

Security and Risk Management for Peacebuilding Organisations

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1 Introduction¹

Violence against interveners has become an area of concern both for aid organisations and for those who research conflict intervention. Prominent attacks on peacekeepers or aid workers appear regularly in the media, highlighting this issue. High-profile attacks against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) occurred in Afghanistan in May 2013, against the aid organisation ACTED in the Central African Republic in September 2013, and against UN peacekeepers in South Sudan in April 2013. For 2013, the UN Staff Union reported 58 fatalities among UN employees (UN Staff Union 2014). The number of serious attacks on aid workers numbered 167 in 2012 and resulted in 274 aid workers kidnapped, killed, or injured (Harmer et al. 2013). Overall, attacks against aid workers and aid organisations have increased over the past 15 years (Stoddard et al. 2006; Stoddard et al. 2009; Wille/Fast 2013). In addition to serious attacks against individuals, security incidents take many other forms: violent attacks against organisational compounds or programmes, threatening messages or phone calls, raids on organisations' premises, denial of work visas and residence or travel permits, demonstrations, and attacks on places frequented by aid workers such as restaurants or hotels.

But what about peacebuilders? Are the risks they face similar to those of aid agencies? How do individual peacebuilders and the organisations they work for provide security or deal with risk? As a field of practice, peacebuilders often work in or on active conflict zones, yet we know little about the specific risks they face. In making this claim, I follow previous Berghof publications and conceptualise peacebuilding as a long-term process involving the transformation of individual attitudes and behaviours, unjust structural conditions, and damaged relationships between conflict parties (Berghof Foundation 2012, 62-64). Accordingly, peacebuilders are those individuals directly engaged in ending violence, transforming relationships and structures, and building a more just and sustainable peace. Their work involves the *direct* activity of facilitating dialogue or interaction between conflict parties as well as broader and related “*efforts to coordinate or set up channels for communication to develop a comprehensive, multi-levelled, multi-sectoral strategy*” to reduce insecurity or violence, including the work of development, human rights, security sector reform, or governance (Schirch 2013, 7, italics in original). Peacebuilders are both insiders and outsiders to the conflict and come from all levels of society. They work on their own or for civil society and government organisations, and at a variety of activities. They are often inclusive and “multi-partial” in talking to and engaging those on all sides of the conflict, including the like-minded as well as those characterised as “extremists”.²

Unfortunately, regardless of how we define the scope of their activities, there are no data about violence affecting peacebuilders, whether insider or outsider, neutral or multi-partial. A cursory glance back across history, however, yields two famous peacebuilders who died as a direct result of their work: Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. Both worked to build relationships across conflict divides and to nonviolently transform unjust systems. Although they did not use the label “peacebuilder”, many in this field look to them as models for nonviolent action. Many other less well-known peacebuilders have died or been injured as part of their work.

With few exceptions (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008; Fast 2013; Autesserre 2014), security incidents and how to manage them are topics generally absent from discussion, at least in peacebuilding literature. This article aims to change this by beginning to develop a framework for a peacebuilders' approach to security and risk management. While it is impossible to prevent all attacks, it is possible to

¹ The author would like to thank Beatrix Austin, Norbert Ropers, Lisa Schirch, and Oliver Wils for their helpful commentary and suggestions.

² Although many peacebuilders work on and in their own conflicts, in this article the data to which I refer relate primarily to external interveners. Accordingly, I use peacebuilders and conflict interveners as synonyms. Both insider and outsider interveners face security issues, and at least some of these issues and security management strategies are the same. Wherever possible, the examples and strategies I use are applicable to both insider and outsider interveners.

manage and mitigate risk, whether risk refers to physical harm to a person or harm to programmes and reputations. Reflective and concerted attention to security and risk management is and should be a central area of concern for peacebuilders. To begin, peacebuilders can learn from related fields that, to date, have devoted more resources and attention to the issue. Adapting this learning, however, must take into account the field's unique philosophy and goals.

At its core, peacebuilding is devoted to the long-term transformation of unjust relationships and structures. Peacebuilders work in the context of injustice and violence and believe that conflict is an inherent element of human existence and relationships. The work, however, is grounded in the belief that it is possible to address conflict, injustice, and violence in ways that do not necessarily involve resorting to force or violence. Peacebuilders work to interrupt, not reinforce, cycles of violence. At the same time, peacebuilders recognise that many use violence because they believe it is the most effective way to assert or project their voice.

To interrupt violence requires talking to and understanding the perspectives of those who commit it. In this context, an emphasis on security and risk comes with both positive and negative implications, which I explore in this article. On the one hand, peacebuilders work in organisations that have a responsibility to their partners, staff and donors to ensure the security of their employees, those with whom they work, and the effectiveness of the programmes they implement. On the other hand, the goals and philosophy of peacebuilding suggest the need to grapple with the implications of fear, violence, and having “security” dominate the work. The tension between attention to risk management and the transformative and countercultural aspects of peacebuilding surfaces in the form of several paradoxes. These paradoxes, in turn, suggest the need for a particular peacebuilding approach to security and risk management that draws upon and supports peacebuilding values. Such an approach builds relationships, networks and good communication, is context- and actor-specific, and, above all, holistic.

The first section describes the security risks and responses of the related professions of humanitarian, development, and human rights work. I adopt this analytical approach because these activities may be construed as part of a broader peacebuilding agenda and because the risks these actors face are likely similar, but not identical, to those for peacebuilders. The second section describes the two paradoxes of multi-partiality – which is of particular concern for those engaged in direct peacebuilding work – and of the instrumentalisation of security. Building on these two paradoxes, I outline three cornerstones of a peacebuilding approach to security and risk management and conclude with some directions for further research and practice.

2 Security Risks and Responses: Learning from Related Professions

A recent survey of self-identified peacebuilding organisations attempted to assess the problem of violence against peacebuilders and how they respond to security issues. The survey generated a relatively small response and thus rendered few instances of targeted violence against peacebuilders in which they were injured, kidnapped, or killed as part of their work.³ Aside from the usual explanations for low survey

³ This survey, titled the Security and Peacebuilding Survey, and follow-up interviews were conducted by the author and the Charity and Security Network from November 2013 through March 2014. The survey, which was circulated via the Alliance for Peacebuilding and other international peacebuilding networks and listserves, netted 32 complete responses. Of these, 15 were international organisations (working on more than one country) and 17 were national organisations (working only in one country, including US-based organisations working primarily in the US). Respondents self-identified as peacebuilding

response rates, several other factors could explain the small response and low numbers of reported incidents. Violence against peacebuilders could be relatively rare, incidents might not be well-documented within organisations (or the news media), security may not be a central concern for the peacebuilding community, or some combination of the three.⁴ For the incidents that were reported, respondents most often described motives related to political targeting (due to the identity or affiliations of the victims), robbery, and extortion. Other motives included terrorism, accusations of espionage, and attacks related to retaliation or revenge for another injury or death, or attacks by former employees. Attacks on peacebuilding organisations and their personnel can also be directly related to their mission or activities. For instance, a peacebuilding organisation's employee was attacked, and although the specific reason for the attack remained unclear, it was likely in protest against the dialogue work the organisation conducted in the country.⁵ Accusations may be published in local newspapers, on billboards, or circulated via word of mouth. These accusations, in turn, can result in protests and demonstrations, office raids, travel restrictions imposed by local authorities, government refusal of visas or other bureaucratic measures designed to prevent an organisation from carrying out its work.⁶

