

RelBib

Bibliography of the Study of Religion

<https://relbib.de>

Dear reader,

This is a self-archived version of the following article:

Author: Rüpke, Jörg

Title: "Religious Pluralism"

Published in: The Oxford Handbook of Roman Studies
Oxford: Oxford University Press

Year: 2010

Pages: 748 - 766

ISBN: 978-0-19-921152-4

URL to the Original Publication:

<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-roman-studies-9780198856009>

The article is used with permission of [Oxford University Press](#).

For permission to reuse this material, please visit
<http://global.oup.com/academic/rights>.

Thank you for supporting Green Open Access.

Your RelBib team

EBERHARD KARLS
UNIVERSITÄT
TÜBINGEN



UNIVERSITÄTSBIBLIOTHEK

CHAPTER 47

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

JÖRG RÜPKE

THE PROBLEM

CONCEPTUALIZING the religious history of Rome and the Roman Empire seems to be easy. Looking back to that period, we usually differentiate Christianity, Judaism (each given a separate chapter in this handbook), and the rest, to which this chapter is dedicated. We are used to differentiating different ‘religions’, even if it is difficult to provide a precise term for those we mean to refer to by ‘the rest’. The term ‘polytheism’ is frequently used, but it reflects the perspective of people who regard themselves as monotheists, starting from the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo (F. Schmidt 1987). However, the same people thus called ‘polytheists’ would have differentiated themselves, together with the Jews, from Christian thinkers who they in turn saw as ‘atheists’. The task of differentiating ‘religions’ from each other brings with it another problem: How are the boundary-lines drawn? How do you classify an individual praying to different gods in the course of a lifetime or within the same week? Do Episcopalians, Mormons, and the Children of God, do Sunnites, Shiites, and Babis belong to different religions? The discipline of Religious Studies has developed a terminology of ‘cults’ and ‘denominations’ to deal with these problems, but the terminological choice itself implies normative statements of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. It has been argued that it was Christianity (singular!)—with its stress on belief

and its wish to drive out 'heretics'—that came to create 'religion' as something different from social life and 'religions' as the plurality of its illegitimate forms. Could this explain the religious conflicts within the Roman Empire?

This chapter will argue that the development of the notion of a plurality of religions represents a larger change in ancient concepts, of which Christian thinkers were only a part. Thus focused, the following pages will not describe the wide variety of religious practices, reflections, and organizations before and besides Jewish synagogues and Christian churches, covered by the books listed as 'further reading'. In tracing concepts by analysing the history of different (Latin) terms, it will, however, take into account the factual variety of religious practices as a background to the intellectual development.

TERMS AND CONCEPTS: *RELIGIO*

Despite the surface continuity of the term, the concept of 'religion' is not identical with the concept implied in the Latin word *religio* (Feil 1986: 16–82; J. Z. Smith 1998). To explore the conceptual differences, the meaning, and, if necessary, the history of the meanings of different terms that might pertain to our concept of religion will be analysed. The body of texts thus taken into account is concentrated on Latin texts, as this chapter is concerned with the main lines of thought that determined political and juridical and religious action on a larger scale.

Cicero

Of all the words that might denote something like 'religion', *religio*, obviously, had the most consequential history. The word (and hence *religiosus*) is attested from Plautus, that is, the early second century BCE, onwards (*Asinaria* 781, *Curculio* 350, *Mercator* 881), clearly implying what we would term religious language. The semantic range reaches from a direct relationship with a deity all the way to a rather generalized sort of scruple. The word is frequent in Cicero, in the speeches as well as in philosophical texts. It occurs with exceptional frequency in the speeches against Verres, the administrator of the province of Sicily, collector of statues, and, in Cicero's view, unrestrained violator of human and divine property. These texts use the term and its adjective more than one hundred times. The much shorter speeches *On his House* and *On the Answer of the Haruspices* show between fifty and sixty occurrences, and the philosophical treaties *On the Nature of the Gods* and *On Laws* (with its second book concentrated on what we term religion—already the

selection demonstrates the conceptual link between *religio* and our concept of religion) manifest the term with similar frequency.

Still, differences are important. Surely, as Ernst Feil in his two-volume history of the term has shown, in Cicero *religio* is not at all our umbrella term. Yet, his analysis, mostly based on *On the Nature of the Gods*, fails to take into account the fact that Cicero's use of the term in the dialogue, that is to say, by different speakers, is strategic and part of the *prosopoieia*, the characterization of the participants. Thus, the triad of *pietas*, *sanctitas*, and *religio*—which seems to juxtapose piety and dealing with the gods with religion—is part of the introductory section only (1.3 and 1.14). As the academic Cotta's later rendering of the title of Epicure's treatise *Peri osiotetos* as *De sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos* (1.115) shows, *sanctitas* as the science of venerating the gods (1.116) is an attempt to translate a Greek concept. Whereas the introductory section uses *sanctitas* in forms of questions or very general statements (Dyck 2003: 60, without noting the implications), Cotta questions the possibility of such a 'science' within the Epicurean framework. When the Stoic Balbus generally talks of the growth of *deorum cultus religionumque sanctitates* (2.5) and shortly afterwards defines *religio* as cult of the gods (2.8) he seems to imply differentiated concepts. The general claim of the first instance is obviously characterized as obfuscating and hence undermined by the author Cicero. The relationship of *pietas* and *religio* seems to be rather simple. The first describes the relationship with a human or divine natural superior. *Religio*, then, is the particular consequence—cult—in the case of the gods. Hence, the existence of the gods is the precondition for any piety or religiosity towards them (1.118 f.; similarly Lactantius, *Divine Institutions* 5.14).

