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Definite or still demonstrative?

Some ideas on the semantics of the German distal demonstrative *jen-*

Abstract: In my paper I offer a unified two-level semantics for the distal demonstrative *jen-* in modern written German using corpus data with pronominal and adnominal *jen-* in anaphoric, anamnestic and determinative uses. I propose that *jen-* combines an at-issue definiteness component – in the sense of denoting a salient referent in the current discourse representation – with a not-at-issue component conveying that the referent is presented by the speaker as not being anchored in the shared mental space of the speaker and the hearer. In contrast to adnominal *jen-*, this not-at-issue meaning seems to be optional with pronominal *jen-*, presumably leading to its nascent grammaticalization as a determinativity marker.

Keywords: definiteness; deixis; demonstrative; determinative; German; mental distance; at-issue vs. not-at-issue meaning.

1 Introduction

This paper focuses on the German demonstrative *jen-* ('that (one)'), which is generally considered to be either the distal counterpart to *dies-* ('this (one)'), or to have been grammaticalized as a definiteness marker restricted to written upper register German. I challenge both views using data from the IDS DeReKo corpus (cf. Kupiez et al. 2010) and propose an analysis of *jen-* in terms of multidimensional meaning: *jen-* has an at-issue definiteness component and a not-at-issue component of 'mental distance'. To that end, I first briefly review some analyses of demonstrative uses in general, as well as two recent investigations on *jen-* specifically (Section 2). In Section 3, some claims made in the literature on *jen-* are checked against corpus data and then modified in accordance with the findings. This investigation reveals some important differences between pronominal and adnominal *jen-*. In Section 4, I argue that the behaviour of *jen-* is adequately accounted for by the assumption that its meaning comprises both at-issue and not-at-issue components (in the sense of Simons et al. 2010). Whereas the at-issue meaning contribution is presumably to convey definiteness, the not-at-issue part places the referent of the

jen-NP outside of the shared mental space of the speaker and the hearer. I show how this analysis accounts for the data in Section 3 including the observed difference between pronominal and adnominal *jen*-. Section 5 summarizes the results.

2 German demonstratives

In this section, I first give a brief overview of the demonstratives in German (Section 2.1). Then I sum up common assumptions about their uses and properties from the literature, and review two recent investigations on *jen*- in particular (Section 2.2). Some questions that stay open or arise after this review will serve as the starting point for the explorative corpus study I present in Section 3.

2.1 Demonstrative paradigms

German has two sets of demonstrative pronouns for person and object reference, cf. (1):

- (1) a. simple/weak demonstratives: *der/die/das* ('this one')
 b. compound/strong demonstratives:
 (i) proximal: *dieser/diese/dies*; *dieser/-e/-es N* ('this; this one')
 (ii) distal: *jener/jene/jenes*; *jener/-e/-es N* ('that; that one')

These two sets are usually referred to as 'simple' vs. 'compound' demonstratives, these terms alluding to the origin of *dies*- forms as composed forms of the elder simplex *der*-forms with the deictic particle *si*. Alternatively they are referred to as 'weak' (*der/die/das*) vs. 'strong' (*dies*- and *jen*-) demonstratives. These terms go back to Brugmann (1904), and are meant to indicate the grade of the demonstrative force.¹ However, for *der/die/das* it is not quite clear whether these forms are really demonstrative by themselves: in adnominal use, *der/die/das* has lexicalized as the definite article, cf. (2a):

¹ This terminological use is restricted to German demonstratives, and should not to be confused with Cardinaletti and Starke's (1999) terms 'weak' and 'strong' to differentiate cross-linguistically between phonologically, morphologically and syntactically different pronoun classes.

- (2) a. **Der** Arzt untersucht einen Patienten.
 ‘The doctor is examining a patient.’
 b. **DER** Arzt hat mich nicht verstanden.
 ‘**This**.STRESS doctor hasn’t understood me.’

(Erben 1980: 225)

Whilst in (2a) *der* is a definite article (potentially contrasting with the indefinite *ein* (‘a’)) marking that the doctor is uniquely identifiable in the current discourse, the stressed article in (2b) clearly has a demonstrative flavour. The stressed forms, both pronominal and adnominal, are often assumed to be more or less equivalent to the strong *dies-* forms (e.g. Himmelmann 1997: 50; Erben 1980: 225). However, Gunkel (2006) argues that the demonstrative flavour with *der/die/das* arises solely as an effect of focusing via stress. Rauh (2003: 410) shows that also personal pronouns can be demonstrative and thus comparable with genuine demonstratives if they are stressed, and argues for distinguishing between lexical item and emphatic stress – the latter being “a specific kind of a pointing gesture” responsible for bringing in demonstrative flavour.

Irrespective of the lexicalization issue in the case of the adnominal use, an absence of inherent demonstrativity can be observed for pronominal *der/die/das*: its main function when used without emphatic stress seems to be to serve as an anaphor: *der/die/das* is used (i) to pick out non-topical referents, while personal pronouns prefer reference to discourse topics² (see e.g. Bosch and Umbach 2007), or (ii) to topicalize syntactically via placing a pronoun with a non-human referent in non-subject function before the finite verb: as unstressed personal pronouns in German are weak in terms of Cardinaletti and Starke (1999), they do not allow prefinite fronting in this case.

So, the status of *der/die/das* requires further investigation. On the contrary, strong demonstratives are uniformly analysed as being truly demonstrative, at least as far as *dies-* is concerned (cf. Section 2.3). They are traditionally described as ‘proximal’, i.e. referring to a locally or textually near referent (*dies-*) vs. ‘distal’, i.e. referring to a locally or textually more remote referent (*jen-*), cf. e.g. Duden (2009; 2011), Zifonun, Hoffmann, and Stecker (1997), as in (3):

² The concept of discourse topicality is by no means uncontroversial; the literature specializing in demonstratives agrees upon a rather informal understanding of discourse topic in the sense of a discourse-old referent that a current discourse segment “is about”, cf. Bosch and Umbach (2007: 50).

- (3) a. *Die Aussicht von **dieser Bank** ist schöner als von **jener**.*
 (Duden 2009: 286)
 ‘The view from **this bench** is more beautiful than from **that.one**.’
- b. *Mutter₁ und Tochter₂ kamen näher, **diese₂** trug ein Sommerkleid, **jene₁** ein Kostüm.*
 (Duden 2011: 240)³
 ‘The mother₁ and her daughter₂ approached; **the latter₂** (**dies-**) was wearing a summer dress, **the former₁** (**jen-**) a suit.’

However, it is controversial whether both demonstratives are still used in this fashion with respect to proximity; e.g. Hauenschild (1982: 183) states that “*jener* practically never occurs in modern spoken or written language”. Also Levinson (2004: 110) assumes that German has only one demonstrative *dies-*. In the following, I first briefly list the functions that can be identified for German demonstratives, primarily for the proximal strong demonstrative *dies-*, and then concentrate on *jen-* and investigate its uses, sometimes comparing *jen-* to *dies-*. My goal is first to describe the meaning of *jen-* and second to try a unified account of strong demonstratives in German.

2.2 General uses of the demonstrative in German

Demonstratives are generally used to re-direct the joint attention of the speaker and the hearer by attracting it to a particular referent that has not been in the centre of joint attention so far (e.g. Diessel 2012: 2417). Himmelmann (1996, 1997) and Levinson (2004) descriptively distinguish eight different uses of demonstratives that result out of this primary function; in the following these are briefly presented:⁴

1. *Deixis proper*, i.e. referring to a physically perceptible referent in the actual utterance situation accompanied with a pointing gesture or something similar which helps the hearer to resolve the reference unambiguously, cf. (4):

- (4) *I want **this cake**, please.* (pointing to a cake at the baker’s).

³ Here and in the following examples, the numbers indicating coreference are mine.

⁴ Both Himmelmann and Levinson present cross-linguistically valid demonstrative systems; out of these, I chose only uses that are possible with *dies-* in German. Only some of the latter are, in turn, available for *jen-* (see below). For the sake of convenience, however, I use English examples in this section.

Deixis proper is taken to be the primary use of demonstratives (e.g. Diessel 1999: 8), other uses are taken to have developed from this one.

2. *Textual deixis* in the sense of referring to segments of the text containing the demonstrative:

- (5) *Our aim in **this chapter** is to summarize briefly the functions of the demonstrative.*

Here, the referring expression is part of the textual unit (the chapter) it refers to; since the reference object is necessarily physically present in the utterance situation (a reader can only read this sentence in case he has the chapter referred to before his eyes), this is seen as an instance of deixis.

