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Gudrun Holtz

Paul, the Law and Judaism: Stoification of the Jewish Approach to the Law in Paul's Letter to the Romans[1]

Abstracts

Eine der zentralen Fragen der Paulusforschung der letzten Jahrzehnte war das von Paulus insbesondere im Römerbrief gezeichnete Bild vom Judentum. Die bisherige Forschung hat dazu vor allem zeitgenössische jüdische Quellen ausgewertet, ohne jedoch zu befriedigenden Ergebnissen zu kommen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz beschreitet darum einen anderen Weg, indem er den stoischen Einfluss auf die paulinische Argumentation herausarbeitet. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass das Dilemma des Ich in Röm 7,14–25, das das Gesetz erfüllen will, es aber nicht zu tun vermag, durch und durch stoisch geprägt ist. Anschließend wird gezeigt, dass Paulus die Einsichten der stoischen Psychologie nicht nur auf das jüdisch-adamitische Ich in seinem Umgang mit dem Gesetz, sondern auch auf das Verhältnis Israels zum Gesetz überträgt. Wie das stoisch gezeichnete Ich in Röm 7 erreicht auch Israel trotz allen Wollens das Gesetz nicht. Es ist damit für den Römerbrief von einer Stoifizierung des jüdischen Verhältnisses zum Gesetz zu sprechen, die insbesondere in der Formel von der "Gerechtigkeit aus Werken des Gesetzes" Ausdruck findet.

One of the major issues in Pauline studies of the last decades has been the picture of Judaism painted by Paul especially in his Letter to the Romans. To that end, scholarship first and foremost adduced contemporary Jewish sources without, however, reaching satisfactory results. The present paper, therefore, takes a different approach in that it works out the Stoic influence on Paul's argumentation. To begin with, the Stoic character of the dilemma of the "I" in Rom 7:14–25, that wills the good, but fails to do so, is demonstrated. Thereupon, it is shown that Paul transfers insights of Stoic psychology not only to the Jewish-Adamitic "I" but also to Israel's approach to the law which is reached by neither one. Paul in Romans, therefore, can be said to stoify the Jewish approach to the law which especially reflects in the formula "righteousness by works of the law".

Key words: Stoic self, Pauline "I", sin, reason, righteousness by "works of the law", righteousness "by faith", human agency, God as acting subject

Gudrun Holtz: Evangelisch-theologische Fakultät der Universität Tübingen, Liebermeisterstr. 12, 72076 Tübingen; gudrun.holtz@uni-tuebingen.de

1. Introduction

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[1]I wish to thank Mr. Randall Henning and Dr. Beth Langstaff for revising the English of this article.

From the beginning of the twentieth century Jewish and Christian scholars familiar with both Paul and Early Judaism have wondered about the kind of Judaism that Paul presents, especially in his Letter to the Romans. Scholars claim that his interpretation of Judaism that understands the law and its "works" in terms of legalistic "works righteousness" cannot be verified in the vast literature of Early Judaism, including Rabbinics.[2]

This issue was taken up by the so-called "New Perspective on Paul" inaugurated by E.P. *Sanders* in his study *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (1977). A lasting contribution of *Sanders* to this debate is his recognition that Paul's position on Judaism is derived from his understanding of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and, thus, does not primarily constitute a critique of Jewish self-understanding.[3] For Paul the "works of the law" are irrelevant because the law has been abolished in Christ: "Just as what is wrong with the law is that it is not Christ, so what is wrong with 'righteousness based on the law' (Phil. 3.9)," or on "the works of the law," "is that it is not *the* righteousness from God which depends on faith."[4] The "picture of Judaism drawn from Paul's writings," in other words, is "historically false, not simply inaccurate but fundamentally mistaken."[5]

In criticizing *Sanders*' thesis of a fundamental discontinuity between Judaism and the Gospel in Paul, J.D.G. *Dunn* argues that the Apostle very much dwelt upon Jewish self-understanding. This fact, he claims, was veiled because of a misunderstanding of the nature of "the works of the law." They "are nowhere understood" in Paul's Letters "as works which *earn* God's favour, as merit-amassing observances. They are rather seen as *badges*: they are simply what membership of covenant people involves, what mark out the Jews as God's people; ... they serve to demonstrate covenant status." Paul, in other words, attacks the Jewish concept of "covenantal nomism" worked out by *Sanders*. The Apostle denies "that God's justification depends on 'covenantal nomism.'"[6] In response to criticism voiced against his interpretation of "the works of the law," *Dunn* specifies that they not only have a sociological function as test cases separating observant Jews from Gentiles but also a more general dimension in that they refer to "whatever the law requires."[7] "Works of the law," according to *Dunn,* "is the Pauline term for 'covenantal nomism.'"[8]

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[2]Cf. the history of research by E.P. *Sanders*, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. A Comparison of Patterns of Religion, Minneapolis 1977, 4–7, who, in rendering that position, reviews C.G. *Montefiore*, S. *Schechter*, J. *Parkes*, and G.F. *Moore*.

[3]Cf. P. *von der Osten-Sacken*, Beobachtungen zur "New Perspective on Paul," in: *idem*, Der Gott der Hoffnung. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Theologie des Paulus, SKI.NF 3, Leipzig 2014, 338–55: 340.

[4]*Sanders*, Judaism, 551; reiterated in: *idem*, Paul, the Law and the Jewish People, Philadelphia 1983, 47.

[5]J.D.G. *Dunn*, The New Perspective on Paul (1983), in: *idem*, The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays. Revised Edition, Grand Rapids (Mi.) / Cambridge (U.K.) 2008, 99–120: 101, in summarizing *Sanders.*

[6]Ibid., 111.

[7]J.D.G. *Dunn*, The New Perspective: whence, what and whither?, in: *idem*: Essays, 24. Also cf. M. *Wolter*, Paulus. Ein Grundriss seiner Theologie, Neukirchen-Vluyn 2011, 355.

[8]J.D.G. *Dunn*, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, Grand Rapids (Mi.) / Cambridge (U.K.) 1998, 355. Similarly, *Wolter*, Paulus, 354–55, who, however, does not use the term. But see P.T. *O'Brien*, Was Paul a Covenantal Nomist?, in: D.A. *Carson* et al. (eds.), Justification and Variegated Nomism. Vol. II. The Paradoxes of Paul, WUNT 2/181, Tübingen 2004, 249–96: 280–81.

The debates of the last third of the 20th century and beyond on the "New Perspective on Paul" have contributed substantially to a better understanding of Paul's picture of Judaism. Still, it remains an open question as to why Paul chose to subsume the Jewish approach to the law under righteousness "by works of the law" and his own approach under righteousness "by faith," with the result that only with difficulty can Paul's picture of Judaism be related to known forms of Early Judaism.[9] *Sanders* is certainly right in insisting that Paul's picture of Judaism is derived from his understanding of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. This, however, does not completely explain the antithesis of righteousness "by works of the law" and righteousness "by faith" in Romans.

Instead of following the classical *status quaestionis* in terms of the kind of Jewish self-understanding Paul had in mind when formulating his doctrine of justification, the present paper suggests that his knowledge of non-Jewish, namely Stoic, notions prompted him in Romans to reinterpret the antithesis of "by works" and "by faith," already found in Gal 2:16, so as to construct Judaism as human-centered[10] and his own religious beliefs as God-centered.

Time and again Paul's Letter to the Romans can be seen as an attempt to convince non-Christian Judaism[11] that in the Gospel of Jesus Christ it is God who acts graciously in favor of Jews and Gentiles alike whereas humans are but recipients of his acting. Against this background, the thesis I wish to propose is that the Judaism that Paul constructs in view of the Gospel is given a Stoic ring, evocative of the Hellenistic philosophy of self. Paul's Jewish counterpart in Romans, then, is not "covenantal nomism," but rather a polemically painted picture of Judaism that borrows motifs especially from "covenantal nomism" and Pharisaic-Tannaitic "works righteousness,"[12] without, however, conforming to either one of these concepts.[13] The Pauline construct of Judaism then proves itself to be a Stoicized Judaism which is more Stoic than Jewish. The polemic character of the doctrine of justification "by faith" has long since been recognized. The proposal presented here starts from that insight, only to qualify the character of that polemic in different terms.

The argument put forward here is based primarily on Rom 7:14–25 where Paul explains the approach of the "I" to the law against the background of Stoic

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[9]The manifold reactions to the "New Perspective on Paul" attest to that problem in the present too.

[10]This characterization of Judaism hardly concurs with Jewish self-understanding as documented in the literature of Early Judaism. This is true, even if one acknowledges that "doing works" in order to receive "merit" is a concept embraced in Jewish antiquity (cf. e.g. F. *Avemarie*, Erwählung und Vergeltung. Zur optionalen Struktur rabbinischer Soteriologie, NTS 45 [1999], 108–26; P.S. *Alexander*, Torah and Salvation in Tannaitic Literature, in: D.A. *Carson* et al. [eds.], Justification and Variegated Nomism. Vol. I. The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism, WUNT 2/140, Tübingen 2001, 299–300, and *von der Osten-Sacken*, Beobachtungen, 343; but see G. *Stemberger*, Der Lohngedanke im rabbinischen Judentum, in: J. *Thiessen* [ed.], Das antike Judentum und die Paulusexegese, BThSt 160, Neukirchen-Vluyn 2016,19–46, who in some ways accentuates differently). For that concept is part of a wider theological system and cannot be judged as an isolated idea.

[11]Cf. M. *Wolter*, Der Brief an die Römer, Teilband 1: Röm 1–8, Neukirchen-Vluyn 2014, 44–45. That dialogical situation is presupposed in chapt. 4 of the present paper.

[12]Cf. *Alexander*, Torah, 300. For the relation of "works righteousness" and "covenantal nomism" cf. *O'Brien*, Paul, 264.

[13]This is echoed by *Alexander*, Torah, 298, who notes that in analyzing the relationship between Torah and salvation in Tannaitic literature he was posing to it "an agenda which has essentially been framed elsewhere (in the study of Paul and of post-Reformation Christian theology), and asking of it questions which it is reluctant to answer."

interpretations of the concepts of *akrasia* and the self (2). This approach is reflected in Paul's interpretation of Israel's relation to the law in Rom 9–10 especially but also in Rom 3–4 (3). In the concluding section the pragmatic function of the stoification of the Jewish approach to the law in Romans is discussed (4).

2. Stoification of the Approach of the Jewish-Adamitic "I" to the Law in Romans 7[14]

In this chapter I want to argue that Paul pictures the Jewish-Adamitic "I" involved in a characteristically Stoic drama of the self acting towards the Jewish law like a Stoic in relation to the ethic good. The Jewish-Adamitic approach to the law as depicted in Rom 7, thus, seems to have undergone stoification.

Paul in Rom 7 explains the approach to the law by the Jewish-Adamitic "I" in terms of *akrasia* – "literally: 'lack' or 'loss' of self-control" –, a concept which is deeply rooted in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition. It refers to "the outcome of a conflict between irrational desires or passions on the one hand and reason on the other hand."[15] The resolution of this conflict greatly differs in the various philosophical schools. Paul's understanding is particularly close to Stoicism.

In the following, first, Paul's interpretation of *akrasia* in Rom 7:14–25 is discussed (2.1), and then secondly his exposition is compared with Stoic understandings of the concept (2.2).

2.1. Paul's Interpretation of *Akrasia* in Rom 7:14–25 – a Sketch

The following argument is based on the assumption that the "I" of Rom 7 is at first primarily a Jewish one but, in the course of the argument in 7:7–13, shows itself to have an Adamitic dimension too.[16] A first clue to the Jewish dimension of the "I" is found in Rom 7:1[17] where Paul addresses "those who know the law,"[18] namely the Jews. That claim is substantiated by two well-known passages from the Sinaitic Torah that are used in Rom 7:7–13 in connection with the ἐγώ. The "I" would not have known desire, if the law had not said: "You shall not desire" (v 7). This prohibition is the last of the commandments of the Decalogue given to Israel at Mount Sinai (Ex 20:17 / Dtn 5:21).[19] Of special importance is the Rom 7:10 allusion to Lev 18:5: ἡ ἐντολή ἡ εἰς ζωήν. This passage in Paul's letters repeatedly serves to summarize

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[14]The point of departure of this chapter is chapt. 9 of G. *Holtz,* Die Nichtigkeit des Menschen und die Übermacht Gottes. Studien zur Gottes- und Selbsterkenntnis bei Paulus, Philo und in der Stoa, WUNT 377, Tübingen 2017, 380–85. Some of the points made in the following are already mentioned there. They will not be referred to in detail.