Despite its initial context in the triad *religio–pietas–sanctitas*, *religio* emerges as a central concept. It appears frequently, however, only in certain opening or summarizing parts of the argumentation. The distribution among the discussants is unequal. The Epicurean Velleius never uses *religio*. The Stoic Lucius Balbus only in a few instances, talking about attention to public omens (e.g. 2.8. 10. 11), apart from the passage already mentioned and a rejection of *superstitio* as opposed to *religio*. It is the Academic and pontifex Cotta who most frequently employs the term *religio*. He uses both the singular and the plural. The plural juxtaposes *religiones* to *caerimoniae* (1.161) or *sacra* and *caerimonia* (3.5), in the first instance qualifying the *religiones* as 'public'. It is the task of the pontifex to defend these. Juxtaposition is supplanted by superposition in a passage dominated by the singular: 'the religion (*religio*) of the Roman people in general has two separate aspects, its ritual (*sacra*) and the auspices (*auspicia*), to which a third element is added when, as a result of portents and prodigies, the interpreters of the Sibyl or the diviners offers prophetic advice' (3.5, tr. P. G. Walsh). *Religio* is not a vague feeling (as his opponents are criticized for holding) or an 'empty fear' like *superstitio* (1.117), but something resulting from the acceptance of the gods as part of one's social order, a human

disposition, a habit, that finds its expression in corresponding rituals (*cultus deorum*, 1.117). Thus, the existence of gods is a precondition for it (*ibid.*), the unrestrained multiplying of gods could endanger it (3.60).

There is a last critical turn to Cotta and his Academic position. In the exchange preceding Cotta's lengthy refutation of the Stoic position, Cotta qualifies his definition quoted above as the view of the pontifex and adds: 'Since you are a philosopher, I must exact from you a rationale for religion, whereas I am to lend assent to our forebears even when no rationale is offered' (3.6). *Religio* is a social fact of the highest importance for the stability of the community (3.94), but it is not an argument and cannot be introduced as such into philosophical discourse (see 1.118). Rather, *religio* is to be tamed by *ratio*, and this is the purpose of the whole book, as the author declares in the very opening of the first book: 'I am dealing with the problem of the nature of the gods, a problem that is most beautiful for the intellect and its ability to know and a topic that is necessary for the steering of religion' (1.1). This is the philosophical agenda repeated in the subsequent treatise *On Divination*, too (2.148–9). In a hierarchy of descending generality, Cicero could list 'tradition (*mos*), religion (*religio*), teaching, augural law, authority of the college' (2.70).

For Cicero, singular and plural do not correspond to our notion of religion and religions. Religion in the singular denotes a necessary corollary of every theism and finds its expression in different religions. Expression and restraint. You can argue about theism—that is a theoretical problem and stance—but not about *religio*. But you can judge *religiones* by social standards of legitimacy and common sense. For instance, does a specific *religio* really refer to a deity? In the earlier books *On Laws*, Marcus (Tullius Cicero) had dealt with the problem by rigorously restricting cults in his fictitious lawgiving to the public and familiar ones, while new or foreign ones could legitimately enter the local cosmos only by public decision (2.19). It is noteworthy that Cicero already deals in this second paragraph of his religious laws with the problem of religious separatism ('nobody should have new or foreign gods of his own'). His attempt to list the gods—always seen as heavenly, consecrated due to merits, laudable virtues—points one by one to problems of such a qualification in terms of public acceptance and legitimacy (*ibid.*). In *On the Nature of the Gods* Cotta dealt with this problem by rigorously referring back to traditional practice—he evokes Numa (3.43)—and a *reductio ad absurdum* of every historical, mythological, or analogue reasoning. To abbreviate the lengthy argumentation based on the countless gods already venerated in practice: if all those are gods who are known to have altars in Greece (3.46), would the lack of any known cult be an argument against other candidates (3.45)?

We will have to follow up on the practical problems involved in these 'solutions' to interpreting religious plurality shortly, but must stay with the history of the term *religio* and its possible plurals for a moment more, in order to enlarge the field beyond Cicero before writers from the third century onwards will be addressed.

Until the beginning of the second century CE Cicero's usage remains representative for Roman thinking. Obviously, the different *religiones* attain to different deities. But such a one-to-one relationship is not usual. *Religiones* could multiply, different religious ideas and their differing cultic consequences could be addressed to one god, could be practised by the same people at the same time or by different people. Hence, Tacitus' expression *religione Herculis*—'the religion of Hercules' (*Annals* 12.13)—implying a one-to-one relationship, is rather unusual. When—within a passage of conduct in war—the same historian states that the *religio Veneris* ('religion of Venus') of the Aphrodisienses and the *religio Iovis et Triviae* ('religion of Jupiter and Trivia') of the Stratonicensis had been preserved (3.62), he modifies the concept of *religio* and points to another level of pluralizing. As the Romans had their public *religio* (in the singular), others had theirs (Cicero, *Pro Flacco* 69), and these might be compared (*On the Nature of the Gods* 2.8). Cicero, it is important to notice, does not employ a plural in his talk about comparison. 'Every community has its religion and we ours', in the speech for Flaccus, is an exclamation, a statement of radical differences, not of possible choice or meaningful coexistence. As in *On the Nature of the Gods*, *religio* confers the notion of a totality, but it is a local totality, justifying our talk of 'Roman' or 'Athenian religion', disregarding the problems indicated by the recent coining of 'religions of Rome' (Beard, North, and Price 1998). Cicero's 'we' and 'our' does not reflect the complex composition of the Roman population which was already the case by his time (see Noy 2000).

***Religio* in Texts of the Third and Fourth Centuries CE**

Religio does not figure prominently in most later texts (Feil 1986: 78). That holds true from Christian apologetics to the laws of the fourth century. Minucius Felix from Cirta, writing in the 240s (Barnes 2001: 151), was an attentive reader of Cicero. In his dialogue *Octavius* both adversaries, the sceptic as well as the Christian, employ the term *religio* in the very last sentences of their perorations, paired with *superstitio* and *pietas* (13.5, 38.7). For the Christian, it is *vera religio*—'true religion' (in 1.5, too)—not another religion. In the body of the text the context of the term is always ritual. That holds true for the more frequent usage in the speech of the Christian-to-be, Octavius (6.2, 7.1, 9.1, 10.1) as well as for the two *nostra religio* ('our religion') in the Christian answer within the same dialogue (29.2, 38.1).

Tertullian, writing earlier, basically conforms to this usage (e.g. *Apologeticum* 24, 33.1). *Religio* is based on the knowledge of god or gods and results in cults of very different kinds. Freedom of *religio* is claimed as the choice of the deity (24.6, 25), true *religio* is the cult of the one and true god (e.g. *On Games* 1.4), Roman *religio* could be termed *Romanae religiones* ('Roman religions') minutes later

(*Apologeticum* 26.3). Outside of *vera religio*, singular and plural do not make a difference.