3. *Deixis ‘am Phantasma’* in the sense of Bühler (1934); here the referent is not present in the actual discourse situation, but in the situation that is the subject of the ongoing discourse, cf. (6):

- (6) *And he’s heading ... you see a scene where he’s ... coming on his bicycle **this way**.*

(Pear stories, quoted from Himmelmann 1996: 222)

In (6), the speaker is treating the narrated situation as if it were taking place directly before his and the hearer’s eyes, using the demonstrative in an as-if-deictic way. It is plausible that he even accompanies his words with a gesture, thus equating the direction he points to in the actual utterance situation with the direction the bicycle takes in the narrated situation.

Under this label, Himmelmann also subsumes cases where the speaker introduces a new referent in a narrative with a demonstrative, thus acting as if the corresponding referent were actually present, cf. (7):

- (7) *One day last year on a cold, clear, crisp afternoon, I saw **this huge sheet of ice** in the street.*

(Prince 1981: 232)

Here the referent of the *this*-NP is neither prementioned, nor present in the discourse situation, nor uniquely identifiable for the hearer. Accordingly, in cases like this, *this* is interchangeable with the indefinite determiner *a*. Besides, such *this*-NPs are grammatical in the presentational *there-is*-construction as in (8), which excludes definite NPs:

- (8) *There is **this/a/*the man upstairs** who is driving me mad because he jumps rope at 2 a.m. every night.*

(Maclaran 1980: 813)

Such cases have been analysed as ‘indefinite *this*’ (Ionin 2006, Maclaran 1980, Prince 1981, von Heusinger et al. 2010, Ward and Birner 1995). Von Heusinger et al. (2010) argue that German also has indefinite *dies*- functioning in an analogous manner.

4. *Anamnestic or recognitional use* in the sense of referring to referents not yet mentioned in the current discourse, but known to both the speaker and the hearer from some previous communication situations, as in (9); cf. Auer (1981, 1984):

- (9) *By the way, where is **this old-fashioned telephone** you used to have?*

The anamnestic use differs from the indefinite use as in (7) and (8) in that the referent is uniquely identifiable for both the speaker and the hearer. In choosing a demonstrative for his referring act, the speaker appeals to the hearer to re-activate his knowledge of the referent. In (9), the hearer is expected to be able to resolve the reference, as he surely knows which particular telephone he owned. In this sense anamnestic reference is definite; accordingly, anamnestic *this* cannot be substituted with an indefinite.

5. *Discourse deixis* in the sense of reference to propositions, situations or speech acts that can be reconstructed from the previous discourse, cf. (10):

- (10) *I forgot my keys and had to wait for my parents to come home.*
 a. ***This** was terrible, as it was raining.*
 b. ***This** is a strange way of apologizing, I know, but ...*

In (10a), the demonstrative *this* refers to a “propositionally structured” (Consten et al. 2007: 82) referent, either the whole content of the previous sentence subsuming two propositions (I forgot the keys; I had to wait) or the second proposition alone (the waiting was terrible). In (10b), *this* takes up the speech act of uttering the previous sentence.

6. *Anaphoric use*, i.e. referring to a referent that was already textually introduced, cf. (11):

- (11) *I had a wonderful friend₁, I still believe I do. I made a mistake, I lied [...] but I couldn't go on forever, so I came clean, and told **this friend₁** the truth*
 (<http://forums.psychcentral.com>)

The fifth and sixth uses are often both subsumed under the term anaphora, the decisive aspect being that there is a linguistically encoded antecedent in the text before. In (10) similar to (11), the corresponding referent (a proposition, respectively a speech act) is introduced in the previous discourse by linguistic means. Consten et al. (2007) use the term ‘complex anaphor’ to enhance the fact that in these cases the anaphoric expression does not simply re-address an already introduced discourse referent, but triggers a process of constructing a discourse referent out of a complex linguistic and referential unit.

7. *Empathetic or emotive use*, where demonstratives serve to mark an emotional attitude (positive or negative) towards the referent, at the same time achieving an effect of “emotional closeness between speaker and addressee” (Lakoff 1974: 351), cf. (12):

- (12) a. *Who is **this William Young** and where has he been? This wonderful work [...]*
 b. *You don't deserve to be discouraged and lied to by a con artist. Which is what **this Arthur Agatston** is.*

(attested examples from online reviews cited in Potts and Schwarz (2010: 5))

- c. *How's **that throat**?*

(Lakoff 1974: 351)

Here, the speaker explicitly expresses his strong positive (12a) or negative (12b) emotion towards the respective referent of the proper name, which gets enhanced through the (morphosyntactically unnecessary) adnominal demonstrative. In addition, in using the demonstrative the speaker suggests that the hearer might share his knowledge of the referent and his emotion, thus establishing an emotional relation between himself and the hearer; see also Potts and Schwarz (2010), Acton and Potts (2014). For the distal demonstrative *that*, Lakoff (1974: 351) argues that “while its spatio-temporal uses are very nearly opposite those of *this*, its emotive uses are surprisingly close”. She gives example (12c) above to illustrate the point: this utterance might be used by a sympathetic nurse towards a patient, while the possessive *your throat* would be emotionally neutral here.

8. For distal demonstratives also the *determinative use* is described; here the demonstrative functions as an antecedent for a restrictive relative clause as in (13):

(13) *United Airlines contacting **those who flew with Ebola victim***

(<http://news.yahoo.com>, 2.10.2014)

In these cases the referent has not been introduced before, but the relative clause is intended to supply the information necessary for the unambiguous identification. The distal demonstrative does not have any pointing meaning aspect nor that of distance; *those* could be replaced with *the people who* without any change in meaning. Himmelmann (1997: 78) talks of “the purely placeholder function” of the demonstrative and assumes that *those* has been grammaticalized as a definiteness marker in such cases.

Recent investigations of German *jen-* (Gunkel 2007a, 2007b, Molnár 2010) argue that *jen-* is not used in contemporary German to denote physical distance in contrast to *dies-*. Gunkel (2007b: 8) proposes that *jen-* can convey “metaphorical (subjective) distance”, when *jen-* refers to “far-off objects in the discourse universe”. However, no precise concept of ‘metaphorical distance’ is given.

In general, Gunkel (2007a: 223) and Molnár (2010) distinguish two possible uses of *jen-* in the present-day German, the anamnestic use as in (14) and the determinative like in (15):

(14) *Es war einer **jener bürgerlichen Sonntagnachmittage**, an denen einem die Langeweile durch alle Knopflöcher kriecht.*

(Gunkel 2007a: 223, ex. (30))

‘It was one of **those middle class sunday afternoons** when the boredom keeps creeping through one’s button holes.’

For (14), Gunkel argues that the “meaning effect” of *jen-* is to “refer to something that it presumed to be known [to the hearer]” (Gunkel 2007a: 223): the speaker in (14) takes it for granted that everybody knows the boring middle-class sunday afternoons from one’s own experience. As actually the case in (14), anamnestic *jen*-NPs have a strong tendency to serve as antecedents for (restrictive or appositive) relative clauses. As mentioned above, also proximal *dies-* has anamnestic use. Molnár (2010) notices that in their anamnestic uses both demonstratives are similar. Hence in (14), *jen-* could be substituted with *dies-* without any change in meaning. The only difference between the two anamnestic demonstratives is their frequency: due to *jen-* being in general seldom used and being “practically never used in oral speech” (Molnár 2010: 329), its anamnestic use is also much more rare than the anamnestic use of *dies-*.

(15) *Für jene Urlauber, die Sri Lanka einst als Fernreiseziel entdeckten, ist in den Plänen kein Platz mehr.*

(Gunkel 2007a: 223, ex. (20b))

‘For **those holidaymakers** who once discovered Sri Lanka as a holiday destination there is no place in the new plans.’

In (15), the restrictive relative clause is necessary since it is the only source of identification for the referent of the *jen*-NP. Without the relative clause it is not clear which holidaymakers are not considered in the new plans. In its determinative use, *jen*- is equivalent with *derjenig*-,⁵ which also requires the presence of a restrictive relative clause, in that both serve as definiteness markers, and can be substituted with the definite determiner *der/die/das*. However, unlike the prototypical “determinativity marker” *derjenig*-, *jen*-NPs allegedly cannot have a non-specific reading, so that (16) can only refer to a specific runner, and not mean “whoever might be characterized as having achieved the goal first”:

(16) *Jener Läufer, der das Ziel erreicht hat, hat gewonnen.*

‘**That runner** who reached the goal has won the race.’

Gunkel (2007a: 221) argues that *jen*- in plural is already grammaticalized as a pure “determinativity marker” both in its pronominal and adnominal occurrences, whilst the grammaticalization of the singular form has not reached this stage as yet.