[15]*J. Müller*, Did Seneca Understand Medea? A Contribution to the Stoic Account of *Akrasia*, in: J. *Wildberger* / M.L. *Colish* (eds.), Seneca Philosophus, Trends in Classics – Supplementary Volumes 27, Berlin/Boston 2014, 65–94: 65.

[16]The thesis of a Jewish-Adamitic "I" has been convincingly argued by *Wolter*, Brief, 431–32.435–37. G. *Theißen / P. von Gemünden*, Der Römerbrief. Rechenschaft eines Reformators, Göttingen 2016, 265–66, connect the Jewish dimension of the "I" with the "flesh" which they claim to have an ethnic component in Paul. The Jewish dimension of the "I" makes it all the more likely that Paul's "reales *Ich*" is included in "seinem idealen literarischen *Ich*" (ibid., 419).

[17]With the majority of interpreters Rom 7:1–6 is understood as introductory part of Rom 7; cf. T. *Söding*, 4.1.3. Der Mensch im Widerspruch (Röm 7), in: F.W. *Horn* (ed.), Paulus Handbuch, Tübingen 2013, 371–74: 372.

[18]νόμος in 7:1 is usually taken to mean the Torah; but see *Wolter*, Paulus, 353 ("ein Gesetz"). Generally speaking, the translations of the passages from Romans follow *Dunn*, Romans.

[19]In Rom 13:9 that commandment is part of the enumeration of the commandments of the second tablet; here it obviously is directed to both Jews and Gentiles.

Israel's approach to the law[20] and would have resonated with Jewish readers in particular.[21]

The Adamitic dimension of the "I" comes to the fore in the passages from the book of Genesis alluded to by Paul in 7:9–11 where he interprets the Jewish relationship to the Torah in the light of the story of Adam and Eve. The Apostle thereby wants to make the point that the Jewish approach to the law is defined by the one *condicio humana* common to both Jews and Gentiles.[22] This presupposition underlies the argument in both Rom 3:19–20 and 9:30–10:4.

Before discussing Paul's understanding of *akrasia* (7:14–25) – that is the drama of the "I" caught up in the contradiction between a person's will, governed by reason, and the person's acting, ruled by sin – as part of his apology of the law (vv 7–25),[23] Paul in 7:7–13 explains the relation between sin and law. It is not the law that causes the death of the "I" but sin which, "seizing the opportunity through the commandment, deceived (ἐξηπάτησεν) me and through it killed me" (7:11). By misusing the law, sin proves itself to be the actual culprit (v 13), whereas "the law is holy, and the commandment holy and just and good" (v 12). Sin in v 8 is linked with desire: Through the law in terms of the commandment it "produces all kinds of desires."[24] Desire in philosophical expositions of *akrasia* is connected with evil. This linkage can be presupposed as regards Rom 7 as well. In 7:14–25 "desire" is completely replaced by "sin;" the notion itself, however, remains present through the terms κατεργάζομαι and ἁμαρτία.[25]

By charging the "I" Paul, as part of his apology of the law in vv 14–16, exonerates the law, now characterized as spiritual (πνευματικός; v14): The "I" is "fleshly (σάρκινος), sold under sin" and, therefore, unable to properly approach the law. The syntagma ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν refers to the understanding of sin as a power, found already in 6:14. πεπραμένος alludes to the notion of enslavement to sin (6:16, 20).[26] The inner situation of the "I" described in v14b, is subsequently explained by the philosophical

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[20]Cf. Rom 10:5 (see below chap. 3.1) and Gal 3:12.

[21]Cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 467. The relationship between Gen 2-3 and Rom 7:7–13 has recently been discussed by J. *Spaeth*, Das 'Ich' in Röm 7,7–25, in: S. *Krauter* (ed.), Perspektiven auf Römer 7, BThSt 159, Neukirchen-Vluyn 2016, 161–204: 191–99.

[22]Cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 467. Ibid., 436, he questions the interpretation of Rom 7:11 as reference to Gen 3:13.

[23]Cf. e.g. *Dunn*, Romans, 377; but see *Spaeth*, 'Ich,' 189.

[24]Also cf. Rom 6:12: the power of sin (βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία) in the body is responsible for human obedience to passions or desires (ἐπιθυμίαις). But see E. *Wasserman*, The Death of the Soul in Romans 7. Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology, WUNT 256, Tübingen 2008, 146–47.

[25]For the relationship between sin and desire further cf. *Theißen / von Gemünden*, Römerbrief, 261–62. Paul in Rom 7:14–25 only uses the term ἁμαρτία to describe the entity active in the "I" as flesh. In Rom 7:5, however, he talks about τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. As in Gal 5:24, παθήματα is to be understood in terms of πάθη (passions; cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 418, fn. 37). In the syntagma under discussion the genitive is a *genetivus qualitatis* ("the sinful passions"); similarly, R. *von Bendemann*, Die kritische Diastase von Wissen, Wollen und Handeln. Traditionsgeschichtliche Spurensuche eines hellenistischen Topos in Römer 7, ZNW 95 (2004), 35–63: 53. But see *Wolter*, Brief, 148, who opts for a *genetivus objectivus* ("die Sünden als äußerlich wahrnehmbare Geschehensfolge der Leidenschaften"), which in the light of 7:8 (ἡ ἁμαρτία ... κατειργάσατο ... πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν) is highly unlikely, and *Wasserman*, Death, 146 ("sin as a representation of the passions").

[26]Cf. e.g. *Dunn*, Romans, 388, and *Wolter*, Brief, 445–46.

notion of *akrasia*: The "I" does what it does not intend (γιγνώσκω)[27] to do, does not do what it wills (θέλω), and does what it hates (v 15).[28] Doing what it does not want to do (v 16a), that is transgressing the law, the "I" agrees that the law is good (καλόν). The "I," in other words, is divided as regards its will and its doing. The term γιγνώσκω points to the cognitive dimension of the concept of *akrasia*. The "I" is fully aware of its situation: it is conscious of rejecting will complying with reason.

In vv 17–20 Paul returns to the problem of sin. In v 14 he pointed out that the "I" is "sold under sin," implying that sin is exterior to the "I." Now he explains that sin is an integral dimension of the "I,"[29] since it dwells in the "I" (vv 17, 20), not good (ἀγαθόν). This is why the "I" is caught up in self-contradiction and is unable to act as it wills. Again Paul emphasizes the cognitive dimension: the "I" is aware (οἶδα) of its situation. Sin, by implication, does not manage to occupy the "I" completely but dwells in the part of the "I" that is flesh (ἐν σαρκί) and prevents the other dimension of the "I" that wills the good from doing it (v 18). As a result the "I" loses its autonomy to do the good, left only with the autonomy to will it.[30]

In the concluding part, vv 21–25, Paul relates the problem of *akrasia* directly to the law. The good is identified with the law; the bad refers to its transgression.[31] The "I" as far as it wants to do the good (v 21) is identified with "the inner man" (v 22) who acts in accordance with human reason (νοῦς), with "*nous*" being "*part of* the body."[32] As far as the inner man is concerned (κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον) the "I" sympathizes with "the law of God" (v 22). But in practice it does the bad (v 21) because it sees "another law" in its "constituent parts at war with the law of my mind (τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου) and making me a prisoner to the law of sin (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας) which is in my constituent parts" (v 23).

The division of the "I," thus, is reflected in the twofold reality of the law. The law approached by the "I" in terms of the "inner man" ruled by νοῦς[33] is "the law of God" that is specified as the "law of my mind." The law approached by the "I" in terms of the flesh, the dwelling place of sin, is "another law" which is identical with "the law of sin" that dwells in the "I" as flesh and its constituent parts. Both laws are in a state of war: the "other law" makes war against the "law of my mind" and gains the victory over it, making the "I" as a whole, as flesh and reason, a prisoner to "the law of sin." The metaphor αἰχμαλωτίζεσθαι (v 23) is consistent with the metaphor πιπράσκω (v

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[27]For that rendering of γιγνώσκω cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 446.

[28]As regards "doing," Paul in v 15 uses three terms: κατεργάζομαι, πράσσω and ποιῶ, which in what follows are used too.

[29]Cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 442, and T. *Engberg-Pedersen*, A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul? From Galatians 5:17 to Romans 7:14–25, in: C.K. *Rothschild* / T.W. *Thompson* (eds.), Christian Body, Christian Self: Concepts of Early Christian Personhood, WUNT 284, Tübingen 2011, 85–112: 109.

[30]Cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 446.453.455.

[31]The ethical terms: ἀγαθόν, καλόν and κακόν, originate from the Greek philosophical discourse. In Rom 7 they emphasize the universal dimension of the dilemma of the "I." By contrast, the discourse on the law would have appealed to Jewish readers in particular.

[32]*Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 109.

[33]Cf. *Spaeth*, 'Ich,' 178, who characterizes Paul's "inner man" as being under "Vernunftherrschaft," and *Engberg-Pedersen,* Concept, 101. V 25b is understood to be part of Paul's text (cf. e.g. *Dunn*, Romans, 398–99, and *Wolter*, Brief, 463–65; but see e.g. O. *Hofius*, Der Mensch im Schatten Adams. Röm 7,7–25a, in: *idem*, Paulusstudien II, WUNT 143, Tübingen 2002, 104–54: 151–52, and H. *Lichtenberger*, Der Beginn der Auslegungsgeschichte von Römer 7: Röm 7,25b, ZNW 88 (1997), 284–95: passim.

14), with both alluding to slavery.[34] In that war the "inner man," ruled by reason, is overpowered by sin residing in the flesh and subsequently enslaved by it. This is why the approach of the "I" to the law does not lead to the fulfillment of the law.
Paul's solution to the plight of the "I," experiencing both the inability to do the good it wants to do – fulfill the law – and the compulsion to do the bad – transgress the law –, is indicated in vv 24–25a and fully developed in Rom 8. It is conceived christologically-pneumatologically.[35]

2.2. Stoic Interpretations of *Akrasia* and Rom 7:14–25
As will be seen, a comparison of Paul and the Stoics on *akrasia* brings both correspondences and differences to the forefront. In terms of the history of tradition Paul is on the receiving side. He incorporates Stoic ideas into his own specific argument and makes them subservient to his very train of thought. In Rom 7:14–25 he undertakes to clarify the role of the "I" in relation to the biblical concepts of law and sin, concepts which in Stoic texts on *akrasia* are not explicitly discussed.[36] It is to be expected then that he not only takes over elements constituting *akrasia* but also modifies them. The argumentative framework of his discussion of the concept is Rom 7:7–8:11 as a whole where he argues with those who know the law (7:1) from the perspective of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ[37] and the giving of the eschatological Spirit.[38]
In Rom 7:7–25 Paul argues for the impossibility of the Jewish-Adamitic "I"'s approach to the law. To this end he adopts the Stoic working out of the concept of *akrasia* as interpreted by Chrysippus and Seneca especially. But Paul also adopts elements which are in line with Socrates and later found in Epictetus' discussion of *akrasia*.[39] Although there are similarities with both his contemporaries, Paul's understanding of the *akratic* problem is closer to Seneca's.
(1) In the present context, Diss 2:26.1–7 is most often adduced to illustrate Epictetus' solution to the *akratic* problem that he describes in terms of a contradiction between one's wish and one's actual doing.

