

Butter, Sweat and Tears

—

Australia, Canada and New Zealand during Great Britain's Negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1958-1973

Clara-Maria Seltmann

This is a revised version of a German dissertation

Translated by Harry T. Craver

This publication is a revised version of the dissertation "Butter, Wut und Tränen – Australien, Kanada und Neuseeland während Großbritanniens Verhandlungen mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1958-1973", which was accepted by the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Tuebingen on 28.02.2019 and published on TOBIAS-lib on 07.07.2020.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1	4
1.1. INTRODUCTION: A DEATH IN THE FAMILY	4
1.2. OUTLINE	14
1.3. THEORETICAL APPROACHES, SECONDARY LITERATURE, METHODOLOGY AND PRIMARY SOURCES 16	
CHAPTER 2	49
2.1. CANOEING THROUGH UNCERTAIN TIMES: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND BEFORE 1960 49	
2.2. AUSTRALIA AFTER 1945	67
2.3. CANADA AFTER 1945	77
2.4. NEW ZEALAND AFTER 1945	87
CHAPTER 3	105
3.1. KEEPING OR LOSING YOUR HEAD IN A MOMENT OF CRISIS.....	105
3.2. CHANGES, RISKS, AND CHANCES	148
3.3. OF DECEIVED SPOUSES, SPOILED CHILDREN, AND MISTRUSTFUL FRIENDS	195
3.4. OF DISORIENTATIONS, INSECURITIES, AND SELF-CONFIDENCE	231
CHAPTER 4	279
DEATH OF THE COMMONWEALTH? REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMONWEALTH AFTER 1973	279
CHAPTER 5	302
5.1. REGISTER OF PERSONS	302
5.2. FIGURE INDEX.....	305
5.3. PRIMARY SOURCES	306
5.4. SECONDARY SOURCES.....	327

Chapter 1

1.1. Introduction: A Death in the Family

A dry-eyed goodbye to the dear old Commonwealth [...] They are going to bury the old Commonwealth on New Year's Day and it doesn't look as though they are even going to put the death notice in the papers. [...] The only requiem will be an unheard salute from the rusty throats of ghostly field-guns that once spoke sharply [...]. Some misting eyes will strain to see the good old Jack still snapping to a thousand spectral staffs in all those places once coloured red in the maps of our boyhood. But generally, it's going to be a private interment. No flowers, by request. Great Britain [...] will formally enter the European Economic Community - the Common Market - on January 1, 1973, and on that day the old Commonwealth will cease to exist in reality. It was always compounded equally of blood and business. Trade followed the flag, as they say. No doubt the apparatus will remain for a while, but the heart will be gone.¹

This eulogy for the Commonwealth, which appeared in the Canadian magazine *Saturday Night* in December 1972, uses burial as a metaphor for the end of the British Empire and the sorrow of the Dominions² of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which had lost their British motherland. The immediate cause of “death” was Great Britain’s entrance into the European Economic Community (EEC)³ on 1 January 1973. With a whiff of nostalgia (“the good old Jack”) and references to Great Britain’s military conquests (“ghostly field-guns”), the article describes the Commonwealth as a composite of “blood and business.” It furthermore recognized that the Commonwealth would be buried without much attention or emotion (“dry-eyed goodbye,” “private interment. No flowers, by request”).

The following dissertation investigates whether or not the governments (and who within these governments) of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand felt that the British membership negotiations with the EEC that took place between 1958 and 1973⁴ represented a “family funeral.”⁵ It analyzes perceptions and assessments of the British negotiations with the EEC from the point of

¹ *Saturday Night*, December 1972. The author of the article describes himself as a, “child of that Commonwealth.” “My father was born in Australia, I was born in New Zealand, I am an adopted son of Canada, and I have lived for a span of years in Britain.” *Saturday Night*, December 1972. The biography of this journalist attests to the close relationship of the three Dominions, both with each other and with Britain.

² In this study, “Dominions” designates the countries of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. South Africa, due to the different circumstances arising from its apartheid regime, is not within the scope of this study. “Aotearoa New Zealand” will for the sake of simplification, be abbreviated to “New Zealand.”

³ In what follows the EEC will also be referred to as the “Common Market,” or “the six” (*die Sechs* or *le Six*) as is found in the primary source material.

⁴ The British entrance negotiations began in 1961, but the Rome Treaty was already signed by six European states – Belgium, Holland, France, West Germany, Italy and Luxemburg – in 1957. It came into force on 1 January 1958. The British perspective on further developments is not the focus of this work and must remain outside the scope of this study.

⁵ Lorne Kavic, “Canada and the Commonwealth. Sentiment, Symbolism and Self-Interest,” in: *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* LXV, No 257 (1975): pp. 37-49, p. 43.

view of the Dominions and the consequences for these former European settler colonies. As a result of this perspective, the investigation rests on the thesis that the British membership application to the EEC reinforced the ongoing processes of detachment from Great Britain within the settler colonies, and further led to their intensification during the 1960s.⁶ The period chosen for examination begins with the establishment of the EEC in 1958 since a British application was already at that time discussed as an option inside the Commonwealth. The covered period ends with the British accession to the EEC on 1 January 1973, which officially confirmed the British rapprochement with Europe.

The focus of the investigation covers not only reflections concerning the British approach to Europe within the Dominions, but also their impact on the respective nation-building processes within these lands during this time. It is the goal of this work, by means of a transnational comparison of Australian, British, Canadian and New Zealand sources concerning the EEC debate, to reveal the emotions at play in the three Dominions, and in so doing to draw some conclusions regarding their self-conceptions and their relationships to Great Britain and their fellow Dominions.⁷ By these means, the issue of whether or not Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, should be understood as postcolonial nations, will be evaluated. Research on decolonization concentrates mostly upon African and Asian colonies and tends to leave the former European settler colonies unconsidered.⁸ The reason for this is the thesis that the Dominions had, since the second half of the nineteenth century, already been on the path to independence. Researchers have understood both their status as quasi-independent Dominions within the British Empire and the significant impact of war-time experiences for national self-perception⁹ as steps on the way to

⁶ This thesis derives from contemporary sources such as, for example, the work of the Australian politician and later Governor-General of Australia, Lord Casey (among other positions, he was the Minister for External Affairs 1951-1960): “All that Britain’s entry into Europe would do would be to intensify an already-existing situation.” Casey, Richard Lord, *The Future of the Commonwealth* (London 1963), p. 142.

⁷ National economic relations (for example, the share of exports in relation to imports with Great Britain) and political-structural interdependencies (legislation, for example) are not a central theme of this work and will only be considered in so far as they give context for this investigation.

⁸ The former settler colonies are given little or no attention in many works on decolonization. See, for example, the following: Jan C. Jansen und Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation. Das Ende der Imperien* (Munich 2013); Jan C. Jansen und Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich 2009).

⁹ The two world wars strengthened the particular nationalisms of all three Dominions, since through the experience of these wars, a national self-awareness was produced. See John Darwin, *Das unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600-1997* (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2013), p. 393. Although, all three Dominions did not hesitate to enter the war on the side of Great Britain, the experience of suffering and the narratives concerning the virtues of one’s own troops in combat, supported national self-awareness in the three countries. The ANZAC Myth (*Australian and New Zealand Army Corps*) in Australia and New Zealand demonstrates this with particular clarity. In World War One, Australian and New Zealand troops in Gallipoli (Turkey). Their endurance through suffering at Gallipoli, where these troops had to persevere for long periods of time, bound the soldiers with one another. The virtue

independence. In the historiography of these countries, the history of the Dominions takes the form of a long, continuous struggle for cultural disengagement from Britain.¹⁰ Nationalism existed in the Dominions since the nineteenth century, however, was restrained by the British (“thwarted nationalism”¹¹). For this reason, the nation-building process in these lands has been interpreted as a lengthy, mostly peaceful, one that occurred over many years. Following this position, the bulk of the work produced in the 1960s and early 1970s gives only minimal attention to both the British legacy in the Dominions and to the settler-colonial history that they share, or they pay no attention to it at all.¹²

The Australian historian Neville Meaney was one of the first researchers to place this approach in question. Meaney’s critique of this thesis, which informs this dissertation, argues that the connections to empire persisted, at the very least, into the 1960s (and even into the next decades). Connections to the empire had even grown in strength in the 1950s.¹³ Thus, Canada, for example, sought to reinforce its connections to Britain in order to counter both the influence of its powerful neighbour, the United States, and the growing conflict with separatists from the French-speaking province of Québec.¹⁴ Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were then closely bound to Britain at the very least into the 1960s.¹⁵ Up to this period, the self-perceptions of the three former

of the soldiers became a central feature of the ANZAC myth. See Ewald Frie, „Einmal Europa und zurück? Australien und Neuseeland“, in: *Die Welt im 20. Jahrhundert nach 1945*, ed. by Helmut Konrad and Monika Stromberger, pp. 337-58 (Vienna 2010), p. 340f.

¹⁰ For examples pertaining to the Australian case, see the following studies: Stephen Alomes, *A Nation at Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism, 1880-1988* (Sydney 1988); Robert Birrell, *A Nation of our Own. Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia* (Melbourne 1995); Charles Manning Hope Clark, *A History of Australia Vol. 4-6* (Melbourne 1978, 1981, 1987); David Day, *The Great Betrayal. Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939-42* (Melbourne 1992); David Day, *Reluctant Nation. Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan, 1942-45* (Melbourne 1992).

¹¹ On the use of this concept, see Gareth Evans und Bruce Grant, *Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s* (Melbourne 1991), p. 17. See also: Neville Meaney, "Britishness and Australian Identity. The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography, in: *Australia and the Wider World. Selected Essays of Neville Meaney*, ed. by James Curran und Stuart Ward, pp. 23-36 (Sydney 2013), p. 23f.

¹² With reference to developments in the Dominion, Jim Davidson coined the expression, “de-dominionisation.” See also Jim Davidson, "The De-Dominionisation of Australia," in: *Meanjin* 38, No 2 (1979), pp. 139-53. This concept has, however, not found acceptance among researchers. See Stuart Ward, "Post-Imperial Australia. Introduction," in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, No 1 (2005), pp. 1-5, p. 2.

¹³ See Andrea Benvenuti und Stuart Ward, "Britain, Europe, and the ‘Other Quiet Revolution’ in Canada," in: *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. by Phillip Buckner, pp. 165-82 (Vancouver 2005), p. 165.

¹⁴ See Anthony Hopkins, „Rethinking Decolonization“, in: *Past and Present* 200 (2008), pp. 211-47, p. 218. Still, within both of the other Dominions, the survival of imperial connections can be detected in the 1950s; See Benvenuti und Ward, „Britain, Europe, and the ‘Other Quiet Revolution’ in Canada“, pp. 165-82.

¹⁵ There already had been an unsettling of the relationship with Britain during the Second World War: the fall of Singapore in 1942. Australia and New Zealand, in particular, feared, on the basis of their geographical nearness to the Asian continent, a growing threat from Japan. Without British protection in the region, they felt they would be delivered into the power of their Asian neighbours. Thus, stated the New Zealand Diplomat Alister McIntosh in a speech given upon receiving an honorary doctorate in 1965, and which was given again in 1993 before a gathering of New Zealand

settler colonies consisted of, on one side, regional experiences and processes of acculturation, and, on the other, of concepts of “Whiteness,” “Britishness,” and “Family Values.”¹⁶ At the same time, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand self-characterizations were by no means simple copies of those found in the motherland, rather they felt themselves to be “better Brits.” Good British traditions had been adopted by them, while the negative aspects of life in Britain, such as the class system and mass poverty, were not present.¹⁷ Of course, precise definitions of British traditions, such as “Britishness,” are lacking. Britishness defines, for instance, who exactly belongs to this group and who it excludes. Certain characteristics may exist that some actors would consider as essential to *Britishness*. Such characteristics are, among others, a shared belief in specific political institutions like the monarchy; a specific code of values, within which loyalty, for instance, occupies a high position; the common English language; and a specific cultural background – or even the appearance of the person. It is evident from this that “Britishness” is not “natural” but something that is constructed. Some characteristics of Britishness, such as a common history, may appear to be natural, but even these naturalized particulars are discursively constructed entities that have real consequences for phenomena such as nation building and collective identity.

It is primarily the political elites that are central to this study. During the period considered here, they were mostly male, Anglo European, and educated. In order to investigate the reactions of the three governments, the political debates in their respective countries, and the reorientation of trade policy among the Dominions, one must be concerned with the policy makers¹⁸ of this

diplomats: “For New Zealand, the fall of the Singapore base was the end of our world; the destruction of an illusion that had had the force of reality. Until that time New Zealanders had always believed that they lived secure behind the sure shield of the British Navy; that Singapore was the bastion, with Suez as its twin. [...] And when the unthinkable happened, it turned New Zealand’s eyes to the need for reinsurance with the only power that could stand between us and the aggressive forces of Asia – the United States of America.” Alister McIntosh cited in Malcolm Templeton (Eds.), *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand’s External Relations, 1943-1993* (Wellington 1993), p. 23. On the fall of Singapore, see Alan Warren, *Britain’s Greatest Defeat. Singapore 1942* (London 2007).

¹⁶ The concept of “whiteness” refers to the identification of an individual or group as “white.” For an exposition of “whiteness,” see Steve Garner, *Whiteness. An Introduction* (London/New York 2007). The concept of “family values” implies specific values that were accepted within the family of the Commonwealth, like, for example, loyalty to the crown. “Britishness” implies the identification of a group with “British” elements. “Britishness” will be further explained in the course of what follows.

¹⁷ Thus, in June 1970, the New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council came to the conclusion that New Zealand’s culture resulted from precisely this tension between dependence on Britain and differences from the “old country.” See ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No 19, June 1970. Equality, a harmonious society, and social legislation are advantages of New Zealand society, while British roots embody the basis of society. See *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Persons who have influence on political decisions and the formation of policy, will be referred to as “policy makers” in this study. See Larry Gerston, *Public Policy Making. Process and Principles* (Armonk 1997), p. 71f. So that the focus of the study will be clear, policy will refer to the content of political debates. As a result, social problems and their possible solutions will remain at the core of the study. “Politics” will refer primarily to the dimensions of policy. Political structures (*Polity*) and processes do, of course, enter into the study at some points, but the focus lies on the

period, which means focusing on these political actors. When one examines these policy makers of the 1960s and 1970s, the following image emerges: many identified Britain as “home,” some had personal and familial relations there, and many had been educated either at Oxford or Cambridge.¹⁹ Political elites thus still felt themselves to be close to Britain.²⁰ Their nationalism was not in *opposition* to Britain, but rather it was a blending of British elements, including the sense of belonging to part of a larger community of British peoples, with specifically Australian, Canadian or New Zealander aspects. “Britishness” was one part of this self-perception. There were further additional connections, for to be an inhabitant of Australia, Canada or New Zealand meant, until 1948, simultaneously to be a *British subject*.²¹ The instruction of history in the schools dealt primarily with the history of Britain and its empire, which at the time was seen as including the history of the respective Dominions.²² Loyalty to the crown was a component of foreign and domestic political affairs. Thus, Australia, for example, affirmed its relationship to London by allowing Britain to test nuclear arms in South Australia during the 1950s.²³ All such factors demonstrate the persistent connection between Britain and the Dominions well into the 1960s.

Emotional links to Britain went hand in hand with the specific forms of nationalism in the three countries.²⁴ Obviously, this was not the case for every actor within the political circles of Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. Nonetheless, the majority of political elites felt that they were

analysis of problems and the potential options for resolving them. See Manfred Mols, „Politik als Wissenschaft. Zur Definition, Entwicklung und Standortbestimmung einer Disziplin“, in: Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung, ed. by Hans-Joachim Lauth and Christian Wagner, pp. 23-62 (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2018), p. 27.

¹⁹ See Ann Curthoys, “We’ve Just Started Making National Histories, and You want Us to Stop Already?“, in: *After the Imperial Turn. Thinking with and through the Nation*, ed. by Antoinette Burton, pp. 70-89 (Durham/London 2003), p. 71. Thus, for example, the Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir Alexander Downer who worked in London from 1964 to 1972. He had studied at Brasenose College (Oxford) and among his friends and colleagues was seen as an “Australian Briton.” See Stuart Ward, „Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia“, in: *The High Commissioners. Australia’s Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010*, ed. by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno und David Lee, pp. 145-63 (Canberra 2010), p. 145. There is more on Alexander Downer in Chapter 3.3, “Of Deceived Husbands, Spoiled Children, and Mistrustful Friends.” One reason for the journey of this Australian to Oxford (just as well as Cambridge) was that before 1960 in Australia there was no possibility of taking a Master’s degree. The first Australian university was the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra. Die ANU was founded in 1946, but it remained a pure research university up to the 1960s. See Frie, „Einmal Europa und zurück? Australien und Neuseeland“, p. 337. For a detailed study of Canadian figures in Oxford, see C.P. Champion, *The Strange Demise of British Canada. The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968* (Montreal/Kingston 2010), p. 117-37. A detailed study of New Zealanders in Oxford and Cambridge is still lacking.

²⁰ See Benvenuti und Ward, „Britain, Europe, and the ‘Other Quiet Revolution’ in Canada“, p. 165.

²¹ See Curthoys, „We’ve Just Started Making National Histories, and You want Us to Stop Already?“, p. 72.

²² Ibid.

²³ See Darwin, *Das unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393.

²⁴ Thus, James Belich points out, for example, that in the case of New Zealand, the connection between it and the motherland was deliberately strengthened during the nineteenth century. See James Belich, “Colonization and History in New Zealand,” in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume V. Historiography*, ed. by Robin W. Winks, Alaine Low and W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 182-93 (Oxford 1999), p. 192.

part of Britain. Prime Ministers, such as John Diefenbaker²⁵ in Canada and Robert Menzies²⁶ in Australia, were strong supporters of the British imperial relationship and had difficulties adjusting themselves when this relationship began to change.²⁷

In recent years, historians have increasingly argued for the significance of British elements within the former settler colonies as well as the consequences of the end of the empire. This study can therefore draw on some fundamental works on this theme. Among them is the anthology edited by the British historians Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, published in 2003, *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*.²⁸ This volume delineates the cohesiveness of the British Empire that was based not only on economic and military elements, but also on “Britishness.” A further anthology concerned with the end of empire is *Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures*, published in 2007.²⁹ In “Ends of Empire,” a contribution to the 2008 anthology, *The British Empire*, Sarah Stockwell comments on the Empire’s end in the Dominions.³⁰ The Canadian Phillip Buckner refers to the imperial relationship in Canada in his works, *Canada and the End of the British Empire* (2005) and *Canada and the British Empire* (2008).³¹ Together with R. Douglas Francis, he has brought out the collected work, *Rediscovering the British World*,³² which investigates the concept of “Britishness” and new identities after the empire’s demise. Based

²⁵ On John Diefenbaker see John Hilliker, „The Politicians and the Personalities’: The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations“, in: *Historical Papers* 19, No 1 (1984), pp. 151-67; Arthur Slade, *John Diefenbaker. An Appointment with Destiny* (Montreal 2001); Denis Smith, *Rogue Tory. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto 1995). John Diefenbaker’s memoirs have been published: John Diefenbaker, *One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Crusading Years 1895 to 1956* (Toronto 1975); John Diefenbaker, *One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Years of Achievement, 1957-1962* (Toronto 1976); John Diefenbaker, *One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967* (Toronto 1977).

²⁶ On Robert Menzies see Allan Martin, „Sir Robert Gordon Menzies“, in: *Australian Prime Ministers*, ed. by Michelle Grattan, pp. 174-205 (Sydney 2000); John Nethercote, *Menzies. The Shaping of Modern Australia* (Brisbane 2016).

²⁷ Menzies declared in an often cited statement that he was “British to the bootstraps.” This influential quotation was to be often repeated in the secondary literature on the relationship to Great Britain. For example, see, Hopkins, „Rethinking Decolonization“, p. 231. In the course of the debates over the EEC, Menzies extended his statement even further to include the entirety of Australian society: } “[...] we are British, in my case and yours, to the bootheels, and in the case of some people perhaps, as you suggest, to their children’s bootheels, [...]” NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview Given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, filmed on 24. June 1962, and broadcast on 25 June 1962.

²⁸ Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich (Eds.), *The British World. Diaspora, Culture and Identity* (London 2003).

²⁹ Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw und Stuart Macintyre (Eds.), *Britishness Abroad. Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures* (Melbourne 2007).

³⁰ Sarah Stockwell, „Ends of Empire“, in: *The British Empire*, ed. by Sarah Stockwell, pp. 269-93 (Malden/Oxford/Carlton 2008), especially p. 272.

³¹ Phillip Buckner (Ed.), *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver 2005); Phillip Buckner (Ed.), *Canada and the British Empire* (Oxford 2008). Together with Douglas Francis: Phillip Buckner und R. Douglas Francis (Eds.), *Canada and the British World. Culture, Migration, and Identity* (Vancouver/Toronto 2006).

³² Phillip Buckner und R. Douglas Francis (Eds.), *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary 2005).

upon the evidence of parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, and high school textbooks, José Igartua has analyzed the “Other Quiet Revolution,” thus noting that the distancing of English-speaking Canadians from British identity after the Second World War was contemporaneous to the “Quiet Revolution” in Québec.³³ The Australian historians James Curran and Stuart Ward devote their studies to the end of empire in Australia.³⁴ Ward’s article, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World”³⁵ is the first actual attempt to compare the significance of the end of empire in all three Dominions. All of the above works distinguish themselves from older research by perceiving the nationalism of the settler colonies not as opposition to Britain, but rather as a blending of “Britishness” with the experience of colonial settlements.

Though Paul Robertson, John Singleton, Stuart Ward, Francine McKenzie, Felicity Barnes and others³⁶ have offered some of the first studies that deal with two, or to some extent, all three countries, there are still no substantial comparative studies that approach all three countries together. A detailed analysis of the correlations between developments in the three Dominions at the end of empire is still needed. For this reason this dissertation responds to the call from Anthony Hopkins, articulated in 2008, to write comparative histories of the former settlement colonies that examine not just one country alone – most often the researcher’s homeland.³⁷ Furthermore, this

³³ José Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution. National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver 2006). Indeed, C.P. Champion shows in his work that newly formulated state symbols such as, for example, the Canadian flag were adaptations, based upon traditional symbols. Thereby, he points to the strongly British foundations of many Canadian symbol. See Champion, *The Strange Demise of British Canada. The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968*.

³⁴ James Curran, „Australia at Empire’s End. Approaches and Arguments“, in: *History Australia* 10, No 3 (2013), pp. 23-35; James Curran und Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation. Australia After Empire* (Melbourne 2010); Stuart Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace* (Melbourne 2001). In his work on Australian prime ministers Curran describes the effects of “Britishness” and national identity on the leading policy makers in Canberra. See James Curran, *The Power of Speech. Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image* (Melbourne 2006).

³⁵ Stuart Ward, „The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World“, in: *Britishness Abroad. Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures*, ed. by Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw and Stuart Macintyre, pp. 231-63 (Melbourne 2007).

³⁶ Felicity Barnes, „Bringing Another Empire Alive? The Empire Marketing Board and the Construction of Dominion Identity, 1926-1933“, in: *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42 (2014), pp. 61-85; Jack Doig, „The Australian and New Zealand Government’s Response to Britain’s Decline in the 1960s. Identity, Geopolitics and the End of Empire“, in: *Journal of New Zealand and Pacific Studies* 1 (2013), pp. 41-53; Francine McKenzie, „Trade, Dominance, Dependence and the End of the Settlement Era in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, 1920-1973“, in: *Settler Economies in World History*, ed. by Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzger and Richard Sutch, pp. 463-69 (Leiden 2013); Paul Robertson und John Singleton, „The Old Commonwealth and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3“, in: *Australian Economic Review* 40 (2000), pp. 153-77; Ward, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World.”

³⁷ See also Peter Gibbons, „The Far Side of the Search for Identity. Reconsidering New Zealand History“, in: *New Zealand Journal of History* 37 (2012), pp. 38-47. An advantage of modern historical research, in which global contexts are analysed, is that the nationality of the researcher must not be identical with the investigated region. In this way, national biases may be avoided. However, it is disadvantageous in so far as cultural and national contexts may remain

approach will contribute to a more differentiated understanding of the distinct developments leading from colony to nation. This is of special relevance for the 1960s and 70s, since the influences and practical lessons learned among the postcolonial Dominions played an important role in the process of regionalization and distancing from Britain. This was the case in political and economic respects, as well as in respect to the processes of identity formation.

What all the above mentioned works lack, however, is also an investigation of emotions in the three Dominions during the British approach to Europe. An analysis of the reactions of the three Dominions to the British application for membership in the EEC can make the additional contribution of illuminating emotional life in the moment of detachment from the motherland, and in so doing offer a new perspective on the process of nation building in the settler colonies. Previous research has not undertaken this task in a substantial fashion. An examination of the three former settler colonies in a postcolonial context will yield new insights into the shifting global relationships of the second half of the twentieth century. New perspectives on power relations, exchange processes, and the connections between periphery and center – recognized as a distinct marker of the postcolonial era – become discernible by making these three countries the focus of this investigation.

Moreover, the existing research concerning relations to empire among the former settler colonies during decolonization lacks a transnational perspective. A few exemplary works have attempted to respond to this research desideratum, by dealing with two, or more rarely all three settler colonies. Still, a detailed study that explicitly occupies itself with this theme is needed. A transnational analysis of all three lands will certainly expand our perspectives on the influence of “Britishness” in the settler colonial context. It may also lead to an improved and more complex understanding of settler colonial nationalisms and the structures that they are based upon. Therefore, a comparison of the three countries will be deployed, illuminating their interrelations and processes of exchange. For this reason, this analysis treats transfers and interdependencies between the colonies as a constitutive part of the investigation, just as much as the comparison of the reactions of the three Dominions to the British negotiations. By so doing, the investigation will not only illuminate the relative reactions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, but also transnational exchange processes, interactions, similarities, as well as regional particularisms.

foreign, and, for that reason, unrecognized. This requires of the researcher a high degree of cultural sensitivity, as otherwise many nuances can be either overlooked or incorrectly interpreted.

Furthermore, this study will evaluate the thesis that Canada, on the basis of its geographical proximity to the United States, differed from Australia and New Zealand in many respects in terms of how it related to the end of the British Empire. The relationship between Great Britain and all the Dominions is a special one: the familial relation between them and Britain is an often recurring narrative in accounts of the relations between these lands. The expression “motherland” is a sign for this close and emotionally laden connection. Thus, an Australian “Policy Guidance Paper” designated the relationship between Britain and Australia as, “[...] in short, very much a mother and son relationship.”³⁸ By placing these affiliated nations into a familial relationship, one opens up new lines of interpretation for a history of Commonwealth relations. The political, economic, and cultural interactions of the three Dominions with Britain that this study will delineate, are, however, not the primary object of study; rather they serve as a context for the investigation of emotions in the three Dominions in relation to the erosion of the Commonwealth through British accession to the EEC.

By examining the reactions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to the British negotiations with the Common Market, this study explores the consequences of the British retreat from its own empire in terms of its impact on the Dominions in the 1960s and ‘70s. Recent developments in Britain and, in particular, the debates concerning Britain’s exit from the European Union (“Brexit”) have led to a renewed interest in both relations within the Commonwealth and the foundation of the European Union.³⁹ The interrelationships of the states of the former British Empire are thus relevant to contemporary political interests and debates. Some of the current discussions refer to the historical relationships within the Commonwealth, and have likewise been informed by them; recent events have thus led to a resurgence of interest in Commonwealth relations and the British role in world affairs. Through a discussion of the EEC debate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand between 1958 and 1973, this study furnishes a further dimension of historical context to contemporary debates, though it makes no claim to explain “Brexit.”

Through the analysis of primary sources that shed light on the EEC debates and the connection of the respective Dominions to Britain, the following discussion will yield an historical analysis of the emotions at play in trade and policy debates. Hence, how relevant actors in the Dominions reflected on particular economic arrangements, on the possible consequences of a British entrance into the EEC, and on the options for new trade concepts stand in the foreground

³⁸ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28. August 1972.

³⁹ For example, see *The Telegraph*, 14. March 2016: “Brexit Will Allow Britain to Embrace the Commonwealth.”

of analysis. This implies an exploration of these emotional “frames”⁴⁰ of trade policy, and for this reason, trade rather than economic policy is placed at the center of this work. In so doing the following three suppositions will be demonstrated. One: actors in Australia, Canada and New Zealand responded with surprise and shock to the British entrance negotiations with the EEC. This was the case even though Britain had already lost its role as a powerful trading partner after 1945, and other regions such as the states of western continental Europe and Japan had become new centers of trade.⁴¹ The reasons for this reaction thus lie not only in trading policy considerations, but also in the emotional and historical relationships with Britain among actors in the Dominions.

Secondly, the relationship to the British motherland altered in the course of the 1960s and 70s. A different generation of policy makers with different mentalities saw no threat in the looming detachment from Britain, but rather the chance for a new and more independent policy. Figures such as Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau⁴² in Canada and Prime Minister Gough Whitlam⁴³ in Australia placed more value on the respective nation-building processes in their own land than on the historical relationship to the British Empire. At the same time, immigration patterns in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand changed. Up to the 1950s, immigrants to the Dominions had been primarily British; migration from the entire Commonwealth led to an increasingly multicultural society. Moreover, many indigenous groups in all three countries had an increasing influence on political debates.⁴⁴ In spite of this, British elements in all three of the former settler colonies persisted – even after the end of the empire in the 1960s.

Third, the transformation of trade relations in all three lands were the end product of altered relations with Britain rather than their origin.⁴⁵ These changes in trade politics were influenced by

⁴⁰ In this study, “Frames” refers to the factors that furnish the framework for social actions. On this subject see Robert Benford and David Snow, „Framing Processes and Social Movements. An Overview and Assessment“, in: *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, No 3 (2000), pp. 611-39.

⁴¹ See P.J. Cain und Anthony Hopkins, *British Imperialism. Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990* (London/New York 1993), pp. 281.

⁴² On Trudeau see (selection), Kevin Christiano, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Reason Before Passion. A Biography* (Toronto 1994); Andrew Cohen and J.L. Granatstein (Eds.), *Trudeau's Shadow. The Life and Legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto 1999); Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, *Pirouette. Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 1990); John English, *Just Watch Me. The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 1968-2000* (Toronto 2009); John English, *Citizen of the World. The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Volume One 1919-1968* (Toronto 2006); Allen Mills, *Citizen Trudeau. An Intellectual Biography, 1944-1965* (Oxford 2016); Nino Ricci, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Volume One 1919-1968* (Toronto 2006); Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Memoirs. Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto 1993); Michel Vastel, *The Outsider. The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto 1990).

⁴³ On Gough Whitlam see Jenny Hocking, *Gough Whitlam. A Moment in History* (Melbourne 2008).

⁴⁴ See Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," p. 231f.

⁴⁵ Additional signs of the changing relations to Great Britain can be found in the foreign and cultural policies of the three countries. These signs will only be discussed marginally in this study. A detailed investigation can be found in the work of my colleagues, Maike Hausen and Sebastian Koch, 'After Britain, Who?' *Australian, Canadian and New*

a variety of processes, aspects and events: elite networks, “Britishness,” emotional responses, among others. Simultaneously, shifting trade policies had repercussions for these processes and events, and left their mark on new policies and international relations. Particular emphasis will be given to how and why these changes in trade policy emerge and how they were related to the growing nationalism in the three countries. This shows that the British entrance negotiations with the EEC was not the original cause, but rather a fundamental factor in the destabilization of the relations to the empire. The connection to the motherland, which was based primarily on trust and a shared codex of values, was deeply shaken by the British negotiations, compelling policy makers to look elsewhere for alternative markets and trading partners. Disappointment with British actions thus had impact on the self-conceptions of the three countries as European, or rather, British lands far removed from the British isles at the edge of the world. New concepts of identity were required in order to further emancipate themselves from Britain.

1.2. Outline

Following the introduction, which offers a review of the secondary literature, the methodological and theoretical approaches, as well as the primary sources, the second chapter presents the historical contexts relevant to this research. First, this chapter gives an overview of the international contexts, including the British Empire after 1945, and the Cold War up to the early 1970s. Since foreign relations between the Dominions and other countries, as well as relations to each other, are central to this study, the international context is fundamental. Thus, it is also important to discuss Commonwealth relations and imperial connections, as well as decolonisation and other global historical shifts in the second half of the 20th century. Since general trends after 1945 had a fundamental impact on the actions of these states, influencing political and economic decisions, it is necessary to give these contexts due attention. This international dimension is primarily presented through the eyes of the three former settler colonies. In addition, the chapter also gives an overview of the respective national contexts of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Their domestic political, economic, and cultural situations had a major impact on their actions during the

Zealand Foreign Policy Considerations following Britain's Withdrawal from Southeast Asia, 1965-1971, Tübingen 2022 and *Identitätskrisen nach dem Ende des Britischen Empire. Zur kulturellen (Neu-)Verortung in Kanada, Australien und Aotearoa Neuseeland*, Tübingen 2023.

1960s and early 1970s, and it is essential to consider these contexts.⁴⁶ Afterwards, a brief synopsis puts the international and national contexts in relation to one another, drawing attention to differences and similarities between the former settler colonies. The synopsis also considers why these three countries are worth comparing to one another, and what impact the Commonwealth had on them and vice versa.

Through an analysis of the primary sources in respect to the fundamental research questions, the third chapter relates the dissertation's theoretical-methodological approach to these historical contexts. The chapter is divided into four sub-chapters with different focuses. The first part investigates observable changes in the formation of economic policy in all three countries. It delineates the material changes to trading patterns in all three countries and considers the reasons for them. By so doing, structural changes are elucidated. The second part investigates the level of communications with a strong focus on those moments in which the EEC debates came to a head. The third part concentrates on the social dimension – how did perceptions of belonging alter in the Dominions during this period? How did the presence of relations of trust (and their destruction) influence social dynamics in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand? As will be seen, the social dimension was of deep importance for issues of identity in the three former colonies. The fourth chapter assesses emotional aspects -- how did reflections concerning the economic order alter perceptions of identity in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand? How did imperial relationships and those between the former Settler Colonies change? The subjects of all four sub-chapters are inter-related and give emphasis to primary sources.

The last chapter summarizes the main points of the argument in respect to the primary research questions concerning the consequences of the British withdrawal from its empire in the 1960s and early 1970s. It likewise assesses the thesis that the accounts originating in the Dominions themselves were due in part to regional experiences and acculturation processes, and in part due to concepts such as “whiteness,” “Britishness,” and “family values.” The assumption that Australia, Canada, and New Zealand attempted to revive trading links with Great Britain after 1945 due to emotional attachments will also be assessed. A further question that will be considered is the thesis that new generations of policy-makers with different mentalities altered the relationship with

⁴⁶ This dissertation refers to these contexts as ‘national’ (or ‘Australian,’ ‘Canadian,’ and ‘New Zealand’) as this is the term used in the primary sources. For further discussions on contemporary concepts of the “nation” in these countries, see the work of my colleague Sebastian Koch.

Britain at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s. These questions provoke a reassessment of the thesis that economic decision-making and the process of nation-building are intertwined.

1.3. Theoretical Approaches, Secondary Literature, Methodology and Primary Sources

This section considers the secondary literature, giving an overview of previous research on the subjects mentioned above, as well as addressing theoretical and methodological approaches. In addition, the basic source material will be presented along with a discussion of its advantages and limitations.

Prior to the 1990s, historical studies tended to focus on the state, nation, or the history of a region – such as German history, British history.⁴⁷ Of late this focus for historical research has begun to shift. Due to globalization, researchers have sought to explain this phenomenon, and have preferred approaches such as world (or global history), transnational history, and the history of globalization.⁴⁸ Whereas the focus in world history is more on social and cultural structures that concern larger entities, global history primarily deals with transfers, linkages, and interactions between regions.⁴⁹ In global history, the formation of the modern world is increasingly interpreted

⁴⁷ Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History. The Past, Present and Future* (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 1, and Thomas Adam, *Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World. Sources and Contexts* (Basingstoke, 2012), p. 1.

⁴⁸ On the ways in which empires have formed our present world systems, written for the politically and historically interested reader, see Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Kurze Geschichte Der Imperien. Mit Einem Beitrag Von Christiane Nolte* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2017).

Other important works on these topics are, for example: C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World. 1780-1940. Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, Oxford, and Carlton, 2004); Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *1750-1870. Wege Zur Modernen Welt, Geschichte Der Welt* (Munich, 2016); Akira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *1945 Bis Heute. Die Globalisierte Welt, Geschichte Der Welt* (Munich, 2013); Sebastian Conrad, Andreas Eckert, and Ulrike Freitag, eds., *Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York, 2007); Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History. Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Cambridge, 2011); Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2009); Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past* (New York and Basingstoke, 2003); Reinhard Sieder and Ernst Langthaler, eds., *Globalgeschichte 1800-2010* (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2010); Reinhard Wendt, *Vom Kolonialismus Zur Globalisierung. Europa Und Die Welt Seit 1500* (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich, 2007). For the differences between “World History” and “Global History”, see Jürgen Osterhammel, “Global History in a National Context. The Case of Germany,” *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* 20 (2009); and Reinhard Sieder and Ernst Langthaler, “Was Heißt Globalgeschichte?,” in *Globalgeschichte 1800-2010*, ed. Reinhard Sieder and Ernst Langthaler (Cologne, Vienna, Weimar 2010); Jürgen Osterhammel, ed. *Weltgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 2008); Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Weltgeschichte. Imperien, Religionen Und Systeme. 15.-19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, Vienna, Weimar, 2005); and Iriye. The “History of Globalization” is not synonymous with “Global History”, rather it is potentially an aspect of it. See Jürgen Osterhammel, “Alte Und Neue Zugänge Zur Weltgeschichte,” in *Weltgeschichte*, ed. Jürgen Osterhammel (Stuttgart, 2008), p. 19. For a short introduction to the “History of Globalization,” see *Die Flughöhe Der Adler. Historische Essays Zur Globalen Gegenwart* (Munich 2017). Transnational history will be covered in the following.

⁴⁹ “Global History in a National Context. The Case of Germany,” p. 44, and Sieder and Langthaler, “Was Heißt Globalgeschichte?,” pp. 9-11.

as a common history among various societies and cultures that shared certain fundamental experiences, creating the modern era through interactions and interdependencies. However, inequality and hierarchical structures were often significant to this dynamic.⁵⁰ A further approach associated with global history is transnational history. Since the latter is the main approach underpinning this study, it will be discussed in some detail in what follows.

Transnational History

The thriving field of transnational history informs the approach of this dissertation.⁵¹ This section offers a brief overview of transnational history, elucidating its strengths and weaknesses in respect to this study's fundamental questions. Awareness of its limitations (and their potential remedies) draws attention to the fact that the transnational approach is not a magic tool for writing a radically new history of the former settler colonies; rather the approach allows us to gain a new perspective both on the individual countries and the Dominions as a group. Thus, transnational history is not viewed as method, but more as a research perspective relevant to the imperial context.⁵²

Transnational history shares some characteristics with global history. Both approaches explore phenomena beyond national borders, putting the focus on matters that affect more than one region of the world.⁵³ However, one difference is clear from the very term 'transnational history' itself, since it invokes the concept of 'nation.' Following the work of Benedict Anderson (*Imagined Communities*, 1983),⁵⁴ Eric Hobsbawm (*The Invention of Tradition*, 1983),⁵⁵ and Ernest Gellner (*Nations and Nationalism*, 1983),⁵⁶ nations are generally viewed as socially constructed concepts.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Andreas Eckert, *Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt a.M, 2006), pp. 2-3.

⁵¹ For the theory and background of "Transnational History," see Margrit Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2011), p. 154; Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen Und Theorien* (Göttingen: 2006); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft Jenseits Des Nationalstaats. Studien Zur Beziehungsgeschichte Und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen 2001). Related approaches such as "Entangled History," "Histoire Croisée," and "Connected History" are seen as variations of transnational history with slightly different emphases, but here they are treated as interchangeable.

⁵² Kiran Klaus Patel, "Überlegungen Zu Einer Transnationalen Geschichte," in *Weltgeschichte*, ed. Jürgen Osterhammel (Stuttgart: 2008), p. 69.

⁵³ Iriye, p. 11. Indeed, some works and scholars use the terms Global history and Transnational history interchangeably (e.g. Ibid.). *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* does not differentiate clearly between the two either. Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (Basingstoke 2009).

⁵⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London/New York 2006³).

⁵⁵ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge 2012).

⁵⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.

⁵⁷ Pernau, p. 10.

For some time, historians had perceived nations as “natural” entities,⁵⁸ and their research often tried to assist the nation-building process in respective nations. History and nationalism thus went hand in hand.⁵⁹ The work of Anderson, Hobsbawm and Gellner brought about a substantial shift. At present, most German historians have assiduously avoided research projects that try to contribute to potential nation-building projects.⁶⁰

Investigating the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand literature concerning the 1960s and 1970s, one could not help but notice that many works on political, economic, and cultural matters had a specific national impetus. This was true not only of older literature prior to 1983, but also of more recent research. The forewords of these books often manifested political opinions and definite emotions.⁶¹ An exemplary reason for this, at least in the case of Australia, can be found in an article by Ann Curthoy, “We’ve Just Started Making National Histories and You Want Us to Stop Already?”⁶² She points out that the national history of Australia is a relatively new phenomenon in Australian historiography. She notes that it is only a few decades old since Australian universities were established in 1950, and only then did research on this theme begin.⁶³ This may be a reason for why the nation-building aspect of Australian history is asserted more than is the case in contemporary German history. The Australian case suggests that historical research may be of immense importance to the nation-building process and to the popular desire to write national history.

Moreover, interpretations of the relationship of Great Britain to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have often led to heated debate. Are these countries to be understood as equals? Is Great Britain the one that provokes change while the Dominions are prodded by its actions, or vice versa? To what degree could the Dominions act with de facto independence? The emotional aspect of these questions was one of the first challenges of the transnational approach. For scholars from the outside, it is often hard not to tread on someone’s toes when discussing the relationship of Great Britain to the Dominions as the issue has an emotional charge. National pride (something that Germans tend to down play for historical reasons that are well known) appears to play a role in

⁵⁸ Adam, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁹ Pernau, p. 17. Discussions concerning the German “Sonderweg” (exceptionalism) point to the fact that such discussions can have a political impact and be used for specific political purposes. See Adam, p. 2.

⁶⁰ The question of how successful these attempts are is outside the scope of this dissertation. It may be better assessed in light of the work done by the international research community.

⁶¹ Philip Buckner, "Introduction," in *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. Philip Buckner (Vancouver/Toronto 2005).

⁶² Ann Curthoy, "We’ve Just Started Making National Histories, and You Want Us to Stop Already?," in *After the Imperial Turn. Thinking with and through the Nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham/London 2003).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

historical research, and it can be readily wounded. For instance, many Canadian historians until recently were nationalistic; for them the empire was seen as irrelevant. While English Canadians had supported imperial expansion, they still preferred to ignore their imperial past.⁶⁴

This dissertation should be read as an attempt to bridge German research traditions with those of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Great Britain. It attempts to bring together not only different scholarly traditions in historical research, but also different styles, expressions, and goals. Even in English, the style and argumentative structure remain primarily German, and part of the literature derives from German sources. By connecting different national research traditions, I hope this attempt will have succeeded in some points, thus fulfilling one of the demands of transnational history and meeting the challenges of modern historical research.⁶⁵

The issue concerning national traditions point to one of the challenges of transnational history, for while it implies the concept of “nation” it seeks to write history without viewing nations as the starting point. Transnational history is something different than just writing the history of more than one nation, for there are other historical approaches that likewise do this, such as the history of international relations,⁶⁶ the history of empires,⁶⁷ and comparative history.⁶⁸

Aside from this, by questioning “nation” as a self-evident category and considering systems – such as the Commonwealth – that transcend national borders, transnational history enriches historical understanding.⁶⁹ By interrogating “nation” as a category, transnational history therefore does not posit the “nation” as the basis of all historical dynamics. This is a small but significant distinction that separates transnational history from global and world history which do not, as transnational history does, scrutinize the concept of “nation.”⁷⁰

For the period under consideration, the category of “nation” is of tremendous conceptual importance. Due to the processes of decolonisation, the number of nations rose globally from ninety

⁶⁴ Buckner, p. 2.

⁶⁵ In this respect, some readers may find that some paragraphs belabour their points; but the dissertation wants to appeal not only to experts in the field, but also to generally informed readers with some knowledge of the subject.

⁶⁶ For example, see Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London 2010); Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945* (London/New York 2008⁹).

⁶⁷ For example, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton/Oxford 2010); David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance. European Overseas Empire, 1415-1980* (New Haven/London 2000).

⁶⁸ For example Bayly; Thomas Welskopp, "Comparative History," *European History Online* (2010), <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/comparative-history/thomas-welskopp-comparative-history>.

⁶⁹ Pernau, pp. 18-19.

⁷⁰ Patel, p. 76.

in 1960 to 134 in 1970.⁷¹ In addition to the emancipation from their former colonial rulers, their nation-building process owed much to the division of the world into east and west during the Cold War.⁷² The concept of “nation” was also a general reference point for the peoples of the former Settler Colonies. It emerges in their political and economic discussions, and it informed decision-making, as is attested to by primary government sources from this period. Since this dissertation’s primary question is what effect the British withdrawal from its empire had on Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, on their respective nation-building processes and their identities, the emphasis on the concept of “nation” is a fruitful approach. Given these issues, and that the primary sources demonstrate the importance of the concept for people during the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of transnational history is more pertinent than other possible alternatives, such as translocal or transregional history.⁷³

These issues foreground the concept of “nation” in transnational history, but the other side of the term is no less important. On the contrary, the aspects of transfer and entanglement are of immense significance to the transnational approach. There are levels of entanglement between individual perceptions and their feelings of belonging, as well as the networks existing between organisations and institutions; these depend much on the duration and degree of exchange.⁷⁴ The feeling of belonging to a wider community of British peoples is based on such transfers, networks, and exchanges, and this, to a large degree, constituted imperial identity. Transnational public spaces, such as the Commonwealth, with its structures, meetings and media influenced political and economic decision-making, hence, such transfer phenomena need to be considered. They informed the political dynamic in all three of the former settler colonies, and they shaped the collective identities of their policy-makers. In this respect, “space” is a constitutive research category, just as important as that of “time.”⁷⁵ This assists the investigation of how political, social, cultural, and economic spaces are constructed, and how they are formed and changed in a postcolonial context.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Geschichte Der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen* (Munich 2003), p. 91.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

⁷³ For a discussion of “Translocal” and “Transregional History,” see Pernau, pp. 67-75.

⁷⁴ Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, "Zur Entwicklung Transnationaler Öffentlichkeiten Und Identitäten Im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung," in *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten Und Identitäten Im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, and Alexander Schmidt-Gering (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2002), p. 10.

⁷⁵ Patel, p. 69.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

All three countries had to rethink their international position in the Cold War context, and this informed how they positioned themselves both regionally and internationally. “

Aside from the issue of integrating concepts of nation into transnational history without letting it become its starting point, a second challenge for this approach is the sheer number of different contexts. Since this dissertation deals with at least three, in addition to those of the Commonwealth and the empire, there is a high number of institutions and peoples that were involved in these processes, and thus require consideration. The domestic and foreign contexts that influence political and economic decision-making must be investigated, and this widens both the scope of the research as well as the primary sources. Another challenge of the transnational approach is the different orientations and systems in the archives of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand. This was a time-consuming issue since there is, of course, no standardized archival system. Thus, the second challenge of transnational history is handling a profusion of facts and sources without losing focus of the underlying questions.

Transnational History is not a radical innovation in historical research, but it compliments and augments other fields such as the history of empires or the history of religion.⁷⁷ As discussed above, it can enable new perspectives in the area of imperial relations and is important to the fundamental questions addressed by this dissertation. However, this work does not claim that the transnational approach is the only legitimate means of analysing imperial connections, and nor does it offer a radically new perspective. Still, it is a relatively new departure, and a transnational comparative analysis, one that attends to the transfers and entanglements of the former settler colonies over the course of the EEC debate, is still lacking. This research intends to address these desiderata. Moreover, by deploying a transnational approach, the dissertation seeks to offer a new perspective on imperial linkages in the postcolonial world, and thus enrich the discussion of postcolonial nationhood in the 1960s and early 1970s. By doing so, the transnational approach will contribute to the history of the Dominions, as well as to the broader field of global history.

The following paragraph will review the historiography concerning the decline of empire in the former settler colonies and imperial history more generally. In so doing, it will position the transnational approach within the research field concerning Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as the empire came to an end in the 1960s and early 1970s.

⁷⁷ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Transnationale Geschichte - Der Neue Königsweg Historischer Forschung?," in *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen Und Theorien*, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen 2006), pp. 165-67.

Empire History and the End of Empire

The history of the British Empire represents a compelling field of inquiry for a global, world or transnational historical approach, as well as for the history of globalization. In recent years, empire history has grown in interest.⁷⁸ The term “empire” refers to a conglomerate of colonial and quasi-colonial areas. Empires are trans-colonial systems with a center where national interests are defined as *imperial interests*, which the center then seeks to implement on an international level.⁷⁹ More specifically, John Darwin defined the British Empire as “a constitutional hotch-potch of independent, semi-independent and dependent countries, held together not by formal allegiance to a mother-country but by economic, strategic, political or cultural links that varied greatly in strength and character.”⁸⁰

As this definition suggests, it is difficult to identify a specific moment as the ‘end of empire’ since some links may have survived the constitutional break-up.⁸¹ In the case of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the idea of “Britishness” remained important to national self-definition and identity. Some such linkages still exist today. For instance, the British Queen is still the sovereign of all three countries.⁸² Moreover, to name just a few examples, many young New Zealanders do their “OE” (or Overseas Experience) in Great Britain, and regular visits by the Royal Family to these countries receive copious media attention.⁸³ Thus, Great Britain retained its importance, and the assumption that British influences played little role in these countries after 1945 can be

⁷⁸ On the end of empire, see Sarah Stockwell, "Ends of Empire," in *The British Empire*, ed. Sarah Stockwell (Malden/Oxford/Carlton 2008); Larry J. Butler, *Britain and Empire. Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World* (London 2002); Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonization, 1945-1963. Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London 2002); Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire. The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968* (Cambridge 2006); John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (London 1988); John A. Gallagher, *Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire. The Ford Lectures and Other Essays* (Cambridge 1982); John Darwin, *The End of the British Empire. The Historical Debate* (Oxford/Cambridge Massachusetts 1991). *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg Und Niedergang Des Britischen Empire 1600-1997* (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2013). For the general reader, Jeremy Paxmann, *Empire* (London 2012) is a good readable account of the British Empire.

⁷⁹ Jürgen Osterhammel and Jan C. Jansen, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, 7 ed. (Munich 2009), pp. 26-27. For more discussion of colonialism, see Eckert; Frederick Cooper, *Kolonialismus Denken. Konzepte Und Theorien in Kritischer Perspektive* (Frankfurt a. M. 2012); Wolfgang Reinhard, *Kleine Geschichte Des Kolonialismus* (Stuttgart 2008²); Boris Barth, Tanja Bühner, and u.a., eds., *Das Zeitalter Des Kolonialismus* (Darmstadt 2007). For a brief description of empires see Herfried Münkler, *Imperien. Die Logik Der Weltherrschaft - Vom Alten Rom Bis Zu Den Vereinigten Staaten* (Berlin 2005²).

⁸⁰ Darwin, *The End of the British Empire. The Historical Debate*, p. 4.

⁸¹ Ibid. Darwin develops this argument in *Britain and Decolonization. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*.

⁸² It is important to note that she is the sovereign as *Queen of Australia*, *Queen of Canada* and *Queen of New Zealand*, thus demonstrating the mixture of British elements with regional and national self-descriptions. This will be explained in more detail below.

⁸³ For example, the royal tour of Prince William and his wife Kate to Australia and New Zealand in 2014, or their appearance in Canada in 2016 with their children George and Charlotte.

discounted. In accordance with the hypothesis that Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had been moving towards independent nationhood since the 19th century, researchers suggested that the end of the British Empire in the 1960s and 1970s had little impact.

The “end of empire” is often associated with the concept of “colonialism.” This phenomenon and especially its often-violent consequences have been a persistent topic in both the media and in historical research.⁸⁴ The term “colonialism” automatically evokes negative assumptions of usurpation, racism, and inequality.⁸⁵ Yet, as Jürgen Osterhammel points out, colonialism is a concept that is difficult to define.⁸⁶ He describes it as a relation of power between collective entities that regulates all important decisions for the colonial subjects.⁸⁷

In recent years, the conflicts of decolonisation as well as the British legacy in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean have been an important focus of historical research. In addition, historians have given attention to the consequences of decolonisation in Great Britain,⁸⁸ and the transfer of knowledge between the colonies and the metropole.⁸⁹ Yet, within this research the former settler colonies have often been overlooked.⁹⁰ To be sure, their special status within the British Empire distinguished them from other colonies. With the Balfour Report of 1926, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand became quasi-independent countries inside the British Empire defined as “autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs [...]”⁹¹

The Statute of Westminster in 1931 further strengthened their independent status, by giving them legislative autonomy.⁹² However, this does not mean that from then onward they were fully independent nation states. Great Britain expected that they would not oppose British interests, and

⁸⁴ Osterhammel and Jansen, p. 7. Dieter Rothermund, "The Self-Consciousness of Post-Imperial Nations. A Cross-National Comparison," *India Quarterly* 67 (2011).

⁸⁵ Osterhammel and Jansen, p. 7.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁸⁷ Quoted in Eckert, p.3.

⁸⁸ By Ronald Hyam (2006), for instance, in his book *Britain's Declining Empire. The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968*. In addition, see P.W. Preston, *Britain after Empire. Constructing a Post-War Political-Cultural Project* (New York, 2014); Hyam; Graham MacPhee and Prem Poddar, eds., *Empire and After. Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective* (New York 2007); and the chapter on the end of empire in John Darwin's overview of the British Empire: Darwin, *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, pp. 359-402; and Chapter Eleven in Cain and Hopkins, pp. 265-96.

⁸⁹ John Marriott, *The Other Empire. Metropolis, India and Progress in the Colonial Imagination* (Manchester 2003).

⁹⁰ Hopkins. p. 213. Nevertheless, some recent works focus on Settler Colonialism: Caroline Elkins and Susanne Pedersen, *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York 2005).

⁹¹ Quoted in John Darwin, "The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and W.M. Roger Louis (Oxford/New York 1999), p. 69.

⁹² Hopkins., p. 214. Australia did not ratify this statute until 1942, and New Zealand not until 1947. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

this obligated them to observe certain rules and expectations.⁹³ Therefore, the Dominions were relatively free in terms of domestic policy and other decisions, but the strong link to the mother country retained its importance, and this had consequences for political, economic, and cultural policy.

On account of the Balfour Report and the Statute of Westminster, the Dominions clearly enjoyed more independence than the other colonies of the British Empire. Still, they were only independent *within* the British Empire, and imperial connections still functioned. Apart from emotional attachments to Great Britain, there were also relationships of economic dependency. In 1932, one year after the Statute of Westminster, the Ottawa Agreements regulated trade issues. These agreements standardized tariffs and imperial preferences, and were thus the basis for trade relations between the Commonwealth countries.⁹⁴ This was the first time since 1846 that the British Empire had a tariff bloc.⁹⁵ In the 1960s, these preferential tariffs were to be challenged by the British application to the European Economic Community, for the Common Market prohibited agricultural imports from non-European countries. Charles de Gaulle went as far as to state that Great Britain would have to leave the Commonwealth to join the Common Market.⁹⁶ This meant that the Dominions would need to re-negotiate tariffs and trade with Great Britain and other countries.⁹⁷ The shocked reaction in the Dominions to Great Britain's announcement that it would seek membership in the Common Market also makes evident the persistent links between them and the mother country.

The Australian historian Neville Meany was among the first to challenge the assumption that the end of empire in the 1960s was of little consequence to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, given that they had already been pursuing independent nationhood since the 19th century. This dissertation agrees with Meany that the ties of empire lasted into the 1960s (and even into the early 1970s and beyond). Up to this period, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand retained their attachments to Great Britain. Many individuals from the male Anglo-European elite who were central to policy-making still had personal and collective ties to Great Britain. Many of them called Britain 'home' and some had personal relationships due to family or friendship. Moreover, many

⁹³ Ibid.p. 226.

⁹⁴ Darwin, "The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics," p. 70.

⁹⁵ *The End of the British Empire. The Historical Debate*, p. xiii.

⁹⁶ Paul Robertson and John Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the Eec, 1961-3," *Australian Economic Review* 40 (2000): p. 175.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 154-55.

policy-makers in the 1960s had studied in either Oxford or Cambridge.⁹⁸ Their nationalism was not opposed to Great Britain, but rather it was an admixture that included British elements, a feeling of belonging to a wider community of British peoples, and elements that were specific to Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. For instance, up to the 1930s Australian newspapers still printed British news under the *home news* section.⁹⁹ Up to 1948, being an Australian, Canadian or New Zealand citizen also meant being a British subject.¹⁰⁰ In schools, history classes usually taught the history of Great Britain and its Empire as part of the history of the respective Dominion.¹⁰¹ Emotional attachment to Great Britain clearly went hand in hand with certain forms of nationalism in these countries.¹⁰² Of course, not everyone in Dominion political circles at that time felt themselves to be British, but this dissertation argues that a majority of these political circles had a strong affiliation with Great Britain, even as late as the 1960s. For them, the end of empire came as a shock. Despite earlier signs of dissolution such as the fall of Singapore in 1942, the British withdrawal from its Empire and the first application to the EEC in 1961 was mostly unexpected. In concrete terms, this meant that the end of empire in the 1960s became a significant factor in contemporary economic, political, and cultural debates, since the persistent ordering function of the British Empire was suddenly gone.

In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have pointed out the importance of the British Empire and its decline among the settler colonies. This study thus draws from some groundbreaking works on the topic. Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich published *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity* in 2003, which demonstrated that the British Empire was held together not only by trade and military affairs, but also by “Britishness.”¹⁰³ Further work on “Britishness” as the empire went into decline appeared in *Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures* from 2007.¹⁰⁴ Sarah Stockwell comments on the end of empire inside the Dominions in her chapter “Ends of Empire” included in the edited collection, *The British Empire*.¹⁰⁵ Phillip Buckner draws attention to imperial ties in Canada in his books *Canada and the*

⁹⁸ Curthoys, p. 71.

⁹⁹ Ewald Frie, "Einmal Europa Und Zurück? Australien Und Neuseeland," in *Die Welt Im 20. Jahrhundert Nach 1945*, ed. Helmut Konrad and Monika Stromberger (2010), p. 344.

¹⁰⁰ Curthoys, p. 72.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² For example, James Belich points out that in the case of New Zealand the link to the mother country was deliberately strengthened after the 1880s. Belich, “Colonization and History in New Zealand,” in: Winks/Low 1999, pp. 182-193.

¹⁰³ Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, eds., *The British World. Diaspora, Culture and Identity* (London 2003).

¹⁰⁴ Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw, and Stuart Macintyre, eds., *Britishness Abroad. Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures* (Melbourne 2007).

¹⁰⁵ Stockwell. Esp. pp. 272.

End of the British Empire (2005) and *Canada and the British Empire* (2008).¹⁰⁶ Together with R. Douglas Francis, he edited *Rediscovering the British World*,¹⁰⁷ whose contributors draw attention to the concept of “Britishness” and the new identities that followed the empire’s demise. Australian historians James Curran and Stuart Ward scrutinized the end of empire in their home country.¹⁰⁸ Stuart Ward’s article, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World,”¹⁰⁹ is a first attempt to compare the end of empire in all three Dominions. These works differ from the earlier literature as they point out that settler nationalism was not in opposition to Great Britain, but rather it was an amalgamation of “Britishness” and colonial experiences.

This research suggests that despite the strengthening of nationalism caused by the two World Wars, the sense of belonging to a community of British peoples did not vanish inside the three Dominions. In all three countries, national self-confidence and identity was bolstered by their war experiences.¹¹⁰ None of the three Dominions hesitated to join Great Britain in both World Wars, but their own narratives of suffering during the conflicts strengthened their respective self-perceptions. The ANZAC legend in Australia and New Zealand clearly attests to this.¹¹¹ During World War I, soldiers from Australia and New Zealand soldiers landed at Gallipoli in Turkey where they endured much suffering that created a sense of camaraderie among the soldiers. Their bravery is a central part of the ANZAC legend.¹¹²

Though national self-confidence was strengthened in all three countries during the wars, “Britishness” and the feeling of belonging to a family of British peoples did not disappear. On the contrary, in the 1950s, there is a noticeable revival of Commonwealth traditions and ties to empire.¹¹³ Moreover, political elites felt attached to Great Britain.¹¹⁴ The ties of kith and kin

¹⁰⁶ Philip Buckner, ed. *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver 2005). *Canada and the British Empire* (Oxford 2008). Also, Buckner with Francis Douglas in Buckner, Phillip A., and R. Douglas Francis (eds.) (2006). *Canada and the British World. Culture, Migration, and Identity*, Vancouver.

¹⁰⁷ Philip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary 2005).

¹⁰⁸ Curran, James, and Stuart Ward (2010). *The Unknown Nation. Australia After Empire*, Melbourne; Curran, James (2013). “Australia at empire’s end. Approaches and arguments,” *History Australia* 10, No. 3, pp. 23-35; Ward, Stuart (2001). *Australia and the British Embrace*, Melbourne.

¹⁰⁹ Ward, Stuart (2007). The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World, in: *Britishness Abroad. Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures*, eds. Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw and Stuart Macintyre, Melbourne. pp. 231-263.

¹¹⁰ Darwin, *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg Und Niedergang Des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393.

¹¹¹ Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC).

¹¹² Frie, pp. 340-41.

¹¹³ Benvenuti, Andrea, and Stuart Ward (2005). Britain, Europe, and the ‘Other Quiet Revolution’ in Canada, in: Buckner 2005, pp. 165-182.

¹¹⁴ Benvenuti and Ward.p.165.

remained strong, and loyalty to the Queen was an important theme in foreign and domestic affairs. Australia, for example, further strengthened its ties with London in the 1950s through the testing of British nuclear bombs in southern Australia.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, as discussed above, it was quite common for students from Australia and New Zealand to travel as far as Oxford or Cambridge for postgraduate study, since it was not possible to earn such degrees in Australia or Canada before the 1960s.¹¹⁶ The Canadian foreign office did not have a “British desk” until 1967; relations with Great Britain were treated as home affairs.¹¹⁷

Due to their geographical proximity to Asia, Australia and New Zealand emphasized their ties to Great Britain even more so than Canada since they relied on the mother country for security.¹¹⁸ Yet, Canada also required Great Britain as a counterweight to the USA. Canada feared that it would be more difficult to maintain an identity that was distinct from the USA if it lost Great Britain as a point of orientation.¹¹⁹ Whereas Australia and New Zealand belonged to the Sterling area with Great Britain, Canada had its own dollar currency. This, of course, had effects on their respective trading positions in the 20th century. For Australia and New Zealand, Great Britain was one of their most important markets, whereas Canada developed stronger trade relations with the USA.¹²⁰

Given these circumstances, Great Britain’s withdrawal from its empire after the Suez crisis of 1956 in no way felt like liberation to the male Anglo-European political elites of the former settler colonies; rather they experienced it as a breakdown of a system that had regulated their politics, economy, and culture. Many politicians and officials in the Dominions viewed the colonial past as an important framework that governed their affairs; thus, the diminishing empire seemed to make the future uncertain. In particular, the announcement in 1961 by the Macmillan government that Great Britain would seek membership in the European Economic Community came as a tremendous blow. In Canada, where trade was in relatively less jeopardy than that of Australia and New Zealand,¹²¹ Canadian politicians reacted vigorously to the announcement.¹²² Prime Minister

¹¹⁵ Darwin, *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg Und Niedergang Des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393.

¹¹⁶ The first Australian university is the Australian National University (A.N.U.) in Canberra. The A.N.U. was founded in 1946 but remained a research university until the 1960s. Frie, 337.

¹¹⁷ John Hilliker and Greg Donaghy, "Canadian Relations with the United Kingdom at the End of Empire, 1956-73," in *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. Philip Buckner (Vancouver/Toronto 2005).p. 25.

¹¹⁸ Darwin, *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg Und Niedergang Des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 392.

¹¹⁹ Robertson and Singleton, p. 156.

¹²⁰ Darwin, *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg Und Niedergang Des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393.

¹²¹ 15.8 percent of Canadian exports went to Great Britain, compared to 23.9 percent of Australian exports, and 50.7 percent of New Zealand exports. See Alex May, "The Commonwealth and Britain’s Turn to Europe, 1945-73," *The Round Table* 102 (2013). p. 34.

¹²² Robertson and Singleton; Benvenuti and Ward.

John Diefenbaker famously stated that Canada would transfer 15 percent of its exports to Great Britain in order to strengthen their mutual trade relations.¹²³ Australians were similarly shocked. The Australian Minister for Overseas Trade, John McEwan, later commented on the event with the following words: “So we were left without a friend in the world.”¹²⁴

For New Zealand, the potential economic damage that could result from Great Britain’s membership in the European Common Market was especially high, since New Zealand exported most of its agricultural products, including milk, butter, meat, and wool, to the British islands. It was known as Great Britain’s ‘farm in the South Pacific’ that supplied the mother country with a bounty of primary products.

Though the EEC debate appears in the literature concerning the 1960s and 1970s, research that specifically investigates this topic is rare. More recently, New Zealand historian David Hall has described the EEC debates within New Zealand’s primary production sector. His PhD thesis, “Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy – New Zealand Primary Production, Britain and the EEC, 1945-1975”¹²⁵ is one of the very few works that deals explicitly with the EEC debate in New Zealand. A co-authored article by Paul Robertson and John Singleton, “Britain, Butter, and European Integration” also covers the topic.¹²⁶ The latter authors have laid important foundations for the analysis of the EEC debate in Australasia in “Britain, the Dominions and the EEC, 1961-1963” (1999),¹²⁷ and “The Old Commonwealth and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3” (2000).¹²⁸ The latter covers reactions in all three Dominions to the EEC negotiations, but only during the first round in 1961.¹²⁹ Their book, *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1945-1970*¹³⁰ also problematizes the relationship between Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand during this period. Andrea Benvenuti analyses the effect of British

¹²³ Buckner, *Canada and the British Empire*, p. 120. Diefenbaker believed in the British connection and wanted to continue and strengthen this relationship. Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984* (Vancouver 2007), p. 135.

¹²⁴ Stuart Ward, "Sentiment and Self-Interest. The Imperial Ideal in Anglo-Australian Commercial Culture," *Australian Historical Studies* 32, no. 116 (2001): p. 103.

¹²⁵ David Hall, *Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy. New Zealand Primary Production, Britain and the Eec, 1945-1975* (Wellington 2017).

¹²⁶ Paul Robertson and John Singleton, "Britain, Butter, and European Integration. 1957-1964," *Economic History Review* L, no. 2 (1997).

¹²⁷ "Britain, the Dominions, and the Eec. 1961-1963," in *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration*, ed. Deighton and Milward (1999).

¹²⁸ "The Old Commonwealth and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3."

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹³⁰ *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1940-1970* (Basingstoke 2002).

talks with the European Common Market on Australia in his thesis, “The End of the Affair: Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations (1961-72),” as does Stuart Ward in “A Matter of Preference: The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship” (2001), and David Goldsworthy in “Menzie’s, Macmillan and Europe.”¹³¹

It is noteworthy that the amount of literature concerning the EEC debates appears to coincide with the amount of potential economic damage expected in the respective countries. While there are few books and articles about the subject in Australian and New Zealand historiography, mostly concerning the implications for trade, the EEC debate appears to be a notably smaller research topic in Canada. It comes up in overviews of Canadian economic and foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s, but specific studies about the British applications to the Common Market are still lacking.¹³² Ursula Lehmkuhl’s article “Fuss about the “holy grail”: Diefenbaker’s Handelsinitiative vom Juni 1957 und die britisch-kanadischen Handelsbeziehungen, 1955-1965”¹³³ and Bruce Muirhead’s articles, “From Dreams to Reality”¹³⁴ and “The Development of Canada’s Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s”¹³⁵ are exceptions, since they thematise the EEC debate in more detail.

Great Britain’s first attempt to join the European Economic Community coincided with the exclusion of South Africa in 1961, which contributed much confusion and shock to an already uncertain situation. The Commonwealth, which was already shifting towards multiculturalism, had thus lost one of its “old” members.¹³⁶ Also, the Sterling crises of the 1960s and its devaluation in

¹³¹ Andrea Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972* (Oxford 2003); Stuart Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The Eec and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," in *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe*, ed. Alex May (London 2001). David Goldsworthy, "Menzie’s, Macmillan and Europe," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 2 (1997). For further discussions of the EEC Debate in Australia, see Andrea Benvenuti, "Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community (1966-67)," *Australian Economic History Review* 46, no. 2 (2006).

¹³² For an introduction to Canadian economic and foreign policy with reference to the EEC debate, see Bothwell, pp. 134-50.; J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette. Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 1990), pp. 158-203.; Michael Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy. Contemporary Issues and Themes* (Toronto et al.1980), pp. 126-42.; Michael Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (Vancouver/Toronto 2002), pp. 204-366.

¹³³ Ursula Lehmkuhl, "Fuss About the „Holy Grail“. Diefenbaker’s Handelsinitiative Vom Juni 1957 Und Die Britisch-Kanadischen Handelsbeziehungen, 1955-1965," in *Canada at the Crossroads? The Critical 1960s*, ed. Gustav Schmidt and Jack L. Granatstein (Bochum 1994).

¹³⁴ Bruce Muirhead, "From Dreams to Reality. The Evolution of Anglo-Canadian Trade During the Diefenbaker Era," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 9 (1998).

¹³⁵ "The Development of Canada’s Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s. The Case of the European Union," *The Canadian Historical Review* 82, no. 4 (2001).

¹³⁶ Darwin, *Das Unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg Und Niedergang Des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393.

1967 added to a mood of uncertainty.¹³⁷ The Rhodesian crisis (1964-1980) was another factor in the weakening of Commonwealth ties.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the Immigration Act of 1971 abolished the difference between Commonwealth and other immigrants.¹³⁹

Politicians in all three former settler colonies perceived these changes to the Commonwealth, which resulted in a sense of disorientation and isolation in the post-imperial world. Stuart Ward has demonstrated this with reference to the flag debate in Canada in 1964, the search for a national anthem in Australia from 1972 to 1974, and the unsuccessful attempt to make New Zealand Day a national holiday in 1975.¹⁴⁰ All three countries were searching for a distinct national identity after the retreat of the British Empire. Almost concurrently, politicians in all three countries called for a “new nationalism” that would orient their respective countries to a post-imperial world, in which “Britishness” was no longer an ordering principle.¹⁴¹ Canada replaced the Union Jack with its own flag in 1965 and adopted the national anthem “O Canada” in 1980. In 1984, “Advance Australia Fair” become the national anthem of Australia, replacing “God save the Queen.”¹⁴² Similarly, New Zealand was vigorously pressed to alter the Union Jack in its flag during the flag debate of 2015-16. For all three Dominions, the USA and Asia grew in importance as trading partners, while the role of Great Britain as a trading partner and guarantor of security diminished. In 1966 during his visit to the USA, the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt stated that Australia would go “all the way with LBJ”.¹⁴³

Concepts of multi-ethnicity became increasingly attractive. Nevertheless, “Britishness” endured as a potential concept of identity. Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand were compelled to further integrate themselves to the Southeast Asian Pacific region. Canada, on the other hand, had to abandon the idea of the north Atlantic triangle and compete alone against the USA. As Anthony Hopkins has stated:

Only in the second half of the twentieth century did the dominions attain full constitutional sovereignty, develop separate identities, establish cultural independence, promote diverse economic relationships, and free their foreign and defence policies from imperial influence.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁷ Cain and Hopkins, p. 266.

¹³⁸ Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*, p. 314. The Rhodesian problem will be further explained in Chapter 2.

¹³⁹ Louis, p. 30.

¹⁴⁰ Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World."

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Hopkins.p.211.

¹⁴³ Quoted in Gary Smith, David Cox, and Scott Burchill, *Australia in the World. An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (Oxford 1996), p. 52.

¹⁴⁴ Hopkins.p. 241.

The decline of the British Empire, the abolition of racist migration policies, the rise of multiculturalism, new trading partners, and the regional reorientation of foreign policy orientation were not just concurrent temporal events, rather they were also linked by similar policy issues and thus closely connected.¹⁴⁵ All three countries were forced to reckon with the possibilities of the post-colonial order, both for themselves and internationally. In doing so, they watched one another, exchanging opinions and evaluating actions. Surprisingly few historical studies investigate the decline of the empire in relation to trade relations with more than one country. As mentioned above, Paul Robertson and John Singleton analyse Australia and New Zealand in their work.¹⁴⁶ In an article from 2000, Richard Pomfret compares 20th-century trade policy in Canada with that of Australia.¹⁴⁷ Hiroyuki Ogawa's article, "Britain's Commonwealth Dilemma: Discussions with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and Transition of British Trade Policy," is one of the very few studies that reckons with all three countries.¹⁴⁸

The arguments that the end of empire had a tremendous impact on the former settler colonies, and that the postcolonial situation offered the potential for a new and different world order has received some criticism. Nevertheless, this is an established position in research concerning the Dominions during the 1960s and 70s. James Curran and Stuart Ward contributed important work on the Australian case, while Philip Buckner did so for Canada. Paul Robertson, John Singleton, Stuart Ward, Francine McKenzie, Felicity Barnes, and others¹⁴⁹ have considered two or even three countries, but a detailed study that considers developments in all three Dominions in terms of their interrelationships is still lacking. A transnational approach to these questions that

¹⁴⁵ Robert van Krieken, "Between Assimilation and Multiculturalism. Models of Integration in Australia," *Patterns of Prejudice* 46 (2012).

¹⁴⁶ Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3."; *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1940-1970*.

¹⁴⁷ Richard Pomfret, "Trade Policy in Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century," *Australian Economic History Review* 40, no. 2 (2000).

¹⁴⁸ Hiroyuki Ogawa, "Britain's Commonwealth Dilemma. Discussions with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and Transition of British Trade Policy. 1956-1959," *Contemporary British History. The Journal of Contemporary British History* 17, no. 3 (2003).

¹⁴⁹ Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3."; Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World."; Francine McKenzie, "Trade, Dominance, Dependence and the End of the Settlement Era in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, 1920-1973," in *Settler Economies in World History*, ed. Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzger, and Richard Sutch (2013); Felicity Barnes, "Bringing Another Empire Alive? The Empire Marketing Board and the Construction of Dominion Identity, 1926-1933," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42 (2014); Jack Doig, "The Australian and New Zealand Government's Response to Britain's Decline in the 1960s. Identity, Geopolitics and the End of Empire," *Journal of New Zealand and Pacific Studies* 1 (2013).

devotes attention to these relations and compares situations in all three Dominions with respect to their ties with Great Britain will offer a new perspective on the post-imperial environment. It will also offer a perspective of the Cold War era from the peripheries.

Unfortunately, historical research on Australia, Canada or New Zealand is, in general, not very common in Germany. Few historians have conducted research on these countries. Even overviews on colonialism or decolonisation (such as Jan Jansens' and Jürgen Osterhammel's *Dekolonisierung*,¹⁵⁰ Osterhammel's *Kolonialismus*,¹⁵¹ or Andreas Eckert's *Kolonialismus*¹⁵²) hardly mention the Dominions. This is surprising since discussions of Australia and New Zealand hardly appear anywhere other than overviews of these topics or in world history.¹⁵³ An exception is the work of Ewald Frie on Australian history, and that of Johannes Voigt on Australia and New Zealand.¹⁵⁴ While the German literature on Australia and New Zealand is not copious, more research has been done on Canada. Udo Sautter wrote an introductory book on the history of Canada in 2000,¹⁵⁵ and Ursula Lehmkuhl has contributed comprehensive studies of Canadian foreign and domestic policy. Nevertheless, Canadian history is often attached to departments of North-American Studies that usually pay more attention to Canada's big neighbour, the USA.

At present, historical debate in Germany usually focuses on European case studies.¹⁵⁶ This dissertation seeks to add an international perspective to German discussions concerning these structural shifts of the 1960s and 1970s. It analyses a mostly overlooked topic concerning three countries that are usually seen as occupying the periphery and are thus neglected. By investigating international relations through the eyes of these three peripheral states (which, of course, from their own viewpoint were central) the dynamics and processes of the postcolonial world emerges in a different light. This augments existing research concerning this period not only because it fills a gap in the research literature, but also because it may draw out different dynamics and different

¹⁵⁰ Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation. Das Ende Der Imperien* (Munich 2013).

¹⁵¹ Osterhammel and Jansen.

¹⁵² Eckert.

¹⁵³ For a brief overview of the history of Australia and New Zealand, see Wolfgang Reinhard in Reinhard, pp. 165-176.

¹⁵⁴ Ewald Frie, "'History Wars.' Geschichtspolitik, Geschichtswissenschaft Und Geschichtskultur in Australien," in *Bilder Nach Dem Sturm. Wahrheitskommissionen Und Historische Identitätsstiftung Zwischen Staat Und Zivilgesellschaft*, ed. Christoph Marx (Berlin 2007); "History Wars. Australien Kämpft Um Seine Vergangenheit," in *Periplus*, ed. Christoph Marx (2004); "Einmal Europa Und Zurück? Australien Und Neuseeland." Johannes Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens Und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung* (Cologne/Vienna/Weimar 2011); *Geschichte Australiens* (Stuttgart 1988). Albrecht Hagemann, *Kleine Geschichte Australiens* (Munich 2004).

¹⁵⁵ Udo Sautter, *Geschichte Kanadas* (Munich 2000).

¹⁵⁶ Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach Dem Boom. Perspektiven Auf Die Zeitgeschichte Seit 1970* (Göttingen 2008).

correlations concerning international politics in the period of decolonisation than those that have been thus far identified and analysed.

This would fulfil the challenge set down by Anthony Hopkins in 2008 to study the settler colonies comparatively, rather than focusing on one country, usually the one to which the researcher is native.¹⁵⁷ This would enable a fuller understanding of the diverse developments that led from colony to nationhood. The approach is especially relevant for the 1960s and 1970s as the post-colonial Dominions influenced one another and had instructive affects that were significant to the process of regionalization and to their growing detachment from British models for politics, economy, and identity. As Stuart Hall has pointed out, settler colonies such as Australia, Canada or New Zealand are obviously post-colonial in a different sense than states such as Nigeria, India, or Jamaica. They neither became independent abruptly, nor through violence as was the case in many former colonies in Africa or Asia. Their road to nationhood was a slower process, one of small steps and much discontinuity.¹⁵⁸ However, the term “post-colonial” may be helpful for the research on settler societies as well. It may further an understanding of global relations in the period after imperial systems broke down. In the Dominions, the uncertainty of a threatening situation with all its various dynamics, unintended side effects, and accelerations¹⁵⁹ should not be misinterpreted as a deliberate pursuit of nationhood in the Dominions. Instead, the search for a “new nationalism” and self-government were one of various options that emerged after 1970, and the reasons behind this search are complex, and they depend on context. The transformation from the imperial to post-imperial could be considered under this rubric, and the research thus might offer new aspects of the processes of decolonization. New power relations can be traced, as well as new constellations in the international world order.¹⁶⁰ German historian Sebastian Conrad stated that the strength of Postcolonial Studies in the field of Global History is the insight it offers in relation to the dynamics of transnational exchange and transfers, as well as its approach to interrelations and its concentration on structurally unequal power relations.¹⁶¹ Drawing from the work of Stuart Hall and Sebastian Conrad, this study analyses reflections concerning the economic,

¹⁵⁷ See also Peter Gibbons, "The Far Side of the Search for Identity. Reconsidering New Zealand History,," *New Zealand Journal of History* 37 (2012).

¹⁵⁸ Osterhammel and Jansen.p. 21.

¹⁵⁹ Decolonisation implies a certain amount of unpredictability and should not be understood as an intentional process just because we know the outcome, as Frederic Cooper, Jan Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel have pointed out: Jansen and Osterhammel, p.9; and Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge 1996).p. 6.

¹⁶⁰ Hall.

¹⁶¹ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalgeschichte. Eine Einführung* (Munich 2013).p. 122.

political, and cultural order of political elites in the Dominions. It will describe and analyse the interactions, transfers, and dynamics specific to each nation. This method will be supplemented by other approaches, such as the “Emotional Turn” and the “New Cultural History,” which will be described in more detail below.

The Emotional Turn

Aside from the approach described above, the “emotional turn”¹⁶² is fundamental for this study. Emotions are a more recent subject for historical research. Following the work of mostly American scholars such as the medievalist Barbara Rosenwein, the cultural anthropologist William M. Reddy and the historians Carol and Peter Stearns,¹⁶³ historians have become increasingly interested in the role of emotions in history – how emotions shape history, and how they are socially and culturally constructed.¹⁶⁴ The “emotional turn” deals with other challenges such as what exactly constitutes the emotions? Who has emotions, and do they have a history?¹⁶⁵

Historians of the emotions investigate how emotional norms are created, shaped, used, as well as who is involved in these processes.¹⁶⁶ The historical field of emotions is still in a nascent

¹⁶² Sometimes known as the “affective” or “emotive” turn. See Florian Weber, “Von Den Klassischen Affektenlehren Zur Neurowissenschaft Und Zurück. Wege Der Emotionsforschung In Den Geistes- Und Sozialwissenschaften,” *Neue Politische Literatur* 53 (2008): p. 21. For a definition of “affect,” see Ute Frevert, “Gefühle Definieren,” in *Gefühlswissen. Eine Lexikalische Spurensuche in Der Moderne*, ed. Ute Frevert, et al. (Frankfurt a.M./New York: 2011), pp. 11-12.

¹⁶³ Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling. A History of Emotions, 600-1700* (Cambridge 2016); William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge 2011); Carol Z. Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Emotion and Social Change. Toward a New Psychohistory* (New York 1988).

¹⁶⁴ Stefanie Pilzweiger, *Männlichkeit Zwischen Gefühl Und Revolution. Eine Emotionsgeschichte Der Bundesdeutschen 68er-Bewegung* (Bielefeld 2015).p. 45. For a brief introduction to the history of emotions, see Bettina Hitzer, “Emotionsgeschichte - Ein Anfang Mit Folgen,” (2011). The origin of the history of emotions can be traced back to Lucien Febvre (1941) who appealed to historians to pay attention to emotions in history: Lucien Febvre, “La Sensibilité Et L’histoire. Comment Reconstituer La Vie Affective D’autrefois?,” *Annales d’histoire sociale* 3 (1941). In addition, see Ute Frevert, “Was Haben Gefühle In Der Geschichte Zu Suchen?,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35, no. 2 (2009); Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer, “Emotionsgeschichte Als Körpergeschichte. Eine Heuristische Perspektive Auf Religiöse Konversionen Im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35, no. 2 (2009); Monique Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion,” *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (2012); Reddy; Rosenwein; “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions,” *Passions in Context. International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions* 1, no. 1 (2010); Jan Plamper, *Geschichte Und Gefühl. Grundlagen Der Emotionsgeschichte* (Munich 2012); Stearns and Stearns; “Emotionology. Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 4 (1985); Susan J. Matt, “Current Emotion Research in History. Or, Doing History from the inside Out,” *Emotion Review* 3, no. 1 (2011).

¹⁶⁵ Plamper.p. 19. The emotional turn is not a completely new phenomenon, but has recourse to earlier literature and research. For an overview of these roots, see Weber.

¹⁶⁶ Anne Schmidt and Christoph Conrad, “The Role of Emotions in the Production of Capitalist Subjects. An Introduction,” in *Bodies and Affects in Market Societies*, ed. Anne Schmidt and Christoph Conrad (Tübingen 2016), p. 6.

state, but some theoretical positions have emerged. Historians of the emotions have shown that concepts of emotions change over time. Some emotions, such as the fear of the apocalypse, have altered over the years as new emotional norms evolved.¹⁶⁷

Some characteristics of emotions have been described in this literature – they consist of cognitive as well as affective elements, and they result from the (sudden) perception of a certain situation. Emotions are “embedded in both the body and the brain,”¹⁶⁸ and they are something “people experience *and* something they do.”¹⁶⁹ Moreover, emotions cause physical reactions, and they can be observed through expressive gestures, so long as the cultural codes that make emotions legible remain clearly established.¹⁷⁰ Given this definition of the emotions, the classical division between them and rationality can be overcome, since the emotions consist of both elements. This definition further demonstrates that emotions have both social and cultural dimensions.

In contrast to the description of emotions found above, this dissertation does not see them as dependent on sudden perception of certain situations. As emotions are socially constructed, they can be formed over longer periods of time, and sudden perceptions of certain situations are not needed in every case (for instance, the Western concept of romantic love). To extend the above-mentioned definition, Monique Scheer has introduced the descriptive concept of “embodied thoughts.” These thoughts, so she claims, are formed by the practices that we do. They are shaped by the habitus, which the social order inscribes onto the individual within every society. Such structures condition how we feel and perceive the world around us. However, this does not entail a deterministic explanation for human behaviour, as emotional practices are not predetermined but can be acted out in different ways. They are highly dependent on specific contexts and therefore

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions."

¹⁶⁹ Scheer, p. 195.

¹⁷⁰ Ute Frevert, "Vertrauen Als Gefühlshaltung," in *Emotionalität. Zur Geschichte Der Gefühle*, ed. Claudia Benthien, Anne Fleig, and Ingrid Kasten (Cologne 2000), pp. 179-80. As quoted in Stearns and Stearns, "Emotionology. Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," p. 813. Emotions are „Emotion: a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated through neural and/or hormonal systems, which gives rise to feelings (affective experiences as of pleasure or displeasure) and also general cognitive processes toward appraising the experience; emotions in this sense lead to physiological adjustments to the conditions that aroused response, and often to expressive and adaptive behaviour.“ Quote by Paul R. Kleinginna and Anne M. Kleinginna, "A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition," *Motivation and Emotion* 5 (1981). The definition leaves out the interrelation between “inner feelings” and the socially constructed norms for their expression. Carol and Peter Stearns introduced the concept of “emotionology” in the 1980, defining it as “the collective emotional standards of a society“ (Stearns and Stearns, "Emotionology. Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," p. 813.), This draws attention to the social aspects of emotions, but the distinction between inner feeling and socially constructed norms for their expressions still persisted. Therefore, this definition has been modified and expanded by other historians of the emotions whose theories will be explained below.

unpredictable.¹⁷¹ This implies that there is no separation between the “inner” feeling and the “outer” (constructed) side of emotions; these aspects are interlinked.¹⁷²

Through the concept of “emotives,” William Reddy has made a further significant contribution to the definitions and theories discussed thus far. He emphasizes the correlation between inner-feelings and utterances, which he calls “emotives.” These have two functions: they describe the feeling even as they simultaneously construct it, forming it into an ‘emotion.’¹⁷³ Emotives therefore help to navigate feelings and evoke reactions from others. Inner and outer worlds thus become intertwined.¹⁷⁴ “Emotional regimes” is the term Reddy uses to describe the social norms governing the emotions. They are formed by the dominant social group.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, Barbara Rosenwein points out that within different societies “emotional regimes” are not singular, but rather there may be plural, potentially rival “emotional communities.”¹⁷⁶ In her book, *Generations of Feeling*, she describes “emotional communities” as groups with their own norms concerning the emotions and how and when to express them.¹⁷⁷ “Emotional Communities” are “social groups whose members adhere to the same valuations of emotions and their expression.”¹⁷⁸ This implies that there is not only one “emotional regime” but many different ones that are often indistinguishable from one other.¹⁷⁹ Rosenwein states that “emotional communities” are largely congruent with social communities such as families.¹⁸⁰ Whether this definition could apply in the cases of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1960s and early 1970s will be considered below.

Thus, for this study, the significant aspect of emotions is that they are both cognitive and affective reactions that are learned, and are socially and culturally constructed. They create social ties between individuals who then also deploy them for this purpose. The emphasis is on how Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders reflected on the role of emotions in imperial relations, and how the emotional background of decision-makers informed economic and foreign policy. This entails the search and analysis of specific emotions and emotional frameworks in the primary

¹⁷¹ Schmidt and Conrad, p. 8.

¹⁷² Scheer, pp. 201-02.

¹⁷³ Hitzer.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Pilzweger, pp. 48-51.

¹⁷⁷ Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling. A History of Emotions, 600-1700*, p. 3.

¹⁷⁸ "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions."

¹⁷⁹ Hitzer.

¹⁸⁰ Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions."

sources. First, one must clarify what was meant by “emotions” in the 1960s and early 1970s, and trace those emotions that can be found in the sources. Having done so, one can examine what role those emotions played in respective social and cultural systems. How did they shape foreign and economic policy? Were they deployed to construct specific national identities or policies? Who used emotions and why? What effect did these emotions have on specific people and actions? The answer to such questions should elucidate the importance of emotions in international politics and Commonwealth contexts, and this dissertation argues that emotions are of the utmost conceptual importance if one is to understand changes in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1960s and early 1970s. As Carol and Peter Stearns have stated:

Changes in emotional standards can in turn reveal much about other aspects of social change and may even contribute to such change.¹⁸¹

This means that “emotives” and “emotional communities” are a primary source for acquiring insight into emotional backgrounds of political and economic decisions. In doing so, this dissertation seeks to contribute to an understanding of how emotions may inform the dynamics of human behaviour, and is less concerned with the individual experience of emotion. One thesis pursued by this study is that the decision to remain politically and economically close to Great Britain, even after it had lost its status as a world power, is not explainable without recourse to the emotions, as they offer the necessary contextual background. The “Emotional Turn” assists in the acquisition of the larger picture behind these decisions, especially where economic or political explanations fail. Of course, these explanations are intertwined, and it would run the risk of simplification to keep these interpretations in isolation from one another.

Still, individual emotions will not be a central focus in this dissertation. Individual emotions are extremely difficult to trace in primary sources, as their authenticity is subjective and thus their effect on political and economic decisions is difficult to evaluate. It is assumed that, in most cases, the individual emotional background of policy-makers is not a major factor for decision-making processes as they are usually bound to a specific emotional regime. Since the study of emotions in history allows one to reckon with the larger contexts that inform social structures and dynamics, the performative aspect of emotions, together with their implications and consequences, is advantageous to this study. Collective emotions may inform history, even as specific events may also stimulate and construct collective emotions – such issues may contribute to a better

¹⁸¹ Stearns and Stearns, "Emotionology. Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," p. 814.

understanding of the 1960s and early 1970s in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Furthermore, emotional practices, that is, the physical side of emotions will be investigated to clarify changes in emotional habitus.

The historical study of emotions also contributes to the “New Cultural History” that has acquired more relevance in recent years, complimenting the more “traditional” diplomatic history that focused more on events and specific figures of international politics.¹⁸² The “New Cultural History” profits from the emotional turn in a reciprocal fashion. What follows will explain why the “emotional turn” together with the “New Cultural History” and economic history underpins this research.

New Cultural History and Economic History

This dissertation investigates an economic theme – namely the trade policies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in the 1960s and early 1970s – with a cultural-historical approach. This is not the more usual choice for economic subject matter, which is mostly the domain of economic historians. The literature on the EEC debates in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand attests to this, since much of this literature is written from an economic-historical perspective.¹⁸³

The economic approach, however, may miss the connections between economic, social, cultural, and political factors.¹⁸⁴ The assumption that economic activity is guided by *ratio* alone is simply not true as Bruno Latour and Vincent Lépinay have argued in their book *Die Ökonomie als Wissenschaft der leidenschaftlichen Interessen* 2010.¹⁸⁵ The “cultural turn” in the humanities¹⁸⁶ has drawn attention to the significance of symbolic and anthropological structures in history. This

¹⁸² Plamper.pp. 44-45. On the New Cultural History of Diplomacy, see Akira Iriye, "Culture and International History," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge 1991); Ursula Lehmkuhl, "Diplomatiegeschichte Als Internationale Kulturgeschichte. Theoretische Ansätze und Empirische Forschung zwischen Historischer Hilfswissenschaft und Soziologischem Institutionalismus," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (2001); Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International History* (New York 2003); Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte, eds., *The Diplomats' World. A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (Oxford 2008); Heidi Mehrkens, "Tagungsbericht: Persönliche Beziehungen zwischen Staatsmännern als Kategorie der Geschichte des Politischen (1815-1914)," (2010); Birgit Aschmann, ed. *Gefühl und Kalkül. Der Einfluss von Emotionen auf die Politik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart 2005).

¹⁸³ Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3.," *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1940-1970*; "Britain, Butter, and European Integration. 1957-1964.," Hart.

¹⁸⁴ Hartmut Berghoff and Jakob Vogel, "Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Ansätze zur Bergung Transdisziplinärer Synergiepotentiale," (Frankfurt a.M. 2004).p. 9.

¹⁸⁵ „Nichts in der Ökonomie ist objektiv, alles ist subjektiv, [...]“ [Nothing in economy is objective, everything is subjective] Bruno Latour and Vincent Lépinay, *Die Ökonomie als Wissenschaft der leidenschaftlichen Interessen. Eine Einführung in die Ökonomische Anthropologie Gabriel Tarde* (Berlin 2010), p. 15.

¹⁸⁶ Doris Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* (2006).

has sometimes led to an astonishing exclusion of material and economic factors as well as their consequences. However, every economic system and every economic action is based on a specific cultural background, and they shape these cultural systems in a reciprocal manner.¹⁸⁷

In contrast to most historical approaches, emotions are a common theme in economic theory as seen, for example, in the Keynesian concept of “animal spirits.”¹⁸⁸ In recent years, some studies in the history of economic thought have reckoned with the history of the emotions, such as Jakob Tanner in his article on Economic Action Theory.¹⁸⁹ Others have studied the impact of specific emotions, such as greed or avarice, on economic behaviour.¹⁹⁰ Studies of advertising, marketing, and consumerism have likewise considered the role played by emotions.¹⁹¹ Still, research concerning the role of emotions in history and its economic dimensions are rare, and when emotions are mentioned, they often play a secondary role.¹⁹²

In this dissertation, societies are understood as complex network systems that are constructed by social relationships.¹⁹³ Such relationships are built on various emotions, but one of the main cornerstones is *trust*.¹⁹⁴ The category “trust” is not exactly an emotion, though it possesses similar characteristics. It evokes certain physical reactions, can be expressed in gestures, and is based on cultural codes. However, trust is usually not a relatively spontaneous reaction to a situation, but rather is formed through a longer process (trust-building process). Trust can be seen as an emotional attitude¹⁹⁵ and as a means of reducing the complexity of the world.