Given the dearth of data about violence against peacebuilders, it is difficult to summarise the full range of risks they face in their work. Many, but not all, of these risks are similar to those for all civilians in a conflict zone or for other conflict interveners. This section briefly describes the risks that other conflict interveners, such as aid workers and human rights defenders, face and the approaches they take to risk and security management. The summary sets the stage for the discussion that follows on the paradoxes and challenges of security for peacebuilders and the approaches peacebuilders might use to manage these risks. In fact, the most sophisticated work on nonviolent or non-military approaches to managing security comes from the aid world and that of human rights defenders. Drawing lessons from the related professions of relief, development, and human rights programming highlights various practices, and their benefits and drawbacks, and lessens the potential for reinventing the proverbial wheel.

2.1 Risks for Conflict Intervenors

Of all violence against conflict intervenors, that affecting aid workers and peacekeepers has received the most attention. Intervening in war and violent conflict is inherently dangerous work. Many risks are context-related. They may or may not be targeted acts of violence. For example, increasingly aid workers are dying during periods of fighting between conflict parties, where they might be caught in the crossfire and not deliberately attacked. An early study of fatalities among humanitarian workers and UN peacekeepers noted motor vehicle accidents, illness, and unintentional violence among the more prominent causes of death (Sheik et al. 2000). Aid workers may be victims of crime or simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Other incidents are targeted. Growing numbers of aid workers are victims of kidnappings. The most dangerous situation for aid workers is being in transit from one place to another, such as traveling between project sites or between home and office. While travelling, aid workers might be caught in an ambush or have their vehicles hijacked and stolen.

organisations, and worked on a variety of activities, from direct peacebuilding to human rights, democracy, and development or humanitarian assistance. In addition, this article incorporates responses from two related interviews and the nine follow-up interviews that we conducted with a range of survey respondents. More information about the research and findings is available from the author.

- 4 Violence against peacebuilders is underreported, particularly for local peacebuilders not connected to international networks. While the survey itself did not yield many examples, respondents recalled additional instances not reported in the survey of peacebuilders (often local peacebuilders) who died or were injured as part of their work.
- 5 Interview with person responsible for safety and security within the organisation, 27 February 2014. For reasons of privacy and confidentiality, I report only generic job positions and do not specifically name any of my interviewees or organisational contacts in this document.
- 6 Multiple interviewees named these types of threats as significant for their organisations. See also Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008.

Box 1: Violence Against Aid Workers

According to the Aid in Danger dataset (formerly known as the Security in Numbers Database) no aid workers died during active fighting between conflict parties between 1996 and 2000. Between 2006 and 2010, approximately 1 of 8 incidents of kidnapping, injury, or death occurred during active fighting between conflict parties (Wille/Fast 2013, 20).

According to the Aid Worker Security Report, kidnapping has become the most frequent type of attack against aid workers since 2009 (Harmer et al. 2013).

In spite of some generalised risks, the dangers for aid workers are not uniform. Aid workers with responsibilities that require frequent visits to project sites face different risks than those whose work is office-based. Thus, the most dangerous jobs for aid workers are drivers and guards. Female aid workers are more often threatened or the victims of crime, incidents that occur more often at home, at work, or in urban areas. In contrast, males are more often kidnapped, injured, or killed, and affected by incidents that take place in rural areas or while they are in transit (Wille/Fast 2011). The fact that drivers are most often male could help explain this finding. Incidents affecting national or local aid workers are less reported in the media than those affecting expatriates.

The causes of targeted incidents of violence are equally varied. The most obvious are politically motivated events, such as the 2009 expulsion of sixteen aid agencies from Sudan. The government of Sudan accused these agencies of espionage and providing information to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which the ICC used to indict President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes. In other instances, threats or attacks symbolise resistance to the presence of particular organisations or associations with particular agendas. After the 2005 publication in a Danish newspaper of cartoons deemed offensive to Muslims, protests erupted and prompted some Scandinavian aid agencies to tighten their security measures. Aid agencies operating in Sri Lanka in 2008 and 2009 were denied permission to assist those affected by the war and numerous aid workers died in the fighting. Overall, NGOs in Sri Lanka faced a hostile working environment, due primarily to the government's perception that NGOs supported the rebel forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Human rights defenders are likewise threatened or killed. Their work challenges the status quo or disrupts the interests of the powerful. Threats and violence are meant to discredit or punish them and to instill fear with the goal of silencing them. Accusing human rights defenders of spying or treason works to decrease their legitimacy and provides a convenient if illegitimate justification for the use of violence against them. In some cases, the violence is very public, while in others targeting human rights defenders may be disguised as a crime. As one human rights activist put it, "threats are almost a measure of effectiveness", since it is only when human rights defenders are effective in challenging the status quo that their work elicits a violent response (Barry with Nainar 2008, 16).

The forms that threats take are rooted in cultural traditions and values that vary from place to place, and convey information about the capabilities and intentions of their senders. A study of security incidents in Yemen, for instance, pointed out that holding individuals hostage at a roadblock, even at gunpoint, is considered less severe than a physical altercation involving a slap to the face. Culturally, this type of hostage incident, called a *qita*, can be seen as a component in a negotiation, or exchange of demands, whereas a slap to the face is a humiliation requiring a serious response (Neuman 2014). Most hostages in Yemen are released unharmed. This emphasises the necessity of deep contextual knowledge in interpreting the nature and degree of threat. Similarly, the nature of a threat often conveys information about the sender's capacity or willingness to carry out the threat. A face-to-face threat indicates little fear of consequences or being caught, whereas a text message "costs" very little effort. Timing a threat to coincide with a person's arrival at a project site or office likely indicates surveillance (Barry with Nainar 2008, 16).

Equally important but less publicised are the causal factors that relate to the profiles of organisations, meaning what they do and whom they hire. In numerous countries, aid agencies have received threats related to the employment of women or against gender-based violence (GBV) programming. Communities have

expressed discontent and anger with repeated needs assessments or promises that, from their perspective, do not result in tangible changes in their situations (Fast et al. 2011). Providing medical care to all sides in the midst of a war zone often results in combatants threatening medical personnel and demanding preferential treatment for their wounded. All of these are related to an organisation's programming.