1 Every error (ἁμάρτημα) involves a contradiction (μάχην). For since he who is in error does not wish to err, but to be right, it is clear that he is not doing what he wishes (ὃ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ). 2 For what does the thief wish to achieve? His own interest. Therefore, if thievery is against his interest, he is not doing what he wishes (οὐκ οὖν ... ὃ μὲν θέλει ποιεῖ).
3 Now every rational soul (πᾶσα ... ψυχὴ λογική) is by nature (φύσει) offended by contradiction; and so, as long as a man does not understand (παρακολουθῇ[40]) that he is involved in contradiction, there is nothing to prevent him from doing contradictory things, but when he has come to understand the contradiction he must of necessity abandon (ἀποστῆναι) and avoid (φυγεῖν) it, just as a bitter necessity compels a man to renounce (ἀνανεῦσαι) the

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[34]Cf. *Dunn*, Romans, 395.
[35]For details see below chapt. 2.2.
[36]For the problem of the law cf. *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 58–59; on sin see below.
[37]Cf. Rom 7:5–6, 25a; 8:2–4.
[38]Cf. 7:6 and 8:1–11 especially.
[39]Epictetus' interpretation of *akrasia* is often taken to represent the Stoic understanding in general; cf. e.g. *Wasserman*, Death, 27–30, and S. *Krauter*, Einführung, in: *idem* (ed.), 1–15: 11–12; but see *Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 104.
[40]Cf. LSJ, 1313, s.v. παρακολουθέω II.2: "follow with the mind, understand."

false when he perceives (τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ) that it is false; but as long as the falsehood does not appear (φαντάζηται), he assents (ἐπινεύει) to it as the truth.
4 He, then, who can show (παραδεῖξαι) to each man the contradiction which causes him to err, and can clearly bring home to him how he is not doing what he wishes (ὃ θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ), and is doing what he does not wish (ὃ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ), is strong in argument, and at the same time effective both in encouragement and refutation. 5 For as soon as anyone shows (δείξῃ) a man this, he will of his own accord abandon (ἀφ' αὑτοῦ ἀναποχωρήσει) what he is doing. But so long as you do not point this out (δεικνύῃς), be not surprised if he persists in his error; for he does it because he has an impression (φαντασίαν) that he is right ... 7 ... Point out to the rational governing faculty (λογικῷ ἡγεμονικῷ) a contradiction and it will desist (ἀποστήσεται)."[41]

The key to solving the *akratic* problem, accordingly, is reason: the rational governing faculty, the *hēgemonikon*[42], must come to understand that it is involved in contradiction in order to desist from committing error; in other words, it must know that it is not doing what it wishes. Correspondingly, Medea's problem for Epictetus consists in her ignorance:

"Show (δεῖξον) her clearly that she is deceived (ἐξηπάτηται), and she will not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what else has she to follow (ἀκολουθῆσαι) but that which appears true to her? Nothing." (Diss 1:28.8)

As has been variously pointed out, terminology and syntax found in Epictetus to express the contradiction between will and doing is closely reflected in Paul.[43] Both authors also agree on the anthropological, trans-individual character of the self.[44] The solution to the *akratic* problem for each, however, differs fundamentally: whereas for Epictetus reason is the key to solving it, for Paul it is part of the problem.
As indicated, the conceptual side of Paul's understanding of *akrasia* is much closer to Chrysippus and Seneca than to Epictetus. Parallel notions especially show in the understanding of the self or the "I" and the role of reason in the conflict between will and doing and the conflict between reason and passions or sin.
(2) C. *Gill* has argued that "passionate self-division" in the Senecan *Medea* and *Phaedra* represents "a key aspect of Stoic thinking, going back to Chrysippus."[45] Stoicism according to *Gill*

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[41]For text and translation here and in the following cf. W.A. *Oldfather*, Epictetus. The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments. With an English Translation. Vol. I-II, LCL, Cambridge (Mass.) / London 1925, 1928.
[42]On the *hēgemonikon* cf. P. *Hadot*, Die innere Burg. Anleitung zu einer Lektüre Marc Aurels, Frankfurt a.M. 1996, 127.
[43]Cf. *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 56–57. For parallels between Rom 7:14–25 and Epictetus as regards contents cf. ibid., 58–59. These parallels, however, are not in each case connected with the problem of *akrasia*.
[44]The first person, the "I," is found in Diss 2:17-18; 4:4.7; cf. S. *Vollenweider*, Freiheit als neue Schöpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt, FRLANT 147, Göttingen 1989, 351, fn. 327.
[45]Cf. C. *Gill*, Seneca and selfhood. Integration and disintegration, in: S. *Bartsch* / D. *Wray* (eds.), Seneca and the Self, Cambridge 2009, 65–83: 65. On self-division of Seneca's drama figures cf. esp. G. *Mader*, The Rhetoric of Rationality and Irrationality, in: G. *Damschen* / A. *Heil* (eds.), Brill's Companion to Seneca. Philosopher and Dramatist, Leiden/Boston 2014, 575–92: 583–86. New Testament scholars such as G. *Theißen*, Psychologische Aspekte paulinischer Theologie, FRLANT 131, Göttingen 1983, 219; *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 57–58, and *Wolter*, Brief, 448–51, adduce

"operates within a unified or 'holistic' psychological model in which all adult human responses reflect beliefs (in Stoic terms, assent to rational 'impressions'). But, although all human adults are in this sense unified, it is only the ideal wise person who is completely integrated and coherent; the psychological life of the non-wise person is marked by vacillation and inner conflict... The Stoic theory of the emotions or passions ... stresses both the cognitive dimension (that passions consists in false beliefs about what is valuable) and also the fluctuating, 'fever-like,' quality of passionate experience."[46]

As seen, Epictetus unilaterally stresses the cognitive dimension.[47] By contrast, Chrysippus, later followed by Seneca, equally emphasizes the "fluctuating, 'fever-like,' quality of passionate experience." Chrysippus' favorite example of passion that can get completely out of control is Medea.[48] In between the killings of her children, Medea, aiming at taking revenge on her husband, admits that "'I know that what I intend to do is bad, but anger is master of my plans.'"[49] Medea for Chrysippus, therefore,

"served as a striking illustration of how someone in a passionate state could be conscious of 'rejecting reason' (of doing what is 'bad') and yet still be so carried away by her 'excessive impulse' ... that she cannot now counteract this. In other words, she herself articulates the conflict between the 'natural' and 'actual' self that is, to some degree, part of every human passion or emotion."[50]

In Chrysippus' own terminology, the conflict within the human soul is presented as a conflict between the "rational (power)" and "some other power" which is the "cause" of passions or affections.[51] The "other power" is called (δύναμις) ἄλογος.[52] In Medea's case this irrational power coerced (ἐβιάσατο) her soul so that she became angry.[53] At the same time, Chrysippus stresses the cognitive dimension involved: Medea "understands" the "evils she is going to do."[54]

Seneca's dramas to examplify the divided "I" of Rom 7 without, however, dwelling on their Stoic character.

[46]*Gill*, Seneca, 71–72. On the monistic model of Stoic psychology also cf. *Müller*, Seneca, 68.

[47]This is not to say, however, that Epictetus is unaware of passionate experience, quite to the contrary; cf. Diss 3:12.7–12 e.g., where, however, *akrasia* is not discussed.

[48]Cf. *Gill*, Seneca, 72.74, and *Müller*, Seneca, 66.

[49]Euripides, Medea 1078–79: καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων (translation *Gill*, Seneca, 74). This text is literally quoted by Chrysippus; cf. Galen, PHP 4:6.19. For Galen the Greek-English edition of P. de *Lacy*, Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. Edition, Translation and Commentary. First Part: Books I–V, Berlin [3]1984, is used.

[50]*Gill*, Seneca, 74. The "natural" self is "the capacity for full rationality that is constitutive of our nature as rational animals," the "actual" self is the one "which imperfectly realizes this capacity" (ibid., 73–74).

[51]... ὁ Χρύσιππος οὐχ ἅπαξ ἢ δὶς ἀλλὰ πάνυ πολλάκις αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ δύναμίν τινα ἑτέραν εἶναι τῆς λογικῆς ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰτίαν τῶν παθῶν (Galen, PHP 4:6.1).

[52]Cf. Galen, PHP 4:6.21, 23.

[53]ἧς ἔργον τὸ θυμοῦσθαι. θυμός is but one passion or affection. In the case of Menelaus the irrational power engendered desire. Chrysippus calls it ἡ (δύναμις) ἡ ἐπιθυμητική. It compelled (κατηνάγκασεν) his soul to follow (ἀκολουθεῖν) its commands (Galen, PHP 4:6.22).

[54]Cf. Galen, PHP 4:6.21. With reference to Plato, for whom "knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) is a royal and despotic thing and that no one errs in anything when knowledge is present" – this, however, is not the whole of Plato; see below and *Spaeth*, 'Ich,' 200 –, Galen criticizes Chrysippus for interpreting

Chrysippus' understanding of emotion or passion, *Gill* claims, also "underlies the portrayal of inner conflict and psychological disintegration in Seneca's *Medea* and *Phaedra*."[55] Illustrating the power of passion over will, Paul's Stoic contemporary makes his Medea in the same situation as the Euripidean Medea say:

"Now has my wrath (*ira*) died within me. I am sorry for my act, ashamed. What, wretched woman (*misera*), have I done? – wretched, say I? Though I repent, yet have I done it! Great joy steals on me 'gainst my will (*voluptas magna me invitam subit*), and lo, it is increasing."[56]

Medea's inner conflict then is between her will governed by reason and her doing – she knows it to be bad – governed by passion and admitted by reason. Her "natural" or "true" self acknowledges that she is rejecting reason, while her "actual" self is giving way to passion. Passion, thus, proves itself to be stronger than reason. Medea, in other words, "is not simply swept away by an irrational passion but ... her mind actively embraces it." [57] Still, Seneca "obviously stays within the cognitivist framework of old Stoic psychological monism."[58]
What Seneca in *Medea* 989–92 puts as conflict between deed and will,[59] in his *Phaedra* he formulates in terms of a conflict between passion and reason.[60] In this drama Phaedra says:

"Frenzy (*furor*) compels (*cogit*) (me) to follow the worse (*peiora*) (course of action). The rational soul (*animus*) moves to the brink knowingly (*sciens*) and retreats in vain to seek (*appetens*) safe counsel... What can reason (*ratio*) do? Frenzy has won and reigns (*vicit ac regnat furor*)."[61]

Euripides, *Medea*, 1078–79, in the sense of a contradiction (ἐναντιώσεως) between the rational and the irrational. Chrysippus "should not have said that she (sc. Medea) understands but the very opposite, that she is ignorant (ἀγνοεῖν) and does not understand (μὴ μανθάνειν) what evils she is going to do" (cf. Galen, PHP 4:6.17–23). To Galen this position is incompatible with Chrysippus' unified psychological model hinted at in PHP 4:6.26: "that the affections are judgments and that they arise in the rational power of the soul." Epictetus in that matter follows Socrates and Plato (as summarized by Galen); cf. Diss 2:26 and his interpretation of Medea in Diss 1:28.8 (see above). But cf. *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 57–58, and similarly *Theißen*, Aspekte, 217–18, 220.

[55] *Gill*, Seneca, 74. For Chrysippan influence on Seneca's Medea also cf. M. *Nussbaum*, The Therapy of Desire, Princeton (N.J.) 1994, 448–53.

[56] Seneca, *Medea* 989–92 (text and translation F.J. *Miller*, Seneca. Hercules Furens. Troades. Medea. Hippolytus. Oedipus, Cambridge [Mass.] / London 1998, 310–11). Epictetus, Diss 1,28.9, similarly calls Medea ἡ ταλαίπωρος.

[57] *Müller*, Seneca, 73.

[58] Ibid., 74.

[59] The importance of will for Seneca also shows in his *Phaedra* (§604–5): *vos testor omnis, caelites, hoc quod volo / me nolle*.

[60] Ovid, Metamorphoses 7:9–21, combines both these expressions of the conflict manifest in *akrasia*: "But a strange force draws me against my *will*, and *desire* urges one thing, *thought* another. I see the better things and approve them, it is the worse I *pursue*" (*sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*; text and translation D.E. *Hill*, Ovid, Metamorphoses. V–VIII, Warminster 1992, 68–69); italics G.H.