Trust is a fundamental concept for trade relations and foreign policy. Without trust such relations would be impossible. Even in pre-modern times, business people had several specific

¹⁸⁷ Berghoff and Vogel, p. 11. For an initial attempt to build bridges between the Emotional Turn and Economic History, see the edited collection, *Bodies and Affects in Market Societies* (2016). It mainly investigates connections between emotions and capitalism: Anne Schmidt and Christoph Conrad, eds., *Bodies and Affects in Market Societies* (Tübingen 2016).

¹⁸⁸ "The Role of Emotions in the Production of Capitalist Subjects. An Introduction," p. 10.

¹⁸⁹ Jakob Tanner, "Die Ökonomische Handlungstheorie vor der ‚Kulturalistischen Wende‘? Perspektiven und Probleme einer Interdisziplinären Diskussion.," in *Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Dimensionen eines Paradigmenwechsels*, ed. Hartmut Berghoff and Jakob Vogel (Frankfurt a.M. 2004).

¹⁹⁰ For example Heinz-Kurt Wahren, *Gier. Der Menschliche Faktor der Finanzkrise* (Munich 2011); Alexander F. Robertson, *Greed. Gut Feelings, Growth, and History* (Cambridge 2001). Also, see Schmidt and Conrad, "The Role of Emotions in the Production of Capitalist Subjects. An Introduction," pp. 9-13.

¹⁹¹ Stefan Schwarzkopf, "The Making of Cold-War Consumer Culture in Britain from the 1940s to the 1960s," in *Cold War Cultures. Perspectives on Eastern and Western Societies*, ed. Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger (New York 2012); Antoine Hennion and Cécile Méadel, "The Artisans of Desire. The Mediation of Advertising between Product and Consumer," *Sociological Theory* 7, no. 2 (1989).

¹⁹² Schmidt and Conrad, "The Role of Emotions in the Production of Capitalist Subjects. An Introduction," p. 12.

¹⁹³ Frevert, "Vertrauen als Gefühlshaltung," p. 183.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

rituals to strengthen trust between them. Political communication in the 19th century, for example, refers constantly to the notion.¹⁹⁶ Therefore, trust may become a resource in the pursuit of political or economic goals. This implies that trust, or to be more precise, the performative act of stating trust in someone or something, has certain consequences, and it affects dynamics in specific ways. “Trust” in trade relationships can extend from personal networks to detailed contracts between different parties.¹⁹⁷ All such forms of trust in these relationships require certain (ritualized) practices to consolidate the relation between different parties.

This dissertation thus draws from the theory of practices that has recently enriched the “New Cultural History.” There are practices specific to trade policy that will be elicited from the primary sources, and their significance to imperial relations between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Great Britain will be likewise considered. By analysing changes to the processes of building trust in the 1960s and 1970s, we may gain a better understanding of the dynamics of contemporary policy-making. As some sources demonstrate, trust between Great Britain and the Dominions had been a fundamental characteristic of their relationship. This appears to have altered in the 1960s and early 1970s, as was noted, for instance, in a policy paper on Anglo-Australian relations from 28 August, 1972:

[...] our dealings with Great Britain would appear in recent years to have lost some of the warmth and closeness that previously characterised them. [...] the old mutual trust, assistance and collaboration have been marred by an element of guardedness [...].¹⁹⁸

Thus, people in political circles noticed a changed relationship between their own countries and Great Britain; “trust” was replaced by “guardedness.” This is one aspect of the alteration of Commonwealth ties in the post-war era that will be analysed below, as will its consequences.

The concept of “loyalty” plays a special role in Commonwealth relations. While ‘loyalty’ shares some of the characteristics of ‘trust,’ there is a significant difference, for the former involves not only a specific code of conduct within the relationship, but also requires specific behaviour towards third parties. For example, loyalty to Great Britain meant an obligation to support them during the two World Wars. Both concepts, ‘loyalty’ as well as ‘trust,’ will be examined in relation to their impact on economic policy-making and Commonwealth relations.

The combining of economic history with the ‘new cultural history’ benefits both approaches, and since the formulation of policy and national identities have both economic as well

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 188-89.

¹⁹⁷ *Vertrauensfragen. Eine Obsession der Moderne* (Munich 2013), p. 107.

¹⁹⁸ NAC A1838 67/1/3 Part 6

as cultural aspects, it is critical to the main research question. By placing these approaches in conjunction with the ‘emotional turn’ the dissertation seeks a new perspective on Commonwealth trade policy in the 1960s and 70s. It will elucidate the contexts of economic and foreign policy decisions and contribute to a general understanding of relations within the British Empire. The ‘emotional turn’ in accordance with its emphasis on the emotions as a matter of both body and brain is complementary to the theory of practices within ‘New Cultural History.’ Since both these approaches are to be applied to subjects that are most usually part of economic history, a different perspective on the formation of economic policy may be gained.

Methodology

The critical analysis of sources is of course the basis of the project, but specific issues pertaining to the sources and methods used in this study do warrant some discussion. In addition, the study makes use of comparative analysis and the investigation of knowledge and information transfers. Together these will be used to investigate the reactions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to British negotiations with the EEC between 1958 and 1973.

Comparative analysis should illuminate both differences as well as similarities between two or more subjects. Of course, there must be enough similarity between them in order to make the comparison fruitful. Comparisons have a long tradition in historical research. Marc Bloch once exhorted historians to use comparison as a way to overcome hostilities between European nations.¹⁹⁹ In the case of the Dominions, comparison assists in the investigation of a specific problem in three different cases that have a common settler background – the dissolution of imperial ties. As mentioned above, the fourth Dominion, South Africa, is left out of this comparison. Even though South Africa shares a similar settler history with the other Dominions, its evolution under the apartheid regime minimizes the degree to which it can be compared to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in terms of political and economic policy. Through a comparative analysis of these former settler colonies, one may obtain a more nuanced understanding of developments in settler societies in the period of decolonization. This may entail a revision of national narratives in all three countries, which had previously suggested that the end of empire in the 1960s had little impact.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Jürgen Osterhammel, "Transferanalyse und Vergleich im Fernverhältnis," in *Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts-, und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2003), p. 439.

²⁰⁰ For an appreciation of the comparative method, see James Belich, John Darwin, and Chris Wickham, "Introduction. The Prospect of Global History," in *The Prospect of Global History*, ed. James Belich, et al. (Oxford 2016).

In conjunction with a transnational approach, this study also engages in a comparative analysis of transfers and interactions between the relevant countries. However, it considers such information transfers not as a process between individuals or groups, but as one between national groups – *between* Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It compares practices, transfers, and connections between national entities. An important dimension of this analysis is thus how similarities, differences, and transfers were perceived within the respective nations. For instance, the tour of Duncan Sandys, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, to the three Dominions to explain Great Britain’s EEC application was of significant interest among the former Settler Colonies, as were the reactions of their fellow Dominions. Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders observed and compared how they each responded. Referring to Canada’s trading policy, the New Zealand High Commissioner in Ottawa wrote on 29 January 1971 to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Wellington: “[...] there is a lot we can learn from Canada; [...]”²⁰¹

This of course means that the comparative aspect of this study can refer to the comparisons that historical actors made during the 1960s and early 1970s. One can thus compare comparative behaviour among these respective countries. There is then a correlation with the analysis of transfers since the method contextualises historical comparisons, while still comparing them, as well as other processes of learning and exchange between historical actors. Since the three Dominions display similarities and cultural affiliation, comparative analysis is imbricated with the analysis of transfers.

Still, an important methodological question remains – how does one investigate emotions in the available sources? As Susan Matt points out in her article “Recovering the Invisible,”²⁰² the feeling itself and the person or persons who have experienced it are long gone.²⁰³ Historians of emotion, however, trace their former presence in a variety of ways. The survival of words and symbols offer primary signs of emotional life.²⁰⁴ As William Reddy has stated, words that express emotions are “themselves instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying emotions, instruments that may be more or less successful.”²⁰⁵ Nonetheless, historians must be sensitive to the fact that modern connotations of a word might not apply to the meanings given to it by past generations. Moreover, the actual perception of emotions may differ within a society.

²⁰¹ NAW/ABHS/6950/W4628/3/ OTT 26/1/11.

²⁰² Susan J. Matt, “Recovering the Invisible. Methods for the Historical Study of the Emotions,” in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana/Chicago/Springfield 2014).

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁰⁵ Reddy, p. 105.

Transnational history foregrounds the differences between cultural codes, and this may also complicate the understanding of emotions even further, and the same is true of symbols. Therefore, it is important to investigate and give due emphasis to the context of words and symbols in the sources and to attempt to elicit their possible implications.

Barbara Rosenwein advises historians of the emotions to give close attention to emotional metaphors. It does not suffice to simply consider those words that indicate certain emotions (such as fear, love, hate); rather one must read sources with attention to those metaphors that make emotions visible (such as the “family funeral” for sadness).²⁰⁶ Rosenwein also points out that emotions are often used to shock, or to be ironic. In such cases, a careful analysis of the source and its context is necessary to avoid misinterpretations. Furthermore, the historian should be alert to the social role of emotions.²⁰⁷ This appears to have become a standard theme among scholars of the emotions.

Within the framework of this study, emotional backgrounds in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, will be investigated not only through the analysis of words and symbols, but also through the investigation of their practices, performance, and construction (that is, emotives, emotionology, emotional habitus and rituals, among other themes). Since emotions also concern the physical, that is, the habitus is deeply inscribed on the body,²⁰⁸ phenomena that reveal the respective habitus will also be considered. For example, the change in diplomatic habitus from a British style to a specifically “Australian,” “Canadian,” or “New Zealand” style, is noticeable in clothing and expressions. The New Zealand High Commissioner in Ottawa described the Canadian politician Gillespie to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Wellington with the following words:

I found Mr Gillespie to be an impressive, if somewhat reserved - even cold – man, who struck me as more English than Canadian in manner and appearance.²⁰⁹

This suggests that a certain knowledge about specific “English” or “Canadian” styles existed and was noticed by people in contemporary diplomatic circles.

To further elucidate the role of emotions in the EEC debates, attention will be devoted to the constructional approach derived from the “linguistic turn.” This involves the analysis of narratives and terms as social practices and meanings. This is combined with a consideration of those practices, rituals, symbols, and images that constitute the ordering systems that regulated

²⁰⁶ Kavic.

²⁰⁷ Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions."

²⁰⁸ For a short summary of Bourdieu's concept see Scheer.

²⁰⁹ December 20th 1973, NAW ABHS/6950/W4628/3/OTT 26/1/11/2.

foreign and economic policy in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This implies that emotions must be analysed in their cultural, temporal, and social setting. As Nicole Eustace states: “Emotional expression inevitably conveys social messages, the meaning of which is defined by cultural context.”²¹⁰

Furthermore, the study of emotions in a political-economic context requires an assessment of power relations as it related to these countries and to their international relations. Thus, it is important to consider who expressed emotions; when, why, and how emotions were defined, and which contexts gave meaning to emotional expressions.²¹¹

However, even with the most careful methods, there are clear limits to the insights that can be obtained. Using such methods to assess whether the respective emotions are authentic would be a speculative matter and is thus to be avoided. Also, the individual experience of emotions is typically not evident in the sources. Therefore, within these contexts individual emotions are only detectable if they are surprising, unexpected, and extreme when compared to the collective emotions or the emotional regime. This means that those individual emotions that contrast with the emotional regime in a certain group at specific moments may help to identify what characteristics define a specific emotional regime. In this way, the effects of emotions on actions and vice versa can be investigated. The authenticity of emotions, however, is not as relevant to the research questions here, since the aim is to interpret those social contexts and frameworks that inform economic and political decisions. Using approaches derived from economic, social, political, and cultural history in conjunction with the history of emotions should elucidate the interrelated processes behind historical change in this period.

Primary Sources

A research grant has enabled the extensive archival research in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand, upon which this study is based.²¹² In each country, the starting point was the national archive and official government papers. These include parliamentary debates, ministry documents (from Foreign Affairs and Departments of Trade, among others), briefing

²¹⁰ Nicole Eustace, "Emotion and Political Change," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana/Chicago/Springfield 2014), p. 170.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² Australia: National Archives of Australia (Canberra and Sydney), National Library (Canberra); Canada: Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa and Toronto); Great Britain: The National Archives (Kew/London), The British Library (London); New Zealand: Archives New Zealand (Wellington), National Library (Wellington). Two weeks at the archives in London and four months in Ottawa.

papers on specific topics (such as the Commonwealth, and the EEC debates), files concerning relations between the four countries, press clippings, speeches, interviews, press conferences, and other documents. It was fortuitous that all four countries had categorized files on the EEC debate between 1958 and 1973.²¹³ These files, which were quite comprehensive, demonstrate the importance that contemporaries attached to the topic.

In addition, national archives and libraries held a substantial amount of published material from this period – books, parliamentary debates, articles, pamphlets, or flyers written by politicians, ministers, diplomats, high commissioners,²¹⁴ or other experts. The literature from this period, such as H.G. Gelber's study, *Australia, Britain and the EEC, 1961 to 1963*,²¹⁵ constitute primary sources, as do the documents from various Boards – such as the Board of Trade in New Zealand.²¹⁶ Local organisations do not play as large a role, as this would have made the scope of the dissertation too unwieldy, but a detailed study of local organisations (such as farming groups) would be worth undertaking to further expand our understanding of the end of empire in the former settler colonies.

Is it then possible to write a legitimate history of emotions among the political elites of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the EEC debates of the 1960s and early 1970s? This question influences both methodological approaches as well as the choice of primary sources. What sources might reveal information concerning the emotional background of policy-makers during this period? And how should these sources be interpreted and related to one another?

First, sources that attest to personal or collective emotions are a good start for an emotional-historical approach. This includes 'ego-documents' such as diaries, autobiographies, and memoirs, but also communications between individuals such as letters, or records of personal conversations.²¹⁷ Such sources are mainly drawn from politicians (such as Prime Ministers, Ministers, and Members of Parliament) and diplomats (such as High Commissioners and ambassadors). Large collections associated with these individuals can be found in the National Libraries (Canberra and Wellington).²¹⁸ Since such ego-documents are highly subjective, written

²¹³ Indeed, files exist across an even wider time frame, but these were not considered as they were outside the scope of this project.

²¹⁴ High Commissioners are diplomats in other Commonwealth countries.

²¹⁵ H.G. Gelber, *Australia, Britain and the Eec. 1961-1963* (1966).

²¹⁶ For example, the chairman of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, John Ormond, campaigned against British entry into the EEC. Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3," p. 159. His attempts are also described in Hall.

²¹⁷ Plamper.p. 44.

²¹⁸ As the National Archives and National Library are affiliated in Ottawa, these sources could be found in the same building as the official sources.

from a specific perspective and informed by (personal) intentions, they require context from other sources to balance the specific perspectives they offer. Even if the historian is lucky enough to find direct expressions of emotions in these personal documents, such declarations are not unfiltered. They reflect individual emotional states as well as cultural norms – intentionally or unintentionally.²¹⁹ This is both a benefit and a challenge to the researcher, for though it will never be possible to extract an indisputable “truth” concerning emotional life in historical situations and processes, the contextual embedding will demonstrate that some interpretations are more likely than others, since actors sometimes demonstrate cultural norms unintentionally.

It is not possible to fully overcome the gap between a conception of the emotions that is historically traceable and what people at that time “really” felt. Nevertheless, the evaluation of historical life in terms of trying to assess whether certain emotions were authentic or not, is not what such research should be concerned with, as it does not further our understanding of historical processes. The individual emotion might be significant – as mentioned above – if the personal emotional state contrasts with an emotional regime, or upsets certain emotional norms. In such cases, it then offers evidence concerning more than one emotional status. What is significant is the analysis of how emotions are constructed, what effects they create, and how historical dynamics are shaped by them and vice versa. Therefore, the aim is not to put historical actors on a couch and write a ‘traditional’ economic or political history with additional mention of people’s feelings. The goal is, through the analysis of emotional communities and how they influence politics, to illuminate how decisions are formed and the processes of historical change in threatening times.

Second, newspapers added further perspectives on the topic. Examples were from commentary, opinion pieces, and letters from readers. To keep the source base manageable, however, this research was limited to the leading newspapers within the three countries.²²⁰ Among these sources, cartoons proved to be a rich source for the history of emotions in the former Dominions. They graphically demonstrate a specific emotional status, often augmented by subtitles. Radio and television shows as well as interviews also added to the corpus of relevant sources.

Thirdly, several interviews with contemporary witnesses were conducted during visits to the three countries. These eyewitnesses were mainly drawn from political and diplomatic circles.

²¹⁹ Matt, "Recovering the Invisible. Methods for the Historical Study of the Emotions," p. 44.

²²⁰ Australia: *Sydney Morning Herald*, *The Daily Telegraph*; Canada: *Toronto Star*, *Ottawa Citizen*, *Montreal Gazette*; New Zealand: *New Zealand Herald*.

They added valuable perspectives, since they were able to explain background information concerning government papers and practices that were not recorded in the sources. There are diverse reasons for such omissions. Sometimes contemporaries did not give much emphasis to matters that in their eyes appeared to be natural or ‘common sense.’ Most often, it is those matters that were perceived, in some sense, to be remarkable that are preserved in the sources. Of course, the interviews do not give access to the truth of these events; rather, as with other primary sources, they are interpretations. However, they are not less valid for this reason, and when put into context with other sources, they potentially yield valuable insights.

Finally, the primary sources from government agencies mentioned above are likewise useful. Their style and content tend to be unemotional, and this lack of emotional language is itself evidence of the norms that govern emotional communities.²²¹ They offer insight into the emotional styles that were perceived as appropriate or inappropriate in different contexts.

Through the consideration of primary source material from the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, together with private papers and interviews with government officials, the connections between changes in economic policy and changes in both emotional backgrounds and attitudes towards the Commonwealth. Thus, the dissertation does not depend on newly discovered or opened sources, but rather it is based on a re-combination of known sources and on new methodological approaches.

Furthermore, the practices that create these written sources will also be analysed. How were government papers composed and then circulated among the political elite in these countries? How was information passed on between Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand? Who had access to the primary sources to be found in archives and national libraries? What changes in Commonwealth practices can be observed?

Moreover, the governmental sources contain seldom-mentioned information related to policy making. In some cases, the policy-makers and experts who read these materials commented on them in various ways. They altered them, by writing, or in some cases, drawing, by adding comments, or affixing notes. These comments and the different versions of papers that circulated among different departments, countries, or people attest to the processes that created governmental or Commonwealth papers. Such examples, however, are not many in number, but the ones that can

²²¹ For example, Jan Plamper has shown in his article about fear in the military that the existence as well as the absence of fear demonstrates emotional norms. Jan Plamper, "Fear. Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology," *Slavic Review* 68, no. 2 (2009).

be found attest to different aspects of policy-making in the former settler colonies during the 1960s and early 1970s. The files themselves give evidence of decision-making practices, both departmental and national dynamics, and of interrelationships and knowledge transfers.

The study will be based on these sources, using the theoretical and methodological approaches mentioned above. The approach should enable a new reading of these sources, offering new perspectives concerning the former settler colonies in the context of decolonization. In so doing, the study will contribute a different perspective on the issue of structural breaks during the 1960s and 1970s, one that comes from the periphery of the empire. It will also contribute a different approach, that of the history of the emotions, to a theme that is most often researched from an economic-historical approach. By addressing the question economic and political decision-making from the point of view of emotional frames, the framework behind such decisions is further elucidated. These include reflections about the economic order, emotional backgrounds, and the relationship to Great Britain, as seen during a moment of threat.

Such sources demonstrate the limited scope of this study as they mainly give evidence of a perspective that is male and elitist, and does not reflect that of the general population of the former settler colonies. How indigenous people perceived the end of empire in the former settler colonies likewise cannot be addressed here. A reconstruction of the variety of emotional regimes and communities that existed in the respective societies of the 1960s and early 1970s is thus outside the scope of this study. The sources were selected for what they can offer concerning political elites in the Dominions and how they perceived the end of empire following Great Britain's first attempt to join the EEC. The question of how other groups outside of the male Anglo-European political elites perceived these events would be a fruitful subject for further investigation.

Chapter 2

2.1. Canoeing through Uncertain Times: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand before 1960

In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the EEC debates took place within the larger context of the post-1945 British Empire. This was a period in which actors in all three Dominions perceived a shift in the British political position globally, as well as within the Commonwealth, and in relation to their own national positions in world affairs. These complex processes in the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth, and globally gave rise to a general sense of insecurity among political and diplomatic actors in the three countries, giving the impression that the Commonwealth was in flux or even decline. For decades, the United Kingdom had been both guarantor and orientation point for security, economic stability, and cultural alignment. Thus, the Australian Minister for Trade, John McEwen, reminded his audience at the Perth Chamber of Manufactures and Commerce in August 1962 of the long years under Britain's protective rule with the following words:

In the early part of my life no British colony or dominion had to worry about insecurity in the world. There was Britain, the most powerful military nation, pledged to a policy of having a navy as strong as the next two most powerful fleets in the world combined. And under the defense of that we slept soundly. You and I have lived in a period of history when much has changed.²²²

With this speech, John McEwen reminded his audience of a time when Great Britain had possessed the scope and power to defend its colonies and the Dominions militarily. Without offering an exact date for the end of this protective role, McEwen was referring to a time when neither colonies nor Dominions needed to worry about their security in the world. In an emergency, Britain was able to protect them with the strength of its navy. They could rest ("slept soundly") under Britain's protective umbrella. In this respect, McEwen appears to have forgotten the two World Wars and the fall of Singapore in 1942. This idealized construction of the past and the narrative of Britain as a protective 'mother' here functions as a contrast to the striking processes of change during the preceding years. McEwen noted a shift in respect to British patronage:

We are living in times that are dramatic; great times of expansion and development. [...] You and I have lived in a period of history when much has changed.²²³

Its monopoly position in the world had ostensibly changed. Although McEwen described the current period as an era of great developments ("great times of expansion and development"), he

²²² NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: John McEwen, speech to the Perth Chambers of Manufactures and Commerce, 1 August, 1962.

²²³ Ibid.

pointed out to his audience the disappearance, or at least the diminution, of British supremacy. It appeared that a transformation of the international power structure had taken place.

In the following chapter, the specifics of the situation that John McEwen was referring to in his speech will be discussed in more detail.²²⁴ Individual developments are not arranged chronologically, but rather sorted by topic. In addition, the three individual chapters on Australia, Canada, and New Zealand revolve around the question of how closely the respective country was intertwined with Great Britain at this time, or whether it was already oriented toward the United States of America, which during this period was growing in importance. A specific theme, introduced by means of a quotation, draws attention to a central aspect of the national context of each respective country.²²⁵ In addition, the foreign policy orientation of the three countries under discussion will be related to the "New Nationalism" in all three Dominions, giving attention to the specifics of each country. This exposition should filter out the differences and similarities among the three countries. It should also lead to an evaluation of whether the Dominions worked together after World War II or, as John McEwen stated, "We all paddle our own canoes."²²⁶ This section will also demonstrate why the three settler colonies are comparable and what insights into the nationalisms of settler colonialism can be derived from this comparison.²²⁷

But back to the great "mothership" of Britain, which, according to John McEwen, had long provided security for the Dominions. The narrative of Britain's decline as a world power after World War II is well known, both from primary sources and the secondary literature. Jim Tomlinson, in his book *The Politics of Decline - Understanding Post-War Britain*, has shown that the notion of British decline in economic terms was already a common argument in policy debates by the late 1950s. As a result, the notion of a "British decline" took root in the minds of contemporaries as well as in later research literature.²²⁸ However, Britain's decline did not occur suddenly after World War II, but rather was a decades long process. Already during World War II,

²²⁴ It would be outside the scope of this study to give a detailed account of both the Cold War and decolonization outside the British Empire.

²²⁵ These respective aspects are not the only or even the most central issues in the countries during this period. However, they play a prominent role and are central to the contexts of the dissertation in general. Other research perspectives may consider them less important, yet they are intended to serve as guidelines and provide orientation to this discussion. They are not, however, to be understood as exclusively characterizing all groups, nor the totality of political concerns in each country.

²²⁶ NAA A3917 Volume 7: Mr. McEwen's Statement, Press Conference held in Bonn, 30 March, 1962.

²²⁷ The individual chapters on the different countries have varied emphases and do not discuss all the same subjects. Differences result from the weight given to these topics within the respective historiographies specific to each country.

²²⁸ Cf. Jim Tomlinson, *The Politics of Decline. Understanding Post-war Britain* (Harlow/London/New York et al. 2001), p. 65.

the fall of Singapore in 1942 had significantly damaged the image of the United Kingdom as a world power.²²⁹

After the Second World War, Great Britain struggled internally with a number of difficulties. The country was especially hard hit by economic disruptions caused by the war. War damages at home, decimated markets and a declining export economy pressed Great Britain to its economic limits, and new competitors entered the international market after World War II.²³⁰ Moreover, Britain had to support its troops, stationed both on the continent (the Rhine Army) and in various overseas possessions.²³¹ This was expensive. By 1945 Britain could only cover around 40 percent of its overseas obligations and expenses.²³² Due to the war, its gold and dollar reserves had fallen from \$4,190 million to \$1,409 million.²³³ The American decision to discontinue "Mutual Aid" after the conclusion of the Pacific War further complicated Britain's financial position.²³⁴ Furthermore, the British population expected the newly elected Labour government to fulfill its election promises to expand the welfare state.²³⁵

Britain was, for these reasons, dependent on American loans after the Second World War.²³⁶ The Americans, however, were not the only ones who supported Britain financially. The four Dominions (including South Africa) also tried to help Britain by offering loans, selling gold, expanding trade, and cancelling debts.²³⁷ For example, Canada supported Britain with a loan of \$1.25 billion in 1946.²³⁸ New Zealand held campaigns for British aid in both 1946 and 1947-48.

²²⁹ In his speech, John McEwen appears to have lost sight of this fact, even though in the historiography of the British Empire, the fall of Singapore was viewed as significant threat to it. Presumably, McEwen refrained from mentioning such crises in his speech in order to make his actual point more clearly, which concerned change in the British Empire.

²³⁰ Cf. Francine McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," in *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 4 (2006), pp. 553-76, p. 561.

²³¹ Cf. David Childs, *Britain Since 1939. Progress and Decline* (Basingstoke 2012). The Rhine Army in continental Europe was supported by Canadian troops until 1968. Cf. Robert Bothwell, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War* (Concord 1998), p. 40.

²³² Cf. Childs, *Britain Since 1939: Progress and Decline*, p. 8.

²³³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

²³⁴ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," pp. 561f.

²³⁵ Cf. Anthony Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown, W.M. Roger Louis, and Alaine Low, pp. 280-305 (Oxford/New York 1999), p. 293.

²³⁶ In 1946, for example, Great Britain narrowly escaped national bankruptcy with an American loan of 3.5 billion dollars. This immense American loan led critics to suggest that Great Britain would become a satellite state of the United States. Cf. W.M. Roger Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by W.M. Roger Louis, Judith M. Brown, and Alaine Low, pp. 329-56 (Oxford 1999), p. 331.

²³⁷ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," p. 565.

²³⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

These campaigns involved a large network of committees that advertised support for the motherland through media campaigns and appeals such as "help Great Britain win the peace"²³⁹. Such assistance, however, arose not only for sentimental reasons. Settler-colonial motives led to an interest in British economic strength: the Dominions saw their own economic advantage and stability as dependent on an economically strong and financially stable Britain. Despite the Sterling Crisis²⁴⁰ of 1949, the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand remained in the Sterling Area because they viewed their economic future as tied to Great Britain.²⁴¹ The legal construction of the Sterling Area stemmed from World War II and was designed to contain the dominance of the American dollar.²⁴² In addition, the Sterling Area offered participants easier terms of trade among themselves and was intended to provide protection against global economic fluctuations. It diminished in importance during the postwar years as participants, including the Dominions, began to establish trade relationships outside of those in the Empire.²⁴³ The zone was formally dissolved in 1972 – one year before Britain joined the European Economic Community.

In the eyes of many contemporaries, the emerging conflicts between the "West" and the "East" required the development and testing of expensive nuclear weapons.²⁴⁴ The East-West conflict (Cold War) and the associated rise of the Soviet Union led to a shift in British defense strategy. In 1946, with the Inter-Government Agreement Between the United Kingdom-Australia Government on the Guided Missile Project, Australia allowed Britain to test missiles at Woomera in southern Australia and to maintain research laboratories near Adelaide.²⁴⁵ In this way, Australia and Great Britain strengthened their ties right after World War II.

The so-called superpowers – the socialist Soviet Union on the one hand and the liberal-capitalist United States of America on the other – courted allies. This appeared to split the global order of states into two camps.²⁴⁶ Aside from the two camps of superpowers together with their allies, there

²³⁹ Quoted in Malcom McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy* (Oxford 1993), p. 99.

²⁴⁰ Sterling crises were related to the depreciation of the pound sterling currency. For more information on individual sterling crises, see, Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen, *Sterling in Decline. The Devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967* (Oxford 1983).

²⁴¹ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," p. 565.

²⁴² Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization. Das Ende* pp. 93f.

²⁴³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

²⁴⁴ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 293f.

²⁴⁵ Cf. David Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954* (Sydney 1999), p. 17.

²⁴⁶ In addition to the USSR, the Eastern Bloc included the Warsaw Pact states, Outer Mongolia, Cuba and North Korea. On the side of the Western bloc, one counts the states of NATO as well as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines and some other states with an American military presence. Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization. Das Ende der Imperien*, p. 98.

was still a third camp of non-aligned states. After the Bandung Conference of 1955 in Indonesia, this association of non-aligned states tried to take a neutral position between the superpowers in the international state system.²⁴⁷ Within this order, the three Dominions counted themselves among the Western powers.²⁴⁸ In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States both possessed nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of reaching any region of the world. The nuclear arms on both sides and the disposition of the global power system between the two superpowers led to an increased need for the United Kingdom to develop and possess nuclear weapons.²⁴⁹ However, it was not just the reach of nuclear weapons that affected every region of the world during the Cold War, since the competition between the two superpowers over spheres of influence also spread to almost every part of the globe. By stationing troops, providing economic aid or dispatching military advisors, the two superpowers attempted to secure the loyalty of other states.²⁵⁰ This meant that during this period the foreign policy of the Dominions was also influenced by the tense relations between the superpowers, since foreign policy as well as the debates and decisions over trade policy had to reckon with this bipolar world order. Decisions concerning potential trade partners might depend on where the state concerned positioned itself in the East-West conflict. New trade agreements with nations that stood with the Eastern bloc might lead to conflicts with allies in the West. Thus, during the Cold War trade policy required careful consideration, since it might intertwine with foreign policy loyalties and one's position within the system of power. For example, Canadian trade relations with communist Cuba made for tension in the relationship between Canada and the USA.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ The "non-aligned countries" included, for example, India, Yugoslavia and Romania. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 99.

²⁴⁸ "[...] let me make it quite clear that in this divided world we know on which side we stand: we stand with the United States, the United Kingdom and our friends of the Western World." NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: John McEwen, speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia, 11 June, 1962. During the Cold War period, the Labor government in Australia tried to reduce the influence of the Australian Communist Party (*Communist Party*) with the Approved Defence Projects Protection Act (1947). The Communist Party had attempted to ban nuclear weapons testing, and the government enacted the aforementioned law so that interference with the testing would be criminalized. Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, p. 18.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Clayton, "Deceptive Might! Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 226.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization. The End of Empires*, p. 100. Thereby the Cold War drew closer to the three Dominions: "We live in a world where the cold war goes on, where Communists are identified as the opponents of the way of life we subscribe to; where there is fighting, or the threat of fighting, not too distant from Australia." NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: John McEwen, speech at the annual conference of the Country Party Queensland, Southport, 29 May, 1962.

²⁵¹ By the early 1950s, Canadian actors had already begun trading with countries behind the Iron Curtain. Starting in 1952, for example, Canada exported wheat and barley to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Later in 1955, Prime Minister Lester Pearson headed a trade mission to Russia to improve the opportunities of expanding trade. This effort led to a Canada-Russia trade agreement in the same year. Canada also traded with the People's Republic of

However, it was not only the influence of the Cold War and Britain's difficult economic situation after World War II that led to the changing dynamics of their trade relations with the Commonwealth countries. Britain's increasingly altered export trade also contributed to these changes. Traditionally, Britain exported manufactured goods and imported food and raw materials from Commonwealth countries and the Sterling area.²⁵² In the 1950s, with an increasing reliance on Japan, the United States, and the industrialized countries of Western Europe, the composition of British foreign trade changed. While imports from Commonwealth countries declined, the type of imported products themselves also changed. Britain began to import more manufactured goods; food imports stagnated. This meant that British trade patterns changed to one of exchange between industrialized countries trading manufactured goods for manufactured goods.²⁵³ Raw materials and foodstuffs became less important to British trade policy, and Commonwealth trade thus became less attractive. In addition to its economic difficulties, Britain was further overshadowed by the two great powers of the Cold War and was stripped of its world power position.²⁵⁴ Various options for regaining its preeminent position were discussed in Britain and the Empire after World War II. Some politicians, such as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, saw a reorientation of imperial defense strategy as a way to maintain Britain's world status.²⁵⁵

Another option for British development after the war was rooted in Canadian ideas. In 1945, the Canadian lawyer and professor John Bartlett Brebner published his book *The North Atlantic Triangle. The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*.²⁵⁶ In it, Brebner outlined ideas for closer cooperation among the three English-speaking nations of Canada, America, and Great Britain. His book pointed out, among other things, that the three countries shared a common goal of global stability and thus should support each other and collaborate more closely. The idea of a North Atlantic Triangle was supported in several other works that followed Brebner's exposition.²⁵⁷ In the context of the postwar period and the aforementioned rise of the United States as a world power, ties between Canada and its American neighbor grew stronger. The creation of

China well before official recognition by the Canadian government. Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 229.

²⁵² Cf. Lehmkuhl, "Fuss About the 'Holy Grail'. Diefenbaker's June 1957 Trade Initiative and British-Canadian Trade Relations, 1955-1965," p. 198.

²⁵³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 198f.

²⁵⁴ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," p. 553.

²⁵⁵ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 294.

²⁵⁶ John Bartlett Brebner, *The North Atlantic Triangle. The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (New Haven 1945).

²⁵⁷ Cf. Owrarn, "Canada and the Empire," p. 155.

the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and Canadian support for America in the 1956 Suez Crisis further brought the two countries closer together. Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in resolving the Suez Crisis.²⁵⁸ With the North American Air Defence Command (1957), a Canada-U.S. military alliance, ties likewise grew. All of these factors show an increasing rapprochement of Canada with America, while British influence was thereby diminished.²⁵⁹ In consequence, Britain faced a waning of its influence in the North American Dominion.

Yet, not all actors in Canada were in agreement with these developments. Intellectuals who feared an expansionist America were particularly prominent among the critics of the increasing orientation to their North American neighbor. Their fear that Canada could be absorbed culturally and economically by the United States was voiced by, among others, Canadian historians. For example, Donald Creighton and W.L. Morton saw a danger that Canada could lose its distinct culture.²⁶⁰ Morton argued that the difference between Canada and the United States was based primarily on Canada's ties to the British Empire.²⁶¹ American technologies, American music, and American television were construed as threats to Canadian culture. In these representations, the British Empire served both as a counterweight and a means of delimiting American influence.²⁶² Consequently, despite the increasing importance of the United States as a world power and partner, the historical relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth remained of great importance to Canadians as a means of distinguishing themselves from Americans.²⁶³

Still, the concept of the North Atlantic Triangle was not implemented in the postwar period. For Britain, the turn towards European integration also did not initially appear to be an alternative. For example, Great Britain did not join the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC/Montan Union), which was founded in 1951. When six European nations – Belgium, France, Luxembourg,

²⁵⁸ Cf. Gary Marcuse and Reg Whitaker, *Cold War Canada. The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 1994), p. 113. On Pearson, see Andrew Cohen, *Lester B. Pearson* (London 2008); John English, *Shadow of Heaven. The Life of Lester Pearson. Vol. I 1897-1948* (Toronto 1989); Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (eds.), *Mike's World. Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs* (Vancouver/Toronto 2017). Pearson's memoir also provides good insight into his views: Lester Pearson, *Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume I 1897-1948*, ed. by John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto 1972); Lester Pearson, *Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume II 1948-1957*, ed. by John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto 1973); and Lester Pearson, *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume III 1957-1968*, ed. by John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto 1975). On Pearson's ties to Britain, see C.P. Champion, "Mike Pearson at Oxford. War, Varsity, and Canadianism," in *Canadian Historical Review* 88 (2007), pp. 263-90.

²⁵⁹ Cf. Owrarn, "Canada and the Empire," p. 155f.

²⁶⁰ Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century* (Toronto 1970); W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronto 1963).

²⁶¹ Cf. W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronto 1963), p. 55.

²⁶² Cf. Owrarn, "Canada and the Empire," p. 157.

²⁶³ Cf. *Ibid.*

Italy, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany – began negotiations for a European economic community, as was permitted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)²⁶⁴, Britain still remained aloof.²⁶⁵ The six European countries signed the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, establishing a customs and trade zone and strengthening their economic ties. At that time, Great Britain was busy preparing a plan for a European Free Trade Area (EFTA).²⁶⁶ The Common Market was to be a member of this zone. However, the six European countries did not support this, since they did not want Britain to benefit from tariff exemptions without contributing to the costs of the economic union.²⁶⁷

New Zealand and Australia observed developments in continental Europe with concern. On the one hand, they saw advantages in a union of Western powers within Europe to establish stability against the Eastern bloc during the Cold War; on the other, they feared disadvantages for the export of their agricultural products.²⁶⁸ The two countries had agreed to EFTA with the proviso that agricultural products would be exempt from its provisions. In 1957, however, they began to revise their views and were favorable to the inclusion of agricultural products – as long as the Commonwealth countries could become associate members of EFTA. This would have opened up new markets for both countries on the European continent. Although the possibility of an affiliation for Commonwealth countries was discussed by Britain, the Commonwealth states, and the EFTA states, they did not reach a solution, and the Commonwealth countries remained outside.²⁶⁹ New Zealand actors feared that the two European economic unions, EFTA and EEC, would lead to a division of Western Europe into two economic blocs, resulting in political and economic differences.²⁷⁰ The worst-case scenario for New Zealand actors would have been an acceptance by

²⁶⁴ GATT was an agreement concluded in October 1947 by 23 nations that regulated international trade. Eight rounds of negotiations established tariffs and rules for international trade. GATT became the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 1 January, 1995. Cf. Achim Helmedach, "WTO," in *Handbook of International Organizations. Theoretical Foundations and Actors*, ed. by Katja Freistein and Julia Leininger, pp. 283-96 (Munich 2012), p. 283; Douglas Irwin, "The GATT in Historical Perspective," in *The American Economic Review* 85, no. 2 (1995), pp. 323-28, pp. 323-26.

²⁶⁵ Under GATT, nations of the Commonwealth were prohibited from creating independent trade and economic zones.

²⁶⁶ Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal were to become members of the EFTA. Cf. Brian Harrison, *Seeking a Role. The United Kingdom 1951-1970* (Oxford 2009), p. 117. On the Australian position regarding the establishment of the EEC, cf. John B. O'Brien, "The Australian Department of Trade and the EEC, 1956-61," in *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to join the European Communities*, ed. by Alex May, pp. 39-52 (Basingstoke 2001).

²⁶⁷ Cf. Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984*, pp. 139f.

²⁶⁸ Cf. Robertson and Singleton, "Britain, Butter, and European Integration, 1957-1964," p. 332.

²⁶⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 332f.

²⁷⁰ Cf. ANZ ADRK 17391 T1W2666/33 61/5/4/2: Text of Broadcast by the Prime Minister, 31 March, 1960.

Britain of CAP (*Common Agricultural Prices*), the standards of the EEC.²⁷¹ The Canadian government also feared regional trade blocs that might create divisions between the countries of Western Europe and the rest of the world.²⁷²

Many British saw another alternative for stabilizing their identity as a world power in a strengthening of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth appeared to lend itself to the exertion of influence on world affairs. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed a Commonwealth customs union in 1947, but this suggestion met with little favor from the Dominions, as they saw little opportunity to expand trade within the Commonwealth.²⁷³ However, the limits on Commonwealth trade did not imply that Commonwealth relations had become less important. On the contrary, for many actors in the former settler colonies, the survival of the Commonwealth represented a central foundation of their own economic, political, and cultural systems. For example, Canada's Conservative prime minister, John Diefenbaker, emphasized the importance of the Commonwealth in 1958 with the following words:

The Commonwealth of Nations is the most unique yet fruitful political and social institution that the mind of man has ever produced. Its greatness lies in its very nature, [...]. A voluntary and revocable union of nations joined in dedication to common ideals and while international in scope, intimate in character, its bonds are not of the sword or the seal, but of the spirit. [...] This is the challenge the Commonwealth faces, must meet, and can meet, for no other institution in the modern world has the same global unity in the things of the spirit, and the economic potential to preserve and defend the heritage of freedom. [...] Trade has become a major weapon in the Communist world offensive [...] I believe that expanding trade and economic cooperation among the free world nations is necessary if the Communist world trade threat is to be met.²⁷⁴

In his speech, Diefenbaker refers to the uniqueness of the “Commonwealth” as an institution. The connections within the Commonwealth are not only political and economic, but also based on emotional affiliations and a shared cultural system. Here, Diefenbaker refers to the close common ties of the Commonwealth states in terms of intellect and culture. Through these commonalities, he argues, the Commonwealth succeeded in binding together heterogeneous nations that were geographically and ethnically distant from one another.²⁷⁵ The rest of the quote can be read in the

²⁷¹ Cf. ANZ ABHS 950 W4627/1410 56/2/5 9: Department of External Affairs (Wellington), "European Economic Integration," 30 August, 1960.

²⁷² Cf. TNA T 236/6549: Briefing Paper for Sir Frank Lee's Visit, 6 February, 1961.

²⁷³ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," p. 563.

²⁷⁴ LAC MG01/VII/507 microfilm 35755-35760: John Diefenbaker speech to the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association in London, 4 November, 1958.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Paul Robertson and John Singleton, "The Commonwealth as an Economic Network," in *Australian Economic History Review* 41, no. 3 (2001), pp. 241-66, p. 251.

context of the Cold War: Diefenbaker points to the Commonwealth's importance as a guarantor of economic security and a bulwark against communism. The Dominions' fear of a communist system had been further fueled in the late 1940s and 1950s by events such as the Berlin Blockade, the communist revolt in China, and the Korean War²⁷⁶ .²⁷⁷

However, the Commonwealth as a whole and its composition also came under strain in the years following World War II. After 1945, many actors in Britain and the British Empire presumed that the basis of British power lay in Palestine and Egypt. Strategic considerations made Palestine a potential base for bomber aircraft and Cold War military operations. Egypt and, by extension, the Suez Canal were important for the transport of oil from the Persian Gulf and the control of oil refineries in Iran. Middle Eastern oil was essential to the viability of sterling. The declining power of the Royal Navy, which had controlled the eastern Mediterranean, was also noted by countries in the Middle East.²⁷⁸ In October 1945, Jewish uprisings began in Palestine, leading Britain to consider intervening in the conflict.²⁷⁹ In 1947, Great Britain handed the issue over to the United Nations. The latter advocated a partition of the country, which resulted in violent excesses between Jews and Arabs. Great Britain drew the conclusion from these events and relinquished its mandate for Palestine in May 1948.²⁸⁰

In turn, Britain's withdrawal from Palestine strengthened voices that likewise demanded the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. Since control of the Suez Canal represented an essential symbol for the preservation of British power, the British government feared significant damage to its image if troops withdrew.²⁸¹ Giving up Egypt would draw attention to British decline and damage both its own national identity as a world power and negatively influence its international reputation. Negotiations with the Egyptian government over troops in the Canal Zone did not produce the desired result for the British government. Instead, the Egyptian government supported violent skirmishes in the Canal Zone. The ensuing conflict over the Suez led to the need to station

²⁷⁶ The Korean War began with the invasion of South Korea on 25 June, 1950, by communist North Korea and lasted for three years. Cf. Bothwell, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War*, p. 35.

²⁷⁷ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," p. 566.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 298.

²⁷⁹ The demand of Jewish protesters for a separate Israeli state was supported by the USA. The Americans therefore exerted pressure on Great Britain to allow Jewish immigration to Palestine. This was contrary to the British idea of a two-state solution. The *Royal Navy* tried to stop illegal Jewish immigration by sea. This attempt was not only costly for the British state, it also provoked strong criticism worldwide. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 298f.

²⁸⁰ Cf. *Ibid*.

²⁸¹ The Suez Crisis was a dramatic turning point for the Commonwealth. A broad body of research already exists on this topic, so a detailed description of the significance of this crisis for the Empire is not needed here.

of British troops in the zone.²⁸² In the meantime, the Iranian government had nationalized the Abadan oil refinery in 1951. The loss of this refinery threatened Britain's economic stability; the economic loss to Britain was estimated at 120 million pounds.²⁸³ The British government was supported by the United States of America, which helped to conclude the Consortium Agreement in 1954. With this agreement, Britain lost its monopoly on oil and allowed American participation, which contributed to an expansion of American world power.²⁸⁴

However, this did not settle the conflict over the Suez Canal. On the contrary, the crisis escalated with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian President Nasser in 1956.²⁸⁵ Great Britain, France and Israel then sent troops to the canal zone and planned to overthrow him. Nasser maintained contact with the Soviet Union and was thus, for actors within Britain, France, and Israel, positioned on the 'eastern side' in the Cold War. Australia and New Zealand supported British intervention, even though New Zealand expressed misgivings. The United States and the United Nations both put pressure on Britain and France to withdraw their troops. A year later, they both agreed to withdraw from the Canal Zone by March 1957. Anglo-American tensions eased relatively quickly after the Suez Crisis, as both saw an advantage in uniting against the threat from Moscow.²⁸⁶ This reassured Canada in particular, which counted on a good relationship between its key partners due to its geographic location and ties to the United States and to Great Britain.²⁸⁷ From Canada's point of view, the Suez crisis was a disaster. Both the British circumvention of the United Nations, which Canada viewed as a highly important institution, and the divisions within the Commonwealth caused by the crisis led Canadian actors view the Suez conflict as a destabilizing event for the British Empire.²⁸⁸ New Zealand's refusal to provide military support to Britain in the Suez conflict demonstrates an increasing rapprochement with the United States in terms of defense alliances.²⁸⁹ In addition to the loss of British prestige, the Suez crisis also contributed to the destabilization of Britain's position in Jordan and Iraq.

²⁸² In 1954, the Churchill government managed to negotiate an agreement in which Britain agreed to withdraw its troops with the proviso that they could return in the event of war. British civilians would remain in the Canal Zone to maintain its infrastructure. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 299.

²⁸³ Cf. Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," p. 339.

²⁸⁴ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 300.

²⁸⁵ For more information on the Suez Crisis, see. W.M. Roger Louis, *End of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization. Collected Essays* (London/New York 2006).

²⁸⁶ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 300.

²⁸⁷ Cf. David MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown, W.M. Roger Louis, and Alaine Low, pp. 574-96 (Oxford 1999), p. 593.

²⁸⁸ Cf. *Ibid*.

²⁸⁹ Cf. Michael King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand* (Auckland 2003), p. 424f.

Between 1956 and 1957, Britain would withdraw from the former, and the pro-British government in Iraq was deposed in 1958. Thus, the Suez Crisis marked the end of official British influence in the Middle East. Hopes that Britain would again be able to act internationally without help from the USA were thereby dashed.²⁹⁰

At the same time, other conflicts in the Empire complicated the British situation. Uprisings in Cyprus²⁹¹ and a violent revolt in Aden²⁹² called for British troops, while uprisings on the Indian subcontinent made the colony of British India ungovernable.²⁹³ In 1947, India and Pakistan became independent, Burma and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) followed a year later. With the exception of Burma, all these countries entered the Commonwealth following independence.²⁹⁴ Among the former settler colonies, some reservations emerged concerning the impending changes in the Commonwealth. When the British government informed Ottawa in May 1947 of its intention to grant India and Pakistan full membership in the Commonwealth, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King expressed his worries about the possible dominance within the Commonwealth of the Asian states.²⁹⁵ With Indian independence, the British Empire was significantly diminished as was its military standing in Central Asia, East Africa, and the Far East.²⁹⁶ Following independence, British troops were forced to leave India, Pakistan, and they did so by March 1947. However, they continued to maintain a presence in Southeast Asia since troops were needed due to the Malayan conflict.²⁹⁷²⁹⁸ Thus, the end of the 1940s and the 1950s was a period of change with

²⁹⁰ Cf. W.M. Roger Louis, "Introduction," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown and W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 1-46 (Oxford/New York 1999), p. 12.

²⁹¹ The terrorist group EOKA (*Ethniki Orhanosis Kyrion Agoniston*) fought for a union with Greece in Cyprus. This was opposed by Turkish groups there. A British army garrison and British police tried to calm the violent clashes. In 1959, a declaration of independence was drafted that rejected annexation to Greece. Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," pp. 300f.

²⁹² Due to a violent revolt in the 1950s, British troops had to be deployed in its last middle eastern colony – Aden (Yemen). Beginning in 1959, Britain pursued the creation of a Federation of Southern Arabia. Aden agreed to join the federation in 1963, but revolts that year prevented accession and led to a British withdrawal in 1967. This ended altogether the official role of Britain in the Middle East. The Suez Crisis was too serious of a destabilizing factor for British influence in the region. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 301. Although British and American politicians and military leaders viewed the Middle East as an important strategic zone in the Cold War and wished to retain control over the transport of oil, Great Britain departed from the region. This was another factor in the decline of the British Empire. Cf. Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London 1994), p. 530.

²⁹³ Cf. Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," p. 332.

²⁹⁴ Cf. Childs, *Britain Since 1939: Progress and Decline*, p. 78.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Donald Barry and John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 2. Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal/Kingston/London/Buffalo 1995), p. 36.

²⁹⁶ Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization. Das Ende der Imperien*, pp. 53f.

²⁹⁷ After World War II, Malay nationalism gained momentum and in February of 1948 the Federation of Malaya was established. In the following years, the federation experienced repeated unrest. The Federation of Malaya was granted independence on 31 August, 1957. Cf. T.N. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya* (Cambridge 1999), p. 55 and pp. 149-94.

²⁹⁸ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 296.

respect to the Commonwealth, as several colonies became independent and Britain was mired in financial difficulties.

Beginning in 1952, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya required British troops.²⁹⁹ Eight years afterward, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan set out on his popular African tour. He gave his famous 'Wind of Change' speech for the first time on 9 January, 1960, in Ghana, which had been independent since 1957.³⁰⁰ His intention was to bind Britain to the growing independence efforts in the African colonies.³⁰¹ Ghana had joined the Commonwealth as the first black member in 1957.³⁰² Subsequently, one African colony after another became independent: Nigeria followed in 1960, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika in 1961.³⁰³ Macmillan's four-week tour of the African colonies concluded with his visit to Cape Town in February 1960, where his 'Wind of Change' speech provoked a global media response and has come to symbolize the shifting history of the British Empire.³⁰⁴ The public in Canada and Australia largely responded to Macmillan's speech with approval and applause.³⁰⁵ However, as events progressed Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker complained off and on about the speech. In his view, it had precipitated a crisis in the Commonwealth, culminating in the expulsion of South Africa in 1961.³⁰⁶ Likewise, Australian

²⁹⁹ This conflict – violent on both sides – led to serious changes in British colonial policy. The British government had to accept the termination of the white settler economy in Kenya. British troops, however, were stationed there until the transfer of power was completed in 1964. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 301f. The areas mentioned, however, were not the only possessions that required the presence of troops. Additional forces were needed, for example, in Honduras, Swaziland, Hong Kong, and many other areas: Honduras (1948), Swaziland (1963), and Hong Kong (1967). In addition, British troops were stationed in the following areas: Grenada and Antigua (1952), British Guiana (1953, 1962-66), Bahamas (1958), Jamaica (1960), Nigeria (1960-61), Zanzibar (1961), Mauritius (1965, 1968), Bermuda (1968, 1969, 1973, 1977), Anguilla (1969), Cayman Islands (1970). Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 302; John Pimlott, *British Military Operations. 1945-1984* (London 1984), pp. 6f. In addition, British military agreements required troops in Kuwait to repel an Iraqi attack in 1961. They were also needed in Oman between 1970 and 1975. In addition, the British military in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya had to protect the newly independent governments even as the Army of the Rhine also had to be maintained. Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 303f.

³⁰⁰ Cf. Stuart Ward, "Run Before the Tempest. The 'Wind of Change' and the British World," in *History and Society* 37, no. 2 (2011), pp. 198-219, p. 204.

³⁰¹ Cf. Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," p. 347.

³⁰² Cf. W. David McIntyre, *The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990* (Basingstoke/London 1991), p. 18.

³⁰³ Cf. *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ With his speech in Cape Town, Macmillan intended to warn the Afrikaner National Party government under Hendrik Verwoerd that British sympathy for apartheid was limited. His speech, however, has been allotted a significant place in the history of decolonization and is representative of the global dissolution of the British Empire in the 1960s. Cf. Ward, "Run Before the Tempest. The 'Wind of Change' and the British World," p. 198. Stuart Ward interprets Macmillan's speech as, among other things, a sign of the disintegrating support from Britain for the white settler colonies. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 199f. Thus, the speech was a "synonym [...] for the disintegration of white solidarity across the empire and Commonwealth." Stuart Ward, "Whirlwind, Hurricane, Howling Tempest. The Wind of Change and the British World," in *The Wind of Change. Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization*, ed. by Larry J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell, pp. 48-69 (Basingstoke 2013), p. 50.

³⁰⁵ Cf. Ward, "Run Before the Tempest. The 'Wind of Change' and the British World," p. 207.

³⁰⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

prime minister Robert Menzies saw the speech as an attack on the integrity of the Commonwealth family.³⁰⁷

When on 31 May, 1961, the fourth Dominion of South Africa became a republic, its status put pressure on the Commonwealth per se. To become a member of the Commonwealth with the status of a republic, South Africa needed the consent of the other Commonwealth members. India opposed the admission of the South African Republic because of its rejection of the South African system of racist apartheid. Other Asian and African nations agreed with India's position and also opposed South Africa's admission. Great Britain favored accession on trade and defense grounds. Australia and New Zealand³⁰⁸ both wanted to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth, but Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was torn. Opposition to the apartheid regime kept him from openly declaring himself in favor of admitting the racist state. The Canadian public mostly condemned the South African apartheid regime. Diefenbaker, who still felt an emotional connection to South Africa through shared wartime experiences and its historical ties to the Commonwealth, was aware that if he chose South Africa, he would antagonize not only the African and Asian countries of the Commonwealth but also his own public. Thus, he decided against the admission of South Africa.³⁰⁹ Diefenbaker tried to persuade the South African prime minister to make concessions regarding the direction of apartheid policy and, as a result, the latter withdrew South Africa's application for admission.³¹⁰ For the rest of the dominions, this episode was of great significance since it exemplified the changes within the Commonwealth and did so in a striking fashion. With South Africa's withdrawal, it lost a member of the 'old Commonwealth.'³¹¹ The four members of this group - Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa - were now separated from each other. Instead, more and more nations joined that did not define themselves by 'whiteness.' Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was resentful of Diefenbaker for having placed himself against the integrity of the "white" nations of the Commonwealth.³¹²

³⁰⁷ Cf. Ibid, p. 210.

³⁰⁸ A Gallup poll in New Zealand in February 1961 showed a majority of 75 percent in favour of continued South African membership in the Commonwealth. Cf. Ibid, p. 209.

³⁰⁹ Cf. Ibid.

³¹⁰ Cf. Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984*, p. 143.

³¹¹ Darwin, *The Unfinished World Empire. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393. The Prime Ministers' Conference in 1961 caused discord between the Australian prime minister and his High Commissioner in London, Eric Harrison, not only because of South Africa's withdrawal. The chairmanship of the conference was not given to the Australian prime minister Robert Menzies, but to India's Jawaharlal Nehru. Cf. David Lowe, "Cold War London. Harrison and White," in *The High Commissioners. Australia's Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010*, ed. by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno, and David Lee, pp. 127-39 (Canberra 2010), p. 137.

³¹² Cf. Ward, "Run Before the Tempest. The "Wind of Change" and the British World," p. 210.

Owing to the newly independent states of Africa and Asia, the Commonwealth became increasingly multiethnic. In 1961, for example, the Australian Department of External Affairs noted that the Commonwealth was no longer the 'close group'³¹³ that had jointly declared war on Germany in 1939. In the future, the Commonwealth would be based less on common policies than on similarities in law, language, intentional methods, and exchanges among themselves.³¹⁴ Clearly, 'whiteness' was no longer a condition for admission to the Commonwealth. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies summed this up in mid-1962:

[...] the Commonwealth has changed a lot [...]. Its association has become much looser. For most of its members, the association is, in a sense, functional and occasional. The old hopes of concerting common policies have gone.³¹⁵

The problem of Rhodesia added another crisis to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Unrest in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland³¹⁶ had already begun in 1959. Rhodesia subsequently declared independence in 1965. The Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), written in 1965, received strong support in New Zealand.³¹⁷ Between the 1960s and 1990s, the troubles in Rhodesia were a recurring theme at Commonwealth meetings.³¹⁸

In the postwar period, however, the Commonwealth not only altered in terms of size and composition, its administrative structures also changed. Of particular importance was the merger of the Dominion Office and the India Office in 1947 to form the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), creating for the first time a central administrative authority for the Commonwealth in Great Britain. Typically, the prime ministers of the Commonwealth countries met at irregular intervals every few years at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings. With the advance of decolonization in the early 1960s, the CRO had to expand its overseas posts and hold the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings annually.³¹⁹ In 1965, the Commonwealth Secretariat was created and the first Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting was held in Singapore.³²⁰ At the meeting, thirty-one states committed themselves to peace, freedom, cooperation, and against

³¹³ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 1: Department of External Affairs: The Political Implications for Australia of United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community, Canberra, 26 June, 1961.

³¹⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ Quoted in Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," p. 173.

³¹⁶ The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established in 1953. It consisted of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). Cf. Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," p. 353.

³¹⁷ Cf. Ward, "Run Before the Tempest. The "Wind of Change" and the British World," pp. 214-16.

³¹⁸ Cf. Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984*, p. 148.

³¹⁹ Cf. McIntyre, *The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990*, p. 47.

³²⁰ Cf. W. David McIntyre, "The Commonwealth," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume V. Historiography*, ed. by Robin W. Winks, Elaine Low, and W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 558-70 (Oxford 1999), p. 564.

racial discrimination, domination, and economic inequality.³²¹ With the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the office of Secretary-General was created.³²² The first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat was the Canadian Arnold Cantwell Smith.³²³ This was the first time that a permanent body was created to explicitly handle the problems of individual Commonwealth countries.³²⁴ The diminishing importance of the Commonwealth in the 1960s is particularly evident in the merger of the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968.³²⁵ Commonwealth issues were now no longer negotiated in a separate office, but were attached to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

In addition to the changes within the Commonwealth described above, the Cold War altered the international power structure. During the Cold War, the USA had an interest in a politically strong Britain as a reliable alliance partner. After 1949, NATO became an important security alliance.³²⁶ NATO also played a major role in the case of Canada. By means of NATO, Canada's self-image as a peacekeeping power would be emphasized and strengthened in the 1950s.³²⁷ The Cold War influenced British security and defense policy, as it placed more importance on metropolitan defense rather than regional agreements; naval power was increasingly degraded in favor of nuclear armaments. Britain's financial resources did not permit the British to fulfill all its overseas commitments.³²⁸ The British government feared that the colonies and new states would be caught in the antagonism between East and West. The post-colonial positioning of the new states was of tremendous importance to Great Britain, as they feared that the new states might align themselves with the East.³²⁹

The Dominions were increasingly less concerned with colonial defense policy unless it involved the defense of their respective geographic regions. The Korean War represented an

³²¹ Cf. *Ibid.*

³²² Cf. Jonathan Hollowell, "From Commonwealth to European Integration," in *Britain Since 1945*, ed. by Jonathan Hollowell, pp. 59-108 (Malden/Oxford/Melbourne et al. 2003), p. 75.

³²³ Cf. McIntyre, *The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990*, p. 51.

³²⁴ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 260.

³²⁵ Cf. Fedorowich, "When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner," p. 14.

³²⁶ Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," p. 295.

³²⁷ Cf. Bothwell, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War*, p. 40f.

³²⁸ With the British "Global Strategy" paper of 1950, American bomber squadrons were allowed to be stationed in Britain. Under the Conservative government (1951-1955), interest in colonial defense policy declined even further. NATO and nuclear weapons both became increasingly important. Thus, the Dominions had to attend more to their own security arrangements. A Defense White Paper ended the Royal Navy Construction Projects in 1952, and the Simonstown naval base was transferred to the Union of South Africa in 1955. In addition, nuclear deterrence was strongly advocated as a strategy in Duncan Sandys' 1957 White Paper. Cf. Clayton, "'Deceptive Might'. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," pp. 295f.

³²⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

exception in this regard, since in this instance forces from the Commonwealth again fought together.³³⁰ In 1950, fear of a communist takeover of Asia led New Zealand to agree to the US request to support the UN-led intervention in Korea.³³¹ Australia, Britain, and New Zealand had concluded the ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand, Malaya) Agreement in 1949, ensuring Commonwealth cooperation among the three countries in the region surrounding Australia and New Zealand.³³² ANZAM was expanded in 1955 to include the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR), under which Australian and New Zealand troops could be deployed in the Federation of Malaya against communist insurgencies. The Menzies government decided to contribute ground, naval and air forces to the Strategic Reserve in 1955 owing to the increasing instability caused by communist takeovers in Asia.³³³ Despite the independence of the Federation of Malaya in 1957,³³⁴ on the basis of the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA), Britain remained responsible for the former colony should it be attacked. This allowed Britain to continue to leave strategically relevant troops in the region. Singapore and the Federation of Malaya were thus the most important British military bases in the Far East.³³⁵

Both Australia and New Zealand were seeking new allies, and they found one in the United States. After World War Two, the US became increasingly involved in colonial policy in Asia. Its central interest was the consolidation of Japan as an important base of support in the Cold War. The Philippines served as a significant pillar of support in the American strategy to stabilize its power in the Asian region. Up to 1949, the United States tried to restore stability in Asia, supporting, for example, Indonesian independence from the Netherlands (1949). North Korea's invasion of the southern peninsula in 1950 and China's entry into the war a few months later led the US to view Asian communism as aggressive and on the march. As a result, Americans began

³³⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 294f.

³³¹ The "Kayforce," consisting of 1100 men (later increased to 1500), sailed for Korea in December 1950. New Zealand soldiers remained involved in the Korean War until the middle of 1953. In addition, the Royal New Zealand Navy supported the ground forces with the full strength of its fleet. The US recognized New Zealand's involvement in Korea through a state visit by Richard Nixon, then vice president, in 1953. Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 422.

³³² In regional terms, this affected not only the territory of Australia and New Zealand, but also British territories in Malaysia and Borneo. Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 29.

³³³ Cf. *Ibid.*

³³⁴ On the independence of the Malaysian Federation, see Marc Frey, "Three Paths to Independence. Decolonization in Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya after 1945," in *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 50, no. 3 (2002), pp. 399-433, esp. pp. 426-31.

³³⁵ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, pp. 59f.

to support further actions to contain communism on the Asian continent.³³⁶ By sending troops to South Vietnam between 1962 and 1975, Australia and New Zealand supported the United States in the Vietnam War, even as Britain stayed out of the conflict.³³⁷ Australia and New Zealand signed the Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951 and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954.³³⁸ The ANZUS treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was a security pact for the Pacific, attesting to the emerging rapprochement of Australia and New Zealand with the United States. With this treaty, Australia, New Zealand, and America committed to mutual support in the event of an attack on one of the allied parties in the Pacific region.³³⁹ New Zealand viewed Southeast Asia as the front line of its "forward defense" policy.³⁴⁰ The US invoked these treaties in 1965 when it sought support for the Vietnam War.³⁴¹

In addition to the discussed events and processes that confronted the British Empire after 1945, there were increasingly vigorous anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements that called for the dismantling of British colonial power. This also led to changes in British colonial policy. The preservation of the empire would have been possible only if the Asian and African states had been considered equal to the British nation. The transformation from a purely 'white' to a 'multiethnic' Commonwealth was seen by British actors in colonial policy as a way to stabilize Britain's position.³⁴² In addition, the North-South conflict prompted new thinking about global justice and economic interdependence. Led primarily by the tropical and subtropical regions of the world, this conflict concerned global economic dependencies, as the poorer countries of the 'Global South' criticized the conditions of international trade.³⁴³ This shows that debates over trade policies in the Dominions must be analyzed against the backdrop of international discussions concerning global economic paradigms. The inequities of international trade, increasingly drawn to attention by the countries of the 'Global South,' received international attention through the platform of the United

³³⁶ Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization. Das Ende der Imperien*, p. 102f.

³³⁷ Cf. W. David McIntyre, "Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by W.M. Roger Louis, Judith M. Brown, and Alaine Low, pp. 667-92 (Oxford 1999), p. 680.

³³⁸ Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, pp. 3f.

³³⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 76. The U.S. terminated the agreement with New Zealand in 1986 because New Zealand denied them access to their ports.

³⁴⁰ Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 424. "Forward defense" meant the strategy of keeping enemies as far away from the coasts of New Zealand as possible. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 450.

³⁴¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 424.

³⁴² Cf. Louis, "Introduction," p. 27.

³⁴³ Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization. Das Ende* p. 100f.

Nations, and they contributed to a perception of the changing realities of international trade relations, which included Commonwealth associations as well.

In summary, after World War II, Britain no longer held the same political and economic power that it had before the war. The discrepancy between British financial commitments and their resources was immense. By the mid-1950s, it was already becoming apparent that Japan, the United States, and the western states of continental Europe would become the centers of the future world economy.³⁴⁴ Limits to military power were clearly evident and, in consequence, cooperation with the US was necessary.³⁴⁵ The situation of the British Empire after World War II was difficult, but not hopeless. As contemporary observers of the international situation already noted, the Cold War further complicated the situation for the former settler colonies:

No foreign policy is conducted in a void. [...] a foreign policy operates within an international framework which is not itself rigid but subject, from the pressure of change, to constant alteration in form.³⁴⁶

This quotation makes it clear that political decisions in the Dominions and their sources must be situated in the international context of the Cold War and decolonization. Fear of a possible communist takeover of the Asian continent was spreading. From their perspective, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand could no longer rely on the military protection and economic support of Great Britain. They noted the changes to the Commonwealth and realized that they lived "in times that are dramatic."³⁴⁷

2.2. Australia after 1945

We in Australia attach the utmost importance to our Commonwealth association. Most of us, you know, prefer to call it the British Commonwealth, because though primarily Australians we are also British. The things that bind us are apparent in many ways, great and small.³⁴⁸

This quotation from a speech by the Australian High Commissioner Sir Alexander Downer in London in 1965 refers to the importance of the Commonwealth for his home country. It is particularly striking that in this context "British" seems to be an important reference point. At the

³⁴⁴ Cf. *Ibid*, p. 96.

³⁴⁵ Cf. McKenzie, "In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War," p. 566.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965* (London 1968), p. 1.

³⁴⁷ NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: John McEwen, speech to the Perth Chambers of Manufactures and Commerce, 1 August, 1962.

³⁴⁸ NAA A463 1965/2040: Alexander Downer speech, London, 11 March, 1965.

very least, Downer assumes that a large part of the Australian population considered the nearness to Great Britain to be significant. Whether this was the case in the post-World War II period is what the following discussion will show. This will lay the groundwork for a discussion of Australian-British relations in the 1960s.

Australia's close ties with the mother country, Great Britain, can indeed be observed on various levels after World War Two.³⁴⁹ On the one hand, Australia was politically bound to the British crown. For although the Australian government ratified the Statute of Westminster in 1942 and thus enjoyed quasi-independence within the British Empire, the British monarchs continued to be the official heads of state. They were represented in the country by the Governor-General.³⁵⁰ However, ties to the British Crown were not the only official links between the Antipode and Britain, for while the Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1948 officially established Australian citizenship, Australian citizens were still required to declare their nationality as 'British' until the late 1960s.³⁵¹ In addition to these political and legislative connections, the national anthem during this time was "God Save the Queen,"³⁵² which also reinforced and symbolized the ties to Great Britain. To many actors, this relationship to the mother country was understood to be self-evident. Trading links were viewed by Australian actors as part of this 'natural' connection; they described such ties as a "natural trading relationship."³⁵³ On the one hand, these ties were based on historical relations with Great Britain, and on the other, the two economic systems resembled and complemented one another: "Raw materials and foodstuffs were exchanged for manufactures."³⁵⁴ At the same time, trade relations strengthened the bonds between Australia and Great Britain since it necessitated a constant exchange with each other.

³⁴⁹ The close ties between Great Britain and Australia had historical roots, beginning with Captain James Cook's arrival on the Australian continent in 1770. Cook placed the eastern part of Australia under the rule of the British King, George III. Subsequently, six colonies were formed on the Australian continent, which were united in the Commonwealth of Australia under the British Crown in 1901. From then on, Australia was a dominion in the British Empire and was not sovereign until the ratification of the Statute of Westminster in 1942. Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 22.

³⁵⁰ Cf. Ibid. Until 1926, the Australian Governor-General had been the main conduit of communication between the Australian and British governments. Cf. Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. V. Until after World War II, the Governor-Generals were themselves British with two exceptions. These were Isaac Isaacs (1931-36) and William McKell (1947-53). Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 22. This makes clear how strong – in political terms – the ties were between Australia and the mother country.

³⁵¹ Cf. Ibid., p. 22f.

³⁵² Cf. Ibid, p. 23.

³⁵³ John McEwen, *Australia's Overseas Economic Relationships* (Melbourne 1965), p. 7. This is a published version of a lecture given by John McEwen in Queensland on 5 July, 1965.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

Trade between the two countries was based on the Ottawa Agreements of 1932.³⁵⁵ In these agreements, certain Australian industries, such as wine, dairy and canned fruit, received preferential terms in the British market. At first, the Australian government viewed this arrangement as favorable to its own economy.³⁵⁶ However, the Menzies government lobbied for a renegotiation of the Ottawa Agreement, since it was their impression that the British side was profiting more from it than the Australians. From the perspective of Australian stakeholders, for example, British efforts to stimulate the domestic agricultural sector led to poor prices for Australian products.³⁵⁷ After negotiations, a new agreement was concluded in Canberra in November 1956. Included were preferential agreements between the two countries, a blanket reduction in the preferential margin on British exports to Australia, a revision of the 1954 meat agreement that committed Britain to buying all Australian beef, and a non-binding agreement to purchase 750 000 tons of Australian wheat per year.³⁵⁸ These arrangements set the stage for the EEC debate in Australia, as they were threatened by a possible British accession to the EEC, for Britain remained a key Australian trading partner into the 1960s despite declining export figures.³⁵⁹

Economically, Australia benefited from the global boom of the post-war period. The revival of world trade, investment, and new technologies pushed the country forward.³⁶⁰ There was increased growth in domestic industry and the service sector. Full employment, high productivity and better wages characterized the overall economic situation.³⁶¹ The centers of Australia's economy were and are mainly located on the coasts, and they still dominate the economy in Australia today: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane (among others). The interior of the continent had and still has no important urban structures, with the exception of small towns near mining centers. The population is mainly concentrated in urban conglomerations.³⁶² Due to intensive sheep farming, wool was, for some time, the most important export commodity.³⁶³ Agricultural products

³⁵⁵ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 23.

³⁵⁶ Cf. Ibid. McEwen, *Australia's Overseas Economic Relationships*, p. 7.

³⁵⁷ Cf. Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 25.

³⁵⁹ Cf. Ibid, p. 26.

³⁶⁰ Cf. Stuart MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 196f.

³⁶¹ However, minor outbreaks of inflation in the early 1950s and again in the 1960s caused uncertainty: The unemployment rate, which rose to three percent in 1961, almost cost Robert Menzies his re-election in 1961. Cf. Ibid, p. 203.

³⁶² Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. Eine Einführung*, p. 63f.

³⁶³ Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 203.

such as wheat, sugar cane and fruit, were also significant exports.³⁶⁴ In addition, Australia had rich uranium deposits, which drew the interest of many countries, especially in the context of the Cold War.³⁶⁵ Other significant mineral resources included coal, iron, copper, gold, tin, lead, zinc, diamonds and lithium.³⁶⁶ This 'mineral boom' led to an upswing in the Australian economy, especially in the 1970s.³⁶⁷

The Commonwealth remained an important institution for Australia in the postwar period, although Australian actors expressed concerns about its increasingly multiethnic composition. They observed changes within the Commonwealth with distrust.³⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the Commonwealth was significant as an economic network: Commonwealth preferences served as a safeguard against economic instability and crises.³⁶⁹ The economic boom meant that more and more people in Australia could afford cars. As a result, cities also expanded, since urban jobs could be more readily reached by car by those living in family homes on the city outskirts.³⁷⁰ The 'Australian Dream' or the 'Australian way of life' was composed of nuclear families in suburban homes, who could explore the nature around them thanks to the automobile.³⁷¹ The 'baby boomers' led to population growth. The younger generation imported more movies, television, music and fashion trends from international (especially American) contexts. They formed a modern, new middle class that was politically engaged and had greater financial means than their parental generation.³⁷² This resulted in a differently composed society in the 1960s, whereas the immediate postwar period and the 1950s were characterized by a mostly white and homogeneous society. The

³⁶⁴ Since World War II, the Wheat Board has marketed the sale of grain. Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 65. Domestic grain farmers were protected by the Wheat Industry Stabilization Acts of 1948-1963. This involved a special committee that determined an Australian "home consumption price" for grain each season. Responsibility for the protection of the grain industry and the marketing of grain within and outside Australia fell to the Australian Wheat Board. For the most part, the Wheat Board acted independently of the government. All grain farmers were required to deliver their grain to the Board, which was responsible for its storage, shipment, and sale. Actual physical storage was mostly done in the individual states. Cf. John Reynolds, "Recognition by Trade. The Controversial Wheat Sales to China," in *Australian Outlook. Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs* 18 (1964), pp. 117-26, p. 120.

³⁶⁵ From 1950 onwards, the Mount Kathleen mine in Queensland was used for uranium mining in particular. Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 162.

³⁶⁶ Cf. Ibid, p. 65.

³⁶⁷ Cf. Ibid, p. 66. The effect of the "mineral boom" on the EEC debate in Australia is discussed in more detail in chap. **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**

³⁶⁸ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 28.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Robertson and Singleton, *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1940-1970*, p. 17.

³⁷⁰ Cf. Judith Brett, "The Menzies era, 1950-66," in *The Cambridge History of Australia. Volume 2. The Commonwealth of Australia*, ed. by Alison Bashford and Stuart Macintyre, pp. 112-34 (Cambridge 2013), p. 124.

³⁷¹ Cf. Ibid.

³⁷² Cf. Paul Strangio, "Instability, 1966-82," in *The Cambridge History of Australia Volume 2. The Commonwealth of Australia*, ed. by Alison Bashford and Stuart Macintyre, pp. 135-61 (Cambridge 2013), pp. 139f.

reasons for the homogeneous composition of Australian society lay primarily in the restrictive migration programs after 1945. The Pacific War and the growing emancipation of the Asian states had created much mistrust and fear of the Asian continent in Australia after World War II.³⁷³ Japanese air raids on Darwin and in the Northern Territory, as well as the Japanese attempt to use submarines to enter Sydney Harbour, had greatly increased fears of Asia.³⁷⁴ The Australian continent seemed almost “deserted” when set against the large population of Asia, which led to increased fears of a possible Asian takeover of Australia. Therefore, after World War II, the Australian government established a targeted immigration policy to populate the country with primarily European (white) immigrants.

The connections to Empire were strengthened still further after 1945, when the Labor-led government of Australia launched a major immigration program designed to boost immigration from the British Isles to Australia.³⁷⁵ The Department of Immigration, established in 1945, was primarily responsible for this step.³⁷⁶ Initiated by the Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, under an administration led by Labor from 1945 to 1949, the program determined Australian immigration policy for the next 20 years.³⁷⁷ It found particular expression in the frequently used phrase “populate or perish!”³⁷⁸ Between 1948 and 1957, Australia admitted approximately 414,000 British immigrants, who accounted for 33.9 percent of the total immigrant population.³⁷⁹ ‘Whiteness’ and ‘Britishness’ thus played a major role in Australian immigration policy.

The rise of communist movements in Asia, in particular, the takeover of China by Mao Tse-tung in 1949 as well as the Sino-Soviet Friendship Agreement stoked fears in Australia of a “red peril.”³⁸⁰ Strengthened by these fears, a change of power from Labor to a coalition of Liberal and Country Party took place in 1949 under Robert Menzies – who had already been prime minister of Australia from 1939 to 1941. Menzies remained in office until 1966 and shaped the country's politics in a conservative direction.³⁸¹ Menzies himself ascribed great importance to the ties with

³⁷³ In Singapore, almost all Australian forces had become Japanese prisoners of war. Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 150.

³⁷⁴ Cf. Johannes Voigt, *Australia* (Munich 2000), p. 76.

³⁷⁵ Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, pp. 20f.

³⁷⁶ Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 52.

³⁷⁷ Cf. Voigt, *Australia*, p. 77f. The immigration program drew half a million immigrants to the country by 1949, and as many as two million more by 1970. Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 52.

³⁷⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

³⁷⁹ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 30.

³⁸⁰ Cf. Brett, "The Menzies era, 1950-66," p. 115.

³⁸¹ Cf. Voigt, *Australia*, p. 78.

the British motherland. Thus, as already mentioned, he described himself as "British to the bootheels"³⁸² and was a loyal admirer of the British monarchy.³⁸³ The connection to the British motherland was crucial for Menzies. For example, in 1952 he made the uninhabited Monte Bello Islands off the west coast of Australia available for British nuclear testing. The British were also allowed to conduct further atomic tests in some desert areas of Australia.³⁸⁴ In the Suez Crisis of 1956, he sided with the mother country, and during Queen Elizabeth's tour of Australia in 1954, he distinguished himself by his great admiration for the queen. His regular trips to London, his displeasure with an increasingly multiethnic Commonwealth, and his defense of the South African apartheid regime often made Australia seem like one of the last representatives of the 'white empire,' even if its foreign ministers were more open to relations with Asia.³⁸⁵ For example, Richard Casey, as Minister for External Affairs between 1951 and 1960, sought to build good relationships with the newly independent nations of Asia. He was assisted by the Australian diplomat Arthur Tange, whom Casey appointed Secretary of the Department of External Affairs in 1954, and also by Walter Crocker, who was ambassador to India and Indonesia during this time.³⁸⁶ With respect to Asia, the Colombo Plan, concluded in 1950 and involving all three Dominions, was significant. A central aspect of the Plan agreed upon in Ceylon was the long-term sponsorship programs of Asian students who could thus study in Australia or New Zealand.³⁸⁷ Nevertheless, many actors in Australia still saw their country as a 'British' country in the 1950s and attached importance to relations with the mother country. Opinion polls from 1951 show that about 80 percent of Australians wanted to remain within the British Empire.³⁸⁸ Underpinning relations with Britain was the idea of 'British Race Patriotism,' which Stuart Ward defines as follows: 'British Race Patriotism' is "the idea that all British peoples, despite their particular regional problems and

³⁸² Quoted in MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 207.

³⁸³ In this way, he represented the emotional attachment to the British motherland that outlasted the Second World War as well as the pride in British heritage that persisted within Australian society. Cf. David Goldsworthy, "Australian External Policy and the End of Britain's Empire," in *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, no. 1 (2005), pp. 17-29, p. 18.

³⁸⁴ Cf. Donald Denoon, Philippa Mein-Smith, and Marvic Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific* (Oxford 2000), pp. 342f.

³⁸⁵ Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 207. The efforts of Menzies' two foreign ministers, Percy Spender and Richard Casey, to open up to Asia are often lauded in the literature. Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, p. 184.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Brett, "The Menzies era, 1950-66," p. 130.

³⁸⁷ Cf. Denoon, Mein-Smith and Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, p. 342.

³⁸⁸ Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, p. 108.

perspectives, ultimately comprised a single indissoluble community through the ties of blood, language, history and culture.”³⁸⁹

Culturally, Australia drew inspiration from British models: radio, newspapers, private schools, and university systems, as well as clubs and business unions, often emulated or drew from British examples.³⁹⁰ Andrea Benvenuti, in his dissertation “The End of an Affair,” argues that ‘British Race Patriotism’ was particularly strong in Australia because it helped Australians cope with the isolation and loneliness caused by their geographic location and distinguish themselves from Asia.³⁹¹ However, ‘British Race Patriotism’ is not a phenomenon limited to Australia: all three Dominions adhered to the idea of a community of British peoples, although they sometimes defended their distinct national interests with loud vehemence. Thus, Dominion identity was composed of two important points: their own national interests, which did not always have to coincide with those of the mother country; and ‘British Race Patriotism.’ Underlying the whole phenomenon was the assumption that, at a certain point, the interests of the community of British peoples naturally had to converge.³⁹²

Although Australia was perceived by many Australians as a European country, it did not always support Britain's foreign policy decisions – or did not fully support them in every case. Yet, Australian foreign policy was often consistent with that of Britain.³⁹³ In 1909, it should be noted that with respect to their foreign policy relations with Britain, the Australian Parliament had established the post of the Australian High Commissioner in London by the “Act to provide for the Office of High Commissioner of the Commonwealth in the United Kingdom.”³⁹⁴ After 1910, Australia was thus represented by a High Commissioner stationed in London.³⁹⁵ Between 1910 and 1972, the Australian High Commissioners were supervised by the Prime Minister's Department rather than by External Affairs, and for this reason the High Commissioners were in close contact with the Prime Minister.³⁹⁶ This reflects the special responsibility of the Australian Prime Minister for

³⁸⁹ Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*, p. 2.

³⁹⁰ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 30.

³⁹¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁹² Cf. Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," pp. 156f.

³⁹³ Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, p. 20.

³⁹⁴ Cf. preface to Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. V.

³⁹⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 1. The first British High Commissioner in Australia was Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, who came to Canberra in 1936. Cf. Fedorowich, "When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner," p. 10. With the exception of Kuibyshev in the Soviet Union, which was established in 1943, London was Australia's only representation in Europe until after World War II. Cf. Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. 2.

³⁹⁶ Cf. Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. 3.

relations with the British government.³⁹⁷ During the 1960s, oversight of the High Commissioners was transferred to the Department of Foreign Affairs; a separate Department of External Affairs (renamed Foreign Affairs in 1969) had been established in Australia in 1935.³⁹⁸ From 1917, and following its ceremonial opening the next year, the seat of the High Commission was officially Australia House in London.³⁹⁹ For some time, this Australian diplomatic mission in Britain was their only policy mission stationed abroad; in 1940, Australian diplomatic missions were sent to Washington, Tokyo and Ottawa.⁴⁰⁰ When British accession negotiations with the EEC were first announced in 1961, Eric Harrison was sent to London as the Australian High Commissioner. He had close ties to Prime Minister Menzies.⁴⁰¹ As described by Peter Edwards in his work on the Prime Ministers and diplomatic corps, the Australian Prime Minister had a leading role in foreign policy.⁴⁰² This meant that sources from Australian Prime Ministers and leading ministers were of primary significance in the analysis, since the primary responsibility for relations with Great Britain was in their hands for a long time.

However, the relationship between Australia and Great Britain described above was not an untroubled one. The fall of Singapore had led to friction between Australian Prime Minister John Curtin and Winston Churchill.⁴⁰³ Conflicts between London and Canberra in the 1940s had also unsettled the relationship between the Australian and British governments.⁴⁰⁴ In the 1950s, there were repeated disagreements between Australia and Britain in questions over defense, trade, the sterling area, and decolonization.⁴⁰⁵ An increasing number of voices also expressed concerns that

³⁹⁷ Cf. Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Cf. Fedorowich, "When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner," p. 14.

³⁹⁹ Cf. Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. 5.

⁴⁰⁰ Cf. Joan Beaumont, "Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-69," in *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats. Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969*, ed. by Joan Beaumont et al, pp. 1-18 (Melbourne 2003), p. 7.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. 6. Harrison deplored the ever more frequent replacement of the term "Empire" with "Commonwealth" (from the late 1940s onwards, the term "British Empire" was officially replaced by "Commonwealth". Cf. Goldsworthy, "Australian External Policy and the End of Britain's Empire," p. 18.) and the change within the Commonwealth. Harrison's proposal in February 1957 that the Commonwealth be divided into two parts (British and non-British, or states that had the Queen as head of state and states that recognized the Queen only as head of the Commonwealth) shows his discomfort with the transformation of the Commonwealth. Cf. Lowe, "Cold War London. Harrison and White," pp. 127f. Menzies was also unhappy with alterations to the Commonwealth, such as the inclusion of republics in the original "Crown-Commonwealth." Cf. Goldsworthy, "Australian External Policy and the End of Britain's Empire," p. 18.

⁴⁰² Peter Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats. The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901-1949* (Oxford 1983).

⁴⁰³ This was demonstrated by David Day in his works of 1992: David Day, *The Great Betrayal. Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939-42*; and Day, *Reluctant Nation. Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan, 1942-45*.

⁴⁰⁴ This is described by Chris Waters in his study, *The Empire Fractures. Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s* (Melbourne 1995).

⁴⁰⁵ The Australian Department of External Affairs noted in the early 1960s that there was a change in British defense policy: the concept of "imperial defense" had faded away and Australia had to focus on the United States, the ANZUS

the sterling zone and the traditional trade relationship with Britain might not be sufficient to meet Australia's future economic needs.⁴⁰⁶ However, these concerns were not enough to provoke a break with the mother country or a comprehensive rethinking of trade policy.⁴⁰⁷

Robert Menzies retired in 1966, and his three successors, Harold Holt, John Gorton and William McMahon, each remained in office only briefly.⁴⁰⁸ During his long reign ("Menzies era"), Robert Menzies dominated political events within his party and the government as a whole.⁴⁰⁹ His successors tried to distance themselves from him. John Gorton, for example, took up Menzies' famous quotation and modified it: "I'm Australian to the boot-heels."⁴¹⁰

To some extent, Australia maintained independent foreign policy relations with other states. Under pressure from the Americans, the Australian government signed a peace treaty with Japan in 1951 and exchanged ambassadors.⁴¹¹ After the crises of World War Two and the Pacific War in particular, relations with Japan were thereby slowly normalized. However, both Australia and New Zealand only consented to the agreement after the USA guaranteed them support and security through the ANZUS agreement of 1 September, 1951.⁴¹² Both Prime Minister Harold Holt and his successor, John Gorton, valued ties with the United States, even though the losses in the Vietnam War led to upset and malaise in Australia.⁴¹³ In 1972, the victory of Gough Whitlam and the Labor Party marked a political turning point. Under the slogan "It's Time," the Labor Party led by Whitlam won the vote.⁴¹⁴ Domestically, he sought to advance social justice and equal opportunity in education, health, child care and the welfare system. In foreign policy, Australia was open to relations with the communist states.

agreement, and SEATO. Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 3.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. David Lee, *Search for Security. The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy* (Sydney 1995), p. 160.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 4.

⁴⁰⁸ Harold Holt disappeared while swimming shortly after taking office, presumably he drowned. John Gorton had to resign at the urging of his own party, and William McMahon was forced out by the votes of the Liberal and Country Party. Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 225.

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. Brett, "The Menzies era, 1950-66," p. 112.

⁴¹⁰ Quoted in Strangio, "Instability, 1966-82," p. 142.

⁴¹¹ Cf. Voigt, *Australia*, p. 72. The Americans needed the Japanese islands as a base for the Korean War; they therefore lobbied for a quick peace agreement with the Japanese. Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 154.

⁴¹² Cf. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung*, p. 154f.

⁴¹³ Cf. Voigt, *Australia*, p. 78f.

⁴¹⁴ Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 231.

Cold War perceptions were particularly formative for Australian foreign policy after World War Two. This was shaped above all by looking to Asia. The domino theory - that is, the idea that the Southeast Asian nations could gradually fall like dominoes under the influence of the Soviet Communist regime - fueled Australian fears. That is why Southeast Asia and Malaysia were the primary regional interests within Australia's foreign policy deliberations.⁴¹⁵ To keep up with global developments, the Australian government began holding periodic meetings of the Commonwealth High Commissioners stationed in Canberra. These meetings began in May 1950 and were held regularly. The Australian government was also considering both the potential for a Pacific Pact and closer relations with the United States so as to be better informed about Cold War developments.

416

It should be noted that the Australian connection to Great Britain consisted of both the Commonwealth relationship and many other aspects, as the opening quotation has already made clear. In the period being considered, Australia was a quasi-independent dominion in the British Empire, which was linked to Great Britain on various levels. Politically and legislatively, the Australian state was tied to the British Crown, and symbolic and historical ties signified the importance of this relationship. Economically, the two countries were linked through trade and the sterling area; in foreign policy they cooperated closely, and culturally, Australia derived much from Britain. In the early 1960s, many actors in Australian society perceived Britain as the mother country and, in combination with distinct Australian characteristics, the source of their own national identity. A rapprochement with Asia and the United States was slowly taking shape, however, at the beginning of the 1960s, no reorientation had yet taken place. Still, certain aspects point to the increased importance of the U.S. for Australia as the Asian region came further into focus as a (potential) trading partner.⁴¹⁷ What was special about Australia after World War II was the ambivalent situation of having close ties with Great Britain while, at the same time, being geographically distant. Australia's geographic location forced it to engage in some form of trade

⁴¹⁵ Cf. Lowe, *Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. Australia's Cold War 1948-1954*, p. 71.

⁴¹⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁴¹⁷ It is interesting to note that the United States Department that handled affairs with Australia was within the Office of the British Commonwealth Affairs, which was in turn subordinate to the European Bureau. The Americans reviewed their foreign policy relations with Commonwealth countries in the 1950s and chose to continue to handle Australian matters through the European Bureau. A further review process in 1954-55 led to the assigning of foreign affairs with Australia, in part, to Southeast Asia. *Ibid.* It is noteworthy that in the US until the mid-1950s, Australia was then considered a "European country" in terms of American foreign policy, since it was administered from there. Consequently, the problem of locating Australia culturally and in terms of identity was not a debate solely within Australia itself, but also in the foreign policy administrations of other countries. Cf. *Ibid.*

with the Asian continent. Under the Conservative government of Robert Menzies, imperial relations were revived; but under subsequent governments, one can discern growing aspirations for a separate Australian identity. What effect the British EEC debate in the early 1960s had on Australia's conflicted position, situated between Britain, the United States, Asia, and its own national development will be elaborated in the main body of the paper.

2.3. Canada after 1945

Canada's membership in the Empire and its sharing of a continent with the United States have been the two major external forces on its development as an independent nation.⁴¹⁸

A look at a world map immediately shows the difference geographical situations of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. While on European maps Australia and New Zealand are located in the lower right area, relatively close to one another, separated by the Tasman Sea, Canada extends from the Pacific to the Atlantic Oceans in the upper left part of the map. Unlike Australia and New Zealand, Canada shares the continent with another nation: the United States of America. Its close proximity to the United States forced Canada to engage in more intensive deliberations with its neighbor, while Australia and New Zealand's physical distance meant that they did not have the same degree of political, economic, and cultural contact with other states.

Both the historical ties to the British Empire and the proximity to the United States had an impact on Canadian policy. The concept of a North Atlantic Triangle, discussed in the previous section, affected how Canada positioned itself nationally as a “British” country on the North American continent.⁴¹⁹ Both the British Empire and the United States of America were central to Canada's security and economic stability.⁴²⁰ Due to its geographic location, Canadian historiography, among other things, has a special role in national self-positioning and demarcation. Before 1960, Canadian historiography was characterized by two main directions. First, the history of empire was described from a Canadian point of view; imperial history consisted mostly of the relationship between Canada and Britain. Second, imperialism functioned as a variant of nationalism, especially in the English-speaking part of Canada. Canadian identity was strongly tied

⁴¹⁸ MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," p. 575.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Ibid, p. 574f.

⁴²⁰ Cf. Ibid, p. 581.

to empire and was perceived by many Canadian actors as a natural and voluntary connection.⁴²¹ Following this trajectory, the 'Empire-to-Commonwealth' school mostly drew attention to the increasing importance of the Commonwealth and, in part, interpreted Canada's role as fundamental to its establishment.⁴²² In the 1920s and 1930s, prominent historians such as O.D. Skelton and J.W. Dafoe increasingly began to interpret history as a path to Canadian independence and a specifically Canadian identity.⁴²³ The emphasis in their works was on situating Canada in the North American context and on Canada's peaceful separation from Britain (the 'colony-to-nation school'). For example, Canadian historian Frank Underhill emphasized that Canada did not wish to sever ties with Britain, but rather sought a peacefully changing relationship with Britain as an equal partner.⁴²⁴ The 'colony-to-nation school' was criticized by contemporary historians who emphasized the traditional relationship with Britain. Donald Grant Creighton, for example, traces the rise of Canada as a British nation in his works.⁴²⁵

For Canada, relations to the empire above all meant ties to Great Britain, while ties to the other Dominions – with the exception of Newfoundland⁴²⁶ - were considered second-tier.⁴²⁷ Until the 1960s, the largest population group within Canada felt close to British ideals and their British heritage.⁴²⁸ Canadian actors, both in the French-speaking and English-speaking parts of the country, emphasized affiliation with Britain as a counterweight to the greater power of the United States. In doing so, this affiliation served as an argument for a distinct national identity for Canada,

⁴²¹ Cf. O'ram, "Canada and the Empire," p. 146f.

⁴²² Cf. Ibid, p. 152.

⁴²³ J.W. Dafoe, *Canada. An American Nation* (New York 1935); O.D. Skelton, *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 2nd vols.* (Toronto 1921).

⁴²⁴ Frank Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto 1960).

⁴²⁵ Donald Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850* (Toronto 1937); Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald. Vol. I. The Young Politician* (Toronto 1952); Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald. Vol. II. The Old Chieftan* (Toronto 1955).

⁴²⁶ Due to the world economic crisis and a fall in global prices for fish, Newfoundland could no longer pay its share of the national debt and therefore returned its dominion status to Great Britain in 1934. Cf. MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," p. 589.

⁴²⁷ Cf. Ibid, p. 575f.

