

Dear reader,

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in *Kierkegaard's Concepts Tome VI* on December 5, 2016 available online:

<https://www.routledge.com/Volume-15-Tome-VI-Kierkegaards-Concepts-Salvation-to-Writing/Emmanuel-McDonald-Stewart/p/book/9781032098487>

Original publication:

Gerhard Schreiber

Transition

Steven M. Emmanuel / William McDonald / Jon Stewart (eds.) *Kierkegaard's Concepts Tome VI*: 185–191

Farnham / Burlington, Ashgate, 2014, *Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources*

URL: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315234724-30>

Access to the published version may require subscription.

Published in accordance with the policy of Routledge: <https://www.routledge.com/our-products/open-access-books/publishing-oa-books/chapters>.

Your IxTheo team

Transition (*Overgang*—noun; *gaae over*—verb)

The concept of “transition” (Danish *Overgang*, from Old Danish *øwergong* or *owergong*, Old Norse *yfirgangr* or *yfirganga*)¹ is primarily used to designate processes of movement, roaming, change, becoming, or decay, i.e., processes in which a substance passes from one state into another. Transitoriness is an essential hallmark not only of logical reality, but of historical and existential actuality as well. What unites logical, historical, and existential transitions is that the original state no longer obtains; another has taken its place.

Such a change of state can occur either continuously or abruptly. In the former case, a thing elides incrementally from one state into another, and so becomes no longer the same as it used to be—although this does not imply that it has severed all ties of coherence to its former self. A continuous transition of this sort, from being one way to being another—a step that is part of an ongoing trek, and at the same time is a step beyond—presupposes a “bridge” as its medium.² Without such a mediating moment, we are left only with transition’s discontinuous form, namely, the leap. By the leap *as* (or *in*) transition, the inner, natural coherence of a process is dissolved, and something “ab-solutely” [lit. *ab-solved*, that is, precipitated out of a solution; detached] new is set in place. In principle, such a transition is transitionless: it is a transgression—a crossing of a border—in the sense of a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, which takes place not by means of mediation, but by a leap.

Over the course of his authorship (i.e., in his published and unpublished writings, as well as in his journals and notebooks), Kierkegaard uses the concept of transition around 350 times.³ As with “leap,” which refers to a specific form of transition, we encounter the concept

¹ See *Ordbog over det danske Sprog*, vols. 1-28, published by the Society for Danish Language and Literature, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1918-56, vol. 6, 1924, columns 541-2 (“gaa over,” 32.7) and vol. 16, 1936, columns 6-10 (“*Overgang*”).

² See *SKS* 1, 173 / *CI*, 121.

³ The earliest mention of the concept is in *SKS* 27, 193, Papir 254 (November 28, 1835), the latest at *SKS* 14, 175 / *M*, 44 (March 30, 1855). Moreover, on sixteen occasions Kierkegaard devised such composites as “category of transition” (*Overgangens-Categorie*), “transition-situation” (*Overgangs-Situation*), and “transition period” (*Overgangsperiode*). In addition, we find uses of the German equivalents *Uebergang* or *Uebergehen* (with

of transition primarily in the pseudonymous texts that Kierkegaard published between 1843 and 1846, particularly *The Concept of Anxiety* (24 occurrences) and the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (59 occurrences). We find only scattered mentions of “transition” both before and after this period, if we set aside *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* (7 occurrences) and *The Sickness unto Death* (9 occurrences). In Kierkegaard’s journals and notebooks, however, we do find numerous remarks about transition, some quite significant, in various entries from the years 1843–1844, as Kierkegaard gathered materials relevant to his “theory of the leap.”⁴ Meanwhile, it should be noted that Kierkegaard was also occupied by the problem of transition and its various forms in his NB journals (31 occurrences), including the later ones, where he in part revisited earlier deliberations on the subject.

Kierkegaard thematizes phenomena of transitoriness in a wide variety of contexts.⁵ Without thereby determining the *mode* of the transition at issue in the relevant (or in another) passage, e.g. by specifying attributes, Kierkegaard refers to, among other things, (1) “the transition from the lyric to the epic”⁶; (2) the “transition from sorrow to pain,”⁷ which can be found in Greek tragedy; (3) “the transition from sculpture to painting”⁸; (4) the “transition from theory to practice”⁹; (5) various transitions that denote distinct periods of life¹⁰; (6) the transition from “abstract wildness” to “concrete madness,” which is formed by means of the “category of higher madness”¹¹; (7) boredom, whereby the demonic passes into the comic¹²;

associated composites) in ten locations, the Latin equivalents *transitus*, *transitio*, or *transgressio* in nine locations, and the Greek equivalents *μετάβασις* (εις ἄλλο γένος) and *μεταβολή* in 26 locations.