[61] Seneca, Phaedra 178–84. Seneca continues: "and a potent god commands my whole mind (*potensque tota mente dominatur deus*)" (§185; for text and translation cf. A.J. *Boyle*, Seneca's Phaedra. Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes, Liverpool / Wolfeboro [N.H.] 1987, 52–53, and *Gill*, Seneca, 75, fn. 42). The change of the power ruling the soul, accordingly, goes along with the change of the god in charge. Outside the fever-like passionate experience divineness in Stoic thinking rests with reason which is the divine in the rational soul. – For standardization purposes here and in the

Seneca's Phaedra just like the Chrysippan and Senecan Medea is "conscious of 'rejecting reason' (of doing what is 'bad')."[62] Furthermore, the Roman Stoic emphasizes the absolute impotence of reason against the overwhelming power of frenzy which forces Phaedra against her own rational discernment to do the worse. This is what according to R. *Mayer* makes out the specifically Stoic profile of the Senecan Phaedra: the "paradoxical doctrine, to the effect that all men are mad (save the Stoic sage), inasmuch as they all give in to the passions of greed, envy, lust, etc., rather than heed the corrective voice of reason (*ratio*)."[63] By contrast, Phaedra's "rational action: her mind (*animus*) acts knowingly (*sciens*), but it cannot strive to effect sensible plans (*sana consilia*...) ... is not a particularly Stoic observation."[64]

As regards the understanding of the self, similarities as well as differences between Chrysippus and Seneca on the one hand and Paul on the other come to the forefront. All three of them agree on the anthropological, trans-individual character of the self and view it as disintegrated. For the Stoics, the division is between the "natural" and the "actual" self; for Paul, the division is between the inner man ruled by reason effective in will and sin effective in the flesh. Here and there this conflict is articulated by the respective self itself. For both Paul and Seneca, the division exists in two forms: in the contradiction between will and doing and in the contradiction between reason and passions or sin effective in desires. The Apostle regards reason as well as sin as "powers" that correspond to the rational and the irrational power in Chrysippus.[65] In both concepts the irrational power generates passions or, in Rom 7:8, desire, which the Stoics regard as one of the four main passions.[66] In Rom 7:14–25 Paul replaces those terms with his very own concept of sin, which, for him, however, is an apocalyptic power.[67] Stoic passions, just like Pauline sin, are uncontrollable powers. In both concepts reason and passions or sin are involved in a warlike conflict that is won by the latter and accompanied by the enslavement of reason.[68] In Stoicism this defeat can be avoided if reason rejects impressions capable of engendering passions, but for Paul human reason is incapable of fighting off sin. Both, again, agree that the cognitive dimension of the self is conscious of rejecting the good that reason demands.

The trickiest aspect of this comparison concerns the anthropological model underlying both interpretations of *akrasia.* The Stoic character of the unified psychological model precisely shows in that the "overpowering of reason" is not linked up with

following some of the terms used by the English translations were replaced; standardized is also the Latin spelling.

[62]See above fn. 50.

[63]R. *Mayer*, Seneca. Phaedra, London 2002, 42–43.

[64]Ibid., 43. That aspect similarly shows in Ovid, Metamorphoses 7:19–21 (ibid.). *Mayer*'s reading concurs with the interpretations of both *Gill* and *Müller*.

[65]Seneca apparently presupposes this understanding when referring to frenzy as an entity that is in the position to "compel" (*Medea* 989).

[66]Cf. A.A. *Long* / D.N. *Sedley*, The Hellenistic philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of the principal sources, with philosophical commentary, Cambridge u.a. 1987, 420.

[67]Cf. *Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 94; but see *Wasserman*, Death, 146, who rejects "the sin-as-power interpretations" of Rom 7.

[68]For Seneca see below (*De ira* 1:7.3).

"an external foe, such as a different irrational part of the soul.[69] Quite to the contrary, it means a voluntary self-enslavement of reason by consenting to judgments which cause the mind as a whole to be in a passionate and excessive state. The *hēgemonikon* is not overwhelmed from the outside but infected from the inside."[70]

It is quite clear that Paul in Rom 7 does not suggest a self-enslavement of reason or will to sin. As regards sin, he starts by describing it as an external foe (7:14) subduing the "I." Beginning with v 17, however, sin is portrayed as an integral part of the "I" dwelling in the flesh. Reason, understood as human reason, is part of the body.[71] That is to say, that Rom 7, too, presupposes a unified anthropological model that encompasses the notion of a disintegrated self. However, in Stoicism the division concerns the soul, whereas for Paul, reflecting Hebrew anthropology, the division concerns the human being as a whole in terms of flesh and reason.[72] They agree, none the less, on the following essentials: from within the self an antagonistic power overwhelms reason and hinders the divided self from doing what it wills.

(3) In order to more fully appreciate both the similarities as well as the differences between Rom 7 and the Stoic texts the role of reason in Stoic thought need be discussed in more detail. Seneca in his tracts "On Anger (*De ira*)" has dealt with that issue on the philosophical plane.[73]

In *De ira* 2:4.1–2 he considers the role of reason in the context of a three-stage account of the emergence of passion: "Emotions [1] begin, or [2] grow, or [3] are carried away."[74] The first movement, which is the appearance of an impression in the mind, can, in no way, be prevented since it is involuntary (*non voluntarius*). The decisive moment in the generation of a passion lies with the second movement. On this level the ἡγεμονικόν has the power to affirm or to reject an impression. In *De ira* 2:4.1 its admission is presupposed. The second movement includes a "voluntary judgment on injustice followed by an impulse to revenge."[75] At this stage the transition from an accidentally aroused motion (*motus*) of the soul caused by external impressions to a passion (*affectus*) takes place. Motions then are non-rational beginnings and preludes of passions (*principia proludentia affectibus*)[76] in the emergence of which reason is involved. The third movement is "out of control (*impotens*), in that it wants (*vult*) to be avenged, not just if it is right, but in any case,

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[69] An external foe shows in Platonism e.g.; see below.

[70] *Müller*, Seneca, 77; for further details see below Seneca, *De Ira* 1:8.2–3.

[71] See above chapt. 2.1.

[72] *Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 108, points out that "the capacity for reasoning and self-reflection" in Stoicism "was itself understood as a feature *of* the human body; it was not some entity of its own, independently of the body." This is why "Stoicism was a materialist, monistic philosophy."

[73] *Gill*, Seneca, 72, stresses that the divided self with the "rational self" being dislocated from the "passionate self," is not only found in Senecas's dramas but also in his philosophical accounts. For similarities between Seneca's portrayal of Medea and *De ira* also cf. *Müller*, Seneca, 71–79.82.

[74] For text and translation here and in the following cf. J.W. *Basore*, Seneca. Moral Essays. I, LCL, London / Cambridge (Mass.) 1958, 174–75; for the present text also cf. *Gill*, Seneca, 72–73.

[75] *Müller*, Seneca, 75, on the basis of *De ira* 2:3.5: *voluntate et iudicio*; in 2:4.1 *cum voluntate* is used. For *De ira* 2:4.1 further cf. D.H. *Kaufman*, Seneca on the Analysis and Therapy of Occurent Emotions, in: J. *Wildberger* / M.L. *Colish* (eds.), 111–133: 119–126 (with further bibliography).

[76] *De ira*, 2:2.5. For examples of motions cf. §3–6.

and it has overthrown reason (*rationem evicit*)" (§2). Chrysippus labels this state explicitly as "'akratic.'"[77]

In *De ira* 1:7.1–1:8.7, Seneca discusses the relation between reason and passion at more length. Against those who defend the necessity of anger on account of its utility, while knowing that its excesses have to be limited "to a salutary degree (*ad salutarem modum*)" (1:7.1), he argues:

"In the first place, it is easier to exclude harmful passions (*excludere perniciosa*) than to rule (*regere*) them, and to deny them admittance (*non admittere*) than, after they have been admitted, to control (*moderari*) them; for when they have established themselves in possession, they are stronger than their ruler (*potentiora rectore*) and do not permit themselves to be restrained or reduced.[78]

"In the second place, Reason herself (*ratio ipsa*), to whom the reins of power have been entrusted, remains mistress (*potens*) only so long as she is kept apart from the passions (*ab adfectibus*); if once she mingles (*miscuit*) with them and is contaminated, she becomes unable to hold back those whom she might have cleared from her path. For when once the mind (*mens*) has been aroused and shaken, it becomes the slave of the disturbing agent (*ei servit).*

"There are certain things which at the start are under our control (*in nostra potestate*), but later hurry us away by their force (*vi*) and leave us no retreat (*regressum*). As a victim hurled form the precipice has no control of his body..., so with the rational soul (*animus*) – if it plunges into anger, love, or the other passions, it has no power to check the impetus (*reprimere impetum*)" (1:7.2–4).[79]

According to Seneca "the best course," therefore, is

"to reject (*spernere*) at once the first incitement to anger, to resist (*repugnare*) even its small beginnings, and to take pains to avoid falling into anger. For if it begins to lead us astray, the return to the safe path (*ad salutem*) is difficult" (1:8.1).

In 1:8.2–3 Seneca substantiates his claim that the way back from passion to reason is fraught with difficulties: "The rational soul (*animus*) is not a member apart, nor does it view the passions merely objectively (*extrinsecus*)" (§2) so as not to allow them to grow exceedingly.

"For... these two do not dwell separate and distinct, but passion (*adfectus*) and reason (*ratio*) are only the transformation of the rational soul (*animi*) toward the better or the worse. How, then, will the reason (*ratio*), after it has surrendered (*cessit*) to anger, rise again, assailed and crushed as it is by vice (*occupata et oppressa vitiis*)" (§3)?[80]

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[77]*Müller*, Seneca, 75, on the basis of Galen, PHP 4:4.24–25: "Such states as these are the sort that are out of control (ἀκρατεῖς), as if the men had no power over themselves (οὐ κρατούντων ἑαυτῶν) but were carried away... But those who move with reason (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) as their guide (ἡγεμόνα) ... have control over (κρατοῦσιν), or are not subject to, that kind of movement and its conations (ὁρμῶν)."

[78]Further cf. *De ira* 1:8.1: "if once we admit the emotion (*adfectus*) and by our own free will (*voluntate*) grant it any authority, reason becomes of no avail (*nihil rationis est*); after that it will do, not whatever you let it (*non quantum permiseris*), but whatever it chooses (*quantum volet*)."

[79]Also cf. Epictetus, Diss 1:1.4, 6.

[80]For a similar argument cf. Stobaeus 2:88.8–90.6 (= *Long/Sedley*, Hellenistic philosophers, 410–11 (65A [= SVF 3:378, 389]).

The rational soul, thus, is not a separate entity that cannot be influenced by the power of passion, but the stage on which the antagonism between reason and passion is acted out. The rational soul can take two different directions: governed by reason, it heads for the better; governed by passion, for the worse. In the first case the self remains integrated; in the second it leads to the dislocation of the "natural" or the "rational" self from the "actual" or "passionate" self,[81] that is to the divided self. The passionate self is the *akratic* self in whom reason, after its surrender, might realize its situation, but probably would be unable to regain the rule over passion. A major aim of Stoic philosophy, therefore, is to enable its followers to prevent passions from flaring up in the first place. In that, the role of the governing logical faculty, the *hēgemonikon*, is essential. Its responsibility is to ensure the correct use of the impressions and refute the ones that might engender harmful passions over which reason has no control.[82]

Stoic philosophy, therefore, can be viewed as "a kind of therapy or quasi-medical treatment" of passions. It goes along with "introspection or the turn towards the self."[83] In this vein Epictetus writes: "For it is within you that both destruction and deliverance lie" (ἔσωθεν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀπώλεια καὶ βοήθεια; Diss 4:9.16).[84] Within a person, in other words, lies the logical faculty to make use of the impressions for better or for worse. With regard to Medea, Epictetus similarly points out that her problem was that "she did not know (οὐ ... ᾔδει) where the (power) lies to do what we wish (τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ θέλομεν) – that we cannot get this from outside ourselves (οὐκ ἔξωθεν), nor by disturbing and deranging things" (2:17.21). Remedy, in other words, lies in a "turn towards the self" constituted by reason.[85]

All put together, Stoic psychology despite the power of human passion then can be said to uphold the principle of the primacy of reason even though reason can be defeated by the power of passion. In the texts discussed, the primacy of reason is self-evident in Epictetus. In their own way, however, Seneca and Chrysippus adhere to this principle, too. It shows, as seen, in two ways: the divided self remains conscious of the fact that it is rejecting reason even in the process of passionate experience. Furthermore, it shows in the Stoic core conviction that the correct use of external impressions by the logical governing faculty (*hēgemonikon*) is the key for attaining the good.[86] This concept is an essential aspect of the "turn towards the self" in Stoic philosophy.