In sum, there is a consensus in the relevant literature that *jen*- is not used contrastively to *dies*- in modern German. In particular, it is argued that *jen*- is not used deictically at all. It is on the way of being grammaticalized as a definiteness marker in determinative contexts, i.e. in contexts where restrictive modifiers, preferably restrictive relative clauses, ensure the non-ambiguous identification of the referent. The preferred use of *jen*- is taken to be the anamnestic one, in which it is usually (or even necessarily) accompanied by a relative clause or at least some attributive expression. The anamnestic use tends to additionally convey ‘metaphorical distance’, i.e. some kind of non-physical, “subjective” (Gunkel 2007b) self-distancing of the speaker from the referent.

Turning back to demonstratives in general, two crucial uncontroversial assumptions are more or less explicitly made in the literature. First, cross-linguisti-

⁵ From an etymological point of view, the German compound form *derjenig*- consists of the weak demonstrative *der* + an adjectival derivation from *jen*-. It has pronominal and determiner forms. It cannot be used demonstratively. Prototypically, it serves as an antecedent for a restrictive relative clause.

cally all descriptively distinguishable uses are grounded in the main function of *demonstration*, i.e. of the speaker's directing his own and the hearer's attention to a referent that has not been in the centre of attention before. Second, if there is a proximal-distal contrast like with *this/that*, then it is relevant only with the deictic and anaphoric uses, especially in cases where there are two referents to be distinguished, one being locally or textually nearer to the speaker than the other. In the anamnestic and emotive uses, the proximal and distal demonstratives seem to function identically (Lakoff 1974; Himmelmann 1997: 73), and the determinative use is only observed with distal demonstratives (Himmelmann 1997: 77).

Generalizing over the uses outlined above, we can reduce the eight descriptively distinguished uses to five ones that are differentiated with respect to three parameters:

- (i) *demonstrativity* in the sense of attracting joint attention via pointing introduced above: 'demonstrative proper' uses 1–7 vs. the *determinative use* lacking this parameter;
- (ii) *immediate presence of the object of reference*: direct reference to objects in the utterance situation (*deixis*, uses 1–3) vs. reference to textually introduced discourse referents (*anaphora*, uses 5 and 6) vs. reference to objects in the shared broader knowledge of the speaker and the hearer (*anamnestic use*);
- (iii) *emotive meaning component* of the demonstrative: given (*emotive use*) vs. not given (others); for this distinction it is important that all 'demonstrative proper' cases can have an additional emotive component (cf. Acton and Potts 2014: 5).

In Section 3, I report an explorative corpus study which investigates whether the two assumptions above are valid for German distal demonstrative *jen-* (as compared to proximal *dies-*), and whether *jen-* actually disposes of all the five uses (deictic, anaphoric, anamnestic, emotive and determinative). To give a brief glimpse into the results of the study, the data show that it is indeed problematic to talk of demonstrating with *jen-*; I found no examples of the deictic use in my data. Similarly, whilst *dies-* clearly has an emotive use (e.g. empirical data in Consten and Averintseva-Klisch (2010) and Potts and Schwarz (2010: 24)), I found no cases of an emotive use with *jen-*. As for uses that are possible in principle, there is an important difference between pronominal and adnominal occurrences. The former are only used anaphorically or determinatively in my data whereas the latter also show an anamnestic use in addition to the anaphoric and the determinative uses. In Section 4, I present my analysis that is based on this findings and aims to explain and derive them from the core meaning of *jen-* in a principled way.

3 Corpus study⁶

As a starting point for my proposal of the semantics of *jen-*, I conducted a small explorative pre-study of 220 instances of *jen-*. Being interested in the actual usage of *jen-* nowadays, I took recently produced texts to investigate it, in spite of the claim that *jen-* is allegedly restricted to written German, presumably even to its lofty or old-fashioned varieties (e.g. Gunkel 2007a). I took approximately 50 % of the cases from the newspaper *Mannheimer Morgen* (2005; 2011; 2012; = MM) and approximately 50 % from Wikipedia discussions (2011; = WikiD) to see if there are any register differences concerning the use of *jen-* here. This was not the case.

The study shows the following general results:

(i) I found no case of a deictic use. One might expect this result for written discourse. However, assuming a broad understanding of deixis comprising textual deixis and deixis ‘am Phantasma’ as discussed above, one could expect to find instances of the deictic use also in written texts. In comparison, out of 30 examples of *dies-* (randomly chosen from *Mannheimer Morgen* 2005), 4 were clearly deictic, like *vom Dienstag bis Donnerstag dieser Woche* (‘from Tuesday till Thursday this week’) referring to the week in which the text appeared in the newspaper, and one further example allowed both for a deictic and an anaphoric reading.

(ii) In only one case out of 220 items, *jener* is used anaphorically in contrast with *dieser*, cf. (17):

(17) *Was von dir als “offensichtliche Banalitäten” heruntergespielt wird, sind übrigens gravierende Mängel im Artikel, die dem unbedarften Leser₁ so wie auch dem interessierten Autoren₂ durchaus mitgeteilt werden sollten – jenem, damit er weiß, daß der Artikel schlecht ist, und diesem, damit er den Artikel evtl. erstmal über (sic!) findet und ihn dann überarbeitet oder sich auf der Disku dazu umguckt.*

(WikiD_2011)

‘What you are playing down as “apparent banalities” are, by the way, serious shortcomings of the article, which should in any case be disclosed to the undiscerning reader₁, as well as to the interested author₂ – to **the former**? [= *jen-*], so that he knows that the article is not good, to the **latter**? [= *dies-*], so that he can, first of all find over (sic!) the article, and revise it, or browse around on the discu[ssion] site.’

⁶ I am very grateful to my student assistants Ben Kings and Pirmin Scharer for their help with the data.

Whether the anaphoric reference with *jen-* in (17) is in accord with the prescriptive grammars, such as Duden, or not, is not quite clear: given that Wiktionary per definition does not clearly distinguish between authors and readers in that everybody can contribute as an author, (17) can plausibly either mean (in accordance with the grammars) that the reader should know that the article is bad, and the author should have the possibility of revising the article and conducting further research – or that the author may learn that his article is bad, and the reader may contribute as an author or at least read up on the subject. Especially the last part “or browse around on the discu[ssion] site” renders the second reading plausible as well.

(iii) Out of 220 exported examples, 39 are pronominal and 181 are adnominal occurrences. This finding allows us to make some first non-quantitative statements about the possible distribution of the two types of occurrences in the data. Grammis, the internet grammar of the IDS Mannheim, differentiates between *jen-* as a pronoun, functioning “textdeictically and referring in the perception field (‘Wahrnehmungsfeld’)” and adnominal *jen-*, the latter having only the “determinativity marker” function, whereas the NP itself provides the information necessary for the identification of the referent.⁷ The data, as I show in the following, suggests the opposite picture, though.

3.1 Pronominal occurrences

The pronominal occurrences I found in the data can be divided into two groups: in the largest group in my data (29 of 39 cases), *jen-* has a *determinative use*; it serves as a definiteness marker, and licenses a restrictive relative clause, cf. (18) and (19):

(18) *Die Schreibweise [...] soll ja nur ein Anhaltspunkt für all jene sein, die keine wissenschaftlich korrekte Notation, sondern einfach eine Idee davon haben wollen, was es mit dem Berlinischen auf sich hat.*

(WikiD_2011)

‘This spelling should be a clue for all **jen.ones** who do not want a scientifically correct notation, but just an idea of what the Berlin dialect is like.’

⁷ The grammar was accessed in November 2013.

- (19) *Du hast erkannt, dass sich die Mehrheit wohl für das Lager interessiert. [...] Jene, die den Lagerteil Birkenau suchen, finden den Link im Artikel KZ Auschwitz.*

(WikiD_2011)

‘You’ve realized that the majority seems to be interested in the concentration camp. **Jen.ones** who are looking for its part in Birkenau will find the link inside the article on the KZ Auschwitz.’

In the examples above, the pronoun seems to function purely as a determinativity marker with a restrictive relative clause. Example (18) has – at least preferably – a non-specific reading, and (19) can only be read non-specifically. Both of these examples oppose Grammis in that pronominal *jen-* can obviously be used determinatively, as well as Gunkel (2007a), who claims that *jen*-NPs must have specific readings.