Other incidents are linked to human resources issues. Inappropriate behaviour on the part of staff members can generate community resentment, as can lucrative contracts awarded to those associated with particular groups. Former employees may protest against their dismissal and current employees may be dissatisfied with their pay or benefits. In early 2014, for example, World Vision staff in Malawi went on strike to protest against changes in salary payments and contracts (Ravelo 2014). Any of these incidents could elicit threats or violence as a way to convey these messages. While hiring staff members from only one group in a conflict, whether deliberate or unintentional, is likely to generate resentment and possibly violence, so too can hiring for multi-partiality. Cleavages from the broader conflict can spill over into office politics, creating tension, disrupting work, and damaging relationships between colleagues. Not all of these instances will result in a security incident. Nevertheless, the perceptions and image of organisations along with their everyday practices of intervening in conflict represent potential vulnerabilities (Fast 2014). These everyday practices affect all organisations, whether they identify as humanitarian, development, human rights, or peacebuilding organisations.

2.2 Responses to Risk: Managing Security

As security incidents have grown in numbers and prominence, the operational responses of conflict interveners have increased in sophistication, particularly those rooted in nonviolent principles and action.⁷ This sophistication is reflected in shifts over time from a narrow focus on the individual to a broader focus on the organisation, and from immediate and reactive responses to incidents to institutionalising the management of risk. While these changes have undoubtedly saved lives, not all consequences are entirely welcome. The positive aspects include concerted and expert attention to security, yet these same developments also serve to increase the distance between aid workers and the populations they assist and with whom they work (for an extended discussion, see Fast 2014).

The security and risk management approaches of aid agencies generally have two goals: (1) to protect their staff members, assets, and programmes, and (2) to ensure access to vulnerable populations and programme continuity, even in the most dangerous contexts. The purpose of access is to offer assistance and protection, which is often but not always life-saving. Early on, responses to security incidents relied primarily on personal security training and security manuals. These trainings and manuals emphasised how to stay safe in new and unfamiliar environments, the importance of situational awareness, and how to survive the particular risks of war zones, such as landmines, artillery and mortar fire, ambush or kidnapping, among other topics. Now aid agencies tend to approach security and risk from a management perspective that, ideally, addresses risk in a comprehensive and integrative fashion: vertically (from executive-level managers to drivers and guards in a country programme) and horizontally (across sectors and departments as well as country programmes). For many, this ideal-type, mainstreamed security management remains an elusive goal. Nevertheless, many of the larger organisations have hired security experts to work in country or regional offices and at headquarters and tend to use a multi-faceted approach to operational security management. Such an approach involves a combination of “hardened” strategies, such as the use of armed escort and armed guards or protective barriers to limit access to aid agency compounds, as well as consent-based approaches, such as building relationships with all stakeholders and negotiating with armed actors for access to populations. Agencies are also increasingly opting to “remotely manage” programmes in highly insecure environments, where expatriate staff are withdrawn and national or local staff or partner

⁷ The legal protections are not covered in this paper. Legal protections for aid agencies are summarised in Fast (2014, chapter 6) and for human rights defenders in Quintana and Fernandez (2012).

organisations implement programmes instead (Humanitarian Practice Network [HPN] 2010, 94-99). The negative consequences of remote management, particularly for local partners and staff members, must be the subject of discussion about the ethics and effectiveness of the strategy among all concerned.

Box 2: Summarising the “Security Triangle”

Deterrence is based on the ability to prevent or “deter” attacks through a counter-threat of some kind. *Protection* functions to “harden” a target in order to prevent an attack or minimise its impact, should one occur. *Acceptance* is “founded on effective relationships and cultivating and maintaining consent from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders. This in turn is a means of reducing or removing potential threats in order to access vulnerable populations and undertake programme activities” (Fast/O’Neill 2010, 5-6; see also HPN 2010).

The “hardened” approaches consist of what is known as “deterrence” and “protection” (see HPN 2010). Deterrence is based on the ability to prevent or “deter” attacks through a counter-threat of some kind, such as armed guards or armed escort for convoys. Not all deterrent strategies involve armed force. Guard dogs, for instance, can deter attacks. The “protection” approach functions to “harden” the target in order to prevent an attack or minimise its impact, should one occur. It is the most prevalent approach, as it includes a variety of mechanisms such as travel restrictions, training (e.g. personal security training or training in defensive or elusive driving techniques), and technology and other equipment (e.g. communications equipment for field staff to check in and report problems, when necessary). Aid workers often travel in pairs or in vehicle convoys and many aid agency compounds are ringed with concrete walls, sometimes topped with concertina wire or broken glass. All of these are protective measures. The hardened approaches tend to rely more on military or law enforcement strategies to ensure the safety and security of aid workers.

Even though most aid organisations have employed private armed security at one point or another, the use of armed security remains controversial (Stoddard et al. 2008). Armed security implicitly challenges the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence, and its life-saving ethic. Among human rights defenders, the issue is similarly debated. While some defenders have used armed protection from state authorities, these same “protectors” have also used their proximity to monitor the activities of human rights defenders and to collect intelligence. One resource on security approaches for human rights activists characterised the issue as a paradox in which “states are legally responsible for protecting human rights defenders, yet frequently, it is the representatives of these governments who pose the greatest threat to human rights defenders” (Barry with Nainar 2008, 71). On the other hand, such direct involvement can serve to hold governments accountable for their actions or their inaction. In Colombia, one group of defenders chose to return protective equipment, such as bullet-proof vests and cell phones, in protest against the government’s failure to adequately prevent, investigate, or prosecute those responsible for attacks against them (Quintana/Fernandez 2012, 71).

In contexts where guns are culturally acceptable, however, using deterrent strategies such as armed security can reflect local cultural norms. In such places, not having armed guards may single out an organisation or compound as a foreign actor and potential target. Likewise, requesting protection, whether armed or not, from local police forces can help to build relationships with local law enforcement actors, and thereby serve a security function. In Sri Lanka, one peacebuilding organisation chose to deliberately maintain connections and register staff with the local police office (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008, 17). Clearly such approaches are not appropriate everywhere, but the fact that they are in some contexts serves to emphasise the importance of contextual knowledge in deciding which approach or combination of approaches will be most effective in a particular context.

In the most dangerous contexts, aid agencies and human rights defenders have adopted protective strategies that minimise their visibility to outsiders. During the height of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, some aid agencies chose to adopt a low profile. They removed insignia and logos from their office

compounds and staff members travelled in local vehicles and taxis instead of the white pickup trucks or four-wheel drives that function as the vehicle of choice for international actors in most countries. Human rights defenders have used similar strategies. Some choose not to publicise their office address or they attempt to maintain anonymity for staff members by using an organisational spokesperson who becomes the public face of the organisation. Defenders often keep copies of sensitive documents outside the office and never carry these documents on their person, in case they are arrested or detained. This strategy helps to keep documents and information safe. In other cases, they effectively disguise themselves by adopting different names or by meeting under the guise of a more innocuous purpose. For instance, a Serbian activist changed her name to one stemming from a different ethnic group as a protective measure. In Bosnia, women human rights defenders met under the cover of knitting or cooking groups (Barry with Nainar 2008, 65-66). As with deterrent strategies, protective measures are contextual and their consequences can be double-edged. Adopting a different name and identity can take a toll on individuals over time. For aid organisations, a lack of tangible outcomes may raise suspicion about the organisation's goals or activities.

