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# Introduction

*Jamal Malik*

As is evident from the number of publications in recent years, research on Muslim diasporic mystical movements has gradually increased, reflecting the rising popularity of Sufism among diverse groups, including immigrant Muslims, Western-born children of migrant parents and converts. There are many examples of the popularity and prominence of Sufism in Europe and the USA, such as the conversion to and initiation into diasporic Sufi organizations, the poetry of the famous medieval Sufi poet Jalal al-Din Rumi, performances of the Whirling Dervishes, and a number of conferences on Sufism. The latter certainly indicates a growing degree of interest among Western scholars in analysing the broader implications of these developments. In contrast, argued from the mainstream perspective, we may hardly find this intellectual curiosity regarding contemporary mystical movements in the diaspora among non-Muslims, as well as among Muslims in contemporary Muslim-majority countries, where Sufi ideas and institutions are tendentially marginalized and often portrayed as being virtually non-existent. In fact, organized Sufism may take different forms, at times witnessing a revival in some Muslim majority areas for quite different reasons (see below).<sup>1</sup>

There seems to be a latent, as well as an overt, feeling that the analysis of Sufism in the West has been neglected in academic discourse so far. This impression might derive in the first place from the perception that Sufism in the West, as well as other folk-religious practices, has been popular among immigrant groups only, especially in Western Europe. Marginalized as migrant communities were and are, they were the only ones still involved in the even more marginalized tradition of their religion: Sufism. This perception of double marginalization corresponds to the overall academic study of religion, the study of which is more or less determined by monotheistic or univocal perspectives and thus singularizing distortions. This might hark back to an orientalist approach which tends to ignore the existence of religious pluralism and reduces Islamic tradition to monolithic essentialism, thereby silencing the multivocality of the Muslim articulations. But there is also the other side of Orientalism: in addition to the essentialization of Islam as fundamentalism, there is also a long-standing romantic idealization of Eastern spirituality.<sup>2</sup>

In the light of this tendency, one may safely assume, therefore, that it will require a great hermeneutic effort – especially in Muslim-majority countries – before the academic study of religion frees itself from paradigms which either stigmatize internal

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religious differences as heresies, ignore them as irrelevant, or render them innocuous through classifications such as mysticism and apocalypticism. Certainly, the reactions of the leading decision-making bodies within a religion against such 'marginal' phenomena vary, ranging from stigmatization by categories such as 'heretic' or 'heresy' to fundamental criticism, official condemnation and active oppression, as is still the case in several Muslim countries.<sup>3</sup> This development, indeed, seems to confuse academic study with internal religious politics.

From an insider's perspective, this tendency seems to be the result of an approach to religion which originates in the normative demands of organized monotheistic and univocal religious traditions. This perspective from within may be complemented by the one from outside, for example through the likes of sociological investigations which have focused on the economic, moral, legal, political or aesthetic functions of Islam. Such studies, however, often took into account only a single long-term, textually transmitted and usually organized religious tradition in a particular geographical area.

One may also encounter reciprocity between outsiders' academic descriptions and insiders' religious practice: As has been pointed out elsewhere, exponents of the academic study of religion persist in the naive belief that they are only dispassionate observers, which is better said than done. There is actually a relationship between mutual interrelationship of religion and its academic study.<sup>4</sup> Formulated more sharply, invested by appropriate authority, in most cases academic discourse originally created, or even established, the category of religion, as it developed a normative effect on the understanding of religions in cultural discourses. The relationship between religion, in this case Sufism and folk religion, and the academic study of religion therefore entails an inherent interrelatedness between categories of religio-historical knowledge and self-representations of Sufis, as well as an interdependent relationship between academia and popularized or public opinion about Sufism.

The present volume aims to clarify some of these issues by raising and problematizing a variety of themes, as they evolved against the background of a versatile history of Islamic mysticism. In addition, certain prevailing assumptions about the relationships and interactions of Sufism with other Muslim movements as well as with non-Muslims are questioned. These issues are debated from theoretical, as well as from empirical, perspectives of various disciplines, including history, social anthropology, comparative religion, theology and Islamic studies. It seems proper, however, to provide the necessary setting in the form of a brief history of Islamic mysticism as it has evolved over time and space, before engaging in the introduction some of the important themes as they occur in the chapters.

### **A brief historical survey of Islamic mysticism<sup>5</sup>**

It is stated both by scholars of mysticism and by mystics themselves that experimenting with Islamic religion in different ways to find the inner path to 'salvation' – perceived as Sufism – does not necessarily mean that mysticism in Islam is inimical to what has been called orthodox Islam, which developed its own dogmatism in the

evolution of major law schools. Mystics claim to be able to interpret the purely literal world of the Qur'an as well as its spirit. Like other Muslims they want to emulate the life of Prophet Muhammad, to 'sunnatize' their life-worlds, and perform *imitatio Muhammadi*. In addition to this more or less literal negotiation with religious truth, salvation or asceticism, later Sufis strove to establish personal contact with God through the person of the Prophet, who is often perceived as still living and present.

As Sufism provided different forms of cultural articulation, it did not develop unilaterally as a reaction to orthodoxy and legalistic rigorism but at times it also complemented and participated in these developments. Similarly, it seems questionable to talk about an antagonism between *shari'a* (law) and *tariqa* (Sufi path) in Islam, because mysticism in Islam does not contradict orthodox law and orthopraxy per se. Instead it builds its foundation upon law and orthopraxy by accepting the basis of the exoteric (*zahir*) and the mundane which itself is sacralized by following the law. However, it does not stop with the rationally and sensorially perceivable law. Rather, it claims to observe the soul and its experiences as well, so as to intensify these sacralized experiences through some kind of spiritual economy, or hidden sciences, considered to be enlargements upon the exoteric knowledge and implementation of law. As it stands, mysticism can be considered as the internal (*batin*) view of Islam, focused on the latent mystery of the Qur'an. And since the experience is acknowledged as an inspiration of divine perspective, Sufis consider the law (*shari'a*) and the path (*tariqa*) not necessarily as opposites but necessary complementaries.

Similarly, Islamic mysticism is as little monolithic as is Islamic law or Islamic 'orthodoxy' or Islamic fundamentalism. Instead it is highly pluralistic, complex, divergent and at times contradictory. There were personal differences among mystical masters in the ways to teach Sufism, so that mystical ideas changed from person to person, and from group to group, depending on their contexts and functions. There were local differences such as the oppositions between Mesopotamia and Khurasan, Baghdad and Nishapur. Simply speaking, one region was known for its asceticism, the other for its hedonism. While the impact of a certain school was not necessarily restricted to one single place, local styles could change through the encountering with other influences. In the face of these differences, cleavages and varieties in Sufism, it seems difficult to generalize about its ideas and developments, but later generations of mystics have always been trying to classify the scattered ideas of their ancestors, thereby rationalizing their own experiences, as seemed to have happened for example in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Ibn 'Arabi (d. 1240) being one example, or later in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Indian Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762) synthesized different perspectives.<sup>6</sup> In the course of time, their classifications were adopted by orientalists in the nineteenth century and also functionally revalued at times – among others in the sense of a *littérature de surveillance*,<sup>7</sup> mostly to serve colonial purpose. In this context certain clichés and stereotypes evolved, such as the idea of one monolithic 'Islamic mysticism' or *tasawwuf* being the alternative 'tolerant and spiritual aspect of Islam'.

Similarly, there are different and divergent opinions about the etymology of the term 'Sufi'. It took the mystics three generations to discuss the origins of the word,

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as can be gleaned from the first Persian treatise on Sufism written by 'Ali b. 'Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri (d. 1071). His opinion is given in the following passage:

The true meaning of this name [ahl al-tasawwuf; J.M.] has been much discussed and many books have been composed on the subject. Some assert that the Súfí is so called because he wears a woollen garment (*jáma*'-i súf); others that he is so called because he is in the first rank (*saff-i awwal*); others say it is because the Súfís claim to belong to the *Asháb-i Suffa* [in Medina; J.M.] with whom may God be well-pleased! Others, again, declare that the name is derived from *safá* (purity). These explanations of the true meaning of Súfíism are far from satisfying the requirements of etymology, although each of them is supported by many subtle arguments .... I said that *safá* (purity) is the opposite of *kadar* (impurity), and *kadar* is one of the qualities of Man. The true Súfí is he that leaves impurity behind .... 'Súfí' is a name which is given, and has formerly been given, to the perfect saints and spiritual adepts .... 'He that is purified by love is pure, and he that is absorbed in the Beloved and has abandoned all else is a 'Súfí.' The name has no derivation answering to etymological requirements, inasmuch as Súfíism is too exalted to have any genus from which it might be derived.<sup>8</sup>

But some decades before al-Hujwiri indicated the definition of Sufi, Islamic mysticism had already developed into a system that challenged the Muslim establishment in a variety of forms. This and the subsequent developments can be traced in the history of Islamic mysticism, which can be – for heuristic reasons – divided into a number of phases, phases which seem to correspond to major socio-historical developments. This historical periodization has been gathered from academic work available on the subject,<sup>9</sup> but is a still-debated subject, rather than presenting scholarly consensus.