As for Gunkel’s (2007) generalization that plural *jen-* has grammaticalized as a “determinativity marker”, and thus allows non-specific reference in plural, but not in singular: in my data (39 items), there were 24 cases of singular pronominal occurrences, 18 of them in determinative use (75 %), and 15 with plural pronouns, 11 of them in determinative use (73,3 %). Of course these frequencies cannot be used as the basis for statistic generalizations, but what can be observed is a certain tendency of pronominal *jen-* to occur in its determinative use irrespective of morphological number and semantic specificity.⁸ The data also showed that restrictive relative clauses are not necessary for the determinative reading; the information necessary for the identification of the referent may also be given by other kinds of restrictive modifier, as e.g. in (20):

- (20) a. *[...] der Untergang Assads wäre auch jener der Offiziere*

(MM_2011)

‘Assad’s downfall would also be **jen.one** of the officers’

⁸ I haven’t found any examples of singular pronominal occurrences with a non-specific reading, but several that are used in definitions like (i):

- (i) *Die Physik ist unter Naturwissenschaften jene, deren Begriffe am klarsten definiert sind.*

(WikiD_2011)

‘Among the sciences, physics is **jen.one** whose terms are most clearly defined.’

Here, the NP that includes the restrictive relative clause forms a part of the predicate, and is thus not referential at all, making it difficult to talk about specific or non-specific reference.

- b. [...] *dass die relative Standardabweichung für F halb so klein wird wie jene von F 90*

(WikiD_2011)

‘that the relative standard deviation for F is half as big as **jen.one** for F 90’

In (20a), a genitive NP, and in (20b), a PP serve as restrictive modifiers, and render the determinative use possible. In both cases, a substitution of *jen-* with the definite article *der/die/das* or with *derjenig-* is valid. The condition on the determinative use is thus not a syntactic, but a semantic one: the pronoun has to be accompanied by some kind of restrictive modifier that constraints the denotation enough to ensure the identification of the corresponding referent.

The second group of examples for the pronominal occurrences, 10 of 39 items, are *anaphoric uses* like in (21) and (22):⁹

- (21) *Im Gebäude, vor dem Raum 111 traf Steinhäuser₁ auf den Lehrer Rainer Heise₂, der gerade diesen Raum verlassen wollte. **Jener₁** hatte seine Gesichtsmaske bereits abgenommen, deshalb konnte Heise₂ Robert Steinhäuser₁ erkennen.*

(WikiD_2011)

‘In the building, in front of the room 111, Steinhäuser₁ met the teacher Rainer Heise₂ just as he₂ was leaving this room. **Jen.one₁** has already pulled off his mask, therefore Heise₂ could recognize Robert Steinhäuser₁.’

- (22) *DFB-Chef Braun₁ hat da seinem Angestellten Vogts₂ zu Recht die passenden Worte gesagt. **Jener₂** hat zwar vor dieser WM in Sachen Matthäus eindrucksvoll über den Schatten springen gelernt, ein ganz Großer ist er deshalb aber noch lange nicht.*

(MM_1998)¹⁰

‘In this case, DFB chief Braun₁ was right to say these suitable words to his employee Vogts₂. **Jen.one₂** has truly learned to swallow his pride in the case of Matthäus before this World Cup, he is not one of the greats, yet, just because of that.’

In these examples, there is a textually introduced referent in the sentence preceding *jen-*, the gunman Steinhäuser in (21) and the football coach Vogts in (22). This referent is picked up with the demonstrative in the following sentence. Interest-

⁹ To operationalize this criterion for my investigation, I took examples where an antecedent for the *jen*-NP is present in the last 5 sentences preceding the one featuring this NP to be anaphoric.

¹⁰ I owe this example, as well as an impulse to its analysis, to an anonymous reviewer.

ingly, whilst in (21) anaphoric reference to the referent of the suitable antecedent NP that is farther away is in accordance with the reference grammars (cf. 2.1), in (22), it is the referent of the linearly closer antecedent, Vogts, that is chosen by *jen-*, although as distal demonstrative, it actually should (and morphosyntactically could) choose the remoter one, Braun. Here, *dies-* could be substituted for *jen-* without (or nearly without; see Section 4.3 below) any difference.

In those examples in which pronominal occurrences were used anaphorically, there was only one case in which just one referent was suitable as an antecedent. In 5 cases *jen-* choose the more remote out of the two suitable referents like in (21) above, and in 3 cases it picked up the nearer referent like in (22). Again, the observed frequencies do not allow for statistically supported generalizations, but they present a first tendency that fits with the assumption quoted above that there is no clear proximal/distal-contrast with *dies-* vs. *jen-* in their anaphoric uses any more.

All anaphoric cases in my data were like the both discussed so far in that they were prototypical cases of anaphora with an NP antecedent. None of the 220 items could be classified as ‘complex anaphora’.

The tendency shown by my data is that *jen-* as a pronoun strongly prefers the determinative use; even in its anaphoric use it seems to lose its distal component and is used irrespectively of the antecedent location, so that it often behaves analogously to definite *der/die/das*. In Section 4.2, I revisit this observation, and account for it with a two-dimensional semantic analysis of *jen-*.

3.2 Adnominal *jen-*

With adnominal examples, the determinative reading where *jen-* is interchangeable with *derjenig-*, and thus presumably grammaticalized as a definite antecedent for a restrictive relative clause is also attested, cf. (23):

- (23) *Die Teilnehmerkarten **all jener Kerwe-Besucher**, die insgesamt sieben Gaudispiele absolviert hatten, fanden sich am Abend in einer Lostrommel wieder, aus der Bürgermeister Roland Esche die Gewinner zog.*

(MM_2005)

‘The participant tickets of all **jen country fair visitors** who had completed seven jamboree games were put into a lottery wheel in the evening, and the mayor Roland Esche drew the winners.’

Here, the demonstrative NP clearly has a non-specific reference with the restrictive relative clause naming the condition on potential referents: whoever completes

seven jamboree games takes part in the lottery. In this use – again, as with pronouns, contrary to Gunkel’s (2007a) observations – not only plural, but also singular NPs can be found:

- (24) *Den allerhöchsten Liebes-Wert hingegen wird immer **jener Mensch** ernten, der, statt das Negative zu verhindern, das Positive vollbringt.*

(MM_2005)

‘Still, the highest amount of love will get **jen person** who, instead of preventing the negative, achieves the positive.’

I will return to such examples below, and propose a slightly different account for them.

A considerable number of *jen*-NP uses are like in (25):

- (25) *In seiner Geburtsstadt Karlsruhe feierte man ihn [...], doch in **jener Stadt**, in der er seine größte Erfindung auf den Weg brachte, nämlich in Mannheim, da wäre sein Jubeltag fast vergessen worden.*

(MM_2005)

‘In Karlsruhe, the city where he was born, he was celebrated; but in **jen city**, where he started with his greatest invention, that is in Mannheim, his jubilee would have nearly been forgotten.’

It is not so easy to describe the use of the demonstrative NP in (25): it is clearly non-anaphoric, as the corresponding referent, the city, has not been introduced before. Similar cases have been subsumed under the *anamnestic use* by Gunkel (2007a) and Molnar (2010). However, what clearly speaks against “the speaker acting as if the referent were known to the hearer”, as Molnar (2010: 328) describes the anamnestic use, is that the referent is explicitly named following the *jener*-NP: *that is in Mannheim*. One could argue that (25) is an example of a determinative reading; but in this case, the referent has to be unambiguously identifiable via a restrictive modifier, as shown above. This is, as is again made clear by the city’s name following, not the case here. Moreover, the prototypical determinativity marker *derjenig*- cannot replace *jen*- in (25) whilst replacing *jen*- with a definite determiner would be possible. In Section 4, I propose an account that can cope with such difficult examples by assuming two meaning levels for *jen*-.

The largest group of *jen*-NPs are those used anaphorically. As with pronominal *jen*-, reference to persons (26) or objects (27) is possible:

- (26) *Ein privater Sammler aus der Region₁ habe den Anstoß gegeben zu dieser ungewöhnlichen Schau [...] **Jener private Gönner₁**, der nicht genannt werden*

möchte, habe andere Sammler davon überzeugen können, ihre Schätze [...] ebenfalls zu zeigen.

(MM_2001)

‘A private art collector₁ from the region has initiated this unusual exhibition. **Jen private patron**₁, who does not wish to be named, was able to persuade other collectors to exhibit their treasures, too.’

(27) [...] von “Bent Fabric”₁ lese ich heute zum ersten Mal. [...] zu erwähnen, dass der gute Mann u.a. auch mit **jenem Künstlernamen**₁ auftritt.

(Wiki-Disc_2011)

‘[...] I’ve read about “Bent Fabric”₁ for the first time today. [...] to mention that the guy also performs unter **jen stage name**₁.’

In both cases – as in the majority of my anaphoric data – there is no contrast with respect to distance: *jen*-NP resumes the only referent available. In these cases, *jen*- is interchangeable with proximal *dies*- or definite *der/die/das* without any truth-conditional changes. In Section 4, I propose that the choice of *jen*- implies certain non-truth-conditional meaning aspects.

