Nr. 48

Matthias Dembinski, Katja Freistein,
Brigitte Weiffen

Form Characteristics
of Regional Security Organizations
- The Missing Link in the Explanation of the
Democratic Peace
# Table of Contents

Summary 1

1. International Organizations and their Contribution to Peace: Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Findings 2
   1.1. Debating the Effects of International Organizations: The early Phase 2
   1.2. Disaggregating International Organizations 4
   1.3. Analyzing Regional Security Institutions 5
   1.4. Opening the Black-box of the Member States 7
   1.5. International Institutions and the Prevention of War 9

2. Domestic Structure and Form of International Institutions - A new Approach to the Study of International Organizations 10

3. Case Selection and Operationalization of Institutional Form 11
   3.1. Case Selection 11
   3.2. Form Characteristic I: Embeddedness 12
   3.3. Form Characteristic II: Communicative Arena 13

4. Comparing the Embeddedness of Regional Security Institutions 14
   4.1. Communicative Channels 14
   4.2. Interface 21
   4.3. Collection, Procession and Distribution of Information 27

5. Comparing the Communicative Arena of Regional Security Institutions 28
   5.1. Norms 28
   5.2. Decision-making Structure 31

6. Conclusion 37

References 39

Appendix: Regional Security Organizations 49
Summary

This paper contributes both to the debate on the effects of regional security organizations and to the debate on democratic peace. It argues that even if international organizations as such may not be able to influence the conflict behavior of their member states, the subgroup of interdemocratic institutions is well suited to do so. The form of interdemocratic institutions differs in two significant respects from the form of traditional institutions: they are more densely connected via transnational links with the societies of their member states (embeddedness), and they are more densely connected via transgovernmental links with the political systems of member states (communicative arena). Due to their characteristic form, interdemocratic institutions channel more information from and to member states and increase the autonomy of policy fields. As a result, they effectively block typical escalatory paths to war and foster deeper forms of cooperation. Hence, we argue that interdemocratic security organizations constitute the missing link in the causal chain of the democratic peace theory. In a first step, we unfold this argument by drawing on the rich literature on international organizations, theories of rational design, theories of war, and the democratic peace theory. We then specify and operationalize the form characteristics of regional security organizations. In the empirical part of the paper, we contribute to the research on comparing regional institutions by presenting detailed data on form characteristics of five differently composed regional security institutions. We compare two democratic institutions – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) - with two Latin American security institutions – the Organization of American States (OAS) and Mercosur/Mercosul (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur, Portuguese: Mercado Comum do Sul, English: Southern Common Market) - which are composed of recently democratized countries, and a traditional institution – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - whose members are still mainly non-democratic. We demonstrate that NATO and the EU are indeed embedded in strong networks of societal actors and that both provide wide communicative arenas. We further demonstrate that Latin American security organizations, as their member-states became democratic, are developing those form characteristics as well. Although the security environment in Southeast Asia is more fragile than in the Southern Cone, ASEAN continues to be a mostly intergovernmental organization.

The analysis is part of a broader project studying the international organization of the democratic peace. In this paper we restrict ourselves to establishing a relationship between the properties of member states and the form characteristics of international institutions, which are theoretically relevant for judging the effectiveness of those institutions in preventing war. In the further course of the project, it will be studied empirically whether the differences of institutional form characteristics identified here are indeed causally responsible for the stable peace in Western Europe and the recent settlement of former rivalries in the Southern Cone of Latin America. The case of Southeast Asia contrasts with these findings.

We gratefully acknowledge the generous support of our research project by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF).
1. International Organizations and their Contribution to Peace: Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Findings

Whether international organizations (IOs) give rise to peaceful relations among their members is one of the most extensively discussed and yet still controversial issues within the disciplines of Political Theory and International Relations. This is not the place to recount the extensive debate on the effectiveness of IOs. In the following pages, we will restrict ourselves to a brief reconstruction of the theoretical debate with the focus on two recent developments which are relevant for our approach: the trend to differentiate among IOs and the growing significance given to second image factors.

1.1. Debating the Effects of International Organizations: The early Phase

Since the days of enlightenment, proponents of liberal theory have maintained that IOs are a crucial building block of lasting peace. Detailed plans for a confederation of states, including stipulations banning the unilateral use of force, provisions for a system of arbitration and adjudication, and binding mutual assistance clauses, have been presented as early as 1711 by the legendary Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Likewise, international organizations constitute one pillar of Kant's “Perpetual Peace”, and figure prominently in the writings of other authors in the liberal tradition (see the overviews in Czempiel 1986; Muldoon 2004). In the 19th century, this concept found its way into the political realm. It inspired the Concert of Europe, the Hague Peace Conferences and eventually Wilson's Fourteen points. After the failure of the League of Nations, the idea that international institutions contribute to peace did not vanish but resurfaced in the guise of functional theory (Mitrany 1966), neo-functional theory (Haas 1958; Nye 1971), and neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984).

Despite the long tradition of reflections on international organizations as a cornerstone of peace, it remains contested whether IOs exert an independent influence on the behavior of their member states at all. Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions reduce transaction costs and thereby foster cooperation even among rational egoists. Institutions

- enlarge the shadow of the future and thus limit the risks of exploitation and render unilateral strategies less attractive,
- reduce the negotiation costs of individual agreements,
- increase the possibility of issue-linkages and side payments and thus enlarge the area of Pareto-optimal solutions,
- increase transparency by demarcating more precisely the border between allowed and prohibited behavior and by providing additional possibilities for verification,
- alleviate the identification of common solutions.

After more than two decades of intensive debate, it is still contested whether or not these mechanisms do indeed allow for long-term cooperation in the field of security among rational egoists in an anarchic environment (Hasenclever 2002a).
Constructivists rather perceive IOs as a shell for cooperation while the explanatory burden rests on ideational factors like common ideas, norms, and identities (Risse-Kappen 1995b; Risse-Kappen 1996: 371).

Realists mount an even more serious attack against the proposition that international organizations contribute to the avoidance of war. Although the different branches of the family of realist theory concur in rejecting the liberal optimism, they disagree in their understanding of the role of IOs. According to neo-realists, international organizations are mere epiphenomena. While IOs may provide some technical services for their member states, they are unlikely to influence the behavior of their members in the area of high politics (Mearsheimer 2001). Security institutions are either symbolic or only exist only as temporary and shallow alliances (Snyder 1997). In contrast, classical realists accede to the notion that international organizations matter. They can be – and in many cases are - used by powerful states with a view to rationalizing and stabilizing their hegemonic position (for an overview cf. Schweller/Priess 1997). If institutions do indeed flourish only because lock-in mechanisms and path-dependencies conserve patterns of interaction which favor the most powerful, more attention needs to be directed towards questions concerning the ethical status of institutions (Martin/Simmons 1999: 106). A third position within the realist tradition holds exactly the opposite view. It assumes that multilateral institutions are the preferred tool of weak states in order to bind the more powerful states (Kagan 2003). Empirically, this question is equally contested. Comparative case studies are rare and their findings ambivalent. Quantitative studies are more numerous, but lead to discordant results. The early research by Singer and Wallace (1970) as well as Rittberger (1973a) did not show a statistically significant correlation between membership in or strength of international organizations and conflict behavior. Domke (1988: 148), too, concluded that “(...) there does not appear to be any relationship between IOs, taken as an undifferentiated whole, and decisions for war”.

In contrast, more recent quantitative studies confirm that IO membership does indeed reduce the propensity for conflict involvement (Russett/Oneal 2001). However, even this seminal work only found a weak negative correlation between IO membership and involvement in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs); and the robustness of this already weak relationship seems to depend on the chosen statistical method (Pevehouse/Russett 2006). Additionally, the IO-peace linkage seems to be especially sensitive to sample selection, which is crucial in any quantitative study. For example, if in a dyad-year approach all possible dyads are included in the sample, no significant relationship between IO membership and peace emerges, whereas a sample of only politically relevant dyads suggests a positive relationship (Russett/Oneal 2001: 172). Most of the above mentioned quantitative studies use a similar research design. They assess the impact of membership in all kinds of international organizations on conflict behavior. Domke (1988) questioned this approach by arguing that international

1 For example, Krebs’ (1999) study of the Greco-Turkish conflict suggests that both countries’ membership in NATO exacerbated their conflict behavior. By contrast, the Human Security Center (2005) states a correlation between the reduced level of interstate violence after the end of the East-West conflict and the increased efforts in institution building.

2 In contrast, Rittberger (1973a) concentrates on membership in the United Nations (UN) and its predecessor organizations and uses budgetary expenditures of IOs as independent variable.
organizations are not alike. An analysis should take their vast differences into account. Although Domke’s findings were inconclusive, too, the plausibility of this research strategy has triggered several attempts to disaggregate IOs and ascribe possible differences in effectiveness to differences in their form.

1.2. Disaggregating International Organizations

For a long time, functionalists have assumed that the form of international institutions follows their function. Building on this classical formula, theories of rational institutional choice explain the variation of international organizations with prospective member states’ demand for certain goods or benefits (Peters 1999). Their approach is based on the premise that the creation and maintenance of international organizations involves costs. Since states are cost sensitive, they design institutions purposefully in order to advance their interests and to minimize costs and risks (Abbot/Snidal 1998). Depending on the function or - to use a more encompassing term - the social environment (independent variable), states will create institutions with a specific form (dependent variable) in order to maximize benefits and to reduce risks. The term “social environment” refers to collective action problems involved, the number of relevant players, the amount and quality of information available etc. The term “form” may include institutional characteristics like scope, range, voting procedures, precision of rules, delegation of authority to supranational bodies and escape clauses.

In a second step, form can then be modeled as an independent variable, which influences the effectiveness of the organization (dependent variable). Effectiveness refers to the ability of the institution to realign member states behavior with stated goals of the organization (Pierson 1998).

Game theory offers itself as a suitable tool for modeling the independent variable (Martin 1992; Zürn 1992). Social situations may resemble collaboration, coordination or assurance games. Theories of institutional choice would expect that actors in collaboration games, knowing that all sides have strong incentives to defect, are likely to create highly institutionalized organizations with precise rules, extensive monitoring capabilities, arbitration mechanisms and, possibly, provisions for sanctions. Coordination games, like “The Battle of the Sexes”, are characterized by multiple equilibrium outcomes. As soon as the players have agreed on one equilibrium, they are likely to stick with their choice. In those situations, defection is less likely and monitoring less important. Hence, institutional choice theories assume that in those cases, states would not waste scarce resources on the definition of precise rules, mechanisms for conflict mediation and arbitration, and elaborated monitoring mechanisms. They would, however, want to have institutions which facilitate discussion, bargaining and side-payments. In assurance games (coordination games without distributional conflict), where cooperation is the preferred strategy of all players, strong institutions are even less relevant to achieve cooperation.

---

3 In addition to those three games, the literature on game theories refers to suasion games and rambo games. They are neglected here due to space constraints.
Although this kind of abstract modeling undoubtedly enriches our conceptual understanding, attempts to use these models as tools for the explanation of empirical cases have encountered a range of obstacles. Firstly, most social situations do not fit easily with one of the ideal game types, but are characterized by both the temptations to defect and by distributional issues (Martin/Simmons 1999; Keck 1997a). Lisa Martin (1992: 781) concurs by conceding that even in assurance games, states cannot be sure whether the other side is not motivated by collaboration preferences. Secondly, many problematic social situations allow for more than one institutional solution. Due to those restrictions, it has proven difficult to establish a clear-cut relationship between function and form. Even Martin acknowledges that, at this abstract level, “the outcome remains indeterminate” (Martin 1993: 92).

Recent projects tried to tackle these shortcomings by specifying both the independent and the dependent variables. Most noteworthy in this regard is the rational design project of international institutions (Koremenos/Lipson/Snidal 2001a, 2001b). Concerning the independent variable, the project focuses on distribution problems, enforcement problems, the number of actors involved, and the level of uncertainty. With respect to the dependent variable, the project differentiates between five dimensions of form, thus allowing the test of 16 conjectures about the relationship between specific cooperation problems and institutional solutions.

The establishment of a clear-cut relationship between differently formed institutions and their effectiveness has been equally troublesome. Clive Archer’s (2001) seminal study on IOs only comes to very general and ad hoc conclusions. The rational design project yields ambivalent evidence, too. Nevertheless, the basic approach of establishing a relationship between social situation, institutional form and effectiveness is highly relevant and guides a whole range of projects on security institutions.