In both the primacy of reason and the "turn towards the self" for remedy, Paul clearly differs from Stoic thought. To him the "I" is inevitably fleshly (Rom 7:13) despite the fact that reason is part of the human body. From beginning to end the "I" is unable to fight off the attack of sin; consequently, sin succeeds in making flesh its dwelling place with the result that the "I" turns utterly incapable of doing that which reason makes it will. By re-conceptualizing the role of reason in relation to sin effective in desire viz passion, Paul de-constructs decisive elements of the Stoic understanding of

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[81]Cf. *Gill*, Seneca, 72.

[82]To be prepared to deal with potentially harmful impressions Stoicism proposes the exercises which by way of premeditation train the rational soul to choose the good "if the occasion for a test really comes" (Diss 3:12.11); for the exercises cf. *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, esp. 317–24 (with further bibliography).

[83]*Gill*, Self, 362.

[84]Cf. *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, 277–80.

[85]Cf. Diss 2:17.24; 2:18.8. For *Seneca* cf. Ep 82:4–7 and see *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, 277–91.

[86]The Stoic theory of impressions was decisively developed by Chrysippus; cf. esp. *Long/Sedley*, Hellenistic philosophers, 237 (39B = SVF 2:54).

reason. Unlike Stoic thought, reason to him is entirely impotent, unable to guard the integrity of the "I" and its autonomy. It proves itself to be anything but divine; it is "my reason" (νοῦς μου; 7:23) and thus part of weak human nature. For Paul, therefore, no way leads from the νοῦς to the good in terms of the fulfillment of the law. In stark contrast to Stoicism,[87] reason itself for Paul is not part of the solution to the plight of the divided "I" but part of the problem. The remedy, according to Stoic thought, if at all,[88] is found within the rational soul; for Paul, the remedy is purely external.

Paul's solution to the dilemma of the "I," that ensures the correspondence of will and doing, that is the good in terms of the law, is conceptualized christologically-pneumatologically.[89] The wretched "I," crying out for rescue, experiences salvation by "our Lord Jesus Christ" (7:25). In what the law was unable to do because of its weakness caused by the flesh, God was able to do by "sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin." He thereby "condemned sin *in* the flesh in order that the requirement of the law might be fulfilled" (8:3–4). Sin preventing the fulfillment of the law by the divided "I," therefore, lost its power with the effect that the law can now be fulfilled in the power of the Spirit of God dwelling in those who are in Christ (v 9). It is the Spirit of the God "who raised Jesus from the dead" and will raise their mortal bodies in the future (v 11). The law, in other words, spiritual as it is, is not fulfilled by the weak and sinful "I," but by God himself, effective in the eschatologically transformed "I" through the Spirit.[90]

To summarize: The essential difference between Paul and the Stoics consists in the agents that bring about the attainment of the good.[91] For the Stoics, it is the logical governing reason within the rational soul. The Pauline ἐγώ, by contrast, does not have any resources of its own that are capable of effecting the good. The "I" finds them at its disposal within itself only after being eschatologically transformed through the power of the Spirit which makes the "I" become a "You" (8:2) in communication

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[87]And, as might be added, to Greco-Hellenistic thought in general; cf. U. *Schnelle*, Paulus. Leben und Denken, Berlin/Boston [2]2014, 586, fn. 167.

[88]Cf. Seneca, *Medea* 1078–79, and *De ira* 1:8.3. According to Seneca the conflict between the "true" self and the "actual" self remains unresolvable once the passions have erupted fully.

[89]Each in his own way, *Vollenweider*, Freiheit, 351–52, and *Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 105–7, connect the transition from Rom 7 to 8, that is the solution to the problem of *akrasia*, with Stoic thought. *Engberg-Pedersen*'s argument, however, is hardly conclusive. He argues that that solution in the first place is brought about "by an invasion of an external power (the pneuma), a complete takeover of believers' bodies." At the same time he insists that this "takeover also had a cognitive side to it" (ibid., 106), that he connects with φρονεῖν κτλ (Rom 8:5–8). The "*sudden* change" from "the situation described in 7:14–25 to the one described in 8:1–13," was brought about by the direct intervention of God and subsequently acknowledged by believers. That change he claims to be Stoic rather than Platonic, for Stoic theory "is focused on cognition: once one *sees* the world in a new way, one changes" (ibid., 107); cf. Epictetus, Diss 2:26 (see above [1]). "Here", he claims "the Platonists had nothing to offer." Human φρόνημα in Rom 8:5-8, however, is not on a par with the Spirit, but is ruled by either the flesh or the Spirit. The decisive agent for Paul then is not human thinking but God's acting in the Spirit. In this respect the Platonists actually had something to offer, since "sudden changes" are found in several authors reflecting Middle Platonism who, in addition, connect them with the divine; cf. *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, 113–15.

[90]In Rom 8:9 the Spirit of God is identified with the Spirit of Christ. Also cf. *O'Brien*, Paul, 265–66.

[91]This point *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 61, briefly mentions without, however, considering it in its full weight.

with God.[92] Still, those resources are not and do not become human possessions (8:16). In that way what for Paul is the adequate approach to the law is guaranteed.
The Spirit-based approach to the law is the Pauline alternative to the one of the Jewish-Adamitic "I" that attempts to attain the good in terms of the law by its own human resources. The "I" fails to do so because of the weakness of its main resource, reason.[93] Against this background, Paul can be said to "stoify" the approach of the Jewish-Adamitic "I" to the law. In other words, in trying to fulfill the law, the "I" acts comparably to the Stoic self and meets with similar problems: By relying on itself, the "I" finds itself caught up in a hopeless dilemma that, however, makes the wretched "I", unlike the Stoic self, cry for external rescue.

Presently, primarily the Platonic-Aristotelian and the Stoic understandings of *akrasia* are discussed as possible backgrounds of Rom 7:14–25.[94] T. *Engberg-Pedersen* has pointed out that there is no indication that Paul in Rom 7 "operated with or presupposed either of the two possible ways of accounting for the phenomenon of *akrasia*, the one in preference to the other."[95] After discerning Stoic features in Paul's solution to the "risk of *akrasia*" (Rom 8:1–13),[96] he somewhat surprisingly argues that the philosophical anthropology underlying "Paul's description of the experience of *akrasia* in 7:14–25" is "a Stoic one."[97] Even though some aspects of his argument are not conclusive, *Engberg-Pedersen* is certainly right in emphasizing Paul's indebtedness to Stoicism in Rom 7:14–8:13. Also his main argument for the impossibility of preferring one philosophical school's interpretation of *akrasia* as background of Rom 7:14–25 to the other is valid since it is based on the correct observation that Plato as well as the Stoics show "the radical and unbridgeable contrast between reason and desire."[98]
Still, in Plato's accounts of this contrast there are several aspects that differ from Paul's interpretation on which the Apostle and the Stoics, however, agree.[99] In Rep 588b–591b Plato sets forth his tripartite anthropology. The "soul is composed of three distinct faculties: the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts." The spirited part is the seat of passions and is "more responsive to reason than the appetites."[100] The reasoning faculty is connected with "the inner human being (ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος)" and is identified with the divine. It is to rule the human being as a whole, strengthening the tame emotions of the spirited part and subduing the wild ones of the appetitive part (Rep 589b–d). By contrast, Paul, similar to Stoicism, presupposes a two-partite self, consisting of reason and flesh, the dwelling place of sin operative in desire.
Furthermore, reason, according to *Engberg-Pedersen*, in Plato comes "'from the outside,'" being immaterial and divine. By contrast, reason in Stoicism is a "feature *of* the human body; it was not some entity of its own." Similarly, in Paul "the *nous* is *part of* the body." Whereas

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[92]Further cf. Rom 8:9–11, 12–16 where the σέ is broadened to include the ὑμεῖς.
[93]As Paul points out in Rom 8:3–4, the law, though being holy and spiritual, because of its weakness was unable to bring about its own fulfillment.
[94]Cf. *Wasserman*, Death, 20–31; *Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 86–87, 104–3, and *Krauter*, Einführung, 8–9, 11–12. Also see *Theißen*, Aspekte, 213–23.
[95]*Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 105.
[96]Ibid., 105–107, quotation, ibid., 105.
[97]Ibid., 107.
[98]Ibid., 104 (partly in italics). *Wasserman*, Death, 27–31, completely ignores that contrast in Stoicism, which might account for her exclusively Platonic reading of Rom 7.
[99]The texts referred to in the following are those central to *Wasserman*'s interpretation of Plato that both *Engberg-Pedersen* and *Krauter* also mention (see above fn. 94); further cf. *Spaeth*, 'Ich,' 200–1.
[100]*Wasserman*, Death, 22.

Platonism is a dualistic philosophy, Stoicism is a monistic one[101] which, as seen, also applies to Paul's anthropology in Rom 7.

In Phaedr 254b–e Plato interprets *akrasia*[102] with the help of the charioteer analogy. The struggle between the charioteer, representing reason, and the two horses, representing the spirited and the appetitive parts of the human soul, is not decided once and for all in favor of the wild horse. It comes close to a temporary victory but does not attain it; the charioteer, by contrast, is getting stronger and stronger so that the wild horse finally gives up. By contrast, reason in Rom 7 is utterly incapable of triumphing. This is paralleled in those Stoic texts assuming the eruption of passions.

Against this background, it is less likely that Paul in Rom 7:14–25 conceptually draws from Plato than that he draws from Stoicism, despite the fact that "the inner human being" is a Platonic notion. S. *Vollenweider* rightly points out that Rom 7:14–25 is comprised of Platonic traditions which in a stoicizing interpretation are found in Hellenistic Judaism as well, namely in Philo.[103] Similarly, in Roman Stoicism as represented by Seneca and Epictetus just as in Philo and in Rom 7, "will" (*velle*/θελεῖν) is much more emphasized than in Platonic texts on *akrasia*.[104] Altogether, Paul in Rom 7 is closer to a Stoic understanding of the conceptual problems involved in *akrasia* than he is to the Platonic one. The above analyses point in the same direction.

3. The Jewish Approach to the Law in Rom 3–4; 9–10 as Reflection of the Approach of the "I" in Rom 7

Central aspects of the approach of the Jewish-Adamitic "I" to the law in Rom 7 are reflected in Paul's exposition of righteousness "by works of the law" versus righteousness "by faith" in the salvation-historical chapters Rom 3–4 and 9–10.[105] As generally acknowledged, Rom 7 and 3 have some aspects in common. They concern the overall topic of the universality of sin but also show in details.[106] Paul in both contexts points out that his argument is specifically meant for Jews (7:1 / 3:19). Furthermore, he emphasizes that knowledge of sin comes through the law (7:7 / 3:19) and criticizes the Jewish approach to the law which in Rom 3–4 is characterized as "by works of the law (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου)." But more can be said. The critique of the approach of the "I" to the law in Rom 7 is followed by an exposition of the Spirit of the one "who raised Jesus from (the) dead" (8:11), enabling the fulfillment of the law (v 4). Similarly, Rom 1:18–3:20 is followed by an explanation of the alternative to righteousness "by works of the law" – for Paul a sheer impossibility –, namely righteousness "by faith" (3:21–4:25). The latter not only agrees with the law (3:31; 4), but also allows God to act in accordance with his being the one "who raised Jesus, our Lord, from (the) dead" (4:24). That basic structure shows in Rom 9:30–10:13 too, with the credential formula: "God raised him (sc. the Lord Jesus) from the dead" (10:9), being reiterated.

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[101] *Engberg-Pedersen*, Concept, 108–9. The early Plato also assumed the soul to be unified; cf. *Wasserman*, Death, 23.

[102] The *akratic* problem is hinted at in §254d in the expression οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ... ἀναγκάζων; further cf. Plato, Prot 352d. This is ignored by *Wasserman*, Death, 23. However, Plato's Protagoras reflects the Socratic solution to the problem of *akrasia*; cf. *Theißen*, Aspekte, 216.

[103] Cf. *Vollenweider*, Freiheit, 352–53.

[104] For Philo cf. Leg 2:31–32; for the problem of will cf. *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 53–54.

[105] Regarding the interpretation of the law, *Theißen / von Gemünden*, Römerbrief, 264–65, too, point to similarities between Rom 2:17; 3:27 and 10:2 on the one hand and Rom 7 on the other.

[106] Cf. 7:7–25 and 1:18–3:20; esp. cf. the wording in Rom 7:14 and 3:9.

In the following Rom 9–10 is discussed first because the issues relevant to this paper here are explained in more detail than in Rom 3–4. As will be shown, Israel's approach to the law ἐξ ἔργων is modelled on the one of the Jewish-Adamitic "I."