The consent-based mechanisms, in contrast, better reflect peacebuilding and humanitarian values and principles, many of which are rooted in privileging nonviolent action and constructive engagement with all sides of a conflict. In many contexts, aid agencies must negotiate with conflict parties to obtain (safe) access to affected populations. They negotiate for consent to pass, provide assistance, or be present. This requires concerted engagement with various parties and a minimal degree of trust. Negotiated access is therefore an exchange of services or consent between two or more parties. Acceptance, however, is aimed at gaining consent from a broader set of stakeholders. As an overall security approach, acceptance is "founded on effective relationships and cultivating and maintaining consent from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders. This in turn is a means of reducing or removing potential threats in order to access vulnerable populations and undertake programme activities" (Fast/O'Neill 2010, 5-6). Acceptance requires a proactive approach to gain and maintain consent from various stakeholders, from armed actors, conflict parties, and affected communities to local or national officials and community leaders. In particular, agencies must gain acceptance from those with the capacity to harm or obstruct. Identifying key stakeholders requires an assessment of how aid agencies or other interveners affect conflict dynamics and who gains or loses from violence.

Key factors that can affect an agency's acceptance relate to its principles and mission, its relationships and networks, its programming, communications, and staffing. Each of these affects an agency's image and how stakeholders perceive it. It must be both a programmatic and security approach that is mainstreamed into the different dimensions of an organisation's work, from programming to human resources and communications. In some cases, staffing with the goal of gaining acceptance might privilege identity (e.g. nationality, region, religion, gender, social status or ethnic background) over programmatic or professional competencies. This helps to ensure that the organisation reflects the various identities of a community and helps to ensure that one group is not privileged over others with regard to employment, programmes, or contracts for services. Agencies must likewise consider their communications strategies, including key messages about what the agency does and its mission or mandate in a country and how these messages may differ according to audience. Organisations might choose to train all staff members, including the drivers and guards who are often the first points of contact with various stakeholders, in how to concisely explain the organisation's mission and activities to others (for a longer discussion of acceptance, see Fast et al. 2013 and 2011; HPN 2010).

The dynamic nature of acceptance, however, renders it especially challenging. It is easier, and often quicker, to lose acceptance than to gain it. To gain acceptance requires a measure of trust, respect, and, in most cases, time. In violent conflict situations, trust is in short supply and the immediacy of need creates an urgency to respond. While acceptance from community stakeholders is linked to meeting the immediate needs of a community, this is not sufficient. When asked about their relationships with NGOs, community members in Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda identified participation, transparency, and accountability as important elements of acceptance. Conversations with local officials and other stakeholders in these

contexts indicated that acceptance is linked to respect and can easily change over time (Fast et al. 2011). If organisations rely on an assumption that they are meeting needs or have a good reputation in the community and are therefore accepted, they are likely to underappreciate the precarious nature of perceptions. Their dynamic nature makes it critical that any efforts to assess acceptance takes place on a recurrent basis.

Human rights defenders also depend on networks for protection. These networks, which often cross international borders, serve as sources of support, solidarity, and security. In fact, some human rights activists carry identification cards that indicate they have international supporters for their work. One of the more well-known practices is that of “accompaniment”. Accompaniment refers to “the physical presence of foreign volunteers with the dual purpose of protecting civilian activists or organisations from violent, politically motivated attacks and encouraging them to proceed with their democratic activities” (Mahoney/Eguren 1997, 2). Organisations such as Peace Brigades International and Witness for Peace send international volunteers to provide support and protection for local human rights defenders. A related practice is that of unarmed or civilian peacekeeping, adopted by organisations such as Nonviolent Peaceforce and Christian Peacemaker Teams. Unarmed peacekeepers, often foreigners, live in and work alongside communities affected by armed conflict or violence and employ tactics of active nonviolence to offer protection to these civilians. Both of these strategies use the presence of foreigners to send a message that the world is watching, will raise the alarm, and speak out if violence occurs.⁸ In the event that a civilian peacekeeper or the civilian population is threatened or harmed, the organisation can activate an international network to barrage leaders with letters, emails, or other social messaging to express condemnation (Schirch 2006, 46). In these ways, networks of relationships, seeking media visibility, and the high profile nature of an individual or organisation can serve as sources of protection.

Clearly, the approaches to managing risk and security from related professions suggest insights and lessons for peacebuilders about ways to manage security. Peacebuilders in various locales can and have adopted some of the aspects of both the hardened and consent-based approaches, from guard dogs to building networks of relationships with various stakeholders. Yet in what ways should a peacebuilding approach to risk and security be different? What are the unique aspects of security for peacebuilders? The next section addresses these questions.

3 The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Security

Many peacebuilders are well versed in the art of tightrope walking and are accustomed to valuing and holding in tension disparate ideas and perspectives. These same dynamics are true of peacebuilding security. The emphasis of peacebuilders on constructive engagement and relationship building with all sides, and a corresponding bias against the use of coercion or force together raise a series of challenges and opportunities regarding risk and security management. In particular, two paradoxes raise a set of unique questions for those engaged in direct peacebuilding activities. The first pertains to the risks of multi-partiality and the second asks whether an emphasis on security actually increases or undermines security.

⁸ The notion that someone is watching and willing to speak out against violations or abuse is central to the protection of civilian populations in general. The humanitarian organisation Médecins Sans Frontières refers to this as “témoignage”, or witnessing.

3.1 Paradox One: The Risks of Multi-partiality

Among conflict interveners that adopt nonviolent approaches, all agree on the importance of a principled commitment to talk to or engage all sides as a component of good security practice. Peacebuilders refer to this as impartiality or multi-partiality. Human rights defenders might use neutrality and impartiality or non-discrimination as functional equivalents, highlighting the need to speak out against harms committed by all sides and to work with victims without discrimination based on nationality, religion, or identity (Barry with Nainar 2008, 76). For humanitarians, however, the principles of neutrality and impartiality have specific and distinct meanings, rooted in international humanitarian law. Neutrality refers to not taking sides in a conflict. Impartiality refers to the provision of assistance based on need and without discrimination based on identity or group characteristics such as religion or ethnicity (Pictet 1979). Such assistance is usually tangible, such as providing medical care, shelter, water, or food. Although the terminology is common to all three, the nuances in meaning across these professions can and have resulted in disagreement or misunderstanding, particularly regarding the conflation of neutrality and impartiality.⁹ Nevertheless, the concept of talking to all sides is an important *principle* across professions.