⁴ *Pap.* V C 12 / *JP* 3, 2352; see especially *SKS* 27, 275-7, *Papir* 283 / *JP* 3, 2345-2351.

⁵ Apart from transitions in philosophical-theological and/or existential contexts, which will primarily be discussed in what follows, Kierkegaard was also concerned with, for example, transitions in argumentation, transitions in presentation, and transitions in the development of thought (e.g., in a text); see *SKS* 1, 47 / *EPW*, 92; *SKS* 1, 130 / *CI*, 71; *SKS* 1, 231 / *CI*, 183; *SKS* 2, 129 / *EOI*, 128; *SKS* 13, 65 / *FSE*, 38.

⁶ *SKS* 1, 27 / *EPW*, 71.

⁷ *SKS* 2, 150 / *EOI*, 151.

⁸ *SKS* 3, 135 / *EO2*, 136.

⁹ *SKS* 18, 84, FF:41 / *KJN* 2, 77.

¹⁰ *SKS* 15, 21 / *JC*, 123.

¹¹ *SKS* 18, 70, EE:195 / *KJN* 2, 64.

¹² Cf. *SKS* 18, 173, JJ:104 / *KJN* 2, 160.

and (8) “the one time of suffering”¹³ as a transition that one must pass through, even if it lasts as long as one lives.

Of greater interest, in any case, are the particular transitions whose nature and/or conditions of enactment became objects of Kierkegaard's deliberations. Here we can speak of, and distinguish fundamentally between, two groups of transitions: those that occur by means of a series of immanent changes,¹⁴ and those that imply “a break with immanence.”¹⁵ While the former mainly represent continuous or gradual transitions, in which a new thing emerges amid (and despite) an inner consistency with another, older thing, the latter transitions are essentially discontinuous or radical, since they have the character of leaps. In numerous passages, Kierkegaard reduces this fundamental distinction to “the difference between a pathos-laden and a dialectical transition.”¹⁶ If we include all of the other types of transition that Kierkegaard thematizes, the following contrast emerges. The first group of transitions encompasses “direct,” “immediate,” “simple,” or “quantitative transitions,” on the one side, and “dialectical transitions” on the other. The second group consists of “qualitative” or “pathos-laden transitions,” such as “leaps.”

One feature common to all “direct” and/or “immediate,”¹⁷ “simple,”¹⁸ and “quantitative transitions”¹⁹ is the simple continuity of a process that unfolds necessarily, or is purely cumulative. This continuous, gradual change involves merely a *quantitative* modification of

¹³ SKS 10, 110 / CD, 97; SKS 10, 113 / CD, 101.

¹⁴ Cf. SKS 7, 269 / CUP1, 295.

¹⁵ SKS 7, 269 / CUPH, 247 (cf. CUP1, 295); see also SKS 7, 309 / CUP1, 338; SKS 7, 313 / CUP1, 342; Pap. V B 49:14 / JP 3, 2343.

¹⁶ SKS 18, 241, JJ:318 / KJN 2, 221 (translation slightly modified); cf. SKS 19, 375, Not12:4 / KJN 3, 373; SKS 19, 386, Not13:8a / KJN 3, 384; SKS 19, 386, Not13:8c / KJN 3, 384; SKS 19, 420, Not13:55 / KJN 3, 418; SKS 27, 399, Papir 365:24 / JP 1, 649; SKS 27, 408, Papir 368:2.b / JP 1, 653 (no. 5); SKS 7, 234 / CUP1, 258; SKS 21, 326, NB10:138 / KJN 5, 337f. See also SKS 22, 107f., NB11:179 / KJN 6, 104-6, where the meaning of this distinction is explored in terms of the relationship between a conviction and its reasons.

¹⁷ Cf. SKS 7, 54 / CUP1, 49; SKS 4, 291 / PF, 94; see also SKS 14, 50 / COR, 14 (“the pure transition”; translation slightly modified).