3.1 Israel's Approach to the Law ἐξ ἔργων and the Righteousness of God in Rom 9:30–10:13

In the first part of this section, 9:30–10:4, Paul puts forward his argument regarding Israel's failure to attain the "law of righteousness." In vv 30–32 the differences between Gentiles and Jews about the attainment of righteousness are explained. They concern two aspects, their respective behavior on the one hand and its effects on the other: "Gentiles (ἔθνη) who do not pursue (διώκοντα) righteousness have attained (κατέλαβεν) righteousness" (v 30b), "whereas Israel pursuing (διώκων) the law of righteousness has not reached (ἔφθασεν) the law" (v 31). Whatever the exact meaning of the imagery of pursuing may be,[107] it is quite clear that Israel was actively in search of covenant righteousness and Gentiles were not. The effects of each group's behavior are contrary to what could be expected: Gentiles overtook righteousness, that is "righteousness from faith," – apparently presented to them like a ripe fruit –, whereas Israel, despite its endeavor to attain covenant righteousness, did not reach the law.[108] It consequently missed the righteousness attained by Gentiles which in 10:3 is interpreted in terms of the righteousness of God.[109] φθάνω (v 31) is another "metaphor of pursuit"[110] used to characterize Israel's behavior.

In v 32 Paul gives the reason for this paradoxical state of affairs: Israel missed the "law of righteousness" because its approach to it was wrong. It pursued it "not from faith (οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως) but as if it was from works (ὡς ἐξ ἔργων)." Had Israel pursued the law of righteousness "from faith" in Jesus Christ, they would have reached it.[111] Paul in 10:2–3 rephrases 9:30–32. Israelites have "a zeal for God" which, however, is misdirected (v 2): "Not knowing the righteousness of God and seeking to establish their own [righteousness] (τὴν ἰδίαν [δικαιοσύνην] ζητοῦντες στῆσαι) they did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God" (v 3). Paul here differentiates

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[107]Cf. *Dunn*, Romans, 580.

[108]In connection with καταλαμβάνω *Bauer*/*Aland*/*Danker*, 519, s.v. 1, and *Dunn*, Romans, 580, refer to Sir 11:10 and 27:8. Interestingly, those who "pursue (διώκης)," but "will not overtake (καταλάβῃς)" (11:10) are identified as "those who work (κοπιῶν) and struggle (πονῶν) and hurry (σπεύδων), but are so much more in want (ὑστερεῖται)" (v 11). They are contrasted with "others who are slow and need help" and are lifted "out of their lowly condition" by God (v 12; translation NRSV). Taking into account that in Rom 10:2 Paul paraphrases Israel's διώκειν (v 30) in terms of Israel's zeal (ζῆλος), Sir 11:10–11 must be taken as a relevant parallel to Rom 9:30–31. Both passages contrast activity on the part of the one with inactivity on the part of the other, with the latter being compensated by God and his activity.

[109]Cf. *von der Osten-Sacken*, Das Verständnis des Gesetzes im Römerbrief, in: *idem*, Gott, 286–337: 312.

[110]*Dunn*, Romans, 581. Ibid., 582, *Dunn* emphasizes that "ἔφθασεν should be understood, on the ground that the contrast is between pursuing (v 31) and not pursuing (v 30), with the implication that it is the very attempt to pursue which was the mistake. But Paul," he rightly underlines, "does not disparage the idea of 'pursuit' (or of 'doing' the law)." He is also right in asserting that "'pursuit' does not in itself carry the overtones of frantic striving to achieve a claim on God" nor "should the ἐκ πίστεως/ἐξ ἔργων antithesis be allowed to degenerate into the same sort of polemic against self-accomplishment or self-assertion." Granting all this to be true, what is in view here is Israel's activity in pursuing a goal, namely covenant righteousness; further cf. fn. 114.

[111]Cf. *von der Osten-Sacken*, Verständnis, 312.

between two forms of righteousness, "their own righteousness" corresponding to righteousness ὡς ἐξ ἔργων (9:32) and "God's righteousness" corresponding to righteousness ἐκ πίστεως (9:32). The active subject of "righteousness from works" or "their own righteousness" is Israel who, because of its zeal for God, pursues it and seeks to establish it on its own. The active subject of "righteousness of God" or "righteousness by faith" is God who grants it on the basis of faith. The relation between these two types of righteousness reflects the argument of Rom 7–8, with the contrast being between the "I" that wills the good, in that it wants to fulfill the law but fails to do so, and the Spirit of God that enables those in Christ to fulfill it.

Seeking "their own righteousness," that is pursuing the law of righteousness (v 31), Israel has failed to subject herself (ὑπετάγησαν) to God's righteousness revealed in Jesus Christ. Israel's refusal to submit herself to precisely this righteousness manifests itself in its failure to reach the law because its goal is "Christ as a means to righteousness 'for all who believe'" (10:4). The issue of self-submission refers to Rom 8:7–8 where "the flesh's way of thinking" is interpreted as "hostility to God" because it "does not submit (ὑποτάσσεται) itself to the law of God" and, therefore, is "not able to please God." The flesh, as seen, is a constitutive part of the "I" which makes it serve the "law of sin," not the "law of God" (7:25). Therefore, the flesh's way of thinking cannot submit to the "law of God" (8:7). In both contexts the possibility of self-submission to the "law of God" (8:7) or to the "righteousness of God" (10:3) hangs on Christology. According to Rom 8 self-submission to the law presupposes God's sending of his Son who, by condemning sin in the flesh, makes it possible that "the requirement of the law might be fulfilled" in those who walk "in accordance with the 'Spirit'" (8:3–4). According to Rom 10, it presupposes Israel's acknowledgment of Christ as goal of the law, which is the same as attaining the law. But both the "I" and Israel fail to do so. The "I" wills to fulfill the law but is unable to do so because it is under the power of sin in the flesh, and Israel pursues the law of righteousness but does not reach it because its approach to the law is "as if it was from works (ὡς ἐξ ἔργων)." This approach is a primarily Jewish expression of humankind under the power of sin (3:9, 19–20). Thus, Rom 9:30–10:4 can be said to reflect basic structural elements of Rom 7–8.

As seen, the syntagma "as if it was from works" (9:32) is explained by "their own righteousness" (10:3), that is "'theirs' as belonging to them, and not to others,"[112] as being "'peculiar'" to them. "That is, it expresses ... righteousness as the appropriate expression of their covenant status, and so peculiarly theirs – 'collective righteousness, to the exclusion of gentiles.'"[113] The contrast between righteousness "by faith" and "by works of the law," in other words, is the contrast between God's righteousness in terms of his gracious acting on the basis of faith and the righteousness of what by analogy with the "I" of Rom 7 could be called the collective self of Israel seeking to establish it by themselves for themselves.

This contrast is expanded on in Rom 10:5, 6–8 where Paul adduces scriptural proof texts for both Israel's "own righteousness" and God's righteousness (v 3). To characterize that of Israel, the "righteousness which is from the law" (v 5), namely righteousness ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, he quotes Lev 18:5 which subsumes Israel's approach to the law under "doing (ποιήσας)." "'Righteousness out of the law' then is righteousness understood as sustained and dependent upon *acts* of law keeping," that

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[112] *Dunn*, Theology, 368.

[113] *Idem*, Romans, 587. Similarly, e.g. *Wolter*, Paulus, 361 with fn. 54.

is in the context of Jewish theology of election "righteousness understood as marking out a relationship with God peculiar to the people of the law."[114] Paul's scriptural proof text of "righteousness from faith" is Dtn 30:12–14. Against the plain sense of Dtn 30, Paul applies the verses to Jesus Christ (vv 6–7) and to the "word of faith" (v 8), the Gospel.[115] Similar to Rom 4, the Torah here witnesses to faith, too. The Torah then affirms both of Paul's claims, one being that Israel's approach to the law is about doing and the other being that the one revealed by God in the Gospel of Jesus Christ is about believing.

In the present context further aspects of Paul's midrash are relevant. Quoting Dtn 30:12–14, the personified "righteousness from faith" does not ask: "Who will go up (ἀναβήσεται) into heaven? that is, to bring Christ down" or: "Who will descend (καταβήσεται) into the abyss? that is, to bring Christ up from the dead." Instead it says: "The word is (ἔστιν) near to you, in your mouth and in your heart" (Rom 10:6–8). The prohibited questions refer to what humans might dream of but are unable to do because it belongs to the realm beyond human experience.[116] The positive statement of the "righteousness from faith" speaks about the nearness of the "word of faith" now, a nearness brought about by God in the resurrection (v 7) and exaltation (v 8) of Jesus Christ.[117] Again it is the agency of God which is bound up with righteousness "by faith." For this reason Paul likewise introduces the questions from Dtn 30 with a quotation from Dtn 8:17; 9:4: "do not say in your heart." It is taken from passages "warning against presumption on the part of his people, of a forgetfulness that the covenant is sustained solely by God and not their doing (Rom 10:3)."[118] Asking those questions would be presumptuous because they obscure that it is God himself who acts in the "word of faith."

Paul in 10:9–13 expands on this notion. The "word of faith" reveals that God in Christ is the agent of salvation and righteousness. Taking up the differentiation between mouth and heart in Dtn 30:14 / Rom 10:8, Paul in vv 9–10 distinguishes between confessing and believing. As the subject matter of both these expressions of faith demonstrates, the dynamic character of the "word of faith," namely the gospel, is emphasized.[119] Confessing concerns the lordship of Jesus (v 9) which in vv 11–13 is explained in terms of his universal lordship manifesting itself in his richness "to all who call on him" (v 12), Jews and Gentiles, a richness that materializes in salvation (v 13). Correspondingly, the subject matter of believing is Jesus' being raised: "God raised him from the dead." This is the basis of all soteriology, present justification and future salvation (vv 9–10). Again, an analogy with Rom 8 is to be observed: The "Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead" (v 11) not only enables the fulfillment of the law in the present (v 4) but also is the power of their future resurrection.

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[114] *Dunn*, Romans, 612 (italics G.H.). Paul does not mean to criticize the doing of the law proper – this would contravene passages like Rom 2:7–8, but a doing of the law that aims at an exclusive relationship with God. Righteousness for Paul "is always something received from God" (ibid., 588). For the connection between election and exclusivism in Judaism cf. E.P. *Sanders*, Judaism. Practice & Belief 63 BCE – 66BCE, London/Philadelphia 1992, 262–66.

[115] Cf. *von der Osten-Sacken*, Verständnis, 316–17.

[116] Cf. *Theißen / von Gemünden*, Römerbrief, 279, who also emphasize the theocentric dimension of the midrash.

[117] Cf. *Dunn*, Romans, 605: "ascent/exaltation" refers to Dtn 30:12, "descent/resurrection" to v 13. Other authors take Paul's interpretation of Dtn 30:12 to refer to incarnation.

[118] *Dunn*, Romans, 614; also cf. *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, 171.

[119] Cf. *Wilckens*, Brief, 2 227.

To summarize: God's power effective in the Spirit (Rom 8) as well as in the "word of faith" (Rom 10) in both contexts is contrasted with the self's futile doing: the will of the "I" to do the good and fulfill the law (Rom 7) on the one hand and the pursuing of the "law of righteousness" by the collective self of Israel, its attempt to establish its "own righteousness" and its "doing" of the law (9:30–10:5) on the other. This analogy is further substantiated by the fact that in both contexts Lev 18:5 is used in relation to the self, the individual self in Rom 7 and the collective self of Israel in Rom 10. Finally, the failure of the collective self of Israel to reach the law and to participate in the righteousness of God parallels the self's inability in Rom 7 to do the good in terms of the law of God in accordance with its will. Israel's approach to the law, thus, is evocative of the stoified "I" in Rom 7. Similar to the "I," Israel, while approaching the "law of righteousness," relies on its own resources, ignoring that righteousness comes from God. This is what is meant by "stoification of the Jewish approach to the law."