According to this proposed schema, the first phase spans the period from approximately 700 to 950, when individual mysticism gradually developed in the wake of the establishment and expansion of early Muslim dynasties and empires, such as the Abbasids and Fatimids. This first phase can be said to have started with Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) and his circle who introduced, among other things, the notion of ascetic piety (*zuhd*) as a constitutive element of early Islamic mysticism, in the peripheral garrison town of Basra which later developed into a cultural centre. A number of important ascetics followed, such as the female mystic, Rabi'a (d. 801), who later became famous for her idea of sincere love (*mababba*) of God. From Basra early mystical ideas migrated to other areas such as Syria and the new capital Baghdad, where they were further developed, or encountered similar ideas in the local context. Soon Khurasan became a major centre of mysticism.<sup>10</sup> Here Shaiq al-Balkhi (d. 810) argued for the mystic state of abandonment into God's will (*tawakkul*) and is said to have described the various stages of worship. The Baghdadian al-Muhasibi (d. 837) added psychological introspection, while the Egyptian Dhu al-Nun (d. 859) introduced mystical intuitive knowledge (*ma'rifa*) to the terminological universe of Islamic mysticism. His Iranian colleague Sahl al-Tustari (d. 896), who migrated to Basra, elaborated upon the idea of divine light, from which derives the luminous spirit of prophet Muhammad, and encouraged the constant recollection of God (*dhikr*), ideas which were appropriated

again and again in mystical history. The famous Persian thinker al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d. c. 910) came up with the controversial idea of the seal of sanctity or friends of God (*khatm al-awliya*), thereby privileging the highest spiritual successor who brings to an end the cycle of sanctity. This creative formative time phase was known for its two other great Sufis, al-Bistami (d. 875), from Khurasan, who propagated among others the concept of the passing away of the attributes of the carnal soul (*fana*), and the Baghdadian al-Junaid (d. 910). While the first stood for intoxication (*sukr*) and self-blame (*malama*), the latter tended to postulate the sober (*sabu*) version of the unity of God (*tauhid*). Both of them were considered to be models among the following generations of Sufis. They provided major ideas for the development of this first phase which found its climax in al-Hallaj's famous words *ana al-haqq* (I am the truth), words that cost him his life. Al-Hallaj's dramatic execution in 922 was a reflection of the tussle which had gradually emerged between representatives of *shari'a* and *tasawwuf*, of lawyers (*fuyaba*) and religious scholars (*'ulama*) on the one side and mystics and gnostics (*sufis* and *'urafa*) on the other.

This tussle evolved during the height of the Abbasid Empire, when Islamic law came to be codified, eventually leading to a certain ossification of the legal system. During this time, this first formative phase of Sufism was characterized by few rules and regulations for the mystic and his followers. Various mystical states (*ahwal*) and spiritual stations (*maqamat*) were to mark the path (*tariqa*)<sup>11</sup> starting with repentance, i.e. conversion to a new way of life, and through different other stations reaching gnosis (*ma'rifa*), and ultimately leading to the annihilation in God (*fana*). Both states and stations can be considered as vehicles for acquiring truth (*haqiqa*) considered as being one of the three levels of cosmic evolution – the other two being exoteric (*shari'a*) and esoteric (*tariqa*) respectively. In spite of this sophistication of the mystical fabric there was no institutionally binding order but only individual monasteries and groups around the Sufi masters, the *shaykhs*. Although the moral authority of the spiritual master was already accepted, the *shaykh*, the friend of God (*wali Allah*), was not yet bestowed with totalitarian power – this was to change in the third phase only.

Initially, *tasawwuf* was intellectually and socially mostly represented by artisans with individualistic tendencies without a sophisticated organizational and theoretical superstructure, which emerged only gradually. Motivated by discontent with the political and social situation around the ruling class and their legitimators, i.e. most of the orthodox scholars and jurists, it was also a movement against the establishment of legalism, which came to rule the lives of common Muslims. Outwardly *tasawwuf* was quietist and regressive, but inwardly it was powerful and activist: al-Hallaj's execution was a manifestation of gradually increasing Sufi visibility, a visibility that had become the symbol of anti-authoritarian and anti-orthodox public struggle.

The second phase (roughly 950–1100), set against the background of Muslim revolts and the disintegration of the Abbasid empire into many territories, eventually brought about an accommodationist approach of Sufis towards orthodoxy, as they found themselves in a position similar to the marginalization of Shi'ites in Sunnite Abbasid dominated territories. This, as well as the growing impact of Persian–Shi'ite political thought on the borders of the Abbasid Empire, led to a Sufism actually incorporating many elements of Shi'ism. Thus, eschatological ideas increasingly influenced

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the mystical fabric, especially since the doctrine of disappearance (*ghaiba*) of the 12th imam in Samarra in 878. On the other hand, there was the deliberate process of standardization and systematization of mystical ideas, such as can be gleaned from the works of Sufi apologists – most of them from Persian stock.<sup>12</sup> However, in the wake of attempts to expel mystical and Shi'ite influences from Islamic heartland by the Sunnite Seljuks in the eleventh century, mystical activities increasingly found their way into rural areas, as well as into far-away regions such as South Asia. At the same time a standardization of mystical ideas paved the way for the integration of exoterics and esoterics. It found its culminating point in the encompassing oeuvre of the jurist, philosopher and mystic al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), in his autobiography called 'Deliverance from Error' and his major work, 'The Revival of the Sciences of Religion'.<sup>13</sup> After a long, painful journey into introspection he propagated obedience to both the *shari'a* as a meaningful way to structure one's life-world, as well as the divine service of the mystics as a way to salutary knowledge of spiritual truth. Beginning to call himself reformer – *mujaddid* – he could synthesize so successfully and creatively, because he could build on the ideas of his intellectual and spiritual predecessors, who had produced masterpieces of early Sufi ethical thought and a whole genre of manuals of practice and spiritual courtesy (*adab*).

Apparently, the standardization was a *conditio sine qua non* for the integration of *shari'a* and *tasawwuf*. This integration, however, became most manifest in the next (third) phase: The formation and spread of the institution first of mystical groups (*ta'ifa*) and then of orders (*tariqa*, pl. *turuq*) in the form of social mass organizations (1100–1300), most prominently at the peripheries of the Muslim empires. The proponents, the mystical orders and congregations, used the shrines and tombs (*dargah*, *tekke*, *zawiya*, *ribat*, *ziyarat*, *mazar*)<sup>14</sup> which had developed around the graves and sarcophagi of the mystics and their successors as centres of spread. The orders' tendency towards both popular piety and mystical ideas was in a way responsible for the creative interaction between alien indigenous and Muslim exogenous ideas and institutions. Through its rituals the shrine was able to make Islam accessible to the uneducated masses. It offered them vivid and clear manifestations of the divine order and integrated then into its ritualized drama, both as participants and also as patrons.<sup>15</sup>

It was, and still is, this mysticism and its drama that provided refuge, shelter and social cohesiveness for a variety of people who wanted an alternative source of comfort within institutional affiliations – in the organized community life, such as the *khanaqah* and *ribat*, with its fraternal security and safety – particularly during the ritual periods such as the death anniversary of the *shaykh* (*maulid*; '*urs*) when profane time is dramatically separated from sacred time.<sup>16</sup> Certainly, this identity was/is revived and maintained at congregations and mass events through communal actions. It is in this context that the cult of the Prophet or the legend of the messiah built around a leading person – the *shaykh*, *murshid* or *pir* – became as important as the use of religious symbols.

Moreover, the ritualized collective visits to the shrines connected to the operations of orders and their centres or leaders turn out to be important social events that also generate profitable earnings due to related economic transactions. The physical

movement to these places or persons can be linked to a spiritual one, namely the elevation of a lower level of consciousness to a higher one, or, in profane terms, the ascent of a social group into another or at least a ritual and situational overcoming of individual limitations and social barriers. An egalitarian identity is being created, as the Sufi song (*qawwali*) proclaims the equality of all.<sup>17</sup> Thus pilgrimage is an act of affirmation, and can, in the face of the multi-centredness of the orders, be considered a minor pilgrimage (*hajj*).<sup>18</sup> A complex, sacred geography is thereby created, contesting the authority of the centre so that the certainty and authority of the centre-periphery system was/is increasingly destabilized.

Hence, in this third phase, the position of the *shaykh* (Persian: *pir*) was further refined and gradually endowed with omniscience, such as argued by Abu al-Najib al-Suhrawardi (1097–1168), the author of the first manual of Sufi discipline called *Adab al-muridin* (The Etiquette of Disciplines) and who is to be distinguished from Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi Maqbul (killed 1191), the great master of illuminist thought. The chain of traditionalists or sacred genealogical link (*silsila*) became an established device to affiliate the *shaykh* to one of the first four caliphs, a trend fully developed by Abu Nu'aym al-Isfahani (d. 1038). The number of traditions which featured words attributed to God (*hadith qudsi*), as distinguished from words of the Prophet (*hadith nabawi*), apparently began to increase.<sup>19</sup> These divine sayings were rather didactic in nature, concerning primarily the believer's spiritual life and his/her relationship to God. As such they were favoured by Sufis as a source of inspiration and could become a proven way to confirm the *shaykh's* power and enhance his moral authority. Likewise, the mystical lore and remembrance of God (*dhikr*) as a method to induce mystical states was sophisticated and elaborated by mystics such as Najm al-Din Kubra (1145–1220).<sup>20</sup> These and other identity markers and rituals were most important for new, rising communities, who gradually developed into prime parent orders along *khanqahs* and monasteries or graves of the powerful *shaykh* or *pir*, the master of the mystical path (*tariqa*). Their deputies and successors (*khalifas*), as well as their followers and students (*murids*), guaranteed the spiritual continuity which permitted the orders' presentation as an unbroken chain of succession of the Prophet.<sup>21</sup> The orders, basically named after their founders (such as Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya) but also connotating toponyms (Kubrawiyya, Suhrawardiyya, Chishtiyya, etc.) often were constituted by specific social groups. The orders spread out in different regions and carved their universe into spiritual territories or saintly realms (*walaya* or *wilaya*). Thus, it is the Sufi order that marked the highest political and social meaning of the Sufi movement. It is in the orders that mystical individualism established community and solidarity.<sup>22</sup>

This third phase also witnessed the collapse of Baghdad, the realm of the great Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), who had reconciled traditionalist Hanbalite legalism with ecstatic mystical individualism. Furthermore, against the background of the Mongol invasion, mystical ideas were systematized and aestheticized by masters like the well-known Spanish mystic theorist Ibn 'Arabi (d. 1240), who is buried in Damascus and whose work has become a signpost and landmark.<sup>23</sup> His ideas on the Muhammadan reality (*haqiqa Muhammadiyya*), the Muhammadan light (*nur Muhammadi*) and the concept of the perfect being (*al-insan al-kamil*), emanating from the archetypical

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Prophet, culminated in the concept of 'unity of being' (*wahdat al-wujud*). Another prominent Sufi of this time is Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273) who became particularly famous for his didactic poems, which are still being read in various circles.