¹⁸ Only in SKS 4, 365 / CA, 60 and SKS 4, 376 / CA, 72.

¹⁹ Cf. SKS 4, 336-40 / CA, 30-4; SKS 4, 344 / CA, 37; SKS 4, 362 / CA, 57; SKS 4, 273-5 / PF, 73-5; Pap. V B 49:5, pp. 107f. / CA, Supplement, 180f.; Pap. VI B 13 / JP 5, 5787; SKS 27, 269, Papir 277:1 / JP 1, 261; SKS 27, 276, Papir 283:1 / JP 3, 2345 (with Pap. V B 49:5, p. 108 / CA, Supplement, 181); SKS 27, 277, Papir 283:2 / JP 3, 2351; SKS 27, 285, Papir 302 / JP 5, 5712; SKS 19, 395, Not13:27 / KJN 3, 393; SKS 18, 303, JJ:492 / KJN 2, 279.

an existing determination; the emerging result of this approximation along a continuum is no new quality suddenly set forth, but can either be derived from its own constituting elements or explained by its previous development. By contrast, “dialectical transitions”²⁰ take place in the course of continual processes of positing and sublating all oppositions and contradictions.²¹ Here Kierkegaard has, most of all, an eye for the Hegelian type of transition, in which “the one standpoint on its own necessarily determines its transition over to another”²² or in which something (a concept) passively “flips over” into another “with immanent necessity.”²³ Such progress, as the self-unfolding of the idea, takes place only in the sphere of thought, which is why the Hegelian notion that we could *move* by means of a “dialectical transition” is nothing but “a chimera.”²⁴ Although this dialectical transition is not necessarily a mere advance in thinking with the aid of mediation, but can also proceed abruptly (i.e., by means of a leap), it nonetheless remains predictable, inasmuch as it takes part in the relevant dialectic. Yet these last leaps—which are influenced so that an as-yet-missing final, external circumstance can arise as well—must be distinguished from leaps in the strict sense, which are executed by virtue of a passionate interest.

This brings us to the second group of transitions, which Kierkegaard defines as “qualitative” or “pathos-laden transitions,”²⁵ such as “leaps.”²⁶ Since quantity is an irrelevant de-

²⁰ See note 16 above.

²¹ Cf. *SKS* 1, 128 / *CI*, 69; *SKS* 3, 169 / *EO2*, 173; see also *SKS* 14, 50 / *COR*, 14 (“the philosophical transition”).

²² *SKS* 7, 269 / *CUPI*, 295 (translation slightly modified).

²³ *SKS* 15, 233 / *BA*, 286; cf. *Pap.* III 21; *Pap.* VII-2 B 261:22.

²⁴ *SKS* 7, 269 / *CUPI*, 295; see also *SKS* 27, 275-7, *Papir* 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2348; *SKS* 11, 210 / *SUD*, 97f.; as well as *SKS* 19, 415, *Not13:50* / *KJN* 3, 413.

²⁵ See note 16 above. This group also includes other types of transitions that Kierkegaard may not have labeled “qualitative” or “pathos-laden,” but which he nonetheless *characterized* as such, as for example (1) the transition between the spiritual person and the sensate-psychical person, which encompasses “an infinite difference” (*SKS* 9, 212 / *WL*, 209); (2) “the incomprehensible transition that comes when erotic love [*Elskov*] awakens” (*SKS* 15, 17 / *JC*, 118) in a person; (3) the transition from contemptibleness to respectability, which does not simply occur such that the contemptible one suddenly becomes respectable “one fine morning,” but rather must be undertaken ethically (and so requires pathos; cf. *SKS* 27, 461, *Papir* 388); (4) “the transition from scholarship to the upbuilding” (*Pap.* VI B 137, p. 228 / *TD*, Supplement, 126); (5) the transition from good to evil (and vice versa) (cf. *SKS* 27, 275, *Papir* 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2345; see also *SKS* 17, 91, *BB:8* / *KJN* 1, 84; *SKS* 19, 92, *Not2:2.b* / *KJN* 3, 88; *SKS* 3, 125 / *EO2*, 125).