In the early fourth century Lactantius follows and transcends Tertullian. The term *religio* is not important for his arguments, but it is useful and, in some texts, frequently used. It is helpful to start with the rare occurrences in his treatise *On the Death of the Persecutors* from c.313/16. Nero started the first persecutions when he realized that ‘a multitude defected from the cults of the images to a new religion’ (2.5). Here, as in other places, *religio* designates Christianity (11.3 and 7); the same Christians could be described as ‘enemies of the public cults (*religionum publicarum*)’ in the same passage (11.6). The frequent usage in the earlier *Divine Institutions* offers the key to understanding. *Religio* is usually paired with cult and gods, it is cult based on the acceptance of the deity to which a particular cult is addressed. Thus, as it is the explicit aim of Book 2 to demonstrate, religion addressed to false gods, humans, idols, is ‘vain’. A one-to-one relationship is the underlying model, hence the plural for the ‘religions of the deities’ (2.17.6). Usual, Roman religion is their ‘own’, opposed to *religiones communes*—‘common religions’ (1.20.1). Here, the reason for Lactantius’ famous re-definition of religion is to be found: ‘By a bond of piety we are bound to God and tied up (*religati*), whence religion itself took its name’ (4.28.3). Thus, *religio* and *superstitio* are to be differentiated according to the god addressed, only (4.28.11). Christians are tied by the true god to his cult, others by demons to the cults of vain idols. Even in key passages, Lactantius refrains from employing the singular *falsa religio* (‘false religion’) to denote the latter. It is the necessary intellectual act to identify the one and true god and to see through the limits of the human condition and knowledge—*sapientia*—which encourages Lactantius to employ *religio* as a general concept: no true cultic piety (*religio*) without philosophy, no true philosophy that would not result in true cultic piety—the topic of Book 1 (1.1.25). In this sense, *religio* sets men apart from the animals (*Epitome Divinarum Institutionum* 32.4).

Writing in the 340s, Iulius Firmicus Maternus prefers in his long list of cults from all over the empire which he considers ridiculous the terms *sacra* and *superstitiones* to *religiones*, but he uses both terms synonymously. Interestingly enough, Firmicus uses *profana(e) religio(nes)* two times in passages referring to texts, not to ritual (*De errore profanarum religionum* [not an authentic title] 17.4; 21.1). Here, even if associated with the cult that must necessarily follow, *religiones* offered the advantage of being more general than *sacra* and *superstitiones*.

Ammianus Marcellinus, writing in the second half of the fourth century, wrote of the emperor Constantius II that he disturbed the *Christiana religio simplex* with empty *superstitio* and thus stirred up many verbal controversies (21.16.18). He could, however, generalize personal *religiones* with the singular. The reforms of Julian intended, *pace* Ammianus, that ‘everybody could fearlessly serve his religious disposition’ (22.5.3). It is important to note that for the historian, cult dominated

the perception of religion and religious differences. Thus he could oppose *cultus Christianus* to *deorum cultores* (21.2.4), could observe that ‘Christian *religio* venerated martyrs’ (27.7.6), could encounter a *ritus Christiani sacrarium* (26.3.3), or run into a Christian festival (27.10.2)—the image of religion as a particular lifestyle rather than ritual, prominently professed by Octavius, belonged to the past. Christianity, however, had successfully established the image of a densely knit unit in contrast to a multitude of other religious practices, even for a critical writer like Ammianus (see Davies 2004), characterized by some as ‘aggressively pagan’ (Rilke 1987: 137).

What are our findings thus far? In contrast to terms like *cultus*, *sacra*, or *caerimoniae*, *religio* (and its plural) implied a reflected belief, an intellectual stance towards the deities addressed by the cult. Thus, already in Cicero, *religio* was used to reflect upon the relationship of philosophy, theological reflection, and religious practices. Some Latin Christian writers, Lactantius above all, used this relationship to polemicize against non-Christian cult within the framework of their own philosophical argumentation. Such a concept could hardly reflect the realities of the formation of groups employing religious symbols for their group identity. Within the religious framework of the ancient world, the cult of a specific deity would only occasionally correspond with or constitute group boundaries. Speaking about a city’s or a person’s religion was thus difficult. The singular could be used to describe one’s own ‘religion’—as Licinius did in his so-called Tolerance Edict from 13 June 313 (Lactantius, *On the Death of the Persecutors* 48), but the dichotomy implied between ‘us’ and ‘the others’ would not reflect clear boundaries and differences among ‘the others’. How, against this backdrop, could a plurality of religions, could group boundaries in terms of religion be conceptualized?

HOW TO EXPRESS A PLURALITY OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS?

I start with an example. When the proconsul Saturninus questioned a group of Christians at Scili at the end of the second century, he attempted to articulate the conflict using the term *religio*, which he quickly defined as an oath in the name of, and a prayer for, the emperor (*Acta Scilitanorum* 3). The offer of the accused Speratus to discuss things religious led him to shift the accusation to terms like ‘being of such a persuasion’ or ‘participant of insanity’ (7–8). In the end the self-definition as *Christianus* was sufficient for the death sentence (10), as Tertullian—irritated—reported (*Apologeticum* 3). However, if we believe the accuracy of the text already formed to the purposes of communal reading, the final reason given by

the proconsul was the confession 'to live *ritu Christiano*' and to refuse to return *ad Romanorum morem* (Acta 14). The conflict was not to be couched in terms of 'religion'.

How did Latin speakers deal with the problem outside of the court? Minucius Felix, Christian and Ciceronian, demonstrates the central option. Already in the prooemium, the notion of 'error' sets the tone (1.4; 3.1; finally taken up in 40.1). Accepting the Christian god is a matter of intellectual cognition, Christianity is a philosophical option. The Christians are the better philosophers (20.1 against 13.1). Regardless of the development of the arguments, this perspective is explicitly given to the critic, probably built on the holder of high offices in Circa Q. Caecilius Q.f. Natalis (Barnes 2001: 151). He characterizes himself as somebody who is not a member of the same 'sect' (*secta*), and talks of 'your sect' and finally, rhetorically (Rüpke 2006) beaten by Octavius, of 'already my sect' (40.2).