1.3. Analyzing Regional Security Institutions

At the end of the 1990s, approximately 30 regional security institutions were in existence (Schiavone 2005; for a list see appendix). In addition to their external function of expressing a common regional identity and a common position of their members, regional security institutions perform the internal task of managing rivalries among members. In many cases, member states regard the task of internal risk management as more important than the provision of security against external foes (Weitsman 2004).

Comparative studies of security institutions typically follow the above-mentioned approach. They conceptualize “form” both as dependent and as independent variable (Keohane 1989: 15; Wallander, Haftendorn and Keohane 1999: 7; Wallander 2000). According to Haftendorn (1997), dimensions of form include membership, rules of decision-making, behavioral rules (norms and values), instruments, and the internal distribution of power.4 Concerning the social environment, Haftendorn distinguishes

4 It is disputable whether the internal distribution of power is part of the institutional form or part of the social situation, as other studies imply.
between collaboration and coordination games. On a more concrete level, she differentiates between external deterrence, internal security, and reassurance against unknown dangers. However, Haftendorn and her collaborators, too, have encountered insurmountable difficulties in establishing a clear-cut relationship between function and form. In the summary of their reader, Keck (1997b: 264) acknowledges that “concrete security institutions like NATO or the OSCE are complex entities which deal with numerous and related cooperation problems”. The relationship between functions and forms of concrete security institutions is obviously more complicated than abstract models seem to suggest. Other case studies, too, are unable to draw generalized conclusions from their cases (Keohane/Haftendorn/Wallander 1999) or introduce intervening variables in order to explain the relationship between function and institutional form (Weber 1992).

The relationship between the form of institutions and their effectiveness is even less explicit. Haftendorn (1997: 25) acknowledges this point when she summarizes that little attention has been paid to the effects of differently formed security institutions. She is inclined to pay tribute to the classical conjecture that the effectiveness of an institution depends on the level of institutionalization. However, when looking at the panoply of her cases, she admits that, in order to explain the whole picture, additional factors, like the interests and preferences of member states, as well as the role of ideas and cultural configurations, need to be taken into account (Haftendorn 1997: 24).

Among the few quantitative studies on regional security institutions, the analyses by Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) as well as Pevehouse and Russett (2006) deserve special attention. The former study differentiates international institutions according to three dimensions of form: mandate, strength of the institutional structure, and level of contention among members. In accordance with the above-mentioned quantitative research, the authors find no strong relationship between IO membership as such and member states’ conflict behavior. However, their tests of differently formed subgroups of IOs yield interesting results. Apparently, institutionalization is the most decisive dimension of form. Membership in highly institutionalized IOs correlates significantly with lower levels of conflict involvement. Especially the combination of high institutionalization and low levels of contention significantly reduces the likelihood of conflict. Pevehouse and Russett correlate the democratic character of IOs with their effectiveness and find convincing evidence that interdemocratic IOs contribute significantly to peace among their members. Less convincing than these statistical findings are the attempts of both studies to construct a causal relationship between institutional form and effectiveness.

To summarize, neither is the relationship between function and form of institutions well established, nor do we know how the form of institutions influences their effectiveness. Comparing the results of the available studies is complicated because they use different measures of effectiveness and different conceptions of institutional form. Some also lack a clear theoretical understanding of the causal relationship between form and conflict behavior. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom’s work is outstanding insofar as it operationalizes its variables and provides an explicit theoretical understanding on how differently shaped institutions might affect the conflict behavior of their member states. However, even their finding of a statistically significant relationship between membership in highly institutionalized IOs and peace
is not unequivocal, since one of their control variables – democracy – has an almost equally strong impact on absence of MID involvement. These findings as well as the Pevehouse/Russett study raise an interesting point. It alludes to the possibility that the form of an institution might not only be shaped by its function, but also by the domestic structure of its members.

1.4. Opening the Black-box of the Member States

The traditional view of international organizations has been state centric (for an early exception see Zürn 1993). According to this view, IOs are composed of states as unitary, rational actors in pursuit of similar goals. Given this perspective, attempts to trace variation in effectiveness and form back to member-state’s properties have appeared utterly fruitless. This ignorance of domestic variables is part of the heritage of the early neo-institutionalist strategy, which tried to challenge realism by showing that cooperation is possible even if one accepts basic premises of realist thinking (Martin/Simmons 1999: 98). Although opening up the institutional debate to second image variables has been considered one of the most promising directions for future research (Milner 1997), the community has just begun to dent the bastion of state-centric thinking in this area. This neglect is all the more surprising since a liberal approach to international organizations could benefit from work in the adjacent fields of transgovernmental and transnational theories.

So far, work building on Robert Putnam’s notion of Two-Level-Games is still regarded as one of the major liberal advancements in the area of studies on international organizations (Putnam/Evans 1993; Zangl 1999). Putnam (1988) points out that inter-state negotiations have both an international and a domestic dimension. Successful negotiations depend on a consensus among the participating states as well as the accordance of winning coalitions of domestic actors within each state. More interestingly, Putnam assumes that chief executives monopolize, and hence are able to manipulate, the flow of information between the domestic and the international level. Following Putnam, Andrew Moravcsik (1993) has complemented neo-institutionalist research with a liberal dimension by explicitly incorporating the domestic process of preference formation into his model of interstate bargaining within institutions. However, his liberal-institutionalism, too, shares basic premises of state-centric thinking, like the assumptions that the process of preference formation takes place within the closed container of the nation state and that chief executives are the sole representatives on the international stage.

Both assumptions are challenged by transgovernmental and transnational approaches (compare Pollack/Shaffer 2001). Transgovernmental approaches were advanced by Keohane and Nye in the early 1970s. They define transgovernmental networks as „sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the politics of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments“ (Keohane/Nye 1974: 43). According to them, transgovernmentalism rises with the complexity of politics as well as with the level of interdependence. Furthermore, they assert that transgovernmentalism flourishes around IOs, which may offer themselves as forums for the regular interaction of national bureaucrats, or which
may actively contribute to transgovernmental networks. In the 1990s, transgovernmental approaches experienced a revival within the area of EU studies (Wessels 1992). By now, research on the EU has identified close interaction of sectorally oriented governmental sub-units as one of the hallmarks of the EU. Most observers maintain that the institutionalized coordination among national bureaucracies follows functional necessities. According to this view, the EU is spearheading developments which are taking place or will take place within other regional organizations as well. For example, Ann-Marie Slaughter maintains that, as a result of the growing complexity and interdependence of the post-Cold War world, states are disaggregating into separate, functionally distinct parts. Functional state bureaucracies then create networks among each other, establishing a sectorally based transgovernmental order (Slaughter 2004, 18). The debate within Western Europe on the future of the state reached similar conclusions. For example, Marin/Mayntz (1991: 17) argued that, due to increasing complexities and informational deficits, the notion of the central state has become a fiction. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of a centerless society and the disaggregation of the state into a set of sectorally oriented and specialized agencies, which are only connected through weak couplings (compare Freund/Rittberger 2001).

Transnational approaches advance a similar argument. Early notions defined transnational relations as all kinds of cross border interaction involving at least one non-state actor (Keohane/Nye 1972). They treated this phenomenon as a residual category, growing in magnitude but of unclear importance. Under the guise of the term governance, by now, transnational approaches are in full swing. Although the term is still ill defined, most contributions perceive transnational governance as regular, intentional and non-hierarchical interactions across borders among private and public actors aiming at the solution of common problems (Blumenthal 2005). Again, IOs are regarded as a focal point for transnational activities. Most contributions to this debate trace the emergence of governance structures back to growing interdependence and complexity on the one hand, and a reduced problem-solving capacity on the state on the other hand. Hence, it is widely assumed that transnational governance structures are evenly distributed over the globe and that all IOs are affected in a similar way. In fact, the UN system is regarded as one of the most important locations for transnational governance activities.

On the following pages, we build on transgovernmental and transnational insights in order to construct institutional form characteristics as building blocks for a liberal approach to IOs. We argue that interdemocratic institutions, i.e. institutions composed of democracies, differ from traditional institutions with regard to the density and depth of transgovernmental and transnational links to member states and that these links are relevant to their ability to contain conflicts and foster cooperation among member states. Thus, we take issue with both the proposition of two-level games: first, that chiefs of executive control the flow of information between the international and the domestic arena, and second, with the notion that the phenomenon of transgovernmentalism and transnationalism is triggered solely by functional pressures and is thus uniformly distributed. Instead, we argue that democracies are more prone to develop transgovernmental and transnational links, while autocratic leaders tend to control their societies and political systems. Consequently, we assume that
interdemocratic institutions are characterized by multiple links between different branches and levels of government, creating a deep communicative arena. Furthermore, we assume that interdemocratic institutions are deeply embedded in networks of societal contacts among their member states. In contrast, we assume that traditional IOs are characterized by intergovernmental structures. We proceed from the basic premises of the rational institutional choice approach. We conceptualize form as both dependent and independent variable. In contrast to rational choice approaches, we advance the notion that the form of an institution is not only intentionally designed according to the cost-benefit structure of its founding members, but is also influenced by their domestic structure and develops over time. We argue that interdemocratic security institutions, even if they start out as purely intergovernmental enterprises, develop special form characteristics distinguishing them from traditional institutions. Furthermore, we argue that this form explains their extraordinary effectiveness in securing peace among their members. The bifurcated nature of the democratic peace may thus not be the result of a combination of state properties, but should be conceptualized as an interaction phenomenon. In this vein, we assert that interdemocratic institutions are a key to the understanding of the democratic peace (Hasenclever 2002a; Dembinski/Hasenclever/Wagner 2004). Before we develop our understanding of institutional form further, it is therefore imperative that we present our theoretical understanding on how international institutions might be able to prevent the onset of war and foster cooperation.

1.5. International Institutions and the Prevention of War

Rational theories on war have identified private information, that is, the absence of information on the military capabilities and resolve of the other side, as the single most important cause of war (Fearon 1995; for an empirical corroboration see Bearce/Flanagan/Floros 2006). Moreover, studies of war have discovered three crucial pathways for the escalation of conflicts. Firstly, the risk of war increases if states perceive each other as power rivals and if they fear that the tide might turn against them. Secondly, the risk of war is further exacerbated if states take recourse to unilateral strategies and bullying tactics. Thirdly, the risk of war increases if the relationship between states becomes polarized, that is if the interactions on every policy field converge into one big confrontational attitude (Hasenclever 2002b; Dembinski/Hasenclever/Wagner 2004). International organizations reduce these risks. Firstly, they may provide reliable information on military capabilities, resolve and strategic intentions of the opponent (Keohane/Haftendorn/Wallander 1999: 330). Secondly, they may allow states to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests and longer-term intentions, thus increasing the chance of cooperation and making the resort to unilateral strategies less attractive. Thirdly, they may prevent the polarization of a relationship by creating robust boundaries between policy fields (Rittberger/Zürn 1990).
2. Domestic Structure and Form of International Institutions - A new Approach to the Study of International Organizations

a) Embeddedness: This form characteristic denotes the way in which international institutions are connected with societal actors and legislatives within their member states. We argue that democratic states are less able to control societal actors and their transnational contacts. In addition, parliaments may infringe on the executive dominance of foreign policy. As competences are shifted from the national level to international institutions, private actors and legislators are seeking access to international institutions. Vice versa, supranational organs as well as state representatives serving at IOs actively seek contacts with societal and legislative actors, thus creating dense networks between the international and the national level of governance (for a similar account see Rittberger 1973b: 49ff). The embeddedness of intergovernmental cooperation within networks of societal actors affects the institutional effectiveness in two ways: Firstly, it increases the level of reliable information on member states’ capabilities, behavior, preferences, and intentions. Secondly, the institutionalization of transnational contacts between private and legislative actors along sectoral lines furthers the autonomy of policy sectors and hinders attempts to re-aggregate the unitary state (Leeds 1999: 986).

b) Communicative arena: This form characteristic denotes the communicative patterns among governmental actors within an institution. We maintain that in democracies, central governments are less able and less inclined to monopolize and control contacts of governmental sub-units across borders. Instead, we hypothesize that among democracies, specialized sub-units of governments form transgovernmental networks through which additional information of a specific quality is being relayed. Quality refers both to the authenticity of information as well as to the amount of information shared at the different stages of the policy cycle. The authenticity of information is ensured by the personal trust and the esprit de corps which develops within semi-permanent transgovernmental networks. The concept of the policy cycle indicates that decision-making processes run through different stages, starting with the gathering and analysis of information on external developments, the formation of national preferences, the national decision-making, international coordination, implementation of policy decision, and evaluation (Kingdon 1984). Most conceptions of International Relations explicitly or implicitly assume that the first three steps of the policy cycle take place within the container of the nation-state and that states begin to interact only after national decisions have been taken (Moravcsik 1993). In contrast, we argue that in interdemocratic institutions, the early stages of the policy process are also affected by the institution. Specialized sub-units of government are occupied with the assessment of developments and the formulation of policy alternatives. As those semi-independent sub-units form additional communicative nodes, chances increase that

---

5 Our concept of embeddedness has some similarities with Karl Deutsch’s notion of security communities (Deutsch 1961), but differs from Deutsch’s work in two respects: Firstly, we are interested in the institutional consequences of transnational communicative patterns. Secondly, we argue that transnational communicative patterns as such do not generate peaceful effect. Rather, it is the societal embeddedness of intergovernmental cooperation within institutions which generates additional information relevant for security and which contributed to the autonomy of policy fields.
information regarding the early phases of the policy-cycle is exchanged. Since this kind of information is valuable, we expect that in interdemocratic institutions spontaneous exchanges give rise to routines and norms which will then express themselves in a specific institutional form. In addition, we assume that transgovernmental networks of functional sub-units of governments create distinct regulatory systems, and thus consolidate the autonomy of policy fields.

