constructivist debate in IR and the new institutionalist approaches in European Studies. The result is the development of multilevel governance approaches that are fit to grasp the subtleties of such complex phenomena. Nevertheless, multilevel governance approaches have mainly been used to understand the European integration process, and the approach is broad enough to capture the dynamic in other regions in the world.

In this sense we look beyond the dichotomical debate between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists to observe the causes and impacts of political integration. Studying the drivers behind the integration process in two different regions with different characteristics may present generalizable factors to explain other integration processes around the world. In the light of this inter-regional comparision, how can we explain political integration emerging in two different regions with a strong history of rivalry in the absense of a common external threat? To answer this question we have to look beyond the regular interstate relations and try to grasp what is underneath the surface of regular meetings. In this sense this study will look not only to the policy outputs of the integration processes in Europe and South America, but we will mainly observe the
daily interaction of individuals responsible for influencing the paths of integration in both continents.

In Europe the integration process started in the 1950’s with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Those three Communities were merged in 1967 under the name of the European Communities (EC). Although we understand that one of the factors motivating the initial drive for integration in Europe was the Soviet threat, this external threat is not strong enough to explain why the political cooperation in the EU only started in 1970 in a period where the Soviet threat was not so strong anymore. Moreover, the main drive for political integration in the EU with the institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was only carried out after the end of the Cold War.

In South America the foundations for the establishment of a sustainable integration process were laid by the newly elected civilian Presidents of Argentina and Brazil in 1985 with the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu. The Southern Common Market (Mercosul) was established in 1991, and although painted as an economic/commercial integration project since the beginning it had very clear political motivations. In 1996 the Mechanism for Political Consultation was created, and in 1998 this was institutionalized in the Forum for Consultation and Political Cooperation (FCCP). In South America we also observe the existence of other integration processes: the Andean Community and

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5 Political cooperation in Europe started with the Luxembourg (Davignon) Report in 1970 after the failed attempts of the European Defence Community (EDC), the European Political Community, and the Fouchet Plans.

6 The US-Soviet détente started in 1969 with the SALT I and Helsinki Accords and later on with SALT II, and it ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent US boycott to the 1980’s Olympic Games in Moscow.
the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). The Andean Community was established in 1969 (named Andean Pact from 1969 to 1996) and has a very complex institutional structure, however due to strong political divergences, border conflicts and economic limitations the development of this integration process was not very successful. The Union of South American Nations (Unasul) was created in 2008, and it is an attempt to unify the two separate integration processes in the region, namely Mercosul and the Andean Community. Moreover, Unasul has a very strong political component and even aims to organize the security and defence integration in the region.

To investigate the logic behind political integration in two different regions this study therefore seeks to analyze and explain the role of transgovernmental networks in pushing forward each integration process. Transgovernmental networks are defined by Keohane and Nye (1974: 43) as: “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments. Thus we take the policies of top leaders as our benchmarks of official government policy.” A more comprehensive definition is provided by Slaughter (2004: 7): “National government officials would be increasingly enmeshed in networks of personal and institutional relations. They would each be operating both in domestic and the international arenas, exercising their national authority to implement their transgovernmental and international obligations and representing the interests of their country while working with their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distil information, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmonizing national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems.” We argue that those transgovernmental networks play a major role in areas where governments are not keen – or find it difficult – to reach an agreement. This is especially seen in the area of security and defence, where national sovereignty is the rule. In this sense the fundamental research question guiding this study therefore asks: *what is the effect of transgovernmental networks in integration processes?*
1.2 The analytical framework

In order to explain the impact of transgovernmental networks in regional integration we will use the tools and concepts present in IR Theory and Integration Studies. We use these tools and concepts to analyse the institutionalization processes in Europe and in South America, in particular in regard to the development of transgovernmental networks. We also observe whether these transgovernmental networks remain in informal, non-institutionalized settings or if they are necessarily institutionalized. We argue that there are many factors influencing the establishment and evolution of regional integration processes, but we defend the idea that transgovernmental networks play an important role in areas where the positions of States are divergent and commitments are difficult. For the purpose of a comprehensive understanding of why and how regional integration occurs, in the next chapter we will overview the state of the art both in IR theory and Integration Studies. In the final part of the chapter an analytical framework which sketches and compares the most plausible drivers for regional integration in Europe and in South America will be presented. It will be observed that the policy outcomes of the integration processes have an indirect impact (through feedback mechanisms) in not only the international environment but also in the integrations own dynamic.

In a nutshell, this study seeks to uncover the elite reproduction through networks of personal relationships and how those relationships affect the process of integration in two different regions. We draw a number of sub-questions from the classic question of socialisation research formulated by Fred Greenstein: who learns what from whom under what circumstances, and with what effects (1968; 1970). Our sub-questions are: what differentiate States from their representatives? What motivates the representatives from flexibilizing their national position? Why and how do individuals engage in
networking? In order to answer these questions this study will analyze the development of transgovernmental networks responsible for security and defence issues in Europe and in South America.

In the EU the discussions for the establishment of an institution for political integration started to take place with the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1950 (which failed in 1954). The learning process and networking between the representatives responsible for negotiating the agreement started to occur and culminated with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation in 1970 (Nuttall, 1992). The creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) gave rise to a semi-institutionalized body where interactions between the representatives started to intensify with the codification of substantive and procedural norms, and this culminated with the institutionalization of the CFSP and ESDP.

In this sense, due to its longevity and complexity we view the EU as the most advanced case of regional security governance in the world. In the EU system of governance member states not only share cultural, historical, and political features, they also share risks, the acquisition of legitimacy and distribution costs (Smith, 2003). Moreover, “habits and customs of interaction on EU foreign and security policy matters have matured over time into rules of behavior and institutionalized patterns, as illustrated by the evolution from the EPC to CFSP and ESDP” (Kirchner, 2003: 29). The slow evolution of political integration in Europe with the development of common habits and customs of interaction generated the first stages of a learning process, which Aggestam (2004) calls the development of “we” feelings. In turn, these “we” feelings resulted in the development of what Nuttall (1992) calls “automatic reflex of consultation”, meaning that national foreign policy actors ask for opinions and consult with each other before reaching a final national position on one issue.
In South America it will be observed that while in the Southern Cone the evolution of political integration has been taking place since the redemocratization process in the 1980’s, in the Andean region political integration has been harmed by political instabilities, border disputes and economic asymmetries. We argue that due to the peaceful solution of border disputes, political stability, and economic development transgovernmental networks were able to develop in the Southern Cone. We also argue that the development of these transgovernmental networks was a relevant factor for the success of the regional integration process in the Southern Cone. Moreover, it is observed that the Southern Cone aims to contribute to the stability of the Andean region by putting political weight into the creation of the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). Particularly with the forum to debate and coordinate security and defence issues, the South American Defence Council may represent a step forward in solving the remaining border disputes and enhancing the relationships between the Andean countries. In the South American case it will be observed that unlike in Europe issues of security and defence are still dominated by the military. In this sense we argue that while in Europe the security and defence integration is carried out by a civilian transgovernmental network (Diplocom), in South America it has been mainly achieved with a military transgovernmental network (Milicom). These networks in Europe and South America will be scrutinized in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

1.3 Limits of this study

In order to clearly delineate the contours of this research it may be useful to outline what falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. To start with, this study only focuses on the political dimension of the integration process. The economic and commercial aspects of the integration processes will be mentioned only when necessary. More specifically, this study is interested in the security and defence aspects of political integration. Security and defence has always been understood as being within the exclusive domain of
States and strongly bounded by sovereignty, however the evolution of political integration in Europe demonstrates that even in this area of “high politics” decisions can be taken jointly (even without unanimity) using the CFSP/ESDP as an institutional framework. Also, the different levels of governance have to be taken into account when we analize security and defence within the EU.

In focusing on security and defence aspects of political integration this study also considers that security and defence is just one resource in the wider range of instruments in joint foreign policy making. In this sense we leave aside other diplomatic or coercive foreign policy measures such as aid conditionality, trade agreements and multilateral negotiations, collective demarches and declarations, or sanctions, all of which may complement or substitute the joint action in security and defence. We will mention those aspects of joint foreign policy making where necessary in order to describe the evolution of political integration in Europe and South America. These limitations are not be interpreted in such a way as to imply that security and defence should or even can be analyzed separately from the other aspects of political integration. In the research questions raised in the last section we observe the general impact of transgovernmental networks on political integration, yet links between security and defence and other political instruments are only touched upon when they are relevant to understand the role of transgovernmental networks in the integration process.

Whether the EU is therefore incomparable with other integration processes depends on what question is being asked and the related research design (Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik and Pollack, 1997). Some defend the notion that the uniqueness of the EU resides in its history, institutional complexity and unique form of political authority (Rosamond, 2000: 16; Wallace, 1994: 9). However, over- emphasising exceptionality and historical contingency seems like a way to present an insurmountable obstacle in
order to prevent fruitful comparisons and foster a hermetic body of theories which are exclusively created to analyze each integration process individually. This study does not share the opinion that each integration process should be analyzed by a hermetic body of theories. We defend the idea that inter-regional comparison is possible once we bridge the theoretical divide between IR and EU Studies. In order to reach beyond the divide of IR and EU Studies we draw on the neoliberal – constructivist debate in IR Theory and the analytical frameworks of new institutionalism and multilevel governance in EU Studies\(^7\). This study also compares two integration processes that are not located in Europe, namely the Mercosur and the Andean Community. We also rely on a within-case comparison when we observe how diverse institutional settings in the European Union are influenced differently by transgovernmental networks.

Inquiring into the influence of transgovernmental networks in the political outcomes of integration nonetheless relates to the broader questions of actorness and presence. The policy outcomes reached as a result of the interactions of national representatives enmeshed in transgovernmental networks reflect how and if the regional integration process interacts with the rest of the World – ie: the tools and norms it uses in its international relations and which issues or areas of the regional organization will be present. In EU Studies these questions raise a hot theoretical and methodological debate on how to generalize the premises of European integration and the type of power the EU represents: civilian, normative, transformative, post-modern or super-power.

Questions about actorness and presence bring us to the impact of policy outcomes both in the international environment and in the internal integration dynamic. Since the notion of “civilian power” was brought to light by Francois Duchene (1972), the concept has been under heated debate with some defending the “normative” or “ethical” impacts of the EU policy outcomes in the international environment (Manners, 2002; 2008; Diez, 2005; Aggestam, 2004), while others challenge this view by arguing about the self-serving nature of EU political outcomes (Bailes, 2008; Youngs, 2004). This study does not take part in this discussion, arguing only that the policy outcomes of the integration process have an impact of the international environment. This study also defends the idea that the policy outcomes have an impact in the institutionalization process by relating institutions with political cooperation (Smith, 2004; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000). These effects are related not only to successful integration attempts but also failed attempts play a role in devising new forms of cooperation/institutionalization. Learning from past mistakes on a trial-and-error basis is also an important characteristic of political integration in both Europe and South America. Moreover, the institutionalization of habits and customs of transgovernmental networks play an important role in fostering integration (Kirchner, 2003; Smith, 2004; Nuttall, 1992).

1.4 The rest of the dissertation

In seeking to elucidate the role of transgovernmental networks in integration processes this dissertation will proceed as follows. In the second chapter the theories of European Studies and International Relations will be assessed in order to observe the evolution of theoretical thinking on regional integration processes. In this chapter we will also present the progressive convergence between both theoretical fields which enables the argument for the development of a comprehensive theory to compare political integration in different parts of the world (and not understand each of them as sui generis). In the last part of the second chapter we will also present two models to
observe political integration in Europe and in South America based on the theoretical convergence. Based on a comparison of these models and guided by the research questions presented above we will draw the causes of integration which are common in both regions.

The third chapter starts with a discussion about the definitions of transgovernmental networks and socialization processes. We also include a brief presentation of social network theory, its basic concepts, and how this approach will help us to understand the establishment and development of transgovernmental networks. Then we proceed with the first case study of the European Union. In this case study we will assess how the transgovernmental networks influenced the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), its codification with the Single European Act (SEA), and its institutionalization in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The institutional settings of political cooperation in the contemporary European Union will also be observed by looking at the within-case variance and clarifying the role of transgovernmental networks in the Council Working Groups (CWG), Political and Security Committee (PSC) and in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).

In the fourth chapter we will assess the existence of and measure the influence of transgovernmental networks in South American politics. Differently from the EU, South American networks are stronger among the military (Milicom). This will have an impact on the integration process, and it will be shown that the military have a strong influence on the paths of security and defence cooperation in South America. However, the military in the region are still feeling the backlash of their participation in the dictatorships and thus facing increasing controls, budget cuts and a loss of prestige. Institutionalization is also viewed as a way to control and constrain those transgovernmental networks by assuring civilian control over the military. In this chapter
we will focus on the development of Mercosul as the most successful integration experience in the region by contrasting it with the Andean Community and the developments of the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). We will also observe the importance of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and the development of institutional settings for political coordination in Mercosul and especially the South American Defence Council (CSD) of Unasul.

The fifth chapter presents the conclusions of this dissertation. The conclusion chapter will be divided into general theoretical implications, future research possibilities, and policy prescriptions. From the theoretical perspective we expect that this dissertation will help to shed light on the emergence and development of regional institutions. Besides, this dissertation is also contributing to the debate about whether the South American experience is similar to the European integration process or not. It also contributes to broadening the literature on the political implications of integration for South America. This dissertation also aims to be readable to policy-makers in order to present new insights on not only how to foster cooperation but also on the role and impact of this political “steering community”, namely transgovernmental networks. This leads to questions of sovereignty, which is praised by South American governments. It also brings us to a reflection on democracy, accountability and regulation.

1.5 Case study selection

There are a number of regional integration processes in the world; some of them were already extensively studied such as the African Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), so why did we select the European and South American experiences as case studies? There are many reasons for the case study selection, as we will present here. We suppose that transgovernmental networks have an impact on institutionalization processes. Europe is the most institutionalized regional integration
process in the World, and therefore it is quite obvious to choose the EU as one of the case studies. According to the literature, South America has integration processes which are most similar to the EU. Also, South America has integration processes with different characteristics and functionality, thus offering us the possibility for intra-regional comparison. Nevertheless, the literature on political integration in South America is very scarce, and therefore the research would be contributing to spreading the knowledge on political integration in the subregion. Besides the above mentioned reasons for case selection there are some other scientific explanations for why we specifically decided to choose these two case studies.

Following the case selection criteria proposed by van Evera (1997: 77), in both case studies we have 1. data richness; 2. extreme values on the independent variable; 3. large within case variance in values on the study variable; and 4. the cases are appropriate for controlled comparison and the method of agreement. In the first criterion we observe the large number of publications and data available for the study of European integration and the access to policy-makers to carry out interviews. In the South American case we do not have as much literature available as in the European case, but we do have good access to policy-makers in order to conduct interviews. Those factors are extremely important because we will infer and test our causation using process tracing and the delphi method. The second criterion refers to the extreme values on the level of integration in both cases. Those values are higher in both cases than in other regional organizations around the World, therefore it will be possible to observe that if we have higher values on the dependent variable the causes should be present in a higher level as well. In the third criterion we observe a large within-case variance in the value of the study variable (transgovernmental networks). We observe that transgovernmental networks in both cases are composed of sub-units of governments’ bureaucracy. We also note that those sub-units form alliances with each other in order to favor or facilitate policy objectives. In this sense the previous personal contacts between the persons involved in the network play an important role. When
those networks are embedded in an institution the socialization processes move into norms and values and peer-pressures play a fundamental role. We also observe that the nature of those networks can vary according to the region or field. For instance, we observe a European diplomatic community playing an important role in issues of foreign, security and defence policy in the EU. On the other hand, in South America we observe a strong relationship between the military in the region that helps to foster integration in the field of defence. The transgovernmental network can also vary according to the field under negotiation, for instance environment, labor or economic issues.

In the European case it is easier to spot the variances between the independent and the dependent variables across time, thus shedding light on the causation. This is possible due to the fact that in Europe institutionalization is observed in a larger time span. Therefore the dependent variable is supposed to show a high value when the independent variable is also at a high level. In the fourth criterion we choose the case studies due to the appropriateness of allowing their pairing for controlled comparison and Mill’s method of agreement. Because both cases have similar values on the study variable but have different characteristics, it makes it easier to spot the candidate causes because they will announce themselves as similarities in the characteristics in both cases.

We recognize the importance of fulfilling the scientific parameters for case study selection; however we also highlight the importance of the case studies for the real world politics. In this sense the case studies are also selected according to real world problems. Both in Europe and in South America integration processes have paved the way for a more cooperation environment, avoidance of war and the fostering of democracy. As we will see in the next two sections, the choice for Europe and South America as study cases has a very ideational component: the idea that fostering
cooperation with the development of institutions leads to a stable peace. The European example is emblematic. After two World wars and widespread bloodshed the Europeans learned to manage their relationship in a civilized way with the help of institutions. Before the dawn of the European integration the Europeans had never had 60 years of continuous peace among themselves\(^8\). This 60 years of peace was not easily managed, and it included periods of euro-optimism, euro-pessimism, euro-scepticism and even paralysis. Despite its difficulties the Europeans remained faithful to the idea of its integration founding fathers, never gave up on the process, and adapted it to the challenges of the times, and most of all the political will. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, notwithstanding its constant diplomatic crises South America has enjoyed a less conflictive environment and longer periods of peace\(^9\). Also, the conditions for integration are strong in the region as there are only two major official languages (Spanish and Portuguese), and they are very similar; the countries in the region enjoy not only similar legal and political systems but also have strong similarities (and compatibility) in their values, religion, and cultural heritage, etc. However, despite all those similarities the successful integration processes in South America only started to develop in the 1990’s with the redemocratization period experienced by most of the countries in the region, and therefore the role played by democracy and rule of law is strongly emphasized. Nonetheless, the region is still marked by past military dictatorships, strong personality politics, and a weird combination of inflamed and empty rhetoric. In this sense regional institutions in South America can be very useful to not only promote peaceful settlements of disputes and stability in the region but also to foster democracy and reinforce political commitments among its member-states and beyond, and also maximizing the economic gains of integration to the region.

\(^8\) Considering conflicts involving more than one member of the current formation of the European Union.

\(^9\) It is not our task to reflect on why South Americans have enjoyed a more peaceful environment than the Europeans. Actually this fact can be explained in many ways, the most popular explanations put emphasis on the young age of South American nations compared with the Europeans and its lack of capabilities to wage a full scale conflict.
1.5.1 Regional institution in Europe

After the Second World War, western European countries realized that Europe needed a strong institutional setting with supranational powers in order to assure that relations between them would be peaceful while cementing the economical interdependences of the member-countries. As a result we can argue that first and foremost the European integration was, from the beginning, a project designed to preserve peace and avoid another intra-European conflict. The integration was even more stimulated with the dawn of the Cold War, the Soviet atomic bomb, the spread of euro-communism, and the importance of a strong, revitalized Western Germany for the security of the West.

With a devastated economy, Western Europe was a weak adversary to the Soviet expansionism, and therefore the US not only supported the plans for a united Europe, but also financed the economic recovery of Europe with the Marshall Plan. The Schuman Plan in 1950, was the first step towards the development a supranational European institution. According to the plan, the French and German coal and steel industry (also used as war industry) were to be placed under a common High Authority. This Plan led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg).

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10 To organize the financial aid the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created, which in 1960, was transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

11 It is worth remembering that the Council of Europe was created in 1949 and also influenced the further development of the European integration, especially with the signature of the European Convention of Human Rights. However, the Council of Europe has a broad membership and the political objectives of the Council of Europe and the European Union are quite similar, and some of its institutions are intertwined (like the Convention of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights).
With further plans to enhance economical development and the increasing importance of nuclear energy, the Europeans created two further institutions. The European Economic Community (EEC) was designed to promote the development of a customs union, thus fostering economic relationships among its member states. The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was designed to promote cooperation in the area of nuclear power. Both communities were created with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and they represent the cornerstone of the European integration process. Those three communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) were merged ten years later, in 1967, under the name of European Communities (EC).

In this dissertation the beginning of European economic integration is taken as given. The main reason for this is that we are interested in analyzing the political integration in Europe, and until the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) very little was achieved in this area. We will of course refer to the previous attempts to coordinate the foreign policies of member states in areas other than economic affairs in order to observe the emergence of transgovernmental networks and its impact in this area. As a result we will observe the trial-and-error character of the political cooperation in Europe, pointing to the learning processes taken from the failed experiences of the European Defence Community (EDC), the European Political Community (both in the 1950’s), and the Fouchet Plans (in the 1960’s). In this sense we will observe how those failed experiences impacted the creation of transgovernmental networks and how those networks influenced the agreement over the European Political Cooperation (EPC), thus shaping its institutional design.

Our study in the European case starts with the 1969 Luxemburg Report (also called the Davignon Report). This report created a loose institutional form to discuss and coordinate the foreign policies of its member states. This “talk-shop” was named European Political Cooperation (EPC). With the establishment of the EPC it was
recognized that a forum to debate and coordinate foreign policies was utterly important in order to avoid internal disruption due to extremely different political views.

The loose EPC framework developed in such a way that by the mid-1980’s it was a tool of preventive diplomacy in the East-West relations, the Middle East and Southern Europe, thus giving voice to the member states (actorness) in the international arena. As a result, in the EPC we can observe how community-building practices, norms, values and rules of behaviour developed and were further codified in reports and acts (such as the Copenhagen Report of 1973, the London Report of 1981, and especially in the Single European Act of 1986); and institutionalized (1993’ Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty) as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

1.5.2 Regional institution in South America

The most important steps towards the development of a sustainable regional institution in the Southern part of South America were taken in 1985 by the former Presidents of Brazil, Jose Sarney, and Argentina, Raul Alfonsin. The Foz do Iguacu Declaration established the Brazilian-Argentinian Integration and Cooperation Program (PICAB). This Declaration was the first major international contract between the two former rivals after the redemocratization process in both countries. It laid down the basis for the institutionalization of the region and cemented the peace between the two most powerful countries in the region. In this sense, the Foz do Iguacu declaration can be compared to the 1957’ Rome Treaties which laid down the foundations of the European integration process.
While in Europe the integration process started after the experience of two devastating World Wars and under the shadow of the communist threat, in South America the process was mainly an answer to economic concerns, and it was especially designed to achieve civilian control and gain leverage over the military establishment after decades of military dictatorships (Sotomayor, 2004; Oelsner, 2009). In South America, the idea of regional institutions was related to the increase of the levels of economic development and to political oversight of the military establishment.

These ideas of enhancing cooperation among South American countries with the development of regional institutions following the European model were carried further by the elected Presidents of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello; and Argentina, Carlos Menem. Despite many internal troubles caused by economic crises and political instability – including a failed military coup d’Etat attempt in Argentina in December 1990 - both Presidents together with the Presidents of Paraguay and Uruguay, signed the Assunsion Treaty in 1991 that created the Southern Common Market (Mercosul). Also in 1991, both Presidents signed the Agreement for the establishment of the Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Those two institutions, following the European institutional model while keeping the South American specificities, offered the basis for sustainable political cooperation among the two most important countries in the region. This axis relationship between Brazil and Argentina can be compared to the French-German relationship for the development of the European Union. In this sense it is correct to argue that the efforts to organize the relationships between the two regional leaders led to reactions in the whole region, firstly through agglutination processes as happened in Mercosul and in the European Union (Cervo, 2008).

12 It is important to highlight the difference between the terms South America and Latin America. South America refers to the geographical area between the Isthmus of Panama and the Tierra del Fuego. Latin America refers to American countries that speak languages derived from Latin, mostly Portuguese and Spanish, but also French. Thus the term Latin America excludes Canada, the United States, most of the Caribbean, Surinam and Guyana. In this sense those two terms are not used interchangeably here.
Therefore it is correct to say that in both South America and in Europe the development of regional institutions were the means found by the regional leaders to produce sustainable cooperation and stable relations in the long term. The two institutional settings in South America and Europe, despite their similar development path, share more differences than similarities. Those differences are due to the contexts in which those institutions were created. In this sense we observe completely different inputs in both institutional settings. If we also take a more constructivist approach, the values, norms and identity-formations are quite different in Europe and in South America. While the Europeans were prone to give away part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions, the principle of sovereignty is very strong in South America, thus making the development of a supranational institution in the region almost impossible (Kacowicz, 2005), and the level of interdependence and the influence of external actors in the region are very different in Europe and in South America.

In this sense we will observe the development of Mercosul as the most successful integration process in South America, and the prospects that Unasul (Union of South American Nations) will develop as the main locus of political and military cooperation. The choice of Unasul is a complementation to Mercosul’s analysis. As will be seen in chapter 4, Unasul is an attempt to merge the two South American subsystems, namely the Andean Community and the Southern Cone. The main locus of political coordination in Unasul is the South American Defence Council (CDS), and therefore we will observe the impact of transgovernmental networks to the development of those institutions and its policies and how far those institutions potentialize socialization processes.
CHAPTER 2

Theorizing political integration: towards a convergence of European Studies and International Relations
This second chapter oversees the theories being used to analyse integration in both International Relations and European Studies. In the last part of the chapter we will use the convergence of both fields to elaborate on a new theoretical model that might account for not only the dynamics of integration in Europe and Latin America but which could also be used in other parts of the world as well.

There is a discussion among students of European political integration on which body of theories, or more properly schools of thought, provides better insights into the European Political Integration in general and the evolution of the Common European Foreign Policy in particular. While many hold that the EU is unique and should be studied within the field of European Integration Theories, others defend the analytical value of theories of International Relations.

In one hand, scholars working on the European political integration from an IR perspective have mainly focused on empirical questions of decision-making, policy-making and regional or issue-area specific governance processes in the EU (Wessels, 1997; Nutall, 1992; Holland, 1991 and 1997, Ginsberg, 1989; 1999), with special emphasis on foreign policy (White, 2001; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008), “security community” or zone of peace (Adler, 1997; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000, Schimmelfennig, 2003), identity and order (Kelstrup and Williams, 2000) and regionalization/regionalism (Telo, 2001). Even though some of these works also suggest to combine EU Studies with IR Theory (especially Kelstrup and Williams, 2000; Adler; 1997; Schimmelfennig, 2003 and Telo, 2001) most of IR Research remained empirical and did not develop new theoretical concepts. In this sense, the empiricism in the IR perspective on the EU avoids the development of a general theory to compare different regional integration processes around the world. On

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13 In this dissertation I use the terms “political integration” and “foreign policy integration” interchangeably. I understand that integration of national foreign policies into the EU sphere started with the EPC (European Political Cooperation) and culminated in the CFSP/ESDP (Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy). I also understand that this political integration includes the role played by the EC in cross-pillar issues.
the other hand the EU Integration literature fails to grasp the specific circumstances of foreign policy by mainly focusing on the internal development of the EU and forgetting about its external relationships (Hix, 1997; Nugent, 1989; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006; Rosamond, 2000; Beach, 2005; Moravcsik, 1998). While those studies shed some light on how European integration has changed expectations among its member states and societies, they do not grasp the emerging actorness of the EU and fail to see that the EU is more than just an arena for the coordination of the national foreign policy making of member states (Hill and Smith, 2005: 5).

We therefore agree that the EPC/CFSP is not well served by theory (Hyde-Price, 2004: 99), and consequently the “state of the art” of the European political integration is still at the pre-theoretical stage (Holland, 1994: 129; Hill 1993, Tonra and Christiansen, 2004), although the beginning of the 2000’s presented us with some bright insights and may represent the beginning of a generalizable theory of political integration (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2004; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000; Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008).

This chapter aims to present an overview of the main theoretical and analytical frameworks that try to explain the dynamics and outcomes of the European political integration. The first approaches to European Integration\footnote{For instance: Haas, 1958; 1964; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; 1971; Lindberg, 1963; Mitrany, 1966 and Pentland, 1973.} constituted a big challenge to IR theory, which at that time was dominated by realism. The first EU approaches stressed that anarchy could be overcome and that a focus on power relations could be replaced by a focus on governance. They also stressed the potential of cooperation and learning. IR Theory reacted by explaining that EU integration was “low politics” of a non-state actor, and therefore when it becomes “high politics” or turns into a state then realism would be a strong explanatory theory. However, the emerging overlap between neorealism and neoliberalism has been very well caught in the EU literature. The neoliberal emphasis on the role played by international institutions and the
developments in the EU challenges the neorealist focus on relative gains. (Smith, 2000)

In this sense, overlapping approaches between European Studies and International Relations are observed in this chapter. In the final part we will propose an analytical model for the study of political integration which draws from the inflexion between IR and European Studies since the 1990’s and which might be applied to other integration processes around the world.

2.1 European integration Studies


Karl Deustch, one of the first integration scholars, defines integration as “the probability that conflicts will be resolved peacefully”. As such, integration appears to achieve some sort of a final state of a process, thereby leading to a situation where conflicts among members are settled by peaceful means. (Deutsch, 1957: 69). Another classic scholar, Ernst Haas, argues that integration as a condition fails to offer a clear distinction between the situation before the integration started and the situation during the process. Therefore, for Haas integration as a condition does not shed light on the role of social change. In this sense, Haas defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 627). As such, Haas sees integration more as a process towards a new political community. The third perspective advanced by Leon Lindberg argues that integration is “the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous actions by national governments” (Lindberg, 1963: 5-6). This definition agrees with Haas’s view of integration as a process, but it foremost refers to the practices of sharing and
delegating decision-making and does not necessarily lead to a new “political community” as proposed by Haas (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 8).

Strong self-criticism of the European integration theorists refers to the fact that they could not agree on a definition of both the process and outcome of integration, and therefore it turned out to be impossible to compare their findings, meaning that what represents a clear indication of integration in one model is viewed as irrelevant to the other. This difficulty to agree on the dependent variable recalls the tale of a group of blind men trying to discover what an elephant looks like. Each blind man touched a different part of the animal and each concluded that the elephant had the shape of the part he had touched. As a result they all reached very different conclusions about its appearance and they began a heated debate (Puchala, 1972: 268). At the time of Puchala’s critique, the field was dominated by a small number of “grand theories,” with a small number of basic assumptions that completely disagreed with each other on how to study integration. Nowadays, in the field of European integration studies the competing “grand theories” gave way to “middle range theories” that are more flexible and try to grasp specific processes and outcomes.

The second question to be answered is whether the European integration a phenomenon which cannot be replicated. According to those who view the EU as a singular phenomenon, the EU is a product of specific geopolitical and historical circumstances, a unique adventure which requires its own specialized body of theories. Most of the studies that take the European integration as a phenomenon not replicated anywhere else in the world are devoted to the study of the Commission with its specific institutional design, decision-making procedures and supranational legal identity (Milward, 1992), however some also defend the uniqueness of the European political integration (Øhrgaard, 2004: 26). This perspective raises many methodological problems however. First of all it raises the problem of testing hypotheses on a single case, often referred to as the n=1 problem (Pollack, 1997; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). If the EU is a singular form of cooperation then how could we test theoretical
propositions on it? Therefore the theories generated to explain European integration would not be suitable to explain the same phenomenon in other parts of the world, meaning that those theories would not be generalizable beyond Europe.

In order to address such a methodological challenge theorists identified three ways to conceptualize European integration as part of a larger class of phenomena. The first approach, defended by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues at Princeton, conceptualizes regional integration as an instance of nation-building, meaning that the end of both processes would be the development of joint perspectives and identities, and therefore it would be useful to compare cases of nation-building and regional integration (Deutsch, 1953a, 1953b, Deutsch et al. 1967). The second approach observes the EU as a kind of international organization or regime, which means it could be compared at the macro level with other international organizations. (Puchala, 1997; Mattli, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2003) In this sense, the guiding questions would be why do states cooperate? and what factors explain specific cooperative outcomes? A third possibility analyses the EU as a “polity” in the sense the EU has developed a complex institutional structure that resembles the modern nation state more than an international regime. Those who view the EU as a “polity” focus their research on the interaction of related actors and the process of agenda setting, policy formulation, legislation, interest intermediation and policy implementation. They focus their attention on formal and informal processes and the locus of power within the institution (Rosamond 2000: 15; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 11).

The incompatibility among those three approaches to integration obstructed the development of a single theory to analyse European integration. Moreover, the inability of most approaches to look at the European impact on international politics and to go “beyond Europe” in comparing different regional integration processes hindered interaction with the IR field, thus preventing mutual theoretical exchanges that could help the development in both fields. In this sense EU integration was viewed with a
particularistic lens, and the research agenda was mostly focused on the internal dynamic of the EU.

The more the EU was treated as being unique, the more integration studies became to be viewed as a separated part of IR. One of the consequences was that it hindered the theoretical advancement on European integration by closing its doors to helpful approaches and theoretical developments in the field of IR and Comparative Politics. Mainly due to positive developments of regional integration processes in other parts of the world (ASEAN, CARICOM, Mercosul, etc.), and the enhancement of European political cooperation with the CFSP, since the mid 1990´s scholars are trying to bring IR approaches back to European studies (Mattli, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack 1997).

2.1.1 Pre-theories of Integration

The three classic early theories of integration were developed after the First World War and tried to create strategies to move away from international anarchy and to fashion a kind of international society that regulates interaction between States. The early theories of integration were developed based on the tradition of the Enlightenment´s models of perpetual peace\(^{15}\) (Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant) as well as on the US example (Deudney, 1995; Andreatta, 2005: 20)

*Federalism*

Federalists believed that national independence should be abolished in favour of a supranational form of government. Some federalists proposed a constitutional revolution initiated by political elites. This revolution should lead to the establishment of formal rules (constitution) to be accepted by all countries (Pentland 1975: 12). Other federalists argued on a more bottom-up approach on which a federal union would be built on a popular movement that pressures the elites to share (or transfer) power with a higher

\(^{15}\) See Hinsley, 1963.
authority (Spinelli and Rossi, 1944), yet other so called “incremental” or “functional” federalists defend the idea that political integration is a result of a gradual process of mutual adaptation of national institutions. This approach of gradual integration is close to neofunctionalism (see below), and is often associated with Jean Monnet. This view gained popularity amongst federalists with the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community in 1954. For all federalists however, integration is a constitutional process which is established by formal rules and agreed among political elites. Federalism received great criticism from functionalists due to its emphasis on formal political and constitutional change, not recognizing that the growing cooperation in specific fields out of political oversight (economic, social and technological) could trigger political integration (Spinelli, 1966: 11).

As a theoretical approach, federalism lacks descriptive and interpretative power. It concentrates on the end product instead of the process which leads to integration. It has been interested in the design of the federal institution instead of trying to understand the dynamics of the integration process, meaning that in the federalist approach there is no clear understanding of the antecedent conditions or causal factors that contribute to integration (Haas, 1970: 624).

**Functionalism**

Functionalism, as developed by David Mitrany in the 1930’s, is intellectually based on the classical liberal economic philosophy of the 19th Century (Norman Angell, Hobhause and Laski). It argues that in an interdependent world states are unable to provide essential services to their citizens, and therefore they would have to rely on international (functional) organizations. These organizations would naturally undermine the traditional Westphalian state. These organizations would also win the allegiance of domestic societies and replace the balance of power. In this new system proposed by functionalists the units are non-territorial, functional and technocratic. (Mitrany, 1975) According to Groom and Taylor (1975: 1), functionalists, like their federalist
counterparts, do not present a theory of integration but a formula for international organization.

Most criticism to functionalism reflected its apolitical and mere technocratic nature. It relies on technical and economic matters to solve political problems, however these issues are not always non-controversial and are also subject to cultural and political conflict (Haas, 1964: 11-13; Claude, 1956: 387). Another critique is that functionalism ignores the significance of political boundaries, and it is naïve to believe that the performance of international organizations will lead people to abandon their loyalty to the State (Morgenthau, 1948: 335). Federalists also criticised functionalism for the lack of democratic oversight. According to federalists the idea of a “government by experts”, ruled by technocrats would be undemocratic and would mainly lack accountability to the generation and representation of interests (Sewell, 1966: 42; Mayall, 1975: 254).

**Transactionalism**

Developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues at Princeton in the 1950’s, transactionalism defends the idea that integration is a process of cultural assimilation which leads to the development of “security communities” where war would be no longer considered feasible due to linkages of mutual trust and identification among peoples. Integration as a development of security communities draws into Deutsch’s notion that processes of social-psychological learning are trigged by international transactions (such as communication, migration, military collaboration, etc.) and produces common identities and trust among social actors. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 29)

According to the transactionalists’ view, integration has two dimensions. Firstly, it is a process of social integration which would lead to the development of pluralistic security communities. In those communities international relations would be defined according to feelings of “we-ness” and “dependable expectations of peaceful change”, however
states would still maintain their power and independence (Deutsch, 1969: 122; van Wagenen, 1965). Secondly, integration is a process of political integration. In this sense political elites can decide to build common (supranational) institutions once a pluralistic security community is established. In the transnationalist view the objective of integration is not the development of supranational institutions. Integration was first and foremost seen as an assimilation of common social standards, loyalties and cultural characteristics which lead to deeper political integration. (Deutsch et al., 1957: 6; Deutsch, 1969: 122). Deutsch and his colleagues find that the creation of a community depends more on the development of mutual sympathy, trust, loyalties (we-feeling), mutual responsiveness and value systems than on formal structures of joint decision-making and geopolitical factors (such as a common external threat) (Deutsch et al., 1957). Transactionalism gained support mainly due to its scientific character. Integration is viewed as a quantitative concept that could be measured by a statistical tool called the “index of relative acceptance”. Also, the idea of a state managing its international relations without giving up their sovereignty was well received by policymakers and scholars (Pentland, 1975: 13).

The critique received by transactionalism was mainly due to its failure to specify the theoretical relationship between both transaction flows and social assimilation and political change. The causal relationship between social assimilation and political change is not specified (among the critics: Fisher 1969; Haas, 1970; Hoffmann 1963; Inglehart, 1968; Nye, 1968). According to Puchala (1970: 762), transaction flows may only reflect regional integration and not cause it, while contrary to this transaction flows may be caused by integration.

2.1.2 Neofunctionalism

As the first comprehensive theory of regional integration developed by Ernst Haas and others in the 1960’s, neofunctionalism aims to offer a systematic predictive theory of international political integration. The main focus of this theory rests on the relationship
between economic and political integration. Neofunctionalism observes that in the first
moment integration in economic areas generate problems. These problems are related
to the increase of trade and transactions across borders. While governments are unable
to solve those problems they need to create a supranational bureaucracy to deal with
them. The premise of neofunctionalism is that “integration in economic and functional
sectors will lead to pressure for political integration due to ‘spillovers’ and ‘unintended
consequences’ that occur when states discover that integration in one functional area
impacts upon their interdependent activities in other related areas” (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 90).

The neofunctionalist view of integration is therefore an incremental and spontaneous
process by which integration in one area creates pressures to integrate in contiguous
areas. In this sense, “spillover” refers to a process when the initial drive for integration
triggers endogenous economic and political dynamics which are essential to further
integration. In Haas’s words (1961: 396): “earlier decisions … spill over into new
functional contexts, involve more and more people, and call for more and more inter-
bureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favour of later
decisions, meeting, in a pro-community direction, the new problems which grow out of
the earlier compromises”. Neofunctionalists differentiate between several types of
spillover. The functional spillover refers to the problems originated by the economic
integration in some sectors that can only be solved with the further integration of other,
related sectors. The political spillover happens when economic integration starts to
influence the political aspirations of some societal groups in states that are part of the
integration process. Those actors recognize that their interest cannot be completely
represented at the national level, and therefore they organize across borders with
others with the same interest. The cultivated spillover refers to the integrative incentives
promoted by supranational institutions. Those incentives increase the pace and areas of
integration. Supranational actors represent the general interest, advance impartial
compromise proposals, and upgrade common interests. For neofunctionalists,
supranational institutions leave controversial issues aside and focus on the issues that
could be agreed. Neofunctionalists also defend the idea that integration can follow a non-linear path. The concepts of “spill around”, “buildup”, “retrenchment” and “spill back” developed by Schmitter (1970) in his seminal article on the development of a general theory of integration, clarifies the view that integration can stagnate or even recede.

One of the flaws of this theory is that it gives too much attention to the background conditions for integration limiting its scope. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006: 96) explains, neofunctionalism was designed to explain integration “among a regional grouping of liberal democratic polities with advanced industrial economies that also found themselves closely allied in security terms”. This limited scope reduced the applicability of the theory to other parts of the world (see also Øhrgaard, 2004: 36 - 41; Rosamond, 2000; Andreatta, 2005: 20 – 22; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006).

Due to its focus on “low politics”, neofunctionalists relegate foreign policy to a secondary position. According to neofunctionalist logic, the EU Foreign Policy is the result of economic and social integration spilling over into the political sphere. In this sense they see the failures of EDC and the Fouchet Plan as a result of not waiting for the economic and social integration be completed and to spillover into the political dimension. They see the EU Foreign Policy as being based on the impulse provided by non-state actors (Commission, Council Secretariat) and as a functional and political spillover. However, the developments in the EPC during the 1970’s seem to contrast with the neofunctionalist view. In the 1970’s there was no Secretariat responsible for the EPC. The role of the EC in EPC affairs was also very limited, with very little influence of EC issues in the EPC meetings. Also, the main drive of economic integration only occurred in the 1980’s and 1990’s. This may show that other actors outside the integration process enhance the prospects of political integration. Actors from outside the region pressure the region to negotiate as a single partner instead of as each individual member state (the process known as ‘externalization’). It can also mean that the pure functional logic is unable to grasp how the changing norms, preferences and values of transgovernmental actors influence the process of political integration. It is also
important to highlight that the influence of other actors (the Commission in a higher and the High Representative to a lesser extent) in the foreign and defence policy is very weak. Member states have been very careful in organizing the EU Foreign Policy pillar in a strict intergovernmental fashion. Even though this strict intergovernmental organization sacrifices the political outcomes, it guarantees national control over foreign policy and defence issues. Nevertheless, the inter-pillar structure present until the Lisbon Treaty provided a clear break to the influence of the EC in the political issues. (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 330-332; Andreatta, 2005: 22) Another critique is that in most cases the implicit neofunctionalist divide between supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism poses a difficulty to understand the EPC/CFSP as a part of the integration process since no supranational institution which would have control over the member states foreign policies has emerged, and nor has the CFSP led to the emergence of a political community according to Haas definition (Haas, 1958: 5). In this sense the neofunctionalist view of European political integration fails to separate the processes that characterise the integration from the institutional framework and the outcome (Jørgensen, 1997; Øhrgaard, 1997; 2004: 36).

2.1.3 Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism was developed first of all as a critique to neofunctionalism. Drawing from the rationalist intellectual tradition, intergovernmentalists based their critique on two key assertions. Firstly they reaffirmed the importance and dominance of the national governments on the integration process, which was against the neofunctionalist view that non-state actors would provide the drive for integration. Secondly they rejected the notion of spillover. For them the integration is a result of decisions taken exclusively by states that calculate the likely results of alternative arrangements. Therefore those arrangements that are judged not to fit the interests of the national state will not be celebrated. For intergovernmentalists the cause and timing of integration relies only on the member states (Hoffmann, 1963; 1964; 1965; 1966 and 1982; Ginsberg, 1999; Scully, 2006).
The strongest critiques of intergovernmentalism were on the role of spillover and the neofunctionalists’ failure to observe the wider context (both domestic and international) where the integration takes place. According to intergovernmentalists’, states suffer from different external pressures and each calculates how to answer those challenges differently. Also, in the domestic realm neofunctionalists fails to recognize the effects of political divergence on integration. For instance, the French positions during de Gaulle’s administration demonstrate that sometimes the empowered groups or individuals of democratic societies may not share the same views of elites in other member-states. (Hoffmann, 1966). We can see that neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism diverge on the role of supranational institutions versus state interest and that neofunctionalists’ view integration as a gradual process of exchanges among different actors, while intergovernmentalists’ view integration as a bargain among executives of member-states that results in treaties. Also, while for neofunctionalists the whole idea of European integration is about building a new political community, intergovernmentalists observe it as an international regime designed to reduce transaction costs among member-states. (Hoffmann, 1966; Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998)

The debate of neo-functionalism - intergovernmentalism can be translated into the question of whether supranational institutions are capable of pushing their own agenda or whether they are exclusively developed to serve the interests of the nation-states and would cease to exist when states so decide. This debate between “supranationalists” and “intergovernmentalists” still represents the main divide in European Studies. The same discussion about the causal significance of international institutions takes place in the wider IR field between neoliberals and neorealists. (Mearshimer, 1995; Keohane, 1989; Young, 1986; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006)

Realist intergovernmentalism
This branch of intergovernmentalism draws from the classic realist tradition of Carr and Morgenthau. They seek to clarify the relationship between international cooperation and national security interests. They see the EU as a forum in which governments get together from time to time to discuss new contracts and enhance their interests and power.

One version of realist intergovernmentalism sees the integration in Europe as a natural response to intra-European geopolitical concerns, like the reintegration of West Germany. For them, the stimulus behind integration is the guarantee against new armed conflicts among European states. Some see integration as a “soft hegemony strategy” (Pedersen, 1998), or a way of “binding” emerging regional powers (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier, 2005). A second version views integration as a direct result of the bipolar conflict. For those the integration is viewed in terms of “a western alliance against the Soviet threat,” and this could only be developed with the “protective mantle” of the “shadow cast by the superpowers” without the fear that the advantage of one would be translated by the use of force against the others (Grieco, 1995, Mearshimer, 1990; Waltz, 1986). In Pijpers (1991: 31) words: “[European political integration is]... not a new phenomenon... but an updated version of old-style alliance diplomacy ... It is difficult to discover original aspects of EU approaches to world politics. An idealized EU should be avoided and (CFSP) should be put into the framework of realpolitik”.

Realist intergovernmentalism bases its view on the notion of state rationality and argues that states have fixed preferences for wealth, security and power. Therefore all states’ actions are rationally directed to achieve clearly ordered objectives. Also, for the realist intergovernmentalists the European integration would fade in the absence of a powerful external threat and a bipolar international structure.

The realist intergovernmentalist argument was heavily hit by the developments in the EU in the aftermath of the Cold War. They foresaw the debacle of the European political project with the end of the East-West divide, however with the end of bipolarity the EU
developed new political structures, including a Defence component (CFSP/ESDP). Even in the absence of a clearly defined external threat the EU continues to strengthen its political and military tools. Therefore, according to Ginsberg (1999: 441) the realist intergovernmentalist argument lacks the explanatory power required for it to be considered consistent enough to analyse the European political integration.

**Liberal intergovernmentalism**

Liberal intergovernmentalism also argues that the integration is controlled by States. Liberal intergovernmentalism observes that States preferences are translated into Treaties, and the negotiations among States are dominated by national governments and based on national interest. There are three main characteristics that distinguish liberal intergovernmentalism from rational intergovernmentalism. First is the idea that national interests are defined primarily by domestic economic factors and by national leaders seeking economic advantage, meaning that they recognize the importance of domestic politics in the development of States preferences. Secondly, they see international institutions as necessary for international cooperation, while thirdly they view integration as a result of economic interdependence and not as a product of geopolitical concerns, thus playing down the influence of international politics and systemic change on interstate bargaining (Moravcsik, 1998: 18; Ginsberg, 1999; Scully, 2006).

Two general assumptions drawn from IR-rationalist institutionalism guide liberal intergovernmentalists: firstly that states are rational actors that aim to maximize their individual utility by calculating the utility of alternative courses of action and selecting the one that gives maximal utility in regard to other actors’ preferences and actions. That means that international institutions will exist for as long as states perceive them as useful to converge preferences in order to achieve self-interested goals (institutional cooperation > unilateral action). Secondly, it sees states as unitary actors which act exclusively and with a single voice through its executive in international negotiations. In
this sense governments pursue stable interests during the negotiations (Milward, 1992; Mattli, 1999; Moravcsik, 1998; Scully, 2006).

