Introduction: Two European Nations in Search of Participatory Democracy

During the last three years, we were witnessing the breakdown of bureaucratic socialism and mostly successful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, the burdens of the past still have a strong impact in all spheres of life, most visibly in the economy and in the natural environment. Millions are troubled by losing their jobs and by increased social insecurity. There is a lack of normative orientation and positive life perspectives. Many creative forces in science and culture need to be revitalized. Last not least, the liberated nations have to (re)build democratic structures in politics and society.

Western market economy and pluralist democracy serve as widely accepted models for the renewal of the formerly socialist systems. The countries of Western Europe appear indeed to be superior in most regards. But the defeat of bureaucratic socialism is not the final victory of today's capitalism. We should not underestimate the structural shortcomings of capitalist democracies, their economic, social and ecological problems. Most Western societies have not yet overcome e.g. mass unemployment, housing shortages, inadequate care for children and elderly people, the drug problem, or widespread political apathy. And there are universal problems representing old and new challenges for modern democracies: how can we avoid total bureaucratization, underdevelopment or a global ecological catastrophe? We urgently need to increase the capability of systems and individuals to meet these challenges in a non-authoritarian way. Therefore, in East and West, the growth of participatory democracy, more popular interest in public affairs and a democratic political culture are necessary to solve those problems and to preserve freedom, whether achieved more recently or decades ago.

My general hypothesis is: The present historical situation is characterized by a growing need for political participation. Though conditions are quite different all over the world, this need is similarly articulated:
- as a personal quest for freedom, as a basis and element of individual self-realization;
- as the claim of informal or formally organized groups of citizens for autonomy, pluralism and an increased share of power in public life;
- as a normative and actually working principle to render democratic legitimacy to the political decision-making process;
- as a functional prerequisite for economic growth and modernization, for labor efficiency and technological innovation;
- as a goal and as a means that is necessary for efficient reforms in all policy areas, in "normal" times as well as in situations of systemic or sectoral crisis.

Of course, the demand for popular political participation is not new, and there were always good reasons for it:

"From Aristotle to John Dewey, political philosophers have extolled popular participation as a source of vitality and creative energy, as a defense against tyranny, and as a means of enacting the collective wisdom. By involving the many in the affairs of the state, participation should promote stability and order; and by giving everyone the opportunity to express his own interests, it should secure the greatest good for the greatest number. The community should gain, furthermore, by drawing upon the talents and skills of the largest possible number of people. Some philosophers have claimed, in addition, that participation benefits like participants as well as the larger community. It ennobles men by giving them a sense of their own dignity and value, alerts both rulers and ruled to their duties and responsibilities, and broadens political understanding." (McClosky 1967, p. 252)

In Eastern and Western Europe, the democratic revolutions of the last two centuries may differ in their achievements - but they are all unfinished. The extension of political participation, the democratization of all spheres of social life arc still on the agenda. In this volume, we will focus on the political system and the political culture of two major Central European countries: Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 80s. There are striking differences, but there are also many similarities in the conditions and prospects of freedom and democracy, both in the past and presence of these unequal neighbours. Most studies refer to developments that took place till the end of 1989, i.e. before a united Germany was created. They want to contribute to our understanding of both nations' experiences, problems and potentials for a democratic transformation of industrial societies in Europe.
Potentials of the Past

The history of European democracies was characterized by the steady growth, sometimes at a revolutionary pace, of popular participation: from constitutional monarchy to parliamentary democracies; from the hidden influence of the few to universal suffrage, public debates, and organized pluralism; from the privileges of the aristocracy to the active public involvement of millions of citizens in parties, trade unions, factory councils, in public and private organizations. In this century, we saw many successes and failures of European nations striving for stable democracies. They wanted to follow the ideals and principles of liberal and socialist democracy, but they also had to learn that the reality of Stalinism or facism proved to be the contrary. Nevertheless, the liberal model, based on human rights, the rule of law and political pluralism, finally prevailed at the end of the 80s. After 1945, Poland and Germany went very different ways in their effort for establishing or improving democracy.

In Poland, the ruling Communist Party (PUWP) asserted to establish and to develop socialist democracy, based on the collective ownership of the industrial means of production, on guaranteed human rights, and on mass participation in all spheres of social life. In reality, these claims proved to be widely untrue in the view of most citizens. The nation had to adapt to communist rule. It tried to find a livable "Polish way to socialism" under Soviet hegemony, always keeping its strong sense for "real" democracy. Especially after 1970, the Polish political class was not as repressive as most of their socialist relatives (including the GDR). It had to give some leeway to the opposition, to intellectuals, artists and workers (or it deliberately refrained from light controls). Civil rights and individual freedom, esp. the freedom of opinion, the right to protest and to organize against the ruling elite were longstanding demands of the Polish working class and the intellectuals. The ability of small groups to gain some autonomy for political action (even illegally or on a semi-legal basis) to realize solidarity in various forms are traditional features of Polish political culture. (For a more detailed account, see the previous volume G. Meyer/F. Ryszka: Die politische Kultur Polens. Tubingen 1989.) Mass protest and proposals for democratic political reforms, so that people would have a larger say in the factory and in politics, were important elements of public discussion and conflict in all crises and reform periods since 1956. The historical breakthrough of "Solidarity" (in 1980/81, and finally since 1989), and the sweeping reform of political institutions, agreed upon at the Round Table in 1989
and headed by T. Mazowiecki, L. Walesa and B. Geremek, were the most visible expressions of the process of democratization in Poland. In comparison to most other socialist systems, this process started very early and seems to be rather successful. But its rapid progress and the hope for stable democracy should not mislead us in underestimating the impact of authoritarian traditions, the dangers of deeply rooted political alienation and of widespread apathy. "The authoritarian temptation" always existed in recent Polish history, and it seems still to be true for a large part of the population. Not only in Poland a long learning process why and how to get actively involved in public affairs is lying ahead for the average citizen.