3. Case Selection and Operationalization of Institutional Form

3.1. Case Selection

In the following chapters, we will describe both the embeddedness and the communicative arena of five regional security institutions located on three continents. We have chosen NATO and the EU, the OAS and Mercosur, and ASEAN. These institutions are similar with regard to their tasks and objectives. They are multi-purpose organizations providing external as well as internal security functions for their members. In addition, alone or in conjunction with sister or off-spring institutions, they promote economic cooperation. These five organizations differ with regard to their membership and with regard to their effectiveness. The European Union and NATO are two interdemocratic security institutions. With the treaty of Rome, the European Economic Community (EEC) started out as an institution focusing on economic cooperation, but began to perform security tasks for its members since the 1970s. NATO, originally designed to guarantee the external security of its members, has also continuously been involved in their internal security relations. The extensive body of literature on European security agrees that both NATO and the EU have contributed heavily to peace and stability in the formerly war-torn European region. The OAS is a case of an institution that has changed enormously due to the democratization of all member states. It was designed as a system of collective security. During the Cold War when most of its members were autocratic, it proved unable to respond to the ongoing conflicts in Latin America. However, starting with the processes of (re-)democratization in Latin America, its mechanisms were reactivated and the necessary conditions were created to turn it into a more efficient security institution. Many observers testify that in recent years the OAS has indeed become more successful in managing conflicts in the Western hemisphere. Mercosur was founded by the newly democratic states in the Southern Cone. The primary motivation for collaboration was the Brazilian and Argentinean desire to establish sustainable democracies and to resolve their economic problems. However, one of the prerequisites for stable cooperation was the ending of their strategic rivalries. The defense cooperation in the Southern Cone can therefore be considered a byproduct of economic cooperation (Alcañiz 2005). Although Mercosur’s original rationale is economic integration, it has inspired further collaboration between member states and associates in the defense and security sector. Meanwhile, a ‘political security network’ is being built up along with the Common Market (Schiavone 2005: 230).
ASEAN is a heterologous institution. Its main goal originally became the maintenance of peace and stability within the Southeast Asian region. Economic development emerged as a secondary aim. While the economies in Southeast Asia indeed flourished well until the Asian crisis, observers agree that cooperation in the field of security has never really taken off. During the Asian crisis, even economic cooperation turned more or less dysfunctional. Since then, especially its more democratic member states have recognized the need for institutional changes and reforms in order to increase its effectiveness as a security institution and are trying to push this agenda.

3.2. Form Characteristic I: Embeddedness

We assume that the embeddedness of security institutions depends on three crucial factors. Firstly, it depends on the density of transnational communicative channels or agents connecting international organizations with the societies and political systems of their member states. Communicative channels may consist of a) interest groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and epistemic communities, b) the media, c) parliamentary networks or associations. Those communicative agents circulate information on the policy of the institution and the behavior of executives on the international level to their domestic audiences as well as information concerning compliance and preferences of political actors within the member states to the international institution and to other member states. The interplay between interest groups, epistemic communities and the media is particularly important. NGOs do not only inform their constituencies directly via newsletters or other communicative devices about the policy of international institutions and lobby IOs on behalf of their constituencies. Together with epistemic communities they also create sectoral transnational public (expert) spaces where the policy of international institutions and the behavior of national executives within institutions are scrutinized and can be criticized. The media links these sectoral transnational public (expert) spaces with the fully developed national public spaces of member states, thereby contributing to the transparency of international institutions. Parliamentary networks and assemblies fulfill similar functions. On the one hand, they provide parliaments independently with information on the inner working of IOs. On the other hand, they pass on information concerning the preferences of domestic public actors directly to the institution and to other member states.

The density of communicative channels may be measured in terms of the number of NGOs and interest groups providing input to and reporting on the institution, the size of epistemic communities covering the activities of the institution, the number of international media correspondents at the location of the IO headquarters, the number of specialized publications covering the institution, the presence and activities of parliamentary networks and assemblies, and the amount of civil servants working with the institution.

Secondly, the embeddedness of institutions depends on the interface of those above-mentioned communicative agents with the security institution. Communicative agents can only relay information from and to the institution if the institution itself is open and accessible. This interface consists of access points as well as outreach activities of
the institution. To assess the quality of the interface we ask whether and how the institution consults with interest groups and the NGO community, whether the institution grants access rights to interest groups, media representatives, and parliamentarians, whether the institution maintains a public relations department, how much of the institution’s resources go into public relations, whether the institution maintains outreach programs, and works with NGOs and interest groups in implementing policy.

A third element of embeddedness concerns the information generating, processing and disseminating functions of the institution. Although this function is closely related to the second dimension, we list it separately because it involves a crucial activity performed by the institution itself (Mitchell 1998). We assess the quality of the information gathering, processing and disseminating function by asking not only whether the secretariat or other organs of the institution are actively engaged in collecting information from member states, but also whether they are entrusted with checking the validity of the information provided.

3.3. Form Characteristic II: Communicative Arena

Assessing the communicative arena of an institution is a challenging task since arena is a rather abstract notion and hence difficult to observe. An assessment of the width and depth of an IO’s arena could either rely on the use of proxies – i.e. observable variables which allow inferences concerning the unobservable dimension ‘arena’ – or could rely on case studies and accounts of political actors. We use both strategies. On the one hand, we employ two proxies, which might shed some light on the scope of the arena. Firstly, we analyze relevant norms by asking whether key documents contain the obligation to consult prior to the adoption of fixed national positions. Secondly, we try to assess the practice of consultation by analyzing the decision-making structure of the institution. Here we assume that the density of contacts at different bureaucratic levels indicates whether an exchange of information concerning the early decision-making stages does indeed take place. In addition, we ask:

- whether member states maintain permanent representations at the headquarters of the institution, how large those representations are and what kind of functions they perform;
- how the process of decision-making is organized, what kind of bodies are responsible for the preparation and implementation of decisions, and how often those bodies meet;
- whether and what kind of operational devices or procedures for the communication between member states exist.

Finally, we also scan the existing body of first-hand accounts and secondary literature on our institutions and summarize their findings concerning the scope of the communicative arena.
4. Comparing the Embeddedness of Regional Security Institutions

Drawing on our theoretical assumptions we expect that the embeddedness of these institutions varies with their members’ level of democracy. We expect that NATO and the EU, although they differ with regard to their scope, membership and the degree of pooling and delegation, are comparably embedded in networks of societal and parliamentary actors. In the same vein, we expect that the embeddedness of the Latin American and Southeast Asian institutions increases as their members turn more democratic.

4.1. Communicative Channels

NATO and the EU are linked through a dense network of transnational and trans-governamental contacts with their member states’ societies. NGOs, interest groups, the media, epistemic communities, parliamentarians and public servants channel information between the international and the domestic level. Next to Washington, Brussels is regarded as the city with the highest density of media offices and representations of societal interests, ranging from industry, associations of professions, employer and labor groups all the way to public interest groups and NGOs of different colors (Greenwood 2003). It is estimated that up to 15,000 representatives of societal interest groups are present in Brussels. Most of them focus on the economic and social policy of the European Union (Greenwood 2003). Since the mid-1990s, however, an increasing number of non-profit NGOs and other interest groups focusing on foreign and security policy has been flocking to Brussels to influence both NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

The landscape of NGOs engaged in the area of security and defense policy consists both of umbrella organizations or networks like the European Network for Civil Peace Services, and of individual organizations like the International Crisis Group, whose 110 staffers are working in five continents. Some of the latter, like Greenpeace, are multinational in character, others, like the British-American Security Information Council (BASIC), are national entities. Some organizations are highly professional NGOs/think tanks, whereas others have preserved their grass roots character. Most influential is the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), which was founded in 1991 by 17 NGOs. EPLO as well as some of its members, like the International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS-Europe), maintain a permanent presence in Brussels and provide a continuous input to the European and NATO policy process. Others, like the British NGO/think tank Saferworld, accompany the European policy process from their home base. Although, in general, distance can be a disadvantage, Saferworld has had a major impact on the EU’s security policy in areas like export controls.

---


7 By the beginning of this millennium, producer interests, associations of professions and employers still account for app. 80% of all interest representations (Fligstein/Stone Sweet 2001; Pfeifer 1995).
Table 1: Major peace-building NGOs and umbrella organizations working on EU/NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Members/Local Groups</th>
<th>Number of Staffers</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Network for Civil Peace Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation</td>
<td>150 local groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms/European Section</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>London/Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace/European Section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brussels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of NATO, the family of the Atlantic Treaty Associations (ATA) is worth mentioning as an additional link connecting the Alliance with its member states. On the one hand, the national ATA organizations inform their national publics on NATO’s policy and on transatlantic security issues. They organize lectures, seminars and visits to NATO’s headquarters for parliamentarians, researchers, and journalists. In addition, some of them support research and publish series or individual papers on transatlantic security issues. On the other hand, through meetings, international conferences, and study tours for legislators or journalists from other NATO-states, they promote understanding abroad for their national foreign and security policy. Epistemic communities consisting of research and consultancy institutions supplement the transnational networks, connecting Western societies with NATO and the EU. To highlight just some nodes and activities of these networks: The family of foreign policy research institutes (Clingendael, DGAP, IAI, IFRI, RIJA, etc.) fosters exchange and collaboration among scientific “EU- and NATO watchers” and among scientists and national officials as well as NATO and EU representatives, respectively. Especially noteworthy in this regard are the annual high-level NATO conferences organized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, German Institute for International and Security Affairs), the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy and similar events in other European countries. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an autonomous agency of the EU, as well as a couple of Brussels-based institutions like the Security & Defense Agenda stimulate strategic discussion among European research institutes and serve as a bridge between the professional knowledge based in these institutes and relevant European bodies. With regard to the armaments industry, another major societal actor in the area of foreign and security policy, two observations are relevant. Firstly, due to functional
pressure and political tutelage, the national European and American arms industries have established close transnational contacts. Secondly, although the nation-state is still the major reference point for the armament industry, large firms and associations of smaller enterprises are increasingly turning their attention both to NATO and the EU. Multinational companies like the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and major national firms like Thales maintain representations in Brussels. In addition, the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), a major interest group that has superseded three smaller lobby organizations, provides input into the European and transatlantic decision-making process.

As mentioned above, the media represents a crucial link connecting the national public spheres with the transnational and intergovernmental level. A couple of specialized journals report on NATO and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. ‘NATO or EU friendly’ publications like NATO Review or Europäische Sicherheit as well as neutral news services like Atlantic News are among them. Some national journals like the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) contain regular columns on NATO affairs. In addition, the Brussels-based press corps, consisting of over 500 press offices, reports on NATO and EU security policy.

Networks of parliamentarians make up the third dimension of the communicative channels. In the case of NATO, the most important network is the Parliamentary Assembly (PA). The PA brings together approximately 300 parliamentarians from NATO states and partner countries – most of them members of the defense committees of their parliaments - twice a year to discuss transatlantic security issues. Its principal objective is to foster mutual understanding among Alliance parliamentarians of the key security challenges NATO is facing. On the one hand, the PA provides NATO and its member governments with an indication of collective parliamentary opinion. On the other hand, it contributes to greater transparency of NATO policies, and thereby advances the possibility of national parliaments to hold executives accountable.

In the case of the EU, the European Parliament (EP) accompanies and scrutinizes the policy of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Although the EP possesses markedly less competence in the second pillar, as compared to the first pillar, it is nevertheless able to question European decision-makers, to report on EU foreign policy-making, and to influence foreign policy via its first pillar competence and its budgetary power.