One of the most insightful views on liberal intergovernmentalism is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik. Moravcsik understands European integration as an intergovernmental regime developed to reduce negative economic externalities caused by changes in the global economic sphere through negotiated policy coordination. He argues that IR-Theories have a great potential to analyse European integration and aims to combine the approaches of IR with those of European Studies. He develops an elegant three stage model: national preference formation (how domestic preferences combine with international interdependence to produce foreign policy outcomes); inter-state bargaining (national executives as exclusive actors); and institutional choice (states create institutions to reduce transaction costs and to embed “credible commitments,” thereby overcoming problems of monitoring and enforcement and enhancing credibility of inter-state bargains). With his insight Moravcsik was able to account for the changes of state preferences over time and across issue areas. This was the biggest contribution of Moravcsik’s approach. He also explained the institutional design better when he recognized that institutions are not merely a reflex of great power alliances but are developed due to the need to enhance the credibility of inter-state bargains. However, with his focus on institutions Moravcsik insists that States are the main actors in the integration. He sees supranational institutions as useless because they do not provide enough incentives for successful bargaining. Successful bargaining depends on the leadership and incentives of national states and not of supranational institutions. He also denies the idea of integration developing through unintended consequences. In his account governments have full control of the integration process and are completely able to predict its implications. (Moravcsik, 1998; Scully, 2006; Mattli, 1999)

Liberal intergovernmentalism's main innovation rests on the use of domestic preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice theories to explain European integration. Its critics argue that even tough liberal institutionalism offers a good starting
point to observe how states behave during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), and especially in the EPC/CFSP formal decision-making rules it fails to grasp the smaller, day-to-day functioning of the EU Foreign Policy which some argue set the motion for formal treaty bargains (Smith, 2003: 64; Hix, 2005; Rosamond, 2000). The IGCs are the main locus for intergovernmental bargaining, but there is some evidence that governments are not the only players in intergovernmental negotiations (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 331; Beach, 2005). According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008), the EU institutions play a major role in reducing bargaining costs and coordination problems while pushing forward their own agenda and providing institutional leadership to the CFSP far beyond the lowest common denominator bargaining position which is presumably practiced by governments. Another critique is that liberal intergovernmentalism is strongly biased to economic issues, recognizing that government preferences are shaped exclusively according by economic concerns. To address this criticism, Moravcsik (1998: 486) argues that political integration may sometimes not be driven by economic interdependence but by broader strategic or ideological issues. In this sense he sees the EPC/CFSP as a process pushed by governments when domestic constraints are weak. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 192)

### 2.1.4 Delegation and agency

In recent years many studies in European integration aimed to answer the question of why political leaders in Europe have been keen to delegate substantial prerogatives to EU institutions like the ECJ, ECB, and, to a different extent, the High Representative for the CFSP (HR/CFSP). (Scully, 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008) This question was accompanied by two other related questions: 1. How far is the independence of those agents related to their principals? and 2. What is the role of those agents in further processes of political formulation? (Pollack, 1997; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006)
According to Pollack (2003: 142), the delegation of power is primarily motivated “to lower the transaction costs of policy-making, in particular by allowing member governments to credibly commit themselves to international agreements and to benefit from the policy-relevant expertise provided by supranational actors”. He identifies four reasons why delegation occurs. Firstly, agents are responsible for monitoring compliance with existing agreements by acting as independent referees and providing a shield against cheating and defection. Secondly, the institutions are important for solving problems of “incomplete contracting”, meaning that it leaves the institutions with powers to proceed within areas when no specific decision was made, for instance the Commission to produce secondary legislation and the ECJ to produce law. Thirdly, Pollack observes that agents have more influence when principals do not have a deep knowledge on the subject and are biased. In this sense, besides their monitoring functions institutions have a more direct role in areas where governments are unfit to control due to a lack of expertise. Fourthly, he argues that the agenda-setting power might be delegated to agents in order to avoid problems of legislative instability. Nevertheless, Pollack highlights the fact that governments do not delegate excessive powers to agents without creating control mechanisms. (Pollack, 2003; Scully, 2006)

Even though principal-agent frameworks are powerful and persuasive we can point to some limitations. As recognized by Pollack (2003), principal-agent frameworks are difficult to test empirically, and the next step in this area will be to test their claims rigorously against concurrent explanations. Another criticism is that principal-agent approaches lack the ability to articulate why governments delegate powers in some areas and not do delegate in other areas with any precision. (Scully, 2006: 27)

**2.1.5 New institutionalism**

New institutionalism tries to explain integration by using general theories of domestic and international institutions. As observed by Jupille and Caporaso (1999: 430), it transcends the divide between comparative politics and international relations, thus
improving the scholarship on EU integration and making it more integral of the discipline of political science. It is generally divided into three types: rational-choice institutionalism; historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The greatest innovation presented by new institutionalism is that it not only tries to explain the origins and design of EU institutions, but it also sees EU institutions as being independent or intervening variables that influence state strategies and goals (Jupile and Caporaso, 1999: 436-437).

Rational-choice institutionalism

Rational-choice institutionalism views states as unitary and rational actors concerned with credible commitments. Like liberal intergovernmentalists, rational-choice institutionalists argue that states create institutions in order to benefit from their functions. Accordingly, the main functions of institutions are the reduction of transaction costs, monitoring and enforcement, and solving problems of contracting. For rational-choice institutionalism preference formation is exogenous to the institution, which means that institutions provide constraints and opportunity structures for actors to perform their goals but do not shape them. However, it is wrong to view institutions as only a reflex of national preferences and power. They are fundamental to distributing decision-making power among actors. In this sense, agenda-setting and veto power in institutional procedures are seen as important tools of institutional influence. (Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996: 294; Pollack, 2001)

The main strength of rational-choice institutionalism is that it accounts for a careful empirical study of EU institutions and their interactions (Council, Commission, Parliament and Court). The critics of rational-choice institutionalism attack the assumption of exogenous preference formation. They hold the view that member-states do not develop their preferences isolated from each other but that those preferences evolve and are negotiated through interstate bargaining and constant interaction among participants. Another criticism is that it focuses the attention exclusively on formal
institutions instead of also taking the informal, transnational policy networks into account. (Sandholtz, 1996; Pollack, 2001)

*Historical institutionalism*

Historical institutionalism starts with the observation that institutions influence decisions of states in ways that are undesired or unintended by their creators. It recognizes the basic premise of intergovernmentalism that states are the main actors in international politics who decide when and how to create international institutions, meaning that institutions are developed by states in order to serve their collective interests. One key assumption to historical institutionalism is the difficulty to change or reform institutions over time due to its “increasing returns” and “lock-in effects” which prevent states from stepping back on their previous commitments. Some analysts even feel that state preferences could be shaped by prior institutional choices. (Jupile and Caporaso, 1999: 438; Pierson, 2000; Pollack, 1996) Historical institutionalism argues that institutions encourage positive feedback processes in such a way that a change of rules and defection becomes very unattractive over time. This happens due to two factors: firstly, the complexity of institutional decision-rules (which are mostly driven by unanimity) is a legal inducement to avoid reform, and secondly, actors learn from the new rules set by the institution and calculate their actions based on the fact that those rules will be maintained, therefore increasing the costs of policy change. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 198; Rosamond, 2000: 116)

Those positive feedback processes induced by institutions develop a dynamic called “path-dependence,” which means that “once a country or region has started down a track the costs of reversal may be high and will tend to increase over time” (Pierson, 2000: 252). In this sense the effect of path-dependence is that decisions taken in the past have a preponderant influence over (and even shape) decisions taken in the
present. Due to high costs of change the first choice towards a “path” will constrain later choices, or “path” changes. This idea is highly compatible with the concept of bounded rationality. According to the concept of bounded rationality actors have certain self-serving goals when they decide to join the institution (EU Foreign Policy for instance), but they do not have all of the information needed to make optimal decisions or are too overwhelmed with information to process it all. In this sense actors are unable to predict future outcomes of the institution precisely, and therefore they become hostages to future institutional developments (March and Olson, 1989: 10; Pierson, 1996; Smith, 2003: 31; 2000).

Even though historical institutionalism offers a good account for why previous decisions constrain present actions it lacks the understanding of why and how institutions were created. It also does not shed light on why and how institutions change over time. Due to its germane focus on endogenous reasons for institutional stability and change it is unable to observe exogenous sources of preferences. In short, historical institutionalism is well suited to analyse the endurance and stability of institutions, but it lacks the capacity to explain change. It is also important not to overstate the consequences of institutional lock-in because many institutional decisions expire or can be amended by qualified majority. (Pollack, 1996: 448)

**Sociological institutionalism**

Sociological institutionalism and constructivism (see below) share a number of core premises. For sociological institutionalists the informal rules, norms and shared systems of meaning shape actors interests and are fundamental to explaining institutional policy outcomes. They also argue that institutions can change not only material incentives but also shape the identities, self-images and preferences of actors. As a result actors follow the rules because they have internalized the obligations and duties that constitute the identity of the institution. In this sense the institutions have not only a regulative role
but also a constitutive one, and therefore institutions have a “symbolic guidance function” that provides actors with a shelter in a turbulent world and contributes to the actors’ sense of who they are and what their interests must be. (Wendt, 1999; Checkel, 1998: 325; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Rosamond, 2000: 119; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 130)

Sociological institutionalists argue that there are two main instruments through which the constitutive effects of institutions operate. Firstly, actors internalize rules and norms which influence how they see themselves and how they define their interests through socialization processes. Socialization, as Checkel (2007: 5-6) defines it, is:

“[…] a process of inducting actors into the norms and the rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness: this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.”

Secondly, actors gain new interests through processes of “social learning” in which argumentation, deliberation and persuasion play an important role. (Risse, 2000; Checkel, 1998; Aggestam, 2004) In this sense actors interact in the European institutions and get in contact with new ideas and arguments. These can change their view of an actors’ own role and interests, meaning that actors can alter their behaviour based on the influence and interactions with other actors in ways that are not explained by material incentives. Therefore they consider actors’ preferences as endogenous as opposed to rationalist views that preferences are exogenous and fixed.

In the European political integration this process of socialization was strengthened by what Allen (1998: 54) called “Brusselization,” which in his words means: “a gradual transfer, in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making authority away from the national capitals to Brussels”. With the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 the working groups meetings that were organized sporadically in the capital of the member holding the Presidency started to meet more constantly and moved to the rooms of the
Secretariat based in Brussels, thus enhancing socialization among diplomats (a more detailed explanation of the European political integration will be given in the next chapter) (Regelsberger, 1997; Øhrgaard, 2004; Allen, 1998).

The concept of “Europeanization” (or “EU-ization”) also represents the interaction between national and European levels on foreign policy. (Radaelli, 2006; Aggestam, 2004) As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 142) presents, Europeanization refers to four interrelated processes known as national adaptation, meaning that when states change their national policy-making instruments, policies, values and identity to adapt to the EU level, the national projection of each states national foreign policy objectives to the EU level increasingly pursues foreign policy on the EU level and the export of EU structures and values to third party countries/regions. Combined with the concepts of Socialization and Brusselization, this concept helps us to understand how national actors’ gradually change their world view, values and norms, role conception and identity, and those concepts also shed light on the incentives of member-states to participate in the EPC/CFSP/ESDP by demonstrating that through the EU foreign policy member-states with no power (or with historical constraints) to influence or act in a country or issue can operate. This process of Europeanization can also be understood as a process of the modernization of foreign policy once member-states are forced or allowed to expand and update their foreign policy toward new issues/parts of the world. (Tonra, 1997: 190; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 144)

Another important concept for sociological institutionalists is the “logic of appropriateness”. This concept runs against the “logic of consequences16” and underlines norms and identities as the basis of action. According to March and Olson (1998: 11):

16 Logic of consequences derives from the realist/intergovernmental tradition that actors act as rational utility maximizers on the basis of stable, consistent and exogenously determined preferences. According to March and Olson (1998: 11), the main problem with the logic of consequences is that it seems to ignore the role of identities, rules and institutions in shaping human behaviour.
“Within the tradition of a logic of appropriateness, actions are seen as ‘rule-based’. Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests; and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations.”

In this sense March and Olson (1989: 23) argue that decisions driven by a logic of appropriateness are made with reference of three distinct questions: What kind of situation is this? Who am I? How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation? According to these questions and their corresponding answers, actors will behave according to what they feel is the most appropriate course of action given their socially defined roles. (March and Olson, 1989)

In the foreign policy domain we observe that through processes of socialization political actors tend to act in accordance to this logic of appropriateness. This means that those actors are steered by what is appropriate in terms of their institutional roles. Expectations about the outcomes of their own actions and other’s opinions also play a role in the actor’s behaviour. (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 132; Smith, 2003; Hyde-Price, 2004) In Tonra’s (2001: 12) words:

“[consultation reflex in foreign policy issues suggests]… that the policy-makers see themselves not as emissaries of pre-defined positions but as policy arbiters. They are, in effect, seeking to internalize the identity ambitions of colleagues so as to thereby see that their own positions are at least complementary.”

In sum, the sociological-institutionalist contribution to European Studies and IR Theory is represented by the approaches that focus on ideas and discourses. According to Rosamond (2000: 120): “[ideas and discourses] are treated as cognitive institutions that shape the ‘boundaries of the possible’ for actors in the European context… [in this sense] … discourses should be seen as institutions in their own right insofar as they can guide political action by denoting appropriate or plausible behaviour in the light of an agreed environment.”
Discourse analysis emphasizes the need to focus on the language used in social life. There is no meaning residing outside language. Even if this meaning would exist, it would be impossible to study the meaning beyond language. Discourse analysis observes how language both constrains and constructs social processes, meaning how language constrains the choices of agents and how it generates agents and social processes (Larsen, 2004; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 399). Studies on how national foreign policies are influenced by the EU compose an important feature of the literature on sociological institutionalism (Tonra, 2001). Sociological institutionalism also has a research agenda that focuses on how communication and argumentation influence views, consensus building, and policy-making. These research points have gained importance in the study of European political integration. They draw from Habermas’ theories of communicative action and point out the reasons for actions. They observe that actors are filled with intersubjective understandings of procedures and policy-making processes and that those issues and understandings guide actors’ behaviour (Diez, 2001; Risse, 1996; Müller, 2004: 425; Jørgensen, 2004: 12).

2.1.6 Comparative Politics

The scholars of Comparative Politics are radical in their rejection of International Relations Theory as an analytical tool to the study of the EU. They argue that the EU institutional structure is more similar to a modern (or postmodern) state than to an international regime or international organization. Therefore general understandings of the main processes in domestic political systems should be applied to the study of the EU. (Hix, 2005)

Some consider/understand the EU as a quasi-federal polity and therefore aim to compare the EU political system with other federal states. Others argue that the EU cannot be studied in accordance to the federal systems typology because it has no clear division of authority between a central government and its constituents units, and
therefore the study of the EU should be carried out according to the study of
government and policy-making in domestic political systems in general and not
specifically in federal systems. (Hix, 2005)

Comparative politics scholars have been criticized for overstating the state-like nature of
the EU and for ignoring the importance of member-state governments in EU decision-

2.1.7 Multilevel Governance

Multilevel governance also sees the EU as a political system, but in contrast to the
comparativist perspective they argue that the EU is not similar to a domestic political
system (whether unitary, federal or quasi-federal). For them, the EU is more equivalent
to a new form of polity: intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational.
(Smith, 1998; 2004). They aim to combine both approaches of IR theory and public
policy to explain the EU politics.

The basic assumption of Multilevel Governance is that sovereignty of the member-
states has been eroded in different forms. Interdependence externally, collective
decision making regionally, delegation to supranational agencies, and the reallocation of
power subnationally all disperses decision-making power across different locations. This
main argument of Multilevel Governance that the state power is eroded by the
dispersion of authority toward supranational, regional and local powers distinguishes
multilevel governance from intergovernmentalist approaches (Marks, Hooghe and
Blank, 1996: 358). Nevertheless, the protagonists of Multilevel Governance argue that
while supranational institutions play an important role in many policy areas state
executives are still in control of many others. However, multilevel governance helps to
avoid a strict intergovernmental approach on EU political integration, which on the one
hand may shed light on high-level negotiations about formal treaty reforms like the
Integovernmental Conferences (IGC), but on the other hand it is not able to explain
normal day-to-day policy outcomes and how norms reorient member states toward “problem-solving” instead of bargaining (Smith, 2004: 741). The result is the emergence of a complex and pluralistic system neither entirely under the control of member-states nor fully understandable under the logic of supranational entrepreneurship (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 31). There have been some efforts to combine multilevel governance with other approaches (see Smith, 1998; Smith 2004 and Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). Those efforts aim to build a consistent body of theory to explain regional integration, yet nevertheless multilevel governance provides a good descriptive approach to the EU political system. They draw from rational institutionalism to explain delegation to supranational institutions and explain how collective decision-making affects the control of member-states to the process of integration. Multilevel governance also invokes federalists to explain how authority is diffused among multiple tiers. They also draw from the public policy analysis on how governance works, not only at the national level but also at the interaction between national and international areas. Finally, multilevel governance is also based in constructivist premises, especially when observing the normative effects of European institutions. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 332; Rosamond, 2000: 173).

Most authors on multilevel governance focus on the specific practise of the coordinating activities of different levels: regional, supranational, transnational, local and national. They study how this interaction works at different levels of the decision-making process, and therefore they typify EU decision-making as “policy network”, “expert committees”, “regulatory agencies”, “open methods of coordination” and “directly deliberative polyarchy”. (Rosamond, 2000; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 333; Keukeleire, 2006: 1-2; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007) For many scholars, Multilevel Governance took the position of neofunctionalism as the main conteste of intergovernmentalism. We can observe several links between multilevel governance and neofunctionalism. Firstly, as neofunctionalism, multilevel governance agrees that supranational institutions and transnational policy networks play an important role in regional integration. Secondly, multilevel governance holds that day-to-day policy outputs sometimes represent
important feedback loops enhancing/decreasing integration, meaning that the way in
which policy is made and its impact have an important effect on the shape of the
institutional framework and change the overall structure of the European governance
system. (George, 2004: 112; Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini, 2007)

Multilevel governance aims to explain how common general interests are defined,
prioritized, and translated into institutionalized behaviours at both the EU and domestic
levels and produces concrete policy actions. According to Smith (2004: 742), the key
question to understand why political integration in Europe is more advanced than in
other regions is about “how the EU has managed to both institutionalize and
Europeanize its multilevel governance of foreign policy while still respecting national
sovereignty… Answering this question could also shed light on why most other
regional organizations have failed in this goal.” In this sense, multilevel governance can
provide the theoretical tools to answer this question. According to Webber (2004: 4),
governance is defined as:

“… co-ordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate
authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors, formal and informal
arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed
toward particular policy outcomes.”

Therefore we can understand multilevel governance as “the sharing of this authority
across an institutionalized, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of
unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources.” (Smith, 2004: 743).
In this regard the European multilevel governance of foreign policy is argued to impact
on four elements. Firstly it increased the coherence of policy-making and leads to a
rationalization of the policy process. Secondly, it is legally binding on member-states
with the inclusion of some compliance mechanisms. Thirdly, it comprises some
authoritative decision-making rules, applying Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) on some
occasions (even though it is almost not used, the QMV presents a threat of a potentially
embarrassing vote and may stimulate member states to reach a consensus). Finally, it
presents a greater degree of autonomy of EC organizational actors in European foreign policy. (Smith, 1998; Smith, 2004)

The weaknesses of multilevel governance approaches are mainly related to the difficulty to clearly grasp the complex administrative system of the EU. Such a complex administrative system that ranges across multiple and intersecting spaces and jurisdictions permits optimal flexibility but presents high transaction costs of coordinating such a complex system (reducing the impact of negative externalities of one policy domain into the other). Also, problems of democratic legitimacy or “governing in the shadow” pose a problem to multilevel governance (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Scharpf, 1997). Multilevel governance represents a move away from the “grand theories” of integration in order to build middle-range theories of specific policy processes and phenomena (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Scharpf, 1997). Multilevel governance also provides the change of theorising beyond Europe, solving the n=1 problem present in most studies of European integration (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004).

2.2 International Relations and the EU

Theoretical works on international relations are highly heterogeneous. The field is divided according to the paradigmatic lines of realism, which is pessimistic in relation to the cooperation and progress in political relationships, and liberalism, which is more optimistic in its view of cooperation and the avoidance of conflict. There are also many alternative approaches which refuse the realist and liberal views about the centrality of states in international relations or their mostly rationalist ontology. In this section we will present how integration is viewed by (neo)realists, (neo)liberals, reflectivists and constructivists.
According to Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008), there are two main axes of division in IR theory. The first one distinguishes critical from problem-solving approaches. Problem-solving perspectives, according to Robert Cox (1986: 208-210), “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and political power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as the given framework of action”, while critical theories “allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order; but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing order.” The second division is the one between formal mathematical and interpretative approaches. While formalists defend the necessity of quantitative methods, interpretativists base their analysis on observation and qualitative methods. Another strand of dispute in IR is between positivists’ and subjectivists’ views of what constitutes social knowledge. According to Katzenstein and Sil (2008: 111-112): “positivists generally gravitate towards a view of social inquiry in which patterns of human behaviour are presumed to reflect objective principles, laws, or regularities that exist above and beyond the subjective orientations of actors and scholars, and that can be deduced, inferred, or falsified through the rigorous application of replicable methods and logics across a specified universe of cases.” On the other hand, subjectivism recognizes social knowledge as fluid favouring interpretative approaches. This view points to the meanings that different actors attach to practices in their social environment. Subjectivists generally look for critique and praxis over explanations or understandings (Katzenstein and Sil, 2008).

In the last century the mainstream theoretical debate in IR focused on rationalist assumptions. Those assumptions are based on a positivist research agenda and postulate that, “When faced with several courses of action, people (States) usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome (for the national interest)” (Elster, 1999: 22, see, Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003: 11). Therefore the mainstream theoretical debate during the last century focused mostly on the positions of (neo)realism in one hand and (neo)liberalism in the other hand (see below). At the beginning of the 21st century IR theorizing confronted the mainstream view with a stark
contestation of those rationalist models. There is a great distinction between rationalists on one side and reflectivists (critical theory, feminist theory, postmodern theory and normative theory) on the other, with social constructivists occupying a middle ground\textsuperscript{17} (Lapid, 1989; Adler, 1997; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000: 11; Smith, 2000: 34).

Fundamental to the IR theory applied to the EU foreign policy integration process is the question of how we can understand the evolution of the EU if not by looking into its international dimension. In the literature of international relations, the impact of the international system on political integration has been neglected to a second plan. Moreover, IR Theory has not been able to grasp the causes for European political integration beyond the Cold War (Haas, 1964; Moravcsik, 1998; Hoffmann, 1995). Only experts on EU political integration such as Ginsberg (1989; 2001), Weiler (1999), M. E. Smith, (1998; 2003; 2004), and Smith (2000) etc. have aimed to explain this relationship. Most scholars in IR, especially in the United States like Mearshimer (1990; 1994), have taken axiomatic, rather radical positions on EU foreign policy with no regard to the specialized literature on the EU. In this sense we observe the necessity to study the increasing importance of the external face of regional integration processes. This external face is represented by the impact of different dimensions of regional integration processes (economic, political and military), not only in the immediate neighbourhood but also in the international system. Therefore the academic studies of international relations should put more emphasis on the external role of regional organizations in the centre of the debate, possibly while promoting institutional research combining different fields of political science\textsuperscript{18}. Political integration processes have gained international weight and helped to shape the external environments of most other actors, thus influencing its own international environment. By incorporating the study of the EU into

\textsuperscript{17} I am aware that some scholars see it as a mistake to differentiate Constructivism from Rationalism (for a discussion, see Hurd, 2008), however I follow Michael Barnett (2005) and agree that rationalism and constructivism are not the same.

its Weltanschauung, IR theory will be able to better understand the processes of international (regional) organization, political economy, the impact of domestic politics, ethical foreign policy, human rights, conflict prevention/management/resolution, and identity, etc. As we will see in this section, the study of the political integration fits into the general categories of IR scholarship, be they realism, liberalism, structuralism or different kinds of post-positivism (Hill and Smith, 2005). For the purposes of this research we will observe the division of IR theory following the lines of rationalism, social constructivism and reflectivism. (Smith, 1995; 1996; 1997; 2000; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006; Rosamond, 2000; Hill and Smith, 2005, Tonra and Christiansen, 2004)

2.2.1 Rationalism

As observed above, this part overlaps with European Studies approaches. In IR Theory the mainstream rationalist debate was carried in the 20th Century, mainly between realism and liberalism. For most of the century both approaches diverged over their understanding of international politics, however since the 1980’s they have started to converge considerably. (Smith, 2000: 35; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 8; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000)

Realists and liberals share very similar views of the social world. Indeed, in their neorealist and neoliberal versions they agree on most premises of what constitutes the international environment. Both share the ideas that states are the main actors in the system, they act rationally, and anarchy is the major force driving international relations. They also share the same methodological individualism to analyse social reality. They view international relations through the lens of power as being mechanistic and material aggregations of individual states. Both observe a positivist logic and agree on the ontology of the social world and on the methods and epistemology for studying it. They differ on whether the anarchical nature of the international system can be eased by
international institutions and whether sovereignties pursue absolute or relative gains. (Smith, 2000: 36; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2004; Andreatta, 2005)

( Neo) Realism

We can observe that the core assumptions of realism are: 1. States are the dominant actors and interact under conditions of anarchy; 2. International anarchy is characterised by the lack of hierarchy among states which leads them to self-help and shapes the states' behaviour; 3. Survival is the vital interest of the states, therefore it needs strong military forces to defend its interests and behave as instrumentally rational, unitary actors; 4. In anarchy, politics are dominated by survival, power and security and by the fragility of trust and cooperation, while war is always an option; 5. International institutions tend to be shaped by conflicting states' interests while only marginally affecting cooperation. (Smith, 2000: 35)

According to realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflicts among States, therefore even when States share common interests they will avoid cooperation. Not even international institutions can mitigate the effects of anarchy, however the European integration and the development of European political integration posed a big challenge to the way realists see international cooperation (Grieco, 1997: 184). For Waltz, integration is an epiphenomenon resulting from States seeking to maximize their national power. In Waltz’s view, States will try to maintain their relative position in the international system while increasing their security and autonomy (Waltz, 1979: 105). In this sense, for many realists including Waltz, European integration is seen as a States rational response to maximizing their national interest according to particular systemic situations, balancing, and war exhaustion.

To understand integration, realists analyse the interests of European countries in the international system on the eve of integration. They see the role of American hegemony as a fundamental precondition to European integration. They argue that international
cooperation is only possible when one state is capable of imposing order in the international anarchic system due to its incontestable power. According to this view, when there is an actor with enough power to impose its will over the others there are few or no armed conflicts (Gilpin, 1981). Other authors highlight the role of the bipolar structure of the international system to explain European integration. They argue that in bipolar systems alignments are structurally determined, thus favouring the stability and durability of agreements between states. Those structurally determined alignments therefore offer a higher degree of cooperation and trust among units forging alliances (for instance: NATO, or Warsaw Pact) (Gowa, 1989). On the other hand, multipolar systems are less stable and can change over time because alignments are based on the choice of multiple options. In this sense, in multipolarity cooperation tends to occur very rarely due to the fear that today’s friend will become tomorrow’s enemy (Mearshimer, 1990: 46). Those approaches argue that the end of Cold War and the decline of American hegemony in Europe would deteriorate the transatlantic ties and could put an end to NATO while spurring the Europeans into a more active role in the world, or even an attempt to balance the United States. According to realists, a stronger Europe would unavoidably weaken the transatlantic ties and could represent a major challenge to the United States (Kissinger; 1966: 232; Kaplan, 1996: 29). Besides this, for (neo)realists the end of the Cold War would increase concerns over relative gains, even among Europeans partners. This problem of relative gains would then represent barriers to cooperation even among close allies such as the Europeans (Grieco, 1995; Smith, 2000: 40). Also, according to Mearshimer (1995: 82) institutions could not overcome this issue of relative gains because they “reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power, and as a result institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent effects on state behavior.

Other realist approaches focus less on broader systemic conditions and instead concentrate on the Western European system instead. Drawing from Morgenthau’s (1973: 509) insights, Grieco (1995: 34) argues that the containment of Germany,
especially after its unification, was the main drive for European political integration. Others argue that the CFSP is better understood as a strong and permanent form of alliance. In this sense integration is seen as a dramatic loss of autonomy in order to considerably enhance the capacity for mutual control and common capabilities (Snyder, 1997; Caporaso, 1996).

The (neo)realist claims make sense when we observe the issues of survival or hard military power in the EU agenda superficially (like the foreign policy split during the Iraq War, the silence over the situation in Chechnya, or the largest states side-lining the CFSP in the Iran crisis). In these examples the realist lenses can offer an account for the outcome and the inaction of the EU in regard to the international balance of power and uneven distribution of capabilities between member states (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 329). However (neo)realist explanations cannot account for the density and quality of cooperation within the CFSP. Additionally, they cannot grasp the impact of this cooperation on member state’s perceptions of what constitutes their national interests. This problem is even bigger when we observe the realists complete rejection of institutional impact on national interests. This issue will be addressed by neoliberal institutionalists. (Øhrgaard, 2004: 35; Andreatta, 2005: 27)

\textit{(Neo)Liberalism}

In contrast to realism, liberalism’s core assumptions are that 1. International organizations and non-state actors play an important role in some areas but states are still central in many other (vital) areas; 2. States are not unitary nor instrumentally rational actors due to different views of what constitutes national interest to different bureaucracies. Therefore state behaviour is not only determined by international anarchy; 3. International anarchy can be transcended by the development of networks between states themselves and other types of actors; 4. International politics is not entirely determined by the distribution of military capabilities, while economic issues
play an important role; 5. Cooperation and international institutions matter and can help to ease the effects of international anarchy. (Andreatta, 2005: 24; Smith, 2000: 36)

The liberal paradigm relaxes the question of the actors in international politics, therefore allowing other actors than the state to play a role\textsuperscript{19}. Another important feature is that liberals are more prone to accept interstate cooperation in the international system than realists. Following the division suggested by Andreatta (2005: 28), we divide the liberal group of theories into three: republican, commercial and institutional.

Influenced by the Kantian tradition, “republican” liberalism stresses the role of domestic regimes in the development of foreign policy. In this sense democracies act differently from non-democracies at the international stage due to electoral concerns at home, a complex institutional system and an orientation towards the peaceful resolution of conflict. Therefore it is argued that democracies do not go to war with each other. In this sense, the European integration is to be seen as a consequence of the democratization process of Western Europe in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century (Olson, 1982; Doyle, 1983; Hasenclever, 2001; Lipson, 2003). The prominence given to domestic structures influenced the development of the intergovernmentalist school (Moravcsik, 1998) in European Studies, as can be seen above.

The so called “commercial” tradition on liberalism highlights the importance of the International Political Economy as an academic discipline to focus on the economic processes in international relations. It argues that the modern societies are attached to each other in an unprecedented way due to the growth of transnational economic flows. The development of those interdependent societies changed the traditional conception of national interest. The high level of complexity and difficulty to control transnational interdependence forced the national states to pool political resources in order to create

\textsuperscript{19} We are aware of the discussion between neoliberal institutionalists, regime theory, and new liberals on the concerns over distribution of information, “functional differentiation”, and treatment of states preferences; however for simplification purposes we treat all “liberal” theories in this section. For a detailed discussion on the differences among them see Moravcsik, 1997: 536-538, and Keohane, 1990.
international institutions that could deal with those new issues. (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Rosencrane, 1986) The argument borrowed from the functionalist logic seen above is that European integration is a by-product of this process due to the dense web of transnational economic relations in Europe and the small dimension of the states. Foreign policy integration is also viewed as dependent if interdependence creates pressures to develop a unified European voice to defend its economic interests. (Andreatta, 2005: 30)

The third group of liberal theories observes the importance of the development of international institutions, and therefore they are called neoliberal institutionalists. They argue that the lack of trust between states living in an anarchical system is the main reason for conflicts. Moreover, international institutions can enhance the commonality of interests, reduce the number of uncertain variables by increasing information, and reinforce the interaction among states in a structured setting, thus reducing uncertainty and mistrust in interstate relations. Integration is an option when transaction costs are prohibitive and *ad hoc* institutions are not economical (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Hasenclever, 1997; Martin, 1992).

The Western European cooperation has challenged neorealist assumptions about anarchy and relative gains. Even though neoliberals acknowledge the argument about states’ fears about relative gains they see that this logic does not apply to Western Europe. Most important is the neoliberal argument that the absence of threats of force among European partners enhances the prospects of cooperation among the states. According to Powell (1993: 229 see Smith, 2000: 41), “If the use of force is no longer an issue then a state’s relative loss will not be turned against the state. Relative gains no longer matter, and cooperation now becomes feasible.” In this sense Powell explains that states’ fear about relative gains cannot account for the difficult negotiations among close partners (like Europeans) when those states do not represent a military threat to each other. Keohane addresses the issue of differentiating fears about relative gains from hard bargaining. He argues that in order to distinguish one from another we must
look for evidence of whether one State’s gains are used against its partners in the longer term. He observes that in Western Europe this behaviour does not exist. For Keohane, “states evaluate intentions as well as capabilities” (ibid 1993: 276) and they see no such “motivation” to use relative gains derived from cooperation against the partners in Western Europe. Therefore “concern(s) for relative gains in these relationships may be of minor significance”. Nonetheless, neoliberals argue that the level of institutionalization also plays a very important role for states to overcome obstacles to cooperation. They observe that international institutions do not eliminate the condition of international anarchy, meaning that they do not exert hierarchical authority over the member states, yet they still offer opportunities and incentives for its member states to pursue common interests through cooperation. What is more, institutions present ways to alleviate their member’s expectations about other members’ behaviour and intentions. (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000: 42)

When analysing the CFSP it is argued that European institutions are useful to solve collective action and distributional problems, especially those derived from cooperation in foreign policy. (Tams, 1999; Andreatta, 2005) It is observed that the EU can act and influence the behaviour of third states and therefore has an impact on the international environment. According to Keukeleire and McNaughtan the EU has proved that it can influence and act autonomously in the international system (2008: 329): “[…] it was the EU and not individual member states (even the most powerful) that played the pivotal role in one of the West’s major foreign policy successes of the last decades: the sustainable transformation and stabilization of ten Central and Eastern European countries and, since the end of the 1990’s, of the Balkan countries […].” Although most neoliberal institutionalists observe the role played by international institutions in enhancing cooperation and solving problems of collective action, they do not recognize that those institutions influence the interests and preferences of the states. They do defend the idea that states are “rational egoists” driven primarily by their own exogenously defined self-interest which use institutions only instrumentally in order to achieve those interests. (Øhrgaard, 2004: 35; Howorth, 2005; 2007; Mayall, 2005)
However some authors have already observed that in the longer term institutions may play a role in influencing how states view their interests (Smith, 2004; 2005; VanHoonacker, 2005). As Keohane and Nye (1993: 9, 15-16 see Smith, 2000: 52) argue:

“The issue is whether states view institutions purely instrumentally – as a means to a given ends – or whether they come to redefine their own interest in light of the rules and practices of the institutions. We expected that instrumental uses of institutions would predominate, as indeed they have. But we also found, […] some interesting instances of institutions helping to define state preferences.”

Finally, we can observe that more generally speaking, institutions matter for neoliberals for five major reasons: 1. They stimulate cooperation by providing the shadow of the future; 2. They encourage issue-linkage between diverse issue areas; 3. They increase transparency and enhance the level of information available to the actors; 4. They reduce transaction costs; and 5. They increase the amount of gains polled together, thus making absolute gains all round more likely. (Smith, 2000: 42-43; Hill and Smith: 2005; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004)

### 2.2.2 Reflectivism

Reflectivist approaches share much in common with constructivism (see below), therefore some authors consider it a part of (radical or hard) constructivism (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006; Checkel, 2007). We make a distinction here between reflectivism and constructivism in order better explain the usefulness of both approaches to integration processes and international relations in general.

Reflective approaches (such as critical theory, feminist theory, postmodern theory and normative theory), argue that theory is constitutive of the social world. This means that the material world only gains meaning through the structure and shared knowledge and understandings in which it is rooted. In this sense the social world can only be understood through the study of what gives it meaning, or in other words ideas,
language and communication. Despite differences among the diverse reflectivists’ approaches they all share the opposition to the rationalists’ positivism and empiricism. They also share a rejection to the rationalist focus on the unitary state within a network of aggregative power relations. Instead they concentrate on an explanation “from inside out” by reconstructing the objective and the subjective setting in which decisions were taken. Therefore they consider an actor’s motives as an “endogenous variable dependent on certain cognitive conditions” (Smith, 2000: 37; Andreatta, 2005: 31; Hollis and Smith; 1991).

Reflectivist approaches have offered important insights in some areas of European integration, especially those who focus on questions of identity, discourse and governance (Smith, 2000; Andreatta, 2005; Larsen; 2004; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). For instance, Critical theory (see Booth, 2004) presents a focus on the nature of the relationship between state and civil society in one hand and inclusion and exclusion within the new political community of Europe on the other. They also offer good insights on the nature of how democracy is created and defended and on the political economy of the “new Europe”. Feminist theory (see Sylvester, 1994) has good prospects to explain gendered aspects in the “new Europe”, both with the effects of integration and enlargement on women and the role of the EU in building new forms of gendered identities. Postmodern theories present an interesting approach to deal with integration as a factor of modernization by observing how identities and subjectivities are formed and transformed through the different phases of the integration process (Best and Kellner, 1991).

Reflectivist approaches mainly differentiate from other approaches in the International Relations discipline on their view of what constitutes politics. Reflectivists do not answer the same questions as those set by the rationalist approaches. In short, reflectivism does not delineate the political realm to be explained and presents very subjective accounts of the reality (Smith, 2000; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004).
2.2.3 Constructivism

Contrasting with the materialism and methodological individualism of rationalist approaches, constructivism focuses on an actor’s subjective and intersubjective beliefs as causes for political outcomes (how norms, values, identities and cultures influence political outcomes). Opposed to the rationalist’s view, they argue that actors do not make decisions based only on calculations of individual utility or material benefit but that they act according to socially defined rules and norms. In this sense the focus of constructivists rests on how these collective rules and norms that guide political behaviour are socially constructed. (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006; Checkel, 2007)

According to some authors constructivism is an attempt to “seize the middle ground” between rationalism and reflectivism (see Smith, 2000; Adler, 1997; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, 2001; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998; Wendt, 1992). Constructivism, it is argued, stands at the intersection of the two grand debates in social sciences, namely the one between materialism and idealism and the one between agency-based and structure-based understandings of the social world. Constructivism understands the difference between ideas and material factors differently from both rationalists and reflectivists. As seen above, for rationalists ideas play a secondary role in respect to the primary role played by material causes. Reflectivists see material causes as meaningless outside discourse. For constructivists ideas are collective understandings. They also do not favour either agency or structure but instead prefer a structuration approach to the social world (Giddens, 1984). According to Smith (2000: 38): “[Constructivist]… importance to International Relations is that its emphasis is on ‘the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological implications of this reality.” In this sense constructivists contribute to a general theory for regional integration in exploring the questions of identity and governance. Constructivists’ accounts offer a better perspective than rationalist
approaches to observe how ideas and norms are part of European integration. However, those accounts must be empirically grounded, otherwise constructivism fails just as much as reflectivism in its efforts to establish a debate with mainstream theories of rationalism. Adler suggests five focal research topics: change as cognitive evolution, epistemic communities and the construction of social facts, the emergence of security communities, national security and social construction, and the social construction of democratic peace. (Adler, 1997: 334)

Constructivism offers a good perspective to advance the theoretical debate in IR by engaging with neoliberalism in empirical studies on the norm-based account of institutions. According to Smith (2000: 49-50), once neorealism seems increasingly unfit to fully grasp contemporary international relationships and while we see the emerging convergence between constructivism and neoliberalism, this may represent the beginning of the next grand debate in the discipline.

However, we can already observe some convergence between rationalists and constructivists with regard to the role of ideas (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Snidal, 2002), and strategic rationality (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The supposed irreconcilable differences between rationalists’ causal theory and constructivists’ constitutive theory are also overstated. According to Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008:16), “…rational choice’s central equilibrium concept is a constitutive statement that a set of elements are in harmony with each other; equilibrium analysis becomes causal only by asking what happens when one element is displaced and harmony disrupted. Conversely, constructivist theorizing about norms has been increasingly used as the theoretical underpinning for causal relations and empirical testing” (Checkel 1999; Ruggie 2005).

As far as the study of European integration is concerned, constructivism plays an important role in analysing how far an institutionalized, dense environment such as the EU has a “socializing effect” on actors. (Checkel, 2007; Jupile and Caporaso, 1999) As we showed above, many constructivists are interested in “Europeanization”, meaning
the study of “how interaction with and within European institutions socializes domestic agents and alters their behaviour over time.” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 397) In this sense, Glarbo (1999: 635) argues that political cooperation in Europe is socially constructed in the sense that “national diplomacies intentionally and unintentionally communicate their intents and perceptions of political co-operation to themselves and to each other.”

The constructivist focus on the immaterial dimensions such as ideas, values, norms and identity contributes to a discussion about not only effective institutional frameworks but also the constitutive elements of political integration. In this sense we can observe that in the development of the CFSP/ESDP the pursuit of identity objectives were just as important as the will to realize external objectives. By first consolidating its values internally (such as cooperation, peaceful resolution of conflicts, democracy, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms) and then establishing these values as focal points on its relationship with the external world the EU defined its identity. This popular approach sees the actions of the CFSP/ESDP as being driven by identity and values rather than exclusively based on egoistic self-interests. The idea that the EU is a normative power in the international relations (especially due to the increasing role of political conditionality, social clauses, and environmental clauses in agreements with third party countries) in contrast to a military or hard power raises many questions about whether the EU has the “ability to shape conceptions of the normal [in international relations]”20. (Manners; 2002: 239) (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Lucarelli and Manners, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2003; Diez, 2005)

Constructivists’ focus on ideas and identities shed light on many aspects of the CFSP/ESDP, thereby providing insights into its most pronounced successes and failures. Firstly, it is better suited to explain the success of redefining the identity and easing the political transition of Central and Eastern European countries (the same is

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being done in the Balkans). In this sense, EU Foreign Policy is understood as a way to transform the identity of other actors and shape ideas and values. Critics of constructivism argue that we should not overestimate the role played by identity and values on the CFSP. For them, member-states continue to diverge in terms of their world views, role conception, and identity. In this sense, while member states converge on soft-policy issues, when it comes to their national interest States answer in terms of narrow self-interests and geostrategic concerns (such as the Arctic policy, relationship with China, and especially with Russia). For those critics constructivism fails to address the issue when States behave egoistically when they should be following the norms and identity established by the institution. Others go further in their criticism against constructivism by arguing that even though it draws attention to the key aspects of institutionalized cooperation it frequently suffers from “empirical ad hocism”, meaning that they have problems in generalizing about “when, how and why [social construction] occurs, thereby clearly specifying the actors and mechanisms bringing about change [and] the scope conditions under which they operate” (Checkel, 1998: 325 see Øhrgaard, 2004: 36). In this sense, constructivism is criticised as being unable to offer the CSFP an account beyond “rich empirical descriptions” and “generalizations which already abound” (Øhrgaard, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008).

2.3 Drawing from experience – toward a general framework

Until now we have tried to present the theoretical debate over European integration in both International Relations and European Studies. The summary of this debate can be seen in table 1 below. It was observed that both fields have tended to converge since the 1990’s, thus enabling the development of a general theory for political integration. This theory, which is drawn from the actual grand debate between neoliberals and constructivists, aims to be general enough to understand the integration processes beyond the European Union.
### Table 1 – Theoretical debate in IR and EU Studies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Integrative dynamic</th>
<th>End product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- EU Studies:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-theories of integration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Federalism</td>
<td>Federal State; Constitution; Popular/Elite movements</td>
<td>Intergovernmental bargaining; Constitutional revolution</td>
<td>Federal State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Functionalism</td>
<td>Non-state Organizations (functional and technocratic); Economy</td>
<td>Obsolescence of Nation State; New functional transnational organizations</td>
<td>Depolitization of the debate; Transnational functional agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Transactionalism</td>
<td>International transactions; Identities; Social and Political integration</td>
<td>Cultural assimilation; communication; socialization; learning</td>
<td>Security Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neofunctionalism</td>
<td>Economic and political integration; Non-state actors; Spillovers; “Low Politics”</td>
<td>Spillover from technical to political sectors</td>
<td>Supranational political community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalism</td>
<td>Nation-State; Rationality; National interests</td>
<td>Intergovernmental bargaining; Convergence of national interests</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation and Agency</td>
<td>Institutions; Agenda Setting; Policy Making</td>
<td>Relations between principal and agents; Delegation to lower transaction costs; Expertise of agents.</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New institutionalism approaches:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Rational Institutionalism</th>
<th>Nation-State; Interests; Agenda Setting; Institutions</th>
<th>Institutions enabling actors to reach their goals but not shaping the interests.</th>
<th>International Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b) Historical institutionalism</td>
<td>Institutions; Interests; Designs</td>
<td>Path Dependences; Lock-in effects; Institutions constraining/defining actors’ preferences</td>
<td>International/Supranational Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Sociological institutionalism</td>
<td>Institutional rules, norms and values; Identities; Individuals; “Brusselization”; “Europeanization”; Appropriateness</td>
<td>Institutions shape actors’ behaviour and preferences; Socialization; Social learning</td>
<td>International/Supranational Organization; Transgovernmentalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparative Politics  
Domestic political system; Government; Policy-making  
EU as quasi-federal polity; Internal institutional dynamics  
Federal State; Supranational Organization

Multilevel Governance  
Public policy; Decision-making; “Policy network”  
Eroding sovereignty; Complex and pluralistic system  
International/Supranational Organization; Transgovernmentalism

International Relations Theory:

Rationalism  
Anarchy; Power; Bargaining; International system  
States the main actors; rationality; material incentives; Intergovernmental Conferences  
Alliance/Intergovernmental Institution

Reflectivism  
Gender; Emancipation; Modernity  
Reconstruction of cognitive spaces; Inside-out explanations;  
Community; Communication; Cognitive system
There are some questions that arise when we look back to the theoretical debate on the EU over the last 60 years. In the last decade the debate is moving away from focusing on dichotomist statements and a hermetic body of theories, thereby opening new venues of research. In this sense, when we observe the debate on integration we can highlight the following questions: How can the EU political integration be described and understood? How does integration develop? How does integration affect the identities and interest of social actors involved in the process?

Firstly, the EU political integration was not only a response to the security dilemma posed by an order shaped by the Westphalian system of sovereign states. It was also pushed forward by the economic pressures and cross-border challenges of complex interdependence (Ginsberg, 1989; 1999). This new context where European states were able to promote and defend their interests while managing their mutual relationships in a less threatening way could promote mutual oversight and resolve tensions and conflicts among member-states while also enhancing the predictability of behaviour and promoting mutual understanding (Smith, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). This means that political integration was not aimed at balancing other powers or to influence other countries/regions. Political integration was developed first and foremost to manage internal EU relations, or in the words of Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008:13), “to serve as an instrument of interrelational foreign policy”. Therefore, in order to better understand the EU political integration we must observe that most of the time, (especially in the formative years), it was not steered to influence the external environment but to manage mutual relations among member-states (interrelational); to strengthen or influence integration; and to affirm the common EU identity.
Secondly, political integration in Europe was developed on a trial-and-error basis. Learning from past mistakes with the failures of previous political integration projects (European Defence Cooperation – EDC; Pleuven Plans and Fouchet Plans), the Europeans developed a loose intergovernmental procedure in order to promote political coordination/cooperation, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (thus avoiding one of the major paradoxes in integration processes: supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism) (see Furudson, 1980; Nuttall, 1992; Menon, Forster and Wallace, 1992; Allen, Rummel and Wessels, 1982). The development of political integration in Europe was also the recognition that at least some level of political coordination and cooperation was utterly relevant in order to avoid harming economic relations (Smith, 2004). As a result the concept of “supranational intergovernmentalism” coined by Jolyon Howorth (2000: 36-84; 2009; 2011) to explain the influence of state actors in moving forward the process of political integration in the EU aims to move the discussion over to the European political integration beyond the dialectical divide of supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism. According to Howorth, in the case of the European political integration (2011: 6-7): “[…] there can be no doubt that the national representatives on intergovernmental agencies are proving as adept at persuading their own governments […] as they are at persuading their fellow representatives of the virtue of national preferences”. In this sense it would be imperative to study the impact of these national representatives to European political integration.