Secta, obviously translating the Greek *hairesis*, was primarily used to differentiate the philosophical schools of the early Hellenistic age, but could be used for Jewish groups like Saducees or Pharisees too (e.g. in Acts 4: 17; Josephus, *Bellum Iudaicum* 2.8.1). The term is rare in Cicero, who used it more frequently for political (e.g. *Letters to Brutus* 10.1) than philosophical groups (e.g. *Pro Caelio* 40; *Brutus* 120), but appears frequently from the first century CE onwards. Tertullian uses the term explicitly in this sense (*Apologeticum* 3.6, 40.7, 46.2). It implied a legitimate choice among comparable options. By the beginning of the fourth century, in Lactantius and Firmicus, the term is no longer used as a self-description in apologetic texts, but it is attested in the so-called Tolerance Edict of 311 (Lactantius, *On the Death of the Persecutors* 34). Here, Licinius looked back on his earlier attempt to bring the Christians back to their 'good senses', as they have left 'their parents' sect' (34.1). The term is very frequently used for the 'catholic sect' as well as heretical and all varieties of sects in the norms collected in the sixteenth book of the Codex Theodosianus (in particular 16.5; for the terminology of religious groups in the Codex, see Zinser 2002). It must be stressed, however, that the instances of 'catholic' or 'orthodox sect' remained rare.

Another term within the field of philosophical schools was *disciplina*. It could denote both intellectual content and a way of life. *Disciplina magorum*, *Etruscorum*, *Chaldaica*, *augurum*, and *rei publicae* are phrases from the first centuries BCE; Cato the Elder warns already in the second century BCE of 'foreign discipline' (1.4). Military discipline, directly or metaphorically, remained the main notion, but did not exclude other developments. Apuleius, for instance, made frequent use of the word (*Metamorphoses* 3.19.4, 4.18; *De Deo Socratis* 3). Tertullian used the term (which was nearly absent from Latin translations of the New Testament, except seven times in Paul) for new traits of the Christian way of life (*Against the Marcionites* 4.36; *On Fasting* 12). Terminological fixation is missing in Minucius Felix, but the idea of a new way of life is given prominence (e.g. 5.1) and *disciplina*

hence applied even to traditional cults (6.1, 8.2, 30.3). For Christians, it is something to be developed (35.3). Firmicus could polemicize against the devil's *disciplina* (*De errore Profanorum Religionum* 18.1).

In contrast to the usage of the term *religio*, the terminology of religious groups is simple. A plurality of comparable choices could be expressed in terms of different philosophical schools. This implied a body of knowledge as—and this is important—a special way of life. By the term *disciplina*, this could be applied to certain types of religious specialists—magicians, *haruspices*, even augurs—already by the late Republic. To my knowledge, in Latin texts that usage was not extended to a wider variety of religions before the Christian apologetics took it up from the end of the second century, and did not reach official texts before the fourth century.

RELIGIOUS PLURALITY: PROLIFERATION AND CONTROL

So far, this analysis has implicitly or explicitly located religious plurality in a plurality of groups of persons exercising different religious options. This has informed the selection of terms and passages analysed. Yet religious plurality could be measured by other parameters too. Starting anew from Cicero and his time, in a perspective informed by his concept of *religio* instead of our notion of 'religion', such alternative parameters gain in importance. Given the structure of the concept of *religio* between the philosophical problem of the existence of the gods and the veneration due to them, the first problem for a local community is the inflation in the number of gods. This formulation implies a modern semi-otical perspective: The primary signs of religious communication were the gods. It was and had been too easy to multiply them, turning every ethical concept, even every abstract concept not only into an image, but into a deity (Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 3.61), and offering every exceptional individual the prospect of divinization. Inflation of signs is devaluation of signs, producing something—to return to object language—that is not worthy (*ibid.*) of the real god(s). The academic and pontifex Cotta uses a large part of his speech to deplore this development (3.38–64), and, as shown above, that was a primary concern of Cicero's literary legislation. The solution imposing itself in his traditionalist society consisted in curbing further proliferation by falling back on tradition. However, already Cicero's generation realized that even that is inconsistent. The forefathers' temple-building for the deity 'Fever' is a stock example used in *On Laws* (2.28) and in *On the Nature of the Gods* (3.63). Varro adhered to

the growing multitude out of civic discipline, not on the basis of a philosophical rationale (*Divine Antiquities* 1, fr. 12). His historical research and systematization produced an even larger multitude, offering material for generations of Christian apologetics to poke fun at (Rüpke 2005a, 2006).

How, then, could control—a concept to be used intensively in the following reflections—be achieved? The gods themselves could neither be controlled nor sanctioned. They could form the object of a philosophical attack, but not of political or military action. Neither could *religio* be an object of control. It was *cultus*, it was individual *sacra*, that could be banned or tolerated. In his books *On Laws* Cicero's idea was to implement control by means of public priests (*sacerdotes*). In the commentary on his own formulations (2.30 on 2.20–1), he stresses their competence even with regard to private religiosity. Without the priests' help the citizens could not ritually satisfy their own private *religio*. Even if Cicero could not offer a complete list of *sacra*, he produced a complete list of priests (thus I understand his formulation at 2.30). Several priesthoods that gained high importance under the later Augustus, such as the *Fratres Arvales* or *Salii*, are not mentioned, but that is in concord with the pre-Augustan concentration of competition for priesthoods on four of the public colleges (see Rüpke 2008), thus ensuring the effectiveness of aristocratic control.

Cicero's solution was incoherent by his own standards. On the one hand, and in good republican tradition, he is operating with a clear-cut division of public and private, regulated either by public decision, that is, by means of certain procedures and—if one considers the agents—ultimately by the nobility, or by family tradition. On the other hand, he suggests that the private requires public regulation. In order to understand this 'incoherence' one has to add that in terms of usage, pragmatically, so to speak, the dichotomy of public and private was not as strict as the property law suggests. From this perspective, public spaces intruded into private houses—the atrium, for example (Rüpke 2002)—and non-public groupings might occupy public space or could be perceived as a danger to public order—associations of artisans, for instance.

The nearly contemporary law of the Roman colony Urso in Hispania Baetica offered a different solution, stressing the dividing-line of public and private. Public cult was to be financed and organized by the council and its magistrates. Financing and the infrastructure necessary for large public rituals formed the means of control, thus shaping the actual contents of the *sacra publica* (see the law's sections 65, 69–72; 128; see Rüpke 2006a for the following). Priesthoods, expiation, burials, and ancestor cult were beyond the public realm. This side of life simply could not be allowed to interfere with political activities. The regulations concerning pontiffs and augurs—usually taken as a testimony for the export of Roman religion—just tried to transfer structural elements of public religion. At Urso these priesthoods were not an element of public control, but are themselves subordinated to magisterial power.

GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION

So far, the frame of analysis has been deliberately restricted to Rome or a single place—following Cicero’s unreflected ‘we’. As has been quoted above, it was common knowledge that other communities had their own *religiones*. The antiquarians extensively reflected on earlier imports. According to them, basically, Rome was made up of Latin, Etruscan, and Sabine gods and cults. The Trojan ancestry, postulated by Greeks from the third century BCE onwards (Erskine 2001: esp. 224) was accepted, religious imports could be imagined in the Virgilian narrative of the *Aeneid* (Cancik 2006; see also Barchiesi 2006). But these contacts were seen as events of a distant past. For the more recent past, cultural contact with Greece and the Hellenic world (so present in southern Italy and Etrurian towns) had been very intensive—and controversial. It was not *religio* that was at the centre of such controversies, but rather clothing, luxury ornaments, philosophy, or rhetoric. Yet, boundaries between religion and the profane could easily shift. In the first half of the second century BCE Numa’s books had been condemned as Pythagorean philosophy according to the earliest testimony by the annalist Cassius Hemina (Pliny, *Natural History* 13.86). A generation later, writers thought of these books as containing pontifical law. Stolen statues of Greek deities filled public and private space at Rome as works of art. Eventually, however, some of them had to be accommodated in new temples. Thus, the nine Muses from Ambracia were transferred to the new temple of ‘Hercules of the Muses’.

Due to continuous contact since the early urban phases, Rome, the city on the margins of the Greek world, had no significant difficulty accommodating and acculturating influx from the Greeks, be it Mater Magna from Asia minor or Venus Erycina from Sicily. Thus, the testimony of Cicero’s dialogue *On the Nature of the Gods* is ambivalent. In itself a witness to the Romans’ attempt to come to grips with Greek thinking on religion (historical and philosophical, Rüpke 2005a), the polemical concentration on the influx of Greek mythology (and ultimately religion) presented by Cotta (3.38 ff.) is a demonstration of parochialism (even if parts of the argumentation were taken over from the Greek academic Carneades). Other cultural and religious areas remained exotic, neither dangerous nor adaptable, for example, Syrian fish gods and Egyptian animals (3.39, the latter again in 3.48) or an Indian variety of Jupiter (3.42, Belus, i.e. Baal; Walsh 1997: 199). The existence of Egyptian variants of divine genealogies was noted more frequently (3.54 ff.), but those were not accorded the status of dangerous knowledge. Such genealogies were perceived as distant local variants, gaining no importance beyond those localities. Hence, interest in Egyptian cults at Rome was limited in that generation. Cicero’s Cotta did not take the trouble to comment upon the removal of shrines to Isis from the Capitol during the 50s, the last of these pertaining to the year 48 BCE (Cassius Dio 42.26; see

Mora 1990: 75–87), hardly more than three years before Cicero wrote the books (he finished the composition before the death of Caesar). Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE) is reported to have resented the cult of Isis and Serapis. The paraphrase in Servius' commentary on Virgil's *Aeneid* (8.698) indicates Varro's urban perspective: 'every community has its own religion.'

Change was imminent, stressing more and more boundaries within local society and approaching the image of religious plurality encountered in chapter 3. Stirred by a famous incident of sexual fraud, in 19 CE the Senate debated about the expulsion of 'Egyptian and Jewish cults' (Tacitus, *Annals* 2.85.5). Suetonius, in his account (*Tiberius* 36.1–2), refers to 'external ceremonies' and 'rites'. Obviously, the Senate thought they should fight a superstition and ruled to destroy cultic paraphernalia and expelled the followers by various means. The combination of measures and the wording of Suetonius suggest ethnic and hence political implications. Mora points to the journey of Germanicus (1990: 93), who entered Egypt in 19 CE and won local sympathies by the measures he undertook in the famine, but also thus produced a serious conflict with Tiberius. The religious dimension, however, must have been important; followers of the cult were expelled, regardless of their ethnic identity, or had to stop 'profane rites', as Tacitus formulates. This is confirmed by Seneca, who adduces the information that the expulsion of 'alien' cults was legitimized by its classification as *superstitio*, argued for (among other facts, not related by Seneca) on the basis of abstinence from certain animals (*Letters* 108.22). Similar conceptual choices are visible in a religious context that was not polemical at all. The Roman institution of the organized training of Etruscan diviners (*haruspices*) was seen as fighting economic misuse of religion—secularization, one might say—by Cicero (*On Divination* 1.92). For Tacitus (*Annals* 11.15.1), however, the fact that 'foreign superstitions' were gaining strength was one of the main reasons for a similar measure by Claudius.

Certain phrases of these writers from the early second century CE look similar to those frequent in much later texts analysed before. Yet, we are encountering a terminology *in statu nascendi* rather than coined phrases. It is dangerous to use later reports as evidence for earlier perceptions. Trends, however, are clearly discernible. Identifying external agents as the main problem—as opposed to Livy's image of a Bacchic infection of Roman youth, formulated at the end of the first century BCE—became a strategy of growing importance. In the fourth century CE, for Firmicus Maternus the strike against the Bacchanalia was a fight against 'foreign' *superstitiones* (6.9) by an intact society, whose infection started only later with the import of the cult of Ceres/Proserpina from Henna (7). Disregarding all the counter-measures taken by the Roman public, by the turn of the second to the third century CE Tertullian identifies the Romanization of Serapis and the 'Italization' of Bacchus as the decisive breach of tradition (*Apologeticum* 6.10; cf. Minucius Felix 22.1).

Already by the second half of the first century CE the differentiation had become very sharp in terms of the trend just indicated. Yet it is still dominated by a Romanocentric view. Juvenal's often-quoted 'the Syrian river Orontes has already flown into the Tiber for a long time' (*Sat.* 3.62), does not explicitly talk about religion, but about culture in general, music and prostitution in particular. Religion, however, is part of the senatorial speech of a C. Cassius, composed by Tacitus in his account of a discussion about the collective killing of slaves after the murder of the urban prefect Pedanius Secundus by one of his slaves. He observes that by his time the family of slaves is formed by entire 'nations', 'that have diverse rites, foreign cults or none at all'—an argument that leaves fear of sanctions as the only remaining means of coercion (*Annals* 14.44.3). The archaeology of suburban Roman villas confirms that, with numerous sanctuaries which might just as well have served a taste for the religious exotic on the part of the owner as the exotic traditions of his slaves and freedmen.