⁴²⁸ This attachment did not necessarily have to mean a simultaneous attachment to the country of England, the Empire, or the Commonwealth. Cf. Neville Thompson, *Canada and the End of the Imperial Dream. Beverley Baxter's Reports from London through War and Peace, 1936-1960* (Oxford 2013), p. 2. The effect of the British Empire on Canadian society in general is not easy to ascertain. Two of the leading scholars of imperialism in Canada reached different conclusions: Bernhard Porter found that imperialism had little effect on the working class, whose interests were primarily concerned with aspects of their immediate situation, while the upper classes, due to their education and their own backgrounds, accused workers of repudiating the empire. Andrew Thompson, on the other hand, argued that attachments extended far beyond the middle class. Cf. Ibid, p. 4.

justifying a differentiation from its increasingly powerful neighbor.⁴²⁹ American influence around the world and in Canada grew steadily in the 20th century. American goods and American culture became more popular, which is why many Canadian actors feared the United States would exert a preponderant influence over their own cultural patterns. This was in addition to economic repression, since large American corporations increasingly dominated the economy. Drawing on British elements seemed an appropriate defense mechanism against pervasive Americanization. However, Canada shared the settler-colonial experience on the North American continent with the USA, which in turn distinguished it from Great Britain.⁴³⁰

Canada had had a Department of External Affairs since 1909, which, among other things, regulated the relationship with the USA.⁴³¹ The founding of a separate Department of External Affairs was one of the first signs of a separate regulation of foreign relation. However, when an American-Canadian trade agreement was discussed two years later, in 1911, Canada's Conservative Party opposed it and instead emphasized ties with Great Britain and the Empire. Thus, the agreement failed to materialize, demonstrating the strong connections to the mother country that still existed at the beginning of the 20th century.⁴³² Nevertheless, the importance of Canadian trade with the United States grew. By 1914, American products accounted for 64 percent of all imports, while British imports had fallen to 21 percent. American investment and the number of American subsidiaries in Canada also increased.⁴³³ Although economic ties were increasingly shifting away from Britain in favor of the United States, the largely British-born population, together with continued migration from the British Isles in the early 20th century ensured the persistence of strong ties with the motherland. As time went on, however, the economic importance of the United States overtook that of Britain many times over. With branch offices, American companies circumvented Canadian customs regulations, and American business interests increasingly influenced the Canadian economy. Canada's automobile industry, for example, was almost

⁴²⁹ For French-speaking Canadians, the Empire was seen as a safeguard against the American absorption. However, they did not share the emotional attachment of English-speaking Canadians to Britain. Cf. MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," p. 576.

⁴³⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 577.

⁴³¹ Cf. *Ibid.* Foreign policy matters, however, continued to be handled mainly by the Prime Minister's Office even after the department was established. In fact, it was not uncommon for the Prime Minister to also hold the portfolio of the Department of External Affairs, as did Arthur Meighen, Mackenzie King, and R.B. Bennett. Cf. Fedorowich, "When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner," p. 14.

⁴³² Cf. MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," pp. 587f.

⁴³³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 580. After World War I made London unattractive as both a financial center and a source of capital, Canada increasingly turned to the American financial market. Ottawa also entered into a series of agreements with the United States to meet its supply needs. Accordingly, Canada emerged from World War I with significantly stronger ties to the United States than had existed prior to 1914. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 580f.

exclusively owned by American firms, and cheap American mass-produced goods flooded the Canadian market in the interwar period. At the same time, Canadian nationalism experienced a surge during this period; Canadian art and literature became increasingly popular, museums and concert halls were built in the urban centers, and nationally oriented organizations were founded.⁴³⁴ Nevertheless, Canadian students mostly went to Oxford for their higher education degrees in the interwar period, although American universities such as Harvard, Chicago, and Columbia became increasingly popular.⁴³⁵

The Great Depression, which significantly shaped the 1930s, led to increased tariffs in the US and Canada. At the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa, Canadian actors hoped to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis by means of Commonwealth tariffs. In the course of this conference, Great Britain conceded special terms to Canada for grain, apples, lumber, and some meat and dairy products.⁴³⁶ Canada and the US signed a trade agreement in 1935, and in 1937 the British-Canadian arrangements of 1932 were renegotiated. Talks with the United States and with Great Britain in 1937-38 both resulted in new agreements that, in general, provided for the reduction of tariffs. In these talks, Canada gave up some of its tariff advantages within the empire in favor of greater access to the American market.⁴³⁷ Canada's relationship with the United States is thus characterized by its ambivalence. On the one hand, the importance of the United States to the Canadian economy and cultural landscape steadily increased during the 20th century; on the other hand, actors feared assimilation by the dominant power of the US. This led to an emphasis on ties with the empire.

During World War Two, Canada fought on the side of Great Britain. At that time, there was a trade deficit with the US, which Canada was able to offset through its trade surplus with Great Britain. However, in 1941 Canada had acquired a large balance in sterling that it could no longer convert into US dollars, which meant they could no longer pay for war-time imports from the United States. In Ottawa, this triggered a crisis. The Hyde Park Agreement of 1941 provided a solution that facilitated defense production and weakened the borders between the United States and Canada. Thus, World War II also ensured stronger economic ties between Canada and the United States, even if the emotional ties to Great Britain remained. Britain would benefit from an

⁴³⁴ For example, the Canadian Author's Association, the Canadian Historical Association, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 582f.

⁴³⁵ Cf. O'ram, "Canada and the Empire," p. 154.

⁴³⁶ Canada, in turn, agreed to reduce tariffs on more than 200 products in return. Cf. MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," p. 584.

⁴³⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*

economically and militarily strong Canada.⁴³⁸ Moreover, Canada also sought to support an economically struggling Britain with loans both during and after World War Two.⁴³⁹ After the war, the trade imbalance with the United States was again a problem for Canadian trade policy, and Canada was forced to import less from the United States or export more to its neighboring country to offset the imbalance. Thus, in 1954, 60 percent of Canadian exports went to the United States, while only 16 percent were exported to Great Britain. Import figures show a similar picture: in 1954, Canada obtained 72 percent of its imports from the United States and only 9 percent from Great Britain.⁴⁴⁰ In addition, agreements such as the aforementioned North American Air Defence Agreement of 1957 ensured stronger ties with the United States in military terms. Nevertheless, ties with Great Britain continued after the Second World War.

Postwar historiography also addressed the increasing Americanization. The growing importance of the United States and the waning of British influence are also found in the historiography of the period. First, for example, political economist Harold Innis warned of an American takeover of Canada in a speech at the University of Nottingham in 1948.⁴⁴¹ The idea of Canada's decline as a distinct nation was taken up by philosopher George Parkin Grant in 1965, who emphasized Canada's traditional ties to Britain as a counterweight to the United States.⁴⁴² Creighton echoed this argument with his work on Canada's centennial celebration that likewise portrayed expansionist America as a danger.⁴⁴³ In his subsequent studies, W.L. Morton also described the dangers to Canada from the US, viewing Canada's historical ties to Britain and the Empire as something that made it distinct from its overbearing neighbor.⁴⁴⁴ Nevertheless, by the 1960s, Canadian interest in the history of Empire had moved to the margins and had become a specific field.⁴⁴⁵ This reflected the personal experience of the postwar generation: they had been born at a time when Empire no longer played the same role it did for their parents' generation. Instead, their political and personal

⁴³⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 587.

⁴³⁹ Canada had given Britain more than two trillion dollars. The Canadian government forgave Britain's war debt in 1946 and supported the mother country with another loan of \$1.25 trillion. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 591.

⁴⁴⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁴⁴¹ Harold Innis, "Great Britain, the United States and Canada, 21st Cust Foundation Lecture, delivered at the University of Nottingham, 21 May 1948," in *Essays in Canadian Economic History*, ed. by M. Q. Innis, pp. 394-412 (Toronto 1956).

⁴⁴² George P. Grant, *Lament for a Nation. The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto 1965).

⁴⁴³ Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century* (Toronto 1970).

⁴⁴⁴ W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronto 1963).

⁴⁴⁵ Political and diplomatic history was replaced by social history as the focus of many students. In addition, "limited identities" – such as Quebec nationalism or questions of ethnicity – moved into the center of historical writing. Cf. Owrain, "Canada and the Empire," p. 157.

experiences were influenced by the tremendous significance of the United States and the Cold War. This reduced the empire to a more marginal role.

In addition, migration patterns changed after World War II. Similar to Australia, most immigrants had, for some time, originated from the British Isles. However, in the 1960s, British migration to Canada began to decrease.⁴⁴⁶ In addition, the Canadian Citizenship Act, enacted in 1947, changed the legal status of Canadian residents, and after World War II, there was more immigration from other European groups. At the same time, the Canadian university system expanded, so fewer academics traveled to Oxford or Cambridge to complete their degrees. Thus, personal ties to Britain increasingly diminished.⁴⁴⁷ Still, there emerged in this period a number of works that embedded the country within the imperial context – for example by Peter Burroughs, Helen Taft Manning, Ged Martin, Richard Preston, and Philip G. Wigley.⁴⁴⁸ However, on the issue of Canada's ties to Britain and the Empire, the works of Robert Bothwell, J.L. Granatstein, and C.P. Stacey have had more influence in Canadian historical writing.⁴⁴⁹ These works refer to both the US and Britain as important factors, shaping events in Canada. The relationship to the empire is thus a part of Canadian foreign policy, but it is not the focus of this research. Canada's development is interpreted as a path to Canadian independence.⁴⁵⁰ A more detailed discussion of British elements in Canada, and in particular the persistence of 'Britishness' after 1945, is offered in the works of Phillip Buckner, cited at the beginning of this chapter.⁴⁵¹

With the exception of the years 1957 to 1961, the postwar period in Canada was characterized by a sustained "boom."⁴⁵² During this time, Canadian actors discussed various options for economic stability. This included the possibility of expanding trade with Great Britain and the preferential systems associated with it. Other options included bilateralism and

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," p. 592.

⁴⁴⁷ Cf. Owrarn, "Canada and the Empire," p. 158f.

⁴⁴⁸ Peter Burroughs, *The Colonial Reformers and Canada, 1830-1849* (Toronto 1969); Helen Taft Manning, *British Colonial Government after the American Revolution* (Hamden 1966); Ged Martin, *The Durham Report and British Policy. A Critical Essay* (Cambridge 1972); Richard Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defence'. A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defence Organizations, 1867-1919* (Durham 1967); Philip G. Wigley, *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth. British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926* (Cambridge 1977).

⁴⁴⁹ Robert Bothwell, *Loring Christie and the Failure of Bureaucratic Imperialism* (New York 1988); J.L. Granatstein, *How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States* (Toronto 1989); C. P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict. A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1948, Vol. II.* (Toronto 1981); C. P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict. A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1948, Vol. I.* (Toronto 1977).

⁴⁵⁰ Cf. Owrarn, "Canada and the Empire," p. 159.

⁴⁵¹ Buckner, *Canada and the End of Empire*; Buckner, *Canada and the British Empire.*

⁴⁵² Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 261.

multilateralism,⁴⁵³ all of which had their advantages and disadvantages. In the 1930s, the expansion of a preferential system with Britain had even then created problems with the United States, souring relations between Canada and its neighbor for the next decade. The bilateralism option had also led to economic difficulties for Canada in the 1930s and was thus not an attractive solution either. For Ottawa, multilateralism and non-discriminatory trade seemed to be the most appropriate options for the conducting of Canadian trade policy in the postwar period.⁴⁵⁴ Thus, Canada supported the 1944 Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) conference that established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF was to regulate exchange rates and prevent competitive devaluation in a multilateral system.⁴⁵⁵ Canada had high hopes for the GATT negotiations in the postwar period; however, over the course of the individual rounds of negotiations in the 1940s and 1950s, Canadian hopes for multilateral trade agreements under GATT were increasingly dashed.⁴⁵⁶ To expand Canada-UK trade, the Canada-UK Continuing Committee was established in 1949, renamed the Canada-UK Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in 1967.⁴⁵⁷ Economic relations within Canada were regulated by the Department of Finance and the Department of Trade and Commerce. With the establishment of the Department of Industry in 1963, there was a shift in the areas of departmental responsibility; from this point onward, the newly established Department of Industry was responsible for the influence of foreign investment in Canada.⁴⁵⁸

For Canadian actors, imperial economic relations consisted of two guiding principles. First, investment and finance; and second, trade and trade policy. Periodically, officials from Britain and Canada would come together in the United Kingdom-Canada Continuing Committee (UKCCC) to discuss matters of concern. Canada was interested in good economic relations with Britain, especially since the Great Depression had demonstrated the dangers of depending on the United States. Using a combination of long-term intergovernmental treaties and loans, Canada sought to

⁴⁵³ Bilateralism refers to bilateral trade and/or payment agreements. Western countries attempted to dismantle bilateralism after World War II (GATT, WTO) and instead pursue multilateral agreements or multilateralism. The exception here is Asia and Oceania, which continued to pursue bilateralism. Cf. "Bilateralism," <https://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/definition/bilateralismus-30631/version-254208>, last accessed on: 31.01.2019.

⁴⁵⁴ Cf. Bruce Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* (Montreal/Kingston 1992), p. 47.

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. Ibid, p. 48.

⁴⁵⁶ Cf. Ibid, pp. 73-75.

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 259.

⁴⁵⁸ Cf. Ibid, p. 263f.

strengthen its exports. However, the tactic did not work as exports increased only in the short-term and restrictions on dollar imports to Britain and the sterling zone hindered Canadian exports.⁴⁵⁹

Nonetheless, the trade relationship between Canada and Britain declined during the 1950s.⁴⁶⁰ The British share of world trade overall decreased steadily, and in 1956 it was granted an emergency loan of \$561 million by the IMF. This was followed by a further emergency loan of \$561 million from the Export-Import Bank. The Suez crisis had also become a financial problem, as confidence in sterling had been shaken. For Britain, this resulted in a loss of nearly \$280 million by November 1956.⁴⁶¹ By the early 1960s, almost all Canadian exports could enter the UK without tariffs; exceptions included tobacco, automobiles, and synthetic textiles.⁴⁶² This meant that primary products such as grain in particular could enter the UK duty-free. Moreover, agricultural exports were not subject to any direct quantitative restrictions. Many other Canadian goods were subject to tariff preferences in relation to countries outside the Commonwealth, such as the United States and Japan.⁴⁶³ The total value of Canadian export trade to Britain in 1960 was \$915 million, of which 33 percent was agricultural products,⁴⁶⁴ 49 percent was basic industrial materials,⁴⁶⁵ and 18 percent was semi-finished and finished goods.⁴⁶⁶

Even during the Cold War, Canada maintained trade relations with the Eastern Bloc countries. Exports of car parts to Cuba and grain to the Soviet Union and China continued, which led to tension with the USA. Exports by subsidiaries of American companies headquartered in Canada were particularly criticized by the United States. Canada, on the other hand, argued that

⁴⁵⁹ When questioned by journalists upon his return to Canada on July 7, 1957, Diefenbaker announced his intentions to shift 15 percent of exports to Britain. A promise to strengthen Commonwealth ties had played a role in his election campaign, which is why journalists questioned Diefenbaker over how he would actually implement his promises. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 207f.

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option*, p. 77.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴⁶² Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C., Briefing Paper from the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for the Cabinet, 23 June, 1961.

⁴⁶³ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ Of particular relevance here were cereals, wheat flour and coarse grains, but also soy, fish products, and cheese. *Ibid.* Representatives of the individual producers of these products repeatedly approached the Canadian government to request information, criticize, or make proposals. An example of this is the reports on possible consequences for certain products from the Toronto Elevators Division Maple Leaf Mills Limited: see LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 918 File 7-72-11-1: Effect on Certain Oil Seeds and their Products Originating in Canada Should Britain Join the European Economic Community, 27 November, 1961 and Effect on Certain Grass or Forage Seeds Grown in Canada Should Britain Join the European Economic Community, 27 November, 1961.

⁴⁶⁵ These were mainly copper, nickel, non-ferrous metals, hides, skins, iron ore, aluminium, etc. Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C., Briefing Paper from the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for the Cabinet, 23 June, 1961.

⁴⁶⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*

the subsidiaries were subject to Canadian law because they were located on Canadian soil, and thus were permitted to trade with communist countries.⁴⁶⁷ Grain shortages in the Soviet Union and China led to a huge increase in Canadian grain exports. Between 1959 and 1965, the trade in wheat increased by 250 percent.⁴⁶⁸ With respect to the formative years of the European Economic Community, it should be noted that Canada was relatively unaffected at first – in 1957, only six percent of Canadian exports went to mainland Western Europe.⁴⁶⁹ Instead, Canadian players initially took EFTA efforts seriously, with 15 percent of Canadian exports going to the United Kingdom.⁴⁷⁰

Regarding Canadian foreign policy, it should be noted that the Department of External Affairs was expanded after World War II. Between 1946 and 1968, the number of employees grew enormously,⁴⁷¹ since there was an expansion of Canadian foreign policy. Among other factors, decolonization and the Cold War were significant to this change. As discussed above, the Cold War ensured that a central aspect of foreign policy decisions and actions involved the positioning of one's own state within the bipolar world order. In the Canadian case, however, the central orientation of Canadian foreign policy was not only its alignment with the West and its distance from communism. Canadian governments also sought to establish Canada's reputation as a 'middle power,' that is, as a mediator in times of conflict.⁴⁷² Still, it positioned itself on the side of the Western powers and as part of the 'Free World' led by the United States.⁴⁷³ Canadian interest in the rest of the empire remained limited, even during the period of decolonization, as the focus was on the United Nations and on NATO. In principle, Canada supported independence from colonial rule, but wanted decolonization to proceed peacefully with few negative consequences for the British-American relationship, which was essential to them because of their location and historical ties to Great Britain.⁴⁷⁴ Proximity to the US exempted Canada, to some degree, from the expensive acquisition of nuclear weapons. Due to this proximity to US nuclear arsenals, it did not seem necessary to acquire any of its own. In addition, Canada benefited from the sale of uranium, which

⁴⁶⁷ Cf. Bothwell, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War*, p. 59.

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁹ Cf. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option*, pp. 163f.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 168f.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. Barry and Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 2, Coming of Age, 1946-1968*, p. ix. For a detailed description of the history of the *Department of External Affairs*, cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁷² Cf. Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada. The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957*, p. 113.

⁴⁷³ Cf. Bothwell, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War*, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. MacKenzie, "Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire," p. 593.

the Americans bought until the late 1950s.⁴⁷⁵ Canada did not participate in the Vietnam War, which made for tension with its North American neighbor. However, there was also an increase of tensions within the country – the ‘Quiet Revolution’ in Quebec began in the 1960s and peaked with the October Crisis of 1970. Aspirations for a Quebec that was independent of the Ottawa government led to Canada's transformation into a bilingual nation under Pierre Trudeau in 1977.

During the period under consideration, the Canadian prime ministers were John Diefenbaker (1957-1963, Conservative Party), Lester Pearson (1963-1968, Liberal Party) and Pierre Trudeau (with a brief interruption 1968-1984, Liberal Party). Diefenbaker's election in 1957 ended the 22-year reign of the Liberal Party.⁴⁷⁶ For Diefenbaker, an Anglophile, the connection to Great Britain was of immense significance and was important as a mechanism that distinguished Canada from the United States. In his view, the long years of Liberal Party rule had led to an excessively strong economic tie to the United States.⁴⁷⁷ Lester Pearson, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for the Canadian role during the Suez Crisis, began removing British symbols in Canada. The Canadian flag controversy occurred during his years in power,⁴⁷⁸ whereby appeasement of separatists in Quebec was to be achieved with the reduction of British elements. After Lester Pearson⁴⁷⁹ the young and popular Pierre Trudeau attained the office of prime minister.

⁴⁷⁵ Cf. Bothwell, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War*, p. 41f.

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 204. Diefenbaker had difficulty dealing with public service actors because he suspected that there were many supporters of the Liberal Party among them. As the EEC debate progressed, his suspicions were reinforced since public service actors were unable to make proposals that would have prevented Britain's entry into the EEC, or mitigated its impact for Canada. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 209. He particularly suspected Liberal Party influence in the Department of External Affairs. Shortly after his election, Lester Pearson became leader of the Liberal Party, and Diefenbaker suspected he and the Liberal Party had a great deal of influence on the employees of the Department of External Affairs – from which he drew his notion of "Pearsonalities" as a description for members of this department. Cf. Hilliker, "The Politicians and the 'Pearsonalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations," p. 152.

⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 205.

⁴⁷⁸ In the flag controversy of the mid-1960s, the Union Jack was removed from the Canadian flag and the “Maple Leaf” flag was declared the national emblem of Canada.

⁴⁷⁹ Lester Pearson - or "Mike" as his friends called him - had himself received part of his academic education in Great Britain, and he had been stationed there at the beginning of his diplomatic and political career. He believed in Canadian nationalism, but also that it could be combined with an attachment to Britain and the Commonwealth: "I believe in the full expression of Canadian nationalism and in Canadian symbols for it. But surely this is possible without losing any of the respect and regard we have for each other within our Commonwealth and the special respect and affection we have for our Motherlands of England, Scotland, Wales and, yes, Ireland." LAC MG26-N9 Vol. 26: Remarks by Lester Pearson, Opening of the 16th Assembly of the British Commonwealth Ex-Services League, 16 September, 1963. For Pearson, the establishment of a "modern Commonwealth" in the postwar period was one of the important guarantors of security and stability in the world. Cf. Peter Boehm, "Canada and the Modern Commonwealth. The Approaches of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau," in *Bulletin of Canadian Studies* 3 (1979), pp. 23-39, p. 24. Although under his reign significant British symbols in Canada were replaced by "Canadian" symbols, the Commonwealth nevertheless continued to be an important forum for world political cooperation. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 26. A detailed account of Lester Pearson's English-Canadian background, together with his decidedly nationalist pride in Canada can be found in John English's rather literary work on Pearson's life. For instance, English describes how Pearson's childhood was stamped

Owing to the popular enthusiasm for him, the era has been designated as one of "Trudeaumania." Like Lester Pearson, Trudeau took action regarding British symbols. Under him, the Royal Mail became the Canadian Post, the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force became the Canadian Armed Forces, and Dominion Day was renamed Canada Day.⁴⁸⁰

With regard to Canada, it must be noted that, in contrast to Australia and New Zealand, its geographical proximity to the United States must always be taken into account. The ties to the United States and the special role of the French-speaking population distinguish Canada from the other two dominions in significant ways. Thus, in Canada the relationship with Great Britain incorporates not only the ties of tradition, but also an aspect of demarcation, distinguishing it from the United States.

2.4. New Zealand after 1945

Our people, our cultural traditions, our political institutions and the forms of our political life all come from Britain and through Britain from Western Europe. Our trade and finance have the strongest links with Britain. But, while history, traditions and hard economic fact place New Zealand among the Western European - or, shall we say, the Atlantic community - geography has put us here in the South Pacific.⁴⁸¹

This quotation from the New Zealand diplomat Alister McIntosh in 1965 clearly suggests that until the 1960s, New Zealand's self-perception was split by a divide between its historical-cultural connections and its geographical location. Linked to Britain, and thus to Europe, through tradition, history, and economy, New Zealand was still geographically remote from the European continent as well as the British motherland. Instead, its closest neighbors – with the exception of Australia – were the Pacific states or the lands of Asia. Through the Commonwealth, New Zealand had long been able to position itself within the British or European world.⁴⁸²

The 'traditional' historiography of New Zealand emphasizes the early initiatives for New Zealand independence, such as the decision not to join the Australian Commonwealth in 1901, or

with British symbols such as Queen Victoria on stamps, crockery, cutlery, and statuary, while still co-existing with Canadian national pride. Cf. English, *Shadow of Heaven. The Life of Lester Pearson. Vol. I 1897-1948*, p. 1.

⁴⁸⁰ At first, Pierre Trudeau was sceptical of the Commonwealth, but later he came to value it as an international forum for the exchange of ideas and the discussion of global political affairs. Cf. Boehm, "Canada and the Modern Commonwealth. The Approaches of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau," p. 27.

⁴⁸¹ Alister McIntosh at a speech given upon his acceptance of an honorary degree in 1965, quoted in: Templeton, *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993*, p. 24.

⁴⁸² "[...] for us the Commonwealth was as much a home as an alibi." Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 25.

its involvement in the two world wars.⁴⁸³ Researchers give particular attention to the Labour government that ruled between 1935 and 1948, and which established the state's first foreign policy institutions and supported supranational institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. The best-known representative of this nationalist school is Keith Sinclair,⁴⁸⁴ who interpreted New Zealand's loyalty to Great Britain as a means of asserting national interests; he likewise argued for a more independent national consciousness.⁴⁸⁵ Sinclair and W.H. Oliver authored the standard works on New Zealand history that have long been the cornerstone of its historiography.⁴⁸⁶ More recent works, on the other hand, either emphasize ties to Britain, while downplaying the importance of independent politics during this period, or they focus more on Māori and migrant history. The works of James Belich⁴⁸⁷ and Michael King⁴⁸⁸ are examples of a bicultural historiography that compares and unites Pakeha and Māori traditions of historical interpretation.

From the 1880s onwards, New Zealand maintained ties with Great Britain in various areas and, in some respects, it strengthened its relations to the mother country. This 're-colonization' was established in the 1920s and continued into the 1940s, and in some respects, even to the present.⁴⁸⁹ New Zealand saw London as their cultural center. Connections existed between the two countries thanks to the refrigerated ships that regularly ran between them, transporting agricultural products from the Antipode to the mother country.⁴⁹⁰ Re-colonization ensured the creation of a colonial myth of 'racial harmony' between indigenous groups and New Zealand settlers, which was intended to distinguish the Dominion from Australia.⁴⁹¹ New Zealand historiography at the beginning of the 20th century often portrayed the country as a paradise; it was a social laboratory that, on the one hand, was strongly British and, on the other – in the words of James Belich – a "Britain without the mistakes."⁴⁹² The leading exponent of this tendency was William Pember

⁴⁸³ Cf. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, p. 6f. In some quarters, New Zealand's decision not to join the Commonwealth of Australia is viewed as the first sign of New Zealand's independent foreign policy. Cf. Templeton, *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993*, p. 3.

⁴⁸⁴ Cf. Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand* (London 1959).

⁴⁸⁵ Cf. Belich, "Colonization and History in New Zealand," p. 187.

⁴⁸⁶ W.H. Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand* (London 1960); Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*.

⁴⁸⁷ James Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000* (Honolulu 2001).

⁴⁸⁸ King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*.

⁴⁸⁹ Cf. Belich, "Colonization and History in New Zealand," p. 183.

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁴⁹¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁴⁹² Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

Reeves, whose comprehensive history, first published in 1898, reinforced the myths of a paradise and social laboratory.⁴⁹³

Constitutional changes undertaken by the New Zealand government often followed the lead of the other dominions, such as the ratification of the Statute of Westminster (1947)⁴⁹⁴ and the British and New Zealand Citizenship Act (1948). In both cases, New Zealand looked to the initiatives of Canada, which in comparison adopted a position more independent of Great Britain. When the New Zealand government sought to change the national anthem from "God Save The King" to "God Defend New Zealand" in 1940, many New Zealanders opposed it. 'Britishness' was an important part of how New Zealanders defined themselves, especially since most immigrants were from the British Isles. By the 1960s, over 90 percent of New Zealand's population was of British origin. Its population growth came more from reproduction than from immigration.⁴⁹⁵ New Zealand reconsidered its assisted migration in 1947 and allowed fewer so-called 10-pound immigrants.⁴⁹⁶ Prior to 1947, unassisted migration by British immigrants remained low. Until the 1980s, immigrants came mainly from either Britain or Australia. Thus, unlike Australia, immigration remained predominantly British, even as Australia's white population was increasingly composed of various European ethnic groups.⁴⁹⁷ Like Australia and Canada, New Zealand introduced its own citizenship in 1948. With the Immigration Amendment Act of 1961, all non-New Zealanders (except Australians) were required to have residence permits in the country.⁴⁹⁸ Immigration to New Zealand came not only from the British and Australians, but also from the territories administered by New Zealand – the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹³ Cf. *Ibid*, p. 185.

⁴⁹⁴ Ratification of the Statute of Westminster by the New Zealand Parliament took place on 25 November, 1947. This gave New Zealand autonomy in matters of both foreign and domestic policy. The late adoption of the Statute demonstrates New Zealand's reluctance to move away from Great Britain. Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 420.

⁴⁹⁵ Between 1950 and 1980, only 23 percent of New Zealand's population growth came from immigration. Cf. Denoon, Mein-Smith, and Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, p. 351.

⁴⁹⁶ "10 Pound Immigrants" – or "Ten Pound Poms" as they were called in Australia – were early immigrants who purchased ship passage to the settler colonies for 10 pounds. The 10-pound ship passages were part of the "assisted passage migration" from Britain to Australia. Cf. A. James Hammerton and Alistair Thomson, *Ten Pound Poms. Australia's Invisible Migrants* (Manchester/New York 2005), p. 29.

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. Denoon, Mein-Smith, and Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, pp. 351 and 53.

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. *Ibid*, p. 351.

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. *Ibid*, p. 353. During the first round of British accession talks with the EEC, New Zealand occasionally pointed out that Great Britain should also take into account Western Samoan interests. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/75 3382 3: New Zealand Delegation Accra to Minister of External Affairs Wellington, 17 September, 1961. Australia, like New Zealand, also asked that tropical produce from its protectorate territories in New Guinea also be included. Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/75 3382 3: United Kingdom/EEC Negotiations, 13 September, 1961.

Under the Anglophile Prime Minister Sidney Holland (National Party, 1949-1957), 'Britishness' flourished as an ordering concept. The Queen's Royal Tour to New Zealand in 1953 revived enthusiasm for the British Empire and Great Britain. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, New Zealand sided with the British. In addition to its cultural affinities with Britain, New Zealand was also heavily dependent on the mother country in economic and political matters, and its foreign policy followed British guidelines.⁵⁰⁰ Many political, social and economic structures were still strongly tied to Britain in the 1950s, such as the Armed Forces – its Navy still had a British admiral in the 1950s. The Security Intelligence Service (SIS) was established in consultation with Great Britain and under the auspices of MI5, from which many of its personnel also at first derived.⁵⁰¹ The business elite also continued to look to Britain as source of imports, financial markets and professional knowledge.⁵⁰² In the 1950s, New Zealand, as did Australia, perceived Asia and especially China as a threat.⁵⁰³

Between 1960 and 1972, New Zealand was governed by Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of the National Party.⁵⁰⁴ In 1963, the campaign of Holyoake and his party ran under the slogan "Steady Does It." Holyoake saw his role as one of preserving the status quo, even though during his reign he took steps toward a foreign policy more independent of Britain. For example, he did not withdraw New Zealand troops from Malaysia after the British withdrawal, but left them in the region.⁵⁰⁵ Holyoake was succeeded as prime minister by Norman Kirk of the Labour Party.⁵⁰⁶ Kirk began his tenure with a variety of policy shifts. Under his government, policy towards China altered, and New Zealand withdrew its last troops from Vietnam; political debates over contact with racist South Africa in sports and French nuclear tests dominated his reign. Kirk countered both problems by reducing diplomatic contacts with both countries and advocating a more moral and idealistic foreign policy. Up to his untimely death in 1975, Norman Kirk paid no official visits

⁵⁰⁰ Cf. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, p. 57.

⁵⁰¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁵⁰² Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁵⁰³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 118f.

⁵⁰⁴ On "Kiwi" Keith Holyoake, see Barry Gustafson, *Kiwi Keith. A Biography of Keith Holyoake* (Auckland 2007).

⁵⁰⁵ Keith Holyoake was himself a farmer. Under Sidney Holland, he became Minister of Agriculture in 1949. He was then appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 1954, a post that had up to that point been an informal arrangement. Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, pp. 448f.

⁵⁰⁶ Kirk was called "Big Norm" by his supporters. Cf. Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, p. 395. Norman Kirk was first an MP for Lyttelton between 1957 and 1969 and for Sydenham between 1969 and 1974. In 1963 he was elected vice-president of the Labour Party and a year later its president. In 1972, Kirk and the Labour Party won the vote, and he became Prime Minister of New Zealand. At the same time, Kirk was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1972 to 1974. He died early of a heart problem in 1974. Cf. "Norman Kirk," <https://www.archway.archives.govt.nz/ViewEntity.do?code=AAWV>, last accessed on: 29 November, 2018.

to Great Britain and plotted an independent course for New Zealand. Nevertheless, even Kirk recognized that Great Britain was of considerable importance, both in matters of security policy and as a protective military power. With Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, there were major changes. Unlike his predecessor, the National Prime Minister supported contacts between the two countries and sought closer cooperation with and ties to Britain. He was rather suspicious of the Americans and Australians, and just as much of Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, he managed to remain in power in New Zealand until 1984.⁵⁰⁷

In the Canberra agreement of 1944, New Zealand and its close neighbor Australia had committed themselves to mutual cooperation and collaboration. For a long time, New Zealand had observed world events, but felt little affected by them because of its geographical distance.⁵⁰⁸ New Zealand was involved in the two World Wars, and the relatively nearby Pacific War posed a particular threat to the country. Thus, treaties and foreign relations grew increasingly important.⁵⁰⁹ For New Zealand, the 1950s marked an upswing in terms of its self-perception. There was an increasing awareness of its significance as a nation. The New Zealand mountaineer Edmund Hillary (together with the Nepalese climber Tenzing Norgay) succeeded in making the first ascent of Mount Everest in 1953. The coronation of Elizabeth II in the same year and talk of a possible visit from the Queen provided an upsurge of imperial feeling within the country.⁵¹⁰ A few days after the Declaration, the General Assembly voted on Samoan independence and accepted Samoan desires for independence on December 18, 1960. Samoa subsequently attained independence on 1 January, 1962.⁵¹¹

In some respects, however, New Zealand also deviated from the political guidelines of Great Britain. New Zealand, which was responsible for the administration of Western Samoa, spoke in favor of the 1960 United Nations Declaration Against Colonialism, while Britain and Australia abstained. London was angered by the action of New Zealand, led by the newly elected Keith Holyoake, and sent a telegram to Wellington to persuade the prime minister to go along with British neutrality. Shortly before the actual vote, however, the New Zealand representative for

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, p. 395.

⁵⁰⁸ Cf. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, pp. 37f.

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 37ff.

⁵¹⁰ Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 412f. Keith Holyoake even saw the ascent of Mount Everest as a "[...] magnificent coronation present for the Queen." Quoted in Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, p. 392.

⁵¹¹ Cf. W. David McIntyre, *Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands* (Oxford 2014), p. 177.

Western Samoa managed to again change the government's mind, and New Zealand voted in favor of the declaration.⁵¹²

Regarding the organizational structure of New Zealand foreign policy, there were some changes. On 11 June, 1943, an Act of Parliament established the Department of External Affairs, making New Zealand the last of the three Dominions to establish its own Department – after Canada in 1909 and Australia in 1935.⁵¹³ In 1969, the Department was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was, from 1988 until 1993, then known as the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (MERT).⁵¹⁴ The establishment of a Department of External Affairs in 1943 demonstrates that by this time the New Zealand government understood that New Zealand had to manage its own foreign affairs like any other independent country. Previously, foreign affairs had been handled by the Prime Minister's Department, and Great Britain had represented the interests of New Zealand abroad.⁵¹⁵ After 1943, Britain often continued to represent New Zealand interests overseas, but 1942 was the first time a New Zealand diplomatic post had been established in another country – Walter Nash had been appointed minister to Washington. High Commissioners were appointed in Canada and Australia in 1942 and 1943.⁵¹⁶ Until 1975, the Department of External Affairs, or later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was administratively attached to the Prime

⁵¹² After Samoa's independence, New Zealand offered the Cook Islands, which were also under New Zealand administration, various options: independence, integration, self-government, or federation with other islands. The Cook Islanders opted for self-government, but retained New Zealand citizenship with the right of free entry into the country. The New Zealand government then, in 1964, passed legislation for the self-government of the Cook Islands with affiliation to New Zealand. However, this arrangement could not come into effect prior to a vote by the UN General Assembly in 1965. Since the agreement was not actually in full compliance with UN stipulations of independence, the UN was to observe elections on the islands. The UN then exempted New Zealand from the obligation to report information about the Cook Islands. Australia and Great Britain were absent from the vote on this matter. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁵¹³ Cf. Fedorowich, "When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner," p. 14.

⁵¹⁴ Cf. Templeton, *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993*, p. 1. As of July 1993, the name of the department was changed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. "Foreign Affairs" was the internationally recognized term for a state institution whose function was the international representation of the nation. "Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,"

<https://www.archway.archives.govt.nz/ViewEntity.do?code=ABHS>, last accessed on 29 November, 2018

⁵¹⁵ Cf. Templeton, *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993*, p. 1f.

⁵¹⁶ New Zealand had had a High Commissioner in London since 1907, who also represented the state at the United Nations. Communications on foreign policy matters, however, still went through the Governor-General and the Dominion Office in London until the war years led to the withdrawal of the Governor-General from these circles. Cf. *Ibid.* The first New Zealand High Commissioner to Australia, Carl Berendsen, was appointed in 1943 and had previously been the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, attesting to the close linkage between foreign policy and the Prime Minister's Department in New Zealand at the time. However, some contemporary witnesses suggest that Berendsen was selected as the first High Commissioner in Australia because he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown due to his work in Wellington. Moreover, it is suggested (cf. *ibid.*) that Berendsen was transferred to Australia because of personal problems with Fraser. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 11. Overall, the New Zealand High Commission in Ottawa was only its third diplomatic mission. Cf. ANZ ABHS 6958 W5579/184 NYP 3/40/4 1: Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 9 September, 1969.

Minister's Department. Between 1946 and 1975, the Secretary of External/Foreign Affairs was also the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department. For much of this period, the Prime Minister himself had oversight of the External Affairs portfolio.⁵¹⁷ In the postwar period, the diplomatic circuit was still relatively undeveloped, its central figure being Alister McIntosh, who served as Secretary of External Affairs between 1943 and 1966, and who expanded the diplomatic apparatus. McIntosh proclaimed as late as 1962 that the principle of "Where Britain goes, we go" was still relevant.⁵¹⁸ For many years, this New Zealand attitude toward foreign policy shaped many contemporary perceptions of New Zealand as a passive and loyal British dominion.⁵¹⁹ This view was supported by New Zealand's self-perception as an isolated South Pacific outpost of the European world, whose security had long been founded upon the Royal Navy.⁵²⁰

In 1943, after the establishment of the Department of External Affairs and in the period thereafter, the foreign policy apparatus in New Zealand was not well developed. New Zealand diplomat George Laking described the structures of New Zealand's foreign policy administration in a 1993 address on the occasion of the department's 50th anniversary. He pointed to several important institutions that guided the new Department of External Affairs. For example, he described the Prime Minister's Personal Office, which consisted of their Private Secretaries, stenographers, and persons of relevant importance or influence. These actors sat close to the important information points and through "good personal relations with them, useful insights into important matters could be gained in casual conversation."⁵²¹

In New Zealand, the 1960s were also a time of stability and prosperity.⁵²² The unemployment rate hardly rose until the end of the 1960s. Urbanization and the strong growth of a suburban culture based on the nuclear family characterized the 1960s in New Zealand. The "baby boom" also led to population growth in the Antipode.⁵²³ This was later used as an argument for why New Zealand needed to increase its export trade:

⁵¹⁷ Cf. Templeton, *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993*, p. 1f.

⁵¹⁸ McIntosh remained in office until 1966, when he became the first New Zealand ambassador to Rome. His successor was George Laking, who was first Secretary of External Affairs and, after the department was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He became Secretary of Foreign Affairs until 1969. Laking had previously been High Commissioner in London between 1958 and 1961 and had been appointed Ambassador to Washington in 1961. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 29.

⁵¹⁹ Cf. *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁵²⁰ Cf. *Ibid*, p. 5.

⁵²¹ *Ibid*, p. 32.

⁵²² The phenomenon of growing consumption known as "keeping up with the Joneses" also took hold in New Zealand. Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 412.

⁵²³ Cf. *Ibid*.

New Zealand faces the economic problems associated with a rapidly expanding population. Export earning must be increased if New Zealand is to retain its high standard of living and to provide employment for its growing labor force.⁵²⁴

During the 1950s and 1960s, the growing influx of Māori into the cities led to demographic change within urban societies.⁵²⁵ In addition, television⁵²⁶ came to New Zealand in the 1960s. Combined with cheaper air travel, this brought more influences into the Antipode, affecting aspects of culture from clothing to the literary landscape. Although New Zealand's universities expanded in the 1960s, New Zealand students still continued to look to the grander institutions of other countries. For the first time, convenient air connections allowed scholars, artists, and intellectuals better conditions for global engagement with a permanent base in New Zealand.⁵²⁷ Nevertheless, it was not until the 1970s that the New Zealand literary and cultural landscape truly began to blossom.⁵²⁸ The founding of the *New Zealand Journal of History* in 1967 is indicative of a growing awareness that the discipline of history in New Zealand needed its own institutions.

In the context of the Cold War, New Zealand also spoke out against communism and cultivated an anti-communist position that inclined towards the US, a position that hardened, especially in the 1950s.⁵²⁹ The growing importance of the US as an ally is also observable in New Zealand. As early as the 1940s, the Fraser government had discussed a possible shift of New Zealand security agreements from Great Britain to the US.⁵³⁰ When the US asked New Zealand for its support in the Vietnam War, the latter agreed. It is of interest that Britain, which was also affiliated to both countries through SEATO, refused to send troops. In 1965, Keith Holyoake's

⁵²⁴ ANZ AEFN 19147 IC22/18 37: Brief for Prime Minister: Mr Mcmillan's Visit United Kingdom - New Zealand Trade, 14 January, 1958.

⁵²⁵ Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 414.

⁵²⁶ Increasingly, the mass medium of television became an important platform and source of information of political debates in the course of the 1960s. Before that time, these discussions took place on political stages in more local and smaller settings. Cf. Ibid, p. 449. For a long time, New Zealanders had believed they must remain excluded from television since the mountains and valleys of the two islands seemed to prevent television reception. The new medium of television brought about changes in the political landscape, as some politicians were better perceived on television than others, and they were more likely to win mass enthusiasm on the political stage. Cf. Ibid, p. 450. At first, television reception existed only in the centers of New Zealand. Between 1960 and 1962, it broadcast for only two to four hours a day at most. By 1970, 77 percent of New Zealanders could receive television, surpassing Australian measures (71 percent). Cf. Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, pp. 426f.

⁵²⁷ The New Zealand painters Colin McCahon, Toss Woollaston and Ralph Hotere, for example, created a large part of their work in New Zealand. Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, pp. 414f.

⁵²⁸ Although there were efforts to strengthen the New Zealand cultural landscape even before the 1970s, such as the founding of the National Orchestra (later the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra) in 1946 or the creation of the New Zealand Literary Fund in the same year, New Zealand culture did not experience a major upswing until the 1970s. Cf. Ibid, p. 419.

⁵²⁹ Cf. Ibid, p. 412.

⁵³⁰ Cf. Ibid, p. 414.

announcement on television that New Zealand would dispatch troops in support of the South Vietnamese government demonstrates that in matters of security New Zealand was by this time a bit less aligned to Britain than it was to the United States.⁵³¹ Domestically, the Vietnam War provoked conflict in New Zealand: the Labour opposition was against New Zealand's involvement in Vietnam, which meant that, for the first time, an important foreign policy decision was made without the agreement of both major parties. The public announcement on national television was followed by many protests by those who opposed the war.⁵³² However, it was not only the Vietnam War that led to a flourishing of protest culture in New Zealand: the arrival of Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1966 as the first American president to visit, and visits by American Vice President Hubert Humphreys and Secretary of State Dean Rusk also brought demonstrators out into the streets. There were also protests against high university tuition, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, sports contacts with racist regime of South Africa, and the use of Lake Manapouri as a power source. Demonstrations for legal equality for Māori, women, and homosexuals increased, especially in the 1970s.⁵³³ The situation of New Zealand's indigenous population was more and more an object of social concern. The Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975 created a tribunal to investigate unlawful acts against the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi,⁵³⁴ which regulated land division between Māori and Pakeha.⁵³⁵ In addition to the tribunal, Māori was introduced as the second official language of the country and recourse to Māori culture ("Renaissance") was promoted by the state.⁵³⁶

Industry in New Zealand was primarily based on agriculture.⁵³⁷ In contrast to Australia, raw materials such as coal, iron, and gas are relatively scarce.⁵³⁸ New Zealand's large forests served as a source of timber, with large areas cleared during the 'Grasslands Revolution' to make way for the various grasses that would serve as the basis for New Zealand agriculture. With the help of new

⁵³¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 450f.

⁵³² Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 451.

⁵³³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 452.

⁵³⁴ Cf. Voigt, *History of Australia and Oceania. An Introduction*, p. 177.

⁵³⁵ (White) inhabitants of New Zealand who are not part of the indigenous population.

⁵³⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 177ff.

⁵³⁷ New Zealand farmers occupied a special position within society, because they embodied much more than "normal" farmers: "[...] the New Zealand farmer is landowner, manager and laborer. His efficiency is due to hard pioneering effort, skilled management, scientific research and a heavy investment in farm improvement. His independence, capacity for hard work and respect for institutions which are basic to our way of life are aspects of our common heritage which we cherish." ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1633/63 3382 29: Keith Holyoake speech, 22 September, 1970. The characteristics of the "New Zealand farmer" thereby "[...] reflects certain characteristics of New Zealand society." ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No. 19, June, 1970.

⁵³⁸ Cf. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens*, p. 67.

pesticides and fertilizers, 51 percent of the land area was converted to grassland. In combination with its mild climate year-round, high yields were achieved in meat, wool, and butter production. As a result, between the 1920s and 1970s, New Zealand consistently ranked between third and fifth among the highest global standards of living.⁵³⁹ New technologies and improved machinery contributed to greater agricultural yields, boosting production. Likewise, new pesticides and fertilizers led to better harvests. Improved road networks and the introduction of milking machines facilitated milk production.⁵⁴⁰ New Zealand's agriculture was regulated by Boards of Trade, such as the New Zealand Dairy Board.⁵⁴¹ During the British talks with the EEC, these Boards of Trade were repeatedly involved in debates and asked for advice.⁵⁴²

Great Britain long remained the main consumer of New Zealand products. However, with the exception of the war years, Britain was not dependent on the New Zealand market, whereas New Zealand was dependent on the British outlet market.⁵⁴³ The Ottawa Agreements of 1932 were also fundamental for New Zealand.⁵⁴⁴ In addition, there were further agreements with Britain:

Other formal commitments are a confidential Exchange of Letters which followed the round of tariff negotiations at Torquay in 1951, and the 1952 Joint Declaration on Meat by which the United Kingdom Government undertook to admit imports of New Zealand meat without restriction of quantity for a period of 15 years terminating in 1967.⁵⁴⁵

However, trade relations altered slowly: while in 1954 most beef products were still exported to the mother country, by 1959 more went to the United States than to Britain. New products such as powdered milk and casein were partially subsidized by the government, which expanded the range of New Zealand products. However, the new outlet markets did not replace the British one. Instead,

⁵³⁹ Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 436. The mandate over Nauru and Banaba, held jointly with Britain and Australia, provided New Zealand with abundant phosphate deposits for the fertilization of their fields. Cf. *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁰ Cf. Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, p. 308.

⁵⁴¹ Cf. ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No 19, June 1970.

⁵⁴² For example, the New Zealand government consulted the Dairy Board regarding negotiations on milk products. Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/40 BRU 46/5/1 28: Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wellington to all posts, 30 July, 1971.

⁵⁴³ Cf. Templeton, *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993*, p. 5.

⁵⁴⁴ "New Zealand's Trade Relations With The United Kingdom: Background: "New Zealand's trading relations with the United Kingdom are governed by a number of formal commitments, the most important being those contained in the Ottawa Agreement of 1932. [...] New Zealand's main obligation accepted under the Ottawa Agreement relates to margins of tariff preference enjoyed by the United Kingdom goods over those of any foreign country [...]. The United Kingdom, for its part, is obliged to grant duty-free entry for practically all New Zealand products (which up until 1957 excluded dairy produce) and maintain specified duties on some foreign products of interest to New Zealand." ANZ AEFN 19147 IC22 18/37/: Brief for Prime Minister: Mr McMillan's Visit United Kingdom - New Zealand Trade, 14 January 1958.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.* The Torquay negotiations (one of the round of talks on GATT) in 1951 and the Joint Declaration on Meat in 1952 were followed by a confidential but formalized exchange of letters between Great Britain and New Zealand. Cf. ANZ ABHS 950 W4627/1199 40/2/1 4: Briefing Paper for Prime Minister.

they complemented it, as Britain was still central to New Zealand trade policy. In 1950, Britain still absorbed 66 percent of all New Zealand exports; in 1965-6, it was still over 50 percent.⁵⁴⁶ As an amendment to the 1957 Ottawa Agreements, Britain and New Zealand agreed to allow, in addition, the unlimited importation of New Zealand butter, cheese, milk powder, casein, and pork. This supplemental agreement also enabled all New Zealand dairy products to enter Britain duty-free. In 1958, the Ottawa Agreements and their amendments were combined in the United Kingdom-New Zealand Trade Agreement, which had a six-month notice of cancellation period. This meant that the right to import all goods duty-free and the unlimited import of dairy products and pork could be terminated six months in advance, but the unlimited import of meat would be valid until 1967.⁵⁴⁷ New Zealand was also a member of the International Wheat Agreement of 1962, which was phased out by the International Grains Agreement of 1967. New Zealand did not join the latter agreement in 1967 since overall grain production had increased and their interest in its export was thus diminished. In addition, the Agreement had been negotiated mainly during the Kennedy Round⁵⁴⁸ and was of special concern to the industrialized countries, which, however, could not agree on a global agreement for dairy products.⁵⁴⁹ In the 1970s, agricultural experts surmised that New Zealand's agricultural assets had been pushed beyond their ecological limit. These assumptions derived from, among other things, the loss of pastures through the flooding of grasslands by rivers. Moreover, the negative effects of pesticides were becoming more widely known, and the production of organic waste by New Zealand's gigantic herds was having more impact on rivers and lakes.⁵⁵⁰ In the second half of the 1960s, the collapse of wool prices meant that overseas revenues from wool and wool products declined, making for economic bottlenecks in New Zealand.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁶ Cf. Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, p. 309.

⁵⁴⁷ See NLW MS-Papers-1403-154/7: UK/EEC Negotiations, Summary of Progress and New Zealand Policy. The United Kingdom-New Zealand Trade Agreement was renegotiated in June 1966, with the possible British accession to the EEC already on the agenda. The agreement was extended for three more years, which was intended to facilitate negotiations with Wellington regarding the EEC. Cf. Bruce Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973* (Toronto 2007), pp. 208ff.

⁵⁴⁸ One of the negotiating rounds for GATT.

⁵⁴⁹ Cf. ANZ AALR 873 W3158/100 T61/7/1/14 2: Cabinet Committee on Overseas Trade Policy, 1971. The Treasury in New Zealand acts as the government's lead advisor on economic and financial matters. In doing so, it also advises the government on the management of the New Zealand economy and develops strategies for the future development of the economy and policies affecting it. Cf. "Treasury,"

<https://www.archway.archives.govt.nz/ViewEntity.do?code=AALR>, last accessed on: 29.11.2018.

⁵⁵⁰ Cf. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 436ff.

⁵⁵¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 450.

In 1947, New Zealand had appointed a Trade Representative in Japan, but only because many other countries had done the same. Trade with Japan remained marginal: no ships operated between the two countries before 1952.⁵⁵² In the late 1950s, this trade increased. During this ‘honeymoon with Japan,’⁵⁵³ some British actors were induced to remind New Zealand what Britain meant for the country and the Commonwealth, and to warn against forgetting the traditional relationship.⁵⁵⁴

Among the Dominions after World War II, New Zealand was the most dependent on Great Britain as its export trade was mostly based on the mother country. Moreover, in cultural terms New Zealand appeared to be more oriented to Britain than the other Dominions. Consequently, geographic and perceived proximity do not coincide in this instance. If we now compare the three Dominions with one another, some interesting parallels as well as differences emerge, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Similarities, differences, cooperation and comparability

What is striking about the historiography of the three countries is that the older literature begins the story with the arrival of European settlers. More recent literature also deals, to some extent, with the history of the three countries before their European settlement, but for a long time this earlier history was neglected and the history of the indigenous peoples was described primarily as an encounter with European settlers.

All three countries share a settler-colonial background, as all three Dominions had been populated by (European) settlers and at the same time had an indigenous population. They share a common history with Great Britain, and for all three, the experience of the two World Wars was significant. During the period under consideration, Australia, as well as Canada and New Zealand, were members of the Commonwealth and part of the British Crown. All three countries centered their Commonwealth relationship around Britain, and their relationships with each other were subordinate to this. Their status as Dominions also linked the three countries, since they were quasi-independent territories within the British Empire. In all three countries, Britain was represented by a Governor-General, while the Queen was (and is) the official head of state. After World War II,

⁵⁵² Cf. Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000*, p. 445.

⁵⁵³ *Evening Post*, 24 March, 1959.

⁵⁵⁴ For example, Cyril Harrison, chairman of the United Kingdom Cotton Board. Cf. *Evening Post*, 24 March, 1959.

all three countries instituted their own citizenship, which replaced the designation of "British subjects."⁵⁵⁵ 'Britishness' flourished in all three countries in the 1950s. Imperial relations became predominant under three conservative prime ministers: John Diefenbaker (Canada, 1957-1963), Robert Menzies (Australia, 1949-1966), and Sidney Holland (New Zealand, 1949-1957). However, Australia as well as Canada and New Zealand noted that the British role had changed. In the disputes within the Commonwealth, such as the independence of individual colonies (Indian, Pakistan, etc.), as well as Britain's difficult economic situation, they recognized the signs of change. All three dominions tried to support the mother country financially and militarily because they saw their own economic stability, their position in world politics, and their cultural position as being linked to Great Britain, even after World War II. However, after the war, another important partner increasingly came to the attention of the three dominions: the United States of America. Parallel to the observed decline of Great Britain, the USA increased its power and influence worldwide.

All three former settler colonies had to take a position in the Cold War. They placed themselves on the Western side with Great Britain, demonstrating their anti-communist orientation and embedding their trade policy in the context of the Cold War. Due to their geographic proximity to Asia, Australia and New Zealand emphasized their ties to Britain with more vigor than Canada since they needed Britain to safeguard their security interests in Southeast Asia.⁵⁵⁶ Many actors in the two countries perceived themselves as a European society far from Europe. Therefore, both countries imposed strict immigration policies – especially in the Australian case – that were intended both to strengthen the European component of Australia and New Zealand, and to facilitate population growth within the relatively empty land masses of the two countries. In contrast, Asia was not as significant to Canada as it was to the other Dominions. Still, Canada required Britain as a counterweight to the US as it wanted an identity distinct from the US that could justify its nationhood.⁵⁵⁷ Canadian proximity to the US was a national threat, as Canadian actors feared the absorption of Canada by its powerful neighbor; but this proximity was also a way to deal with economic difficulties. While Australia and New Zealand were part of the sterling bloc, Canada was a land of dollars. This had implications for the countries' respective trading positions

⁵⁵⁵ In the subsequent period, however, the Australian passport continued to include the British crown on its cover and the statement "Australia, British Passport". Cf. Stuart Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia," p. 150.

⁵⁵⁶ Cf. Darwin, *Das unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 392.

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3," p. 156.

in the 20th century; for Australia and New Zealand, Great Britain remained one of the most important markets, whereas Canada had established increasingly strong trade relations with the United States.⁵⁵⁸ While Australia and New Zealand were more closely aligned to the superpower in terms of security policy, connections to the US were of the upmost significance for Canada since the US played a more important role for them economically and culturally. Similarly, Canada differed from Australia and New Zealand due to its potential involvement in the North Atlantic Triangle, of which the two antipodes were not a part. Moreover, as a platform for establishing themselves as a force in peacetime and a ‘middle power,’ NATO was more relevant to Canada than it was to Australia and New Zealand.

However, these were not the only distinguishing points between Canada and Australia and New Zealand. Canada’s French population and the “Quiet Revolution” in Quebec –during which the French population underwent a social transformation – set Canada apart from the other two dominions. Debates over Canadian identity and Canada's place in a postcolonial world were always embedded in the context of the Anglo-French conflict.⁵⁵⁹ Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand had taken over trust territories from Britain and administered them as quasi-colonial powers; Canada, on the other hand, did not share this experience as a ‘colonial power.’ In all three countries, there was an observable upswing of multiculturalism in the 1960s, and especially in the following decade. During the 1960s, there was a shift to immigration patterns that were primarily British or European and based on targeted immigration policies. This allowed more people from other nations to come to these countries. At the same time, indigenous populations started the process of emancipation, placing the negotiation of concepts of multiculturalism on the national level. In addition, the Commonwealth changed from a ‘white’ confraternity to a multiethnic Commonwealth, thus putting the negotiation of concepts of multiculturalism on an international level.

Another aspect that was common to the three countries is observable when considering the High Commissioners. After World War II, the Commissioners were the main source of information and liaison between London and the Dominion capitals of Canberra, Ottawa and Wellington.⁵⁶⁰ However, the position and definition of the High Commissioner office was variable in the three

⁵⁵⁸ Cf. Darwin, *Das unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600-1997*, p. 393.

⁵⁵⁹ For a detailed discussion of the crisis of Canadian identity during this period, see the work of Sebastian Koch, *Identitätskrisen nach dem Ende des Britischen Empire. On Cultural (Re)Location in Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand*.

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. Fedorowich, "When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner," p. 22.

countries. Compared to Australia and New Zealand, Canada defined the office with the most precision. After World War II, the Prime Minister's Office in Canberra often bypassed the High Commissioner, preferring direct communication with London.⁵⁶¹ Nevertheless, the flow of information between the individual High Commissions and their respective home countries was of fundamental significance as a means of communication between London and Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. In addition, the individual High Commissions communicated with each other and exchanged information such as faxes, telegrams, and other 'papers'.⁵⁶² In addition, the presence of a High Commissioner on the ground in each of the other dominions and in London ensured a better flow of information and the expansion of (personal) networks. This allowed information to be exchanged outside of official channels, which was often faster. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings held at irregular intervals, government representatives from Australia, Canada and New Zealand also had the opportunity to exchange information and engage in conversation with each other in a setting that was, to some degree, both formal and informal. In connection with the talks that led to the EFTA, a Committee of Commonwealth High Commissioners had been established in London, which also offered opportunity for exchanges on economic and trade issues.⁵⁶³

However, it is noteworthy that the three countries rarely made autonomous agreements with one another independent of the Commonwealth, and they rarely met without Great Britain. They appeared to be part of one family, but they did not seem to have much contact among themselves without Britain. Agreements or meetings occurred at moments of crisis, such as during the two world wars, but in principle the following quote was true:

The relationship [of Canada] with Australia has generally been taken for granted by what an Australian journalist has described as 'allies with a common heritage (we meet at wars), but distant pre-occupations. Cousins with little interest in one another, who come together tentatively at family funerals.'⁵⁶⁴

The three states were "related" to one another, but their relations were constituted mostly through the mother country of Great Britain. The way they designated one another varied: in some cases,

⁵⁶¹ Cf. Ibid.

⁵⁶² Partly with and partly without informing London. Depending on the content of the information paper, a cable was forwarded to one or more of the other High Commissions.

⁵⁶³ Cf. ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

⁵⁶⁴ Kavic, "Canada and the Commonwealth. Sentiment, Symbolism and Self-Interest," p. 43.

they described themselves as “siblings”⁵⁶⁵ and in others as “cousins.”⁵⁶⁶ The varying descriptions can be traced back to the respective intention of the actor, since with the term "siblings" an even closer relationship was described or constructed than with the term "cousins". In the mid-20th century, there were few official arrangements and ties between them, such as trade or defense agreements. For example, there was the Canberra Pact of 1944 between Australia and New Zealand, in which the two dominions established their strategic defense positions and made it clear that they were cooperating on strategic defense issues in the Pacific region. Moreover, the intention of the pact was to establish themselves as leading powers in the Pacific after World War II.⁵⁶⁷ The agreement created a regional defense zone that encompassed the southwestern and southern Pacific from the northeastern islands of Australia to the Cook Islands. Up to the 1970s, this zone was referred to as the Maritime Archipelago Environment. Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand lobbied for a 1947 conference that resulted in the South Pacific Commission, in which six countries with administrative territories in the Pacific pledged to cooperate for the social and economic development of the region.⁵⁶⁸ In military terms, Australia and New Zealand were linked by cooperation with the British in Malaysia and Singapore, by ANZAM in 1949, by the Anglo-Malayan Defence Arrangements in 1957 and 1963, and by the Five Power Defence Arrangement of 1970 – the latter made for military cooperation between the two dominions. In addition, Australia and New Zealand were linked through ANZUS, the Manila Pact, and SEATO.⁵⁶⁹ ANZUS was followed by developments in Australian defense doctrines that established the United States as the primary ally in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.⁵⁷⁰ It is thus clear that Australia and New Zealand were *directly* linked by only one agreement in terms of defense policy, though they cooperated through further ones. Through agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States, both Australia and New Zealand worked together in some conflicts, and in Vietnam and Malaysia, they fought side by side.

⁵⁶⁵ See NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 34 Speeches: speech John McEwen, Luncheon in Honour of John Diefenbaker, 5 December, 1958; NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 39 Speeches: speech John McEwen to Australia Club, London, 17 April, 1962.

⁵⁶⁶ Cf. Kavic, "Canada and the Commonwealth. Sentiment, Symbolism and Self-Interest," p. 43.

⁵⁶⁷ Cf. McIntyre, *Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands*, p. 176.

⁵⁶⁸ Cf. Stuart MacIntyre, *The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990* (Basingstoke/London 1991), p. 158.

⁵⁶⁹ However, the British did not participate in the 1951 ANZUS treaty. Cf. Bridge et al, "Introduction," p. 2.

⁵⁷⁰ Cf. Goldsworthy, "Australian External Policy and the End of Britain's Empire," p. 17.

Likewise, there were few official links between Canada and New Zealand. The Canadian government had established a Canadian High Commission in Wellington in 1940.⁵⁷¹ During that period, the Commonwealth Air Training Plan initiated the first major official contacts between Canada and New Zealand. As a result of this plan, about 7000 New Zealand pilots as well as aircrew were trained in Canada. Western Canada was connected to New Zealand by traditional shipping routes across the Pacific. The New Zealand Union Steamship Company, for example, traded with Vancouver, but in due course it was increasingly displaced by the large Canadian-Pacific Transport Company. The two nations fought side by side in the Korean War and both World Wars, and prior to the 1960s, they worked together closely in the United Nations in New York. Furthermore, prior to the withdrawal of New Zealand police contingents from Cyprus, they worked together in several peacekeeping missions.⁵⁷² These are among the few distinct links between the two countries. In the mid-1950s, both sides began to concentrate their foreign policy interests on different regions of the world. According to the analyses of some New Zealand actors in the late 1960s, this led to a deterioration of political ties between the two states.⁵⁷³

With the exchange of High Commissioners in 1940, formal diplomatic relations between Australia and Canada were established.⁵⁷⁴ By the early 1970s, the official relationship between the two countries was based on Commercial Offices (Canadian ones in Sydney and Melbourne and those of Australia in Vancouver and Montreal) in addition to the two High Commissions.⁵⁷⁵ A bilateral Air Agreement existed between Canada and Australia beginning in 1946, but it repeatedly caused tension between the two countries as both were dissatisfied with the terms and sought to modify them.⁵⁷⁶ There was also dissatisfaction between the two countries in regards to trade agreements: for example, the Australians were annoyed by Canadian restrictions on the import of dairy products. The same was true for imports of sheep and lamb. The Canadians, in turn, had difficulty selling their pork in Australia.⁵⁷⁷ The countries negotiated new trading terms in 1960, with a joint agreement covering exchange preferences.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷¹ Cf. ANZ ABHS 6958 W5579/184 NYP 3/40/4 1: Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 9 September, 1969. The New Zealand government established a diplomatic mission in Ottawa in 1942. Cf. Steve Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook* (Oxford 1992), p. 7.

⁵⁷² Cf. ANZ ABHS 6958 W5579/184 NYP 3/40/4 1: Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 9 September, 1969.

⁵⁷³ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁴ Cf. LAC MG26-O Vol. 7: Canada-Australia Relations, 16 April, 1970.

⁵⁷⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ See LAC RG25 Vol. 5579 File 12850-A-13-1-40: Briefs for the Visit of the Hon. [crossed out and replaced by RT] R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, to Ottawa, 8 June to 10 June, 1960, 6 June, 1960.

⁵⁷⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁸ Cf. McEwen, *Australia's Overseas Economic Relationships*, pp. 13ff.

Apart from that, Australia and Canada cooperated on the Commonwealth Communications System. This system involved the laying of telegraph cables between the Commonwealth countries. It was overseen by the Commonwealth Communications Board in London, of which Canada was a member. All four countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) were involved in the project, which was intended to improve communications between countries in the late 1950s and 1960s through the use of improved technology. For example, all four had agreed to plans to lay a new trans-pacific cable from Vancouver to New Zealand and Australia. The laying of the cable was to be completed by 1964.⁵⁷⁹

How relations between the dominions developed in the 1960s and during British accession talks with the EEC will be discussed in the following analysis. It should be noted that the three settler colonies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have enough similarities for meaningful comparison: all three had relationships with Britain that, following a reinvigoration of 'Britishness' in the three countries during the 1950s, and even in the 1960s, was still formative for many political actors. Thus, the three countries lend themselves to a comparative study since they were all embedded in the Empire context, they all aligned their foreign and trade policies to their settler-colonial backgrounds, and they all had to respond to a situation of external threat – the British accession negotiations with the EEC. The membership of the three countries in the Commonwealth and their special status as Dominions make them 'close relatives.' Differences among the three countries pertain to their size, geographic location, ethnic composition, and other structural conditions. Together with their basic similarities, they provide interesting interfaces for observing how threats communications were communicated⁵⁸⁰ and practices under similar, but not entirely identical, conditions.

⁵⁷⁹ See LAC RG25 Vol. 5579 File 12850-A-13-1-40: Briefs for the Visit of the Hon. [crossed out and replaced by RT] R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, to Ottawa, 8 June to 10 June, 1960, 6 June, 1960.

⁵⁸⁰ The term "threat communication" comes from the vocabulary of the German Collaborative Research Center 923, "Bedrohte Ordnungen." It refers to the communication of actors about a situation perceived as a threat. See the paper by Fabian Fechner et al, "'We are gambling with our survival.' Threat Communication as an Indicator of Threatened Orders," in, *Aufbruch - Katastrophe - Konkurrenz - Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften*, eds. Ewald Frie and Mischa Meier, pp. 141-73 (Tübingen 2014). The Collaborative Research Center investigates societies in threatening moments.

Chapter 3

3.1. Keeping or Losing your Head in a Moment of Crisis

Within the Commonwealth, communications⁵⁸¹ and relations were by and large formalized, that is, certain prescribed practices had become codified over the years. The Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council, a permanent committee to deal with trade issues that concerned the Commonwealth, brought together the trade and finance ministers of the Commonwealth at regular intervals.⁵⁸² The Commonwealth Economic Committee was responsible for providing statistical information and reports on questions that influenced trade.⁵⁸³ Moreover, it was customary that during the Prime Minister's Meetings that took place at regular intervals and brought together the first ministers of the Commonwealth states in London, there was time devoted to the discussion of economic issues.⁵⁸⁴ Beyond that the memoranda and dispatches of the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, which were regularly sent to the British High Commissioners in each of the Commonwealth states, were an important medium of communication:

The Commonwealth Relations Office in London sends out a steady flow of memoranda and telegrams to United Kingdom High Commissioner' offices overseas with information to be passed on to Commonwealth Governments. For countries such as New Zealand which do not have a wide diplomatic coverage these memoranda and telegrams are very often the only source of immediate information on

⁵⁸¹ By focusing on trade relations and policies of the three Dominions, the following discussion will present associations within the Commonwealth with an orientation towards economic transfers and relationships. Additional liaisons and institutions on the political or cultural plane are thus outside the focus of this work. Concerning the totality of relations between the Commonwealth countries, it certainly remains to be said that, for the general population of the Dominions, there was an element of "mystery" in the relations between political actors; in particular, among the Prime Ministers in the Commonwealth, there existed a special relationship that was solidified in meetings without advisers or protocols. What exactly happened at these meetings, often remained hidden from the general public. See Boehm, „Canada and the Modern Commonwealth. The Approaches of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau“, p. 23.

⁵⁸² The Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council normally met once a year and consisted of a meeting of the Commonwealth Trade and/or Finance Ministers. See Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 260. Yearly meetings of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers were a customary practice after 1952: "It has become customary, at least since 1952, after the annual meetings of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to hold a meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers." ANZ AEFN 19147 IC22 18/37/: Brief for Prime Minister: Mr Mcmillan's Visit United Kingdom – New Zealand Trade, 14. January 1958. Now and then these meetings also held on a larger scale to deal with specific economic issues: "From time to time there are somewhat larger Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meetings at which full dress debates on economic questions are held." Ibid.

⁵⁸³ See Ashton and Louis, *East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964-1971. British Documents on the End of Empire*, p. 329.

⁵⁸⁴ "Prime Ministers' Meetings at irregular intervals (normally about eighteen months) meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers are held in London and it is usual at these conferences for some time to be spent in discussions of economic problems." ANZ AEFN 19147 IC22 18/37/: Brief for Prime Minister: Mr Mcmillan's Visit United Kingdom – New Zealand Trade, 14. January 1958.

some topics. This flow of information should not be taken as a substitute for effective consultation, however considerable or forthcoming it might be.⁵⁸⁵

The High Commissions *in situ* then relayed the received information to the governments of the Dominions. These communications were an important information source, especially for New Zealand which was at a great distance from Britain. The annual meetings of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan also offered possibilities of exchanges concerning economic questions.⁵⁸⁶ A further means of communication on trade issues was the Commonwealth Liaison Committee (CLC), situated in London.⁵⁸⁷ It set the flow of information in motion and served as a forum of exchange among the Commonwealth lands.⁵⁸⁸ Aside from these methods, the preliminary meetings for GATT offered opportunities for Dominion representatives to discuss economic questions.⁵⁸⁹

In September 1961, shortly after the British announcement that the government would open membership negotiations with the EEC, London convened a meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council in Accra. High on the agenda of the conference was, among other issues, the consequences of a possible British entrance into the EEC. Generally, meetings within the Commonwealth were viewed by the Dominions as different from other international conferences. Before 1960, there were no formal speeches during the meeting, no formal closing addresses, and no resolutions. Commonwealth relations (and relations in the Sterling area) were “largely informal and customary and hence more flexible,”⁵⁹⁰ and thereby they contrasted with the

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ “Since the Colombo Plan was initiated as a result of a Commonwealth Conference in 1950, there have been regular annual meetings of the Consultative Committee to discuss economic problems which are of more particular concern to Commonwealth members in South and South East Asia.” Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ This committee was a “[...] research organization housed in London with Commonwealth representatives on its governing body and designed to produce information on Commonwealth trade, production and consumption. It does not initiate discussion nor does it assist in the formulation of Commonwealth policies. At the present time an examination of the Committee's scope and functions is being carried out with a view to widening the Committee's work beyond that of research, particularly in the field of development.” Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ “This Committee is a gathering of Commonwealth officials stationed in London and is serviced by a secretariat provided by the United Kingdom Treasury. The United Kingdom officials on the Committee are drawn from appropriate economic departments. The Committee exchanges information on matters of common interest. Discussions are held at the official level only.” Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ “Before each session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) it has been customary to hold a short meeting in London of members of Commonwealth delegations proceeding to the annual sessions of this organization.” Ibid. In GATT, all three countries were affiliated with one another. Thus, not only were they economically associated via the Ottawa Agreements and the general Commonwealth, they also cooperated in GATT.

⁵⁹⁰ NAA M2568 144: Harold Holt to Selwyn Lloyd (Chancellor of the Exchequer, London), 29. November 1961.

formal and standardized protocols of the Rome Treaties.⁵⁹¹ Commonwealth associations were, to a large degree, based on the personal relationships existing between the participants:

Although there are a number of formal methods of consultation between Commonwealth members on economic matters, consultation in the main is carried out through the usual intra-Commonwealth diplomatic channels (i.e. High Commissions) and at periodic meetings, and also through the vast number of personal contacts that are made between Commonwealth officials, representatives, and statesmen.⁵⁹²

This excerpt from a briefing paper for the New Zealand Prime Minister, which he received on the occasion of a visit from Harold Macmillan, clearly shows that, alongside formal relations, *personal* contacts played a role. Commonwealth meetings distinguished themselves through “all the frankness, the give and take, the vigour and the underlying friendliness that you would expect in a family gathering.”⁵⁹³ Meetings within the Commonwealth thus actually reminded the participants of a family gathering, so much did the participants assist one another and feel connected to each other. At these meetings, there prevailed the exchange of ideas, the forging of personal relations among equals, and the strengthening of trust between the various participants. Aspects of current political affairs were, of course, dealt with, but these were not the focus of the meetings. Through them the Commonwealth was connected by a network of diverse and personal threads that were nowhere stipulated by official regulations. Participants of these meetings, at times, even constituted the basis for stronger relationships among each other,⁵⁹⁴ since they created a special connection between these like-minded individuals. Common ideas, loyalty, and the economic strength of the group, reinforced the position of the members vis-à-vis each other. Shared trust and mutual understanding consolidated these relationships.⁵⁹⁵

The idealistic statements of the representatives of the individual Dominion governments reflected not only the unique atmosphere of the Commonwealth meetings, for they also served simultaneously as a rhetorical medium by means of which the distinctive character of the meeting was discursively reinforced. An example of the stimulus that the Commonwealth meetings occasioned is John Diefenbaker’s announcement that Canada would seek to divert fifteen percent of Canadian exports from the USA to Great Britain. Diefenbaker proclaimed this idea after his

⁵⁹¹ See *Ibid.*

⁵⁹² ANZ AEFN 19147 IC22 18/37/: Brief for Prime Minister: Mr Mcmillan’s Visit United Kingdom – New Zealand Trade, 14. January 1958.

⁵⁹³ ANZ AEFZ 22620 W5727/176 206/: Prime Minister’s Broadcast on Visit Overseas, 31. March 1960.

⁵⁹⁴ See *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁵ See *Ibid.*

return from the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference of 1957, held in London.⁵⁹⁶ At the time, 71.1 percent of Canadian exports went to the USA. Diefenbaker's proposal, which resulted from his enthusiasm for the British motherland that had been invigorated by his stay in England, was assessed by experts as impossible and as a danger for the Canadian economy.⁵⁹⁷ The implementation of the proposal would have required a doubling of British exports to Canada and a readiness of Canadians to buy British products (that is products inferior to those from the USA). In addition, the British would have had to more than double their purchases of Canadian products, which experts did not believe was possible. Moreover, such a plan would have meant a contravention against GATT unless Britain and Canada first negotiated an economic union or free trade zone between their states. In the course of these events, the British government proposed a free-trade zone to Ottawa, however, nothing for Canada the proposal was a non-starter.⁵⁹⁸ The reasons for this refusal lay within the fact that Ottawa could see no economic advantages for themselves in such a zone and had concerns about the reaction of the USA.⁵⁹⁹ The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of 1957 thus did not have the effect that Diefenbaker had wanted. Rather than strengthening relations with London, his proposal fizzled out and has instead been preserved as a curious anecdote in Canadian history books.⁶⁰⁰

From this episode, the specific effects of the Commonwealth conferences become clear. Thus, it is no surprise that the Dominions, even before the official announcement from Macmillan, had desired a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in order to personally discuss EEC issues within a trusted circle. John Diefenbaker, more than any other, pressed for such a meeting between the British and the other Dominions so as to exchange views concerning a possible British accession to the EEC. The British, in contrast, wanted to avoid a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers since it could have presented potential difficulties for the beginning of the negotiations

⁵⁹⁶ During an interview with journalists after his return on 7 July 1957, Diefenbaker announced his intention to transfer 15 percent of exports to Great Britain. The promise to strengthen Commonwealth relations played a role in his election campaign, hence why journalists questioned him about the actual implementation of his promises. See Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 207f.

⁵⁹⁷ For example, members of the "Gordon Commission" (*Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects*) which had the task of evaluating national possibilities for the Canadian economy, counted as experts.

⁵⁹⁸ See Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 207f. However, Michael Hart also found an important idea in Diefenbaker's proposal: after the Second World War, Canadian exports to Britain and to the continent were limited by the balance of payments, as well as currency and other restrictions. The idea of ameliorating these restrictions seemed more realistic in 1957 than in the previous years. In any case, Hart suggested that Diefenbaker's motive could have been something other than naivety and nostalgia. See *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁹ See Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 179f.

⁶⁰⁰ See Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 207f.

with Brussels at the end of September 1961. They feared that it could come to variances of opinion concerning trade relations in the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth states might themselves speak out against British membership.⁶⁰¹ For this reason they called for a meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Accra, because this would have less significance than a meeting of Prime Ministers.

At the meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council in September 1961 in Accra, the Canadians distinguished themselves through their fierce and strongly worded reactions. The Canadian Finance Minister, Donald Fleming, expressed himself vehemently against all British ambitions concerning the EEC.⁶⁰² He forcefully pronounced his disappointment with the British and prophesied that Britain would scarce derive any benefit from EEC membership.⁶⁰³ To the British, Fleming's statements amounted to a tirade that could potentially prod other Commonwealth nations to likewise express their reservations.⁶⁰⁴

The Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, George Hees, also stood out on account of his speech. Many conference participants understood his statements to be an ultimatum to Great Britain to decide between either the Commonwealth or the common market. Hees himself later denied his statement in the Canadian House of Commons: "At no time did I say anything which could be constructed as an ultimatum to the United Kingdom government [...]"⁶⁰⁵ However, it is indisputable that Hees warned of a weakening of the Commonwealth: "The Commonwealth is held together by tradition, trust and trade. To weaken one of these weakens all three."⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰¹ See Alan Milward, *The United Kingdom and the European Community, Volume I: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963* (London/New York 2013), p. 362.

⁶⁰² Thus, British diplomats reported to London: "There was a full scale bombardment of the United Kingdom, the most energetic onslaught being from Fleming and a strong attack from Holt." TNA PREM 11/3211: Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office. Peter Newman described Fleming as follows: "Don Fleming doesn't just fight an issue [...] He beats it to death. Then cuts its throat, slashes its wrists, throws acid in its face, and sets fire to it." See Newman, *Renegade in Power*, p. 124. The case of Fleming and Hees in Accra will be discussed in detail from further points of view in Chapter 3.3, "Of Deceived Husbands, Spoiled Children, and Mistrustful Friends."

⁶⁰³ The Australian High Commissioner in Accra gave an account of Fleming's "force and uncompromising speech against the United Kingdom entry," to the Department of External Affairs in Canberra. NAA A987 E1437A Part 1: Inward Cablegram Department of External Affairs from Australian High Commissioner Accra, sent 15 September 1961, received 16. September 1961. Fleming had left no doubt that Canada was against Great Britain's entrance into the EEC. See *Ibid.* The Canadian press reported on the "emotional intervention" and on Fleming's "eloquent requiem for the system of trading preferences." *Ottawa Citizen*, 14. September 1961.

⁶⁰⁴ See TNA PREM 11/3211: Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, 15. September 1961.

⁶⁰⁵ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 2629 File 20-358-2: George Hees, House of Commons, 26. September 1961.

⁶⁰⁶ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 2629 File 20-358-2: Remarks by George Hees at the Commonwealth Conference, 12.-14. September 1961. This quotation demonstrates again the close association of economic policy with traditions and trust in the Commonwealth.

The conduct of the Canadian minister in Accra made for a media echo⁶⁰⁷ in Canada and led to criticism from within the minister's own ranks. The Canadian Deputy Minister for Trade, Jake Warren, asserted that the Canadian delegation had probably been humiliated by the reports in Canadian newspapers.⁶⁰⁸ Diefenbaker distanced himself from Hees' statement that Britain "had to choose between European Common Market and the Commonwealth".⁶⁰⁹ He later described the entire affair as the "mistake of Accra",⁶¹⁰ that led to a silence on the part of the government regarding the EEC debates.⁶¹¹

The behavior of the minister in Accra worsened the Canadian position within both the British parliament and British society, just as much as it did within the Canadian public.⁶¹² Through their harsh reaction they had antagonized the British and had thus weakened their negotiating position, because the British, after this public attack, were less inclined to take heed of Canadian wishes.

Fleming's conduct in Accra intensified a dispute between him and a number of journalists concerning what had actually taken place in Accra:

Mr. Fleming v. The Press [...] The government has one version. The newspaper correspondents who covered the conference have another. [...] Let's examine the actual news reports from Accra. Mr. Fleming took particular exception to a dispatch of mine which began: "The nations of the Commonwealth, led by Canada, have ganged up on Britain and formally declared their opposition to British membership in the European Common Market."⁶¹³

While Fleming denied that he had acted inappropriately in Accra, reporters who were at the conference affirmed the truth of their reporting. The question of just what the minister had actually said at the conference also concerned the other Dominions. On 14 September, observers from New Zealand inquired at the Canadian Department of External Affairs whether they had more precise information concerning the minister's statements that might give them a better perspective on the situation. However, at the time the Department did not have any more precise information. Das

⁶⁰⁷ *The Globe&Mail*, 12. September 1961: „M. Flemings Song of Woe“; *Ottawa Journal*, 14. September 1961: „Fleming Warns Commonwealth Facing Disaster“; *The Gazette*, 14. September 1961: „Hees Leads Attack On UK Move To Common Market“; *The Globe&Mail*, 15. September 1961: „Lamentations at Accra“; *Ottawa Citizen*, 14. September 1961: „U.K. Must Choose, Commonwealth Or Bloc – Fleming“.

⁶⁰⁸ See NAA A1838 727/4 Part 12: Inward Cabelgram Department of External Affairs from Australian High Commission Ottawa, 15. September 1961.

⁶⁰⁹ NAA A1838 727/4 Part 4: Alan Renouf, Australian Embassy Brussels to the Secretary Department of External Affairs Canberra, 15. June 1961.

⁶¹⁰ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 3: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy Brussels, sent 7. August 1962, received 8. August 1962.

⁶¹¹ See Ibid. *Ottawa Journal*, 14. September 1961: „No Canadian Ultimatum to UK – PM“; *The Globe&Mail*, 15. September 1961: „Hees Misrepresented PM Tells Commons“.

⁶¹² NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 3: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy Brussels, sent 7. August 1962, received 8. August 1962.

⁶¹³ *Ottawa Citizen*, 27. January 1962.

Department war jedoch zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht genauer über die konkreten Aussagen informiert.⁶¹⁴ This indicates that the minister in Accra spoke *independently* of his instructions from the Department of External Affairs, and thus had followed no predetermined line of policy.

The advice given by the Canadian Department of External Affairs to the Canadian government was shaped by the assumption that the Canadian negotiating position and its influence on Britain were relatively weak. For this reason the Department advised a cautious approach that the minister, however, viewed as “Too weak!”⁶¹⁵

In the briefing paper that the minister had received in preparation for the meeting in Accra, one finds alongside general information concerning the EEC and other aspects of trade and economic policy, the instructions and advice of Department of Trade and Commerce pertaining to the statements of both ministers.⁶¹⁶ George Hees was supposed to make clear the directives of the Department to the effect that Canada very much valued the opportunity for an exchange of views with Britain. At the same time, he should emphasize the drawbacks (economic) for Canadian trade that might arise from British membership in the EEC. Furthermore, Hees was to relay Macmillan’s assurances that a British accession should not lead to the disruption of stability within the Commonwealth. He was to make clear Canada’s belief in this position,⁶¹⁷ so that Britain would be reminded of these assurances and bound to them. In these preparatory instructions there is no reference to a threat to Britain from the Canadian side that London must decide between the Commonwealth and the EEC.

What the precise words of the speeches of both ministers were can not be determined from the available sources.⁶¹⁸ Of more interest than the actual words is, however, what this episode reveals about communications within the Commonwealth. The issue of what was the appropriate way for the Commonwealth states to communicate with one another appeared to become fraught. Although the atmosphere of the Commonwealth meetings has regularly been described as cordial, open and

⁶¹⁴ See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/75 3382 3: High Commission Ottawa to Secretary of External Affairs Wellington, 21. September 1961.

⁶¹⁵ Comments of Minister Green in response to a *Guidance Paper* of 2 March 1961, cited in Hilliker, „The Politicians and the 'Personalities': The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct "of Canadian External Relations“, p. 162. The *Guidance Paper* originated just before the official announcement of the opening of British membership negotiations. Canadian actors thus assumed, even before Macmillan’s official statement, that Great Britain would make efforts to enter the Common Market.

⁶¹⁶ See LAC RG25 Vol. 5267 File 8490-B-40: Notes for Statement by Mr. Hees, Department of Trade and Commerce, 7. September 1961.

⁶¹⁷ See *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁸ Some details concerning the events in Accra can be found in Peter Newman, *The Diefenbaker Years*, (Toronto/Montreal 1963), pp. 238-240.

familial, intemperate behavior by the diplomats within this circle was not allowed. An attack against Britain – whether actual or only implied – appears to have been sufficient grounds to criticize the persons who behaved in this manner.

All of these circumstances did not dissuade Fleming from striking a tone similar to the one he was alleged to have taken in Accra a short time later. In a speech before the House of Commons, he proposed that Britain should be persuaded not to join the EEC. As the *Evening Standard* reported:

In an emotional speech to the Canadian Commons last night Finance Minister Mr. Donald Fleming made an eleventh-hour plea to persuade Britain against joining the Common Market. [...] The Canadian Minister said it was Australia, not Canada, that had adopted the most aggressive attitude at the Ghana conference.⁶¹⁹

In his address before the Canadian Parliament, the minister thus stood by his conviction that Britain had best not enter the EEC („eleventh-hour plea to persuade Britain against joining“) and, at the same time, he accused the Australian delegation of having been the actual troublemakers in Accra. The question of who had behaved with “the most aggressiveness” towards Britain in Accra appears to have been a relevant fact in terms of assessing appropriate or inappropriate behavior within the framework of the Commonwealth. To be sure, however, Canada supported the views and opinions of the Australians,⁶²⁰ even as Fleming tried, in his speech before the House of Commons to distance himself from their actions.

However, along with much criticism, the conduct of both ministers met with popular support. Alongside critical letters to the minister, one also finds positive comments that expressed admiration and praise for the ministers on account of their strong position at Accra. Some saw the EEC debate as the last chance for the Commonwealth “to show that it has some teeth.”⁶²¹ In the same letter, the woman wrote: “This could be a golden opportunity for the Commonwealth to prove that it does have some valid purpose and is not a fading flimsy illusion as so many Canadians feel.”⁶²² The EEC debate was reckoned as in itself positive since it offered an opportunity to test and defend the foundations and meaning of the Commonwealth. The quotation resonates with the sense that, as an institution, the Commonwealth had appeared to decline in significance within its own domain and was considered less relevant and of little realpolitical. This private letter writer thus had the impression that the Commonwealth had lost power and influence in the last years.⁶²³

⁶¹⁹ *Evening Standard*, 29. September 1961.

⁶²⁰ See *Ibid.*

⁶²¹ LAC MG32-B39 Vol. 136: Brief B. Kelsey to Fleming, 16. January 1963.

⁶²² *Ibid.*

⁶²³ See *Ibid.*

With the combative position of Fleming and Hees in Accra, the Commonwealth could put itself to the test and show that it was still an influential factor on world events. Nonetheless, in the sources, voices of criticism for the Canadian actions in Accra are preponderant.⁶²⁴

Indeed, Canadian newspapers such as the *The Globe & Mail* censured the harsh *Australian* reactions to the EEC negotiations. Though they also commented positively on a speech by Robert Menzies given on 9 August 1962, praising it as an “Intelligent Politician’s guide to the whole issue of the Commonwealth and Common Market.”⁶²⁵

In contrast to the vociferous protests from Canada and – even if less demonstrative – Australia, politicians and diplomats from New Zealand demonstrated calm and reserve in their public statements, press releases, and in their communications with London. There were no strong emotional outbursts, and public criticism of Britain was absent. As early as 1965, Vilasini Perumbulavil noted in an overview of publications on the EEC debates in New Zealand that: “Surprisingly, despite so much at stake, New Zealand was the least vociferous in the Commonwealth’s protests against Britain.”⁶²⁶ On the one hand, this was due to the fact that New Zealand’s policy makers saw themselves in a weak negotiating position as they did not want to offend Britain on account of considerations of security policy.⁶²⁷ They feared that Britain would withdraw from its role in Southeast Asia and thus leave New Zealand in a strategically precarious position, alone at the edge of Asia. On the other hand, they proceeded, during the first and also during the second round of entrance negotiations, from the view that the British accession would *not* take place. After conversations with French politicians, New Zealand’s policy makers were certain that France would hinder British membership. Through New Zealand diplomats in Europe, who traveled back and forth between the capitals of Europe, the New Zealanders received sensitive information concerning the current status of the respective negotiations.⁶²⁸ Hence, French aversion to the British role in the Commonwealth was known to them. For this reason, they worked from the premise that Great Britain might, of course, after some period of time enter the European Economic Community, however, they still had time to consider alternative markets and new trade

⁶²⁴ For example: NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 3: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy Brussels, sent 7 August 1962, received 8 August 1962.

⁶²⁵ NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 2: Australian High Commission (Ottawa) to Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Department et al., 27. August 1962, sent 23 August 1962, received 24 August 1962.

⁶²⁶ Perumbulavil, *The European Economic Community and New Zealand*, p. 1.

⁶²⁷ This was also the case for the Australians in the second round of British membership talks. See below in Chapter **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**

⁶²⁸ Cf. interview with Terence O’Brien in Wellington, 21 April 2017. Unfortunately, in the existing literature on the EEC debate in New Zealand, there is no investigation of New Zealand’s contacts with Europe itself.

policy strategies. A public critique of Britain would, if anything, be counterproductive to their interests, since Britain would then negotiate no special conditions for New Zealand with the EEC.⁶²⁹

Even the tone of the Canadians became milder from 1962 onwards, although for different reasons than those of the New Zealanders. At first, Canadian ministers – as shown by the conference in Accra – were indeed very critical of the British application for EEC membership. However, a series of events in early 1962 led to a noticeably more moderate communications strategy towards the British, which the New Zealanders also observed: “The Canadians have been remarkably silent and inactive for many months.”⁶³⁰ The first event that altered the mode of Canadian communications with London was the official state visit of Edward Heath to Canada in January of 1962. At the time, the Canadian government led by John Diefenbaker had taken much criticism from the opposition and various newspapers on account of their position towards the British membership negotiations. For this reason, Canadian ministers showed restraint in their statements, which was noticed by Heath. At the meeting, Canadian ministers were, according to Heath, taking “special pains” and making efforts to avoid an “impression of bad feeling between our two Governments.”⁶³¹ The Canadian government faced an election in June of the same year, and sought to avoid making the EEC negotiations an election issue. The many criticisms of Ottawa’s behavior towards Great Britain had made the EEC debate into an unattractive election topic for the ruling Conservative party. In the opposition, the Liberal Party supported British efforts to the widest extent, in contrast to the Conservatives. In the course of the election campaign, they attempted to make use of government statements regarding the EEC as part of their campaign strategy. At the same time, they went one step further: they argued that Canada likewise should join the enlarged EEC.⁶³²

The Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming, and the Minister for Trade and Commerce, George Hees, discussed these domestic political problems in detail with Heath during a second round of ministerial meetings at the end of March. Both Canadian ministers there asserted that, in consideration of the imminent election in Canada, they did not wish to take a clear position vis-à-vis London. They wanted to campaign neither for or against a British membership in the EEC. At

⁶²⁹ See *Ibid.*

⁶³⁰ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

⁶³¹ Cited in Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 100.

⁶³² See *Ibid.*

the same time, however, they mentioned that there were many people in Canada who felt connected to Great Britain and would support the British unconditionally in their decision. For this reason, it would be an imprudent strategy to take a position against the British decision, because the Minister would then signal to these their lack of unconditional support for the motherland. Groups of voters who supported Great Britain would probably then be offended.⁶³³ The restraint of the Canadian ministers at the meeting with Heath therefore had *domestic* political motives: the Minister did not want to rub potential voters the wrong way owing to the upcoming election. Thus this behavior is simultaneously an indication of the continuing significance of connections to the British within the Canadian population. Fleming and Hees worked from the assumption that a part of the population (of relevance for the election) felt bound to Great Britain and would support the British government without question. The bottom line was that British intentions to enter the EEC could not be criticized. This argument had an ambivalent effect, since in this case the feelings of affiliation with Britain meant the support of an alienation of this relationship. Against the background of the image of the Commonwealth “family” in which Britain assumed the role of “mother” the logic of this argument becomes clear. Since Great Britain occupied the “adult” position within the family metaphor, it was granted a certain authority that was not to be questioned. Thus, the argument functioned in such a way that the connection to Britain demanded an acceptance of all of London’s decisions – even when these decisions meant a diminishment of this relationship.

In addition, there was an increasing number of voices in the Canadian press who asserted their faith in the British negotiations. *The Globe & Mail*, for example, criticized the Canadian government repeatedly for its handling of the British membership negotiations.⁶³⁴ The British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Derick Heathcoat Amory, even reported to Macmillan in March 1962 of the positive reception by the Canadians of the membership negotiations: “[...] public opinion has been almost unreasoningly favourable to our case [...]”⁶³⁵. Public opinion, therefore, seemed for the most part to be on the side of Great Britain. The previous critics of the British accession, such as Fleming and Hees, had to reconsider their reactions.⁶³⁶

⁶³³ “[...] very many people in Canada who felt so warmly towards the British that everything the British did must be right and they would support it.” Cited in *ibid*.

⁶³⁴ Cf. Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship", p. 164.

⁶³⁵ Cited in Benvenuti and Ward, "Britain, Europe, and the 'Other Quiet Revolution' in Canada", p. 173.

⁶³⁶ Subsequently, the tone of the Canadian Minister would become significantly friendlier, a fact which Australian observers, among others, attributed to the criticism of the Canadian government found in the press and among the public. Cf. NAA A1838 727/4 Part 17: High Commissioner of Australia, Ottawa to Secretary of Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 16 November 1961.

Later in the course of the talks with Heath, Fleming made what was for him an unusual suggestion: Great Britain should withdraw its request from the Canadian government for a written assessment of the Brussels negotiations. As a basis for this, Fleming mentioned that all the leading civil servants in the government were from the Liberal Party, and had been trained during the long period (twenty-two years) of Liberal rule. These civil servants still had close connections to the leaders of the Liberal Party; for this reason, every written proposal from the British – even those of the utmost confidentiality – would reach the political opposition that would then try to use them to their advantage. Heath accepted the proposal, although with one condition: the Canadian would not be allowed a veto in the Brussels negotiations and would not later present any formal complaint in reference to the lack of consultation with Canada.⁶³⁷ Thus, an agreement came about by which the Canadians promised to not criticize Great Britain's decisions in the future. Damit kam eine Abmachung zustande, bei der die Kanadier zusagten, die Entscheidungen Großbritanniens in der Zukunft nicht zu kritisieren. In return, the British assured that the EEC negotiations would be kept from becoming an electoral issue in Canada.⁶³⁸ This episode demonstrates that *domestic* policy motives tipped the scales towards a climbdown on the part of the Canadian ministers. Through the events of early 1962, Canada's tone altered: instead of openly criticizing Great Britain's decision, assurances of trust in the British government displaced the previous protests. Of course, this should not be interpreted as a complete reversal of opinion among government circles; rather personal views had to give way to party interests in the course of seeking reelection, since critical voices were becoming louder within the Canadian public sphere, and the reelection of the Conservative regime appeared to be in jeopardy.