The loose intergovernmental structure and procedures which characterised the political cooperation in the EPC enabled the development of a complex transgovernmental network of national diplomats sharing ‘professional expertise and professional pride’ (which was already in motion in NATO and WEU, however those institutions were very formal - structural and procedural - and strictly under intergovernmental control, thus inhibiting further integration) (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 11; Øhrgaard, 2004: 30; Smith, 1998: 308). According to Keohane and Nye (1974), transgovernmentalism is defined as the predisposition of government’s subunits to form international coalitions across
national boundaries and to operate on the basis of shared interests that might challenge the idea of exogenously defined national-interests.

In the absence of formal structures and a codification of practices this transgovernmental network was left with the task of developing the “rules of the game” for daily EPC issues and creating information-sharing mechanisms, and while maintaining their national loyalties they were gradually oriented towards the development of common European positions for their national problems, thus creating a sense of ‘ownership’ of the process (von der Gablentz, 1979: 694; Wessels, 1982: 15; Nuttall, 1992: 16; Glarbo, 1999, Smith, 2003). The participation on the EPC/CFSP led to the development of a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding among national representatives. This *esprit de corps* represents at least “a basic commitment and belief in joint decision-making” (Tonra, 2001: 261), or in the words of a national representative: “People just know each other privately; invite each other to the meetings, and also on private grounds discuss various issues and some kind of community emerges … lets call it a community of thinking or a community of common views…” or “There is a kind of family atmosphere in the group. I probably spend more time with my group colleagues than with the other representatives from my country.” (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006: 6 and 16). The informal practises developed by the transgovernmental network of diplomats (or DIPLOCOM) were captured with the Copenhagen and London Reports and the Stuttgart Declaration, but they were only codified in the Single European Act (SEA-1986) and further institutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (Smith, 2003) A complete description of this process of institutionalization can be seen in chapter 3.

In this sense, as the EPC/CFSP developed the diplomats became more “Europeanised” (Pjipers et al., 1988: 36). However, it is important not to overstate the influence of “Europeanization” and socialization on EU foreign policy (Øhrgaard, 2004). Other issues such as the influence of the EC in many issues of foreign policy and path-dependencies
generated by previous entanglements are also a part of the processes self-dynamic. Nevertheless, the role played by the presidency (during the EPC) and the presidency and the High-Representative (CFSP/ESDP) is important in facilitating consensus-building. The presidency/HR is expected to “raise the horizon beyond the pursuit of immediate national interests” (Wallace, 1983a: 5). The rotating council presidency also enables everyone, especially the small member-states, to attain “enhanced visibility and presence in the international scene”, (Lorenz, 1996: 236) although a successful council presidency obviously depends on the ability to gather support from other member-states and move on the agenda, thereby avoiding paralysis (de Schoutheete, 1988: 79; Øhrgaard, 2004: 32). By and large it is important to highlight the fact that the CFSP has become one key (for some member-states the key) instrument to achieve some member-states’ national foreign policy interests. In this sense the maintenance and development of the EU foreign policy system is seen as a pre-requisite for the successful national foreign policy of some member states. Therefore, while creating binding positions in some issues and reducing national autonomy, the EU foreign policy also reinforces some national positions, thereby making it possible for some member-states to “punch above their weight”. (Wallace, 1983b: 14; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 33; Øhrgaard, 2004; Pijpers, 1996: 265).

Drawing from the theoretical developments and convergence in the fields of European Studies and International Relations, and especially from the models of European foreign policy analysis developed by R. H. Ginsberg (1999: 434), K. Glarbo (1999: 637) and M. E. Smith (1998; 2003; 2004), we suggest an analytical model to explain the self-dynamic of political integration. Even though the study cases will be presented in the next two chapters of this dissertation, we will now briefly present the relevant explanatory concepts to our suggested theoretical model. According to figure 1 below we can observe the main features of the European political integration. We divided the features according to inputs, outputs and self-dynamic.
Many authors have already observed that despite the different historical, political and economic contexts in which they developed the integration processes in Europe and South America share much in common (Mattli, 1999; Vera-Fluixa, 2000; Hurrel, 1998; Mukhametdinov, 2007; Jaguaribe and Vasconcelos, 2003; Guedes de Oliveira, 2005; 2006). Nevertheless, those studies have mostly focused on either the economic, legal or historical issues of the integration process in South America. By adding to the previous studies this dissertation aims to contrasts the political integration in the EU, with other integration processes in South America. This comparison should point us in certain directions in order to develop general explanations about political integration in different integration processes around the world. Following the European model as presented in Figure 1 we turn to the main features of the incipient South American political integration process in Figure 2. Those two processes will be contrasted in order to find possible common explanations. Those figures also help us to visualize the features in both integration processes.

In Figure 1 we depict a schematic figure of the European political integration system. This system can, however, be divided into two subsystems according to the debate between EU Studies and International Relations. Therefore the upper right part of the system which is consisting of feedbacks characterized by actorness, presence, and coherence is normally understood as being inside the International Relations field, while the system on the left with feedbacks of cooperation and institutionalization is seen as being a part of specific European Studies. The difficulty of putting together the external impacts in the integration process (IR) with the internal dynamics of the integration (EU Studies) was avoided for decades, thus limiting further theorizing on political integration. In this sense it is important to highlight the neoliberal-constructivist debate in IR theory and the developments in new institutionalism in the EU Studies to the theoretical convergence of both fields. An extensive description and analysis of the system will be carried out in the next steps of this research where we will present an explanation of how this system works in Europe and in South America in detail.
We divide the political integration model into four analytical units: inputs, self-dynamic, outputs, and feedbacks. Each of them has a distinctive impact in the integration process. Inputs are related to the impacts of the external environment in the integration. Those external impacts in the integration process are characterised by the influence exerted by the international system (for instance polarity, wars, relations with other powers and their interests, etc.). The self-dynamic is composed by the internal characteristics to the integration process. Those internal characteristics are not only defined by the institutional design\(^{21}\) (membership, scope, formal rules, norms, and mandate), but also by its multilevel governance\(^{22}\) (socialization, transgovernmentalism, and delegation, etc.). We define this process as self-dynamic because it replicates itself by reproducing/reinforcing its own mechanics. Outputs are characterised by the concrete policy-making results of the integration process. Those outputs are concrete policies resulting from the integration process. The outputs also influence the feedback loops. The feedback loops are the result of the impacts of the integration outcomes in two levels: internal to the integration and external in the international system. Internally speaking the policy results of integration can either harm or enhance the cooperation and institutionalization. For instance, the successful ESDP mission in Congo propelled the development of more ESDP missions and more cooperation in this field (f.i. the creation of battle-groups). However, it is not only successful policies which lead to more integration. For instance, the failed Berlin-Plus agreements stimulated the development of European capabilities and the institutionalization of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The external influences of the integration refer to the impact that the regional policies have in the international system. This can be seen in how other States adapt to the regional policies (for instance: accession strategies, sanctions or common positions), and the effect that joint voting behaviour has in an international organization.


like the UN. Below we observe two figures that show the political integration model in Europe and in South America and the four analytical units. Following the figures we give an explanation of the analytical units in Europe and in South America.
Figure 1: An Analytical Model of European Political Integration

INPUTS
- International and European:
  - Systemic (bipolar, unipolar, US politics, etc.)
  - Complex interdependence
  - Other Intl’l Org. (UN/NATO)
  - Expectations from 3rd Countries/Regions
  - National Actors
  - National interests

SELF-DYNAMIC
FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM
Pillar 1 ↔ Pillar 2 ↔ Pillar 3
  - Cross-Pillarization
  - Intergovernmentalism (formal)
  - Transgovernmentalism (informal)
  - Europeanization
  - Path Dependencies
  - Delegation
  - EU Values
  - EU Norms
  - EU Identity
  - ‘Aquis communautaire’/‘aquis politique’

FEEDBACK
- Actorness
- Presence
- Coherence

OUTPUTS
- Coordination-reflex
- Joint Actions
- Common Positions
- Common Strategies
- Civilian and military Operations
- Sanctions
- Association and Cooperation Agreements
- Accession Strategies
- Development/Humanitarian Policies
- Human Rights / Democracy
- Summits

FEEDBACK
  - +/- Cooperation
  - +/- Institutionalization
Figure 2: An Analytical Model of South American Political Integration

**INPUTS**
- International and South American:
  - Systemic (End of Cold War, unipolar, US politics, etc.)
  - Complex interdependence
  - Other Intl’l Org. (OAS, Rio Group, etc.)
  - International Negotiations with 3rd Countries (FTAA, WTO, UN)
  - South American values, norms, identity
  - Strengthen civilian control over military
  - National Actors
  - National interests

**SELF-DYNAMIC**
FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM
- Intergovernmentalism (formal)
- Transgovernmentalism (informal)
- Socialization
- Path Dependencies

**FEEDBACK**
- Actoriness
- Presence
- Coherence

**FEEDBACK**
+/- Cooperation
+/- Institutionalization

**OUTPUTS**
- Confidence building mechanisms
- Joint Exercises
- Joint Peacekeeping Training Center
- Joint participation in Peace Operations
- Human Rights/Democracy
- Association and Cooperation Agreements
- Accession Strategies
- Summits
2.3.1 European Model of Political Integration

Inputs

The European political integration is influenced by international, national and regional actors/issues. In this sense we observe that the EU is influenced by the changing currents of international politics and outside pressures for the EU to act internationally, regardless of whether it is ready or able to. Therefore systemic changes and challenges such as crises and wars, etc, have a measurable impact on the EU Foreign Policy dynamic. Also, other international actors such as powerful countries like the United States, Russia, China, and international organizations, such as NATO, UN and OSCE, have a direct impact on the European political integration, thereby putting pressures in place for responses/actions from the European part. As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 10) argue: “until the end of the Cold War foreign policy actions were largely to remain within the constraints of a world structured around the dividing lines of this contest.”

The changes in the international system with the development of complex interdependences (Keohane and Nye, 1984) presented challenges and opportunities for the EU which are not accounted for by power politics. In this sense it is important to highlight the debate of Europe as a “civilian or normative power”. The concept developed by Duchêne (1972, 1973) was initially based on three assumptions: 1. European interstate relations were moved away from self-help towards politics based on cooperation and peace; 2. It would be possible for an actor to be a “power” whilst not possessing military instruments; and 3. A civilian power could play an important role in shaping the international milieu without resorting to force.

The European context also plays an important role in defining the dynamic of the integration process. In this sense the basic premises of peace and reconciliation are still the guiding principles that inform relationships among EU member-states. (Feldman,
As a result we can see that European values, norms and identity have a major impact on the dynamic of the European political integration (Jørgensen, 2004). One of the first common declarations in the EPC was named the “Declaration on European Identity” in 1973. As much as the European political integration was developed less in terms of influencing the external environment and more on mutual understanding, it was also aimed at establishing the basis of this mutual understanding on the pursuit of a common identity. The importance of values, norms and identities is even more evident when we observe that among the CFSP objectives as listed in Article 11(1) of the TEU are: “...to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union...” and “…to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Also, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria which were developed as preconditions to the accession of new members to the EU are strictly based on the forging of an EU identity: 1. Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities; 2. The existence of a functioning market economy...; 3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of a political, economic and monetary union; and 4. Adjustment of administrative and institutional structures to guarantee effective implementation of the acquis. As our model argues, the constant participation in the EU political system fosters a sense of shared identity. As C. Hill (1996: 9) states: “[participation on the] ... EPC stimulates a consciousness of and a debate about what Europe ought to be doing in the world ... Where the EPC is weak in leverage it is strong on values ... and European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles.” Therefore we can conclude that while some argue that those principles function as “consensus-generating,” serving “both to mask disagreements between member states on their actual operationalization and to underscore the EU’s self-conformity and superior moral identity” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 153), the European principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, soft-edged capitalism, zone of peace among members, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts represent the normative backbone in which the dynamic of the political integration process develops.
Based on decisions/actions taken in the past, the foreign policy system of the EU is also strongly shaped by the *acquis communautaire* and the *acquis politique*. The former refers to the legal obligation of member-states to accept EU relationships/agreements with third party countries and international organizations. The latter refers to the cumulated amount of previous political instances and actions implemented in the context of the EPC/CFSP/ESDP which is primarily set out in joint declarations, common positions and common actions. This accumulated set of “soft-laws” represents the fact that past decisions have a real impact on the actual system, thus constraining and influencing future outcomes. (Glarbo, 1999; Ginsberg, 1999)

Besides the international and European contexts, the interplay between national foreign policies and collective diplomacy is also observed. This subject was well analysed by C. Hill et al. (1996) and also by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008). They argue that relationships between national and European interests and actors have a major influence on the advancement of outcomes in the European foreign policy system. In this sense, even governments of the most powerful member states benefit with the EU legitimisation and growing influence in world politics in order to pursue explicitly national interests (Pijpers, 1988). This situation is even more evident on the smaller member states, as argued by Pijpers (1996) in the case of the Netherlands.

**Self-Dynamic of the European Foreign Policy System**

The Maastricht Treaty established an EU with a three-pillar system: the first pillar with the supranational EC and its provisions on an internal market, common agricultural policy, and trade and development policies, the second pillar with the institutionalization of the intergovernmental EPC into the CFSP, and the third pillar which was designed to deal with cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, thus making the second (CFSP) and third (justice and home affairs) pillars strictly and formally intergovernmental, and the first pillar supranational. This means that member states
retain complete control over those pillars while the majority of decisions are taken by consensus. This “pillarization” of the EU structure had serious consequences on the coherence and effectiveness of the outcomes, especially for the second pillar. It is argued that despite the clear limitations to cross pillar cooperation presented by the Maastricht Treaty with a formal division between the EC and the CFSP, in practical terms the EU political integration follows a logic where all pillars play a role. This lack of coherence and cohesion in the “pillarization” of EU politics was addressed by the Lisbon Treaty. Also, within the pillars there are disparities in the competence and policy making methods. This is intended to show that it is not possible to make such a clear cut distinction between EC vs. CFSP or Community method vs. Intergovernmentalism. It is more correct to characterize the EU political integration as a continuum with different degrees of supranational competences and intergovernmental cooperation and with any one pillar overlapping the others. In this sense, Stetter (2004) observes that the functional indivisibility of foreign policy led to a gradual and partial erosion of the pillar structure and the rise of “cross-pillarization” which enhances the operational capability depending on the issue being discussed. This problem of interpillar cohesion was partly solved by the Lisbon Treaty merging the positions of the High Representative for the CFSP (HR/CFSP) with the Commissioner for External Relations. Although this enables the use of Commission tools in foreign policy making, the decisions regarding the CFSP/ESDP remain intergovernmental (Ginsberg, 1999: 439; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 31; Stetter, 2004: 720).

As observed above, one of the main features of the CFSP is its intergovernmental, consensus-oriented decision-making. This means that member states retain complete control over outcomes, however this intergovernmental nature masks one of the other main features of the system: a transgovernmental network is able to influence outcomes and learn from past mistakes (social learning), thus enhancing common interests, reaching common positions and moving the system forward (Smith, 2004). In this sense it is correct to argue that while the system moves on the diplomats become more “Europeanized”. As argued above, this transgovernmental network was set in motion
since the beginning of the EPC with the freedom for the diplomats to establish the procedural and substantive norms on which the European political cooperation was based. The development of those informal practices had a major influence on the institutional setting and the outcomes of the system, and most importantly it was recognized as an inherent part of the political cooperation in Europe by the Copenhagen and London Reports and the Stuttgart Declaration, codified by the Single European Act and formally institutionalized with the CFSP. (Tonra, 2001; Glarbo, 1999, Smith, 2003)

Another important feature of the system and something that is also associated with the transgovernmental network presented above is the increasing interaction of foreign policy processes on the national level with those on the European level. This process is called “Europeanization” and is comprised of four characteristics: 1. National adaptation occurs when states adapt their policy-making instruments, policies, values and identity to fit with those of the EU; 2. National projection happens when states forward their national policies to the EU level, thus debating and flexibilizing their positions in regard to the others; 3. States not only forward their national positions to the EU level, but they also pursue their national foreign policy through the EU; 4. Refers to the effort to embed third party countries/regions within its structures and values. The effects of Europeanization on the outcomes of the system are various, including the reduction of foreign policy differences among the participants of the CFSP. According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 143): “Europeanization implies gradual changes in a national actor’s world view, values and norms, role conception and identity”. Some also understand Europeanization as a forced modernization of the foreign policy of member states. This represents the idea that because the EU has global interests some of the member-states without a previous specific foreign policy towards a country/issue are forced to develop new positions for these new countries/issues. If the EU members do not develop or update their foreign policy to cover more distant geographical areas or other issues where they had no previous foreign policy position, they are just carried along by the more powerful member states with foreign policies with a global reach. In this sense all member-states have to upgrade their foreign policy position once they
participate in the CFSP/ESDP. (Tonra, 1997: 190; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 144). Europeanization of national foreign policies also offers an interesting locus to analyse the impact of the EU in member-states national bureaucracy. According to Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini (2007: xiv): “Europeanization has brought about a series of changes in the workings and organization of national bureaucracies. In some cases, new offices have had to be created or old ones reorganized in order to manage the ever-growing flow of exchanges with other European partners.”

Political integration is also defined by the fact that decisions taken previously constrain and shape future outcomes. In this sense, the concept of path dependence used by historical institutionalists might be useful. According to William Sewell (1996: 262-263, see Paul Pierson, 2000: 252), path dependence refers to the fact “that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”, and Margaret Levi (1997: 28 see Pierson 2000: 252) also suggests that: “Path dependence has to mean … that once a country or region has started down a track the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.” According to Pierson (2000: 252), this means that once decisions are made (and especially when they are legally binding, such as the *acquis communautaire/politique* and most CFSP decisions), the costs of exiting increase, thus stimulating further steps in the same direction.

The last feature of the European foreign policy system presented here is the importance of the delegation of leadership to the EC (*communitarization*) in the form of the High Representative (*commonization*) to one or a coalition of large member states (*directoire*) or/and to core groups (*segmentation*). As Scharpf (1988) observed, in systems like the CFSP with complex decision-making procedures which are ruled by unanimity in most of the cases and filled with participants and with too many policy issues to be discussed (with different order of priorities to different member states), outcomes and changes of course might be harmed due to what he calls “joint decision-traps”. In this sense,
member states may delegate authority to other actors that act on behalf of a policy outcome. As a result we can initially observe the Commission playing an important role on foreign policy issues, especially due to its wide (and good) relations with third party countries/regions, budgetary instruments and legal capacity to implement foreign policy initiatives (such as conflict prevention and institution-building and initiatives in the area of human rights and the promotion of democracy). The Council Secretariat (High Representative, Special Representatives, Policy Unit, DG E, PSC, etc) also provides political steering and operational action for the EU foreign policy. But in most issues political steering and operational action are delegated to “an informal and self-selected group of member states that take the lead in EU policy-making towards specific issues in which they have a particular interest and/or value added.” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 113). This is not to be confused with the directoire-styled groups, where action is delegated to one or a coalition of large member states such as the EU3 negotiations with Iran (Germany, United Kingdom and France together with the High Representative) or the Contact Group for the Balkans (the “big three” plus Italy, the US and Russia). Core groups instead involve the participation of smaller member states together with representatives of the EU institutions (for instance the informal Contact Groups on Afghanistan and on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the EU Core Group on Somalia). These groups can operate either temporarily or permanently and work either completely within the EU framework or only loosely related to it, and they can also operate informally and have a low profile or be very structured and highly visible. It is argued that this segmentation of EU foreign policy-making towards a set of specialized policy networks dealing with specific issues leads to a specialization and division of labour among member states that can strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU foreign policy system (Keukeleire, 2006).

Altogether, those features compose the EU political integration system and provide a benchmark to analyse how far (or at least how similar to the EU) other political integration processes are developing around the world. One distinctive factor that will be analysed below is the self-dynamic of the system, meaning how the outcomes produced
by it have important impacts on the development of the whole system to the point that it will be able to influence the external environment and enhance further institutionalization. These feedback loops generated by the outcomes of the system represent the major stimulus for its functioning, and as a result we can characterize the EU political integration as a self-dynamic process with its outcomes shaping not only the institutional design (and the integration process) but also impacting the behaviour of third party countries and other international institutions around the world with its actions. After we observe the outcomes of the EU foreign policy system we will return to this discussion.

Outcomes

The outcomes of the EU foreign policy system are of various natures. They can be divided into four major groups, namely trade, bureaucratic, diplomatic, and military. The result of each of those outcomes will generate feedbacks impacting on both the external world and the internal EU system. An extensive analysis of those outcomes in Europe and in South America will be dealt in the next chapters of this dissertation.

The first range of foreign policy outcomes does not stem from the second but from the first pillar. The Commission instruments of the EU foreign policy system are seen by many as being those who have the greater impact on the external world. They include trade, accession strategies, association and cooperation agreements, development and humanitarian, crisis management and conflict prevention, and the promotion of human rights and democracy.

The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is one of the main expressions of EU presence and the most visible form of EU actorness. (Redmond, 1992; Sjostedt, 1977; Allen and Smith, 1990; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). It is observed that the decision to conclude a trade agreement with a third party country/region and the depth and scope of this agreement is to a large extent foreign policy. The EU also tries to use its trade policy in
order to pursue specific foreign policy objectives such as environmental and labour clauses. In this sense, trade policy has been one of the major outcomes of the EU as an international actor which is able to shape the external environment, and consequently it has been influential in shaping the EU foreign policy system.

Association and cooperation agreements are located under the EC competencies, despite their increasingly political use. There are three types of agreements: 1. Pure trade agreements; 2. Trade and economic cooperation agreements; and 3. Association agreements. Here the use of political conditionality plays an important role in shaping third party countries political systems, human right records, etc. (Sole, 2004)

Development and humanitarian policies are also very important outcomes of the EU foreign policy system. If we include the EC and the member states donations for humanitarian aid and Overseas Development Aid (ODA), the EU is the largest donor worldwide. The EC alone is the third largest. As observed in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), “trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be a more secure world for the European Union and its citizens”. Also, the EU has tried to insert the promotion of specific norms and values in its development activities such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. The European Instrument/Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) pushed forward by the European Parliament has its own budget line and aims to use EC external assistance and cooperation instruments to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008).

Perhaps the most well-known outcome of the European political cooperation is the coordination-reflex among members of the system (de Schoutheete, 1988; Nutall, 1992; Wessels, 1997; Glarbo, 1999). This bureaucratic outcome of political integration refers to the previous consultation among member states of their foreign policy objectives in order to adjust it to the other member states. This reduces tensions and misperceptions
among the players while enhancing predictability, confidence and willingness to (co)operate inside the system. This outcome could only be achieved with the development of the transgovernmental networks of diplomats, which according to a first-hand description of an EU policy-maker (Nuttall, 1992: 312) means: “the automatic reflex of consultation brought about by frequent personal contacts … has become an effective substitute for the traditional bilateral diplomacy … the experience of working together is durable, and as time goes by there will be an increasing number of diplomats who have attended the meetings … and thus feel bound to each other by family ties.” In this sense, as Nuttall describes above we consider the coordination reflex as one of the most important outcomes of the transgovernmental network of diplomats. Nevertheless, we can also see that the coordination reflex has turned into a characteristic of the EU political system in which national foreign policy actors consult with each other before arriving at defined national positions (Tonra, 2003).

According to Article 12 of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU shall pursue the CFSP’s objectives by: 1. Defining the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP; 2. Deciding on common strategies; 3. Adopting joint actions; 4. Adopting common positions; and 5. Strengthening systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy. It is important to note that with the CFSP common strategies, joint actions and common positions are legally binding on the member states. In practice however those instruments have not been used so often while diplomats are developing other instruments that work alongside this legal categorization. This Treaty definition is useful for understanding how CFSP tools are organized and formulated in the EU system, however on a daily basis CFSP uses its standard diplomatic instruments to carry out its foreign policy, where declarations, demarches, high-level visits and meetings, international conferences, informal talks and telephone calls, mediation, and observers, etc. are the instruments used to consult, confirm, support, show solidarity, suggest solutions or options; demand, protest, disapprove, accuse, reject, deter, or sanction, etc (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 154).
Common strategies are instruments devised by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 in order to provide an appropriate framework to develop broad strategic policies towards a specific region, country or issue. Once a common strategy is adopted (by unanimity) it can be implemented through joint actions and common positions, etc and require a qualified majority vote (QMV). This would allow a high-level of strategic guidance, coherence of policies and smooth implementation through the QMV. This would also allow the EU to use instruments from all three pillars and from member states towards a specific foreign policy objective. In practice, this instrument was dropped by the Union after the Javier Solana’s 2000 Common Strategies Report. According to the Report, the instrument was tested on three occasions (Russia, 1999; Ukraine, 1999; and Mediterranean, 2000), and failed to offer any added value to the first pillar instruments and was simply not strong enough. However, Joint Actions and Common Positions play an important role as policy outcomes of the EU foreign policy. Joint actions are directed to “address specific situations where operational actions by the Union are deemed to be required” (TUE; Art. 14 – 1 and 3). Joint actions are also binding of the member-states: “joint actions shall commit the member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity” (TUE; Art. 14 – 1 and 3). Common positions are in practice used to adopt sanctions and restrictive measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and the freezing of funds and economic resources, etc. against third party countries. To come into effect, however, those actions need to be implemented by the first pillar and third pillar, thus showing the importance of cross pillar coherence. Common positions are also an instrument which can be used to define the Unions’ approach to an issue, for instance the Common Positions on the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 2005 Review of the Non Proliferation Treaty, the support to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and to affirm the EU’s position in regard to conflicts in Africa.

Although security and defence issues have been a taboo in European integration for a long time, starting with the “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” in the Treaty of Maastricht (Art. J.4(1)) and
culminating in the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki that established military and non-military aspects of crisis management of the Union, the development of the ESDP was a major breakthrough for the European integration process. Despite its weaknesses and flaws (which will be discussed in the next chapter), the ESDP instruments provided the CFSP with military and civilian means for crisis management operations which have already been used more than 20 times (see Annex II for a list of operations).

**Feedbacks**

The main characteristic of the system is its self-dynamicism. This self-dynamic system would not occur without the feedback loops observed in this section. Those feedback loops are represented by the impact of political outcomes on two different levels: internationally and internally. The international level refers to the impacts that the EU has on the international system, while the internal level represents the impact the policy outcomes of the EU have on its own integration process (f.i. outcomes impact on the institutional design). Both feedback loops influence the European political integration in different ways, one indirectly through the impact of the outcomes in the external environment (international/European/national levels) and the other directly by impacting on the level of cooperation/institutionalization of the integration process (enhancing or constraining). This represents the fact that political outcomes have an impact on the internal shape of the integration process (for instance: the assessment of an ESDP mission can reveal that a new Joint Command is necessary, thus increasing the institutionalization). In this last section we will present what constitutes those feedbacks and how they affect European political integration.

*External feedback*

We can see that two concepts help us to understand the impact of European foreign policy system outcomes on the outside world, namely *actorness*, which was developed
by Sjoestedt (1977) and deepened by Bretherthon and Vogler (2006), and presence, which was developed by Allen and Smith (1996). Those concepts observe the notion of the EU as an international actor and the qualities and pre-requisites for international actorness and presence.

Therefore, while the former concept refers to the EU as an international actor and thus having the capacity to act and to influence the others, the latter concept is related to the visibility in regional and global fora (f.i.: joint voting behaviour in the UN) (Ginsberg, 1999: 432). According to Jupille and Caporaso (1998), the EU’s capacity to impact on the international environment should be measured in regards to four criteria: 1. Outsiders’ acceptance of its competence (recognition); 2. Legal competence to act (authority); 3. Distinctiveness and independence from other actors (autonomy); and 4. To what extent it acts unitarily in the external world (cohesion). Therefore we can argue that ideal-type actorness would involve all four of those elements, while the EU can be considered to be a quasi-perfect actor due to difficulties to act with cohesion and authority, etc. According to Hill (1996), the actorness is determined by not only common values, norms, identity and decision-making systems, but it also depends on concrete capabilities to produce effective outcomes.

To avoid the difficulty of defining the international activity of an actor that is not a state, Allen and Smith (1990) developed the concept of presence to explain the increasing influence and legitimacy of the EU in the international environment. Presence refers to the step prior to actorness. This distinction explains why some actors have the possibility to engage in one issue (presence) but not the capacity (or will) to do so (actorness). Therefore presence is related to the legitimacy to act while actorness relates to the “ability to have a notable effect on the outcomes for third-parties” (Hill, 2007: 15). Allen and Smith (1990), observe that although the EU does not always act as a unified actor, it has considerable structure, importance and legitimacy in processes of international politics. They go further and ask how the EU makes its presence felt internationally, and to what extent can it move from presence to purpose? In this sense
we have already observed (and a deeper analysis will be presented in the next step of this research) that the EU foreign policy system has the means to make its presence felt internationally in the economic, diplomatic and military spheres. Nevertheless, it is argued that EU actions have significant effects on both the perceptions and operational environments of third parties (Hill, 1993), however this *presence* impacts differently according to the use of the wide range of outcomes at the EU’s disposition, and most scholars observe that while this *presence* is real it is still incoherent. As a result, the coherence and effectiveness in not only implementing but also in generating political outcomes can determine not only the EU’s international *presence* but most importantly its international *actorness* (Ginsberg, 1999).

*Internal feedback*

This second category of feedback represents how outcomes of the European foreign policy system impact directly on the system itself, thus enhancing or constraining political cooperation/institutionalization.

Students of International Relations have long argued that institutions enhance the prospects of cooperation among states. (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000) Moreover, many students of European political integration have observed that foreign policy outcomes have a distinctive impact on the institutionalization of the EU (Smith, 2003). This does not mean that all outcomes have to be successful to have an impact on the systems self-dynamic. As seen above, the EU foreign policy system was constituted of trial-and-errors, and it is still like that, however it is clearly observable that not only the institutional nature but foremost the quality of the political cooperation in Europe has increased dramatically in the last 60 years. Therefore, according to Tonra and Christansen (2004: 6):

“*The trajectory of such development has been – and continues to be – towards greater institutionalization and greater coordination. The development of a complex political/military committee structure, the establishment and growth of the political secretariat, the increasing coordination between Community instruments and broader...*
foreign policy goals, and the introduction of a policy planning cell and the office of the High Representative for CFSP are all testaments to this increased institutionalization.”

In this sense, we can observe that this feedback has major and more identifiable impacts on the self-dynamic of the system, however without understanding to what extent the external feedback influences the system no general theory of political integration can be achieved.

In this section we observed the framework in which we will analyse and compare the integration processes in Europe and in South America. We briefly presented the characteristics of the European system and how we think the theoretical debate in EU Studies and IR can be synthesized. A full fledged study-case on the EU will be discussed in chapter 3. In the next section we will briefly analyse how the integration dynamic works in South America. The South American study-case can be seen in chapter 4.

2.3.2 South American Model of Political Integration

Inputs

The South American system is influenced by international, national and regional actors/issues. In South America, the first failed attempts of integration in the 1960s and 1970s concurred with the background of the Cold War and the spread of communist ideology in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, and guerrilla activity in many countries in the region combined with strong nationalistic ideologies and the presence of military regimes and the role of the United States.

The establishment of the actual regional integration initiatives had less to do with extra-regional powers and more to do with the regional/national issues and more global
trends. Especially in the Southern Cone\textsuperscript{23}, it is difficult to understand the establishment of the Mercosul if we don’t observe the global trends of economic prosperity in the aftermath of the Cold War, globalization, regionalization and the movements to build economic blocs.

Internally speaking it is fundamental to observe the transition from the military regimes to redemocratization and the need to change the economic paradigm in order to adapt to the global market. Regionally speaking it is essential to understand the overcoming of disputes that fueled the nationalistic rhetoric of the military regimes, and especially the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.

In this sense we divide the integration inputs into three parts: international, regional and internal.

In the hemispheric level no one can ignore the influence of the United States in the region, and consequently in the regional integration projects. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the will of the United States has always been pushed by either the instrumentalization of hemispheric institutions (such as the OAS) or bilaterally. The growing divergence of interests and expectations between Latin American countries and the United States exacerbated this behavior, which culminated in the US support of the military coups in the region. This led to a paradoxical relationship with the US: the perception in the region that the US cannot be trusted, while at the same time countries in the region compete for US favoritism in order to receive special treatment. Additionally, the elites in the region view the approachment of any country in the region with the US with suspicion.

\textsuperscript{23} The Southern Cone is a geographical area that covers the southernmost part of South America under the Tropic of Capricorn. It includes: Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and the southern part of Brazil.
More recently, the United States tried to push forward the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a free trade zone which is mirrored in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). In the first phase, the US tried to negotiate multilaterally with all of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This negotiation put big pressure in Mercosul countries to negotiate together and block the US proposal. With the failed multilateral negotiations the US is trying to develop free trade agreements with every Latin American country bilaterally, however despite US attempts to disrupt bloc negotiations Mercosul countries still hold the same joint position on the issue. The Andean Community also tried to coordinate its position on the issue, but the divergent positions inside the group shunned a common stand (especially between Colombia and Peru on one side and Ecuador and Venezuela on the other). Venezuela even pushed for the creation of an anti-FTAA group named the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA\textsuperscript{24}) which aims to integrate infrastructure and energy but which also has more ambitious objectives such as economic, political and even military integration.

Regionally, there has been a historic feeling of mistrust among the countries in the region. In the dawn of the independence movements in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century the countries were more worried about developing their own institutional capacities than with demarcating the borders located in remote areas of jungle, desert or High Mountains. However, by the end of the Century border disagreements started to arise, and some of them remain an issue to the day. Those disputes and conflicts were mostly settled in the Southern Cone in the 1970s – 1980s, thus creating the environment for the subregional integration. The fact that Mercosul survived even when the interdependence was very low and during deep economic crises is also partly explained by strong political will, the resolution of major disputes, and the development of confidence and mutual trust

\textsuperscript{24} Composed of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
among the countries in the subregion. In the Northern part of South America most of those disputes and conflicts remain active, thus harming the development of trust among the countries. Even though there has always been a discourse of Latin American brotherhood and cooperation, in reality the lack of trust due to unresolved disputes does not provide the common ground needed for deeper cooperation in this part of the region. The best examples of failed integration attempts are the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). The former was created in 1960, and it was inspired by the EEC and had the objective of creating a free trade zone and eliminating trade restrictions within 12 years. However, the project collapsed even before it started due to the fact that the countries were experiencing the beginning of the industrialization process, and there were therefore very different levels of development allied with the diversity of interests. In order to save the heritage of the LAFTA the countries negotiated a new institution: the ALADI. ALADI came to replace the LAFTA with less ambitious goals. ALADI also had the final objective of constituting a common market, but instead of starting with a free trade zone it formed a preferential trade area, thus giving more flexibility for the members to negotiate bilateral agreements. However, the 1982 debt crisis and the consequent Latin America’s “lost decade” pushed for protectionist measures and left the ALADI as nothing more than a symbolic arrangement working as a framework for bilateral agreements. Those failed attempts show a typical pattern in Latin America of creating artificial institutions without the real basis for its existence (Oelsener, 2005).

Internally, the military has always played an important role in South American politics since the independence movements in the 19th Century. In Brazil, the military is especially identified with the republican movement which overthrew the monarchy. As Mullins put it (2006: 41): “Across Latin America there is a strong connection between nationhood and the armed forces. According to the military folklore, the armed forces are not just part of the nation, they created it.” Therefore it is no surprise that the continent has been hampered by military interventions on politics throughout its history.
In this sense the politics in the region have been characterized by a competition between democratic and autocratic forces. In particular, the simultaneous military dictatorships that spread throughout the region during the 1960s created a shared trauma and a sense that the countries alone could not carry a stable democratic transition. The internal logic behind those military coups in the 60s was to counter the spread of communism. In all cases both the defence and the foreign policies were grounded on inter-regional rivalries. Those policies were based on the National Security Doctrines (NSD). The NSD is a set of ideas and principles on how to achieve national security. Ideologically bred in German, French, US and Latin American literature, it was theoretically advanced in the School of the Americas, a US training centre for Latin American officers that was specialized in anti-communist counterinsurgency during the 1960's. The primary focus of the NSD was to eliminate leftist opposition by all means, including political repression, use of force and economic development. In the NSD ideology the component of development played a fundamental role in fighting against leftist movements. The NSD also emphasised the role of the military in defending national borders and territorial integrity, thus overdimensioning regional rivalries and regional threats (Arcenaux, 2001; Pion-Berlin, 1989).

Against the background of a historical military participation in politics which makes it impossible to completely exclude the military from politics completely and after a shared period under strong military rule, South American countries started the transition to democracy in the 1980s. The stability of the new democracies depended on two mutually reinforcing factors. Firstly, the internal configuration of power within the civilian regimes was determined by the way in which the transition to democracy was carried

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25 This competition does not mean that direct military rule has been the normal state of affairs, but that the military has always been present and ready to intervene in daily politics.

26 For a deeper discussion of the NSD see Arraigada, 1981; Pion-Berlin, 1989; and Arcenaux, 2001.

27 Since 2000 renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and relocated to Fort Benning, Georgia.
out. Secondly, this configuration influenced the process of foreign and defence decision-making policies. This represents the extent to which the militaries were able to control the transition and keep political power in the new democracies. As Mullins (2006:8) argues: “The more influence components of the old regime had over the civilian authorities the more continuity there was in policy terms”. The fact that those countries were experiencing similar difficulties in reestablishing democracy allied with the dire economic problems in the 1980s lessened the particularist predispositions and propped up deeper integrationist movements. As a result, at that time foreign and defence policies were seen as a tool to foster transition from the military dictatorships to democratic governments by reducing the tensions between the countries, enhancing civilian control over the military apparatus, and promoting economic development (Mullins, 2006; Oelsener, 2001; Kacowicz, 2005).

The relationships between South American countries were marked by rivalry and mistrust; however the difficulties that those countries faced in the transition period from dictatorship to democracy represent a major breakthrough in order to review the norms guiding those relationships. According to Kacowicz, (2005), there is set of norms shared by the whole region which guide the relationships among the countries. Those norms include: uti possidetis (the recognitions of former colonial borders), peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-determination, convivencia (peaceful coexistence), concertacion (consensus seeking), arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation, and CBMs (confidence building measures). Besides this, since the 1980s we can identify political democracy and human rights as being well recognized norms (Mullins, 2006). Holsti

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28 Here we follow the classic distinction between transition models proposed by Guillermo O’Donnell. He differentiates the transition patterns between controlled transition (when the military were able to highly influence the transition to democracy), balanced transition (low military influence) or collapse (no influence at all).

29 The Argentinian case occupies one end of the spectrum of civilian control over the military, while Peru is positioned on the opposite side of the spectrum.
(1993), argues that due to a long historical and learning process Latin American countries have managed to develop a unique normative system of “diplomatic culture” that has helped their governments to resolve many of their international conflicts without resorting to war. In this sense, Kacowicz (2005) observes that some places, especially in South America (and in the Southern Cone), people have succeeded in developing this Latin American exceptionalism regarding their recourse to a peaceful settlement of international disputes. These common norms have had a clear influence on the international relationships of the region in three cases according to Kacowicz (2005: 11): (1) They have contributed to the maintenance of the “long peace” in South America since 1883; (2) They have reshaped the definition of state interests in terms of their foreign relations, and (3) After the redemocratization process, they have moved and upgraded the already existing relationships among countries in the direction of a pluralistic security community. Those norms form the background in which the integration process evolves.

**Self-Dynamic of the South American Political Integration**

No integration movement in South America can be thought of in terms of supranationalism. The strong normative of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states plays a fundamental role in understanding integration in the region. In fact, all integration initiatives in the region, from LAFTA-ALADI to UNASUL, were characterized by a strong commitment to intergovernmental politics and a solemn exclusion of supranationalism. According to the Brazilian President during a meeting of the UNASUL: “I am deeply convinced that it is the time to deepen our South American identity (...) based on common values and principles such as the respect for sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity and
non-intervention in domestic affairs.” However, as we aim to show in this study, the question about political integration must be located beyond the dialectical divide of intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism. In this sense we look at how a region marked by the strong sovereignty normative can allow a regional integration process to flourish and succeed. The success of regional integration in South America points to the fact that the development of supranational institutions is not a pre-condition to integration processes. Strict intergovernmental relations are also not able to account for the integration in areas beyond commercial/economic policies, especially in a region with a strong sovereignty normative. Therefore the discussion over the success of integration processes beyond traditional trade and economic regimes must surpass the supranational-intergovernmental divide and focus on the systems of governance beneath the Intergovernmental Conferences and formal meetings.

Comparing this with the European case also reveals an important hidden factor in the South American political integration dynamic: transgovernmental networks. Those networks are especially strong in the Southern Cone and were re-directed and enhanced in the aftermath of the military dictatorships, first and foremost to foster the civilian control over the military during the transition period. On the other hand, in the Andean region the institutional weakness harms the civilian hegemony and the unresolved international disputes disrupt the development of networks. The extent of the influence of this network in their governments has to do with how the transition to democracy was internally negotiated. The establishment of Mercosul, for instance, was pushed by an *ad hoc* transgovernmental network created with the 1986 Program of

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31 Ranging from total collapse in Argentina to controlled transition in Brazil, and more extreme military autonomy in Peru (see Pion-Berlin, 2001 and Arceneaux, 2001). The South American case suggests an inversion of the huntingtonian model of military professionalism in the sense that more professionalism leads to more military autonomy. According to Diamint (2001: 122), “The more organized and efficient the institutions and the armed forces are, the more influence they have over other government agencies” (free translation from Spanish).
Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) signed by the Argentinian and Brazilian Presidents. This network was initially composed of technicians from the Foreign and Development Ministries and was loosely bound and created top-to-bottom with strong presidential backing. This in turn led to the creation of an institution, namely Mercosur, which started very successfully in the economic/commercial area, however the economic crisis that affected the region in the 2000s halted the integrationist pace. Despite the initial economic/commercial successes, the biggest advances in the integration hide in the politico-military cooperation. The increase of confidence among the countries and the perspective of common interests enhanced the prospects of institutionalization where the strategic partnerships were framed. One of the fundamental aspects for the institutionalization according to Andrew Hurrel (1998: 246), was the “[…] steady creation of interest-groups and networks within the state favouring integration. The network of bi-national working groups established under the 1986 agreements, and also the intergovernmental structures of Mercosur acquired a degree of bureaucratic autonomy … Not only was the habit of consultation growing but a small group of officials was increasingly able to push the integration agenda forward and to work together to try and find solutions to problems. Moreover, the institutionalization of visits and exchanges by presidents and officials was leading to a broader ‘habit of communication’ of the kind that has been so important within Europe.” What is most interesting for the political cooperation is that the military in the region (and especially in Brazil and Argentina) developed closer political ties after the redemocratization process,\(^{32}\) and those were re-directed from the traditional rivalry logic to extensive cooperation (Mullins, 2006; Goncalvez and Pena, 2005; Mathias, Guzzi and Giannini; 2008).

\(^{32}\) In fact, the rapprochement between the military had already started in the last phase of the military dictatorships with the Tripartite Agreement signed between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in 1979. This Agreement put an end to the conflict over the management of water resources and construction of the Itaipu Dam, solving one of the most serious disputes between Argentina and Brazil. However, the most significant steps toward the de-escalation of the rivalry were taken in the first years of the democratic governments with the solution for the nuclear issue and economic integration.
In this sense, while in Mercosul the economic and commercial issues constituted a set of contentious questions in the agenda of integration, the issues of security and defence advanced at a much faster pace. A special preoccupation with the consolidation and expansion of democratic regimes in the region was exemplified with the adoption of the Democratic Clause of the Mercosul. The rapid development of relationships in the field of security and defence was a consequence of the existence of consolidated networks of relationships among the military in the region. Those relationships were re-directed in the democratic transition. The most important mechanism for the creation and steering of this network is the School for High Command and General Staff of the Brazilian Army (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exercito - ECEME). Passing in one of the graduation courses in the ECEME is a pre-requisite for promotion to the post of General in the Brazilian army and an important factor in the promotion of army officers in South America. Students in the ECEME are normally majors or lieutenants and are usually already married with children. Most officers do not bring their families for the usual 2 years-course in Rio de Janeiro, and therefore they live together in a shared apartment next to the School. This enables an intensive personal exchange between the students, thereby creating tight relationships that involve their whole families which eventually come for visits. In this network relationship takes precedence, because only graduates from the School move upward. Those bonds are maintained informally with email conversations and phone calls, mostly containing small talk, however it is no surprise that high level officers also talk about politics. As the officers move upwards in their careers they expand the group’s contacts. Normally students in the same schoolyear attach themselves to a higher level officer, usually one of the Professors or one superior officer. These students then become what form the superior’s “trusted men”. Those relationships are remembered when one of the officers has openings in his command. Since the beginning of the redemocratization process and through the 1980s and 1990s the structure of the courses has been changing to not only include disciplines of

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democracy and human rights, but also of regionalism and peacekeeping operations. Even though the armed forces have autonomy in educational matters, the courses of the ECEME have been sanctioned by the Education Ministry. (Medeiros, 2010; ECEME, 2013)

The most important issue for this dissertation is the impact of those networks on the regional political integration. In terms of security and defence issues, despite the development of civilian Defence Ministeries in the 1990s and further efforts to enhance civilian control over the military, the politics of security and defence in the region are still dominated by the military. Therefore the importance to observe how these networks of South American military impact on the policy-making and political integration processes cannot be overstated. Moreover, it is important to understand the transformation of these networks to conform to the norms set by the democratic governments. As mentioned above, the networks that have been built in the ECEME play a fundamental role in strenghtening the relationships of friendship and cooperation between countries in the region. Until 2009 the School had graduated 618 officers from Latin American countries, including 28 Argentinians, 37 Bolivians, 21 Chileans, 28 Colombians, 21 Equatorians, 57 Paraguayans, 31 Peruvians, 23 Uruguayans, 103 Venezuelans, and many others from Central America. Those foreign students do the same courses as the Brazilians and live together with the Brazilians in the same building. Besides the graduation of foreign students, the ECEME has instructors from Argentina, Chile, Equador, Paraguay, the United States and Spain. According to Gen. Campos, commander of the School: “In this aspect [the presence of foreign students], there is not only an exchange of knowledge, but also an affirmation of relationship […] It is fundamental that foreign students come to us because they learn, teach and – most importantly – develop relationships.” Moreover, Gen. Campos states that: “If I had to


35 The instructors in the ECEME are high level members of the armed forces.
choose one factor that differentiates the ECEME from the other similar Schools in Brazil and in the World, I would say that it is the will of the officers to come and study here”.

The influence of each of those officers in their respective countries’ foreign and defence policies vary according to the pattern of transition each country experienced. For instance, while in Brazil the officers still have a position to influence the formulation of polices, in Argentina this influence is very small (Goncalvez and Pena, 2005; Mathias, Guzzi and Giannini; 2008). Nevertheless, the lack of civilian knowledge or will to deal with issues of security and defence leaves the military in the region as the dominant players in the field. As a result, when it comes to the regional institutionalization of practices already adopted by the military or new policy prescriptions in the area they activate the previous transgovernmental contacts in order to coordinate positions and arguments to push for a common governmental response by either bypassing or supporting their government’s policies, but definitely by influencing their governmental positions. The biggest achievement of this network was the creation of the South American Defence Council (CDS), which was established under the aegis of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL).