A rather prominent group of anaphoric *jen*-NPs are those referring to time spans situated in the past, like in (28):

(28) *Die Ruine der vor 104 Jahren*₁ *erbauten prächtigen Mannheimer Synagoge wird abgetragen. Nichts ist geblieben von dem Glanz **jener Zeit***₁, *als 6600 jüdische Mitbürger ihren Mittelpunkt in F2 hatten.*

(MM_2005)

‘The ruins of the grand synagogue of Mannheim, which was built 104 years ago₁, are being removed. Nothing has remained of the glamour of **jen time**₁, as 6600 fellow Jewish citizens were living in F2.’

Here, the referent of the NP *jene Zeit* (‘that time’) is fixed in the previous sentence as being some 100 years ago, the time when the synagogue was built and soon after; i.e., it lies far away in the past, and is said to be gone without a trace: *nothing has remained*. In my data there were 41 examples out of the 182 anaphoric ones in which *jen*-NPs referred anaphorically to a time span; all of these were clearly situated in the past.

To sum up: Out of the five uses for demonstratives identified above (deictic, anaphoric, anamnestic, emotive, and determinative) I’ve found the anaphoric, the anamnestic, and the determinative use with full *jen*-NPs and the determinative and the anaphoric uses with the pronominal *jen*-. For adnominal *jen*-, two observations could be made: first, time span referring NPs, like *jen-time/days/night* etc.,

seem to be used rather often. Second, in some cases it was not possible to decide whether the *jen*-NP was used anamnesticly or determinatively, since the actual reference act in these cases showed traits of both uses. Neither with pronominal nor with adnominal *jen*- a deictic use in the broad sense (comprising textual deixis) could be found. Also no examples in which *jen*- has a clearly emotive function could be found, but see Section 4.1 below for a detailed definition of the emotivity with *jen*-.

4 *jen*- revisited: demonstrativity as a not-at-issue component of mental distance

I assume that definite descriptions, personal and demonstrative pronouns, and demonstrative NPs are definite in the sense of von Heusinger (2013: 369), who proposes that a definite NP *the X* denotes the most salient X in the context *i*. This more or less corresponds to the concept of internal anchoring in Kamp (1990) or Farkas (2002), but restates this concept more decidedly in terms of salience and not uniqueness.

Given this assumption, definite determiners like *der* in German require an anchoring to the current “context” or discourse representation. This anchoring can be achieved via physical presence of the referent (deixis) or mentioning the referent beforehand (anaphora). In these cases, definite reference is expected. If the referent is neither present in the discourse situation nor aforementioned, but his identifiability arises directly from the properties of the current discourse representation, the anchoring is also given. That is why definites allow for an indirect anaphoric use (bridging reference) like in (29a) and a larger-situation use like in (29b): in both cases the corresponding referent is not aforementioned, but is identifiable via principled bridging references (Irmer 2011). In (29a), the mentioning of a lottery allows the inference that there are some winners, in (29b) the general properties of the discourse situation allow the unique reference:

- (29) a. [...] *in einer Lostrommel, aus der Bürgermeister Roland Esche **die** Gewinner zog.* (MM_2005)
 ‘in a lottery wheel from which the mayor Roland Esche drew **the** winners.’
- b. *Es ist unübersehbar: **Das** Weihnachtsfest gehört wieder zum Schnee von gestern.* (MM_2011)
 ‘One cannot ignore it: **the** Christmas festivities are again old and forgotten.’

As additional features, I propose that demonstratives bring in the concepts of *speaker-anchoring* (S-anchoring) and *hearer-anchoring* (H-anchoring).¹¹ This means that with a demonstrative, the corresponding referent has to be not only uniquely identifiable with respect to the current discourse representation, but also has to stand in a particular relation to the speaker (S) and the hearer (H). The specific relation needed for a particular demonstrative depends on the demonstrative in question. In particular, for German demonstratives *dies-* and *jen-*, I assume that the referent of the demonstrative has to be *mentally near* to both S and H in the proximal *dies-* case, and *mentally distant* from both S and H in the distal *jen-* case.

To model the concept of *mental distance* and *proximity* I use the distinction between ‘speaker’s place’ (SP), ‘denotation space’ (D), and ‘reference space’ (R), proposed in Ehrich (1982) for local deixis.¹² In particular, Ehrich distinguishes between the space a speaker refers to by using a deictic expression (= D) and the space relative to which D is identified (= R). She argues that the two German distal local adverbs, *da* and *dort* (both roughly ‘there’), can be distinguished in the following way: for both, SP is not equal to nor included in D (hence both adverbs are distal), but for *dort*, R is necessarily distinct from D, whilst with *da*, R might overlap with both SP and D, cf. (30):

(30) *Ich wohne in Tübingen und will dort/da auch alt werden.*

I live in Tübingen and wish *there* also old become

A speaker uttering *I live in Tübingen and wish to grow old there* would choose *dort* for ‘there’ only if he is not in Tübingen while uttering it; with *da*, he might be in Tübingen or not.

Modifying Ehrich’s analysis, I propose first that not only the speaker, but also the hearer should be taken into account. Hence, I introduce the ‘hearer’s place’. Behind this proposal is the simple intuition that an act of showing necessarily comprises not only somebody who shows (S) and something that is shown (the referent of the demonstrative), but also somebody else to whom it is shown (H). Second, I understand H’s and S’s places in the more abstract sense of *mental*


¹¹ This analysis builds on proposals like Elbourne (2008), who argues for an ‘index’, i.e. a reference value *a* as a parameter in demonstrative semantics. The meaning of demonstratives is then “distal/proximal (*x,a,t,w*)”, i.e. “*x* is distal/proximal with respect to *a* at the time *t* in the world *w*”, cf. Elbourne (2008: 432).

¹² This distinction itself builds on a corresponding trichotomy in the temporal domain, utterance time, event time, and reference time, as originally proposed in Reichenbach (1947) and developed in Klein (1994).


space, i.e. roughly as a notion that includes that part of the private world knowledge of the S and H respectively that is relevant for the current discourse. This change is the reason why in the following, I talk of “spaces”, not of places.

In particular, I argue that for proximal *dies-*, the speaker’s space and the hearer’s space necessarily have to overlap, and this overlapping region has to include the reference space; the denotation space is not restricted. For distal *jen-*, the reference space (and often also the denotation space, although this is not necessarily required) lies outside of the shared region of the speaker’s space and the hearer’s space. Whether the speaker’s and the hearer’s space overlap or not, is not constrained; cf. the schematic representation in (31):

(31) *diese Katze* (‘this cat’)



jene Katze (‘that cat’)



In prose: *diese Katze* (‘this cat’) denotes a cat that is (i) either in the shared physical space of S and H; this is the deictic use proper, and the reference space is given via non-linguistic means or linguistically like in *this cat on the garage roof*, or (ii) in the shared mental space, as with the deictic use ‘am Phantasma’ or the anamnestic use: *this cat of my neighbour* can be used when the neighbour is present in the shared mental space on H and S as a reference space.¹³ In this case, even if the cat referent itself is not present, the reference via a demonstrative is valid. *Jene Katze* (‘that cat’) denotes a cat that is not anchored in the shared physical or mental space of S and H. Importantly, the reference space is not in the mental space shared by S and H whilst it is left open whether the reference space and the denotation space overlap, and whether the denotation space is also outside the shared mental space.

This proposal implies that the physical space S and H share is a proper part of their shared mental space, which, in turn, is a proper part of S’s public world knowledge. Note that it is left open whether (and if, to what extent) S and H share

¹³ The concept of the reference space resembles the concept of the ‘anchor’ in the sense of von Heusinger (2011a, b).

their public knowledge, and whether the denotation space (the referent of the *jen*-NP) and the reference space are part of S's and H's mutual public knowledge or only part of the speaker's.

That is, using *jen*- allows the speaker to present the referent of the *jen*-NP as being neither anchored¹⁴ in the physical space that S and H are sharing, nor in their shared private world knowledge. Example (32) illustrates this point:

- (32) [...] *kann es nicht schaden, den Blick auch einmal nach Timbuktu, **jener sagemuwobenen Stadt** aus Lehm am mächtigen Nigerfluss in Mali, Afrika, zu richten. Der Publizist Roger Willemsen hat [...] uns wissen lassen, dass Bundespräsident Heinrich Lübke dort im Jahre 1956 eine Bronzeplakette eingeweiht habe.*

(MM_2012)

'It wouldn't do any harm to have a look at Timbuktu, **jen city of clay shrouded in legend lying on the river Niger in Mali, Africa**. The publicist Roger Willemsen lets us know that the federal president Heinrich Lübke has inaugurated a bronze tag there in the year 1956.'