When considered in light of the now tempered reaction of Canada and the already less conspicuous ones of New Zealand, the Australians emerged as more clearly active in the representation and communication of their own interests. Their often vehement and blunt tone captured attention on a global scale.⁶³⁹ However, up to 1962 the Australian approach distinguished itself from both of the

⁶³⁷ See Benvenuti and Ward, "Britain, Europe, and the 'Other Quiet Revolution' in Canada," p. 176.

⁶³⁸ See Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship", p. 169.

⁶³⁹ For example, John McEwen explained himself thus: "I have been talking pretty bluntly in London, Washington, and other countries, but not in the sense of quarrelling with other Governments." NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: McEwen's speech before the Primary Producers Organisations, Melbourne, 15 June 1962. During the second round of British membership talks, New Zealand observers described the Australian delegates as angry and very strident negotiators: "[...] Australia's chief negotiators are what they themselves would call 'bushrangers', who are perhaps not noted for their tact in the rough business of international trade negotiations. [...] Australians adopted an angry and indeed exasperated posture [...]." ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/226 3382 18: New Zealand High Commission Canberra to External Affairs Wellington, 22 July 1967.

other nations not only in terms of tone. The Australians also desired *direct participation* in the proceedings with Brussels. The Australian government had first made this demand at the time of Duncan Sandy's visit. Some time after the visit, on 27 November 1961, Canberra sent an *aide mémoire* to the British government and The Six, in which it renewed its bid for representation at the negotiations:

The Australian Government has no wish or desire to intrude upon those negotiations between the UK and the EEC Governments which relate to matters which are not Australia's business. On the other hand, the Australian Government would regard it as anomalous, and indeed inequitable if Australia [...] should be denied any part in the discussions and be absent from them even when matters profoundly affecting its economic future are being decided.⁶⁴⁰

The *aide mémoire* demonstrates that the Australian regime perceived itself as directly affected by some of the negotiations in terms of economic policy. For these negotiations, Canberra requested a seat at the negotiations with Brussels. To policy makers, it seemed "anormal" to not be there. The Australian government worked from the assumption that it would be "natural" to negotiate together with Great Britain in Brussels, since a possible British accession to the EEC would have a *direct* influence on some points of their own interests.

Moreover, the Canberra government sought to remain in contact with London. In September 1961, a team of civil servants made their way to London under the leadership of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and the Secretary of the Department of Primary Industry. There they wanted to discuss with British civil servants the possible consequences for the Australian economy of British membership in the EEC.⁶⁴¹ Personal conversations on the spot seemed to be an effective means of convincing London of Australian interests. Following from these discussions in person, the Australian government attempted to bridge the distance to London, while they remained in constant contact with Whitehall over the negotiations. Alongside the usual diplomatic representation via the High Commission in London, the Australian government sought to be in direct and unmediated contact with representatives of the British regime⁶⁴² so that the exchange of information would proceed more effectively. It is noticeable that in these attempts, much value was laid upon personal relationships in the field. The wide geographic distance between London and

⁶⁴⁰ Cited in Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 101.

⁶⁴¹ See McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 4. A conference of this nature had already been requested by the Commonwealth governments during the visits of the British representative to the Commonwealth countries, visits undertaken to discuss the possible opening of British membership talks with the EEC. See NAA A1209 1961/1230 Part 1: Report of the Australian Delegation to the Commonwealth Consultations on the United Kingdom's Proposed Negotiations with the E.E.C., London, 18.-19. September 1961.

⁶⁴² See McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 4.

Canberra and the unavoidable time-zone differences hindered the flow of information between the two lands, so that the Australian hopes to protect their trade interests had better chances through direct participation in negotiations and a direct “on the spot” presence.

At the beginning of March 1962, the Australian Minister for Trade, John McEwen, made a trip of almost two months to the USA and to Europe in order to communicate Australian interests directly to the American and British governments.⁶⁴³ At the same time, his visit was to help construct a picture of how the Commonwealth was viewed in the USA, Great Britain, and the EEC-member states.⁶⁴⁴ His first stop was the USA. There he met with President John F. Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and the Under-Secretary of State, George Ball. The meeting was difficult, because the Americans were not impressed by McEwen’s arguments and his reference to the dangers posed to Commonwealth preference. The reasons for this were, above all, that the United States looked on Commonwealth preference as inimical to its own interests and as a limitation of international trade.⁶⁴⁵ Moreover, it was their declared goal to bring the British into the EEC in order to ensure stability in Europe.⁶⁴⁶ The Americans hoped that, with British membership in the Common Market, a strong European union would prevent wars and unrest.

McEwen was therefore not especially pleased with the course of the negotiations. Above all, the negative position of the Americans towards Commonwealth preference angered him – after all, they had agreed to British preferences in the GATT negotiations. For this reason, he announced in the discussions that it would not be taken well if, in the negotiations, the USA were to boycott a preference system for Commonwealth trade. He even put forward the argument that an American repudiation of preferences could lead to difficulties for the British accession to the EEC.⁶⁴⁷ McEwen’s trip to the USA is a sign of the increasing significance of the United States for Australia – Canberra turned to Washington for support. At the same time, this episode demonstrated that the Americans were not inclined to help the Australians to the detriment of their own interests. For this

⁶⁴³ “My mission was to explain Australia’s interests and to convey the views and thinking of the Australian Government by direct personal contact, at high political level.” McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 4.

⁶⁴⁴ See *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁵ See Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 101.

⁶⁴⁶ See McEwen, *His Story*, p. 61.

⁶⁴⁷ See McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 5. At a press conference held after his return, McEwen informed the Australian public that the Americans “didn’t understand our position.” NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Transcript of Press Conference by Rt. Hon. J. McEwen, Canberra, 26. April 1962.

reason, the visit was a disappointing failure for McEwen. In relation to the EEC debates, the Americans appeared to be an unsuitable ally for Australia.

Following the discussions with Kennedy, Rusk, and Ball, McEwen met with John Diefenbaker, the Canadian Minister for Finance, Trade and Commerce, and the Minister of Agriculture. At this meeting, the similarity of the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand positions became apparent to McEwen, although, after his return to Australia, he asserted that the situation of the three countries were similar, but with differences (“comparable, but [...], not identical.”)⁶⁴⁸ Still, McEwen made plans for a meeting with the New Zealand Prime Minister during a stopover from Holyoake to Canberra in May of 1962. There had been plans for such a meeting before this visit, but up until then nothing had come of them.⁶⁴⁹

After North America, McEwen traveled on to Great Britain, where he again became entangled in discussions. A particular point of contention was the defining of the Australian interests which should be protected in Brussels. McEwen argued that Australian “vital interests” ought to refer to the British market, against which the British wanted to extend the term only as far as the Australian economy.⁶⁵⁰ Afterwards, McEwen toured through the capital cities of the Six in order to make Australian interests known. There he met with more understanding for his concerns.⁶⁵¹ In preparation for his visit, Australian officials had already worked closely with their French counterparts. This cooperation facilitated McEwen’s visit in Europe. The French offered to satisfy Australian wishes for direct participation in the negotiations. Of course, the Six declined a participation of Australian ministers, but the French agreed to the participation of officials from the lower government officials.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁸ McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 5. Before his departure, McEwen had said in a statement to the press that Canada and Australia shared many other common interests in addition to their positions on a potential British accession; he wanted to renew the contacts established at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference in Montreal in 1958. See NAA A3917 Volume 7: Text of a statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, the Right Honourable John McEwen, Sydney, 4 March 1962.

⁶⁴⁹ See McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 5.

⁶⁵⁰ See Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 101.

⁶⁵¹ See McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 6. Thus, after his return, McEwen reported on his conversation with the deputy of the Common Market Commission, Dr. Holstein, who assured him that through his visit, he had gained a clear impression of Australia’s dilemma in respect to British membership in the EEC. See NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: McEwen’s speech at a country party meeting, 1 June 1962.

⁶⁵² See Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 101. At the press conference in Canberra after his return, McEwen presented himself as optimistic regarding the support of the EEC states. At the very least, he assessed the possibility of special conditions as “not at all unrealistic.” NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Transcript of Press Conference by Rt. Hon. J. McEwen, Canberra, 26 April 1962.

During his visit, McEwen realized that the British had enough difficulties asserting their own interests in the negotiations. It seemed improbable to him that the British were, overall, in the position to insist upon Australian interests.⁶⁵³ Australia could thus not depend on the protection of the motherland.⁶⁵⁴

In June 1962, the official visit of Prime Minister Robert Menzies in London followed that of McEwen. Shortly before his visit, Menzies gave a press conference at which he asserted that *political* concerns were in the foreground of his visit – *not economic* ones. In particular, the problem of Commonwealth cohesion and the Anglo-Australian relationship were the themes of the visit.⁶⁵⁵ Therefore, for the former settler colonies, the EEC debate brought together a complex of problems on various levels. On the one hand, they feared complications for trade and economy; on the other, political considerations entered into the debate – the Commonwealth as a whole and the relationship to Great Britain appeared to be in jeopardy.

On the day of Menzies' arrival in Europe, British delegates struck an agreement with the EEC states that would allow for a transition period until 1970 that would cover manufactured goods from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In a joint statement with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Overseas Trade, John Marshall, Menzies criticized the agreement, although Australian manufactures were not the main focus of Australian trade policy. The basis for this criticism was that they feared the agreement could serve as a paradigm for further agreements on more important products.⁶⁵⁶ During his visit, Menzies had more success than McEwen in making his cases known within government circles and media. In public statements and speeches, he appealed to the sense of Commonwealth solidarity within the British Conservative Party and the British public.⁶⁵⁷ This, however, strengthened fears in Canberra that the Australian government was pushing Australian concerns and problems with *too much force*. After his return, Menzies' cabinet expressed

⁶⁵³ "I also came to realise that the British were having so much trouble looking after their own interests in the negotiations that they were not going to complicate things further by trying very hard to defend Australia's position. [...] So we were left without a friend in the world." McEwen, *His Story*, p. 61.

⁶⁵⁴ In addition, further uncertainty arose for the Dominions. In May 1962, the French attempted to influence the three countries, as French emissaries called on the embassies of the Dominions. They informed the Dominions that the existing Commonwealth system would be broken up if the EEC negotiations moved forward. This French action was reckoned by the British as an attempt to incite criticism within the Commonwealth countries. See Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 102.

⁶⁵⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶⁵⁶ See Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 48.

⁶⁵⁷ See Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 102. Increasingly, the Australian public also perceived the British membership negotiations with the EEC as important to Australia's further development. See NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: McEwen's speech at a Country Party meeting, Cootamundra, 1 June 1962.

reservations concerning the attention that he had received in the press. Figures from within Australian government circles, and, especially, from the opposition suspected that Menzies, while abroad, had painted the Australian situation in grim colors in order to obtain special conditions. Simultaneously, back at home he drew a too rosy picture of the situation so as not to disrupt the confidence of industry and trade.⁶⁵⁸

Moreover, the Australian government wanted to avoid responsibility for the possible failure of the Brussels negotiations should they not succeed. Policy makers in Canberra feared that London could lay the blame for the failure of negotiations on Australia if Australian politicians spoke to openly against British membership in the EEC. Particularly, in view of the uncertain political situation in south-east Asia, Canberra could not afford to offend their traditional ally with such statements.⁶⁵⁹ Thus, Prime Minister Menzies asserted in the House of Representatives on 9 August 1962 that: “these decisions are not ours to make. All we can do is to state our views as we hold them and as we are entitled and bound to express them, and trust to the accumulated wisdom and experience of Great Britain, as the center of the Commonwealth, to come to sound conclusions.”⁶⁶⁰ Shortly before, the British and European negotiation leaders had agreed that a transition period (without any indication concerning the length of the period) for Commonwealth preference would be given. The Six declared themselves, over and above this, in agreement that there would be special conditions arranged for New Zealand – though not for Australia and Canada.⁶⁶¹

Still, voices criticizing the behavior of the policy makers were to be found not only in government circles. Thus, for instance, the *Sydney Morning Herald* saw no reason to doubt the assurances of Great Britain that they would act in the interests of the Commonwealth at the negotiations.⁶⁶² This

⁶⁵⁸ Menzies disputed this, however, in a television interview with *Channel 7* of 30 July 1962. See NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on Channel 7, Perth, 30 July 1962.

⁶⁵⁹ See Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship", p. 169f. The concentration on political aspects and security strategy was assiduously pursued by the Australian Department of External Affairs, while the Department of Trade was more insistent regarding economic consequences and their own inclusion in the talks. Some disagreement between both departments resulted from this. The difficulties are laid out in an *Interdepartmental Common Market Cabinet Committee Paper* from 29 August 1962: Australia should not position themselves against Britain at the upcoming Prime Minister's Conference, but instead try to make its own interests clear. The committee was convened in June of 1961 and consisted of representatives from External Affairs, Trade, Primary Industry, Treasury, National Development and the Prime Minister's Department. See Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 52f.

⁶⁶⁰ Robert Menzies, *Common Market Negotiations. Statement in the House of Representatives, 9th August 1962* (London 1962), p. 6.

⁶⁶¹ See Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 49.

⁶⁶² See *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 August 1961.

trust in British policy is indicative of the enduring confidence in Britain within Australian society; it seemed improbable to most that Britain, in general, would act against the interests of the Commonwealth. Similar perceptions are also to be found among the Canadians; part of the Canadian population were convinced that the British people did not agree with the decisions of the Macmillan government to open up membership talks with Brussels, and that the general sentiment in British society was pro-Commonwealth.⁶⁶³ In the course of the first membership negotiations, the *New Zealand Herald* assured its readers that Britain would never enter the EEC under conditions that could harm the Commonwealth,⁶⁶⁴ whereby anxieties concerning an economic decline ought to have been assuaged.

Yet, there were also waves of discouragement and doubt in the assurances of the British government in the Commonwealth nations in the course of 1962. Thus, *The Wellington Evening Post*, for example, denounced that there was no observable sign of an effort from Whitehall to safeguard either New Zealand or the other Commonwealth states.⁶⁶⁵ In September 1962, Britain convened a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in order to discuss the course of the entrance negotiations. Here the delegates of the individual states occupied themselves for three days in plenum and in individual groups for several more days with the question of the British accession. In addition, there were bilateral meetings between British ministers and officials and those of the individual Commonwealth countries.⁶⁶⁶ Harold Macmillan saw the talks with Robert Menzies as a the only real danger, as he was the only figure who might have had enough reach with the public to make things difficult – as his visit to Britain had shown. However, Menzies exercised restraint at the conference, even as Diefenbaker emerged as the strongest critic of the negotiations.⁶⁶⁷ Keith Holyoake also used the conference to make the New Zealand position clear to Macmillan. He warned the British Prime Minister that in the event of a British accession to the EEC without special conditions for foodstuffs, New Zealand would be ruined.⁶⁶⁸ The September conference took place at a point in time when no precise conditions with the EEC member states had been negotiated. Thus, the New Zealanders felt that the reassurances that Britain had made there were insufficient, because there were no concrete agreements that could be presented to them.

⁶⁶³ See *Ottawa Journal*, 15 September 1962.

⁶⁶⁴ See Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship", p. 164.

⁶⁶⁵ See *The Evening Post* (Wellington), 4 April 1962.

⁶⁶⁶ See NLW MS-Papers-1403-156/3: Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London 10./19 September 1962, Prime Minister's Notes for Cabinet.

⁶⁶⁷ See Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions", p. 104.

⁶⁶⁸ See Robertson and Singleton, "Britain, Butter, and European Integration, 1957-1964", p. 327.

For this reason, as Holyoake noted, New Zealand was “unable to form a judgment as to whether our vital trading interests would be adequately protected.”⁶⁶⁹

The meeting in 1962, according to Stuart Ward, marked the end of resistance to the British EEC negotiations within the Dominions.⁶⁷⁰ In a briefing paper for the New Zealand delegation, it was clearly set out that:

The first and fundamental assumption is that the British Government is convinced of the imperative need to join the Common Market and is determined to do so as soon as possible.⁶⁷¹

Hence, from this point onward, it was clear to the New Zealand government that Great Britain would, sooner or later, join the EEC. The hope that Britain might abandon the project were extinguished. In addition, for the three Prime Ministers of the Dominions, the meeting confirmed the imperative to act for their own national interests without getting in the way of Britain, that is, without giving the impression that they wanted to harm Britain.⁶⁷² They had to communicate their positions in such a way that, where possible, they would lead neither clearly to the success nor to the failure of the negotiations with Brussels. Despite the initially harsh discussions – especially from the Canadian side — the Prime Ministers ultimately stated that the final decision over a British accession to the EEC was the responsibility of the British government alone. Thereby it was certain that Great Britain would, first and foremost, look after its own needs first and the wishes of the Commonwealth would, in future, be secondary to this imperative.⁶⁷³ In the final communiqué, the Commonwealth countries affirmed that they *trusted* Great Britain would not endanger the cohesion of the Commonwealth in the negotiations with Brussels.⁶⁷⁴

In the wake of the conference, as Stuart Ward has described, there was resignation on the part of the Dominions. They realized that they could offer Great Britain no good alternative to the Common Market, and based on this, they assumed that in the foreseeable future Britain would join the EEC. John Diefenbaker even struck an agreement with Macmillan that the subject of the EEC should no longer be a topic of discussion at their next meeting in the Bahamas in December 1962.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁶⁹ NLW MS-Papers-6759-145: Broadcast Keith Holyoake, [probably toward the end of September 1962].

⁶⁷⁰ “[...] marked the end of Dominion resistance to Britain’s EEC membership application.” Cited in Ward, “A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship”, p. 172.

⁶⁷¹ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

⁶⁷² “[...] fighting without hurting Britain.” *Observer*, 14. September 1962.

⁶⁷³ See Ward, “A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship”, p. 172.

⁶⁷⁴ “They trusted that, should there be closer association between Britain and Europe, it would not be allowed, as it developed, to weaken the cohesion of the Commonwealth or its influence for peace and progress in the world.” LAC MG32-C3 397: Excerpts from Final Communiqué Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, September 1962.

⁶⁷⁵ See Ward, “A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship”, p. 172.

Australian newspapers perceived the Prime Ministers' Meeting as an important caesura for the Australian nation; the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Melbourne Age*, and the *Australian Financial Review* described the conference as a watershed event in Australian-British relations. From this point on, Australia stood on its own and, going forward, had to look after its own interests.⁶⁷⁶

Similar voices were to be found in the New Zealand press. Thus, the *Wellington Evening Post* wrote that, following the conference, New Zealand must look more to its own interests. Similar articles are to be found in the *Auckland Star*.⁶⁷⁷ The meeting in autumn 1962, thus marked an important break in the relationships of the Dominions to the motherland, though it is a matter of one of many breaks that occurred during the EEC negotiations. The 1962 conference led to the realization that, sooner or later, Great Britain would enter the EEC, and Commonwealth relations would undergo an irrevocable change. However, the feeling of connection to Great Britain did not vanish as a result, as the following statement from Menzies on 16 October 1962 shows:

In any event, so far as Australia is concerned, nothing can shake us in our allegiance to the Throne, an allegiance which will always give us a very special relationship to many other millions of people in Great Britain and elsewhere.⁶⁷⁸

Following from such views, policy makers in the Dominions were, of course, disappointed by the September conference as a matter of principle – especially since no concrete details concerning Commonwealth trade had been agreed to⁶⁷⁹ – but a complete renunciation from the motherland with a new orientation of trade and foreign policy did not follow. For this reason, the September conference should be reckoned as the high point within the longer processes that distanced Great Britain from the Dominions during the 1960s.

Dominion Communications with Great Britain during the EEC Debates

In the course of the British negotiations with the EEC many actors from the Dominions perceived that communication with Great Britain no longer functioned as before, but rather was understood to be in flux. From the outset a fundamental problem for actors in all three affected countries was

⁶⁷⁶ See *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 September 1962; *The Australian Financial Review*, 25. September 1962; *The Age*, 21 September 1962.

⁶⁷⁷ See *The Evening Post* (Wellington), 4. October 1962; *Auckland Star*, 15-16 January 1963.

⁶⁷⁸ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 5: The Prime Ministers' Conference and the Common Market. Ministerial Statement [From the „Parliamentary Debates“], 16 October 1962.

⁶⁷⁹ See ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/163 BRU 46/9/2/13 1: External Wellington to London/Paris/Brussels, 3 October 1962.

the uncertainty of the final result and consequences of the British membership proceedings. Of course, civil servants and politicians in the Dominions played out diverse projections of future scenarios, however, no one could with certainty determine the outcome of the membership talks. All possible solutions for the threat posed by a possible British accession to the EEC, therefore had to proceed on the basis of speculation.⁶⁸⁰ Moreover, various rumors and counter-rumors emerged concerning the possible outcome of the negotiations and over the consequences of British membership in the EEC. Thus, Australian actors feared a collapse of the, in any case, already weakened Commonwealth trading system. They assumed that Britain's entrance into the EEC could disrupt the entire trade and economic system of the western world.⁶⁸¹

New Zealand actors expressed disappointment over the (partial) lack of communication with Britain. The fact that Edward Heath held his opening speech before the Six on 10 October 1961 without previous consultations with the Commonwealth lands stirred them to protest via the New Zealand High Commission in London. New Zealand officials saw Heath's conduct as a breach of British promises to consult the Commonwealth countries. From then on they were mistrustful of future agreements. The British government even refused, at first, to publish the full text of the speech – against this the Commonwealth countries likewise protested. The speech was finally published at the end of November in the same year.⁶⁸² Just as much as the behavior of the British Prime Minister, the withholding of the speech contradicted the promises of the British government to consult and inform the Commonwealth countries during the negotiation talks.⁶⁸³

This problem found expression in a caricature from *The New Zealand Herald* of 28 November 1961 that made reference to the publication of Heath's speech:

⁶⁸⁰ The actors themselves recognized this fact, as exemplified by the Australian Prime Minister, McMahon. To a question regarding Great Britain's chances of admission to the EEC in 1967, he pointed out: "Well, you'd ask me to speculate here and you have got to accept my answer on the basis of speculation not being a member of the British government." NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community, McMahon on Common Market, 7 April 1967.

⁶⁸¹ See NAA M58 340: McEwen, 5 August 1961.

⁶⁸² At the time, the New Zealanders had already received a summary of the speech from the French embassy in Wellington. See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17. August 1966. Moreover, the Canadians had received a full transcript of the address from one member of the Six, and had forwarded it to the other Commonwealth Governments. See O'Brien, "The British Commonwealth and the European Economic Community. The Australian and Canadian Experiences", p. 483.

⁶⁸³ See ANZ ADRK 17391 T1/435 61/5/4/4 1: Commonwealth Views on Britain and the E.E.C., Supplementary Background Diess Information No.3, 27 September 1961.



No 2

Britannia is seen, proceeding unworriedly on to a wood plank with the inscription “EEC Negotiations” that lies above a dark abyss. Behind her is the New Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, his eyes blindfolded, and compelled to follow Britannia blindly over the abyss. One finds the explanation in the left upper corner of the caricature: “The news that the full text of Britain’s E.E.C. statement is to be made available is welcomed in N.Z. It should help us to view the negotiations as a whole said Mr Holyoake.” The contradiction between the text stating that New Zealand, through the publication of the speech, will now be able to clearly assess the negotiations, and the figurative representation of the blind Prime Minister, is a critique of the negotiation process; New Zealand can not see what is to be expected from the negotiations – here represented symbolically as a plank over a dark abyss. Regardless, Britain expected the Antipodes to follow them blindly, even if there was a danger that New Zealand would thereby be drawn into an economic catastrophe (the dark abyss). The New Zealanders were – as conveyed by the caricature – up to this point relied on their faith in Great Britain without themselves being able to estimate the abyss, that is, the risk of collapse.

A similar problem occurred in February 1962 when the British government was unwilling to give information concerning Heath’s opening address which was to be held on 22 February of that year.

New Zealand protested against this and the New Zealand *Department for External Affairs* instructed the High Commission in London to inform the British government of the following:

We do not consider that the receipt of transcripts of important statements after they have been made is adequate consultation in terms of the assurances the British have given us.⁶⁸⁴

It was not sufficient for the New Zealand government that they were to be informed of delivered speeches in hindsight; rather they wished to be notified beforehand of the content in British statements.

In May 1962, the Australian Secretary of the Department of Trade, Dr. Westerman, explained to his New Zealand listeners in Wellington that the British had worked out their proposal pertaining to industrial goods for the Brussels negotiations without consultation with the Commonwealth countries. This strengthened the Australian position of directly representing their own interests in the negotiations.⁶⁸⁵ The New Zealanders did not follow the example of the Australians, although the New Zealand embassy in Brussels found the transmission of information from the British to be essentially too slow.⁶⁸⁶ The British always first informed the government of the country that was the primary exporter of a product that was affected by the negotiations, before including the other Dominions.⁶⁸⁷ This meant that all the Commonwealth countries were not equally informed about the current state of the negotiations. The exchange of information between governments, which was considered to be a matter of course, was, for this reason, seen by the New Zealanders as endangered, and they became increasingly detached by mistrust towards British promises.⁶⁸⁸

However, the problem of a lack of communication was also perceived by the British side. Thus, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Henry Lintott, advised the Commonwealth Relations Office that the Canadian reactions would probably turn out to be friendlier if, before a renewed bid for EEC membership in the mid-1960s, Canadian ministers and officials were enlightened in

⁶⁸⁴ ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17. August 1966.

⁶⁸⁵ The Australian impression that the British were not involving the Commonwealth countries enough was reinforced by the French, who had informed the Australians through private channels that they had a similar impression of the British's behaviour. See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/223 3382/7: Notes of Meeting with Dr Westerman, Wellington, 9. May 1961.

⁶⁸⁶ See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17. August 1966.

⁶⁸⁷ For example, the New Zealand and British governments discussed butter and lamb before the Australians were involved. Conversely, Australians and Brits spoke to each other first about beef and veal. See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/223 3382/7: Notes of Meeting with Dr Westerman, Wellington, 9. May 1961.

⁶⁸⁸ See *The Christchurch Star*, 26. September 1970.

regards to British intentions and the reasons for them.⁶⁸⁹ With a Canadian public well-disposed towards the British decision and ministers informed beforehand, only Canadian “nationalists” represented a potential problem to a renewed British attempt at entrance; the rest of Canada would then be on the side of Great Britain.⁶⁹⁰

In Great Britain itself, a new Labour government under Harold Wilson came to power in October 1964. Wilson himself felt personally bound to the Commonwealth and, at first, strove for a revitalization of Commonwealth relations. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting of 1965, Wilson proposed a Three-point plan for economic cooperation in the Commonwealth. However, only little came of this, and Wilson himself was disappointed by the slight interest shown for the expansion of Commonwealth trading relationships.⁶⁹¹ The Canadian government indicated little interest in Wilson’s proposals. Above all this was because trade with Britain had up to 1965 only risen slightly, while trade with the USA grew steadily.⁶⁹²

During the second round of negotiations for British membership, policy makers in the three Dominions observed a shift in the international power structure: the Cold War, the rise of Communist China, the changes in the British Empire, and the rise of the USA to a world power, seemed to transform the world in the 1960s.⁶⁹³ In particular, the shift within the Commonwealth – Menzies still spoke of a “British Commonwealth” in his speech of 1967 – was significant. The Commonwealth was no longer “British,”⁶⁹⁴ but rather increasingly multi-ethnic. The Dominions were clearly more aware of this change during the second round of membership talks than they had been at the first. During the second round of negotiations, the Canadian government sought to prevent reactions such as those of 1961/1962 (felt to be mistakes) from emerging in their communications pertaining to Britain’s potential EEC membership. The Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin made it clear from the beginning that Canada wanted to avoid any impression it was against British membership.⁶⁹⁵ Moreover, there were increasing voices that surmised that a

⁶⁸⁹ See TNA DO 215/13: Memorandum „Attitude of the Canadian Government and Canadian Public Opinion towards British membership of the EEC: Probable Reactions if Britain renews its application for membership, sent by the British High Commission (Ottawa) to the Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 14. March 1966.

⁶⁹⁰ The "nationalists" could criticize the British approach because they feared Canada would be absorbed by the USA. See Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ See Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 198.

⁶⁹² Canadian exports to the UK increased from 915 million Canadian dollars to 1.74 trillion from 1960 to 1965, while trade with the US increased from 2.9 trillion to 5 trillion Canadian dollars. See Ibid.

⁶⁹³ See NAA A4092 84: Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Menzies, The Ditchley Foundation, 28. July 1967.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ See Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 209.

British accession could only have a short-term effect on the Dominions. Thus, the Australian Prime Minister McMahon, for example, emphasized the opportunities that a British accession could offer to Australia, and declared that the effects of accession would pass by after a brief period.⁶⁹⁶ Still, during the second round, many Australian policy makers proceeded from the assumption that EEC membership would permanently alter the complex economic relationships between Great Britain and Australia and also provoke a fundamental shift in Anglo-Australian relations.⁶⁹⁷ Since the second round of British membership talks turned out to be significantly shorter than the first, and, moreover, the governments of the Dominions worked under the assumption that Charles de Gaulle would again veto British membership,⁶⁹⁸ there are obviously less debates over these negotiations to be found. For these reasons, consideration of the second round of membership talks are, on many points, more briefly stated in this study than those concerning the first ones.

During the second round of membership talks, the conduct of the British chief negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, gave the Dominions grounds for a positive assessment. A report on Rippon's visit to New Zealand in September 1970 praised in particular the fact that this had taken place *before* Britain began detailed talks with Brussels. The initiative for the visit came from Rippon, which likewise received special emphasis in the report.⁶⁹⁹ The New Zealand Prime Minister took advantage of Rippon's visit to make a representation of the consequences of the British membership negotiations on New Zealand. Through the negotiations, the country had been placed in the "most testing period in its history"⁷⁰⁰ and would now be fighting for its economic survival. Still, in spite of the positive evaluation of Rippon by the Dominion governments, the worsening relationship between Great Britain and the Dominions remained a persistent theme of the EEC debate; the Dominions asserted that there was difficulty in relation to the "confidentiality"⁷⁰¹ between the British government and the Dominions that had not existed before. Thus, that Great Britain would in future speak of itself and the EEC as "us" and locate its national interests more forcefully within the European framework, would alter the previously existing communications relationships on the basis of secrecy, clusters of interests, and shifted loyalties.⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁶ See NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community, McMahon on Common Market, 7 April 1967.

⁶⁹⁷ See Curran and Ward, *The Unknown Nation. Australia After Empire*, p. 34.

⁶⁹⁸ See Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 203.

⁶⁹⁹ See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1633/63 3382 29: Report of Visit of Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon, 17 to 22 September 1970.

⁷⁰⁰ ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1633/63 3382 29: Speech of the Prime Minister, 22 September 1970.

⁷⁰¹ TNA FCO 82/115: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London) to British High Commission (Ottawa), 12 December 1972.

⁷⁰² See *Ibid.*

Communications and Dominion Relations during the EEC Debates

The communications with the British government were not alone in offering cause for criticism; the communications of the three countries among one another was also felt by policy makers in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington, to be weak in many areas. Thus, a New Zealand decision maker complained that Australian colleagues had not come to an agreement with New Zealand before making statements in front of the Committee of Deputies in 1962. As a result a statement had come about that the New Zealanders found unacceptable on many points nicht nur die Kommunikation mit der britischen Regierung bot Anlass für Kritik: Auch die Kommunikation der drei Länder untereinander fiel an vielen Stellen für *Policy-Maker* in Canberra, Ottawa und Wellington zu gering aus. So beklagten neuseeländische Entscheidungsträger, dass australische Kollegen sich nicht vor ihrem Statement vor dem *Committee of Deputies* 1962 mit den Neuseeländern abgesprochen hatten. Dadurch war ein Statement von australischer Seite zustande gekommen, das den Neuseeländern an einigen Stellen nicht passte. In this instance, the policy makers in Wellington took the lack of communication previous to the statements as disadvantageous, because it led to a result that worked against New Zealand's interests. In hindsight, the New Zealanders came to see how they could use the Australian statements for their own interests: in comparison with Australian demands, those of New Zealand could now appear to be more sensible and rational. In so doing they did not wish to awaken the impression that they were stabbing the Australians in the back; rather the particular position of the New Zealanders could appear with more emphasis.⁷⁰³

However, along with the grievances concerning poor communication one finds sources showing that, from the beginning of the 1960s, the countries shared information with each other.⁷⁰⁴ Thus, in May 1962, Keith Holyoake informed Robert Menzies about the New Zealand strategy pertaining to the British membership talks with the EEC. Holyoake there emphasized, among other points, that the different approaches of Australia and New Zealand were mostly questions of "emphasis"⁷⁰⁵ and not ones that touched on "basic objectives"⁷⁰⁶; they were complementary rather than contrary.⁷⁰⁷ A further example of the channels of exchange between the countries, is that Australia

⁷⁰³ See ANZ AEFN 19152 ICW2458/1 115B: Briefing Paper for John Marshall, Department of External Affairs Wellington, 16 May 1962.

⁷⁰⁴ An example of this are the sources concerning, inter alia, Australian perspectives, Australian speeches, letters and statements to the British government that are to be found in Canadian archives: RG25 Vol. 5519 File 12447-40 or RG25 Vol. 5517 File 12447-40.

⁷⁰⁵ NAA A3917 Volume 3: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Inward Cablegram from Australian High Commission (London), 1 June 1962.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ See Ibid.

learned from Canadian sources that Macmillan had informed Diefenbaker that the Kennedy government unconditionally desired British membership in the EEC so as to preserve political stability in Europe.⁷⁰⁸

Aside from the exchange of information, the countries used their knowledge of each other to advance their own interests. Thus, Robert Menzies, for example, described New Zealand as an endangered land in a television interview and appealed, for this reason, to the sentiments of solidarity among the Commonwealth countries: no country should accept Great Britain's deal with the EEC states, a deal which would be disastrous for New Zealand. As the Australia Prime Minister made use of this instance, he attempted to activate the feelings of solidarity within his own population. He even drew a threatening image of a "heavy blow"⁷⁰⁹ struck within the Commonwealth. Knowledge concerning the precarious situation of New Zealand was deployed in this instance as a means of sensitizing his own population to the problem of a British membership in the EEC.

In general, informal discussions between politicians, diplomats, and officials was crucial to the exchange of information between the Dominions – as it was in the Commonwealth overall. Thus, by way of example, J. Shepherd of the New Zealand delegation in Brussels reported to External Affairs in Wellington: "We have in the last few days „shopped“ around the various Departments in order to obtain some idea of where the Australians might go from here."⁷¹⁰ That meant that the New Zealand delegation attempted to find out what strategies the Australians would pursue in Brussels. The "Kiwis"⁷¹¹ received this information from personal contacts on the spot.

All three of the former settler colonies monitored each other during the period of the EEC negotiations. They described each other as "sister countries,"⁷¹² a sign of the perception that they felt themselves part of a Commonwealth "family." The three countries observed the reactions of

⁷⁰⁸ See NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 1: The Implications for Australian Foreign Policy of United Kingdom Participation in the European Economic Community, undated [probably July 1961].

⁷⁰⁹ NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of a television interview given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, filmed on 24 June 1962, broadcast on 25 June 1962. Indeed, Australian actors also observed that New Zealand had gained a special position among the general public in Britain. Thus, New Zealand was more preoccupied with its own problems than with those of Australia. See NAA A1838 727/4/2/4: Note for File: United Kingdom Public Opinion and New Zealand, September 1961.

⁷¹⁰ ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/162 BRU 46/9/2/9 1: J. Shepherd New Zealand Mission to the EEC Brussels to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 4 October 1962.

⁷¹¹ A self-descriptive term used by New Zealanders.

⁷¹² NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 34 Speeches 1958: Speech by John McEwen, Luncheon in Honour of John Diefenbaker, 5 December 1958; NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 39 Speeches: Speech of John McEwen to Australia Club, London, 17 April 1962.

each other, and compared these to their own. All three lands commissioned studies of one another, sought out common points of interest and discussed (collective) ways of approach. The Australians then classified the positions of the different Commonwealth countries into different groups at the time of the EEC talks. The first group, consisting of Canada and New Zealand, was just as upset by the negotiations with Brussels, however, they would represent their views to The Six less actively than the Australians.⁷¹³ The Canadian government shared the Australian view concerning the significance of safeguarding Commonwealth trade in the possible entrance conditions that would be required of Britain. Moreover, common to both lands was a fear, in particular, for their exports⁷¹⁴ of manufactured goods⁷¹⁵ and temperate foodstuffs.⁷¹⁶ However, in contrast to the Australian regime, Ottawa left the negotiations to the British and exercised restraint during the Brussels talks.⁷¹⁷ In a joint communiqué after conversations between Macmillan and Diefenbaker in May 1962, the Canadian government asserted that they were confident that Great Britain would negotiate in the best interests of Canada.⁷¹⁸ For that reason, so reported the Australian government – Canada took a distinctly less active approach than they themselves did. Here Australian politicians and officials explicitly compared the conduct of the Canadians with their own; they concluded that both countries had common ground, but their actions varied.

In relation to New Zealand, Australian actors reckoned that there would be a severe economic shock associated with Britain's accession to the EEC. They noted that the New Zealanders in no way wished give an indication that they were addressing their views directly to the Six. Australian policy makers saw the reason for this in New Zealand's preoccupation with strictly preserving the status quo regarding the current import regulations for their products entering Britain. Thus, New Zealand's approach distinguished itself from that of Australia, which was ready to accept more

⁷¹³ See NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Britain and the E.E.C., 22 May 1962.

⁷¹⁴ See *Ibid.* In particular, Canada was concerned about its exports of grain, timber and newsprint. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, explained to his audience in a radio address that “temperate agricultural products” meant food stuffs produced in a “temperate climate,” and it was commonly used as a technical term within the EEC. NLW MS-Papers-6759-145: Broadcast Keith Holyoake, [probably at the end of September 1962].

⁷¹⁵ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Britain and the E.E.C., 22 May 1962.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁷ The Canadian Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. A.E. Ritchie, acknowledged this position in a conversation with the Australian High Commissioner: “He [Ritchie] felt that this lack of familiarity on the part of the Canadian Ministers stemmed very much from their basic approach – to let the British make all the running and take all the responsibility. There had thus been no day-to-day need for Canadian Ministers to study the details.” NAA A3917 Volume 7: Record of Conversation between Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. D.O. Hay, Australian High Commissioner, Ottawa, 21 March 1962.

⁷¹⁸ See NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Britain and the E.E.C., 22 May 1962.

changes to the status quo.⁷¹⁹ The conclusion of the Australian study is that the only lands in the Commonwealth with which Australia shared the same interests were New Zealand (“temperate foodstuffs”⁷²⁰) and Canada (“temperate foodstuffs”⁷²¹ and “industrial products”⁷²²).⁷²³ From this, however, it did *not* follow that all three lands strove for the same solution to these problems. For this reason, the study concluded that a joint approach would be improbable and imprudent. Only in relation to agricultural products could a potential agreement on strategy be reached, but this would vary from product to product. The report also asserted, however, that every impression of a “ganging-up”⁷²⁴ against Great Britain was to be avoided.⁷²⁵

One can find in the sources individual examples of persons who desired precisely such a “ganging-up” or, at the very least, a joint decision of the three Dominions towards Britain. The Canadian High Commissioner in London, George Drew, proposed a so-called “Salvage-Operation”:

If UK goes into the Common Market on anything like the rumoured economic terms, or accepts the political implications of the Rome Treaty, the final fragmentation of the Commonwealth will come about. Already great damage has been done to mutual trust, interest and inter-dependence. [...] There is therefore some time, but little time, left for the Commonwealth “Salvage Operation”. This would have to be an Operation on the part of the Big Four, i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and UK. [...] We are all equal in the Commonwealth (but vide George Orwell – “some are more equal than others”). The UK is clearly not going to take a lead in a dramatic Salvage Operation. [...] The Salvage Operation would be snatching, almost at the eleventh hour, the Commonwealth leadership from Britain and coming forward with economic proposals of imaginative scope which would link

⁷¹⁹ See *Ibid.* The Australians had been enlightened by a staff member of the New Zealand High Commission, Mr. Milan, who explained that the New Zealanders, through their restraint, were following a carefully planned campaign. This had been introduced in the middle of the 1960s and consisted of regular statements by New Zealand Ministers and officials, of an active press campaign by the *New Zealand House* and New Zealand actors in Great Britain, as well as a program that publicized issues important to New Zealand. Marketing Boards and similar organisations played an important role in this campaign. Marketing boards and similar organizations played an important role in this campaign. Even on the European continent, the New Zealand government attempted to explain the position of their country through smaller campaigns. In comparison, the Australian campaign began later and placed more emphasis on the potential difficulties for the *British* side, even as New Zealand almost exclusively emphasized its *own* difficulties. See NAA A1838 727/4/2/4: Note for File, United Kingdom Public Opinion and New Zealand, undated. Hence, according to the Australians, the difference between New Zealand and Australian strategies in relation to the British public lay in the fact that New Zealand attempted to gain sympathy for its own problems, while the Australians tried to make the British more aware of the problems they might face due to EEC membership.

⁷²⁰ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Britain and the E.E.C., 22 May 1962.

⁷²¹ *Ibid.*

⁷²² *Ibid.*

⁷²³ In a conversation with the Australian High Commissioner in Ottawa, the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, A. E. Ritchie, mentioned, however, that the Canadian position was somewhat different than that of Australia, because Canadian interests were concentrated on goods that were also of interest for the USA. Thus, the Canadians would feel uneasy about negotiating without the Americans. See NAA A3917 Volume 7: Record of Conversation between Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. D.O. Hay, Australian High Commissioner, Ottawa, 21 March 1962.

⁷²⁴ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Britain and the E.E.C., 22 May 1962.

⁷²⁵ See *Ibid.*

the Commonwealth together in what might be termed a 1962 Ottawa. [...] Let Mr. Diefenbaker, Bob Menzies and the New Zealand PM meet on New Zealand soil (being the smallest and so avoiding any political embarrassment to the major partners) – Fiji could be considered. Let the Big Three try to make a new Commonwealth trade picture based on amendment of the new Preference rule of GATT; guaranteed markets for Commonwealth primary products and mutually beneficial bi-lateral trade agreements. [...] The cause of the Commonwealth is bigger than the position or reputation of any individual or set of individuals.⁷²⁶

Therefore, George Drew saw the necessity of a “Salvage-Operation” by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In order to preserve the Commonwealth, the three countries, according to his view, had to join together and take over the leadership of the Commonwealth. They should establish a new Commonwealth trading system, since the Commonwealth itself was more important than the individual countries.

At the beginning of the negotiations, or rather just before, the three countries actually had contemplated banding together – if not in as drastic a fashion as George Drew demanded. On the occasion of Robert Menzies’ visit to Canada in 1960, the High Commission in Canberra informed Ottawa about the potential course of events and themes to be discussed in such a visit: “Prime Minister Menzies may raise with Mr Pearson question of wider Australian CDN contacts through more intimate consultation, visits and exchanges.”⁷²⁷ Up to this point Australia was more vigorously occupied with its relationship to Britain than with the one to Canada. Hence, official relations scarce existed, though of course there were contacts (informal) at the ministerial level between the two lands. This was also true for the Australian relationship with New Zealand.⁷²⁸

In 1961, actors in the three Dominions considered whether the three countries should take a *common* approach to the negotiations with London. Thus, McEwen and Menzies contemplated whether Canada and New Zealand should be present at future talks with Great Britain. On the one hand, Britain could attempt to play the three countries against one another, on the other, varying positions among the countries could be hard to overcome during joint discussions.⁷²⁹ The New Zealand High Commission in Canberra deemed an agreement between Australia and New Zealand (and Canada) in preparation for the London talks in 1961 good in so far as the approaches did not

⁷²⁶ LAC MG32-C3 Vol. 397: George Drew, Study of the Common Market, 1961.

⁷²⁷ LAC RG25 Vol. 5579 File 12850-A-13-1-40: Canadian High Commission (Canberra) to External (Ottawa), 13 June 1963.

⁷²⁸ See *Ibid.*

⁷²⁹ See NAA A3917 Volume 2: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Outward Cablegram to Australian High Commission (London), 9 March 1961.

conflict with one another, but rather could compliment each other.⁷³⁰ Before the discussions, Menzies inquired of John Diefenbaker whether the two governments could come together before the London talks in order to compare the Canadian and Australian approaches in relation to various trade commodities, participation in the negotiations, and future arrangements for the Commonwealth.⁷³¹

However, a united front between the three lands did not materialize. The conduct of the Canadians in relation to the British membership talks were viewed in a critical light by New Zealand actors. Thus, the Canadians appeared to them to be particularly brash opponents of British membership who did not shy away from publicly criticizing Britain. The often strident Canadian reaction stood in contrast to the minor economic damages that Canada had to expect in the event of a British accession. For the New Zealanders, this discrepancy was not explainable and, with an eye to their own situation, the Canadian reaction appeared out of place to them. That contributed to the view that, for them, a common front was not particularly appropriate.⁷³²

Moreover, a common front between the three countries did not materialize because the Dominions wanted to avoid the impression that the Commonwealth states were working jointly against the motherland. In autumn of 1961, rumors emerged concerning a political pact between Australia and New Zealand in the event of a British accession to the EEC. Thus, in September 1961, the First Secretary, H. Neil Truscott, reported from Bonn to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (Canberra) about a report from London that had appeared in Bonn's *General Anzeiger*. Therein was mentioned Robert Menzies' warning to the Queen that, in the event of accession, a political union with New Zealand and the proclamation of a Republic was planned. Following upon this, the countries would withdraw from the Sterling zone and the Commonwealth, and then conclude a financial agreement with the Americans.⁷³³ They wanted unconditionally to avoid the impression of a fraternal arrangement between the countries so as to not offend Britain. The following episode demonstrates some further reasons that spoke against a common front. In 1961,

⁷³⁰ See ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/75 3382 1: High Commission Canberra to Secretary of External Affairs Wellington, 5 June 1961.

⁷³¹ See NAA A1209 1961/1124 Part 1: Department of External Affairs, Outward Cablegram to Australian High Commission Ottawa, 22 August 1961.

⁷³² See ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

⁷³³ This report has hand-written annotations to the effect that indeed there could be some rumours concerning an economic rapprochement between New Zealand and Australia; aside from this, however, the report offers no basis for this. See NAA A1838 727/4 Part 13: H. Neil Truscott to the Secretary Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 29 September 1961.

Robert Menzies declined a request from an international television program that was planning a one-hour special broadcast on the theme of the “Common Market” with John Diefenbaker, Keith Holyoake, and Robert Menzies. Diefenbaker and Menzies had already given their consent, however, Menzies did not want to participate as he felt the space of three minutes allotted to the Australian case was too brief. In a short note from 5 October 1961, the precise words of the Prime Minister were thus described: “It would be an act of folly to explain our position in three minutes.”⁷³⁴ For this reason – that, according to his opinion, Australian interests would not receive sufficient attention – Menzies declined the possibility of a joint television appearance of representatives of the Dominions. Menzies put *their own* interests above a joint Commonwealth representation. Thus, the Dominions wanted to avoid giving offense to Britain and curbing their own respective interests. This problematic emerged time after time during the negotiations as further discussion will show.

During the London talks of 1961, there was likewise no common front between the three lands. The Australian economist, W. E. G. Salter, observed that cooperation between the three countries had scarce appeared; during the talks the Australian delegation had cooperated even less with the other delegations. They had perceived the departure points of Canada and New Zealand in the negotiations as “foolish”, and Salter suspected that Canada and New Zealand had felt that Australia had been uncooperative. Salter saw therein a danger for Commonwealth cooperation and proposed a stronger exchange of information via direct communication between the Prime Ministers.⁷³⁵ Likewise, some journalist saw advantages to closer cooperation. Thus, an article in *The Age* asserted that it would be helpful for Australia and New Zealand if they were to work together closely and speak with “one voice”⁷³⁶ on questions concerning the British membership in the EEC. Moreover, the article saw advantages for both countries in a closer economic association, since a „common market in the South Pacific“⁷³⁷ could strengthen both sides.⁷³⁸ Even the Australian Senior Trade Commissioner, H. C. Menzies, spoke out for the further development of Australian-New

⁷³⁴ NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Handwritten notes for a telegram from External Affairs (Canberra) to London, 5 October 1961.

⁷³⁵ See NAA A1209 1961/1124 Part 1: W.E.G. Salter, Thoughts on the United Kingdom’s Negotiations to Join the E.E.C., 17 October 1961.

⁷³⁶ *The Age*, 5 August 1960.

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁸ By the end of the 1950s, some New Zealand actors also saw advantages for their own country in a common front with Australia. For example, according to J.R. Hanan (Delegate of the New Zealand Group at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference): “Many advantages would exist in a federation of New Zealand with Australia”, cited in *Evening Post*, 7 November 1959.

Zealand trade relations since similar patterns of trade and shared interests would promote such an association.⁷³⁹

Some voices in the press, however, assumed there primarily would be competition and disunity between Australia and New Zealand as the negotiations proceeded further. Thus, the *Dominion* on 28 September 1962 had the headline: “Australia – N.Z. Friction Over E.E.C.?”⁷⁴⁰ By so doing, the *Dominion* alluded to British press reports from Straßburg that had appeared in the *Melbourne Herald*. The basis of contention was the granting of special conditions for New Zealand, which Australia had not received in the negotiations.⁷⁴¹ In connection to possible special conditions for New Zealand, Australian politicians and officials stressed repeatedly that these should not be allowed to disadvantage Australia. New Zealand could, of course, receive special conditions, though not if these meant “discriminatory treatment”⁷⁴² towards Australian products.⁷⁴³ The New Zealanders were aware of this problem; the Briefing Paper for the New Zealand delegation to the Commonwealth Conference of 1962 warned the representatives beforehand that Australia and Canada could meet New Zealand with mistrust if the Six considered special conditions for New Zealand.⁷⁴⁴ Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, according to the Briefing Paper, had few common interests: not only the question of special conditions for New Zealand, but also commodity interests put both countries at variance with each other. Thus, Australia would attempt, above all, to protect beef and veal exports and, therefore, neglect sheep and lamb products. The latter were, however, one of the main interests for New Zealand. Australia and Canada would probably advocate for a global agreement on grain exports, what was of minor concern for New Zealand. Moreover, the Australians had come to an agreement with the Americans without consulting New Zealand ahead of time.⁷⁴⁵

Aside from these reasons, a common approach was also difficult because the New Zealanders suspected that Menzies would primarily support the argument that a British accession to the EEC would harm traditional Commonwealth relations. Diefenbaker would argue that Britain’s

⁷³⁹ See *The Dominion*, 25 September 1959.

⁷⁴⁰ *The Dominion*, 28 September 1962. Such suspicions persisted throughout the membership negotiations. Thus, in 1971, Miles Hudson mentioned of voices suspecting that Australia was jealous and begrudging of New Zealand’s special conditions. See NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 16: Record of Conversation with Mr. Miles Hudson, 1 July 1971.

⁷⁴¹ See *The Dominion*, 28. September 1962.


⁷⁴² ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/162 BRU 46/9/2/9 1: Statement John McEwen in the House of Representatives, Canberra, 6 December 1962.

⁷⁴³ See *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁴ See ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

⁷⁴⁵ See *Ibid.*

membership in the Common Market would have consequences for the Commonwealth, and that Canada, as a NATO member and a potential member of the Atlantic Community, would become increasingly isolated from the other Commonwealth countries. For New Zealand, in contrast, *economic* arguments were in the foreground. Based on this, the Briefing Paper saw little possibility for cooperation between the three Dominions at the Commonwealth Conference in September 1962. The interests were too divergent and the arguments too multi-sided: “[...] there may be as many positions as there are countries around the table.”⁷⁴⁶ The following caricature, taken from *The New Zealand Herald* of 7 September 1962, demonstrates the varying interests and the problem of special conditions for New Zealand:



No 3

The three national animals of the Dominions are illustrated: a moose for Canada, a kangaroo for Australia, and a Kiwi for New Zealand. The three beasts have the faces of the Prime Ministers of each country: the moose the face of John Diefenbaker, the Kangaroo that of Robert Menzies, and the Kiwi that of “Kiwi” Keith Holyoake. In the background, a signpost can be seen, upon which is

⁷⁴⁶ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

the inscription, “To the Macmillion’s Den.” The Kiwi appears to be headed in the direction indicated by this signpost. Here the caricature plays upon the name of the British Prime Minister Macmillan, whose name has been transformed into the word “Million” in order to suggest that Great Britain is the key to economic advantage. In the upper right part of the caricature, one reads a quotation from Keith Holyoake: “Britain is Giving New Zealand Special Consideration.” The caricature is subtitled with a quotation (modified from Orwell) that the small Kiwi says to the moose that looks on with menace, and the kangaroo that peers forward critically: “All animals are equal, boys – but some are perhaps a bit more equal than others!” The caricature illustrates that the three countries find themselves, of course, in a similar situation, but still differ from one another as is shown by their specific characteristics. Furthermore, as the caricature also shows, the three countries were handled differently in the EEC debate: only the Kiwi had received special conditions and was allowed to proceed in the direction of “Macmillion’s” den. The distinctive nature of the three creatures here symbolizes the distinct interests of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and the special treatment of the latter in the negotiations. For this reason, the caricatures show why the three countries could not join forces and why no common approach (towards Britain) arose: they were too divergent, and for New Zealand it was worth pursuing their own policy since it yielded special conditions.

The avoidance of the impression that the Dominions were making a common front was also the reason why no meeting between New Zealand and Australian actors took place prior to the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in September 1962.⁷⁴⁷ To press inquiries about a possible conference between the two states, John McEwen responded as follows:

I believe it would be bad for the Commonwealth relationships if there were any ganging up. We exchange views, but in no sense have we sought to gang up. I think there is a great danger in any attempt to gang up.⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴⁷ The Australian press had already, by the end of July 1962, assumed that the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand would meet separately in preparation for the September conference in order to agree upon their conduct in respect to a British membership in the EEC. The basis for this assumption was the efforts of Keith Holyoake who had proposed such a meeting in a telephone conversation with Robert Menzies; he had planned to likewise invite John Diefenbaker. See *The Dominion*, 31 July 1962. In a conversation on 10 August 1962, the Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra, E.W.T. Gill, informed the Acting Secretary, R.L. Harry that he had warned Ottawa of the impression that such a meeting might produce. See NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 3: Record of Conversation with the Canadian High Commissioner (Mr. R.L. Gill), Officer present: The Acting Secretary (Mr. R.L. Harry), 10. August 1962.

⁷⁴⁸ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Transcript of Press Conference by Rt. Hon. J. McEwen, Canberra, 26 April 1962. Furthermore, in the same press conference, McEwen dismissed assumptions that, during the Prime Minister’s Conference in September 1962, the Commonwealth states would naturally represent their common interests vis-à-vis Britain. Each country would concentrate on its own dilemmas.

Still, the *Times* reported in January 1963 on possible cooperation between Australia and New Zealand. According to correspondents in Canberra, the two countries scarcely worked together (outside of times of war). The article, however, cited a deputy of the Liberal Party in Canberra: “If E.E.C., NATO and United Europe are possible, is Australasia unthinkable? The Rhine may be narrower than the Tasman, but the urgencies of merger across it are certainly no greater and the difference of peoples and history are certainly far more formidable.”⁷⁴⁹ For this reason, the article referred to the close affinity between Australia and New Zealand. This relationship was even nearer than the one that existed between the peoples of Europe, so that a union ought to be closer to hand.

In the course of the first EEC talks, policy makers in Australia and New Zealand actually discussed a union of their economies. Though, the end result was that both governments spoke against this possibility. The Australian government feared that as part of such an arrangement, New Zealand would try to export its agricultural products – especially butter – free of tariffs. That represented a danger for domestic agriculture.⁷⁵⁰ At the beginning of the 1960s, actors in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada had discussed the possibility of a Pacific Common Market, consisting of the three states. That was the theme of a headline story in the *Ottawa Citizen* on 19 June 1961, which had cited the *Auckland Star*. The report explained that in the event of a British accession, Australia and (especially) New Zealand would orient themselves towards Canada, under whose leadership, they would welcome a Pacific Common Market. Diefenbaker, however, quashed this idea.⁷⁵¹ After the first veto by Charles de Gaulle, a series of articles in the *Dominion* attempted to bring the advantages of a common front between Australia and New Zealand more forcefully into the public discussion. The proposal, however, found little attention in the press.⁷⁵²

In the 1960s, Australia gained in importance for New Zealand in respect to trade politics. Deliberations over an expansion of trade relations increased on both sides. In preparatory for a meeting of the Australia-New Zealand Consultative Committee on Trade, which was to convene in Wellington in April 1963, representatives of the Australian and New Zealand governments met one month prior to discuss trading relations between the two countries. The atmosphere of the

⁷⁴⁹ *The Times*, 10 January 1963.

⁷⁵⁰ See NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview Given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, filmed on 24 June 1962, broadcast on 25 June 1962.

⁷⁵¹ See NAA A3917 Volume 17: Inward Cablegram Department of External Affairs (Canberra) from Australian High Commission (Ottawa), sent 20 June 1961, received 21 June 1961.

⁷⁵² See NAA A571 1963/320 Part 2: Australian High Commission Wellington to External Affairs, 8 February 1963.

preparatory meeting was described by the New Zealanders as “frank and friendly.”⁷⁵³ They remarked, however, that proceedings were reserved at the beginning of the meeting, and both sides had to overcome a certain mistrust. This mistrust seems primarily to have resulted from an uncertainty about the intentions of the other side. The initiative for the meeting came mostly from New Zealand, which was unsatisfied with the imbalance of trade between itself and Australia, and was striving for a renegotiation of trading relations between the two countries.⁷⁵⁴ A goal of the meeting was to be a negotiation of a trade agreement between them.

A paper from the New Zealand Department of Trade and Industry, which was discussed in a seminar on Australian-New Zealand relations at Victoria University in September 1973, describes further developments. The paper first mentions why the geographic proximity of the two countries never led to a close trading relationship. This was because both countries exported primary products that were not economically complementary, but rather competed with one another. The paper noted further that, already by 1958, negotiations and discussions between the Ministers of both countries had led to a complete revision and rethinking of previous trade relations. Thereby, the Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had been signed into existence on 31 August 1965. The agreement came into effect on 1 January 1966 – at first for a period of ten years – and represented a framework for the development of trade relations between Australia and New Zealand.⁷⁵⁵ Under the terms of this agreement, New Zealand was allowed to export manufactured goods, yields from forestry and „non-sensitive agricultural products“⁷⁵⁶ into Australia. Though the agreement involved the exchange of goods without tariffs, it did not, however, in contrast to an economic union, discriminate against goods from third-party countries through the formation of an identical system of tariffs.⁷⁵⁷ In December 1966, *The Daily Telegraph* described the NAFTA agreement in the following terms: “The New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is only the first cautious dipping of the toe into the water, which has proved economically cold, despite good intentions on both sides.”⁷⁵⁸ Thus, NAFTA was an important step in the development of trade relations between Australia and New Zealand. The tough negotiations and the agreement that resulted from them, however, showed how far both countries were from a close economic union.

⁷⁵³ ANZ ABHS 6971 W4630/12: Australian-New Zealand Trade Talks Officials Meeting 18-20 March 1963.

⁷⁵⁴ See *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁵ See ANZ ABHS 22128 W5533/5 CBA 8/4/1: Paper of the Department of Trade and Industry, August 1973. See also Robertson and Singleton, "Britain, Butter, and European Integration, 1957-1964", p. 331.

⁷⁵⁶ ANZ ABHS 22128 W5533/5 CBA 8/4/1: Paper of the Department of Trade and Industry, August 1973.

⁷⁵⁷ See *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁸ *The Daily Telegraph*, 15 December 1966.

During the EEC debate, it was not only Australia and New Zealand that considered possibilities for cooperation between each other; Canada also thought about ways to work with Australia and/or New Zealand. John Diefenbaker was the first Canadian Prime Minister to make an official visit to Australia. During his visit in 1958, the two countries negotiated a trade agreement and reassured each other of their common trade interests.⁷⁵⁹ In 1960, the Australian and Canadian governments signed the Canada-Australia Trade Agreement,⁷⁶⁰ through which trading relations between the two countries was to be regulated. During a 1962 visit to London, Robert Menzies met the Canadian High Commissioner, George Drew, a meeting which he reported on at the request of a radio and television conference. To be sure, the exchange with Drew, as Menzies declared in the interview, had not been satisfactory, because he could not make no statements (political) in connection to the EEC on account of the imminent election in Canada.⁷⁶¹ During this radio and television conference, the Australian public was interested to know whether or not Menzies was pursuing a joint campaign of the Commonwealth states. Menzies refused this, however, primarily because he spoke only for his own government and not for the governments of others.⁷⁶² This is an ambiguous statement, because shortly thereafter he asserted: “We identify our own interests with the interests of the Commonwealth. I decline to believe that they are different.”⁷⁶³ Thus, it is to be understood from Menzies statement that the interests of the Commonwealth still correlated with those of Australia. Certainly, he had to take into account the safe-keeping of Australian interests for his voters. In cases of doubt, he was obliged to Australian interests, however, there were in the ideal case, from his point of view, in agreement with those of the Commonwealth. Canada’s volume of trade with the other Dominions increased in the mid-1960s: between 1963 and 1964, exports to Australia rose from 101 million dollars to 146 million. The primary trade products during this period were automobiles and automotive parts, newsprint, softwoods, iron, steel, asbestos, pulp, synthetic

⁷⁵⁹ See NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 34 Speeches: Speech by John McEwen, Luncheon in Honour of John Diefenbaker, 5 December 1958.

⁷⁶⁰ See NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 118 Minister for Trade: Signing of Trade Agreement between Canada and Australia, 12 February 1960.

⁷⁶¹ See NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Press, Radio and Television Conference Given by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, Canberra, 24 June 1962.

⁷⁶² However, the rumour that Australia was planning to ally with Canada and New Zealand against Great Britain persisted. In an Outward Cablegram from the Department of External Affairs dated September 4, 1962, this assumption made to Menzies is repeated. The cablegram reports Menzies' renewed assurance that Australia, Canada and New Zealand were not planning to join forces against Great Britain („gang up“). NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 2: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Outward Cablegram to Australian High Commission (Accra, Lagos, New Delhi et al), 7. February 1963 [contains a statement from Menzies dated February 5].

⁷⁶³ NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Press, Radio and Television Conference Given by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, Canberra, 24. June 1962.

rubber, Sulphur, and canned fish. Imports from Australia rose from 56 million to 60 million dollars, in which the main products were sugar, dried fruit, meat, wool, and canned fruit.⁷⁶⁴ The trade in exports between Canada and New Zealand also increased in this period. It rose to 34 million dollars in 1964. The products traded were primarily aluminum, locomotives, copper tubes, generators, plastic film, and canned fish. Imports from New Zealand grew substantially slower: between 1963 and 1964 it rose only to 11 million dollars. New Zealand imports consisted almost entirely of sausage casings, wool, and meat.⁷⁶⁵

During the second round of British membership talks, the potential special conditions for New Zealand gave the other Dominions renewed cause for discontent. Thus, a Briefing Paper on trade issues at the Australia/New Zealand Trade Talks in Wellington in February 1967 noted that the Australian position on the special conditions depended on the amount of discrimination against Australian products.⁷⁶⁶ The differences between New Zealand and Australian trade interests were the reason why common aims, consultations, and associations had been problematic up to this point. Should Britain offer bilateral consultations to New Zealand and not to Australia, this would probably lead to resentments and disputes.⁷⁶⁷ In addition, the Briefing paper stated that Australia was perceived by the British as a rich, developed country that had posed an unwelcome complication to the issue of butter with New Zealand.⁷⁶⁸ Certainly, the New Zealanders observed that the difficulties between Australia and Britain in relation to butter quotas was only the “tip of the iceberg.”⁷⁶⁹ Still, subsequent economic policy decisions will show how closely associated the two states could still be. An accumulation of factor during this period could be interpreted as the reasons for as well as the effects of the alterations in the Australian-British relationship.⁷⁷⁰

The question of a common front between Australia and New Zealand extended into the third round of membership talks:

Two recent memoranda from posts [...] have raised the question of the scope for coordination of New Zealand/Australia policies and supporting activities in relation to the forthcoming negotiations between Britain and the EEC.⁷⁷¹

⁷⁶⁴ See LAC RG2-B-2 File T-1-12-A1: Denis Harvey an Mitchell Sharp, 18. August 1965.

⁷⁶⁵ See Ibid.

⁷⁶⁶ See ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 3: Briefing Paper, Australia/New Zealand Trade Talks, Wellington, 23. February until 1. March 1967.

⁷⁶⁷ See Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ See ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 4: B.V. Galvin for High Commissioner London to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 30. May 1967.

⁷⁶⁹ See Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ See Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/28 164/2/3 10: Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 9. April 1970.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that trade with Australia could be of increasing significance in the future: the market lay geographically nearby and Australian tastes were similar to those of New Zealand.⁷⁷² In a Joint Statement of 1970, Australia and New Zealand noted that in the coming decade they would strive for closer cooperation on the basis of “logic of history and the realities of political and economic geography.”⁷⁷³ However, the *Melbourne Sun News Pictorial* wrote in May 1971 that New Zealand would not profit from coordination with Australia, since it had already received attention in the negotiations on its own strength. Moreover, it would only benefit from an expansion of its trade agreement with Australia into an Antipodean Common Market, in which New Zealand would be allowed to sell agricultural products in Australia. For this reason, the relationship between the two countries was better described as a “rivalry [rather] than co-operation,”⁷⁷⁴ even though the countries “should have logically gone into economic union 50 years ago.”⁷⁷⁵

At the start of the 1970s, the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, came to an agreement with the Australian cabinet that Canada and Australia would hold, in subsequent years, regular consultations on the ministerial level concerning common interests. Counted among these interests were not only aspects of global trade, but also “Asian and Pacific affairs, atomic energy, civil aviation and communications.”⁷⁷⁶ Of course, Australia and Canada were in competition with one another in terms of global trade, but cooperation could help to understand each other’s respective positions and to smoothen out disagreements.⁷⁷⁷ Trudeau also made efforts to expand relations to New Zealand; as *The Southland Times* reported in connection to his visit in early 1970: “[...] Mr Pierre Trudeau, did much to restore a friendship between the two countries [Canada and New Zealand] which had been allowed to lapse sadly since World War II.”⁷⁷⁸ The expansion of Canadian-New Zealand relations should, among other things, strengthen Canada’s role in the Pacific region.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷² See ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/119 BRU 64/1/6 1: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 9. June 1972.

⁷⁷³ ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/119 BRU 64/1/6 1: Joint Statement, 5. June 1970.

⁷⁷⁴ *The Sun News Pictorial*, 25. May 1971.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁶ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 8: Cabinet Discussions with Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Trudeau, Extract from Decision No. 353, 19. May 1970.

⁷⁷⁷ Canada had already established such a system with other countries, such as Japan. See *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁸ *The Southland Times*, 23. September 1970.

⁷⁷⁹ See ANZ ABHS 6950/3 OTT 26/1/11 2: New Zealand High Commission Ottawa to Foreign Affairs Wellington, 20. December 1973.

Nonetheless, the relationship between Canada and New Zealand was still, according to the New Zealand High Commission in Ottawa, “too much one of friendly inattention.”⁷⁸⁰ The endeavors of Pierre Trudeau to strengthen the connection with visits to New Zealand were seen by the High Commission as very welcome.⁷⁸¹ The *High Commission* itself made the observation that, up to the middle of the 1960s, rarely would either Ottawa or Wellington have come to the point of seeing the relationship to one another as in jeopardy. In the 1970s, this had now changed, since trade with Canada had become more important for New Zealand due to the EEC debate. Free access to the Canadian market for meat was from this point onward a central issue for New Zealand’s export trade, because it represented the only open market for New Zealand meat products. Import regulations and tariffs made other markets much less attractive.⁷⁸² Therefore, the three Dominions began, as the 1970s began, to deliberate on the expansion of their trade.

In connection to the successful British membership talks with the EEC and to the election of Labour governments in Australia as well as in New Zealand, Ministers from both countries met in early 1973 for talks concerning the further growth of economic and trade relationships between the two lands. NAFTA, as well as the common deployment of resources and economic growth, stood in the foreground during these meetings. Both countries represented the largest destination market for one other in respect to manufactured goods.⁷⁸³ At the end of November 1973, Prime Ministers Norman Kirk and Gough Whitlam met on the occasion of a visit from Kirk to Australia – likewise, for discussions concerning economic cooperation between the two Dominions. Potential fields of cooperation crystallized at this time.⁷⁸⁴ The talks over a joint trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand dragged on through the following years. Only with the *Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement* (ANZCERTA/CER), which came into effect on 1 January 1983, did a free-trade agreement between the two states come into existence.⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁸⁰ ANZ ABHS 6950/3 OTT 26/1/11 2: New Zealand High Commission Ottawa to Foreign Affairs Wellington, 29. January 1971.

⁷⁸¹ See *Ibid.*

⁷⁸² See *Ibid.*

⁷⁸³ See ANZ AEFN 19147 ICW2968/3 399: Joint Communique Seventh Annual Ministerial Review of NAFTA, 1973.

⁷⁸⁴ That means: „trade policy, financial policy, policies, customs, standards, energy and mineral resources, defence production and supply policies, tourism and foreign aid policies.“ ANZ AEFN 19147 ICW2968/3 399: Economic Cooperation with Australia, 1973.

⁷⁸⁵ See Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook*, p. 80.

Of Cool Heads, Panic and Crisis

The foregoing discussion has shown that, alongside formalized connections, relations in the Commonwealth ran, to a large degree, through *personal* and *informal* channels. An important medium for the exchange of information were the personal networks that were constructed by political and diplomatic actors. Through the community-building experiences of the educated elites in Oxford and Cambridge, many knew each other. Thus, friendships could grow that could then be used for the exchange of information.⁷⁸⁶ The communal experience of participants at the Commonwealth Conference was likewise relationship-building. Thus, Commonwealth relations set themselves apart from the relations to other states: formally defined protocols that governed relations among each other – with few exceptions, such as the Ottawa Agreements – scarce existed. Instead, members of the Commonwealth referred to community-building factors such as common values and familial relations (*Family Values*).

The EEC debate at the beginning of the 1960s, therefore, concerned a particular conglomerate of countries that, above all, demanded of Great Britain the continued observance of personal and traditional means of communication. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, owing to the specific nature of this relationship, expected from Britain that they would be kept informed in detail and be included in decisions concerning the EEC. It emerged during the EEC debate that certain rules applied to these informal modes of communication: attacks against Britain, as, for example, at the 1962 meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Accra, were not tolerated and drew criticism from both the press and government circles. Through an analysis of the EEC debate and the ways and modes of communication used therein, there also emerges an imbalance in the power relations between Great Britain and the Dominions. In the debate, Britain is the active party that, indeed, includes the Dominions in the process; but Australia, Canada, and New Zealand *reacted* to British actions that they themselves did not set in motion.

This chapter has described varying reactions of the Dominions. They distinguish themselves in terms of intensity and character. While Canada reacted very critically to the first British membership talks, it modified its behavior in the course of the negotiations due to domestic policy considerations. Australia, similar to Canada, expressed its displeasure over the developments and demanded direct participation in the negotiations with Brussels. New Zealand conducted itself with

⁷⁸⁶ For example Harold Macmillan sent a special paper about the EEC to Robert Menzies because he was an „old and trusted friend“. Macmillan, *At the End of the Day. 1961-1963*, p. 15.

more restraint than both of the other countries and clearly reacted more dispassionately so as not to jeopardize its own interests.

The discussion makes clear that for actors within the Dominions, the collapse of an ordering center, namely Great Britain, represented a threat on the political and diplomatic level, a threat which they articulated on different occasions and with which they struggled in the course of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. In particular, at the meeting of Commonwealth representatives and during European visits, representatives of the Dominion governments pointed out to their British counterparts the problems presented to them by a potential British accession to the EEC. The EEC debates incited interest not only within government circles, as newspaper articles and the private letters of individuals have shown. On balance, the response of Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders to the 1961 membership negotiations turned out to be less strong and dramatic than the British had expected. However, the forceful Canadian approach at the beginning of the talks and, in particular, the outspoken communication against British membership had damaged the British-Canadian relationship.⁷⁸⁷

On the level of the policy makers, there is an observable change to the patterns of communication between the three Dominions and Great Britain during the EEC debates. All three countries felt themselves to be insufficiently informed by London, and a certain measure of distrust crept into the familial relations that had existed up to this point. Thus, the EEC debate altered communications with Great Britain, as the atmosphere of openness and trust increasingly declined. Among one another, the three countries likewise criticized intercommunications in various situations as too weak. Indeed, they passed on information reciprocally, but the relationships among them were weakly defined, since the Commonwealth relationship centered primarily on Britain; the Prime Ministers and Ministers spoke, of course, with one another, but the main supply of information continued to go through Britain. Nevertheless, the three countries compared notes with one another and, in the course of the EEC debates, considered various options for cooperation. Admittedly, no country was prepared to set their national interests behind a common position; instead, each country placed its own interests in the foreground. For this reason, in spite of various deliberations and preparatory talks, there emerged no common front between Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. There was no “ganging up.” On the contrary, they made every effort to avoid where possible the impression of a confraternity raised against Britain, so as not to offend the motherland. From the

⁷⁸⁷ See Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 197f.

middle of the 1960s, the Dominions did indeed increase their attempts to come to an agreement with one another, but the efforts proceeded at a relatively slow pace.

To conclude, this chapter shows that the British rapprochement with Europe was of significance for all three countries, and it had effects on the informal patterns of communication within the Commonwealth. Furthermore, points of departure for a transnational exchange between the Dominions can be found; however, these do not extend beyond the observation of one another and some scattered proposals for cooperation. The three Dominions did *not* work together during the EEC debates, but rather concentrated on their own interests. Thus, this chapter adds to the previous literature on the EEC debates in the Dominions, by showing that the separation from Great Britain was a *gradual* process that extended through all three rounds of the membership talks and which was, primarily, negotiated individually with Britain by each of the Dominions. In the previously existing literature, the changes to Commonwealth communications during the EEC debates has not been discussed in detail in relation to any of the three countries, and a precise placing of these changes within the Commonwealth context is likewise lacking.⁷⁸⁸ This chapter thus contributes an important dimension to the existing research. What concrete threats the EEC debate constituted for the Dominions and what strategies developed to deal with these threats, will be analyzed in the following chapter.

3.2. Changes, Risks, and Chances

In this chapter, I will discuss the actual strategies and transformations inside the Dominions. Each of the Dominions followed a distinctive approach, but they first discussed various strategies for dealing with the British entrance talks with the EEC. In addition to the material changes, this chapter will also investigate why and how decisions were reached regarding particular political strategies, and whether or not these strategies were successful.

⁷⁸⁸ Many works on the EEC debate deal with one of the three EEC debates (usually the first) and analyze them in detail, such as Benvenuti and Ward, „Britain, Europe, and the ‘Other Quiet Revolution’ in Canada“; Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*; Ward, „A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship“; Robertson und Singleton, „Britain, the Dominions, and the E.E.C. 1961-1963“. Andrea Benvenuti compares the first and second EEC debates in Australia: Benvenuti, „Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community (1966-67)“. He also relates the second EEC debate in Australia to the East of Suez debate: Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*.

The first round of British negotiations with the EEC set off alarm bells in Australia, Canada and New Zealand: all three countries recognized that the British-EEC talks meant that a serious restructuring of Commonwealth trade relations was imminent. Policy makers in all three lands were preoccupied with the EEC debate. At first, this meant the collection of information and the analysis of the economic and political factors that concerned the trade situation within each nation. Committees were thus founded in all three lands, which were to keep their respective regimes informed. Second, these committees, together with those participants from the various ministries in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington, drew up instructions to guide the negotiations for their respective governments. How this process took shape in the three states will now be considered in specific detail – the feared consequences and their possible means of resolution will be discussed with reference to each of the Dominions.

The Australian Government and their Approach to the British-EEC Negotiations: Reactions, Fears, and Strategies

Soon after the conversations with Duncan Sandys, the Department of External Affairs summarized for the cabinet its concerns regarding a possible British membership in the EEC. Therein, the Department explained that membership would not have much of an immediate impact, but rather, the probable effects would be long-term. For the moment, so the Department stated, all evaluations were of course speculative, but nonetheless it seemed likely that the actions of Great Britain would no longer have the same decisive impact as they had had before. Britain could even become unable to maintain its strategic role in Southeast Asia; and this would cause a problem for Australian security interests.⁷⁸⁹ Furthermore, a membership in the Common Market could also disrupt relations within the Commonwealth; therefore, the British decision could have an impact on the *overall* relationship with the motherland, even if the first concerns were primarily with matters concerning trade. A wider range of questions ensued: for instance, would British membership disrupt trade with New Zealand, and what effects would this have in Australia? Would the Sterling zone survive? Would the flow of finance from Britain to Australia be affected?

The Department concluded that membership would confirm tendencies that had already been observed – these concerned Britain’s turn towards Europe, its diminishing role in Southeast Asia,⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 1: Department of External Affairs: The Political Implications for Australia of United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community, Canberra, 26 June, 1961.

⁷⁹⁰ Certainly, the Department saw in a possible EEC membership for the British the possibility of slowing the already apparent decline of Britain as a power in the Middle East and Asia. Cf. *Ibid.*

and the transformation of the Commonwealth into a “looser group.”⁷⁹¹ It followed from these considerations that a British accession to the Common Market would mean that Australia would have to depend even more on the USA for defense against the “aggressive powers of Asia.”⁷⁹² British entrance would diminish Australia’s position in relation to Communist expansion and, for instance, Chinese and Indonesian aspirations to gain regional predominance.⁷⁹³ The Department advised the Australian regime to deploy, from this point onward, all “arguments of sentiment and mutual interest available to us” in order to protect Australian economic and political interests.⁷⁹⁴ The focus was thus on the aspects of security conferred by the British presence in Asia; Britain was both a bulwark against Communism and a guarantor of Australian (and New Zealand) inviolability. The Australian government should therefore ensure that these political interests – the preservation of the Commonwealth and Asian security – were not forgotten during the negotiations.⁷⁹⁵ Even during the first round of EEC talks, it was clear that the Australians feared for more than their economic stability and that security issues likewise played a role.

At the beginning of the first round of membership talks, one finds in Australian sources the view that the accession could probably be prevented, if all of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers banded together and voiced their opposition to British membership.⁷⁹⁶ The influence of the Commonwealth upon the motherland was thus estimated to be strong, and it was assumed that Commonwealth opinion could influence British politics. However, an open rejection of British membership was to be avoided, as Australia did not want to be made responsible for hindering British aspirations. This could cause long-term damage to relations with the motherland, a risk that the regime in Canberra did not wish to take. Moreover, Australia could propose no alternative to the Common Market that might prevent accession. Given this position, it did not want to be held responsible for an evolution of the EEC that did not include Britain, one disposed towards isolationist, neutralist and chauvinist sentiments.⁷⁹⁷

Three phases can be identified within the Australian dealings with the British. In the first phase, the Australians compiled information about the potential impact that British membership in the

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Ibid

⁷⁹³ Cf. Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁵ Cf. Ibid.

⁷⁹⁶ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 4 Annex A: The political situation in the United Kingdom in relation to British entry into the E.E.C. and the Effect on Australian Relations with Britain if Australia should not approve British Entry, n. d. [probably summer of 1962].

⁷⁹⁷ Cf. Ibid.

EEC would have on a variety of goods. In order to make Britain aware of Australian interests, a summary of this information was to be given to the British as a basis of discussion. In the second phase, detailed discussions concerning the summarized information should take place with the British; in the third phase, the Australians planned to clarify their views concerning previous relationships at a meeting in London.⁷⁹⁸ This demonstrates that Canberra built upon the detailed exchange of information with London. Parallel to this development, policy makers in Canberra, right from the beginning of the negotiations, discussed alternatives to the British market. Given the real-political and economic reality of their situation, the possibilities for a diversification of Australian exports appeared to be limited. The USA, a potential trade partner, was the only land that wanted to impose duties on Australia's largest export, wool. Though Japan had become – through the Australian-Japanese Trade Agreement – a more significant trading partner, the Japanese expected that the Australians should in their turn buy goods from them, in particular industrial goods. The Communist lands appeared unattractive as trading partners for political reasons and the “new” states of Africa and Asia were themselves in difficult economic circumstances. For these reasons, a geographical expansion of trading networks appeared less attractive to politicians and officials in Canberra.⁷⁹⁹

The Australian government continued to reassure Australian industries that they would not simply be abandoned and could count on government support.⁸⁰⁰ The Australian economist, W.E.G Salter advised the government that they should, during the negotiations, concentrate on export goods that would be more relevant in the *future* such as aluminum, and not waste too much energy on traditional products such as milk or dried fruit. He also criticized the thus far vague definition of what was meant by endangered “trade interests”⁸⁰¹ and their impact on Commonwealth relations. According to his view, the government needed to define and delimit these with more precision. Moreover, he was of the opinion that Australian industry was in a position to compensate for threats to their trade.⁸⁰²

⁷⁹⁸ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1230 Part 1: Report of the Australian Delegation to the Commonwealth Consultations on the United Kingdom's Proposed Negotiations with the E.E.C., London, 18-19 September, 1961.

⁷⁹⁹ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: McEwen's speech before the Annual Building Industry Congress, Melbourne, 17 August, 1962.

⁸⁰⁰ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview Given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, filmed on 24 June, 1962, broadcast on 25 June, 1962.

⁸⁰¹ NAA A1209 1961/1124 Part 1: W.E.G. Salter, 17 October, 1961.

⁸⁰² Cf. Ibid.

As events progressed, the Australian regime focused on interactions with British ministers and officials, and the public representation of their interest. In the process, the government asserted that the decision concerning membership lay with Britain alone, however, they also asserted that Britain should enter only under conditions that protected Commonwealth trading interests.⁸⁰³ In April 1962, the Australian High Commissioner in London reported to Canberra that he would do everything in his power to inform British decision makers of Australian intentions to cooperate.⁸⁰⁴ In conjunction with this, the Australians sent *aide-memoires* to the governments of the EEC member states, informing them of the Australian position and their point of view concerning British EEC membership. In these *aide-memoires*, the Australian government described their country as bound to Europe and the western world by heritage, culture, and goals. Moreover, they reminded the EEC member states that Australia was isolated geographically, situated near the turbulent Asian continent.⁸⁰⁵ Through this information, the European nations were to be made more attentive to Australia and better disposed towards its plight. In particular, Australian officials stated repeatedly that all Australian export industries (with the exception of wool) would suffer from British membership in the EEC unless there were special conditions for Australian products within the Common Market.⁸⁰⁶ Additionally, the Australians drew attention to the fact that Australia was one of largest buyers of British products, and for this reason many British workers were employed on account of the Australian people.⁸⁰⁷

On 4 October, an Interdepartmental Committee presented to the Cabinet Committee the results of a study concerning the prospects for a strategic approach to the British public sphere. In this study, the Committee asserted that the current situation was a “very fluid one,”⁸⁰⁸ subject to rapid changes

⁸⁰³ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 2: Department of External Affairs (Canberra) Outward cablegram to Australian High Commission (Accra, Lagos, New Delhi et al), 7 February, 1963 [includes a statement by Menzies of 5 February].

⁸⁰⁴ In his cablegram, the High Commissioner reported that in his consultations with the British he had sought political benefits from every channel; however, he stressed that “in real life” economic and political relations closely accompany one another, and that a weakening of the one entails a weakening of the other. cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Department of External Affairs (Ottawa) Inward cablegram from Australian High Commission (London), sent 17 April, 1962, received on 18 April, 1962.

⁸⁰⁵ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19152 ICW2458/1 115A: Statement W.A. Westerman (Secretary Australian Department of Trade), Brussels, 26 April, 1962.

⁸⁰⁶ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Common Market Effects on Rural Industries, Statement by the Rt. Hon. J. McEwen (for Press), Canberra, 26 July, 1961. Herein, McEwen makes it clear that this was not a matter of his own personal views, but rather those of the Cabinet.

⁸⁰⁷ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, recorded 24 June, 1962, sent on 25 June, 1962.

⁸⁰⁸ NAA A1838 727/4/2/4: Final Paper, Interdepartmental Committee, 4 October, 1961.

and, for this reason, printed matter could very quickly become out of date.⁸⁰⁹ The chances of a good reception of the Australian position in Whitehall were, for the moment, good, since the Australians had shown themselves to be more constructive than the Canadians. So as not to disturb the good will in Whitehall, the affair had to be managed with tact. For this reason, the Interdepartmental Committee advised the Australian government to divide publicity work in Britain into phases. In the first phase, statements appropriate to the current state of the negotiations in London should be issued by Ministers and potentially by the Prime Minister. This should be followed by a series of articles concerning Australian interests, which could be offered to the most influential British newspapers. In conjunction with this, information materials and articles ought to be made available to British journalists. Moreover, press conferences could support the information drive. In the course of these actions, leading figures from Australia House in London should encourage and should use every opportunity to inform those around them about Australian interests.⁸¹⁰

A draft paper entitled “United Kingdom Public Opinion and the E.E.C.” falls within the framework of these considerations regarding publicity work inside of Britain.⁸¹¹ The paper worked out a strategy to improve the British public’s perception of Australian interests. At the outset, the paper acknowledged that the British did not have the same emotional connection that many Australians had for Britain, and this was precisely what an Australian campaign should alter by strengthening emotional bonds through diverse channels. Within Britain, there were three identifiable groups with emotional ties to Australia. The first group consisted of people with Australian friends and relatives. The second was made up of persons and organizations that strongly believed in the Commonwealth and were attached to the Empire.⁸¹² The last group included Australian citizens who resided in Britain.⁸¹³ In this last group, there were persons of influence who could be readily informed about the present state of Australian relations with the EEC, since they consumed programs such as “News from Home.” One could, however, reach out to the second more directly since they often had organizational affiliations. In any event, as this group was already protesting against a British accession, they would be readily reached through the media. To be sure, this group also positioned themselves against the Crown and the British regime, and thus Australia could not

⁸⁰⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁰ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2/4: Draft Paper, “Australia and the Common Market,” n.d. [probably Summer 1961].

⁸¹¹ NAA A1838 727/4/2/4: Draft, United Kingdom Public Opinion and the E.E.C., n.d. [probably Summer 1961]

⁸¹² This was the least influential of the groups, but nonetheless it was one that included an important and active part of the electorate (probably conservative voters). Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸¹³ Cf. *Ibid.* Thereby, three segments of an “emotional community” were identified within British society that were distinguished through positive feelings for the Commonwealth.

bring themselves into too close of a relation with them; it would be better to reach out to them through personal contacts. The final group, about which little was known, should be targeted through mass media, such as articles, television, magazines and other popular channels. Through such means, “emotional arguments”⁸¹⁴ concerning Australia should be disseminated.⁸¹⁵

In addition, the Australian Industries Development Association (AIDA) founded an expert committee that intended to investigate the effects of a possible British membership in the EEC. In February 1962, the committee presented its report, which predicted that following British accession to the Common Market there would be a weaker political relationship to Britain and a stronger one with the United States.⁸¹⁶ Moreover, the committee advised the government to expand relations with the non-communist states of Asia, Africa, and South America; in Asia they should pitch not only traditional agricultural products, but also manufactured goods.⁸¹⁷ The committee concluded that British membership in the EEC without special conditions for the Commonwealth could mean a loss of 170 million pounds for Australia.⁸¹⁸ Therefore, the Australian regime must diversify its trade and develop new markets.⁸¹⁹

The Canberra regime thus reacted to the first round of British membership talks by establishing committees that were to analyze the situation and make recommendations to the government. Alongside the fears over the hindrances for Australian trade stood considerations of security policy regarding Southeast Asia. Above, all, the government pursued a strategy of information politics; to ensure the good will of Britain, government representatives as well as the British public were to be kept well informed about Australian trade and security policy.

Thus, in the course of the first round of membership talks, the Australian government concentrated on trying to influence the outcome of the negotiations by way of campaigns of persuasion, and the supply of information concerning the difficult situation of the Australian economy.⁸²⁰ The government was in basic agreement that the EEC – a union of peace and economic unity among the peoples of Europe – was a good idea. European integration could function as a shield against

⁸¹⁴ Ibid.

⁸¹⁵ In particular, “colourful or dramatic statements by Australian Ministers and Officials” would be suitable for such dramatic representations in the media. Cf. Ibid.

⁸¹⁶ Cf. Australian Industries Development Association, *Committee on the European Economic Community: Report on the Implications for Australia of the United Kingdom Becoming a Member of the European Economic Community* (Melbourne and Sydney, 1962), pp. 11f.

⁸¹⁷ Cf. Ibid., pp. 48f.

⁸¹⁸ Cf. Ibid., pp. 13f.

⁸¹⁹ Cf. Ibid., pp. 48f.

⁸²⁰ Cf. Menzies, Common Market Negotiations, Statement in the House of Representatives, 9 August 1962, p. 7.

the core of Communism and thus offer protection to Australia and the western world.⁸²¹ As well, Australian policymakers conceded to Britain that, on account of their geographic situation, the British must in some form position themselves vis-à-vis the EEC. Some individual policy makers even saw advantages in British membership in the Common Market. According to them, relations to Britain would continue after accession, and moreover, on account of the British membership, the former settler colonies would then have connections to the states of Western Europe.⁸²²

However, Australian actors shifted decidedly against British EEC membership when the Commonwealth was seen to be thereby endangered. This was the stated goal of the Australian regime – to secure their own trade and that of the Commonwealth. Moreover, this was a supra-party theme that was followed by all political actors, regardless of party affiliation.⁸²³ The government saw the protection of their interests as linked with *direct participation* in the negotiations in Brussels. This was conceded to them by the EEC and the British.⁸²⁴ In addition, Australian actors feared that British membership could weaken the Commonwealth and its trading interests. European integration should not, according to their views, be pursued to the detriment of the Commonwealth countries.⁸²⁵ Through such a turn of events, Australia would be compelled to strike trade agreements with the communist states. Australia would then be victimized by the unfair policies of the Western industrial nations, and thus they were obliged to respond.⁸²⁶

John McEwen's account of the challenges that British membership in the EEC would mean for the Australian economy and its trading interests was felt by observers in New Zealand to be exaggerated. However, his "Jeremiads"⁸²⁷ had convinced Australian farming communities that it did amount to a real and present danger. In contrast to this guiding theme that predicted severe economic hardship for Australia, the Treasury and some members of the Liberal party argued that this line of thought would lead to a loss in economic self-confidence, thus hindering investment from both domestic as well as foreign sources. According to observers in New Zealand, however,

⁸²¹ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material. Speech by McEwen before the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers, Melbourne, 8 June, 1962.

⁸²² Cf. NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community Gough Whitlam, M.P. on Australia and the European Common Market, Parliament Debates, 9 August, 1962. Likewise, it was considered whether Australia would, through a British membership, shift from driving on the left to driving on the right, and that it might also adopt decimal and metric systems. Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸²³ Cf. McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 14.

⁸²⁴ Cf. Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*, p. 103f.

⁸²⁵ Cf. NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 121 Minister for Trade: Mr. McEwen's Review of Trade Problems, 5 August, 1961, "Australia and N.Z. Exploited, Says Mr. McEwen," *The Age*, 1 August, 1961.

⁸²⁶ Cf. McEwen cited in the *Canberra Times*, 1 August, 1961.

⁸²⁷ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

there was a method to this argument, which offered a scapegoat for the stagnation of the Australian economy.⁸²⁸ Indeed, during the 1960s, the national economy had mostly struggled in spite of the global boom. Not only did the three British membership attempts represent a threat to the Australians, the liberalization of trade promised by GATT had not covered agricultural products, and as a result this sector experienced no noteworthy upswing. In addition, on account of the emergence of newly independent states in the 1960s, there was more competition on the world market.⁸²⁹ Within the Dominions, the EEC debates were also used to remedy or conceal domestic problems; political actors in the three countries could deploy the issue of British membership, in part, to direct attention away from their own dilemmas. Opposition politicians, moreover, made use of the issue and proclaimed the failings of the current regime's trade policy. Thus, for instance, Gough Whitlam reproached the Australian Ministry of Trade for concentrating too much on the EEC and not enough on their own policy mistakes.⁸³⁰

The membership talks afforded Australian policy makers an opportunity to rethink their trade relations. According to the former Secretary of the Department of Trade, Sir John Crawford, this meant more than "just" a rethink of trade agreements; on the contrary Australia had to revise its guidelines for the shipment of goods, export credit agreements, and import procedures.⁸³¹ In this context, Crawford also addressed Australian defense policy; he was of the opinion that this would have to change on account of the EEC talks. Europe and Britain would probably lose interest in Asia, and for this reason Australia would have to make available more resources for defense and development within Asian countries. Of course, this was a theme that existed independently of the Common Market, but it acquired more significance and urgency through the membership talks. Through them, the relationship with Britain became weaker in economic terms and, for that reason, more distant and less direct in political terms.⁸³²

During the preparations for the second round of EEC membership talks, British political actors guessed at the reactions of the Australian government, press, and population. As far as the Australian government was concerned, the British assumed there would be a noticeably milder

⁸²⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸²⁹ Cf. McEwen, *Australia's Overseas Economic Relationships*, p. 10.

⁸³⁰ As an example of such problems, he named the failures of the current regime to expand trade or to diversify production; he also cited the dependency on foreign trade institutions and the failure to develop new markets. Cf. NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community Gough Whitlam, M.P. on Australia and the European Common Market, Parliament Debates, 9 August, 1962.

⁸³¹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 4A: Sir John Crawford's Speech "The Impact of the Common Market on Australia," University of Sydney, 31 August, 1962.

⁸³² Cf. *Ibid.*

reaction than in 1961, while they presumed a renewal of emotionally laden arguments in the press.⁸³³ From the Australian population, however, they did not anticipate a strong or emotional reaction:

The man in the street cannot be expected to understand all the complex issues involved and will be guided largely by the press. We can expect resigned regret but not much resentment.⁸³⁴

The previous Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, retired early in January 1966, and the primary responsibility for the second round of EEC talks was with John McEwen in the administration led by Harold Holt.⁸³⁵ As the talks began, the Australian Department of External Affairs spurred the creation of an interagency committee that was to assess the Australian negotiating position. The preliminary meeting of the committee took place in June 1967.⁸³⁶ In contrast to the loud protests against British membership that prevailed at the first round of talks, Australian actors, during the second round, adapted themselves to the policy of “layin’ low and sayin’ nuffin’.”⁸³⁷ However, this did not mean that Australian decision makers were resigned to having to make the most of an inevitable British EEC membership.⁸³⁸ They did indeed see that a British accession, whether in the short term or the long, was unavoidable,⁸³⁹ but they adjusted themselves to this reluctantly taken position on the basis of specific political considerations – as has been shown by Andrea Benvenuti.⁸⁴⁰ The reason behind the reluctance of Australian political actors, according to Benvenuti, was the growing awareness that a possible British withdrawal from Southeast Asia could become a security problem. For this reason, the Australians did not wish to dismay the British government through strong protestations in the course of the EEC debate, but rather to ensure good will through a milder approach. The Holt administration clearly declared itself to be against a potential withdrawal of British troops from southeast Asia. A British withdrawal would, on the one

⁸³³ “But even the quality press can be expected to exploit the emotion aspects of Britain ‘cutting the apron strings.’” TNA DO 215/14: Memorandum “Britain and the E.E.C.”, sent from the British High Commission (Canberra) to Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 25 March, 1966.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ Cf. Benvenuti, Benvenuti, “Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community (1966-67)”, p. 158.