The influx of cults to Rome, their blossoming at Rome, and the frequent establishment of a Roman centre of cults originating in other places (Isis, Christianity), has been described in detail in modern research. Rome, the capital, captivates and captivated the interest of modern as ancient intellectuals. Everyone venerates his gods, and the Romans all of them, is the summary observation of Caecilius (Minucius Felix 6.1), laying his stress on cult (6.3–7.1). A Romanocentric view is, however, dangerous. The image of Rome as 'temple of the whole world' uses a phrase that the Hermetic *Asclepius* applies to Egypt. An extraordinary mobility, enabled by the structures, needs, and possibilities of the Roman Empire, modified the religious landscape everywhere, as is clearly seen by an observer with experiences of Rome and Northern Africa, Minucius Felix (20.6, 'before the globe was open to commerce and the peoples mixed their rites and behaviours').

CONCEPTUAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN IMPERIAL PERSPECTIVE

The apologetic argument was not interested in specifying the different subjects of such cults. Mobility is not identical with immigration. The young males who also frequently died young, whom Walter Scheidel has identified as the largest group of immigrants (2004), are not the part of a population which would be credited with being the most knowledgeable messengers of religion. Long-distance traders, however, wished to bolster their economic position in society; military officers and administrative personnel had much travel experience and experience in leading rituals (Haensch 1997). People like these, and intellectuals, could develop the

bird-eye's view of the Roman Empire used by Christian apologetics in order to win freedom and acceptance for their own religious practice. The observation credited to the sceptic Caecilius that empires, provinces, and cities have and venerate their own deities (Minucius Felix 6.1) could be seen in its argumentative function in the earlier *Apology* of Tertullian: why, then, cannot we have a religion of our own (24.9)? Here, the group referred to as 'we' and the group composed of those enjoying full citizenship did not directly correspond.

Occasionally, consequences of the emergence of a continuous cultural space by the military and administrative establishment of the Roman Empire had been formulated earlier. Varro made a start. He did not only research the identity of the images of the Samothracian deities, venerated on their island in the north-east of the Aegean Sea, but declared that he was going to explain this to those who should know it (*Divine Antiquities* 15, fr. 206). At least by intention, this opened a space for communication about religion that transcended one's own city. In his praise of Italy and Rome, Pliny the Elder describes the mitigation of rituals (*Nat. Hist.* 3.39) as one of the functions of the establishment of the ecumene. He implies a trans-local discourse that implied local changes. The Roman dealing with the Druids and human sacrifice might offer an example (Rives 1995). In the second century, Lucian not only presented an assembly of gods critical of newcomers, but also analysed the establishment of a new cult, an oracle, in his *Alexandros* (Elm 2006, Bendlin 2006). Greek novels stage-managed their plots within an ecumenical Mediterranean imbued with mutually compatible religious practices (Waldner 2006).

The positions assembled so far did not imply any hierarchical ordering of such cultic practices. Yet such positions existed by the turn from the second to the third century. Celsus, as Arnaldo Momigliano has pointed out, produced a theology of the Roman Empire during the last quarter of the second century:

If it is accepted that all of nature—everything in the world—operates according to the will of God and that nothing works contrary to his purposes, then it must also be accepted that the angels, the demons, heroes—everything in the universe—are subject to the will of the great God who rules over all. Over each sphere there is a being charged with the task of governance and worthy to have power, at least the power allotted it for carrying out its task. This being the case, it would be appropriate for each man who worships God also to honor the being who exercises his allotted responsibilities at God's pleasure. (p. 115 in the reconstruction of Hoffmann 1987; see Momigliano 1986: 289–90)

Despite the concentration on the emperor, Celsus' suggested consequence is utterly traditionalistic. Everywhere the (seemingly contingent) cults are part of the order of things, and hence participation is necessary and not bad, as it is ultimately referring back to the 'great God'.

L. Claudius Cassius Dio Cocceianus, perhaps writing in the 220s, a Roman consul of Greek background, is much more radical. His opposition to imperial cult (52.35.3) is combined with a strong insistence on the 'traditional' form of

(Roman) religious practices everywhere (52.36.1). For purely economic reasons he opts for Rome to be a religious centre by monopolizing circus races and keeping extra-Roman festival expenses at a moderate level (52.30.4, 7). A more centralizing model is implicitly present in Minucius Felix's non-Christian Octavius. The city of Rome is not only one of many, but a superior place because it attracts and venerates every god (6.1). Such a doubling or transfer is said to ensure Roman superiority on the scale of an empire. That, however, leaves open the function of the ongoing local cults.

Such inconsistencies remained unsolved, due to the combination of an urbanocentric view with what I have called the bird's-eye view of travelling officers, administrators, and merchants on trans-local religious plurality. For the period analysed here, there is no idea of unification of the empire by religion (contrary: Buchheit 1998). In practice, the symbolic loading of the centre dominated (Ando 2002; Cancik, Schäfer, and Spickermann 2006). It was only by the decree of Decius in 249 that local cults and central authority were integrated in a common framework. Now, compliance with the worship of local deities was made a matter of central concern and regulation (Rives 1999: 152). Still, the centre itself—personal (the emperor), not geographical (Rome)—did not emerge as the subject of a proper theology.

All of this does not reflect anything like a theory of religious plurality, neither does the widespread phenomenon of *interpretatio Romana*, Roman names given to 'foreign' deities (Ando 2005), mostly practised by local elites, who thus integrated traditional local deities into the media offered by Mediterranean religion, statues, inscriptions, and temple architecture. Yet, these reflections and practices attest to a growing complexity and importance of religion. Cult was more than the natural consequence of a religious disposition towards a contingent deity. It was subjected to rational explanation. It was subjected to universal standards of humanity. It was a necessary part of one's way of life, to which the division between public and private could not be applied. It was an economic and political factor. It was a medium of a non-religious discourse. These elements were neither new nor consistent. They fitted together with terminological changes, with *ratio* and *fides* controlling *religio* (e.g. Isidor, *De Differentiis* 2.139), with an insistence on *vera religio*, 'true religion', with *disciplina*, lifestyle, and morality (see Veyne 2005: 454–5), and *secta*, a grouping which is neither public nor private. Christians detected the origins of games and claimed them to be religious events (Tertullian, *On the Games*; Lactantius, *Epitome* 58). In the western provinces, by its use of inscriptions and architecture, religion became one of the most important media of public communication.