Likewise, with regard to security, the implications are the same: that engaging with and working on all sides of a conflict is an approach rooted in principle that *may* also provide security benefits. For human rights defenders, these principles highlight the imperative of talking to all victims and speaking out against harms, regardless of the identities or affiliations of the perpetrators. For humanitarians, neutrality and impartiality are principles with operational implications that enable them to reach those in need of assistance. For peacebuilders, dialogue and building relationships across conflict lines is a manifestation of inclusion and is vital in identifying and understanding the root causes of conflict. In each case, talking to all sides is integral to the work. Fortunately, in cases of kidnapping, threats, or theft, having pre-established relationships can facilitate communication and negotiation. Aid agencies operating in Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Gaza Strip have used their relationships with various sides of a conflict to communicate and successfully negotiate the release of kidnapped aid workers or the return of stolen goods.

The paradox, however, is that even as talking to all sides can offer a measure of insulation from harm or mitigate the negative consequences of an attack, it is not enough as an operational *strategy*. It may even make one a target for attack. One of the few sources on risk management for peacebuilders explicitly names multi-partiality as a risk. In Sri Lanka, as conflict dynamics shifted and the party in power changed, “Berghof was criticised and attacked by influential nationalist groups for its dialogue processes with the LTTE and for having been close to the former government party UNP, which was now in opposition. This dynamic meant that multi-partiality as a core working principle of Berghof caused us a significant risk that we had to cope with” (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008, 6). Thus, associating with all parties incurs an unavoidable reputational risk, since peacebuilding requires dialogue with those from all sides and of all persuasions. It may even make consent, and therefore acceptance, more difficult to obtain, since consent from one side may preclude consent from another.

Box 3: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Peacebuilding

In multiple countries, anti-terrorism legislation has threatened or impeded peacebuilding endeavours. American law prohibits civil society groups and individuals from engaging with terrorist groups or providing terrorists with “material support”. The material support laws, which include the USA Patriot Act (2001 and 2004 update) and Executive Order 13224 (2001), allow exemptions only for medicine

⁹ The nuances of meaning of these principles across professions merit a longer discussion. For brevity, non-humanitarian actors are more apt to conflate neutrality with impartiality. In conflict situations, humanitarian actors tend to use the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence to distinguish themselves from those whose work is not confined to meeting immediate and life-saving needs. Military actors are not independent or neutral, while peacebuilders work toward social transformation, which is inherently a political and therefore partial agenda.

and religious materials. Under these laws it is possible for humanitarian organisations to provide medicine, but not clean water or food assistance. Moreover, in interpreting these laws the US Supreme Court decided in *Holder v Humanitarian Law Project* (2010) that even encouraging terrorist groups to lay down their weapons or providing them with legal and negotiation training could be construed as “material support”. This expanded the scope of the law to activities aimed at convincing terrorist groups to participate in nonviolent political processes. The result of this ruling was chilling for civil society actors, since it meant that individuals and groups could be prosecuted under US law for these activities.

To date, no peacebuilding organisations have been prosecuted. Nevertheless, the ambiguous and general nature of material support laws has led civil society actors to curtail the scope and scale of their activities or to limit the places in which they work. In more than one country, organisations have closed peacebuilding programmes while in others they have sought, and sometimes received, exemptions for peacebuilding work. Civil society groups have criticised the material support laws for their lack of clarity and broad applicability.

Toward the end of 2013, a bipartisan coalition in the US Congress has introduced legislation that would remove barriers facing humanitarian and peacebuilding groups working in conflict zones. The Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act (HAFA) of 2013 (HR 3526) seeks to remove barriers that such groups face when working in conflict zones. For more information about HAFA, visit the Charity and Security Network website: www.charityandsecurity.org/solutions/Humanitarian_Assistance_Facilitation_Act (accessed 7 March 2014).

Dialogue with those on the fringes, such as extremist or terrorist groups, poses additional risk of censure or even prosecution under laws preventing such associations (see Box 3). While necessary from a peacebuilding perspective, governments are less likely to interpret these dialogues and interactions in a positive light. It may even lead to accusations of treason, consorting with the “enemy”, or naiveté, in which peacebuilders are said to ignore the very human capacity for evil. In some cases, affiliating with the “other” can pose a risk for dialogue participants or local peacebuilding organisations. Some participants in early problem-solving workshops, for instance, faced ostracism and threats because they were talking to the “enemy” (see Box 4). Peacebuilders must consider these risks and account for them in any risk management strategy for the individuals involved, for partners and participants, for the specific country programme, and for the organisation as a whole.

Box 4: Dangers for Participants in Dialogue Processes – An Early Case

In 1972, two Yale academics, Leonard Doob and William Foltz, brought together a group of Catholics and Protestants from Belfast to study group dynamics in a violent conflict situation (the “Stirling Workshop”). The structure of the workshop constituted an early form of what most in the conflict resolution field would consider to be a problem-solving workshop (see Doob/Foltz 1973, 1974).

Participants in the workshop, however, later published a stern rebuke of Doob and Foltz for the intrinsic and extrinsic dangers affecting participants as a result of their participation. These included “psychic damage” and physical dangers that participants encountered “when they return to their everyday lives and have to justify their changed attitudes, or their meetings with ‘the other side’: that is to say, the ‘reentry problem’” (Boehringer et al. 1973, 258). These dangers, the participants wrote, stemmed from a questionable methodology and selection procedures, and improperly articulated and unrelated goals. In their evaluation of the effects of the workshop, the participants wrote: “An assessment of Stirling, in order to give a balanced view of the impact of the techniques upon the participants, their families, friends, and organisations, must deal with the suffering caused to specific individuals, and the feelings of betrayal, hostility, guilt, fear, and distrust aroused in the community towards consultants, administrators, those who appeared to, or objectively did, ‘side with’ the staff

[of the workshop], and of course toward those labeled as disrupters, extremists, and ‘casualties’” (Boehringer et al. 1973, 273).

While much current peacebuilding practice has addressed these dangers, the central critique remains one of which peacebuilders must be mindful. Participation may incur psychological, social, political, or professional costs for those courageous enough to engage in these types of processes. Ethical practice demands that peacebuilders take these concerns into account in designing processes and in follow-up work.

3.2 Paradox Two: Increasing or Undermining Security?

The second curious paradox unmask the tension between a focus on security that takes seriously the risks and vulnerabilities of peacebuilders, whether individuals or organisations, and the instrumentalisation of security, where security becomes an end in itself and not simply a means to an end. Thus, a focus on security is potentially problematic and, at a minimum, comes with hidden costs. These costs appear in at least two ways. First, although fatalities are the most dangerous and consequential type of security incident peacebuilders face, they are not the most common. The peacebuilder security survey results mentioned above identified few instances of peacebuilder fatalities. Instead, peacebuilders are more likely to deal with threats, complications at checkpoints, bureaucratic impediments such as a government denying or revoking permits or visas, office raids, or crime. Planning for and documenting these more common yet less serious security issues can be an important tool in developing a risk management strategy that accurately reflects the range of security incidents a peacebuilding organisation experiences. Yet documenting the full range of incidents may perversely ratchet up the perception of danger, since it will likely record significantly more incidents of varying severities over time. In contrast, assessing the degree of danger only on the basis of the least frequent but most severe incidents (fatalities, kidnappings, injuries) may skew perceptions in the opposite direction, perhaps making the environment feel safer than it is. Thus, those responsible for documenting and managing risk must delicately balance between accuracy, effective preparation, and raising or creating fear among staff members.