In West Germany the heritage of the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic and, most important, of fascism, was a heavy burden for the new democracy finally established by the Grundgesetz in 1949. In its early years, this "democracy without democrats", as some critics put it pointedly, was primarily based on democratic procedures and institutions. A democratic political culture developed only gradually. (For a more detailed account see e.g. P. Reichel: Politische Kultur der BRD, Opladen 1981.) In Germany, participation was always an important norm for political behaviour, as demonstrated e.g. by high voting turnouts in national elections. But the demand for a "democratization of all spheres of social life" only emerged in the wake of the student revolt in the late 60s. Its democratic ideas and rational demands, new models and experiments in social and cultural life, the experience of revolt, of mass demonstrations, and of "grass roots democracy" had a strong impact on public life in the reform era of the 70s. It started in 1970 with the formation of a coalition government between Social Democrats and Liberals under chancellor Willy Brandt. "Daring more democracy" was one of his goals. The following "participatory revolution" (Kaase/Barnes) saw a significant increase in political activity - e.g. in political parties, in "citizens' initiatives" (Bürgerinitiativen), or in the "new social movements" (e.g. anti-nuclear, women's lib, peace, ecology, Third World). In the 80s, innovative ideas for more effective political participation were brought in by a new party, the Greens. It originated from a growing discontent with (or even alienation from) the "established parties" and their representatives. The Greens attacked their policies and political style. They articulated the neglect of basic issues and of popular concerns in the field of ecology. As a "movement party" (Bewegungspartei), the Greens also encompassed the positive experience of mostly young people in the civic movements, looking for new ways of action and personal relations in politics. The programs and policies of the other parties reflected as well the
change of values that took place in the 70s and 80s: political participation, a larger say for the individual in all social arenas, became an important goal, especially for well educated people. This attitude corresponded with the traditional demand and established practice of (more) "co-determination" (Mitbestimmung) in the factory, as put forward by the trade unions. But in the history of the FRG, there also existed strong authoritarian, conservative and liberal political forces and social groups that opposed vigorously the idea of a democratization of all spheres of social life. In their view, democracy should be limited to the political realm. They thought it should not and it cannot be fully applied in the economy, and only to a very limited degree in public institutions, e.g. in schools, universities, hospitals, or churches. Thus, in the FRG, there is no general consensus how far participation and democratization should go. The basically hierarchical structure of most institutions and organisations, the interests of state bureaucrats, and the power of economic elites put severe limitations on popular participation in this capitalist democracy. The West German political culture is characterized by a pluralism of traditions, theoretical positions and actual practices of political participation on the various levels of its political system. For many, a more active role and more personal influence, both at the workplace and in politics, remain important goals to be achieved.

Before we can go on describing and explaining some major trends and problems of political participation in Poland and West Germany, we have to clarify our key concepts of political participation and democratization. And, we also have to discuss some theoretical and methodological questions of a parallel analysis of these two strongly differing political systems.

The Concept of Political Participation

In this book, the term "political participation" will be used in a broad sense. It refers to all voluntary activities by which individuals or groups want to influence the selection of rulers and representatives and/or the making and outcome of public policies. These activities are based on individual predispositions (e.g. needs, motives, perceptions, values) and resources (e.g. time, education). They are important preconditions and variables for the size and quality of political participation. Effective political participation, or at least the opportunity for it, is an essential part of democracy. To enhance political participation is a major objective in the democratization of a polity or society. For the comparison of authoritarian systems, e.g. of the formerly socialist systems of Central and Eastern Europe, and democratic
systems, as they developed in many Western European countries and (now also in the East), it is important to distinct between political participation, mobilization, apathy and compliance.

Political participation is based primarily
- on voluntary activities,
- on a certain degree of individual or group autonomy and equal legal opportunities to become politically active and make political choices,
- on a minimum of chances to wield public influence, guaranteed by formal rules and institutions, and by a certain degree of responsiveness of the political elite.

Political participation is not just a symbolic, ritual or token activity that is designed to merely support a given political order or the interests of a political elite that does not allow political opposition and regular tests of its democratic legitimacy.

If the involuntary character, the fear of negative sanctions, and the pressure for acclamation prevail in political activities, if the power elite is defining the scope and content of political activities, "organizing the masses from above", we should rather speak of political mobilization. It is not always easy to make clear cut distinctions. In most states, we find a mixture between elements of political participation "from below" and political mobilization "from above". But there are substantial differences not to be blurred between the two types of mass political activities e.g. in Poland under Gierek or Jaruzelski on one hand, and the time after the Round Table in 1989 or in comparison with West Germany in the 70s and 80s, on the other hand.

In both systems, we find public activities of individuals that are best characterized as political compliance. In this case, citizens obey or follow norms of political behaviour that are defined in laws, institutional rules, or in decisions by powerful political bodies, e.g. the party or the secret police. They usually go with the threat of severe negative sanctions in case of non-compliance.

In both systems we also find political apathy, either as an expression of indifference ("I dont't care for politics"), or of a low sense of efficacy, of a feeling of alienation or of political privatism. Politically passive citizens, though, may follow this pattern on grounds of deliberate criticism and refusal of the political system. The articles of K. Jasiewiez and H - G - Wehling present motives and patterns of non-voting in both countries as an expression of apathy, alienation or conscious non-interference.

Political scientists differ strongly on the question: What is political? Where is the borderline between political and "non-political" participa-
There is no clear borderline in reality. In most Western studies, for analytic purposes or as a matter of convenience, political acts are defined as those which are conceived or directed towards political goals to be achieved by the various decision-making units of the political system. In the case of socialist systems, e.g. in Poland after 1947, such a distinction is hardly feasible, as is clearly demonstrated in M. Marody's article. Most areas of social life were, directly or indirectly, at least influenced, if not determined by political decisions. Hence, most Polish citizens include the state of economic affairs, social policies, and individual living conditions in the notion of what is political. In Poland, until 1989, nearly all public activities implied political purposes or consequences. Social life, in most of its dimensions, was a "res publica" and treated as a public affair. Polish society regards herself as a civil and moral society, apart from the domains of "politics" which was mostly conceived as "what the authorities do". In any case, we will have to look at different perceptions of social, economic and political life, and at the different ways how activities in economic, social and cultural life are related to the political system. (Therefore, we included e.g. studies on industrial and work relations in both countries, or on "social self-help groups" in Germany, in this volume.)