In (32), the whole situation of the federal president's tag inauguration is presented as having taken place far away and long ago. The distance to the situation itself, as well as its location, the city referred to with a *jen*-NP, is not only temporal and local, but also epistemic: the situation was not witnessed by the writer, but is only reported second-hand. The location, the city Timbuktu, is not only far away, it is also said to be *shrouded in legend*. That is, S and H not only cannot physically see the city, but also cannot have any real knowledge about it, even less any private shared knowledge – and this is, as I claim, exactly what the use of *jen*- here is making explicit.

I propose to model the expression of mental distance to S and H with *jen*- as non-truth-conditionally relevant, not-at-issue meaning.

4.1 At-issue vs. not-at-issue meaning

I propose that *jen*- has two meaning aspects at the levels of at-issue and not-at-issue meaning:

¹⁴ In all the examples discussed below, the denotation space of the *jen*-NPs is outside of the shared mental space of S and H, too. That is why in the following, I speak of the referent not being in the shared mental space of H and S, although this is a terminological simplification for "not being anchored via R (and also not having D inside)".

- (i) *at-issue meaning*: *jen*-NP contributes a salient identifiable referent, (i.e. salient referent anchored in the discourse representation), corresponding to *definiteness*;
- (ii) *not-at-issue meaning*: *jen*- anchors the referent to S and H (*demonstrative meaning*), i.e. the referent is presented by the S as being mentally distant from S and H in the sense of the reference space not being in the shared mental space of S and H.

For this analysis, I adopt the idea to differentiate two levels of meaning from Roberts (1996), which was recently developed by Potts (2005, 2007) and Simons et al. (2010), to name but a few. At-issue content is the descriptive truth-conditional content answering the current question under discussion (QUD; Roberts 1996/2012). A prime example for not-at-issue content is contributed by expressive epithets like in (33):

(33) That bastard Kresge is famous.

at-issue meaning: Kresge is famous.

not-at-issue meaning: Kresge is a bastard/bad in S's opinion.

(Potts 2007: 168)

It is possible to question or negate the at-issue content (cf. (34a and b i)) contributed by a sentence explicitly, and it does not project out from under negation or modality. Not-at-issue content, i.e. content not directly addressing the QUD, is not truth-conditionally relevant. This content is not directly questionable, and it projects out from under negation or modality (as in (34c)). It is possible to address it, however, with the “hey, wait a minute” protest (cf. (34b ii)).

(34) a. What do you know about Kresge? / Who is famous? – Kresge is famous.

b. That bastard Kresge is famous.

(i) No, he is not famous.

(ii) # No, he is a wonderful person. vs. Hey, wait a minute, he is a wonderful person!

c. That bastard Kresge is not famous. → Kresge is bad in S's opinion.

Evidence for the two-dimensional meaning analysis of *jen*- proposed above comes from example (35): here, it is clear that first, distance is a meaning aspect of *jen*-reference, and second, that truth-conditionally *dies*- and *jen*- cannot differ:

(35) *Im Januar dreiundvierzig sprach man viel von der Stadt Stalingrad₁. Da Matzerath jedoch den Namen dieser Stadt₁ ähnlich betonte, wie er zuvor Pearl Har-*

bour, Tobruk und Dünkirchen betont hatte, schenkte ich den Ereignissen in jener fernen Stadt₁ nicht mehr Aufmerksamkeit als anderen Städten, die mir durch Sondermeldungen bekannt wurden.

(Günther Grass, Blechtrommel)

‘In January 1943, one spoke a lot about the city called Stalingrad₁. But as Matzerath emphasized the name of *this city*₁ exactly as he had emphasized Pearl Harbour, Tobruk, and Dünkirchen earlier, I paid no more attention to the events in **jen distant city**₁ than I did to other cities that I had come to know from special announcements.’

The city Stalingrad is explicitly presented as very far away, via the adjective *fern* (‘distant’), for the first person narrator, spatially as well as emotionally. He states that the ongoings in the distant city cannot really emotionally involve him. The choice of adnominal *jen-* clearly enhances this distance. Still, it is possible to refer to the same referent with *diese Stadt* (‘this city’), which would not be possible if the meaning aspect of distance were truth-conditionally relevant. The relevant part of the sentence in (35) containing *jen-* has the following meaning:

(35') *I paid no more attention to the events in jen-distant city than I did to other cities*

at-issue: S paid no more attention to the events in Stalingrad than he did to other cities;

not-at-issue: S presents Stalingrad city as being distant in the sense of not in the shared mental space of S and H.

Applying the projection test (cf. (34c) above) shows that the not-at-issue meaning part projects out from under negation:

(36) *Ich schenkte den Ereignissen in jener Stadt meine vs. keine Aufmerksamkeit.*

‘I gave the events in **jen city my** vs. **no** attention’

Here, changing the truth-conditions for the at-issue meaning by adding or taking away sentential negation does not affect the mental distance conveyed by *jen-*: the city is still presented as far away and not directly involving the narrator emotionally. Note that this effect remains even if the adjective *fern* explicitly naming the distance is taken away.

Spoken drastically, my analysis denies that the distal demonstrative *jen-* expresses demonstrativity, at least at the truth-conditional level: truth-conditionally *jen-* is only definite, demonstrativity only comes in at the not-at-issue level. Taking into account that the deictic use, which is the prototypical use of demonstra-

tives, is neither assumed for present-day *jen-* in the relevant literature, nor found in the corpus data, this analysis makes sense. In the deictic use, both the definiteness requirement (the anchoring to the discourse situation), as well as the demonstrativity requirement (S- and H-anchoring) is trivially given if the corresponding referent is actually present in the current discourse situation. However, the requirement on *jen-* that the corresponding referent is not part of the common mental space of S and H makes a direct deictic use pragmatically odd. Given the assumption made above, i.e. that common mental space includes common physical space, S would be required to draw the attention of H to something that per definition cannot be present. Hence, assuming that the referent of the *jen*-NP is distant in the sense of ‘not in the shared physical space of the speaker and the hearer’ and not in the sense of ‘far away (or: less near) in the shared physical space’ leads directly to an explanation for the lack of the deictic uses in my data. The observation for the anaphoric use of *jen-* made above, i.e. that the distal component of *jen-* is also not observable for the anaphoric use since there is no contrast with the proximal *dies-*, serves as additional evidence for my analysis.

Thus, demonstrativity comes in only at the not-at-issue level: to be felicitously used as a demonstrative, the reference with *jen-* has to satisfy two conditions: (i) the reference has to be validly definite, i.e. the referent has to be anchored to the discourse representation; (ii) the reference has to be validly demonstrative in the sense that the referent has to be anchored to both S and H as being mentally distant, i.e. not (anchored via R) in the shared mental space of S and H.

In the following, I revisit the three uses of *jen-* that were found in the corpus data – the anaphoric, the anamnestic, and the determinative use – and show how they can be accounted for with my analysis.

(a) the anaphoric use revisited

For examples involving anaphoric reference, condition (i) at the at-issue meaning is trivially given since the corresponding referent has already been mentioned in the previous discourse, cf. example (37), repeated from Section 3:

(37) *DFB-Chef Braun₁ hat da seinem Angestellten Vogts₂ zu Recht die passenden Worte gesagt. Jener₂ hat zwar vor dieser WM in Sachen Matthäus eindrucksvoll über den Schatten springen gelernt, ein ganz Großer ist er deshalb aber noch lange nicht.*

‘In this case, DFB chief Braun₁ was right to say these suitable words to his employee Vogts₂. *Jen.one₂* has truly learned to swallow his pride in the case of Matthäus before this World Cup, he is not one of the greats, yet, just because of that.’

In addition, the context has to ensure that the at-issue condition (ii) is plausibly met. In (37), this is also the case since the corresponding referent is presumably not known to S and H privately, but is part of public world knowledge. Moreover, S does not seem to be sympathetic with the referent, as is made clear by *he is not one of the greats, yet*. Up until now, I was able to find four possible varieties of mental distance. They often interact in the specific use:

1. *Temporal distance*: the referent of the *jen*-NP is presented as distant in time; cf. (38), repeated from Section 3:

(38) *Die Ruine der vor 104 Jahren₁ erbauten prächtigen Mannheimer Synagoge wird abgetragen. Nichts ist geblieben von dem Glanz **jener Zeit**₁, als 6600 jüdische Mitbürger ihren Mittelpunkt in F2 hatten.*

‘The ruins of the grand synagogue of Mannheim, which was built 104 years ago₁, are being removed. Nothing has remained of the glamour of **jen time**₁, as 6600 fellow Jewish citizens were living in F2.’

Here, the NP *jene Zeit* (‘that time’) refers to a time span that is around one hundred years before the utterance time, and that is explicitly stated to be gone forever.