⁸³⁶ Cf. Ibid.

⁸³⁷ Cf. Ibid. p. 155.

⁸³⁸ Cf. Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*, p. 252.

⁸³⁹ The British also assumed a less vigorous reaction from the Australians than had been the case during the first round of talks: “[...] most Australians are now resigned to what appears to them the inevitability of Britain’s entry into the E.E.C. The question in their minds is no longer ‘if’ but ‘when and on what terms’.” TNA DO 215/14: Letter British High Commission Canberra [probably to London], 24 October, 1966.

⁸⁴⁰ Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*; Benvenuti, “Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community (1966-67)”.

hand, mean an increase in regional defense spending for the Australians and a reorientation of their foreign policy, while on the other, Canberra viewed Britain as a counterweight to the growing regional influence of the USA. Aside from this, the Australians assumed that since British decision makers had, during the negotiations of 1961-1963, declared that they would keep the best interests of Australia in mind, they did not need to state their interests so vehemently once again.⁸⁴¹

As the course of events showed, the second round of British talks with the EEC received less notice in Australia than the first. However, during the second round of talks, the relationship between the negotiations and other threats moved into sharper focus. In the context of Australian security policy in southeast Asia, a "Political Intelligence Bulletin" of 17 March 1967 drew attention to a further risk that emerged from the negotiations: the potential change to the financial relationship between Britain and Australia. The flow of finance from Britain and the USA to Australia represented almost 90 percent of the movement of private capital into the country. This could now be jeopardized by the Rome Treaty, as Britain would have to reckon with potential restrictions on the movement of all capital. Through such measures, Australians might derive less profit from British investment.⁸⁴² Furthermore, McEwen was pessimistic about the prospect of Britain negotiating secure conditions for Commonwealth trade, and for this reason, he took a more diffident position than had been the case in the earlier negotiations. Of course, McEwen still feared significant damage to Australian exports, however, he accepted that there were limited possibilities of influencing the negotiations on this point. For this reason, he advised Prime Minister Holt to concentrate on national political and economic considerations, so as to make the best possible impression within the Australian public.⁸⁴³

Holt himself was more concerned with the potential consequences that British membership might have for financing than he was with impact on primary industries.⁸⁴⁴ In July 1966, the Sterling crisis moved financial risk more into focus.⁸⁴⁵ Moreover, in August of that year, the *Konfrontasi*⁸⁴⁶ between Indonesia and Malaysia made security considerations more pressing. Thus, there were an

⁸⁴¹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 17: Paper No. 5, n.d.

⁸⁴² Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 6: Department of External Affairs, Political Intelligence Bulletin, Canberra, 17 March, 1967.

⁸⁴³ Cf. Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia", p. 151f.

⁸⁴⁴ Cf. Miller, *The EEC and Australia*, p. 93.

⁸⁴⁵ In the mid-1960s, the pound sterling was not stable, and in 1967 this led to a devaluation. Cf. May, "The Commonwealth and Britain's Turn to Europe, 1945-1973," p. 31.

⁸⁴⁶ The Indonesian President Sukarno did not accept the foundation of a Malaysian Federation. From this a persistent conflict drew on until 1963, known as the *Konfrontasi*. Cf. Shaun Narine, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia* (Boulder and London), p. 12.

increasing number of deliberations over how British membership might endanger Australian security, since for many actors it was a given that Britain would then reduce its engagements in Southeast Asia.⁸⁴⁷ For this reason, Holt concentrated, at the time of his visit to London in June 1967, more on the debates concerning “East of Suez” than on those pertaining to the second round of talks. The British were surprised. On both themes, he tried to engage public interest as little as possible. On the EEC theme, in particular, he informed Harold Wilson that, for domestic policy reasons, he could not allow himself to distinguish between what was significant and what was not – for instance, between Australian industries deserving of protection and those that were not.⁸⁴⁸ Also, worries about the integrity of the Commonwealth played a role in the Australian reaction to the second round of British talks with the EEC. Thus, the Minister for External Affairs, declared in the House of Representatives in February 1967 that Australia would continue to cultivate traditional Commonwealth relations with Britain, and the close political association would be preserved. Australia wished for an even more significant role for Britain in the Commonwealth.⁸⁴⁹ Alongside these factors, the persistent French refusal of British membership conferred, for the Australians, a note of uncertainty to the negotiations, as they gave reason to doubt that Britain would obtain a positive outcome from the talks. Furthermore, the Australian government did not want to be made responsible for a failure of the talks, as Britain then might have wanted compensation from them. In addition, Canberra wanted to avoid letting the Australian public know too much about the negative prospects for Australian agricultural products.⁸⁵⁰ This reserved position did not sit well with all Australian actors; Australian diplomats in Europe repeatedly complained about the lack of leadership from Canberra.⁸⁵¹ Indeed, one can find in press articles

⁸⁴⁷ Cf. Benvenuti, “‘Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Union (1966-67),” p. 161.

⁸⁴⁸ Cf. Ward, “Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia,” p. 152.

⁸⁴⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 6: Record of Conversation with Mr. Jean Rey (Member of the Commission of the E.E.C: in charge of External Relations), Officers present: Ambassador R.L. Harry/Mr. F.O. Donovan (Minister), Australian Embassy Brussels, 3 March 1967. In contrast to John Diefenbaker, the Australians restrained themselves from speaking of an “end of the Commonwealth” if Britain were to join the EEC. Cf. *Ibid.* Some rejected the notion that British membership in the EEC would mean the end of Britain as an independent nation and the end of the Commonwealth; the Australian politician, Lord Casey, for example, stated: “It is wrong to say that Britain’s entry in to the European Economic Community would be the end of Britain as an independent nation and of the Commonwealth.” Casey, *The Future of the Commonwealth*, p. 145.

⁸⁵⁰ Cf. Benvenuti, “‘Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community (1966-67),” p. 156.

⁸⁵¹ Three Ministers also demanded stronger action from the Australian side, emphasizing the problems that a possible British membership in the EEC could pose for the Australian economy: Fred Peart (Agriculture), Herbert Bowden (Commonwealth Office), and Douglas Jay (Board of Trade). Thus, the Cabinet was just as divided as the Labor Party over the question of what response to the talks would be appropriate for the Australian government. Cf. *Ibid.* p.163f.

and among Australian officials the view that British accession represented the “greatest single concentrated shock in relations between Australia and Britain since the fall of Singapore in 1942.”⁸⁵² However, according to the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra, this was the case for only a few isolated figures. Few people outside of government circles were worried about the economic impact of British membership on Australia.⁸⁵³

During the conversations between British and Australian actors in London from 6-8 June 1967, the Australians were directed by Canberra to not distinguish between *vital* and *less vital* trading goods among Australian exports. For this reason, the negotiations became laborious for the British, as the Australians concentrated on representing facts and specific details of the difficulties affecting Australian products. Harold Holt followed the same line during his visit to London in June 1967. Since the Australians had realized that the British could hardly acquire membership under conditions that would not cause some harm to the Australians, they decided on a course that would present their efforts in the best light to their own public and to the affected industries.⁸⁵⁴ In particular, the announcement that the existing Commonwealth agreement for the sugar trade probably could not be continued over the long term, was a “shock” for the Australians.⁸⁵⁵ Under the terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the Australians were permitted to deliver 350 000 tons of sugar per year to Britain until 1974, for which they would receive a fixed price that was above the world market.⁸⁵⁶ The “tough line”⁸⁵⁷ that the Australians accepted on this point, stemmed, according to New Zealand observers, from a skepticism as to whether the British were actually in a position to satisfy Australian interests in the talks.⁸⁵⁸

During the third round of membership negotiations, there were an increasing number of voices in Australia that saw the consequences of membership in a less disastrous light than had still been the case in 1961. When John McEwen again predicted negative consequences for Australian trade, there were also voices that saw the salvation of Australian economic stability in resource extraction, which was experiencing a boom. This was, at least, what the New Zealand Minister of Agriculture,

⁸⁵² An Australian daily paper, cited in: ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/226 3382 18: New Zealand High Commission Canberra to External Affairs Wellington, 22 July, 1967.

⁸⁵³ Cf. Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ Cf. Ibid. “‘Layin’ Low and Sayin’ Nuffin’. Australia’s Policy Towards Britain’s Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community,” p. 167f.

⁸⁵⁵ ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/226 3382 18: New Zealand High Commission Canberra to External Affairs Wellington, 3 July,

⁸⁵⁶ Cf. Ibid. The world price for sugar lay around 20 pounds per ton. Cf. Ibid.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁸ Cf. Ibid.

Douglas Carter, determined at a press conference in Canberra in 1979.⁸⁵⁹ In fact, the mineral boom in Australia and the growing export trade in its manufactured goods cushioned the impact it felt from the British accession to the Common Market.⁸⁶⁰

By the time of the third round of talks, the Australian government was no longer in doubt about the possibility of obtaining special conditions for Commonwealth trade; on the contrary, they were certain that there would be no such conditions. Thus, McEwen informed the Minister in May 1970:

The significant difference between the stated intention of the U.K. now as against 1961 is the omission of any reference to safeguarding “vital Commonwealth interests.”⁸⁶¹

In May 1970, the Australian cabinet reaffirmed that it was up to Britain to decide on the question of membership, and that Australian trade interests could suffer thereby. Furthermore, the expansion of the EEC ought to be compatible with GATT, and the Australians would still do everything they could to influence public opinion in Britain and the EEC member states on this point. Aside from this, Australian representatives in Brussels and London should concern themselves with the visibility of the Australian situation.

Australian actors distinguished between their own approaches during the third round of talks. At the time of the first negotiations, Australia had, for the most part, left it to Britain to represent Australian interests. Although Australia was in direct contact with the Six, their participation in the talks were largely based on its traditional relationship with Great Britain. Thus, in the first negotiations it had not been precisely determined which goods were viewed as essential and for which goods special conditions should be established. During the third round of talks, it was now of significance that Australia was at pains in its public statements to identify those goods that would be most affected.⁸⁶² Personal and official statements were to be used to influence the conditions of membership in ways favorable to Australia, even if the chances of success were considered to be low. Over and above that, Australian representatives in other capitals – such as Washington and Tokyo – should proclaim the challenges facing Australian exports. Australian actors also considered an expansion of multilateral trade, which however, might lead to a weakening of traditional connections with Britain, while it would also necessitate a stronger association with the

⁸⁵⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 9: newspaper article, 1 September, 1970.

⁸⁶⁰ This is in contrast to Australia's neighbor, New Zealand. Cf. ANZ ABHS 22128 W5533 CAB 89/1/1 1: A Survey by The Australian, 27 September, 1971.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid.

⁸⁶² Australian actors estimated that Australia had comparatively less chances of special conditions than New Zealand: “[...] we can accept that no amount of representation, personal or otherwise, are going to achieve a special position for Australia such as New Zealand has.” NAA A5882 CO904: Submission for Cabinet, May, 1970.

USA. Representatives were also advised to make clear that the expansion of the Common Market should be consistent with GATT; they should repeatedly draw attention to the Australian position on this issue when in London and Brussels. A committee occupied with all matters pertaining to the EEC negotiations should likewise be convened; it would consist of the Prime Minister, the Treasurer, the Minister for External Affairs, the Minister for Primary Industry, and John McEwen.⁸⁶³

A primary concern of the Australians during the third round of membership talks was to make the transitional period for Australian products as long as possible.⁸⁶⁴ McEwen had already sought at this first meeting with British officials to extend the transitional period for preferences for as long as possible so that Australia producers could become accustomed to the new circumstances. John McEwen announced this to the Cabinet, and henceforth concentrated on the improvement of relations with Asia, in particular Japan. This shift in the Australian handling of the EEC talks also struck Rippon during his visit to Australia in September 1970. He reported that “most of the emotion has gone out of the issue.”⁸⁶⁵ Nonetheless, a Policy Information Paper, which was circulated to all diplomatic posts, clung to the view that with British EEC membership, the last substantial relationship of the old Commonwealth order would shatter. Since the Second World War, an altered relationship had already been apparent, which now through various policies had become more distinct.⁸⁶⁶ The entrance negotiation did not, for Australian actors, proceed without friction; a dispute between Rippon and Dough Anthony, the successor of John McEwen, broke out in June 1971. During a visit through the capitals of the EEC member states, Anthony found out that the three-year transition period that Britain had negotiated, did not apply to Australian agricultural products. For this reason, Australian primary products were jeopardized, which the British government had not directly communicated to their Australian counterparts.⁸⁶⁷ In a statement to the press after his arrival in London in June, Anthony accused the British of duplicity. The Australian butter industry in particular would be threatened by the given conditions, since it was,

⁸⁶³ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁴ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 16: Internal Departmental Record of a Meeting held in this Department on 9th July, sent to the Head of Mission on 29 July, 1971.

⁸⁶⁵ Cited in Ward, “Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia.,” p. 157.

⁸⁶⁶ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 4: Policy Information Paper, 1 September, 1971.

⁸⁶⁷ That June in London, Anthony announced that for Australia the agreement that had been struck during a Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg between 21 and 23 June was not satisfactory. Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 13: Press release, 24 June, 1971. “I find it hard to accept that Britain’s largest Commonwealth trading partner will be cast off with the scantiest of consideration and with little sympathy for our immediate and consequential problems.” NAA A571 1970/6260 Part 3: Australian/British Trade Association, Address by Anthony, London, 22 June, 1971.

on account of global overproduction, dependent on the British market. Due to this episode, Anthony was no longer certain which British statements the Australians could trust.⁸⁶⁸ Thereupon, the just elected Prime Minister William McMahon, sent a letter to Edward Heath, in which he requested that Britain should renegotiate the transition period for Australia, as British policy makers had promised. Heath, however, declined to do so, and a few days later he informed the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth that the negotiations were concluded and the British government had decided to accept the negotiated terms. Britain would sign the Rome Treaty and enter the EEC on 1 January 1973.⁸⁶⁹

Thus, it only remained for Australia to accept the statements of the negotiating parties that the “safeguards clause” would ensure that trade could gradually become accustomed to the new conditions. A Department of Foreign Affairs paper from October 1971 stated that Australia viewed the EEC member states and Great Britain as obliged to maintain this “safeguards clause.” In addition, Australia requested that Britain should even negotiate in the interests of Papua New Guinea.⁸⁷⁰ The Australians, furthermore, emphasized that an expanded EEC was potentially one of the most significant economic unions for the future, while also emphasizing that the conditions under which Britain would enter, did not entirely fulfill their original demands: “Australia’s disappointment at the terms agreed upon in the negotiations must be accepted as history. We must now look to the future.”⁸⁷¹ Following the British decision to join the Common Market, Australian actors concentrated on enforcing the “safeguards clause” for producers such as themselves. In so doing, they dispensed with direct influence on the negotiations and stressed instead that the tariff barriers of the EEC should be consistent with those of GATT.⁸⁷²

Among the Australian public, one could find voices critical of their own government during the third round of talks. Thus, it was claimed on a radio program that aired on 14 May 1971, that British membership in the EEC had been, from the outset, unavoidable; the Australian government had merely delayed it. This had weakened Britain’s negotiating position, and this meant fewer concessions could be expected from the current talks. The Australian government initially had

⁸⁶⁸ Cf. Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia," p. 157f.

⁸⁶⁹ Cf. *Ibid.* p. 159.

⁸⁷⁰ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 18: Paper by Department of Foreign Affairs, 21 October, 1971. For this reason, the Australian focus was, from this point onward, on the construction of closer relationships with the EEC, while insisting on the maintenance of the “safeguards clause.” In contrast to New Zealand, Australia in fact would not experience a threat to its entire economy; rather only individual sections would be affected. Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 18: Department of External Affairs, Outward savingram, 8 September, 1971.

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷² Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 12: Foreign Affairs Paper (written and declared by the Department 1971), no date.

fought against British membership and bore some responsibility for the worse conditions for trade. Moreover, the Australian public had scarcely been consulted and understood little of the contexts surrounding the EEC debates, whereby Canberra must take the largest part of the responsibility for the present conditions.⁸⁷³ In a nutshell, it could be said that the strategies that Australia adopted during the first British membership talks were designed to keep the British government and public informed about the severe problems that British membership in the Common Market posed for Australia's economy and trade interests. By so doing, special conditions and the protection of their own trade interests were to be ensured. Furthermore, the Australian government began efforts to expand their trade networks. During the second round of talks, the Australians were visibly more restrained, because the EEC debate took a back seat to considerations of security policy in Southeast Asia. By the third round of talks, Australia attempted to focus the negotiations on a few important products in order to arrange favorable conditions for them. Up to this round, the EEC debates in Australia primarily revolved around the question of British entrance. Even though Australia had by that time begun to develop new markets, the feeling of betrayal was still maintained.⁸⁷⁴

To a large degree, the entrance of Great Britain in to the EEC was seen as a separation of the former settler colonies and their motherland, since membership meant the end of a "special trading relationship." From this point onward, Britain was part of a large economic union; direct and separate negotiations with the country were no longer possible. At the same time, however, Britain's membership also signified new possibilities to extend influence to the states of Western Europe.⁸⁷⁵ Moreover, it is observable that the reactions of the Australians varied from those of "shock" during the first talks to those of "unavoidable" during 1973; over this time, economic considerations retreated in favor of political ones.

The Canadian Government and their Approach to the British EEC negotiations: Reactions, Fears, and Strategies

In so far as they related to foreign relations with Britain and their general way of obtaining information, British observers perceived Canadian strategies as follows: "The Canadian habit of making the Whitehall rounds to get information on developments of interest to them is not new."⁸⁷⁶

⁸⁷³ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2/Part 12: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 14 May, 1971.

⁸⁷⁴ Cf. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 September, 1973.

⁸⁷⁵ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 8: Draft Directive for Mr. Armstrong by E.G. Whitlam, March 1973.

⁸⁷⁶ TNA DO 35/8381: N.E. Costar to H.A.F. Rumbold, 14 December, 1959.

For the Canadians, the customary practice of gathering information consisted, above all, of visits to various departments in London and direct contact with people on the spot.⁸⁷⁷ Normally, the Canadians addressed themselves directly to the British Foreign Office, and, in principle, they did not inform the Commonwealth Relations Office about such visits – in contrast to the Australians. No formal agreement was in place that required that the Commonwealth Relations Office should be informed about such visits. The usual practice was to keep a record of important discussions or, at the very least, to make a brief report by telephone concerning the meeting.⁸⁷⁸ This practice was not formalized or put down in writing, rather it was, as was common to the Commonwealth, established over the years.⁸⁷⁹

In contrast to the Australian and New Zealand reactions to the announcement of British talks with the EEC – so reported the Australian High Commission in Ottawa to the Australian government – the Canadian government undertook little in relation to the Common Market in the time between the visit of Duncan Sandys and the British decision to open negotiations. This information was reported by the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, A. E. Ritchie. Ritchie stated that Canadian ministers and officials would occupy themselves less with the EEC question in the coming months, and that the Canadian government would see little significance in the preparations for a potential decision by the British to open membership talks.⁸⁸⁰ However, the first round of EEC talks would provoke vigorous interest in Canada. As the Canadian Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming, remarked in a 1962 speech: “Hardly a day passes without some reference in the press and elsewhere to the great issues which face us in relation to these far-reaching changes in Europe.”⁸⁸¹

In contrast to Australia and New Zealand, Canadian trade interests were more diverse; they did not, as was the case with Australia and New Zealand, revolve around agricultural products. The

⁸⁷⁷ This method was certainly not a specialty of the Canadians alone; the Australians also preferred direct contact. Cf. *Ibid.* Indeed, up to the end of the 1950s, this method seems to have coalesced above all in foreign policy departments and agencies. J.R.A. Bottomley, for one, reported that the British Economic Policy Department up to this point (1959) had no such experience with the methods of the Canadians. Cf. TNA DO 35/8381: J.R.A. Bottomley, 21 December, 1959. Whether or not this method altered during the EEC debates would be an enticing area of research; however, it cannot be answered in the present work as, at present, no sources addressing this theme have been found.

⁸⁷⁸ In contrast to the Canadians, it was the customary practice of the New Zealanders to apply first to the Commonwealth Relations Office and not directly to the Foreign Office. Cf. TNA DO 35/8381: H.A. Twist, 18 January, 1959.

⁸⁷⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁰ Ritchie argued, moreover, that August was also a vacation month in Great Britain, so that Britain could hardly have a great hurry to come to a decision. Cf. NAA A1838 727/4 Part 9: Record of Conversations between A.E. Ritchie, R.W.D. Fowler, D.O. Hay, Canberra, 27 July, 1961

⁸⁸¹ LAC MG32-B1 Vol. 42: Speech by Donald Fleming, Canadian Club of Winnipeg, 19 January, 1962.

different branches of industry and the different products arising from regional diversity, emerged as more variable than those of both of the other countries.⁸⁸² Canadian products most affected by the EEC negotiations were grain, aluminum, zinc, timber, and newsprint. For some of these industries, the British entrance into the EEC represented a concrete threat.⁸⁸³ Canadian actors, as did their Australian counterparts, came to the conclusion that a British accession to the EEC would have grave economic consequences for their economy:

[...] we have concluded that accession by the British to the Rome treaty could, unless Britain were able to negotiate the necessary derogations from the Treaty, have serious consequences for Canada, the Commonwealth, and perhaps Britain herself.⁸⁸⁴

Canadian officials feared that an economic consequence of British membership would be the imposition of tariffs on Canadian products within Britain that up to this point had entered without them. The preferential tariff status of Canadian goods vis-à-vis countries not belonging to the Commonwealth would be lost, while preferential status for European lands would come into effect. Furthermore, Canadian agricultural exports would be endangered, as the EEC was especially protectionist in regards to such products.⁸⁸⁵ Thus, Canadian policy makers estimated that of the 915 million dollars of Canadian exports to Britain in 1960, 691 million dollars would be affected by British membership in the EEC (631 million would be heavily affected).⁸⁸⁶

A diverse range of potential consequences presented themselves to different classes of exports. In relation to the primary products of industry, Canadian actors viewed it as especially dangerous that unlimited access and tariff-free entrance to the British market could be jeopardized. These products were, however, not as heavily affected on account of a suspension of preferential tariffs that benefitted the EEC. In addition, Canadian actors had already struck a deal on tariffs for some products, so that the loss of tariff preferences could be ameliorated.⁸⁸⁷ For this reason, primary industrial products were not in as much danger as, for example, semi-finished and manufactured goods. For some of these products, British membership probably meant the end of the entirety of

⁸⁸² Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/75 3382 3: Secretary of External Affairs to Director General of Agriculture, 13 September, 1961.

⁸⁸³ Cf. LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article from the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

⁸⁸⁴ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 918 File 7-72-11-1: Letter to Mr. J.V. Clyne, Draft by George Hees for Mr Diefenbaker, 26. September 1961.

⁸⁸⁵ Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C., Briefing Paper by the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for the Cabinet, 23 June, 1961.

⁸⁸⁶ Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C. – Trade Impact, 11 July, 1961.

⁸⁸⁷ Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C., Briefing Paper of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for the Cabinet, 23 June, 1961.

their trade with Britain, since they now would be subjected to high tariffs by the EEC. Agricultural products as well were jeopardized by EEC regulations and tariff agreements.⁸⁸⁸ In 1960, the primary interest had initially been the retention of existing tariff preferences in the British market. Later, however, there came the idea of using the negotiations in order to get better conditions of access to European markets, and, through a modification of Canadian tariffs, to even aim for better conditions in American ones. Moreover, the loss of preferential access to the British market also offered the chance to reduce British preferences within Canada.⁸⁸⁹

In addition to economic considerations, for many Canadian actors it was apparent that: “A U.K. move into Europe would have broad international and Commonwealth implications which are not at all clear [...]”⁸⁹⁰ In the *Briefing Book* for Duncan Sandys’ visit to Canada in 1961, there are already many reflections concerning the potential loss of Britain’s role, both as a world power and within the Commonwealth. In the book, numerous Canadian actors stated that they appreciated the British role during the decolonization of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean; they had respect for the current British relationships to these “new” lands, and deemed Britain’s “mediating” position between the two superpowers as of great significance in the Cold War.⁸⁹¹ Canadian actors viewed these roles as threatened by British membership in the EEC. The previously existing connections of exchange and cooperation in the Commonwealth could be altered by British membership, through which the whole Commonwealth could be at risk; Canadian representatives feared that the “new” states could become more closely associated with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Canadian actors asked what would the foreign policy consequences be of British membership: would Britain still be in a position to act independently and to make decisions concerning foreign policy unhindered by its connections with Europe? Furthermore, they feared British membership would lead to an unfavorable enlargement of the EEC: a small union would be able to reconcile France and the German Federal Republic, while a larger one (with Great Britain) absorbed and suppressed national identities, and probably would be regarded by the Soviet Union (perhaps even by the USA)

⁸⁸⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁹ Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C., Briefing Paper of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for the Cabinet, 27 June, 1961.

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹¹ Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C. – Political Implications, Briefing Paper 1961.

with mistrust.⁸⁹² Canadian actors also feared the impact on the cohesiveness of NATO, the consequences of which could not be foreseen with any precision.⁸⁹³

The Ottawa government assumed that Great Britain, at the beginning of the 1960s, was not in a good negotiating position, and for this reason it possessed little leverage in talks with the EEC. Consequently, it seemed improbable to the Canadians that Britain would use its limited leverage for the preservation of Commonwealth preferences. Therefore, Britain would not be able to protect Canadian interests during the talks.⁸⁹⁴ Moreover, since it was improbable that Britain could make future trade promises to Canada during the preparatory stages of the talks, an Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy advised the Canadian government to seek informal discussions with Britain before and during the negotiations with Brussels.⁸⁹⁵ In these talks, there was nothing for Canada to do but “to rely heavily on the long history of close and friendly trading relations between Canada and the United Kingdom and the resulting fund of goodwill which has been built up over the years.”⁸⁹⁶ Thus, Canadian actors focused on making the British aware that Canadian interests ought to be protected during the talks. To this effort belonged the comprehensive information materials concerning the Canadian economy and trade situation, within which they avoided the prioritization of affected products.⁸⁹⁷

British politicians felt Canadian reactions to be exaggerated, since a large industrial nation such as Canada would certainly be in a good situation to compensate for the loss of the British market over time. According to an article prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), the reasons for the forceful Canadian reaction lay elsewhere: “The real problem is that Canada is at present faced with economic difficulties of impressive dimensions, to which its traditional policies seem to offer no adequate solution.”⁸⁹⁸ The country was at a turning point in terms of their economic, political, and cultural affairs, and it now sought for new patterns of orientation.⁸⁹⁹ The economic relationship to its neighbor, the United States of America, added to the Canadian predicament. The USA was Canada’s largest export market in the 1960s, and American investment

⁸⁹² Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸⁹³ Thus, Canadian representatives, for instance, asked to what extent Britain, on account of its membership, would feel obligated to support de Gaulle in NATO. Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁴ Cf. LAC RG25-A-4 Vol. 3492 File 18-1-D-Brit-1961/1: Possible U.K. Association with the E.E.C., Briefing Paper of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy for the Cabinet, 27 June, 1961.

⁸⁹⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁷ Cf. LAC MG32-B13 Vol. 9: British-EEC Negotiations, Possible Courses of Action, 29 November, 1962.

⁸⁹⁸ LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article by the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

⁸⁹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

in Canada had grown steadily. For this reason, American investors controlled significant parts of the Canadian economy. Since 1956, Canada's manufacturing industry had struggled with difficulties, as demand stagnated and foreign competition grew. In this context, it appeared to the British that Canadian reactions were more a response to a general economic malaise.⁹⁰⁰

In addition to these domestic problems, it appeared that the Canadians wanted to position themselves more assertively in the changing international situation: "[...] the national psychology is beginning to adapt to a changing world."⁹⁰¹ Trade with the EEC member states and Japan had risen steadily, and certain Canadian products were able to compete on the world market in terms of price and quality. The Canadian public and industry seemed increasingly supportive of progress and were interested in an open Canadian trade that placed more value on long-term as opposed to short-term impacts.⁹⁰² On 12 January 1963, the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee met for the first time in Tokyo. The Committee,⁹⁰³ founded in June of 1961 by John Diefenbaker and the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda, was to facilitate the expansion of trade between the two countries.⁹⁰⁴

At the beginning of the first round of EEC talks, Diefenbaker repeatedly stressed the need for a Prime Minister's Meeting.⁹⁰⁵ Initially, the Canadian Prime Minister spoke vehemently against British membership in the Common Market, since he viewed British efforts as a "sell-out"⁹⁰⁶ of Commonwealth interests – in particular Canadian interests. For this reason, his primary concern at the beginning of the first membership talks was to organize a Commonwealth meeting so that the member countries could have an exchange views with Britain concerning these imminent changes. This undertaking, however, received little support from the other Commonwealth states: the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, appeared to support Diefenbaker, while the New Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, held back. The reason for this reserve was that the New

⁹⁰⁰ "Seen in this context, the current misgiving about Britain's overtures to the Common Market are perhaps more easily understood." LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article by the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

⁹⁰² Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁰³ The Canadian side was represented by Donald Fleming (Minister of Justice and Attorney General), J. Angus MacLean (Minister of Fisheries), David Sim (Deputy Minister of National Revenue), N.A. Robertson (Under Secretary of State for External Affairs), J.A. Roberts (Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce), and W.F. Bull (Canadian Ambassador to Japan). Cf. LAC MG32-B39 Vol. 158: Joint Communique of the First Meeting of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee, 12 January, 1963.

⁹⁰⁴ Cf. Ibid. For more information concerning the Canadian-Japanese relationship, see John Schultz and Kimitada Miwa (eds.), *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto/Oxford/New York 1991).

⁹⁰⁵ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4 Part 13: High Commission Ottawa to Department of External Affairs, 28 September, 1961.

⁹⁰⁶ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 2558 File 7-72-11: Info Brussels to External Ottawa, 13 June, 1961.

Zealand government reckoned that if they lay low and made a show of good will towards Britain there were better chances for special concessions.⁹⁰⁷ Diefenbaker predicted that the EEC negotiations, which were of primarily of an economic nature would have an impact on future political developments.⁹⁰⁸

In Canada, it was observable that the approach of the Diefenbaker government differed from that of the public, as represented by the leading newspapers. Thus, the *Montreal Gazette*, as well as the *Globe and Mail*, criticized the government approach and called for one that was more positive. The British observed that the Canadian government stood relatively alone with its dismissive position. Thus, the British assumed that the Canadian press, business elites, farming organizations, as well as the majority of Canadian economists and financiers were supportive of British membership in the EEC. This was because they believed that the Canadian economy would be invigorated by British membership and that Britain's future lay within Europe.⁹⁰⁹ Thus, the Canadian approach became more moderate. During the talks with Brussels, the Canadian government restricted itself to keeping Britain aware of Canadian trading interests. By so doing, the Canadians did not seek direct participation in Brussels, but rather to keep the British informed about Canadian trade and its interests, so that Britain might negotiate with these in mind.⁹¹⁰

During the first British entrance negotiations, Lester Pearson and the Liberal Party spoke out in favor of British EEC membership, because their goal in the long term was the establishment of a North Atlantic Economic Community.⁹¹¹ Pearson criticized the previous Canadian conduct: "We complain and whine, we preach, bluff, bully and bluster."⁹¹² Canada had declined a British offer of free trade, and now they saw British entrance into the EEC only as a threat.⁹¹³ According to the opposition, Canada should focus more of its efforts on the expansion of a trade union: a large, Atlantic trading bloc would offer, for many states, a more amenable alternative than small, individual trade agreements. Pearson's vision even took a step further: "[...] eventually this might

⁹⁰⁷ Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁰⁸ Cf. LAC RG25 Vol. 5516 File 12447-40: Address by John Diefenbaker on "The Nation's Business", 29 November, 1961.

⁹⁰⁹ Cf. TNA DO 215/13: Memorandum, "Attitude of the Canadian Government and Canadian Public Opinion towards British membership of the EEC: Probable Reactions if Britain renews its application for membership, sent from the British High Commission (Ottawa) to the Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 14 March, 1966.

⁹¹⁰ Cf. LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 5384 File 8625-04-16: British-EEC Negotiations: Canadian Trade Interests. Possible Courses of Action, 29 November, 1962.

⁹¹¹ Cf. ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August, 1962.

⁹¹² LAC RG25 Vol. 5515 File 12447-40: Address by Lester Pearson in the TV series, "The Nations Business", 15 November, 1961.

⁹¹³ Cf. Ibid.

become a great free-world trading movement.”⁹¹⁴ At the same time, trade meant not only the guarantee of jobs, but also of security and peace. Through such agreements, current global security issues could be addressed – security through trade.⁹¹⁵ According to British observers, the Liberal party tried, moreover, to strengthen EEC membership, because owing to the separatist problem in Quebec, they had an interest in a rapprochement between Britain and France. Integration between Britain and France could potentially diminish the difficulties between British and French Canadians.⁹¹⁶

At the beginning of the negotiations in the early 1960s, British actors perceived the reactions of Canada as a “sabotage”⁹¹⁷ of the British application for EEC membership, which was supported by the Beaverbrook press in Britain itself.⁹¹⁸ This hostile position was criticized not only by the opposition and the organs of the press, but also by private individuals; thus, one finds in the sources, some letters to the Canadian Minister that criticize the administration’s approach. For example, G. Sachs, who imported and exported leather goods to and from Britain, addressed the Minister for Trade and Commerce, George Hees:

It does seem to me that the present public approach of the Government and your department [...] are not really likely to help Canada’s long or short term interests. [...] I would have thought a much better approach for Canada would be to state publicly that in the interest of the Free World, and indeed in helping towards One World, Canada thoroughly welcomes Britain’s decision.⁹¹⁹

Part of the Canadian press supported the view that the government should be positive – or at least neutral – towards a possible British membership in the EEC: “There would not seem to be much point in Canada setting her face against British membership in the Common Market. Rather, we should prepare ourselves to accept that this is a world of change [...].”⁹²⁰ In a review of the issue in 1966, the repudiation of the line taken by the Canadian government by large segments of the population is still a theme:

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

⁹¹⁵ Cf. Ibid.

⁹¹⁶ TNA DO 215/13: Memorandum, “Attitude of the Canadian Government and Canadian Public Opinion towards British membership of the EEC: Probable Reactions if Britain renews its application for membership”, sent by the British High Commission (Ottawa) to the Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 14 March 1966.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

⁹¹⁸ Cf. Ibid.

⁹¹⁹ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 918 File 7-72-11-1: Letter of G. Sachs to George Hees, 4 December, 1961. Sachs warned Hees that Canada’s “unwarranted amount of fuss” over the EEC question could lead to a disadvantaging of Canadian interests in the subsequent negotiations.

⁹²⁰ *The Globe and Mail*, 23 June, 1961. For further articles to this theme, see *The Globe and Mail*, 8 July, 1961; *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 15 June, 1961; *Ottawa Journal*, 29 June, 1961; *Winnipeg Free Press*, 30 June, 1961; *The Sun*, 16 June, 1961.

[...] Canadian public opinion, including the press, the business world, farmers' organisations and most economists and commentators on financial affairs, was in general favourably disposed towards the British application and critical of the Canadian Government's opposition to it."⁹²¹

From 1962 onward, Diefenbaker stated his confidence in British policy and their efforts to secure the Commonwealth. However, as British observers stated, this was not an actual change in the views of the Canadian government toward a possible British accession, but rather it was purely a political tactic.⁹²²

In contrast to politicians, economic actors were essentially much less concerned about a possible British membership in the EEC. They observed the ever dwindling and less attractive British market; even the European market offered few good prospects, while in contrast the American market was one of persistent growth.⁹²³ During the first round of British membership talks, the Canadian example made it clear that the EEC debate was now more than just an issue concerning economic considerations. Some aspects played a role that do not let themselves be explained in terms of economic-historical terms alone; rather, as Jack Granatstein has already observed, it was a matter of protecting the Commonwealth.⁹²⁴ This in no way meant that British accession represented the most important problem of the age, however, it did represent an important locus of the debates in Ottawa political circles during the 1960s.

During the second round of membership talks, the Canadians focused on two important points: one, on the impact of British membership on Canadian trade with Britain as well and an expanded EEC, and two, on the impact on Canada's political relationship to Britain and the Western European powers, which up to this point had functioned as a counter weight to American influence. In spite of the imminent and direct effects upon Canadian trade, Canadian actors still saw long-term economic advantages for Canada if Britain joined the Common Market. With British membership, the market for Canadian products in Europe could potentially expand, and economic growth in Britain could also bring benefits to Canada. Also, in terms of political consequences, Canadian actors distinguished between long and short-term effects. In the short term, trade and political

⁹²¹ TNA DO 215/13: Memorandum, "Attitude of the Canadian Government and Canadian Public Opinion towards British membership of the EEC: Probable Reactions if Britain renews its application for membership, sent by the British High Commission (Ottawa) to the Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 14 March, 1966. This was true above all for the English-speaking part of Canada, for the French speaking part the EEC debates did not have the same significance. Cf. Ibid.

⁹²² "This volte face reflected no significant change in the Canadian Government's real sentiments, but only in Mr. Diefenbaker's political tactics." Ibid.

⁹²³ Cf. . Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 211.

⁹²⁴ Cf. J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967. The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto 1986), esp. p. 55.

relationships with Britain would become worse, but in the long term, diverse connections to the EEC and Britain could be established.⁹²⁵ For this reason, political considerations gained more weight in Canada during the second round of talks, a fact that would be noted by New Zealand observers: “Canada is considering the question from a political rather than an economic angle [...]”⁹²⁶

The sitting Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, welcomed the British approach to Europe. In 1966, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin,⁹²⁷ explained to the British Minister that indeed Canada must fear economic damages, but long-term political advantages might also flow from these developments.⁹²⁸ Nonetheless, the British-Canadian relationship still suffered during the mid-1960s: the price of raw materials such as copper, for instance, and a trade imbalance between the two states in favor of Canada set the stage for discord.⁹²⁹

During the third round of membership talks with the EEC, the British Diplomat, Peter Hayman, described the mood in Canada in the following way:

Although it would be wrong to suggest that there is any great enthusiasm for Britain’s entry into the European Communities, Canadian opinion – Government and public – views the prospect with considerable understanding and with a realization that Britain inside the Communities could be a more helpful partner to Canada than if she remained outside.⁹³⁰

Some Canadians did actually describe the British EEC negotiations as positive, since they could have a “healthy effect”⁹³¹ on Canada; from this point onward, Canada would now consider its trading position as an independent player in the global market.⁹³² The New Zealanders also noticed a shift in the Canadian reactions to the announcement of British membership talks between the first and second rounds of negotiations: “Canada’s announced attitude towards the present entry

⁹²⁵ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17 August, 1966.

⁹²⁶ ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 3: High Commission Ottawa to Secretary of External Affairs Wellington, 24 February, 1967.

⁹²⁷ The memoirs of Paul Martin have been published. The second volume offered good insight into the period under investigation here: Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life. Volume II. So Many Worlds* (Toronto 1985).

⁹²⁸ Cf. Lara Silver, "A Long Goodbye. Pearson and Britain", in: *Mike's World. Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, eds. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras, pp. 210-28 (Vancouver/Toronto 2017), p. 219.

⁹²⁹ Cf. Ibid. The Chair of the British Committee for Exports to Canada published these facts in an open letter to the *Glasgow Herald* in March of 1966. Therein, the Chair encouraged British exporters to trade with Canada and become part of this lucrative market. A brochure entitled, *Selling to Canada*, by the former British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Kenneth McGregor, was to help British merchants thrive in the Canadian market. British commodities were given a push by means of a traveling trade show of British products and two exhibitions in Toronto and Vancouver. Cf. Ibid. p. 219f.

⁹³⁰ TNA FCO 82/17: British High Commission (Ottawa) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), 15 July, 1971.

⁹³¹ Ibid.

⁹³² Cf. Ibid.

negotiations differs markedly from the stance taken in 1961 when Canada openly opposed the prospect of Britain's linking arms with the Six.”⁹³³ In a *Government White Paper on Foreign Policy*, the Canadian government noted that the question of British membership in the EEC lay with Britain and the EEC member states. At the same time, however, the *White Paper* made it clear that owing to the impact upon Canadian trade, consultations between Britain and Canada would be needed, before, during and after the talks.⁹³⁴ Canada hoped that British membership in the EEC would signify a step in the direction of a regionalization and liberalization of international trade.⁹³⁵ During the third round of talks, politicians and officials in Ottawa identified six different strategies for the Canadian response: the first option was to hinder British membership until Canadian interests were secured.⁹³⁶ Yet, it had to be considered that a (public) Canadian opposition to British membership might lead to difficulties for British membership, but it would not be decisive grounds for declining membership. For this reason, it was improbable that the British government would risk a collapse of the negotiations with Brussels in order to avoid a public dispute with Canada. Moreover, a dispute with Britain would disturb relations between the two countries for years. Furthermore, it would be overall unrealistic for the British to aim for special conditions for Canadian products in the negotiations. In addition, no single party, no business organization, and no representative organ of the Canadian government had positioned itself as against British membership. A second possible strategy was that the government could withdraw, behave calmly and wait to see what happens. However, thereby one risked criticism of government inaction.⁹³⁷ A further option would be to provoke the opening of multilateral negotiations, which the EEC and Britain had already declared would be impracticable. Another alternative would be the attempt to pursue an association with the EEC, whereby an American rebuff was to be feared because the USA, at the time, accounted for two-thirds of Canadian trade. Moreover, it would be unrealistic for the EEC to allow a connection of this sort. A fifth option proposed the so-called “McEwen approach”. To Canadian actors this approach consisted of provoking a confrontation within GATT, by insisting that the EEC should be established on the basis of the obligations stipulated in this

⁹³³ ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 10: High Commission Ottawa to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wellington, 12 August, 1970.

⁹³⁴ Cf. Ibid.

⁹³⁵ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 9: New Zealand High Commission Canberra to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 6 February, 1970.

⁹³⁶ “Attempt to block British entry unless our interests are safeguarded.” LAC RG25 Vol. 9579 File MF-365: Briefing Material for Ministerial Consultations Enlargement of EEC Geneva/London/Brussels 30 September – 6 October, 1970.

⁹³⁷ Ibid.

agreement. This option, however, would require massive international support and would probably unsettle every relationship with the EEC. As a final option, Canadian actors proposed to keep channels open and to search for new trade partners (Japan, Australia, USA) as the negotiations proceeded. At the time, the last option appeared to be the only realistic one. Publicly, Canadian representatives still asserted that the decision over membership rested with Britain alone, while publicizing Canadian trading interests. Since they found themselves in a constantly shifting and uncertain situation, Canadian actors viewed the exchange of information with Britain and other participants in the talks, which they vigorously promoted, as extremely important.⁹³⁸

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs observed during the third round of membership talks that the Canadian government was concerned with having a regular line of communication with members of the Common Market. During a 1971 visit by Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf and Franco Malfatti in Ottawa, Canadian actors considered the establishment of continuous communication channels with these states. Regular and formal consultations with the individual member states, as well as the Commission, were to be part of this arrangement. Since regular and formalized exchanges in other than economic affairs were out of the question for the EEC member states, Canada concentrated on a trade agreement that should include some form of consultation. Such agreements would not only consist of trade agreements, rather relations with West European states would become formal and institutionalized. An official legation discussed this idea with EEC representatives in Brussels and the European capitals in June of 1972. In these proceedings, the legation made it clear that Canada did not demand an association, a system of preferences, or to distance itself from GATT. According to an Australian source, the EEC states accepted Canada's dynamic initiative and, at least, voiced no disapproval of the proposal. Further discussions about these options should be reviewed during a visit of the Director-General of External Trade in the Commission, Theodor Hijzen in Ottawa.⁹³⁹

A comprehensive strategy for the diversification of Canadian trade and policy was outlined in the paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, and a government "Options Paper" from 1972. One of the potential partners for the expansion of Canadian trading networks, was the EEC. Already by 1974, the Department of External Affairs had been able to make progress in relation to the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Europeans. In March 1972, Dupuy had established the

⁹³⁸ On this last point, the experiences of recent years played a part: "Even though committed to safeguarding Commonwealth interests in 1961-63 negotiations, they were in practice not able to do much for us." Cf. Ibid.

⁹³⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/1/8 Part 1: Department of Foreign Affairs, 29 December, 1972.

Interdepartmental Committee on Commercial Policy (ICCP), for which the Department of External Affairs provided the position of Chair as well as the secretariat. This should function as a counterweight to the critical assessments from Industry, Trade and Commerce, and from Finance, both of which dismissed the attempt to expand Canadian trade networks with Europe as unrealistic. To a large degree, the Committee coordinated the subsequent relations to the EEC.⁹⁴⁰

In May 1972, the Cabinet accepted the proposal of the ICCP to send a legation to Europe for discussions. The Chair of the mission was J.F. Grandy, the Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce. In connection to this mission, there was a subsequent increase of contacts between the EEC and Ottawa on the ministerial and official level. In November of 1973, the EEC asked Ottawa to more precisely define a possible bilateral relationship.⁹⁴¹ Further conversations and visits followed during the early and mid-1970s. On 6 July 1976, the EEC and Canada signed a Framework Agreement.⁹⁴² This came into effect on 1 October 1976.⁹⁴³

Canadian actors thus had been occupied with the diversification of Canadian trade before the EEC debates. Yet, at the beginning of the 1960s, the Commonwealth lands (primarily Britain, the other Dominions and the West Indies) still took second place among Canadian trade partners. This altered in the course of the 1960s. Shortly before the official British announcement opening negotiations with the EEC, Canada concluded a significant trade agreement with the People's Republic of China. The agreement obligated China to purchase from Canada up to five million tons of wheat and a million tons of barley between 1 June 1961 and 31 December 1963. Two years later, Canada concluded a similar agreement with the Soviet Union. There were, of course, reservations within Canada concerning trade with Communist countries, but this criticism was not very loud.⁹⁴⁴ Trade with Japan, the German Federal Republic, France, and other European states also grew continuously in this period; trade with Latin America likewise increased.⁹⁴⁵ A Canada-Japan Ministerial that came together at least once a year, was brought into being in 1961, and a Canada-Caribbean Trade and Economic Committee met for the first time in 1967. Official visits to and

⁹⁴⁰ Cf. Greg Donaghy, Mary Halloran and John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 2017), pp. 212f.

⁹⁴¹ Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁴² The Framework agreement included arrangements concerning closer cooperation on trade policy, investment, technological exchange, cooperation, among other issues. Cf. Ibid. p. 215.

⁹⁴³ Cf. Ibid. pp. 213-216.

⁹⁴⁴ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 230.

⁹⁴⁵ Cf. Ibid. p. 259.

from France, the Federal Republic, and others contributed to the expansion of trade relations just as much as trade missions to new markets.⁹⁴⁶

For Canada, the EEC represented the so-called “third option.” This concept derived from a foreign policy analysis by Ottawa from the late 1960s to early 1970s, which defined three options for Canadian foreign policy: two of the three options involved closer economic and political connections with the USA, and the third alternative reduced this connection. This third – and eventually chosen – option focused Canada’s foreign policy attentions on Europe and Japan, while simultaneously asserting that no existing ties to the USA should be adversely affected by these additional, new relationships.⁹⁴⁷ After President Richard Nixon had announced his New Economic Policy, which prompted the House of Commons to act independently of the USA, Canadian actors realized that they could not automatically expect accommodation from their neighbor. Furthermore, the “third option policy” did not develop as expected; the negotiations with the Europeans and with the Japanese turned out to be more difficult than had been assumed.⁹⁴⁸

In summary, during the first EEC debate, the Canadian government under Diefenbaker adjusted their strategy to the mood of the Canadian population, which had criticized the previously hard and dismissive line initially taken by the government. In the subsequent course of events, Ottawa focused above all on the publicizing of Canadian interests, but otherwise showed restraint and left the negotiations to Britain. From the outset, the Diefenbaker government tried to obtain a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in order to discuss problematic issues in person with the British and the other Commonwealth countries. Furthermore, Ottawa pressed ahead with the expansion of Canadian trade networks. In the course of the EEC talks, the “third option” for the orientation and development of Canadian trade and foreign policy crystallized – policy makers sought to expand relations with Europe and Japan. Through this option, they could on the one hand, compensate for economic damages, and on the other, avoid the political influence of the USA, which would become greater on account of increased trade relationships.

Ottawa’s reservations concerning British membership were, as in Australia, a blend of *economic* and *political* considerations. Alongside the damages to Canadian trade, policy makers feared the collapse of the Commonwealth that they viewed as a stabilizing force for peace and justice in the

⁹⁴⁶ Cf. Ibid. pp. 259f.

⁹⁴⁷ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: European Report, 8 November, 1975.

⁹⁴⁸ Cf. Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 8.

post-war period. Moreover, Canadian politicians and officials feared that with the British turn away from the Commonwealth, they had no more counterweight to the USA.

The New Zealand Government and their Approach to the British EEC negotiations: Reactions, Fears, and Strategies

As did Australia and Canada, the New Zealand government proclaimed that the decision concerning membership in the EEC lay with Britain alone. The Minister of Overseas Trade, John Marshall, described the decision itself as a “turning point in history”⁹⁴⁹ that would fundamentally alter the relationship between New Zealand and Britain. The more passive role would fall to New Zealand, since Britain alone would decide; New Zealand could of course influence the decision and protest against it, but in the end, it would be determined elsewhere.⁹⁵⁰ Thus, New Zealand was compelled to *react* to a decision with which they could *not actively* engage.

Although economic frictions between Britain and New Zealand had been adumbrated since the 1950s,⁹⁵¹ for the New Zealand agricultural sector the possibility of British EEC membership posed problems of an altogether different magnitude. At the beginning of the 1960s, over 90 percent of butter exports went to Britain. New Zealand butter was allowed to enter Britain free of tariffs, whereas butter from countries outside of the British empire were subject to duties. On account of these favorable conditions, in 1960 New Zealand exported 92 percent of its butter to the British motherland. Milk and lamb, as well as mutton were almost exclusively exported to Britain. In 1960, the total share of New Zealand exports to Britain still lay at 53 percent.⁹⁵²

Since agriculture was by far the most important sector in New Zealand, and the EEC forbade agricultural imports from non-European states, New Zealand actors saw British membership as a threat to the economic stability of their country. In addition, there emerged a cooperative relationship between Britain and Denmark, since both states were members of the European Free Trade Association and were simultaneously seeking admission to the EEC. After New Zealand, Denmark was the second largest exporter of butter to Britain, and there existed some risk that even without EEC membership Denmark would negotiate concessions for its butter in Britain.⁹⁵³ Furthermore, many policy makers in Wellington were convinced that the geographical location of

⁹⁴⁹ ANZ ADRK 17391 T1/435 61/5/4/2/1: Speech by John Marshall, House of Representatives (Wellington) 20 June, 1962.

⁹⁵⁰ Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁵¹ For example, during the “Balance-of-Payment Crisis” and in the “Sterling Crisis.”

⁹⁵² Cf. Robertson and Singleton, “Britain, Butter, and European Integration, 1957-1964,” p. 328f.

⁹⁵³ Cf. Ibid. p. 327.

New Zealand made the marketing of their milk and meat products impossible, because Asian lands consumed few of such products.⁹⁵⁴

A large part of the electorate (especially for the Labour Party) consisted of farmers.⁹⁵⁵ That was a further reason why New Zealand politicians and diplomats had a negative assessment of the membership talks, reckoning that it would be fatal for their economic stability. They sought to signal to their electorate that their interests would be protected. Of course, they proclaimed their agreement with European integration, however, they did not want this to happen to the detriment of their own economy. According to the New Zealand government, the only possibility of hindering an economic disaster for New Zealand was to preserve the continuing tariff-free entry of its exports to Britain.⁹⁵⁶

Looking back from the mid-1960s, a New Zealand study of its policy reported that even by May 1960, there was a marked ideological shift in Great Britain towards rapprochement with Europe. However, since at the time it had not been clear what developments this shift might entail, New Zealand had not, prior to February 1961, settled on a definite policy.⁹⁵⁷ Canadian observers in the High Commission for Canada (Wellington) reported that, at first, there had been relatively little interest in the EEC since New Zealand actors assumed that the EEC would not affect them. Within one year (1960-1961), however, this disinterest was superseded by panic. Likewise, disbelief that Britain could actually enter the EEC was displaced within a short amount of time by a readiness to accept that the motherland would, sooner or later, join the Common Market.⁹⁵⁸ By June 1961, the Cabinet Committee on Economic and Financial Questions, concluded that British membership in the EEC would fundamentally alter trade relationships between New Zealand and Britain. Moreover, the very basis of the Commonwealth – trade amongst one another – would suffer, and as a result the Commonwealth would likely be weakened as a whole.⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁴ The Chair of the New Zealand Meat Producers Board, John Ormond, expressed his worries about the impact of British membership in January 1961: “No other country in the Northern Hemisphere consumes lamb and mutton to anything like the extent the United Kingdom does.” NLW MS-Papers-1403-152/2: John Ormond, 27 January, 1961. The search after alternative markets was fraught with difficulties, and the broad situation made the situation of New Zealand “uncertain.” Ibid.

⁹⁵⁵ Cf. TNA T 236/6549: British High Commission (Wellington) to London, 24 February, 1961.

⁹⁵⁶ Cf. NLW MS-Papers-1403-152/3: Supplement Background Information No. 3, 27. September 1961.

⁹⁵⁷ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17 August, 1966.

⁹⁵⁸ Cf. LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 2558 File 7-72-7: Letter High Commission for Canada Wellington to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Ottawa, 15 June, 1961.

⁹⁵⁹ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17 August, 1966.

During the first round of British talks with the EEC in 1961, the New Zealand government commissioned studies in order to determine the potential damages British membership in the EEC could have for the New Zealand economy. The Committee founded for this purpose published several studies in the following years; they laid out in detail the current state of the economy, a sketch of potential changes, and proposals for various strategies to address these changes. The proposed trade instructions that emerged thereby concentrated on the following three points: the search for new export markets, the diversification of products, and the use of *Soft-power strategies*. This latter point was to ensure that Britain and the European countries were kept informed about the situation in New Zealand, so that special concessions could be obtained if Britain did join the EEC. This strategy primarily drew on assertions of economic and emotional dependence on Britain: “New Zealand tended to play upon the degree of moral obligation the United Kingdom had to defend New Zealand.”⁹⁶⁰ For this reason, in a policy analysis from 1966, the New Zealanders made a point of referring, above all, to the *moral* obligation of Britain towards the Commonwealth lands – especially those that directed their export trade to Britain.

At the same time, many political decision-makers in New Zealand also felt that the EEC had responsibilities in respect to the Antipode: New Zealand, as a primary exporter, could not simply be robbed of its most important market.⁹⁶¹ References to their shared history and, in particular, to the support that New Zealand troops gave Britain in the First World War – as well as references to the bonds of family and common language – were to ensure that New Zealand would be respected during the negotiations. They would thereby obtain fairly adjudicated conditions.⁹⁶² That New Zealand politicians and officials, during talks with the British, repeatedly proclaimed their confidence in Britain was also a part of this soft-power strategy.⁹⁶³ New Zealand would pursue a muted but persuasive diplomacy that appealed to public sympathies. Regular consultations between Ministers, officials, and diplomats were to guarantee exchanges with Britain and the Six. Moreover,

⁹⁶⁰ ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17 August, 1966.

⁹⁶¹ Cf. Ibid. In New Zealand’s self-assessment of 1966, it was, however, also assumed that New Zealand may have used the EEC negotiations to gain better access to the British market under the pretext of special concessions in the framework of the EEC talks; this may have been done by representing their “vital interests” in an exaggerated fashion. For this reason, the assessment remarked self-critically that New Zealand could not be clear about what it actually needed and wanted during the first negotiations. Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁶² Cf. NLW 306952 MS-Papers-1403-156/1: A.T. Campbell, New Zealand House London, 2 October, 1962. A.T. Campbell made the point concerning the connection between history and current events: “In the past New Zealanders have gone to Europe to fight and to die, today we fight to live.” Ibid.

⁹⁶³ Cf. TNA DO 165/77: New Zealand Attitude to European Trade Relations, 29 September, 1961.

the consultations served – at least from the British point of view – to make it clear that the New Zealanders did not rely upon Britain alone, but rather demonstrated their own initiative as well.⁹⁶⁴ For New Zealand actors, one motivation for the adoption of a soft-power strategy was that policy makers saw little chance of being able to offer trade concessions to the EEC. For this reason, the nation had much less negotiating leverage than the other states, and it was necessary to construct a climate of “sympathy and understanding” for New Zealand.⁹⁶⁵ This meant keeping the EEC states well-informed about New Zealand, so that their geographically distant country would become more understood and less remote.⁹⁶⁶ Moreover, it should be asserted that New Zealand was not in competition with European farmers, and together with Australia it was an “outpost of the Western World in Asia”; thus it could anchor Western thought in the Asian continent.⁹⁶⁷ Since Asia increasingly stood in opposition to western ideals and ways of life, Australia and New Zealand were both spaces that could, through the ideas of the West and alternative living standards, offer a contrast to Asian ways of life.⁹⁶⁸ New Zealand should thus be represented as a modern and progressive country that offered products such as meat and fruit of high quality. The special taste of New Zealand products, which up to now had been ignored by European lands, were the result of the sunny climate and modern agricultural methods. These methods, which used the latest science to ensure hygienic transportation and refrigeration, could supply Europe with especially good foodstuffs. Thereby, it was a producer of high efficiency and economic significance. Furthermore, New Zealand should build up its image as a destination for tourism and investment.⁹⁶⁹ To this end, the soft-power strategy included a “publicity campaign” for the Antipode.

⁹⁶⁴ Cf. TNA DO 128/3: John L. McGrath to Mr. Williams, 27 February, 1969.

⁹⁶⁵ NLW MS-Papers-1403-152/2: W.B. Sutch (Department of Industries and Commerce) to Secretary to the Treasury Wellington, Public Relations Aspects of the Consequences of the United Kingdom Joining the E.E.C., 19 May, 1961.

⁹⁶⁶ Cf. ANZ ADRK 17391 T1/435 61/5/4/4 1: Commonwealth Views on Britain and the E.E.C., Supplementary Background Information No.3, 27 September, 1961. In this context, the New Zealand rugby tour of 1961 played a role. Media reports concerning the rugby tour to France should, on the one hand, offer a display of good rugby, but on the other, should also create sympathy for New Zealand. To this end, the New Zealand public should show its best side; the French team should be given special attention, and French reporters should be offered special tickets, tours, concert passes and other perks. Every journalist should receive a file with information about New Zealand (preferably in French and with particular emphasis on the French participation in the discovery of New Zealand) and should be treated with special hospitality. Cf. ANZ ADRK 17391 T1/435 61/5/4/4 1: W.B. Sutch (Department of Industries and Commerce) to Secretary to the Treasury Wellington, Public Relations Aspects of the Consequences of the United Kingdom joining the E.E.C., 19 May, 1961.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁸ Cf. ANZ ADRK 17391 T1/435 61/5/4/4 1: W.B. Sutch (Department of Industries and Commerce) to Secretary to the Treasury Wellington, Public Relations Aspects of the Consequences of the United Kingdom joining the E.E.C., 19 May, 1961.

⁹⁶⁹ Cf. NLW 306952 MS-Papers-140-156/1: A.T. Campbell, New Zealand House London, 2 October, 1962.

The hopes for a successful soft-power strategy and the establishment of New Zealand as a “special case” meant that the New Zealanders took a cautious tone during the three rounds of negotiations. John Marshall repeatedly asserted New Zealand’s dependency on Britain – especially in comparison to Canada and Australia. Instead of striving for a common position with their Commonwealth allies, New Zealand placed its own interests in the foreground and struggled for these alone; this was because New Zealand policy makers reckoned this would improve the chances of success for their policy of soft-power. For this reason, Marshall distanced himself from the sharper position of the Australians and adapted themselves to a cooperative strategy. This was risky, since in doing so the New Zealand government appeared weak.⁹⁷⁰ Not all New Zealanders were in agreement with the cautious approach of their government; in some quarters the approach was interpreted as feeble.⁹⁷¹ Press reports about the more vigorous reactions of Australia and Canada allowed New Zealand actors to appear less “tough”⁹⁷² in comparison. This dilemma of the New Zealand government was also observed by British actors:

New Zealand’s attitude towards Australia in this matter is ambivalent. While she does not wish to show herself less tough than Australia and wishes to gain what advantage she can from Australian toughness, she is aware that her problems, which turn on access to Europe rather than on preferences, are not the same as Australia’s, and that she may lose the opportunity of special concessions for herself if she is too closely associated with an unreasonable Australian line.⁹⁷³

The New Zealand conduct would indeed be criticized by the opposition in Parliament: they complained that the Holyoake Administration pursued a policy of inaction and that factual information concerning the negotiations had, at first, been kept secret from the public.⁹⁷⁴ That changed after 1962, when the New Zealand government made efforts to inform the public about the EEC debates; press publications, speeches and discussion forums throughout the land explained

⁹⁷⁰ Cf. Ward, Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions," p. 99. "New Zealand received, moreover, support through Jean Monnet, who perceived New Zealand as a special case and advocated for the Antipode with the Americans. In a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State, Everell Harriman in June 1962, Monnet stated that, if New Zealand was contented, the Commonwealth front would be broken and the negotiating problems for the British minimized. Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁷¹ Cf. *The New Zealand Herald*, 28 September, 1962.

⁹⁷² TNA DO 165/76: Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office (London) from Wellington (British High Commission), 17 July, 1961. The British High Commission indeed advised the Commonwealth Relations Office (London) to extoll the restraint of the New Zealanders so that they would not stand out as “weak” in comparison to Australia and Canada. That might upset the New Zealanders and lead to a fraternization with the Australians. Moreover, the High Commission feared that the New Zealand Minister might become, through the lobbying of the Australians and Canadians, less amenable. Cf. Ibid.

⁹⁷³ TNA DO 159/64: Savingram to Commonwealth Relations Office, 22 May–4 June, 1962.

⁹⁷⁴ Cf. Perumbulavil, *The European Economic Community and New Zealand*, p. 1.

the EEC issue to the population and its danger for the New Zealand economy.⁹⁷⁵ In two White Papers (230 and 231), the government attempted to draw attention to the significance of these issues for New Zealand. The first big debate in Parliament on the theme was held shortly after the visit of Duncan Sandys; many more followed during the subsequent stages of the debate.⁹⁷⁶ In a press report from the Prime Minister, it stated: "New Zealand is fighting tooth and nail to protect our vital trading rights and interests in the British market."⁹⁷⁷ Critical voices that felt government policy, up to this point, had been too passive, should thereby be silenced. Nonetheless, the response of the government remained mild. This withdrawn tone was supported by leading newspapers, for instance, by the *New Zealand Herald*.⁹⁷⁸

In contrast to the Australian government, the New Zealanders did not want direct participation, but rather strived for participation on a "next-room" basis. This meant that the New Zealand delegation would be at the spot and able to communicate with relevant people, but would not be seated directly at the negotiating table. The advantage of this "next room participation" was that the responsibility for securing New Zealand's interests lay *not* with representatives from New Zealand itself, but rather with the British. Thus, concessions from New Zealand could not be sought as part of a *quid pro quo*. Behind this approach lay the feeling that the negotiating position of New Zealand was clearly much weaker than that of the British administration. Of course, New Zealand politicians and officials feared that the interests of Great Britain might diverge from their own. This was, however, taken to be the lesser evil.⁹⁷⁹

For his official visit to Great Britain and the EEC states from May to June of 1962, John Marshall was prevented by the Department of External Affairs from representing the New Zealand point of view *directly* to the Six. The reason for this restraint lay in the assumption that Britain, after such a statement from New Zealand, would feel less obliged to stand up for New Zealand's interests,

⁹⁷⁵ Cf. *Ibid.* Prior to this, New Zealand actors such as Dr. Muriel Lloyd Prichard, a senior Lecturer in Economics at Auckland University, faulted the New Zealand public for taking too little interest in the EEC debates. The regulation of economic affairs should be left to the politicians alone, but rather the breadth of the public should be informed so they could vote for the relevant persons in parliament. Cf. *Auckland Star*, 4 January, 1961.

⁹⁷⁶ Cf. Perumbulavil, *The European Economic Community and New Zealand*, p. 1.

⁹⁷⁷ ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/223 3382/7: Minister of External Affairs, Wellington, 4 May, 1962.

⁹⁷⁸ Cf. Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," p. 164.

⁹⁷⁹ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[15A]: The United Kingdom-EEC Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17. August 1966. Among the divergent interests were, for instance, lamb and mutton, since New Zealand and Britain were competitors in this area. Australia was also a competitor in this respect, and conflicts emerged between the three parties during the consultations between July 1961 and June 1962. Cf. *Ibid.*

and New Zealand might be held responsible for the failure of the talks.⁹⁸⁰ At the same time, however, the New Zealand government reserved the right to alter their policy and to indeed insist on direct participation should this appear meaningful from the New Zealand point of view.⁹⁸¹ On 5 August 1962, the Italian Minister for Industry and Trade, Emilio Colombo, observed that New Zealand would be considered as an exceptional case.⁹⁸² For this reason, the policy of engaged passivity was taken up by the New Zealanders, since it had established them as a “special case”⁹⁸³ in the eyes of the Six.

The information material of the New Zealand government during the first round of talks referred, on the one hand, to the dangers posed to the New Zealand economy by British membership, and on the other, to the possibilities of developing new markets, diversifying the economy, and building connections to the lands of Asia. In May of 1962, the Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Economic and Financial Policy stated that trade networks would alter, even if Britain remained outside of the EEC. Indeed, the growth of agricultural production in Britain would force the British government to agitate for more restrictive policies towards New Zealand.⁹⁸⁴ Therefore, future change depended not on British membership alone; rather export trade would, in any case, have to adapt to changing conditions. For this reason, the Committee observed that the British approach to Europe strengthened an already occurring change.

In preparation for the second round of British membership talks, New Zealand politicians and officials were – through a Briefing Paper of the Department of External Affairs – urged to avoid making concrete demands and, initially, to refrain from stating New Zealand’s interests. The intention thereby was to see that New Zealand would not be given short shrift in the early stages. Department staff suspected that the British would be less disposed to special conditions in some areas (for instance, lamb products) than the EEC states, so that negotiations concerning such special conditions should wait until the official talks.⁹⁸⁵

⁹⁸⁰ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19152 ICW2458/1 115B: Briefing Paper for John Marshall, Department of External Affairs Wellington, 16 May, 1962.

⁹⁸¹ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/75 3382 3: United Kingdom/EEC Negotiations, 13 September, 1961.

⁹⁸² Cf. Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions," p. 103.

⁹⁸³ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁴ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/223 3382/7: The Chairman Cabinet Committee on Economic and Financial Policy, Wellington, 2 May, 1962.

⁹⁸⁵ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W5705/76 3382/[18A]: Brief for New Zealand Consultations, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 24 May, 1967.

At the second round of talks with the EEC, New Zealand restricted its demands for special conditions to specific goods such as butter, cheese, and lamb.⁹⁸⁶ The second round of talks were also an important break in British-New Zealand relations: “To the New Zealander, whether Minister or man in the street, it is not just a matter of economics but of the basic traditional relationship between our two countries.”⁹⁸⁷ At the National Development Conference (1968/69), New Zealand’s economic future was analyzed in detail. The conference report predicted that by as late as 1978/79 – in spite of further industrialization – the primary share of the New Zealand economy would be earned through agriculture.⁹⁸⁸ Therefore, New Zealand would not be able to diversify its trade fast enough. As was the case during the first round of talks, New Zealand’s approach depended on soft-power strategy. Politicians and officials took pains to further instruct the British and the EEC member states about the special dependency of New Zealand on the British market. For this reason, in 1968 British officials in Whitehall were “thoroughly indoctrinated” regarding New Zealand’s situation.⁹⁸⁹ The member states of the Common Market were also enlightened concerning the problems of New Zealand, as the High Commissioner E. D. Blundell reported.⁹⁹⁰

Still, during the years that followed, the diversification of production proved to be difficult. New Zealand had neither large mineral resources nor significant industry; thus, the dependence on the agricultural sector persisted. Diversification within the rural sector meant a shift from milk to meat production, which demanded high levels of investment and resulted in less efficient production. Furthermore, New Zealand actors feared that due to low exports, the potential to buy materials and machines for a conversion to industrial productions was limited.⁹⁹¹ As a further strategic solution, policy makers considered using former pasture lands for the cultivation of non-food agricultural crops, as well as for forestry or beef production. These possibilities were, however, all fraught with difficulties, since they were either expensive or required extensive materials. As well, the shift from primary to manufactured products and the export of industrial goods was a lengthy process with high costs.⁹⁹²

⁹⁸⁶ Cf. NLW MS-Papers-7939-057: Address by J.R. Marshall to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch, 29 August, 1970 (printed in September 1970).

⁹⁸⁷ TNA DO 215/15: Memorandum, “Britain and the E.E.C.” (February 1966), sent by the British High Commission (Wellington) to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 16 February, 1966.

⁹⁸⁸ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/30 164/2/3/1 4: Address by J.R. Marshall, Fontainebleau, 12 November, 1970.

⁹⁸⁹ ANZ ABHS 7148/50 LONB 67/1 2: E.D. Blundell to Secretary of External Affairs Wellington, 23 May, 1968.

⁹⁹⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁹⁹¹ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 22500 W5814/8: Briefing Paper Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 2 April, 1971.

⁹⁹² Cf. *Ibid.*

Likewise, the search for new markets started off sluggishly at first. New Zealand did indeed attempt to develop markets for their products in Asia with various trade fairs or with advertising campaigns. Still, the Asian market only opened slowly to New Zealand products. The reasons for this were varied: in China and Southeast Asia, milk products were not traditional food staples. Furthermore, New Zealand actors observed that living standards were not high enough to afford products such as butter and cheese.⁹⁹³

In Japan, rising living standards and the transformation of dietary customs appeared, at least at first, to make the Japanese market for New Zealand's products attractive. However, during this period, Japan further developed its own milk industry, which made the introduction of New Zealand products superfluous.⁹⁹⁴ In October 1969, John Marshall traveled to Japan to address trade issues. This visit followed hard on the heels of difficult economic negotiations between Japan and the United States, and during a period in which the Japanese government was thus occupied with a reassessment of domestic agricultural prices, production policies and tariff systems. Indeed, there followed from this visit no new negotiated agreements; nonetheless, the visit was useful in so far as it strengthened the positive climate in Japan in regards to New Zealand.⁹⁹⁵ The promotion of trade with Asia, connected with regional social and political cooperation, was felt by New Zealand actors as indicative of their growth as an autonomous and independent nation.⁹⁹⁶ The breakdown of the British membership talks with Brussels brought a short breather to the New Zealanders, affording them the time to look further for new export markets.⁹⁹⁷

During the third round of talks, the New Zealanders were true to their central position that the EEC negotiations were of central importance to them.⁹⁹⁸ In February 1970, the Chair of the Overseas Trade Committee presented a strategic brief, in which it was proposed to invite as many influential people as possible to New Zealand so as to give them first hand acquaintance with the antipode. Moreover, European journalists (from France and Britain, in particular) were encouraged to offer coverage concerning New Zealand.⁹⁹⁹ The Overseas Information Activities Committee was, for

⁹⁹³ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁹⁹⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*

⁹⁹⁵ Cf. ANZ AATJ 7428 W3566/1752 164/2/3/1 7: New Zealand Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of External Affairs, 31 October, 1969.

⁹⁹⁶ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1633/63 3382 29: Speech of the Prime Minister, 22 September, 1970.

⁹⁹⁷ "The breakdown in the negotiations is important for New Zealand because it gives us more time to take action now [...]." John Marshall, cited in *Hauraki Plains Gazette*, 5 June, 1968.

⁹⁹⁸ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19746 ICW2266/2 320: Briefing Paper for John Marshall by the Cabinet Committee on Overseas Trade Policy, 5 May, 1971.

⁹⁹⁹ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 9: Chairman Overseas Trade Committee, 3 February, 1970.

this reason, further involved with the possibility of gaining a stronger presence in European television. In addition, information brochures and studies in close cooperation with a variety of departments and the New Zealand Institute of Economic research were produced in four European languages.¹⁰⁰⁰ In this manner, the New Zealanders furthered their information strategy.

During his visit to New Zealand in October 1970, Geoffrey Rippon advised Robert Muldoon to invite politicians, officials, and journalists to New Zealand so as to make it clear that the issue of New Zealand was a matter of “two-and-a-half million Europeans.”¹⁰⁰¹ Afterwards, it would be important to convince these people to demonstrate their sympathies through concrete actions.¹⁰⁰² The New Zealand High Commissioner recommended the promotion of New Zealand and its products; a colorful brochure, vividly advertising the unique quality of New Zealand products, should be addressed to the “British housewife” in particular.¹⁰⁰³ Thus, the promotion of New Zealand in Europe was a persistent and central concern of New Zealand’s strategy. Some ministers, however, feared that this would be used by opponents of British membership in Britain itself in order to strengthen their arguments against joining. Thus, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a briefing paper on the occasion of the Prime Minister’s visit to London in April 1971, which warned against using the “anti-market group”¹⁰⁰⁴ as an argument against membership.¹⁰⁰⁵

For the New Zealanders, the third round of talks began with the visit to Brussels by Talboys, the New Zealand Minister of Overseas Trade.¹⁰⁰⁶ During his visit, periodic discussions were set up so as to clarify at the “technical and senior levels”¹⁰⁰⁷ questions concerning the export of milk products.¹⁰⁰⁸ For the delegation from New Zealand, these discussions with the British were laborious and disappointing on many issues.¹⁰⁰⁹ As the talks progressed, British reassurances

¹⁰⁰⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰¹ ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 10: Notes of Discussion between Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Rippon, 1 October, 1970.

¹⁰⁰² Cf. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰³ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/227 3382 24: Overseas Trade Committee, 30 January, 1970

¹⁰⁰⁴ ANZ AAFZ 22500 W5814/8: Briefing Paper Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 2 April, 1971.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Between the second and third rounds of talks, New Zealand ministers repeatedly visited Europe so that the European states would not forget the “existence of the New Zealand problem.” ANZ AEFN 19746 ICW2266/2 341: Briefing Paper for John Marshall.

¹⁰⁰⁷ NAA A1838 727/1/8 Part 1: Department of Foreign Affairs, 29 December, 1972.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19746 ICW2266/1 291: Report on Discussions between British and New Zealand Officials, London, 8-17 June, 1970.

appeared, from the New Zealand point of view, to be insufficient for the protection of their interests.¹⁰¹⁰

The concentration on dairy products provoked criticism against the New Zealand government. For instance, Charles Hilgendorf, the Chair of the Meat Board, claimed that the government had advocated on the difficult issue of long-term conditions for dairy products and not for the less difficult issue of similar provisions for lamb.¹⁰¹¹ The French also criticized the New Zealand government. For instance, in the newspaper, *Le Monde*, it was argued that the New Zealand government had been aware since 1963 that the British wished to enter the Common Market, yet they had been slow to push for the diversification of their markets.¹⁰¹²

As events progressed, the New Zealanders concentrated on the implementation of Protocol 18 of the membership agreement. As had been the case during the second round of membership talks, their demands concerned a few goods such as butter, cheese, and lamb.¹⁰¹³ Since the British public, for the most part, sympathized with the New Zealanders, the British negotiators made every effort to avoid a dispute with New Zealand and to keep them informed of developments. Moreover, on Easter of 1971, the brochure “Britain, New Zealand and the EEC” appeared so as to keep the British public informed concerning the ongoing situation with New Zealand. The High Commissioner in London endeavored to stir interest in the predicament of New Zealand through a series of speeches and other public appearances, as well as visits by important British decision makers. Overall, the New Zealanders acknowledged the British efforts on their behalf in Luxembourg.¹⁰¹⁴ The year-long efforts of the soft-power strategy appeared to have borne fruit. Thus, the High Commission in London recorded in 1971:

The unavoidable emphasis in our publicity on our dependence on grass may have left some in Britain with the impression that we are a nation composed exclusively of dairy farmers, themselves herbivorous.¹⁰¹⁵

¹⁰¹⁰ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19746 ICW2266/1 291: Closing Statement M. J. Moriarty, London, 17 June, 1970.

¹⁰¹¹ Cf. *Christchurch Press*, 23 February, 1970. The Chair of the Meat and Wool Section of the Federation Farmers of New Zealand, Bruce Dryden, also warned Keith Holyoake in 1971, not to forget the meat industry in favor of dairy. The Meat Board wanted to be included in the subsequent negotiations, and above all to be kept informed concerning developments – as had been customary during the previous talks. Cf. ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/26 164/2/2 13: B. Dryden to Keith Holyoake, 16 February, 1971.


¹⁰¹² Cf. *Le Monde*, 18 February, 1971.

¹⁰¹³ Cf. ANZ AEFN 19746 ICW2266/1 291: Opening Statement M. J. Moriarty, London, 8 June, 1970.

¹⁰¹⁴ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/40 BRU 46/5/1 28: New Zealand High Commission to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wellington, 15 July, 1971.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*

This was taken up by the following caricature from *The New Zealand Herald* of 22 September 1970. The caricature showed the visit of Geoffrey Rippon in New Zealand. The labor of the New Zealand farmers – shown grazing on a meadow together with their cows – are presented in an attempt to convince Rippon of the significance of grass for the New Zealand economy. The caption of the caricature is the commentary of Rippon: “Ah yes – I get your point!” The caricature thus censures the (exaggerated) assertion of the significance of agriculture to the New Zealand economy:



No 4

The soft-power strategy fulfilled its purpose: the British public and government, as well as the member states of the EEC, were well informed concerning the circumstances of New Zealand at the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁰¹⁶ New Zealand received a large share of the special conditions that were demanded and considered. While a solution for the trading interests of Australia and Canada

¹⁰¹⁶ British actors felt the protestations of the New Zealanders to be much exaggerated, because New Zealand was an affluent country and could, so they thought, deal with British membership in the EEC. Cf. Gustafson, *Kiwi Keith. A Biography of Keith Holyoake*, p. 294.

were dealt with in the GATT negotiations, New Zealand actually obtained a special protocol – Protocol 18 – in the membership agreement, which established New Zealand’s special status.¹⁰¹⁷ Through this protocol, New Zealand received further access rights for butter and cheese. This agreement was valid for five years (1973-1977). Annual import volumes for butter and cheese were thereby established, which would be reduced gradually over the five-year period.¹⁰¹⁸ Although New Zealand appreciated the British intervention, Protocol 18 did not entirely correspond to what New Zealand had proposed – neither the volume nor the price for New Zealand’s goods coincided with their wishes.¹⁰¹⁹ In the events that followed, New Zealand decision makers repeatedly emphasized their dissatisfaction with Protocol 18,¹⁰²⁰ and indeed, voices in the press feared a conflict over the agreement between the governments of New Zealand and Britain.¹⁰²¹

In the period following the negotiations, New Zealand actors further concentrated on strengthening their relations with Britain and the other EEC countries.¹⁰²² Relations with Japan were also to be further cultivated. With the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister, M. Ohira and the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, T. Adachi, in October 1972, New Zealand had already taken steps to improve relations with their pacific neighbor. The urbanization of Japan, together with its growth in population and the adoption of “western” diets at the beginning of the 1970s, seemed to offer a propitious moment for further improvements to their economic relations.¹⁰²³ The New Zealand Dairy Board had already begun some years before to deliver powdered milk and cheese to Japan under the auspices of the Japan School Lunch Corporation. Australia was the primary exporter in this cooperative arrangement, but New Zealand could also export larger volumes to Japan. By means of this cooperation, New Zealand hoped for a growing export market in Japan.¹⁰²⁴ Nonetheless, even after British membership in the EEC, New Zealand decision makers still continued to assert their connections to Europe: “We are still a European community in the

¹⁰¹⁷ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: European Report, 8 November, 1975. The special conditions were agreed upon at the meeting in Luxembourg (21-23 June, 1971). Cf. Gustafson, *Kiwi Keith. A Biography of Keith Holyoake*, p. 306f.

¹⁰¹⁸ The annual volume for butter was reduced from 166 000 tons in 1973 to 138 000 tones in 1977. For cheese, the annual import volume was reduced from 68 500 to a little more than 15 000 tons. Cf. Brown, “New Zealand in the World Economy. Trade Negotiations and Diversification,” in, *New Zealand in World Affairs, 1972-1990*, ed. Bruce Brown, p. 21-61 (Wellington 1999), p. 24

¹⁰¹⁹ Cf. ANZ ABHS 7148/101 LONB 86/4/9/1A 1: Notes of Discussions between J.A. Walding and Joseph Godber, 18 April, 1973.

¹⁰²⁰ Cf. ANZ ABHS 7148/101 LONB 86/4/9/1B 1: Statement by J. A. Walding, 16 July, 1973.

¹⁰²¹ Cf. *Otago Daily Times*, 7 July, 1973: “Clash with Britain over EEC Protocol.”

¹⁰²² Cf. ANZ AEFN 19147 ICW2968/2 381: Briefing Paper for J.A. Walding (Minister of Overseas Trade), April 1973.

¹⁰²³ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*

Antipodes.”¹⁰²⁵ Despite reservations concerning the Asian trade region and the difficulties described above, New Zealand was able to expand its trade in the region before British membership in 1973. The opening of new markets, for which the New Zealand Dairy Board had advocated, however, were primarily concerned with non-fat milk products, and were not suitable for the overall export trade.¹⁰²⁶

Thus, for New Zealand, the EEC debate was, above all, concerned with a threat to their *economic* base, because up to that point their trade was strongly centered on Great Britain. In relation to the New Zealand strategy, it was clear that for the course of the EEC debates, New Zealand pursued a soft-power strategy. This strategy implied an extensive information campaign for both the British public and the British government concerning New Zealand itself, and a detailed account of the particular challenges faced by its economy. New Zealanders perceived that they were a small country without much leverage on Great Britain, so they used soft-power to appeal to the sympathies of the motherland (as well as the Six) in order to obtain special conditions. This strategy worked out, since New Zealand actually did obtain special terms through Protocol 18. Alongside this strategy governing the approach to Britain and the Six, policy makers in Wellington elaborated various options for a reorientation of trade policy. One option was the diversification of products and the restructuring of native industries. However, this option would be reproached as too costly and laborious. One alternative was the geographic expansion of trade networks. For this reason, New Zealand politicians and officials focused their efforts on Asia, however, this would only progress slowly.

Changes, Threats and Opportunities

In this chapter, the changes, threats, and opportunities that the EEC debates presented to the Dominions on a national level have been discussed. It is noteworthy that for all three lands, the British rapprochement with Europe represented an economic threat, though of varying intensity. In New Zealand in particular, there was a predominant fear concerning trade policy and the economic disadvantages that British membership might entail for New Zealand. In Canada and Australia, from the outset the perceived threats of the negotiations combined more strongly with concerns of a political nature. While Canada, above all, dreaded the fragmentation of the Commonwealth and, stemming from that, a shift in international power structures, the Australian government looked to

¹⁰²⁵ Cf. AEFN 19294 ICW2072/30 164/2/3/1 4: Address by J.R. Marshall, Fontainebleau, 12 November, 1970.

¹⁰²⁶ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 22500 W5814/8: Briefing Paper Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 2 April, 1971.

troubles related to the British presence in Southeast Asia. This threat to their regional security interests was shared by the New Zealand government. More precisely, perceptions of the British approach to Europe could be delineated as follows: policy makers in all three Dominions saw their trading relationship with Britain placed in jeopardy, and for this reason they feared economic disadvantage; the political order would also be endangered.

Although all three countries had different key areas of concern that they viewed as dangerous, they developed similar strategies to resolve these problems. Australia, just as much as Canada and New Zealand set into motion an intensive exchange of information with Britain and the emphasis lay on ensuring that their respective interests were known in London. For this reason, their strategies for approaching the British were based on familiar patterns of communication within the Commonwealth: personal consultations and discussions were to clarify their positions, and bring about the securing of their interests. New Zealand, in particular, used this approach, incorporating it within their soft-power strategy. In addition to the promulgation of their own interests, the New Zealand government launched an extensive information campaign that was to enlighten the British government and population (as well of those of the Six) on matters pertaining to New Zealand so as to build a moral and emotional connection. Alongside the strategy for approaching the motherland, New Zealand policy makers elaborated strategies for a new orientation of trade policy. In the process, they dismissed the idea of transforming the range of products they could offer as too expensive. Instead, they tried to expand their trading networks, which was not free of difficulties on account of tariff regulations and culturally specific dietary customs. For this reason, soft-power strategy was valued not only as a strategy for dealing with Britain, but also as a strategy for reorienting trade policy. Since the diversification of markets and products looked unappealing, soft-power strategy meant the possibility of obtaining special conditions. In this way, trade policy could be suited to changing circumstances.

Alongside the information campaign directed towards Britain, Australia pursued a strategy of *direct participation*. They were participants in those negotiations at Brussels that concerned their interests. Through these means they hoped to achieve conditions that would be amenable to their trading interests. During the Brussels negotiations, they concentrated on extending the transition period, so that the Australian economy could adjust to the change. A potential strategy for addressing this was the expansion of trading blocs; however, as was the case with New Zealand, this was not so simple since Asian countries were not much interested in Australian products. For Australia, an additional possible solution for the difficulties confronted by the export trade

presented itself in the 1970s: the discovery of natural resources could cushion the impact of British membership in the EEC.

Canada initially criticized the British rapprochement with Europe, however, due to objections within their own country, they adjusted their strategy towards Britain. For the most part, they left the negotiations to British, while also focusing their efforts on keeping the British government apprised of Canadian interests. To address threats to trade, Canada above all followed a policy of expanding its trade networks. Foremost in these efforts, were the trade relations with Japan and the states of Western Europe. Thus, the British approach to Europe could also represent a *chance* for a new order of trade networks.

Policy makers in the Dominions perceived this shift in Commonwealth relations and trade connections – taking place from the 1960s into the early 1970s – in different ways. In part, they observed the change in international trade relations as a slow but quite significant transformation.¹⁰²⁷ Political actors like John McEwen tried to reassure the public and industry by making it clear that the shift would not take place suddenly over night, but rather would settle in over a long and undefined period of time.¹⁰²⁸ The Australian Department of External Affairs also prophesied that the political consequences would draw out over a longer period of time.¹⁰²⁹ In this way, politicians attempted to hinder a breakout of panic in their respective countries.

The EEC negotiations, however, were perceived by some politicians and officials in the Dominions as *one part of a transformation within the global order that was taking place rapidly*. At the beginning of the 1970s, actors observed the increasingly powerful role of China, the shift in American policy towards the USSR, the efforts of the USSR to augment its power, the growing strength of Japan, and the fast tempo of changes in the Pacific regions.¹⁰³⁰ Even in the early 1960s, some actors situated changes inside the Commonwealth with a larger process of change: “We are in the midst of a dynamic, rapidly changing world situation. We face many complex issues that present new challenges and new opportunities.”¹⁰³¹ This shift would take place much quicker and

¹⁰²⁷ Thus, John McEwen noted in 1965, “...this is also a time of less spectacular, but quite profound and far-reaching pressures for change in the patterns of man’s international economic life. Change does not necessarily mean violent change.” McEwen, *Australia’s Overseas Economic Relationships*, p. 3.

¹⁰²⁸ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen at a Country Party meeting, Cootamundra, 1 June, 1962.

¹⁰²⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 1: Department of External Affairs: The Political Implications for Australia of United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community, Canberra, 26 June, 1961.

¹⁰³⁰ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/119 BRU 64/1/6 1: Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 15 June, 1972.

¹⁰³¹ LAC MG32-B1 Vol. 42: Rede Donald Fleming, Canadian Club of Winnipeg, 19 January, 1962.

in a short span of time than had been the case in previous history.¹⁰³² From this point of view it becomes clear that actors – in this case the Canadian Finance Minister Donald Fleming – decided that there was not much time, that changes to the trade relationship with Britain, as well as with Commonwealth relations more generally, was imminent. The “acute” problem of the British announcement of membership negotiations with the EEC was a shock to the former settler colonies. Politicians and officials in the Dominions had to respond directly. In order to cushion the economic blow faced by the three Dominions, the pressing problem of the transitional period for specific products had to be resolved.

With the first veto by Charles de Gaulle, the danger presented by British EEC membership receded into the distance. It no longer appeared imminent and was thus deferred to an undetermined point in the future. The risk of economic disruptions was not therefore banished, but the time frame for the formulation of strategic solutions to these issues through external actions was lengthened. Owing to the expansion of the time available to policy makers, perceptions of these dangers altered. They appeared unavoidable in the future, and owing to this conclusion, there resulted directives to maintain the status quo. The anticipated danger should be ameliorated as much as possible by a pre-emptive diversification of trade and the opening to new markets. Thus, assumptions concerning *future* difficulties provoked present actions so as to alleviate these anticipated problems. In the Dominions, the perception of the first round of British membership talks as a threat requiring immediate action altered during the second and third rounds of talks. The danger of British membership in the Common Market was less startling since it was now expected. The threat was no longer imminent, and it took its place as a *permanent* element in the rhetoric of policy makers from the three Dominions right up to the final entrance of Britain into the EEC in 1973 – and, to some degree, for some time afterwards. Britain’s entrance into the EEC was thereby rhetorically manifested and prepared in advance. At the same time, both the emphasis on the British role in Europe as well as a narrative concerning the deceit practiced by Britain upon its Commonwealth partners led to a progressive alienation between the former colonies and the motherland.

¹⁰³² “Indeed, events appear to be moving more rapidly than they have for many years.” LAC MG32-B1 Vol. 42: Donald Fleming, Annual Seminar on Canadian-American Relations, 9. November 1961.

3.3. Of Deceived Spouses, Spoiled Children, and Mistrustful Friends

In the following chapter, emotions are brought into the foreground. It describes the *emotional community* of Commonwealth networks and the emotional background of the political decisionmakers in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This chapters shows that the majority of politicians and functionaries in the three Dominions, through their personal and/or collective *emotional community*, had strong ties to Great Britain. The EEC debates concerned not just a transformation of trade relations, it was also a transformation of emotional engagements and relationships. Without Great Britain, the three Dominions felt themselves “left alone” in a political setting in which Asia and “the East” were presumed hostile. Furthermore, without Britain, all three countries had to rethink their identity.

The previous discussion has sketched out the channels of Commonwealth communication during the EEC debates. It was then established that for policy makers, the British approach to Europe signified a threat on the economic and political plane, which they countered with various strategies. However, this only demonstrates two dimensions of the threat that do not explain why the Canadian and Australian reactions to the British entrance negotiations was so vehement. Although they anticipated only minor damage to their trade, they vociferously criticized Britain. Only the New Zealand reaction can be explained by their strong economic dependency on Britain.

Economic and political arguments alone, therefore, do not fully explain the conduct of various policy makers during the EEC debates. The case of the Australian High Commissioner (stationed in London), Sir Alexander Downer, is an example of a contemporary actor whose reaction cannot be explained by economic or political reasons alone. In 1964, Downer had been appointed to the position of High Commissioner in Australia House in London. Friends, colleagues, and British officials saw Downer as a prime example of an “Australian Briton.”¹⁰³³ Owing to a period of study at Brasenose College at Oxford, Sir Downer possessed an extensive network of personal and political connections in London, which he further built upon during his time as Minister for Immigration under the Menzies government (1958-1963) and as High Commissioner in London (1964-1972).¹⁰³⁴ In this way, Downer serves as a representative of an entire generation of Australian diplomats and political actors. Although, he saw himself first as an Australian, for him,

¹⁰³³ Thus, a contemporary British figure described him as “violently Anglophile.” Cited in Ward, “Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia,” footnote 2.

¹⁰³⁴ Cf. *ibid.* p. 145. Downer’s connections are demonstrable innumerable ways, including that he was the godfather of Charles, the 9th Earl of Spencer and brother of Princess Diana. The godmother of Charles was Queen Elisabeth II. Cf. *ibid.* p. 146.

Australian nationalism was inseparably bound to membership within a community of British peoples. “Britishness” was thus part of his self-perception as an Australian. For him personally, the EEC debates in Britain were problematic, as were the announcement of a withdrawal of British troops from southeast Asia (East of the Suez), and various migration policies in Britain. Furthermore, during his time in London, there were changes to the position of Australia House and the role of High Commissioner that was connected to it.¹⁰³⁵

At the time of Downer’s appointment in 1964, a shift in the view of Australian policy makers emerged. The first round of EEC negotiations had provoked reassessments within these circles that Downer did not share as his first speech addressing the EEC in March 1965 demonstrated. Therein he described the EEC debates as a “deep bruise on Anglo-Australian relations”¹⁰³⁶ and emphasized the long-standing solidarity of the Australian people with Great Britain, or in his own words, “the essentially British flavour of our communities.”¹⁰³⁷ The Australians had in no way resigned themselves to the inevitability of British membership in the EEC and perceived a prospective membership as a betrayal of the Australian people.¹⁰³⁸ The Australian government did not want to take a position with his speech, and when in 1966 Downer presented his views on the EEC debate with an unstated threat that Australia might offset British imports with ones from Japan, there was an uproar at the Trade Department. By allowing a government position on the EEC to become public, Downer had – so it appeared from this quarter – encroached upon the responsibilities of Trade Minister John McEwen. Neither McEwen nor the Prime Minister Harold Holt took a clear position backing Downer’s statements.¹⁰³⁹

After the British announcement of renewed membership negotiations, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, informed Downer that one had to take into account that British accession to the EEC could have negative effects on the defense position in Southeast Asia. Downer

¹⁰³⁵ Cf. *ibid.* pp. 146. The changes related to Australia House, owing to the EEC debates, will be outlined and explained in Chapter 3.4.

¹⁰³⁶ NAA A463 1965/2040: Speech by Downer, London, 11 March 1965.

¹⁰³⁷ As an example, he mentioned that most Australians would prefer the designation “*British Commonwealth*”; the Union Jack, moreover, was part of their flag; Great Britain was still “home” for many Australians who revered the Queen and according to the *National Act* were “Australian citizens and British subjects.” Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁰³⁸¹⁰³⁸ Cf. Ward, “Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia,” p. 147f. In Australia, the leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, was astonished by Downer’s speech and in Parliament asked if his statements represented the official policy of the Australian government. Menzies ignored the question and Downer, irritated by Calwell’s question, contacted the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Bunting, who replied to Downer that the Minister, at present, had not expressed himself on the EEC debates, neither in Cabinet, nor in public. The uncertainty surrounding the possibility of membership talks made the EEC debate a theme that, as Menzies explained it to Downer, one ought to avoid. Cf. NAA A463 1965/2040: Speech by Downer, London, 11 March 1965, and Ward, “Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia,” p. 148.