Political participation is embedded in the political culture of a society. Thus, political participation belongs to the subjective dimension of politics as well as to the "objective" structures of the polity and its political process. In contrast to most specialists in the field, I would not refrain the concept of political participation to actual political behaviour. I would rather include the psychic and cognitive bases of participation, i.e. the citizens' perception of and their attitude towards political participation. Political interest and motivation, political resources and values of individuals are important factors for their readiness, ability and availability for political participation. M. Marody's article is a fine example for the significance of people's perceptions for their potential political behaviour.

A Typology of Participatory Activities

Any empirical analysis of political participation starts with a typology and a selection of specific types of political activities. Max Kaase's (1987) typology of individual acts of political participation seems to be most suitable for our purposes. It includes four heuristic dimensions:

1. constitutional vs. non-institutional ("verfasst vs. nicht verfasst"). Participation can be based on constitutional norms, laws or similar rules that
formally define the conditions and consequences of an act of participation, e.g. voting. On the contrary, there are activities that are allowed by, but not explicitly incorporated in the constitution; or, they may be not formally institutionalized, e.g. activities of "citizens' initiatives" or "social movements" against nuclear power plants, or as shown by F. Vilmar/B. Runge, the activities of autonomous groups for social "self-help".

2. legal vs. illegal. This obvious difference between political activities is not only important in practical politics. In its definitions, it may vary between political systems as well as over time, or in the patterns of law enforcement. Correspondingly, a further distinction can be made between civil disobedience and aggressive political violence.

3. legitimate vs. illegitimate. In contrast to the "objective" definition of legality, this dimension refers to the "subjective" assessment of political acts by citizens or collective political actors. This is a significant aspect of both public controversy and political change.

4. conventional vs. non-conventional. Conventional acts of participation are related to institutional elements of the political process with a high degree of legitimacy, conventional and unconventional ones aim at direct influence on political decisions with a low degree of legitimacy. There are both legal and illegal forms of unconventional participation, e.g. voting, campaigning, acting in a city's council, collecting signatures for a resolution, citizens' initiatives, legal demonstrations and boycotts as opposed against "wild strikes", lax boycotts, traffic interruptions or the occupation of buildings. A further distinction can be made between violence against persons and against property.

In this volume, we will deal with nearly all forms of political participation, from voting to activities in self-help groups, trade unions, political parties and workers' self-administration. We will look both into patterns of behaviour as shown by professional "gladiators" or political elites, by occasional "activists", by "spectators" (who seek information and vote), or by "apathetics" who just watch the political process. There are certainly various degrees in the intensity of a person's political involvement. On first sight, they seem to follow a hierarchy, from "easy" to "more advanced or demanding" forms of action, according to the resources (time, effort, risks, money, prestige) that have to be invested. After many years of debate in political science, it turned out that there is not a one-dimensional continuum of political participation, neither for conventional nor for unconventional participation (cf. Kaase 1981.)
Dimensions or Democratization

A democratic political culture cannot grow without an increase in the size and efficiency of political participation. This is strongly determined by the degree of democratization or the democratic opportunities to wield political influence, as offered by the political system. In general, democratization means to reduce or to eliminate obstacles in the power structure of a society which hinder people to satisfy legitimate individual or collective needs. Democratization is understood both as a goal and as a process. More specifically, in the political sphere, democratization means to back or to dismantle illegitimate political power, often based on socio-economic privileges, in favor of individuals or groups hitherto underprivileged. To guarantee individual human rights is an essential part of this process. If we look at the conditions for a democratic political culture, democratization encompasses

1. the reduction of socio-economic and educational inequalities, e.g. in general education, in professional qualification or in the quality of labor, that make for unequal opportunities to become active and influential in politics;
2. more equality in the rights, resources and opportunities of citizens to participate and to exert influence in the political process, to control political elites and institutions;
3. the growth of attitudes and motivations to participate in politics;
4. a process of political socialization and public media that provide adequate informations, capabilities, and skills for mass political participation.

So, if a democratic revolution wants to be successful, not only constitutional, legal and political changes have to be accomplished, but also socio-economic, psychological and cultural ones.


1. as limited and non-binding participation in the political decision-making-process by the right to be informed, to consult or to be consulted, to vote or to protest.
2. restrictions on the decision-making power of ruling elites or institutions by the right to propose, to control, to consent (including quote or majority rules) or to refuse compliance (obligatory or binding participation);
3. the dissolution or abolition of the decision-making power of ruling elites or institutions, shifted to or acquired by other political actors. This can be accomplished by legal, peaceful, spontaneous or revolutionary acts,
by informal self-organization, nationalization or the gradual phasing out of a political system.

Today, the institutionalized democratization of the political system in the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe means, above all, the introduction of basic structures of liberal democracy, i.e. primarily:

1. the guarantee of basic human rights, esp. the freedom of information and opinion, to assemble and to organize particular interests;
2. the rule of law, an independent judiciary, possibly administrative and constitutional courts;
3. organized social and political pluralism, a multi-party system, free elections, guaranteed rights for political opposition and for minorities;
4. the extension of popular participation in political, social, economic, educational and cultural institutions (e.g. the recruitment of leaders by election, democracy within political parties, co-determination of workers and employees in enterprises; popular plebiscite; a growing autonomy of private organizations, e.g. interest groups, "citizens' initiatives" and "social movements");
5. maximum control and internal restrictions of the political executive (government, state bureaucracy, secret police, army, prosecutors) and economic state monopolies:
   - by strong parliaments on all levels of the political system;
   - by independent critical mass media ("glasnost") and public debates on policy alternatives;
   - by the division of powers in the state ("checks and balances");
   - by free scientific research and discussion, artistic expression and cultural creativity;
   - by decentralization and regional autonomy, possibly federalism; by local self-administration.
6. the abolition of an official stale ideology, claimed to be valid for all citizens ("open society").