In the OAS as well as in Mercosur, it is clearly visible that transnational contacts have been expanding in the course of democratization processes in the region. Although, in comparison with NATO and the EU, the density of communicative channels between both Latin American organizations and societal actors is still low, civil society meetings are organized more regularly, for example preceding the Summits of the Americas or the meetings of the OAS General Assembly.

The hemisphere’s largest network of civil society organizations is the Red Interamericana para la Democracia (RID, Inter-American Democracy Network), founded in 1994 and comprising more than 350 member organizations in 24 countries. Its main task is the support of the democratization process in Latin America and the promotion of citizen participation. In this context, it also advocates the participation of civil society organizations in hemispheric processes, such as the Summits of the Americas and the General Assembly of the OAS. As far as civic engagement in the
defense and security sector is concerned, the Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL, Network for Security and Defense in Latin America), formed in 2001, is an important advancement towards democratic governance and greater transparency of defense issues.

During the 1990s, it has become more common for social science research, also in the area of international relations, security and defense studies, to carry out joint projects with research institutions from several countries. The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) is to the present the largest research institute in the social sciences in Latin America. FLACSO Chile, in particular, has traditionally been very active in developing and coordinating regional research on international security, strategic studies and civil-military relations. There are several other research networks that focus, among other issues, on regional integration and hemispheric security.

Most of the larger civil society networks and epistemic communities are accredited to the OAS or have at least participated in OAS events. Although the possibilities of these organizations to express themselves within the OAS are quite limited, at least if compared to Western European NGOs, they are growing. Not only the General Assembly, where civil society participation is most visible in the context of its annual meetings, but also the Permanent Council and the Committee on Hemispheric Security as one of its important sub-units are consulting with experts from academia and experienced civil society associations.

In connection with Mercosur, there are a number of interest groups pushing forward civil society participation, though most of them, like the initiative Somos Mercosur (We are Mercosur) or the Instituto Mercosur Social (IMS), concentrate on social policy topics and the negative consequences of economic globalization (Grugel 2005, 2006).

In the field of international and defense politics, according to the Yearbook of International Organizations, the only mentionable special relationship that Mercosur maintains is with the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile. However, some influential academic institutions in Mercosur member countries dealing with issues of regional integration and security cooperation are in the process of building up international collaboration, and are beginning to constitute important parts of second track diplomacy: Their academic fora and conferences frequently bring together academics, politicians, diplomats, and entrepreneurs. Since most of them are privately funded, they are independent from the national governments. Among these group of rather young institutes, the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI, Argentine Council of International Relations) the Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI, Brazilian Center for International Relations), as well as the Argentine NGO Seguridad Estratégica en el 2000 (Ser en el 2000, Strategic Security in the Year 2000) are worth mentioning.

Compared to the transatlantic region, the development of transnational links between civil society organizations is retarded in Latin America, which stems from the fact that democratization processes are still rather recent phenomena throughout the region. Although the situation has been changing quickly during the last years and many new organizations have emerged, their lasting impact and ability to take effect on the international level cannot be definitively gauged yet (Ugarte 2004; Jácome/Milet/Serbin 2005). Within the framework of transition from military regime to democracy,
a lot of emphasis was placed on issues linked to security and defense policies, civil control and the role of the armed forces. However, along the path of democratic consolidation, these issues faded into the background. Additionally, due to the rise of crime and violence in the region, the most pressing concerns associated with the term “security” have shifted to public safety (Jácome/Milet/Serbin 2005; ECCP & CRIES 2003: 192-195).

In contrast to the Western security institutions like the EU and NATO, there are neither media representatives nor specialist publications focusing exclusively on the OAS or Mercosur. However, the two organizations and problems of hemispherical and sub-regional integration and cooperation are increasingly dealt with in policy papers and academic journals. Media attention peaks during the annual General Assembly meetings as well as the Summits of the Americas, whereas the regular meetings and results of other OAS bodies are usually not covered. Major newspapers of the Southern Cone countries report rather frequently on Mercosur affairs, albeit with a bias towards frictions and trade disputes. However, there seems to be awareness of the problem of lack of communication and media presence. The Center of Formation for Regional Integration (CEFIR) started a program called “Fortification of the Communicative Capacity fostering the Integration Process in the Framework of Mercosur”, which consisted of seminars and workshops for regional journalists and opinion leaders.

The oldest parliamentary network in the region is the Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO), which was founded in 1964 and is composed of members of 22 Latin American and the Caribbean national parliaments. However, it is not related to any regional organization. Since the 1990s, several initiatives have been launched on the hemispherical as well as the sub-regional level. In 1997, the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) was founded. In the framework of the Organization of American States, another initiative was started in this vein recently. The Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas (FIPA) is an independent network made up of the national legislatures from OAS member countries. FIPA encourages the sharing of experiences and best practices amongst its members and works to strengthen the role of legislatures in democratic development.

In Mercosur, the Joint Parliamentary Commission was established by the Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994. It is composed of legislators from the four member countries, and its main aim is to assist in harmonization of legislation, as required by the integration process. Recently, it has been decided to transform it into a Mercosur Parliament, which will at first continue to be made up of legislators from the member states, but shall be directly elected by 2014. While this is an official Mercosur organ, giving the member states’ legislative chambers formal access to Mercosur’s decision-making procedures, the Unión de Parlamentarios del Mercosur (Parliamentary Union of Mercosur), founded in 1999 and based in Buenos Aires, is an intergovernmental organization composed of the national and provincial parliaments of all Mercosur member states. Its central goal is to encourage exchange and cooperation between the diverse legislative entities of the region.

ASEAN presents a different picture; in contrast to the European and Latin American institutions, ASEAN activities remain largely intergovernmental – although this has been changing with developments after the Asian crisis (Caballero-Anthony 2005). At
the point of comparison (1997/98), ASEAN was an institution with mainly elite contacts and hardly any embeddedness into society. As most of the ASEAN member states had only weak, disempowered civil societies, societal influence was generally low (Yamamoto 1995). The national conditions of most member states impaired the development of transnational networks and the emergence of transnational contacts as it has been almost taken for granted in the European and North American context. All in all, therefore, ASEAN’s embeddedness into its member states’ societies and nongovernmental actors was not pronounced. Accordingly, the density of communicative channels between ASEAN and societal actors was low.

Concerning foreign and security policy, the academic sector provided the only input from private or - to be more precise - semi-private actors (Higgott 1994). This input takes the form of second track diplomacy (Ball 1994; Kerr 1994; Rüland 2002a). Many of the regional research institutes around which this second track is organized have been governmentally sponsored and, hence, only rarely been independent. The second track comprises policy-oriented workshops, academic fora and conferences (Diamond/McDonald 1991; Davies/Kaufman 2002). What distinguishes track two diplomacy from purely academic conferences and workshops is its close connection to the first track, whether by the direct participation of politicians or the existence of communication channels between the two tracks (Kraft 2000).

The network of ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), initialized in 1984, is the most frequented platform for research on foreign policy issues. ASEAN-ISIS comprises member institutes from almost all regional states, except Brunei and Laos. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Indonesia, for example, is part of the ISIS network. It is an explicit advocate of ASEAN regionalism and pursues an active exchange with politicians in order to influence their foreign policy decisions. The scholars of CSIS stress the importance of keeping in touch with civil society, with universities and other academic institutions in order to base their research on a broad foundation.8

ASEAN-ISIS has produced a number of very well-known experts in security affairs and, more recently, regional economic development, who form the strong core of a regional epistemic community. The network has traditionally focused on improving regional cooperation and was also engaged in establishing the ASEAN regional forum (Caballero-Anthony 2005).

Initially, the second track was an instrument of the states to separate difficult and controversial issues from official negotiations and to have them discussed without the risk for any participant to publicly lose his face. Recently, the character of the second track has slowly started to change, though. Some of the experts participating in these activities have also become involved in other political processes that bring them closer together with national and transnational civil society groups (Caballero-Anthony 2005).

Media relations constitute only a weak link between ASEAN and its members. As ASEAN decision-making processes, on the whole, have been quite opaque, journalists have not been granted insights into the institution’s politics. This lack of transparency is particularly distinct in security affairs. The consequence has been either an overly

---

positive reporting by the media or, contrarily, a complete disinterest in ASEAN affairs. A specialized network of ASEAN journalism does not exist. Additionally, the lack of press freedom has been a major impediment in many member states; there are only few newspapers and press organs that are not under state control or threatened by censorship. In order to give balanced and fair accounts of ASEAN politics, journalist networks, such as the Southeast Asia Press Alliance have made efforts to educate regional journalists about ASEAN. By this, they aim at creating a new generation of free ASEAN reporting.

Finally, ASEAN just like the other institutions discussed here, possesses a parliamentary organization:, ASEAN’s Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO, founded in 1978) is a transnational network of parliamentarians from most ASEAN countries (except Brunei and Myanmar). Its main task is to communicate developments in the other member countries plus news from ASEAN to their respective parliamentary assemblies (Slaughter 2004: 111-12). Although some of its members would like the organization to be turned into an ASEAN parliament modeled on the European Parliament, AIPO is far from being anything but a discussion forum. Originally designed as a body to enhance democratic participation of ASEAN people in ASEAN legislation, AIPO has not lived up to its goals yet. This, again, hinges on the low profile of many participating parliaments. It is hard to evaluate its communicative impact, however, which depends largely on the role that each parliament plays in its national setting.

In the course of the last years, especially since the Asian crisis, ASEAN has started to reach out to its societies in order to enhance its own legitimacy. Alternative networks of NGOs that aim at forming a societal basis of ASEAN politics have developed. ASEAN-ISIS, for example, is the organizer of the annual colloquium on human rights that intends to establish a human rights mechanism within ASEAN, and it is also highly active in the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA). Furthermore, most of the ASEAN-ISIS staffers are employed at national research institutes, and therefore concentrate their research not exclusively on regional affairs. Their expertise in issues such as democratization, economic development and national security also ensures their involvement in societal processes and, thus, potentially opens channels between national societies and the regional, institutional level. Connections to other non-state actors have increased within the last decade. Therefore, second track experts are in constant communication with other civil society actors and NGOs at these meetings and receive input from them. At the same time, they also publicly advertise ASEAN policies. For that reason, ASEAN-ISIS has the perspective to change its role from a classic track two instrument of ASEAN heads of government to a more autonomous mediator between the institution and societal interests. This dual function is new and has only just started to change the character of the second track (Job 2003). In ASEAN’s most recent development plan, the Vientiane Action Program (VAP), ranging from 2004 to 2010, a stronger role of second track agents, functioning as a tie between the institution and its member societies, is officially acknowledged as a mechanism to base ASEAN on a stronger societal foundation.

---

9 This was confirmed in an interview with Sjofjan Noor (AIPO Secretariat) and Warsiti Alfia (Regional Parliamentary Organisation at Indonesian Parliament) in June 2006 in Jakarta.
Furthermore, the ASEAN People’s Assembly, a platform for regional and national nongovernmental and civil society groups, was formed in 2000 following the initiative of a few ASEAN governments and several research institutes. The assembly is intended to reach into the societies of ASEAN member states and therefore deals with issues that are of current importance in these states, such as the rights of indigenous peoples or social security. While to some observers the APA is the most promising approach towards reconciling ASEAN with the societies of its members, others claim that it is another elite project. Indeed, the most regular and active participants of the People’s Assembly have been academics, mostly members of think tanks which are involved in policy-making on the regional level anyway. The participation of NGOs and other societal groups still remains on a low level, so that, altogether, communicative channels between member states’ societies and the institution via society-based NGOs have only minimally developed, so far.

To sum up: ASEAN remains divided over the relevance and desirability of closer transnational connections and maintains bodies and fora that are quasi-isomorphisms of the other institutions and have yet to be filled with content. In contrast, NATO and the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy are closely linked to their member states societies through numerous communicative channels and agents. Both major Western security institutions are embedded in a dense network of societal agents, parliamentarians, and public servants. The same holds increasingly true, although so far only to a much lesser degree, for OAS and Mercosur. On the one hand, societal actors contribute to the intergovernmental cooperation and provide additional information on national conditions. On the other hand, they scrutinize the intergovernmental cooperation and transmit their findings to their constituencies as well as via the media to the larger public. In effect, the participation of those agents creates transparency, reduces private information and contributes to accountability.

4.2. Interface

The two Western security institutions are not only open for cooperation with societal actors. The bodies of both institutions actively seek contacts with transnational public and civil societies of member states. Most importantly, they expect that interaction with societal actors will improve efficiency, increase legitimacy and strengthen their influence. Due to their different portfolios, the EU’s interface is more developed than NATO’s. However, even NATO is expanding contacts with societal actors.