Second, managing security for any organisation inevitably results in policies or procedures that impede free movement and exchange. For example, according to those responding to the peacebuilding security survey, restrictions on employee travel or freedom of movement in a country is one of the most commonly used mechanisms to ensure safety and security for both national and international organisations. From a security management standpoint, these protective mechanisms help reduce the vulnerability to attack. Interpreted from a community standpoint, however, the policies and procedures designed to reduce vulnerability also institutionalise distance and separation between communities and those intervening, or between “us” and “them”. Particularly for expatriates, these procedures tend to produce a climate of fear that further inhibits interactions between interveners and the communities that surround them (Fast 2014; Autesserre 2014). At worse, these actions model and create new divisions in a context where boundaries between groups are reified and examples of inter-group collaboration are scarce. These mechanisms also contradict peacebuilding practice and theory that emphasise the value of contact and dialogue as mechanisms for transforming conflict, whether violent or not. Institutionalising separation, distance, and fear through such security measures may increase paranoia or inadvertently undermine the pursuit of justice. They signal a willingness to adopt a stance that divides and plays into, rather than disrupts, the seductive cycle of violence.

The consent-based approaches to security management counter the detrimental effects of the deterrent and protective measures, but a consent-based approach in and of itself may not be appropriate or effective in ensuring the security of peacebuilders or their programmes. As a result, peacebuilders and their partners must work to balance between a security management approach that better reflects peacebuilding values but is often not enough in and of itself to cope with all types of incidents, and the unintended consequence

of some approaches that inadvertently nurture a climate of fear or support cycles of violence. This fear, in turn, may be well-founded, a chimera, or anything in between. To cope with fear, interveners may react in different ways. Among women human rights defenders, for example, these reactions include “hyper-vigilance, fatalism, humour, denial and paranoia. Sometimes, they will belittle themselves for feeling it, sometimes they will belittle others. And sometimes, they will recognise it, but say, ‘what right do I have to worry about my own safety? In comparison to others, my situation isn’t so bad’” (Barry with Nainar 2008, 29). At worst, the chimera of fear diminishes any contact and understanding between peacebuilders and those affected by conflict. On the other hand, as those intervening become increasingly accustomed to more risk, danger habituation results, which may decrease vigilance and result in the uncritical acceptance of higher degrees of risk.

4 A Peacebuilding Approach to Security and Risk Management

This section begins to build a case for a peacebuilding approach to managing risk and security, paying particular attention to nonviolent approaches since they are most consistent with the meaning of peacebuilding as described above. Because a variety of resources already thoroughly describe the practicalities and details of mainstreaming and managing risk (Van Brabant 2001; Barnett 2004; HPN 2010; see also Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008), I do not summarise these elements here. Instead, I describe a set of cornerstones for a peacebuilder’s approach, using the paradoxes above as a point of departure.

4.1 One Size Does Not Fit All

Every organisation’s strategy for addressing security concerns and managing risk should, and even must, differ. These differences reflect two aspects: the importance of context and the varying missions and profiles of peacebuilding organisations. Peacebuilders work in situations of conflict, which requires a keen sensitivity to broader dynamics. Conflict analysis frameworks assist peacebuilders in analysing these dynamics, all with a focus on designing and implementing peacebuilding interventions. These same analytical frameworks often implicitly identify the ambient risk peacebuilders face. Curiously, however, peacebuilders do not often share these analyses among organisations or use them for their own risk management.¹⁰ Also missing from these frameworks is an awareness of how the *organisation’s* profile, including its activities, mission and staffing, affects conflict dynamics and stakeholder interests, and therefore influences peacebuilders’ vulnerability or exposure to risk (Fast 2013).

In conflict work, an often-used refrain is that every conflict is unique yet similar patterns and dynamics do hold across conflicts. The same is true for managing risk. The specific patterns of risk will differ according to context and organisation, but the types of security threats and vulnerabilities, from fatalities to threats, are the same across contexts. Thus, the strategy an organisation adopts in a particular context must firstly respond to the particular threats and vulnerabilities in that context, and how its activities shape its risks. In one country, the predominant security incident might be theft of equipment, cash, or other resources, while in another, an organisation might be the target of office raids or be attacked in

¹⁰ Interview with staffperson at a peacebuilding organisation, February 2014. This same individual reported that conflict analyses are usually conducted once when developing a security management plan and not continually updated as the context changes.

local media as supporters of the opposition or traitors. The overall security management strategy, in turn, should reflect these differences. In training sessions for staff members, it will be more helpful to cover topics related to avoiding crime in the former and, in the latter, to strategise about how to react in cases of office raids or to proactively counter accusations in the media. As one resource described, “the security plan cannot simply adopt SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures] from other contexts but needs to respond to the real risks the organisation is facing” (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008, 9). Thus, training and security management must address the context-specific threats as well as those that are specific to the organisation. For this reason, monitoring and tracking security incidents affecting peacebuilders over time would be useful in developing appropriate and accurate security management plans. In doing so, however, peacebuilding organisations must also take seriously the concerns about reifying security mentioned above with regard to the second paradox.

Box 5: Security Tips from Peacebuilders for Peacebuilders

The following are security tips compiled from interviews with peacebuilders.

For expatriate peacebuilders travelling to conflict zones:

- ≡ Find a “fixer” and interpreter to help you navigate the context.
- ≡ Always use the same taxi in a particular place or travel in unmarked, private cars.
- ≡ Rely on and trust in local partners to determine what is and what is not safe.
- ≡ Stay in a quiet hotel or guest house away from mainstream tourist areas or not on the beaten path.
- ≡ Recognise that places frequented by internationals are more visible and may be targets for attack.

For peacebuilding organisations:

- ≡ Adopt a low profile, travelling in local taxis or vehicles and removing branding and insignia from offices or other compounds.
- ≡ Join country-specific NGO or security coordination networks (e.g. ANSO in Afghanistan, GANSO in the Gaza Strip, NSP in Somalia, the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum, the NGO Forum in South Sudan).
- ≡ Create a crisis management plan that establishes lines of responsibility in case of emergency (e.g. which crises will be managed by HQ vs. the field level).
- ≡ Establish a staff person who is the “safety and security focal point” for your organisation.
- ≡ Consider hiring a “roving expert” who can assist in developing and implementing security management plans.
- ≡ Use security networks and draw upon tools and expertise from other agencies wherever possible.
- ≡ Consider outsourcing for specific needs (e.g. training).
- ≡ Consider adapting or expanding your existing conflict analysis tools to incorporate security management issues.
- ≡ Recognise and respect that local and international NGOs have different currencies of power and access (e.g. local and national NGOs can negotiate in local languages, whereas foreign NGOs may not have this capability).