In the following (fourth) phase, a first spell of institutionalization of the orders can be depicted, going hand in hand with their integration with professional groupings such as guilds and various movements of young men known as *futuwwa* (1300–1700), as well as the establishment of major Muslim empires in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This fourth phase witnessed a further development of hierarchical concepts and a diversification of mystical practices. It also brought to light new aspects and issues for an organized communal life, which apparently were to become important in the process of empire-building. In the face of these developments, rules and discipline had to be restructured and reformed, and membership reformulated. Well-known concepts such as *futuwwa*, spiritual chivalry (*jawanmardi*) and guilds proved to be useful devices for the processes of both expansion and integration.

These concepts provided for morality and straightforwardness, but above all for masculine virtues, such as pre-Islamic norms of bravery and hospitality characterizing the socially free and unbound man (*fata*). The virtues began to be associated in Sufi circles with the fourth caliph Ali through the tracing of the initiatic chain (*silsila*) back to him, to the extent that Ali became the *fata* par excellence. However, *futuwwa*-organizations also implied social rebels who at times were on good terms with guilds and professional associations, connections that had inventively been made use of by caliph al-Nasir (d. 1225) for the purpose of integrating Abbasid rule before its last breath.<sup>24</sup> Gradually, orders had become so powerful that they became constitutive elements for the establishment of whole empires, such as the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, so that the ruling classes needed them for their expansion. For example, the Mughal Empire used Sufi orders for its policy of cultural integration.<sup>25</sup> Against the background of this incorporation and subsequent bureaucratization of the orders and their spiritual and material appropriation by ruling families and dynasties in order to enforce the centralized policies of Muslim empires in the seventeenth century, a first spell of rethinking of Sufi ideas emerged in the writings and actions of scholars as disparate as Mulla Sadra (d. 1640), the most prominent philosopher of the Safavid era in Iran, and Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) of India, who tried to programmatically mobilize mystical ideas for social reform. The first gave prime importance to rationality and called for a critical evaluation of Sufi teachings and philosophy, at a time when, in the Safavid Empire, Sufism in its institutional form was deprived of its public and social expressions.<sup>26</sup> The second – the 'renewer of the Second Millennium' – stressed strict observance of *shari'a*,<sup>27</sup> though there were other major Sufi leaders of that time pointing out the necessity of Islamic law as well. But the case of Sirhindi gives a clue to the versatile voices of that age, when he reinterpreted the saintly idea of 'unity of being' in terms of a more prophetic concept of 'unity of experience or witnessing' (*wahdat al-shuhud*) as a powerful Sufi message, thus empowering those who aspired to acquire agency in order to change the social fabric.<sup>28</sup>

As the three great Muslim empires witnessed their political decentralization in the eighteenth century,<sup>29</sup> a powerful wave of Sufi rethinking seemed to have arisen in different parts of Muslim-majority areas, while in Arabia the puritan movement known

as the Wahhabiyya was inimical to Sufism.<sup>30</sup> This era of political, social and cultural reform marks the fifth phase, spanning roughly from 1700 to 1900. To be sure, elaborating on these developments and debates the researcher is confronted with major problems, because there were many different tendencies present at the same time in an area stretching from South East Asia to North Africa. Not all were subject to exactly the same intellectual tendencies. But some scholars have called this rethinking 'neo-Sufism', which was later rejected; others have coined the term 'Muhammadan Path' (*Tariqa Muhammadiyya*).<sup>31</sup> It seems, however, that an important feature of this Sufi rethinking was an ethical concept according to which direct initiation became increasingly possible. This might have questioned the concept of *silsila*. It is true that there were a significant number of approaches that made possible a direct access to the Prophet, but the real and physical encounter with the Prophet became quite important now, through means of different mystical devices, such as refined remembrance of God (*dhikr*) and the formula of blessing upon the Prophet (*tasliya*) in particular. At the same time, multi-layered affiliations of individual and group identity which had been evident as early as in the fourteenth century, seem to have become even more popular.<sup>32</sup> This can be seen in simultaneous memberships of multiple Sufi orders – with the changing and competing involvement of different loyalties and affiliations. One may contend that the underlying postulate of appropriating God's message individually and freely through the revealed text implied the emancipation of the self from immediate and direct ties of authority. It also opened the way for the reconstruction of Islamic society by laypersons, in many cases justified by the iteration of an original historical model, referring to the early 'Muhammadan' time. This seemed to be *ijtihad* in the widest sense, and it is most likely that the past that was referred to seemed not to be perceived as an era of heroism that would return, but as a political and social utopia, which needed individual efforts in order to be lived and translated into reality. Thus, the act of memory could be energized through a mood of powerful expectation. Needless to say, this approach would stand in contrast to traditionally bound compliance with state law and thus the ties to authority – *taqlid*, as was the case with the major part of the imperial service elites. The social basis of the receptivity to this ethical concept was, as it seems, primarily to be found among the newly emerging urban social formations of traders and businessmen. They were able to establish themselves in the wake of the expanding world market on the one hand, and political instability of the Muslim empires on the other, along the borders of the newly established princely territorial states that had evolved in several regions in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Soon, the ethical concept of the '*Muhammadan Path*' was translated into political action, originally in reaction to changes in land rights by the new princely territorial states and then gradually turned against European trade and colonial intrusion, as can be seen in the activities of numerous orders evolving in the nineteenth century. Likewise, these orders called for religious and social reforms, primarily among agrarian societies and nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes informed by egalitarian ethos. Eventually, certain orders contrasting with urban trends rallied against colonial expansion; examples are the Sanusiyya, Tijaniyya, Mirghaniyya and Naqshbandiyya. Some of them merged with anti-colonial Mahdist movements and called for warfare (*jihad*) against the infidel enemy.<sup>33</sup>

Another spell of the institutionalization of Islamic mysticism began around 1900. This sixth phase, it can be argued, was basically informed by anti-colonial, national and nationalistic movements, in which mystical orders provided prime channels for Muslim cultural articulations and mobilization. However, these orders were increasingly contested by the emerging urban Islamic reform movements, certain pan-Islamic and Salafi endeavours and eventually by the ideologized Islamic movements such as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin and Jama'at-i Islami. The endeavours of men like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) and Abu al-Ala Maududi (d. 1979) are cases in point.<sup>34</sup> Their deliberate silencing and obliteration of Sufism was programmatic, since a victory over esotericism was to render them into the sole agents of Islam, regardless of the Salafis' and Islamicists' contesting opinions. Hence, many Muslim activists and intellectuals even now stigmatize mystical ideas and folk-religious practices as being un-Islamic, opining that they were inserted into Islam by charlatans and spiritual delinquents who were then uncritically followed by the ignorant masses.<sup>35</sup>

After World War II and in the light of the foundation of new nation-states, Sufi orders were deliberately marginalized from the ideological and political centre, among other developments by the appropriation of their economic base via the nationalization of religious endowments (*waqf*, pl. *auqaf*). But along this decline, mainly initiated by state agents and representatives of political Islam, there is also a continuity of organized Sufism, such as in many areas of Africa. Corresponding with contemporary Islamic revival since the 1970s, we witness resurgent Sufism, politically, such as was the case of Ayatullah Khumaini, who considered Sufi spirituality in terms of *'irfan* as private speculative mysticism distinct from Sufism as a social and institutional movement crucial for his Islamic system. Indeed, his interest in the philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi did not prevent him from intimidating and suppressing Iranian Sufi leaders, some of whom have gone into exile. Sufism also witnessed a revival apolitically in areas as diverse as Egypt or the now defunct Soviet Union.<sup>36</sup>

More recently with migration and rapid social changes, Sufism and its institutions once again have been envisaging most fascinating and complex systems of solidarity and commonality when they make conscious attempts at reconstructing or reinventing Sufi tradition based on and recurring to its long and multifarious evolution with a variety of ideas and methods, organizations and institutions. Additionally, this seventh phase is marked by individual mystics using esoteric ideas designed for new social formations, particularly in the Muslim post-colonial diaspora. This all is happening in spite of the prevalent worldwide Wahhabi anti-Sufi influence in recent years, particularly by means of the Islamic World League, established in Mecca in 1962. The versatile development of the diasporic mysticism and its theoretical, institutional and organizational patterns seems to have materialized because contemporary Sufism is able to invoke an all-encompassing history and rich heritage of ideas and institutional building processes, as sketched out above, and as will be discussed in a number of chapters.