In the case of the European Union, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is the official interface between the EU and civil society (Morgan 1991). In practice, however, the ESC has been bypassed by direct links between private actors and EU organs. The European Commission has been the most important access point and partner for interest groups (Commission 2001a: 19). Most of the Directorates-General consult continuously and excessively through different mechanisms like open consultations, ad hoc meetings, consultative committees and institutionalized dialogues with private actors. At any given time, some 600 consultative committees are in existence.
The Commission regards the cooperation with civil society as being so important that it supports the presence of NGOs at the European level. Some Directorates-General have literally created European NGO networks in their respective fields in order to establish a counterweight to industry and to have additional societal interlocutors to consult with (Greenwood 2003: 189ff.). The Commission finances NGO projects and contributes – sometimes even heavily – to their core funding. According to its own estimation, NGO projects are sponsored with approximately one billion Euros annually (Commission 2000, 2; 13). Two thirds of these contributions are being spent in the area of foreign and security policy (Greenwood 2003).

This active stance is motivated by a couple of concerns. The Commission expects that participation of societal actors will

- improve the quality of its policy (Commission 2002a: 5),
- facilitate the implementation of policy by reducing the costs of monitoring and the realization of policy initiatives (Héritier/Knill/Mingers 1996),
- increase the chance that its policy initiatives are accepted by local actors (Commission 2001 b; 2002b: 4),
- advance the emergence of a limited European public space on the level of associations (Commission 2001a),
- provide legitimacy for its own policy.

Although the European Parliament (EP) as an institution takes a more skeptical stance towards the activities of lobbying groups, individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are not only easily accessible, but also seek contacts with interest groups and civil society actors. The committees of the EP, too, rely heavily on outside expertise and input. As a result, interest groups of all kinds are able to channel their views into the parliamentary process. However, the resulting cacophony also means that most initiatives just drown in the flood of ongoing activities (Corbett/Jacobs/Shackleton 1995; Peterson/Shackleton 2002). In order to maximize their effectiveness, interest groups focus on two strategic access points. They try to engage the rapporteurs of the committees, who are responsible for pushing draft legislation through parliament. Additionally, they try to connect with the so-called inter-groups, i.e. groups of like-minded MEPs from different parties who have the ability to shape the agenda.

The Council of the European Union is widely regarded as the least accessible of the three main EU-bodies because it represents the interests of states and only has a weak institutional structure. However, in the area of foreign and security policy, this assessment needs qualification. Firstly, the process of “Brusselization” (Howorth 2001), that is the concentration of political activities in Brussels, is creating new access points. The newly established Political and Security Committee consists of Brussels-based representatives and is hence more accessible than the former Political Committee. In addition, the EU has established the position of a High Representative whose bureaucratic interests are furthered by establishing direct contacts with a European public. Secondly, even executives from member states have started to realize that the expert public opinion has an impact on their ability to prevail in the intergovernmental deliberations. Hence, talking to opinion leaders, NGOs, and experts has become the daily bread and butter even for Council members.
NATO’s interface consists of various access points and outreach programs. The alliance maintains a Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) equipped with 100 staffers, which is responsible for press and public relations as well as for contacts with societal actors in NATO member and partner states. The 15 staffers of the press and media section are responsible for dealing with the Brussels-based press corps. Approximately 400 journalists are accredited to NATO. Accredited journalists enjoy easier access to the NATO headquarters and receive invitations to weekly background briefings. NATO issues between 150 and 175 press releases per year. The second task of the press office consists of preparing and circulating daily press clippings which give the higher echelon of the NATO bureaucracy an overview on the debates within individual NATO-states. The NATO countries section of the PDD is in charge of some of NATO’s outreach activities. The staffers of the section organize visits by journalists, parliamentarians, researchers, and other opinion leaders to NATO’s headquarters. Each year, approximately 700 groups (20,000 people) visit both NATO and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In addition, the section arranges speeches and public appearances of NATO’s leading political and military representatives in member states. The Secretary General alone gives between 50 and 100 lectures per year. Another sphere of activity is the advancement of research and exchange on transatlantic security issues. NATO sponsors between five and eight major conferences in each member country per year. The Outreach Section of the PDD is responsible for similar activities in partner countries. NATO maintains a science program. In the framework of the program, NATO awards fellowships and supports the transnational cooperation of scientists, mostly in natural science. In recent years, the program has focused on supporting the collaboration of researchers from NATO and partner countries. Approximately 10,000 researchers participate in different functions in NATO’s science program. 10

Due to NATO’s restricted portfolio as a military alliance, cooperation with developmental and peace-building NGOs has traditionally not been one of NATO’s priorities. This, however, is changing as NATO takes on the task of stabilizing post-conflict situations. Beginning in the late 1990s, NATO has been establishing working relations with this part of the NGO community on the theater level within its Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) programs. By now, this cooperation has evolved into a full-fledged and more or less formalized relationship. Cooperation with NGOs on the local level has triggered increased efforts at the international level as well. Discussions within NATO headquarters on an intensification and institutionalization of relations with the peace-building NGO community started two years ago, the United States, Britain and Denmark being the driving forces behind this new policy. So far, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has encouraged various NATO divisions to intensify, where possible, their contacts with NGOs. The signing of memoranda of understanding with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross are the first concrete manifestations of this change. In 2004, the NAC invited NGOs for a brainstorming on Afghanistan. In addition, the PDD as well as SHAPE are increasingly engaging the NGO community in conferences and seminars.

As mentioned above, both NATO and the EU have developed close links with the European armament industry. In the case of NATO, these efforts date back to the 1950s. After plans for the joint production of major items failed in the early 1960s, NATO members settled on a less centralized approach where states were encouraged to cooperate on a case-by-case basis. In this context, the Conference on National Armaments Directors (CNAD) was set up in 1966. Two years later, the CNAD established the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) as an industrial forum for the exchange of views on all aspects of armaments cooperation and as a link between national armament industries, NATO, and the CNAD.

Within Europe, efforts towards closer armament cooperation can be traced back to the establishment of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in 1976 (Stewart 1991). By now, a whole panoply of organizations and forums, bringing together representatives of the European armament industry as well as of member states and the EU organs, tries to foster close armament cooperation (Schmitt 2003).

Both OAS and Mercosur have, albeit to a different extent, developed possibilities of access for societal actors. Prior to 1999, there were no mechanisms that granted civil society organizations official status or provided them with access to the OAS and its decision-making bodies in a formalized manner. Permission to attend relevant meetings was granted on an ad hoc basis only. Prepared by a working group, two key initiatives were set in motion in 1999, namely the creation of a Committee on Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities as well as the approval of the “Guidelines for Participation by Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities” (Permanent Council Resolution 759). This document outlines the scope of civil society participation in the organization’s activities and introduces the policy of accreditation. In order to further increase civil society participation, the “Strategies for Increasing and Strengthening Participation by Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities” were adopted in 2003 (Permanent Council Resolution 840). They especially aim at improving the information exchange between OAS bodies and civil society organizations, expanding participation opportunities and harmonizing processes and participation mechanisms in the different departments of the OAS (Cole 2003).

Currently, there are three ways how NGOs can participate in the activities of the OAS (OAS 2005b: 18-23). First, an NGO can register to the OAS. Registered organizations are granted the right to participate in public meetings of the OAS political bodies. Second, in case an NGO would like to participate without registering, it can still attend meetings of the General Assembly and specific conferences of the OAS. Third, an NGO can also enter into cooperation agreements with the General Secretariat or other OAS organs. As of February 2006, there are 127 formally registered organizations, six of which have their main thematic focus on peace building and security affairs.

In recent years, the annual OAS General Assembly has been preceded by a dialogue between representatives of civil society and heads of member state delegations. In 2003, the foreign ministers turned this type of exchange into a regular activity of the annual General Assembly session. More than 220 representatives of 133 nongovernmental organizations participated in the session of the OAS General

---

11 The Committee on Civil Society Participation was formed only in 2001 and was subsequently merged with the Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management, creating the Committee on Inter-American Summits Management and Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities.
Assembly in 2005. Several preparatory meetings which involved civil society organizations and academics were held in advance, leading to recommendations that were later submitted to the OAS headquarters and presented to foreign ministers and other delegates in a dialogue meeting.

Increasingly, civil society organizations are not only granted access rights, but are also called upon as experts. This also applies to the defense and security sector. For this purpose, the General Secretariat maintains a roster of experts on confidence- and security-building measures, which is updated yearly on the basis of information provided by the member states and circulated to the member states. The Committee on Hemispheric Security holds an annual special meeting dedicated to the analysis of confidence- and security-building measures in the region. The participation of experts is considered as very helpful here.

Although the integration mechanisms of Mercosur evidently have the potential to affect citizens in various policy fields, the ability of regional institutions to respond to civil society concerns is questionable. The Protocol of Ouro Preto, dated 1994, created two organs that are generally regarded as points of access for societal actors: the Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta (CPC, Joint Parliamentary Commission), which is composed of legislators from the four countries, and the Foro Consultativo Económico y Social (FCES, Economic and Social Consultative Forum).

The OAS maintains an extensive outreach program, for example by means of publications and press releases. The offices in charge are located in the Department of Communication and External Relations which belongs to the General Secretariat and contains, among others, the Office of External Relations and Resource Mobilization as well as the Office of Public Information. The mission of this latter body is to promote greater international awareness and understanding among diverse audiences of the decisions of OAS policy-making bodies and of the programs and work of the General Secretariat. As of February 2006, 18 staff members were explicitly mentioned on the website. In the same month, for example, 27 press releases were issued. Official OAS publications intended for a wider public include the Americas Magazine as well as the electronic magazine Americas Forum which is distributed monthly to more than 45,000 subscribers, including government representatives, NGOs, research institutes and universities. A series of documentaries reports among other topics on OAS involvement in conflict resolutions and peace building processes. In addition to their publications, the Office of Public Information maintains a radio channel called Voice of the OAS.

Mercosur, in turn, is less ambitious in its public relations endeavors. It releases its official gazette, the Boletín oficial del MERCOSUR, in Spanish and Portuguese four times a year. Mercosur’s Secretariat publishes an Annual Report as well as two series of more comprehensive technical reports and thematic documents related to subject matters of the regional integration process. Mercosur’s Macroeconomic Monitoring Group also provides a database containing fiscal indicators from the member states.

The relations between societal actors and ASEAN are much more one-sided than those of the other four institutions. The interface between ASEAN and its communicative agents is partly secured via public relations and partly via (recent) attempts to include nongovernmental actors, such as the ASEAN University Network, the ASEAN Business Council or AIPO, into development initiatives. In the security sector, only
experts from research institutes have been able to establish regular exchanges with ASEAN representatives. The organization has made no systematic attempts to look for information exchange and input from non-state actors. Furthermore, no political consensus exists about the necessity and desirability of these actors’ participation in ASEAN politics. Officially, however, 58 nongovernmental organizations are affiliated with the institution. Although most of these ASEAN NGOs formally represent societal interests in member states, it is unclear to what extent they are actually linked with local interest groups. Moreover, the relationship between ASEAN and NGOs is unsystematic and consists mostly of ad hoc contacts. None of these groups belongs to the realm of security and foreign affairs. Although some approaches have been taken to include civil society actors and interest groups into policy-making, a state-centric perception of international politics, a strong accentuation of national sovereignty, and the non-democratic nature of many member states have gotten into the way of a consensus about cooperation with transnational non-state actors. ASEAN maintains a Press and Public Information Office as part of the Secretariat. It is closely linked to the Secretary General. In general, however, ASEAN’s public relations efforts have been rather erratic. The relevance of public relations work depends on the respective Secretary General, but it is not generally fixed how it should be conducted. Its financial means of about 3.5 percent of the entire budget demonstrates the low importance attached to public relations. Of the approximately 150 employees at the Secretariat, eleven work at the public affairs office, mainly producing publications. The Secretary General is occasionally interviewed in regional newspapers and journals, and he regularly attends lectures and conferences with ASEAN-related agendas. He is the main representative of the organization towards the public, and he is also the main contact person for interested external parties. Thus, he functions as the most important access point for ASEAN-society relations. Where security affairs are concerned, ASEAN does not put much effort into reaching out to the public or giving media or societal representatives the opportunity to accompany its policies. Access points for foreign affairs have not been institutionalized. The ASEAN Regional Forum, which has no secretariat of its own, is even less present in media reporting and not at all connected with transnational societal actors. Moreover, occasional press reports tend to focus on summit meetings and their adorning karaoke events or other leisure activities of the participating politicians.