The transformation of the military mindset in the aftermath of the redemocratization processes in South America was influenced by how the transition from the military dictatorships to democratically elected governments was negotiated. In this sense the development of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and regional organizations were an important step to enhancing civilian control over the military and re-steering the military network towards normative conformity. According to Pion-Berlin (2001:24), “[…] institutions – be they trade, border or security agreements – can also have an impact on domestic civil-military affairs. They do so by shifting the military incentives towards or away from support of civilian-led foreign policy initiatives, while altering incentives of societal actors either to conspire with the military or to join to constrain its reach.” As a
result institutions can socialize the military to incorporate the normative discourse prompted by the new democracies. This logic surrounded the Argentinian-Brazilian relationship in the immediate period after the redemocratization, according to the words of the former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Lafer (1992 and 2001-2002): “If the coincidence of authoritarian regimes favored a somewhat similar perception of the international order and the internal order, it also bred a mutual perception of mistrust in the bilateral and sub-regional level. Now the simultaneity of the democratic regimes breaks the tension and aggregates an element of partnership and necessity of both governments [Brazilian and Argentinian] to affirm and consolidate the democratic civilian control over the military” (1997: 254).

The question that remains open is how those military involved in the dictatorships were re-directed to comply with democratic norms. This question is especially relevant in countries where the military maintained political influence. One important issue that should not be overlooked is the reconfiguration of the Brazilian military education which took place in the 1990s. This factor is important because most of the transnational contacts and the development of networks occurs in the Brazilian military schools. The inclusion of disciplines that teach human rights, democracy and new roles for the military such as peacekeeping play a role in resocializing the military mindset to comply with the democratic standards. As observed in a quantitative study by Medeiros (2010:191-196), the younger officers that are more exposed to the new courses are more prone to accept civilian control and to take the democratic norms for granted. This explanation might work well for the next generation of senior officers, but it has a lesser impact on the generation that participated in the dictatorships. This generation was socialized in a period that the literature calls “populism” (1946 – 1964), which was marked by a mindset composed by views of elitism, moralism, diffuse religiosity (in a secular state), historic positivism (the military as savior and promoter of the republic), and pro-US behaviour. In order to foster compliance of these senior officials socialized in the populist era, democratic governments use the attractive device of fulfilling the
military corporate wants to reward cooperative behaviour or cut benefits to punish non-compliant behaviour. This is done by sharing the costs regionally, such as regional programs for officers’ exchange, joint exercises, joint arms projects, and the creation of regional schools to train the military for UN Peacekeeping Operations. This mix of educational and material rewards enhances regional peace and helps to socialize the military into the democratic norms (Hurrel, 1998; Pion-Berlin et al, 2001; Taddei, 2007; Mederios, 2010).

Furthermore the concept of path dependence used by historical institutionalists is useful and can help us to understand the evolution of political integration in South America. Although in South America a lower commitment to institutions is observed than we see in Europe, the destiny of the democracies in the region seems to be tied to the development of regional institutions that decrease external rivalries and enhance the solution of common economic and political problems. Therefore the decisions taken in institutionalizing cooperation and moving it forward constrain future decisions, thereby increasing the costs of exiting and promoting more integration.

Altogether, those features compose the self-dynamic of the political integration in South America and provide the aspects to compare political integration in South America to other political integration processes that are developing around the world. One distinctive factor that will be analysed below is the self-dynamic of the system, meaning how the outcomes produced by it have important impacts on the development of the whole system to the point that it will be able to influence the external environment and foster further institutionalization. These feedback loops generated by the outcomes of the integration represent the major stimulus for its functioning.

36 Argentina and Chile even created a binational military contingent patterned after the French-German battalion EuroCorps.
The first and foremost attraction for joining the existing institutions in South America is the increase of trade and economic well-being. In this sense we see a splendid evolution in the past 20 years of integration in Mercosul. As seen in the table below, the trade flow in the internal market grew 10 times since the creation of Mercosul in 1991, from 2 billion dollars in 1991 to 22 billion dollars in 2010. In the Andean Community the trade flow was more modest but was still significant, increasing from 1 billion dollars in 1999 to 7 billion dollars in 2008. Both institutions are planning to merge and create one single internal market by 2014 under the aegis of the UNASUL. The attraction of increasing development and economic well-being are translated into association and cooperation agreements with other countries/regions and accession strategies designed to enlarge membership. Those tools are especially interesting because they are also based on political conditionality. Only democratic countries are eligible to join and remain in the South American institutions.

**Graph 1 – Trade flow in Mercosul 1989 - 2010**

Source: Brazilian Ministry of Development

**Graph 2 – Trade flow in the Andean Community 1999 - 2008**
The second set of outputs, which is defined as bureaucratic, can be understood in the development of a South American bureaucracy, with officials from different countries thinking on how to move the integration forward. This is especially seen in Mercosul with the creation of the Forum for Consultation and Political Cooperation (FCCP). This organism aims to consolidate and expand the political dimension of Mercosul by deepening the relations among the member-states and between the member-states and third party countries/regions in terms of foreign policy and a common political agenda (Decision MERCOSUR/CMC/No 18/98). In this sense we can observe the FCCP working as an institution where member states consult and coordinate common political positions, both in regard to the internal and external issues related to the bloc. Apart from the negotiations of the Mercosul-EU Bi-regional agreements, the associate countries\textsuperscript{37} also participate in the FCCP. The external representation is carried out by the High Representative. The FCCP has already produced interesting common policies such as the joint positions in the regional (Rio Group, Latin America – European Union

\textsuperscript{37} Mercosul member-states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Associate members: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Non-members with special status: Surinam and Guiana. Observers: Mexico and New Zealand.
Summit) and international (Iraq War) agenda. The FCCP also plays an important role internally, as shown in its resolutions regarding the Paraguayan and Ecuadorian Coups, the Bolivian separatism and the state of democracy in the region (Ushuaia Protocol) (Ueltschi, 2011). We also observe the development of an incipient South American bureaucracy in the South American Defence Council (CDS) of the UNASUL. The South American Defence Council (CDS) is an institutional space which was developed in the framework of the UNASUL in order to foster regional cooperation and political coordination in the field of security and defence. The CDS is not a collective security mechanism (like NATO), but it is first of all designed to be a consultative forum where governments inform their partners on their positions on issues of security and defence. As a result it can be defined as a mechanism of confidence building among the countries in the region in order to enhance mutual trust, decrease levels of tension and promote at least some political coordination to avoid damaging the economic interests. In this sense the CDS can be seen as a forum that can be used by the member States to promote and defend their interests while managing their mutual relationships in a less threatening way, thereby promoting mutual oversight and resolving tensions and conflicts among member-states while enhancing the predictability of behaviour and promoting mutual understanding (Vaz and Jácome, 2009).

At the diplomatic level we see an increase in the coordination of foreign policies of South American countries when those countries are involved in international negotiations. The most important outcome at this level is the realization of summits between South America and other countries/regions. At the Mercosul level we see the high importance of the bi-regional negotiations with the European Union. In those negotiations the Mercosul member-states harmonize their interests in advance and negotiate as a bloc with the Europeans. At the UNASUL level we note the increase of exchanges with African countries in the creation of the UNASUL-Africa Summit. We also see the increasing interest of the Arab countries to increase exchanges with South
America in the institutionalization of the UNASUL-League of Arab States Summit since 2005.

On the military level the outcomes vary greatly for a region that was hampered by strong rivalries and mistrust not long ago. Since redemocratization we can see an increase of joint-military exercises among South American countries. The graph below depicts the number of joint military exercises of Argentina in the period between 1993 and 2004. We can see that in this period Argentina carried out joint exercises with almost all of the other South American countries. Brazil, the former rival, supplanted the United States as the closest military partner of Argentina during this period. Those joint-exercises were further institutionalized into formation courses for officers (such as Operation Fraterno between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) (Hurrel, 1998: 235; Silveira, 2002; Saint-Pierre and Winand, 2005).

**Graph 3 – Argentinian joint military exercises with foreign nations 1993-2004**

![Graph showing joint military exercises with foreign nations 1993-2004](source: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoria)
Since redemocratization we can also see a proliferation of Peacekeeping Training Centers in South American countries. Those PKO Training Centers incorporate officers from other countries in the region as both students and as instructors.\footnote{For instance, the Argentinian CAECOPAZ has permanent instructors from Brazil and Chile and has invited instructors from other South American countries.} The increasing participation of South American countries in Peacekeeping Operations points to the necessity to satisfy the military corporate wants of better professionalism in an era of budgetary constraints, while at the same time the participation in UN PKO induces the military to work with diversity, thereby creating a democratizing effect because it brings the principle of tolerance to the soldiers (Diamint, 2001). Beyond increasing the ties of friendship and camaraderie already present among the armed forces in the region, the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations prompts the military to incorporate subjects such as Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and International Relations, etc. in their academy’s curricula (Medeiros, 2010). The culmination of the intensive exchange among the UNPKO Training Centres in the region prompted the creation of the Association of Latin American and Caribbean Peace Keeping Training Centres (ALCOPAZ). This regional joint-training Centre offers courses and organizes the cooperation between the diverse national Peacekeeping Centres.

Even though there is a longer tradition of South American countries participating individually in Peacekeeping Operations\footnote{For instance, Brazil has already participated in 33 PKO with over 27,000 troops (source: Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: \url{http://www.un.int/brazil/book/conselhoSecurancia_index.html}) and Uruguay is one of the top ten worldwide contributors to UNPKO (source: MIT Center for International Studies: \url{http://web.mit.edu/cis/fpi_peacekeeping.html}).}, the most interesting military outcome of the recent political integration in South America is the regional participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Created in 2004 under the diplomatic leadership of Chile and the military leadership of Brazil, the MINUSTAH is composed of soldiers from all of the South American countries. According to the Argentinian General Julio Hand, the participation of South American countries in the
MINUSTAH: “… represents the first project of joint sub-regional participation in a Peacekeeping Operation (…) We cannot say that there is an integrated force, but there are not only strong ties and interconnections in the General-Staff level, but also in the battle-groups level operating in the Mission” (see Mathias, Guzzi and Giannini; 2008: 77). The importance of transgovernmental networks to the success of the Mission was also highlighted by one Brazilian Army General who stated that his personal connections with members of the armed forces involved in the Mission (and especially those Armed Forces integrated in the Brazilian Battalion such as those from Bolivia, Paraguai and Peru) were very important to accomplish certain tactical and operational goals. The Minustah represents a breakthrough in terms of military and defence cooperation for countries that not long ago were on the brink of a nuclear arms race. The UN Mission consists of troops from eight South American countries (including all Southern Cone countries) under the military aegis of Brazil (Costa Vaz and Jacome, 2009).

**Graph 5 – Participation of South American Troops in PKO during the month of July/2008**

Graph 6 – Brazilian participation in UNPKO (1989-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>América Central</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAI</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMIZ</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMUR</td>
<td>Ruanda/Uganda</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Camboja</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>Libéria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSA</td>
<td>África do Sul</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPRODF</td>
<td>Croácia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>Macedónia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>Eslovênia Oriental</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>Província da Província</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1996-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET/UNTAET</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1999-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.seitenfus.com.br

Graph 6 – Mercosul share of contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

Feedbacks

The main characteristic of the system is its self-dynamicism. This self-dynamic system would not occur without the feedback loops observed in this section. Those feedback loops are represented by the impact of the political outcomes of the system on two different levels, namely those that are international and internal to the integration. Both processes influence the political integration in different ways, one indirectly through the impact of the outcomes on the external environment (international/South American/national levels) and the other by directly impacting on the level of cooperation/institutionalization in the region (enhancing or constraining). In this last section we will present the things which constitute those feedbacks and how they affect the South American political integration.

External feedback

As observed above in the previous section about the EU, the concepts of actorness (Sjoestedt, 1977; Bretherthon and Vogler, 2006; Hill, 2007) and presence (Allen and Smith, 1996; Ginsberg, 1999) help us to understand the impact of political integration outcomes on the outside world. Those concepts were created in order to observe the notion of the EU as an international actor and its qualities and pre-requisites for international actorness and presence, but they are also general enough to help us understand the impacts of South American political integration in the international environment.

While the EU can be considered a quasi-perfect actor, South America cannot be classified as an international actor due to difficulties of acting with cohesion and authority, etc. Some South American institutions such as Mercosul have a limited
concrete impact on the external world and can be analysed in terms of actorness though. According to Hill (2007: 4), a regional organization can be defined as an actor when it “… has the capacity to act and to influence others without necessarily requiring the attributes of statehood…”

In terms of presence, the South American integration processes lack the further structures and legitimacy which they need to be felt throughout the world, but somehow their influence is being felt regionally due to coordinated economic, diplomatic and military actions. Nevertheless, it is argued that South American actions have significant effects both internally in the member-states (such as with the ease of tensions, consolidation of democracy and civilian control over the military), and externally on the perceptions and operational environments of third parties (such as the Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti and the common positions in international organizations). However, this presence impacts differently according to the use of the outcomes at their disposition, and therefore we can see that the South American presence is incipient and mainly felt internally in the region.

Internal feedback

This second category of feedback represents how outcomes of the South American political integration impact directly on the integration process itself, thereby enhancing political cooperation and institutionalization.

As seen above, we argue that institutions enhance the prospects of cooperation among states (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Smith, 2000). The distinctive impact of policy outcomes in the institutionalization process has also been extensively studied (Smith, 2003). South American political integration is constituted of trial-and-errors, as the
former institutionalization attempts have shown, however the dramatic increase in not only the institutional nature but also the quality of the political cooperation in South America since the redemocratization in the 1980s is clear to see. Therefore, according Andrew Hurrel (1998: 252):

“... regionalism has become important to security and political stability, not because the costs of fighting became too high according to some abstract measure, but instead because it has helped to stabilize the redefinitions of interest that occurred in the 1980s and because it promotes an ongoing process of socialization and enmeshment. It has done this through a double process of internalization, the first element of which involves material changes in the way in which politically salient individuals think and act.”

As a result we can see that this feedback loop has a major and more identifiable impact in the prospects of political integration in South America. In the absence of a more pro-active role in international politics the impacts of the South American political integration are more visible regionally with the institutionalization of cooperative measures.
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CHAPTER 3

Transgovernmental networks and socialization in European Union Political Integration
Since the seminal works of Ernst Haas (1958) and Karl Deutsch (1961) there is little doubt among students of European integration that international institutions can develop senses of community and belonging beyond the nation-state under certain conditions (Checkel, 2007; Beyers, 2007). This interaction between European integration and changes among domestic actors/institutions is also a subject of the contemporary Europeanization studies. In this chapter we analyse how far socialization processes and the development of transgovernmental networks have influenced the European political integration, especially in the field of security and defence, and whether they were a precondition for the institutionalization of cooperation or vice-versa. In this sense we observe the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, states and state agents internalize group community norms and how transgovernmental networks based on those shared understandings give feedback on the process of integration in Europe.

In the first part of this chapter the definitions and types of transgovernmental networks based on shared principles of trust and consensus-building and which influence the integration process in Europe will be examined and presented. We will then continue by looking at the conditions under which the European Political Cooperation (EPC) enabled the starting point for the consolidation of a transgovernmental network devoted to European political integration. It will be shown that the further the political cooperation in Europe advanced in its institutionalization then the more dense and broad this transgovernmental network became.

In the second part of this chapter we will observe the definitions, strategies and mechanisms through which the institutions socialize state agents, thus leading them to internalize new roles or group-community norms. After this first glance at the socialization and development of the transgovernmental network in the EU the chapter will focus on the socialization processes in the contemporary CFSP Council Working
Groups, Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Those three bodies are the most important in daily EU Foreign Policy formulation and decision-making while allowing the measurement of the internalization of socialized norms due to its high variance on the socialization indicators. In this sense, those three bodies are the main organizations to be tested in the task of measuring the influence of socialization processes and transgovernmental networks in the European political integration.

3.1 - Transgovernmental networks: definitions, strategies and outcomes

According to Wessels (1997), Slaughter (2004), and Thurner and Binder (2008), transgovernmental interactions represent the most important factor in integration processes. Sometimes referred to as supranational intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance, administrative fusion, Europeanization or Brusselization, transgovernmentalism argues that the relationships between national government officials at every level of the decision making process shape the European integration. In this section we will observe the definitions of and look at why and how transgovernmental networks emerge (Howorth, 2000; 2001; Wallace and Wallace, 2000; Webber et al. 2004; Regelsberger and Wessels, 2005; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle, 2010).

However, in order to understand the development and role of transgovernmental networks in International Relations we must first go one step backwards and look at the main concepts in “social network analysis” theories. By social network we are not referring to the common contemporary use of internet-based tools like Facebook and others, but instead social network theory focuses on the idea that personal influence plays an important role in decision-making processes. Social network methodology helps us to detect and describe formal and informal relations in a policy field. As a result
this section is divided into two parts. The first part is an introduction to social network theorizing, and the second part explains how IR works out this concept.

**Social Networks**

Nowadays when we speak of networks we immediately have in mind the World Wide Web, however the basic definition of network is “a set of relationships between objects which could be people, organizations, nations, items found in a Google search, brain cells, or electrical transformers” (Kadushin, 2012: 3). In this research we are interested in transgovernmental networks, which is one kind of social network. In social networks, instead of electricity or data the flows among the nodes of the network are constituted of friendship, love, money, power, ideas, values, norms, and even diseases. As a result social networks are networks involving people and the flows that pass from one to another. Those human networks are created by individuals and organizations and develop from interaction between its participants, but they also produce extended structures that the participants had not imagined and in fact cannot see. The individual interaction in the network occurs in a context of social statuses, positions, and social institutions, and therefore the social networks are also constrained by these factors. These networks are in constant movement and developing or decreasing, but in any case they are affecting and changing the very institutions and organizations from which they emerged (Kadushin, 2012).

As we mentioned in the definition above, a network is composed first of all of a set of relationships. More precisely, a network comprises a set of objects named “nodes”. Between the nodes there are flows of relationships. The figures below⁴⁰ are graphic descriptions of simple networks. Figure 3.1 is the simplest value-free form of a network.

⁴⁰ All figures are based on Kadushin, 2012: 14-16.
Those nodes might be people in the same room for instance. Figure 3.2 is a directional relationship. For instance 1 loves 2 but 2 doesn’t love 1. Figure 3.3 represents a symmetrical relationship and presents us with one very rare characteristic in networks: mutuality. A predominant type of network is anti-symmetric, which means that there is no mutuality. Examples vary, such as boss – employee or professor – student, etc.

In most cases however there are n relationships between the nodes, and those are called multiplex relationships. Figure 3.4 shows a relationship through an intermediary. Those relationships can be transitive, which means that if 1 likes 2, then 2 also likes 3. This example also represents a typical hierarchical relationship: 1 gives an order to 2 that passes it forward to 3. Figure 3.5 is the so-called sociogram and is the basis for mathematical analyses and graph methodology (Moreno, 1953). Another possibility is to work algebraically with networks depicted as matrixes (table 3.1 is an algebraical representation of the sociogram 3.5). The network presented in figure 3.5 has three nodes and is called a triad, and this is the building block of more complex networks.

Figure 3.1 – Simple relationship

1———2

Figure 3.2 – Directed relationship

1—2
Figure 3.3 – Symmetric relationship

1 ←→ 2

Figure 3.4 – Relationship through intermediary

1 → 2 → 3

Figure 3.5 – Mutually related three nodes

![Mutually related three nodes diagram]

Table 3.1 – Adjacency Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although most studies with networks are carried out in natural sciences, there are three types of networks which are researched by social scientists: ego-centric, socio-centric, and open-system networks. Ego-centric networks are those that are centred in just one node. Socio-centric networks are those characterised by very controlled closed systems, for instance the relationships of children in a classroom. Open-system networks are those which are not enclosed and have boundaries which are difficult to measure, for instance the connections between elites or corporations. (Kadushin, 2012)

In all those types of networks there are some social situations that favours the connections between the nodes. Those are mainly caused by propinquity and diverse types of homophily. Propinquity refers to the likeliness of nodes being connected to one another if they are spatially near. Therefore it is much more probable that individuals will make friends to those who are geographically close (Feld and Carter, 1998). There is an important distinction between co-location and co-presence though. While the first refers to people being in the same geographical range of one another, the latter implies a social relationship that happens within a social institution or structure (Zhao and Elesh, 2008). Common interests and common places for meeting also foster the development of relationships (Feld and Carter, 1998). According to Domhoff (1967) in his study of elites, people that went to the same prep school at the same time are more likely to have a connection and therefore propinquity can be related to the Brusselization of political integration in Europe, as we will see later in this chapter. On the other hand, homophily refers to the people that share characteristics in a proportion greater than the average part of the population, and they are more likely to be connected (Lazarfeld and Merton, 1978). However, Kadushin (2012:19) reminds us that the opposite is also true:

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41 Open-system networks are the most studied type of network. The “small world” and diffusion models are drawn from this type of network.
“if two people are connected then they are more likely to have common characteristics or attributes. There is also an implied feedback: over time relationships tend to sort themselves out so that they become more homophilous.” Furthermore, Lazerfeld and Merton (1978) divide between status-homophily (determined by things beyond control such as race, sex, etc., or acquired things such as education, occupation, and marital status, etc.) and value-homophily\(^4^2\) (such as common attitudes, stereotypes, etc.). According to Burt (1982) there are two causes of homophily: firstly, common norms or values may connect people with common attributes (the opposite also holds true), and secondly is the structural location of the nodes – meaning that two nodes may have the same attributes because they share the same space (and vice-versa). Homophily is a fundamental trait of transgovernmental networks and involves seeing the counterpart as a peer.

One of the most important ways to describe the aspects of a network is to observe the distributions of network properties. This includes an observation of the number of connections (dyads, triads), density, structural holes, strength of weak ties, popularity or centrality, and distance between the nodes.

*Density* of a network refers to the number of direct connections divided by the number of possible direct connections. According to Kadushin (2012:29): “Density is at the heart of community, social support, and high visibility (when people in a network can see what others are doing and monitor and sanction their behaviour). Density facilitates the transmission of ideas, rumours, and diseases. Other things being equal, the greater the density is the more a network is likely to be considered a cohesive community, a source of social support, and an effective transmitter.” While density focuses on the amount of connections, *structural holes* focus on the lack of connections. Structural holes are mostly used in ego-centric networks when members of a network are connected only

\(^{42}\) Also called homogeneity (Hall and Wellman, 1985)
through one member (ego), and therefore without the presence of this ego the network wouldn’t exist. (Burt, 1992) Like structural holes, weak ties also focus on a lack of connections in a network. According to Granovetter, 1982:105-106, (see Kadushin, 2012:30): “Our acquaintances (‘weak ties’) are less likely to be socially involved with one another than our close friends are (‘strong ties’). Therefore the set of people made up of any individual and his or her acquaintances will constitute a low-density network (one in which many of the possible ties are absent), whereas the set consisting of the same individual and his or her close friends will be densely knit (many of the possible lines present).” In this sense, weak ties help to facilitate communication from peripheral parts of the network and facilitate the integration of social systems. The concept of popularity or centrality refers to the node(s) with a high degree of connections. This concept could also be called “leadership”, “brokerage” or “gatekeeping” because those nodes with more connections are responsible for enacting the connections and circulating the information among members of the network. This also relates to the concept of “betweenness” which refers to the nodes that are “in the middle of things” and serve as a switching point between nodes of a network. Ego-centric networks and structural holes have a high level of betweenness. (Freeman, 1979)

Another important characteristic of a network is distance. According to the definition, the distance between two nodes is measured by the length of the shortest route via the edges or binary connections between nodes (Kadushin, 2012). However, in networks for the diffusion of ideas, values, and norms, redundancy (the fact that one has to hear the same thing from different sources to get it rooted) plays a major role. As a result the set of nodes directly connected to each other are known as the first-order zone or

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44 See de Nooy et al., 2005.

45 Also called geodesic distance.
When studying social networks it is important to observe their “multiplexity”. This concept refers to the fact that sometimes the nodes have more than one single relationship with each other. Multiplexity is commonly used in two fashions: firstly as role multiplexity which means that two nodes can occupy more than one position that ties them together (for instance, the nodes relate as diplomats and friends), and secondly as content multiplexity, which refers to when two nodes have one role but the flows are multiple (for instance, they are diplomats that negotiate agriculture, security and environment). Multiplexity plays a major role in defining the network, and according to a very substantial part of the literature the relationship between formal positions held in organizations and informal relationships between the nodes has a fundamental impact on the organizational outcomes (Homans, 1950; Lazega and Pattison, 1999; Podolny and Baron, 1997). As a result there are two different consequences of multiplexity: firstly it can enhance a relationship and build trust, or secondly it can create conflict and enhance the possibility of fraud (Kadushin, 2012).

The last step of this brief introduction to the concepts of social network theory refers to network partitioning (or segmentation). The most important concepts in network segmentation are: primary groups, cliques, clusters, cohesiveness, structural similarity/equivalence, and core/periphery structures.

Primary groups are those networks where members identify strongly with each other. According to the definition of Charles Cooley (1909:23, see Kadushin, 2012:46): “By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of
intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole so that one’s very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a “we”; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which “we” is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.” This definition fits well for what the EU scholars refer to the development of we-feelings among diplomats involved in the EPC.

Cliques are defined by cohesiveness. In the mathematical definition it is “a maximal complete subgraph of three or more nodes” (Luce and Perry, 1949), meaning that all nodes of the network are connected to each other (total direct connectivity). Clusters refer to a named group or organization (for instance members of the Council Working Group on Human Rights are a cluster). They may have a clear hierarchical organization or not. In most cases clusters do not overlap, which means that a node can only be part of one cluster at a time. Cohesiveness is defined according to Moddy and White, 2003:106, as “A group is structurally cohesive to the extent that multiple independent relational paths among all pairs of members hold it together … The strongest cohesive groups are those in which every person is directly connected to every other person (cliques), though this level of cohesion is rarely observed except in small primary groups”. The level of cohesiveness can be measured in two equivalent ways: firstly when the network is confronted with disruptive forces, and secondly when some nodes of the network are suppressed or substituted and/or the connections removed. Another example of partitioning networks is by examining those nodes with special or stronger relationships with each other (instead of looking for cohesion in terms of relationships between the nodes). This concept is called structural similarity (Burt, 1992; Borgatti and Everett, 1992). Finally, core/periphery structures are the most common method of

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46 This idea is based on an algebraical method called “blockmodeling” developed by White, Boorman, and Breiger (1976). According to the literature on blockmodeling, polarization in the network is fundamental to promote social change. According to Kadushin (2012:54) “[…] polarization of networks leads to social change in terms of norms, values, and other social structures.”
network segmentation. This concept sheds light on the relationship between cores of nodes that are responsible for dictating the relationship to the periphery. Normally those core nodes are the founders of the network and are more enmeshed and experienced with the flows. As a result they are the “guides” or norm-setting nodes responsible for communicating with the periphery of the network (Kadushin, 2012).

Now that we have examined the basic social network concepts, we will present how the concept of transgovernmental networks is analysed in the field of International Relations.

*Transgovernmental Networks and IR*

The study of transgovernmental networks is interested in the observation of social structures involving the relationship between government’s subunits. In this sense it tries to detect informal social relationships in addition to the formal ones, thus “verifying the growth of a social layer beneath formal state interactions” (Merand, Hoffmann, and Irondelle, 2010:4). These networks of government subunits interrelate through transversal bureaucratic cooperation which is beyond the formal state hierarchy and along functional lines. Therefore we can differentiate between pure intergovernmentalism (figure 3.6), transnationalism (figure 3.7) and transgovernmentalism (figure 3.8).

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47 Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 adapted from Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle, 2010: 6-7.
In International Relations literature the classic definition of transgovernmental relations is provided by Keohane and Nye (1974: 43):

“We define transgovernmental relations as sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments. Thus we take the policies of top leaders as our benchmarks of official government policy.”
In their definition, Keohane and Nye observe the power of transgovernmental networks to go further than the highest governmental authority’s interests. They differentiate two types of transgovernmental relations: “transgovernmental coordination” and “transgovernmental coalitions”. While the first refers to relationships of government officials that are fully consistent with the targets and intentions of top leaders, the latter refers to when State interests are diffuse or when the State control of officials is weak and officials “perceive a great common interest with another government or sub-units of another government” (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 43; Thurner and Binder, 2008: 3).

A more comprehensive definition of transgovernmental networks is offered by Slaughter (2004: 7):

“National government officials would be increasingly enmeshed in networks of personal and institutional relationships. They would each be operating both in domestic and the international arenas, exercising their national authority to implement their transgovernmental and international obligations and representing the interests of their country while working with their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distil information, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmonizing national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems.”

The definition of Slaughter grasps how the state officials embedded in those transgovernmental networks act with a “double hat”, representing their State interests and sharing information, while arguing and persuading each other in order to build consensus while addressing common issues at the same time. She also highlights the distinction among different locations of transgovernmental networks. It is observed that they can be located within traditional international organizations and can be created both as a result of executive agreements or can be generated spontaneously through increasingly regular contacts between officials (Slaughter, 2004: 14). She also identifies
three different types of networks: information networks, enforcement networks, and harmonization networks.

Information networks are not only exchange information hubs but they often collect and distil information about how members behave. The hallmark product of this distillation of information is a set of the best possible means for achieving a desired result to a common issue (Fulton and Sperling, 1996). Officials in an information network can also cooperate to uncover new information of value to all members. Equally important is the information that officials exchange about each other relating to competence, quality, integrity and professionalism. When a network is established it basically becomes an arena of information exchange about member’s reputations and peer pressure. According to Slaughter (2004: 54): “[…] Having and caring about a reputation among one’s peers is a very powerful tool of professional socialization to the extent that the bond between members of a network is that they face common challenges and responsibilities, and therefore they are likely to strengthen norms of professionalism.” Violations of those norms are likely to be transmitted and harm one’s reputation and credibility, thus raising the costs of violations. As we will see below, in the EPC/CFSP, these networks are referred to as “bearers of reputation,” thus facilitating the creation of behavioural standards and working practices that develop common expectations and improve the effectiveness of the social tools of reputational enforcement. In this sense, reputation plays a central role in this network of regulation by information, where power stems not from coercive threats but from the ability to influence decisions through knowledge and persuasion (Majone, 1997; Slaughter, 2004; Smith, 2004).

Enforcement networks are mainly developed in order to enhance cooperation among national regulators to enforce existing laws and rules. In this sense, enforcement cooperation refers to the sharing of information and the concerted development of enforcement strategies to deal with common problems. One of the main features of
enforcement networks is its capacity-building through technical assistance and training. This kind of network is typically populated by police officers, customs officials, drug agents, and prosecutors. The best European example of an enforcement network is the EU criminal enforcement network known as the TREVI\textsuperscript{48} Group. This group was created in 1976 and is constituted of national officials from Ministries of Justice and Interior responsible for anti-terrorism, international organized crime, and public order. In 1993 this network was codified in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar (Slaughter, 2004).

Harmonization networks are a product of harmonization agreements between States. These agreements aim at the harmonization of regulatory standards with the objective of achieving efficiency. These networks clearly represent the complex interrelationship between formal international agreements, transgovernmental relations, and domestic regulation (Slaughter, 2004). In this sense, harmonization represents “the adoption of an international standard that adjusts the regulatory standards or procedures of two or more countries until they are the same” (Mattli and Slaughter, 1995: 183). One example of a harmonization network is the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) in which networks of officials are created in order to standardize their respective national requirements on a specific issue (food security, Visa waiver, etc.)

Another possibility to help typify transgovernmental networks is to differentiate between horizontal and vertical transgovernmental networks. Horizontal networks refers to the relationships of representatives of the States that interact, share information, socialize, discuss, and persuade each other in order to achieve a consensus or a common ground for cooperation. According to Slaughter (2004: 19): “These [horizontal] networks operate both between high-level officials directly responsive to the national political process – the ministerial level – as well as between lower level national regulators. They may be surprisingly spontaneous – informal, flexible, and of varying membership – or

\textsuperscript{48} The acronym TREVI stands for: Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, et Violance Internationale.
institutionalized within official international organizations.” On the other hand, vertical transgovernmental networks refer to the ties between supranational officials and their domestic government counterparts. Supranational organizations are more effective in their tasks if they can link up directly with national government institutions. Being capable of cooperating with its national counterparts means supranational officials are able to exert a more legitimate authority by “borrowing” the coercive power of domestic government officials in order to implement supranational rules and decisions (Slaughter, 2004).

A transgovernmental network can become so sufficiently institutionalized that it can transform itself in an international organization or regime. The formalization of transgovernmental networks normally follows the path of their own institutionalization, meaning that they are not a direct result of international negotiations but instead derive simply from regular meetings so that the participating officials decide to constitute themselves into an organization, thus influencing the decision of States to institutionalize what was previously already agreed between members of the network. In other cases the transgovernmental network can just choose to stay looser, consisting of webs of agreements, norms and rules that define its behaviour. Transgovernmental networks can also be institutionalized by States that aim to exert greater control over the networks (Slaughter, 2004; Smith, 2004).

An important piece of the puzzle is to observe how far those transgovernmental networks impact on addressing the common problems and how efficiently they do that. According to Slaughter (2004: 24), transgovernmental networks contribute in three ways: 1. By creating convergence and informed divergence; 2. By improving compliance with international (organizational) rules; and 3. By increasing the scope, nature, and quality of international cooperation. In this way networks lead to the development of standard rules and practises which are common to the countries that
participate in them. This can lead to a sufficient policy convergence which enables the development of a more formal international organization or regime over the longer term. As a result, soft law codes of conduct which are created by transgovernmental networks together with the simple diffusion of credible and authoritative information also promotes political convergence. Nevertheless, the attempt to promote convergence can also lead to informed divergence, when governments acknowledge a prevailing standard and intentionally choose to diverge from it for reasons of national history, culture, or politics. Transgovernmental networks also enhance existing cooperation by providing individuals with the information, norms, rules and principles they need to figure out how to improve their performance against benchmarked standards by moving away from the traditional command-and-control methods to a more “regulation by information” approach. Finally, transgovernmental networks can socialize their members in ways that create a perceived cost in deviating from the standards. In this sense, socialization can operate within transgovernmental networks in different ways, most importantly by inducing compliance with collectively generated rules through peer pressure. In his seminal work, Mancur Olson (1965) showed that small groups are especially well suited to overcoming the problems of collective action because of their ability to put social pressures and reward with social incentives to induce compliance. Those incentives are most powerful when they are selective, meaning when “the recalcitrant individual can be ostracized and the cooperative individual can be invited into the center of the charmed circle” (Olson, 1965: 61). These kinds of incentives work primarily in groups that are small enough that members can know each other personally, and they are even stronger in groups that are relatively homogenous in terms of norms and values.

In the next section we will observe the development of transgovernmental networks in Europe, including how they were created and developed and how they influence the path towards political integration in Europe.
3.1.1 - Common foreign policy on the making: transgovernmental networks and the EPC/CFSP

The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union represents a milestone for the foreign and security integration in the EU with the formal institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of a three-pillar Union. However, this outcome represents the two decades of silent evolution of a more informal mechanism, the European Political Cooperation (EPC). In this section we will observe the antecedents of the EPC and look at how and why it developed as a transgovernmental network and its influence on the formal institutionalization of the CFSP/ESDP.

It is not very surprising that strongly interdependent States involved in an economic integration project would establish at least modest political institutional support in order to avoid a situation where different political views which are too different could harm economic integration. In this sense there is little doubt that the first drive for the creation of the EPC could be described in part as a consequence of functional or sectoral spillover (Smith, 1998; Mattli, 1999). What is extraordinary about the EPC is that member governments felt increasingly impelled to develop and adhere to common norms, even though the EPC had a very weak and almost inexistent organizational structure with an inexpressive participation of supranational actors. However, some questions need to be addressed to see how the transgovernmental network created for - and mainly within - the EPC influenced the institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. How could an allegedly weak agreement such as the EPC have such deep impacts on its member governments, especially in such a sensitive issue-area such as foreign policy cooperation? How could this happen with no involvement of supranational actors such as the EC? In this section we will challenge the notion that strict State interests dominate the EPC/CFSP decision-making
process, notwithstanding the fact that the EPC originated as an intergovernmental talk-shop. Secondly, it will be shown that the EPC changed from a strict intergovernmental system due to the development and enhancement of a transgovernmental network which linked and harmonized foreign policy-making in the member-states.

According to first-hand policy-makers accounts such as De Schoutheete (1996) and academic research such as Nuttall (1992), the EPC developed as an unusual European institution, a community of national diplomats (Diplocom). It reinforced informal rules of behaviour established through trial and error. Those informal EPC rules changed it from being simply a forum for sharing information among governments, as it was designed, to a more institutionalized, collective, legally-binding system, even though some governments tried to resist the process. In addition, state preferences were often formed endogenously within the EPC’s transgovernmental network. The member governments did not monopolize the EPC system. Its administrative infrastructure, based on a highly complex transgovernmental information network, was developed in such a way that it limited the ability of senior-level officials of member states who were not involved in daily EPC issues to dominate the entire policy process. In this sense the EPC’s outcomes were less based on ad hoc political discussions than on the socialization of lower-level officials in national capitals. According to Smith (1998: 309): “Shared ideas and understandings were pursued in this [transgovernmental] network, and this sensitivity to European issues among lower-level policy-makers filtered up to governments in terms of the issues and options that were considered. With EPC’s low-key network of transgovernmental consultation, state preferences were changed in some cases and practically created out of thin air in others”. Secondly, the transgovernmental network in the EPC developed its customs into rules that did not stress bargaining. The EPC was not used as a forum for making side-payments, threatening sanctions against each other, or linking issues into broad package deals in
order to solve incomplete contracting problems. That kind of behaviour was considered inappropriate by officials who preferred to avoid power politics and confrontations during their discussions. Instead, officials emphasize the exchange of views and persuasion, and if states discovered a common interest during discussions they could act in common if they wanted to. In this sense the EPC was seen as a problem-solving forum instead of a bargaining style of decision-making. This happened thanks to the links of trust built up in the transgovernmental network. Officials stress the EPC’s social dimensions and the importance of persuasion and peer pressure. Once these informal rules provide themselves to be useful they were preserved in a coherent body of policies and procedures that later conditioned the EPC outcomes (Glarbo, 1999; Hill, 1993; Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 1998; 2004).

The substantial effects of this behaviour on the outcomes of the European cooperation in foreign policy were exponential. The first direct tools of the EPC were declarations, démarches, and common positions to international organizations and conferences. The direct impact of this political coordination can be attested to with the rapid increase of voting unanimity among EPC states at the UN General Assembly, which jumped from 30-40% in the 1970’s up to 80% at some point in the 1980’s. The performance in the CSCE was even better. The EPC tools expanded to include codes of conduct, written conventions, economic aid and sanctions, peace and democratization plans, and fact-finding missions, etc (Smith, 1998: 311). Moreover, the EPC changed the ways member states determined and pursued their interests. In this sense, countries with no previous interest in specific problems took EPC positions or even strongly supported EPC’s positions (such as Ireland’s participation during the Portuguese crisis in 1975 and the first years of the Euro-Arab dialogue). Member’s foreign policies became more

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49 According to Johnston (2001: 488-491), the involvement in international institutions can lead to changes in state behavior once those conditions mentioned are absent. In this case, those changes can be attributed to socialization effects.

50 See annex I for a complete list of EPC/CFSP/ESDP tools.
transparent and predictable and compliance with common positions became stronger, even in the absence of sanctioning mechanisms.

The development of the Diplocom was in fact the key feature of the EPC from the beginning. Due to the fact that rules and sanctions were not well developed in the EPC and because decisions were not legally binding on the member states, officials experienced more freedom of movement. Also, the fact that governments allowed coordination to occur below the highest levels to harmonize their views in order to produce common positions enabled the emergence of a tighter coupled transgovernmental network. For States, the development of this transgovernmental network was acceptable and a low cost alternative to devoting resources to a permanent staff and secretariat to manage the EPC. However, that was the first step towards the institutionalization of political cooperation. Despite the fact that the rules of the EPC were sometimes developed in a process of trial and error, States did not object to the increasing links between professional bureaucrats and diplomats. For instance, coordination below the level of foreign ministers was reached through regular contacts between the Foreign Offices. Those contacts occurred primarily in the Political Committee (PoCo) which was composed of Political Directors of the member state’s Foreign Offices. PoCo started with at least four meetings a year and eventually met once a month. With its unusual casual group atmosphere, the PoCo reached many agreements, most of which had to be defended later to individual national governments. The PoCo was also allowed to set up working groups composed of experts from foreign or other appropriate ministries. Below the PoCo, a European Correspondents body was created to manage the EPC on a daily basis because the EPC had no secretariat. The main task of the European Correspondents was to serve as liaison between member states capitals (Hill, 1993; Nuttall, 1992; Glarbo, 1999; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). According to Smith (1998: 314): “Cohesion within this group [European Correspondents] became especially close over the years, and it fostered many personal friendships. With their common bureaucratic roles, esprit de corps, and devotion to a new policy system
that privileged their input, European Correspondents and EPC working groups made common analyses of problems rather than bargaining on behalf of their governments."

This horizontal, information-sharing, transgovernmental network was further deepened with the development of the *Correspondence Europeène* (COREU). COREU was a telex network created in 1973 to enhance the communication among officials dealing with the EPC. In Table 1 we can observe the exponential growth in the number of COREU telexes on the EPC from 1974 to 1994. This system enabled officials to share their points of view with all other participants in a matter of few hours. Besides this quantitative change, the qualitative change can also be seen with more security and defence issues being discussed via COREU.

**Table 1: Growth in the number of COREU telexes on EPC, 1974-94**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-82</td>
<td>4,800 (avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>11,714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51 Recent data on COREU are difficult to evaluate due to the use of emails supplementing the telex system in the EU and the 1995 enlargement. The objective with this table is to show the fundamental importance of institutionalized communications during the formative years of the EPC, and the COREU data reflect this finding.
The day-to-day contacts of this transgovernmental network helped to limit the strict intergovernmental monopoly of the EPC process\textsuperscript{52} and the working groups created in the PoCo also played a greater role, as was anticipated by member states, by frequently suggesting collectively derived options to higher officials (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). Most scholars of the European political integration observe the emergence of a “mobilization effect” or “coordination reflex” among Foreign Offices and member states missions in international organizations (also described in the Copenhagen Report, 1973). This refers to the automatic consultation through the COREU communications system in order to exchange information, consider options and build consensus, even before individual national positions over a foreign policy issue were adopted (De Schoutheete, 1980; Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981; Hurd, 1981; Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 1998; 2004; Ginsberg, 1999; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, etc). As a result, officials from member states dealing with the EPC gradually oriented themselves toward “Europe” when considering foreign policy issues. According to Wessels (1982) and De Schoutheete (1980), by empowering and involving domestic bureaucrats with the task of developing political cooperation in Europe the EPC developed some sense of organizational loyalty among foreign policymakers by moving their positions towards a middle ground instead of defending strict national considerations.

Finally, the development of the EPC stimulated the idea of joint gains and common perceptions based on an especially designed \textit{communauté de vue}. The transgovernmental network built inside the EPC allowed relations to be structured towards achieving a European consensus on foreign policy issues. This is not to

\textsuperscript{52} Jolyon Howorth (2000 and 2011) suggests that political integration in Europe must be understood beyond the the supranational vs. intergovernmental divide. As a result he coined the term “supranational intergovernmentalism” to describe the influence of the community of diplomats (Diplocom) in the European political integration.
overstretch the explanatory power of individual personalities, career options and loyalties, but the information-sharing and consultation mechanisms developed by the Diplocom in the EPC permitted the idea that most officials felt committed to the communauté de vue (Glarbo, 1999; Smith, 1998). In the following sections we will see the conditions under which this transgovernmental network was created and how it influenced the evolution of a loose discussion forum (EPC) to the institutionalization of the cooperation into the CFSP/ESDP.

The years before: from EDC to Elysée

The 1954 failed French plans to develop a European Defence Community (EDC) with the “Pleven Plan” which would work in the framework of a European Political Community following the lines of the European Community (EC) left two immediate legacies: firstly, the German and Italian rearmament was left as an issue for the Western European Union (WEU) which had most of its security and defence functions transferred to NATO. Secondly, it was common sense that a political union in Western Europe should start in an informal or indirect way (Furdson, 1980; Menon, Forster and Wallace, 1992).

On his comeback to the French presidency, Charles de Gaulle proposed a three-power directorate which would serve as a political cooperation framework for the Americans,

53 As the description requires, when I refer to the European Community (EC) it is understood to be following the common usage to the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Community and the European Economic Community linked together with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The term is referred to in the literature as “European Communities”. The EC was absorbed by the EU with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU – Maastricht Treaty). Here the terms are used interchangeably.

54 As stated in Grosser, Alfred, (1980) The Western Alliance, London: MacMillan,, page 304: “[this directorate would have]… made joint-decisions in all political questions affecting global security … and would also draw up and, if necessary, implement strategic action plans, especially with regards to the use of nuclear weapons”.

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British and French. This idea was immediately rejected by the Americans and British, thereby turning the attention of the French towards continental Europe (West Germany, Italy and the BENELUX States). The French government suggested they should hold informal talks between the foreign ministers in order to discuss foreign policy issues. An agreement was reached in November 1959, but defence matters were excluded from the meetings and they would mainly focus on European instead of Atlantic issues (Grosser, 1980; Furdson, 1980).

Despite its limitations and its problematic relationship with the United States, this intergovernmental agreement provided the basis for the Luxemburg Report ten years later. It was the first recognition that the efforts for economic integration would have impacts on political relationships too. Due to its ineffectiveness in producing coordinated actions the French, with the support of the Germans, proposed a political union based on intergovernmental meetings and a secretariat in Paris, but the EC small States, led by the Dutch, promptly rejected the French proposition fearing that some kind of Political Committee dominated by the French or the Germans could undermine the EC, which at the time was still fragile (Smith, 2004; Nuttall, 1992).

Replying to the Dutch concerns, some ideas to develop a loose intergovernmental procedure to promote political integration were suggested. For this purpose, a study commission led by the French ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet, was set up. The main idea of the “Fouchet Plans” was to create a new council of heads of State or government with powers to “harmonize, coordinate, and unite the foreign, economic, cultural, and defence policies of the Six”. The proposal failed again due to the resistance of small EC States, now led by Belgium. Even though the Fouchet Plans were revised to try to reconcile the intergovernmental and supranational visions of political cooperation that divided the Europeans, it failed to bridge the divide (Allen and Wallace, 1982; Nuttall, 1992).
Meanwhile, through the close relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom the Atlantic Alliance was managing all defence and security issues at the European level, what made the French president Charles de Gaulle veto the UK application to join the EC and resume the efforts to find a “European way” to political integration based on the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation (called the Elysée Treaty). This Treaty, signed in January 1963, established close cooperation between France and Germany on issues of foreign policy, defence and culture, but the Germans wanted it to refer explicitly to the cooperation in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, thus blocking an independent European defence policy. In this sense, as the French could not find resonance for its proposal of creating a defence policy more independent from the Atlantic Alliance and they were not willing to accept any kind of foreign policy cooperation which would not include the defence component, the political cooperation at the European level stalled for the rest of the decade (Smith, 2004; Menon, Forster and Wallace, 1992).