The present volume is primarily concerned with this seventh phase of Sufism, including organized and unorganized Sufism, representing orders and folk-religious practices that have formed the alternative, or rather complementary, sources of social

and intellectual identity and institution-building processes to what is commonly known as orthodox mainstream Islam. This is even more the case, since diasporic Sufi orders may be seen as part of the Muslim global diaspora, providing for yet new identities and solidarity systems and making meaningful the diasporic situation for a variety of new social formations by expanding its semantics.

Some of the ideas and developments briefly outlined above echo in the contributions to this book. We saw that Sufism in the West, in contrast to Islamic orthodoxy, has thus far been relatively marginal in the public sphere, in spite of the fact that popular practices and Sufi traditions have been present in one way or the other. This is especially the case with the influx of immigrant Muslims to the USA and in Europe from the mid 1970s onwards, when they started reproducing their indigenous religious, cultural and social contexts in an alien and sometimes hostile environment.

In the light of recent social and political developments in Muslim-majority countries in general and among diversified Muslim minorities in the West in particular, this book elaborates the ideas and institutions of organized Sufism and folk-religious practices which provide for a diasporic post-modern pluralistic situation. Nearly all chapters discuss the brief history of the respective Sufis, orders and movements they introduce, their social base, their ways of organization and institutionalization, and respective hierarchization, as well as their recruitment patterns in new environments, sometimes in comparative perspective to their countries of origin. The ways, means and channels of disseminating ideas, such as ritual, charisma, organization, and the reasons for, and plausibility of, their popularity among certain social groups, as well as the nature of their affiliations with the countries of their origin are touched upon. Likewise, their economic activities are highlighted.

### **The contributions**

Concentrating on the major genres of literary productions among Western Sufi movements, Marcia Hermansen distinguishes Sufi movements in the West into 'hybrids', 'perennials' and 'transplants'. 'Hybrids' belong to those movements that show close ties to an Islamic source and content, embedded in a non-Islamic framework. These movements attract both immigrants and people born or socialized in the new environment. 'Perennials' generally represent groups who are close to the idea that truth forms the base of all religions. Still, they are divided among each other into perennialist, universalist or traditionalist positions. Examples of perennial movements are 'The Sufi Order International' of Pir Vilayat Khan and his son Zia Inayat Khan, the 'Society for Sufi Studies' of Idries Shah (1924–1996) and the 'Tradition' of his brother Omar Ali Shah. 'Transplants' connote groups who rather remain among themselves without adapting themselves to the new environment.

By using the word 'literary' Hermansen refers to a wide range of sources, including all possible and diverse genres, such as transcribed lectures, hagiography, poetry, Sufi 'Op-Ed' pieces, allegories, quest novels, biographies and autobiographies, but also polemics. The literature produced by these movements reflects its vast diversity. The major themes of these genres are transformation, travel and Sufi psychology. The first theme mainly deals with telling the stories about the gradual way of conversion.

## 12 Introduction

Conversion does not only mean becoming a formal practising Muslim. Many stages of conversion and transformation can be observed, for example, simply by joining a Sufi movement without actually becoming a Muslim. The second theme is concerned with the different travels and journeys and how they can be used for purifying reasons. It concentrates on transnationalism, a phenomenon that is seeking to overcome questions of national identity. The third theme, Sufi psychology, sheds light on how Islamic and contemporary psychological Western discourses interrelate with each other. Its main contents illustrate transformation and healing.

Over and above all, Western Sufi literature enables a synthesis of different perceptions, Islamic, Western, traditional or modern identities, through their wide range of themes and genres. Moreover they reopen discussions about identity, authority and location. Hence,

Members of Western Sufi orders are constantly negotiating traditional symbols and methods with their experiences as contemporary individuals from or living in Western environments. Some Sufi teachers negotiate these tensions by explaining why certain methods are chosen over others and how correspondences exist among therapeutic/scientific approaches and various spiritual paths. (Hermansen, p. 53)

Similarly, Leonard Lewisohn's contribution shows the immense flexibility of Sufi orders:

The life of the spirit is only one, albeit the central, part of the Sufi's life, but the Sufi lives like every other member of society subjected to the ills, malaise and profanation, as well as the well-being, prosperity and re-enchantment of the community. Consequently, the spiritual attitudes of Sufis are not only not independent from socio-political concerns and events, but are often causally influenced by them in a very direct manner. (p. 163)

Showing the development of the Ni'matu'llahi Sufi Order, founded by Shah Ni'matu'llah (d. 834/1431) in Iran, the chapter shows how Western society as a new environment has created a new cultural expression of traditional Sufi doctrines. After giving a brief historical overview about the origins of the Sufi order, the author turns to the current head of the order, Dr Javad Nurbakhsh, who immigrated to the USA in 1979, and set up several *khanaqahs* in the USA and in Britain. Followed by an overall extension of *khanaqahs* in several countries outside Iran, the total number nowadays comprises 3600 outside Iran. Dr Nurbakhsh heads twelve *shaykhs*, who are entrusted with the task to initiate new followers. Below the *shaykhs*, other people function in the hierarchy, such as directors, *khanaqah* managers, stewards and serving dervishes, who conduct a number of tasks. In the process of adjusting to the West several new implements were adopted, such as changing methods of communication. Moving beyond the prevalent method of exchanging information in Iran by word of mouth, they now instead use flyers or the Internet for spreading messages. Renaming Western initiates and changing the importance of following the *shari'a*, which in the

western context becomes an individual matter, are other important changes. Even the gender relations in Iran and the West differ enormously from each other. While in Iran a high level of gender segregation can be observed, in the West, veiling, separation or any specific dress code are not compulsory. The ethnic and social composition also varies from *khanaqah* to *khanaqah*, but the pattern changed after 1985, when refugees were able to flee Iran. The backgrounds of the followers also encompass a wide range in terms of class, background or profession, but the search for spirituality and consolation in the exile serves as a commonality, based in Persian culture. The Ni'matu'llahi is also present over the Internet, providing the user with information about Sufism in general, the order and the spiritual leader and his publications. A huge amount of literature has been produced both in Persian and in English, mainly focusing on practices, traditions, inventions, Persian cultural heritage and its relation to Sufism and Islam, as well as volumes on Sufi gnosis. The idea that the order specifically follows modern and secular values, such as nationalism, is reflected in the fact that they emphasize Persian culture and national mythologies. But at the end their main goal lies in the spiritual source of the Ni'matu'llahi teachings. 'The One, the unborn, the undying, knows neither East nor West' (Lewisohn, p. 64).

The evolution of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi in Germany, as studied by Gerdien Jonker, shows remarkable resemblance to the Ni'matu'llahiyya. The author argues that Turkish Muslim organizations in Germany, such as Milli Görüş, Nurçu and Sulaymançı amount to Sufic lay communities, which maintain Sufic devotion by reconcentrating on 'worldly religious aims' and hardly deal with discourses about devotion.

The 'modern organization with a spiritual connection' that has been created is a reaction to Turkish forced secularization. In the eyes of these Muslim practitioners, the political event was catastrophic because it did away with all spiritual values and methods to obtain grace. Migration brought this response to Europe before it was properly institutionalized, and it is the Western European framework that left its imprint on the present organizational shape. Its result I have termed the Sufic lay community. (Jonker, p. 183)

After a historical overview of the existence of the Sulaymançı *da'wa* organization, the chapter explains the structure of the organization, which shows features characterizing a lay community. First the religious proficiency does not depend on *shaykhs* and theologians or a charismatic authority. Therefore the community spawns its own staff. The role of the *shaykh* is changed into missionary activist. Second, lay communities are a modern phenomenon, because they are inspired by the idea that society can be renewed. Thus, the members, who are devoted believers, try to spread the divine message by means of books or religious education; a matter they consider to be a worldly duty. Third, the quest for spirituality seemingly no longer remains at the centre, although it is considered to be influential and essential for maintaining the organization. A collective approach including the aim of achieving divine grace replaces the former hierarchical approach towards spirituality based on a spiritual leader. Fourth, new fears of becoming a secular organization have been caused because of the shift from spiritual to worldly grounds and from a hierarchical transmission of

knowledge to that which is accessible to all who aspire for it. To enhance solidarity, *dhikr* and the *imitatio Muhammadi* are mainly performed in groups, and thus it is not the individual who achieves the 'spiritual connection', but the whole organization. In pursuing these goals for three generations, the organization, which emerged in the context of modernity and as a reaction to secularization, has adapted itself to the permanently changing environment in Western Europe by translating its teachings into European languages. The outcome is a lay community, which certainly represents modern ideas.

The shifting and changing of central Sufic practices and methods, ideas and organizational patterns can be envisaged in the next three chapters, which highlight the transnational levels of contemporary Sufism in the West. Gisela Webb considers this development in terms of waves. Her essay pays attention to Bawa Muhaiyaddeen and his fellowship and how they affected and contributed to the discourse about Islam and Sufism in a globalized societal order. According to the author, Sufism came to the USA in three stages. The first wave, starting in the 1920s, was based on 'oriental knowledge'. This wave brought Sufis to the USA in order to bring their teachings to a part of the world where presumably hardly any spirituality could be found. The second wave occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, and was marked by a revival of Muslims' lost legacy and search for spirituality among the Americans. The third wave's main characteristic is the ongoing engagement with issues of peace, communication and globalization. The explanation of the third wave is reflected by means of the Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship, which had its origins in the 1970s in Philadelphia, focusing primarily on universal spirituality. But it became more closely identified with normative Islam during the 1980s and 1990s. Although tensions signified the Sufi/Islamic identity, the fellowship was able to establish an attractive environment for the entire multi-ethnic Muslim diaspora of the USA. Moreover, they were able to unite a diversity of interpretations about Sufism and its relation to Islam, to bring people of perennial, hybrid or non-Sufi Muslim background together and to contribute to an establishment of a long-lasting community. The founder, Muhammad Raheem Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, was the central figure who became an important mediator of Sufi legacy to the USA.