In the economic sector, however, more effort is made to consult with interest groups. For instance, an ASEAN Business Advisory Council (BAC) has been founded. Moreover, ASEAN has announced its intention to involve the societies of its member states in the framework of its socio-cultural programs. Especially after the Bali summit in 2003 (for example in the Vientiane Action Program 2004), the relevance of an ASEAN linked with national societies has been underlined.

To conclude: We have shown that the EU as well as NATO have developed close links with societal actors of their member states. The Latin American institutions have

---

12 In 2006, ASEAN decided to engage civil society groups more systematically and agreed on new guidelines for contacts of these groups with the secretariat and, eventually, the Standing Committee.
begun to develop connections with their publics. These findings contrast with the remarkable lack of interface in the case of ASEAN.

4.3. Collection, Procession and Distribution of Information

In the case of NATO, one of the most important information gathering and processing function concerns the so-called Annual Reviews. In a first stage, member states develop a common force goal (Ministerial Guidelines), which is then broken down into force goals for each country (Draft Force Proposals). In the second stage, the commonly agreed force goals serve as a benchmark against which national efforts are measured. The evaluation takes place on the basis of Defense Planning Questionnaires (DPQ), detailed sets of questions, which are prepared and sent out to national Ministries of Defense (MDs) by the International Staff. From the replies to the DPQ, NATO’s staff prepares Draft Country Chapters. NATO representatives then visit each MD. Those “Trilaterals” represent in-depth evaluations of national defense planning. Member states are required to disclose their military capabilities, future force goals and armaments plans as well as their financial and industrial capacities. NATO experts provide an independent assessment of those data. Finalized Country Chapters are then adopted by the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and form the basis of NATO’s Force Plan. Interestingly enough, NATO distributes the answers as well as the independent assessments to all other member-states, thus creating an unusually high level of transparency (Tuschoff 1999: 151).

In the case of the EU, the collection of information of member states’ defense forces, armaments, and procurement plans has been left to the Western European Union (WEU). With the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), however, the EU is beginning to play a more active role in coordinating and overseeing the defense and procurement policy of its member states. So far, the so-called Headline Goal process has more or less been a bottom-up venture. This is beginning to change, though. The European Capability Action Plan, designed to close the gap between the Headline Goal and actual contribution by member-states, envisages not only the close collaboration on individual defense projects, but also a wide-ranging exchange of sensitive information on armaments and procurement plans. The creation of the armament agency will intensify this exchange. With regard to the export of armaments and dual use goods, the European Code of Conduct has not only stimulated greater transparency on behalf of many member states. The Code of Conduct has also charged the EU with the collection and dissemination of sensitive data. The Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), the Council’s working group responsible for operating the Code of Conduct, compiles and disseminates to all member states data on arms transfers, denied requests, and the outcome of the consultations, which ensue if one country considers responding positively to a request that had been denied by another member state.

The OAS has started to improve its mechanisms for the collection and procession of information, an advancement which also applies to the security realm. From 1992 onwards, the General Assembly has passed annual resolutions on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM). Member states are increasingly sending their
actual information on CSBM, and some even provide figures on defense spending. These reports are stored by the General Secretariat and made publicly available on the website of the Committee on Hemispheric Security. Furthermore, the communication network of the OAS Information System (OASIS) shall be made operational for instant exchange of information on security matters.

In the medium term, it is intended to collect member states’ national doctrine and defense policy papers, as well as the information provided by the states parties pursuant to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. It is also planned to include relevant information from other sources, such as the information submitted by the member states to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, the OAS Roster of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and the OAS Register of Antipersonnel Land Mines.

In contrast to these efforts, Mercosur is characterized by a lesser degree of transparency (Malamud 2005a: 424). Mercosur does not collect or monitor any information on its member states’ foreign policy or the defense sector, which may be attributable to the fact that defense cooperation is mainly managed by bilateral institutions in the Southern Cone. However, Mercosur has directed its attention to the so-called new security threats like terrorism, organized crime and drug-trafficking, and in this context has developed new instruments, like the Sistema de Intercambio de Información de Seguridad del MERCOSUR (SISME), a subregional databank containing information on transnationally acting criminals.

ASEAN does not gather information on member-state’s policy. The secretariat has no authority to attain or process information from the member states. Furthermore, no mandatory document exists that obliges members to reveal information regarding their defense or security policies. So far, the only exception to this rule is the ASEAN Regional Forum’s encouragement to report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and to share long-term defense plans.

5. Comparing the Communicative Arena of Regional Security Institutions

5.1. Norms

By the end of the Cold War, NATO was perceived by its members as a political community, and a norm of early consultation had clearly developed. At its inception, the character of the new alliance as well as the obligation to consult and to share information was rather contested. The United States sought to create a traditional collective defense organization which would contribute to the mobilization and the integration of the military potential of the Western European states, but which would infringe as little as possible on the American freedom-of-action. In contrast, Canada and some of the smaller European allies insisted on a more political organization. The North Atlantic Treaty reflects both views. While Article 5 portrays NATO as a

---

13 It remains to be seen whether with the ASEAN Charter, which is currently in the stage of debate, an empowerment of the secretariat – as many observers hope – can be achieved.
classical collective defense pact, Articles 2 and 4 call for closer economic and political collaboration. In practice, initially the American view prevailed. NATO’s early design envisaged a decentralized organization. Consultations, too, remained weak although an array of conflicts among members threatened the coherence of the alliance. The Korean War and the Suez crisis triggered a political shake-up. A Committee of Three Wise Men urged member states in 1956 to strengthen political, economic and cultural collaboration within NATO and called upon them to consult more closely on all matters which might affect their collective or individual security as envisaged in Article 4. The report stressed that “consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information (...). It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.”14 Later declarations and key statements, like the famous Harmel Report of 1967 and the June 1974 Ottawa Declaration, reaffirmed the mutual obligation and expectation of early consultations. The April 1999 Alliance’s Strategic Concept again stresses that NATO will serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issue that affects member states’ vital interests.

In the case of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the acquis politique, that is the entirety of politically binding basic documents, common declarations, resolution, and major decisions, clearly indicates the existence of a norm of early consultation. The Luxembourg Report of October 27, 1970 defined the accomplishment of a better mutual understanding of relevant aspects of international politics through a regular exchange of information and consultations as a major goal of the newly established European Political Cooperation (EPC). In its Copenhagen Report of July 23, 1973, the foreign ministers promised not to adopt a fixed national position without prior consultations within the EPC framework. The London Report of October 13, 1981 extended the competence of EPC into the security realm. The Solemn Declaration, adopted June 19, 1983 in Stuttgart, envisaged reinforced processes of consultation in order to enable member states to react collectively to challenges which confront them as a whole. Heads of states and governments underlined the commitment to take their partners’ positions fully into account. Article 30(2) of the Single European Act obliges member states to consult with each other on all issues of general interest before adopting fixed national positions.15 Articles J.2 and J.3 of the Maastricht treaty reinforce this obligation. Article 16 of the Amsterdam Treaty succinctly determines that states inform and consult each other on all relevant foreign policy issues. The norm of early consultation is also emphasized in Article I-40 of the European Constitution.

In the case of the Latin American regional organizations, a practice of early consultation is just developing. Traditionally, members of the OAS gave precedence to the principle of non-intervention, which is pegged down in Article 1 of the OAS Charter. This is changing, however, as a number of observations seem to indicate that member states are beginning to use the organization as a platform to reveal future

15 These documents are reprinted in: Auswärtiges Amt: Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union (GASP). Dokumentation, Bonn 1994 (10. Aufl.).
policy initiatives and to discuss possible approaches. As early as 1991, the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System decided to initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security. Subsequent declarations on confidence- and security-building measures as well as the Declaration on Security in the Americas, issued in 2003, expressed member states’ commitment to strengthen the organs, institutions and mechanisms of the Inter-American security system, and assigned the Committee on Hemispheric Security the task to develop common approaches to manage international security issues, including disarmament and arms control, and to serve as a forum for consultation on these matters. So far, however, those declarations of intent have not led to the formal establishment of norms of early consultation, and it is too early to state with certainty whether these signs of a changed practice will indeed lead to changed expectations and norms.

Concerning Mercosur, some of its basic documents do indicate the existence of a norm of early consultation. In the economic realm, the Protocol of Brasilia, adopted in 1991, stipulates that parties should consult early in case of economic disturbances or conflicts and introduces arbitration mechanisms. The Protocol of Olivos on Dispute Settlement, adopted in 2002, also calls for early consultations to resolve disputes and creates a permanent appeals court. However, member states’ willingness to put it into action is not encouraging. Member states frequently insist on their national positions even if this means that pressing problems are resolved in a last-minute fashion by presidential consultation (Malamud 2005a, b). Even worse, many regional regulations are not applicable because they have not been ratified by every member state. Up to now, even in the economic realm, there is a contrast between the proclaimed ambitious goals of Mercosur and its poor institutional practice.

But Mercosur, although originally designed as an economic institution, has inspired further collaboration: “In the field of defense and security, the logic behind Mercosur led to a pattern of cooperation and dialogue which also included these matters.” (Villagra Delgado 2003: 4). This cooperation is mainly happening by means of bilateral agreements and coordination mechanisms: The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was established in 1991, and the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación sobre Defensa y Seguridad (Permanent Consultation and Coordination Mechanism on Defense and Security Matters), created in 1997, intends to bring together the Argentine and Brazilian ministers of foreign affairs and defense annually. Additionally, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has initiated bilateral working groups on defense policy with all countries of the extended Mercosur, except for Paraguay. Argentina and Mercosur associate member Chile installed the Comité Permanente de Seguridad (Permanent Committee on Security) which brings together civilian actors from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs as well as representatives of the General Staff twice a year. These agreements are characterized by patterns of early consultation, too.

The key ASEAN principles, often called the “ASEAN Way”, contain a number of procedural norms regulating regional cooperation (Haacke 2005). These norms envision consensual decision-making, strongly relying on consultations (known as the principle of musyawarah) between the state leaders in a process of quiet diplomacy (Rüland 2002). ASEAN has frequently been labeled a “talk-shop”, indicating the important role of informal dialogue as opposed to binding decision-making.
“Consultation” as a procedure of cooperation is mentioned in different key documents (the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action, and the Second Declaration of ASEAN Concord), but its concrete meaning has never been defined. The norm of consultation prior to any decision-making within ASEAN is pronounced; yet, as politicians meet behind closed doors, there is no evidence that state positions may be open for debate. On the contrary, the fact that negotiations are routinely conducted on high administrative levels and that the majority of decisions reached in negotiations in ASEAN are based on a very minimal consensus indicates that national positions are clearly fixed in beforehand and not negotiable.

Furthermore, one of the most prominent norms valid in ASEAN cooperation is non-intervention in internal affairs. Due to the colonial heritage, all regional states have frequently stressed the primacy of their national sovereignty, and accordingly, the non-intervention principle has attained overarching importance. When it comes to the practice of consultation, therefore, one has to keep in mind that no state has any interest in letting another state interfere with its domestic politics; this also suggests that state delegates come with fixed national positions that are non-negotiable.

Most case studies on NATO and the EU confirm the assumption of intense and early consultations. Risse-Kappen’s (1997) study on the influence of small countries within NATO shows that early consultation has indeed been widely practiced. The importance of NATO’s consultation culture is also the subject of Theiler’s (1997) and Tuschoff’s (1999) study. Concerning the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, insider accounts and case studies confirm that EU members do indeed share even sensitive information and consult routinely and extensively before they adopt fixed national positions (Rummel 1978: 22; Rummel 1982; Hill/Wallace 1996; Nuttall 1992; Nuttall 2000). Lindemann (1978) testified that this reflex is especially distinct in the case of international conference diplomacy. Smith (2001: 272) highlights “habits of consultation” which were increasingly influential.

As for the Latin American and Southeast Asian security institutions, case studies do not mention a habit of early consultation. This neglect could either be due to the fact that intergovernmental negotiations do indeed take place only after national positions have been fixed or could be the result of a lack of interest.

5.2. Decision-making Structure

The Korean War triggered the transformation of NATO from a rather loose alliance into a highly institutionalized political organization where consultation takes place almost permanently on different topics and levels. Originally, it was envisaged that NATO’s superior body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), would meet only once a year, as would the Defense Committee comprising the defense ministers. It took until 1952, before the Lisbon Ministerial turned the NAC into a permanent body consisting of government appointed permanent representatives (permreps) holding the rank of ambassadors. Since then, the NAC has been meeting in different formats. On the level of heads of state and governments, the NAC meets only sporadically. On the level of foreign ministers, the NAC meets twice a year. On the level of permreps, it meets
every Monday morning. Additionally, NATO ambassadors attend a weekly private luncheon to discuss all pending issues in a more informal setting (George 1991). Regardless of the format in which it meets, the NAC is always chaired by the Secretary General and always exerts the same authority.