²⁶ See my article on “Leap” in Tome IV of this volume.

terminant with respect to quality, a given quality remains the same even when the relevant quantity is altered.²⁷ On its own, a quantitative alteration cannot generate anything qualitatively new. The transition from a quantitative to a qualitative determination thus implies a discontinuous, qualitative change: a leap.²⁸ The leap as “the dialectically decisive”²⁹ pertains to qualitative differences between states, as well as to the inconceivability of the emergence of other states. Kierkegaard provides an example of this state of affairs by pointing to the transition from innocence to sin, the Fall, in *The Concept of Anxiety*.³⁰ The Fall stands for a qualitative transition, and therefore cannot be the result of a quantitative “more”³¹ (of anxiety). Unlike a transition simply from being one way to being another (as in the phase change from water to ice³²), which presupposes the existence of something “in which change is taking place,”³³ the transition from innocence to sin involves a “qualitative leap”³⁴ *stricto sensu*: a leap from non-existence to existence.³⁵

In *Philosophical Fragments*, Climacus characterizes such a “transition from possibility to actuality”³⁶ as “the change of coming into existence.”³⁷ The *differentia specifica* of this change (κίνησις), as opposed to other types of alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), consists in the fact

²⁷ Cf. *SKS* 19, 406, Not13:41b / *KJN* 3, 404.

²⁸ Cf. *SKS* 27, 267, Papir 277:1 / *JP* 1, 261; *SKS* 7, 21 / *CUPI*, 11; *SKS* 4, 273-5 / *PF*, 73-5; *SKS* 19, 395, Not13:27 / *KJN* 3, 393; *SKS* 27, 276, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2348.

²⁹ *Pap.* VI B 98:26.

³⁰ For more on this, see my article on “Leap;” see also *SKS* 4, 380 / *CA*, 77; *SKS* 4, 388 / *CA*, 85; *SKS* 4, 394 / *CA*, 91; *SKS* 4, 415 / *CA*, 113; *Pap.* V B 55:15; *Pap.* V B 55:26 as well as *SKS* 20, 65, NB:73 / *KJN* 4, 64.

³¹ *SKS* 4, 365 / *CA*, 60.

³² Cf. *SKS* 27, 275, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2345.

³³ *SKS* 4, 273 / *PF*, 73; cf. *SKS* 4, 274 / *PF*, 74.

³⁴ *Pap.* V B 55:26 / *CA*, Supplement, 200; cf. *SKS* 4, 352f. / *CA*, 47f.; *SKS* 4, 413 / *CA*, 111; *Pap.* V B 72:11.

³⁵ As Climacus adds, this transition from not existing to existing not only corresponds to “the transition of birth,” but also to that of being born again, i.e. “rebirth” (in Christianity), cf. *SKS* 4, 227f. / *PF*, 19f.; *SKS* 4, 230 / *PF*, 22; *SKS* 4, 237 / *PF*, 30; see also *SKS* 5, 393 / *TD*, 12. Correspondingly, such a leap is also to be found in the transition from existing to not existing, namely, in “death” as the (final) transition from temporality to eternity, cf. *SKS* 4, 137 / *FT*, 42; *SKS* 11, 48 / *WA*, 44; *SKS* 21, 338, NB10:166 / *KJN* 5, 349; see also *SKS* 2, 379f. / *EOI*, 392f.; *SKS* 3, 242 / *EO2*, 253; *SKS* 5, 461 / *TD*, 92; *SKS* 5, 464 / *TD*, 97; *SKS* 5, 466 / *TD*, 99; *SKS* 8, 85 / *TA*, 89; *SKS* 8, 102f. / *TA*, 108f.; *SKS* 5, 455 / *TD*, 86.

³⁶ *SKS* 7, 313 / *CUPI*, 342; cf. *SKS* 4, 25 / *R*, 149; *SKS* 15, 74 / *R*, Supplement, 309f.; *Pap.* V B 55:1; *Pap.* IV B 118:7; *SKS* 4, 273-5 / *PF*, 73-5; *SKS* 4, 281 / *PF*, 82; *SKS* 4, 385 / *CA*, 82. On “the occasion” as “the essential category of transition from the sphere of the idea to actuality”, see *SKS* 2, 231f. / *EOI*, 238.