The Fellowship entails three different orientations. First are those who merely follow Bawa's teachings, while the second are those who attend the mosque regularly and exercise non-Sufi Islamic practices. The third combines both these orientations. Due to a symbolic shift towards Islam by Bawa Muhaiyaddeen through building a mosque, the Fellowship involved itself in an Islamic-Sufi dialogue. After Bawa's death in 1986 no further *shaykhs* were appointed. Until now, two imams who lead the Friday prayers were instructed by him. Next to setting up a mosque, Bawa provided the community with a farm, for three different purposes; firstly as a location for the community, secondly as a burial site for Muslims and thirdly as a tomb (*mazar*) for himself. This locality enabled other group members from different ethnic origins, who did not even know Bawa, to follow their local cultural traditions and perform local practices with which they were familiar in their homeland. Over and above this the Fellowship represents an important community concerned about the public discourse on Islam in the American public, especially after 9/11. It has managed to

establish a ground on which Muslims and non-Muslims can interact without being prejudiced. Hence 'Bawa Muhaiyaddeen can be seen as a twentieth-century example of the tradition of the popular Sufi teacher of South Asia, who taught the mystical dimensions of Islam to regions well-beyond the geographical origins of Islam' (Webb, p. 98).

The transnationalism as propagated by the Haqqaniyya is, however, different from the inclusivist Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship because it focuses on other issues, as discussed by David Damrel: 'The Haqqani order expresses a public agenda in the Americas in a number of places: it is simply to promote Islam. To this end, the order has created several affiliated organizations, each dedicated to particular types of *da'wa*-related activities' (p. 118). Looking at the Naqshbandi-Haqqani order in North America, his contribution highlights their history and status as well as their core activities inside the order and towards the public. It is argued that these Naqshbandis maintain four main characteristics. Firstly, they follow a strict Sunni orientation; secondly, they stress the importance of the *shari'a* and *Sunna*; thirdly, they follow their tradition of engaging themselves in social and political activities; and fourthly, they do not hesitate to challenge state authorities to abide to religion. The leader of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani order in the USA is Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, a *khalifa* and son-in-law of Shaykh Nizam Adil al-Qibrusi al-Haqqani al-Naqshbandi, who represents the 'grand-*shaykh*' of the current order. Meanwhile a large network has been established, resulting in a 'Sufi religious enterprise'.

The activities of the order are divided into two sections. The first is the public section, while the second deals with the teachings inside the order. In public activities, the order presents itself in four non-profit organizations: the first is represented by the order itself. The second one is the As-Sunna Foundation of America (ASFA), mainly providing religious education to Muslims and establishing links to other Islamic institutions of learning, for example al-Azhar in Cairo. The third one is the Kamilat Muslim Women's organization, founded in 1997, particularly dealing with domestic issues, such as family, health, education and marriage. The fourth one is the Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA). The ISCA, having their office in Washington D.C., is probably the most apparent organization, since it engages itself in political matters, thereby pursuing two main goals. The first one focuses on American Muslim communities in order to provide them with a 'proper Islamic lifestyle', the second aims to enlighten American non-Muslims on 'a corrective vision of what Islam is'. Furthermore, the Haqqaniyya does not hesitate to criticize other Muslim organizations. As a consequence they were marginalized and estranged from Muslim communities in America. Nowadays, the order has started to increasingly involve in engaging American converts.

The internal affairs can be delineated in three points that show the Haqqanis' directions of instruction. The first point is the spreading of teachings via the Internet, thus creating a large virtual community. The second is the idea of millennialism, a theme that covered an enormous part of the teachings during the last three decades. The third point is the instrumentalization of issues of the modern world for spiritual teachings, such as foot-and-mouth disease, the death of Princess Diana or the Y2K excitement. The efforts made for directing themselves to the centre of representing

mainstream Islam and expressing sharp criticism against other Muslim organizations led the Haqqanis to a position of alienation. The question remains whether they will be able to keep hold of the order's structure in the long run.

Indeed, transnationalism comes back to this order only partially because it concentrates primarily on the *shaykh*, as shown by Jorgen Nielsen, Mustafa Draper and Galina Yemelianova:

Traditionally, a Sufi *tariqa* existed primarily as a local group, adapting to and taking on the character of the locality in which it was integrated. [...] The traditional nature of the Haqqanis is evident both in the enormous local variety and in the central esteem in which Shaykh Nazim is held. [...] As we have observed around the visits of Shaykh Nazim to Britain and Lebanon, the *tariqa* only fully exists where Shaykh Nazim is. (p. 113)

Drawing information from a fieldwork conducted in three different countries, in Dagestan, Lebanon and Britain, the essay focuses on the Haqqani *tariqa*, whose origins go back to a branch of the Naqshbandiyya in Dagestan. These three different locations were selected in order to keep certain ties to the *tariqa* and provide different situations and surroundings. Dagestan has been chosen because of the *tariqa's* origins, Lebanon because it represents the first location that offered a solid base before further orientation to the West, and Britain because the *tariqa* had its first base in the West there. It is shown how communities, whose focus is transcendent, acquire diversity by adapting to a new environment, and how they interact on a transnational level. On the other hand, it is interesting to see how the *shaykh* himself tried to contextualize the *tariqa* within a new framework without losing its traditional elements and its identity.

With the help of the three locations, three different environments are analysed, showing different cultural and political situations. In Britain the *tariqa* attracted followers from different regions, mostly being converts or of South Asian origin, who set up local groups outside London. In Lebanon the *tariqa* was marginalized due to different reasons, such as a comparatively little number of adherents, the *shaykh's* concentration on spreading the *tariqa* in the West, a relatively low level of *tariqa* traditions and attacks of the *salafis* and the Muslim Brotherhood on Shaykh Nazim because of his religious teachings. In Dagestan the situation has been shaped through Soviet policy, the various Islamic local traditions and ethnic diversity. However, an exact number of adherents could not be stated in any of the countries. The authors' conclusion describes the membership in three circles. Those who belong to the inner circle, the *murids*, regularly participate in *dhikrs* and are frequently in contact with the *shaykh*. The second circle attends sessions occasionally. The third one simply sees the *shaykh* as a spiritual guide.

Two more themes connected with the *tariqa* show its flexibility and its relations within the network, the relations to political authorities and the millennium theme. Through its political statements the *tariqa* got into a lot of trouble, especially in Lebanon and Dagestan, when it declared most Muslim organizations a threat to US security. The millennium discourse was mainly spread in Britain and Lebanon

through the Internet, but was absent in Dagestan. This shows how patchy the communication among the network was. Even though the *shaykh* used the prevalent methods of travelling, texts, audio- and videotapes, the 'locals' living in Dagestan were excluded from most of the network. Two pertinent questions are asked at this juncture. Can one really speak of a 'community' in the light of inequalities within the network, and is it really transnational? The answers to these questions are illustrated by the *shaykh's* person himself. The community only exists around his presence during visits. The same is true for transnationality, which is closely tied to the *shaykh*. Without his presence and the mere existence only in society the *tariqa* becomes translocal.

According to Roger Ballard,

Britain's Pakistani Muslim population is now rather more than three quarters of a million strong. The more firmly such migrants – as well as their overseas-born offspring – have established themselves in their new homes, the more comprehensively they have begun to reconstitute almost every aspect of their social, cultural and religious heritage. The results are now plain to see: a multitude of self-sustaining ethnic colonies have by now sprung to life within the heart of most British cities. (p. 175)

He focuses on the interactions and interdependencies of Sufism and orthodoxy and on how Islam can be faced as a living and lived religion, because 'Sufi spiritualism is as intrinsic to the Islamic tradition as is the legalism of the *'ulama'*' (p. 168). However, Sufism is not to be equated with popular Islam, rather, the 'spiritual adepts who are wholeheartedly committed to intense levels of spiritual practice' (p. 168). Aspects of these Islamic and cultural traditions from the homeland have been reproduced in the diaspora, three themes being most important. First, the re-establishment of different local cults; second, the reshaping, changing and transformation of these cults; and third, the challenges addressed to the cultural heritage. The first generation of migrants, it is argued, was marked by social and cultural renunciation. But when the first migrations resulted in a long-phase presence of migrants in Britain, entailing permanently increasing numbers of immigrants, they started reconstructing their own social, cultural and religious institutions and practices. The construction of mosques, thus, served not only the purpose of collective praying, but also as a place of socializing with other Muslims living in Britain. Inevitably linked to the economic recession in Britain, many migrant workers became unemployed. It is in this context that the established mosques received further significance, when listed as charity institutions. Subsequently, the re-emergence of *pirs* and local cults was closely tied to the family reunions in the 1970s. It is emphasized that all processes of re-establishing local cults are by no means the consequence of a fixed traditionalism, but are due to the complexity and diversity of challenges the immigrants have to face while living in a new environment. Therefore, they required their own sources of psychological and spiritual support they were familiar with.