The Luxemburg Report and the EPC

A couple of years later the idea of greater political integration at the European level regained power due to the enlargement perspectives of the EC, the final stage of the Common Market, the inability even to discuss the Six-Day War, and Charles de Gaulle stepping down as French president. In this context, the debate about an institutionalized political integration restarted with the Hague Summit in December 1969 in which the foreign ministers of the Six were instructed to study the best way to achieve political unification,\(^{55}\) thus “paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate

\(^{55}\)As explicitly cited, the foreign ministers were not supposed to develop institutions for foreign policy cooperation but to study the possibilities of political unification which were not defined in the instructions. (Smith, 2004: 69)
with its traditions and its mission” (Regelsberger, 1997: 6). The foreign ministers of the Six passed the instruction to the Political Directors which were responsible for drafting the Luxemburg Report (also called the Davignon Report). This report created the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Smith, 2004).

The ghost of the failed EDC and Fouchet Plans haunted the negotiators during the deliberations, meaning that the participants of the negotiation did not want to open the Pandora’s Box of discussing the views of intergovernmental or supranational political unification which led to the collapse of previous attempts. This norm of not discussing issues that led to the failure of previous attempts of integration (mainly the subject of supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism) and focusing on consensus building was one of the first features on the development of the transgovernmental network composed by the Political Directors in charge of the Luxemburg Report’ negotiations. They were also aware that the perspectives of enlargement and especially the inclusion of a major power like the UK could undermine the efforts already made to coordinate the policies of the Six. Moreover, France and Germany were unable to assume a bigger part of the leadership and the US was still standing against the idea of a more politically independent Europe (Smith, 2004; Nuttall, 1992).

Unlike its predecessors (the EDC and the Fouchet Plans) the EPC was successful because it gave away the main problem of its predecessors as it was neither supranational or federal like the EDC nor completely intergovernmental and separate from the EC like the Fouchet Plans (Nuttall, 1992: 30). However, the most important features during the creation of the EPC were the development of an information-sharing transgovernmental network directed at consensus building and the recognition of member states’ that at least some political coordination and cooperation were important in order to avoid harming the EC, its policies, and the relationships between themselves and between the EC and the external world. Therefore we can argue that
one of the most important achievements of the political cooperation in Europe was not the establishment of capacities to act on the world stage but the ability to avoid internal disruption due to extremely different political views. Furthermore, it gave a voice to member-states in the international arena, and by the 1980’s this was a tool of preventive diplomacy in the East-West relations, the Middle East and Southern Europe (Hill, 1993; Stewart, 2006).

According to the framework proposed by the Luxemburg Report the idea of a common foreign policy was discarded, or at least omitted from the framework. The defence issues were not to be discussed in the EPC but in NATO following the concerns from Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK of interfering with NATO politics. The institutional framework of the EPC was also very loose. The foreign ministers should meet at least twice a year to discuss international problems, however there were no specific decision-making mechanisms for producing coordinated foreign policy positions and taking common actions. Coordination was to be delivered by the regular Political Committee (PoCo) meetings which were composed of national Political Directors. Some countries had to create the position of Political Director in their Foreign Ministries due to the EPC (e.g. UK). This small evidence shows how the EPC somehow impacted on the domestic political systems of the member-states. The Luxemburg Report also required that each member-state should designate a liaison official to hold responsibility for the EPC on a daily basis in the absence of a secretariat. Those officials were later known as “European Correspondents”. As a result we can conclude that according to the Luxemburg report the EPC had a scarce institutional sphere, was dependent on the national foreign ministries and limited the participation of the EC procedures and organizations, even though it recognized the legitimacy of the EC, and it also established an informal biannual colloquy between foreign ministers and members of the EP (Smith, 2004).
The EPC was the perfect system for states who preferred to cooperated informally: it had no permanent budget, finances and staff for many years, no fixed meeting place, no secretariat, no specific subject to start the discussions, no compliance standards, no record-keeping system, and no legal obligations or enforcement mechanisms. Its administrative infrastructure was carried out exclusively by the foreign ministries of the member-states and the three most important documents until 1981: the Luxemburg Report, Copenhagen Report and London Report, had no treaty status and therefore didn’t need parliamentary ratification. This was a perfect system for States that wanted to avoid explicit, formal and visible pledges so that they could easily renegotiate their commitments and develop or abolish the system at the pace they desired. In short, in the beginning the EPC was little more than an exclusive “gentlemen’s club”, run by diplomats for diplomats (Lipson, 1991; Smith, 1998; 2004). Nonetheless, the lessons of the failed attempts at political cooperation showed the negotiators involved in the creation of the EPC that a more formal, legally binding agreement would be impossible at that time.

Informal networks of political cooperation: Copenhagen and London Reports

With the Copenhagen Report of 1973 and the London Report of 1981, the EPC gained weight and showed the importance of informal cooperation to European political integration. The Copenhagen Report established a transgovernmental infrastructure which gave rise to a broad information-sharing structure (combination of actors involved, types of information and channels of communication) that helped to prevent clashes on foreign policy interests among member-states and even stimulated the coordination and cooperation of policy views with the goal of solving common problems. According to Michael E. Smith (2004: 92 – 93), “many of these …

56 Among these transgovernmental infrastructure created with the Copenhagen Report we can cite: the cooperation between embassies of member-states in third-countries and in international organizations and
[information-sharing] … mechanisms and processes were not ordained by EU governments; they were based on the habits and customs of EPC diplomats themselves.” With the Copenhagen Report, the Political Committee (PoCo) was allowed to meet as much as the amount of work required and established the role of the Working Groups in the elaboration of the EPC (Nuttall, 1992; 2000). This enabled the foreign ministries to refer to the “reflex of coordination” which means that they had been accustomed to automatic consult with their colleagues on important foreign policy matters.

This information-sharing structure left by the Copenhagen Report can be translated as five major institutional developments to European political integration process. First it was a confidence-building measure in the sense it reduced the possibilities that the member-states would be surprised with others positions on foreign policy, thus reducing the possibility of conflict inside the community. Second, it helped to define to which problems the EPC were to address. Third, it helped to produce common points of view and analyses. Fourth, it had an evaluative aspect, that means there were discussed not only the EPC performance regarding a specific policy but also the overall development and effectiveness of it as an institution. Fifth it helped to enhance the demands for more norms and rules of behaviour to address common problems and the daily management of the EPC. Therefore the main policy outcomes of the EPC under Copenhagen Report were: 1. creation of institutionalized regional political dialogues, as seen in the Euro-Arab Dialogue, and 2. the first experiments with conflict prevention and civilian crisis management outside the community, with the European responses to the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the Portuguese Revolution of April 1974, the Cyprus Coup of July 1974, and the execution of Basque terrorists in Spain in 1975 (Regelsberger, 1988; Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 2004).
After the consistent establishment of the transgovernmental network at the time of the Copenhagen Report and further disappointments with the response of the EPC to the crises in Iran and Afghanistan the member-states agreed to improve the EPC, although with caution and efforts made not to make it more supranational. As a result the London Report was negotiated under the British presidency. The new Report focused on three areas of improvement within the EPC in particular: a better consultation mechanism in case of crises, the establishment of an administrative secretariat to the EPC, and the necessity for stronger political commitment of the member-states to the EPC (Nuttall, 1992). Therefore the London Report aimed to produce a major change in the EPC in order to transform it from a coordination mechanism to a tool for supporting the European interests in its international relationships (Smith, 2004). Here we can see the policy-makers recognizing that the EPC worked well enough as a preventive diplomacy mechanism (especially in the cases of East-West relations and Middle East and Southern Europe as mentioned above), and now they realized they needed to deepen the conflict prevention tools. As a result, with the London Report the member-states indicated their will to start building the basis for an external crisis management approach, thereby demonstrating the potential for projecting stability beyond its borders (Stewart, 2006).

It is important to highlight the evolution of procedural and substantive norms and rules inside the transgovernmental network after the Copenhagen Report. Those norms and rules enhanced the cohesion of the network, and although not institutionalized in a treaty they presented the driving force towards the forging of consensus and further development of the EPC as the main European political tool. These norms developed

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57 According to the London Report, Part I: „... possible to discuss in political cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security.”
through constant debate, interaction among the negotiators and trial-and-error learning, as reflected in the Luxemburg, Copenhagen and London Reports.

*The Single European Act: institutionalized cooperation*

The provisions of the London Report were further discussed in the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration which highlighted the importance of greater coherence and close coordination between the EPC and EC structures (Nuttall, 1992), but the EPC was only codified in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. However, it was still treated as a separate entity to the EC, thus reflecting the concerns of the member-states with its *de jure* intergovernmental character (Stewart, 2006). The SEA recognized that while the EC was based on its own treaties the EPC was based on “…reports of Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983) … [Stuttgart Declaration] … and the practices gradually established among the member states [called the coutumier]⁵⁸”. The SEA also highlighted that: “… [member-States] are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the *political and economical aspects of security*…”⁵⁹.

The SEA included the most complex provisions since the EPC was created, mainly involving three aspects of the system: intergovernmental, transgovernmental and rule-governed. Firstly it slightly enhanced the intergovernmental character of the EPC by basically establishing the role of the European Council (Bonvicini, 1988) on one hand but allowing the EPC meetings to be held together with the General Affairs Council of the EC on the other, thereby challenging the procedural distinction between the EPC and EC affairs. The transgovernmental aspect of the EPC was also slightly improved in

⁵⁸ Single European Act, Title I, Article 1 (emphasis added).

⁵⁹ Single European Act, Title III, Article 30 6(a) (emphasis added).
the SEA due to the move of the Political Committee to Brussels and the increase in the frequency of the EPC working groups meetings in Brussels (a process called “Brusselization” by many EU scholars) (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). Those actions enhanced the consultation and brought the EPC closer to the EC. Thirdly, the SEA formally codified many EPC informal norms, rules and customs as “general obligations” or legal rules and demanded that the EC and EPC external policies should be consistent, thus highlighting the importance and influence of the norms developed by the transgovernmental network into the integration process. In conclusion, the SEA did not make the EPC either more “supranational” or less “intergovernmental,” but its main achievement was to codify existing practices and to formally start to bridge the gap between the community and the EPC (Smith, 2004).

**Treaty of Maastricht: CFSP**

The fact that the international system was rapidly changing at the end of the 1980’s prompted major challenges and reforms to many institutions, including NATO, WEU, CSCE and the EU. However, it was not only due to external pressures that the institutional reform of the European political integration occurred, and instead those changes reflected endogenous, path-dependent processes. More precisely, those changes reflected the further codification of previously established norms and principles which were already in motion at the EPC. The institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union – TEU) represented a natural, logical progression by codifying what was already achieved with the EPC and establishing new goals and procedures into the system (Smith, 2004: 107).

Nevertheless, we can define four major areas of improvement of the European political integration as established by the Treaty on the European Union. Firstly it demanded a
higher level of coherence and rationalization of the policy-making process. Secondly, it established the CFSP as legally binding on EU member-states. Thirdly, it established many areas in which decision-making would take the form of qualified majority voting (QMV) instead of unanimity, and finally, it provided the EC organizational actors with a broader degree of autonomy to act in European foreign policy.

The TEU clearly signalled the vision (mainly stated by France and Germany) that the EPC needed to be transformed from a reactive to a proactive cooperative mechanism. It was the recognition that the EPC was unable to deal with the crises that affected Europe, and this deficiency was felt mainly during the outbreak of the Gulf War and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore issues of security and defence were brought to the negotiation table for the new Treaty while concerns over the possibility of serious security and defence problems in the post-Cold War era could undermine the ability of the Europeans to even prevent conflict inside Europe. Moreover, Europeans recognized that they would have more foreign interests with the development of the Single European Market and the possibility of a European Monetary Union, but they lacked institutional resources to politically protect those interests. Also, the demand to aid the Central and Eastern European Countries to support democracy and development posed a challenge to the European political structures.

Under the TEU the CFSP represented a mix of intergovernmental and supranational elements, with enhancements and extensions of institutional mechanisms. The major elements of change can be identified as the rationalization of the policy process, the establishment of binding legal obligations, changes in decision-making rules, and the greater autonomy of EC organizations.

In the TEU the Europeans agreed to include the need for more cooperation in defence matters in the provisions of the CFSP, even though they did not agree to merge the
Western European Union (WEU) with the EU. This clarified the decision-making process for the use of common positions and joint actions alongside the normal EPC consultations, declarations, and demarches, and this is a change from a consultative approach of the EPC to a mechanism designed to produce regular foreign policy outputs (see the actual CFSP instruments on the Annex I). The EU presidency represented the Union under the CFSP (as one of the two intergovernmental pillars of the Union – CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs), implemented its policies and was responsible for expressing the EU positions in international organizations and conferences. The EU presidency could be assisted by the Troika (former, current and following EU presidencies), the Commission and the WEU (in any decisions and actions of the Union with defence implications).

In the second element we can observe that for the first time the European political cooperation was institutionalized in terms of a Treaty, and the CFSP common positions had the form of a formal legal act of the Council of Ministers and therefore they were legally binding on EU states (they are published in the Official Journal of EC Legislation). Moreover, the term Common Foreign and Security Policy denoted the EU’s will to transform itself into a global actor and reflected an obligation towards joint policy making rather than the coordination of individual national foreign policy goals during the EPC.

In the third element we can see that a major advance regarding decision-making rules was that the TEU established that any initial decision concerning actions under the CFSP must be unanimous, but once passed the actions could be subject to QMV (such as means, duration, financing, etc.). Together with the inclusion of defence issues, the

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60 However there was a WEU declaration attached to the TEU in which the WEU would commit to strengthen itself as the defence arm of the EU and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
QMV was a major advance of the CFSP compared with the EPC, even though there are many rules and restrictions to the use of QMV.

Finally, in the fourth element the TEU saw the increase of autonomy on the part of EC organizations. This was both due to Treaty provisions and to complex linkages of EC actors and CFSP policy process. The creation of a “Unified External Services” and the new DG-IA (Directorate General – External Political Relations) represented those linkages between the EC and CFSP. With the creation of these organs we can see that the economic and political functions of external relationships were inseparably linked for the Commission.

Even though the taboo over defence issues was brought down under Maastricht, different visions on what would be an independent European defence structure, the future of NATO and the WEU and the relationship between the EU, WEU and NATO undermined the efforts of a common European defence (van Ecklen, 1998). Therefore under Maastricht the CFSP, like its predecessor the EPC, was basically devoted to long-term conflict resolution with diplomatic and economic tools and not a quick crisis management mechanism using military means, as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia showed (Stewart, 2006). The institutionalization of the transgovernmental network of officials dealing exclusively with military issues was pushed forward only after the Yugoslavian Crisis. This explains the inability to reach a European consensus to military action during this crisis. Due to the strong resistance in the military staff of some countries of the EU (such as England, Germany, and the Netherlands, etc.), those issues were left to NATO. The development of an institutional setting to deal with military issues was only possible after the Saint Malo agreement and the development of capacities to launch joint operations. For this reason it is important to distinguish between the “coordination reflex” and socialization effects in the foreign ministries and the transgovernmental network among military staff
in the EU that is still on the making (what Christoph Meyer calls “development of a European strategic culture”, 2007). Those crises influenced the reform of the CFSP under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which emphasised the operational capacities, coherent foreign policy representation and competences on planning and analysis.

Considering the fact that during the EPC years security and defence issues were a taboo, we can see that during the European Councils in 1992 (Lisbon and Edinburgh) and 1993 (Brussels) the EU defined specific issues in the security area that could be subject to joint actions (those included non-proliferation, territorial and political integrity of the EU, stability of neighbouring nations, etc.). Nevertheless, until the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996 few minor security-related issues were addressed by the CFSP through joint-actions. Even during the early 1996 crisis between Greece and Turkey over the island of Imia/Karadak, the CFSP was unable to avoid conflict escalation and depended on the United States to take action. This problem was in part due to the major role played by the EU presidency over the CFSP agenda. The Italian presidency did not call for a more assertive approach of the EU, and the leadership vacuum was not filled by anyone (Smith, 2004). These problems of crisis management were expected to be addressed during the next IGC in Amsterdam.

To this point we can remark that substantive coherence was enhanced in the CFSP compared to the EPC, meaning the use of different EU external policy mechanisms or competencies (such as development aid, political dialogue, market accession, etc.) toward a common external goal. Meanwhile, procedural coherence was still a problem because it involved the rationalization of institutional tools for achieving those goals (decision-making, policy implementation, representation, etc.). We also see the discussion over the development of an institutional setting to deal with military issues as an effect of the Yugoslavian crisis. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice tried to address these institutional flaws of the EU external policy.
3.1.2 - Transgovernmental networks and the ESDP

Treaty of Amsterdam: High-Representative for the CFSP

The Amsterdam Treaty put forward general provisions concerning coherence and common interests by expanding the definition of fundamental objectives of the CFSP and providing common strategies that enabled the mobilization of resources under the three-pillars (EC, CFSP and JHA) towards a single foreign policy goal. It also addressed three other concerns of EU foreign policy, namely decision-making, implementation and financing.

The most important change to be noticed was the creation of the function of High-Representative for the CFSP (which would also be the Secretary-General of the Council) and is designed to assist the EU presidency and head the “CFSP Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit” in the Council Secretariat. This Unit is responsible for monitoring and providing assessments, early warning and policy options for the Council, and it was expected that it would provide a link for greater cooperation among the Commission and the EU member-states. However, the Higher-Representative for the CFSP (HR/CFSP) is not able to initiate policies, and until the Lisbon Treaty they had fewer resources as the Commission (Smith, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). Despite its high prominence in the CFSP/ESDP structure, the High Representative and his staff occupies, together with political leaders, the most remote positions in the

61 The acronym ESDP was substituted by CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) by the Lisbon Treaty. We will use the ESDP acronym in this work because it is how the Defence policy of the European Union is still best known.
network (Merand, Hoffmann, and Irondelle, 2010:10). According to Duke and Vonhooonacker (2006), this is caused because those administrative actors are more heavily involved in day-to-day policy making, and therefore they become remote from the information that has already passed and was digested through other more central nodes in the network.

The Amsterdam Treaty also established a legal basis to provide military capability to the CFSP, incorporating the WEU “Petersberg Tasks” which included “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making.” The discussion over the merging of the WEU into the EU divided the member-states, and this was only concluded in 1998 when the UK agreed to pursue crisis management tasks under the EU at the St. Malo Declaration (Boyer, 2004). Still, in Amsterdam it was affirmed that NATO was the essential forum for European defence.

**Building up the capabilities: Cologne, Helsinki and Nice**

The discussions to develop institutional settings to deal with military aspects of security gained weight after the agreement at St. Malo and the European failure to formulate a coherent response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The agreement to develop an autonomous military capacity of the EU was established on the condition that it would not duplicate or challenge the role of NATO as Europe’s main defence organization.

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62 The HR/CFSP has many connections in the network, but it does not occupy a central position and could be defined as a weak-tie in social network theory. Nonetheless, the lack of centrality is compensated by the number of connections and the status sponsored by the HR/CFSP. In this sense the HR/CFSP helps to facilitate the exchange of information from different parts of the network (easing the integration of the social system) and between the network and other actors.

63 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, Article J. 7 (2).
Nevertheless, the argument that an independent European collective defence was to be developed was false because the main focus of the Europeans was on external crisis response such as that delineated in the Petersberg Tasks and not defence in its traditional sense (Stewart, 2006).

The most important steps toward the development of European crisis management capabilities were taken in the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki in 1999. In the European Council of Cologne it was agreed that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) would need enough military capabilities and decision-making structures to work properly. As previously agreed at St. Malo, it was accepted that the WEU crisis management functions would merge with the EU (Hochleitner, 2001), and the WEU Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies were also incorporated into the institutional framework of the CFSP. The talks with NATO to establish protocols for the use of its assets to accomplish the ambitious “Petersberg Tasks” started in 1999 and were agreed in 2002 at the Copenhagen European Council with the so-called Berlin-Plus arrangements (Howorth, 2007).

The Finnish presidency moved forward the agenda regarding the military and non-military aspects of crisis management established in Cologne. During the Helsinki European Council the European Headline Goals were established, and these prompted the Member-states to enhance their military capabilities and interoperability. It proposed the creation of an EU crisis management force, known as the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), which would undertake the Petersberg Tasks. This force was to be composed of 60,000 troops which would be ready to be deployed within 60 days for a minimum period of one year. With the advancements achieved in Cologne and Helsinki, the ESDP was finally declared operational at the Laeken Summit in 2001 (Weisserth, 2003).
Even though it was not on the discussion agenda for the 2000 Nice Treaty, additional reforms of the CFSP were finalized at this Treaty. After the 1998 St. Malo Declaration it was possible to merge the WEU within the EU. The Nice Treaty also added three new institutional organs to deal with the issues related to the ESDP: the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, and the European Union Military Staff. Among those new organs, the most important is the Political and Security Committee – PSC (also known as the French acronym, COPS). The PSC is composed of permanent representatives of the member-States with ambassador ranks that meet two or three times a week in Brussels to discuss the formulation of policies, draft opinions for the Council and oversee the implementation of agreed policies (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Howorth, 2007). According to recent research, the PSC is a fundamental gathering of a transgovernmental network dealing with defence issues and the development of a “European strategic culture” (Howorth, 2011; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Meyer, 2007). According to Merand, Hoffmann, and Irondelle (2010), the PSC ambassadors occupy a strategic position in the network as the main gatekeepers\textsuperscript{64} for their domestic governments\textsuperscript{65}. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff of the member-states and is responsible for making military recommendations to the PSC. The EUMC is the highest EU military body, and its chairman participates in the PSC, Council and NATO Military Committee meetings. It is the designated “forum for consultation and cooperation between member-states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management” (Howorth, 2007). The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of 150 senior officers from the member-states and is responsible for providing expertise through situation assessment, early warning and strategic planning.

\textsuperscript{64} For a statistical analysis of the Gatekeeping Scores in the ESDP Transgovernmental Network see Merand, Hoffmann, and Irondelle, 2010.

\textsuperscript{65} However, it is important to highlight that the accesses to national subnetworks are also controlled by other governmental actors with more internal connections (such as national officials in defence and foreign ministeries).
The Treaty of Nice also endorsed the development of the civilian crisis management mechanisms with the creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The CIVCOM was established to report the COREPER and assist with the PSC. It should produce expertise on civilian crisis management operations and enhance the inter-pillar coherence of the EU capabilities on civilian crisis management. Those progressed in four areas, namely police, rule of law, civilian administration and civilian protection operations (Stewart, 2006).

*The European Security Strategy (ESS): developing a strategic culture*

The first concrete result towards the development of a European strategic culture can be observed in the European Security Strategy (ESS). This document was presented by the High Representative for CFSP at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 (Stewart, 2006). The ESS established the normative strategic thinking behind the ESDP. The document had in mind an idea to forge a “European strategic culture” in the event of disputes among EU member-states over the Iraq War (Howorth, 2007). The ESS would not have been possible without the initiative of the transgovernmental network of ambassadors at the PSC which decided to draft a common strategic document and managed to persuade their own governments of the importance to develop such a common EU strategy (Meyers, 2007).

The document shows that the Europeans have drawn lessons from perceived failures in cooperation and policy-making. Moreover, some authors understood it as a response to the US American National Security Strategy (US NSS) of September 2002 (Dannreuthuer and Peterson, 2006). This understanding that the ESS was a response to the 2002 US NSS derives from the fact that the firm commitment of the ESS to multilateral solutions to deal with threats contrasts with the unilateral inclination of the US American National Security Strategy.
The ESS identified the main threats to EU security and outlined responses to deal with those threats. The threats identified in the ESS are international terrorism, failed states, regional conflicts, organised crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The document reinforced the EU commitment to multilateralism and the EU responsibility to build security in its neighbourhood and work with partners in order to tackle those threats. Moreover, the ESS recognizes that the EU has to be more active, capable and coherent. There is also a very strong mention of preventive engagement of the EU as opposed to the pre-emptive logic of its US American counterpart. In the first draft it was suggested that the ESS should mention pre-emptive engagement instead of emphasising preventive engagement, which would please the American partners, but there was strong objection to using this nomenclature (Stewart, 2006).

The ESS also reflects the many concepts which inform the normative approach of the ESDP (Howorth, 2007). The most relevant among those concepts are comprehensive security, global public good and human security. The first key concept relates the ESDP to a positive dimension of security, which means that the concept of security (one’s security depends on the security of the others) is directly opposed to the concept of defence (one’s security depends on the weakness or insecurity of the other). First drafted at the Helsinki Final Act, the EU concept of security addresses basic human rights, fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental cooperation, peace and stability. The second key concept of global public good reflects concerns with stability, physical security, rule of law, economic development, general well-being, health, education and environmentalism. Those issues are understood as being interdependent and they cannot be addressed separately. The third concept of human security, according to the Human Security Report, is defined as “freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations".
The ESS also recognizes that the first line of defence of the EU is usually abroad, and therefore it stresses the role of conflict prevention and crisis management of the Union. As a result it calls for a closer relationship between the conflict prevention capabilities of the EU and the crisis management tools of the CFSP/ESDP.

For most of its critics however there are many flaws in the ESS, mainly with the lack of indication of the ESDP’s geographical scope and disputes on the appropriate use of force. Moreover, there is still the uneasy partnership with NATO and the fact that to date the ESDP missions\textsuperscript{66} have been relatively small, and there are still doubts on the will of member-states to act in case of crisis response (Stewart, 2006). However, the ESS represents the increasing influence of the transgovernmental network in the EU and contributes to the emergence of an EU strategic culture which is socializing the military and civilians responsible for defence and military issues into shared norms, rules and codes of conduct.

\textit{Transgovernmentalism and the ESDP}

Based on our research and the statistical analysis presented by Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle (2010) we can see that the PSC ambassadors are the main leaders in the ESDP transgovernmental network. Those actors are responsible for expressing the opinions of their governments, but they are also influential on how those opinions can be steered back in their capitals in order to reach a common agreement. As a result they occupy the position of main gatekeepers in the EU-National Capital relationship. Other political-military bodies also occupy a relative central position in the network such as the EUMC and the EUMS, but these act more as coordinators than facilitators. Other bureaucratic actors of different countries also provide access to sections of the network,

\textsuperscript{66} The list of ongoing and completed Missions is available in Annex II.
but their relationship and interaction is exclusively formal and bureaucratic. Other actors such as think tanks, NGO’s, lobbies and political leaders are deemed as not being relevant to daily cooperation practices.

We observed a high degree of cooperative interaction among governmental units that occupy structurally similar positions in the ESDP issues. In our interview with the German PSC representative he argued that: “The interactions with my colleagues not only in the work-time but also in the private sphere enhance the prospects of trust and confidence that a common position can be reached.” As a result, based on the results of our interviews we agree with the statistical findings of Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle (2010) which shows two main transgovernmental groups in the ESDP: first a core policy group which is responsible for crisis management and capability development and is composed of officials in the Council’s Secretariat, permanent representations, and national-based security officials (with a more functional than political role), and secondly a more politically robust Franco-German group that can be related to almost 60 years of close cooperation. Therefore, in the words of Merand, Hoffmann and Irondelle (2010:15): “… there are clear elements of transgovernmentalism in the ESDP domain, but the phenomenon seems limited to a narrow group of officials.” We will see how the transgovernmental networks are socialized in the PSC, CWG, and COREPER below.

3.2 - International socialization: definitions, strategies and outcomes

Our second hypothesis to be addressed in this chapter is whether European institutions are able to socialize agents. Institutions are understood as organizations established by state’s agreements such as the EPC, the CWGs and the COREPER. While some scholars focus on the broad socialization effects of institutions on States (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2006), in this chapter we study the influence of
institutions on individuals (national representatives) as socializable agents\textsuperscript{67}. Those socialized agents might internalize or instrumentalize norms, values and principles developed in transgovernmental networks, but they sensitively influence the path of integration in Europe.

Socialization is a central concept for constructivists. According to Onuf (1998:59) “social relations make or construct people – ourselves – into the kinds of beings we are”. As a result, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) suggest that we should treat institutions as social institutions where “actor expectations converge”. Johnston (2001) argues that there are two microprocesses of socialization: persuasion and social influence. While the first refers to “changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion” (2001:496), the latter denotes the distribution of social rewards and punishments that enhance pro-norm behaviour such as “rewards that might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations. Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning, or dissonance derived from actions which are inconsistent with role and identity” (2001: 499). Socialization is especially used for observing how newcomers and novices change their ways to comply with the norms of a group. According to Stryker and Statham (1985: 325 see Johnston, 2001: 494), “Socialization is the generic term used to refer to the processes by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee for example – becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction”; or as Berger and Luckmann (1966:130, see ibid) define it, “the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or sector of it”.

\textsuperscript{67} According to most of the socialization literature in social psychology, sociology, communications theory, and political socialization theory, the unit of analysis is the individual or small group, and not the unitary state (See Johnston, 2001: 506-507).
We use the ideotypical definition of socialization, according to Checkel (2007; 5-6):

“[...] a process of inducting actors into the norms and the rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness: this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.”

Therefore, in Checkel we observe the close relationship between the concepts of socialization and internalization. Although the concept has been used by many to cover all forms of rule adoption by States and governments (Schimmelfennig; 1994; 2000; Alderson, 2001; Checkel; 2005), we understand internalization in its narrow sense as it was presented by Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. In this sense internalization refers to the reflective and individual adoption of rules, and therefore individuals internalize rules and follow them because they accept them as legitimate or appropriate. However, even though we consider the idea that socialization might lead to internalization, we also consider that actors may also only adopt the group’s practices strategically and without internalizing such norms or practices. Checkel (2007: 6) observes two different types of internalization of socialized norms. The so-called “type I” internalization refers to the fact that agents may learn a role and therefore behave appropriately, independent of whether they like or agree with the role. The important feature in this “type I” socialization is that agents learn to consciously know what is socially accepted in a given setting or community. Contrary to this, “Type II” socialization goes beyond role playing and implies that individuals adopt the interests or even the identity of the community to which they belong.
The second question refers to how and when the socialization process of norms occurs. The socialization strategies addressed in this chapter are strategic calculation, role playing, and normative persuasion. We will examine each of these strategies below.

Strategic calculation recognizes that incentives and rewards for socialization can take the form of social (status, shaming) as well as material roles. However, this mechanism – with deep roots in rationalist social theory and which implies that agents are instrumentally rational – only produces socialization effects when behaviour adaptation to the norms and rules of a given community which are first carried by calculations to maximize interests are later followed by sustained compliance caused by cognitive and institutional lock-in effects (Checkel, 2007).

Role playing or role conception sees agents being bound by rationality, meaning that they are overwhelmed with information to process and are therefore not capable of calculating the costs and benefits of all of the alternative courses of action precisely. In this sense, organizational or group environments offer simplifying shortcuts which can lead to the development of specific role conceptions among individuals. This lack of calculative behavioural adaptation can be described as Type I internalization because agents assume determined roles due to the appropriateness of one particular setting and therefore are not involved with reflective internalization guided by communicative processes. In this sense, according to the mechanism of role playing individuals take on roles because it is easy socially and when it is impossible to measure the costs and benefits of all alternative courses of action. However, those roles can develop into taken-for-granted habits without any conscious act of persuasion (Checkel, 2007; Beyer, 2007; Aggestam, 2004; Smith, 2004). According to Checkel, the conditions for the internalization of role conceptions according to community norms can be defined as

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68 Based on Checkel, 2007.
1) The contact among agents is long and sustained and it has some significant duration; and 2) Agents are in settings where the contact is intense.

Normative suasion argues that agents present arguments and try to persuade and convince each other, thus keeping their interests and preferences open for redefinition. In this sense, when normative suasion occurs agents actively and reflectively internalize new norms of behaviour. According to Hasenclever et al. (1997: 176-177), “the parties enter a discourse where they try first to bring about agreement concerning the relevant features of a social situation and then advance reasons why a certain behaviour has to be avoided. These reasons – as far as they are convincing – internally motivate the parties to behave in accordance with the previously elaborated interpretation and the justified expectations of others.” This is what Checkel labels Type II internalization. This idea that persuasion operates as a fundamental mechanism in internalization/socialization is also defended by practitioner-scholars such as Chayes and Chayes (1995), and De Schoutheete (1988). According to Chekcel (2007: 13), the scope of conditions under which a persuasion-socialization dynamic occurs can be defined as: 1) The agent is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyse new information; 2) The agent has few previous and deep-rooted beliefs that conflict with the socializing agency’s message; 3) The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the in-group; 4) The socializing agency/individual acts out principles of serious deliberative argument; and 5) The meetings/interaction happen in less politicized and more closed-doors settings.

In this sense, in our case-studies of the Council Working Groups (CWGs), Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the COREPER we will see which socialization strategies are used and the outcomes of this socialization process. Although these are highly institutionalized settings, they are also the locus of transgovernmental networks which were established well before its creation (especially the PSC), and therefore they
are legitimate settings to analyse if and how socialization operates inside transgovernmental networks.

3.2.1 - When norms matter: socialization and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since Deutsch’s (1957) and Haas (1958) seminal studies, questions on European integration have been about issues such as to what extent, under which conditions, and through which processes political elites of member states shift their allegiance towards the EU. According to Beyers (2007: 99), socialization is conceived as: “[...] the organization of social interactions (meaning institutional conditions and informal/formal rules that structure social life) and/or the logic of these interactions (meaning instrumental bargaining, role playing, or suasion) affect which behavioural practices, norms about appropriateness, and preferences about outcomes are internalized by individual actors, but because they are shared by many they also characterize and shape the identity of larger social aggregates (meaning a bureaucratic agency, a political party, a country, and so on). Socialization therefore refers to both individuals (meaning when and how they socialize) and groups (meaning the social aggregate’s features and how interactions among individuals shape these aggregates).” Therefore we can see that socialization is a process of the internalization of the rules and norms of a group that can lead to a change from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness.

In this section we will look at the strategies (strategic action, role paying, or normative suasion) and outcomes of socialization in the three main bodies of the Council that deal with foreign policy and security issues (the CWGs, COREPER and PSC), ranging from ambassador level bureaucrats (such as in the COREPER and the PSC) to less experienced diplomats (CWGs), and also observing the variance in the level of rotation
(high in the CWGs and low in the COREPER and PSC). Besides the secondary literature used and the official documents, this section is also based on non-consecutive in-depth interviews carried out in Brussels and national capitals during the period of 2007-2009 with officials of the three bodies.

3.2.1.1 - Socialization in the Council Working Groups dealing with the CFSP

The Treaty of Maastricht merged the former EPC Working Groups with the EC Working Parties in a single institutional framework known as CFSP Standing Working Parties\(^{69}\) (CWGs henceforth). The function of the CWGs is to discuss and draft CFSP documents such as Join Actions, Council Conclusions, and Action Plans. National representatives of the permanent representations in Brussels compose the CWGs. There are 36 permanent CFSP CWGs following either thematic or geographical lines; two dealing with EU crisis management (the EU Military WG and the CIVCOM), two responsible for preparing the agenda for the PSC and COREPER II meetings, and the RELEX Counsellors WG responsible for certifying horizontal coordination between CFSP and EC matters. Most of the CFSP CWGs meet once or twice a week, and they sometimes meet together with other CWGs on cross-cutting issues (see figure 2 for CWGs channels of socialization). CWGs can also meet in “capital formations” with expert officials from the Foreign Offices. The CWGs in “capital formations” meet twice every presidency on average (6 months), however depending on the theme of the Working Group and the current world political situation they can meet more often. According to officials, not all of the CWGs share the same position in the European foreign policy-making process, and there is a feeling that CWGs that deal with sensitive issues have a lesser say while the CWGs that deal with the ESDP issues are composed of more

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\(^{69}\) For a detailed explanation about the merger and transformation of the former EPC and EC Working Groups into CFSP Working Groups see Nuttall, 2000: 249.
senior officials (EUMC is composed of senior officials from the Ministries of Defence), and they occupy an intermediate position between bodies at higher levels (PSC and COREPER II). Also, contrary to the COREPER and PSC meetings CFSP CGWs meetings are not insulated\(^70\). However, issues agreed at the CWGs meetings represent around 70 per cent of the items “ready for approval” in the GAERC agenda and 15-20 per cent in COREPER’s agenda. This is a very high percentage because sensitive or contentious issues such as granting candidate status or appointing the EU Special Representatives have to be directly forwarded to higher levels (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 169; Nuttall; 2000; Juncos and Pomorska; 2006; Beyers, 2007).

The code of conduct in the CWGs is composed of three principles, namely coordination reflex consensus building practice, and \textit{domaines réservés}.

Coordination reflex represents the willingness of officials to communicate and exchange information with each other (even if actors take into account who they share the information with and for which purposes – i.e. actors as self-reflective). In this sense, the group exerts peer pressure on those who do not share information. Even though the COREEU system has lost much of its importance for informal communications in the CWGs, the communication among officials has increased exponentially and nowadays happens mainly through emails, mobile phones, and frequent corridor or lunch meetings. These consultations can take place in small groups (core groups), bilaterally, or in broader groups, etc. In those informal negotiations the officials exchange information about their positions or other types of information that facilitate the decision-making process.

\(^{70}\) According to Lewis (2007: 146), insulation refers to the fact that the participants of the group are not influenced by “normal currents of domestic constituent pressures”. As a result insulated meetings are confidential and closed to participation and attendance of non-members of the group. In the case of the COREPER meetings, besides discussing sensitive positions officials debate the best strategy to sell the package back in their home capitals.
Informal negotiations to achieve a compromise before the meeting is also a normal practice among the CWGs officials. In the like-minded groups (core groups), informal consultation meetings serve the purpose of preparing a common line of action and arranging the strategy for the next formal CWG meeting in detail. Therefore the formal meeting becomes a simple representation of “roles” previously agreed. Those groups often operate on a very informal basis and participants credit each other with trust. Coordination reflex therefore also implies a tendency to take other’s views into account when formulating national positions (instructions) and avoiding conflict with others’ positions. However, coordination reflex is mostly seen by diplomats as a path to increase their chances in the negotiations and avoid isolation in the CWGs. In this sense we can conclude that it’s a strategic calculation of socialized actors. Some officials even admit that they share selective sensitive information (like national instructions, security assessments, etc.) with their colleagues if it is necessary to reach an agreement (Tonra, 2001; Aggestam, 2004; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Beyers, 2005).
The second guiding principle of the CWGs is the consensus building practice. This refers to the fact that member states hardly ever use their veto power during negotiations. The logic is the opposite, as there is a general practice to keep everyone in the discussion and try to achieve consensus. In this sense, the main driving force behind day-to-day CWG is the search for an agreement within the group. The group, their superiors in the PSC and COREPER II, and the presidency pressure for effectiveness by pushing the officials to reach an agreement at the end of the day and not leaving any unresolved problem to be passed on to a higher political level. In these terms of agreed issues of the agenda, efficiency in the CWGs reaches 90-95% (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006: 8).

The third guiding principle identified is the role played by the domaines réservés to the convergence of positions in the CWGs. Domaines réservés are very sensitive issues to specific member states that cannot be submitted to discussion and interference of other member states. Those domaines réservés are normally security/defence issues (national defence, borders, nuclear status, neutrality, etc.) and special relationships. Those issues are purposely kept out of the CWGs agenda and go straight to a higher level.

Besides this there are rules of behaviour which are considered appropriate by the group, and once breached these lead to a decrease of credibility and even the ostracism of an official in the group. These rules refer to the comportment to present the instructions, courtesy towards other group members, and language used. According to Juncos and Pomorska (2006: 9), other rules of behaviour in the CWGs include: 1) Vertical and horizontal consistency (meaning not contradicting the position taken at a higher level, not opening an already closed issue, and not contradicting the positions already taken in other forums); 2) When the instructions are considered difficult to justify in front of the group the official should give informal signs of that to other group
members with expressions such as “according to my instructions…” or “according to my capital…” instead of “we think…”; 3) Keep the group atmosphere positive by avoiding clashes with other members; 4) One cannot argue against the EU’s agreed policy which has been established before; 5) Consider the deals proposed by the Commission and the presidency; and 6) Do not express radical positions or “hide behind the back” of others.

The rules of behaviour, or “ways of doing things” in the CWGs originate from the interaction with members of the same group and the norms and rules evolved from the transgovernmental network developed since the beginning of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The socialization to those norms and rules do not mean the actors internalize the interests and identity of the organization. In this sense however some authors argue that socialization in the CWG follows a logic of role conception (see Beyer, 2007), but we argue that in the CWGs rationality plays a major role in determining an actor’s behaviour. Therefore the most important mechanism of socialization at work in the CWG is strategic calculation because it recognizes that incentives and rewards for socialization are, in this case, social (status, shaming), and/or material (career perspectives). This means that in the CWGs the behaviour adaptation to the norms and rules of the community is firstly carried by calculations to maximize interests (long term negotiations) and then later followed by sustained compliance caused by cognitive and institutional lock-in effects (reputation, credibility). Diplomats in the CWGs are self-reflective, and when asked about why they adopt these norms they respond in terms on national interest. According to Juncos and Pomorska (2006: 4): “The [CWGs] actors’ motivation to follow social pressures stems from the desire to maintain or improve their position within the group as part of their long-term interest calculation. Legitimacy and reputation, factors contributing to one actor’s status in a group become highly appreciated as they improve the chances of getting the national interest reflected in the policy outcome. Credibility is particularly important in the case of iterated negotiations such as those taking place at the EU…”
This is not to say that in the longer term, especially when actors stay in the same group for long time periods with regular contact with each other, that the behavioural norms and rules become “taken for granted” (habitualization or type II internalization according to Checkel). However, the empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis for the CWG officials. We observe that officials in the CWG might imitate the behaviour of their colleagues in the beginning when they don’t know how to act accordingly. This represents what Checkel (2007) calls type I internalization. Some socializations’ scope conditions identified by Lewis (2005: 945-947) such as insulation, the density of issues, and low level of rotation are not present in the CWG. In this sense, contrary to the PSC and COREPER meetings the CWG formal negotiations are not insulated, thereby allowing not only the participation of other diplomats and ambassadors of the COREPER and PSC but even the participation of actors which are external to the EU. This leads to a lack of “agent autonomy”, also identified by Johnston (2005) as another condition for internalization. Therefore national representatives in the CWGs experience relatively less margin of manoeuvre than their colleagues in the COREPER and the PSC. Furthermore, the level of rotation of the CWGs officials (average of 2-3 years) is higher than in other bodies such as the COREPER and the PSC. In this sense, if national representatives would stay longer in the CWGs they might have the time to develop internalization type II or habitualization with the CWGs norms and rules and thus begin taking them for granted (Checkel, 2007; Beyers, 2007; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006).

Another important question to be addressed is how far socialization affects the national positions (instructions) received by the officials at the CWGs level. As seen above, credibility and reputation play a central role in daily negotiations in the CWGs. In the CWGs there are two types of credibility: the individual (perceived as the adherence of representatives to the group norms and rules) and the country. More than the State credibility, if the position of the diplomat within the group is strong he will have more
possibilities to negotiate and move forward his national instructions. However, the representatives can be entrapped in situations where the instructions are not in tune with the negotiating atmosphere in Brussels. According to CGW officials, when there is a difference in the perceptions of officials in Brussels and those formulating the instructions in the capital the official will try to discuss the instructions with his superior or try to convince the capital that the instructions should be changed for the sake of the state’s credibility in the group. The officials see themselves as “transmission belts” – they are able to use their expertise and institutional position to not only influence the European politics and decision making process but also their foreign ministries (Spencer, 2002: 33; Lewis, 2007). According to Beyers (2007), this happens because they are embedded in two social environments: domestic and European (what he calls “multiple embeddedness”), and in this way the code of conduct learnt upon their arrival in Brussels modifies their national code of conduct. As a result their participation in the process of the Europeanization of national foreign policies is twofold: adapt the national foreign policy to the European foreign policy and promote national foreign policy goals at the European level. Officials have different ways of influencing their instructions. In some cases diplomats are not given any precise instruction on how to deal with a specific issue on the agenda. In other cases, depending on the foreign office organizational structure and the power of the representatives’ position within it the official practically writes his own instructions. The worst situation for a national representative is when he receives instructions completely “out of the point” which are ignoring the negotiating atmosphere and the code of conduct in the CWGs (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Smith, 1998; 2004; Glarbo, 1999; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Beyers, 2007).

Despite the mostly technical nature of the issues discussed in the CFSP CWGs, they still exert influence on the directions of the EU foreign policy. This influence is based on the norms, rules and principles that constitute the CWGs code of conduct. These rules are learnt as a result of the official’s participation and exposure in the CWGs (but also
quantity, quality and longevity of the interaction in the CWGs). As a result, non-compliance with those rules harms the credibility and legitimacy of the diplomat and the state inside the group, therefore decreasing the chances of influencing the policy outcome according to the national instructions. Finally, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the lack of insulation and agent autonomy allied to a high level of rotation inhibits the development of internalization type II among CWG officials.

3.2.1.2 - Socialization in the Political and Security Committee

The PSC (Political and Security Committee), also known by its French acronym COPS (Comité Politique et de Sécurité), was established in 2000 by the Treaty of Nice and replaced the EPC’s Political Committee (PoCo). Many studies from policy-makers and scholars show the importance of this specialised committee (PoCo) in the formulation of European foreign policy making. According to those accounts, “the notion that the Committee’s ‘ambiance d’intimité’, with its small number of regular participants, had led to the formation of both an ‘esprit de corps’ and a ‘consultation reflex’” (Nuttall, 1992; 2000; de Shouthetee, 1980). Those studies provided evidence for ‘cognitive’ approaches to the study of European foreign policy which showed that the events happening in the PoCo meetings had an impact on the European foreign policy making, and moreover “that national officials could, over time, come to develop new loyalties,


73 Nuttall refers to “consultation reflex” as the “automatic reflex of consultation brought about by frequent personal contacts with opposite numbers from other Member-States” (1992:312) . Nuttall also observes the development of a “club spirit” allegedly caused by the frequent meetings, formally in the PoCo formations and informally at lunches and dinners, and through sharing information and discussing their national foreign policy positions (1992:313).
thereby affecting their definition of interest” (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 128). Ben Tonra suggests that the participants of the PoCo (2001:12) “see themselves not as emissaries of pre-defined positions but as policy arbiters. They are, in effect, seeking to internalize the identity ambitions of colleagues so as to thereby see that their own positions are at least complimentary”.

It is important to highlight the fact that the PoCo was established together with the EPC in 1970 by the Luxembourg Report, right after the failed attempts of the European Defence Community and the Fouchet Plans. In this sense, the discussion between supranationalists vs. intergovernmentalists was a major issue during the creation of PoCo, and therefore in order to avoid a spillover contamination of foreign policy issues by the European supranational structures the participation of the EC in the EPC was voluntarily restricted, thus excluding the EC’s participation in meetings in which issues of security and defence were being discussed. Moreover, the PoCo meetings were carried out in Member State capitals in order to “keep the new procedure untainted by the insidious atmosphere of Brussels” (Nuttall, 1992: 317).

Despite the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 replacing the EPC, the PoCo remained in its original form. The PoCo also survived other changes in the EU’s institutional arrangements such as the establishment of the High Representative and the Policy-Unit. A reform of the PoCo only started to be formulated with the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the European Council of Cologne in 1999. As a result the PSC, modelled after similar NATO structures such as the WEU Council and the NAC (North Atlantic Council)74, was designed in order to adjust two main flaws in the PoCo. The first issue addressed was the lack of continuity and permanency in the people involved in

74 See Chaillot Paper no. 47, Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, Paris, 2001. The idea of a committee similar to those of NATO was pushed by the UK and Germany.
the organization. This was especially true in regards to the PoCo, which was composed of the Political Directors of member-states which used to meet just once a month with the objective to coordinate the broad issues of foreign and security policy at senior level. The second flaw addressed with the creation of the PSC was the constant moving of the meetings from one capital to the other according to the six-month presidency. With the inclusion of the ESDP issues the Political Director’s agenda was overwhelmed, and it was evident that the political coordination of the EU needed a permanent body composed of ambassadors with longer term of office (three to four years) and based in Brussels. Therefore with the creation of the Nice Treaty the PSC replaced the PoCo.