³⁷ *SKS* 4, 273 / *PF*, 73.

that it is not the subject of the change that is changed—i.e., its essence—but its mode of being.³⁸ In so distancing himself from the usual interpretation of the transition from possibility to actuality as the actualization of a possibility, Climacus exposes the very moment of discontinuity in the transition from not existing to existing, given that this transition “takes place in freedom”³⁹: the new does not arise simply by *turning* possibility *into* actuality, but because “possibility is *annihilated* by actuality.”⁴⁰

The backdrop for these considerations is Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with the Aristotelian doctrine of κίνησις, as it was transmitted to him via W.G. Tennemann’s history of philosophy.⁴¹ While taking reading notes on Tennemann’s *History of Philosophy*⁴² during the months between January and April 1843, Kierkegaard realized that the transition that he was looking for—in critical opposition to the “notion of mediation”⁴³ and to every “dialectical transition” as hallmarks of Hegelian philosophy—is accompanied, and indeed made possible, by “passion,” and is thus a “pathos-laden transition,”⁴⁴ which Kierkegaard considered to be equivalent to “the qualitative transition of the leap.”⁴⁵

In existence, all transitions are pathos-laden,⁴⁶ namely, by the decisions that the individual makes in passion about his existence in general, by virtue of his infinite interest in his own existence.⁴⁷ The so-called “motion” of “dialectical transitions” is only apparent motion, since it concerns only essence, rather than being, and does not change anything in actuality.⁴⁸

³⁸ Cf. *SKS* 4, 273f. / *PF*, 73 and *SKS* 19, 395, Not13:27 / *KJN* 3, 393.

³⁹ *SKS* 4, 275 / *PF*, 75.

⁴⁰ *SKS* 4, 274 / *PF*, 74.

⁴¹ Cf. *SKS* 19, 395, Not13:27 / *KJN* 3, 393; *SKS* 19, 415, Not13:50 / *KJN* 3, 413; *SKS* 19, 415, Not13:50.a / *KJN* 3, 413; *SKS* 19, 420, Not13:55 / *KJN* 3, 418; see also *SKS* 27, 270, Papir 278 / *JP* 5, 5601; *SKS* 19, 245, Not8:50 / *KJN* 3, 23.

⁴² Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vols. 1-11, Leipzig: J.A. Barth 1798-1819 (*ASKB* 815-826).

⁴³ *SKS* 18, 125, HH:2 / *KJN* 2, 117.

⁴⁴ Cf. *SKS* 19, 386, Not13:8a / *KJN* 3, 384, as well as the two entries *SKS* 19, 375, Not12:4 / *KJN* 3, 373 and *SKS* 19, 386, Not13:8c / *KJN* 3, 384, which likely arose at the same time; compare also note 16 above.

⁴⁵ *SKS* 7, 21 / *CUP1*, 12; cf. *SKS* 19, 375, Not12:4 / *KJN* 3, 373.

⁴⁶ Cf. *SKS* 27, 408, Papir 368:2.b / *JP* 1, 653 (no. 5).

⁴⁷ Cf. *SKS* 27, 267, Papir 277:1 / *JP* 1, 261.

⁴⁸ Cf. *SKS* 27, 276, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2348.

The *primus motor* of authentic movement is pathos. The pathos-laden transition is potentially available to every human being, because it has to do with the will⁴⁹ and not merely with the individual's intellectual talents, as is the case with the “dialectical transition” that takes place “with immanent necessity.”⁵⁰ The pathos-laden transition is thus the result of an active decision⁵¹ on the part of the individual that does not come about “by itself,” but rather “re-sults”⁵² [*lit.* “jumps back”] from, and in, procedures of communication.

Kierkegaard's examples of pathos-laden transitions not infrequently concern the transition from ideality (the realm of thought) to reality (the realm of the will), or they illustrate the ethical resolve with which a human being grasps an idea in order to live by it. Other noteworthy examples include (1) the characterization of the transition from natural experience to pure understanding, which Kierkegaard embarks on in opposition to rationalist metaphysics, as a consciously undertaken transition desired in personal passion⁵³; (2) the transition between various “stages”⁵⁴ or “spheres”⁵⁵ of existence, whether this be the transition “from esthetics to ethics”⁵⁶ or that “from ethics to religion;”⁵⁷ (3) the “transition to Christianity”⁵⁸ and to faith in an eminent sense. “Faith *is*” the “pathos-laden transition (the leap).”⁵⁹ Kierkegaard emphasizes repeatedly, and untiringly, that there is no “direct and immediate transition” to “becoming Christian,” “Christianity,” or “faith”⁶⁰; there is only “the qualitative transition of the leap from

⁴⁹ Cf. *SKS* 19, 386, Not13:8a / *KJN* 3, 384; *SKS* 7, 80f. / *CUPI*, 80f.