The second British-born generation tends to reject its parents' traditional practices, because these practices can neither offer it solutions in a British environment, nor help it

to identify itself as Muslim. This dilemma causes neo-revivalist movements to become a magnet for a significant number of followers. Still, these movements, despite being able to attract attention and gain followers, are not able to offer their followers a wider range of information about their origins and their cultural, religious and linguistic heritage. Consequently, the author argues, the older movements will reassert, because once they start reaffirming themselves and their origins they might realize that the neo-revivalist movements are not in a position to get a hold of the entirety of resources available.

These tensions between Sufi movements and folk-religious practices on the one hand, and neo-revivalist movements and the call for orthodoxy on the other, is highlighted by Ron Geaves:

Increasingly, Muslims loyal to the *tariqas* have become concerned that the combination of urban environments, western education and the secular ethos will provide the conditions in which they will lose their children either to the attractions of the pursuit of material pleasures or to recruitment by the better-organized reform movements. (p. 147)

Muslims living in Britain, mainly from Pakistan and Bangladesh, draw on practices and beliefs that are connected to tradition rather than to orthodoxy. In the last twenty years, especially, many transplantations and developments of branches of Sufi *tariqas* can be seen. Still, Sufism showed a quite slow development due to three reasons. Firstly, migration – the new, small immigrant community could not fully represent its Muslim diversity. Thus, reform movements, such as the Deobandis, could gain ground. Secondly, there were tensions between the urban imams and the predominantly rural congregations at mosques, and thirdly, a lack of local shrines. Consequently, local versions of Islam did not develop in Britain; rather, believers related on journeys back home. Reform movements, which arrived in Britain through migration, such as the Deobandis and the Jama'at-i Islami, used these tensions to work against traditional Islam and Sufism. However, the Deobandis and their religious and ethnic discourses focusing on the subcontinent were not able to attract a larger number of youths among British Muslims, who were looking for solutions to being a Muslim in Britain.

Organizations such as Jama'at-i Islami were able to catch the attention of these youths by providing them with a new identity concerning Islam and using it as their ideology, thereby overcoming ethnic or national boundaries. Other groups criticizing Sufi practices are the Hizb ut-Tahrir who identify themselves with the Salafis, and the Wahhabis. Even though the Barelwis, whose version of Islam evolves around local customs, are large in number, they were not able to organize themselves. It was only in the 1970s and 1980s that a united Barelwi identity evolved, when a respectable number of *shaykhs* and *pirs* arrived in Britain, followed by construction of mosques and production of literature rejecting the reform movements' critique. But the danger of losing youth to the better-organized reform movements, due to unemployment, recession and a lack of opportunities, has given way to yet new organizations and movements, such as the Idara Minhaj ul-Qur'an or the Haqqani-Naqshbandi orders. They are trying to provide people not only with an ideological and organizational

foundation for traditional beliefs, adapted to British context, but also with alternatives to the reform movements.

Yet, at the local level, the microcosm of Sufic and popular Islamic traditions show remarkably different, indeed, versatile ways of seeking the path, as elaborated by Pnina Werbner:

The social heterogeneity of diasporas, their internal complexity, is a central feature of all established diasporas. This is particularly so in the case of South Asian Muslims who orient themselves towards a global Islam while practising a peculiarly Pakistani or South Asian version of that Islam. (p. 129)

By examining three different ways of being a Sufi in Britain, Werbner's essay substantiates the transnational character of Sufi cults, though in Britain a large number of Pakistani Sufi cults centre on a local *khalifa* or *pir* and maintain close ties to the origins in Pakistan. These cults mostly constitute networks inside Britain, especially in major cities and cult centres in Pakistan.

Three different life paths of becoming and being a Sufi, belonging to the same Sufi order in Britain, show this tendency in detail. The personalities of three *khalifas* are centred on Shaykh Zindapir, who died in 1999 in the North Western Frontier Provinces, and who belonged to the Naqshbandiyya Ghamkoliyya. The cult he followed displayed in many terms orthodox elements. Pictures, portraits and biographies of him were forbidden.

It is further argued that Pakistani communities in Britain and communities in general are not only shaped by religious or ethnic reasons. They rather share their orientation in time and space, for example by joining different circles, such as poetry readings or recitations, religious discussions or political gatherings. This shows two main features of all diasporas, namely, internal complexity and social heterogeneity. Even among the Sufi cults many distinctive characteristics can be observed: not all groups catch the attention of British-born followers. They mostly consist of endogamous groups from the subcontinent. In contrast, Sufi groups show a certain level of heterodoxy by focusing on *dhikr* and meditation. On the one hand, they invent new traditions; on the other, they keep on treading in the Salafi direction. The gender relationships differ from group to group. The milieu of followers is predominantly South Asian, the spoken language among these groups is mainly Urdu. However, their members, many of them British-born educated Muslims, consider themselves to be open-minded towards other faiths and nationalities. At the same time all leading figures put great emphasis on faith healing and amulet writing.

Even among a single Sufi cult, three different ways of being a Sufi can be envisaged. Hence, all the three *khalifas* of Shaykh Zindapir show different backgrounds, motivations, emotions and identifications towards their *shaykh* in Pakistan. The first one was able to build up a religious empire in Britain, achieving a charitable status, then extended the regional cult around Shaykh Zindapir from Pakistan to England and gained charismatic authority. He became a significant figure for Barelwis in England. The second one founded a branch of the order in Manchester. He tried to achieve knowledge of the transcendence, but remained disappointed, because his

*shaykh* was not able to transmit that kind of knowledge to him. His approach was rather intellectual, while he relied on Urdu sources, such as the translated letters of Ahmad Sirhindi, Naqshbandi texts and discussions with other *khalifas*. The third one obtained a research post at a British university, and maintained close ties with the *shaykh* and to God, which was always linked with his fortune while living in Britain.

## Major themes of diasporic Sufism

In the diverse contributions to this volume, a number of unifying threads may be discerned. Some of the common themes that have come to ready attention in this volume are: the process of religious construction, mystical as well as historical; the complexity and multiplicity of identity; the problems of localization and symbolic representation; the dynamics of conflict and that of reciprocities. It is towards these common themes that we turn our attention now.<sup>37</sup>

### *Construction of religious history*

Taking into account the plural structures of competitive religious or Islamic systems, as is the case of *Sufism in the West*, some contributors have interrogated the process of construction and establishment of master narratives of a dominant normative history as against divergent 'sectarian histories'. Hence, the ambivalent role of memory and canon, as well as the narration of the history as a conscious and non-innocent process for solidarity and identity needs to be taken into account. The critical evaluation of this process interrogates the validity of historical narrative and, connected to that, tradition, which is equally important for religious and Sufi legitimacy. Instead of regarding tradition as a firm and authoritative part of religious and cultural identity, the chapters bring out the limitations of what is being negotiated as tradition.

The role of Sufis in the West highlights a major example of contested tradition, when Muslim immigrants recreate demands and desires that were to be met by newly evolving local holy men or their deputies (*khalifas*). However, this lived and reproduced Islam of the first migrant generation gradually came under severe criticism by the second generation with the appearance of new Muslim youth cultures. They tended to take refuge in neo-orthodoxy and so-called Wahhabi or Islamist movements. Their scripturalist approach provides Western-born Muslim children with the 'Islamically' legitimated desire for differentiation, on the one hand towards their parents – which can be read in terms of generational conflict – as well as differentiation in antagonism to the host (Western) society on the other hand<sup>38</sup> – which can be read in terms of self-exoticization. As has been argued elsewhere, Islamist discourse has become a powerful emancipative tool for youth – against the traditional cultural baggage of their parents both in Muslim-majority countries and in diaspora contexts. Young Muslim women, in particular, increasingly use the veil to symbolize their Muslim identity, and also to transform feminist critique into an Islamic one.<sup>39</sup> However, due to the relative soberness and exclusivity of orthodoxy and scripturalism, and because of the new rising self-statement of evolving diasporic Sufi movements,

the Muslim traditions of the first generation have learned their lessons, as it were. Their children have stimulated a concerted counter-attack in which their Muslimhood hopes to reclaim the loyalty of future Muslim generations in the West, at times in a polemic and apocalyptic way – a clash that certainly ‘involves the competition and contest over both the interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them’.<sup>40</sup> Some of the contributors to this volume such as Ron Geaves, Roger Ballard and Pnina Werbner explore these developments lucidly, showing the versatile forms that they are taking in reconstructing master narratives and tradition and the huge problems that they will have to surmount. Hence, it is only recently that Sufism has become a vocal and considerable force among Muslims in the West, not the least because of its deliberate use of public media such as the Internet, through which Sufi movements can share ‘spiritual’ communication in a deterritorialized and retraditionalized way. These tendencies are comparable to the phenomenon of Internet *fatwas* among immigrant orthodox Islamic groups,<sup>41</sup> as can be gleaned from the contributions such as by Jorgen Nielsen *et al.* and David Damrel.

At the same time, elite movements or orders such as the Sulaymançis, which transformed into an organization of the Muslim Turkish lay community in Germany, target primarily professional classes when reading out the letters of the Indian Naqshbandi reformer Ahmad Sirhindi, who stressed the direct, unmediated contact with the *shaykh* and his divine grace. To appeal to these classes they tend to create and reinvent new cults and narratives, i.e. a new history, thereby departing from the original and traditional Sufi path, as has been shown by Gerdien Jonker. Others even try to integrate more literalist, orthodox, or intellectual aspects with more popular, i.e. heterodox, ones. The adjustments of the Iranian Ni‘matu’llahis are a case in point. Since the late 1970s, they have spread into the West, which they conceptualize as an exile, implying an ultimate return – as portrayed by Leonard Lewisohn. The Western migration of this order – considered to be its third diaspora – and its versatile approaches to religious diversity show clearly that the Ni‘matu’llahis, in the process of diffusion, have constantly and successfully been expanding the semantics of diaspora. They have been re-presenting gender issues and Sufi ideas in diasporically accessible and vernacular terms, as well as making use of reciprocal translations of a variety of symbols and terms. All that provides for the ability of action on different social levels,<sup>42</sup> thereby creating ‘sacred nationalism’, which might negate the transcendental aspects but at the same time endows the nation with a transcendental quality, and which reifies the notion of exile.