2. *Spatial distance*: S and H do not share the physical space with the referent, as in (39), which has been discussed above in detail:

(39) *Im Januar dreiundvierzig sprach man viel von der Stadt Stalingrad₁. Da Matzerath jedoch den Namen dieser Stadt₁ ähnlich betonte, wie er zuvor Pearl Harbour, Tobruk und Dünkirchen betont hatte, schenkte ich den Ereignissen in **jener fernen Stadt**₁ nicht mehr Aufmerksamkeit als anderen Städten, die mir durch Sondermeldungen bekannt wurden.*

‘In January 1943, one spoke a lot about the city called Stalingrad₁. But as Matzerath emphasized the name of *this city*₁ exactly as he had emphasized Pearl Harbour, Tobruk, and Dünkirchen earlier, I paid no more attention to the events in **jen distant city**₁ than I did to other cities that I had come to know from special announcements.’

3. *Modal distance*: the referent exists in some fictitious world, and is thus not part of the real world, which S and H inhabit – and in this sense distant; the fictitious world is presented not as part of shared private knowledge of S and H, but as being generally well-known (e.g. the setting of a widely popular book or movie):

(40) *Selbst das Unmögliche erscheint möglich: Warum sollte eine Figur, die einem Buch entspringt, keine Gefühle haben und kein Heimweh nach seiner fiktiven Welt empfinden wie eben **jener Feuerspucker Staubfinger?***

(MM2012)

‘Even impossible things seem to be possible. Why should a character originating in a book not have feelings and miss his fictitious world, like **jen firebreather Dustfinger?**’

In this example, the referent Staubfinger (‘Dustfinger’ in the English translation), a protagonist of Cornelia Funke’s novel ‘Inkheart’, gets evoked anamnesticly in a short newspaper article reporting a theatre adaptation of the novel. The protagonist has not been mentioned so far, and the author appeals to the general world knowledge of the readers to locate the referent in the fictitious world of the novel.

4. *Emotional distance*: by choosing *jen-*, S expresses with his reference that he is not sympathetic to the referent of the *jen*-NP.

(41) *Ein gerader Straßenzug führt von Norden nach Süden, nüchterne Hausfassaden beherrschen die Sicht [...] Inmitten **jener Schmucklosigkeit** am Breiten Weg in Magdeburg entsteht “Die Grüne Zitadelle”*

(MM_2005)

‘A straight street of houses leads from the north to the south, sober house fronts is the only thing one sees. In between, in **jen baldness** on the Breiten-Weg-street in Magdeburg “The Green Citadel” is growing.’

Here, the baldness of the place described in (41) does not get S’s sympathy. In this case, S arguably uses *jen-* to express both emotional and spatial distance: the described streets are not in Mannheim, where the newspaper is published, and thus also spatially distant from S and H. Usually, different varieties of mental distance interact, as is actually expected from my analysis: not being in the shared mental space of H and S makes not only spatial, or modal, or temporal, but also emotional distance expectable, and is in no way restricted to only one of these aspects of mental distance in isolation. Recall for instance the Timbuktu-example (32) above, where we could distinguish temporal, local, and modal aspects of mental distance for one single occurrence.

Emotional distancing is understood in the sense of not having a positive emotion towards the referent. Note that it does not imply that S has strong negative emotions towards the referent of the *jen*-NP. The data show that *jen-* can in fact not be used to mark strong negative emotion towards the referent; this, as well

as marking of strong positive emotion, is the domain of *dies-*, cf. the following examples:

- (42) *Soviel Geld kann der im ganzen Leben nicht verdienen, wie er als Entschädigung zu zahlen hat, **dieser Blödmann!***

(a chat example, after Consten and Averintseva-Klisch 2010)

‘He can never earn that much money in his life as he will have to pay for compensation, **this idiot!**’

- (43) *Der Kirchbau, dessen Einweihung wir heute feiern, zählt zu dem Besten, was freie Bürger leisten können. **Dieser wunderbare Bau** ist mehr als ein Gebäude. Er steht für das Gute, das uns eint.*

(the federal president’s Horst Köhler speech at the inauguration of the rebuilt Frauenkirche of Dresden 2005)

‘This church building, whose inauguration we are celebrating today, counts among the best things free citizens may achieve. **This wonderful building** is more than just an edifice. It is a symbol of the good that unites us all.’

In both cases, *jen-* instead of *dies-* would sound very odd. Data like those two examples provide evidence against Bisle-Müller (1991: 70), who assumes “emotional distancing” with *dies-*. As is obvious from (42) and (43), *dies-* marks emotional proximity – in contrast to Bisle-Müller’s claim – as is expected since strong emotions render the referent mentally *near*. This emotional proximity has two aspects: First, S states that the referent is mentally near to him as he has a positive emotional stance (cf. (43)) or a negative emotional stance (cf. (42)) towards the referent. Second, S invites H to share his attitude, thus explicitly suggesting mental closeness between S and H.

Note that for English, Lakoff (1974: 351) assumes that both proximal and distal demonstratives, i.e. *this* and *that*, can mark what she labels “emotional closeness between speaker and addressee”, as in (44); both examples are from Lakoff (1974):

- (44) a. **This Henry Kissinger** knows his way around Hollywood!

b. How’s **that throat?** (a sympathetic nurse to a patient)

A comparable use is not attested for German *jen-*. I believe that for English, both *this* and *that* require S, H, and the referent of the demonstrative to be in the shared mental space of S and H whilst *jen-* is used to refer to something outside this shared mental space (see Averintseva-Klisch to appear for more details to this assumption).

(b) the anamnestic use revisited

In the anamnestic use, the conditions stated for demonstrative *jen-*, that is the condition on the at-issue meaning, i.e. situational anchoring, as well as the condition on the non-at-issue S- and H-anchoring are at first glance not satisfied. Since the referent has neither been mentioned before nor is physically present, we can say nothing about reference anchoring by examining the context. However, in these cases, it is *the use of the demonstrative itself* that serves to force such an anchoring. Gunkel (2007a: 223) describes anamnestic function as referring to “something that is supposed to be known”. In Consten and Averintseva-Klisch (2012: 259), we instead talk of ‘tentative reference’ with anamnestic demonstratives in the sense of referring “with insufficient linguistic means leaving open if the reference is really resolvable for the hearer and appealing to him to accept this deficient reference.” In any case, this appeal towards H seems to apply to all those cases where the form of the NP automatically, by virtue of the reference act itself, induces (or as-if induces) the necessary reference conditions for anchoring the referent both in the discourse representation and relative to S and H. With *jen-*, the S- and H-anchoring has to be specified as the referent not being in the shared mental space of S and H, hence temporal, modal (cf. ex. (40) above) or emotional distancing are again expected.

Note that the anamnestic use is also possible with *dies-*, cf. (45):

(45) *Was is’n eigentlich mit **diesem Haustelesfon**, was wir immer g’habt ham?*

(Auer 1984: 637)

‘What has actually happened with **this internal phone** that we used to have?’

The difference between anamnestic *dies-* and *jen-* lies in the character of the tentatively evoked mutual knowledge: *dies-*reference presents this knowledge as belonging to the shared private knowledge of S and H, whilst with *jen-*, due to its not-at-issue meaning, it is the shared public knowledge that is relevant.

(c) the determinative use revisited

For examples with a determinative reading (46) which has already been discussed above, we can observe the following:

- (46) *Die Teilnehmerkarten **all jener Kerwe-Besucher**, die insgesamt sieben Gaudispiele absolviert hatten, [...]*
 ‘The tickets of all **jen country fair visitors** who completed seven jamboree games [...]

First, the at-issue condition, i.e. the referent’s discourse-situational anchoring, is satisfied via the NP itself. Thus, the referential means that are used have to be enough by themselves to achieve the anchoring; that is why additional restrictive modifiers are necessary in this case.

Second, we can assume that *jen-* in its determinative use has lost its not-at-issue meaning component of marking that the referent is not in the shared mental space of S and H. For the determinative cases, no traces of mental distance can be found, hence we can doubt the demonstrativity of *jen-* in this use. In fact, in cases like (46), *jen-* is interchangeable with *derjenig-* or *der/die/das*. Thus, we can recast *jen-*’s “grammaticalization as pure determinativity marker” proposed in Gunkel (2007a) as the loss of *jen-*’s not-at-issue meaning component. What the exact conditions for this loss are, is still to be investigated in detail. In any case (and as expected with grammaticalization) this loss seems to be a gradual matter. Recall that in Section 3.2, I noted that for some of my corpus examples, it was difficult to define exactly what kind of demonstrative use they instantiate. In particular, the data show that the anamnestic use and the determinative use do not necessarily form two separate cases, but can be two functions of one and the same occurrence, cf. (47):

- (47) *Als Elias Leondaris die Zuschauer auffordert, mitzutanzten, und diese auch dazu bereit sind, da weht ein Hauch von Stoupa durch Ladenburg. Stoupa – Filmfreunde erinnern sich – ist **jener Ort auf dem Peloponnes**, in dem der Hollywoodstreifen “Alexis Sorbas” spielt.*

(MM_2005)

‘And when Elias Leondaris prompts the spectators to dance with him, and they are also willing to join in, a hint of Stoupa wafting through Ladenburg. Stoupa, as movie buffs will remember, is **jen place at the Peloponnese** where the Hollywood film “Alexis Sorbas” is set.’