Another factor accrued. The mobility of more densely organized 'venerators'—by far not of every deity, *religio* and *cultus*—posed the problem of trans-local recognizability. Stabilization was achieved by different means. The rather standardized cult image of Mithras, unusual rituals and Egyptian decoration in the case

of Isis (in general: Turcan 1996: 24–8), exchange of letters and collections of narratives in the case of the Christians, were equivalents in that perspective (see Rüpke 2005*b*). Yet they had very different consequences for the phenomenology of the ensembles and their success. Narratives could be much more easily propagated, adapted, and rephrased than images (see Elsner 1998: 235; Av. Cameron 1991: 19, 38–43), as the spread of Judaism and Christianity demonstrated.

For such a loaded concept of ‘religion’ and the appearance of boundary-creating ‘cults’, the religious framework of the empire became a problem, which it had not been in Cicero’s day, from whose letters—as should be stressed for the readers of his philosophical treatises and orations—religion is virtually absent (Veyne 2005: 505). How could that bundle of life-shaping practices and beliefs which is more than *religio* be related to the empire and the emperor? To put it in a nutshell: it was not the empire that was crying for its own religion (‘Reichsreligion’), but the mobility of the empire (succinctly Scheidel 2004: 22–3) had led to an accrued concept of religion that posed the question of its political position more and more urgently. From Aurelian and Diocletian onwards, the Roman administration strove to give an answer, if necessary by violent persecutions and penal law.

CONCLUSION

Without a concept of religion that allowed the drawing of unsurpassable boundaries between unities thus addressed, within our period religions could not be thought of in the plural in the modern sense. Neither *secta* and *disciplina* nor *religiones* fully arrived at fulfilling this function. The problem of a plurality that goes beyond the dual of ‘we’ and ‘the others’ was, however, present. It was a multi-dimensional plural, including a plural of religious signs as well as of places. ‘Cults and religions’, as modern research has come to say, do not capture these dimensions. The most important change between the first century BCE and the fourth century CE was not a change in numbers. Within the empire, religion changed its place in society. Only as a consequence, I should like to claim, did the problem of numbers, differences, and groups occur. We should no longer indulge in explanations based on the idea of ‘syncretism’ and ‘transgression of boundaries’ between Jews and Hellenists, Christians and astrologers, without looking carefully at the specific conditions of place and time. Of course, *katà tà pátria*, ‘according to the way of the ancestors’, could stress ethnic differences in the medium of religion. But intermarriage and mobility confounded the notion of *patria* (now Latin). Our modern concepts of ‘religions’ and ‘cults’ suggest boundaries that could not be seen by ancient agents and hence could not explain their acting. Thus, the Roman

Empire invites us not to reflect about the plurality of religions, but the boundaries that created ‘religions’.

FURTHER READING

For the complex religious situation of the Roman Empire, exchanges and common religious traits, a complete history or analysis is lacking; Rives 2007 is an overview. The chapters in volumes 11 and 12 of the 2nd edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History* and in Rüpke 2007 offer much material and relevant analyses. Succinct regional analyses are offered, for instance, by Sartre 2005: 274–342 (Syria); Woolf 1998: 206–38 (Gaul); and Spickermann 2003/7 (Germania). The situation of the centre is dealt with by Edwards and Woolf 2003 and Cancik, Schäfer, and Spickermann 2006. The notion of a separate class of ‘oriental cult’ is dissolved by the contributions in Bonnet, Rüpke, and Scarpi 2006. A critical bibliography for Roman religion is found in Belayche, Bendlin *et al.* (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009) and Wallraff 2007 for late antiquity.

REFERENCES

- ANDO, CLIFFORD (2002), ‘The Palladium and the Pentateuch: towards a sacred topography of the later Roman empire’, *Phoenix*, 55/3–4: 369–410.
- (2005), ‘Interpretatio Romana’, *Classical Philology*, 100: 41–51.
- and RÜPKE, JÖRG (eds.) (2006), *Religion and law in classical and Christian Rome* (Potsdamer altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 15), Stuttgart: Steiner.
- BARCHIESI, ALESSANDRO (2006), ‘Mobilità e religione nell’*Eneide*: Diaspora, culto, spazio, identità locali’, in Elm von der Osten, Rüpke, and Waldner 2006: 13–30.
- BARNES, T. D. (2001), ‘Monotheists all?’, *Phoenix*, 55: 142–62.
- BEARD, MARY, NORTH, JOHN, and PRICE, SIMON (1998), *Religions of Rome. 1: A history; 2: A sourcebook*, Cambridge: University Press.
- BELAYCHE, NICOLE, BENDLIN, ANDREAS *et al.* (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), ‘Römische Religion (1990–1999)’, *Archiv für Religionsgeschichte*, 2 (2000), 283–345; 5 (2003), 297–371; 9 (2007), 297–404; 11 (2009), 301–411.
- BENDLIN, ANDREAS (2006), ‘Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Mantik: Orakel im Medium von Handlung und Literatur in der Zeit der Zweiten Sophistik’, in Elm von der Osten, Rüpke, and Waldner 2006: 159–207.
- BONNET, CORINNE, RÜPKE, JÖRG, and SCARPI, PAOLO (eds.) (2006), *Religions orientales—culti misterici: Neue Perspektiven—nouvelle perspectives—prospettive nuove* (Potsdamer altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 16), Stuttgart: Steiner.
- BUCHHEIT, VINZENZ (1998), ‘Einheit durch Religion in Antike und Christentum’, in Ernst Dassmann (ed.), *Chartulae: Festschrift für Wolfgang Speyer*. Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum suppl. 28. Münster: Aschendorff. 36–43.
- CAMERON, AVERIL (1991), *Christianity and the rhetoric of empire: the development of Christian discourse*. Sather Classical Lectures 55, Berkeley: University of California Press.