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which came into being in 1963 as a replacement of the original Defense Committee, is politically responsible for all matters pertaining to the integrated defense structure. This set-up is supplemented by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the third senior political-military body, which was founded in 1967. Both the DPC and the NPG are chaired by the Secretary General and meet twice a year on the level of defense ministers from member countries which take part in the integrated military structure. Both organs meet much more frequently on the level of permreps, the DPC weekly or even more often. Altogether, the Secretary General and the permreps meet almost daily.

The frequent meetings of the permreps are just the tip of the iceberg of NATO’s political consultation and coordination. Under those three main committees, a myriad of subordinated committees and working groups has been established. A cursory count shows that in 2000 NATO’s political structure comprised 35 principal subordinated committees (NATO Handbook 2001). In addition, a mushrooming number of regional expert groups and ad hoc political working groups exists.

Representatives of the national representations as well as staff from the international secretariat attend the meetings of these subordinated committees. National representations vary in size. Luxembourg’s representation comprises six staffers, whereas the representations of the UK and the US employ 50 and 95 staffers, respectively (George 1991:18f.). NATO’s International Staff, the political wing of NATO, is headed by the Secretary General. He is supported by a deputy and several Assistant Secretary Generals who administer a vast and complex structure of divisions and directorates mirroring the structure of the subordinate committees under the NAC. NATO’s military wing is headed by the Military Committee and consists of a likewise complex structure of subordinated committees and military commands. NATO’s International Military Staff (IMS), part of its military wing, is headed by a director and consists mainly of military personnel. The Military Committee and the IMS, however, are only the tip of NATO’s vast military structure. NATO’s military command structure is composed of several ten thousand posts, turning NATO into a gigantic meeting place for the officer corps of its member countries.

Europe’s foreign policy decision-making system has evolved in several stages. The Luxembourg Report introduced the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The Single European Act brought the EPC in the purview of the EC. Maastricht established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU. Amsterdam introduced the High Representative and refurbished the decision-making instruments. The Helsinki and Nice Summits created the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and remodeled the institutional structure. The Convention was supposed to replace the three pillars with a more consistent institutional structure. This process is characterized both by a growing density of meetings, consultations, and exchanges of information, as well as by Brusselization.

The European Council serves as the supreme decision-making body of the CFSP/ESDP. Since its early days, the frequency of its meetings has doubled to at least
four times a year. The General Council constitutes the most important decision-making center between two meetings of the European Council. It meets at least once a month (Gomez/Peterson 2001). This is a remarkable development since the Luxembourg Report envisaged two meetings of foreign ministers per year outside the Framework of the EU. The Political Committee (PC) and, since 2000, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) prepare the meetings of the council and implement its decisions.\textsuperscript{16} The PC and the PSC form the crucial link between the council working groups and the council. The PC is composed of the political directors of the foreign ministries. The frequency of meetings grew rapidly from four in the early 1970s to approximately 12 in the late 1980s and to 22 in the middle of the 1990s (Regelsberger 1997: 69). The PSC took over most of the functions of the PC without replacing it completely. In contrast to the PC, its members – which in most cases hold the rank of an ambassador - are based at their permanent representations in Brussels. This format allows a much higher frequency of meetings than the over-worked Political Directors would have been able to manage. Since the Swedish Presidency in 2001, the PSC has met at least twice a week. (Regelsberger 2004: 36).

Working groups constitute the basis of the CFSP machinery and demonstrate most visibly the phenomenon of a Europeanization of national diplomacy. In 2003, 28 working groups on almost all relevant regions and functional issues worked under the guidance of the PSC. Working groups bring together diplomats from the capitals and/or the permanent representations. Contacts among them are intensified by the Correspondance Européenne (COREU) telex-communication system, a non-hierarchical, multilateral system that can be used even by junior diplomats to communicate simultaneously with all other EU states.

Due to the less operational character of the CFSP, fewer diplomats served on European posts as compared to officers serving on NATO posts. However, the CFSP machinery, too, has knotted dense networks among European diplomats. Many insider accounts report that these regular contacts have not only fostered a corps d’esprit. They have also given rise to the establishment of independent channels of communication and information between foreign ministries.

In the case of the OAS, the General Assembly is the supreme organ. It meets annually at the level of foreign ministers. The formulation of political goals is primarily accomplished in these annual meetings. The Permanent Council carries out the decisions of the General Assembly or assigns their implementation to other OAS bodies. All member states – except Cuba - maintain permanent missions at the OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C. With 27 staffers, the permanent mission of the United States is the largest. Small states employ between two and six staffers. The head of the permanent missions has the rank of ambassador and represents his country during the meetings of the Permanent Council. Depending on the circumstances, the Permanent Council meets several times a month, if necessary even several times a week. During the 1990s the OAS has witnessed a further wave of institutionalization with the restructuring or creation of five specialized committees working under the Permanent Council.

The OAS Secretariat has a comparatively high profile. In 2004, the staff of the General Secretariat totaled 630 people, out of which 234 were professional and 396 technical

\textsuperscript{16} The PC and the PSC share this role with the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).
The Secretary General is the most widely known representative of the OAS throughout the hemisphere. After a recent reform aiming at higher efficiency, the Secretary General now leads a cabinet composed of the directors of seven departments.

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is an OAS organ in security policy, which, however, does not meet on a regular basis, but can be convoked upon request of any member state to deal with problems of an urgent nature. Throughout the last decade there have only been two meetings, both in 2001 in reaction to the terrorist acts perpetrated within the territory of the United States on September 11. Defense and strategic cooperation often takes place outside the OAS framework. The most noteworthy discussion forum is the Defense Ministerial of the Americas Meeting, initiated in 1995 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in Williamsburg, Virginia, and perpetuated biannually.

The most important institutional innovation on the way to a collective management of defense and security issues has been the creation of the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS). It first came into existence in 1991 as a special committee through the provisions of the Santiago Commitment. In 1995, it became a permanent organ. It is chaired by the permanent representative of one of the member states and holds meetings at least once a month. The Permanent Council instructs the CHS to consider and take action on those General Assembly resolutions that pertain to hemispheric security. The Committee might also take into consideration other resolutions that, according to its Chair, are directly related to its agenda. As a consequence of the various Declarations on Confidence and Security Building Measures, the CHS was mandated to periodically constitute itself as the Forum for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, in order to review and evaluate existing CSBM and to discuss, consider, and propose new CSBM. The first meeting of this kind took place in April 2005, the second one is scheduled for November 2006.

Although there has been significant development in the OAS decision-making structures throughout the last 15 years, it is still predominantly an intergovernmental organization. Contacts of various levels of bureaucracy are the exception rather than the rule. OAS’s main achievement is the extension of its essential purposes, like democracy, human rights, and peaceful conflict resolution, to the entire hemisphere and the vitalization of the mere declaratory norms by the adoption of a number of new instruments and specialized organizations.

**Mercosur**’s supreme organ is the Common Market Council which is comprised of the ministers of foreign affairs and the ministers of economy. The Council holds two meetings a year, at least one of them with the participation of the member states’ presidents. Decisions taken by the Common Market Council are implemented by the Common Market Group, composed of bureaucrats from the ministries of foreign affairs and economy, and the central banks. In the recent past, Mercosur has witnessed some important institutional developments. With the implementation of the Protocol of Ouro Preto (1994), the original administrative Secretariat was transformed from a body servicing the Common Market Group into a technical body with wider competences, servicing the whole Mercosur. Additionally, Ouro Preto introduced the Joint Parliamentary Commission, the Economic and Social Consultative Forum as well as the Mercosur Trade Commission. In October 2003, a Commission of Permanent
Representatives was established, whose president is entitled to participate in high-level meetings and represent the bloc abroad, thus emulating the Secretary General of the United Nations or the OAS, or even the High Representative of the EU.

In general, Mercosur’s institutional structure allows actors on different levels to participate in decision-making. However, some observers note the already mentioned difference between formal decision-making structure and the de facto practices. Malamud (2005b) shows that, especially in times of crisis, the usual Mercosur decision-making structures and rules were ignored, and states resorted to presidential diplomacy. Overall, it seems that the traditions of executive authority in the region tend to overwrite the institutional structure. And although the Presidents Lula and Kirchner have talked of reforming the organizational structures of Mercosur with the intention to increase representation within it, there have not been any official proposals in this direction, yet (Grugel 2006). In any case, intergovernmentalism suits the larger and more powerful member states since it means that they can shape outcomes.

In the political realm, institutional growth is discernable as well. As early as 1996, in the Presidential Declaration on Political Dialogue between Mercosur member states, signed in Potrero de los Funes, the presidents of the Mercosur countries had expressed their political willingness to create a mechanism of political consultation. Two years later, the multilateral Foro de Consulta y Concertación Política (FCCP, Forum for Political Consultation and Coordination) was founded (Ugarte 2004: 153; Flemes 2005). It is usually manned with high-ranking diplomats or bureaucrats from the ministries of foreign affairs. However, it is not a self-contained organ like the three new organs created by the Protocol of Ouro Preto, but an auxiliary organ to the Common Market Council, to which it can make recommendations. Its main responsibility is to systematize political cooperation between Mercosur member states by means of coordinating 15 working groups on diverse topics outside the framework of economic integration. In spring 2002, the Mercosur Council has assigned the task of coordinating meetings on the minister level to the new forum, including coordination of some main mechanisms combating “new security threats” like terrorism, organized crime, and drug-trafficking. In 2004, the FCCP was asked to develop a vision of South American integration, to be considered by the foreign ministers. It also maintains a working group on firearms and ammunitions, and the latest move initiated in 2005 was the conformation of a working group on multilateral politics, comprising the Mercosur members and associates and aiming at the elaboration of common foreign policy declarations and positions towards external actors or other international organizations. The FCCP members have already brought forward joint positions in meetings of international institutions, like the UN or the Summit of the Americas. Its sessions take place twice a semester, so that between its formation and December 2005, the FCCP has held 40 meetings.

ASEAN has been and still is a predominantly intergovernmental institution. Contacts between member states are maintained via ministerial meetings and only to a lesser extent between national bureaucracies.\(^\text{17}\) State leaders and foreign ministers formulate political goals in the high politics sector and have decision-making competencies

\(^{17}\) Yet, new fora and regular meetings, e.g. between embassy staff of the ASEAN members in Jakarta, have been emerging lately. Interview with Ngurah Swajayah (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia) in June 2006 in Jakarta.
regarding ASEAN. Additionally, Senior Officials from the foreign ministries belong to the top elite of ASEAN decision-making. Decisions are prepared by Senior Officials Meetings (SOM). The ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) convened by the (rotating) ASEAN chair co-ordinates ASEAN activities.

The number of meetings of ASEAN bodies has increased over the last decades (Dosch 1997). In 2003, the ASEAN calendar lists five meetings of heads of government, four meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers, and 22 other ministerial meetings in the political and security sector. The ASC meets three to five times a year, and there are usually more than 40 Senior Official Meetings (ASEAN Annual Report 2004). These figures indicate the high relevance attached to meetings on the top bureaucratic levels; as neither the ASEAN secretariat nor the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are supplied with differentiated institutional structures, top level meetings may often offer the only contacts between representatives of member states.

Other ministries and government agencies are involved in policy-making as well, for example the ministries of economics, trade and industry, national development agencies, and strategic institutes belonging to the government sector. Defense and strategic cooperation relies on separate networks between ministries and agencies that have developed from bi- or trilateral security partnerships, often outside the institution. The defense ministers meet within the ARF framework or in accompanying track two fora, but not in the context of ASEAN security cooperation.

Unlike in the EU or NATO, there are no permanent representatives at the ASEAN headquarters. Instead, desk officers seconded by member-states operate as transmitters between the domestic and the institutional level.

The secretariat has a rather low profile: it is comparatively small and responsible solely for administrative tasks, without being endowed with any decision-making functions. At the first Bali summit in 1976, a small secretariat was established, and was restructured and endowed with more staff following the summit in 1992. The organizational structure of the secretariat today consists of the Secretary General, two deputies (responsible for functional and economic cooperation respectively), four Director Generals (economic cooperation, finance and integration support, external relations, and resources development) and the office of the Secretary General. The staff of the ASEAN secretariat performs primarily administrative tasks.

After the shock of the Asian crisis, the ASEAN Troika was created as a new instrument to improve ad-hoc decision-making and prevent intra-ASEAN conflict (Narine 2002: 164). The troika consists of three foreign ministers (the current, former and future chairs of the Standing Committee) and is an ad-hoc committee designated for immediate and effective crisis management (Acharya 2001). A consensus from all ASEAN foreign ministers is needed for its activation. Although this mechanism was generally approved, the ASEAN Troika has not been used yet.