Here, the anamnestic appeal to people’s general knowledge about well-known movies (explicitly worded: *as movie buffs will remember*) is combined with explicitly giving the information necessary for the identification of the referent in the restrictive relative clause. If determinative use has lost its demonstrative character in the sense discussed above, then an anamnestic touch, like in example (47), could again bring in demonstrativity. Since *jen-* is originally a demonstrative, it

might be the case that using it in such ambiguous cases, where a demonstrativity flavour is retained, is preferred over clear determinative uses. A detailed investigation of this issue requires further data, and is therefore left to future work.

Summing up, I argue that demonstratives are definites that require anchoring with respect to both S and H in addition to situational anchoring. In particular, *jen-* signals that its referent is ‘mentally distant’, i.e. that the reference space (and often also the denotation space) lies outside of the shared S- and H-space. This meaning aspect can be modeled as non-at-issue meaning in the sense of Potts (2005; 2007) and Simons et al. (2010). It follows from the analysis of *jen-* as a linguistic means of reference to something or someone not in the shared mental space of S and H that the deictic use, as well as (strong) emotive use found with *dies-* are not expected with *jen-*. At least in my data, these uses are in fact not attested. In the anaphoric and anamnestic uses, reference to something or someone ‘mentally distant’ is possible. In fact, my data contain anaphoric and anamnestic cases, the latter only occurring as full lexical *jen*-NPs. I address this discrepancy in the next section. For the determinative use, I have argued that *jen-* loses its not-at-issue meaning component.

4.2 Pronominal vs. adnominal *jen-*

As discussed in Section 3, I did not find pronominal occurrences of *jen-* in an anamnestic use in my corpus data. This can be expected on the basis of the crucial referential difference between full NPs vs. pronouns: the former contribute descriptive meaning which is needed for referent identification, whilst pronouns lack descriptive meaning, and therefore require other means and sources for the identification of the referent. If the corresponding referent has not been mentioned before (anaphoric use), and is not present in the current discourse situation (deictic use), the identification of the referent is not ensured. Still, cataphoric uses are possible for personal pronouns, like in (48), but not for demonstratives: (48a) is only possible with accompanying deictic pointing but not cataphorically, (48b) is completely ill-formed.

(48) *Er ist da, wenn es keinen Trost gibt. Als Notfallseelsorger hilft Peter Bublitz aus Amberg Menschen im vielleicht schlimmsten Moment ihres Lebens.*

(www.mittelbayerische.de)

‘(The beginning of a discourse:) **He**₁ is there, when no consolation is possible. As an emergency pastor, [Peter Bublitz from Amberg]₁ helps people in maybe the worst moments of their life.’

- a. # **Dieser** ist da, wenn es keinen Trost gibt. ('**This.one** is there ...')
- b. * **Jener** ist da, wenn es keinen Trost gibt. ('**Jen.one** is there ...')

This is exactly what we expect given the analysis above. In the case of a personal pronoun *er* ('he') in (48), discourse representation anchoring via accommodation is available: the pronoun supplies the information that a male person referent has to be accommodated in the current discourse representation. The next sentence then adds information about this referent: the accommodated male referent is an emergency pastor named Peter Bublitz.

With a demonstrative, S- and H-anchoring is additionally required. If the person referred to is present in the discourse situation, such anchoring is allowed with *dies-* (deictic reference). As has been shown above, *jen-* does not have this option. The possibility to search for a suitable referent in world knowledge, as is appealed for with anamnestic demonstratives, is excluded since the pronoun does not supply enough descriptive information that can be used for the search.

In anaphoric cases, the at-issue condition requiring discourse representation anchoring is satisfied. If the context supports the not-at-issue meaning of mental distancing, then pronominal *jen-* occurrence is valid, as both conditions are satisfied. This holds irrespectively of number marking and the relative linear order of any potential antecedents, as we have seen above.

The descriptive poverty of pronominal *jen-* also explains why the loss of the not-at-issue meaning component is predestined in the pronominal occurrences in a determinative use: the meaning component cannot be supported by other lexical material (as it is the case for the head noun and possible attributes in a full lexical NP), and is therefore especially susceptible to loss via grammaticalization.

5 Summing up

In modern German, there is no real opposition of *dies-* vs. *jen-* as proximal vs. distal demonstratives on the physical dimension, neither in their anaphoric nor their deictic uses. The corresponding meanings are expressed with other lexical items. To account for this descriptive observation, I propose that demonstratives have two meaning components: they are (i) definite, i.e. require an anchoring to the current discourse representation, and they are (ii) demonstrative in that they require an anchoring with respect to the speaker and the hearer. These meaning components are specified differently for proximal *dies-* and distal *jen-*:

For the distal demonstrative *jen-*, I assume that it contributes the definiteness meaning component to the at-issue level, whilst the demonstrativity component

is not-at-issue. More precisely, *jen-* has a not-at-issue meaning component that contributes what I label ‘mental distance’: *jen*-NPs are used by the speaker to refer to objects that are not in the shared mental space of the speaker and the hearer. To be more exact, the reference space and preferably also the denotation space do not belong to the shared S-and-H-space. In this sense – but only in this one – *jen-* can still be called a distal demonstrative.

For proximal *dies-* I hypothesize that it is a demonstrative proper, so to speak. Its demonstrative meaning component, i.e. the anchoring of the referent to S and H, such that it is in their shared mental space, is part of the at-issue meaning. This explains the asymmetry between *dies-* and *jen-* with respect to their deictic and their anaphoric uses. However, to pursue this issue any further goes beyond the scope of this paper, and is left for further research.

As proposed in the literature and backed up by the corpus data, *jen-* also has a determinative use in which the demonstrative meaning component is absent, and *jen-* serves as a definiteness marker. This use requires the presence of restrictive modifiers in the *jen*-NP. Gunkel (2007a) and Grammis propose that *jen-* currently is subject to grammaticalization losing its demonstrativity, with plural forms (Gunkel) and/or adnominal *jen-* (Grammis) already having completed grammaticalization as a definiteness marker. I recast the observed loss of demonstrativity in the determinative use as a semantic grammaticalization process, i.e. as loss of the not-at-issue demonstrativity meaning component. Contra Gunkel, this loss does not seem to be restricted to a particular parameter value of grammatical number, i.e. it neither affects only singular nor only plural forms. Moreover, this loss is a gradual process, as *jen-* uses with both determinative and anamnestic features, that is, cases that still have mental distance traits, are attested.

My data show that there is an important difference between adnominal and pronominal occurrences of *jen-*. For pronominal *jen-*, no clear anamnestic use is attested, whilst the determinative use is the use that is strongly preferred. One could, contra Grammis, assume that grammaticalization occurs in the pronominal use first since pronominal *jen-* lacks descriptive material that is needed to overtly justify the speaker’s mental distancing. However, this is a semantic reason for a semantic process. Hence, it is doubtful whether it makes sense to assume that a morpho-syntactic process of the emergence of two different lexemes, an adnominal determiner and a pronoun, goes hand in hand with it.

An analysis of *jen-* as contributing an at-issue definiteness component, as well as a not-at-issue component of mental distance correlates naturally with the observed differences between *dies-* and *jen-* in style and register: the latter is assumed to occur specifically in written German. If one assumes that in oral communication, one preferably refers to spatially and/or mentally near objects, this difference does not seem all that unexpected. However, as was also shown with

the data from Wikipedia discussions, *jen-* is not only used in lofty or formal written communication. Hence, rather than saying that *jen-* is only used in upper-style communication, one should assume more to the point that referential immediacy (in the sense of referring to objects physically or mentally present) and strong emotiveness of ‘conceptual orality’ (cf. Koch and Oesterreicher 1985) cannot be adequately expressed with *jen-*.

Of course there remain lots of questions that still have to be answered. One open issue is an exact definition of the intuitive concept of ‘mental space’ that I use in this article. To that end, a comparison with other indexical linguistic items, as well as with demonstratives in other languages seems promising. Levinson (2004: 109) provides a list of languages that encode spatial distance from both speaker and addressee with a special lexeme. It would be interesting to find out whether these lexemes can also be used to express what I described as mental distance, and if that is the case, to compare these uses with German *jen-*.

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