⁵⁰ See note 23 above.

⁵¹ Cf. *SKS* 27, 277, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2349; see also *SKS* 7, 313 / *CUPI*, 342f.

⁵² Cf. *SKS* 27, 276, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2349; *SKS* 18, 241, JJ:318 / *KJN* 2, 221; see also *SKS* 27, 338, Papir 326:1 / *JP* 5, 5779; *Pap.* VI B 13 / *JP* 5, 5787 (No. 7).

⁵³ Cf. *SKS* 19, 386, Not13:8a / *KJN* 3, 384.

⁵⁴ *SKS* 7, 262 / *CUPI*, 287.

⁵⁵ *SKS* 6, 439 / *SLW*, 476; cf. *SKS* 7, 455 / *CUPI*, 501.

⁵⁶ *SKS* 27, 275, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2345; cf. *SKS* 19, 375, Not12:4 / *KJN* 3, 373; *SKS* 22, 236, NB12:148 / *KJN* 6, 237; *SKS* 22, 315, NB13:68 / *KJN* 6, 317; furthermore *SKS* 21, 332, NB10:152 / *KJN* 5, 343; *SKS* 3, 222 / *EO2*, 232.

⁵⁷ *SKS* 27, 275, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2345; cf. *SKS* 7, 238 / *CUPI*, 262; furthermore *Pap.* VII-2 B 241:7 / *BA*, Supplement, 218; *SKS* 15, 256 / *BA*, 99; *Pap.* IX B 10, p. 310 / *BA*, Supplement, 230; *SKS* 27, 277, Papir 283:1 / *JP* 3, 2350.

⁵⁸ As we already see in *SKS* 17, 31, AA:13 / *KJN* 1, 25.

⁵⁹ *SKS* 27, 408, Papir 368:2.a / *JP* 1, 653 (emphasis mine).

⁶⁰ *SKS* 12, 104f. / *PC*, 96; *SKS* 7, 54 / *CUPI*, 49 and *SKS* 4, 291 / *PF*, 94 respectively; see also *SKS* 10, 64 / *CD*, 54f.; *SKS* 11, 205f. / *SUD*, 93f.; *SKS* 12, 143f. / *PC*, 140f; *SKS* 14, 174f. / *M*, 44; *Pap.*

Gerhard Schreiber: „Transition“, in: Kierkegaard's Concepts, hg. von Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald und Jon Stewart, Tome VI, Farnham und Burlington: Ashgate 2014 (*Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources*, Bd. 15), S. 185-191.

unbeliever to believer.”⁶¹ The transition to Christianity is “the transition whereby something historical and the relation to this becomes decisive for an eternal happiness..., a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος..., a leap for both the contemporary and the one who comes later.”⁶²

See also Actuality; Being/Becoming; Christianity; Existence/Existential; Faith; God; Immanence/Transcendence; Leap; Mediation; Movement/Motion; Sin.

VI B 95; *SKS* 22, 40, NB11:63 / *KJN* 6, 36; *SKS* 23, 51, NB15:75 / *JP* 1, 73; *SKS* 24, 67, NB21:110 / *JP* 6, 6679; *SKS* 25, 491, NB30:135 / *JP* 1, 554; *SKS* 26, 182, NB32:93; *SKS* 26, 290-4, NB33:50 / *JP* 2, 2080; *SKS* 27, 349, Papir 340:1 / *JP* 3, 3628; furthermore *Pap.* IX B 10, p. 310 / *BA*, Supplement, 230 (“the leap into the religious”).

⁶¹ *SKS* 7, 21 / *CUP1*, 12; cf. *SKS* 7, 332f. / *CUP1*, 365f.; *SKS* 7, 347 / *CUP1*, 381; *SKS* 7, 350 / *CUP1*, 384; *SKS* 22, 40, NB11:63 / *KJN* 6, 36; furthermore *Pap.* IX B 10, p. 310 / *BA*, Supplement, 230.

⁶² *SKS* 7, 96f. / *CUP1*, 98; cf. *Pap.* VI B 35:30; *Pap.* VI B 95; *SKS* 22, 40, NB11:63 / *KJN* 6, 36; *SKS* 27, 349, Papir 340:1 / *JP* 3, 3628.