These were and are main elements of democratization in modern industrial societies. In most regards, West European - states are historically well ahead. In general, this is also true comparing West Germany and Poland after 1949. But if we take a close look at all dimensions of democratization, at the socio-economic, cultural and psychological conditions of political participation today, it is no longer possible to pass quick and simple judgments. This is especially true, if we do not only ask for the present state, but also for the relative historical progress each society has made under very different systemic and international circumstances. This rises both the
question of historical relativity, and even more of legitimate and adequate comparisons.

**Polish-German cooperation: approaches to cross-national analysis**

Since 1986, political scientists and sociologists from the University of Tubingen, the University and the Academy of Sciences in Warszaw organized five conferences to study the political culture, political participation and the process of democratization in both countries. We started with separate studies to understand these phenomena in their historical and national context. Two volumes were published containing more than 40 empirical, interpretative and theoretical studies on the political culture of Poland and West Germany in the 80s (cf. Meyer/Ryszka 1989, Ryszka/Meyer 1990).

Once and again during the first three conferences, spontaneous questions and remarks popped up comparing both societies, showing different backgrounds of experience, understanding and judgement of the participants. To be sure, astonishment or critical tones were not missing in our discussions. Today, not only the relative achievements and failures in both countries, but even more the perspectives of a united Europe, of capitalist and post-socialist democracies made us ask: what is the state of political participation and democratization in Poland and West Germany? Can we compare at all these unequal partners of the 80s?

This volume contains our contributions to a parallel and exemplary, if not truly comparative analysis of some central aspects of the subject. Most articles were presented at two Polish-German conferences in Weingarten (West Germany, sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation) in 1988 and in Krakow in 1989.

Stefan Nowak, the well known Polish sociologist who died in 1989, look part in two of our earlier conferences. We commemorate his valuable contributions, and the editors feel honored by the fact that we can offer such an excellent piece of his theoretical and methodological thoughts on the intricate problems of comparison in the field of social and political values, attitudes and opinions.

In two earlier papers (in German and Polish), I gave an overview of major approaches and methodological problems of comparative studies on capitalist and socialist systems in Europe (Meyer 1989, 1990). For the two conferences, they served as a basis of discussion and of conceptual clarification for a parallel analysis of the two politics. We ended up with a very
modest program that represents the feasible in the view of the authors: a partial and "problem-oriented" comparison of some important aspects and exemplary fields of democratization in Poland and West Germany until spring 1990.

In political science, there does not yet exist a comprehensive theory or model for a multidimensional and multilevel comparison, or even for a parallel systematic and historical analysis, of capitalist and socialist systems. There is also no consensus among political sociologists how to carry out empirical studies of extremely contrary types of political systems, based on widely accepted operational concepts and evaluative standards (cf. Kaase 1987). Therefore, we were very pragmatic in our approach. We are touching many aspects of political participation that, for heuristic purposes and better orientation, are listed here in a compact form.

**Political participation: aspects or cross-national analysis**

1. Structural conditions
   a) Systemic contexts: the political system (politics polity, policies), the political culture; class structure and social stratification; regional differences and historical traditions; formal and informal structures and opportunities to participate.
   b) Resources of individuals and groups that determine the scope and efficiency of participation, e.g. time, information, knowledge, education, money, status and professional qualifications; differences according e.g. to class, gender and age.

2. Perceptions and attitudes
   a) Prevailing types of perception (cognitive, emotional, evaluative), of the political system (esp. the power structure and images of socio-political cleavages); of the most important problems and major political actors (e.g. parties, trade unions).
   b) Political interest, individual motivation, attitudes and value orientations concerning political participation and its possible efficiency ("sense of efficacy"); the effects of socialization; the use of mass media.

3. Patterns of behaviour
   Types of participatory activities (e.g. conventional vs. unconventional), patterns of actual behaviour; gratifications and sanctions; norms, conformity, and deviance; strategies and tactics; differences according to goals, types of problems and situations.
4. The dynamics of public interaction

Various ways how people become active in politics (politization, mobilization); informal and institutional activities as part of the dynamics of public interaction between citizens, groups, organizations, mass media, political institutions and elites; participation in the articulation and aggregation of interests; patterns for the resolution of social, cultural, normative, religious and political conflicts; patterns of general and specific consensus and support for the political system ("legitimacy by participation").

5. Scope and effects of political participation

Opportunities to act and to get access to the decision-making process according to goals, problems, resources and types of actors; the constellation of political forces and situative factors; patterns of how political power is used to influence or to block participatory efforts; effects of participation (1) on individuals, groups, institutions etc.; (2) on reforms in certain policy areas; (3) on the legitimacy and the (in-) stability of the political system, (4) on the progress of democratization.

In this volume, we want to present a selective overview of major problems of political participation and democratization in Poland and West Germany in the 80s. Sometimes, the Polish and German studies run fairly parallel as to their field of inquiry or as to the questions asked, sometimes they take divergent approaches. But in any case, they hint at structures and problems rather similar in both societies. We fell far from true comparison, but, for the attentive reader, it is easy to find out implicit differences or common features between these two neighbours experiencing rapid changes on their way into the 90s.

The contents of this volume

The idea of a parallel and selective analysis of political participation in Poland and Germany is realized by the sequence of the articles dealing with five major aspects:
- concepts and methods for cross-national studies (G. Meyer, S. Nowak);
- general trends in political participation and the question of democratic legitimacy (M. Marody, A. Ryehard; B. Westle, D. Fuchs);
- the party system, elections and electoral behaviour (St. Gebethner, K. Jasiewicz; R.-O. Schultze, H.-G. Wehling);
- participation, bureaucracy and the welfare state (I. Bialecki; R. Prätorius, F. Vilmar/B. Runge);
In this chapter, the reader will find brief sketches of each article. They are not meant to be summaries of these complex studies and their arguments. They should rather give an idea of the author's focus of interest. Maybe, they can also serve as an appetizer for further reading.