---

18 Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/ar05.htm (accessed in July 2005). In 1995, the total number of official meetings was indicated as 191 – compared to about 700 in 2006, however, including conferences and workshops. (Dosch 1997: 85; Interview with Ngurah Swajayah, Minstry of Foreign Affairs, ASEAN Cooperation, Jakarta, June 2006).

19 Interview with Dato’ Ahmad Mokhtar Selat (former Director General of ASEAN) in July 2006 in Kuala Lumpur.
To conclude, ASEAN differs from NATO and the EU as well as from Mercosur and the OAS with regard to the communicative arena. So far, communication within ASEAN has been monopolized by chief executives. Institutionalized contacts among specialized bureaucracies are far less developed as compared with the European and Latin American institutions. This system of close personal contacts had its merits, though. The highly personalized atmosphere, the longevity of important leaders, and the continuity of dialogues among national power elites has rendered each partner’s position rather predictable. At the same time, the hierarchical, minimalist structure of the institution poses obstacles for developing diversified processes of decision-making. Whether this system is sustainable as new elites attain power, and whether ongoing institutional reforms come to fruition remains to be seen. Again, the prospective ASEAN Charter and the vision of strengthening the Secretariat and improving contacts with societal actors may offer the most fundamental change here.

6. Conclusion

Although the five security institutions discussed here are designed to perform similar tasks and although at a first glance their institutional structures show interesting similarities, they are strikingly different with regard to our form characteristics.

Table 2: Summary of embeddedness and arena (year of comparison: 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator for Embeddedness</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>OAS</th>
<th>Mercosur</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access of Interest Groups</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low but increasing</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Coverage and Access</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>not important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of Parliamentary Assembly</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>rather low</td>
<td>rather low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Facilities</td>
<td>very distinct</td>
<td>very distinct</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator for Arena</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms of Early Consultation</td>
<td>very distinct</td>
<td>very distinct</td>
<td>slowly developing</td>
<td>slowly developing</td>
<td>slowly developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Institutionalization</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low, but increasing</td>
<td>low, but increasing</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Studies</td>
<td>strong accounts</td>
<td>strong accounts</td>
<td>no accounts</td>
<td>no accounts</td>
<td>no accounts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While NATO and the EU are deeply embedded in networks of societal and parliamentary actors of their member states, both ASEAN and the OAS were characterized by intergovernmental structures. And while NATO and the EU brought together entire bureaucracies and covered the entire policy cycle, policy-making within ASEAN and the OAS involved primarily the chief executives and pertained only to the last stages of the policy cycle.

With the democratization processes in Latin America, institutional characteristics began to change. Mercosur as well as the OAS have developed closer and more institutionalized relations with societal actors and parliaments, and both of them witness a wave of institutional evolution, indicating growing arenas. Although the security situation in Southeast Asia is more fragile than in the Southern Cone, ASEAN is still lagging behind. The fragile Southeast Asian democracies, still a minority among ASEAN’s members, have just begun to request ASEAN to step down from its aloof place and develop ties with member states’ societies.

This paper focuses on an analysis of institutional form and does not deal with the causal relationship between form and effectiveness. Whether NATO and the EU have been able to contribute to stable peace in Europe because of their specific form and whether their lack of embeddedness and their narrow arena prevented ASEAN and the OAS from establishing stable peace in their regions will be discussed in a second part of the research project. However, since our two form characteristics are closely related to the level of information geared through and generated by the institution, and since the availability of credible information has been identified as the major key for the prevention of war and a prerequisite for cooperation, we would already at this point claim to have identified a previously neglected causal mechanism which might help us to understand why some institutions contribute to peace among their member states, whereas others do not.
References


Alcâñiz, Isabella 2005: An Economic Road to Peace, a Peaceful Road to Growth: Regional Integration through the Side Door in Western Europe and South America. e-Working Paper No. 3. Lisbon: CIES.


Czempiel, Ernst-Otto 1986: Friedensstrategien, Paderborn: UTB.


ECCP & CRIES 2003: The Role of Civil Society and NGOs in the Prevention of Armed Conflict in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), in: Pensamiento Propio 17, 185-232.


Gomez, Ricardo/ Peterson, John 2001: The EU’s Impossibly Busy Foreign Ministers: No One is in Control, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 6: 1, 53-74.


Héritier, Adrienne/ Knill, Christoph/ Mingers, Susanne 1996: Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the State: Britain, France, Germany, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.


Ugarte, José Manuel 2004: Prevención de conflictos y el rol de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil en el Cono Sur, in: Pensamiento Propio 20, 135-208.


### Appendix: Regional Security Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Security relevant Objectives</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Principal Organs</th>
<th>Homepage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comunidad Andina (CAN)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>To foster close ties among member countries. An Andean Charter for Peace and Security was adopted in June 2002 with a view to strengthening subregional security.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Andean Presidential Council, the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers, the Commission, the General Secretariat, the Andean Parliament, Court of Justice.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.comunidadandina.org">www.comunidadandina.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS Pact</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>co-ordinate the defence of the three contracting parties in order to preserve peace and security in the Pacific”</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Council (consists of Foreign Ministers or their deputies).</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dfat.gov.au">www.dfat.gov.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>A key instrument for dialogue on political and security concerns with a view to establishing a strong foundation of trust and confidence among its participants</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Minimal institutionalization: Meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.aseansec.org">www.aseansec.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>In 1995, the Heads of State and Government stressed that ‘cooperative peace and shared prosperity shall be the fundamental goals of ASEAN’.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Meeting of the Heads of State and Government, Ministerial Meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers, numerous other ministerial meetings, permanent central Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.aseansec.org">www.aseansec.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>To foster unity among peoples of the Caribbean through common or co-ordinated regional actions in spheres ranging from foreign policy to health.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Conference of Heads of Government, Community Council of Ministers, four Ministerial Councils, Secretariat, Caribbean Court of Justice.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.caricom.org">www.caricom.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>A framework for integration and complementarity among member countries with a view to strengthening peace, security and stability.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Conference of the Heads of State meeting, Executive Council at ministerial level, General Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cen-sad.org">www.cen-sad.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Security relevant Objectives</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Principal Organs</td>
<td>Homepage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>To preserve their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and to ensure the stability and security of the Gulf region</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Supreme Council consists of the Heads of State, Ministerial Council consists of the Foreign Ministers, 30-member Consultative Commission, Secretariat General.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.gcc-sg.org">www.gcc-sg.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>To develop co-operation in the political and security fields. The prevention and settlement of regional conflicts through “solidarity and collective self-reliance”.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat, and the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sec.ecowas.int">www.sec.ecowas.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUUAM Group</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The strengthening of regional security, including co-operation in combating separatism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in member countries.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Meeting of the Heads of State, Sessions of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, committee of National Co-ordinators.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.guuam.org">www.guuam.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>To strengthen the ties between Arab countries, to co-ordinate their policies and activities, to safeguard their sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Council, number of Committees and the General Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.arableagueonline.org">www.arableagueonline.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Security relevant Objectives</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Principal Organs</td>
<td>Homepage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>To ensure their joint security through co-operation and consultation in political and military fields.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council (at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Heads of State and Government or permanent representatives), Defence Planning Committee, Secretary-General and numerous Committees.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nato.int">www.nato.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States (OAS)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>To promote peace and security and economic and social development in the western hemisphere, to strengthen and to speed the process of economic integration among the nations of the Americas.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>General Assembly, the Permanent Council, and the Inter-American Council for integral Development, General Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oas.org">www.oas.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>To strengthen the security of these smaller countries of the Eastern Caribbean and to foster their development and harmonize their foreign policies.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Authority of Heads of Government, Foreign Affairs Committee, Defence and Security Committee, Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oecs.org">www.oecs.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>To promote effective solidarity and to strengthen co-operation among Islamic countries in the economic, social and political fields.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government, Conference of Foreign Ministers and the Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oic">www.oic</a> oci.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Security relevant Objectives</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Principal Organs</td>
<td>Homepage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>To promote collective self-reliance among the member countries.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Meeting of Heads of State of government, Council of Ministers, Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries, Technical Committees and the Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.saarc-sec.org">www.saarc-sec.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Development Community (SADC)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>To strengthen regional solidarity, peace and security.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Summit Meeting of Heads of State or Government, Committee of Officials and the Secretariat.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sadc.int">www.sadc.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The attainment of regional peace and security is now considered to be among the Union’s goals.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conférence des Chefs d’État, le Conseil des Ministres, la Commission de l’UEMOA, la Cour de Justice, la Cour des Comptes et le Comité Interparlementaire Chambre Consulaire Régionale, Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) et la Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.uemoa.int">www.uemoa.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European Union (WEU)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>To promote the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe through the co-ordination of the defence policy and equipment of member countries.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Council (consisting of Foreign and Defence Ministers), Assembly, WEU Institute for Security Studies.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.weu.int">www.weu.int</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


aktuell Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung (Hrsg.): Analysen zum Golf-Krieg, 1991. (vergriffen)


Nr. 24 Kittel, G./Rittberger, V./Schimmelfennig, F.: Between Loyalty and Exit. Explaining the Foreign Policy of Industrialized Countries in the UNESCO Crisis (1978-87), 1995.***


Nr. 27 Schimmelfennig, F.: Legitimate Rule in the European Union. The Academic Debate, 1996.***

Nr. 28a Rittberger, V./Schimmelfennig, F.: German Foreign Policy After Unification. A Re-Examination of Realist Prognoses. A Tübingen-Based Project, 1997.***

Nr. 29 Hasenclever, A./Mayer, P./Rittberger, V.: Regimes as Links Between States: Three Theoretical Perspectives, 1997.***

Nr. 30 Baumann, R./Rittberger, V./Wagner, W.: Macht und Machtpolitik: Neorealistic Foreign Policy Theory and Prognoses for the German Foreign Policy, 1998.*** (vergriffen)

Nr. 30a Baumann, R./Rittberger, V./Wagner, W.: Power and Power Politics: Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory and Expectations about German Foreign Policy since Unification, 1998.***

Nr. 31 Hasenclever, A./Mayer, P./Rittberger, V.: Fair Burden-Sharing and the Robustness of International Regimes: The Case of Food Aid, 1998.***

Nr. 32 Breitmeier, H./Rittberger, V.: Environmental NGOs in an Emerging Global Civil Society, 1998.***


Nr. 33a Bienen, D./Freund, C./Rittberger, V.: Societal Interests, Policy Networks and Foreign Policy: An Outline of Utilitarian-Liberal Foreign Policy Theory, 1999.***

Nr. 34 Boekle, H./Rittberger, V./Wagner, W.: Normen und Außenpolitik: Konstruktivistische Außenpolitiktheorie, 1999.***

Nr. 34a Boekle, H./Rittberger, V./Wagner, W.: Norms and Foreign Policy: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory, 1999.***


Nr. 36 Hasenclever, A./Mayer, P./Rittberger, V.: Is Distributive Justice a Necessary Condition for a High Level of Regime Robustness?, 2000.***

Nr. 37 Rittberger, B.: Demokratie und Frieden in Europa I – Welche Verfassungsordnung für Europas „erste Gemeinschaft“?, 2001.***

Nr. 38 Hasenclever, A.: Demokratie und Frieden in Europa II – Europa und der
demokratische Frieden, 2001.***

Nr. 39  Reiber, T.: Die Bedeutung der Art der Konfliktbearbeitung für die Befriedung von Bürgerkriegsgesellschaften am Beispiel von Angola und El Salvador, 2002.***


Nr. 40a Mayer, P./Rittberger, V./Zelli, F.: Cracks in the West? Reflections on the Transatlantic Relationship today, 2003.*** (nur online verfügbar)

Nr. 41  Rittberger, V./Zelli, F.: Europa in der Weltpolitik: Juniorpartner der USA oder antihegemoniale Alternative?, 2003.***

Nr. 42  Rittberger, V./Zelli, F.: Die Internationalisierung der Universität im Lichte ihrer Lehre, 2004.***


Nr. 44  Binder, M.: Der Einsatz von Söldnerfirmen durch gewählte Regierungen - eine „Antinomie des Demokratischen Friedens“?, 2004.***


Nr. 46  Rittberger, V.: Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theories, 2005.***

Nr. 47  De Juan, A.: Vom aggregierten und extrapolierten Weltfrieden – Plädoyer für einen integrierten Ansatz des demokratischen Friedens, 2006.***


*** online im World Wide Web abrufbar unter:
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/tapliste.htm