¹⁰³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

perceived this as an unforgivable deception by the British Minister, who had personally reassured him repeatedly that British obligations in Southeast Asia would be maintained.¹⁰⁴⁰ In the following months, Downer gave a series of lectures that were described by Whitehall as a campaign against British membership in the EEC. Therein he emphasized the emotional and sentimental aspects of the relationship to Britain that had been discarded by the Australian government. In the event of British membership in the EEC, Australia must unavoidably distance itself from the motherland. He did not believe that Britain would want to distance from a country that was as closely bound to it as was Australia.¹⁰⁴¹ Furthermore, he made clear his views on the role of emotions in political relationships: “Historic ties, emotion, sentiment, are at a discount: they are said to be old-fashioned and have no place in contemporary politics. I disagree.”¹⁰⁴² He observed that in the interactions of the governments of the Commonwealth lands, the previous paradigms of argument that drew on shared history and emotional connections had lost significance. Diplomacy and modern politics should, according to the opinion of some of his contemporaries, get along without these arguments. Downer set himself against these views, as he considered such argumentative paradigms to be of further importance.

Downer was personally struck by the British decision to enter the EEC and withdraw troops from Southeast Asia, as he wrote to his friend of many years, Lord Casey, the Governor General. The “double talk”¹⁰⁴³ of British ministers and the gap between their reassurances to him and their actual political decisions upset him deeply. He felt the British decisions as a personal *betrayal* by persons with whom he had built a close network of relationships since his student days in Oxford.¹⁰⁴⁴ In his immediate circle in London, many people reinforced Downer’s view of the situation. Among the resident Australians and British, there were few to be found who had the same views in relation to the British-Australian relationship.¹⁰⁴⁵ This confirms the change in communications within the Commonwealth that was discussed in Chapter 3.1. In the personal exchange of information to which the policy makers of the Dominions were accustomed, now mingled dissatisfaction and mistrust.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁰⁴² Cited in *ibid.* p. 153. Australian expats in Great Britain and opponents of British membership in the Common market welcomed Downer’s speech. In Australia itself, his address elicited little reaction. In his private correspondence with Robert Menzies, Downer himself conceded that he had gone “beyond the bound of conventional diplomacy.” Cited in *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴³ Cited in *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.* p. 153f.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Cf. *ibid.* p. 155.

The 1971 dispute between John McEwen's successor, Dough Anthony, and Geoffrey Rippon over the duplicity of the British¹⁰⁴⁶ also affected Downer. At a diplomatic banquet in Hampton Court, Downer clashed with Rippon. Subsequently, Rippon emphasized that interactions of this sort would only be possible with people from Australia – a closely related country that was known for its direct and blunt statements. Downer himself stated that Rippon's direct tone was not out of place, since he was a "fellow Brasenose man" and for this reason communication of this sort was allowable.¹⁰⁴⁷ The unique style of Commonwealth communications found renewed expression in this instance. Downer served as High Commission until shortly before the handover of Australia House to the Department of Foreign Affairs. In his final report to McMahon, who was Prime Minister at the time, Downer once more stated that he regretted the diminishing significance of emotional bonds to Great Britain.¹⁰⁴⁸ Downer was the last High Commissioner for whom Anglophilia as a uniquely salutary concept played a role. His successors did, of course, refer in their speeches to the emotional relationship with Britain, but their approach was more strongly stamped by the ministrations of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁴⁹


The case of Sir Alexander Downer demonstrates that next to the political and economics aspects, the emotional bonds to Great Britain played an important in the EEC debates and in the reactions of policy makers. The British shift away from the Commonwealth appeared as a betrayal to their Commonwealth partners, and it harmed the long-standing close relations between the motherland and the Dominions. Downer was not an isolated case, for one can find many examples that reference emotional responses, as for instance in a caricature from the British newspaper, *The Observer* that appeared on 10 June 1962:

¹⁰⁴⁶ See footnote 978.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Cf. Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia," p. 158.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 163.



No 5

The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan is seen lying in the matrimonial bed with a figurative representation of Europe, where he is caught out by the visibly outraged Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies – recognizable by his heavy and prominent eyebrows. The figure of Menzies is representative of the entire Commonwealth as one can read from the inscription “Commonwealth” on his flowered dress. The caricature thus uses sexual humour and represents the Commonwealth symbolically in the cliché role of the deceived wife. The caricature is subtitled with the declaration directed at Menzies: “Oh no, darling, we’re just very good friends.” The caricaturist herein implies, on the one hand, a longer relationship between Great Britain and the Commonwealth, since Macmillan feels he must offer some form of justification to his “wife,” and, on the other, an ongoing affair with Europe that for the present moment can be denied and kept secret (“[...] just very good friends”). The caricature illustrates that on the one hand the Dominions felt themselves betrayed, and on the other hand, that up to that point in the summer of 1962, the consequences of the affair had not been honorably imparted by Britain to its partners even though a relationship with Europe could no longer be denied. The negatively conceived image of the deceitful husband was deployed to outline the current (political) relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth. Moreover, the caricature demonstrates that Britain, in any event, had to decide between the aged and angry seeming Commonwealth and an attractive young Europa. Simultaneously, the caricature

showed that Britain itself – here symbolized by the figure of Harold Macmillan – was by this point in time no longer the most youthful and attractive partner. After the Second World War, Great Britain was battered and in the grip of a political decline. In spite of this, the Commonwealth countries were upset by the “deception” of Britain.

The caricature attests to the in fact very close relationship between the Commonwealth countries and Britain that now had been wounded by the betrayal of one of the parties. The interpretation of the conduct of the British government as a betrayal was also shared by the Canadian government under John Diefenbaker. Even one before the appearance of the cartoon discussed above, he was convinced that Britain was ready to write off the Commonwealth. The Canadian government perceived this as a deception.¹⁰⁵⁰ A *New Zealand Review* of international relations also asserted in July 1961:

[...] there is nothing for it but to be a realist when the marriage around which you had shaped your life and capacity and on which you had become emotionally dependent, breaks, by reason of withdrawal of your partner. And we in New Zealand cannot shrug it off and go elsewhere, without living well short of the manner to which we have been accustomed.”¹⁰⁵¹

The role of emotions in the EEC debates within Australia, Canada, and New Zealand has indeed been discussed implicitly in the literature,¹⁰⁵² but a comprehensive analysis of this emotional level still does not exist. In the following discussion, the emotions that came to light during the EEC debates will be outlined. In addition, their contribution and function within the debates will be reviewed, and the persons who *experienced* and *created* these emotions will be brought to light. Through a detailed investigation of the emotions, which constitute a distinct level of analysis in this study, the significance of the emotions to the perception of threats within the former settler colonies will be delineated. On the other hand, the study will show how *Emotional Communities* and emotional life influences and, accordingly, is foundational to the processes that generate a new political order. One can thereby attain a better understanding of the negotiating process within the distinct personal communication networks that existed within the Commonwealth.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Cf. Ward, “A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship,” p. 163.

¹⁰⁵¹ NLW MS-Papers-0274-034D: New Zealand and the Common Market, Lookout, A Review of International Affairs (National Broadcasting Service), 8 July 1961. In December 1972, a Canadian newspaper article reported that the Canadian government had made every effort to keep “the old girl [Great Britain] away from the “continental ravisher.” *Saturday Night*, December 1972. The image of a seduction” by a “young” Europe was also used here.

¹⁰⁵² See for example, Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*; Hall, *Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy. New Zealand Primary Production, Britain and the E.E.C., 1945-1975*; Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*.

The negative estimation of the first round of membership talks between Britain and the EEC appeared in reports from various quarters of the “Old Dominions,”¹⁰⁵³ in which the nations regarded themselves – especially in Australia and New Zealand – as at a far remove from events. Spatial proximity and perceived effects diverged accordingly in the perceptions of the Dominions. The British decision to draw closer to the European continent elicited spatially wide-reaching consequences; indeed, as the Australian Minister observed: “[...] a great historical drama [is] now being played out in Europe, [...] they [negotiations] have repercussions around the whole world.”¹⁰⁵⁴ Emotions could therefore bridge the spatial distances and, accordingly, diminish the perceived distances.

The feeling of having been deceived is not the only emotion that can be found in Dominion sources. At the Commonwealth meeting in Accra in September 1961, New Zealand actors observed “shock, fear and almost panic” among the Canadian participants.¹⁰⁵⁵ The description of the opening of British membership negotiations with the EEC as a “shock” appeared often in Dominion sources.¹⁰⁵⁶ As contemporary explanations pointed out, the British had rejected EEC membership for years, and for this reason the announcement of the opening of membership talks now came as a surprise.¹⁰⁵⁷

This perception of the British negotiations with Brussels at the beginning of the 1960s as a “shock” demonstrates two distinct aspects of the EEC debates. On the one hand, the label of “shock” describes the frightening and anxiety-inducing perspectives concerning future changes to trading relationships. Great Britain’s membership in the Common Market would alter global trade networks. Especially in the case of New Zealand, British membership in the EEC could have fatal consequences for the indigenous economy and export trade in the motherland. Branches of Australian and Canadian industries, such as sugar cane farmers in Queensland and grain exporters

¹⁰⁵³ Cf. May, “The Commonwealth and Britain’s Turn to Europe, 1945-73,” p. 37.

¹⁰⁵⁴ McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁵⁵ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

¹⁰⁵⁶ An Australian source even described the first round of talks with the EEC as the “great single concentrated shock in relations between Australia and Britain since the fall of Singapore in 1942.” Australian newspaper, cited in ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/226 3382 18: New Zealand High Commission Canberra to External Affairs Wellington, 22 July, 1967. Actors in Great Britain were aware that the British turn to the Common Market would be felt as a shock in the Commonwealth nations: “No matter how much this fact may shock you, our future is in Europe not in the Commonwealth” – thus was titled an article in the *Daily Mail* from 16 June, 1961, cited in, Grob-Fitzgibbon, *Continental Drift. Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to the Rise of Euroscepticism* (Cambridge 2016), p. 249.

¹⁰⁵⁷ “After years of refusing to join the Six, and, indeed, after setting up EFT as a rival trading block in May, 1960, Britain’s surprise decision only one year later (July, 1961) to negotiate with Brussels baffled many observers.” LAC MG32-C3 Vol. 397: Common Market Memorandum “Britain and Political Union with the Six” no date [probably summer 1961].

in Ontario, also looked on British membership in the European economic unions, saw themselves facing an existential dilemma, because the EEC forbade agricultural exports from non-European nations. For this reason, anxiety due to potential economic damage was a serious factors leading actors in the Dominions to feel shock at the news concerning a possible British membership.

In addition to the anxiety over economic difficulties, the general context in which the negotiations took place contributed to the worries and uncertainties of the Dominions. The Cold War and Decolonization fostered profound feelings of insecurity and, accordingly, a sense that the global structure of political power was undergoing a transformation. To politicians and officials in the Dominions, the world appeared to be “in flux,” and the possibility of British EEC membership represented an additional destabilizing factor that put into question their own position in the global political order. Policy makers in the Dominions were faced with a complex and open-ended situation with various outcome scenarios. Consequently, the “shock” concerning Great Britain’s negotiations with the EEC brought together concerns about economic decline with those that concerned their position within the global political order.¹⁰⁵⁸

For this reason, “shock” is to be understood above all as a synonym for “anxiety.” The analysis therefore confirms the previous findings that the Dominions perceived threats on the economic and political planes. However, the investigation can narrow these previous findings – policy makers in the Dominions were anxious about economic damages and political consequences. They feared that the patterns of trade that had existed up to this point would be disrupted by British membership in the EEC. Furthermore, anxieties over Asia and communism compounded reservations in the three nations concerning their potential future options in the global trading market.¹⁰⁵⁹ Canada struggled, in addition, with the worry that the overpowering presence of its neighbour – the United States of America – would dominate them, both culturally and economically.¹⁰⁶⁰ For this reason, anxiety over economic and political consequences is the mainspring behind the actions of politicians and officials in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. That is the first indication of the significance of emotions as a basic underpinning that structured conduct: the anxiety concerning

¹⁰⁵⁸In addition, anxieties about both the national and, in part, personal levels, played a role. Thus, the British announcement was a shock, for instance, to Georg Drew and John Diefenbaker. The latter had built a large part of his political arguments and promises upon the close relationship between Canada and Great Britain. British engagement with Europe could have symbolic as well as practical effects on this relationship. Accession would be a rebuff of the efforts of the Diefenbaker administration to strengthen relations, what might jeopardize Diefenbaker’s political prestige at home. Cf. Smith, *Rogue Tory. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker*, p. 421.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Cf. Robertson and Singleton, “The Old Commonwealth and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3,” p. 154.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Cf. Ward, “Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions,” p. 97.

future scenarios pushed politicians and officials in the Dominion to collect studies over the economic fallout and to develop strategic solutions. The actual economic damage and political consequences had, at the time of the political debates, not come into play and in some respects were scarcely foreseeable. Consequently, it was a matter of *future scenarios* that presented threats on the economic and political plane. The immediate motive for action was not an *urgent* (or immediately present) threat, but rather one that lay on the emotional plane: anxiety concerning the consequences of British membership in the Common Market. Therefore, during the EEC debates in the Dominions, emotions motivated action in a situation of danger.

The expression “shock,” however, still contained a further significance. It attested to the *surprise* that had seized hold of large part of the political elites when they were faced with news of the potential British membership talks. The announcement appeared to rise up suddenly, which implied a certain degree of unexpectedness.¹⁰⁶¹ It seemed that many of the politicians and officials in the Dominions had not anticipated the announcement that Britain would open membership talks with the EEC. In contrast to the reports of surprise concerning the initiation of the talks, there exist numerous sources that offered a criticism of precisely this surprise and shock on the part of the government. The dumbfounded reactions of the New Zealand government, for example, astonished New Zealand diplomats in Europe. Thus, the former New Zealand ambassador to Paris, J. V. Wilson, explained that the possibility of British membership in the EEC was implied by the establishment of the EEC itself through the Treaty of Rome.¹⁰⁶² The letter of a Canadian citizen to the Canadian Minister for Trade and Commerce, George Hees, likewise attests to this incomprehension of reaction of shock: “I’ve seen this coming for years and if you (and your like) had any amount of brain you’d have seen it too.”¹⁰⁶³ The commencement of British membership talks with the EEC was in no way surprising, but rather had begun to take shape over the previous years.¹⁰⁶⁴ At the same time, the author of the letter criticized the incomprehension of British

¹⁰⁶¹ “[...] rumoured economic terms [...]” LAC MG32-C3 Vol. 397: George Drew, Common Market, 1961 and “[...] Britain’s surprise decision [...] baffled many observers. [...]” LAC MG32-C3 Vol. 392: Common Market Memorandum, “Britain and Political Union with the Six,” no date [probably summer 1961].

¹⁰⁶² Cf. LAC RG25 Vol. 5514 File 12447-40: J.V. Wilson, “New Zealand in Ominous Shadow of Long Black Cloud,” no date. Canadian sources offer a potential explanation for this shocked reaction in all three of the Dominions: “After years of refusing to join the Six, and, indeed, after setting up EFT as a rival trading block in May, 1960, Britain’s surprise decision only one year later (July, 1961) to negotiate with Brussels baffled many observers.” LAC MG32-C3 Vol. 397: Common Market Memorandum “Britain and Political Union with the Six,” no date [probably summer 1961].

¹⁰⁶³ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 962 File T-7-1106: Letter of John Wilson to Hees, 14 September, 1961.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Cf. Ibid. In his memoirs, Harold Macmillan also reported that he had already spoken with the Prime Ministers of the three Dominions American pressure on Britain to join the EEC prior to the visit of Duncan Sandys. Cf. Macmillan, *At the End of the Day. 1961-1963*, p. 6f.

conduct evinced by many politicians and officials in the Dominions. Developments had occurred over a number of years and were not surprising; clues for the direction of British policy seemed to exist. This argument was even more clearly stated in a further letter from a citizen in which the author pleaded: “Have a heart for Great Britain, please!”¹⁰⁶⁵

There were explicit arguments from diverse sources that Great Britain, due to its geographic and economic proximity, *must* become a member of the EEC at some point due for practical reasons.¹⁰⁶⁶

Those voices that appealed for more understanding for Britain referred mostly to the dire economic situation of Britain after the Second World War and to its geographical nearness to the European continent. As a result of the conduct of the Dominions themselves, some voices critical of their own governments argued for sympathy with the British government. One such voice from an article prepared for the Canadian Conference Board¹⁰⁶⁷ for the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in 1962, laid out aspects of the British-Canadian relationship that advocated for an understanding of the British government – Canada was, at the time, somewhat unpopular in Britain and relations between the two countries had deteriorated over the last years. The reasons for this were the British decision to commence negotiations with the EEC, and the Canadian response to this decision. In particular, the conduct of Canadian ministers had contributed to a worsening of the relationship. British irritations with Canadian behavior was, above all, based on the fact that Canada was the Commonwealth country that would probably feel the least impact from British membership. Moreover, Edward Heath proclaimed that Britain would advocate for the dismantling of tariffs on grain, aluminum, tin, zinc, pulp and newsprint – all products that were of particular interest to Canada. Thus, the British came to the conclusion that “Canada is making an undue fuss about a relatively minor difficulty and their patience is obviously wearing thin.”¹⁰⁶⁸ This impression among the British was not unfounded. Many Canadians shared this view (“Many Canadians are generally in sympathy with this feeling of irritation.”¹⁰⁶⁹) and, in this respect, did not understand the approach of its own government.

¹⁰⁶⁵ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 962 File T-7-1106: Letter of John L. Adam to George Hees, 18 September, 1961.

¹⁰⁶⁶ For instance, *The Mercury* (Hobart), 19 August, 1961.

¹⁰⁶⁷ The Canadian Conference Board is a non-profit organization independent of the government that was founded in 1954 to produce economic analyses and policy advice. Cf. "Policy.ca - Conference Board of Canada Organization Profile," <https://www.conferenceboard.ca>, last accessed on 23.01.2019.

¹⁰⁶⁸ LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article of the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

However, according to the Conference Board, the voices critical of the government could not escape from the impression that Great Britain had swept a number of difficulties and problems under the carpet and gave little credence¹⁰⁷⁰ to Ottawa's "obstructive tactics."¹⁰⁷¹ The Canadians would presumably have responded in a less extreme fashion if an uncritical trust in the good intentions of Britain had been required of them. Canada had represented its potential trade losses in an exaggerated fashion, even if it did have reckon with real losses. Individual branches of industry could certainly suffer from a British membership in the Common Market.¹⁰⁷² At the same time, however, many political actors overlooked the potential advantages that British membership could bring such as the termination of preferential agreements that favored Great Britain and the expansion of trade with the EEC. Considering all these factors, the conduct of the Canadian government was not justified. The British view of Canada as "childishly intransigent"¹⁰⁷³ or "inordinately reactionary"¹⁰⁷⁴ was understandable.

Alongside of anxiety and surprise, there can also be found in the sources an *understanding* of the British decision. This understanding appears to have played a role, above all, among private individuals who contacted government ministers via letter,¹⁰⁷⁵ and also among economic experts, such as the employees of the Conference Board. This affirms the previous conclusion that Canadian society, for the most part, supported British membership in the EEC, and it was, above all, government circles in Ottawa that were against this development.

In spite of this understanding of British actions, a certain measure of sadness within these sources concerning the transformation of Commonwealth relationships cannot be denied. The sources cited in the introduction have, with their metaphors of "mourning," affirmed this conclusion.¹⁰⁷⁶ Along with this feeling of mourning for the loss of previous Commonwealth relationships, there was often a nostalgia that depicted the good old days of "certainty" that had existed within it.¹⁰⁷⁷ Within

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷¹ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁰⁷² "[...] it would seem that Canada has indeed something to fear from the prospect of British membership in the Common Market. For some industries the damage may well be serious." Ibid.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Cf. LAC MG32-B39 Vol. 136: Letter from B. Kelsey to Fleming, 16 January, 1963; LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 962 File T-7-1106: Letter of John L. Adam to George Hees, 18 September, 1961 and LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 962 File T-7-1106: Letter of John Wilson to Hees, 14 September, 1961.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Cf. *Saturday Night*, December, 1972, and Kavic, "Canada and the Commonwealth. Sentiment, Symbolism and Self-Interest."

¹⁰⁷⁷ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by John McEwen before the Perth Chambers of Manufactures and Commerce, 1 August, 1962.

these sources, it is primarily a matter of the eyewitness reports of policy makers.¹⁰⁷⁸ In the place of the former feelings of security, many policy makers now felt uncertainty and a feeling of abandonment within a rapidly changing global political context. The feeling of abandonment stood in contrast to the previous feelings of security within the Commonwealth as well as to the feelings of solidarity within a Commonwealth family.

The narrative of the “Commonwealth family” is an oft-used image for the relationship of the Dominions to Great Britain. In this image, Britain functioned as “mother” and the Dominions as “children.”¹⁰⁷⁹ It should be said here that the metaphor of the “Commonwealth Family” is a positive one – “family” represents closeness and a strong solidarity. Within the family, individual members can trust individual members and rely on one another. The three Dominions could feel a sense of belonging with Britain. This readily and fundamentally distinguished the three Dominions from the Asian and African colonies within the British Empire. Thus, one finds in the literature concerning these colonies the term “colonial power” referring to Britain with considerably more frequency – a formulation that is unusual in the historiography of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Trust among one another was one of the fundamental pillars of Commonwealth relations, and it increasingly faltered during the course of the EEC debates and was gradually replaced by distrust¹⁰⁸⁰ – as was previously indicated in Chapter 3.1 in connection to communication networks. However, mistrust attached itself not only to communications from Great Britain, but also to other aspects of the Motherland-Dominion relationship. During Duncan Sandys’ visit to Australia, the politicians and officials in Canberra were extremely distrustful regarding the motives of the British government.¹⁰⁸¹ Had Sandys been delegated the task of informing Canberra that the British decision to open membership talks had already been taken? Or was the visit to be an exchange on both sides over whether or not to pursue negotiations? Since the British government announced the commencement of negotiations only three weeks after Sandys’ stay in Australia, it seemed improbable to many actors that he had sought to obtain Australian agreement; rather many policy makers believed that his visit was to inform them of a British decision that had been arrived at long before.¹⁰⁸² In his own published work, *His Story*, McEwen described Sandys’ assurances in hindsight as follows:

¹⁰⁷⁸ For examples, see *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁹ See NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972.

¹⁰⁸⁰ “Already great damage has been done to mutual trust, interest and inter-dependence.” LAC MG32-C3 Vol. 397: George Drew, *Common Market*, 1961.

¹⁰⁸¹ Cf. Ward, “Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions,” p. 96.

¹⁰⁸² Cf. NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community Parliamentary Debate, 17 August, 1961.

[...] this assurance was far from being iron-clad and I now think that the British were doing little more than nod their heads at our proposals. They never committed themselves to anything as specific as a statement that they would not join the Market if they could not get the kind of terms we wanted. In retrospect, I am sure that the British understood better than we did how difficult these terms would be to secure.¹⁰⁸³

Britain's conduct thus was concerned about the loss of trust for the motherland within the Dominions. Newspapers in New Zealand also noted distrust during the third round of British membership talks – though much less among political circles within the country than in the general population. An article in the *Christchurch Star* from September 1970 entitled, “Why this distrust of U.K.?” outlined the leeriness of the New Zealand public towards British reassurances, to which, outside of the government, few gave any credence.¹⁰⁸⁴ The New Zealand government, even at the time of the third round of talks, availed itself of its soft-power strategy. Since a fundamental part of this strategy was the assertion of trust in Britain, the conduct of policy makers attested less to an actual faith in the reassurances from London than to a strategy of restraint. However, in addition to the positive connotations implied by the familial narrative, there was an implied inequality within the relations between these nations. Great Britain occupied the position of the model “adult” within this family metaphor, while Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were relegated to “children” on the way to adulthood. In addition to the emotions already described, there can be found expressions concerning a feeling of disappointment in Great Britain, and the feeling of having been treated *unfairly*. In previous years, all three Dominions had supported Britain in many respects – they had been actively on the British side during both of the World Wars. In the dire situation after Second World War, they had, in financial terms, taken Britain under their wing. That Britain now wanted to turn away from them and orient themselves towards Europe, disappointed policy makers in the former settler colonies, and spurred their *anger*. They expressed themselves in the particularly harsh communications that flowed between their respective government representatives; these were perceived by the British as “aggressive.” Thus, emotions influenced relationships between the Dominions and Britain.

However, amid the initial feelings of anger that arose from the opening of British membership talks with the EEC, there soon mingled a feeling of resignation.¹⁰⁸⁵ In the course of the three rounds of

¹⁰⁸³ McEwen, *His Story*, p. 60.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Cf. *The Christchurch Star*, 26 September, 1970.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Cf. Ward, “A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship,” p. 172.

negotiations, there is an observable smoothing over of the emotional rupture that drawn the particular interest of contemporaries. The tone within the sources – and the very quantity of them – clearly subsided in the period leading up to 1973.¹⁰⁸⁶ To be sure, the final outcome of the membership talks was likewise a cause of disappointment for the former settler colonies. Thus, the actual expansion and accession agreements did not incorporate all the conditions that policy makers had expected. In spite of this, Australian actors had to resign themselves and accept the conditions: Australia’s disappointment at the terms agreed upon in the negotiations must be accepted as history. We must now look to the future.¹⁰⁸⁷

Policy makers in Canberra had wished for further support from Great Britain, in some respects, even expected them. From their point of view, that the Commonwealth had to accept disadvantages for the benefit of European integration constituted unfair treatment.¹⁰⁸⁸

In places one still finds alongside of the negative emotions just described (with the exception of sympathetic feelings for Britain) positively understood emotions. Among these number, above all, the short-term relief felt in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand over the first veto by Charles de Gaulle.¹⁰⁸⁹ In addition, one finds hopes for a better future; next to the fears of the *negative* consequences of a potential British membership in the EEC, there is in the sources some thoroughly *positive* expressions: “[...] one can’t deny that there are, [...] the possibilities of gain.”¹⁰⁹⁰ During the first round of EEC talks, politicians and officials in the three Dominions hoped, on the one hand, that Britain would struggle for their interests. They were optimistic that Britain would not enter the Common Market under conditions that would harm them. On the other hand, they hoped for potential advantages. They reasoned that through British membership they might develop a larger market on the European continent, by receiving access through Britain to the other European countries. However, these advantages were very speculative.¹⁰⁹¹

In the sources for the EEC debates in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the following emotions related to emotional positions can be found: shock, mourning, incomprehension, desertion, surprise, trustfulness (and accordingly, mistrust), insecurity, anxiety, nostalgia, disappointment,

¹⁰⁸⁶ For this reason, sources from the time of the first round of British membership talks predominate in this work – these represent the largest quantity of sources.

¹⁰⁸⁷ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 18: Department of External Affairs, Outward savingram, 8 September, 1971.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Cf. McEwen cited in the *Canberra Times*, 1 August 1961.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972.

¹⁰⁹⁰ NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview Given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, filmed on 24 June, 1962, broadcast on 25 June, 1962.

¹⁰⁹¹ Cf. *Ibid.*

sympathy, and hope. Further, the feeling of having been deceived. These emotions distributed themselves among the various groups of actors. While sympathy for Britain was found among private individuals and economic experts, the negative emotions of shock, sadness and dismay were felt, first and foremost, by the anglo-european male political elites. Since the focus of this work is on the policy makers, no sources for the emotional life in explicitly different circles of the population have been sought, thus the available sources are restricted to a few letters political figures and the analysis of a exemplary newspaper articles. For this reason, the source base is too thin to do more than outline tendencies in the societies of the Dominions. The Canadian example represents an exception since the mass of critical newspaper articles and letters offers a more clear picture than is the case with Australia and New Zealand. The following analysis concentrates, for this reason, primarily on the policy makers in the Dominions and only gives attention to other groups of actors if they emerge in the source materials.

The following points can be established in connection to the policy makers and other groups of actors: all persons were considered as agents that *feel* emotions, *deploy* emotions and/or were, in their actions, *influenced* by emotions. This concerns, above all, the anglo-european, male and educated political elites. Their emotions resulted from a confluence of the events already described (EEC debates, withdrawal of British troops, etc.) and their collective background. Almost all had familial relations in Britain; they had served in the Second World War, or had been educated in whole or, at least in part, in Britain. On account of these networks and familial backgrounds, many felt themselves personally connected to Britain; but the framework of this emotional community was also reinforced by education in schools that was oriented around Britain and emotional practices within the Dominions such as the singing of national anthems or the royal tours of the Queen through the three states. The closeness of relations to political elites to Great Britain is evident in the fact that the Foreign Ministry in Canada, up to 1967, had no “British desk”; relations to the motherland were handled as “home affairs.”¹⁰⁹²

‘Community’ was a matter of the ‘transnational emotional community’ that was established, strengthened, and affirmed by the meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Ministers or High Commissioners. These meetings constituted a space for mutual exchanges and the affirmation of belonging to the group of Commonwealth nations. There is no available term to describe the feelings that arose among the members at such meetings. Neither in English, nor in German is there

¹⁰⁹² Cf. Greg Donaghy and John Hilliker, "Canadian Relations with the United Kingdom at the End of Empire, 1956-73," in: Canada and the End of Empire, ed. Phillip Buckner, p. 25-46 (Vancouver/Toronto 2005), p. 25.

a distinct term for the feelings that arose during a Commonwealth conference. For this reason, one reaches for helper terms such as ‘commonwealth feeling,’ ‘connectedness to the Commonwealth,’ and other such terms. That these feelings had an effect can be shown by the case of John Diefenbaker and his announcement that Canada would divert 15 percent of its exports to Britain.¹⁰⁹³ Thus, at these meetings the Commonwealth became manifest and affirmed its significance. Contemporaries described the meetings as “family gatherings” or “meetings of a special sort.”¹⁰⁹⁴ Nonetheless, no specific term was coined for the relations among political actors within the Commonwealth, so that one must use metaphors or auxiliary terms to them perceptible. Certainly, a general understanding within this emotional community existed that proceeded from the “natural”¹⁰⁹⁵ (trade) relationships between Britain and the Dominions. Keith Holyoake described this “natural connection” in July of 1961 to an audience in the New Zealand parliament as follows: I need not talk about the ties of Commonwealth – the ties of blood, loyalty, race, and all the rest of them that exist between Britain and the other Commonwealth countries, ties which have been formed, tried, and tested in peace and in war. Although these are emotional matters we cannot divorce them from our consideration of this question, especially in New Zealand, because we place such a high value on the special relationship between us and Britain. That relationship is not only a matter of tradition, blood, culture, and partnership, but it also rests – and I want to stress this particularly tonight – on an economic relationship vital to our very existence. The British market provides the basis of our prosperity, indeed of our very livelihood.¹⁰⁹⁶

Keith Holyoake expressly mentions in this speech the intertwining of “natural circumstances” such as blood relations, cultural commonality, and trade policy. The relationship to Britain and within the Commonwealth were of a familial nature, since the individual members were bound by economic interdependency as well as their affiliations and tradition. The prosperity of New Zealand was dependent on the British market, and, for this reason, was of particular significance to the economic stability of the Dominions. For policy makers in the Dominions, the relationship to Great Britain was thought to exist upon a natural and unquestionable basis. When the EEC debates unsettled these “natural” connections and “feelings of Commonwealth solidarity,” actors sought to express the reasons why they felt affronted and wounded; they felt that Britain had

¹⁰⁹³ Cf. Chapter 3.1.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Cf. ANZ AEFZ 22620 W5727/176 206/: Prime Minister’s Broadcast on Visit Overseas, 31 March, 1960.

¹⁰⁹⁵ McEwen, *Australia’s Overseas Economic Relationships*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Parliament New Zealand, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) First Session, Thirty-third Parliament, 29 June - 5 July 1961* (Wellington, 1961), p. 470.

betrayed and abandoned them. A relationship that was once perceived as natural was already devastated by the first round of membership talks. The previous Secretary of the Australian Department of Trade, John Crawford, noted that after the first failed negotiations with Brussels: “Our psychology has been changed. We will never be the same as we were before we were given a shake-up by British application.”¹⁰⁹⁷

For the groups of actors investigated by this study, it can be stated that the EEC debates not only represented a threat on the *economic* and *political* planes, but rather they also threatened the framing aspects of emotional rootedness on both an individual and collective emotional plane. Previous affiliations were suppressed, and the feelings of belonging to Britain, from this point onward, appeared to be false. The EEC debates challenged political actors in the former settler colonies to, on one side, confront British membership in the EEC with trade policy solutions and, on the other, to achieve a new sense of personal and collective rootedness for an entire emotional community, whose basic premises had become, through the EEC debates, outmoded, incorrect and backwards looking.¹⁰⁹⁸ Simultaneously, the emotional sensibilities of this community influenced the responses of policy makers to the British rapprochement with Europe. The case of Sir Alexander Downer has shown that diplomats from the Dominions felt personally wounded, and for this reason expressed themselves as against British accession in public speeches and on other occasions. The feeling of having been betrayed, therefore, motivated political actors to act publicly in their interests. At the time of its announcement, British negotiations emerged as a threat on an emotional level, thus, as an ‘acute’ threat – policy makers felt immediate feelings of betrayal, deception and abandonment.

The British approach to Europe was therefore felt as an *immediate* threat that provoked reactions such as that of Alexander Downer. In contrast, the British announcement was, in economic and political terms, a *future* threat: “[...] if Great Britain is to go into the European Community, if Great Britain is to accede to the Treaty of Rome, then [...]”¹⁰⁹⁹ The use of conditional sentences alludes to the future dimension of this threat, but these future threats elicited an immediate emotional

¹⁰⁹⁷ Cited in Ward, „A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship“, p. 176.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Denis Smith, in his work on John Diefenbaker, goes so far as to state that the Canadian approach to the EEC debates were, for the most part, the product of Diefenbaker’s own emotions; Diefenbaker’s enthusiasm for Britain, his trauma over British withdrawal, and his anxiety over financial repercussions had significant influence on the Canadian government’s response. Cf. Smith, *Rogue Tory. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker*, p. 422.

¹⁰⁹⁹ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 5: Speech by the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, to the Greater Wollongong Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 July, 1962.

response in the present. Anxiety over these anticipated threats was *acute* and a motivation to action. On account of this, policy makers in all three Dominions formulated the strategies that were described in Chapter 3.2.

During the EEC debates, however, emotions acquired more functionality than the motivation to act in a threatening situation. The most striking emotional responses to the EEC membership talks at the beginning of the 1960s were in Canada. On this point, one can refer, in particular, to the above-mentioned conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Accra in September 1961, during which the conduct of George Hees and Donald Fleming was especially conspicuous. In the *Calgary Herald*, their actions were described in the following manner:

It cannot be expected, [...], that the plea of Hon. George Hees, Canada's trade minister, entered at a meeting of the Commonwealth economic conference in Ghana on Wednesday, will carry very much weight. Mr. Hees based his appeal on what must be considered sentiment rather than on cold business facts. And the decision Britain is bound to make is one governed by practical considerations, not sentiment.¹¹⁰⁰

This article from the *Calgary Herald* made a clear distinction between “sentiment” and “cold business facts.” It made use of the classic distinction between emotional and rational planes. Instead of relying on cold and sober facts, the Canadian Minister Hees had concentrated on emotional means of argument, means that had little weight in this context, since they would not be taken seriously. In this situation, emotions had an obstructive impact that was counter-productive to Canadian interests. The *Globe & Mail* criticized explicitly the emotionalism behind these expressions: “Such emotionalism seems altogether excessive.”¹¹⁰¹

Even the already cited article of the Canadian Conference Board suggested that the worsening of relations between Great Britain and Canada could be blamed primarily on the *inappropriate* behaviour of Canadian politicians and diplomats. The “harsh words”¹¹⁰² of George Hees in Accra and the absence of the Canadian High Commissioner George Drew at an information meeting in London had led to a deterioration of the relations between the two countries. Also, the outrage of Donald Fleming over the fact that he had not received a speech by Edward Heath to read in advance

¹¹⁰⁰ *Calgary Herald*, 15 September, 1961. Indeed, not only the press criticized the behavior of the Ministers. A letter in response to the article from John Adam on 18 September 1961 expressed agreement with the author: “It [the article] expresses my sentiment exactly.” LAC RG20 Vol. 962 File T-7-1106: Letter from John L. Adam to George Hees, 18 September, 1961.

¹¹⁰¹ *The Globe & Mail*, 15 September, 1961.

¹¹⁰² LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article of the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

– a copy of which, according to British information, he had at his disposal – fueled the negative impression of the Canadians in Britain. The result of this was newspaper articles critical of Canada in general and of the Canadian cabinet in particular.¹¹⁰³ As an example of this, the article cited the *Sunday Times*: “No one wants to quarrel, but nobody seems able to keep on terms with the Canadian government.”¹¹⁰⁴

The article criticized first of all the emotionally loaded actions of the Canadian government – and in particular the Ministers, Hees and Fleming – as inappropriate. From this it is clear that the reproach of having reacted with too much emotion was, evidently, a valid point of criticism at the time. The display of emotions within Commonwealth relations was only acceptable to a certain degree. Many Canadian newspapers expressed disapproval of the conduct of the Ministers; several months after the events, media interest still remained.¹¹⁰⁵ The emphasis on emotions as a link between the individual countries would be accepted without criticism, but, in contrast, the use of emotions as a means of persuasion (the aggressive display of emotions, for instance, the outraged voices and expressive gestures) appeared to draw criticism, and, in some respects, delegitimated one’s position.

However, criticism of the Ministers Hees and Fleming, hailed not only from the side of Canadian newspapers and official quarters. In the files of the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce, there can be found numerous letters from scholars and students, who requested further information about the Common Market, and some letters to Ministers Hees and Fleming from private letter writers who condemned the behaviour of the Ministers:

It seems to me that the Commonwealth ministers in general, and the Canadian ministers in particular, are taking a view that would only suggest spoilt children. If the other parts of the Commonwealth had anything to offer Great Britain in exchange for the latter not joining the Common Market there might be some reasonable excuse for all this furore, but there is not a single suggestion of any concession [...].¹¹⁰⁶

¹¹⁰³ Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁵ The mass of newspaper articles from diverse publications show that the article can be reckoned as representative for Canadian public opinion. For further examples, see *The Globe & Mail*, 12 September, 1961: “M. Flemings Song of Woe; *Ottawa Journal*, 14 September, 1961: “Fleming Warns Commonwealth Facing Disaster”; *The Gazette*, 14 September, 1961: “Hees Leads Attack On UK Move To Common Market”; *The Globe & Mail*, 15 September, 1961: “Lamentations at Accra”; *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 September, 1961: “U.K. Must Choose, Commonwealth Or Bloc – Fleming.” Also see, *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 January, 1962.

¹¹⁰⁶ LAC RG20 Vol. 962 File T-7-1106: Letter of John L. Adam to George Hees, 18 September, 1961.

Within the letter, the author John Adam again deploys, on the one hand, the image of the Commonwealth family, in which the Dominions occupy the role of children, while Great Britain represents the mother; on the other hand, Adam reproaches his own government for behaving in a particularly egregious and unsuitable fashion when compared to the other Commonwealth lands. Their conduct was especially immoderate, since the Dominions, for their part, could not even offer Britain an alternative means of expanding their trade without the EEC. The letter again demonstrates that the type and manner of criticism that was brought forward by the Canadian minister fell outside of the accepted norms of ministerial conduct and thus left them open to criticism. The comparison of the position taken by the Ministers in Accra with the negatively charged behavior of a spoiled – and ill-mannered – child, devalued the position of Hees and Fleming, reproaching them with immature behavior and ensuring that their arguments would not be taken seriously. Had the two Canadian representatives at least been able to offer Britain an alternative to the Common Market, then the behavior would have been excusable and, in some respects, understandable. However, their position lacked substance and was untenable. The representatives of the Canadian government acted not on the same plane as Britain, but rather their – and Canada’s – role. Criticism of the ministers within Canada thus referred, above all, to the *inappropriate conduct*, which had put their country in a bad light and amounted to unprofessional diplomacy.¹¹⁰⁷

Indeed, the reactions of the Ministers were perceived and criticized as outlandish not only within Canada. To some degree, their actions met with incomprehension round the globe, what policy makers in Wellington understood.¹¹⁰⁸ Thus, actors in New Zealand observed that the Canadian response coming from John Diefenbaker and his ministers had been “emotional rather than reasoned.”¹¹⁰⁹ Although Canada had the least to lose in economic terms, it had reacted with the most emotion and vehemence.¹¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰⁷ The argument that Canadian policy makers should not contradict British emissaries, since basically every British decision were to be supported (Chapter 3.1), does not appear in the sources pertaining to Accra.

¹¹⁰⁸ “The New York Times said – it is hard to see why the Australians are making so much fuss. The “Washington Post” said – There has been some feeling that the cries of panic have been overdone.” NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community Gough Whitlam, M.P. on Australia and the European Common Market, Parliament Debates, 9 August, 1962.

¹¹⁰⁹ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

¹¹¹⁰ “Although Canada was at first the most outspoken of the Commonwealth countries in opposing Britain joining the EEC, it would be one of the least affected by such entry.” Ibid.

The *Financial Times*, in contrast, reported on the incident in Accra with some understanding for the three Dominions – their angst concerning the breaking up of the “family”¹¹¹¹ should be taken seriously in London. Although the anxiety was “sentimental and unreasonable,”¹¹¹² it was nonetheless real.¹¹¹³ In all three states, newspapers as well as political and diplomatic actors perceived emotional aspects within the EEC debates. To be sure, with the exception of the persons feeling them, the observed emotions were mostly evaluated as negative and felt to have been detrimental to an exchange of political views.

This impression would be confirmed by later events. In addition to the conduct of the Canadian ministers in Accra, the absence of the Canadian *High Commissioner* in London, George Drew, from an informational meeting of Commonwealth deputies in London in November 1961, represented a *faux pas*.¹¹¹⁴ The *Ottawa Citizen* thus reported on this incident:

Mr. Drew Stamps His Foot – Canadian diplomacy achieved a new level of kindergarten spite over the past weekend, if one is to believe the version given to reporters by Canada House. Mr. George Drew, our High Commissioner in London, rudely declined to attend a meeting at which Mr. Edward Heath gave Commonwealth diplomats a report on the British position on the negotiations with the European Common Market.¹¹¹⁵

The Canadian diplomat had, by his absence, embarrassed and affronted the British government.¹¹¹⁶ The behavior of Drew was portrayed, in this article, as extremely impolite (“rudely”) and childish (“kindergarten”). It was apparent that in this instance diplomatic protocols had not been maintained, and this was interpreted as a direct critique of British policy. The image of the foot-stamping High Commissioner also contributed to the image of a raging child that felt itself unfairly treated and wished to make this known to its mother. This source demonstrates the double function of emotions in the EEC debates. On the one hand, they reflected the anger felt by Commonwealth representatives at British actions, on the other, this emotional display was used to criticize the behavior of the persons involved.

From this episode, followed a media echo in Great Britain and Canada. Thus, a *Globe & Mail* article of 11 November, 1961 was entitled: “Drew Snubs U.K. Briefing on Common Market

¹¹¹¹ *Financial Times*, 16. September 1961.

¹¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹¹³ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁴ Cf. LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article of the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

¹¹¹⁵ George Drew denied that he had wanted to rebuff the British through his absence. See, *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 November, 1961 and 15 November, 1961.

¹¹¹⁶ Cf. *Globe & Mail*, 11 November, 1961.

Talks”;¹¹¹⁷ and an article in the *Montreal Gazette* on 13 November, 1961: “U.K. Press Disturbed by Canada.”¹¹¹⁸ Thereupon, George Drew himself sent an excerpt from the lead article of the *Daily Express* that described the incident:

A long-simmering row between Canada and Britain over the Common Market exploded into the open yesterday. Mr. George Drew, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, pointedly stayed away from an urgent meeting called by the Commonwealth relations secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, and the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Edward Heath. This was Mr. Drew’s way of making clear his dissatisfaction with Britain over inadequate consultation with the Commonwealth on the move to join the market.¹¹¹⁹

The absence of the Canadian High Commissioner clearly was perceived by English journalists as unusual and as critical. Moreover, the article suggested that the incident represented more than a one-time disagreement, but rather was part of a long-term, subterranean discord between Canada and Britain. The absence of the High Commissioner was thus equated with an “explosion.”

Of interest was the fact that it was not only the Canadian High Commissioner who missed the conference, but also the Australian and New Zealand High Commissioner:

Australia’s High Commissioner, Sir Eric Harrison, and New Zealand’s, Mr. T.L. Macdonald, also stayed away. Explanation given for Sir Eric: Quote He went away on holiday this morning Unquote. For Mr. Macdonald quote slightly ill. Unquote. They also sent their deputies. Mr. Drew has sounded public warnings on the British Govt’s BID to join the Common Market. Behind the scenes he has made strong calls for Britain to come a lot cleaner on her talks with the Six.¹¹²⁰

Apparently, the Australian and New Zealand representatives had, in contrast to the Canadian High Commissioner, followed the custom and excused themselves from the meeting. For this reason, their absence was not viewed as an affront and was relatively unremarked.

In connection to this episode, Diefenbaker demanded by telegram and telephone that Drew make a public statement that he in no way had intended his actions as a rebuff to the British government – Drew complied. Nonetheless, the episode demonstrated the difficulties that Diefenbaker faced when coordinating the statements of high-ranking members of his staff, in particular, when his own feelings were mixed, and he could, for that reason, impart no clear instructions.¹¹²¹

¹¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁸ *Montreal Gazette*, 13 November, 1961.

¹¹¹⁹ LAC RG25 Vol. 5515 File 12447-40: Article from the *Daily Express*, November 1961, cited in a telegram from George Drew to Ottawa, 11 November, 1961.

¹¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹¹²¹ Cf. Smith, *Rogue Tory. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker*, p. 425

In subsequent events, Canadian ministers made efforts to downplay the emotional reactions. The Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming, offered an example of this before the Canadian Club of Winnipeg in January 1962:

It has been alleged in some quarters that Canada has somehow shown hostility towards the United Kingdom in connection with their negotiations for accession to the European Common Market. I would like to say now, clearly, emphatically and without equivocation, that such charges are completely and utterly devoid of any foundation in truth. At no time has there been anything remotely approaching coolness or hostility in our relations with the United Kingdom.¹¹²²

In the same speech, Fleming once again dealt with the meeting Accra in September 1961, and he dismissed all reproaches concerning aggressive conduct from the Canadian side.¹¹²³ Evidently, the events in Accra had so strongly contravened the customary codes of behaviour within these political circles, that it had left an impression in the collective memory. The reproach of having reacted with too much emotion, in some respects, with too much aggression to the potential British negotiations, appeared to have been a valid reason for criticizing the Canadian minister. Apparently, there was a general convention concerning what was, and what was not, an “appropriate” reaction.

However, it was not only the Canadian reaction that provoked discord between Great Britain and the Dominions. The reactions in all three states created conflict among decision makers, since these reactions were, in part, interpreted as inappropriate.¹¹²⁴ The, at times, heated emotional reaction in Australia readily surprised the British ambassador, Duncan Sandys during his visit to the Dominions in 1961. Thus, the *Herald* on 10 July, 1961 had the headline, “Strength of Aust. Objections Surprises Sandys.”¹¹²⁵ The conversations with the Australian ministers and Prime Minister Menzies were often fraught with difficulties on account of the divergent views among the participating parties. Still, even here there are voices to be found that were critical of the emotional nature of the debate over British membership application. For instance, a letter from an Australian reader that appeared on 16 August, 1961 with the title, “Do not Weep... It is Chronic,”¹¹²⁶ deplored the tone of the debate. The writer criticized a speech by Prime Minister Robert Menzies and its melancholy note of resignation. Menzies’ delivery would be appropriate for an “elder son

¹¹²² LAC MG32-B1 Vol. 42: Speech by Donald Fleming, Canadian Club of Winnipeg, 19 January, 1962.

¹¹²³ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁴ Cf. NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community Gough Whitlam, M.P. on Australia and the European Common Market, Parliamentary Debates, 9 August, 1962.

¹¹²⁵ *The Herald*, 10 July, 1961

¹¹²⁶ NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community Gough Whitlam, M.P. on Australia and the European Common Market, Parliamentary Debates, 9 August, 1962.

expressing the family reaction to the news that a widowed father is about to go through a second marriage with a spirited and possessive woman,” however, not for a head of state.¹¹²⁷ Instead, the situation demanded a dynamic handling of problems. The situation was inevitable, and therefore it ought not to be confronted with nostalgia and resignation.¹¹²⁸

Menzies himself dismissed reproaches of an emotional Australian reaction. In a speech before the Parliament on 16 October, 1962, he stated: “Suggestions of panic, sometimes heard in Australia, are absurd. We are a sturdy and resourceful people.”¹¹²⁹ He had already warned Australian industry to not fall into a panic: “[...] don’t get into that frame of mind.”¹¹³⁰ John McEwen also stated that Australia would approach the British with a “constructive attitude,”¹¹³¹ and emphasized that he would not lean against Britain in mourning, “[...] not sobbing at mother’s skirts pleading to be looked after.”¹¹³²

However, the dismissal of the Minister of Air and Minister Assisting the Treasurer,¹¹³³ Leslie (“Les”) Bury in July 1962 demonstrated that, in spite of the rejection of panic, someone who publicly characterized the problem of a British membership in the EEC as minor, would have no place in the administration.¹¹³⁴ Bury had publicly stated that the downside for Australia of a British accession to the Common Market was being exaggerated by the government, and that the ¹¹³⁵long-

¹¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹¹²⁸ Cf. Ibid.

¹¹²⁹ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 5: The Prime Ministers’ Conference and the Common Market. Ministerial Statement [From the “Parliamentary Debates”], 16 October, 1962.

¹¹³⁰ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 5: Speech by the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, to the Greater Wollongong Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 July, 1962.

¹¹³¹ McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 14.

¹¹³² NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen at the Annual Building Industry Congress, Melbourne, 17 August, 1962.

¹¹³³ Cf. ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

¹¹³⁴ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on Channel 7, Perth, 30 July, 1962.

¹¹³⁵ Cf. Miller, *The EEC and Australia*, p. 89. Bury was not alone in this opinion. Some Australian actors were convinced that the effects on the Australian economy would remain minor, since the trade in wool products would not be affected, and Australia increasingly exported minerals to Japan. Cf. NAA A1838 727/4 Part 4: Alan Renouf, Australian Embassy Brussels to the Secretary Department of External Affairs Canberra, 15 June, 1961. The friction between Robert Menzies and Leslie Bury is recognizable in their correspondence. In a letter from 27 July, 1962, Menzies reproved the Minister for positioning himself against the opinion of the cabinet as well as that of John McEwen and his own. Since “ministerial responsibility” and “cabinet solidarity” were the basis of the Australian system of government and, in consideration of the upcoming Prime Ministers’ Conference and further negotiations, the Australian government could not allow the presence of a minister with opposing convictions. For this reason, Menzies requested that Bury submit his resignation (“I must, with unfeigned regret, ask you for your resignation”) NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Leslie Bury to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 27 July, 1962. Bury, however, received no noteworthy support from his own party (Liberal Party). Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/162 BRU 46/9/2/9 1: J. Shepherd High Commission Canberra to New Zealand Mission to the EEC, Brussels, 30 July, 1962.

term impact of membership would outweigh the short-term problems for trade. This could not be tolerated by the Menzies government, because it jeopardized their negotiating position.¹¹³⁶ Menzies thereupon called on Bury to tender his resignation. The minister complied.¹¹³⁷

It was a central concern of the Australian government to represent its interests with one voice.¹¹³⁸ New Zealand observers, however, stated that the initiative to dismiss Bury had come from John McEwen, who looked on Bury as a rival and tolerated no dissenting views in connection to the problem of the Common Market. McEwen had for this reason forced Menzies to compel Bury to relinquish his office.¹¹³⁹ The speculations of the New Zealanders demonstrates that the strong estimate they had of McEwen's influence on Australian politics. According to their opinion, McEwen had sufficient power to determine who would occupy government posts. Evidence for this New Zealand theory, however, are not to be found in the sources examined from Canberra.

In contrast to New Zealand policy makers, Australian and, in particular, Canadian ministers and diplomats voiced their vehement displeasure with the British announcement of the opening of membership talks. Canada and Australia had, of course, to reckon with difficulties for specific branches of industry, but their economic stability did not appear to be seriously endangered. Thus, the question arose as to why government representatives of both of these countries reacted with so much emotion. A potential explanation for the strong emotional response of the Canadian minister is offered by the article by the Canadian Conference Board, already cited on several occasions. In connection to the criticism of the Minister, the article sought to find the reason behind the minister's inappropriate conduct. According to the article, the reasons for this were to be found in the prevailing situation in Canada; during the 1960s, Canada began to be confronted with economic problems that were remediable by traditional political strategies.¹¹⁴⁰ The country stood before a "turning point"¹¹⁴¹ in its economic interests – perhaps in its political and cultural structures as well.¹¹⁴² The reasons for Canada's problematic situation lay, among other causes, in its relationship

¹¹³⁶ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Common Market Effects on Rural Industries, Statement by the Rt. Hon. J. McEwen (for Press), Canberra, 26 July, 1961.

¹¹³⁷ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 2: Leslie Bury to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 27 July, 1962.

¹¹³⁸ Cf. McEwen, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives*, p. 14.

¹¹³⁹ Cf. ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

¹¹⁴⁰ "[...] Canada is at present faced with economic difficulties of impressive dimension, to which its traditional policies seem to offer no adequate solution." LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Article of the Canadian Conference Board for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

¹¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁴² "[...] the country has reached a turning-point in its economic – and perhaps even political and cultural – affairs, [...]." Ibid.

to the USA. Canada had long struggled with its position vis-à-vis its powerful neighbor. The ambivalent relationship of dependence and delimitation had been shaken by the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s. The Canadian attempt to build trade relations with lands outside of North America met with a persistent lack of success, while trade with the USA grew constantly, as did American investments in Canada. Since 1956, moreover, Canadian manufacturers suffered from market difficulties, global competition, and the gap between capacity and returns. In part, these difficulties derived from a sustained expansion within its borders, and land development. In addition, however, structural maladjustments to the situation continued to be the general problem, since such strategies were rooted in views about progress in Canada from the late 1940s and early 1950s.¹¹⁴³

For this reason, the country was on the search for a “new formula”¹¹⁴⁴ that could orient and link together lines of policy. In part, the “national psychology”¹¹⁴⁵ had already accommodated itself to the changing conditions. Nonetheless, the rethinking and renovation of economic structures in Canada had not yet penetrated far enough into the actual development of economic foundations. The “new thinking” was to be found primarily among the public and economic actors. This “revolution in public and business thinking”¹¹⁴⁶ was likewise shared by parts of the Canadian government, officials, and independent research institutes.

The reactions of Hees and Fleming should be integrated within this context, since they belonged to the “bewildered groupings of men”¹¹⁴⁷ who had lost their patterns of orientation as change took hold around them. Their conduct, for this reason, is to be understood as a reaction to domestic transformations, and not as an attempt to hinder the membership of Great Britain in the Common Market.¹¹⁴⁸ The authors of the article did not place the actions of the Minister within the international context of the EEC debates, but rather within the framework of *national* politics.

Another explanation for the conspicuous behaviour of the Canadians is the – relatively – low risk that British membership in the EEC might have for Canadian export trade. For the Canadian economy, in comparison to New Zealand and Australia, there was relatively less at stake (excepting certain branches of industry), so that the Canadians were less dependent on the good will of Great

¹¹⁴³ An example of the structural problems of this period would be the persistent enthusiasm of investors who put their resources into unpromising industries. Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁷ Who h

¹¹⁴⁸ “[...] who have lost their bearings [...]” Ibid.

Britain during the negotiations as were the New Zealanders. Instead, they could bluntly voice their criticism, since Great Britain was not the basis of their economy.

This argument, however, also functions in the reverse direction. Precisely because the Canadians did not have to fear economic repercussions, they could not argue on the basis of high levels of damage, but rather had recourse to “emotional” arguments and their irrational expressions. A further explanation for the behaviour of the Canadians, which is not readily demonstrable from the available sources, is that the special relationships existing between the Commonwealth states (informal, familiar) appear to have permitted such emotional outbursts. The lack of defined protocols inside the Commonwealth expanded the range of possible behaviour. For this reason, at the Commonwealth conferences, the space for “emotional speech” extended wider than it did at meetings with other heads of government. Moreover, it was possible that the actions of the Canadians attested to different emotional parameters in politics and a distinct “national code of conduct.” While New Zealanders were relatively proud of their comparatively restrained (in comparison to the Australians) and less direct course of action, so Canadian codes of conduct had more recourse to blunt statements.¹¹⁴⁹

Still, the at first highly emotional response of Canadian actors, as was observable in Accra, was superseded by the resigned position of the Canadian government only a short time later. According to New Zealand observers, the reasons for this shift were that large parts of the Canadian population were not in agreement with the emotive reactions of their government. The criticism of Diefenbaker and his administration over the attempt “to keep Britain out”¹¹⁵⁰ moved Ottawa in a different direction. Canadian industry responded positively to British accession to the EEC, since they strived, in general, for a liberalization of trade.¹¹⁵¹ Even Canadian labour unions and the spokesperson of the Farmer Associations were not resolutely opposed to British membership in the Common Market. The central theme for Canadians was the persistent unemployment, the absence of economic growth per capita during the previous six years, and the crisis of “overseas exchange.” For this reason, they were ready to test out new solutions.¹¹⁵²

The analysis thus far makes clear that the initially extreme reaction of ministers in Canada derived from their *personal sensibilities*. Emotional predispositions moved the ministers to speak publicly

¹¹⁴⁹ I owe thanks for this reference to remarks made by the Canadian historian, Philip Buckner, during the “End of Empire” conference in Tübingen in October 2018.

¹¹⁵⁰ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

¹¹⁵¹ Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁵² Cf. Ibid.

against a British rapprochement with Europe and to do so in an emotional fashion. Their emotional attitude thus informed their handling of the EEC debates from the beginning. They then had to modify their actions in the course of the debates for reasons of domestic political strategy.¹¹⁵³

Although the New Zealanders were conspicuous in terms of their emotional reactions, one still finds emotional aspects amid their response, even if it differed from the Canadian reaction in terms of type and method. New Zealand was reckoned as the “most British” of the three former settler colonies.¹¹⁵⁴ In its *Annual Review* from 1962/63, the Information Service in New Zealand reported that older New Zealanders still had a strong relationship to Great Britain and were proud of this connection – more so than the old generations in Australia and Canada. The younger generations, however, were more distant from Britain in emotional terms.¹¹⁵⁵ Within New Zealand society, the Information Service thus noted a connectedness to Britain that was stronger than in Australia and Canada. Furthermore, for the New Zealanders emotional arguments were a strong component of soft-power strategy, and thus “sentiment”¹¹⁵⁶ was a central factor in the New Zealand approach to the EEC debates. While politicians and officials stressed, on the one hand, the dependency of New Zealand on the British market, on the other, they emphasized the special relationship between the Antipode and the motherland ought to produce some understanding for the potential economic difficulties of New Zealand. Furthermore, the reference to the special relations of both countries should foster *sympathy*, that is, a *close emotional connectedness*. With the oft-repeated discursive emphasis of dependency, New Zealand actors thus tried to engender a specific *emotional reaction* on the part of British actors and the public. The New Zealand government, nonetheless, did not subscribe to the naïve assumption that Britain would be able to protect them in this instance. Instead, they pursued a strategy that Deputy Prime Minister John Marshall described with the following words: “New Zealand puts her trust in British assurances but is keeping her powder dry.”¹¹⁵⁷ The feeling of solidarity between the Commonwealth states was used to engender and strengthen feelings of responsibility to New Zealand. Emotions were, in this case, clearly deployed as part of a distinct political strategy that would give birth to the appropriate feelings.

¹¹⁵³ Cf. Ward, “A Matter of Preference: The EEC and Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship,” p. 169.

¹¹⁵⁴ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: New Zealand Mission to the European Communities (Brussels) to Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Wellington), 7 November, 1975.

¹¹⁵⁵ Cf. TNA DO 192/12: Annual Review of Information Service 1962/63, sent by the British High Commission (Wellington) to the Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 17 September, 1963.

¹¹⁵⁶ *Dominion*, 3 June, 1971.

¹¹⁵⁷ Cited in Ward, “A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship,” p. 164.

However, this did not prevent New Zealand policy makers – public statements aside – from criticizing the British administration. Thus, Heath told the US ambassador, David Bruce, that the New Zealanders were “polite in public and rude in private.”¹¹⁵⁸ Publicly, they consistently evinced their confidence in Great Britain, however, in private conversations with British emissaries, they let their criticisms become known in order to persuade the British and the Six to offer special conditions. Even Australian policy makers used emotions in connection with common history, friendship, and other factors as a strategic “sentiment card,”¹¹⁵⁹ with which they attempted to advance their interests. During the first round of membership talks, the Menzies government tried to use the pull of emotional arguments to apply pressure on the British government.¹¹⁶⁰ This occupied, however, a lesser role in Canberra’s strategy when compared to the New Zealanders. When the first and second rounds of negotiations are compared, it becomes clear that there is a shift in relation to the quantity and intensity of the emotional aspects of the response in all three countries. One of the reasons for the levelling out of the emotionality in the EEC debate was that in Canada and Australia altered patterns of trade were taking hold; Canada promoted the diversification of trade so that the British market would further lose its significance. Moreover, from the middle of the 1960s, other themes prevailed in political discourse. The conflict between English and French speaking Canadians, the latter who sought their own national identity, and the relationship to the USA, dominated political debates in Ottawa.¹¹⁶¹

Economic conditions also changed in Australia. The “mineral boom” of the 1970s, paved the way for an economic upswing that mitigated the consequences of the British approach to Europe.¹¹⁶² Furthermore, in contrast the situation in 1961, it was admissible for political actors to describe the repercussions of a British accession as *not* altogether catastrophic for the Australian economy -- as Les Bury had done earlier. In June 1972, the Minister for Trade and Industry, J. D. Anthony, commented in a speech before the Australian-British Trade Association that the Australian economy “as a whole would not be irreparably damaged”¹¹⁶³ by British membership in the EEC. In relation to the strategy of the Australian government, there had taken place an adjustment in the

¹¹⁵⁸ Cited in *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵⁹ Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 6.

¹¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶¹ During this time, the debate over the relationship to Great Britain took place much more in the private as opposed to the public realm, as José Igartua has demonstrated: cf. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution. National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*, p. 1-16.

¹¹⁶² Cf. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung*, p. 162.

¹¹⁶³ LAC RG19-F-2 5384 File 8625-04-7: J.D. Anthony, Address Australian/British Trade Association, 28 June, 1972.

perception of the EEC debates; instead of an abrasive position and assertions of the consequences for the Australian economy, Anthony struck a milder tone. However, he made exceptions concerning particular branches of industry: for sugar cane growers of Queensland, for the producers of dried and canned fruit, for the Tasmanian fruit growers and for Australian dairy farmers, British membership in the EEC represented a great hardship.¹¹⁶⁴ The effects of the British rapprochement with Europe thus, according to Anthony, were concentrated on specific branches of industry and did not concern the entire national economy.

In the course of the three rounds of negotiations between Britain and the EEC, not only did the basic framework change, but also the composition and the emotional equipage of the policy makers. At the end of the 1960s – and continuing into the 1970s – there was a generational shift among those serving in political and diplomatic postings. The number of persons in the Dominions who were born in the Dominions was constantly diminishing.¹¹⁶⁵ The younger generations in the Dominions no longer had the same strong feelings of belonging to Britain as did the parental generation: “The old traditional links between Canada and Britain have little meaning for the new generation of Canadians [...]”¹¹⁶⁶

Since the Second World War an entire generation came of age had emerged that had no direct personal experiences of the relationship to Britain in the war.¹¹⁶⁷ In the early 1970s on a trip through the countries of the “old commonwealth,” the journalist Leslie Hannon had not found the anticipated “grief”¹¹⁶⁸ over the separation from Britain, but rather there was a “quite literal joy and palpable excitement at a flowering of national spirit.”¹¹⁶⁹ This feeling, according to Hannon, was for some years still reckoned as a “betrayal” of the motherland (“treason”)¹¹⁷⁰ by Australian, Canadian and New Zealand society.¹¹⁷¹

Of particular significance was the change among policy makers in response to Pierre Elliott Trudeau who was sworn in as the Canadian Prime Minister on 20 April 1968. Trudeau and his

¹¹⁶⁴ Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁵ This was also observed by the Canadian Finance Minister, Walter Gordon, in the mid-1960s: “[...] these ties [to Great Britain] have been weakening and are bound to weaken further as the number of Canadians who were born in Britain declines as a proportion of the total population [...]” Walter Gordon, *A Choice for Canada. Independence or Colonial Status* (Toronto/Montreal 1966), p. 5.

¹¹⁶⁶ TNA FCO 13/573: The British Council Canada, Representative’s Annual Report 1971/2, June, 1972.

¹¹⁶⁷ Cf. Walter, *A Choice for Canada. Independence or Colonial Status*, p. 5.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Saturday Night*, December 1972.

¹¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁷¹ Cf. Ibid.

collaborators belonged, as he described himself, to a generation of “new guys with new ideas.”¹¹⁷² They drew strength from their vision, and their ideas for Canada’s future derived from experiences from the country itself, and no longer felt Britain to be a homeland. Their generation had primarily been socialized in Canada, so that the feeling of connectedness with the British isles was much less strong than had previously been the case. Moreover, the immigration system in the three countries had altered itself during this period, so that the population of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand was, from this point onward, no longer decisively shaped by its British heritage. New concepts of identity such as multiculturalism and the “new nationalism” promoted this change, so that it could find a footing on the basis of a separation from the British order. The “new nationalism” referred to a nationalism that got along without the British connection and stood for a self-conscious and independent state. It was constructed primarily upon the symbolic and formal manifestations of nationalism, such as official rituals, national holidays, flags and national anthems. At the same time, however, it included alterations in political concerns, such as, for example, citizenship, foreign policy, and the role of the state in “national culture.”¹¹⁷³

At the end of the 1960s, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Charles Ritchie, observed that: “We and the British were excellent friends who had known each other for a long time, but we’re no longer members of the same family.”¹¹⁷⁴ Relations between Great Britain and the Dominions – so often represented, affirmed, and availed upon as familial relations – appeared to have altered. Of course, the connections were still “excellent,” but instead of belonging to the same family, the relationship had gradually chilled and become a *friendship*. The fundamental and basic trust that was the basis of the familial relationship had changed. Up to this point, the three Dominions relied upon Britain. The EEC debates had made clear that Britain would, first and foremost, look to its own interests, and consider the needs of the Commonwealth states afterward. After having once been part of Britain’s “family,” the Commonwealth countries had become just “friends,” who could, on the whole, no longer have confidence in Britain’s good will. Instead, they had to increasingly take their *own* initiative in order to expand their trade networks and win new trading partners. Of course, they continued to assert in their public statements and within the

¹¹⁷² Cited in Donaghy, Halloran and Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984*, p. 3.

¹¹⁷³ Cf. Ward, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World,” p. 232.

¹¹⁷⁴ Cited in Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 210.

negotiations with Britain their trust in British policy. However, this had the purpose, above all, of obliging Britain to behave appropriately vis-à-vis the Dominions. By way of this shift from a familial relationship to one between friends, however, the unequal power relations inherent in the family metaphor were cancelled. The Dominions no longer had to look to Britain as the “motherland” and orient themselves around her. Instead, they acted as friends of equal standing. In light of the preceding account of the EEC debates in the Dominions, one cannot avoid the impression that the debates were primarily shaped by particular individuals (Diefenbaker, Menzies, McEwen, Marshall, Hees, Fleming, Drew, Downer, among others). Furthermore, it was common to all these individuals that they either expressed themselves often in the course of the debates (McEwen), or with particular vehemence and flamboyance (Drew, Hees, Fleming). Interestingly, it was, in particular, the High Commissioners in London who turned against these changes and created a media echo with their demonstratively emotional behaviour. The Canadian high Commission, George Drew, just as much as his Australian counterpart, Alexander Downer, stood out during the EEC debates on account of their emotionally charged and historical viewpoints. In particular, the case of Downer, as described above, turned upon the growing shift away from the familial relationship between Britain and the Dominions. Downer, both as an individual and in his position as the Australian High Commissioner in London, took on an important role. Nonetheless, his conduct and statements appear as the core of a disappearing *emotional community*, a *community* that defined itself by its connections to the Commonwealth, and its sense of belonging to a community of British peoples; these communal feelings were reaffirmed in Oxford and Cambridge, and at the Commonwealth conferences. London seemed to be a focal point for this feeling among the High Commissioners, a place where they experienced the British way of life and identified with it. Their connection to the motherland and the British discussions concerning accession to the EEC appear to have led them to pursue the maintenance of the Anglo-Australian, and Anglo-Canadian relationship.

The policy makers in the Dominions often acted without consulting the “persons in the second tier,” that is, the individual departmental employees or (trade) experts, as is demonstrated by the examples of John Diefenbaker, George Hees, and Donald Fleming. Since all of these figures were *elected* representatives of their party and country, it can be assumed that they were of the opinion that their conceptual, personal, and emotional frames of experience were transferable to and shared with their voters. In the course of the EEC debates, some of these policy makers recognized that their own framework of experience and *emotional community* was no longer the primary organizing

paradigm; they had to adjust their politics accordingly. Thus, for example, the Canadian government under Diefenbaker altered its views and their approach to the British government, because they were criticized by press and public, by representatives of industry and other politicians (such as the Liberal Party in opposition under the leadership of Lester Pearson) and, for this reason, saw their chances of re-election placed in jeopardy.

The situation took a different shape in New Zealand, as there the number of people who were affected by the strong economic links of New Zealand agriculture to the British market was fundamentally larger than in Canada. In the sources from New Zealand, one finds – apart from the arguments for soft-power strategy – almost no emotional outbreaks or outlandish behaviour on the part of policy makers. New Zealand could not afford to aggravate Great Britain with blunt statements, since they needed British support to obtain concessions from the negotiations with Brussels. In New Zealand, and especially in Australia, the EEC debates followed the respective trade Ministers, Jack Marshall and John McEwen, for a long time afterwards. In the case of McEwen, there are numerous sources that suggest he was, during the EEC debates, perceived as the primarily responsible party.¹¹⁷⁵ This demonstrates that individuals were more strongly attached to this theme because they had cared about it for a long period of time and had taken up the primary responsibility for it.

Of Deceived Spouses, Spoiled Children, and Mistrustful Friends

The sum of this discussion moves the emotional aspects that were internal to debate concerning trade policy into focus. It demonstrates that the most diverse emotions within this discussion played both a direct and indirect role; they informed it, and through them it was strengthened, or in some instances, weakened. Alongside the economic and political threats described in the previous chapters, the British rapprochement with Europe was thus an *emotional threat*, which put into question the connection to Britain and the “natural” familial relationship, and also framed political and economic decision making. The vehement reactions of policy makers in Australia and Canada are explainable as a response to an emotional threat. *Britishness* and the feeling of belonging to a community of British peoples shaped the politicians and diplomats from Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington at the beginning of the 1960s. The EEC debates thus threatened the feeling of belonging

¹¹⁷⁵ See footnote 641.

to Britain among a group of actors with strong personal attachments to the motherland, and, for this reason, shaped the course of the debates over British membership in the EEC.

Emotions were deployed in diverse ways by both private as well as official participants in the debates – reproaching a discussion participant on the basis of their high degree of emotionalism, could weaken or even delegitimize their argument. This was particularly observable in the condemnation of the actions of the Canadian ministers during the first round of EEC negotiations. Emotional arguments thus lost their effectiveness in the course of the debate, since they were increasingly subjected to criticism and were considered to be “unreasonable.”¹¹⁷⁶ Emotions were also used strategically, as the case of New Zealand had shown. With the discursive repetition of particular emotional narratives, such as confidence in Great Britain’s policy and the assertions of historical connection, New Zealand policy makers created and strengthened the emotional connections of Britain and the Six to the Antipode. Commonwealth solidarity was accepted as an argument and would not be labelled as untrue or without basis by any side in the EEC debates. It was unassailable, since it was built upon shared emotions. Such methods of argument embedded Britain within a network of responsibility and emotional solidarity. The motherland was thus obliged to negotiate in the interests of the New Zealand government. The establishment of this emotional solidarity on the part of New Zealand was successful, as it received the promised conditions. New Zealand thus did not only react passively to events in Europe, but rather attempted to actively influence developments in the Brussels negotiations. However, the success of the emotional strategy could only extend so far during the EEC debates, not so far as to impede Great Britain’s membership in the EEC, as some of the actors in the Dominions had perhaps hoped at the beginning.

The EEC debates, moreover, made clear that the exhibition of emotions within the political-diplomatic sector was very limited. Thus, the emotional outbursts of various individuals provoked surprise and confusion in the British administration, because they had not anticipated it in this form. This was exemplified, above all, in the absence of the Canadian High Commissioner, George Drew, from an informational meeting in London. Drew’s conduct had consequences for the diplomatic relations between Canada and Britain; within Canada it led to a debate between the ruling party and the opposition. It thus demonstrated that even individual emotions – which were embedded into the larger *emotional community* by leading Commonwealth personalities – could affect

¹¹⁷⁶ *Financial Times*, 16 September, 1961.

diplomatic relations. It was precisely within a community based upon personal relations (such as the Commonwealth) that individual emotions could have a wider impact, since the maintenance of these relations required them. The delimiting framework for these individual emotions was, however, the persisting vision of a community of British peoples that manifested itself at the Commonwealth conferences. For a long period of time, this emotional framework conferred a basic orientation for political conduct in the Commonwealth countries. With a potential British membership in the EEC, the foundations of this ordering framework were shaken, so that policy makers in the Dominions at first attempted to stabilize and preserve this framework, instead of searching for a new paradigm.

Individual cases such as those of the Australian High Commissioner, Alexander Downer, and the conduct of the Canadian Ministers, Fleming and Hees, demonstrate that in the 1960s through to the beginning of the 1970s, a change had taken place within the *emotional community* and within the emotional range of action for political and diplomatic actors. If at the beginning of the 1960s, political actors proceeded on the assumption that the contention that the Commonwealth family was significant for trade policy goals, in the later part of the decade, there was less support for that argument. Moreover, it could not be used to justify diplomatic behaviour that was outside of the accepted framework. The argument that Great Britain had a responsibility to the Commonwealth only had real political consequences – as in the case of New Zealand – if it was combined with verifiable evidence of economic damage.

In summary, it should be said that the EEC was an acute emotional threat for policy makers in the Dominions, a threat that could not be separated from the political and economic dangers. The consideration of emotions as its own level of analysis has therefore added a further dimension to previous levels of analysis, which can explain the reactions of Australia and Canada (in particular, the responses of particular diplomats and politicians). This can further attest to the connection between emotions and political, and in some respects, economic decision making, and thus the potency of emotions in relation to the conduct of policy makers is clear. There is no politics outside emotions, but on the contrary, diverse emotional communities exist within politics. Moreover, the analysis has shown that there can be emotional motives for policy initiatives, as the feared consequences of a British accession took shape. Furthermore, the analysis has demonstrated that the procedures of negotiation within Commonwealth systems of communication changed. In diplomatic relations, emotions were increasingly problematic and no longer a valid mode of argument.

Emotional threats alone, however, did not suffice to provoke a profound change and new orientation in the trade policy of the three countries. First, in the moment in which the emotional threat converged with economic, national, foreign policy, and international factors that destabilized the empire, a culmination of factors led to a fundamental rupture to trust in Great Britain. However, so long as the hope still persisted that the old order of the British Empire that had conferred meaning to the world could be reconstructed, change was prevented. Only when through the confluence of a diversity of factors, did the hope for a restitution of the old order die, thus allowing a new orientation in the former colonies. In the situations of crisis that have been described above, hope functioned as a *hindrance to change*. It was otherwise in terms of the hope for opportunity arising from the EEC negotiations. In the latter, hope had precisely the opposite effect and functioned as an *accelerator of change*. The hope for economic improvement that was expressed by actors throughout the Dominions stimulated policy among decision makers, enabling them to seek new trading partners and discuss alternatives to the British market.

Even today, the EEC debates make for emotional reactions. The question whether Great Britain had deceived the three Dominions continues to be a research theme, as for example in the work of David Hall.¹¹⁷⁷ In his dissertation, Hall questions the extent to which the EEC debates were advantageous for New Zealand, and directs his argument against research that reproach Great Britain for bringing an end to Commonwealth relations. Furthermore, over the last few years, questions concerning the relationship of Britain to the three Dominions in a post-Brexit age has been raised often in research presented at conferences devoted to the EEC debates in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, as well as in conversations with other researchers, and with private individuals. In such conversations, a measure of *schadenfreude* towards Britain is often perceptible. In the collective memories in Australia, for example, one discovers with some frequency the narrative of a British betrayal of its partners, for which “Brexit” is then a just punishment. A revival of Commonwealth trading relations, as is sometimes desired by the British side, appears to be more amusing to many people in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, rather than being taken as a serious possibility for future trade policy. By now, trade with Asia is much too lucrative to make the resumption of earlier trading relationships with Britain seem attractive.¹¹⁷⁸

¹¹⁷⁷ Hall, *Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy. New Zealand Primary Production, Britain and the E.E.C., 1945-1975*.

¹¹⁷⁸ Cf. Interview with Terence O’Brien in Wellington, 21 April 2017.

3.4. Of Disorientations, Insecurities, and Self-Confidence

In all three of the former settler colonies, threats on the emotional level affected feelings of belonging. Among the policy makers in Canberra, Ottawa and Wellington, there was a resultant feeling of abandonment and disorientation within the post-imperial world order.¹¹⁷⁹ These effects will be described in detail in the following chapter. Moreover, the strategic solutions that were actually adopted on the economic, political, and emotional level will be outlined, and their impact on the three Dominions will be elucidated.

Impact of the EEC Debates: Changes in the Relationship to Great Britain and to the Commonwealth

The following quotation of the New Zealand Minister of Overseas Trade, Jack Marshall, expresses a central problem of New Zealand's sense of belonging within Great Britain and Europe:

I [John Marshall] am not a visitor from outer space, but within the confines of the earth I could not have come from a greater distance than from my country in the South Pacific. But although separated by 12,000 miles, New Zealand is in other respects very close to Europe. We are in fact a European community in the antipodes.¹¹⁸⁰

This passage from the New Zealand Minister draws attention to the ambiguity of the distance between New Zealand and Europe, both in geographic and perceptual terms. Although New Zealand is spatially far removed from the European continent, in the 1960s New Zealand policy makers considered themselves to be European, and in a certain sense, living in a country that was close to Europe. Thus, in historical, cultural, economic, and political respects, New Zealand located itself in Europe, and in Great Britain in particular.¹¹⁸¹ For that reason, New Zealand, as Marshall stated, had “a continuous sense of identity with Europe.”¹¹⁸² Furthermore, he emphasized that soldiers from New Zealand had fought in both World Wars, and that the entire population had accepted food rationing in order to support Europe.¹¹⁸³ With such arguments, Marshall stressed the special relationship of New Zealand to the European continent, and to Britain in particular.

However, the relationship to Britain was, as Marshall established in the further course of his speech, one-sided. While New Zealand saw the significance of Europe, the Continent viewed its

¹¹⁷⁹ Cf. Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World," p. 259.

¹¹⁸⁰ NLW MS-Papers-1403-153/4: John Marshall, Consultative Assembly Council of Europe Straßburg, 25 September, 1962.

¹¹⁸¹ Cf. NLW MS-Papers-1403-153/3: Draft Section for Inclusion in Statement by Mr. Marshall, no date.

¹¹⁸² Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁸³ Ibid.

relationship to New Zealand as having no special importance.¹¹⁸⁴ The difficult “national” position of New Zealand was a consequence of the sensitive nature of its historical and economic relationships, and its geographical position. Marshall further stated that New Zealand, on account of the protection offered by Great Britain, could long ignore its spatial situation and have only a limited contact with Asia. This had altered since the end of the Second World War. Diplomatic contacts with Asia were of increasing importance. However, in spite of this he still described New Zealand as “not an Asian country,”¹¹⁸⁵ although he recognized that New Zealand was in the South Pacific and for that reason had to be more cognizant of its responsibility to the inhabitants of the Pacific islands.¹¹⁸⁶

For New Zealand policy makers, the British shift towards Europe thus represented a rupture among relations that they had believed to be secure. For a long period, New Zealand had been able to rely upon Great Britain (in issues of foreign policy and trade), but now it dawned their policy makers that in the future the country must accommodate itself to a separation from Britain.¹¹⁸⁷ The same was true for New Zealand’s neighbor, Australia, as was noted in a New Zealand Briefing paper from 1962:

Australia and New Zealand are the odd man out. No countries have benefited more from the Commonwealth connection than these geographically isolated dominions.¹¹⁸⁸

From the perception of policy makers in Canberra and Wellington, Australia and New Zealand shared the same fate of being situated on the margins of the globe (when viewed from Europe), and, as a result, far from their own cultural context. Therefore, both countries had profited greatly from the Commonwealth connection, since this established a bridge between Europe and the geographically distant Antipodes. It is worth noting that Australia and New Zealand considered themselves, in these sources, not as the *center*, but rather as the *periphery* of the world.

¹¹⁸⁴ “Europe is important to us. We cannot perhaps claim that New Zealand is so important to Europe.” NLW MS-Papers-1403-153/4: John Marshall, Consultative Assembly Council of Europe Straßburg, 25 September, 1962. By publicizing their positions, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand acted as quickly as they could to rectify the alarming situation posed by the fact that the Dominions were not all that important to Europe, and that their previous relations had lost their former significance. Cf. NLW MS-Papers-1403-154/3: K.S.C. Dodd to Mr. Marshall, London, 22 May, 1962. Still, one can find British support for the three countries. This is shown, for example, by a letter to John Marshall: “To sever our ties with our friends and allies in New Zealand and Australia is unthinkable, and we will fight with you all the way to prevent this happening.” NLW MS-Papers-1403-154/3: Letter by Mrs. Baumont, 222 [sic] May 1962 to Mr. Marshall.

¹¹⁸⁵ NLW MS-Papers-1403-153/3: Mr. Marshall’s Visit to the United Kingdom and Europe, no date.

¹¹⁸⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸⁷ Cf. NLW MS-Papers-0274-034D: New Zealand and the Common Market, Lookout, A Review of International Affairs (National Broadcasting Service), 8 July, 1961.

¹¹⁸⁸ ANZ AAFD 811 W3738/1135 CAB 129/13/1: Briefing Paper for the New Zealand Delegation, Wellington, August 1962.

During the EEC debates, Australian policy makers felt themselves to be more isolated than they had ever been before in geographic, political and cultural terms.¹¹⁸⁹ Due to their spatial distance from London, it was of great importance for Australian politicians to nurture their direct contacts with the British government. These contacts could, for example, be solidified by visits from politicians and diplomats in Great Britain that bridged over the distance to the motherland. Thus, Robert Menzies, described the direct discussions and exchange of views with British ministers as the most important aspect of his 1962 visit to Britain.¹¹⁹⁰ When Prime Minister John Gorton came into office in 1968, there was a change in the rhetoric used by Australians to describe the Anglo-Australian relationship. Thus, during his visit to the High Commissioner in London, Sir Alexander Downer, in 1969, Gorton informed him that Britain was, for many Australians, now a “foreign country”¹¹⁹¹ and that feelings alone could no longer guarantee a cohesive relationship.¹¹⁹² For this reason, Gorton referred to the shift within the Australian sense of solidarity with Britain – the relationship was from this point onward no longer characterized by the particular traits of a familial relationship, but rather, a chill in relations had set in and the connection was now similar to that with other states. The previous basis for the uniqueness of the relationship – the basis of shared feelings – no longer existed and could not preserve the cohesion of the states.¹¹⁹³

One of the reasons that these feelings of solidarity changed was the British negotiations with the EEC. From the perspective of Dominion policy makers, this brought about a distancing from the British government and led to a shift in feelings of solidarity. In the course of the negotiations, the Australian government drew increasingly closer to the USA. The second visit of Harold Holt to Washington in June and July of 1966, and the visit of the American President, Lyndon Johnson, to Australia in the fall of 1966 attested to this steady rapprochement.¹¹⁹⁴ During the visit to the USA, Holt announced that Australia was ready to go “all the way with LBJ.”¹¹⁹⁵ Moreover, Australia made efforts to compensate for the loss of the British market with other agreements. In the final

¹¹⁸⁹ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Transcript of Television Interview Given by the Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies on the Common Market with Michael Charlton for Telecast on A.B.C. Stations throughout Australia, filmed on 24 June, 1962, broadcast on 25 June, 1962.

¹¹⁹⁰ Cf. NAA A1209 1961/1121 Part 1: Press, Radio and Television Conference Given by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, Canberra, 24 June, 1962.

¹¹⁹¹ Cited in Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia," p. 154.

¹¹⁹² Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁹³ Cf. Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁴ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 134. However, references to “Britishness” were prevalent in Holt’s rhetoric, as James Curran has shown. Cf. Curran, *The Power of Speech. Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image*, p. 57.

¹¹⁹⁵ Cited in: Scott Burchill, David Cox and Gary Smith, *Australia in the World. An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (Oxford 1996), p. 52.

talks during the “Kennedy Round,”¹¹⁹⁶ the Holt administration tried to arrange optimal conditions for Australian exports; however, in Canberra this round of talks was seen as insufficient compensation for the British market.¹¹⁹⁷

New Zealand also tried to use the “Kennedy Round” of talks to obtain better conditions for their agricultural products. This accomplished little, as apart from concessions for lamb and sheep, these efforts had no effect.¹¹⁹⁸ New Zealand, however, was an active member in the Agricultural Committee of GATT founded in 1967, and it thus hoped to attain some influence within global trading networks.¹¹⁹⁹ In the course of the GATT negotiations and through visits to Washington, Australia and New Zealand aligned themselves more closely with the USA, which intensified their pivot from Great Britain to the USA.

During the EEC debates, Canadian feelings of solidarity with Great Britain were also shunted aside, as the diplomat John Holmes noted:

Two countries closely associated for centuries, Britain and Canada, are drifting apart, and it is a pity [...]. What has gone wrong?¹²⁰⁰

Holmes described the relationship between Britain and Canada as a very close one that had lasted for years, but which now was succumbing to changes. Even the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Charles Ritchie, observed at the of the 1960s:

We and the British were excellent friends who had known each other for a long time, but we’re no longer members of the same family. [...] There remained the bonds of the past, but our future was no longer any concern of theirs. If our preoccupations were with the United States, theirs were increasingly with Europe.¹²⁰¹

Thus, for Ritchie, Canada’s situation led towards an increased convergence with the USA, while Britain oriented itself towards Europe. Furthermore, he stated that concerns over the British relationship had declined in Ottawa: “there [was] no interest in Canada in tightening relations with the United Kingdom or in reporting [...] on British policies.”¹²⁰² Canadian interest in Great Britain waned slowly and the previous feelings of belonging subsided. Increasingly, the European Economic Community then emerged as a counterweight to the USA in the minds of Canadian

¹¹⁹⁶ A session of the GATT negotiations.

¹¹⁹⁷ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 194.

¹¹⁹⁸ Cf. ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No 19 June, 1970.

¹¹⁹⁹ Cf. Ibid.

¹²⁰⁰ Cited in Muirhead, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973*, p. 210.

¹²⁰¹ Cited in *ibid.*

¹²⁰² Cited in *ibid.*, p. 210.

politicians and diplomats.¹²⁰³ In all three Dominions, politicians and diplomats noted the shift in relations with Britain on account of the EEC and their increased openness to the USA. The Dominions tried to respond to this change. In mid-April of 1966, the Canadian Deputy High Commissioner in London received a request from the Canadian Under-Secretary of State, Marcel Cadieux. The request charged the High Commissioner with the preparation of an analysis of British-Canadian relations. Furthermore, at the end of April of the same year, civil servants referred to the current decline in solidarity between the two states in a confidential memo circulated inside the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. The memo solicited the views of department officials regarding this general “sensation of friction.”¹²⁰⁴ Since the middle of the 1960s, it was then apparent that politicians and diplomats perceived a shift in their relations with Great Britain, and they viewed it as serious enough to undertake an analysis of the situation and to seek opinions.

The different branches of the Department of External Affairs reacted in diverse ways to this request. The Latin American Branch stated that they viewed relations to Britain as satisfactory, but not especially close. According to their perspective, the reason for a potential diminishment of relations was the decline of Great Britain as a world power and the increasing fragility of the Commonwealth.¹²⁰⁵ The Department of Defense likewise described a chill in relations and emphasized that Canada might have disagreements with Britain owing to the Canadian rebuff of a British proposal for a common policy on nuclear weapons. The Branch for Africa and the Middle East pointed out that Great Britain looked on Canadian support as “self-evident.” London would expect that Canada would simply follow British foreign policy in Africa.¹²⁰⁶

Thus, the various branches of External Affairs had registered a turn, but found different reasons behind it. The response of Geoffrey Murray from the High Commission in London also supports this impression. He noted that Canada, just as much as Great Britain, found itself at a crucial juncture in its development and the formulation of its objectives. Both were thus preoccupied with finding their own national identity in the post-war period.¹²⁰⁷

Canadian politicians and diplomats thus attributed the shift in the Canadian-British relationship to the following reasons: the diminishing role of Great Britain as a world power and the weakening of the Commonwealth, disputes concerning nuclear weapons, British expectations of Canadian

¹²⁰³ Cf. Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984*.

¹²⁰⁴ Cited in Silver, "A Long Goodbye. Pearson and Britain," p. 220.

¹²⁰⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²⁰⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 220f.

¹²⁰⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

loyalty, and the search for identity in both lands. According to the considered sources, Canadian politicians and diplomats, in contrast to policy makers in Australia and New Zealand, did not attribute the changes to Anglo-Canadian relations to the British rapprochement with Europe.

In the mid-1960s, questions of national alignment were of primary importance to Canadian policy makers. During this period, it was a thorn in the side of many Canadian diplomats that the British government handled their relations to Canada primarily via the Commonwealth Office and not through Foreign Affairs. Thus, a sign of the changed relationship to the former motherland and of a growing national consciousness was the consolidation of the British Commonwealth Office and Foreign Affairs. For Canadian diplomats, the consolidation of these two departments appeared to be an appropriate step towards dissolving the outmoded administrative apparatus that recalled the colonial period; it would cultivate a new kind of relationship to the motherland.¹²⁰⁸ To Canadian policy makers, this transformation of the relationship and its patterns of affiliation was to be *welcomed* rather than *regretted*.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the altered relations to Great Britain appeared to be so drastic of a shift that, for the first time, they made efforts to put their dealings with the motherland down in writing and to formulate general guidelines for their relations with the British government:

Northwestern European Division is undertaking a major review of Anglo-Canadian Relations. There has in recent years been an element of drift in our relationship with Britain. Because of their very nature, relations between our two countries have always to a great extent been taken for granted.¹²⁰⁹

For this reason, the Northwestern Division of the Canadian Department of External Affairs looked on British membership in the EEC as a radically new phase:

With Britain's entry into the EEC, the Anglo-Canadian relationship is entering an important new phase. We [Northwestern European Division] are in the process of reviewing the present state of our relations in order to identify more closely our priority interests and how these might best be strengthened and developed.¹²¹⁰

It is then evident that the imminent British accession to the EEC had a significant impact on the British-Canadian relationship that could be viewed as a turning point, even though other branches considered it to be of less importance.

The Northwestern European Division stated that the British entrance into the Common Market did not mean a rupture of relations, but rather a new direction ("new phase"¹²¹¹) within it. In order to

¹²⁰⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

¹²⁰⁹ LAC RG25-A-3-c Vol. 8624 File 20-1-2-Brit: Memorandum, 16 May, 1972.

¹²¹⁰ LAC RG25-A-3-c Vol. 8624 File 20-1-2-Brit: Review of Anglo-Canadian Relations, 23 August, 1972.

¹²¹¹ LAC RG25-A-3-c Vol. 8624 File 20-1-2-Brit: Memorandum, 16 May, 1972.

make adjustments to the relationship going forward, interests and objectives should now be defined. Thus, at the beginning of the 1970s, Canadian policy makers restructured and reconceived their relationship to Great Britain.

This process of restructuring proceeded in the following way: the Northwestern European Division charged a number of politicians, officials, and diplomats with the drafting of a summary or opinion paper on the British-Canadian relationship. From these efforts they wished to draw up a report on the state of this relationship for the Prime Minister. The High Commission in London, for example, sent back a situation report on the British-Canadian relationship and its prospects of development:

Until recently Canadian perceptions of Anglo-Canadian relations have tended to be distorted by traditional attitudes, loyalties and neurosis about our Number Two ally, Number Two trading partner and the cultural progenitor of the largest group of population. [...] However, there is now much greater awareness on both sides of changing patterns and recognition that the traditional relationship, while still valid and useful in some respects, is increasingly a misleading lens through which to look at the bilateral picture of Canada/U.K. relations in the multilateral concept.¹²¹²

In the summary of the High Commission, a definite shift was noted. The High Commission stated that perceptions of this shift could be detected on both sides. The reasons for it derived, above all, from Britain's decline as a global power, the relocation of British economic and political interests to Europe, and the gradual diminishment of Commonwealth relations. Moreover, the drop in number of Canadians with British heritage led to a further dissipation of ties to Britain. To these reasons may be added a number of international factors: growth in Canada, the diversification of its economic and political relations with the rest of the world, and the Canadian focus on its own national identity. These had likewise contributed to the alienation from Britain. The British approach to Europe *accelerated* and *strengthened* this process (“[...] is accelerating the process of change [...]).¹²¹³ According to the High Commission, only the continuing effort on both sides to improve cooperation could ensure the maintenance of good relations.¹²¹⁴ In general, they argued that the British-Canadian relationship should be taken out from under the shadow of the British accession to the EEC, and it should be expanded into different areas.¹²¹⁵ The widening of bilateral relations with Great Britain would be important in the coming years – if only to have a

¹²¹² LAC RG25-A-3-c Vol. 8624 File 20-1-2-Brit: Summary statement of Anglo-Canadian relations as viewed from the High Commission in London, August 1972.

¹²¹³ LAC RG25-A-3-c Vol. 8624 File 20-1-2-Brit: High Commission London, Anglo-Canadian Relations, August 1972.

¹²¹⁴ Cf. Ibid. The High Commission viewed regular meetings between the Ministers and Prime Ministers of both lands and the annual meetings of the Canada-UK Continuing Committee as possible areas of cooperation. Furthermore, the High Commission proposed diverse fields in which to expand collaborative ventures (the financial sector, trade, culture, press and information, tourism, immigration). Cf. Ibid.