The PSC was established by the Nice Treaty under Article 25, which states that:

“Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. Within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. The Council may authorize the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation…”

In a letter to the Finnish Presidency in 1999 the French President, Jaques Chiraq, showed that he was particularly convinced that the establishment of the PSC would

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75High rotation in the ministerial and representative levels plus six-month presidency.
move forward “l’Europe de la defense”\(^{76}\). In this sense, as a Brussels-based committee designed to deal with substantive issues related to the CFSP/ESDP the PSC represented a significant development from the PoCo. However, the worries of some States about keeping this powerful Committee under strict control created a major debate during the Finnish Presidency. While some States favoured the idea that the representatives in the PSC would have a more senior level, other States, fearing that those senior ambassadors would escape their principals’ leash\(^{77}\), were favourable of more junior representatives\(^{78}\). Finally, at the Helsinki Council in December 1999 it was agreed that the representatives in the PSC should have “senior/ambassadorial” levels. However, the first generation of PSC officials (2000/2001-2003/2004) was very mixed in terms of seniority. After this agreement an interim PSC was created in March 2000 and this became permanent in January 2001. The PSC is therefore composed of permanent representatives with ambassadorial rank gathering two or three times a week in Brussels. As seen above, this group of diplomats was charged with tasks of monitoring the international situation and drafting opinions for the Council, thus contributing to the formulation of policies and supervising the implementation of the agreed policies. The former PoCo liaison officers (Political Directors based in their national capitals) were then displaced as gatekeepers of the CFSP/ESDP decision-making process in their national capitals, thus also facilitating the communication between the PSC and member-states capitals.

Another important issue raised by the creation of the PSC was the division of labour between the PSC and the COREPER. According to the provisions establishing the PSC, both the PSC and COREPER were legally responsible for preparing the Council’s


\(^{77}\) Some member states were trying to avoid what Howorth calls “the lionisation of EU institutions” (2010: 6).

\(^{78}\) The United Kingdom proposed “double-hatted” representatives in NATO and in the PSC. This suggestion was directly dismissed by Paris (op. cit.).
meetings\textsuperscript{79} (Duke, 2005). This legal issue was tackled at the 2002 Seville European Council with the differentiation between the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Committee) internal and external agendas\textsuperscript{80}. While the “internal” meetings (GAC meeting under Lisbon) are prepared by the COREPER, the PSC prepares the “external” meetings (FAC meeting under Lisbon). Regarding the relationship between the PSC and COREPER, if the PSC ambassadors do not reach a consensus over a sensitive issue this issue goes “up” to the COREPER for resolution\textsuperscript{81}. As a result the COREPER enjoys a formal hierarchical superiority to the PSC and all decisions in the PSC go to the GAERC via COREPER\textsuperscript{82}.

Although the PSC is responsible for all aspects of the CFSP/ESDP, it focuses its attention on what is seen as their “core business” by the Ambassadors, namely planning, preparation and oversight of both civilian and military operations. The meetings of the PSC are not completely insulated, and a representative of the Commission participates in order to guarantee cross-pillarization and four representatives of the Council Secretariat also attend the meetings. The Director-General of the DG-E also attends the meetings frequently. Back in the national capitals, the PSC Ambassadors are assisted by “European Correspondents” who work as a liaison between the PSC’s representatives and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs’s political


\textsuperscript{80} Before Sevilla it was known as GAC (General Affairs Committee). With the Lisbon Treaty the GAERC was further divided into two different Council formations: the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) chaired by the High Representative and the General Affairs Council (GAC) chaired by the rotating Council presidency. For an extensive explanation of the GAERC see Kaczynski P.M., and Byrne A., (2011), “The General Affairs Council”, CEPS Policy Brief, n. 246.

\textsuperscript{81} According to Howorth estimates, the issues that go up to the COREPER for decision are roughly once a month. (Howorth, 2010 : 6)

\textsuperscript{82} There are in fact two COREPER (I and II). While COREPER I consists of permanent representatives of member-states (deputy heads) and deals with social and economic issues, COREPER II consists of heads of mission (Senior Ambassador/Plenipotentiary) and deals with political, financial and foreign policy issues.
The agenda of the PSC is previously agreed between the Presidency and the Council Secretariat and prepared by the so-called “Nicolaidis Group” which helps to identify problem areas before they come to the Committee. The Nicolaidis Group is modelled after COREPER’s “Antici and Mertens Groups”. Initially the COREPER resisted the creation of the Nicolaidis Group, apparently because it felt threatened by the PSC copying its working methods and feared that it could lead to the PSC stealing some of COREPER’s responsibilities. Instead of waiting the approval of the COREPER, the PSC created the Nicolaidis Group informally. When the COREPER realized that it would be impossible to avoid the functioning of the Nicolaidis Group it released the Council document 8441/03, thus approving the creation of the Nicolaidis Group, but imposed the condition that all institutional changes in the PSC had to be previously accepted by the COREPER in accordance with Article 19 (3) of the Council Rules of Procedures (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007, Howorth, 2010).

The PSC members are also assisted by the Politico-Military Working Party, which is composed of officials from member-states’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence that meet around four times a week in Brussels. This working group deals with diplomatic aspects and technical details of planned operations and also the relationship with NATO. Other preparatory bodies are the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which is composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) of the member-states, but they are regularly represented by their permanent Military Representatives (MilReps), and this group discusses the military aspects of ESDP operations, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) which is responsible for accessing the results of civilian missions and planning new missions (Howorth, 2007; 2010).

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83 The Nicolaidis Group is a Council Working Group named after his first chair in 2003.

84 Termed “the working muscle of the PSC” by one PSC Ambassador (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007: 138).

85 The EUMC has its own Council Working Group: the Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG).

86 Including the use of NATO assets under the Berlin-Plus Agreement.
Unlike the PoCo meetings, the PSC meetings sometimes include 100 people. However, even if the PSC is not as “insulated” as the PoCo was, ambassadors in the meeting refer to each other using their first-names (and not the delegation’s name). Nonetheless, according to our interviews and the literature, ambassadors in the PSC had already had previous relationships with the each other due to their educational and career tracks\(^{87}\). The meetings have no translation available, and therefore all interventions are most commonly made in English, but also in French\(^{88}\).

According to a in-depth study carried out by Joylon Howorth (2010 and 2011) about the socio-political profile and identity of the PSC members,\(^{89}\) the data indicated that there is a “strong sense among members of the PSC that they are deeply involved in taking the EU forward,” showing that they have a “high degree of belief in the intrinsic wisdom and virtue of the European integration project” (Howorth, 2010:8). Ambassadors also stressed the “club-like” atmosphere and revealed that “there is clearly a unanimous feeling in the minds of PSC members that national interests and European interests are entirely compatible”. The room to manoeuvre that a particular ambassador enjoys depends on their seniority, the member-state they represent, and of course the issue being discussed. While some large member states have instructions which sometimes consist of 50 pages, the ambassador’s position is also dictated by what his government has already said publicly about the issue. On the other hand, an ambassador of a smaller or new member state often receives no instruction on a specific subject and has the liberty to formulate the national position in Brussels.

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\(^{87}\) For a similar perspective see: Meyer, 2006; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007 and Howorth, 2010; 2011.

\(^{88}\) According to (Meyer, 2006: 126) between 70% to 80% of the PSC’s business is carried out in English and 20% to 30% in French.

The effectiveness of the committee also depends on the working procedures, and we found a number of procedural rules that are not written down in official documents. Those informal rules of procedure are fundamental in ensuring the Committee’s objective of reaching agreements on issues before moving them up to the COREPER. The most interesting feature of the PSC is something which according to their members is a consensus-seeking committee\(^90\). Instead of purerly defending their national positions as their primary goal, the members of the PSC try to defend their national position while at the same time actively seeking consensus towards European positions. According to one ambassador “there is always a strong will to find a common line, whatever the instructions from our capitals\(^91\)” (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007:141). Even though in most cases the starting positions of the members are quite different, the process involved in decision-making usually ends up with a broad consensus or unanimity\(^92\). Ambassadors also stress that “a significant measure of socialisation ensures that the dominant mode of interaction is consensus-seeking rather than bargaining around fixed national positions”. (Howorth, 2010: 16) Most ambassadors in the PSC agree that the strategy used in the meetings to gain support for their propositions is persuasion using the common EU norms and values to base their proposals and not package deals (hard bargaining). They also mention that the maintenance of legitimacy within the group plays a major role in their cooperative style of negotiation because they know that they will meet again to discuss other topics. Another important unwritten rule inherited from the PoCo and strengthened in the PSC is the consultation-reflex. Due to the residence of all of the committee members in Brussels, informal meetings to consult with each other before the negotiations take place are a routine for the ambassadors. We can see the result of this constant

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\(^{90}\) In the Howorth study the prevalent attitude within the committee was defined as “cooperative and consensus-seeking” by 63% of the ambassadors.

\(^{91}\) It is important not to overstate the PSC’s ability in forging consensus. Issue areas such as: US policy, Russian policy, and the Middle East are still difficult policy areas in which consensus is not easily achieved.

\(^{92}\) We can ask how broad and honest this consensus is, but the fact that in most cases a consensus emerged from different starting national positions shows that the quest for consensus is a basic norm in the PSC daily business.
interaction of PSC representatives either as trying to anticipate the outcome of the negotiation in order to improve their strategy *vis-a-vis* the others, or alternatively the representatives could be seen as trying to “actively seek to internalize*3* each others views. According to Juncos and Reynolds (2007:142) “[…] this would not be seen as a calculated process to increase pay-offs but a ‘natural’ process necessary to define their own positions/interests.” This statement might prove itself to be truthful, especially in cases where ambassadors receive no specific instructions from their capitals on the subject being discussed, thus opening up space for them to develop their national position according to the interaction with other colleagues.

For Howorth (2010; 2011), the major factor stimulating compromise is the degree of socialization happening in the committee. The members also know each other very well, so they learn how to “read” each others stances and how to react. Besides this, they also share a strong sense of mutual trust. According to one Ambassador: “I think we all have a trust in each other that whatever compromise is possible we will find it. […] It is really true that there is a trust among colleagues that they try to find wherever a common basis is possible. It would be a different thing altogether if you always met 26 different colleagues. You simply would not have that crucial element of personal trust that everybody is doing their utmost, whatever is possible, to find the best compromise”. (Howorth, 2010: 16) This means that the substitution of one ambassador by his/her deputy is enough to break down the trust-based group dynamics because the trust is something personal and non-transferable. Another interesting dynamic in the PSC is that in cases where some members have no defined position on a subject they see it as their duty (and role) to help other members with divergent positions on the subject to reconcile their views. Here we can identify some evidence of the Type I socialization proposed by Checkel, which means that members change from strategic calculation to role playing. In the case of those members with strongly held national positions they try to persuade the others to change their positions with the force of argument. When the

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decision-making process reaches a stalemate due to strict instructions members are allowed to call their capitals, and that is usually sufficient to keep the discussion moving forward. The fact that ambassadors' point to persuasion and the force of argument based on the common EU norms and values as the main features in convincing their colleagues to change position also shows that some kind of normative suasion is happening in the committee, which is the first sign of a movement towards Type II socialization. The scope and condition which allows for socialization in this committee is the member-states' readiness to compromise in order to keep the CFSP/ESDP moving forwards. It is important to highlight the point that we do not deny that member states have full autonomy in national foreign-policy making. However, all participants in the CFSP/ESDP have the interest that the system moves forward. Particularly in this area the whole has been shown to be more important than the sum of the parts. Moreover, the member states also want the process to achieve results. In this sense, in order to avoid disturbance of the system we do not see proposals circulating in the PSC that explicitly run against the national interest of one member state. In this sense, the PSC is creating a new policy area (like the EPC before them). According to Howorth (2010:17):

“Debates thus tend to turn around proposals that have a realistic chance of success. In this context, knowing intimately the sense of the prevalent collective mindset ambassadors will sometimes pitch their initial bargaining positions slightly closer to what they feel would be a consensual position than might have been the case in, say, the PoCo. Thereafter, as they feel their way through the ensuing discussion they quickly know what margin of manoeuvre exists and are in a good position to contact the national capital with a suggestion as to how best progress business”

In this sense, with constant formal and informal interactions ambassadors are embedded in a European learning process, and at the same time they give feedback to their capitals about the sense of European collective opinion in the PSC and suggest how national positions can be moulded to achieve the desired collective result. This
suasion, or didactic function represents the notion that although PSC representatives still remain under the hierarchical control of their capitals’ Ministries they are able to influence and sometimes dictate the national interest at home, while at the same time they influence others’ national interest in Brussels and write on the “blank sheet” of the CFSP/ESDP.

The 2004 enlargement also apparently did not disturb the modus operandi in the committee. Even though new ambassadors often come with a specific idea of how the committee should work, they realize quickly that they must follow the written and unwritten procedural rules. Those rules are enforced by peer pressure, and therefore the existing members of the committee explicitly censure the newcomer if they disregard those rules. This adjustment of the newcomers to the group dynamics clarifies the functioning of the committee after the enlargement. Besides, some accounts point to the better functioning of the committee after the enlargement due to the development of another informal rule about the importance of being concise in a more populated committee, so no delegate speaks for more than two minutes (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007).

Christoph Meyer (2006) also reaches the same conclusions in his analysis of the PSC, taking into account the group characteristics, discursive dynamics and persuasiveness: “… [the work of the PSC] has set in motion dynamics of social influence that can mould a group of national officials into a socially cohesive policy community with shared objectives and increasingly shared attitudes concerning the use of force” (2006: 112). He also observed two dynamics in the PSC: “compliance or normative pressures, which make group members conform in public to dominant attitudes or views, and personal

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94 In particular, the ambassadors with more seniority, lengevity in the committee, personal charm, in-depth knowledge, and relevance of their country to the issue being discussed, have a bigger chance to influence the group with their arguments, as long as they follow the accepted normative framework.
acceptance of these group norms through informational influence based on better arguments or superior expertise of in-group persuaders (2006: 117). As in the EPC, PSC ambassadors see themselves as pioneers of a very important policy area, and their necessity to reach consensus leaves their inclination to compete at bay. Again, Meyer sees the PSC as having inherited the characteristics of the PoCo as “an unusually cohesive committee with a club atmosphere, high levels of personal trust and a shared ‘esprit de corps’ driven by a common commitment to pioneer cooperation in a new-labour intensive and particularly sensitive policy-field” (2006: 124). Furthermore, he argues that the PSC “has developed into a multiplier of social influence, both through informational influence and peer pressure. It has managed to manufacture consent and broker compromises even in areas where national strategic norms would initially indicate incompatibility. [It] remains one of the most important ideational transmission belts of a gradual Europeanisation of national foreign, security and defence policies” (2006: 136-137).

However, we should not overstate the internalization of rules and norms in the PSC. The fears expressed by Nuttall (2000: 246) that the codification and bureaucratization of the CFSP/ESDP would undermine the possibilities for socialization, which was the key factor for moving the EPC/PoCo forward, are consolidated in the PSC. As a result, one can state that the socialization in the PSC occurs more due to the number of contacts between the representatives based in Brussels rather than the quality of those contacts. The workload of the committee reduces the possibilities for socializing among the members. With the tight agenda and increased number of participants, ambassadors have few opportunities for personal informal meetings and socializing with all of their colleagues. This has an impact on how well they can develop personal relationships with the other representatives and discuss the issues informally. This factor differentiates the PSC from its counterpart, the COREPER II, and limits the opportunities for the internalization of rules and norms (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007).
3.2.1.3 - Socialization in the COREPER

The COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) was created in 1958 within the context of the Council’s rules of procedure and inspired by the Coordination Committee (COCOR) of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. In 1967 both bodies were merged in accordance to Article 4 of the Merger Treaty, and this was the first time that the COREPER was cited in a Treaty. There, the general responsibilities of the COREPER were defined as: “A committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council” (Art. 4, Merger Treaty, 1967). With the 1973 enlargement (Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom) and the increasing workload of the Council, the 1974 Paris Summit and then the 1980 European Council redefined COREPER’s responsibilities to increase its participation in the decision-making process, thereby leaving the Council with only the major political issues. Those new roles of the COREPER were codified in Article 207 of the EC Treaty (TEC) which states that it is responsible for preparing the Council meetings both in formal terms and content. This is a major breakthrough, because until then the COREPER could not participate officially in the decision-making process. The TEC also established that “… The Committee may adopt procedural decisions in cases provided for in the Council’s Rules of Procedure …” (Art. 207, TEC). This task allowed for further discussion when the PSC decided on the creation of its own preparatory committee (Nicolaidis Group) without the previous approval of the COREPER.

Since 1962, the Committee meets in two functionally independent settings. COREPER I is composed of deputy members of the national representations and gathers weekly to

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95 However the Committee was already informally operating since 1953 (see Nugent, 2006: 199).

96 Also known as the Brussels Treaty, it merged the executive bodies of the ECSC, Euratom and EEC.

97 See Rules of Procedure Art. 19, paragraph 2.
prepare the “technical” Councils (employment, environment, social policy, etc.). COREPER II is composed of senior-level ambassadors of the permanent national representations to the EU and also meets weekly to discuss “politically sensitive areas” and prepare the monthly GAERC meeting. As a result the committees main tasks are coordinating the work of the Council, giving detailed evaluations of the dossiers, and suggesting options. In this sense, all items in the Council’s meeting agenda are examined by the COREPER\(^\text{98}\). Generally speaking, when an agreement is reached in the Committee, the Council simply confirms it.

The agenda of the Committee is divided into issues that have been agreed at the CWGs and PSC and are ready for approval (so-called Part I)\(^\text{99}\), and issues that have been “moved up” to be examined by the COREPER (Part II)\(^\text{100}\). When an issue is agreed in the COREPER it moves to the Council’s Part A agenda\(^\text{101}\). The Mertens (COREPER) and Antici (COREPER II)\(^\text{102}\) Working Groups are responsible for preparing the Committee discussions.

In this sense, the permanent representatives are seen as the “guardians” of state interests in Brussels, serving as exemplars “state agents”. Therefore this is a perfect

\(^{98}\) Unless decided differently by the Council (unanimity) or COREPER (simple majority).

\(^{99}\) The inclusion of an item in Part I does not represent that this item has to be approved by the COREPER. Members of the COREPER have the power to raise an objection on one or more items included in Part I, and this automatically transfers the item to Part II agenda, however this almost never happens.

\(^{100}\) According to Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1995: 562), ca. 70% of the issues are agreed in instances below the COREPER. The Committee then agrees on ca. 15-20% of the Part II agenda. The Council then focuses on the 10-15% of Part B items that still need to be resolved.

\(^{101}\) The Council’s agenda is also divided into Part A – items ready for approval and Part B – issues under discussion.

\(^{102}\) The Antici Group started its activities in 1975 and is responsible for organizing the agenda for the Coreper II meetings and settling technical and organizational details of the meetings. It also informally presents the positions that the delegations will adopt at the meeting.
locus to infer on the impact of socialization in daily politics. Recent extensive research on the socialization in the Committee\textsuperscript{103} points to the development of a decision making process that is anchored in informal norms, rules and discourse. Besides this, a long time before the PSC the COREPER was already known for its \textit{esprit de corps}, “club-like” atmosphere and consensus-seeking based on collectively legitimate arguments. According to Lewis (2005: 138-139):

“Joining the COREPER “club” involves more than behavioral adaptation to institutional norms that alter incentives and strategies. EU permreps\textsuperscript{104} also internalize group-community standards that become part of an expanded conception of the self. This internalization includes a distinct epistemic value in the collective decision-making process itself. The standards of appropriateness found in COREPER include norms ruling out certain instrumental behaviour (such as “pushing for a vote” under conditions of qualified majority voting), obligations to practice mutual responsiveness and collectively legitimate arguments (including appropriateness standards for dropping arguments that fail to convince the group), and a duty to “find solutions” and keep the legislative agenda of the Council moving forward …”

The Permanent Representatives are placed between policy-experts located in the CWGs below and the Ministers in the level above and have to discuss a variety of topics from fisheries to foreign policy. According to Bostock (2002: 215), “[the COREPER]… is a body composed of officials with the seniority and proximity to the ministers to take a politically informed view, but with the diplomat’s and bureaucrat’s obligation to master the technicalities of the dossier before him”. This position within both the EU and national politics gives the members of the COREPER a good overview of the whole work being done in the Council. In this context, the quality of the contacts in the COREPER is marked by the density of the issues being discussed, unlike the PSC

\textsuperscript{103} See Lewis, 1998; 2002; and 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1995; 2003; and 2006; Lempp, 2007; Bostock, 2002.

\textsuperscript{104} Acronym used for the Permanent Representatives.
where the number of contacts in the meetings plays a major role in socialization. Moreover, it is important to highlight the point that the issues being discussed in the COREPER are those that were not agreed at the CWGs and PSC levels, and besides this the COREPER is the last instance before the Council and therefore has a major amount of pressure to find a solution to the dossiers before they reach the Council. Nevertheless, with the density and cross-sectoral responsibilities of the Committee the permreps also fulfil an intense agenda of meetings in different domains of EU decision making while also sitting beside their Ministers during the Council’s sessions and serving as consultants “behind the curtains”. Also, the relationships with the EP occupy a great deal of work in the COREPER. This intensity of interactions is also strengthened by the high level of experience that senior Ambassadors have with not only the issues being discussed but also the functioning of the Committee. Contrary to the other bodies, the ambassadors in the COREPER participate in the Committee for longer periods of time (around 5 years), but due to the specificity of the work in Brussels many ambassadors stay for a decade or their whole career. In addition to the weekly meetings, before the Council’s monthly meetings the COREPER II prepares a luncheon\textsuperscript{105} that is used to deal with the most complicated issues that could not be solved in the normal meetings. The participation in the lunches is very restricted with no notes being taken, and even translators are not allowed to participate. Other informal mechanisms are the COREPER trips organized by the presidency, when members of the Committee travel together to the capital of the rotating presidency (Lewis 2005; Bostock, 2002; Butler, 1986).

Another very important characteristic of the COREPER that facilitates the socialization is the high degree of insulation of the ambassadors in regard to the normal currents of domestic pressures. According to the interviews there is a clear sense of confidentiality

\textsuperscript{105} The COREPER Luncheon also takes place on an \textit{ad hoc} basis.
around the meetings\textsuperscript{106}. In the meetings the national positions are fine-tuned and ambassadors are able to talk freely without the concern that their position will be exposed to their superior back in the capital or in the media. The meetings also include a brainstorming session on how the deal will be sold back in the capitals with convincing arguments. The participation in the COREPER meetings is so restricted that even experts from national capitals and foreign ministries are not allowed to be present in the meetings. According to Lewis (2005: 146), “The role of insulation in COREPER diplomacy supports Checkel’s hypothesis that persuasion and socialization are more likely in “less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings”.’ This insulation also allows the permreps to reshape their instructions because they are not exposed to the control of their principal during the negotiations. As a result, in cases where the representative perceives that their position is unsustainable in the group and could harm the delegate’s reputation he/she simply drops it, and with the help of their colleagues they make up good and convincing arguments to justify the position back home\textsuperscript{107}. This also includes a high degree of autonomy or input of the ambassadors in the formulation of the instructions together with their capitals and preparation on how the instruction can be articulated and defended using the Committees’ language. The creation of such an insulated Committee also represents the fact that States are committed to keeping the work of the Council moving forward, and they avoid tough public battles between their ministers/heads of government (Lewis, 2005). Stasavage (2004: 673 see Lewis, 2005: 146) shows that insulated negotiations decrease the levels of negotiators’ “posturing” because they do not have to show their local constituency that they are “effective or committed bargainers”.

\textsuperscript{106} This makes it hard to scientifically “open the black box” of the COREPER negotiations because ambassadors are unwilling to speak about the content of their meetings.

\textsuperscript{107} For a good example on how this mechanism works see the French and Greek positions in the case of the 1994 local elections directive in Lewis, 2005.
Jeffrey Lewis studied the Committee for 10 years, and in his acclaimed work on the socialization in the COREPER (Lewis, 2005) he identifies three socialization mechanisms at stake: strategic calculation; role playing and normative suasion. The former is observed in the strong “self-binding” unwritten, informal decision-making norms that permeate COREPER’s institutional environment. The permreps comply with those norms in the absence of external sanctioning due to the insulating nature of the Committee. This pro-norm behaviour is suggested to stem from the willingness to gain social influence and “social capital” in the group and avoid shaming and damaging their reputation. This behavioral adaptation in order to increase social influence is what Checkel calls strategic calculation. Additionally, in order to move your proposal forward in the group the participant must use the accepted language, arguments and standards of behavior, which would support the idea that besides strategic calculation there is a Type I internalization, or role-playing socialization. This case can mostly be seen in how the informal norms work at molding the newcomers to the accepted group standards\textsuperscript{108}, and if a member does not fit in the expected role he/she becomes ostracised in the group (Lewis, 1998; 2003; and 2005). However, it is clear that when a new member joins the group he/she has to undergo a period of “social learning”, as stated in Lewis (2005:151): “On balance, the evidence suggests that newcomers have relatively high levels of ingrained cognitive priors […] The COREPER novice who “treats colleagues as opponents” undergoes a period of social learning (and mimicry) during which they adopt new cognitive templates in order to operate in an unfamiliar environment.”\textsuperscript{109}

Lewis identified five informal norms at work in the Committee. The norm of \textit{diffuse reciprocity} of concessions represents the notion that once a delegate compromises his position in order to achieve a consensus in the group (including dropping reserves and/or abstaining) he can expect to be “rewarded’ with future concessions and

\textsuperscript{108} For a concrete example see the Austrian position in the case mentioned above.

\textsuperscript{109} On the other hand, new members are more easily socialized when they have fewer ingrained norms, values, principles and beliefs that go against the standard cognitive priors of the COREPER.
derogations. The delegate also receives support to persuade the capital that the changes in the position are utterly important to keep the work moving forward. Secondly, the norm of *thick trust* represents the fact that ambassadors are motivated to speak frankly, and this reliability is reinforced by the constant contact among ambassadors in formal and informal settings. The norm of *mutual responsiveness* characterizes a willingness to understand each other’s problems, and therefore to receive the understanding and support of the group one has to be willing to understand and support the other’s interests and arguments first. In this sense, mutual responsiveness is the group’s answer to the collective legitimation of one’s claims. The fourth norm identified by Lewis is *consensus-seeking*, and this embodies the Committee willingness to reach a consensus, even under conditions of qualified majority voting (QMV). Empirical data on this norm is difficult to gather due to the confidentiality of the meetings, however the ambassadors in the COREPER claim that most of their decisions are taken consensually and that they would rather stay longer with their colleagues to reach a consensus than approve an issue by QMV. Following this norm therefore imprints a high rejection for explicit pushing for a vote in the Committee, thus making consensus-seeking a reflexive practice. Last but not least, the norms mentioned above influence the norm of *compromise* and the ambassadors’ disposition to flexibilize their positions in order to house divergent interests. This norm is facilitated by the densisty of the work and issues being discussed in the COREPER and is characterized by moderation when presenting their national positions and defending their national interests. Therefore Lewis (2005: 148) concludes by arguing that, “Taken together, these informal norms are widely practiced and firmly institutionalized in COREPER’s organized culture … That is, pro-norm behaviour is rooted in a complex combination of both strategic calculation and role-playing socialization.”

The third socialization mechanism observed by Lewis at work in the COREPER is the normative suasion. The Committee has its own specific language, signals and unspoken meanings that are very important to enable the constant issue-dense debates
to keep rolling. Also, this “jargon” is expected to develop in high level diplomats’ circles with interpersonal relationships, especially when sitting in insulated settings and discussing intensive issues. Therefore, whatever the content the procedure that a diplomat uses to present their claim has a lot of influence on the outcomes, and of course the “collective legitimating arguments” that he/she uses, and as a result ambassadors use specific language when presenting their case, thereby justifying their position by persuading their colleagues of the rightousness and fairness of the claim, especially in the “derrogarion discourse” where we can observe that diplomats with longstanding positions in the COREPER use this mechanism well, where newcomers normally misuse this mechanism and are rapidly censored by their colleagues. As a result, in COREPER we see the fundamental importance attached to the argument where the persuasive power of ambassadors’ arguments has a strong impact on the decisions adopted. When they go to the meetings ambassadors are not only ready to convince the others of their interests, they are also open to be persuaded by the force of the other’s arguments. In this sense, with the use of their specific language COREPER members signal that they need support and understanding from the group or that something is particularly important with arguments and persuasion. The possibility of persuading the others with the power of a convincing argument and the mutual responsiveness in the Committee enables ambassadors of smaller member-states that display the appropriate rethoric code and powerful arguments to “punch above their weight”. We can also observe normative suasion at work in the COREPER in a negotiation pattern named “plotting”. In plotting, one member uses the collective pressure in the group to justify back home that a national position has to be changed or that the domestic constraints need to be redefined. According to the interviews carried out by Lewis (2005: 150), one ambassador says “To get new instructions we have to show [the capital] we have a black eye […] We can ask COREPER for help with this; it

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110 Lewis identifies idyiosincratic methods that senior diplomats use when they want to signal special dispensations (Lewis, 2005).

111 Two-level game theorists call it “COG collusion”. For a concrete example of “plotting” in the COREPER see Lewis 2002.
is one of our standard practices”. Indeed overstating the group’s rejection is also a tool which can be used to jointly support or refuse claims. (Lewis, 2005; Lempp; 2007)

As a result, we generally see that in the COREPER the collective interest of keeping the Council working stands above the unwillingness to compromise a particular national position. More than just strategic calculation or role-playing, the cases that show the permanent representative influencing their national capital to accept another delegate’s claim while dropping their own claim down (even when it is possible to exercise the veto power\textsuperscript{112}), shows that type II internalization is at work in the Committee. This normative suasion is a practice that occurs often and is well documented in the COREPER (Lewis, 1998; 2003; and 2005; Lempp, 2007; Beyers, 1998; Beyers and Dierickx, 1998). However, we agree that socialization in the COREPER is not automatic but partial, therefore it would be incorrect to argue that the group standards are “taken for granted” or irreversible all the time. Nor do ambassadors change their identity as a cause of the socialization in the Committee. Instead they act as “double-hatted” by defending their national interest while at the same time being flexible to compromise in the cause of the European interest. It is also not possible to assure that the Committee would continue to act with the actual standards of appropriateness if the scope condition for socialization in the COREPER would change (density, insularity, etc). In all likelihood the negotiations would be more self-interested and instrumental and the consensus-seeking orientation would be substituted for national battles over self-serving interests.

\textsuperscript{112} For an interesting case on how informal norms operate in the COREPER and promote pro-norm behaviour even in cases when veto power (or threat of veto) can be used see Portugal’s position in Lewis, 2005.
CHAPTER 4

Transgovernmental networks and socialization in South American Political Integration
As seen in the previous chapter, transgovernmental networks and socialization processes played an important role in the institutionalization of the European political integration. This phenomenon illustrates the importance of looking at factors beyond the simple dichotomy between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists over the ends of the integration process. In order to demonstrate the independent impact of transgovernmental networks and socialization to the creation and development of institutions we will compare our findings in the previous chapter on the European example with institutionalization in South America.

In South America we can see a high number of regional institutions (just as in Europe), and some with a considerable degree of success (such as Mercosul) but no level of supranationalism. This fact points to the rejection of the premise that supranational institutions are the driving force of integration (Smith, 2004).

There are quite a few regional institutions in South America, but those that aim to be more than trade blocs or specific international regimes are the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), Andean Community (CAN), Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul), and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). There are other regional regimes which were formed to deal with specific issues such as the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (OTCA). Other institutions with a hemispheric character which include South American countries are also worth a mention, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Grupo do Rio, and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).

Among these institutions we will take a close look at those which have developed more significantly and in a similar way to the European Union, namely the Andean
Community (CAN), Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul), and Union of South American Nations (Unasul). In this chapter we will see how those institutions were created and developed and how they interact, merge and overlap with other institutions. Most specifically, in this chapter we will focus on the role of transgovernmental networks and socialization processes, not only in the creation of those institutions but also in how those institutions further impacted on those transgovernmental networks and on the changing norms of South American politics.

4.1 - From Pan-Americanism to regionalism

Before we analyse the actual developments of the South American political integration processes it is important to first give an overview of the past experiences and why they did not work. As a result we can observe that historically speaking any proposition on political integration in Latin America had a “Pan-American” or “hemispheric” character. This “Pan-Americanism”, especially sponsored by the United States of America, can be divided into three consecutive parts. The first part is called the Hemispheric Defence System, and this aimed to create an alliance against external threats. This was characterised by the Monroe Doctrine and lasted until the end of the Second World War. In the second part, which is characterized by the National Security Doctrine, cooperation was seen as an instrument to neutralize the communist movements that were spreading in Latin American countries. The third and actual Hemispheric Security System aims to respond cooperatively and multilaterally to transnational threats, with special emphasis on the fight against terrorism. Besides this there is also the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which constitutes the main instrument of collective security for the Americas. Those initiatives were led by the United States and put forward in the Organization of American States (OAS), but they received strong criticism from other Latin American countries due to different
perceptions and conceptions on security and defence issues and on how political coordination should be achieved.

As a result the idea of a hemispheric security system that could lead to a deeper political integration among its member-states is not foreseeable in the OAS due to the strong asymmetries among its member-states and the very different motivations involved. This also justifies the fact that the institutional mechanisms are characterised by weak infrastructures and very limited influence (Diamint, 2004; Medeiros, 2009; Villa, 2007). As we will see, despite the notion that Brazil might be replacing the United States as the dominant player in South American politics, the political will to set forth political integration and its requirements of regional interconnectedness is much more clear in the South American context than it is in the Latin American or Hemispheric contexts. The expression of this South American interconnectedness is seen in the recent developments aimed at enlarging the integration process to comprise all of the South American countries in the Union of South American Nations (Unasul). As will be explained below, the Unasul is the attempt to merge two integration processes in South America, namely the Mercosul and the Andean Community.

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113 It is important to highlight the difference between the terms South America and Latin America. South America refers to the geographical area between the Isthmus of Panama (Colombia-Panama border) and the Tierra del Fuego (southern part of the Argentinian-Chilean border). Ethimologically speaking, Latin America refers to American countries that speak languages derived from Latin, mostly Portuguese and Spanish but also French. Therefore the term Latin America excludes Canada, the United States, most of the Caribbean, Surinam and Guyana. Geographically speaking, Latin America refers to the countries in North, Central and South America, located between Rio Grande in Mexico and Tierra del Fuego in the southmost Argentinian-Chilean border, excluding the Caribbean. In this sense those two terms (Latin America and South America) are not used interchangeably here.

114 A good example of successfully merging two different subsystems in one integration process is the partial fusion between the European Communities and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
We can see quite a high number of economic, military and cultural interactions in South America that are mostly marked by cooperative attitudes. In the economic field there is the CAN (Andean Community of Nations), which includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (Chile and the Mercosul countries are “associate-members”). In the intersection between economic and political integration we have the Mercosul (Southern Cone Common Market), composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Chile and the CAN countries are associate-members and Venezuela is in the accession process to become a full member).

While the CAN members have presented a big political challenge to South American political integration due to its high level of internal (such as Colombia and Bolivia) and external (Colombia and Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Chile, Bolivia and Chile) conflicts, despite economic divergences the Mercosul has moved forwards as the most promising integration process in the region. Political ties developed between Brazil and Argentina in the beginning of the redemocratization process have transformed the biggest rivalry in South America into the axis relationship for South American political integration. Development of joint political projects such as the Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the Mercosul, and the growing number of joint military exercises and exchange of officials to military academies, etc. contributed to cementing and enhancing the prospects of integration in the Southern Cone. However, it is also important to highlight the contribution of the close cooperation and ties between Argentina and Chile in the field of security and defence to the stability of the sub-region.

As will be seen below, the military transgovernmental ties that began to form during the military dictatorships for political persecution were countered and re-directed by the new elected democratic governments. The democratic governments in the Southern Cone fostered an ad hoc civilian transgovernmental network with the objective of pushing
forward a program to develop regional institutions and Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) in order to gain leverage over the strong military network (for more on the development of the civilian transgovernmental network see Olsener, 2009; Steves, 2001; Hirst, 1993; Hirst, 1995; Bouzas and Fanelli, 2002). According to the research, there is evidence that the military network has been furthered socialized into democratic norms and was therefore re-directed to comply with the normative objectives of the democratic governments. We also have evidence that this military network (Milicom) is more responsible for pushing forward South American integration in the field of security and defence nowadays than its civilian counterpart\textsuperscript{115}. This fact also points to an apparently successful socialization of the Milicom into the norms of peace and democracy.

Those strong transgovernmental networks being built along the years in military academies, diplomatic academies, joint-exercises and regular meetings have contributed to not only reducing the tensions among countries on the Southern Cone and enhancing the institutionalization in the region but have also culminated into the UN Haiti Mission (Minustah). The Minustah represents a breakthrough in terms of military and defence cooperation for countries that not long ago were on the brink of a nuclear arms race. The UN Mission consists of troops from eight South American countries (including all Southern Cone countries) under the military aegis of Brazil (Costa Vaz and Jacome, 2009).

\textsuperscript{115} Interviews carried in the period of 2006-2010 with South American politicians, diplomats and military. It is important to highlight that in the interviews carried before the institutionalization of the Unasul and its South American Defence Council it was possible to confirm the influence of the military transgovernmental network in the actual integration projects. As seen in the methodological part of this dissertation, the results of the interviews were contrasted with the official positions of governments in regard to the integration process, and it is difficult to infer if the statements in the interviews were valid or biased.
4.2 - Transgovernmental networks in South America: from Mercosul to the Unasul and its South American Defence Council

The Union of South American Nations (Unasul) was created with the Brasilia Treaty (also called the Constitutive Treaty) and signed in May 2008. This institutionalization represents an attempt to merge two different sub-regional systems that exist in the region, namely the Southern Cone and the Andean. The first is related to the Mercosul’s member-states and Chile, while the latter refers to the Andean Community’s member-states plus Venezuela\(^{116}\). The institutionalization of the Unasul has the clear objective of unifying those two sub-regional systems under one institutional umbrella. Moreover, the Unasul (and its foreign policy, security and defence instance, the Defence Council), is designed to create a consultative forum (if not to produce coordination) on issues of foreign policy, especially security and defence, among the member-countries. This is a clear recognition that some level of coordination is necessary in order to avoid harming the economic interests.

According to our main argument, this fact suggests the existence of two separated transgovernmental networks operating in the South American region. The high level of interconnectedness in the Southern Cone and its political/economic stability (not to mention the stronger and more efficient institutions) indicates that this sub-region has a stronger and more closely bound network than its counterpart in the north. The transgovernmental network in the Southern Cone has been developing since the redemocratization process in 1980’s\(^{117}\). The transgovernmental ties among Southern

\(^{116}\) As will be observed further, I consider Guyana and Suriname as being interlinked with the Andean region but as part of a Caribbean system. Both countries (Guyana and Suriname) are members of another regional institution: the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

\(^{117}\) Although I consider the position of some authors that ascribe the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 as the departing point of the development for the transgovernmental network responsible to deescalate the tensions
Cone diplomats were stimulated by the newly elected democratic governments in order to bypass the military network developed for repressive purposes during the dictatorships (see Condor Operation below). This network, among diplomats and supported by the governments, was responsible for elaborating on and defining the rules of the integration process which culminated in the institutionalization of Mercosur. Therefore in this section we will observe the development of Mercosur and the Andean Community, looking at how and why they advanced as two distinct transgovernmental networks, and the influence they had in attempting to merge the two subsystems into one regional institution, namely the Unasur.

4.2.1 - Southern Cone Common Market: Mercosur

We can situate the legal antecedents for the creation of Mercosur in 1985’s Iguacu Declaration, signed by the elected presidents of Argentina and Brazil. Both countries had experienced long military dictatorships\(^{118}\), and the external agendas of both countries were a reflection of the internal changes they were experiencing. Both countries were deeply marked by a strong rivalry since the end of the 19\(^{th}\) Century, which was escalated during the period of military dictatorships, and the democratically-elected governments shared the concern of how to establish strong civilian control over the military. Both countries were also struck by dire economic problems which were left by the military, and Argentina’s morale was especially low due to the disputes with Chile.

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\(^{118}\)The military dictatorships were in power from 1966 until 1983 in Argentina (with a democratic intermezzo from 1973 to 1976 – peronismo) and from 1964 until 1985 in Brazil.
over the Beagle Channel (1978) and with Great Britain in the Malvinas/Falklands’ War (1982). Therefore Argentina and Brazil shared a common vision of internal and external problems. According to Llama (2003: 168): “The concepts of striving for greater autonomy, modernising productive capacity and consolidating the internal market while counting on human resources for technological development and promoting the sub-regional market in view of opening up to the world formed the ideological core for both governments.”

There were particular concerns about civilian control over the military. In Brazil the military were granted a full amnesty, while in Argentina the main actors of the dictatorship were sentenced on the eve of redemocratization but were granted an amnesty in 1991\textsuperscript{119}. However, the ties that existed among the military during the dictatorships continued to exist in the democratic era. The strong relationships among the military in the Southern Cone date back to the 1970’s, something which is confirmed with Operation Condor\textsuperscript{120}.

Operation Condor was a transgovernmental network propelled by the Chilean government in order to exchange sensitive information and coordinate counter-subversive operations against left-wing movements. The network conducted operations outside South America, extending its activity even to Europe (McSherry, 1999). The network was formed by military personnel and diplomats from Argentina, Brazil\textsuperscript{121},

\textsuperscript{119} The transition period in Brazil was much softer than in Argentina, and this allowed the Brazilian military to negotiate a full amnesty, while in Argentina the extremely violent nature of the dictatorship (so-called dirty war – guerrra sucia), and the lost war against Great Britain did not leave room for the dictatorship to maneuver and negotiate a full amnesty. After protests (highlight the importance of the movement Mothers of Mayo) the amnesty in Argentina was cancelled in 2005 and the investigations restarted.

\textsuperscript{120} I thank the Argentinian political scientist Dr. Martin Ladrone for raising this point.

\textsuperscript{121} In 2007 it was revealed how Brazilian diplomats were recruited by the Foreign Information Centre (Clex – Centro de Informacoes do Exterior) and acted on behalf of the governments in the persecution of political dissidents outside Brazil. The persecutions were not only directed at Brazilian nationals but also included nationals.
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Once the hub of the network was established at the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) it functioned very autonomously from their executives. According to a telegram sent from the US Ambassador in Chile to the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976, \(^{122}\) “[…] cooperation among South American intelligence agencies is handled […] apparently without much reference to anyone else. It is quite possible, even probable, that Pinochet has no knowledge whatever of Operation Condor…” As a result we can conclude that the transgovernmental network formed by Operation Condor was very autonomous and operated in “the shadows”, often bypassing the instructions of their own governments.

According to Guillermo O’Donnell (1999), the military dictatorships in the region were “bureaucratic-authoritarian” regimes in the sense that they were fine-tuned with the capitalist system with a firm commitment to modernize the infrastructure and economies of their societies. While the military would stay responsible for countering “subversive behaviour” (the authoritarian part), the ministries would be left in the hands of highly qualified civilians and technocrats \(^{123}\) (the bureaucratic part). Due to this “bureaucratic-authoritarian” nature, the Condor Operation was able to flourish despite the high level of external rivalry among the countries (Domingues, 2007). Therefore, in order to understand this Janus-faced character of the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone (cooperation and rivalry) we must realize that while they cooperated to cope with the internal “subversive movements” they tried to legitimize themselves with the adoption of strong national security doctrines. The external face of the military dictatorships, modelled after the national security doctrines, included an escalation of tensions in

\(^{122}\) The telegram can be seen at: [www.gwu.edu/~nsaarchiv/news/20001113/760824.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsaarchiv/news/20001113/760824.pdf)

\(^{123}\) In Chile known as the “Chicago Boys” due to their education in the liberal school of economics at the University of Chicago under the aegis of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger.
order to justify the presence of and investment in a strong military apparatus. Argentina and Chile were at the brink of war in 1978 over the dispute of a group of small islands and sea territory in the Beagle Channel, while Argentina and Brazil had conflicting positions on a wide range of issues from how to manage the waters of the Parana River to developing a nuclear arms race. Therefore the transgovernmental networks formed with the Condor Operation were unable (or unwilling) to change the conflictive nature of their countries' foreign and defence policies, mostly because it was a network aimed at reinforcing the military-authoritarian nature of the dictatorships.

Following this strong external rivalry, it is interesting to observe how the relationships among the countries in the Southern Cone de-escalated and cooperation in foreign and defence policies developed and culminated with the institutionalization of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul). To answer this puzzling question, Andrew Hurrell (1998b) proposed the hypothesis that connects international cooperation with the evolution of civil-military relations. Therefore, drawing on Hurrel’s hypothesis we argue that the transgovernmental network established during the military dictatorships did not change many of its pieces\(^\text{124}\) but was re-directed (just like in a cybernetic model\(^\text{125}\)) in order to comply with changes in the norms caused by the redemocratization processes\(^\text{126}\). This re-steering occurred with the influence of another network, civilian, which was left with the task of developing regional institutions to promote stability, economic prosperity and democracy (Olsener, 2009; Steves, 2001; Hirst, 1993; Hirst, 1996; Bouzas and Fanelli, 2002).

\(^{124}\) The evidence that the network did not change many of its pieces is confirmed by the full amnesty that the military gained with the redemocratization and the fact that most of the high offices in the Defence Ministries are still occupied by military personnel that participated in the dictatorships.

\(^{125}\) For more on cybernetics see Deutsch, 1963; Wiener, 1961. I thank Ben Kamis for raising this question.

\(^{126}\) The normative change was intensified with the development of regional institutions and the civilian strive to gain control over the military establishment.
According to Hirst (1996:218), the diplomats involved in the creation of Mercosul brought with them the experience of other failed integration attempts such as the ALADI and the ALALC. Just as in the European case, in Mercosul, the integration process was developed on a trial-and-error basis and can be very much characterised as a learning-by-doing process. In this process the transgovernmental network responsible for developing the “rules of the game” had a major influence on the flexibilization and harmonization of their own government’s foreign policy (Hirtst, 1996:218). But how did this civilian network come into being? As mentioned above, despite the economic interest and the external pressures of globalization, the main goal of the integration was to overcome the conflictive relationship that gave fuel to the military dictatorships, thus enforcing civilian control over the military. This was achieved by putting forward an agenda where democracy and political stability would be anchored in regional institutions and confidence building mechanisms. With this objective the governments of Argentina and Brazil signed 1988’s Economic Integration and Cooperation Programme. According to Oelsner (2009:200): “[…] the Economic Integration and Cooperation Programme had more than a purely economic agenda. Instead, it was the result of the successful securitization of democracy and development. Its institutionalization took the form of six-monthly presidential summits and gave rise to the establishment of formal and informal transnational networks…" In the final years of the military dictatorship it was already possible to observe the development of a normative change in the Brazilian Foreign Office which gave rise to the development of the civilian transgovernmental network together with the Argentinian diplomats. According to Pinheiro (2004:42): “[…] the slow relative autonomy regained by the Itamaraty in the foreign policy formulation was a crucial element in this process, one that meant many diplomats that were now occupying important offices in the institution’s hierarchy shared a strong pro-Third World view. This regained autonomy can be explained by the growing trust that the military had in the Itamaraty. This deposited trust was due to the opinion that the diplomats and military shared similar patterns of education and socialization, despite the political and

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127 Itamaraty is the name used in the diplomatic jargon to refer to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.
ideological divergences between the two groups. Sotomayor (2004:49) argues that: “Negotiating the foundations ... of institution in the Southern Cone involved the active participation of the Argentine Chancellery and Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry. The two presidents [of Argentina and Brazil] could then be served by a well-trained diplomatic corps that enjoyed relative autonomy from military pressures.” While in Argentina the Chancellery tried to distance itself from the military connections, in Brazil one of the Itamaraty’s main objectives “was to soften the nationalistic stances defended by the Brazilian military” (Hirst 1995: 106 see Sotomayor 2004: 49)

Therefore the development of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) and the further institutionalization in the Southern Cone were caused due to the re-established democratic governments’ concern to gain leverage and control over the Milicom in a time when democracy was not yet well consolidated (Hurrell and Fawcett, 1995; 1998a; 1998b; Sotomayor, 2004). In Hurrel’s words (1998b: 244): “In part this reflects the close and very concrete link between conflict resolution abroad and democratic consolidation at home – the need to promote regional pacification in order to deprive the nationalists of causes around which to mobilize opinion, to demand a greater political role, or to press for militarization and rearmament.” Or, as Kacowicz explains (2005: 130), “Hence, military and political CBMs have fulfilled an important role in strengthening peace and stability and promoting the institutionalization of military regional and hemispheric cooperation”.