According to each author's preference and language skills, the articles were written either in English or German (if so, my sketch is a little longer). We thought, with English as the lingua franca of the social sciences, we would reach a maximum of readers. My special thanks go to all colleagues (esp. from Poland) who renounced to write in their own language and who took the burden of translation. Let us now take a closer look at individual studies.

Political participation and Democratic Legitimacy

For M. Marody, a Polish sociologist, political action is not so much a product of specific environmental factors, but much more a creative act of the individual. It is primarily determined by the way the actor perceives social reality, his role and his identity in interacting with the outside world. So, she focuses on the subjective dimension of participation, i.e. on individual predispositions and perceptions of the "world of politics". M. Marody looks at the expectations and mechanisms that determine the citizen's behaviour in Poland. She gives both a critical account of past attitudes, of widespread alienation from the realm of politics, as well as of emerging pluralist and democratic patterns of thinking.

A. Ryehard directs his attention towards the various problems of the legitimation of the Polish political system in the transition period between autumn 1985 and early 1990. He asks for the basis on which people accept and subordinate themselves to the existing institutional system. The author argues that the ancien regime was "based on a mixture of pragmatic adaptation and the possibility of resorting to violence". The new political order enjoys much stronger support and democratic legitimacy. But paradoxically enough, its main representatives get more support than their reform programmes (in the past, it was just the other way round). New dangers and contradictions are developing within the "Solidarity"-based order, because it is "in a sense suspended in a social, legitimational and institutional vacuum".

B. Westle, in a comprehensive study on West Germany, analyzes the complex relationship between political participation and political legitim-
acy. She questions the general judgements on the "crisis of legitimacy" of the political system. Based on systematic conceptual differentiations and carefully chosen indicators, B. Westle presents abundant empirical data of the 80s that are to be found in the cognitive, affective, and pragmatic orientations in Germany.

These are patterns, e.g. of
- diffuse and specific support;
- satisfaction with the reality, the policy outputs and the institutions of West German democracy, in relation to its ideas and values;
- (post-)materialist, left/right orientations, party preferences as well as socio-demographic factors;
- attitudes towards (un-)conventional political participation.

Democratic support and legitimacy of the polity, the political process and many policies seem to be rather high in general, but medium or low for selected elements, e.g. for politicians, parties, state interventionism, and the opportunities for participation.

U. Fuchs studies recent trends in the development of unconventional political participation and new social movements as innovative forms of political activity in Germany. Following in general the typology of political participatory activities mentioned above, we observe a continued growth of these new forms. Yet, they do not exert a destabilizing stress on the established forms of representative parliamentary democracy. They are rather complimentary in character, offering new and broader options for civic participation. There is not so much a general discontent with the intermediary system in politics, but an increasing acceptance of unconventional political behaviour that lends to enhance the integrative capacity and legitimacy of the political system.

The party system, elections and electoral behaviour

St. Gebethner, a Polish political scientist, studies a central aspect of democratization: the formation of a new party system in Poland since 1989. In this process, new legal, institutional, and organizational foundations are laid for political participation, overcoming the old hegemonial party system. But a recent survey on the attitudes of Poles towards political parties and civic movements also shows that there is still widespread mistrust of any political party. Probably this is a specific feature of the Polish transitional period to pluralist democracy.

K. Jasiewiez studies Polish electoral behaviour in the light of surveys on his nation's political attitudes which were performed between 1984 and
1989. In general, the relatively high acceptance, or reserved acknowledgement, of the authorities and the political status quo in 1984/85 underwent considerable change since 1988/89, when the opportunity for public discussions, and political opposition movements, above all for "Solidarity", and for the autonomous organization of interests, increased dramatically. The negative or ritualized attitude towards elections changed, and, in 1989, the citizens expressed, mostly in the free elections for the Senate, their radical refusal of the old system. Aggregate data on the urban/rural dimension show that cultural more than structural factors may explain differences in the electoral behaviour in the regions.

R.-O. Schulze gives a comprehensive overview on major trends in the development of the West German party system and changes in electoral behaviour. Based on a wealth of empirical data, he looks at the dominant patterns of party preferences in national and regional (Länder) elections. There was a strong tendency of concentration in the West German party system, closely related to significant changes in the social structure. The author describes and explains the electoral behaviour of major social groups and of the heterogeneous young generation. The analysis of the consequences of new value orientations and the weaknesses of catch-all parties are further steps to lay ground for eight theses on structural changes and the deconcentration of the West German party system, and on the corresponding voting behaviour. The author observes tendencies to overcome or to supplement two traditionally dominant cleavages of the party system:

1. clerical/secular or Catholic/non-Catholic;
2. positions in favor of market economy and of a low level of state intervention vs. equality and redistribution in a welfare state.

He emphasizes the development of a new dimension: protection and improvement of the natural environment (ecological polity) vs. economic and technological growth.

II.-G. Wehling deals with an important part of the German electorate: the non-voters. He distinguishes unauthentic absentees from those citizens who do not vote as a result of incomplete social or political integration or as an expression of deliberate protest. In ten theses, he elaborates the effects of major variables for non-voting: German political culture, institutional levels, social status and integration, images of politics and society. The article hints to many dimensions of latent and manifest alienation from the political system that are also analyzed in the articles of Westle and Fuchs.
Participation, bureaucracy, and the welfare state

R. Prätorius raises the question which type of challenges and adaptations the traditional structures of the German welfare state have to undergo as a result of changes in the social structure and the political culture. His main thesis is (cf. his own summary): The case of the FRG offers a good illustration for the "social democratic consensus" and its asserted decline (Dahrendorf). The core elements of this ideological pattern are shared not only by social-democrats: paternalistic intervention of the welfare state, economic growth and technological progress, limited cooperation between labor and capital, pluralistic group representation and resolution of social conflicts.