¹²¹⁵ Cf. Ibid.

counterweight to the USA.¹²¹⁶ The High Commission's report thus shows that British-EEC negotiations were not the *starting point* of the altered relationship between Great Britain and the Dominions; rather, British talks with the Common Market supported processes that went back as far as the Second World War. Deliberations over the Anglo-Canadian relationship were a sign of a renovation of external relations to the former motherland. The previously informal and undefined relationships were now to be carried out amid detailed analyses and in a formal framework that would establish the basis for future ties with Britain.

At the same time in the early 1970s, Australian policy makers also reassessed their foreign policy relations with Great Britain. Against the background of the EEC debates and the final decision of Britain to enter the EEC, the administration of the High Commission in London (Australia House) was moved from the Department of the Prime Minister to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Of course, British membership was not the only factor that led to this decision, but it still had a role to play in this symbolic gesture. Since Great Britain had now oriented itself more towards continental Europe, it seemed appropriate to place Australian-British relations under the umbrella of Foreign Affairs.¹²¹⁷ In August 1971, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, had initiated the change. His argument was that if most Australians had in previous times seen themselves as "British", the majority now, however, understood themselves to be "Australian." As a result, it was no longer necessary to handle relations with the British as if they were special. No other Commonwealth nation had a separate Department for relations with Britain, and on account of the 1968 merging of the Commonwealth and Foreign Offices in Britain, it seemed only logical that Australia would adjust its administration accordingly. Moreover, Britain's potential EEC membership, the future British approach to the Commonwealth, and the diminishing British role in Southeast Asia all led to a new situation, which had displaced the relationship with Britain into the realm of "foreign policy." The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nigel Bowen, supported Waller in this view.¹²¹⁸ The High Commission in London would then be administratively regulated just as diplomatic representatives in other countries were. Yet, the High Commissioner in London, Sir Alexander Downer, and his Deputy High Commissioner, Robert Boswell, were against this. Both men saw Australia House as different from other diplomatic missions. Boswell perceived the

¹²¹⁶ Cf. Ibid.

¹²¹⁷ "The transfer to this Department of responsibility for the administration of the Australian High Commission in London, brings with it a change in the way we conduct our relations with Britain." NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 7: B.C. Hill (First Assistant Secretary Pacific and Western Division), Relations with Britain, 19 March, 1973.

¹²¹⁸ Cf. Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia," p. 159.

possible take-over of Australia House by Foreign Affairs as a threat to the already existing and particular forms and ways in which the High Commission worked.¹²¹⁹

Prime Minister McMahon and his Department viewed the efforts of Foreign Affairs concerning the administration of Australia House as too presumptuous. As a result, McMahon decided that the regulation of the relationship of the High Commission to the Palace and to the Commonwealth Secretariat, as well as the naming of the High Commissioner and the Deputy High Commissioner, should lie with the Prime Minister. McMahon emphasized the particularity of diplomatic relations with Britain, which were still distinct from those of other states.¹²²⁰ McMahon's proposal conflicted with Bowen, which led to the convening of a series of talks between both Departments. In the end, they agreed to a compromise: relations with the Crown and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences would remain the responsibility of the Prime Minister. Likewise, the Prime Minister was to name the High Commissioner (in consultation with Foreign Affairs), while Foreign Affairs was permitted to name its own official to the post of Deputy High Commissioner. The High Commissioner would still report directly to the Prime Minister, however, Bowen insisted that this privilege should be the same for every diplomatic mission in a foreign country. Thus, the special position of Australia House within the diplomatic sector was cancelled. McMahon announced the decision in October of 1972, which in the context of the EEC negotiations, was a symbolic step in the shift of Australian-British relations. From this point onward, as Gough Whitlam ordered the new Australian High Commissioner, Australia House was to be run as an "embassy" and not as a "tourist bureau."¹²²¹

In addition, Australian policy makers decided in 1972, that the time had come (for the first time in Australian history), to prepare a Policy Guidance Paper on British-Australian relations.¹²²² The paper was founded on the recognition that "our dealing with Great Britain would appear in recent years to have lost some of the warmth and closeness that previously characterised them."¹²²³ The British accession to the EEC and the declining significance of the Commonwealth reinforced the sense of alienation between the two countries. In part, the responsibility for the dwindling relationship lay with the Australians themselves, since they had not made a strong enough effort to

¹²¹⁹ Cf. Ward, p. 160.

¹²²⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹²²¹ Cited in Bridge et al., "Introduction," p. 6.

¹²²² In one draft of the paper, W. B. Pritchett, the Deputy High Commissioner in London, commented: "[...] this is the first governmental paper to be produced on the Anglo-Australian Relationship – an event of some moment!" NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 4: W.B. Pritchett to Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 January, 1972.

¹²²³ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972.

preserve the relationship.¹²²⁴ Nonetheless, the paper emphasized that the relationship persisted, but that the *kind and manner* of this association had to change.¹²²⁵ Although, the EEC negotiations had left behind a “scar”¹²²⁶ on the relationship, both countries still had much to offer one another, since in many respects their trade and foreign policy interests overlapped.¹²²⁷

Indeed, through British entrance into the EEC, a window might open into the EEC itself, so that Australia might profit from British membership. Certainly, a revision of the previous relationship would be required: relations to Great Britain had to be formalized so that official relations, in addition to the informal means of contact, would remain functional.¹²²⁸ Of course, both sides had secrets to keep from one another, and Australia should not put its trust in Britain blindly. Nonetheless, the relationship remained important and unique.¹²²⁹ The administrative relocation of Australia House to the Department of Foreign Affairs symbolized an important step in the relationship to the motherland. Foreign policy in connection to Great Britain would from this point onward no longer be separated from foreign policy in relation to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the Australians wanted to make use of the British for information, particularly in relation to British policy, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China, the EEC (“We [...] should regard Britain not as a door but as a window to the EEC.”),¹²³⁰ NATO, Africa, Southeast Asia and many others. In future, Australia would cultivate a *relation of friendship* with Britain, and ensure that the British relationship was no more restrictive than it was to other states.¹²³¹ In addition to the Paper, the Australian cabinet decided on 27 March, 1973 that the Minister should report the content of official

¹²²⁴ Moreover, the Australian High Commissioner in Nairobi added in his commentary on the paper, that to some extent, the rivalries between the individual Australian Departments meant that the information that one Department had received from the British was not passed on to the others. Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 4: K.H. Rogers, High Commissioner Nairobi, 5 January, 1972.

¹²²⁵ Furthermore, Australia was connected through bilateral trade relations, British investment in Australia, ties to the Crown, migrants from Britain and common defense interests. In addition, there were still cultural and practical ties in various areas. Due to the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic connections, in particular, the relationship to Britain would remain a special one. Moreover, the paper argued that the chill in relations could be just a temporary phenomenon. Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972.

¹²²⁶ Ibid.

¹²²⁷ Cf. Ibid.

¹²²⁸ The High Commissioner in Nairobi also commented on this issue: “[...] we should try and formalise more our relations with U.K. We have probably missed out on useful exchanges of information from time to time for the reason that no formalised machinery existes.” NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 4: K.H. Rogers, High Commissioner Nairobi, 5 January, 1972.

¹²²⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972. Thus, on 11 January, 1972, the Australian High Commissioner in Islamabad commented on the paper with the statement that the Australian view of the Crown was one that derived from the 19th century. Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 4: Australian High Commission (Islamabad) to Department of Foreign Affairs (Canberra), 11 January, 1972.

¹²³⁰ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972.

¹²³¹ Cf. Ibid.

discussions with the representatives of other governments directly to the Department of Foreign Affairs. In this way, the uncoordinated relations to Britain – among others – should be subsumed under a “unified policy,”¹²³² and the relevant part of the administration would be kept informed in respect to other countries.¹²³³

From this account, it becomes clear that by the beginning of the 1970s, Australia as well as Canada not only recognized an unavoidable shift in relations to Great Britain, but rather they had drawn the consequences from this shift, and had rethought their foreign policy relations to the motherland and structured them anew. One of the reasons for this change was the British membership talks with the EEC. The “new” relationship to Britain was characterized by its formal and prescribed form. Prior to 1970, much of the relationship flowed through informal and personal channels; an official format for such connections had not been required. The EEC debates and the cumulative effects of various changes in the Commonwealth during the 1960s, altered this. The previous practices had to be reconsidered, since the EEC debates had shown actors in both Dominions that they were not part of Great Britain; the British government would look to their own national interests first. The relationship thus transformed from a *familial relationship* to *friendly relations*. The third Dominion, New Zealand, also reconsidered its foreign policy alignments in the course of the EEC debates. However, this reorientation definitely took more time than was the case in Canada and Australia. By the second round of membership talks, this was already detectable. As the *Daily Telegraph* reported in December 1966:

Despite some changes, in trade and sentiment, since Britain’s first attempt to get into the Common Market five years ago, it [New Zealand] is still virtually a British supply ship anchored as far away as possible on the other side of the world, a corner of a foreign sea that, despite all the effects of independence, would apparently have been prepared to remain forever England.¹²³⁴

The *Daily Telegraph* observed that New Zealand, in spite of the British membership application, was always ready to remain attached to Britain and to function as a “supply ship” to the motherland. Of course, there are signs of New Zealand independence, but still the basic situation had not altered since the mid-1960s. Up to this time, the small number of changes in New Zealand pertained to *trade* and the *emotions*. However, New Zealand was still prepared to remain English for all eternity (“to remain forever England”).¹²³⁵ Furthermore, the *Daily Telegraph* observed that, in clear

¹²³² NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 10: Draft “Relations with Britain” for Minister, no date.

¹²³³ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²³⁴ *The Daily Telegraph*, 15 December, 1966.

¹²³⁵ *Ibid.*

contrast to Canada, which had removed the Union Jack from its flag at this time, there were no such serious steps taken in New Zealand.¹²³⁶ An association with Australia was likewise not pursued by New Zealand actors.¹²³⁷ The British High Commissioner in Wellington, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, made a similar observation:

The body politic here moves more slowly than the speed of events elsewhere requires. As with one of the smaller dinosaurs having slow moving limbs and a small head, no amount of kicking and pricking or even the risk of destruction will make the animal move much faster than its habit. But we will do all we can here to push it along from behind.¹²³⁸

Feelings of belonging to Britain thus persisted longer than in Canada and Australia. This was likewise confirmed by a *European Report* from 1975, which dealt explicitly with the effects of the EEC debates:

But if any one of the three developed Commonwealth countries has had totally to rethink its foreign policy and external relations as a result of British membership, it is New Zealand, whose emotional links with the UK and the concepts of it as somehow being 'home' have died far more slowly than in the case of the other two [...].¹²³⁹

The report emphasized the special relationship of New Zealand to Great Britain, which was not founded upon the strong economic connection to the motherland, but rather relied on emotional ties above all. In comparison to Canada and Australia, the emotional ties would dissipate at a substantially slower pace. As a sign of this slower process of detachment, the *European Report* mentioned the tendency of New Zealand ministers – in contrast to the Australians (Gough Whitlam) above all – to travel first to London instead of directly to Brussels.¹²⁴⁰ For the New Zealand delegation, the path to the membership talks went through London, while the Australians increasingly talked directly with Brussels.¹²⁴¹

However, the feeling of solidarity with Great Britain appeared, above all, to concern older generations in the Dominions. The British High Commission in Wellington observed as early as 1969 that the young in New Zealand were “in a state of revolt, albeit a milder version, against the

¹²³⁶ Cf. Ibid.

¹²³⁷ Cf. Ibid.

¹²³⁸ Cited in Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," p. 166.

¹²³⁹ ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: New Zealand Mission to the European Communities (Brussels) to Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Wellington), 7 November, 1975.

¹²⁴⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹²⁴¹ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: European Report, 8 November, 1975. OECD is the acronym for the *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*. This is an economic advisory council founded in 1960 with headquarters in Paris. It replaced the *Organisation for European Economic Co-operation* (OEEC). In contrast to the OEEC, Canada and the USA could join the OECD. Cf. Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984*, p. 186.

old order and are determined to fashion a new and better world.”¹²⁴² For this new generation, old connections and relationships were more of a hindrance to the new alignment of international politics and a more general social transformation.¹²⁴³

The *European Report* pointed out, moreover, that in spite of this gradual distancing from Great Britain, *all three* Dominions had to reconsider their foreign policy and international relations owing to the British rapprochement with Europe. In the case of New Zealand, documents that deal decisively with the restructuring of relations to Great Britain are not to be found, as they are in Australia and Canada. However, even in New Zealand foreign policy was altered – especially within the diplomatic sector. Prior to the 1960s, the foreign policy apparatus in New Zealand was scarcely formed, since most foreign policy relations were governed through Great Britain. Thus, Britain had functioned as the orientation point for the direction of New Zealand’s foreign policy. Until the beginning of the 1960s, outside of the embassy in Paris and in The Hague¹²⁴⁴ (as well as the High Commission in London) New Zealand itself maintained no other diplomatic representation in Europe.¹²⁴⁵ In the course of the EEC debates, the New Zealand government established further diplomatic missions in European countries. By the time of the first round of membership talks, the New Zealand Department of External Affairs opened a diplomatic post in Brussels:

In the view of the importance of representation at the headquarters of the EEC and of the need for close contact with the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC, the Government decided in October to open a diplomatic post in Brussels. The establishment of a Consulate-General in Geneva, announced in April 1961, also had a bearing on economic policies, as Geneva, in addition to being the location of several international organisations of a technical character, is the site of the GATT Secretariat and the headquarters of the European Free Trade Association.¹²⁴⁶

Thus, the EEC debates had led policy makers in Wellington to consider some form of representation in Europe to be important. The preface to a *Report of the Department of External Affairs* by Keith Holyoake also attests to this:

In the past year the Government has decided to open New Zealand missions in Bonn and Rome and has thus ensured that New Zealand’s position will be further understood by members of the EEC.¹²⁴⁷

¹²⁴² TNA FCO 95/590: Information Policy Report, British High Commission Wellington, 17 June, 1969.

¹²⁴³ Cf. *Ibid.* In this report, British actors concluded that certainly they could still expect good will towards Great Britain on the part of New Zealand, but they could no longer rely upon these (emotional) ties to Britain in connection with trade relations. Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²⁴⁴ Both embassies were opened in 1950. Cf. Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook*, p. 28f.

¹²⁴⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²⁴⁶ Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs 1 April 1961 to 31 March 1962* (Wellington, 1961), p. 12.

¹²⁴⁷ Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs 1 April 1965 to 31 March 1966* (Wellington, 1966), p. 7.

The following table shows the increase in the number of New Zealand's diplomatic missions:




Fig. 6

The chart shows a clear increase in the number of diplomatic missions starting from the 1950s. In the mid-1960s, the Department of External Affairs opened embassies in Greece (1964), Italy (1965), and the Federal Republic of Germany (1966). Moreover, after 1973 the Department maintained an embassy in the People's Republic of China.¹²⁴⁸

Aside from the opening of further diplomatic missions, there arose an increasingly professional and trained diplomatic corps that could be sent to these countries.¹²⁴⁹ This expansion, however, did not signify a diminishing significance of the High Commission in London.¹²⁵⁰ Owing to the shift in relations to Great Britain, which had up to this point conducted New Zealand's foreign policy,

¹²⁴⁸ Cf. Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook*, p. 28f.

¹²⁴⁹ Cf. Interview with Terence O'Brien in Wellington, 21 April, 2017.

¹²⁵⁰ Cf. ANZ ABHS 7148/101 LONB 86/4/9/1B 1: Statement by J. A. Walding, 16 July, 1973.

policy makers in Wellington increasingly recognized that they required an *independent* foreign policy, as an interview by Norman Kirk demonstrates:

[...] you [Norman Kirk] have drawn attention to two recent events – the vote in the British Parliament endorsing entry to the EEC and China’s admission to the United Nations – which both have profound implications for New Zealand and you issued a call for this country [NZ] to adopt clearly independent policies and attitudes of its own.¹²⁵¹

Not only the question of the journalist, but also the answer given by Kirk attests to the growing aspirations for an independent New Zealand foreign policy:

[...] I can’t see that we can afford any longer just to wait for our trade or our international relations to be satisfied as a by-product of some alignment or of some attitude of another’s country policy. [...] it is to suggest that we need some careful thought of where New Zealand’s interests lie and a responsibility not only to pursue those ourselves but to do so first.¹²⁵²

This need to formulate an independent foreign policy for New Zealand is also demonstrated by the establishment of the first “Foreign Policy School” at the University of Otago in 1966. One reason for the foundation of this school, which consisted mostly of courses on world events and current affairs, was the British turn towards Europe.¹²⁵³ In New Zealand, the EEC debates thus brought about a renovation of the diplomatic sector. There was a *growing awareness* that New Zealand needed its own foreign policy, since in the future, they would need to attend to their *own* interests first.

Changes in the diplomatic sector also ensued in Australia, but there they were related to the development of a decidedly unique “national” style of diplomacy.¹²⁵⁴ Shortly after the British accession to the EEC, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Alan Renouf, proposed that all Australian diplomats should wear a uniform at official occasions. Through this proposal, Renouf wanted to create a specifically “Australian” appearance that would set Australian diplomats

¹²⁵¹ ANZ ABHS 6957 W4628/21 SAI 63/1/1 1: “Point of View,” 7 November, 1971.

¹²⁵² Ibid.

¹²⁵³ Cf. Austin Gee, Robert Patman and Chris Rudd, “Building Foreign Policy in New Zealand. The Role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School, 1966-1976,” in *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, eds. Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, p. 3-37 (New Jersey, London et. al. 2018), p. 4. The school had close links to the Department of External Affairs, which viewed the school as an important forum for debates concerning foreign policy. Cf. Ibid., p. 12.

¹²⁵⁴ At least, according to a survey of officials in the diplomatic service conducted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2001, just about 70 percent of those questioned declared that there was a specifically “Australian” diplomatic style. Cf. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge 2003), p. 266.

apart from the British.¹²⁵⁵ His proposal was rejected as laughable.¹²⁵⁶ John McEwen, in his later work, *His Story*, also remarked on distinctions in diplomatic style:

During the long series of international negotiations I conducted, I was able to assess the negotiating characteristics of the various nationalities. The British were never easy to deal with, for they were tremendously skilled and experienced negotiators – and very smooth. Whilst they always had their own interests to look after, they never laid their cards on the table. They never said, ‘Look here, John, we cannot agree on this because our position is so and so,’ which is the line I would have taken. Instead they talked their way smoothly around a thing until finally it bore in on you that you were getting nowhere. Nothing would be explained so that you were left to judge for yourself what their reasons might be. The British would drive a hard bargain, often with an almost oriental disregard for the time being taken up by negotiations.¹²⁵⁷

The shift in Anglo-Australian relations was not only recognized, but rather was described, by some Australian actors such as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nigel Bowen, as “natural.”¹²⁵⁸ The Australian tendency and the increasing independence of its foreign policy interests were likewise “natural.”¹²⁵⁹ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, L. H. E. Bury, had emphasized as early as April 1971, that Australian views on foreign policy had, on account of the geographical situation, altered in the last years.¹²⁶⁰ The British entrance into the EEC thus functioned as a “catalyst” in a process of transformation.¹²⁶¹ At the same time, however, particular ties to the motherland remained due to “kinship, past comradeship in arms, mutual affections, and a wide range of business, professional, cultural and academic associations.”¹²⁶²

Moreover, in Australia during the mid-1970s, British symbols were replaced. With the enactment of the *Royal Styles and Title Act* of 1973, the title of the Queen in “Queen of Australia” was changed; British royal titles of honor were dismantled, and “God Save the Queen” was gradually replaced by “Advance Australia Fair” as the national anthem.¹²⁶³ Furthermore, the designation “British subject” disappeared from Australian passports.¹²⁶⁴ Together, these steps symbolized the

¹²⁵⁵ Cf. Curran, *The Power of Speech. Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image*, p. 77. Renouf suggested a “Mao-style suit” with “sported embroidered springs of golden wattle on chokered collars.” Ibid.

¹²⁵⁶ Cf. Ibid.

¹²⁵⁷ McEwen, *His Story*, p. 62.

¹²⁵⁸ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Nigel Bowen, House of Commons (London), 8 November, 1972.

¹²⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁶⁰ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 3: Address Bury, 26 April, 1971.

¹²⁶¹ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 7: Possible Parliamentary Question for the Minister, Relations with Britain, from K.C.O. Shann (Deputy Secretary), 24 January, 1973.

¹²⁶² NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 7: Draft themes which might be developed by the High Commissioner in his public comments, 5 January, 1973.

¹²⁶³ “Advance Australia Fair” first became the official national anthem in 1984. Cf. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” p. 211.

¹²⁶⁴ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 270.

detachment from Great Britain that, of course, was not provoked by the EEC debates alone, even if they had been spurred by it. Thus, Australian officials noted:

For Australians the most dramatic change in Britain's policies has been British entry into Europe which we have tended to link with the reduction in British military presence east of Suez, and the end of Britain's "imperial" role and its predominance in a Commonwealth which has become a more disparate but more representative association of equals.¹²⁶⁵

Alongside other explanations for the shift in relations to the motherland, this quotation from a draft paper for the High Commissioner also refers to changes within the Commonwealth, which had now become an association of *equals*. The EEC debates had unsettled the feeling of belonging to a larger community of British peoples, gathered together in the Commonwealth. Internal developments, such as the independence of former colonies in Africa and Asia, and the exit of South Africa, had transformed the Commonwealth since the beginning of the 1960s. The British announcement of the opening of EEC membership negotiations, accentuated the confusion of the former Settler Colonies. The first round of British membership talks was thus, according to Stuart Ward, a moment in which the feeling of belonging to the Commonwealth was shaken, "eroding the sense of mutual identification and organic community that had traditionally characterised Commonwealth relations."¹²⁶⁶ The policy makers in the Dominions were aware that serious changes were imminent. Thus, the Australian Ambassador in Paris, E. Ronald Walker, stated after the European visit of Robert Menzies in 1962 that:

I feel that the time has already come when serious thought must be given to adjustments that will be required, both in our national economic life and in our external relations with various other countries.¹²⁶⁷

The quotation also attests to the close association of economic aspects and foreign policy relations – the EEC debates influenced both. One of the most important supports of the Commonwealth was trade, which had been impacted by the entrance of Great Britain into the Common Market, as a draft letter by George Drew to the Chair of the Canadian Pulp Association shows: "[...] while this institution [the Commonwealth] is held together by various bonds, none is more important than that of trade, and to weaken this bond is to weaken all of the others."¹²⁶⁸ Herein the relationship

¹²⁶⁵ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 7: Draft themes which might be developed by the High Commissioner in his public comments, 5 January, 1973.

¹²⁶⁶ Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," p. 156.

¹²⁶⁷ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 170.

¹²⁶⁸ LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 918 File 7-72-11-1: Draft Reply to J.Y. Clyde by George Drew, 26 September, 1961. This draft letter was drawn up at the urging of the Prime Minister, so as to explain government actions. It was intended as a reply to a critical letter from Clyde.

of the issue of trade and the overall cohesion of the Commonwealth is clear – Drew feared that other realms of the Commonwealth would become worse as a result of weakened trade relations. During the first round of membership talks, it emerged that the Dominions seldom distinguished between the interests of Great Britain and the interests of the Commonwealth, both of which were often treated as one and the same.¹²⁶⁹ In respect to Australia and their relationship to Great Britain and the Commonwealth, there was a shift in interests. In his remarks before the House of Representatives on 16 August 1961, Robert Menzies described the situation of Australia with the following words:

[...] we are both British and Commonwealth. But our first duty is to protect what we believe to be the proper interests of Australia, whose future development will be a considerable factor in Commonwealth strength [...].¹²⁷⁰

Here the close connection between national interests and the role that a particular country should occupy within the Commonwealth is evident. The feeling of belonging to a community of British peoples, so it appears, could only be changed gradually. In particular, the cohesiveness of the Commonwealth was a matter of great (personal) significance for Robert Menzies. In his private correspondence with Macmillan in 1961, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the “New Commonwealth” that now also consisted of “colored” members.¹²⁷¹ “Whiteness” was no longer a binding element between the individual Commonwealth states. Instead, the Commonwealth now had members that were not defined by “whiteness”, such as the newly independent colonies of Africa.

In 1961, the Australian Department of External Affairs predicted that ties within the Commonwealth would be significantly less close, a change that was already observable in the preceding years. The Department particularly noted a shift in the relationship between the “Old Commonwealth” states and Great Britain; relations among the individual countries and Britain were increasingly treated as separate matters. However, the Department also underlined that the “new” members of the Commonwealth might offer a bridge to Asia and Africa for the “old” members. Still, even in a multiethnic Commonwealth, the leading role of Britain would be unavoidable.¹²⁷² In its paper for the Cabinet, the Department noted that relations inside the Commonwealth had changed; the individual countries increasingly established bilateral relations

¹²⁶⁹ Cf. Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," p. 161.

¹²⁷⁰ Menzies, *Australia and the Common Market*, p. 12.

¹²⁷¹ Cf. Ward, "Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions," p. 102.

¹²⁷² Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 1: Department of External Affairs: The Political Implications for Australia of United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community, Canberra, 26 June, 1961.

with Great Britain, instead of aligning themselves with the Commonwealth in general. At the same time, the Department saw in the Commonwealth an opportunity to expand their spheres of influence.

In the course of the negotiations, the Australians saw their fears of the last few years increasingly confirmed. Great Britain seemed to be aligning itself more clearly to Western continental Europe and the USA: “In the decade since [Great Britain’s first attempt to join the EEC], Britain’s declining relative interest in the Commonwealth seems to have been confirmed.”¹²⁷³ Moreover, in 1962 the introduction of the UK Commonwealth Immigrants Acts added to the EEC debates. This Act represented the first attempt of the British government to distinguish between their own citizen nationals and other “British subjects” as they entered the United Kingdom of Great Britain.¹²⁷⁴ With the Act of 1962, the British government restricted the unconditional right of Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders to immigrate to Britain. To be sure, the Act permitted entry to the United Kingdom on the basis of specific qualifications that, in practice, allowed Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders to continue to have unrestricted access to the motherland. Nonetheless, for many contemporaries, the fact that they had to procure an “entry voucher” from this point onwards, caused some disturbance.¹²⁷⁵ The British interest in the Commonwealth and the preservation of its strength seemed to be reduced. The feeling of Commonwealth solidarity faltered in the Dominions and, consequently, among the British people. Furthermore, the unique position of the Commonwealth as an association was jeopardized by numerous further agreements (EFTA, OECD, EWG),¹²⁷⁶ as these too were associations of various states. Moreover, with the Immigration Act of 1971 distinctions between migrants from the Commonwealth countries and other regions became null,¹²⁷⁷ so that the unique position of the Dominions receded even further.

As the EEC debates proceeded, all three countries shared a growing fear concerning the dismantling of the Commonwealth, and they emphasized the importance of this institution for global stability and security. In the Canadian case, this was relevant, above all, from the beginning of the 60s and the administration of John Diefenbaker. In the further course of the 1960s, Canada

¹²⁷³ NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 8: Draft “British Entry into the European Economic Community,” no date [probably May 1970].

¹²⁷⁴ This was a reaction to the increased arrival of travelers from the West Indies and Southeast Asia after 1948. By the end of the 1950s, there was growing pressure on the British government to regulate the steady flow of Commonwealth migrants, but without giving preference to migrants from “white” Commonwealth states. Cf. Ward, “Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia,” p. 148f.

¹²⁷⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²⁷⁶ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: European Report, 8 November, 1975.

¹²⁷⁷ Cf. Louis, “Introduction,” p. 30.

saw a chance to establish its own role as a “middle power” within a transformed Commonwealth. The Dominion attempted, in these years, to redefine its image and its role as a world power; in states which had gained their independence,¹²⁷⁸ the Canadian administration saw the chance to promote Canada’s image. Since Canada, likewise, had had colonial experiences, it could be a good model for countries on the way to independence and nationhood. They could help such countries take on their position within the global order, on a variety of levels (financial, political, cultural).¹²⁷⁹ In general, however, the feeling of belonging to the Commonwealth shifted in all three dominions. While veterans of the Second World War, and the old generations still thought in terms of the British empire, the younger generation was less interested in the Commonwealth and unaware of the British empire.¹²⁸⁰

Impact of the EEC Debates: “[...] a victory of geography over history”¹²⁸¹ – the new regional alignments of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand

In addition to the shifting feelings of belonging to Great Britain and being part of the Commonwealth, the particular geographic position of the individual Dominions influenced their development in the 1960s. The geographic location of New Zealand and Australia, on the fringes of Asia with all its dangers and potentials, had from the beginning of the EEC debates already played a role in the Dominions. From the outset, the Australian economist, W. E. G. Salter, was of the opinion that Australian industry was in a good position and could compensate for threats to its trade. Much more problematic for Australia and New Zealand, from his point of view, was the threat of political isolation in the wake of a British withdrawal from the Commonwealth. In this case, both of the Antipodes would be abandoned in the Southeast Asian region.¹²⁸²

The question concerning the regional position of the three Dominions emerged repeatedly in the course of the debates over possible British membership. In the context of the Cold War, the notion emerged that the economic stability of Australia and New Zealand were of special relevance for

¹²⁷⁸ The lands which obtained independence in this period are, for example, Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone (1961), and Tanzania (1961). Cf. McIntyre,

¹²⁷⁹ Cf. Kevin Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* (Vancouver/Toronto 2009), p. 7.

¹²⁸⁰ Cf. TNA FCO 95/590: Information Policy Report, British High Commission Wellington, 17 June, 1969.

¹²⁸¹ Interview with Neil Walter in Wellington, 21 April, 2017.

¹²⁸² In addition, he had also warned that, as the trade talks proceeded, the manner in which these occurred could have an impact on the political relations of the countries involved: “[...] a row in the Commonwealth about trade arrangements would react back on political relationships [...]” NAA A1209 1961/1124 Part 1: W.E.G. Salter, Thoughts on the United Kingdom’s Negotiations to Join the E.E.C., 17 October, 1961.

the security of the Pacific region and Southeast Asia.¹²⁸³ Thus, as a trade zone, “Asia” was an opportunity to create security through trade.¹²⁸⁴

As early as 1962, in a speech before the Wollongong Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Menzies had challenged Australian industry to toss aside their conservative views regarding Australian trade policy and to concentrate on the potential opportunities of future markets in Southeast Asia, as well as the development of new export products.¹²⁸⁵ For this reason, the EEC talks were no “disaster” but rather a “challenge to get cracking.”¹²⁸⁶ Asia increasingly became an area of potential that could serve as a focal point for Australian trade policy. In connection with this, the Australians expanded their Trade Commissioner Service into these regions, as well as their Trade Missions.¹²⁸⁷ The government began to invest large sums for the promotion of the Australian economy and its exports.¹²⁸⁸ This expansion of trade networks led to an increased emancipation of the country. In 1965, the organizer of the Milne Memorial Lectures in Melbourne emphasized strenuously that the lecturers should concentrate on economic themes above all.¹²⁸⁹ By way of example, John McEwen, suggested that Australia should henceforth try to shape its own trade policy, and not just react to circumstances.¹²⁹⁰ In this way, the growth of an independent trade policy contributed to a new Australian self-confidence, as the British noted in 1968:

¹²⁸³ Dean Rusk confirmed that during a visit to Canberra on 8 May 1962: “[...] anything that helps the prosperity of Australia and New Zealand would help the peace and security of the area [Pacific and Southeast Asia].” NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community, Dean Rusk in Australia, New Zealand and the US, Canberra, 8. May 1962. In the subsequent round of questions, Australian actors tried to secure support for special conditions at the membership talks between Britain and the EEC. By deploying the regional instabilities of the Cold War and referring to the dangers of economic instability in Australia and New Zealand, they emphasized the importance of special conditions for the Antipodes in the Cold War. Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁴ As early as 1961, Lester Pearson had stated in a TV program that security could be ensured through trade relations. Cf. LAC RG25 Vol. 5515 File 12447-40: Address by Lester Pearson in der TV-Serie, *The Nation's Business*, 15. November 1961. These ideas resembled the basic premises of the EEC, in which reconciliation of the peoples of Europe had played a role.

¹²⁸⁵ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 5: Speech by the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, to the Greater Wollongong Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 July, 1962.

¹²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁷ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen before the Annual Building Industry Congress, Melbourne, 17 August, 1962. Trade Commissioners were charged with publicizing and promoting domestic trade with foreign countries. Trade Missions were sent to Southeast Asia, America, Japan, India, the Persian Gulf states, Egypt, the Mediterranean, and South America. Further Trade Missions were planned for Israel and the Caribbean. Through these Missions, trade between Australia and other respective nations were promoted. Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen at the Country Party Meeting, Cootamundra, 1 June, 1962.

¹²⁸⁸ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: John McEwen, speech at the annual conference of the Country Party Queensland, Southport, 29 May, 1962.

¹²⁸⁹ Cf. McEwen, *Australia's Overseas Economic Relationships*, p. 3.

¹²⁹⁰ “We do not accept that our overseas trading relationships merely happen to us; we have a strong determination to be the principal in shaping our trading partnerships.” *Ibid.* p. 4.

The Australians are now beginning to see themselves as a Pacific power and one effect of our attempt to join the E.E.C. at the beginning of the decade was to bring home to them the need to establish themselves as a Pacific power both politically and commercially.¹²⁹¹

British policy makers thus observed that due to the EEC debates Australia had increasingly realigned itself to the Pacific region and had adjusted its trade policy accordingly. As a consequence, Australian saw itself more and more, politically and economically, as a Pacific nation.

Even in Australia, a growing number of voices emerged calling for the alignment of the country within the Pacific-Asian region. On account of its cultural orientation towards Europe and its geographical location, Australia was suited to the task of transporting Western ideas¹²⁹² into the Asian “hinterland.”¹²⁹³ However, their position within the Asian-Pacific region could also lead to an increased emphasis of their distinctly European background, which would distance them from neighbouring cultures.¹²⁹⁴ Acceptance from their Asian neighbours was, in any case, doubtful:

[...] Australians will still tend to be regarded by those around them in something like the same way as Chinese are regarded in Southeast Asia and Indians in East Africa: as in but not of the region in which they live.¹²⁹⁵

Still, a larger number of policy makers believed that, in terms of trade policy, the future of Australia lay in Asia. In its report of 1962, the Committee on the European Economic Community pointed out that Australia needed to concentrate more on the Asian market. The Committee also referred to the need to develop new markets and new products so as to secure future economic stability.¹²⁹⁶ Indeed, the expansion of trade networks was increasingly pursued by the Australian government as a strategic solution. During the EEC debates, the focus of Australian trade policy relocated from Great Britain and Europe to the Pacific region – in particular, Japan.¹²⁹⁷ Since 1958, Japan had already displaced Great Britain as the primary buyer of Australia’s most important export product

¹²⁹¹ TNA FCO 24/189: Background note for the Foreign Secretary’s Meeting with Sir Charles Johnston, 17 July, 1968. Although the British-EEC talks were viewed as an important step on the way to Australia’s regional alignment in the Pacific, it seems questionable to derive this solely from the British initiative.

¹²⁹² Barbara Ward, *Australia, America and the Common Market. An Address by Lady Jackson (Miss Barbara Ward), delivered at the American Independence Day Luncheon of the American-Australian Association in Melbourne on July 4th, 1962* (Melbourne 1962), p. 12.

¹²⁹³ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁴ Cf. Miller, *The EEC and Australia*, p. 2.

¹²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁶ Cf. Australian Industries Development Association, *Committee on the European Economic Community. Report on the Implications for Australia of the United Kingdom Becoming a Member of the European Economic Community* (Melbourne/Sydney, 1962), p. 47f.

¹²⁹⁷ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 12: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 14 May, 1971.

– wool.¹²⁹⁸ In 1957, Australia had concluded a trade agreement with Japan that represented an important step for the expansion of Australian trade relations among its Asian neighbours.¹²⁹⁹ This trade agreement had been negotiated, above all, by John McEwen and John Crawford against the will of Robert Menzies. Trade Unions, manufacturers, and the Australian Labor Party had at the time spoken out against the pact. Nonetheless, it came into effect and represented a first step in the direction of a trade policy directed towards Asia.¹³⁰⁰ The subsequent expansion of trade with Japan would be built upon the basis of this agreement. Trade with Japan increased as the EEC debates continued, and further throughout the 1970s. Younger generations in Australia were, in emotional terms, less biased towards Japan, since they had had no direct experience of their Pacific neighbours during the war.¹³⁰¹ For this reason, there were fewer reasons against the expansion of trade relationships than was the case with the older generations. Furthermore, the young generations had not grown up with the “buy British” mentality,¹³⁰² and other possible economic partnerships were close at hand.¹³⁰³

Long before the Australian government officially recognized China, pragmatic considerations within the Department of Trade allowed for the sale of grain to the communist state. In the early 1960s, however, “wheat sales to Red China”¹³⁰⁴ was a public interest concern in Australia. By December of the same year, the Australian Wheat Board announced the sale of 40 million bushels of grain to the People’s Republic. Just prior, the news that Canada was dealing with the People’s Republic for a comparable volume of grain had become known in Australia.¹³⁰⁵ The Chinese ordered further grain from the Australians (and the Canadians) in the next year. The Soviet Union, two years later, also bought large quantities of grain for their territories in the far East. Grain sales to Communist countries – and in particular those to China – drew criticism. Since the Australian government had, up to this point, not officially recognized the People’s Republic, the Board of

¹²⁹⁸ Cf. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung*, p. 64.

¹²⁹⁹ Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 203. Australian actors stressed the importance of this treaty with Japan, and the shifts in relations between the two states that resulted from it: “The Japanese Trade Treaty has undoubtedly transformed the relationship and understanding between the Japanese Government and people and the Australian Government and people.” McEwen, *Australia’s Overseas Economic Relationships*, p. 1. The close connection between trade policy and political relations between Australia and Japan is clear in this quotation. Some years later, in 1963, the treaty would be renegotiated. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹³⁰⁰ Cf. Brett, “The Menzies era, 1950-66,” p. 122.

¹³⁰¹ Cf. TNA FCO 24/394: British High Commission (Canberra) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), 30 September, 1969.

¹³⁰² Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁰³ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰⁵ Cf. Brett, “The Menzies era, 1950-1966,” p. 123.

Trade seemed to be working against the national interest. To many critics, trade with communists was seen as a betrayal of their values.¹³⁰⁶

In 1967, the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra noted that the focus of Australian trade had turned towards Asia and the United States of America. This demonstrated that, after the first round of membership talks with the EEC, the Australians had decidedly begun to rethink and reset their trade patterns.¹³⁰⁷ Indeed, in 1964 the British and Australian Action Council was founded in order to strengthen economic ties between Australia and Great Britain.¹³⁰⁸ This demonstrates that in the mid-1960s the economic relationship to Great Britain was not felt to be insignificant. In spite of the frictions in the Australian-British relationship during the EEC debates, there were also signs within Australia of the attempt to expand trade connections with Great Britain.

The diversification of trade, however, went further. By 1971, Australia had established forty-seven trade commissioner postings in thirty-five countries, which were to help Australian firms develop new markets. The Australian government invested funds into the promotion of Australian trade and support for Trade Missions in Asia. Moreover, they arranged for foreign representatives to visit so that they could inspect their potential export goods. In this area, the Australian government worked closely with industry representatives.¹³⁰⁹

With the change of government under Gough Whitlam, the increasing internationalization of Australia became apparent. Only a short time after his entrance into Office, he began to forge diplomatic relations with China, North Viet Nam, North Korea, and the GDR.¹³¹⁰ Aside from his obligatory visits to London and Washington, Whitlam also went to Ottawa, Beijing, Tokyo, the UN General Assembly and Jamaica.¹³¹¹ Under Whitlam, the rapprochement with Asia was stepped

¹³⁰⁶ Cf. *Ibid.* Australian trade with China had begun in the early 19th century and had lasted – with some interruptions – up to the 1960s. Australia exported wool, wheat, flour, sandalwood, and railroad ties to China, while importing tea, rice, silk, ginger, textiles, tung oil, bristles, camphor, and cotton. At the beginning of the Second World War, this trade was disrupted as shipping was required for other purposes. After the war, both countries re-established their trade in primary products with the addition of manufactured goods. Australia exported dairy products, canned foods, and alloy steel, while China sent cotton textiles, shoes and leather goods. At the same time, Australian trade with Communist countries such as Poland also grew. A Chinese Trade Mission visited Australia in 1958, although unofficially. Trade with communist countries proceeded in the 1950s mostly without much attention in the public sphere. Cf. Reynolds, "Recognition by Trade. The Controversial Wheat Sales to China," p. 121-126.

¹³⁰⁷ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/226 3382 18: New Zealand High Commission Canberra to External Affairs Wellington, 22 July, 1967.

¹³⁰⁸ Cf. NLA MS 4654 Sir John McEwen Box 44 Speeches: John McEwen Address to the Inaugural Banquet of the British and Australian Action Councils, 21 September, 1964.

¹³⁰⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 16: Internal Departmental Record of a Meeting held in this Department on 9th July, sent to the Head of Mission on 29 July, 1971.

¹³¹⁰ Cf. Voigt, *Australien*, p. 79.

¹³¹¹ Cf. Graeme Davison, "The Colonial Strut. Australian Leaders on the World Stage," in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, No. 1 (2005), p. 6-16, p. 13.

up. Multicultural ideas of society dissolved the previous frames of “Britishness” and “whiteness.” Related to this issue were the colonial experiences of Australia, which functioned on two levels. On the one hand, Australia had experienced colonialism through its respective roles as a colony and Dominion in the British empire.¹³¹² On the other, Australia ruled some territories for Great Britain, and treated the indigenous peoples as colonial subjects in their own land.¹³¹³

The former settler colony of Australia had ruled over the region of Papua New Guinea, which had attained independence in 1975.¹³¹⁴ Australia had already taken over the administration of Papua from Great Britain in 1905, and after the First World War it had received (with New Zealand) a mandate over the German colonies on islands south of the equator.¹³¹⁵ Moreover, Australia administered the trusteeship of Nauru, for which Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand shared mandatory rule. The administration of this was taken over by the British Phosphate Commission with its headquarters in Melbourne.¹³¹⁶ When, on 14 December 1960, the full assembly of the United Nations accepted Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and with Resolution 1541¹³¹⁷ which established three potential end stages for independence,¹³¹⁸ Australia and New Zealand came under pressure on a variety of levels. First, they were colonial powers who ruled over their possessions, and second, they were colonial societies that were confronted with the consequences of colonialism. In both countries up to this point, neither the Māori nor the Aborigines enjoyed the same rights as the settler population and the subsequent anglo-european generations.¹³¹⁹ Until 1971, the Australian state took Aboriginal children from their families without consent, and placed them in civil custody so as to assimilate them into Caucasian society.¹³²⁰ In the 1960s, however, the indigenous population was

¹³¹² Among settler colonies, the experience of colonization differs from that of other colonies of the British empire, since the history of conquest and colonization proceeded differently than was the case in African, Asian, and Caribbean colonies.

¹³¹³ Cf. Voigt, *Australien*, p. 79.

¹³¹⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³¹⁵ Cf. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung*, p. 164.

¹³¹⁶ In 1951, Nauru received local self-rule. Great Britain and Australia opposed Nauru's efforts to obtain full independence, while New Zealand abstained. Australia had to concede this in 1968, and on 31 January, 1968 the independent Republic of Nauru came into existence. Cf. McIntyre, *Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands*, p. 158.

¹³¹⁷ Two different resolutions are concerned here, rather than a transposition of digits (author's note).

¹³¹⁸ Full independence was the first option; second, there was free association with another independent state; and third was integration with an independent state. Two years later, the General Assembly convened a special committee to prepare a list of colonies that could become independent. Cf. Voigt, Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung*, p. 166.

¹³¹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.* p. 169f.

¹³²⁰ These procedures began in 1902. The guilt of the Australian state for this “stolen generation” and their families was first conceded by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in a public apology given on 26 November 2007.

increasingly visible in urban society, since they had started to move into the cities in larger numbers and to found organisations. In 1958, the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines had been founded; and in 1964, it would be renamed as the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. At first, this organisation consisted mostly of sympathetic anglo-european Australians, but by the end of the 1960s, these organisations were in the hands of indigenous actors themselves.¹³²¹ Strengthened by pressure from the UN and the international anti-colonial movement, there were more voices in Australia that called for an end to relationships of colonial rule. After 1968, New Guinean members of the Administrator's Executive were given more rights. Internal self-rule of this region was in effect from 1973, and final independence followed in 1975.¹³²² Thus, in the 1960s it was not only the composition of the Commonwealth and its relations with Asia that was transformed, but also the relationship to indigenous populations and their own colonial past.

During the debates concerning British EEC membership and the new position of the Dominions, the concept of the "western world" acquired more significance. In this respect, Australia numbered among the Western powers to which, New Zealand and Canada belonged as well.¹³²³ The concept of the "Western world" was closely associated with the United States. Australian actors designated the relationship to the USA as a "friendship."¹³²⁴ This term attests to the "kinship" and, for that reason, "natural" relationship that was felt to exist with Great Britain. "Friendship" implied an encounter and exchange on an equal level. In the friendship relations to the USA, Australian actors felt that criticism was possible:

I believe that you are all grown up enough, as I feel I am grown up enough, to feel that as friends we can have an argument. We can even have a difference of view without that imputing that there is any weakening of friendship.¹³²⁵

All these remarks have shown that the EEC debates, among other concerns, had displaced the regional self-positioning of Australia. Adjusting trade networks was one of the strategies to resolve

¹³²¹ Cf. Brett, "The Menzies Era, 1950-1966," p. 131f.

¹³²² Cf. McIntyre, *Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands*, p. 178f.

¹³²³ Cf. NLA McEwen, Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen at the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers, Melbourne, 8 June, 1962.

¹³²⁴ Ibid.

¹³²⁵ NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen before the American Chamber of Commerce, Sydney, 11 June, 1962. The criticism introduced by McEwen with this statement was related to the American rejection of the system of preferences. McEwen went further in this speech, which was given before the American Chamber of Commerce in Sydney. He pressed for support in the matter of implementing measures to protect Australian interests during the Brussels talks. If the Americans were not prepared to offer this support, McEwen advised them to: "[...] keep out of our hair and let us look after ourselves as we have succeeded in doing in the last 50 or 60 years of our existence." Ibid.

threats on the economic plane, and it led to an increased engagement with the Pacific region. Regional relationships led to an increased Australian alignment to the Pacific sphere. As early as 1961, Australian actors had hypothesized about such developments: “In the period of adjustment ahead we may well have good cause to be grateful for the recent expansion of our trade with the Pacific.”¹³²⁶ These developments, however, were not fully foreseeable, since during the EEC talks, the situation was too complex and uncertain. Today, China, South Korea, and New Zealand are Australia’s most important trading partners, though Great Britain still represents a significant source of investment, migrations, and tourists. Under the Hawke administration, the Australian constitution was repatriated in 1986, but the Australian High Court first defined Great Britain as a “foreign country” only in 1999.¹³²⁷

The Regional Position of Canada

In contrast to the Australians, for Canada the EEC debates meant a new alignment towards the *American* continent and a shift of relations towards the USA. As mentioned above, Canadian actors often used the association with Great Britain as a barrier mechanism with the United States, since Canada feared a takeover from this quarter:

In attempting to pursue an independent destiny on the doorstep of this huge, dynamic neighbour, the country has throughout its history been obliged to fight against the economic and cultural forces that have tended always to drag it into the U.S. orbit.¹³²⁸

The Canadian Finance Minister from 1963 to 1965, Walter Gordon,¹³²⁹ took up this problem in his publications, speeches and other writings. In his work, “A Choice for Canada,” he reviewed the dilemma of Canadians, caught between the British and the Americans: “Canadians ask themselves whether they have become free of Britain’s colonial influence only to fall under the spell of United States’ economic imperialism.”¹³³⁰ American investment, in particular, was a thorn in the side of Walter Gordon, because he saw an inherent danger that Canada could become an economically

¹³²⁶ NAS M157 43/16: European Economic Community J.G. Crawford, Articles in Sydney Morning Herald July 4-5, 1961.

¹³²⁷ Bridge et al., “Introduction,” p. 3.

¹³²⁸ LAC RG19-F-2 Vol. 4461 File 8625-04-13: Artikel des Canadian Conference Board für das Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 1962.

¹³²⁹ Gordon’s memoirs offer valuable insight into his time as Finance Minister: Walter Gordon, *A Political Memoir* (Toronto, 1961).

¹³³⁰ Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*, p. X. Gordon had already, in 1961, published a work on the Canadian economy in which he clarified his views on the position of Canada and its economic development: Walter Gordon, *Troubled Canada. The Need for New Domestic Policies* (Toronto 1961).

dependent “colony” of the USA.¹³³¹ In any case, Canada *must* maintain good relations with the US on account of geographic and other – unspecified – reasons.¹³³²

Due to the growing distance from the motherland, Canada was thus confronted with a difficult task of self-definition, trying to become a “North American” land without becoming subordinate to the USA. Department officials, however, found it difficult to translate this kind of nationalism into concrete political proposals and decisions. They found Gordon’s proposal to make Canada less dependent on both American investment and markets as absurd as Diefenbaker’s earlier proposal to divert 15 percent of Canadian trade to Great Britain.¹³³³ Even some members of the Liberal Party were opposed to Gordon’s proposals, since they feared the uncertainties that a shift away from the American market might bring. In the end, critics of Gordon’s approach asserted themselves, and the Canadian government continued to pursue an expansion of trade with the USA.¹³³⁴ In the mid-1960s, Canada and the United States of America signed the Canada-United States Auto Pact, which represented another economic association between the two countries.¹³³⁵ By 1967, the significance of the USA for Canadian trade was firm; by then Canada sent more than half of its export goods into the USA, and about two-thirds of Canadian imports originated from their neighbour.¹³³⁶ At the beginning of the 1970s, the “Nixon shock”¹³³⁷ and the third round of British membership talks with the EEC led to a further diversification of Canadian trade. More and more, Canada tried to build on its status as a Pacific as well as Atlantic power. The extension of Canadian-New Zealand trade agreements, for instance, was part of Canada’s expanded role as a Pacific power.¹³³⁸

On a Canadian initiative, the Canada-New Zealand Consultative Committee was founded in 1970. Ottawa first proposed the idea to Wellington, through Jean-Luc Pepin, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, during his visit to New Zealand in 1969.¹³³⁹ The Committee’s primary task was “to provide a forum for private discussions on general bilateral and multilateral matters and

¹³³¹ Cf. Walter Gordon, “Foreign Control of Canadian Industry,” in: *Queen’s Quarterly* LXXIII, No 1 (1966), p. 1-12, p. 4-12.

¹³³² Cf. Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*, p. 3.

¹³³³ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 234.

¹³³⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³³⁵ The Auto Pact included agreements concerning auto parts and their sales in North America. For more information, cf. *Ibid.*, p. 240-247.

¹³³⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³³⁷ The “Nixon shock” co

¹³³⁸ Cf. ANZ ABHS 6950/3 OTT 26/1/11 2: New Zealand High Commission Ottawa to Foreign Affairs Wellington, 20 December, 1973.

¹³³⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

especially those of commercial and economic interest to the two countries.”¹³⁴⁰ The foundation of the Committee attests to the readiness of both to put relations with one another on a more formal footing. Even though official statements continued to refer to the special relationship that existed between them, actors nonetheless observed that the “substance underlying these feelings has become eroded over the years.”¹³⁴¹ The chill in relations between the two countries was concealed by their official pronouncements, and both countries found themselves unable to work towards an expanded friendship.¹³⁴²

Aside from the establishment of the Canada-New Zealand Consultative Committee, there were further processes of exchange between the two countries. Thus, the Canadian Minister for Indian Affairs, Jean Chretien, visited New Zealand in 1971 in order to study the multicultural social order that existed there.¹³⁴³ Herein one can observe how relations among the Dominions altered; common interests replaced the feelings of belonging to an empire as the primary factor in these relations. Both countries struggled with similar problems during this period, and they looked to one another as templates, as Jean Chretien’s visit shows. In respect to the New Zealand-Canadian relationship, Canada was the driving force for its extension. New Zealand actors were aware of this fact, and they recognized that in future it would be up to them to take further steps towards building the relationship: “The ball is in our court.”¹³⁴⁴ For New Zealand, it was important that Canada be included in the Asia-Pacific region, and this was one significant reason, among others, for them to value Canadian cooperation.¹³⁴⁵

A trade agreement between the two countries came into effect in 1981 – the Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation Between the Government of Canada and the Government of New Zealand.¹³⁴⁶ Canadian policy makers also discussed a restructuring of their relationship with Australia; in order to discuss existing trade conditions and to suggest improvements, representatives of both countries met in Ottawa in September, 1972. Both parties came to an

¹³⁴⁰ ANZ AAFZ 22500 W5814/8: Letter by Keith Holyoake to Mr. Carter, 19 October, 1971. The Committee met for the first time in Ottawa in June of 1970, and was, for the moment, occupied primarily with the impact of a possible British membership in the EEC. Cf. *Ibid.* The agreement for such a committee led to a consideration of whether such an institution should also be established for New Zealand-Canada relations. Cf. ANZ ABHS 22128 W5533/5 CBA 8/4/1: Lecture G.K. Ansell (Head of the Economic Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

¹³⁴¹ ANZ ABHS 6958 W5579/184 NYP 3/40/4 1: Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 9 September, 1969.

¹³⁴² Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁴³ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 22500 W5814/8: Letter from Keith Holyoake to Mr. Carter, 19 October, 1971.

¹³⁴⁴ ANZ ABHS 6950/3 OTT 26/1/11 2: New Zealand High Commission Ottawa to Foreign Affairs Wellington, 29 January, 1971.

¹³⁴⁵ Cf. ANZ ABHS 6958 W5579/184 NYP 3/40/4 1: Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 9 September, 1969.

¹³⁴⁶ Cf. “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement,” http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf, last accessed on: 18 December, 2018.

agreement that the two countries should maintain the system of preferential tariffs within their respective countries.¹³⁴⁷

During the EEC debates, Canada also extended its trade relations into Asia. Already under John Diefenbaker, there had been steps taken towards the expansion of trade with China; up to that point no serious diplomatic relations existed with the People's Republic since the Canadian government had not given official recognition of the Chinese state. Under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canada increased its dealings with China, and on 13 October 1970 political recognition of the state was made official. Both states set up diplomatic missions in the following year, and exchanged ambassadors.¹³⁴⁸ The Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Jean-Luc Pépin, undertook a trip to China and, one year later, a Canadian trade delegation travelled there under the leadership of the Foreign Minister, Mitchell Sharp.¹³⁴⁹ In 1973, Pierre Trudeau was the first Canadian Prime Minister to make an official visit to the People's Republic of China. His trip was undertaken primarily to further the expansion of Sino-Canadian trade relations and to stabilize bilateral ties between the two countries.¹³⁵⁰ His visit was crowned with success: among other results, a three-year trade agreement and a framework for future trade emerged. Thus, shortly before Trudeau's departure to Beijing, the announcement was made that 224 million bushels of Canadian wheat would be sold to China over the next three years.¹³⁵¹

Since the beginning of the 1970s, a reconsideration of relations with Japan had also been vigorously discussed. Japan was considered as a potential option for expanding Canadian trade networks. As early as 1961, the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee was founded, which met at least once a year.¹³⁵² However, in the early 1970s, the expansion of trade was constrained by both the reservations of government departments including Finance and Industry, and Trade and Commerce, as well as the absence of an influential representative to lead the development of relations with Japan. In February 1974, Ivan Head took the lead in the expansion of the Canadian-Japanese relationship – supported by the Canadian Ambassador in Japan, Ross Campbell. He

¹³⁴⁷ Cf. LAC RG19 Vol. 6121 File 7425-5: Minute of Discussions, Canada-Australia Trade Talks, 14.-21 September, 1972.

¹³⁴⁸ Cf. Donaghy, Halloran and Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984*, p. 102ff.

¹³⁴⁹ Cf. Bothwell and Granatstein, *Pirouette. Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 187.

¹³⁵⁰ Cf. Donaghy, Halloran and Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984*, p. 154f.

¹³⁵¹ Cf. *Ibid.* p. 156. Moreover, within this framework, the two countries concluded a further agreement in a short space of time

¹³⁵² Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 259.

decided to travel to Tokyo and thus enliven relations. His Tokyo visit was crowned with success. The Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka proposed a meeting with Trudeau in Paris during the funeral for the former French head of state, Georges Pompidou; there were to discuss ways to potentially improve their ties. At a second meeting in Ottawa in September 1974, the two heads of state agreed to consider the upgrading of the relationship. Still, in spite of further meetings and the foundation of a Canadian inter-ministerial Committee, the expansion of relations only proceeded slowly.¹³⁵³

After the accession of Great Britain to the EEC on 1 January, 1973, Canada further concentrated on the diversification of its trade. Canada attempted to build on its existing relationships to the EEC. The Nixon-shock had muddied Canadian relations to the USA, and thus, policy makers in Ottawa tried to use their former ties to Great Britain in order to gain Europe as a partner.¹³⁵⁴ Canadian efforts to find an agreement with the EEC peaked in 1976 with the signing of a framework agreement concerning trade and economic cooperation between the EEC and Canada. In October of the same year, Canada signed a similar agreement with Japan.¹³⁵⁵ However, trade with the EEC countries and Japan achieved its high-water mark in the 1970s, and fell off in the 1980s. For this reason, the “third option” was not successful; instead trade with the USA continued its growth.¹³⁵⁶

The Regional Position of New Zealand

New Zealand, in contrast to Australia and Canada, was the country where the process of detachment was slowest. New Zealand also did not follow the others directly into the Asian market. Instead, it adopted a “wait and see” position to the EEC and concentrated on the expansion of its relations to the smaller Pacific states as well as its own identity as a Pacific nation.¹³⁵⁷ For New Zealand, the USA appeared to be the only viable alternative to Britain in terms of beef exports.¹³⁵⁸ In the course of an ANZUS conference in Canberra, New Zealand actors had the opportunity to exchange views with the US Secretary of State, in the course of which, they agreed with their counterpart that

¹³⁵³ Cf. Donaghy, Halloran and Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984*, p. 214-18.

¹³⁵⁴ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 290.

¹³⁵⁵ Cf. Bothwell and Granatstein, *Pirouette. Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*, p. 158.

¹³⁵⁶ Cf. Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, p. 292.

¹³⁵⁷ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/35 BRU 46/4/7 1: European Report, 8 November, 1975.

¹³⁵⁸ Cf. ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/223 3382/7: Aide Memoire.

international trade should be promoted so as to increase economic growth. By so doing, peace and security would be introduced into more countries.¹³⁵⁹

Since trust in Great Britain had played a significant role for a small state such as New Zealand, and since New Zealand was unhappy with how little Great Britain had included them in the negotiations, there followed an unsettling of diplomatic relations with the motherland in the wake of the EEC talks. New Zealand saw itself compelled to rethink its position in the world and to align itself more and more in the Pacific region. However, New Zealand actors, such as the Secretary of External Affairs, George Laking, doubted that New Zealand could be fully centred on the Asian sphere:

There are many ways in which we cannot think of ourselves, or be accepted, as Asian. We remain a Western nation, still linked with Britain by many ties and affinities and still with our economic condition largely dependent on British decisions and actions.¹³⁶⁰

At the beginning of the 1970s, New Zealand was still strongly connected to Britain and, in economic respects, dependent on them. This economic dependency hindered New Zealand's regional realignment.

Within this framework, wherein the importance of Southeast Asia in political, economic, and military terms was growing, and the roles of the USA and Great Britain were in flux, the Pacific was increasingly seen as a counterfoil. Japan and Australia had evolved into significant trading partners, which likewise supported this change.¹³⁶¹ In the early 1970s, under Norman Kirk, there was an increased emphasis on the South Pacific as a regional reference point. Under his administration, the abolition of nuclear testing in the region had been one of New Zealand's primary foreign policy goals.¹³⁶² In addition, Pacific islanders, who had increasingly migrated to New Zealand after the Second World War to compensate for local labour shortages, had more presence in the cities and in New Zealand society.¹³⁶³ In 1972, the members of South Pacific Forum, to which New Zealand belonged, founded the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). The SPEC was intended to be a source of information concerning trade in the region, and it was to circulate advice among its members in regards to regional trade and cooperation.¹³⁶⁴

¹³⁵⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁰ NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 3: Speech by Laking, Lower Hutt, 18 February, 1971.

¹³⁶¹ Cf. ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No 19, June, 1970.

¹³⁶² Cf. Jack Doig, "New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s," in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 59, No 4 (2013), p. 559-75, p. 561.

¹³⁶³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 555.

¹³⁶⁴ Cf. Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook*, p. 45f.

Moreover, New Zealand recognized the People's Republic of China, which was a sign of the changing direction of foreign policy in the Dominion.¹³⁶⁵

The New Zealanders also reassessed their relationship to Canada. In 1969, the Department of External Affairs in Wellington observed that though there were few official visits between the two countries, there were many unofficial contacts.¹³⁶⁶ The expansion of relations was desirable, however, the Department noted that one could no longer resort only to traditional associations. Canada's national initiatives, such as the new flag, the introduction of bilingualism and biculturalism, as well as their own national anthem, made it necessary to arrange relations with Canada as they would with other countries with cordial intentions. Furthermore, New Zealand depended on the stability of Southeast Asia, and Canada could be an important support in this area.¹³⁶⁷

In 1973, the New Zealand High Commission in Ottawa pressed for a fundamentally new definition of the political, economic and cultural relationship between New Zealand and Canada, which from this point onward would be of a *bilateral nature*.¹³⁶⁸ As a consequence of the British turn towards Europe, the previously existing ties to Britain had fallen to the way side, and future relations between the two countries now required bilateral agreements. Furthermore, relations had altered in other respects as well – the bilateral relations of both countries had become more formalized in recent years.¹³⁶⁹ This development and the discussions over a renegotiated Trade Agreement, a bilateral Air Agreement, and access to meat products, had required a formalization of relations. Moreover, in March 1970, during the renegotiation of trade agreements in Wellington, the High Commission had perceived a “certain stiffening”¹³⁷⁰ in the relationship between New Zealand and Canada. This had resulted from the fact that political actors in both countries had become more aware of their divergent trade interests, and they recognized that they were just as much *competitors* as they were *Commonwealth-Partners*.¹³⁷¹ The increased formalization and cooling of relations between the two countries allowed the High Commission to assert that “the future relationship

¹³⁶⁵ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/40 BRU 46/5/1 28: New Zealand Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wellington, 6 April, 1973.

¹³⁶⁶ Cf. ANZ ABHS 6958 W5579/184 NYP 3/40/4 1: Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 9 September, 1969.

¹³⁶⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁶⁸ Cf. ANZ ABHS 6950/3 OTT 26/1/11 2: New Zealand High Commission Ottawa to Foreign Affairs Wellington, 29 January, 1971.

¹³⁶⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁷⁰ *Ibid.* The High Commission in Ottawa cited, among others, Max Saltsman, who had visited New Zealand in 1965 and had already observed a cooling in the relations at that time. Cf. *Ibid.*

¹³⁷¹ Cf. *Ibid.*

between Canada and New Zealand will be governed by tangible interests, rather than shared sentiment and tradition.”¹³⁷² The idea of a “Pacific Community”¹³⁷³ in conjunction with Canada on the model of the EEC, however, was rejected by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs, as they did not believe that a union of this sort would be able to function in this part of the world.¹³⁷⁴ In the case of New Zealand, it is especially striking that the economic situation was the most significant aspect of change in the 1960s and in the early 1970s. Without the EEC debates, the process of detachment would have taken a longer course, and the realignment with the Pacific region would have stretched out over a longer period of time. It is clear that there was already a recognizable trend towards detached relations as early as 1961, but this still had not become vigorous enough to effect deep changes. With the necessity of opening new markets, of thinking beyond traditional products, and of evolving deeper diplomatic relations to other countries, economic, foreign policy, and identity “frames” shifted. This shift was, at the very least, tangible to diplomatic and political actors, and it was augmented by the EEC debates. In this context, the year 1967 gains special significance; the second round of British membership talks undid any hopes among New Zealand actors that Britain might in the long run remain outside of the EEC. In combination with the withdrawal of British troops from Southeast Asia, the fears of the previous years were thus confirmed: relations between Great Britain and New Zealand were subjected to changes that could no longer be delayed and required New Zealand to act. Thus, they concentrated on the diversification of their trade, in which the quest for new outlet markets occupied a central role. They also intensified their search for oil and mineral deposits.¹³⁷⁵ For New Zealand, trade (and exports of agricultural products in particular) was the central theme of national foreign policy alignments. At the end of the 1970s, the Prime Minister Robert Muldoon stated: “Our foreign policy is trade.”¹³⁷⁶ Trade and foreign policy were thus closely linked in New Zealand and conditioned one another. Subsequently, Asian-Pacific trade took on more significance

¹³⁷² Ibid.

¹³⁷³ Ibid.

¹³⁷⁴ Cf. Ibid.

¹³⁷⁵ Cf. ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No 19, June, 1970.

¹³⁷⁶ Cited in Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook*, p. 70.

for New Zealand.¹³⁷⁷ With the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asian-Pacific trade was given an institutional framework that exists to the present day.¹³⁷⁸

Strategic Solutions and Impacts: “New Nationalism” and altered Self-Perception

After the British withdrawal from the Empire, “post-imperial disorientations” ensued among the circles of Dominion policy makers.¹³⁷⁹ In their trade and foreign policy alignments, politicians and officials in the Dominions could no longer orient themselves to Great Britain, and thus they lost a part of their national identity. In the 1970s, this resulted in a *new nationalism* with new national narratives. The dissolution of the British empire, the dismantling of racist migration systems, the increased significance of multiculturalism, new trade partners and a regionally aligned and focused foreign policy, were put into effect in the three former settler colonies not only at relatively the same time, but also amid similar conditions. Moreover, they had a reciprocal influence on one another.¹³⁸⁰ All these factors altered the self-perception of the three countries and contributed to a strengthened feeling of independence. There were more voices that emphasized the growth of autonomy in the lands: “[...] we want to, and are determined to stand on our own feet. We are determined to grow and to expand.”¹³⁸¹

The previously cited Policy Paper of the Australian Foreign Ministry on the subject of Australian-British relations, predicted that the “new” relationship to Great Britain would mean complete independence for Australia.¹³⁸² From this point onward, Australia could put its focus on the security of its own continent and within the Asian-Pacific region. The decision to accede to the EEC had

¹³⁷⁷ On the subsequent realignment of New Zealand in relation to trade policy, see Jane Kelsey, “New Zealand and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations. Strategy, Content and Lessons,” in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, eds. Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, p. 145-68 (New Jersey, London a. o., 2018); Brian Lynch, “New Zealand and Its Asia-Pacific Destiny. Sailing the Waka in Ever-Widening Circles,” in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, eds. Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, p. 103-20 (New Jersey, London a. o., 2018); Hugh White, “Old Friends in the New Asia. New Zealand, Australia and the Rise of China,” in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, eds. Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, p. 187-98 (New Jersey, London a. o., 2018).

¹³⁷⁸ Cf. Robert Scollay, “New Zealand’s Evolving Response to Changing Asia-Pacific Trade and Economic Currents Since 1989,” in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, eds. Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, p. 121-44 (New Jersey, London a.o. 2018), p. 121.

¹³⁷⁹ Ward, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World,” p. 259.

¹³⁸⁰ Cf. Robert van Krieken, “Between Assimilation and Multiculturalism. Models of Integration in Australia,” in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 46 (2012), pp. 500-17.

¹³⁸¹ NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen before the Primary Producers’ Organisations, Melbourne, 15 June, 1962.

¹³⁸² Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 8: Department of Foreign Affairs, 5 April, 1973.

led to a “new image for Australia.”¹³⁸³ Australians were now more independent in international relations and inside their own geographic region.¹³⁸⁴ More and more, actors in all three Dominions realized that the connection to Britain, once viewed as secure and natural, had dissolved. Australia – far from Great Britain, the USA, and Europe – had to build upon its own strengths and concentrate more on the pursuit of its own interests.¹³⁸⁵ Thus, the question concerning new national points of orientation and new feelings of self-worth attained greater significance. Politicians in the three countries began to call for a *new nationalism* that would give them an orientation and position in the post-imperial world.¹³⁸⁶

The British side also observed changes in the Dominions. The *Financial Times* reported in May 1967 of altered trade patterns, and altered ways of thinking in Australian economic strategy. Moreover, they made note of statements concerning the abandonment of the Sterling Zone.¹³⁸⁷ In this year, it became evident to the New Zealand High Commission in London that the relationship was in transition. Thus, the changes in the Australian-British connection did not appear to be a “passing phase,”¹³⁸⁸ but rather an unavoidable dissolution of previously existing ties. Signs such as the Australian announcement of a review of Australian-British economic relations, spoke to this lasting change.¹³⁸⁹

The New Zealand High Commission in Canberra agreed with the primary assumptions of this article. They likewise observed a transformation in Australian-British relations. The article in the *Financial Times* was “as far as we can tell accurate.”¹³⁹⁰ The change in the Australian-British connection was an unavoidable consequence of Australia’s development as a *nation* that was increasingly integrated with Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, while Great Britain sought rapprochement with Europe. The simultaneous regionalization of both nations necessarily led, according to the High Commission, to alterations in the relationship between Dominion and Motherland. Thus, it was not a matter of sudden political developments, but rather of long-term

¹³⁸³ Ibid.

¹³⁸⁴ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 8: Department of Foreign Affairs, 6 April, 1973.

¹³⁸⁵ Cf. NLA 856960 Australia & The Common Market Reference Material: Speech by McEwen at the Country Party Conference, Cootamundra, 1 June, 1962.

¹³⁸⁶ Cf. Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World," p. 195f.

¹³⁸⁷ Cf. *Financial Times*, 16 May, 1967.

¹³⁸⁸ ANZ AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25 164/2/2 4: B.V. Galvin for High Commissioner London to the Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 30 May, 1967.

¹³⁸⁹ Cf. Ibid.

¹³⁹⁰ ANZ AAFZ 7174 W1318/226 3382 18: New Zealand High Commission (Canberra) to External Affairs (Wellington), 22 July, 1967.

trends. It had been influenced by Great Britain's increasingly reluctant role *East of Suez*, its abstention from the Vietnam war, and its financial distancing from Australia.¹³⁹¹ In this instance, Australian evolution into an independent nation was reckoned as a primary cause for the changes in the Anglo-Australian relationship, and not, as in many other sources, the other way around. Of course, it is certainly true that the growing emancipation of Australia influenced the tie to the motherland. The more independently Australia formulated its trade and foreign policy, the less it required London. However, since the British approach to Europe was one of the central reasons for a realignment of Australian trade policy, it is an essential factor that influenced the Australian nation-building process; Australian actors had already in the course of the first round of membership talks speculated that Australia could, as a nation, profit through the EEC question, as it would be forced to stand more surely "on her own feet."¹³⁹² Australia would now no longer turn to Great Britain first if it encountered difficulties, but rather try to act independently of the motherland. This is, however, a long-term development that was much accelerated by British membership in the EEC. However, in spite of the economic problems, this resulted in political advantages for Australia.¹³⁹³

In the middle of the 1960s, growing aspirations for an independent "national" identity had become apparent. However, this still – as the British High Commissioner in Canberra reported to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in July 1965 – included a connection with Great Britain: "The Australian attitude to Britain is a mixture of loyalty and a desire for a separate identity."¹³⁹⁴ The diversification of export markets and the reduction of Australian dependence on the British market strengthened national self-awareness:

¹³⁹¹ Cf. Ibid.

¹³⁹² This is clearly demonstrated by, among other sources, the correspondence between the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, and Reverend Kingsley Bond, a resident of Britain, in September 1962. Bond had written to Barwick in order to share his worries over Australia. In his letter of 23 August, 1962, Bond pointed out to Barwick that the "England of sentiment" no longer existed for Australians, in some respects, had never existed. Great Britain had taken little interest in Australia, and Australians must now independently work out an "alternative plan." It was time to consider a change to the Australian constitution that severed the British connection. Barwick agreed with the Reverend that Australia must stand on its own feet to a greater degree; yet at the same time, it could serve as a bridge between Europe and Asia. It was time to turn to Asia and accept its position in the Pacific. Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 4A: correspondence between Rev. Kingsley G. Bond and Garfield Barwick, 23 August and 6 September, 1962.

¹³⁹³ Cf. NAA A1838 727/4/2 Part 4 Annex A: Foreign Affairs Committee, Report on European-Commonwealth affairs on the subject of the United Kingdom's possible entry into the European Economic Community, 21 August, 1962.

¹³⁹⁴ TNA DO 169/341: British High Commission (Canberra) to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (London), 8 July, 1965.

Increased national self-confidence in the knowledge that a beginning has been made over the past five years in the diversification of export markets and the reduction in Australian dependence on the British market.¹³⁹⁵

At the end of the 1960s, Australia broke from the previous pattern that had bound the Australians to Great Britain. Until the late 1960s, Australian citizens still had to declare their nationality with the term “British”; under Prime Minister Harold Holt, it was decided to strike this word from Australian passports. Two years later, the Nationality and Citizenship Act was renewed, whereby the concept of “Australian nationality” was officially confirmed.¹³⁹⁶ In the mid-1960s, the first national daily newspaper, *The Australian*, was founded. The first edition of the paper dealt with the new challenges of a “young” Australian nation, and, in doing so, called the EEC negotiations a “salutary shock”¹³⁹⁷ that had shown Australians that from this point onward they would have to look out for themselves.¹³⁹⁸ With this, a further part of the connection to Great Britain broke loose on a variety of levels. Holt maintained traditional ties to London and Washington, however, his first overseas visit as Prime Minister took him to Asia. This along with the decision to give more attention to policy concerning indigenous peoples,¹³⁹⁹ were the first signs of an altered political landscape in Australia.¹⁴⁰⁰

At the beginning of the 1970s, officials of the British High Commission in Canberra remarked on a growing “Australian nationalism.”¹⁴⁰¹ This process had begun with the fall of Singapore in 1942 and the real threat to the Australian mainland during the Pacific War; it now acquired more momentum on account of more independent trade and foreign policies. Furthermore, more travel overseas and within Australia itself had boosted the sense of a national, Australian identity. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the British talks with the EEC, the war in Vietnam, the Rhodesia Crisis, and the removal of British troops from Southeast Asia had contributed to the cutting of the umbilical cord that had connected Australia to Great Britain.¹⁴⁰² In addition, there existed a general

¹³⁹⁵ TNA DO 215/14: Memorandum „Britain and the E.E.C.“, sent by the British High Commission (Canberra) to Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 25 March, 1966.

¹³⁹⁶ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 23.

¹³⁹⁷ Cited in Curran and Ward, *The Unknown Nation. Australia After Empire*, p. 39.

¹³⁹⁸ Cf. Ibid.

¹³⁹⁹ Cf. Davison, “The Colonial Strut. Australian Leaders on the World Stage,” p. 13.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴⁰¹ TNA DO 127/140: British High Commission (Canberra) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), 13 May, 1970.

¹⁴⁰² Cf. Ibid.

feeling that “geography had re-asserted itself”;¹⁴⁰³ both Great Britain and Australia were increasingly aligned to their own geographical region.

However, the events cited above were not the only causes behind the shift in Australian-British relations. Transformations in the composition of Australian society through different patterns of migration also played a role. The influx of migrants from other parts of Europe had overtaken the primarily British immigration that had prevailed up to that point. The altered relationship in both countries, however, did not lead to more energetic demands for Australia to transform itself into a republic. This goal was actively pursued by only a small number of intellectuals and academics who resided primarily in Sydney, and who attempted to influence leading newspapers and the younger generations.¹⁴⁰⁴

In Western Australia and Tasmania, however, British actors observed a persistent loyalty to the crown, as well as in the Armed Forces and in the civilian Returned Servicemen’s League. Among the older segments of Australian society and, in particular, among Protestants, there was still a “strong and emotional attachment to the Throne.”¹⁴⁰⁵ In general, many Australians had a “warm and friendly”¹⁴⁰⁶ interest in the British Royal Family. Though the British crown had become a subject of boredom for many Australians under Robert Menzies, it had come “back in fashion”¹⁴⁰⁷ again under Harold Holt and his pro-American policies. Moreover, Australians felt themselves to be increasingly isolated in the world, and the affiliation to the Commonwealth and to Great Britain offered them the security of having allies in the world.¹⁴⁰⁸

With the electoral victory of Gough Whitlam in 1972, the political landscape in Australia changed. Under the slogan “It’s Time”, the vote was won by Whitlam’s Labor Party.¹⁴⁰⁹ Under Whitlam, “White Australia-Policy” was ended, and Australia was defined as a “multicultural society.”¹⁴¹⁰ The Immigration Department no longer recorded the ethnicity of immigrants.¹⁴¹¹ Within the first month of his time in office, Whitlam withdrew the last troops from Vietnam, ended conscription, established diplomatic relations to China, announced the imminent independence of Papua, and the

¹⁴⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 231.

¹⁴¹⁰ Cf. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung*, p. 52.

¹⁴¹¹ Cf. Doig, “New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s,” p. 563.

ratification of international conventions on nuclear weapons, labour, and racism. Moreover, he did away with imperial “honours.”¹⁴¹² The cultural landscape of Australia expanded under Whitlam; the promotion of Australian art, of Australian television programming, and the preservation of historical sites, was to support a stronger national consciousness. The completion of the Opera in Sydney in 1973, and the appearance of the three volumes of Manning Clark’s *History of Australia* invigorated the growing sense of “Australianness.”¹⁴¹³ With the Australian Citizenship Act of 1973, all migrants had to swear an oath to the Australian nation upon naturalization – this was required of British and non-British migrants alike.¹⁴¹⁴ In the “new nationalism,” “nation” was no longer defined as an ethnic marker of “whiteness.” Instead, the nation defined itself via laws, institutions, and culture.¹⁴¹⁵ With the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, all forms of racist discrimination were suppressed, so that indigenous Australians were now on an equal legal footing.¹⁴¹⁶

Whitlam had to relinquish his office after the Australian constitutional crisis in 1975. The cause was the blocked passage of several bills in the Senate by the Liberal Party, which at this time had a majority. The Liberal Party wanted to block government bills until Whitlam agreed to new elections to the House of Representatives. Whitlam refused so a stalemate ensued. The Governor General, John Kerr, intervened and Whitlam had to give up his office. Kerr set new elections and installed a caretaker government under the Liberal-Conservative, Malcolm Fraser.¹⁴¹⁷

Nation-Building in Canada

During the mid-1960s in Canada, the nation-building process also overlapped with aspects of trade policy. Some actors – such as the Canadian Trade Committee of the Private Planning Association of Canada¹⁴¹⁸ – saw the EEC debates as a chance for Canada to grow through the crisis and become an independent state. One of the most significant findings of a report entitled, “The Impact of the

¹⁴¹² Cf. MacIntyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, p. 231.

¹⁴¹³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹⁴¹⁴ Cf. Doig, “New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s,” p. 562.

¹⁴¹⁵ Cf. Neville Meaney, “The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s Changing Perception of Asia, 1945-1990,” in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 49, No. 2 (1995), p. 171-89, p. 185.

¹⁴¹⁶ Cf. Doig, “New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s,” p. 566.

¹⁴¹⁷ Cf. Voigt, *Australien*, p. 79.

¹⁴¹⁸ The Trade Committee founded at the end of 1961 consisted of 50 representatives from across the country who held leading positions in the economy, in the agricultural sector, and within education. Cf. LAC MG32-B13 Vol. 9: New for the Press, Montreal, 19 July, 1962. The main focus of the Committee was to publicize the trade situation in Canada, as well as to generate solutions to further Canadian national interests in a changing global trade environment. The Committee was financed by the Private Planning Association of Canada – a non-profit research firm. Cf. *Ibid.*

European Integration on Canada,” which was issued by the Committee in July 1962, was that Canada was now confronted by challenges. These challenges would spur Canada to become a “stronger nation” and a “nation better fitted to achieve its destiny.”¹⁴¹⁹ For this reason, the Report rejected some possibilities that Canada could face in the future as unrealistic. Among such alternatives numbered an association with the EEC, the creation of an “Atlantic Community”, the transformation of the Commonwealth into a free-trade zone, and the establishment of a free-trade zone with the USA.¹⁴²⁰ Instead, Canadians should accustom themselves, in future, to working on their own productivity and competitiveness.¹⁴²¹

A further example is the already mentioned work by Walter Gordon. In his introduction to *A Choice for Canada*, he cited an article from the *London Times* of 28 February 1966, which described Canada as a nation “doubtful of her identity and unsure of her future.”¹⁴²² To him, this appeared to be an apt description of his homeland, which in spite of enormous natural resources, such as precious metals, minerals, oil, gas, hydropower, and forestry products, was still, in the mid-1960s, uncertain of its future prospects. Gordon saw the reason for this incomplete nationhood in the problems between the English and French-speaking inhabitants; both these groups as well as the “new” immigrants from other parts of the world, were hindered by both regional differences in Canada and the influence of the USA.¹⁴²³ In order to support this incipient nationhood, Gordon called on the Canadian government to put more distinctively Canadian symbols into circulation. The adoption of the Maple Leaf flag was, of course, an essential first step in the right direction; however, according to him more such steps had to follow. “O Canada” should be formally recognized as the National Anthem; stamps and coins should be carefully designed. Furthermore, Gordon advocated for an internal exchange program for students, so that the great distances within Canada could be bridged over by reciprocal visits:¹⁴²⁴

Canadians need more symbols, more traditions, and more in the way of clearly identifiable national policies to remind them of their country and the pride they should take in it. We should adopt distinctively Canadian attitudes wherever this is natural and possible in our economic, defence, and foreign policies.¹⁴²⁵

¹⁴¹⁹ Ibid. The report was initiated by the Committee and prepared by L. D. Wilgress. In the introductory chapter, Wilgress described himself as a committee member, experienced in trade relations, and a long-time public servant in the Canadian government. Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴²⁰ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴²¹ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴²² Cited in Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*, p. ix.

¹⁴²³ Cf. Ibid., p. ix.

¹⁴²⁴ Cf. Ibid. p. 21.

¹⁴²⁵ Ibid., p. 21f. An exact description of what distinctively Canadian attributes, however, is not to be found in his account.

Thus, the writings of Walter Gordon link trade relations, economy, and Canadian identity, whereby he decidedly calls for an *independent* Canadian economy. This refers primarily, however, to relations with the USA. The connection between trade policy and national identity was also remarked on by followers of his work: “May I congratulate you on your firm attitude on a real Canadian identity in economics.”¹⁴²⁶ An independent economy in which trade was a significant pillar of support,¹⁴²⁷ would be seen as a critical linchpin of national strength and self-consciousness.¹⁴²⁸

Gordon’s work appeared in the middle of the 1960s. At that time, basic (imperial) symbols in Canada were altered under the liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson; in 1965, Canada replaced the Union Jack with its own flag.¹⁴²⁹ The “Quiet Revolution” began in the 1960s and peaked with the October crisis in 1970. The efforts to attain an independent Quebec outside of Canada led to a transformation of Canada into a bilingual nation under the administration of Pierre Trudeau. The Canadian flag dispute took place in the context of this Quiet Revolution. It demonstrated that within Canada, two movements existed. Some actors demanded the removal of British elements from the national flag and the creation of their own genuinely “Canadian” flag. Others emphasized the relationship between Canada and Great Britain and called for the retention of the “red ensign.” “O Canada” was established as the national anthem, even though the official adoption of the song as an anthem was first took effect in 1980. In the mid-1960s, Canada could orient itself around two celebrations: Expo and the Centennial.

Thus, in Canada discussions concerning the cohabitation of French and English-speaking Canadians ran parallel to the EEC debates. Canada dismantled, for this reason, imperial symbols much sooner than Australia, and is, in this respect, the only Dominion that has altered its flag. The nation-building process thus transpired earlier than in Australia. How this played out in New Zealand will be shown in the following section.

¹⁴²⁶ LAC MG32-B44 Vol. 17: Letter of Kenneth McAllister to Walter Gordon, 26 April, 1967. In the same year, the *Canadian Institute of Public Opinion* undertook a study of public opinion on Canadian economic independence, in the course of which, it referred to a study in the *Toronto Star* and an investigation by *Maclean’s*. Cf. LAC MG32-B44 Vol. 21: Public Opinion and Canadian Independence. A Survey of Nation Wide Polls 1959-1967, July 1967.

¹⁴²⁷ On the significance of trade for the overall Canadian economy, see Hart, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*.

¹⁴²⁸ In *A Choice for Canada*, Gordon did not deal explicitly with the British approach to Europe, but instead focused more strenuously on the problematic relationship to the USA. This demonstrated again that the economic and financial importance of the USA for Canada on the level of trade and economic policy was more significant than the connection to Great Britain. To be sure, the British-Canadian relationship emerged in his work, both explicitly and implicitly, but the main focus for Gordon is the American connection. He appears to view the EEC debates, within this framework, as not so grave, which signified a perceptual shift among political circles in Ottawa. Cf. Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*.

¹⁴²⁹

Nation-Building in New Zealand

Even in “laggard” New Zealand, the EEC negotiations led to changes. The talks pushed New Zealand into a new orientation of its economic and political alignments. As contemporary actors observed, this took place straight after the first round of membership talks with the EEC.¹⁴³⁰ By this time, the traditional relationships among New Zealand actors had already altered. This was the conclusion of both the President of the Federation of Labour, F. P. Walsh, and the Chair of the New Zealand Meat Producers’ Board. Traditionally, the Farmer Associations were separate from the Federation of Labour. Due to the EEC debates, they now began to work together.¹⁴³¹ As the *Evening Post* reported on 12 September 1962, some actors saw in the EEC talks a direct and long overdue chance for New Zealand to cast aside its economic, mental, and emotional ties to Great Britain.¹⁴³² At the third round of British membership talks, New Zealand actors noted that “politically and psychologically, a more mature society has emerged.”¹⁴³³ A “more assured identity”¹⁴³⁴ and an “increased confidence”¹⁴³⁵ was detectable, but the close ties to Europe and Great Britain persisted.¹⁴³⁶

In New Zealand, a political rupture akin to the one in Australia took place in the 1970s. In 1972, a newly elected Labour government led by Norman Kirk ousted the National Party after twelve years of rule. Labour won with the same slogan as the Labor Party in Australia – “It’s time.” Just as it did in Australia, in New Zealand, this slogan referred to a “new” age that departed from the previous one, and to a strengthened national consciousness. Labour in New Zealand and Labor in Australia both emphasized equality and justice for everyone.¹⁴³⁷ Their nationalism consisted of “new” ideas that, to be sure, did not originate from a “void”: “These new ideas did not emerge from

¹⁴³⁰ For an example of this shift in consciousness, see the convention of the Export Development Conference of 1963. Cf. Perumbulavil, *The European Economic Community and New Zealand*, p. ii.

¹⁴³¹ *The Guardian*, 30 May, 1961. The Federation of Labour was one of the most significant and influential forces vis-à-vis the New Zealand government. The President of the Federation wrote straight away to the British Trade Union Congress and asked British Labour to support New Zealand trade interests. Other influential organisations in New Zealand were the New Zealand Chamber of Commerce and the New Zealand Dairy Board. Cf. LAC RG20-A-3 Vol. 2558 7-72-11 pt. 1: Letter from the Canadian High Commission, Wellington, 15 June, 1961.

¹⁴³² “New Zealand has Chance to Throw off Ties?,” *The Evening Post*, 12 September, 1962. Australian actors followed such reports concerning Australia with great interest. This is traceable through the fact that this and similar articles were collected by the Australian High Commission in New Zealand, and as a result found their way into the Australian National Archives: NAA A1838 727/3/22 Part 1: European Economic Community, Attitudes of other countries: New Zealand, 1962.

¹⁴³³ ANZ AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107: New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council Report No 19, June, 1970.

¹⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁷ Cf. Doig, “New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s,” p. 560.

a vacuum, plucked out of the air for an election campaign.”¹⁴³⁸ The retreat of Great Britain had, of course, left behind a “hole” that was now to be filled with the “new nationalism”, but the ideas upon which this “new nationalism” was based had long been in circulation, or were put together from universal concepts such as equality, multiculturalism and the dismantling of racist systems. Also similar to the government in Canberra, the one in Wellington won the vote with a large majority. This they saw as a confirmation and justification of fundamental changes. Both propagated an independent foreign policy and a strong national consciousness.¹⁴³⁹ The Kirk administration also began to replace British symbols with national ones. Up to 1973, New Zealand did not have a national holiday that marked the independence of the country. All such holidays were linked to Great Britain or – with the exception of Labour Day – were religious in nature. In the summer of 1973, Henry May, the Minister of Internal Affairs, presented a draft proposal for a “New Zealand Day”: “It is a fact that all nations feel a need to express their independence and nationhood [...]”¹⁴⁴⁰

After the British accession to the EEC and with a newly elected Labour government, it appeared natural to New Zealanders that New Zealand would take a more independent course in foreign affairs and should pursue its own trade policy.¹⁴⁴¹ At this time in New Zealand, the definition of “nation” itself also altered; from this point onward nation was defined more by laws, institutions, and culture.¹⁴⁴² This did not mean that “Britishness” disappeared from New Zealand society or no longer occupied a place in the definition of the nation; the New Zealand government still identified the country as a “British Nation.”¹⁴⁴³ However, in distinction from prior times, the nation could now deal with the diversity of the population and accept different identities alongside the British one.¹⁴⁴⁴ Under Kirk, New Zealand also changed the way it dealt with its indigenous population. His government adopted a bicultural status for New Zealand; with the Māori Affairs Amendment Bill (1974) and the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) the laws of the Māori were strengthened. Increasingly, assimilation was replaced by the idea of living together.¹⁴⁴⁵

¹⁴³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴³⁹ Cf. Ibid. p. 561.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 561f.

¹⁴⁴¹ Cf. ANZ ABHS 18069 W5402/40 BRU 46/5/1 28: Record of Copy Call by the Hon. J.A. Walding on Minister of International Trade and Industry, 5 April, 1973.

¹⁴⁴² Cf. Robert Patman and Chris Rudd, *Sovereignty under Siege? Globalisation and New Zealand* (Aldershot 2005), p. 100.

¹⁴⁴³ Cf. Doig, "New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s," p. 564.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Cf. Ibid.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Cf. Ibid., p. 567f.

In retrospect, the EEC debates was central to New Zealand policy makers, and to their self-perceptions of their own independence and identity:

It is clear the EEC problem will prove to have been one of the major influences which compelled New Zealanders to come to terms with their identity, as a group with certain positive social and cultural values.¹⁴⁴⁶

Looking back, some former New Zealand diplomats such as Neil Walter and Terence O'Brien labeled British membership "the best thing that could have ever happened to New Zealand."¹⁴⁴⁷

The EEC Debates as a "sobering experience"¹⁴⁴⁸ for Australia, Canada, and New Zealand

The Australian historian, Stuart Ward, identified the crisis of the British EEC negotiations as a "sobering experience for Australia, Canada and New Zealand."¹⁴⁴⁹ As a result of the 1961 crisis, the sense of identifying with a community of British peoples, a feeling that had stamped the national psyches of the Dominions for years was now broken. Thus, the first British attempt to join the EEC was a "pivotal moment"¹⁴⁵⁰ that in all three of the Dominions led to a new orientation that departed from "British race patriotism" and led them to pursue their own national interests. All the previous difficulties in the relations between Great Britain and the Dominions had initiated a very slow transformation, which up to 1961 had altered neither the public imagination nor the political culture of the three nations:

There was no episode of sufficient magnitude to activate the press, the parliament, and public opinion in such a way as to reshape the core assumptions of Anglo-Dominion relations.¹⁴⁵¹

For Stuart Ward, the shaking of the groundwork of the Anglo-Dominion relationships followed from the first round of British membership talks. According to Ward, the EEC debates were for this reason a catalyst for a long overdue discussion in a world in which British race patriotism was no longer bound to their own political and economic interests.¹⁴⁵² Ward was not alone in his assessment that the first round of British-EEC talks was a watershed for the Anglo-Australian, and respectively, the Anglo-Dominion relationships. The quantity of literature alone concerning the first round of membership talks, when compared to the clearly less prevalent literature on the

¹⁴⁴⁶ ANZ ABHS 6944/5 HGK 64/21/1 2: Letter of the High Commissioner to the Prime Minister, London, 28 May, 1976.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Neil Walter and Terence O'Brien, respectively.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Ward, "A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship," p. 156.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 157.

¹⁴⁵¹ Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁴⁵² Cf. Ibid.

second and third round of talks, suggests that the first negotiations were felt as a definite “shock.”¹⁴⁵³ Andrea Benvenuti argued in his dissertation on the British-Australian relationship that the Australians had little possibility of influencing the British. The shift initiated by London came too fast for Australian actors, and for this reason they focused their efforts on protest – though in a restrained fashion so as not to offend the British administration and thus leverage some advantage for themselves. Gradually the Australians came to accept the situation; they then concentrated on trade in the Asian-Pacific region and the reconceptualization of their strategic imperatives in Asia.¹⁴⁵⁴ This severe disturbance of Australian-British relations did not, as Stuart Ward described, proceed from the first round of EEC negotiations, but rather from a combination of diverse moments of crisis in the 1960s.¹⁴⁵⁵

Certainly, one must agree with Ward that the first membership talks, on account of their shock effects and their singular impact, elicited a more wide-ranging discussion than the subsequent rounds of talks. By the time of the second and third rounds, policy makers in the Dominions had, on the one hand, accustomed themselves to the thought that Great Britain would join the Common Market; on the other, they had already formulated numerous analyses and strategic solutions, upon which they could build at the time of the renewed negotiations. Indeed, it should be noted that, even if the “shock” during the first entrance talks was greater than that of both of the other rounds, the second round obtained a special significance, as Andrea Benvenuti has argued, on account of its combination with the “East of the Suez” debates in Australia and New Zealand. The end of Empire, which at the time of the first round of talks was only one among several future scenarios, now seemed to be more near and clearly more realistic. The second round of British membership talks are, for this reason, the point at which the open and complex situation of a possible British withdrawal intensified and manifested itself as the end of empire. Moreover, in both countries, further arguments of British race patriotism are evident in the second and third round of talks, even if they were in flux and by 1973 had significantly declined. The British withdrawal left behind a “void” in the Dominions. This void was, however, no *sudden occurrence* that originated from the

¹⁴⁵³ Literature on the first membership talks in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada: *ibid.* Furthermore, the actors themselves had already identified the 1960s as a “watershed” in Australia – for instance, Alexander Downer, at a speech to the International Investment Conference in 1970: “I believe that when the economic history of Australia in the 20th Century is written, the 1960s will appear as a watershed [...]” NAA A463 1970/2098: Speech of Alexander Downer, 22 May, 1970.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain’s Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Cf. *Ibid.* p. 11.

first negotiations; rather it arose *gradually* in the course of the 1960s with the announcement in 1961 being a climax of the process. It was also not the kind of void that left one dumbfounded, for Dominion actors discussed a variety of options to fill it. Therefore, to the previous investigations of the EEC debates in the three Dominions, it should be added that the British withdrawal from the Empire led, *in the long run*, to a void that was “filled” by various solutions discussed by policy makers.