One group working on confidential dialogue processes invented cover stories in case news of the process leaked to the general public. In this situation, the group would either cancel the dialogue or continue to hold the process, but the cover story would make the process sound as harmless and boring as possible.

One organisation chose to continue operating in a country facing international sanctions, opting to respect its mandate and values even if this decision put them in a precarious legal position.

Secondly, organisations have unique profiles, referring to their separate histories, philosophies and missions, activities, and way of operating. These profiles, in turn, should shape the security management

approaches that the organisation adopts. For instance, the profile and experience of an organisation will determine which of these measures are consistent with its values and therefore which, if any, of the protective and deterrent approaches it adopts. In documenting the security management strategies of women human rights defenders, for example, Jane Barry and Vahida Nainar (2008, 76, 87) note that they eschew the use of violence or armed force since it contradicts a feminist ethic that the use of weapons only increases insecurity. Peacebuilding organisations may choose similarly, believing that drawing upon weapons for security only feeds into the cycles of violence that they strive to interrupt.

In addition, the varying experiences and profiles of organisations are likely to influence their respective risk thresholds, referring to the determination of acceptable risk. At what point does a situation become too dangerous to remain present? For aid agencies, particularly those with a life-saving mandate, a higher degree of risk may be acceptable than for an organisation providing education and training or agricultural development. Similarly, peacebuilding organisations engaged in documenting harms or abuses may choose to stay or remain operational precisely because all others may have left. Discussing these thresholds should be conversations that take place both vertically, from executive management to programme leadership to individual staff members, and horizontally, across programmes and countries, to determine what is appropriate for a specific programme or context. Moreover, these discussions need to take into account the ways that individual risk thresholds may be less or more permissive than organisational thresholds.

4.2 Looking Outward: Networks, Relationships, and Communications

Regardless of the extent to which peacebuilders draw upon the hardened approaches of protection and deterrence, two crucial aspects of any peacebuilding organisation in managing risk are likely to concern networks and relationships with all stakeholders, and communications.

Acceptance is, in the words of a veteran peacebuilder, a “peacebuilding approach to managing security.”¹¹ Mapping the stakeholders in a conflict and analysing their interests is a crucial aspect of building relationships and acceptance. This analysis must also account for the ways in which peacebuilders’ actions and relationships intersect with these interests and agendas, both positively and negatively. An acceptance approach incorporates the same skill sets and tools that peacebuilders already employ in their work. It does not rely upon force or weapons but instead on building networks and relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders, especially those who benefit from violence or who are likely to undermine a peace process or peacebuilding activities. It emphasises the importance of process, and not simply outcomes. It has many potential benefits: in emphasising process, it is possible to engage in joint and participatory activities to identify security threats that build confidence and trust between partners and that more effectively incorporate local voices. In a central African country, one peacebuilding organisation adopted a consultative security planning process with its local partner, creating policies that reflected the concerns of both partners.¹² One expatriate chose to hire a relative of a UN driver while working in Afghanistan, led by the belief that her associations and the driver’s kinship networks would provide an incentive to keep her safe.¹³

Yet acceptance also carries drawbacks, as the discussion of the paradoxes of multi-partiality above indicate. It requires time and effort, and gaining acceptance is dependent upon the quality and character of those building acceptance. It may not be “transferable” from one individual to another or from an individual to an organisation and vice versa (Fast et al. 2011, 2013). Even so, for peacebuilders, its benefits as both a programming and security approach are likely to outweigh its drawbacks.

An equally important aspect of looking outward is a peacebuilder’s communication strategy. This strategy is vital in shaping perceptions and responding proactively to misperceptions or accusations. In a

¹¹ Conversation with author, March 2011.

¹² Interview with staffperson at a peacebuilding organisation, February 2014.

¹³ Interview with peacebuilder, February 2014.

context where threats originate in the media, a proactive strategy should involve increasing transparency as opposed to responding reactively to charges and accusations. Websites are clearly crucial mechanisms for disseminating information. In some countries, aid organisations have discovered that would-be assailants have searched the organisations' websites for information about their funders and activities, and used this to rate an organisation's "acceptability". One peacebuilding organisation found that translating materials into local languages, including a Frequently Asked Questions section on its website, and providing press releases about its activities enabled it to better respond to threats (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008).

Others may more directly and publicly confront their accusers. In some cases, human rights organisations have chosen to combat accusations and slander with public lawsuits. In other instances, ignoring them is a more appropriate risk management strategy (Barry with Nainar 2008, 37). In all cases, these choices must reflect the context, risks, and risk thresholds of the organisation and its constituents.

4.3 Focusing Inward: A Holistic Approach

Assuming one size does not fit all, how should peacebuilders think about security and risk management within an organisation? A holistic approach to risk and security management considers the mission and identity of the organisation and more importantly, draws upon and reflects peacebuilding values of inclusion, integration, and interdependence in managing security.

Applying the peacebuilding value of inclusion to risk management has two dimensions. First, inclusion suggests that managing and responding to risk should involve everyone. Security is everyone's responsibility, even though the job descriptions of particular individuals are more likely to include security management responsibilities of various types. For example, executive-level involvement in security decision-making is crucial to ensuring an overall perspective of the needs and concerns of the organisation. Nevertheless, dialogue about the specific risks and vulnerabilities of an organisation should include everyone, from management to programme staff, drivers, and guards. This has the dual advantage of diversifying perspectives on risk and of building ownership and awareness of security issues and policies among all staff members. This level of inclusion is clearly easier to accomplish in small organisations or with close partnerships. It requires time and resources. Inclusion should be balanced with clear lines of responsibility, especially for emergencies (such as a serious security incident) for which organisations can proactively identify key decision-makers and lay out telephone trees to keep key individuals informed. One peacebuilding organisation that adopted many of these mechanisms found them valuable, particularly in responding to the specific needs of local staff and in making security a team effort (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 2008).

Second, the value of inclusion suggests careful attention to human resource policies. Agencies that adopt an acceptance approach, in particular, should hire with regard to conflict dynamics (Fast et al. 2011), thereby making their internal policies conflict-sensitive as well. For most agencies this requires hiring individuals who represent the various identity groups in a conflict. Such policies model the value of inclusion, even though they may also present challenges for workplace dynamics if broader grievances play out at the office. In some cases, it may also require sensitivity to professional and experiential background as well as to identity. Hiring individuals with previous experience in the field indicates a commitment to the work and minimises the potential of hiring those who harbour other agendas (e.g. working for security or intelligence forces). Deciding what takes priority will depend in part upon the context in which peacebuilders are working.