The recovery of the German welfare state since 1945 was dominated by the persistence of bureaucratic routines and corresponding organizational segmentation deriving from traditional cleavages and generating routine tasks for a reactive social policy. This arrangement was appropriate for a political culture that implied "output-expectations" and a passive understanding of democratic values.

The composition dissolved as soon as one of its ingredients changed. The "participatory revolution" of the seventies is partly caused by the mismatch of organizational and societal structures, partly by a change of values, esp. among the young. Traditional milieus and the importance of gainful employment decrease. Basic provisions of social security are indispensable. But welfare bureaucracies or the trade unions have to change in order to meet the requirements caused by an increasing social complexity and the strive for more individual autonomy.

F. Vilmar and B. Runge, in a summary of a larger study on this subject, give an outline of the participatory relevance of social self-help groups in Germany. They not only give an idea of the scope, size, and some basic structures of these groups. Above all, the authors understand them as an innovative way of "participatory learning": people come out of their isolation; they initiate change "from below" in their social environment; they reduce alienated work; they contribute to a gradual reform of the welfare state - and, last not least, to the growth of a democratic political culture. Vilmar and Runge regard these activities of hundreds and thousands of FRG citizens as a creative response for the lack of participation as allowed by political parties, trade unions and the bureaucratic welfare state.

I. Bialecki describes a major mechanism how political power and the social structure were reproduced in Poland till the 80s: the dependence of important social groups on the bureaucracies of party and state, based on the nomenklatura system. He describes which occupational groups were in-
deed, or felt the most dependent on the bureaucracy when asked for their fear of loosing jobs and other benefits in 1987. This article outlines some socio-economic and psychological mechanisms of bureaucratic rule and political adaptation. They worked as major restrictions for criticism, protest and efficient reforms in Poland under Jaruzelski. Objective and subjective in character, this kind of dependence was (and still is?) an important obstacle for the democratization of Polish society.

Participation in the factory and in the trade unions

I. Hanke looks at the trade unions and the ways they participate as an organizational actor in the political process, and which opportunities for participation they provide for the individual member. Her article, esp. in an appendix with tables and figures, gives an outline of the development of major structures and policies of the DGB unions. She briefly describes the specific German form of economic co-determination ("Mitbestimmung") in enterprises, and its political effects. Since decades, West German trade unions have kept their strong position in industrial relations as well as in the political system. Yet, in their internal structures, they still are very much a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization. Centralism and discipline are caused both by external (e.g. neo-corporatist strategies) and internal factors (e.g. to keep their strike potential high; traditional strategies, authoritarianism). But trade unions have to face radical changes in the labor force. I. Hanke thinks they should no longer stay too much with defending their traditional clientele. Rather, they should develop better opportunities for creative and effective participation inside, and for new negotiating strategies outside.

R. Bahnmüller and W. Wild discuss new trends and concepts for the participation of workers and employees in enterprises. Radical technological, organizational and social changes are taking place in industrial production and administration. Better educated, competent and experienced employees ask for more participation. But they meet a "participatory gap". This is increasingly filled by new models of management that aim at increased, but limited participation. Most of them are presented by their management, closely linked to efforts of modernization and rationalization. The authors discuss new opportunities and dangers of these profitable integrative strategies. They do not refuse them, they rather take a stand for their intelligent use. Paradoxically enough, these changes are virtually passing without effective interference from the dual system of organized participation, i.e. by the enterprise councils (Betriebsräte) and the trade
unions. In the social sciences, the discussions on participation and democratization in political science and industrial sociology, that have been separated since the early 70s, should "re-unite", according to the authors.

J. Hausner correspondingly deals with a semi-public arena that since a long time is a main field of political participation in Poland, seeing many attempts of democratization: the state and prospects of self-management in state enterprises. The author gives a summary of several studies that have been carried out in enterprises of the Krakow voivodship between 1983 and 1987. They dealt with nearly all aspects of participation in this conflict ridden arena: the organizational and legal setting, the institutional place of self-management bodies in the enterprise's management system; self-management, the consciousness of the staff, and its effects on the economic performance of the enterprise. The author shows the gap and the many contradictions between official declarations and practices in the past. But he also argues that there is a considerable potential for a more democratic, though probably "corporate form of management on behalf of the staff, not primarily by the staff.

**Participatory Democracy: Questions in Common**

In spite of all obvious historical and structural differences, Poland and Germany are two industrialized societies in the heart of Europe which share some similar problems in their efforts to establish or to enhance participatory democracy. We will try to give a brief overview on those questions that rose in our conferences and that run through many articles of this volume. (This superficial sketch of questions to be asked thus serves mainly heuristic purposes, and does not substitute its empirical study.)

In both countries, politicians, scientists and educators complain about a lack of political participation, both in quantity and quality: "too few govern too many", "the many let themselves be directed by the few". First, there is the preoccupation with the so-called non-political spheres of life, the private and personal well-being. It ranges from the strive for more money, consumer goods and better apartments to life in the family, with friends or relatives, to enjoy leisure time, TV or cultural events, and, last not least, to what you invest in your job, qualification or career.

Certainly, all these needs and activities serve legitimate individual and social interests that dominate everyday life in Europe and elsewhere. So, it is actually active participation in politics that needs special motivation (and explanation). M. Marody refers to many negative perceptions of politics
that hinder individual political participation in Poland. Here, fear and frustra-
tion, refusal and resignation, feelings of helplessness and senselessness
have to be overcome. But there always was (and still is), a strong sense of
dignity among Polish citizens who refuse just to obey or to be submitted.
People want to express emotions, opinions and ideas in freedom. This is a
psychological need as much as a matter of instrumental action.