Within this process of diffusion, however, responses of religious traditions in general and Sufism in particular stretch from orthodoxy to the most liberal manifestations. The former can be recalled in the diasporic mystical orders’ advocating strict adherence to principles set up by their founders and their followers. The iteration of a mythical original establishment shows the enormous potential and meaning of these social and spiritual formations for identity-forming processes. Liberalization may, in fact, be traced in the orders’ changing their forms and content when they refrain from gender segregation or call upon converts to keep their Christian names, as the Ni‘matu’llahis have done. This reflects new dimensions of multi-ethnic and

multi-professional base of the migrants as well as the transmuted orders in a diasporic setting.

### *The question of identity*

Connected with the issue of the construction and reconstruction of history and tradition is the question of the identity of members of Sufi movements and orders, firstly from the external perspective, that is, the identification of the other, and secondly, from the internal perspective, that is, self-identification. In this context composite identity is understood as a procedure in the argument between self-reference and reference of the other. Basically, identity can be changed without major difficulty according to context and can therefore be described as situational, multiple or corporate. It is open rather than closed. Hence, identity is not a given but rather a process of becoming, which matters in context. This is particularly true in the case of cultural encounter, reciprocity and oscillation between different subjects that necessarily lead to a cultural multi-dimensionality and which can shift and extend predetermined limits and standardization. Consequently, normative and hegemonic identity constructions are being shifted, extended and displaced exactly at these frictional points. Therefore, it seems that the most creative forms of cultural identity emerge at the margins of the lived realities of collectivities, and are manifest in multiple affiliations and loyalties and hence in code- and identity-switching. This is even more the case, since minority and majority mutually conceptualize each other and therefore always form a complex cultural ensemble. The Sufi orders and movements in diaspora are good examples for this interaction, for they provide exactly the religious pluralistic potential required.

Most radically, as argued by some diaspora movements, Islamic mysticism does not even require a Muslim identity, as the case of the Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship studied by Gisela Webb. Pnina Werbner shows in the British context how multiple *tariqa*-affiliation opens up new patterns of loyalty enabling the actors to operate in different contexts. Similarly, the contributions by David Damrel and Jorgen Nielsen *et al.* on the Haqqani movement show the intriguing dynamics and functions across communities and ethnic groups within the vast networks of a 'hybrid', transnational, Sufi order in two different contexts, the European and the American. It seems that this 'world-rejecting' order has been one of the fastest-growing and most important orders in Western Europe and North America for some time, largely due to its non-Muslim constituency, a constituency that might be looking for some alternatives to their Western status markers such as profession and wealth. In fact, this organization brings in typical American competition in order to participate on a broader level with the host society, as has also been convincingly argued by Marcia Hermansen. Thus, light is shed on missionary as well as dialogical activities of this and other innovative orders that spread worldwide, through making use of traditional as well as modern devices, for example its propagation of millenarian visions or its deliberate deterritorialization through virtual space, notably the World Wide Web. In this process of dissemination and diffusion, different – Christian and Islamic – traditions intermingle and overlap. In the case of the Haqqani order, at one point the Islamic Judgement Day

was to take place at the end of the second Christian millennium, in the Christian year 2000 (Damrel). Similarly, among diaspora Sufis, current political and social events and even popular culture become part of mystical pedagogical techniques and are used as teaching tools. In other cases discussion circles became part of Sufi practice, augmenting or replacing *dhikr*, as was the case of the Society of Sufi Studies of Idries Shah (Hermansen). Likewise, some diaspora Sufi orders are multi-religious in the sense that they allow non-Sufis and even non-Muslims to join, such as those studied by Webb. Also, as can be gleaned from some contributions to this volume, Sufism can be ethnically very distinctive, leading to closed ethnic networks, but depending on their contexts, they can also split and open up, as has been elaborated in Werbner's case studies.

### *Localization and symbolic representation*

The discussions in this book also revolve around the questions of what it is that places and spaces narrate, and how places are transformed through narration or even semiotic representation. To be sure, localization of Sufism can only occur if there are movements, either through processes of migration or through new metaphorical constructs, in a public space, in which prestige and power are constantly negotiated. Contested space is explored when looking at the definition and creation of local, translocal and diasporic boundaries – such as divisions of the mystical universe in spiritual territories – since by implication all Sufi orders inevitably ‘territorialize’ themselves, even in the virtual space of the Internet. Multi-localization and multi-vocality establish, as does the so-called ‘little tradition’, a very complex, multi-centred sacred geography. But the opposite possibility is also explored, namely in cases of decentralized orders characterized by placelessness or loose networks integrated only by the charisma of the spiritual leader, that often exist virtually. Such orders, through the form of a photograph or a video may create and intensify but also shift loyalties and obligations through the power of imagination, however vague this might be. For example, Hermansen, Nielsen *et al.* and Webb discuss the concepts of Sufi travel in the context of changing political and economic contexts of Western Sufi movements.

### *Conflict*

Encounter and interaction also imply conflict. Competitive situations within a specific movement, between different Sufi orders or between Sufi orders and other Muslim groups can be distinguished and described, from a legal perspective, especially when a violation of legal boundaries occurs. In other instances interorder rivalries evolve, in terms of spiritual and hence material territories. However, there is also the perspective of conflict transformation, conflict management and conflict resolution, turning conflicts into creative channels of interaction. One may well distinguish between intrareligious conflicts such as stigmatization and official oppression; between inter-religious conflicts such as induced from outside a system, that is, Sufis' influence on Christianity or the West; and extrareligious conflicts, such as Sufism competing with secular systems. Consequently, conflicts must not be seen as pathological social diseases,

or deviations only, but can be regarded as contributions to the stability and cohesion of incremental societies, whence discussions among minorities systemically unleash debates among the host societies. These various conflictual tendencies, as well as interdependencies, can be envisaged particularly in the transformation of the Sulaymañçi, studied by Jonker, of the Ni'matu'llahis portrayed by Lewisohn, and the Haqqaniyya introduced by Damrel as well as by Nielsen *et al.*

### *Reciprocities*

Another important common theme of a number of chapters is the reciprocity between religious communication and social acceptance on the part of the usually majoritarian and politically dominant host countries, as well as the impact of 'new' Islamic mysticism on the self-image of Western societies. Jonker suggests that the orders and movements reflect the host societies' socio-political structures and operate within their given structural boundaries, in terms of the institutional channelling theory,<sup>43</sup> in the case of the Sulaymañçi in Germany. Werbner argues that the underlying reformist approach is also of importance in another context, that of the largest diasporic Sufi order in Britain – the Naqshbandiyya. Interestingly enough, both orders have the tendency to decentralize through the activities of contesting quasi-*khalifas*, after the demise of their leaders. While the first keeps to the structural boundaries as they are set in Germany, in the British context they seem to be more autonomous, reflecting the local political structure. The transnationality of the orders is only one ingredient in this dynamic; the other is the host society's political culture.<sup>44</sup> Both led to schisms and eventually to new and independent organizations, and to new social formations.

Needless to say that nearly all orders and diasporic forms or religious organizations create and maintain links with their home communities/countries, links that at times can transcend prior kinship, caste or village relations in the new environment. Certainly, such cross-cutting ties extending into home communities create a consciousness of a broader and elective Muslim community. They generate a constant interaction with the places of origin and the influx of overseas newcomers. This of course leads to the reproduction of positive as well as negative developments from back home, as discussed by Werbner, Ballard and Geaves.

The implicit context of this volume is socialization and transmission of knowledge that epitomizes all these issues. This knowledge is rendered into a normative discourse through a most complex procedure of dissemination. Likewise, the historical developments and societal conditions of these movements are considered in the new, migrational environment with reference to processes of reciprocity and othering. They are ingeniously analysed through literature pertaining to gender issues, Sufi psychologies and convert literature in the contributions of Damrel, Webb, Lewisohn and Hermansen in particular.

The present book therefore shows that Sufism in general and Islamic mysticism in the West in particular provide for a vast variety of cultural articulations that interact in a diversified public sphere in post-modern and post-secular societies, not the least because of access and usage of a vast and flexible repertory. Indeed, due to its various

and alternative modes of articulation and envisioning of Islam which is rich and appealing in terms of spirituality and culture, Sufism appeals to many Westerners. Especially in the current political atmosphere, this might create a much-needed positive impression of Muslim culture and Islamic traditions, and might therefore be supportive of the further integration of Muslims in Western societies. Whilst penetrating mainstream Western culture through these different channels and modes of articulation, Sufi immigration might have the potential to become one vehicle among others – for a more inclusive Western response to Muslims.