In this sense, the Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) in the Southern Cone were instrumental in enhancing the relationships between Argentina and Brazil since the beginning of the détente in the late 1970’s and between Argentina and Chile in the mid-80’s. Particularly between Argentina and Brazil, these CBMs were further developed in parallel with the institutionalization process. These CBMs reinforced the mutual trust

128 Free translation from the Portuguese version.
among Southern Cone countries and included military cooperation, integration of border areas, negotiations and agreements on border disputes, exchange of information, permanent communication, periodical meetings, and, most incredibly, joint military manoeuvres in the 1990’s. These CBMs also contributed to re-steering the military transgovernmental network, and because to them a range of common normative themes such as defence of democracy, economic integration, regional cooperation, non-interference, sovereignty, self-determination, maintenance of peace, protection of natural resources, and the ban of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were attached. (Oelsner, 2005; Diamint, 1994; Hirst and Rico 1992; Kacowicz, 2005)

Therefore, the CBMs, vested with a normative toga, propelled the movement towards civilian control over the military in the Southern Cone. The military were able to maintain their close ties among in the sub-region while the multilevel security governance architecture re-directed those ties in order to reduce tensions, promote trust and achieve a more stable degree of security cooperation in the direction of a pluralistic security community (Flemes, 2005; Oelsner, 2009).

Among these CBMs in the 1980’s, it is important to highlight the developments in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. The nuclear programmes in both countries were the main projects of the military dictatorships, and therefore in order to gain leverage and control over the military the new democratic governments of Argentina and Brazil decided to increase cooperation on this issue. Without the de-escalation of tensions in the nuclear area it would be impossible to move the cooperation agenda of both countries forwards. In 1980 both countries has already signed a package of agreements that included cooperation for the development and implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Brigagao and Fonrouge, 1998). However, with the return of democracy the cooperation among both countries on the issue of nuclear energy and non-proliferation
further expanded and became the core of a more broad and ambitious program of security and economic integration, which was expressed in the creation of the Mercosul. The signing and ratification of the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Act and the Integration and Cooperation Program (ABEIP) by the presidents Raul Alfonsin and Jose Sarney in 1985 (also known as the Iguacu Declaration) is the cornerstone for the creation of Mercosul. Its importance was mainly political: overcome the rivalry in order to propose a long-term cooperation. In the nuclear sphere it aimed at enhancing technical cooperation, mutual trust and transparency. It also intended to show to the international community that neither country wanted to develop or obtain nuclear weapons. Therefore, based on the foundations laid by the ABEIP the presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello ratified the nuclear cooperation among both countries with the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

The ABACC was created with the signature of the Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy in November 1990. This institutionalization of the evolving nuclear regime developed a common accounting and control system to apply to all nuclear activities in both countries. Additionally, the agreement included negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the creation of a safeguards agreement, which was signed in 1991. Those safeguards were further enhanced with the signature of the regional regime of Tlatelolco in 1994 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a result the once highly nationalistic nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil were now under direct control of the civilian-led Argentinian and Brazilian nuclear agencies, the ABACC and the IAEA (Brigagao and Fonrouge, 1998; Kacowicz, 2005).

The institutionalization of the ABACC is the most expressive attempt to control the military in South America, and together with the increased economic integration this led
to a stable peace between the two former rivals. In the following years the cooperation in the fields of security and defence increased dramatically. A large number of military exchanges (notice the importance of the Brazilian Military Academies)\textsuperscript{129}, mutual visits and academic gatherings to discuss issues of defence and security took place. In 1996 the presidents signed a document of cooperation in the area of security and defence that included space exploration, nuclear activities, physical and energy integration, and the establishment of a joint working group on strategic issues. With this agreement both countries started to carry out common joint manoeuvres for the first time since 1865 (Kacowicz, 2005). With the development of Mercosul in 1991, the integration in the Southern Cone deepened and broadened to include the other countries in the region under a common institutional setting.

After laying the basis for a stable peace in the region with the Iguacu Declaration, together with Paraguay and Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil signed the Treaty of Asuncion in March 1991. The Treaty of Asuncion founded the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul), and as we observed above it was from the beginning a shared political project and not just a trade agreement (Dominguez, 2007; Kacowicz, 2005; Flemes, 2005; Hurrel, 1998b).

The Treaty of Asuncion established the Mercosul and fashioned it as an intergovernmental institution. Therefore, according to the Treaty Mercosul would have two main institutional bodies: the Common Market Council (CMC), and the Common Market Group (CMG). Both bodies are populated by appointed officials from the member-states. In this institutional setting, the CMC is the consensual decision making

\textsuperscript{129} As will be seen later, it is important to highlight the fact that the Brazilian Military Academies (ECEME, EGN, Universidade do Ar) are working as “hub centers” where officers from all South American countries meet to study and foster relationships. A more detailed discussion on the importance of the military academies to the development of transgovernmental networks and to the socialization of military commanders into common norms and values can be seen in the second part of this chapter.
body and is composed of Ministers of the Foreign Affairs and Economics. The heads-of-state gather in this Council at least once every year, and the presidency is held by each member-state for a six-month period on a rotating basis. The CMG works as the executive body and is populated by member-states’ representatives from the Foreign Affairs and Economics Ministries and the Central Banks’ Chiefs. The CMG is responsible for taking measures to comply with the decisions of the Council, proposing policies for the development of the bloc, coordinating macroeconomic policies, negotiating with third party countries, and the constitution with Working Groups to help with the policy-areas. In 1994 the Treaty was amended by the Ouro Preto Protocol, which broadened the bloc’s institutional setting by incorporating four new bodies: the Mercosul Trade Commission (MTC), Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), the Socioeconomic Advisory Forum (SAF), and the Administrative Secretary of the Mercosul (ASM) (Hoffmann, Coutinho and Kfuri, 2008).

After consolidating this first phase of economic integration the Mercosul institutionalized some political mechanisms such as the 1996 Portero de los Fuentes declaration, which was signed by the presidents of the Mercosul member-states and created the Foreign Policy Consultation Forum (FCCP). The FCCP is populated by senior foreign office’s representatives and is designed to coordinate and systematize the political cooperation among Mercosul’s member-states. Its decisions are non-binding and consensual. This mechanism has proven its worth when diplomats of Mercosul countries (plus Bolivia and Chile) try to reach common positions for meetings of the Grupo do Río and the Organization of American States (OAS). It also produced results in coordinating the voting behaviour of Mercosul countries in the UN\textsuperscript{130}. The creation of the FCCP also

\textsuperscript{130} In the UN’s General Assembly, the joint-voting behavior of Mercosul member-countries increased dramatically after the establishment of the FCCP. While between 1991 and 1996 the member-states voted jointly in 51% of the cases, after the establishment of the FCCP it increased to 75% of joint-votes (for more on the statistical data and methodology of analysis of voting behavior see: Hoffmann, Coutinho and Kfuri; 2008). To increase the level of political coordination in the UN the Argentinian and Brazilian governments exchange permanent liaison diplomats in their respective missions in the UN. This is especially relevant when one of them occupies the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
stimulated the inclusion of the democratic-clause in the Mercosul. According to this clause which was included in the Mercosul-legislation in 1997, any member-state whose political system does not comply with the democratic norms must be immediately expelled from the integration process. This clause gave support to the Mercosul position in the Paraguayan political crisis, thereby avoiding disruption of the democratic system in this member-state. The member-states also coordinated their positions in the FCCP and used the democratic clause to pressure the governments of Peru and Haiti to respect human rights and maintain democratic institutions (Flemes, 2005). The FCCP also negotiated the Ushuaia Agreement, which declares the Mercosul as a Peace Zone. In this sense, it is correct to observe that the FCCP plays an important role as a mechanism for crisis prevention and secure regional stability.

Since 2003 the Mercosul has focused on the institutionalization of norms and values which are important to the region. As a result we can see the creation of new bodies in the CMC structure that deal exclusively with issues of human rights (the High-Authority Meeting for Human Rights), rule of law (Centre for Promotion of the Rule of Law), democracy (Democracy Observatory\textsuperscript{131}), and other bodies for social inclusion, education and employment. In order to reduce the complaints over the democratic deficit in the integration process, Mercosul also created a consultative forum composed of members of municipalities, federal states, provinces and departments; and in 2005 the CMC approved the creation of the Mercosul’s Parliament\textsuperscript{132}. Another important step for the consolidation of the integration process was the establishment of the Fund for

\textsuperscript{131} This new body is responsible for following up on the state of the democracy in its member-states (supervising the Democratic Clause), and is designed to be sent abroad in order to observe the transparency and fairness of elections.

\textsuperscript{132} The Mercosul Parliament has a consultative character and is initially composed of representatives of national parliaments, but it has already foreseen the need for direct elections (the pace depends on how fast the member-states internalize the legislation and organize the elections).
Structural Convergence and Institutional Strengthening of the Mercosul (Focem), which eased the asymmetries and promoted competitiveness in the bloc.

*Figure 3: Simplified view of Mercosul’s institutional structures*

In 2011 the Mercosul took a substantial step towards the institutionalization of political integration and external representation. The Foz do Iguacu Declaration created the office of the High-Representative of Mercosul as a body of the Common Market Council.

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133 For a more detailed institutional chart see: [http://www.mercosul.gov.br/organograma/organograma-mercosul/view](http://www.mercosul.gov.br/organograma/organograma-mercosul/view)
(CMC). The duties of the High-Representative include foreign policy coordination among the member-states, coordinating activities with the Common Market Group (CMG), developing action plans to be presented in the CMC, and presenting Mercosul’s common positions to third party countries, international organizations and regional blocs. The High-Representative has a three-year mandate and can be appointed once more. The first High-Representative of Mercosul was the Brazilian Ambassador, Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes\textsuperscript{134}.

In 1996 Chile and Bolivia signed associate agreements with the bloc. Chile did not join Mercosul because it did not want subscribe to Mercosul’s common external tariff and did not want to give up its freedom to sign free trade agreements with third party countries. Bolivia is member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). In 2003 and 2004 Mercosul extended the association agreements to Peru, Colombia and Ecuador (all of them are members of the CAN). Venezuela applied for full membership in 2006, however due to the nature of the Venezuelan democracy and the anti-capitalistic and anti-American rhetoric of Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez the Parliaments of some countries were hesitant to ratify it as a member-state of Mercosul. Therefore, with the association agreements Mercosul comprises the two most dynamic regions of South America (Southern Cone and the Andean Community).

Despite the difficulties of carrying out the integration process in the Southern Cone (not to mention in South America), Mercosul is the culmination of a great transformation in the region from an unstable nature with strong rivalries among the countries to a kind of “pluralistic security community”. This term, coined by Karl Deutsch, represents the notion that among a set of states, “there is real assurance that the members of the

\textsuperscript{134}\textsuperscript{See:} http://www.mercosur.org.uy/innovaportal/file/2810/1/DEC_063-2010_PT_ALTO%20REPRESENTANTE%20GRAL.pdf
community will not fight each other physically but will instead settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch, 1957: 5-6). This represents the idea that war is not an alternative for members of that community, and it is completely absent. More than that, according to Hurrel (1998) new shared interests and identities were constructed by the elites of the newly democratic Southern Cone countries. Meanwhile, new norms were internalized in order to gain leverage over the Milicom and re-direct this network to comply with them. It remains to be seen whether the northern part of South America also shares the same values of the Southern Cone, how strong its transgovernmental networks are, and if it can contribute to the political integration of the region.

4.2.2 - Andean Community of Nations: CAN

In 1969, after the failure of the Latin American Free Trade Association – LAFTA (Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio - ALALC) five South American countries in the Andean region with similar economies (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), signed the Cartagena Agreement, thereby creating the Andean Pact. Venezuela joined the bloc in 1973. The Andean Pact was initially fashioned as a protectionist trading bloc, establishing barriers for trade between the member-states and the rest of the world, and it was hoped that this would increase the intra-bloc trade. However, this first aim of the Andean Pact failed miserably due to the lack of capital and

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135 Geographically speaking, the Andean countries are defined by their location in South America, and particularly those which have in their territory part of the Andes mountain range. Therefore, according to the geographical definition the Andean countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. However, the initial idea of the Andean Community was to comprise all of the Andean countries in its institutional structure, but not all of them are part of the institution, f.i. Argentina and Chile. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that when we refer to the “Andean countries” or “Andean region” we are counting the members of the Andean Community, or the countries located in the Northern tier of South America. Those are: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (this last one is not a member of the Andean Community since 2006).

136 The official name Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones – CAN) was only formally introduced in 1996 with the Trujillo Protocol. From 1969 until 1996, the official name was Andean Pact.
technical capacity of the member-states which were unable to sustain an industrialization programme. Due to these shortcomings and the restrictions on foreign investment and strong protectionism, Chile left the bloc in 1976. During the 1970’s Chile was experiencing strong growth due to its market-oriented economic policies (the influence of the so-called Chicago Boys mentioned above), and therefore it would have been contradictory for Chile to stay in the protectionist bloc (Arroyo and Roth, 2009).

The Chilean decision to withdraw from the Andean Pact had a serious impact on the evolution of the goals agreed in 1969. In this sense, additional protocols were signed in 1976 and 1978 postponing the establishment of the common external tariff and the implementation of a full-fledged free trade zone. However, in order to try to solve the problems with the fulfilment of the goals the Andean Pact member-states introduced a judicial organism in 1979, the so-called the Andean Court of Justice. Moreover, in order to enhance accountability and reduce the democratic deficit the Andean Parliament was created. Most importantly, the establishment of the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers as the political body (together with the Andean Presidential Council) of the Andean Pact took place. The Andean Council of Foreign Ministers is composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member-states. It has the task of coordinating the positions of member-states in regard to the objectives of the Andean Pact and of elaborating joint-positions of the Pact in international forums and negotiations with third parties. The Council can issue either decisions or declarations. While decisions are legally-binding (under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), declarations function as demarches, communicating the positions of the Andean Pact in specific issues. Both tools need to be approved by consensus in the Council. The Council is also responsible for preparing the meetings of the Heads of State and evaluating the performance of the Secretary-General of the Pact with the possibility to renew or end their mandate (Sanches Avendano, 1999; Mattli, 1999; Rosales, 2008).
Notwithstanding those efforts in increasing the institutionalization of the Andean Pact, the integration process remained stagnated in the period between 1975 and 1987. This standstill is attributed to the impact of the withdrawal of Chile together with the economic crisis that affected Latin America in the 1980’s, but most of all this difficulty to deepen the integration was caused by the political constraints (such as border disputes, lack of CBMs, aggressive discourse, etc.) which inhibited the development of transgovernmental networks that could foster the integration process by giving flesh to the institutional structure established in the first place. Apparently those networks did not develop in the Andean countries due to a lack of political will, very different political systems\textsuperscript{137}, the existence of strong nationalisms in the region, and the presence of many border disputes among the member-states.

With the Quito Protocol in 1987 the basis of the integration process was re-launched, with the countries accepting an open form of regionalism. The less ambitious nature of the integration gave impulse to the Andean Pact, and after 24 years of attempts the free trade zone was established in 1993 followed by the creation of a Common External Tariff in 1995. However, once again the political instability of the Andean countries hindered the efforts of a less ambitious integration. In 1992, Alberto Fujimori carried out a \textit{Coup d’Etat} in Peru and refused to participate in the free trade zone and in the common external tariff. Bolivia and Ecuador also did not accept the common external tariff. While Bolivia and Ecuador negotiated special treatment in the Andean Pact, Peru was reintegrated into the free trade zone in 1997 (Mattli, 1999; Rosales, 2008).

In 1996 the Andean Pact experienced an ambitious institutional reform. The Trujillo Protocol signed by the Heads of State introduced the Andean Integration System (\textit{Sistema Andino de Integracion} - SAI), and created an ambitious integration program. The Trujillo Protocol also changed the name of the bloc to the Andean Community of

Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones – CAN). The SAI is the unification of all bodies and institutions that operate in the Andean region in order to enhance the coordination and cohesion of the Andean Community.

*Figure 4: Andean Integration System (SAI)*

The Andean Presidential Council is the highest decision-making body of the CAN. The CAN Heads of State’ meet in an Intergovernmental Conference format once a year to define the general guidelines for the integration process. The pro-tempore presidency of the Council rotates every year among the member-states. The president of the Council represents the CAN in international forums and in negotiations with third parties (Rosales, 2008).
The General Secretariat can be considered to be the executive branch of the CAN. The Secretary-General is elected consensually by the Council of Foreign Ministers for a 5 year term. The tasks of the SG include preparing drafts and decisions to propose to the Council of Foreign Ministers and to the Commission. Therefore the SG has the capacity of agenda-setting. The Commission of the Andean Community is composed of representatives of all member-states and meets 3 times every year in ordinary sessions. The functions of the Commission are exclusively related to trade and development policies, including advising the Council of Ministers in negotiations with third party countries and international forums. Besides those organisms mentioned above there are other financial (such as the Andean Development Corporation – CAF), advisory (with the participation of Civil Society, such as the Andean Business Advisory Council), and social/educational (such as the Simon Bolivar Andean University and the Social Conventions) groups (Rosales, 2008).

Despite this incredible and legally advanced institutional structure, the Andean Community presents more problems than achievements. This is due to the high level of political instability in the region\(^{138}\) and economic fragility. According to Rosales (2008: 52): “… each Member-Country wants to apply and maintain different rhythms (with different aspects) to the process of integration; … there are still border-problems which have not yet found a solution and which represent one of the most destabilizing factors of the Andean region. […] there are actually strong differences regarding ideologies and political tendencies between the Member States.” On the other hand, Sanches-Avendano (1999) argues that the main problem of the Andean Community has been the lack of political will to make the institution work. In his view, the rapid institutionalization the CAN has experienced since 1996 was a response to external pressures, especially due to the success of the Mercosur and the necessity to interact with the European

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\(^{138}\) Just to mention some of those problems: strong political (and ideological) polarization inside and between the member-states, civil war in Colombia, coup attempts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, border tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, Peru and Colombia.
Union in inter-regional negotiations. In this sense we can observe the Andean Community as the institutional skeleton of an integration process without substance.

The lack of common norms and values that could drive the integration forward is also noticed. The Andean region is stroked by historical democratic and institutional fragility, and therefore the power and presence of the armed forces in each of the countries is a reflection of this. In the next section of this chapter we will discuss the influence of the military in the integration process, but for now it is enough to say that the political instability and unresolved border disputes harm any kind of positive development of transgovernmental networks among the military and/or diplomats in the sub-region.

The political polarization in the Andean Community reached such a level that in 2006 Venezuela withdrew from the integration process. The official reason presented by Venezuela was that the integration process had failed due to the Free Trade Agreements signed separately by Colombia and Peru with the United States. However, some analysts argue that Hugo Chavez (former Venezuelan President) saw the possibility to join Mercosul as a more interesting opportunity,\(^{139}\) not only economically, but also politically. Venezuela expected that a rapid exit of the Andean Community would enhance the prospects of a fast integration in the Mercosul. However, the conflictive rhetoric of Hugo Chavez and his apparent views of integration\(^{140}\) have brought concerns that the presence of Venezuela as a full member of Mercosul could harm the integration process (Malamud, 2006).

\(^{139}\) The Andean Community has an annual trade of ca. 9,000 million dollars, while Mercosul’s annual trade consists of ca. 150,000 million dollars (figures of 2005, Andean Community Secretariat).

\(^{140}\) Chavez has already stated that he aims to bring about 21st century socialism and that regional integration should be a tool he can use to spread his ideology to the rest of the region.
Therefore the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community brought about an important discussion on the future of the integration process. The political and ideological pressure that Venezuela exerts on Bolivia and Ecuador could lead to the breakdown of the integration process (Rodriguez-Larreta, 2006). More realistically however, it would be possible to see a reorganization of the CAN without Venezuela. It is also lowering its aspirations and maybe negotiating with Mercosul about the possibility to merge both integration processes under the umbrella of the Union of South American Nations (Unasul) (Rosales, 2008).

4.2.3 - Union of South American Nations (Unasul) and the South American Defence Council (CSD)

In order to organize cooperation in the field of security and defence, the South American Defence Council (CSD) was created inside the framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). The UNASUL aims to merge the Southern Cone system (composed of the Mercosul member-states plus Chile) with the Andean system (composed of the CAN), and Guyana and Surinam who normally participate in the Caribbean system. It aims to create a single market with the development of the free trade zone starting in 2014. It also has big projects in infrastructure (South American Infrastructure Integration Initiative – IIRSA), and energy supply. On the political side, the UNASUL played an important role during the Bolivian crisis in 2008. The UNASUL, however, has a strictly intergovernmental character and is constituted of three councils: officials, Ministers, and Heads of State (Ramírez; 2008). The most important factor for this dissertation is the development of the South American Defence Council and its implications to the political integration in the region.

The South American Defence Council (CSD) is a new institutional space which was developed in the framework of the UNASUL to foster regional cooperation and political
coordination in the fields of security and defence. Therefore, the CSD, is not a collective security mechanism (like NATO) but is first of all designed to be a consultative forum where governments can inform their partners on their positions on issues of security and defence. Therefore it can be defined as a mechanism of confidence building among the countries in the region to enhance mutual trust, decrease levels of tension, and promote at least some political coordination in order to avoid damaging economic interests. In this sense, the CSD can be seen as a forum that can be used by the member States to promote and defend their interests while managing their mutual relationships in a less threatening way, thus promoting mutual oversight and resolving tensions and conflicts among them while enhancing the predictability of behaviour and promoting mutual understanding. The importance of transgovernmental networks for the establishment of the CDS is supported by interviews of the author with military advisors to the Brazilian Minister of Defence in 2006. One Brazilian Air Force General, for instance, argued that without activating personal connections in other South American countries, and without the diplomatic offensive of the Brazilian Defence Minister the establishment of the CDS would have been impossible due to strong initial reservations in many South American governments (and the United States). Mobilizing the support from military advisors in other countries together with the activation of pre-existing connections between them was an important factor as highlighted by the interviews.

Secondly, it is guided by the principles of non-intervention in domestic matters, the subordination of the military to the democratically-constituted civil authorities, and the respect for human rights and individual freedoms. Moreover, in its Charter the CSD only recognizes the institutional forces included in its member-states’ Constitutions which are expressly condemning violent groups (which is very important due to mutual accusations of guerrilla support made between Colombia on one side and Ecuador and Venezuela on the other). Thirdly, in the long term the CSD is oriented towards fostering a common South American identity based on shared values. This can be seen as an
intention of changing and harmonizing the South American strategic cultures that could culminate in a common South American Security and Defence Policy. According to the words of the Brazilian President: “I am deeply convinced that it is the time to deepen our South American identity in the field of defence too (...) We have to articulate a new defence idea in the region based on common values and principles such as the respect for sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity and non-intervention in domestic affairs.” In fact, in the view of the policy-makers one of the first steps towards this common strategic culture would be the harmonization of a regional defence market. This would lead to an increasingly strategic autonomy, thereby promoting the regional arms industries and enhancing cooperation and joint-projects among them as well as fulfilling targets the military corporations want to meet in an era of Defence cuts, thus keeping the military under civilian control and away from daily politics (Vaz and Jácome, 2009).

In this sense we can observe three main challenges posed to the development of the CSD as a sustainable institution to promote South American political integration, namely the need to guaranteed peace and democracy in the region, contribute to fostering a South American identity, and the development of a regional defence market.

The first one is related to the fact that the South American security and defence agenda can be characterised by three types of conflicts: domestic crises that affect regional stability and threaten democracy, interstate conflicts (border disputes and territorial conflicts), and transnational threats (organized criminality, guerrilla movements, etc). These three kinds of conflict interrelate with each other, especially in border zones (see

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141 Translated from “Lula sugere reuniao exclusiva para tratar do Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa”, Folha Online, 23/05/2008, original in Portuguese: “Estou convencido que é chegada a hora de aprofundarmos nossa identidade sul-americana também no campo da defesa. (...) Devemos articular uma nova visão de defesa na região fundada em valores e princípios comuns, como o respeito à soberania, à autodeterminação, à integridade territorial dos Estados e à não-intervenção em assuntos internos”.

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more in Flemes and Radsek, 2009). In this sense, the first general objective of the CSD\textsuperscript{142} is to “consolidate South America as a Zone of Peace and a foundation for democratic stability”. Although the Mercosul and the UNASUL have already shown the ability and capacity to influence domestic crises decisively, as seen in the cases of Paraguay and Bolivia respectively, the normative question on the parameters on how to do it still remains open (in Mercosul this is more clear due to the democratic clause and the transgovernmental links). The political instability and the confrontational-ideologically based rhetoric of some member-states, especially those located in the Andean system, is also a reason for concern.

The second challenge is whether the CDS will be able to foster a South American identity. Besides the guiding principles of democracy and sustainable peace, the CDS effectiveness will also be measured on whether it will be able to promote and deepen a set of norms which are largely accepted throughout South America. According to Kacowicz (2005:4), among the South American countries there is a set of norms shared by all, those are: “(…) \textit{uti possidetis}, peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-determination, \textit{convivencia} (peaceful coexistence), \textit{concertación} (consensus-seeking), arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation and confidence building mechanisms (CBM’s)”. In fact, some of those norms are evident in the CSD foundation document: “respect for sovereignty, integrity and territorial inviolability of the States, non-intervention in domestic affairs and people’s self-determination”. This represents the fact that in whichever way it is possible to identify common principles, values and norms, the question on how they will be operationalised in order to produce a common South American identity that could be used as a driving force for integration remains. For many policy-makers the first step to solving this puzzle is to establish a South American Defence Market.

\textsuperscript{142} As stated in its constitutive agreement, article 4 of the Decisao para o Estabelecimento do Conselho de Defesa Sul-americano da UNASUL, subscribed in Costa do Sauípe, Brazil, December 16th 2008
This leads to the third challenge of the CSD: develop a regional defence market. According to its constitutive document, one of the specific objectives of the CSD is to “Promote the exchange and cooperation among defence industries”\(^{143}\). The promotion of a regional defence market in South America would not only contribute to the technological development and more strategic autonomy for the countries in the region, it would also deepen the economic ties which are fundamental to the integration process. The establishment of this regional defence market also has the potential to foster a common South American identity if it contributes to the development of, if not common, at least compatible strategic cultures (for more on strategic culture see Giegerich, 2006 and Meyer, 2006). Economically speaking, even though the military expenditure in the region is one the lowest in the world it represents approximately 50 billion dollars, from which 15 billion goes to new investments and maintenance\(^ {144}\). This market is seen as having the potential to serve the development of the local defence industries. Nevertheless, the development of a common South American Defence Market would give member-states the possibility to better fulfil the corporate needs of the military while at the same time decreasing the defence expenditure. It would also make it more difficult for the military to find nationalistic excuses to justify an aggressive policy against their neighbours. Therefore the common defence market would increase civilian control over the military and help to socialize them into the norm of peace while fulfilling their corporate needs with increasing interoperability with forces from neighbour countries and joint South American projects.

As seen above, those three challenges interrelate and offer the CDS the potential to develop as a sustainable institution for the South American political integration. This

\(^ {143}\) Translated from: letter f, article 5 of the Decisao para o Estabelecimento do Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano da UNASUL. The original text in Portuguese: “Promover o intercâmbio e a cooperacao no ambito da indústria de defesa.”

\(^ {144}\) Ca. 70% of defence expenditure in the region is destined to pay salaries and pensions. See SIPRI Yearbook 2008.
means that political integration should not be aimed at balancing other powers or influencing other countries/regions. As the European example demonstrates, in order to be sustainable political integration has to be developed to manage the region’s internal relationships first. In this sense, the policy-makers in the region should see that in most cases (especially in the formative years), the South American Defence Council (and the UNASUL) will not be directed at influencing the external environment but will instead be used to manage mutual relationships among the member-states (interrelational), to strengthen or influence integration, and to affirm a common South American identity.

As observed above, both in the successful case of Mercosul and the unsuccessful case of the Andean Community transgovernmental networks played an important role in the integration process. As a result the strong transgovernmental networks being built along the years in the Southern Cone with the permanent exchange in military schools, diplomat academies, joint-exercises and regular meetings can be the cement which is used to slowly increase the level of institutionalization of South American political integration. The statistical data already shows an increasing participation of Andean representatives in Southern Cone military and diplomatic academies in the last decade.

It can be seen that in South America, just as in the European case, in the absence of formal structures and the codification of practices these transgovernmental networks have already produced important steps in the direction of integration. It is clear that those networks have the potential to create and enhance information-sharing mechanisms, and while maintaining their national loyalties they can be gradually oriented towards the development of common South American positions for their national problems, thus creating a sense of ‘ownership’ of the process. The participation of the CDS can lead to the development of a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding among national representatives. This *esprit de corps*, as seen in the European integration process, represents at least a basic commitment and belief in joint
decision-making. The idea of developing a “community of thinking” or “community of common views” is especially facilitated by the “South American way”. By “South American way” we understand the social competences that South Americans have, especially those related to fostering interpersonal relationships, meaning the ability of the South Americans to discuss, exchange ideas and foster personal relationships, thus creating an environment of mutual trust, dialogue, openness and friendship. This “family atmosphere”, which is eased by the way in which South Americans develop interpersonal relationships, has the potential to facilitate negotiations and create a sense of ownership of the process through the development of shared norms. These established informal practices can then be codified and further institutionalized, thereby offering the cement for the political integration.

Another important factor is the fact that the more the political integration in South America develops (not only institutionally, but mostly with the spread of shared norms and values on which the integration is based on), the more the diplomats and military officials will become socialized (Regelsberger, 1988: 36). As observed in the last chapter, socialization, according to Checkel (2007: 5-6), can be defined as: “[...] a process of inducting actors into the norms and the rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness: this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.” We are not overstating the influence of socialization on political integration, but we recognize that together with the development of transgovernmental ties it represents a fundamental “cement” for institutionalization and further political integration.

This is not to say that international institutions will be built and will all follow the same pattern once the foundations for its existence (transgovernmental networks and
socialization processes) are laid down. Some other issues have to be considered if we want to observe how and why institutions develop sustainably in some contexts and not in others. According to Dembiski, Freistein and Weifen (2006: 4): “Depending on the function or [...] the social environment [...] , states will create institutions with a specific form [...] in order to maximize benefits and to reduce risks. The term “social environment” refers to collective action problems involved, the number of relevant players, and the amount and quality of information available etc. The term “form” may include institutional characteristics like scope, range, voting procedures, precision of rules, delegation of authority to supranational bodies and escape clauses. [...] form [...] influences the effectiveness of the organization [...].” In this sense, these other factors need to be taken into account if we want to analyse why and how institutions are built.

4.3 - Norms and socialization in the South American politics of Defence

Despite efforts to institutionalize the integration process in the Andean region, the lack of common understandings on the objectives of the integration processes allied with the high level of mistrust and political instability have harmed the development of the transgovernmental networks which could push the process forwards and give flesh to the institutional bones. In the Southern Cone we can see that transgovernmental networks already existed when the institutionalization started, and these were somehow controlled or re-directed with the institutionalization process.

The task of this section is to discover to what extent, under which conditions, and through which processes the political elites (here with a focus on the military) of South American countries incorporated the idea of a positive integration process. As a result

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145 We argue that although the civilian network was responsible for the first movement towards institutionalization in the Southern Cone, the military network is nowadays much more advanced and active in furthering security and defence integration in South America. The main objective of the civilian network was to gain leverage over the
we are basically interested in how the political actors in the region relate not only through the so-called “military diplomacy\textsuperscript{146}, but also how and if they are socialized into common norms of behaviour that promote democracy and stability. According to our hypothesis, the socialization into common norms and values is one strategy used to promote the control/steering of transgovernmental networks. In this section we will locate the “hubs” where those networks are socialized, the strategies (strategic action, role playing, or normative suasion) and the outcomes of socialization in the Southern Cone, Andean countries, and Brazil\textsuperscript{147}.

Unlike from the European case where we observe the development of transgovernmental networks among diplomats (Diplocom) and further socialization in European institutions, in the South American case the stronger transgovernmental activity occurs among the military (Milicom), and their socialization occurs mostly in national military academies but also in technical cooperation programmes and joint-exercises. Therefore we need some short explanation on the different ethos of the South American military before we start to analyse the socialization processes.

4.3.1 - Military ethos in South America: what the military think?

\textsuperscript{146} According to Soares, 2003:4, military diplomacy refers to foreign policy initiatives carried out by the military (or Defence ministries). Medeiros (2010:116) observes that foreign policy initiatives carried out by the military are eased due to a common “military ethos”. As a result, in the South American case it is possible to speak of a parallel integration process established on the basis of the military diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{147} Due to its political relevance for the development and socialization of norms to the integration process, Brazil will be analysed separately.
When we consider the role played by the military in South American politics, two important characteristics must be analysed: the nationalism and the “culture of confidentiality”. The military ethic is traditionally realist and conservative, and therefore we must look at the extent to which those characteristics represent an obstacle to the possibility of international cooperation (Huntington, 1957).

The nationalist character of the South American armed forces has been constant. Deeply influenced by the French nationalism at the beginning of the 20th Century, the military in the region believe their role goes beyond the technical aspects of war and includes a strong political-ideological content. According to Rattenbach (1972:60), the military profession in the region includes some common beliefs, such as the fact that the professional military official believes that he is not simply a “military employee” but has a very important social role, he believes he is part of a very (if not the most) prestigious institution\(^\text{148}\), the military person believes he is the last source of “nationality”. In their view, their constant intervention in daily politics in South American History is due to the high level of internal political instability, and not the opposite.

The so-called “culture of confidentiality” is another characteristic of the military ethos which harms the prospects of cooperation. According to Almeida (2008:51), the culture of confidentiality is the inappropriate extension of the secrecy characteristics of specific themes to others that should be of general knowledge. This leads to a difficulty in communication because ordinary issues are treated as secrets. The culture of confidentiality contradicts the construction of confidence building. The highest

\(^{148}\) In fact, the Armed Forces are pointed by the population as the most reliable institution in most South American countries, far more popular than the political parties and the Congress, and astonishingly more popular than the Catholic Church. For instance, in Brazil the two most reliable institutions are the Armed Forces with 73% approval and the Catholic Church with 56%, Political Parties have only 5% and the Congress has 22% approval rate (see the results in \url{http://fgvnoticias.fgv.br/pt-br/noticia/pesquisa-do-icibrasil-avalia-confianca-nas-instituicoes-do-estado#Updz-cRDv5g}).
expression of this misleading culture of confidentiality is the inability of South American
nations to develop regional mechanisms for the transparency of defence expenditure\(^{149}\)
(Medeiros, 2010).

These characteristics are harmful of the integration process in South America. As we
observed at the beginning of this chapter, one of the fundamental changes which
enabled a sustainable integration process in South America was the establishment of
the civilian control over the military. As seen above, while we can see a high degree of
civilian control in the Southern Cone the Andean countries present high levels of
institutional crisis and direct military interventions in internal politics (Diamint, 2001). As
observed by Iglesias (1999), there are two ideal-type models of civilian-military relations
in South America: total subordination of the military to civil authorities (Argentina) and
total autonomy of the military (Peru). Diamint (1999) presents an interesting insight on
the idea of “professionalization as an aspect of civilian control”. Unlike to Huntington
(1996), she argues that in Latin America the more professional the armed forces
become the more military autonomy they have, and “the more organized and efficient
the institutions and armed forces are the more capacity they have to influence other
governmental agencies” (Diamint, 1999:19).

As a result, due to a shared past of military dictatorships and the constant influence of
the military in politics, the question of the autonomy of the military in a democratic
system persists in South America as an important point for discussion. In most countries
in the region topics such as defence policy and military strategy which, at least
theoretically, should be in the hands of civilians remain under military responsibility.

\(^{149}\) Here it is important to highlight the efforts made by the Argentinian and Chilean governments to establish a
common methodology to measure the defence expenditures of both countries. This effort to enhance
transparency and mutual trust started with the signature of the El Salvador Declaration in 1998. The project to
elaborate the methodology was carried out by the UN Economic Comission for Latin America (CEPAL). (CEPAL,
2001)
Although the office of the Minister of Defence has been occupied by a civilian, the directory structures have been occupied by military personnel (many already retired). (Medeiros, 2010)

The big picture presented above points to the important position that the military in South America occupies in the forums of the elaboration and discussion of cooperation and integration policies regarding security and defence. Furthermore, the military actions in the foreign policy field have been eased by the military channels, which has been called “military diplomacy”. The shared military identity which includes patterns of character, friendship and comradeship\textsuperscript{150} constitutes a feature in the relationships among the military in South America\textsuperscript{151}. Moreover, those characteristics are especially present in the military meetings and make the exchange of ideas more straightforward and objective (Amaral, 2004; Medeiros, 2010). According to a retired Brazilian officer: “In regard to the military field (...) persists a tradition of good relationship, at the institutional, organizational, personal, and family levels (...) I have held very good relations with Argentinian military in the last 50 years.” (see Correia Neto, 1994: 112). This statement is validated by the interviews we carried out in the period between 2006-2011 with military personnel from South American countries, and it is especially observable between Brazilian and Argentinian officials.

The relationship among the military forces in the region was especially enhanced with the military dictatorships and the establishment of the Condor Operation (described above). According to Martin (2001), during this period the armed forces perceived

\textsuperscript{150} Those characteristics are not only part of the military \textit{habitus} but are codified in the regulations of the armed forces (see Regulamento de Continencias, Honras, Sinais de Respeito e Cerimonial Militar das Forcas Armadas; Brasil, 1997: §2o Art. 2o)

\textsuperscript{151} According to Huntington (1996) the military identity pressuposes States in competition, with no possibility of cooperation.
themselves to be members of an informal-supranational league involved in political repression and government control. At that time the contact among the military forces mostly happened informally, but also bilaterally and multilaterally at the Conference of the American Armies (CEA). The Conference of the American Armies was an initiative of the United States in 1960, right after the Cuban Revolution, to constitute a forum for the exchange of experiences among armies in the continent (Amaral, 2004). With the redemocratization of Latin American countries the CEA lost its importance, and the contacts among the military now occur under the aegis of the civilian Defence Ministries. However, the defence policy and military strategy are still in the hands of the military. The next step which is required to increase transparency and control over this influential transgovernmental network would be to enhance the civilian interest, expertise and responsibilities in the Ministries of Defence (Diamint, 1999).

While for the armed forces military diplomacy is about the possibility they have to influence their country’s foreign policy, for their governments this transgovernmental network conducts an organic function by bringing together the armed forces of the region, thus enhancing mutual understanding and regional cooperation (Pinto, Rocha and Silva, 2004; Medeiros, 2010). Particularly during the recent democratic period, the strength of this transgovernmental network has compelled governments to push forward transparency mechanisms in defence issues. At the same time, military diplomacy can help to cement a common perception where the possibility of military conflict among the participants of the network is very remote. According to the military, the level of common understanding has been interpreted as the basis for the establishment of a future common security and defence policy (Rabello, 2006).

Moreover, the democratic values being internalized in this transgovernmental network along the years and the participation of South American military in UN Peacekeeping Missions have contributed to the incorporation of humanitarian law into the military
doctrines. This is especially seen in the countries that already have UN approved Peacekeeping Training Centres such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. In this sense, the necessity to work with diversity during the participation in UN Missions has a democratizing effect because it brings the principle of tolerance to the soldiers (Diamint, 2001). Beyond increasing the ties of friendship and camaraderie that are already present among the armed forces in the region, the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations encourages the military to incorporate subjects such as Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and International Relations, etc in their academy’s curricula. (Medeiros, 2010)

4.3.2 - Socialization in the Southern Cone

Since the 1990’s Argentina has been the country that has pushed forwards the construction of mechanisms for regional defence. According to the Argentinian Minister of Defence: “[it is necessary] to stimulate the creation of forums for political and strategic reflexion, the development of which leads to the construction of regimes, systems or security communities, bilaterally or multilaterally, in the context of the sub region.” (Argentina, 2006). This speech echoes a position adopted by the Argentinian government since redemocratization. The National Defence Law of 2006 also codifies this practise and commits the government to: “(…) put forward a reconversion of the traditional schemes of defence actually based on out dated geopolitical realities and archaic conflict possibilities. This process of reconversion and institutional modernization is based on the necessity to, together with the neighbour countries, project a Sub-regional Defence System (Argentina, 2006b). This official document is a reflection of the good relationships with other South American countries that the Argentinian military cherishes since the redemocratization.
As a result, the perception of the Argentinian military in relation to the regional integration process has been very positive. According to our interviews and based on secondary sources, it was possible to see that for most military personnel the possibility of war with a neighbouring country represents the most distant threat. The most positive relationship that the Argentinians pointed to are with former rivals: Brazil and Chile. According to one official: “I don’t know if integration should be extended to all countries in the region. I think it can work well in the Southern Cone” (see Medeiros, 2010). The good relationship among Argentinian and Brazilian officials is also an important feature highlighted by the interviews: “Unlike how it might appear, the Argentinian officials admire Brazil (…)”; and “In Argentina, the military are in favour of pro-integration initiatives, especially with Brazil (…) the problem is the civilians that have political control and sometimes don’t have the same perception”. The relationships developed during the Argentinians’ stay in the Brazilian military academies are maintained and deepened, especially in the border areas where the commanders exchange informal visits to each other (including their families), and assist each other in any material or political way possible.\(^{152}\) Besides this, especially for the Army commanders, the equestrian events are an opportunity to maintain and deepen their relationships.

Two examples are mentioned when referring to the Argentinian commitment to the development of regional political integration in the fields of security and defence: the *Cruz del Sur* Bi-national Force, and the join-project for the development of a General Employment Airborne Light Vehicle (*VLEGA*). The Joint Peacekeeping Force *Cruz del Sur* is a joint-force composed of an 800 strong Argentinian and Chilean military to operate in Peacekeeping Operations. The agreement was signed in 2005 in Santiago de Chile, and the force was operational in 2007 with the headquarters located in Argentina. The *Cruz del Sur* is also composed of a Permanent Combined Joint Command Centre (General Staff). Besides the joint-Peacekeeping force, the

\(^{152}\) One commander told me that he helped his Argentinian counterparts by lending them hardware for a training operation or helping to secure political authorization for a military manoeuvre.
Argentinian Defence Ministry created an Argentinian Joint Peace Keeping Operation Training Centre (CAECOPAZ) in June 1995. Besides training for the Argentinian military and civilians that take part in Peacekeeping Missions, the CAECOPAZ also organizes joint-training and exchange programs for the military of Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. The CAECOPAZ also includes permanent trainers from Brazil and Chile and has invited trainers from Uruguay.

As seen in the first part of this chapter, the fear of backlashes in the redemocratization process compelled the Argentinian government to impose rigid civilian control over the military. As a consequence, the military lost the ability to set the defence policy agenda and saw their budget decrease to the lowest percentage of military expenditure in the region. Besides this, unlike other countries in South America there is a clear definition for the employment of military forces. In Argentina the military can exclusively be used for defence missions and not security. In the absence of a concrete threat\(^{153}\) and the impossibility to participate in internal missions, the Argentinian armed forces have concentrated their efforts in enhancing their participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations as the only way to keep their operational capability active. The Argentinian military sees the development of a South American Defence System as the way to project itself politically. These focuses, allied with the change in the military academies’ curricula\(^{154}\), increase the exposure of the Argentinian military to democratic values and contributes to socializing the military exchange students from other countries into those values (Medeiros, 2010).

\(^{153}\) The most concrete external threat would be a military conflict due to the Malvinas/Falklands issue. However, the perception of the military and the government position is that the question of the Malvinas/Falklands has to be solved diplomatically.

\(^{154}\) In 1993 Argentina adopted a new curricula for their military academies that included obligatory courses on International Relations, Humanitarian Law, etc. For more on the curricula reform in the Argentinian military Academies see: http://www.mindef.gov.ar/educacion.html.
Chile is positioned in a very particular geographical spot in South America, and this contributes to a sense of isolation from the region. Besides this, Chile still has border disputes with Peru and Bolivia. Unlike Argentina, the military in Chile is also assigned with internal tasks such as ensuring law and order and humanitarian and disaster relief. Just as in other South American countries, Chile strives to establish efficient institutional control over the military (Pior-Berlin, 2010). Moreover, the military in Chile has maintained some of the privileges it acquired in the Pinochet’s era, such as the Copper Law. According to the Copper Law\textsuperscript{155} (dated from 1958), 10\% of the copper revenue flows directly to the armed forces. As a result Chile is the South American country with the highest rate of military expenditure per capita.

The Chilean military sees the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations as positive. As mentioned above, Chile and Argentina have a joint-Peacekeeping Force named \textit{Cruzeiro del Sur}, and since 2002 Chile has also hosted a Peacekeeping Training Centre called the Chilean Joint Peacekeeping Operations Centre (CECOPAC). They also see the development of a sustainable regional arms industry positively, especially one involving Argentina and Brazil. In terms of joint weapon projects, Chile participates in the development of fighter jets with Brazil (Medeiros, 2010).

Constitutionally speaking Paraguay renounces war\textsuperscript{156} as a political possibility and considers it only as a matter of self-defence. As a result the perception of Paraguayan military being involved in the participation of possible conflicts is null. Paraguay also has the lowest net defence budget\textsuperscript{157} and possesses the smallest military force in the

\textsuperscript{155} Chile is the world’s larger copper exporter.

\textsuperscript{156} See Paraguayan Constitution Article 144.

\textsuperscript{157} Around 52 Million USD in 2003 (source \url{www.indexmundi.com}, accessed 08.07.2011).
Despite those reduced numbers the military still has a strong amount of political power in Paraguay.

The cooperation with other South American countries is seen a necessary condition for Paraguay. Only through this cooperation is Paraguay able to have access to military equipment as the country has no important arms industry, and the Paraguayan defence industry consists of clothing, parts of weapons and ammunition. As seen above, Paraguay and Brazil have an important relationship, especially between the armed forces. The military cooperation between both countries started in 1942 with the establishment of the Permanent Brazilian Military Mission in Paraguay, which ended in 1994 and was responsible for training and equipping the Paraguayan military. However, in 1996 the governments established a broader agreement called the Brazilian Military Cooperation in Paraguay (CMBP) which includes duties beyond the tasks of training and equipping, including tasks of “planning, reorganizing, military intelligence, social communication and other necessary operations” (Brasil, 2011). The exchange of Paraguayan senior officials to Brazilian academies is also very high. According to one official it is an unspoken pre-condition to achieving higher ranks in the Paraguayan army that the official has previously studied or worked in Brazil. The relationships between Paraguayans and Brazilians are so deep that one Brazilian commander we interviewed told us that during an official Paraguayan presidential visit to Brazil: “the [presidents’] agenda was organized partially by one Paraguayan colonel and one Brazilian major that had studied together at the ECEME. Both shared not only personal bonds … but also family relations … which facilitated mutual understanding and helped to move forward the political agenda.” The military cooperation with Argentina mainly occurs with the training of Paraguayan troops for UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Argentinian Peacekeeping Training Centre (CAECOPAZ). In the preparation for participation in the

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Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Paraguayan troops were trained in the Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIOPAZ) (Medeiros, 2010).