But *privatism, political apathy* and *indifference* can also be found in a rich
liberal society as Germany where an output-orientation toward the state or
e.g. the trade unions is still strong. Democratic traditions are not so old in
the F R G that radical parties on the right (like the "Republikaner"), servile
compliance in the work place, and intolerance against certain minorities
would have no chance. Germany has certainly overcome many authorita-
rian traditions of the past, and it has seen a change of values in the genera-
tions that grew up since the early 70s (ef. the articles of Weslle and
Fuchs). Moral criteria are not so strong in political judgements than in Po-
land. Religion and the Catholic church play a less important role in Ger-
man society and politics. But there is still a strong sense of duly e.g. in vot-
ing, and people are not so "tired of politics" as it seems to be the case in Po-
land. Here, there seem to persist quite a number of traditions unfavorable
to a liberal participator)' democracy: *traditional authoritarianism* stemming
from the hierarchical rule of the party, the state and, to a certain degree, of
the Catholic Church; an attitude "to wail for what you get from the stale",
or the call for a "strong man" who finishes up with the "whole mess", i.e.
anomy, economic inefficiency, corruption etc.

Obstacles for political participation are not only formed by subjective
factors, such as a lack of motivation, opposed personal needs, or a weak
sense of meaning and efficacy. Very often, there is a *lack of resources*, dis-
tributed uneven in society. The "standard model" of political participation,
widely tested in the West, shows a clear advantage for citizens with higher
education, income and social status, with power and prestige, in urban sett-
lements and "good neighbourhoods". This class bias of political participa-
tion goes along with strong differences in the life styles and perspectives of
men und women, of the old and the young. The socialist claim that the
citizen should not only have the constitutional right to participate, but that
society must also provide the necessary means, has not become obsolete.
Legal political equality is not enough if there are very unequal economic,
social or educational opportunities to participate.

The tendency that only a rather small number of people is able to partici-
pate effectively in any political decision-making is also very much due to
the fact that the number and complexity of political problems has increased enormously. We all have a limited ability and capacity to get and to process the necessary amount of information. We have to be highly selective and efficiency oriented in our attention, in the choice of topics and attendances. Specialization and professionalization are inevitably growing.

The complaints about low participation tend to neglect the institutional and organizational conditions in established capitalist or developing post-communist democracies. Legal provisions in Poland e.g. were very complicated for the parliamentary elections of 1989. In the FRG, the 5% clause prevents all minor parties (and emerging political movements) to enter parliaments. Elections are still a crucial and integral part of democracy. But voting is not enough if a stable democracy is to be based on active citizens. The spectrum and quality of programs, organizational structures and representative elites of political parties must be attractive enough to make citizens active beyond elections.

Many citizens do not feel adequately represented in the political system. This is also a result of the internal structures and policies of political, social, economic, educational and cultural institutions. In both countries, children and students are not socialized effectively enough to participation. They grow up with a lot of pressure for conformity, with mechanisms of pseudo-democracy, with paternalism and patriarchalism. Double talk towards people "above", and subtile pressures to comply, are still widespread. Generally, innerorganizational democracy is generally underdeveloped.

This is especially true for the socialist or capitalist factory, but it also applies to the trade unions (as shown by Hausner, Bahnmüller/Wild and Hanke). Thus, both political socialization and experience on the job still too often discourage people to participate and to act in public for their own and others' interests. Correspondingly, the trade unions and many other organizations, which try to organize the interests of "underprivileged" people, show a structural weakness in terms of organizational strength, collective solidarity and efficient intra-organizational participation, as well as in the political arena, leading to an unbalanced social and political pluralism.

Many efforts to increase political participation do not really care for tying politics to the life situations of average individuals, i.e. to their actual interests, needs, and emotions, to specific groups and their aspirations, to basic needs of housing and for a safe job. Or they do not respond to a growing need to be consulted and to have a say in one's own affairs. New forms and ways of addressing and activating people are necessary.
In both countries, we find a lot of *alienation from politics in general, in particular from political parties and entrenched political elites* (ef. Marody, Rychard; Wcslte, Fuchs, Wehling). In Poland, the heavy burdens of the past, the heritage of Stalinism and the results of PUWP cadre policy, corruption and repression, many decades of unkept promises and inefficient reforms, and last not least, a desastrous socialist economy and terrible ecological catastrophes have discredited "official politics" and "the authorities" for many years. Sure, there were also some politicians and institutions trusted and appreciated by the masses. After radical changes in the political elites and institutional settings, the establishment of a new party system, of fully democratic procedures and effective mass participation are still on the agenda of democratization. Lacking major economic success, the "new political order" is by no means enjoying wholehearted popular support, and, hence, full democratic legitimacy and stability (ef. the articles of Gebethner, Jasiewicz, Rychard).

In *West Germany*, we can also observe considerable political alienation. This is not only true for the "extreme" right and left of the political spectrum. It also applies to the center, predominantly as a widespread feeling of being not adequately represented by "the politicians" and their non-responsive, "egoistic" political parties. Since 1985, we watched the rise of a new nationalist Party ("Die Republikaner"), based on latent authoritarianism and hostility towards immigrants, combined with a "new nationalism". Feelings of general desorientation, social insecurity and diffuse political discontent prevail with their voters. This Party successfully mobilized and organized this potential until 1989. With German unity and permanent internal strife, it had to face its gradual decline.

At the same time, we observe the decline of the former "new social movements", i.e. the peace, ecology, women's lib, anti-nuclear, third world movements. Their institutionalization within the "Green Party", and their subsequent integration into the political system, led to the decrease of their innovative potential, loosing some attractiveness for young voters. In December 1990, the Greens of West Germany in contrast to the coalition of Greens and civic movements, called "Bündnis 90" in East Germany, could not win enough votes to reenter the Federal Diet. But in the 80s, there is also a remarkable growth of an autonomous "self-help movement" or network of private initiatives (ef. Vilmar/Rungc). Once more, this rises the question of the relationship between conventional and non-conventional social and political participation.
Feelings of political alienation are created or supported not only by the visible political actors, as presented in the mass media: politicians, parties, parliaments etc. Even more important is the rule of bureaucracies. Their pervading rights and efforts to organize public affairs, and to interfere in social life characterizes most modern societies. The rationality and efficiency of bureaucracies, are certainly necessary ingredients of modernization and public welfare. Yet, in socialist Poland, the rule of the cadre bureaucracy and its nomenklatura lacked any effective political control by mass participation or parliament. It was the essence of Communist party rule to transform, to stabilize and to repress society by bureaucratic rule. It nearly replaced popular democracy.