3.2. "By works of the Law" and "by Faith" in Rom 3:27–4:25

The contrast of righteousness "by works of the law" and "by faith" first figures in Rom 3:27–30. This contrast condenses the preceding discussion of 1:18–3:20 and 3:21–26. ἐξ ἔργων νόμου is first used in 3:20, that is at the end of Paul's discourse on humankind under sin. For Paul, then, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου is one exemplification of sin. After the summary statement of the theme of Romans in 1:16–17, the formula "by faith" is first mentioned in Rom 3:21–26. It is characteristic of the eschatological present time (νυνί; v 21) inaugurated by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In 3:27–31 that contrast is asserted without being explained in detail. This is done in Rom 4 with the help of the example of Abraham. While systematically dealing with faith in Rom 4, as regards the "works of the law" Paul, however, confines himself to some remarks which fit well in the overall picture as painted above. This accentuation is by no means accidental, since the exposition of "by works" in Rom 9–10 presupposes Rom 7:14–25. Israel's failure to reach the law is modeled on the failure of the "I" to do the good in terms of the law. Vice versa, Paul in Rom 9–10 presupposes his exposition on faith in Rom 4.

In 3:19–20 and 3:27–4:12 Paul's main addressees are "those within the law (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ)" (v 19a), that is the Jews.[120] In both passages he explains why justification is not on the basis of "works of the law." In 3:19 he asserts the liability of "all the world," Gentile *and* Jewish, to God's judgment. Both are "under sin" (3:9) and therefore – against Jewish self-understanding – dispose of no "works of the law" that would allow of their being justified. On these grounds the Apostle clarifies the function of the law: it is not meant for justification; its function rather is to make conscious of sin. For if human "works" are compared to the requirements of the law, only sin is recognizable.[121] Under the power of sin there simply are no "works of the law" to bring about righteousness; the law only reveals sin. Paul's argument is

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[120]Just as in Rom 2:1–3:20, Paul in 3:27–4:12 directly addresses his Jewish partner in dialogue (cf. the style of the diatribe), an element missing in both 3:21–26 and 4:13–25. The partner addressed according to *Wolter*, Brief, 49, ist "niemand anderer als der *Jude Paulus*." However, this is not a necessary assumption for the argument presented here. The interlocutor could just as well be a fictive Jew – whether non-Christian or Christian – who embraces the biblical concept of Israel's election with all the consequences it entails concerning the understanding of the Torah and the law she witnesses to.

[121]Cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 237.

obviously theological, not empirical.[122] The reason, why under the power of sin no flesh is able to do the "works of the law," he is to discuss in Rom 7. At this point of the argument, it suffices him to state that there simply are no "works of the law" that would allow of justification. Neither does he clarify what he means by those "works." Anyway, the preceding context advocates a broad understanding in terms of both the ethical and the specifically Jewish laws of the Torah.[123]

In Rom 3:21–4:25, where Paul's primary focus shifts from human acting to God's acting, his argument for the impossibility of justification "by works of the law" is that it is *God* who justifies and justifies on his terms alone.[124] The corollary of this theocentric accentuation of the righteousness of God is that justification, put into effect by God's acting in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, is on the basis of faith (3:21–26). In 3:27–4:12 Paul deepens the argument by linking it up with his controversy with the Jewish interlocutor set forth in 2:1–3:20. Its polemical dimension shows in the term "boasting" (3:27) that refers to the Jewish boasting of God (2:17), the law (2:23) and especially the "works of the law" (3:19–20). This boasting is excluded not by the "law of works," the primarily Jewish approach to the law, but by the "law of faith" (3:27) summarizing Paul's understanding of the proper use of the law, which is subsequently explained in Rom 4. The reason is given in 3:28–30.[125] Humans are justified "by faith," not "by works" (v 28), on the grounds that God is the one who justifies Jews and Gentiles alike on the basis of faith (v 29–30).[126] Hence, only the Jewish part of humankind would be justified if justification were on the basis of "works." But since God is the God of Gentiles also, justification is on the basis of faith. The theological argument here is combined with an ecclesiological one that implies the leveling of the differences between Jews and Gentiles already observed in connection with Rom 7 and 10. As will be seen below, the theo-logical dimension of "by faith" is not exhausted with Paul's reasoning in 3:28–30.

In Rom 4 this is followed by proof from scripture, in Paul's terminology: by the "establishment of the law" (v 31) in terms of the "law of faith" (v 27). His main proof-text from the law is Gen 15:6: "Abraham believed God and it was reckoned (ἐλογίσθη) to him for righteousness" (Rom 4:3). The obvious – positive – notion that Paul draws from this passage is that Abraham's faith was the reason for his justification (v 5). The negative conclusion is that the patriarch was not justified on the basis of "works" (v 2).[127] This contrast is reflected in v 5 where Abraham's case is related to the one "who does not work, but believes on him who justifies the ungodly," and whose "faith is 'reckoned for righteousness.'"

Paul does not say much regarding the meaning of ἐξ ἔργων in Rom 4:1–12, still some relevant aspects emerge. The example of Abraham teaches that δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων

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[122]Cf. *von der Osten-Sacken*, Beobachtungen, 351. Self-evidently, the same is true of Paul's description of Jewish behavior.

[123]The phrase: ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ (3:19), refers to "boasting" in 2:17, 23; cf. *Holtz*, Gott, 285. The laws mentioned in 2:17–24 are stealing, adultery, and idolatry which are part of the decalogue and in post-biblical Judaism belong to the Noahidic laws (ibid., 238–39). In v 25 circumcision is mentioned, that is a specifically Jewish commandment.

[124]Cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 124.

[125]Cf. γάρ in v 28.

[126]Also see Rom 4:5; 8:33.

[127]Also cf. v 6 where David is introduced as an analogy to Abraham.

νόμου is not what the "law of faith" establishes and, therefore, is nothing to boast about towards God (v 2). It does not exclude, however, that in the human sphere, which from the preceding context is to be identified with a primarily Jewish point of view, a connection between ἔργα and δικαιοσύνη exists (v 2). But in the realm of God it is excluded. For God reckons belief for righteousness, not "works," because he acts on the basis of grace, not on the basis of what is due.[128] The reckoning of wages to the one who works (τῷ ... ἐργαζομένῳ) on this basis, rather applies to the human realm. A further dimension of the term ἔργα νόμου in 4:1–8 is its semantic connection with ὁ ἐργαζόμενος (vv 4–5), thereby emphasizing the aspect of "doing." Finally, the chronological argument of 4:9–12, that Abraham's justification "by faith" (Gen 15:6) preceded his circumcision (Gen 17:10–11), implies that the "works (of the law)" mentioned in 4:1–8 include the specifically Jewish laws of which circumcision is a *pars pro toto.*[129]

In view of the overall topic it need be emphasized that the evidence, as regards the ἔργα νόμου in Rom 3–4, connects well with Rom 9–10. The primarily Jewish approach to the law in both contexts is summarized by "works of the law." The "works" include the commandments exclusively given to Israel.[130] In both contexts they are interpreted in terms of "doing" (ἐργάζομαι [4:4]; ποιεῖν 10:5) and are contrasted with belief to which God responds by acting.[131] Furthermore, both passages concur that the law is not reached by individual Jews or the collective of Israel. In Rom 9:32; 10:4 Paul expressly makes this point, in Rom 3–4 it is clearly implied: In 3:19–20; 4:2, 6 he refutes the possibility of being justified "by works of the law." In 3:27 he implicitly rejects the "law of works," primarily reflecting the Jewish approach to the law, by connecting it with "boasting" and contrasting it with the "law of faith." As seen, a number of these aspects resonate with Rom 7.

As regards faith, in the first part of his exposition of Gen 15:6, in Rom 4:1–8, Paul focuses on the subject matter of Abraham's faith, i.e. the agency of God in bringing about righteousness. Two observations are relevant. First, Gen 15:6 is reworded so as to expressly identify the logical subject of ἐλογίσθη with God: It is God who justifies (Rom 4:6). Similarly, in Ps 31:1–2 LXX / Rom 4:7 at the beginning two *passiva divina* are used: "Blessed are those whose lawless deeds have been forgiven (ἀφέθησαν) and whose sins have been covered (ἐπεκαλύφθησαν)." This *makarismos* is paralleled by a second one in which the logical subject, God, again is explicitly named: Blessed is the one "whose sin the Lord (κύριος) will by no means reckon (λογίσηται)" (v 8).[132]

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[128]χάρις refers to both Rom 3:24 and 4:16 where it is a distinctive feature of God's acting; further cf. 5:12–21. In introducing the term χάρις in v 4, Paul consciously breaks the "analogy from the business world" (*Dunn*, Romans, 203) in order to underline the theo-logical dimension of his argument. This dimension is subdued in the translations of both R. *Jewett*, Romans, Minneapolis 2007, 304 ("as a gift"), and *Dunn*, Romans, 203 ("... the reward is not reckoned as a favor"). But cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 281 ("aus Gnade"), and ibid., 283. The analogy implies that Paul's argument alludes to the notion of "works righteousness" (for necessary qualifications see above chapt. 1 with fn. 10); but see *Dunn*, Theology, 366–67.

[129]Cf. Gal 5:3 par tDem 2:5.

[130]Cf. 2:25; 4:9–12; but see fn. 122.

[131]Cf. 3:28–30; 4:4–5 (and see the following); 10:3; 10:5, 6–10.

[132]The theocentric interpretation of v 3 / Gen 15:6 in Rom 4:6–8 is also stressed by *Dunn*, Romans, 205. Remarkably, in Ps 31:1–2 LXX, adduced by Paul to support his reading of Gen 15:6, πίστις κτλ is not used a single time. The focus here rather is on God's acting which unlike human acting follows the

The second observation concerns statements dealing with who God is and how he acts. In v 4 Paul refers to χάρις which in the overall context is a reference to the grace of God. It obviously transcends the "analogy from the business world"[133] used to explain how reckoning functions in everyday life as opposed to God's reckoning. His reckoning aims at the one who believes rather than the one who works, and is done on the basis of faith (v 5). Explaining grace as the mode of divine acting, Paul defines God as the one "who justifies the ungodly," i.e. those who are under sin, Jews and Gentiles alike, and, consequently, under judgment and, therefore, in need of grace.

The theocentric dimension of Abraham's exemplary faith becomes even more evident in the second part of Rom 4, namely in 4:17b–22. Paul here interprets the patriarch's faith as faith in the promise of God[134] and emphasizes that this faith in the first place is not about Abraham's believing, but about God's acting embraced by faith.[135] In v 17b Paul sets out with defining the God whom Abraham believed: he is the one "who gives life to the dead and calls things that have no existence into existence." Being the childless centenarian he was, Abraham had no choice but to ignore the physical reality of his and Sarah's "dead" bodies and to trust in God's promise (v 18)[136] in order to "become 'father of many nations' (Gen 17:5) in accordance with what had been said: 'So shall your seed be' (Gen 15:5)." It was precisely this promise which preceded God's reckoning Abraham's faith to him for righteousness. From a human point of view, his faith was completely irrational. Yet "he did not doubt the promise in unbelief" (Rom 4:20), but continued to believe against hope in hope (v 18), "being fully convinced that what he (sc. God) had promised he was also able to do (δυνατός ἐστιν καὶ ποιῆσαι)" (v 21). This is what Abraham's faith in Paul's view is all about: the unshakable conviction that God has the power to fulfill the promise and to call into existence what does not exist. Because Abraham's faith allows God to be God and to act in accordance with the promise, the patriarch is said to give the glory (δόξα) to God (v 20) that is due to him.[137] In doing so, Abraham was the first to fulfill the purpose of human existence,[138] not in having something to boast towards God (v 2). It was his absolute trust in the God of the promise, therefore, that was reckoned to him for righteousness (v 22).

In the final subsection (vv 23–25), Paul applies this conclusion to the present generation of believers, both Jewish and Gentile. To them *their* faith is to be reckoned (v 24), i.e. their faith in the God "who gives life to the dead and calls things that have no existence into existence" and who has manifested this quality in the present age in

principle χώρις νόμου. This is affirmed by Rom 4:4–5 (see below). Also cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 281: "Wichtig ist, dass es ab V.2c um Gott und um die Eigenart seines Handelns geht ..."

[133]See above fn. 128.

[134]The term ἐπαγγελία is introduced in Rom 4:13. In 4:13–17a Paul makes the point that the promise that Abraham believed was given to him not "through the law," that is because of his fulfillment of the law (Gen 26:4–5 e.g.; cf. *Wolter*, Brief, 297–98), but through "righteousness of faith" (v 13) or "of faith" (v 16). Faith here is directly linked up with grace as reference to God's acting.