In the same situation observed in Paraguay, the relationships between the military of Uruguay and Brazil are also very positive. The top priority for the Uruguayan military is the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations. They see the participation in UN Missions as an important opportunity for professional training, and it represents a source of international prestige to the country (Uruguay, 1999). Just like Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Uruguay has its own Peacekeeping Training Centre, the so-called Uruguayan National School for Peace Operations (ENOPU), which was created in 2008. Uruguay is the South American country with more participation in Peacekeeping Missions, with a lot of military personnel with participating in different UNPKO’s. Some official have participated in PKOs more than once.

The Uruguayan Defence Policy of 1999 includes a clear pro-integration view in its objectives: “Enhance the armed forces’ combined operational capabilities with the other Mercosul member-states”; “Steer the equipment acquisitions of the Army, Navy and Air Force to (…) guarantee the standardization of the equipment of the three forces in the first step, and in a second step to standardize our equipment with the armed forces of the other Mercosul countries” (Uruguay, 1999). In regard to the relationship with Brazil, there is a very intense exchange of Uruguayan military to Brazilian academies, mostly financed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of External Relations (MRE). During the interviews a Brazilian official that served with Uruguayans mentioned that they share “identity and interests, including the commitment with democratic values, protection of human rights, and integration of the continent – having Mercosur as its central axis”. (Medeiros, 2010:139)

4.3.3 - Socialization in the Andean Countries

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Bolivia is the second poorest country in the region\textsuperscript{159} and presents high levels of political instability. Bolivia’s relationships with neighbouring countries have been very unstable, with alternating periods of friendship and mistrust. Those changes are attributed to the fact that Bolivia has borders with former adversaries\textsuperscript{160} and still nourishes revisionist feelings, especially towards Chile due to the Ocean access which was lost in the War of the Pacific. Another factor is the high level of political instability, with governments constantly shifting the States policies (Rosales, 2008). Nevertheless, the biggest threat to Bolivia is not a war with one of its neighbours, and instead it is the high level of social unrest and the uncontrolled transnational criminality\textsuperscript{161}.

Recently, since the election of Evo Morales to the presidency in 2005 Bolivia has fostered a strategic partnership with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. This close relationship and the incendiary character of the Venezuelan president has caused some worries among the Brazilian and Paraguayan military that Bolivia could breed in the nationalistic feeling to wage war and appease the military. One of the objectives of this strategic relationship\textsuperscript{162} was to build strong transgovernmental ties between Bolivian and Venezuelan officials. This objective is being successful due to the commitment of the Venezuelan government to finance a permanent exchange of officials and troops of both countries, focusing on training and equipping the Bolivian armed forces. The

\textsuperscript{159} The first is Guyana (source: European Comission, 2002).

\textsuperscript{160} Right after its independence Bolivia fought wars with Chile and Argentina. Then it lost the access to the Ocean in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) against Chile. Bolivia also had to sell part of its territory to Brazil due to an imminent Civil War (1903). The most recent large scale war in the region was fought between Bolivia and Paraguay (Chaco War – 1932-35), when Bolivia lost a big part of its territory.

\textsuperscript{161} Bolivia is one of the largest cocaine producers in the world. Recently the Morales administration expelled a DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) Mission in Bolivia and accused the United States of planning a Coup in Bolivia (source: www.estadao.com.br, accessed 03.03.2009)

\textsuperscript{162} The Military Agreement establishing the strategic cooperation between both countries was signed in 2006.
Agreement also includes financing the construction of military bases on the borders between Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil (Figueiredo, 2006, Medeiros, 2010). According to the interviews, there are many Venezuelan military personnel in the Bolivian academies who are teaching doctrine and training.

Nevertheless, with the recent strong relationship with Venezuela the Bolivian military have welcomed the proposals to develop regional security and defence mechanisms. In particular, the creation of the South American Defence Council in the Unasul was seen as a very positive development by the Bolivian establishment. One of the first and hardest tasks of this Council was to deal with the Bolivian Crisis in 2008. Moreover, due to the fact that the country has many deficiencies, opportunities for cooperation have been especially welcomed (Medeiros, 2010).

Therefore the Bolivian position is complex, because while in one hand it carries some mistrust in regard to their neighbours, on the other hand they need the support of the neighbour’s capabilities in order to fulfil their own mission. In this situation the possibility of regional political integration is seen as the most interesting solution to Bolivia. Like the other countries in the region, Bolivia also sees the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations as a good possibility to keep the military operational.

Colombia occupies a singular position in the South American defence and security context. After more than 40 years of civil war and after receiving consecutive rejections of other countries in the region to assist with their military, since 2001 Colombia has had strong military support from the United States (so-called Plan Colombia). In particular,

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163 For more on the Bolivian Crisis and the Unasul mediation see: Malamud, 2008.

164 Bolivia has 215 soldies in the MINUSTAH, mostly trained in the Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIOPaz).
after the Plan Colombia a restructuring of the military ability to fight internal missions was observed (Rosales, 2008).

As a consequence of the Plan Colombia neighbouring countries felt threatened by the US military presence and the possibility that the Colombian conflict could spill-over to their territories, including the issues of drug-trafficking, guerrillas, paramilitary forces, and the fumigation of farms, etc. (Pacheco, 2002; Rosales, 2008). This spill-over of the Colombian conflict led to border problems with Venezuela, and the situation reached the brink of war with Ecuador in 2008.

As a result we can see that the Colombian conflict harms any development of the emergence of transgovernmental networks between the Andean countries which are directly affected by the conflict. Due to the specific tasks of the military (mostly steered towards fighting internal issues), and the priority given to exchanges with the US (Plan Colombia), it is also very difficult for some kind of socialization process to emerge into common South American norms.

Peru and Ecuador have been involved in the last classic armed conflict in the region (1995)\textsuperscript{165}. Since the Brasilia Agreement which ended the hostilities and established the border limits relations between Peru and Ecuador have stabilised, and nowadays there are no imminent tensions between the countries. On the other hand, Ecuador has been severely affected by the spill-over of the Colombian conflict\textsuperscript{166}. In this sense the

\textsuperscript{165} The conflict was called the Cenepa War and occurred on the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border in the disputed region of Cenepa and Paquisha. The conflict was permanently solved by an agreement which was mediated through Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States.

\textsuperscript{166} According to the Ecuadorian Defence Policy (2006:38): “Ecuador is the most affected country by the consequences of the Colombian conflict. Ecuador is affected not only in terms of its relationship with their neighbour and the border security, but also due to the economic, political and social impacts.”
northern border (with Colombia) is the actual strategic priority. The relationship with Colombia worsened after the March 2008 events when the Colombian military attacked installations of the FARC\textsuperscript{167} located in Ecuadorian territory without asking permission or communicating the attack to the Ecuadorian local authorities. The unexpected attack of the Colombian forces in Ecuadorian territory demonstrates the instability of the security relationship in the northern part of South America. It also demonstrates the inefficiency of regimes/institutions in this part of the region, even though since 1996 both countries (Colombia and Ecuador) have organized a Bi-national Border Commission (COMBIFRON). The objective of this organization is to strengthen the relationships between the police and armed forces responsible for the border security. Since 2006 the organism also elaborates and exchanges reports on the activities on the border. The incident in 2008 demonstrated the impotence of this confidence building mechanism and contributed to enhancing the feeling among the Ecuadorian military that the Colombians are not transparent enough in their relations. Ecuador, like the other South American countries, strongly defends the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, something which contributes to dramatically decreasing the possibilities of a joint military strategy with Colombia to fight the guerrillas (Medeiros, 2010).

The tensions between Colombia and Ecuador are enhanced by the perception that the impact of the United States participation in the Colombian conflict affects the strategic balance in the Andean region (Marques, 2009). In this sense the Correa administration implemented a security agenda named “Plan Ecuador,” with a special focus on the northern border, thereby rejecting any external intervention and reinforcing its

\textsuperscript{167} FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) is the biggest guerrilla group (also called narco-terrorists due to its involvement with drug-trafficking) fighting in the Colombian Civil War.
commitment to the non-intervention of the internal affairs of other countries (Ecuador, 2007:1).

Peru is the South American country with the lowest level of control over their military. The difficulty to establish a clear cut division of the military and police functions enhances the vulnerability of the Peruvian civilian governments. This difficulty is justified by the different threat perception of Peru. The increasing tensions with Chile\textsuperscript{168} and the conflictive relationship with Ecuador in the 1990’s allied with general political instability, guerrillas, and transnational crimes all combine to intensify the grey zone between police and military roles, especially in border areas (Medeiros, 2010).

As a result Peru is the classic example of a country facing problems to establish civilian control over the military and to increase political stability. Among the South American countries, Peru experienced the most recent dictatorship\textsuperscript{169} with Alberto Fujimori in 1992, supported by the armed forces.

In Venezuela the armed forces have undergone a deep transformation since the establishment of the new Constitution in 1999 during the Hugo Chavez government. These transformations include a high level of politicization of the military\textsuperscript{170}. For Chavez,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{168} Peru disputes a maritime border with Chile and the tensions escalated in 2006 when Peru unilaterally established a new border disregarding the treaties of 1952 and 1954.

\textsuperscript{169} In 2000 a Coup in Ecuador led by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) resulted in the exile of President Jamil Mahuad but failed to establish a dictator due to a military counter-Coup that empowered the Vice-president and imprisoned the Coup leaders. Other failed Coups in South America during the 2000’s: Venezuela in 2002 and again Ecuador in 2010.

\textsuperscript{170} Is it important to highlight that Hugo Chavez was an Army Colonel when he participated as one of the leaders of the failed military Coup in 1992.
\end{flushright}
the military occupies a key role in the “Bolivarian revolution”\textsuperscript{171} and the establishment of “21\textsuperscript{st} century socialism”.\textsuperscript{172} As a result, in the first years of the Chavez government, there were many military officers heading ministries and other administration offices. (Rosales, 2008)

In this sense, it is clear to see that there is a strong level of socialization of the Venezuelan military into the values, norms and principles of the so-called “Bolivarian” discourse. This strong participation of the military in politics contrasts sharply with the Southern Cone model of civilian control over the military. As seen above, since the reestablishment of the civilian governments there is an effort to distance the military from the politics in the Southern Cone, and a reorientation of priorities to the effect that the Armed Forces should restrict their tasks to defence against external aggression. There is the perception that the instrumentalization of the military for political projects could harm the professionalization of the military and compromise the civilian control (Sotomayor, 2004).

The regional political integration is seen by the Venezuelan government as being fundamental to the spread of the “Bolivarian revolution” to other Latin American countries. Due to the explosion in the oil prices\textsuperscript{173} in the 2000’s it was possible for

\textsuperscript{171}This is the term coined by Chavez to describe the transformations in Venezuelan politics during his government. Deeply influenced by the nationalistic thoughts of the Venezuelan historian Frederico Figueroa and the anti-American positions of the Argentinian political scientist Norberto Ceresole, the Bolivarian revolution is in its essence anti-liberal and anti-American. Simon Bolivar was the main character during the wars of liberation in many South American countries. (Magnoli, 2007)

\textsuperscript{172} This term was created by the German sociologist Heinz Dieterich. This doctrine advocates a Marxist economic agenda and the use of plebiscits to substitute the representative democracy (Magnoli, 2007).

\textsuperscript{173} Venezuela is the fifth largest exporter of crude oil and has the biggest oil reserve in the world. (data from El Pais, see: \url{http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Venezuela/supera/Arabia/Saudi/principal/reserva/crudo/mundo/elpepueco/20110719elpepueco_15/Tes}, accessed 22/07/11)
Venezuela to finance its political project in Latin America. Besides supporting many presidential candidates in Latin American countries (Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Ollanta Humala of Peru, etc.), Venezuela pushed for stronger integration among Latin American countries with the creation of joint infrastructural projects and regional institutions. This *tour de force* of the Venezuelan foreign policy encompassed the project for the development of a military alliance among South American countries, with a special focus on the Mercosul countries. The increasing influence of Venezuela in the region was balanced by a more active Brazilian foreign policy oriented towards South America, which eased the Venezuelan impulse to build regional institutions according to the “Bolivarian” political project.

### 4.3.4 - Socialization in Brazilian Military Academies

As seen above, the Brazilian Military Academies harbour a tradition of cooperation, educational and technical exchange with other South American countries, especially those located in the Southern Cone. In the cases of Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina to a lesser extent, the Brazilian Military Academies function as an obligatory stop to senior officials of those countries. As a result, the study of the Academies is of fundamental importance, not only for the process of socialization into common norms, values and principles, but also with regards the formation of transgovernmental networks in South America. Those Academies are the “resonance boxes” of the Brazilian military mind-set (Soares, 2006).

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174 This section is based on interviews carried out with officials from the Brazilian Military Academies of Command and General Staff, Air Force College (Universidade do Ar), Naval War College (Escola de Guerra Naval), Superior War College (ESG), Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIOPAZ), and secondary literature.
Since the consolidation of the redemocratization process in the 1990’s the possibility of a “military integration” in a regional perspective has been discussed among military personnel in Brazil. Two aspects of the geopolitical context in post-Cold War South America were highlighted by the military: on one hand the necessity to deconstruct the mistrust and negative rivalry between the two major players in the region (Brazil and Argentina), and on the other hand, the development of sub-regional security mechanisms excluding the United States. As a result, in this initial moment the integration model thought of by the Brazilian military was a response to the unpredictability of international politics at the end of the Cold War and the globalization process. It was also a reply to concerns of the military redefining its mission in the new democracy and securing funds for new projects. Besides this, the discussion prompted by the US raised concepts such as “shared sovereignty”; “internationalization”; and “intervention rights” with relation to the natural resources in South America, and this was also instrumentalized by the military in South America to justify their new role (and new funds). This preoccupation led Brazil to push forward the establishment of the Amazon Treaty Cooperation Organization (OTCA), created in 1998 by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. The objective of this organization is to coordinate infrastructure, communications and transport initiatives among the

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175 According to Medeiros (2010:167), the first public exposition of this thought was made in 1993 by General Gleuber Vieira in a conference between Argentinian and Brazilian officials in Buenos Aires. In his exposition, General Vieira suggested that a “collective system of security and defence” should be implemented by “the military, with the creation of a conflict prevention centre, established according to the political will of the member-states”. In this sense the General proposes “the establishment of permanent or periodic forums for joint analysis and the evaluation of threats and strategic concepts and the dynamic exchange of information” (Vieira, 1994: 18-19).

176 In this sense, the retired General Jonas de Morais Correia Neto argues that: “[the military integration] is viable with the condition that is understood as a cultural and professional exchange, technical and operational. In a broader sense, it can also be understood as the participation in joint activities and missions” (Correia Neto, 1994: 110).

177 Since 1997 the thematic of regional integration has been discussed systematically in the Brazilian Military Academies. The first thesis on this subject defended in a Brazilian Military Academy was presented by the Argentinian exchange student Major Eduardo Luis Doval.
countries that conform the Amazon basin. In this sense, Brazil occupies an important role as the link between the two subsystems in South America: the Southern Cone and the Northern tier.

For some people, the Brazilian ambition to push forward the integration of both South American systems represents the consolidation of the Brazilian regional leadership. For Brazilian politics this leadership would represent the credentials to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{178}

In order to fulfil this political ambition, regional integration in South America is perceived as being positive by the Brazilian military. According to the data presented by Medeiros (2010:174), 2/3 (69.6%) of the students in the Brazilian Military Academies agree that South American integration is advancing, and 73.1% believe that the development of a regional South American security council is possible. Also, according to the data this positive view of the integration process is mainly observed in the younger generation of military officials. This is especially seen in the military personnel that have participated in a Peacekeeping Mission with other South American countries. Therefore, as seen above it is clear that the participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations goes beyond enhancing the friendship and comradeship ties among the armed forces in the region and also immerses the military in concepts such as Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and Democracy, etc, thereby exposing the military to a “culture of peace”. Those concepts are especially highlighted in the interviews with officials that served in the UNPKO, but they are also seen in a lesser extent in regular military academies. This fact is derived due to the intensive training and socialization into those concepts in the Peacekeeping Training Centres. This socialization is reflected in the

\textsuperscript{178} Brazil has pleaded for a permanent seat in the UNSC since the San Francisco Conference in 1945. In the beginning of the 2000's Brazil entered the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), to pressure for a UNSC reform that would include a permanent seat for those countries (Landau, 2010).
According to 2/3 (61.1%) of the students in Brazilian Military Academies the development of a South American joint Peacekeeping Force is viable; and moreover, for 89.5% of the students, subjects of citizenship and Human Rights must be part of the academies’ curriculum. This suggests the successful internalization of democratic values among the military. This data is even more important when we compare the generational factor (values being socialized strongly among younger generations than older generations).

Therefore we argue that institutions have an impact on the individuals as sociable agents. In the absence of a common regional South American institution where these agents can be socialized, we found that the military schools are a fertile locus for agent socialization among the South American military. The most important instruments for socialization in the South American context are developed in the School for High Command and General Staff of the Brazilian Army (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exercito - ECEME). The ECEME is a necessary stop for officials willing to achieve the post of General in the Brazilian Army and is an important step for the promotion of foreign officials from other South American countries. Officials from all South American countries gather there in intensive courses for the approximate duration of 2 years, living together and sharing personal and familiar ties. Besides this, officials are immersed in high level courses that involve the disciplines of human rights, international law, peaceful resolution of conflicts and participation in PKOs. Although these 2 years are not enough to develop ingrained interests or even the identity of the community to which they belong (type II internalization), we can see that during these 2 years the officials may learn a role and therefore behave appropriately, independent of whether they like or agree with the role (type I internalization) (Checkel, 2007; Lewis,

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179 Statistical data collected from Medeiros, 2010: 178.

180 In this case, the success of the South American participation in the MINUSTAH contributed to such perception.

181 The courses are created, developed and managed by the Army Educational Department (DEP – Departamento de Ensino e Pesquisa) but were sanctioned by the civilian-led Ministry of Education.
We also found that due to the increasing strive for control over the networks agents act according a strategic calculation logic, recognizing that if they comply with the norms and values put forward in the schools they can receive social (status) as well as material (promotions, projects) incentives and rewards. That doesn't mean that individuals take the norms and values being socialized for granted (normative suasion). As the statistical data above shows, this resistance is especially seen in the older generation of officials\textsuperscript{182}, while it seems that the younger generation are more prone for type II internalization. As the recent events in South America have shown\textsuperscript{183}, the military act according to a calculation of costs and benefits involving their acceptance of the new socially defined roles. In this sense we can see that in South America agents assume determined roles due to its appropriateness in one particular setting, thus not involving reflective internalization guided by communicative processes.

Nevertheless, we can still see the centrality of the pieces of the transgovernmental networks in national and regional politics, especially in terms of security and defence\textsuperscript{184}. These representatives act as local gatekeepers to their national governments, while at the same time exercising their network contacts when needed. They have the ability to influence the policy orientations of their respective countries and cooperate with the members of the network when it is necessary\textsuperscript{185}. Of course, the degree of influence

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\textsuperscript{182} This older generation was socialized in an era called “populism” by the literature (1945-1964). Socialization in this era is characterised by a mindset composed of views of: elitism, moralism, diffuse religiosity (in a secular state), historic positivism (the military as savior and promoter of the republic), and pro-US behaviour (Pion-Berlin, 2001).

\textsuperscript{183} Recently, the senior officials from the Military Club in Brazil issued a very critical and politically oriented letter contesting the president’s decision to create a truth commission to investigate the crimes committed during the dictatorship. The reaction of the military in Chile to the imprisonment and judgment of former dictator Augusto Pinochet reveals the same logic.

\textsuperscript{184} We contrasted the list of the former foreign ECEME students and their actual positions in their countries. We observed that most of them have moved up to high ranks in their career and either work with issues related to education and foreign relations or as close advisors to the presidents (see the list of individuals in Annex III).

\textsuperscript{185} This was especially seen in the interviews regarding the creation of the South American Defence Council and the formulation of the National Defence Policies.
varies according to the country. As we explained above, the actual political relevance of the military is attached to how the redemocratization process was managed\textsuperscript{186} and how much leverage the military managed to gain during this period. Naturally, issues of security and defence are still mainly dealt with by the military, however the most evident impact of the transgovernmental networks occurs in the border areas, where commanders that studied together at the ECEME share operational capabilities, carry out small joint-exercises, and even influence their capitals to grant authorization for manoeuvres in border areas\textsuperscript{187}. According to the interviews they maintain the contacts with a constant exchange of personal and professional emails, family gatherings, and equestrian contests\textsuperscript{188}, and use the alumni social network of the ECEME, named Actualization Programme for the Former ECEME Students (PADECEME – Programa de Atualização para os Diplomados da ECEME). The PADECEME offers a continuous and actual database of former students, helps them to get in touch with one another, and produces scientific and non-scientific journals produced by former students and distributed among the alumni network.

\textsuperscript{186} According to Guillermo O’Donnel, the transition patterns are differentiated between controlled transition (when the military were able to highly influence the transition to democracy), balanced transition (low military influence) or collapse (no influence at all).

\textsuperscript{187} Interviews.

\textsuperscript{188} It was mentioned in more than one interview that the equestrian competitions organized by former students play an important role in fostering contacts.
CHAPTER 5

Political integration and beyond: suggestions for a research agenda on institutions and transgovernmental networks
“We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think as much of being a European as of belonging to their native land, and that without losing any of their love and loyalty of their birthplace.”

Winston Churchill

“La unidad de nuestros pueblos no es simple quimera de los hombres sino inexorable decreto del destino”

Simón Bolívar

Churchill’s quote represents the “double-hatness” of transgovernmentalism well. While individuals participating in transgovernmental networks are socialized into norms and rules of behaviour that define how policy-making is conducted, they are still subunits of national states. There is no contradiction whatsoever that a representative develops “we” feelings towards their peers while maintaining their love and loyalty (and professionalism) towards the state they represent. These transgovernmental networks, besides creating links and identity between the individuals, also foster convergence, compliance with international agreements, and enhance cooperation among national states and even influence state’s preferences. This governance structure is able to engage, socialize, support, pressure and constrain government officials to act in accordance to the rules and norms of behaviour defined in the network. To understand the impact of this governance structure we must go beyond the intergovernmentalist – supranationalist debate and look at how globalization affects states’ ability to act alone to solve problems.

The challenges presented by globalization represent the fact that the necessity states have to either cooperate in order to solve common problems or create an unrealistic global government. Besides this, national governments are unable to attend to all of the issues in the international agenda, thereby leaving the solution for common problems to

189 “The unity of our peoples is not a mere illusion of men but an inexorable decree of fate” free translation from Spanish.
the expertise of their representatives. According to Slaughter (2004: 263): “The old model of the international system assumes unitary states that negotiate formal legal agreements with one another and implement them from the top down, with great emphasis on verification and enforcement. The new model advanced here assumes disaggregated states in which national government officials interact intensively with one another and adopt codes of best practices and agree on coordinated solutions to common problems.” Transgovernmental networks offer the perfect setting where representatives gather to address common specific problems. In this setting, the members can educate, bolster and regulate one another. Governments can promote the development of these networks, thus institutionalizing the cooperation that already exists. This institutionalization can also create a framework for enhancing future cooperation.

This final chapter will be divided according to the general theoretical implications of the research, future research possibilities in the field, and finally some topical policy prescriptions on how to enhance integration with the help of networks.

5.1 - General theoretical implications

In the first part of this research we aimed to present the theoretical debate on integration. The second chapter presented the different theoretical frameworks used to analyse integration. We observed the theoretical gap between IR and EU Studies until the 1990’s, when metatheoretical debate avoided theoretical dialogue and empirical work. It is possible that between the 1970’s (with the demise of neofunctionalism) until the 1990’s EU Studies experienced its greatest intellectual isolation and lowest level of theoretical ambition.
The developments in new institutionalism, and especially the debate between neoliberalism and constructivism, gained weight during the 1990’s, thereby providing a possible intellectual bridge towards the development of a general theory of integration (Milner, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel, 2003). Based on this “institutionalist turn” and the multilevel governance approaches, in this research we seek to aid in the development of a theory to understand how political integration emerges in different parts of the world. Besides this, we also aim to improve our understanding of the diverse governance levels which operate inside integration processes and promote awareness of political integration, thereby contributing to the literature.

In this sense, this research ultimately aimed to contribute to the understanding of how political elites are replicated and socialized and their influence in the process of integration. We intended to do this by opening the black box of interest and identity formation, observing where agent interests come from and the agents’ interaction with institutional structures. The creation and development of transgovernmental networks and the socialization processes inside these networks play a major role in the path towards policy convergence and boost integration. As seen in section 3.2, through an emphasis on arguing/deliberation and appropriate behaviour driven by complex learning processes and socialization, we argue that both agents have an impact in the institutionalization process and that institutions have deeper effects on the core properties of agents, thus affecting meanings, interests and identities (Risse, 2000; Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel: 2003).

5.2 - Future research possibilities

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190 On the institutionalist turn in EU Studies see Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Jupille and Caporaso, 1999.
It is possible to identify three main venues of research deriving from this dissertation. These research possibilities stem from the conclusion that regional integration processes are in fact influenced by the role played by transgovernmental networks. In this section the impact of this research for the study of sovereignty, democracy/accountability, and inter-regional comparison will be presented.

### 5.2.1 Sovereignty

Sovereignty is traditionally understood as the absolute authority of a political entity acting as a unity over its own affairs. This authority is related to the complete control of a territory in a given period of time. Besides this, the rights of this authority over the given territory (including the monopoly of violence) are recognized by the other units (Weber, 1978: 54; Herz, 1957; Diez; Bode and da Costa, 2011: 215). This traditional conception of sovereignty is inadequate for understanding the complexity of contemporary international politics, and the debate on the changing nature of sovereignty is an important puzzle in International Relations. The increasing interconnectedness between internal and external issues erases the “wall of defensibility” of the Westphalian nation-State. According to Chayes and Chayes (1995 see Slaughter: 2004: 267): “… the ‘new sovereignty’ … [is defined] as the capacity to participate in international institutions of all types – in collective efforts to steer the international system and address global and regional problems together with [States’] national and supranational counterparts. This is a conception of sovereignty that would accord status and recognition to states in the international system to the extent that they are willing and able to engage with other states, and thus necessarily accept mutual obligations.” The question to be answered here is under what conditions this new concept of sovereignty promotes cooperation and the solution of common problems (see Krasner, 1999).
In this sense, we can see that in this new definition of sovereignty regional integration processes play a major role in interconnecting the local, national and international in a very efficient fashion. Integration processes in Europe and South America have led to an increasing political and economic stability inside these regions. Integration also boosted a convergence of norms and rules of behaviour among the member states, with them in some cases even developing the political ability to influence events outside the region (Sperling, 2007). Understanding how this convergence took place points towards the study of transgovernmental networks, unveiling how common norms are constructed, and most of all how common policies are developed/implemented. Besides this, in this new sovereignty the key to success is not autonomy but the ability to connect to the rest of the world and the political capacity to be an actor (Slaughter, 2004). Studies on the EU as a “civilian” or “normative” power enhance our understanding on how norm compliant behaviour is gaining leverage over the maximization of material interests in a post-Westphalian world.

In this post-Westphalian world sovereignty must be understood as a more flexible and practical characteristic of States. National government institutions should become more engaged and entangled with the development of transgovernmental networks. With the support of their national governments these networks would be responsible for the “formulation and implementation of professional norms and the development of best practices on substantive issues” (Slaughter, 2004: 269). As a result, besides influencing their national positions on specific issues these networks would be influenced and influence the perspectives of their counterparts, thereby reaching common solutions for common problems. Because the members of the network would know they are under scrutiny of their constituents, their peers and the national governments, they would perform in order to guarantee that an agreement is reached in the best normative basis (societal and international). (Sperling, 2007) Finally, in a world where sovereignty represents the ability to join in cooperative regimes in the collective interest of all states, national states should engage with and expand the formal ability of national
institutions/agents to interact with their counterparts across borders. These interactions and interconnectedness across borders, being influenced and influencing the interests of the others, represent not a loss of sovereignty but an expansion of state power. (Slaughter, 2004) According to the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, this new reality of international politics requires a redefinition of American global leadership that she terms networked leadership. She defines this networked leadership in terms of soft (or smart) power in the new context of sovereignty in the sense that\(^{191}\): “a nation’s power is defined by how networked it is. Nations that are more connected, that are the central nodes for other networks, are the most powerful.” Moreover, she defends the notion that 21\(^{st}\) Century US leadership must rely on transnationalism: “We will never be able to deal with the problems of cyber-security unless there is a partnership between business and government”. She argues that US strategy under president Obama is deeply rooted in fostering transgovernmental and transnational networks using tools such as social media to increase networking in economics, diplomacy and military. This also points to the potential that the study of transgovernmental networks has to explain power relations in the 21\(^{st}\) Century.

### 5.2.2 Democracy/Accountability

The development of transgovernmental networks and its increasing importance in the regional policy outputs raises questions of control and accountability. Accountability is a basic principle of democracy. In Europe we have seen a greater interest in the population for establishing more democratic institutions, thus cutting the “democratic deficit” in the EU (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Majone, 1998, etc.). We identify two main areas of research when it comes to accountability and transgovernmental networks: the study of the institutional designs of regional integration processes and the legitimacy of transgovernmental networks.

\(^{191}\) Hillary Clinton, Chatham House Prize 2013, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzeAOJc49Kc](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzeAOJc49Kc).
Institutions developed by democratic states generally have the ambition to be both effective and accountable. There is a great pressure from the citizens to increase transparency and accountability in international organizations. This poses a question of representation that according to Keohane is framed as (2008: 713-714): “How can multilateral institutions be designed without global government so that qualified and dedicated leaders are more likely to be chosen, and so that those leaders who are selected are held accountable to the people whose actions they affect?” It is very clear that international institutions are dependent on States, nevertheless the relationships between these organizations and the citizens of their member states are very weak, even if all member-states are democracies. In this sense, democratic institutions should play a stronger role in the integration processes such as the European Parliament. How the increase of transparent and accountable institutions might impact on the effectiveness of transgovernmental networks in finding a consensus to deal with common problems poses another question that should not be neglected.

Transgovernmental networks are composed of subunits of national governments (national representatives) which interact with each other. Even though these national representatives were not directly elected by the people they have a responsibility towards their national constituencies, not only with regards their domestic activity but also their transgovernmental interactions. Moreover, as part of a multilevel regional governance system transgovernmental networks have a responsibility towards the regional community as a whole, not only their domestic constituencies. In this sense, what may be ideal from a national perspective is not achievable from a regional point of view, and in these cases the representative acts as a mediator between the national and regional dimensions (or gatekeeper in the language of social theory). Criticism that transgovernmentalism is leading towards “technocratic elitism” (Perez, 1996) are guided by the idea that these transgovernmental networks lack transparency. According to Alston (1997: 441, see Slaughter 2004: 219), the rise of transgovernmental networks
“suggests a move away from arenas of relative transparency into the back rooms and the by-passing of the national political arenas”. Moreover, Picciotto adds that (1996/7: 1049) “A chronic lack of legitimacy plagues direct international contacts at the sub-state level among national officials and administrators”. In this sense, the answer to the “technocratic elitism” critique seems to reside in increasing the transparency of transgovernmental networks. However, transparency would increase the sectoral pressures over the networks and could ultimately disrupt the network due to the over-politicization of issues been dealt with there. For instance, a senior official of the PSC told us that representatives feel more comfortable making their decisions behind closed doors and without external interference. He also noticed the difficulty to reach an agreement on issues where his minister/superior had already positioned himself in the media. One interesting insight on how to make networks more transparent is to link them with broader networks of NGO’s and corporations as the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggests. This opening would mean increasing interactions between technocrats with different perceptions and awareness of non-governmental sectors, thereby taking a broader range of interests into account. Increasing transparency of transgovernmental networks would increase the fairness and responsiveness of the multilevel governance system and would decrease the level of democratic deficit for international institutions (Slaughter, 2004).

5.2.3 - Transgovernmental networks and other regional organizations

In this study we focused on the impact of transgovernmental networks in distinct regional organizations in Europe and South America. The inter-regional comparison sheds light on factors that we may think are unique to one region but that are able to explain the same phenomenon in other regions. In this research we observed that integration only prospered in regions where transgovernmental networks were present. This evidence points to factors that transcend the uniqueness approach to understand
regional integration. In this spirit the next steps would include comparing these findings with integration processes in other regions with high values in the study variable but with no sign of deeper integration.

One of the most representing regions with highly developed transgovernmental networks but a low level of integration is the ASEAN (Acharya, 2001). According to a comprehensive study of Acharya (2001: 57), ASEAN has very similar normative characteristics to South America with a strong doctrine of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Despite these common normatives and the development of transgovernmental networks, both integration processes (Mercosul and ASEAN) differ fundamentally. In this sense, more research needs to be done in order to observe how the reproduction of regional elites with the creation of transgovernmental networks affects the regional integration process in Asia. These findings could be contrasted with regional integration in South America because these two regions share a more similar normative (especially the patterns of non-interference and sovereignty) than the European case.

Another interesting inter-regional comparison would be to observe regional integration processes in Africa and contrast them with integration processes in South America. The African Union is modeled after the European Union, and unlike any other regional integration the AU has so much potential to advance due to the security necessities of the region (Babarinde, 2011). Despite its EU-like institutionalized structures, the AU seems to have little or no power at all to be defined as an actor even inside Africa. According to Babarinde (2011: 293), “Unlike the EU which has leverage over other actors on the global stage, including its member states, the AU’s leverage over others is limited, if not non-existent”. The growing number of internal threats and armed conflicts between the member states seems to prevent the development of stable networks of officials which could be responsible for giving flesh to the already established
institutional structure of the AU. This situation seems similar to the integration process in the Andean Community, where despite highly institutionalized structures the integration process has not advanced. In this sense, the causes and solutions for the development of transgovernmental networks in Africa should be explored and contrasted with other examples of failed integration attempts that managed to reverse the course and learn from past mistakes in order to turn failure into success.

5.3 Implications for Europe and South America

5.3.1 European integration beyond the CFSP/ESDP

The European experience shows that the interplay of diverse factors during the integration process leads national foreign policies to undergo an adaptation (also called Europeanization in the EU literature) to each of the other member states’ foreign policies (Smith, 2003; Checkel, 2007). We argue that in Europe this process of adaptation was facilitated by the development of transgovernmental networks composed of national representatives that deal with everyday issues related to the CFSP/ESDP (Foradori; Rosa and Scartezzini, 2007). The development of this transgovernmental network started with the EPC but continued replicating and fortifying itself with the institutionalization of the CFSP/ESDP.

Nowadays we observe the important role played by this community of diplomats (Diplocom) in finding common solutions in different institutions such as the PSC, COREPER and Working Groups. According to Foradori, Rosa and Scartezzini (2007: xii): “The density of contacts and communications between governmental sub-units facilitates the formation of a sense of collegiality, which is reinforced by the shared professional backgrounds of the actors. A transgovernmental network is therefore made
up of persons united by a common interest, by a common professional outlook, and by friendship.” According to Majone (1997), transgovernmental networks are “bearers of reputation” broadcasting the position and actions of individual members to the others. In these networks the credibility of individual members is enhanced because the members have to safeguard its reputation in the network, and they can only do that by adjusting to common norms (Slaughter, 2004). In this sense, under certain conditions these individuals that participate in these networks are not defending narrow national preferences but are instead trying to find common solutions to common problems.

Alongside the development of transgovernmental networks, we can see the formalization of customs and informal rules in Europe into a set of binding laws. The institutionalization of procedures in the EU Foreign Policy system was one key feature for deeper integration (Smith, 2003). Together with these procedural regulations the EU was able to develop a set of substantial rules regarding the geographical and issue areas in which it would use its influence and the instruments at its disposal (ESS, 2003; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). In this sense, the EU actorness stems from the definition of the geographical space, issue areas, and the instruments at its disposal to act.

The big question arising from the influence of transgovernmental networks in the European integration project is related to the concerns over a “government in the shadows” (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007) or the “democratic deficit” (Follesdal and Hix, 2006) in the EU. This question relates directly to problems of accountability in the EU multilevel governance system. The European multilevel governance system is associated with the delegation of rule-making authority which escapes the democratic inputs in important areas of policy. Besides this, authority is dispersed across diverse levels of the EU governance system, thus making accountability a serious problem. Two main considerations on the issue of democracy/accountability are identified in the
literature. One view posits that the people affected by a policy should have the possibility to debate its formulation. According to this view, in order to decrease the democratic deficit political authority should either remain within the member states (Moravcsik, 1999) or be extended to liberal democratic institutions in the European level (for instance, increasing the powers of the European Parliament) (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). This would make the EU closer and more accountable to their citizens. The second view argues that it is not possible to compare the EU with the democratic legitimacy of national states, firstly because the EU does not have a *demos* and secondly because it lacks the features that the national states have (culture, identity, etc) in order to justify majority rule. According to this view, EU decision-making has to be responsive instead or participatory (Scharpf, 1999), in the sense that what legitimises the EU multilevel governance system is not democratic representation but the expertise, policy consistency and problem-solving skills of national representatives acting on behalf of their national governments in the EU (Majone, 2006).

5.3.2 - South American Defence Council: the future of integration?

Unlike the EU experience, in South America we see a great battle for the control of the transgovernmental networks. In South America most questions regarding security and defence are still left in the hands of the military organisations, which have their own mentality and *modus operandi*. The recent authoritarian past of South American countries left deep scars in the relationships between civilians and military. This troublesome relationship can be seen clearly, especially in the Southern Cone where the dictatorships were more violent and civilians strive for greater control. This shared drama of dictatorship strengthened the relationship between the civilian governments. As a result one of the major concerns of the civilian governments is how to balance the civil-military relationship in order to achieve a stable democratic regime while keeping the policy making flowing. The answer to this question is the development of a regional
security governance system in the Southern Cone. This system is composed of CBMs, regimes and institutions and is based in the specific norms and principles of peace, democracy and economic development. (Mullins, 2006; Sotomayor, 2004; Kacowicz, 2005; Hurrel, 1998a).

Since the eve of the military dictatorships the transgovernmental connections among the military played an important role in cooperation for deterring counter-revolutionary behaviour and political persecution. The most expressive of these networks was the Condor Operation. The Condor Operation was developed and implemented by a network of military and intelligence agents from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, with the collaboration of the United States (McSherry, 2005). With the democratization process one of the main concerns of the civilian governments was to gain leverage and control these networks. Some countries such as Argentina and Uruguay did that by punishing those who participated in political persecution, while in other countries the pieces of the network remained the same. However, despite efforts to curtail those military contacts the issues of defence and security are still in the hands of the military (with different degrees of influence) in all South American countries. As a result, any analysis that wants to calculate how politics of security and defence are played in South America needs to take into account these important actors and their positions.

In this sense, the biggest question involving the role of transgovernmental networks in South America revolves around how to control or steer these networks. The literature on Civil-Military relationships in South America abound (Pion-Berlin, 2001; Arceneaux, 2001; D’Araujo and Castro, 2000, etc.). According to Mullins (2006: 154): “The process of transition [from dictatorship to democracy] impacted greatly on foreign policy formation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The Mercosul project was at least in part the product of the dictatorships. The determinations on the part of the civilian authorities to
avoid a repeat of the human rights abuses of the 1970’s and 1980’s drove them to establish a more cooperative security regime in the Southern Cone.” As a result, in South America there has been a constant fight to gain control over the military and their networks. Civilian governments have tried to control and steer these networks in different ways, either by punishing uncooperative behaviour or by establishing a system of regional security governance. Internally speaking each country does that by imposing defence cuts in their respective Defence Ministries and trying to socialize the military in the values and norms of peace and democracy. Each of these strategies has had different impacts on the civil-military relations, especially because the military continues to have great influence in terms of security and defence\textsuperscript{192} and therefore it is so important for the civilian governments to increase control over the networks (Hurrel, 1998b). In this sense, the military networks are constituted of like-minded government sub-units (Milicom) and play an important role in fostering cooperation in security and defence in the region. We have seen that in general most of the representatives which deal with issues of security and defence within the Defence Ministries come from the army. For that reason we investigated how the networks among these representatives are created in the Brazilian Army Academy for Command and General Staff (ECEME). However, it would be interesting to observe other networks and their influence in politics (for instance, in Bolivia it seems that the Air Force has more political influence than the Army). Besides this, we only researched how a specific group of commanders create networks and are socialized, however the literature shows that the most fertile ground to analyse socialization of the military in the norms and principles of peace and democracy (and subordination to the civilian leaders) is at the Sergeant and Lieutenant levels. Here the literature highlights the role played by the Brazilian Army’s Military Academy of the Agulhas Negras (AMAN). (Medeiros, 2010; Castro, 2009)

\textsuperscript{192} In all South American countries (except Argentina), the military have the constitutional prerrogative of being the guarantor for the maintenance of Law and Order inside their countries.
All in all we have seen that in the Southern Cone the relationships between the representatives are much deeper than in the Andean region. We suggest that these relationships facilitate cooperation and increase stability among the countries in the Southern Cone, while at the same time the lack of these networks in the Andean region, despite the complex institutional structures of the CAN, prevents the development of stable and deeper political integration. According to a Brazilian official, these relationships are based on a: “fellow feeling, friendship and common objectives. [Our relationship] helps us to understand and clarify each others political objectives and interests. However, these feelings are not only restricted to us, they are also extended to our families as well. We talk and visit each other.” As a result these networks of sub-units of governments provide the flesh for the institutional bones of the integration process. In the past few years we have observed a dramatic increase in the exchanges between the countries in the Andean region and some countries in the Southern Cone (Argentina and Brazil). Together with the development of the Unasul, and especially the South American Defence Council, we could be witnessing the spread of the transgovernmentalism culture to the Andean region. It is only in the medium/long term that we can confirm whether the relationships that have been created with the Andean countries will pay-off and whether the institutionalization of the South American political integration will move forward within the Unasul.

On the other hand, the South American Defence Council (CSD) also has the potential to destabilize the region even more if it is used by some governments to promote radical ideologies with confrontational rhetoric or to insist on terms that are unacceptable to the other member-states (f.i., insist on issues such as the military alliance, or joint-army). Moreover, the stabilization of the Andean system, as seen above, is one of the biggest challenges of the CSD. The Colombian conflict led to a high level of borders’

193 Data gathered from the ECEME.
militarization, and the Plan Colombia is seen as a destabilizing factor and viewed by many as a threat to the South American security. Besides this, the CSD is also composed of Guyana and Surinam, which have traditionally participated in the Caribbean system with different aspects, agendas, priorities and strategies from the Andean and Southern Cone systems (Costa Vaz and Jácome, 2009). In this sense, the CSD will only be successful if it manages to integrate those subsystems based on shared values and to foster a common identity. Nevertheless, although the integration must be first and foremost directed towards mutual understanding and interrelational politics, some member-states will push for concrete political outcomes. However, before arriving at those political outcomes it will be necessary to have a discussion on the definitions of security and defence in the region. This discussion is important in order to overcome the limitations of a too general concept that rends its operationalization system void, thus making it impossible to develop a common regional security and defence policy (Tulchin, Benites and Diamint, 2006). Due to historical sensibilities, it is also important for many South American countries to see reform in the security sector. This reform would have the objective of enhancing the civilian control of the military, promoting the civilian careers in the Ministries of Defence, better defined functions and responsibilities of the armed forces, and making its actions and administration more transparent (Costa Vaz and Jácome, 2009).

In order to develop itself more strongly and become sustainable the political integration in South America needs to build into the already existing transgovernmental networks (among the military and diplomats) and expand itself, particularly to the Andean region, and include actors from other sectors in the debate. Among those sectors we can see the growing importance of non-governmental organizations, universities, political parties, media, legislative and judiciary institutions. The CSD would be an important forum to socialize those actors into the norms, values and principles of peace, democracy, and military subordination to the civilian authorities, etc. It is also utterly important to:
- enhance the exchange of military and diplomatic officials to high-level military and diplomatic academies\textsuperscript{194};

- intensify the number of military joint-exercises, thus fostering interoperability;

- increase the joint participation in peacekeeping missions and the development of a joint peacekeeping training centre to harmonize doctrines\textsuperscript{195};

- exchange the perceptions and elaboration of common scenarios;

- cooperative integration of the arms industries and development of a common defence market in order to enhance autonomy and logistics, thus increasing the technological capacity and lowering the costs with economies of scale\textsuperscript{196}.

As a result we conclude that the viability of the Unasul/CSD is uncertain, firstly because it is a very recent experience and still lacks some of the necessary features seen in the European experience (transgovernmentalism and socialization mechanisms). Secondly,

\textsuperscript{194} Initiatives such as the Advanced Course of South American Defence (CAD-SUL) implemented by the Brazilian government at the ESG (Brazilian War College). Moreover, the South American countries are discussing the creation of a Joint South American Defence College under the aegis of the Unasul/CSD. In regard to the diplomatic services, since 2011 there is an annual meeting of the Diplomatic Academies of the Unasul member-states. They have the objective to create, in the medium/long term, a South American Diplomatic School and foster common training and networking among diplomats in the region.

\textsuperscript{195} It is important to highlight the activities of the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) in bringing together the experiences of local Training Centers. The ALCOPAZ was created in 2007 and has the Peacekeeping Training Centers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay as associate-members.

\textsuperscript{196} The project for the development of a South American joint fighter to be used for training by all Air Forces in the region represents an important step in this direction.
it needs to deal with the divergences and fragmentations, not only in the subsystems (especially in the Andean), but also between the subsystems (CAN and Mercosul). In this sense, despite the recent advances in terms of diplomatic and military cooperation, it will only be possible to observe whether the Unasul/CSD will surmount those difficulties in the medium/long term because the creation of new institutions does not necessarily allow organisations to overcome the obstacles that have already been faced in previous attempts to move political integration forwards.
### Annex I – CFSP/ESDP instruments

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CFSP instruments (low intensity)</th>
<th>Political dialogue and diplomacy</th>
<th>Diplomatic missions</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dialogue Meetings</td>
<td>Special Representatives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Declarations</td>
<td>Observation and fact-finding missions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Démarches</td>
<td>Monitoring missions</td>
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<th>CFSP + EC instruments (middle intensity)</th>
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<td>Commercial and economic Sanctions</td>
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<td>Sanctions on capital movements and payments</td>
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<td>Arms embargoes</td>
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<tr>
<th>CFSP instruments (high intensity)</th>
<th>Crisis mechanisms</th>
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<tr>
<td>Civil police Force</td>
<td>Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law Mission</td>
<td>Civilian Administration Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil protection</td>
<td>Military deployment</td>
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</table>

Annex II- EU Missions and Operations Overseas

**Ongoing Missions and Operations:**

EU NAVFOR Somalia – December 2008
EUAVSEC South Sudan – October 2012
EUBAM Libya – May 2013
EUCAP NESTOR – July 2012
EUCAP SAHEL Niger – July 2012
EUMM Georgia – September 2008
EUTM Mali – January 2013
EUTM Somalia – January 2010
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine – January 2005
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR – Althea) - December 2004
EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) – February 2008
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) – November 2005
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) – November 2005
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) – July 2005
EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) – June 2007
EUPOL DR Congo – July 2007
EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) – June 2005

**Completed Missions and Operations:**

EUFOR Libya – April 2011 to November 2011
EUFOR Tchad/RCA – March 2008 to May 2009
EU Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) – February 2008 to August 2010
EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) – January 2003 to December 2011
EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT) – December 2005 to June 2006
EU Military operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA) – March 2003 to December 2003
EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA) – December 2003 to December 2005
EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) – July 2004 to July 2005
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) – September 2005 to December 2006
EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) – July 2005 to December 2007
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) – April 2005 to June 2007
EUFOR DR Congo – April 2006 to November 2006


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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