- CANCIK, HUBERT (2006), ‘“Götter einführen”: Ein myth-historisches Modell für die Diffusion von Religion in Vergils Aeneis’, in Elm von der Osten, Rüpke, and Waldner 2006: 31–40.
- SCHÄFER, ALFRED, and SPICKERMANN, WOLFGANG (eds.) (2006), *Zentralität und Religion*. Studien zu Antike und Christentum 39, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- DAVIES, JASON P. (2004), *Rome’s religious history: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on their gods*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- DYCK, ANDREW R. (ed.) (2003), *Cicero, De natura deorum liber I*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- EDWARDS, CATHARINE and WOOLF, GREG (eds.) (2003), *Rome the cosmopolis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ELM VON DER OSTEN, DOROTHEE (2006), ‘Die Inszenierung des Betruges und seiner Entlarvung: Divination und ihre Kritiker in Lukians Schrift “Alexandros oder der Lügenprophet”’, in: Elm von der Osten, Rüpke, and Waldner 2006: 141–57.
- RÜPKE, JÖRG, and WALDNER, KATHARINA (eds.) (2006), *Texte als Medium und Reflexion von Religion im römischen Reich*. Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 14, Stuttgart: Steiner.
- ELSNER, JAŚ (1998), *Imperial Rome and Christian triumph: the art of the Roman Empire AD 100–450*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ERSKINE, ANDREW (2001), *Troy between Greece and Rome: local tradition and Imperial Rome*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FEIL, ERNST (1986), *Religio: Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs vom Frühchristentum bis zur Reformation*. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 36, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- HAENSCH, RUDOLF (1997), *Capita provinciarum: Statthaltersitze und Provinzialverwaltung in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Kölner Forschungen 7, Mainz: Zabern.
- HOFFMANN, R. JOSEPH (1987), *Celsus, On the True Doctrine: a discourse against the Christians*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- MOMIGLIANO, ARNALDO (1986), ‘The disadvantages of monotheism for a universal state’, *Classical Philology*, 81: 285–97.
- MORA, FABIO (1990; 1990a), *Prosopografia Isiaca*. 1: *Corpus prosopographicum religionis Isiacae*; 2: *Prosopografia storica e statistica del culto Isiaco*. EPRO 113, Leiden: Brill.
- NOY, DAVID (2000), *Foreigners at Rome: citizens and strangers*, London: Duckworth.
- RILKE, R. L. (1987), *Apex Omnium: religion in the Res gestae of Ammianus*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- RIVES, J. (1995), ‘Human sacrifice among pagans and Christians’, *JRS* 85: 65–85.
- (1999), ‘The decree of Decius and the religion of empire’, *JRS* 89: 135–54.
- (2007), *Religion in the Roman Empire*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- RÜPKE, JÖRG (2002), ‘Collegia sacerdotum—religiöse Vereine in der Oberschicht’, in Ulrike Egelhaaf-Gaiser and Alfred Schäfer (eds.), *Religiöse Vereine in der römischen Antike: Untersuchungen zu Organisation, Ritual und Raumordnung*. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 13, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 41–67.
- (2005), *Fasti sacerdotum Prosopographie der stadtrömischen Priesterschaften römischer, griechischer, orientalischer und jüdisch-christlicher Kulte bis 499 n. Chr.* Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 12/1–3, Stuttgart: Steiner. 3 vols.
- (2005a), ‘Varro’s tria genera theologiae: religious thinking in the late Republic’, *Ordis prima*, 4: 107–29.

- RÜPKE, JÖRG (2005*b*), 'Buchreligionen als Reichsreligionen? Lokale Grenzen überregionaler religiöser Kommunikation', *Mittelalterliches Jahrbuch*, 40: 197–207.
- (2006), 'Literarische Darstellungen römischer Religion in christlicher Apologetik: Universal- und Lokalreligion bei Tertullian und Minucius Felix', in Elm von der Osten, Rüpke, and Waldner 2006: 209–23.
- (2006*a*), 'Religion in the *lex Ursonensis*', in Ando and Rüpke 2006: 34–46.
- (ed.) (2007), *The Blackwell companion to Roman religion*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (2008), *Fasti Sacerdotum*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SARTRE, MAURICE (2005), *The Middle East under Rome*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- SCHIEDL, WALTER (2004), 'Human mobility in Roman Italy, I: the free population', *JRS* 94: 1–26.
- SCHMIDT, FRANCIS (1987), 'Polytheism: degeneration or progress?', in F. Schmidt (ed.), *The inconceivable polytheism: studies in religious historiography*. History and anthropology 3, London: Harwood Academic Press. 1–9.
- SMITH, JONATHAN Z. (1998), 'Religion, religions, religious', in Mark C. Taylor (ed.), *Critical terms for religious studies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 269–84.
- SPICKERMANN, WOLFGANG (2003/2007), *Germania superior/Germania inferior: Religionsgeschichte des römischen Germanien 1–2*. Religion der römischen Provinzen 2/1–2. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- TRANOY, LAURENCE (2000), 'The living and the dead: a struggle for space—approaches to landscape around Lyons', in John Pearce, Martin Millett, and Manuela Struck (eds.), *Burial, society and context in the Roman world*, Oxford: Oxbow. 162–9.
- TURCAN, ROBERT (1996), *The cults of the Roman Empire*, tr. Antonia Nevill, Oxford: Blackwell.
- VEYNE, PAUL (2005), *L'Empire Gréco-Romain*, Paris: Ed. du Seuil.
- WALLRAFF, MARTIN (2007), *Religionsgeschichte der Spätantike = Verkündigung und Forschung* 52,2. Gütersloh: Kaiser.
- WALDNER, KATHARINA (2006), 'Die poetische Gerechtigkeit der Götter: Recht und Religion im griechischen Roman', in Elm von der Osten, Rüpke, and Waldner 2006: 101–23.
- WALSH, PATRICK G. (1997), *The nature of gods*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- WOOLF, GREG (1998), *Becoming Roman: the origins of provincial civilization in Gaul*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ZINSER, HARTMUT (2002), 'Religio, Secta, Haeresis in den Häresiesetzen des Codex Theodosianus (16,5,1/66) von 438', in: Manfred Hutter (ed.), *Hairesis: Festschrift für Karl Hoheisel zum 65. Geburtstag*. Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum suppl. 34, Münster: Aschendorff. 215–19.