The integrative aspects of a holistic approach refer to how peacebuilding organisations incorporate security management across the various departments and point to the value of using peacebuilding tools and perspectives as part of risk management. An integrative risk management approach will bring together finance, human resources, and programming staff, among others, to discuss the risks that characterise the organisation's activities and the context more generally. Managing security must be built into job descriptions, budgets, and work plans. Moreover, an integrative approach might consider creative ways to

apply peacebuilding values and tools to risk management. Security training might incorporate role-plays and simulations as key learning tools, and peacebuilders could use their skills in facilitating dialogues about risk among staff or with partners. Alternatively, peacebuilders could use their own tools and resources to address the aftereffects of security incidents. Some women human rights defenders symbolically reclaimed their space after an office raid by using rituals to re-establish a zone of safety (Barry with Nainar 2008, 40). In documenting the responses of these women to the risks they faced as defenders, the researchers discovered that many of their security strategies were the same as the strategies the women adopted in their human rights work. For example, they sang and danced, using these as acts of resistance against the violence they experienced. They drew strength from their spirituality and their relationships and families, whether the families into which they were born or the ones they claimed as part of their work (Barry with Nainar 2008). These resources were integral to their ability to sustain themselves and carry out their work, despite the obvious risks they faced on a regular basis. Similarly, the tools, rituals, and relationships that are essential to peacebuilding work can become resources for managing risk and its effects.

Finally, the value of interdependence suggests that peacebuilding organisations must pay attention to difference. Local, national, and international staff all meaningfully contribute to the work of the organisation and its effectiveness; they are thus interdependent. They also face different risks as a result of their work. International staff are able to leave when violence erupts, yet are vulnerable to having work visas or travel permits revoked. They might be targeted for kidnapping or crime. Local and national staff, on the other hand, have essential knowledge about the context and conflict dynamics. Their individual identities, however, may make them targets of violence, and they usually remain long after others have departed.

All are vulnerable to burn-out and trauma as part of the work. Living and working in contexts of deprivation, loss, and violence exert a toll on one's mental, physical, emotional, and spiritual health in the immediate and long term. Organisations have a "duty of care" to all staff members that requires attention to the mental and physical health of those they employ. A more comprehensive approach, however, begins with recruitment and continues after a contract ends. In addition, organisations have an ethical responsibility to consider the mental and physical health of all with whom they work, even if a legal "duty of care" may not strictly apply. Providing access to counselling services after a traumatic event is a start. Developing solidarity networks and alliances, often informal and based on relationships, and incorporating creative approaches, such as rituals, to deal with traumatic events are also important. This duty of care is part of an overall risk management approach, since burnout and trauma also present dangers to self, others, and the organisation.

At a broader level, peacebuilding organisations should consider partners and participants in peacebuilding programmes as falling under their security umbrella. Carrying out peacebuilding work requires partnerships and networks that value the contributions of each partner and, ideally, account for different risks. One expatriate peacebuilder observed how just her presence put her local partners at risk. She remarked, "I realized I am bringing a huge threat on them because of my presence. They told me I couldn't ride the bus because it made the bus a target, with a foreigner on board."¹⁴ Moreover, in intractable conflicts, participating in peacebuilding programmes exposes individuals to risk. Proactively discussing risks, expectations, and responsibilities should be part of programming as well as an overall risk management approach.

¹⁴ Interview with peacebuilder, February 2014.

5 Conclusion

In the area of security management, all too often a devastating event spurs change or innovation. A series of kidnappings and the deaths of six delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Chechnya in 1996 prompted humanitarian and development agencies to work together to design a security-training curriculum. This comprehensive curriculum has undergone several revisions and expansions, including in 2010 (HPN 2010). The revisions incorporate new practices and lessons, but its core elements remain much the same. Individual peacebuilders have died over the years, especially local peacebuilders, but to date, fortunately, no large-scale tragedies have afflicted the peacebuilding sector. Perhaps as a result, the peacebuilding community has neglected this as an area of inquiry and practice.

Several areas stand out in particular as areas for further research and intervention:

- ≡ As a field, we must do a better job of educating peacebuilders themselves, especially those new to the field, about the risks inherent in the work and also in recognising that exposing oneself to risk is, to some degree, a personal choice.
- ≡ The dearth of data documenting the specific risks that peacebuilders face highlights the need for better monitoring and tracking of incidents, both in terms of type and prevalence. Without data, we have no way of knowing beyond anecdotal evidence how and why security for peacebuilders is (or is not) different from other intervener populations, or the variations between peacebuilders of various types (international, national, multi-partial, or insider). Any such effort must also include equal and perhaps more concerted attention to the specific risks for national and local peacebuilders. Local peacebuilders often operate out of the spotlight or might not be linked into international networks but nonetheless put their lives on the line.
- ≡ Most international peacebuilding organisations have only begun to consider security and risk management. Their access to resources, however, is likely better than for insider or local peacebuilders. Security management materials are often not translated into local languages and international peacebuilders are usually better networked with other international actors or have access to a broader base of financial support. Nevertheless, a lack of access to resources does not necessarily imply a deficiency in security management approaches. In developing a peacebuilding approach to security and risk management, we all must work at implementing an ethic of care toward staff as well as partner organisations. We must also work at developing an ethic of mutual learning in the context of insider-outsider peacebuilding encounters.

In moving forward it is vital that peacebuilders think proactively about how to manage risk. My goal in this article is to provoke a discussion among peacebuilders about how best to do this. Drawing upon knowledge and strategies from other professions is important in laying a foundation for managing security. As the above discussions have demonstrated, the values and skills of peacebuilders represent a wealth of experience and knowledge upon which to build a peacebuilding approach to security and risk management.

6 References and Selected Resources

Box 6: Useful web resources

The websites below contain useful resources. This is a partial and not a comprehensive list.

Acceptance training materials (research reports and toolkit for applying acceptance)

<http://acceptanceresearch.org>

Aid Worker Security Database (data on aid worker security)

<http://aidworkersecurity.org>

Antares Foundation (management and staff support resources)

<http://www.antaresfoundation.org>

Centre for Safety and Development (security training and resources)

<http://www.centreforsafety.org>

Charity and Security Network (publications and resources related to peacebuilding and counter-terrorism)

<http://www.charityandsecurity.org>

Disaster Preparedness Training

<http://www.disasterready.org>

European Interagency Security Forum (maintains lists of trainings and resources on security)

<http://www.eisf.eu>

Headington Institute (staff support resources and training)

<http://www.headington-institute.org>

International NGO Safety and Security Association

<http://ingossa.org>

Insecurity Insight (publications on aid work in danger)

<http://insecurityinsight.org>

NGO in a Box, Security edition

Details are available at <http://securityinabox.org> and
<http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/manuals/protection>

People in Aid (human resource and duty of care resources)

<http://www.peopleinaid.org>

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