[135]Similarly, *O'Brien*, Paul, 269–70: "The ground of justification lies not in works, nor in faith, but 'in the revelation of God's grace in Christ, embraced by faith,'" and S. *Gathercole*, Justified by Faith, Justified by Blood: The Evidence of Romans 3:21–4:25, in: D.A. *Carson* et al. (eds.), 147–84: 167.

[136]*Gathercole*, Faith, 162, underlines that Abraham's "faith in God is concomitant precisely with *losing* faith in one's own body" and in "fulfillment through natural order."

[137]Further cf. ibid., 162.

[138]Cf. Rom 1:21, where sinful humanity is characterized as refusing to give glory to the one whom they know to be God.

raising "Jesus our Lord from the dead." For v 24 to make sense in the context of Rom 4, it need be assumed that Paul likewise understands the faith of believers in terms of faith in God's promise.[139] Just as Abraham experienced the God "who gives life to the dead ..." (v 17b) when, in accordance with the promise, he overcame the deadness of his and Sarah's bodies, so in the present age God's raising Jesus from the dead includes his promise for believers. Paul labels it δικαίωσις, which means "vindication" or "rightness."[140] Similar to the effects of the Spirit in Rom 8 and those of believing in Rom 10, the term seems to have both a present and a future eschatological dimension.[141] The former, in analogy to Abraham, means justification in the sense of God's response to specific acts of believing in God's promise on the side of the believers.[142] The future dimension primarily refers to "right(eous)ness of life" (5:18) and the resurrection of mortal bodies (8:11).

To summarize: The subject matter of faith in the promise that is reckoned to righteousness is the God who raised Jesus from the dead and so proved himself able to bring about present righteousness and future salvation. This is what Paul means when he says that justification is "by faith." Faith in Rom 3–4 then is not as much about the one who believes as it is about the God who is able to do to the believer what he has promised. By contrast, "works of the law" are related to humans doing the law (ἐργάζομαι [4:4]). Therefore, the antithesis of ἐξ ἔργων and ἐκ πίστεως in the end is about the difference between human doing and God's powerful acting, between "divine ability and human inability."[143]

As mentioned, this contrast also appears in Rom 9–10 and mirrors the contrast between the "I" incapable of doing the law and the Spirit of God enabling its fulfillment (Rom 7–8). Paul here describes the approach of the Jewish-Adamitic "I" to the law similar to the one of the Stoic self. In other words, he transfers the insights of Stoic psychology on the dilemma of the self, who wants to do the good but does the bad, to the Jewish-Adamitic "I" as well as to Israel's approach to the law.

3.3 The "Works of the Law": Self-reliance or National Reliance?

J.D.G. *Dunn* has taken issue with R. *Bultmann* on his understanding of the "works of the law." This debate sheds light upon the matter under consideration, namely the assertion that in Romans Paul stoifies the Jewish approach to the law. *Dunn* summarizes their respective positions as follows:

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[139]Cf. E. *Käsemann*, An die Römer, HNT 8a, Tübingen [4]1980, 121.

[140]The former rendering is given by *Dunn*, Romans, 196, the latter by *Jewett*, Romans, 322.

[141]An either-or-exegesis does not suggest itself here. μέλλει allows grammatically for both interpretations (cf. *Dunn*, Romans, 222–23 [with further bibliography], who himself opts for the future eschatological dimension) just as Rom 4 and the wider context of Romans: in Rom 8 the eschatological Spirit connected with God's raising Jesus from the dead has a present dimension (v 4, 7) as well as a future one (v 11); in 10:9–10 faith in that God includes the promise of both present justification and future salvation.

[142]Corresponding to Abraham's belief, δικαίωσις in this sense refers to future divine responses within present eschatological time, of course.

[143]*Dunn,* Romans, 239. According to the interpretation proposed here, the "works of the law" emphasize human "doing" as opposed to God's acting. For Paul then the problem with "doing" is "human inability" and not a merit-amassing observance of the law to earn God's favor; see above chapt. 1.

"Bultmann rightly recognized that Paul identifies religious 'boasting' as a primary expression of sin. However, he further identified the boasting of Rom. 2.17, 23 as the 'extreme expression ... of the attitude of sinful self-reliance.' In turning Paul's critique of religion into a critique of self-reliance Bultmann grasped only part of Paul's argument – and the part directed more against Gentile idolatry than that directed against Jewish religious self-understanding. For the 'boasting' language of Rom. 2.17 and 23 in context hardly suggests an attitude of *self*-reliance. Rather, it expresses clearly a *national* reliance – a confidence that God is Israel's God, that possession of the law puts the possessors in a position of advantage over all others, that the people marked out by circumcision are secure in God's praise."[144]

Despite the obvious differences in their understanding of the "works of the law," *Bultmann* and *Dunn* agree that sinful humankind, both Jewish and Gentile, relies on something that is not God. Whereas *Bultmann* does not distinguish between Jewish and Gentile forms of reliance, *Dunn* differentiates between Gentile *self*-reliance and Jewish *national* reliance. In view of the consequences *Bultmann*'s interpretation has had with regard to the perception of Judaism in terms of a legalistic "works religion," *Dunn*'s interpretation certainly is a necessary corrective. In view of the underlying conception of human sin,[145] to which the Gospel of God's gracious acting in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the response, these differences, however, appear to be of minor importance. This holds all the more true because the ἔργα νόμου not only have a sociological dimension but also an anthropological one.[146]
In order to underline both the common features of and the differences between both approaches, I propose to qualify the active subject of Gentile self-reliance as *human self* and that of Israel's national reliance as *collective self* because in Paul's view the collective of Israel mistakes God for a national god and relies on its own privileged access to him based on its doing the "works of the law." That terminology also suggests itself because of the analogies between the doing of the "I" or the self in Rom 7 and that of collective Israel in Rom 9–10. In his discussion of the basis on which a person is justified, Paul criticizes that the self, the individual and especially the collective self of Israel, under the power of sin misuses the law in terms of the "law of works" by making itself the agent of righteousness instead of honoring God's role in bringing it about. Paul's criticism of the "works of the law", in other words, reflects his fundamental conviction of "'divine ability and human inability.'"[147]

4. Paul, the Law and Judaism: The Pragmatic Function of the Stoification of the Jewish Approach to the Law in Romans

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[144] *Dunn*, Theology, 119.
[145] The above quotation is taken from chapter: "§5.4 The effects of sin – misdirected religion;" cf. *Dunn,* Theology, 114–119.
[146] Cf. *von der Osten-Sacken*, Beobachtungen, 349, e.g. Within Romans especially Rom 2:25–29; 13:8–10 and 14 are relevant where Paul deals with Gentiles doing the law. The possibility that Gentiles, too, approach the law ἐξ ἔργων, thereby aiming at their justification, is evident in Rom 14 where, according to scholarly opinion, the weak also comprise persons of non-Jewish descent. Also see Rom 3:20 (πᾶσα σάρξ) and 3:28 (ἄνθρωπον) and cf. ibid., 350. Furthermore, in Galatians the problem of "works of the law" is discussed with Gentiles doing the law in view.
[147] See above fn. 143.

R. *von Bendemann* has pointed out that Rom 7 is to be understood as "a critical contrafact of the optimistic anthropology of late Stoa."[148] He then asks if Paul does not have to be interpreted against this very same background, since in Neronic Rome Stoic thinking had widely penetrated literature and popular education.[149] Granting all this to be true, it must be noted, however, that Paul does not write his "contrafact" to Stoics but to a Christian congregation of Jews and Gentiles, both of whom were presumably familiar with Stoic fundamentals. Unlike Philo, however, whose primarily Jewish audience apparently included sympathizers with Stoicism,[150] Paul assumes his Jewish addressees in particular to embrace the widespread Jewish notion of a nexus between works and righteousness. Therefore, the additional question need be asked as to the pragmatic function of the Stoic coloring of Rom 7 in view of its prime addressees, Jews in Rome "who know the law."

By stoifying the Jewish approach to the Law in Romans, Paul aims at clarifying what is at stake for Israel when it refuses to believe in the God who raised Jesus from the dead. In doing so, Israel, in his view, is in danger of giving up all that makes it to be Israel: the acknowledgement that it is thoroughly dependant upon God's graciously acting in its favor. Instead it behaves like a Stoic convinced that the human self disposes of all the resources necessary to attain the good and effect its own "deliverance."[151] As Paul explains in Rom 7, this is an illusion since the Jewish-Adamitic "I" is overpowered by sin manifest in desire or, in Stoic terms, by the passions, making the self do what it does not want to do. Paul implicitly relates both sin and *akrasia* to the Jewish people. In Rom 2:1–3:20 he makes the point that Jews too are "under sin" and, therefore, unable to do the "works of the law" necessary for justification. In Rom 9:30–10:4, he argues that Israel, despite its zeal, does not attain what it desperately wishes, i.e. the law of righteousness. Interpreting the Jewish approach to the law in terms of the Stoic self aiming at the good but missing it, Paul tries to demonstrate to unbelieving Israel its affinity to a philosophy intrinsically foreign to its own conviction that God is the sovereign who graciously acts in its favor. By approaching the law presumptuously, he insinuates, it behaves similarly to the autonomous Stoic self.

This being said, it is hardly surprising that scholars from *Montefiore* to *Moor*e were unable to identify Paul's picture of Judaism as drawn in his Letter to the Romans with any extant concept of Torah and salvation attested in the literature of Early Judaism, including "works righteousness" and what has been called "covenantal nomism." In Romans Paul makes aspects reminiscent of these concepts subservient to his overall argument. From this point of view, the contrast of "by works of the law" and "by faith" need be understood as his very own theological construct, even though the term "works of the law" is also attested in Jewish literature[152] and the contrast itself probably is pre-Pauline.[153]

Paul interprets Jewish obedience to the law in stoicizing terms in order to convince his Jewish addressees in particular that the adequate approach to the law consists in believing, namely in the God who raised Jesus from the dead (4:24; 8:11; 10:9). This

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[148]Cf. *von Bendemann*, Diastase, 60 ("ein kritisches Kontrafakt").

[149]Ibid.

[150]Cf. *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, 391–92.

[151]"Deliverance" here is meant in a Stoic sense; cf. Epictetus, Diss. 4,9.16, and see above chapt. 2.2.

[152]Cf. 4QMMT C26–27.

[153]Cf. *Holtz*, Nichtigkeit, 262–63 (with further bibliography).

God, Paul implies in Rom 4, is the same God in whom they have believed since Abraham, that is from the very beginning of God's covenant-making with the patriarchs and later with Israel.[154] In the birth of Isaac this God fulfills the promises of the covenant he gave to Abraham,[155] thereby initiating the process which led to the birth of Israel as a people. Furthermore, in overcoming their father Abraham's and their mother Sara's deadness God shows himself to be the God who gives life to the dead – a conviction affirmed by Israel in its prayers.[156] God's renewed act of giving life to the dead, manifested in the resurrection of Jesus, therefore, is completely in line with Israel's experiences with God. It is "for our own righteousness" (4:22–24) which, however, is not "by works" but "by faith."

The stoification of the Jewish approach to the Law then is a means to an end, intended to make clear what is at stake for Israel when it refuses to believe in the God who raised Jesus from the dead and continues to work: by continuing to seek its own righteousness to the exclusion of Gentiles and rely on its exclusive relationship with God it falls prey to its own self, the collective self of Israel. Instead, in pursuing righteousness, Israel should be following its father Abraham's example who believed God, thus allowing God to be God, and, by doing so, give glory to him. This way Israel would live up to the faith of its father Abraham. Stoification of the Jewish approach to the Law then is a polemical way of presenting Jewish law-keeping intended to make unbelieving Israel and, as the case may be, Jewish Christians critical of Paul's interpretation of the law understand that they are betraying the God whom their father Abraham believed and experienced: a God able to act and willing to act in bringing about righteousness.

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[154]Cf. Gen 15:18; 17:1–14 (with Abraham); 17:19–21 (with Isaac); Ex 6:4–5 (the patriarchs); Ex 24:1–8 (with Israel); for Paul's reception of these motifs cf. Rom 9:4.

[155]Gen 15:4–5, 18–19; 17:7–10, 19–21; cf. Rom 4:17b–21.

[156]Cf. the second of the Eighteen Benedictions and JosAs 20,7.