A case in point could be the Islamic Institute in Mannheim, Germany. Even this rather exoteric institution that works towards the integration of Muslims in Europe was informed by ideas, such as the necessity of interreligious communication, the ideal of living interreligious collectiveness and, finally and prominently, Sufism. The activists of the Institute argued that Western rationality and progress was too restrictive, because it fulfilled the theoretical or better, the ontological conditions, of one communication partner only. In contrast, Sufism is particularly suited for interreligious and intercultural harmony of different peoples and cultures in democratic pluralist societies. It was stated that Sufism was the symbol of tolerance and humanism in Islam, undogmatic, flexible and non-violent, not striving towards the establishment of a divine order. Hence, Sufism was considered to be the starting point for the adaptation of Islam, especially for a European version of Islamic practice and for a deliberate interreligious encounter. It could not only inform Islamic practice, but also support monotheistic religions in their struggle to unite and live together in harmony, within its all-encompassing philosophy. Finally, the Institute claims, one can assert that this kind of religious tolerance would effect a conflict-free adjustment of the interests of religious minorities and majorities both.<sup>45</sup>

Even if these arguments sound a bit grand, if not naive, one may appreciate the dialogical potential of Islamic mysticism for the process of integration as it is put forward even by exoteric institutions such as the Islamic Institute in Mannheim. Especially when it comes to encounters with Sufism as a potentially innovative and ingenious interacting medium, its various representatives can be seen as oscillating actors between different social languages or consciousnesses. They are separated by social differentiation or by some other factor, but nevertheless address and relate to each other in a discursive field. Here may lie the potential of Sufism, as it always has been, when its members adopted the patterns of their host environment and hence became actors of both Islamization as well as indigenization. Given the new situations of Muslim diaspora in post-modern Western societies, Sufism – intellectually as well as sociologically – may therefore eventually become mainstream Islam itself due to its versatile potential, especially in the wake of what has been called the failure of political Islam world-wide.<sup>46</sup> This proclaimed reversal of perspective from a centralized view to a multi-vocal view might bear significant effects both on what is researched and on the researchers themselves. Contemporary organized and unorganized Sufism in the West seems to have the capacity to diversify Islam, as well as to operate in different public spheres and visibilities through its rich semiotics and symbol-systems, as well as its rituals, which appeal to a variety of social strata.

## Notes

- 1 I wish to thank Marcia Hermansen and Carl Ernst for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of the introduction.
- 2 As has been discussed for instance by Richard King (1999).
- 3 This tendency of singularization and normatization builds on a long history of contest against Islamic mysticism. See Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (1999).
- 4 Compare Friedrich H. Tenbruck (1993), pp. 31–67.
- 5 For the following see also the introductory work of Alexander Knysh (1999); also Leonard Lewisohn (1993).
- 6 Shah Wali Ullah's major work has been translated by Marcia Hermansen (1996).
- 7 Compare R. S. O'Fahey and B. Radtke (1993).
- 8 'Ali Ibn 'Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri: *Kashf al-Mahjub. The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufiism*, transl. by R. A. Nicholson, Lahore, 1953, pp. 30–34.
- 9 See for instance Annemarie Schimmel (1985a); Fritz Meier (1976b), pp. 117–128; Alexander Knysh (1999); Leonard Lewisohn (ed.) (1993); Carl Ernst and Bruce Lawrence (2002).
- 10 The significance of this region has been discussed among others by Fritz Meier: 'Hurásán und das Ende der klassischen Súfik', in Fritz Meier (1992), pp. 131–156; Terry Graham: 'Abu Sa'id ibn Abi'l-Khayr and the School of Khurasan', in Leonard Lewisohn (ed.) (1993), pp. 83–1366.
- 11 Bernd Radtke, in Ugo Bianchi (ed.) (1993), pp. 517–522, p. 521.
- 12 Important scholars and Sufis were al-Niffari (d. 965), al-Makki (d. 996), al-Sulami (d. 1021), Abu Sa'id (d. 1049), al-Qushairi (d. 1072) and al-Hujwiri (d. 1071). See Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Niffari: The 'Mawaqif' and 'Mukhatabat' ... with other fragments, ed. and transl. by A. J. Arberry (1935); Richard Gramlich (1992); Franz Taeschner (1953); Fritz Meier (1976a); Abu Nasr al-Sarraj: *Kitab al-luma' fi'l-tasawwuf*, ed. Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, in: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, 22, 1914; Richard Gramlich (1989, 1990); al-Hujwiri: *Kashf al-Mahjub*.
- 13 Compare Imam al-Ghazali/R. J. McCarthy (2000); for al-Ghazzali's *Ihya'* 'ulum al-din, see Gramlich (1984).
- 14 There is a vast literature on shrines. See Christian W. Troll (ed.) (1989); C. W. Ernst in Ernst, C. W. and Smith, G. M. (eds) (1993), pp. 43–67.
- 15 Richard Eaton (1984), p. 334.
- 16 For stimulating approaches by social anthropologists see Victor Turner (1979), p. 97; Dale F. Eickelman (1981), p. 228; Ernest Gellner (1985), p. 80.
- 17 For this important genre of Sufi music compare Adam Nayyar: *Qawwali* (1988); R. Burckhardt-Qureshi (1986).
- 18 On the crucial issue of Muslim travel and travellers see comprehensively Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds) (1990).
- 19 For *hadith qudsi* see W. A. Graham (1977).
- 20 These and other important Sufic approaches and methods are introduced and discussed by Hellmut Ritter (1937); Henry Corbin (1971), transl. Nancy Pearson (1979); Shihab al-Din Maqtûl Suhrawardî: *The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Subrawardi*, transl. Wheeler M. Thackston Jr (1982); Fritz Meier (1957).
- 21 Compare also Carl W. Ernst (1994), pp. 5–10.
- 22 On the mystical techniques, ideas and institutions such as mystical orders, see J. S. Trimingham (1971); A. Popovic and G. Veinstein (eds) (1985); Henry Corbin (1976); Fritz Meier (1992).
- 23 On this famous Sufi and scholar see for example Michel Chodkiewicz (1986), English transl. *Seal of the Saints*, by L. Sherrard (1993); W. C. Chittick (1989).
- 24 Compare S. H. Nasr (ed.) (1991), pp. 304–315; still interesting and useful is Franz Taeschner (1979).

- 25 For the impact of Sufis in Empire-building compare Michel M. Mazzaoui (1972); Said Amir Arjomand (1981); Halil Inalcik (1973); Paul Wittke (1938), reprint, London 1982; Carl Ernst and Bruce Lawrence (2002); Annemarie Schimmel (1980), esp. Chapters 3–5.
- 26 This has been elaborated in detail by Carl Ernst (1999). I am grateful to Carl Ernst for sharing his insight.
- 27 It must be noted that Sirhindi, like Shah Wali Allah, has been rather ideologized from a contemporary point of view. On Sirhindi see Johan G. J. ter Haar (1992); also Arthur Frank Buehler (1998). Still relevant is the study by Yohanan Friedmann (1971).
- 28 Actually, this idea had already been formulated by the Iranian Kubrawi sufi 'Ala al-Din Simnani (d. 1336) two centuries ago. See H. Landolt (1973) and Pierre Lory (1990), pp. 177–187.
- 29 Compare for example Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds) (1998), who elaborate on these developments in some detail in the context of South Asia.
- 30 On the social history of the early Wahhabiyya see Esther Peskes (1993).
- 31 The whole issue of mystic reform in the eighteenth century is still very much debated. Compare Fazlur Rahman (1979), who first used the term 'Neo-Sufism'; Reinhard Schulze (1990); a critical survey is provided by R. S. O'Fahey and B. Radtke (1993); R. S. O'Fahey (1990); N. Levtzion and John O. Voll (eds) (1987); Annemarie Schimmel (1985b); John Voll (1982); Jamal Malik (2003); Peter Gran (1979); Rudolph Peters (1980), pp. 131–145.
- 32 As has been discussed by Bruce Lawrence and Carl Ernst for instance in connection the famous Chishti Ashraf Jahangir Simnani (d. 1427), the spiritual leader of the political master Ibrahim Sharqi in Jaunpur.
- 33 For the subsequent developments in the nineteenth century in the context of colonial intrusion see for example P. B. Clarke (1995); Jamil Abun-Nasr (1965); Knut S. Vikor (1995); Mervyn Hiskett (1976), pp. 125–169; John Hunwick (1994), pp. 308–328; Ali Salih Karrar (1992); Christine Dobbin (1983); Karel Steenbrink (1993).
- 34 A comprehensive overview on these developments is provided by E. Sirriyeh (1999).
- 35 Fazlur Rahman (1979), p. 153.
- 36 Compare E. Sirriyeh (1999), Chapter 6.
- 37 For a contextualization of various issues in reference to religious pluralism see my 'Introduction', in Jamal Malik and Helmut Reifeld (eds) (2004), pp. 1–20.
- 38 For the growing trend, particularly among young American Muslims to use Islam as a means to assert an independent identity, see Marcia Hermansen in Safi, O. (ed.) (2003), pp. 303–319.
- 39 Compare Nilufer Göle (1995).
- 40 D. F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (eds) (1996), p. 5.
- 41 See Mark Sedgwick in B. O. Utvik and K. Vikor (eds) (2000), pp. 251–269.
- 42 For this optimistic viewpoint see also Marcia Hermansen in Clarke, Peter (ed.) (1997), pp. 155–178.
- 43 This has been used in different contexts, such as P. R. Ireland (1994).
- 44 For structural differences between British, French, German and the USA societies see the illuminating study by Werner Schiffauer (1997).
- 45 Ludwig Hagemann and Reiner Albert (eds) (1998), pp. 128–131.
- 46 See for example the studies by Olivier Roy (1995) and Gilles Kepel (2000), who have extensively written on the decline of contemporary political Islam.