In West Germany, bureaucracies are much better controlled by parliaments and interest groups, by critical mass media, and by responsible politicians and sensible citizens. But we cannot overlook the fact, that here, too, the predominance of state bureaucracies by state interventionism or welfare state paternalism represent a serious threat to participatory democracy. Two examples:

1. Very often the controls of how personal data are used by various public and private institutions are inefficient or incomplete. Thus the capacity to control the average citizens enhanced considerably. In turn, this may lead to a weakening of certain basic civil rights, and it may strengthen feelings of powerlessness and distrust.

2. A growing number of citizens who live on welfare ("Sozialhilfeempfänger"), and a nearly constant rate of jobless people (ca. 7-8% or 2 million) are only two indicators that more and more citizens become dependent on the welfare state, its bureaucracies and economic capability. Yet, their political loyalty to "the system" and the major political parties is not broken, but may get shaky in the future.

Expectations and demands on the welfare state to take even more responsibility for comprehensive social security, housing, child and old age care etc., as well as changes in the social structure and the political culture, i.e. the "participatory revolution of the 70s", put enormous contradictory pressures on the welfare state. At the same time, it should grow, be efficient and open up for transparency and participation (cf. Prätorius, Vilmar/Runge, Bialecki).

These contradictions are even deepened by the fact that the ecological problems cry for tight state controls - ex ante, as intervention in actu or as remedy ex post. But those who are most outspoken and active about these grievances and catastrophes, the ecological movements, at the same time
advocate strongly for tougher laws and controls as well as for an antibureaucratic, radical democracy. "Green" and left critics of the political system assert that the structural dominance of private enterprise and a growing concentration of economic power in a few hands leads to a structural neglect of ecological, social and human aspects of production, labor and the quality of life. Non-materialist values and criteria of global ethics are said to have no proper place in the decision-making of "big-business", of large banks or with their political representatives. Not only Marxists strongly criticize the lack of popular influence in politics because of the power and dynamics of private capital interests. Ecological problems are only one example to demonstrate that there is a growing pressure and opposition that the state and its bureaucracies gain (have to gain?) more and more competences to intervene.

In order to enhance popular participation many proposals have been made how to strengthen parliamentary control and how to give a larger say to the ordinary citizen. Many scientists and politicians speak out in favor for more decentralization, regional autonomy or federalism. Thus, the horizontal division of powers would be supported by a vertical redistribution. Local government should attain more autonomy and responsibility. New elements of plebiscitarian or "direct" democracy, e.g. referenda, could be introduced. Civic movements should be given more rights and better access to the decision-making process. To extend the autonomy and the opportunities of internal democratization for most public institutions (including the churches, the military and schools) would enhance both their efficiency and their legitimacy.

A minimum of regular participation is a prerequisite for the democratic legitimacy of a political system. All other forms of political behaviour (political mobilization, compliance, apathy) can at best create mass loyalty. Consequently, there is a substantial difference between legitimacy and mass loyalty. A political system has gained legitimacy if a majority of the adult population believes that

1. the system actually realizes, to a satisfying extent, generally accepted, "essential or basic values" (such as freedom, equality, democracy, social justice, economic welfare, social and physical security, rationality, efficiency, progress) and/or

2. the leadership's actions and the system's functioning (its institutions, procedures, norms and sanctions) are in accordance with the constitution and the laws of the country ("due process"), i.e. is not primarily based on force, terror or arbitrary decisions by the rulers.
So, the concept of legitimacy may be "value oriented or material" and/or "process oriented or legal" in character. Legitimacy is based on positive convictions or the identification of a majority of citizens with the system's main goals, supported by acts of political participation. In contrast, the notion of mass loyalty implies no claim for a positive belief in the legitimate or "just" character of the system. Mass loyalty is achieved when there is actual compliance and a minimum of cooperation of the vast majority of citizens "with the power", with the rulers and their rules. The functional requirements for the working of the economy and the public institutions are fulfilled, regardless of the motivation. The motives may be: "you can't do anything against the system"; "you have to learn the qualify and to work in order to survive"; "it is the lesser evil to do what 'they' ask for and to avoid any trouble"; "it doesn't matter to me" etc. Mass loyalty only requires a minimum level of activity by the citizens, so that the political system is able to function on a satisfying level, not necessarily democratic in character.

After decades of authoritarian communist rule, new political institutions and democratic procedures had to be established in Poland to give democratic legitimacy to the protagonists and negotiators for peaceful change, for the new political elites and institutions, and, last not least, for risky and radical reforms. Many of the formerly socialist countries bring a very special experience to European political culture: the round tables. In Poland, in 1980/S1 and in 1989, negotiations for a broad national understanding to solve heavy social and political conflicts look place. Very early, negotiating, dialogue, and de facto compromises were characlerie for the political culture and reform politics in Poland. In the GDR, in a different political setting, the round tables, on many political levels and in many spheres of publie life, for some months became important institutions for reform, stability, and a very cooperative approach to transform the socialist system. It remains to be seen whether these patterns of cooperation beyond the majority principle will bring a new spirit or new patterns of conflict resolution into the political culture of Central Europe.

In some Western European countries, where cooperative strategies of trade unions prevail, neo-corporatist structures serve to coordinate policies and strategies for economic crisis management between state, entrepreneurs and trade unions. The FRG presents a good example of a higly co-operative approach to manage confias between "social partners" in a "social market economy". In the future, the similar functioning of some EC or UN organs may be as important for the reduction of social and political conflicts by international cooperation and high-level diplomacy. Because of