For Canada too, the time of the second British membership talks – and 1967 in particular – was decisive. The striving after a distinct Canadian identity hit its pinnacle in the Canadian centennial and the Expo in Montreal. As Lester Pearson noted:

There are other memories of Centennial year, but the important thing was what it [Expo] did for our national morale. It really gave the country a lift which I thought would extend over a good many years [...]¹⁴⁵⁶

Politicians and officials in Ottawa had up to this point handled the EEC debates with an eye towards public opinion, and the conflict between Quebec and the rest of Canada was the dominant theme of political debates. Stuart Ward agrees that the first round of EEC talks likewise drew more attention than the subsequent rounds, and that arguments referring to British race patriotism were significantly less than was the case in Australia and New Zealand. Nonetheless, it should still be noted that for Canada too, there was a confluence of several diverse factors in the middle of the 1960s – the time of the second round of talks. These paved the way to a distinctive Canadian identity. For all three countries it can be said that the first round of talks received the most public attention. At the time of the second round of negotiations, different aspects coalesced, however, and distinct models of identity emerged in the discussion.

Of Disorientation, Uncertainty, and Self-Confidence

The sum of these investigations shows that the EEC debates had an impact on all three countries, though of varying intensity and tempo. In all of the Dominions, policy makers reviewed their trade policies in light of the British rapprochement with Europe, and they sought out new export markets for their products. The search for new markets went along with an increasing regionalization in all three lands: Australia and New Zealand situated themselves more decisively in the Asian region, while New Zealand concentrated, above all, on the South Pacific. Canada built on its status as a Pacific nation and positioned itself increasingly on the North American continent.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Pearson, Mike. *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume III 1957-1968*, p. 306.

Furthermore, the British membership talks with the EEC altered relations with the individual Dominions: Canada and Australia decisively reassessed their foreign policy relations with Great Britain, and elaborated a formalized bilateral relationship to the former motherland. New Zealand reviewed its foreign policy apparatus and expanded its diplomatic sector. All three countries developed independent foreign and trade policies, that were influenced by the EEC debates.

The attachments and the feelings of belonging to the Commonwealth also changed. Instead of connections that were primarily conducted – as had been usual up to that time – through the shared Commonwealth forums, the three countries consolidated bilateral relations among themselves. Here too formalized relations replaced the previously personal ties within the Commonwealth. Parallel to the EEC debates, additional factors did stimulate these changes. Modified migration systems in the Commonwealth and in the countries themselves, the removal of British troops from Southeast Asia, and an increasingly multi-ethnic Commonwealth had an influence on these processes. All these factors led to an invigorated nation-building process in the three countries, since independent trade and foreign policies themselves elicited a strengthened sense of national consciousness. Of course, the “new nationalism” in the three countries was not only a consequence of the EEC debates and other factors; rather it was, at the same time, a strategic solution for the post-imperial disorientation¹⁴⁵⁷ that ensued from the British withdrawal from its empire. The void of identity that the British withdrawal from the Commonwealth had left behind on a personal level, on the level of those who had built their personal and collective identities on “Britishness” in conjunction with local experiences, had to be filled. Therefore, the emergence of a distinct domestic nationalism in the 1970s, was also a strategic solution for threats on the emotional level. This applies more to Australia and New Zealand than to Canada, because in the latter, the nationalism of the 1960s was mainly a strategy for resolving the conflict with separatists in Quebec. Canada turned away from British symbols of nationality¹⁴⁵⁸ earlier than was the case in Australia and New Zealand, and it distanced itself from Great Britain sooner as well. Still, even though Australia and New Zealand detached themselves from the motherland, the journalist Leslie Hannon, on his travels through the Dominions in the early 1970s, observed that:

New Zealand and Australia, both of them more British than Bristol, where ladies still have tea at four and gentlemen carry handkerchiefs, have cheerfully accepted the bare-knuckle facts of the mid-

¹⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World," p. 259.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Australia and New Zealand still have the Union Jack in their flag. However, the Flag debates of 2015-2016 demonstrate that discussions over British symbols still play a role in the process of nation-building.

1970s. They are lustily striking out for new markets, new allies, new anthems, and a new lifestyle that owes nothing to Westminster or West End.¹⁴⁵⁹

Chapter 4

Death of the Commonwealth? Reflections on the Commonwealth after 1973

In order to bring the core arguments of this work to a conclusion, it should be stated that the British membership applications of 1961 and 1967, as well as the final accession to the EEC in 1973, reinforced the ongoing processes of alienation between Great Britain and the Dominions. Thus, the first entrance attempt was not the origin of the weakening of relations between Great Britain and the former settler colonies, but rather a climactic moment within relationships undergoing change, giving these processes a new *intensity*. Political circles in the Dominions were shocked and deeply disturbed by the possibility of British membership in the EEC. For the most part, the anglo-european and well-educated elites in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington were, at the beginning of the 1960s, still attached to the motherland both in personal and collective terms. Family ties, friendships, “Britishness” and the feeling of belonging to a community of British peoples, connected them to Great Britain. Economic relations between the Dominions and the British Isles remained strong, since all three Dominions, especially New Zealand, cultivated close trade relationships with Great Britain. Moreover, British investment in the three countries played an important role in their economic systems. Thus, with the British decision to seek membership in the Common Market, the Dominions viewed their trade interests as endangered, as they expected that it would be very improbable to gain tariff-free access to the British market after a potential British accession to the EEC.¹⁴⁶⁰ As a consequence, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand feared that those products that they made specifically for the British market would remain on the shelf.¹⁴⁶¹ In addition to the feared economic repercussions, the three Dominions felt themselves to be betrayed and abandoned by Great Britain. Actors in the former settler colonies could not understand why the Motherland would leave them in order to join the geographically closer, but culturally very removed, European continent. From their point of view, they all belonged to a large

¹⁴⁵⁹ *Saturday Night*, December 1972.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Cf. Robertson and Singleton, “The Old Commonwealth and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3,” p. 157.

¹⁴⁶¹ New Zealand produced, for instance, large quantities of mutton that was too fatty for other parts of the world market and would only be consumed in Great Britain. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 154.

Commonwealth family and adhered to the same cultural background – that of “Britishness”, “whiteness”, and “family values.” Trade relationships, therefore, went hand in hand with shared cultural background and emotional nearness. As it was expressed in a newspaper article from 1972, cited in the introduction: “It [the Commonwealth] was always compounded equally of blood and business. Trade followed the flag, as they say.”¹⁴⁶²

In the context of the Cold War and a strong aversion to Asia based on historical events and anti-Communist tendencies, the Dominions feared that they would be left alone in a dangerous world without British protection. Moreover, the British announcement in 1968 that it would withdraw its troops east of the Suez inspired angst in the former settler colonies. They thus feared that not only would Great Britain soon enter the EEC and risk damage to the Dominion economies, but also, that the withdrawal of troops would leave them defenseless. Australia and New Zealand felt themselves, in geographic terms, left alone out on the periphery. The New Zealand diplomat, George Laking, expressed this feeling in the following words:

[...] in the vast area of South East Asia and South Pacific we represent, with Australia, the only substantial lodgment of European civilization.¹⁴⁶³

Moreover, as far as trade relationships were concerned, the countries of Asia were felt to be unsuitable trade partners. Trade with Asia appeared more difficult to them on account of the cultural differences among the range of products that these countries made.¹⁴⁶⁴ Moreover, prior to 1960 there were few political or economic connections to the region, so that “new” relations to the Asian states would first have to be built. Many other potential markets, such as those of Japan or America, were protectionist and, for this reason, it was difficult to gain access for agricultural products.¹⁴⁶⁵ This strengthened reservations in the Dominions about alternative markets as well as their anxiety concerning economic damage through British EEC membership.

Thus, at the beginning of the 1960s, British membership talks with the European Economic community caused a stir in Australia, as well as in Canada and New Zealand. The consequences of such membership for the other Commonwealth countries were discussed not only among political

¹⁴⁶² *Saturday Night*, December, 1972.

¹⁴⁶³ George Laking, *The Economic Development of New Zealand and the Impact of the European Economic Community* (New York 1963), p. 9. In his speech, Laking further argued that the European peoples were in no way superior to other peoples, but in contrast to the relatively young states of Asia, New Zealand had benefited from its European affiliations and experiences.

¹⁴⁶⁴ The only products that New Zealand could sell easily to Asia was wool. In contrast, New Zealand dairy products were hard to sell in this region. Cf. Robertson and Singleton, “The Old Commonwealth and Britain’s First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3,” p. 154.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*

circles; indeed, public interest in the issue could be found in the press and in private letters to politicians and diplomats. The creation of a European Economic Union *per se* was, at the same time, assessed positively, since a united Europe would be a force for stability and a guarantee of peace and security on the European continent. Moreover, the European Economic Community served as a bulwark against Communism.¹⁴⁶⁶ However, the communications surrounding Great Britain's rapprochement with Europe exceeded a simple interest in the issue, and, above all, it inflamed worries about the consequences in individual national contexts. On a number of levels, the events in Great Britain could be interpreted as a threat to their own national interests. Actors, especially those within political and diplomatic circles, feared a consequent disappearance of the previously existing orientation paradigms in which Great Britain had provided the framework for their own trade and foreign policies.

The economy of all three Dominions was based largely on revenue from trade. For this reason, all three countries – though to varying degrees of intensity – were concerned by the potential for economic damage. New Zealand was the most strongly affected by a potential accession of Great Britain to the EEC, since in 1960 the Antipode still exported 53 percent of its total export goods to the motherland.¹⁴⁶⁷ A large power imbalance resulted from this, since New Zealand was – of the three Dominions – the most economically dependent on Great Britain. At the beginning of the 1960s, the New Zealand economy was, for the most part, based on agricultural produce. These products were in direct competition with the produce of European countries, so that the guarantee of special conditions for such products appeared improbable to actors in the Dominions. Accordingly, New Zealand politicians and diplomats viewed British membership in the EEC as a great danger for the economic stability of their own country. Politicians and diplomats in Australia and Canada likewise referred to the disastrous repercussions of British EEC membership for their domestic economies as well as for specific branches of industry.¹⁴⁶⁸ Thus, they supported the view that the EEC membership talks were a danger to the Dominions.

¹⁴⁶⁶ In the eyes of some actors, these advantages readily outweighed the short-term trade problems for the Dominions: "This [stabilization of the continent through the British entrance to the EEC] [...] outweighed any immediate disadvantages and dislocations that might ensue for Canada." Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume II 1948-1957*, p. 76.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Cf. Robertson and Singleton, "The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3," p. 154.

¹⁴⁶⁸ For Australia, this mostly affected the trade in sugar, canned fruit as well as dairy and meat products. In Canada, grain farmers were the most threatened.

Parallel to these negative voices, one finds among the primary sources, actors who saw in the British retreat from its Empire an opportunity for the economy and trade of their respective countries. Through a British shift from the Commonwealth, the Dominions were offered new trade options and possibilities for the “liberation” of their trade policy. By opening the door for the Dominions to Western Europe, Great Britain – by way of its membership in the EEC – could even offer trade advantages to Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Such statements emerged, in particular, among the opposition parties and industry representatives, who assessed the British-EEC negotiations as positive. At the same time, however, they confirmed the significance of the EEC debates *in themselves* as a dramatic event in the relations between Great Britain and the Dominions. The negative evaluations, just as much as the positive ones, attested to the fact that the rapprochement of Great Britain with Europe was a watershed event for the relationship with Britain; lasting changes to previous relations were to be expected.

Regardless of the different outlooks, both points of view attested to a permanent change of existing relations within the Commonwealth on account of the British membership talks with the EEC. Both perspectives found support in the respective press organs and among the population in the three countries – newspaper articles and letters bear witness to this. For this reason, it is clear that the British membership talks with the EEC meant a caesura in the Anglo-Dominion relationship. However, the negotiations first functioned as a watershed in combination with the withdrawal of British troops from Southeast Asia.

The British rapprochement to Europe threatened not only trade conditions, but also the paradigms of the political order. Up to this point, British foreign policy had set the direction of Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand policies.¹⁴⁶⁹ A British orientation towards Europe could – so actors in the Dominions feared – mean that London would be more strongly integrated in European affairs, thus altering traditional solidarities. Prior to the EEC debates, an agreed upon policy for approaching Great Britain did not exist in the three countries. Moreover, Great Britain was always perceived by Dominion actors as the center of the Commonwealth. An increased integration of Great Britain within Europe could jeopardize its position as a cohesive force in the Commonwealth, whereby the stability of the Commonwealth in general appeared to be endangered. The fears of the Dominions concerning a transformation of the Commonwealth had been nurtured in the years after

¹⁴⁶⁹ Of course, one does find examples in which the foreign policy of the three states diverged from that of Great Britain, as well as explicit variances of opinion; but London nonetheless remained a functional model, to which all three countries oriented themselves.

the Second World War; growing movements for independence within the colonies and their organizations – in particular, at the beginning of the 1960s¹⁴⁷⁰ – unsettled Dominion actors, who had grown and been socialized with the feeling of being a part of community of British peoples. Now they were ranked among the newly independent nations of the Commonwealth who did not define themselves by “whiteness” or “Britishness”; instead, the Commonwealth had become a forum within which “white and black”¹⁴⁷¹ could meet. Some actors in the Dominions recognized this fact, as did, for example, the Canadian Finance Minister, Walter Gordon. Membership within a forum in which the various nations could meet and discuss, might secure Canada’s place in the international order, in a form that the United States could not.¹⁴⁷²

Alongside the fears concerning foreign policy shifts in light of British membership in the Common Market, actors in Australia and New Zealand voiced misgivings in relation to aspects of security policy. A British accession to the EEC could have potential consequences for British security policies in Southeast Asia, and it could demand the withdrawal of the contingent of troops it stationed there. In such a case, Australia and New Zealand saw themselves as beset by a direct threat from the countries of Asia, as they feared a takeover by their large populations, which at the time were still under the influence of Communism. Canadian actors, in contrast, feared economic and political takeover by the United States of America if Britain was no longer able to function as a counterfoil.

It can be observed that within the three Dominions the threatening communications concerning a potential EEC membership tapered off in every respect, over the course of the three British membership attempts. The extent of the sources, just as much as the variance within them, decreases by 1973; sources from private individuals grow fewer, from which one can infer a diminished interest in the subject within the general population. The pattern of communications between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Great Britain likewise altered in the course of the EEC debates. At the beginning of the 1960s, there still reigned an emphatic and especially lauded form of communication within the Commonwealth that was distinguished by openness, cordiality, and informality; this altered to become the established official protocols of diplomatic exchange.

¹⁴⁷⁰ The first round of British membership talks coincided with the “Wind of Change” speech by Harold Macmillan (1960) and the independence of several African colonies: Nigeria (1960), British-Somaliland (1960), Tanganyika (1961), South Cameroon (1961), Sierra Leone (1961), Uganda (1962), Kenya (1963), and Zanzibar (1963).

¹⁴⁷¹ Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁷² Cf. *Ibid.*

The first analytic chapter of this work has thus shown that there was, among actors in the Dominions, a perceived threat for Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in the British rapprochement with Europe, and patterns of communication altered in the course of the EEC debates. The three Dominions stated that there was a threat to their patterns of trade and policy, and they confirmed this position discursively in speeches, interviews, and debates. Parallel to this,¹⁴⁷³ the governments and departments in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington worked on a variety of strategic solutions and new configurations of trade and politics.

In all three Dominions, strategic proposals in relation to the economic danger posed by British EEC membership, ranged from a preservation of the status quo, to the diversification of trade products and export markets, and to the foundation of economic unions. The respective governments (Prime Ministers and Ministers) took decisions concerning the effective new arrangement of trade relations, with reference to the views of their own Departments and to their economic sectors (for instance, Boards of Trade).

In this process, all three governments decided upon complex strategic solutions. On the one hand, Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington tried to make their interests clear to the British, and to secure their good will in the negotiations with Brussels. Thereby, special conditions and a transition period could be arranged for products that were particularly threatened. On the other hand, all three governments worked to expand their export markets, by developing alternative markets in Asia, building trade with the USA, or working for an agreement with the EEC. Other solution mechanisms, such as, for example, the restructuring of their own economic systems, were pushed aside, since a range of studies and expert opinions found such options to be too expensive and impractical. It took some time to settle on these solutions and then put them into effect in concrete terms, but at the beginning of the 1960s, the EEC debates reinforced these efforts. The groundwork for these transformative processes, however, had been laid in the preceding years. For this reason, political actors in the Dominions resorted to a pre-set pattern of reorientation, which could not have been grasped prior to the EEC debates, because Great Britain was still viewed as the center of orientation on various levels.

The dangers that culminated in the EEC debates and the British retreat from empire, became more concrete with the membership application, in both symbolic and real terms. Alongside the

¹⁴⁷³ Isolated actors had acknowledged these threats even before the British announcement, and had prepared prognoses on the economic future of the Commonwealth. These, however, had not yet entered into the broad political discourse; after the official announcement from the British, this mass of studies, papers, and scenarios gained traction.

economic threats through damage to trade, the EEC debates posed a challenge to political and diplomatic actors in the three Dominions, who had to deal with changes in relation to the foreign policy precedents that had been set by Great Britain. Actors in the Dominions met these transformations on the political level with a rethinking of their own foreign and security policies. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Canadian and Australian governments came to the conclusion, based on the British rapprochement with Europe, that the guiding principles of the Commonwealth (as well as for Australian and Canadian relations with Britain) had been upset by the EEC debates, and that a new orientation was now necessary. In consequence, they initially generated briefing papers that concentrated on the new order of foreign policy relationships between their own nation and Great Britain. These outlines concerning foreign policy, gave more impetus to the increasing differentiation between their *own* national context and that of the *other* British one. The New Zealanders established their foreign policy apparatus anew, but did not produce a definite policy paper, as did the Australians and Canadians. However, they did likewise realize, in the course of the 1960s, that they needed an *autonomous* foreign policy. In consequence, this restructuring demonstrated and confirmed the growing distance felt towards the former “home” of Great Britain. The practice of analyzing relations between states thus embedded the relationship to Great Britain within the relations to other states. From this point onward, the relationship was to be assessed on similar grounds to those of other foreign policy relationships, even if the shared history and language continued to make the relationship special.

With the British withdrawal from its empire, the protective functions that Great Britain had once provided to Australia and New Zealand vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, and to Canada as a counterfoil to the USA, was also jeopardized. This was made especially clear during the second round of membership talks with the EEC in 1967, as Andrea Benvenuti has shown in his dissertation.¹⁴⁷⁴ Australia and New Zealand attempted to close the security gap left by the British withdrawal by an approach to the United States of America. This had already been foreshadowed by the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 and the SEATO Treaty of 1954. During the 1960s, troops from Australia and New Zealand fought alongside the USA in Viet Nam, while Canada did not participate in the conflict. Through its role in the Commonwealth and as a peaceful nation, Canada tried to adopt a distinctive image in foreign policy as a “middle power.” In order to sketch out the

¹⁴⁷⁴ Cf. Benvenuti, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972.*

course of the EEC debates in the Dominions and to acquire an overview of the decision processes of the governments in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington, the second analytic chapter of this work has discussed the negotiated strategies and solutions, as well as their actual implementation.

However, the economic and foreign policy risks to structures within the Dominions resulting from the British turn to Europe only partially explain the EEC debates in the Dominions. At most, the economic implications of British membership in the Common Market can only explain the reactions in New Zealand which was heavily dependent on Great Britain in economic terms. Indeed, the Australian and Canadian economies were much less affected by a British entrance into the Common Market. Nonetheless, in both lands one finds communications strongly informed by a sense of danger. The reasons for this were not grounded solely in a tactical exaggeration of economic damages resulting from British membership so as to protect domestic industries from harm; rather further aspects of the “particularity” of Commonwealth relations took shape during the EEC debates. Individual and collective emotions inside the Commonwealth family were rendered problematic by the British rapprochement with Europe. With the EEC debates, the world views of an entire (with exceptions) generation of politicians and diplomats began to give way; previous frameworks for trade and foreign policy were no longer viable. This was, of course, reinforced through other developments in the Commonwealth – both globally and in the countries themselves – such as changing migration patterns, decolonization, and a condemnation of colonialism. However, in the EEC debates these develops took symbolic shape in a (seemingly) conclusive dissolution of the previously existing Commonwealth paradigm. The announcement of British membership talks with the Common Market is, in consequence, a juncture in the dissolution of the British empire.

For this reason, the EEC debate was not a purely a matter of politics or economy, but rather emotions played a definite role. The transnational “emotional community” of leading actors was endangered by the British approach to Europe, since it affected their emotional context, both personally and collectively. The emotional threat was thus “urgent”; it arose within the moment when Dominion policy makers learned of Great Britain’s intentions. In contrast, since actors were afraid of *future* developments, these economic and political threats were aligned to a period that would come later. The emotions triggered by these future threats motivated policy makers in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington to entertain solutions to these dangers. In consequence, emotions did not allow for the separation of political and economic debates and decisions; they explain and,

in some respects, formed the reactions of political actors – political or economic decisions without emotions are inconceivable.

In the course of the EEC debates, however, the emotional paradigm that framed the decisions of political actors changed. Thus, emotional “outbursts” are hardly to be found in these sources, and the opening to Asia was given more impetus. On account of generational change in all three of the countries, policy makers came into power who had no close personal connections to Great Britain. This explains, along with other factors, why the EEC debates in Canada provoked vigorous reactions at the beginning of the 1960s, despite being less affected economically; it also explains why, at the end of the 1960s, it increasingly vanished from political and public discourse. Under Trudeau, the EEC only played a minor role. Instead, it was the alignment of Canadian foreign and domestic policy that occupied a decisive position. The EEC debates were, consequently, no longer a noteworthy threat to political actors on any level – the emotional framework had altered. Likewise, this shows that political debates are simultaneously negotiations of diverse “emotional communities” -- as an “emotional community” establishes itself, its objectives and focal points alter in the course of political-economic debates.

“Emotional communities” could thus exercise influence on the direction of policy, even if they could not be defined as their sole cause. The third chapter of analysis in this work has rendered a significant building block and a pattern of explanation for the sharp reactions of the three countries, while pointing out the significance of emotions in political debates. For this reason, the debates surrounding the British membership talks are not to be characterized by a distinction between emotional and unemotional politics, but rather one between different “emotional communities” that informed the debates and determined its direction.

The emotional threats, moreover, entailed a displacement in feelings of allegiance in the three lands, influenced by their regional position and their perceptions of the center and periphery. This new positioning within their region and in global terms, was not a result of the EEC debates alone, but rather was influenced by further factors such as Great Britain’s withdrawal from Southeast Asia and other national issues. To be sure, the EEC debates were an essential component in this process and informed these changes. The threat to previously existing emotional points of orientation required a search for new patterns of identification. Hence, there arose diverse practices to cope with the “post-imperial disorientations,”¹⁴⁷⁵ which have been described in more detail in the fourth

¹⁴⁷⁵ Ward, "The 'New Nationalism' in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World," p. 259.

chapter of analysis. On the one hand, in all three lands there was a “new nationalism” that countered the lacunae of regional contexts with an invigorated national sense of self-awareness and identities. On the other, all three lands made stronger identifications in their geographical position – Canada in the North American continent, and Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific and as neighbors of Asia. “Britishness,” “Whiteness,” and “Family Values” were increasingly displaced in the self-descriptions of the three settler colonies by concepts of multiculturalism.¹⁴⁷⁶ Furthermore, the analysis has also indicated a shift in the diplomatic patterns of conduct within the Commonwealth; for before and at the beginning of the EEC debates, “emotives” were a part of Commonwealth communications. They served to consolidate the “special” Commonwealth relationship and could function as a form of argument within internal Commonwealth debates. In the course of these discussions, however, “emotives” were increasingly suppressed, and in accord with this, the absence of feelings was more and more viewed and understood as “professional” conduct within diplomatic circles. This is attested to by the criticism of emotional expressions described above. For this reason, diplomatic and political actors entered into a new era of Commonwealth relations; the function of emotions in Commonwealth debates was thus circumscribed. They still functioned to consolidate relations, but no longer as a point of argument in the conduct of political debate – even if some actors did not want to accept this.¹⁴⁷⁷

By way of a transnational analysis of the EEC debates in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, there emerge further conclusions in relation to the individual countries. These concern their relations with Great Britain and with one another (as well as the Commonwealth) and the linkage between trade policy and emotions. Furthermore, the investigation obtains insights concerning nationalism in the settler colonies, postcolonial states in the Cold War, and the “age of professionalization.” In the following, these results will be collected and examined in relation to one another.

During the EEC debates, different priorities emerged in the three countries. While New Zealand was primarily concerned with the protection of economic ties and traditional means of subsistence, Australia concentrated, alongside these economic considerations, on those of defense strategy and the impact on Commonwealth relations. As far as economic considerations went, Australia likewise sought to protect existing trade. Canada, on the other hand, based its position more on political

¹⁴⁷⁶ For a detailed analysis of the cultural solutions that responded to the British retreat from its empire (as well as those pertaining to identity) see the Dissertation of my colleague, Sebastian Koch: *Identitätskrisen nach dem Ende des Britischen Empire. Zur kulturellen („Neu“-)Verortung in Kanada, Australien und Aotearoa Neuseeland.*

¹⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Ward, "Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia," p. 153.

arguments than on economic ones, although the latter did of course play some role. However, the Canadian focus was more on the repercussions of the EEC debates inside the Commonwealth, while also emphasizing more forcefully the opportunity of expanding trade relations that might arise from European integration. As a consequence, the EEC debates in Canada were more forward-looking than in Australia and New Zealand, who, above all, looked to the protection of their existing trade relationships. The analysis has further shown that Canada reacted to the British turn towards Europe on the basis of different assumptions than was the case in the other Dominions. In contrast to the Antipodes, Canada was, in economic terms, substantially less affected by Great Britain's orientation to the Common Market. Compared to both of the other countries, the Canadian economy was thus more tangential to the EEC debates. In the United States of America, Canada had a significant trading partner directly on their doorstep, and due to this geographical and cultural proximity to the US, Canada was more removed from London in terms of emotions and cultural identity – even though it was geographically the closest to Great Britain. In Canada, conflict with its powerful neighbor, together with the Quiet Revolution in Québec, had provoked an engagement with questions of national identity earlier than was the case in Australia and New Zealand. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, the implementation of official bilingualism, as well as the proclamation of a multicultural state likewise distinguished Canada from both of the other Dominions. Thus, when the British announced the opening of membership talks, the preconditions in Canada differed from those in Australia and New Zealand. However, it is of interest to note that the attention surrounding British membership and the approach taken to this issue differed less than those in Canberra and Wellington.

Also, in Canada the EEC debates met with broad interest in political circles, in the press, and in the population as well. Of course, priorities in the three Dominions varied, and Canada put more emphasis on the political implications of membership than Australia and New Zealand; however, in all three lands the route by which they pursued their own interests led through London. The demands on the British government were similar in all three countries (protections for certain products/transitional periods), and they all began to step up their search for export markets. Earlier than was the case in Australia and New Zealand, Canadian actors began to review and change previous paradigms; still, the solutions were similar. Generational change in Canada during the late 1960s and the early 1970s was illustrated, in particular, by the figure of Pierre Trudeau. Due to his origins in the French-speaking part of Canada, Trudeau had a different social background and a different relationship to the British empire than that of his predecessors, Diefenbaker and

Pearson.¹⁴⁷⁸ In Canada, due to the nationality question in Québec, the break with the British empire in the mid-1960s, likewise was more noticeable in the change of symbols than was the case in Australia and New Zealand; neither of the latter altered their flags and their national anthems only replaced “God Save the Queen” much later. The following points should be noted in relation to the Canadian case and the thesis that Canada, due to its proximity to the USA, differs from the cases of Australia and New Zealand. First, the EEC debates did play a role in Canada as well, and the dissolution of Empire provoked debates on numerous levels. Second, priorities in Canada at the beginning of the 1960s were different from those in Australia and New Zealand, since the problem of the USA *and* the situation in Québec influenced the EEC debate. Also, the minimal security interests Canada had in Southeast Asia, distinguished this North American nation from the other Dominions. Nonetheless, their solutions and the practices they developed were similar to those in the other two countries – they only took place earlier than in Australia and New Zealand and were more strongly stamped by *national* problematics.

In how far Canada functioned as a model for Australia and New Zealand, it is, in this respect, difficult to determine on the basis of the examined sources. Canada’s trade with China was viewed in Australia, at the very least, as a landmark, and it justified their own trade with the People’s Republic. The similarities of approach are, above all, to be attributed to the fact that all three countries had similar methods of engagement, along with their respective difficulties. All three countries generated studies and analyses concerning the situation. Similarly, in all three cases, experts, politicians, and diplomats evaluated the global trade situation and prospective changes to it; the growing significance of the Western European states and Asia for global trade was recognized, and the decline of the British Empire appeared imminent. Through the analysis of the current state of affairs, actors in all three lands reckoned that it was probable that Britain would enter the EEC, either in the short or long term. It followed from this that they had to diversify their own trade. The impact of the EEC debates for the restructuring of Canadian trade policy, in combination with the USA problematic, is thus relevant. The influence of the EEC debates on the restructuring of Canadian foreign policy is likewise significant. For the restructuring of patterns of cultural identity, the EEC debates were less decisive than in Australia and New Zealand; instead, it was the conflict between the French and English-speaking regions of Canada that were formative. A further peculiarity of the EEC debates in Canada is the relatively stark change of course under

¹⁴⁷⁸ Cf. Donaghy, Halloran and Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984*, p. 3.

Diefenbaker – a strongly negative position to British membership dissolved into an essentially demure position after 1962. Added to these issues is the added factor that decisions pertaining to the EEC debates within the three countries were taken by governments; all these governments were *elected* regimes that had substantial interest in re-election, which meant that the wishes of the voter informed the direction of their policies. Thus, the Diefenbaker regime recognized that large portions of the population did not agree with the political line he took in the debates at the beginning of the 1960s, and thus he adopted a more restrained tone. The deal with the British government in which Canada kept silent also shows that political decisions were not taken in “empty” political space, but rather *national* as well as *international* factors had a direct influence on these principles. Foreign and domestic policy were interconnected, and, in the case of the EEC debates, they had an impact on trade policies, while the latter simultaneously altered foreign and domestic politics.

Turning to Australia during the time of the EEC debates, it is clear that the ambivalence of Australian relations with Great Britain, which were distinguished by its orientation to the motherland while at the same time taking account of national interests, had begun to show. Australian actors were fearful for their own national stability on account of the disappearance of the British focal point, to which they still looked, first and foremost, for their own national security. Priority lay with the stabilization of the Australian economy, but at the same time, relations to the motherland remained important. A balancing act between foreign and trade policies had to be achieved, since with the EEC debates an important supporting element of the Australian-British relationship (that of trade) threatened to fall away. Even the restructuring of foreign policy relations to Great Britain is more ambiguous as a direct result of the EEC debates.¹⁴⁷⁹ On the one hand, the change showed in the relations between the two states, since these connections clearly had become more formal, more prescribed, and less familiar. On the other, they demonstrate a persistent desire for a strong, reliable and clearly comprehensible connection to the motherland. By the beginning of the 1970s, it was also important to Australian actors to have regular, structured relations with Great Britain, although the motherland, having turned towards Europe, had lost some significance for Canberra on various levels. The EEC debates also made visible, to some extent, the tremendous significance individual persons had in the shaping of political guidelines in respect to an issue. In Australia, the decisive responsibility for the EEC debates lay with John McEwen – thus with the standing Minister, and then with those Departments occupying the second rank. Of course, they

¹⁴⁷⁹ Cf. NAA A1838 67/1/3 Part 6: Policy Guidance Paper on Anglo-Australian Relations, 28 August, 1972.

could not act in a political vacuum, as they were also bound to democratic mechanisms; but in the Australian case, a high degree of personal responsibility among political actors is observable in the formation of policy. In New Zealand as well, the primary responsibility for the EEC debates lay with one minister – John Marshall. The debates represented much more of an existential threat to New Zealand than for Australia and Canada; for this reason, threats on the economic plane were predominant in New Zealand, though threats on other levels – as described above – likewise played some part. Similar to Australia, security considerations in respect to Asia were a factor in the debates,¹⁴⁸⁰ and the New Zealand administration also re-evaluated its relations to Great Britain. For Australia and New Zealand, the EEC debates, above all, brought about an opening to Asia through the expansion of their trade networks, which was accompanied by a rapprochement in political and cultural respects. The positioning of New Zealand as a Pacific nation in the vicinity of Asia gained traction during the EEC debates.

For all three Dominions in respect to the EEC debates, it should be said that the British approach to Europe meant a threat to their previous trade and foreign policy paradigms. Furthermore, for Australians and New Zealanders it questioned the location of their cultural identities with more urgency than was the case in Canada. All three perceived the EEC debate as a key moment in the review of their relations with Great Britain and their global position. In none of the countries did Commonwealth relations experience an upsurge during the late sixties and early seventies, rather in their policies they acted independently of Great Britain and asserted a more distinct national identity. All three observed one another during the EEC debates and assessed the reactions of their fellow Dominions. Thus, they frequently compared responses among each other, and derived guidelines for the direction of their policy. Thus, New Zealand actors, for example, observed that the strident Canadian response would weaken the Canadian negotiating position, and from this conclusion New Zealand was led to adopt a more restrained approach for themselves. Despite various attempts to come to an agreement or some form of mutual cooperation, there was no decisive collaborative effort between the three Dominions – neither between two of them or all three. Collaboration was confined to the exchange of information and some deliberations over possible cooperation (in economic terms); but an active collaboration is not to be found. While interrelations and transfers followed on the *international* plane, the Dominions were *nationally*

¹⁴⁸⁰ For a detailed analysis of security debates concerning Asia in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, see the Dissertation of my colleague, Maike Hausen: “*After Britain, Who?*” *Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Foreign Policy Considerations following Britain’s Withdrawal from Southeast Asia, 1965-1971*.

separate. Observations and assessments of one another strengthened national views that informed their own conduct. The reasons for this lie within the distinct trade interests in diverse goods, and an increasing competition with one another on the world market in respect to certain products. During the EEC talks, Great Britain remained, for all three countries, the center of the negotiations and for the implementation of their own interests – primarily because Great Britain could open a lucrative door to Western Europe from within the EEC. Only towards the end of the debates did the Dominions begin to expand their relations with one another, as for example, with NAFTA in 1965 and 1970. Herein, it is clearly demonstrated that cooperation only went so far, that national interests still had to be protected. Since all three parties saw no appreciable advantage in close cooperation with one another, and looked much more to their own national affairs, there is no hint of a common strategy in respect to the EEC debates. Instead, the reactions of the Dominions to the “death” of the Empire resemble more a dispute among heirs; each tried to recover the most favorable parts from a changed situation, and looked more to themselves than to the entire “family.”¹⁴⁸¹ The EEC debates therefore strengthened the nationalist direction of the Dominions and put to the test national approaches to a problem that was perceived as a transnational struggle that was beyond any single nation.

One of the results influenced by the EEC debates, but not provoked by them alone,¹⁴⁸² was a shift in the *character* of the relationship between the three countries and within the Commonwealth. Through the intensification of the different levels of the EEC debates in particular, relations among one another and inside the Commonwealth were no longer perceived as “natural” and centered around Great Britain. Beforehand, it would have been unnecessary to invest much effort in the cultivation of bilateral relations among each other. This, among other aspects, altered on account of the EEC debates; from this point onward, it was not only relations with Great Britain that had to be reconsidered, but rather the relations between the Dominions themselves also needed to be structured anew. These interrelationships now required more attention than before and could proceed directly between the countries themselves – the “detour” through London was no longer important.

Through transnational comparison, it becomes clear that in all three countries similar processes took place, though in respect to Canada, similar processes transpired under different auspices.

¹⁴⁸¹ This is intended as a simple statement of fact, and not a judgment of events.

¹⁴⁸² Different factors such as the changes within Commonwealth structures and constitutions – among others – likewise influenced the change.

Further, the analysis has shown that the feelings involved in the EEC debates and, in particular, the feelings of solidarity with Great Britain did not break off suddenly or abruptly. Instead, the transnational “emotional community” was subject to a long process of transformation, which experienced an additional upsurge due to the EEC debates. Commonwealth feelings were no longer a particularly desirable aspect of political events, but rather were a cause for criticism and for the delegitimization of the views expressed. Dominion societies expected a “professional” presentation on the part of their politicians that was equated with the absence of strong emotions. The transformative process, however, did not go as far as the removal of feelings, rather, the valid and accepted role of feelings within political discourse changed; feelings were afforded less space and instead formal prescriptions should regulate relationships and the negotiations among themselves. For this reason, feelings in Commonwealth relationships were more and more suppressed and displaced into the private realm. The monopoly of the previous “emotional community” in Commonwealth relations was thus broken.

Conclusions regarding the relationship between emotions and trade policy also emerge from the analysis. Within the examined time frame, cultural and emotional factors are a matter informing the direction of trade policy inside the Dominions. All three were historically and culturally connected to Great Britain, whereby trade with the motherland was much simpler, while, at the same time, it reinforced ties. Trade with Asia was subject to difficulties that arose both from the minimal cultural access that the three Dominions had with the continent, and from the culturally specific consumption of products. Moreover, emotional aspects hindered trade with Asia; anxiety in the face of the large Asian population and with respect to Communism, as well as the experiences of the Pacific War had made trade relations with the continent difficult well before the EEC debates. Hence, cultural and emotional disposition informed trade structures and functioned as a stabilizing agent, or in some respects, as a hindrance to trade relations. In addition, it is clear that certain trade policy decisions and discussions do not allow themselves to be wholly explained apart from their emotional background. The reactions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand cannot be elucidated in all their complexity without the emotional framework of Dominion trade relationships. From the present-day perspective and with knowledge of the enduring development of global trade, the real economic threats to the Dominions (with the exception of New Zealand) may appear minor, but actors in the Dominions stood before an open-ended and unpredictable situation with additional threats on the emotional level.

In addition to these issues, there was also the power imbalance between the Dominions and the motherland. Great Britain had taken the decision – even if they had consulted with the Commonwealth states – and the three Dominions had to *react* to a changing situation. In the EEC debates, these quasi-independent units of the Commonwealth were confronted with their dependency on British decisions, a dependency which had not, up to this point, shown itself with such clarity. The intensity of this realization of their own dependency was aggravated by the many years of support from Great Britain; while the Dominions had supported the British in both World Wars as well as in the aftermath of the Second World War. They were the “better Brits” in a system with all the advantages of Great Britain, but without the drawbacks. In spite of all these factors, at the start of the 1960s, news of the British turn to Europe reached the Dominions – a decision which it seemed they could not influence. For this reason, the EEC debates clearly went beyond the levels discussed thus far; they symbolically stood for a dependency on the motherland that the Dominions believed had been overcome. The nationalisms of the three settler colonies, which consisted of British and distinctly Australian (Canadian, New Zealand) experiences, were reminded by the EEC debates of their British connections, and it pointed to the negative aspect of this power imbalance with London. The British retreat from its empire thus was more than a threat to the orientation paradigms in the settler colonies; at the same time, it made the three Dominions aware of their dependency on British decision making, and it further reminded them that decisions in London could have grave repercussions in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. In spite of their special position as Dominions in the empire, actors in Canberra, Ottawa and Wellington could not fully decide over their national affairs. The national context depended on processes in Great Britain, and the political and diplomatic actors in the Dominions had their hands tied in many situations, since they had only a limited say in the fundamental direction of their own trade and foreign policies. Therefore, the orientation towards Great Britain, which for many was cast in a positive light, showed its negative side in the EEC debates. Policy makers experienced an impotence during the debates, which was a new to them. In the previous years, they had been able to enjoy the advantages of special Dominion status and profited from the protection offered by Great Britain as a colonial power. Now, they felt the negative side of this colonial relationship, whereby the EEC debate was simultaneously a threat and a liberation. These three aspects did not contradict each other, since the British orientation towards Europe was, on the one hand, a danger to orientation paradigms on different levels, as has been discussed; but on the other hand, the debates clearly reminded actors within the three governments of their dependency vis-à-vis London. This dependency, however,

was not viewed by all actors in the Dominions as negative, as this examination has shown – thus it also implied a certain degree of stability and security. The relationship to the motherland would remain unquestioned until the stabilizing and reassuring functions broke away, and the relation of dependency pressed into the foreground. As long as sufficient advantages deriving from ties with Great Britain existed, there was no radical change to the structures of trade and foreign policy in the three countries. Though to varying degrees, Australia, New Zealand and Canada all appear, according to this analysis, forced into postcolonialism, in which the relationship to Great Britain is preserved even today in numerous areas. For this reason, they stand in strong contrast to other colonized countries and their more violent accounts of seeking independence. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are actually “postcolonial” in a different form than was the case in African and Asian states; on account of their status as Dominions and their settlements, they were “colonial” in a different way than these states.¹⁴⁸³ They had not become independent in an abrupt fashion through the downfall of their colonial rulers, as was the case for many African and Asian colonies. Their road to independence was a gradual process with many individual steps and breaks.¹⁴⁸⁴ It is not surprising then that the starting point and trajectory of colonial history had an impact on decolonization. However, it is worth noting that in respect to the histories of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand discussed in this study, it was on account of the push given by Great Britain that the three states moved towards independence in trade and foreign policy; they did so in a Cold War era in which many factors provoked uncertainty among the political and diplomatic actors in Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. They no longer had a place in the British empire, but rather they now had to negotiate their position on the world stage anew. Classification within the “western world” increasingly replaced a positioning within the Commonwealth. For the three states, postcolonial meant that they had to devise their own structures in place of the previous ones that had been shaped by Great Britain; what followed was a search for identity on the national and international plane.

Thus, the concept of “postcolonial” also furnishes a useful point of research for the former settler colonies, since it draws attention to global relations in an era after the collapse of imperial systems. The dynamics of colonization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had led to the emergence of economic, cultural, and ideological networks in the three countries that were influenced and

¹⁴⁸³ Though South Africa and Rhodesia have similarities with the three Dominions, their historical development is nonetheless distinct due to the Boers – that is, the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the low number of white settlers in the Rhodesian population.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Cf. Jansen and Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, p. 21.

altered by decolonization.¹⁴⁸⁵ The uncertainty and open-endedness of the situation, together with its dynamics, unintended side-effects, and accelerations,¹⁴⁸⁶ should not be misinterpreted as an intentional process with a set goal of achieving an independent national idea; rather the search for a “new nationalism” was *one* of several possible options that emerged after 1970. The reasons behind the pursuit of a “new nationalism” are as complex as they are also situational. The transformation from an imperial to a post-imperial age can be delineated with the concept “postcolonial.”¹⁴⁸⁷ Research concerning postcolonial developments in the Dominions could expand the way we characterize decolonizing processes.

With the British retreat from its empire, there is a shift in the connection between periphery and center, an observable sign of the postcolonial era. At the beginning of the 1960s, London was the definite center, as all three Dominions attempted to intensify their communications with the British government, and to represent their position within the EEC debates by travelling to Great Britain. Even the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings took place mostly in London. Within the Dominions, the EEC debates had demonstrated that the fulcrum for central decisions concerning trade arrangements in Australia and New Zealand (in Canada, this was less the case) was situated in London. This relationship of center and periphery was displaced by the EEC debates, as increasingly independent trade paradigms arose in the former settler colonies. When these processes are observed from those lands thought to exist on the edge of the geographically and historically reconstituted periphery, the shift in the global power relations of the 1960s becomes apparent; more and more the former center of Great Britain was replaced by other regions of the world. The United States of America became, in many respects, the focal point for political and security issues. On the economic plane, the previous center of Great Britain was less relevant; rather several focal points for trade policy emerged, such as Western Europe, Asia, and the USA. As a consequence, the centering function that Great Britain had occupied alone up to this point, divided itself among different planes and geographical spaces. By the end of the 1960s, Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington took on more responsibility for the alignment of foreign policy and

¹⁴⁸⁵ Cf. Ward, "Run Before the Tempest. The "Wind of Change" and the British World," p. 201.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Decolonization implies a certain measure of unpredictability and should not be understood as a goal-oriented process, as Frederick Cooper, Jan Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel have emphasized. Cf. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge 1996), p. 6; Jansen and Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation. Das Ende der Imperien*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Stuart Hall, "Wann gab es "das Postkoloniale"? Denken an der Grenze," in: *Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, p. 197-223 (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2002), p. 219.

security issues, and its orientation looked more to the United States of America. Economically, there emerged geographically diverse networks with centers in more diverse regions than had been the case before. From the point of view of Western Europe, the former global peripheries gained in significance, that is, they became new centers. Likewise, mechanisms of exchange no longer ran exclusively through London, but rather bilateral relations between the Dominions and other states received more attention. For this reason, a displacement in global power relations followed; the decline of Great Britain as a world power implied a retreat of its global influence. Instead, nations such as the USA and the Soviet Union gained more power. Through the economic union in Europe, the western European region acquired more importance in economic, political, and strategic terms, especially for those states such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which classed themselves as part of the “west”. All three recognized the EEC as a potential partner in the future, a partner that would become more significant on these levels. Given this ascription of power, the economic union in Europe grew in significance.

In contemporary German historiography, the period from the end of the 1950s to the early 1970s, is understood as a time of broad social and political transformation. The concept of the “long 1960s” serves as a descriptive term for this period.¹⁴⁸⁸ Sociocultural blueprints for society and domestic political realities altered during this time. Furthermore, there was a subsequent shift in the conceptions of foreign policy. On the one hand, the foreign policy alignments of both German states expanded in this period; on the other, the forms and content of foreign policy communications altered – foreign policy was increasingly professionalized and institutionally regulated.¹⁴⁸⁹ To delimit the period of the “long 1960s,” there are various proposals among researchers, most of which lie within the span of 1956 to 1974.¹⁴⁹⁰ One of the goals of this study is to build a bridge between German researchers and those from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. On this point, one such undertaking imposes itself straightaway – the analyses in this work have yielded comparable findings for similar periods of time. For Australia, Canada, and New Zealand the period from the announcement of British membership talks to that of the entrance of Great

¹⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Johannes Großmann and Hélène Miard-Delacroix, "Das transatlantische Dreieck in den 'langen' 1960er Jahren. Perspektiven, Probleme und Fragen," in: *Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA in den 'langen' 1960er Jahren. Ein transatlantisches Dreiecksverhältnis*, eds. Johannes Großmann and Hélène Miard-Delacroix, p. 13-34 (Stuttgart 2018), p. 15-19; Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers, "Einleitung," in: *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, eds. Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers, p. 11-20 (Hamburg 2003), p. 16.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Cf. Großmann and Miard-Delacroix, "Das transatlantische Dreieck in den 'langen' 1960er Jahren. Perspektiven, Probleme und Fragen," p. 18f.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*

Britain into the Common Market was also one of dramatic change. In all three countries, the EEC debates provoked a rethinking of their previous policies concerning trade and foreign relations, as well as their structures of identity. These transpired during a long process of detachment from the British empire and from Great Britain, which had received a push forward in 1961. Thus, the “long 1960s” in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand begin in 1961 – even if the foundation of the EEC in 1958 was already a signal of the beginning of this process. In all three countries, an increasingly professionalized and global foreign policy evolved over this period, as was also the case in both German states. The “long 1960s” in Australia and New Zealand lasted until the mid-1970s (the removal of Whitlam in 1975 in Australia, and the death of Norman Kirk in 1974), since in this period British symbols were more and more dismantled and replaced by national ones. For the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, it is thus *national* self-invention in particular – along with a global orientation – that is a sign of the “long 1960s.” Hence, the change is here related to a *nation building* process, which, in this form, is not a characteristic of the “long 1960s” in German research.

It is more difficult to place the Canadian case within the “long 1960s”; rather in this instance the 1960s are abbreviated. The alteration of the Canadian flag in 1965, the recognition of official bilingualism in 1969, and Pierre Trudeau’s assumption of office in 1968, marked an important break within the 1960s. The affiliations of English-speaking Canada still existed even at the end of the 1960s, but they persisted more in the private rather than the public sphere.¹⁴⁹¹ The developments of the 1960s up to the Nixon shock in 1971, and British membership in 1973 only had an impact on trade policy. Indeed, Canada had, by this point already pursued a global alignment of its trade and foreign policies, as the recognition of China in 1970, for instance, demonstrated. Thus, for Canada, one *cannot* speak of the “long 1960s.”

People from the Dominions experienced the dissolution of empire after 1 January 1973 personally. After the British entrance into the EEC, they had to wait with those of all other parts of the world in the customs areas of British airports, while Europeans could enter Great Britain and walked by with no hassles.¹⁴⁹² The burdensome entrance into the former motherland, for many people from the Dominions, symbolized the breakup of the British empire. Uncertainty regarding the prospective conceptions of economic, political and cultural arrangements, compelled actors in the

¹⁴⁹¹ Cf. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution. National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71*, p. 1f.

¹⁴⁹² Cf. Belich, "Colonization and History in New Zealand," p. 15.

former settler colonies to reflect on paradigms of order for their own societies without taking Great Britain as an orientation point.

For some actors in the Dominions, the EEC debates may have meant the “death” of the Commonwealth, however, British membership in the EEC did not bring to an end the relationship between Great Britain and the former settler colonies. Up to the present day, the Queen is the official Head of State in the three countries, and the Commonwealth still connects them – indeed, actors within the three states still emphasize the special role of the Queen as “Queen of Australia” or respectively, “Queen of Canada,” and “Queen of New Zealand.”¹⁴⁹³ Even in the course of the Brexit debates, the empire appeared, in some discourses, to have been reanimated; there emerged deliberations to strengthen trade relations in the Commonwealth, and actors appealed to earlier ties within the Commonwealth “family.”¹⁴⁹⁴ Thus, the Commonwealth is not “dead.”

Due to the large amount of source material pertaining to the EEC debates, the analysis must confine itself to the period up to 1973. An expanded investigation on the effects of the oil crisis of that year,¹⁴⁹⁵ the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, and the impact of the new economic order after 1974¹⁴⁹⁶ on the trade relations of the three Dominions, would be worth the undertaking. It would render an account of the “test phase” of restructuring within the Dominions. Long-term developments in respect to the trade relationships of all three states support the view that already characterized the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s: Canada made efforts, in the early 1970s, to expand its trade with Europe, Japan and South America;¹⁴⁹⁷ Australia concluded the “Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation”¹⁴⁹⁸ and expanded trade with China and Japan in particular; and New Zealand also was able to broaden its trade relations among its Pacific and Asian neighbours. Today, the trade networks of all three countries extend to a multitude of trade partners, to which belongs the EU – which at present includes Great Britain. On 30 October 2016, Canadian and EU representatives signed a free trade pact, the “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement”

¹⁴⁹³ For an account of the relations of the Dominions to the British Crown, see Boyce, *The Queen's Other Realms*.

¹⁴⁹⁴ See Stefanie Bolzen, “Großbritanniens neuer Traum vom Empire,” <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article175465954/Commonwealth-Grossbritanniens-neuer-Traum-vom-Empire-nach-dem-Brexit.html>, last accessed on 15 January 2019.

¹⁴⁹⁵ For an introduction to the effects of the oil crisis in Canada, see Donaghy, Halloran and Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984*, pp. 166-70 and 73f.

¹⁴⁹⁶ For an initial foray into the impact of the new economic order on Canada, see *Ibid.* pp. 226-229.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Cf. *Ibid.* pp. 212-220.

¹⁴⁹⁸ For the thirtieth anniversary of this agreement, the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer – the son of the High Commissioner of the same name who has been mentioned often in this study – and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Aso, released a joint statement on the friendly ties between Australia and Japan. Cf. Desmond Ball and Brendan Taylor, “Australia – Japan”, in: *Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power. Friendships in Flux?*, ed. Brendan Taylor, pp. 50-59 (Abingdon/New York 2008), p. 52.

(CETA), which included trade and tariff ameliorations for both parties.¹⁴⁹⁹ In 2018, the EU decided to open trade negotiations with New Zealand as well as Australia.¹⁵⁰⁰ The narrative that the British had deceived its Commonwealth partners by opening membership talks in the 1960s persisted with some stubbornness. In conversations on the spot during the three visits abroad in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, such allusions to British conduct emerged repeatedly during the EEC debates. The New Zealand study by David Hall in 2017 is a strong indication of the contemporary relevance of the debate over whether or not Great Britain's turn towards Europe was positive or negative, and whether Great Britain had left its partners in the lurch.¹⁵⁰¹ To be sure, the Commonwealth clearly declined in significance as a result of the EEC talks on the political and economic levels, however, it still survives and even today is part of the collective memories of the three states. In summary, this work comes to the following overarching theses: debates over politics, or trade policy as the case may be, do *not* exist apart from emotions. Political debates are the negotiation of diverse emotional communities that come to light with differing degrees of clarity. Second, the transnational analysis of emotional life in the moment of separation from Great Britain demonstrates that in all three nations in which the settler-colony nation-building process took place, it was shaped by ideas of "Britishness" and an ambivalent relationship to the motherland. It was impossible to have a separation without dealing with British elements, and the search for a distinctly unique identity took place through an engagement with previously existing identity paradigms. The history of decolonization in the Dominions thus cannot be understood in its complexity without reference to the motherland. Third, changes in global relations become visible within the debates around different emotional communities. The formerly close and familial bonds between the nations of the Commonwealth dissolved, and all three Dominions struggled more and more over their own regional position, and their relations with the USA. The 1960s, are for these reasons, a period of realignment, a reorientation of global power relations and exchanges processes.

¹⁴⁹⁹ The text of the free trade agreement between Canada and the EU is available online under the "Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement," http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradedoc_152806.pdf, last accessed on 18 December 2018.

¹⁵⁰⁰ Cf. "Towards an EU-Australia Trade Agreement," <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-australia-trade-agreement/>, last accessed on 1 February 2019.

¹⁵⁰¹ Cf. Hall, *Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy. New Zealand Primary Production, Britain and the E.E.C., 1945-1975*.

Chapter 5

5.1. Register of Persons

Adachi, T.: Japanese Minister of Agriculture

Anthony, Dough: Australian Minister for Trade and Industry

Ball, George: American *Under-Secretary of State*

Barwick, Garfield: Australian *Minister for External Affairs*

Beaverbrook, Max Aitken Baron: British-Canadian Publisher

Berendsen, Carl: New Zealand Diplomat

Bevin, Ernest: British *Foreign Secretary*

Blundell, Edward Denis Sir: New Zealand Diplomat

Bond, Kingsley: Reverend in Great Britain

Bowen, Nigel: Australian *Minister for Foreign Affairs*

Bury, Leslie: Australian *Minister for Air* und *Minister assisting the Treasurer* and later *Minister for Foreign Affairs*

Cadieux, Marcel: Canadian *Under-Secretary of State*

Callaghan, James: *Chancellor of Exchequer*

Calwell, Arthur: Australian *Minister for Immigration*

Campbell, Ross: Canadian Diplomat

Carter, Douglas: New Zealand *Minister of Agriculture*

Casey, Richard Lord: Australian *Minister of External Affairs*

Chretien, Jean: Canadian *Minister for Indian Affairs and Northern Development*

Churchill, Winston: British Prime minister

Cook, James: British Explorer

Crawford, John Sir: *Secretary of the Department of Trade*

Crocker, Walter: Australian Diplomat

Curtin, John: Australian Prime minister

Dahrendorf, Ralf: *Commissioner* of the EEC

Diefenbaker, John („Dief“): Canadian Prime minister

Douglas-Home, Alec: British Prime minister

Downer, Alexander („Alick“) Sir: Australian Diplomat

Drew, George: Canadian Diplomat

Dryden, Bruce: Chairman of the *Meat and Wool Section der Federated Farmers of New Zealand*

Eden, Anthony: British Foreign Minister
Fleming, Donald: Canadian *Minister of Finance*
Garner, Saville („Joe“) Sir: *Permanent Secretary of the Commonwealth Office*
Gaulle, Charles de: French Prime minister
George III: King of England
Gillespie, Alastair: Canadian Politician
Gordon, Walter: Canadian *Minister of Finance*
Gorton, John: Australian Prime minister
Grandy, James Frederick: Canadian *Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce*
Green, Howard: Canadian *Secretary of State for External Affairs*
Hannon, Leslie: Canadian Journalist (*Saturday Night*)
Harrison, Eric: Australian *High Commissioner*
Hayman, Peter: British Diplomat
Heath, Edward Sir: *Lord Privy Seal* and British Prime minister
Hees, George: Canadian *Minister of Trade and Commerce*
Hijzen, Theodorus: *Director-General of External Trade in the Commission*
Hilgendorf, Charles: Chairman of the New Zealand *Meat Board*
Hillary, Edmund: New Zealand Explorer
Holland, Sidney: New Zealand Prime minister
Holt, Harold: Australian Prime minister
Holyoake, Keith: New Zealand Prime minister
Humphrey, Hubert: American Vice President
Isaacs, Isaac: Australian Gouverneur
Johnson, Lyndon Baines: American President
Kennedy, John Fitzgerald: American President
Kirk, Norman: New Zealand Prime minister
Laking, George: New Zealand Diplomat
Linton, Andrew: Chairman of the *New Zealand Dairy Board*
Lintott, Henry: British Diplomat
Macmillan, Harold: British Prime minister
Malfatti, Franco: *Commissioner* of the EEC
Marshall, John/Jack („Gentleman Jack“): New Zealand *Minister of Overseas Trade*

Martin, Paul: Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs
May, Henry: New Zealand *Minister of Internal Affairs*
McEwen, John („Black Jack“): Australian *Minister for Trade* and later Prime minister
McIntosh, Alister: New Zealand Diplomat
McKell, William: Australian Gouverneur
McMahon, William: australischer Premierminister
Menzies, H.C.: Australian *Senior Trade Commissioner*
Menzies, Robert: Australian Prime minister
Muldoon, Robert: New Zealand *Minister for Finance* and later Prime minister
Murray, Geoffrey: Employee of the Canadian *High Commission* London
Nash, Walter: New Zealand Prime minister
Nasser, Gamal Abdel: Egyptian Prime minister
Nixon, Richard: American President
Norgay, Tenzing: Nepalese explorer
O’Brien, Terence: New Zealand Diplomat
Ohira, Masayoshi: Japanese Minister of External Affairs
Ormond, John Davies Wilder: Chairman of the *New Zealand Meat Producers’ Board*
Pearson, Lester („Mike“): Canadian Prime Minister
Pépin, Jean-Luc: Canadian *Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce*
Pompidou, Georges: French Prime minister
Rippon, Geoffrey: British negotiator (EEC)
Ritchie, Albert Edgar: *Assistant Under-Secretary des Department of External Affairs*
Ritchie, Charles: Canadian Diplomat
Rusk, Dean: American *Secretary of State*
Salter, Wilfred Edward Graham: Australian Economist
Saltsman, Max: Canadian politician
Sandys, Duncan: *Secretary for Commonwealth Relations*
Shepherd, Jack: New Zealand participant (EEC)
Smith, Arthur Cantwell: First *Secretary-General des Commonwealth Secretariat*
Tanaka, Kakuei: Japanese Prime minister
Tange, Arthur: Australian Diplomat
Trudeau, Pierre: Canadian Prime minister

Truscott, Horace Neil: Australian Diplomat
Tse-tung, Mao: Chinese Politician
Verwoerd, Hendrik: South African Prime Minister
Walker, Edward Ronald: Australian Ambassador in Paris
Walsh, Fintan Patrick: President of the New Zealand *Federation of Labour*
Walter, Neil: New Zealand Diplomat
Warren, Jake: Canadian *Deputy Minister des Department of Trade and Commerce*
Westerman, Wilfred Alan: Australian *Secretary des Department of Trade*
Whitlam, Gough: Australian Prime Minister
Wilson, Harold: British Prime Minister
Wilson, Joseph Vivian: New Zealand Diplomat
Wormser, Olivier: French Employee of the Department for Trade Relations

5.2. Figure Index

No 1: Cartoon, *The New Zealand Herald*, 12. July 1961.
No 2: Cartoon, *The New Zealand Herald*, 28. November 1961.
No 3: Cartoon, *The New Zealand Herald*, 7. September 1962.
No 4: Cartoon, *The New Zealand Herald*, 22. September 1970.
No 5: Cartoon, *The Observer*, 10. June 1962.
No 6: The Growth of Overseas Posts: Steve Hoadley, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook* (Oxford 1992), p. 15.

5.3. Primary Sources

Unpublished Sources:

Archives New Zealand (ANZ)

Archives Reference	Record No.	Part	Title	Date
AAFD 811 W3738/1135	CAB 129/13/1		Foreign Trade – European Economic Integration – General – Prime Ministers’ Meeting – Prime Ministers Brief	1962
AAFZ 7174 W1318/223	3382	7	European Economic Community – United Kingdom – European Economic Community Negotiations	1962
AAFZ 7174 W1318/225	3382	13A	European Economic Community – United Kingdom – European Economic Community Negotiations (Special File)	1962- 1963
AAFZ 7174 W1318/226	3382	18	European Economic Community – United Kingdom – European Economic Community Negotiations	1967
AAFZ 7174 W1318/227	3382	24	European Economic Community – United Kingdom – European Economic Community Negotiations	1970
AAFZ 7174 W1633/63	3382	29	European Economic Community – United Kingdom-European Economic Community Negotiations	1970
AAFZ 7174 W5705/75	3382	1	European Economic Community [E.E.C.] – United Kingdom-European Economic Community Negotiations	1961
AAFZ 7174 W5705/75	3382	3	European Economic Community [E.E.C.] – United Kingdom-European Economic Community Negotiations	1961

AAFZ 7174 W5707/76	3382	[15A]	[Supplement to Volume 15] The United Kingdom-E.E.C. [European Economic Community] Negotiations 1961-1963: A Survey from the New Zealand Viewpoint – Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 17 August 1966	1966
AAFZ 225000 W5814/8			[Loose papers: Prime Minister's Visit to London April 1971, Economic Questions; United Kingdom – European Economic Community Negotiations by the Hon. J.R. Marshall, May 1971]	1971
AALR 873 W3158/100	T61/7/1/14	2	New Zealand External Relations Agricultural Commodities – UK EEC [European Economic Community] Discussions	1968- 1978
AATJ 7428 W3566/1752	164/2/3/1	7	European Economic Community (EEC) – Visits to Europe by Ministers, Officials and Others – Relating to British Negotiations for Membership	1972- 1973
AAWV 23583 Kirk1/107			New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the EEC	1969- 1971
ABHS 950 W4627/1199	40/2/1	4	New Zealand Affairs: Economic Relations – United Kingdom - General	1948- 1960
ABHS 950 W4627/1410	56/2/5	9	New Zealand Affairs: Foreign Policy – Foreign Affairs Committee – External Affairs Committee	1957- 1964
ABHS 6944/5	HGK 64/21/1	2	New Zealand Affairs – External Relations – United Kingdom (including Ireland): General	1971- 1976

ABHS 6950/3	OTT 26/1/11	2	New Zealand/Canada Relations – General – Joint Canada New Zealand Consultative Committee	1969- 1978
ABHS 6957 W4628/21	SAI 63/1/1	1	New Zealand Foreign Affairs, General	1967- 1974
ABHS 6958 W5579/184	NYP 3/40/4	1	Political Affairs – Canada – Canadian/New Zealand Relations [09/1969-12/1979]	1969- 1979
ABHS 6971 W4630/12			Australia New Zealand Trade Talks Officials' Meeting 18-20 March 1963	1963
ABHS 7148/50	LONB 67/1	2	United Kingdom Affairs – General	1967- 1971
ABHS 7148/101	LONB 86/4/9/1A	1	European Communities – European Economic Community – Mr Wilding's Visit to Europe, April 1973	1973
ABHS 7148/101	LONB 86/4/9/1B	1	European Communities – European Economic Community – Mr Wilding's Visit to Britain, July 1973	1973
ABHS 18069 W5402/35	BRU 46/4/7	1	EC [European Community] – External Relations – Developed Commonwealth [01/1972-02/1976]	1972- 1976
ABHS 18069 W5402/40	BRU 46/5/1	28	EC [European Community] – Enlargement – NZ – EEC [European Economic Community] – Protocol 18 [07/1971- 07/1971]	1971
ABHS 18069 W5402/119	BRU 64/1/6	1	New Zealand – Foreign Relations – Australia [01/1963-01/1973]	1963- 1973
ABHS 18069 W5402/162	BRU 46/9/2/9	1	UK/EEC [European Economic Community] – Australian Attitude – General [08/1961- 02/1963]	1961- 1963

ABHS 18069 W5402/163	BRU 46/9/2/13	1	UK/EEC [European Economic Community] – New Zealand – NZ Additional Solutions [08/1962-12/1962]	1962
ABHS 22128 W5533/5	CBA 8/4/1		Representation – Speeches by High Commissioner and Others – L. Francis [05/1970-05/1976]	1970- 1976
ABHS 22128 W5533/154	CBA 89/1/1	1	Australia/New Zealand Relations – General – General [11/1961-12/1975]	1961- 1975
ADRK 17391 T1/435	61/5/4/2/1		EEC [European Economic Community] Association: implications for New Zealand, press cuttings and statements	1962- 1966
ADRK 17391 T1/435	61/5/4/4	1	United Kingdom Association with EEC [European Economic Community] – Financial implications and public relations aspects	1961- 1966
ADRK 17391 T1W2666/33	61/5/4/2		EEC [European Economic Community]- United Kingdom Association implications for New Zealand	1960
AEFN 19147 IC22/18	37		Economic papers – Brief for Prime Minister on MacMillan’s visit	1958
AEFN 19147 ICW2968/2	381		Brief for visit of Hon J A Walding (Minister of Overseas Trade) to Europe (London, Brussels)	1973
AEFN 19147 ICW2968/3	399		New Zealand/Australia free trade agreement – Brief for ministers’ brief in Canberra	1973
AEFN 19152 ICW2458/1	115A		Statement on behalf of Australia to the Committee of Deputies of United Kingdom/European Economic Community Conference	1962

AEFN 19152 ICW2458/1	115B		United Kingdom/EEC [European Economic Community] negotiations – Visit of Hon. JR Marshall to United Kingdom and Europe	1962
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25	164/2/2	3	Europe – European Economic Community (EEC) – British negotiations for membership	1966-1967
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25	164/2/2	4	Europe – European Economic Community (EEC) – British negotiations for membership	1967
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25	164/2/2	9	Europe – European Economic Community (EEC) – British negotiations for membership	1069-1970
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/25	164/2/2	10	Europe – European Economic Community (EEC) – British negotiations for membership	1970
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/26	164/2/2	13	Europe – European Economic Community (EEC) – British negotiations for membership	1971
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/28	164/2/3	10	Europe – EEC [European Economic Community] – New policy relating to continued access, general – Previously titled New Zealand policy relating to British membership (include commodity studies)	1970
AEFN 19294 ICW2072/30	164/2/3/1	4	Europe – EEC [European Economic Community] – Visit to Europe by ministers, officials and other relating to British negotiations for membership and subsequent membership	1970
AEFN 19746 ICW2266/1	291		Briefs – United Kingdom – EEC [European Economic Community] discussions, Hon J R Marshall – July 1970	1970

AEFN 19746 ICW2266/2	320		Briefs – United Kingdom – EEC [European Economic Community] negotiations, Hon J R Marshall – May 1971	1971
AEFN 19746 ICW2266/2	341		Briefs – United Kingdom – EEC [European Economic Community] discussion, Hon J R Marshall – November 1970	1970
AEFZ 22620 W5727/176	206/		Press Statement: NZ and EEC [European Economic Community]	1960

Library and Archives Canada (LAC)

Private Papers

Archival Reference Number	Volume	Title	Date
MG26-N9	26	Lester B. Pearson fonds – Speeches	1963
MG26-O	7	Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds	1970
MG32-B1	42	Richard Albert Bell collection ¹⁵⁰² – Speeches Donald Fleming	1961-1962
MG32-B13	9	Howard Green – European Economic Community	1961
MG32-B39	136	Hon. Donald Methuen Fleming _	1961-1963

¹⁵⁰² Richard Albert Bell collected documents, that seemed interesting to him. That is the reason why there are speeches by Donald Fleming in these Fonds.

		European Economic Community (E.E.C.)	
MG32-B39	158	Hon. Donald Methuen Fleming – Memoirs Series	1957-1982
MG32-B44	17	Walter Lockhart Gordon – Career in politics and government	1948-1986
MG32-B44	21	Walter Lockhart Gordon – Associations, institutions, etc. – Canada	1969-1986
MG32-C3	397	George Alexander Drew – High Commissioner to the United Kingdom	1957-1963

Microfilm Private Papers

Archival Reference Number	Microfilm	Title	Date
MG01/VII/507	35755-35760	John Diefenbaker fonds – Commonwealth – Speeches	1957-1963

Government Records

Archival Reference Number	Volume/Box	File	Title	Date

RG2-B-2		T-1-12-A1	Trade and Economic Questions – Trade Relations – Australia	1960-1967
RG19-F-2	4461	8625-04-13	International Economic Relations – European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) – United Kingdom and EEC – Representations – Correspondence	1961-1963
RG19-F-2	5384	8625-04-7	International Economic Relations – U.K. & EEC – Australian Participation in Negotiations	1961-1972
RG19-F-2	5384	8625-04-16	International Economic Relations – U.K. & EEC – Canadian Trade Interests	1962-1972
RG19	6121	7425-5	Relations with Other Countries – Australia – Visits and Meeting with Trade Officials	1962/03/01- 1973/12/31
RG20-A-3	918	7-72-11-1	Submissions Re Effect on Canadian Trade of United Kingdom Association with EEC	1961-1962
RG20-A-3	962	T-7-1106	European Free Trade Area & Common Market General Enquiries Only	1959-1961
RG20-A-3	2558	7-72-7	Association of the United Kingdom with European Economic Community – Common market – EEC	1960/12- 1961/08

RG20-A-3	2629	20-358-2	Canada, Britain and the European Economic Community – Basic documents, ref. and briefing material	1961/08-1962/03
RG25-A-4	3492	18-1-D-Brit-1961/1	Briefing Books by the Department of External Affairs	1961
RG25-A-3-c	8624	20-1-2-Brit	Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Britain	1971/12/01-1972/04/30
RG25	5267	8490-B-40	Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council	1961/09/12-1963/05/15
RG25	5514	12447-40	European Common Market (EEC) – (Customs Unions)	1961/07/03-1961/07/12
RG25	5515	12447-40	European Common Market	1961/09/01-1961/10/31
RG25	5516	12447-40	European Common Market (EEC)	1961/11/01-1962/01/12
RG25	5517	12447-40	European Common Market – EEC	1961/08/03-1962/04/17
RG25	5519	12447-40	European Common Market (EEC)	1962/03/09-1962/04/30
RG25	5579	12850-A-13-1-40	Visit to Canada of the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia – June 1960	1960/05/04-1963/07/04
RG25	9579	MF-365	Ministerial Consultations – Enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC)	1970/09/30-1970/10/06

			– Geneva – London – Brussels – Briefing Material	
--	--	--	---	--

National Archives Australia (NAA)

Series Number	Control Symbol	Title	Date
A463	1965/2040	Parliamentary question regarding Mr Downer's statement on Britain and the EEC [European Economic Community]	1965
A463	1970/2098	Speech by Sir Alexander Downer regarding the EEC [European Economic Community]	05 Jun 1970 – 22 Jun 1970
A571	1963/320 Part 2	United Kingdom – European Economic Community – Negotiations – Implications of failure	1963
A571	1970/6260 Part 3	European Economic Community – United Kingdom entry – implications for Australia's trade by United Kingdom entry	1971
A987	E1437A Part 1	European Economic Community – negotiations entry United Kingdom – cables	1961
A1209	1961/1121 Part 1	United Kingdom Association with the European Economic Community – Statements and Speeches by Australian Prime Minister	1961-1962
A1209	1961/1121 Part 2	United Kingdom association with the European Economic Community – Statements and speeches by Australian Prime Minister	1962-1963

A1209	1961/1124 Part 1	Australia/UK consultations prior to UK negotiations for EEC [European Economic Community] membership	1961-1962
A1209	1961/1230 Part 1	Report of the Australian Delegation to the Commonwealth Consultations on the United Kingdom's proposed negotiations [sic] with the European Economic Community – London 18-29 September 1961	1961
A1209	1962/60	Consultations with Manufacturing Industries Advisory Council	1962
A1838	67/1/3 Part 3	United Kingdom – Foreign Policy – Relations with Australia – General	1964-1971
A1838	67/1/3 Part 4	United Kingdom – Foreign Policy – Relations with Australia – General	1971-1972
A1838	67/1/3 Part 6	United Kingdom – Foreign Policy – Relations with Australia – General	1972
A1838	67/1/3 Part 7	United Kingdom – Foreign Policy – Relations with Australia – General	1972-1973
A1838	67/1/3 Part 8	United Kingdom – Foreign Policy – Relations with Australia – General	1973
A1838	67/173 Part 10	United Kingdom – Foreign Policy – Relations with Australia – General	1971-1973
A1838	727/1/8 Part 1	European Economic Community – Australia – Commodity by commodity discussions with EEC and United Kingdom	1972
A1838	727/4 Part 4	United Kingdom, European Economic Community and Commonwealth	1961
A1838	727/4 Part 8	United Kingdom and the European Economic Community and Commonwealth	1961

A1838	727/4 Part 9	United Kingdom and the European Economic Community – Commonwealth	1961
A1838	727/4 Part 12	United Kingdom – European Economic Community – Commonwealth	1961
A1838	727/4 Part 13	United Kingdom – European Economic Community – Commonwealth	1961
A1838	727/4 Part 17	United Kingdom – European Economic Community – Commonwealth	1961
A1838	727/3/22 Part 1	European Economic Community. Attitudes of other countries: New Zealand	1962
A1838	727/4/2 Part 1	European Economic Community – Britain – Australian interests and action	1961
A1838	727/4/2 Part 2	European Economic Community – Britain – Australian interests & actions	1961-1962
A1838	727/4/2 Part 3	European Economic Community – Britain – Australian interests & action	1962
A1838	727/4/2 Part 4A	European Economic Community – Britain – Australian interests & action	1961-1962
A1838	727/4/2 Part 4 Annex A	Spare European Economic Community documents – the Australian position	1962
A1838	727/4/2 Part 5	European Economic Community – Britain: Australian interests & action	1962-1964
A1838	727/4/2 Part 8	EEC [European Economic Community] – Australian interests and action	1967-1970
A1838	727/4/2 Part 9	EEC [European Economic Community] – Britain – Australian interests and action	1970
A1838	727/4/2 Part 12	EEC [European Economic Community] – Britain – Australian interests and action	1971
A1838	727/4/2 Part 13	EEC [European Economic Community] – Britain – Australian interests and action	1971

A1838	727/4/2 Part 16	EEC [European Economic Community] – Britain – Australian interests and action	1971
A1838	727/4/2 Part 17	EEC [European Economic Community] – Britain – Australian interests and action	1971
A1838	727/4/2 Part 18	EEC [European Economic Community] – Britain – Australian interests and action	1971
A1838	727/4/2/4	European Economic Community – United Kingdom – Commonwealth: Australian publicity in United Kingdom	1961-1962
A3917	Volume 2	United Kingdom negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1961-1963: Key documents – Book I	1961-1962
A3917	Volume 3	United Kingdom negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1961-1963: Key documents – Book II	1962
A3917	Volume 7	United Kingdom negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1961-1963: Visits overseas – Minister for Trade, Mar-Apr 1962; Prime Minister, June 1962; Dr Westerman to USA	1962
A3917	Volume 8	United Kingdom negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1961-1963: Country attitudes – Canada, New Zealand and United States of America	1961-1963
A3917	Volume 17	United Kingdom negotiations with the European Economic Community, 1961-1963: Inward cables, June-Sept 1961	1961
A5882	CO904	United Kingdom entry into the European Economic Community	Feb 1969-Jul 1972

A4092	84	UK [United Kingdom] and the EEC [European Economic Community] – Ministerial statements – Britain New Zealand France Canada	1967
M58	340	[Personal Papers of Prime Minister McEwen] European Economic Community – Melbourne file	1959- May 1964
M58	356	[Personal Papers of Prime Minister McEwen] Common Market congratulations [on presentation of Australia’s case in negotiations for United Kingdom entry into the European Economic Community]	19 Jun 1961 – 08 Mar 1963
M1003	John McEwen	The Hon Sir Alexander Downer KBE, correspondence – The Right Hon Sir John McEwen	1967- 1971
M2568	144	[Personal Papers of Prime Minister Holt] Cabinet Committee: EEC [European Economic Community] – European Market	29 Nov 1961- 30 Jan 1962

National Archives Sydney

Series Number	Control Symbol	Title	Date
M157	43/16	[Personal Papers of E G Whitlam] Trade and Industry: European Economic Community [box 78]	1958- 1967

National Library of Australia

Bib ID	Title	Date
856960	Australia & The Common Market: Reference Material	1961-1962

Collection Number	Creator	Series	Box	Date
MS 4652	Sir John McEwen	4	34	1958-1960
MS 4652	Sir John McEwen	4	39	1961
MS 4652	Sir John McEwen	4	39	1962
MS4652	Sir John McEwen	4	40	1962
MS4652	Sir John McEwen	4	44	1962
MS 4652	Sir John McEwen	5	60	1961-1962
MS 4652	Sir John McEwen	14	118	1956-1960
MS 4652	Sir John McEwen	14	121	1961-1964

National Library of New Zealand (NLW)

Reference	Title	Date
MS-Papers-0274-034D	Papers relating to the EEC	Jul 1961
MS-Papers-1403-152/2	EEC-Papers	1961
MS-Papers-1403-152/3	EEC-Papers	1961

MS-Papers-1403-153/3	Visit to Australia, UK, Europe and the US - Papers	May 1962
MS-Papers-1403-153/4	Visit to Australia, UK, Europe and the US- Papers	May 1962
MS-Papers-1403-154/3	Visit to Australia, UK, Europe and the US - Correspondence	16-31 May 1962
MS-Papers-1403-154/7	Visit to Australia, UK, Europe and the US	Aug. 1962
MS-Papers-1403-156/1	European and US visit - Papers	Oct. 1962
MS-Papers-1403-156/3	European and US visit - Papers	Nov 1962
MS-Papers-6759-145	Text of broadcast by Keith Holyoake re Britain and the EEC (C14)	1962
MS-Papers-7939-057	Papers relating to entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC	1970- 1971

The National Archive Kew (UK)

Reference	Title	Date
CAB 129/106/11	Record Type: Memorandum. Former reference: C (61) 111. Title: Europe: Talks with the New Zealand, Australian and Canadian Governments	21. July 1961
DO 35/8381	Canadian attitude to European trade relations	1958-1960
DO 127/140	Role of the monarchy in Canada	1970
DO 128/3	External political affairs	1968-1969
DO 159/64	New Zealand attitude to Common Market negotiations	1961-1962
DO 165/54	Visit by Commonwealth Secretary to Australia, New Zealand and Canada	1961
DO 165/64	Consultation with Commonwealth governments prior to UK negotiations with EEC, September 1961	1961

DO 165/76	New Zealand	1961
DO 165/77	New Zealand	1961
DO 169/341	Australia	1964-1966
DO 192/10	Canada	1963
DO 192/12	New Zealand	1963
DO 215/13	Canada	1966
DO 215/14	Australia	1966
DO 215/15	New Zealand	1966
FCO 13/573	British Council in Canada: British High Commissioner's remarks on annual report	1972
FCO 24/189	Relations between Australia and UK	1967-1968
FCO 24/394	Australia in the 1970's: British High Commission report	1969
FCO 82/17	Attitude of Canada towards membership of EEC by UK	1971
FCO 82/115	Attitude of Canada towards EEC	1972
FCO 95/590	New Zealand: annual information policy report; briefing for High Commissioner Designate	1969
PREM 11/3211	Meeting of Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council in Accra, Sept 1961: Special reference to UK link with EEC	1961
T 236/6549	Negotiations with EEC: Consultations with developed Commonwealth countries; Australia, Canada and New Zealand	1961

Interviews

Interview with Terence O'Brien in Wellington, 21. April 2017.

Interview with Neil Walter in Wellington, 21. April 2017.

Published Sources

- Australian Industries Development Association, *Committee on the European Economic Community. Report on the Implications for Australia of the United Kingdom Becoming a Member of the European Economic Community* (Melbourne/Sydney 1962).
- Barclay, G.St.J. *Commonwealth or Europe* (St. Lucia 1970).
- Casey, Richard Lord, *The Future of the Commonwealth* (London 1963).
- Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs 1 April 1961 to 31 March 1962* (Wellington 1962).
- Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs 1 April 1965 to 31 March 1966* (Wellington 1966).
- Diefenbaker, John, *One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967* (Toronto 1977).
- Diefenbaker, John, *One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Years of Achievement, 1957-1962* (Toronto 1976).
- Diefenbaker, John, *One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Crusading Years 1895 to 1956* (Toronto 1975).
- Gelber, H.G., *Australia, Britain and the EEC. 1961-1963* (Melbourne 1966).
- Gordon, Walter, *A Political Memoir* (Toronto 1977).
- Gordon, Walter, *A Choice for Canada. Independence or Colonial Status* (Toronto/Montreal 1966).
- Gordon, Walter, „Foreign Control of Canadian Industry“, in: *Queen's Quarterly* LXXIII, No 1 (1966), pp. 1-12.
- Gordon, Walter, *Troubled Canada. The Need for New Domestic Policies* (Toronto 1961).
- Kavic, Lorne, „Canada and the Commonwealth. Sentiment, Symbolism and Self-Interest“, in: *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* LXV, No 257 (1975), pp. 37-49.
- Laking, George, *The Economic Development of New Zealand and the Impact of the European Economic Community* (New York 1963).
- Macmillan, Harold, *At the End of the Day. 1961-1963* (London/Basingstoke 1973).
- Martin, Paul, *A Very Public Life. Volume II. So Many Worlds* (Toronto 1985).
- McEwen, John, *His Story* (Published 1983).
- McEwen, John, *Australia's Overseas Economic Relationships* (Melbourne 1965).
- McEwen, John, *Australia and the Common Market. Speech in the House of Representatives, 3rd May 1962* (Canberra 1962).

Menzies, Robert, *Common Market Negotiations. Statement in the House of Representatives, 9th August 1962* (London 1962).

Menzies, Robert, *Australia and the Common Market. Statement by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable R.G. Menzies in the House of Representatives, 16th August 1961* (Canberra 1961).

Miller, John Donald Bruce, *The EEC and Australia* (West Melbourne 1976).

Newman, Peter, *The Diefenbaker Years* (Toronto/Montreal 1963).

Parliament New Zealand, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) First Session, Thirty-third Parliament, 29. June-5. July 1961* (Wellington 1961).

Pearson, Lester, Mike. *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume III 1957-1968*, ed. by John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto 1975).

Pearson, Lester, Mike. *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume II 1948-1957*, ed. by John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto 1973).

Pearson, Lester, Mike. *The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume I 1897-1948*, ed. by John Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto 1972).

Perumbulavil, Vilasini, *The European Economic Community and New Zealand. A Checklist* (Wellington 1965).

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, *Memoirs. Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto 1993).

Ward, Barbara, *Australia, America and the Common Market. An Address by Lady Jackson (Miss Barbara Ward), delivered at the American Independence Day Luncheon of the American-Australian Association in Melbourne on July 4th, 1962* (Melbourne 1962).

Newspapers and magazines

Auckland Star, 4. January 1961.

Auckland Star, 15. January 1963.

Auckland Star, 16. January 1963.

Calgary Herald, 15. September 1961.

Evening Standard, 29. September 1961.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 24. September 1973.

Financial Times, 16. September 1961.

Financial Times, 16. May 1967.
Hauraki Plains Gazette, 5. June 1968.
Hindustan Times, 12. July 1961.
Kingston Whig-Standard, 15. June 1961.
Observer, 14. September 1962.
Otago Daily Times, 7. July 1973.
Ottawa Citizen, 14. September 1961.
Ottawa Citizen, 13. November 1961.
Ottawa Citizen, 15. November 1961.
Ottawa Citizen, 27. January 1962.
Ottawa Journal, 29. June 1961.
Ottawa Journal, 14. September 1961.
Ottawa Journal, 15. September 1962.
Saturday Night, December 1972.
The Adelaide Advertiser, 31. May 1971.
The Age, 5. August 1960.
The Age, 1. August 1961.
The Age, 21. September 1962.
The Australian Financial Review, 25. September 1962.
The Canberra Times, 1. August 1961.
The Christchurch Star, 26. September 1970.
The Daily Telegraph, 21. September 1962.
The Daily Telegraph, 15. December 1966.
The Dominion, 25. September 1959.
The Dominion, 7. July 1961.
The Dominion, 17. July 1961.
The Dominion, 31. July 1962.
The Dominion, 28. September 1962.
The Dominion, 18. January 1968.
The Evening Post, 7. November 1959.
The Evening Post, 4. April 1962.
The Evening Post, 12. September 1962.

The Evening Post, 4. October 1962.
The Gazette, 14. September 1961.
The Globe&Mail, 23. June 1961.
The Globe&Mail, 8. June 1961.
The Globe&Mail, 12. September 1961.
The Globe&Mail, 15. September 1961.
The Globe&Mail, 11. November 1961.
The Guardian, 30. May 1961.
The Herald, 10. July 1961.
The Hindu, 12. July 1961.
The Mercury, 19. August 1961.
The Montreal Gazette, 13. November 1961.
The New Zealand Herald, 12. July 1961.
The New Zealand Herald, 28. September 1962.
The Southland Times, 23. February 1973.
The Sun, 16. June 1961.
The Sun News Pictorial, 25. May 1971.
The Sydney Morning Herald, 1. August 1961.
The Sydney Morning Herald, 2. August 1961.
The Telegraph, 14. March 2016.
The Times, 8. July 1957.
The Times, 10. January 1963.
The Times, 15. January 1963.
The Washington Post, 12. July 1961.
Winnipeg Free Press, 30. June 1961.

5.4. Secondary Sources

- Abernethy, David B., *The Dynamics of Global Dominance. European Overseas Empire, 1415-1980* (New Haven/London 2000).
- Adam, Thomas, *Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World. Sources and Contexts* (Basingstoke 2012).
- Alomes, Stephen, *A Nation at Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism, 1880-1988* (Sydney 1988).
- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities* (London/New York 2006).
- Ashton, S.R. und W.M. Roger Louis (Ed.), *East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964-1971. British Documents on the End of Empire* (London 2004).
- Bachmann-Medick, Doris, *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften* (Reinbek 2006).
- Ball, Desmond und Brendan Taylor, „Australia – Japan“, in: *Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power. Friendships in Flux?*, ed. by Brendan Taylor, pp. 50-59 (Abingdon/New York 2008).
- Barnes, Felicity, „Lancashire at War with Australia. Rethinking Anglo-Australian Trade and the Cultural Economy of Empire, 1934-36“, in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 46, No 4 (2018), pp. 707-30.
- Barnes, Felicity, „Bringing Another Empire Alive? The Empire Marketing Board and the Construction of Dominion Identity, 1926-1933“, in: *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42 (2014), pp. 61-85.
- Barry, Donald und John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 2. Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal/Kingston/London/Buffalo 1995).
- Barth, Boris, Tanja Bühner, Andreas Eckert et al. (Eds.), *Das Zeitalter des Kolonialismus* (Darmstadt 2007).
- Bayly, C.A., *The Birth of the Modern World. 1780-1940. Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden/Oxford/Carlton 2004).
- Beaumont, Joan, „Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-69“, in: *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats. Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969*, ed. by Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, David Lowe et al., pp. 1-18 (Melbourne 2003).

- Belich, James, John Darwin und Chris Wickham, „Introduction. The Prospect of Global History“, in: *The Prospect of Global History*, ed. by James Belich, John Darwin, Margret Frenz et al., pp. 3-22 (Oxford 2016).
- Belich, James, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000* (Honolulu 2001).
- Belich, James, „Colonization and History in New Zealand“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume V. Historiography*, ed. by Robin W. Winks, Alaine Low und W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 182-93 (Oxford 1999).
- Benford, Robert und David Snow, „Framing Processes and Social Movements. An Overview and Assessment“, in: *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, No 3 (2000), pp. 611-39.
- Benvenuti, Andrea, „Layin' Low and Sayin' Nuffin'. Australia's Policy Towards Britain's Second Bid to Join the European Economic Community (1966-67)“, in: *Australian Economic History Review* 46, No 2 (2006), pp. 155-75.
- Benvenuti, Andrea und Stuart Ward, „Britain, Europe, and the 'Other Quiet Revolution' in Canada“, in: *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. by Phillip Buckner, pp. 165-82 (Vancouver 2005).
- Benvenuti, Andrea, *The End of the Affair. Britain's Turn to Europe as a Problem in Anglo-Australian Relations. 1961-1972* (Oxford 2003).
- Berghoff, Hartmut und Jakob Vogel, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Ansätze zur Bergung transdisziplinärer Synergiepotentiale* (Frankfurt a.M. 2004).
- „Bilateralismus“, <https://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/definition/bilateralismus-30631/version-254208>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 31.01.2019.
- Birrell, Robert, *A Nation of our Own. Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia* (Melbourne 1995).
- Black, Jeremy, *A History of Diplomacy* (London 2010).
- Boehm, Peter, „Canada and the Modern Commonwealth. The Approaches of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau“, in: *Bulletin of Canadian Studies* 3 (1979), pp. 23-39.
- Bolzen, Stefanie, „Großbritanniens neuer Traum vom Empire“, <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article175465954/Commonwealth-Grossbritanniens-neuer-Traum-vom-Empire-nach-dem-Brexit.html>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 15.01.2019.
- Bothwell, Robert, *Alliance and Illusion. Canada and the World 1945-1984* (Vancouver 2007).
- Bothwell, Robert, *The Big Chill. Canada and the Cold War* (Concord 1998).

- Robert Bothwell und J.L. Granatstein, *Pirouette. Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 1990).
- Bothwell, Robert, *Loring Christie and the Failure of Bureaucratic Imperialism* (New York 1988).
- Boyce, Peter, *The Queen's Other Realms* (Riverwood 2008).
- Brebner, John Bartlett, *The North Atlantic Triangle. The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (New Haven 1945).
- Brett, Judith, „The Menzies era, 1950-66“, in: *The Cambridge History of Australia. Volume 2. The Commonwealth of Australia*, ed. by Alison Bashford und Stuart Macintyre, pp. 112-34 (Cambridge 2013).
- Bridge, Carl, Frank Bongiorno, David Lee et al., „Introduction“, in: *The High Commissioners. Australia's Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010*, ed. by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno und David Lee (Canberra 2010).
- Bridge, Carl und Kent Fedorowich (Eds.), *The British World. Diaspora, Culture and Identity* (London 2003).
- Brown, Bruce, „New Zealand in the World Economy. Trade Negotiations and Diversification“, in: *New Zealand in World Affairs, 1972-1990*, ed. by Bruce Brown, pp. 21-61 (Wellington 1999).
- Buckner, Phillip (Eds.), *Canada and the British Empire* (Oxford 2008).
- Buckner, Phillip und R. Douglas Francis (Eds.), *Canada and the British World. Culture, Migration, and Identity* (Vancouver/Toronto 2006).
- Buckner, Phillip (Eds.), *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver 2005).
- Buckner, Phillip, „Introduction“, in: *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. by Phillip Buckner, pp. 1-14 (Vancouver/Toronto 2005).
- Buckner, Phillip und R. Douglas Francis (Eds.), *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary 2005).
- Budde, Gunilla, Sebastian Conrad und Oliver Janz (Eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen 2006).
- Burbank, Jane und Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton/Oxford 2010).
- Burchill, Scott, Gary und David Cox, *Australia in the World. An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (Oxford 1996).
- Burroughs, Peter, *The Colonial Reformers and Canada, 1830-1849* (Toronto 1969).
- Butler, Larry J., *Britain and Empire. Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World* (London 2002).

- Cain, P.J. und Anthony Hopkins, *British Imperialism. Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990* (London/New York 1993).
- Cairncross, Alec und Barry Eichengreen, *Sterling in Decline. The Devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967* (Oxford 1983).
- Calvocoressi, Peter, *World Politics since 1945* (London/New York 2008).
- Champion, C.P., *The Strange Demise of British Canada. The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968* (Montreal/Kingston 2010).
- Champion, C.P., „Mike Pearson at Oxford. War, Varsity, and Canadianism“, in: *Canadian Historical Review* 88 (2007), pp. 263-90.
- Childs, David, *Britain Since 1939. Progress and Decline* (Basingstoke 2012).
- Christiano, Kevin, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Reason Before Passion. A Biography* (Toronto 1994).
- Clark, Charles Manning Hope, *A History of Australia Vol. 4-6* (Melbourne 1978, 1981, 1987).
- Clayton, Anthony, „Deceptive Might‘. Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown, W.M. Roger Louis und Alaine Low, pp. 280-305 (Oxford/New York 1999).
- Cohen, Andrew, *Lester B. Pearson* (London 2008).
- Cohen, Andrew und J.L. Granatstein (Eds.), *Trudeau’s Shadow. The Life and Legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto 1999).
- „Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement“, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 18.12.2018.
- Conrad, Christoph und Anne Schmidt (Eds.), *Bodies and Affects in Market Societies* (Tübingen 2016).
- Conrad, Christoph und Anne Schmidt, „The Role of Emotions in the Production of Capitalist Subjects. An Introduction“, in: *Bodies and Affects in Market Societies*, ed. by Anne Schmidt und Christoph Conrad, pp. 1-22 (Tübingen 2016).
- Conrad, Sebastian, Akira Iriye und Jürgen Osterhammel (Eds.), *1750-1870. Wege zur modernen Welt* (Munich 2016).
- Conrad, Sebastian, *Globalgeschichte. Eine Einführung* (Munich 2013).
- Conrad, Sebastian, Andreas Eckert und Ulrike Freitag (Eds.), *Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen* (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2007).

- Cooper, Frederick, *Kolonialismus denken. Konzepte und Theorien in kritischer Perspektive* (Frankfurt a. M. 2012).
- Cooper, Frederick, *Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge 1996).
- Creighton, Donald, *Canada's First Century* (Toronto 1970).
- Creighton, Donald, *John A. Macdonald. Vol. II. The Old Chieftan* (Toronto 1955).
- Creighton, Donald, *John A. Macdonald. Vol. I. The Young Politician* (Toronto 1952).
- Creighton, Donald, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850* (Toronto 1937).
- Curran, James, „Australia at Empire's End. Approaches and Arguments“, in: *History Australia* 10, No 3 (2013), pp. 23-35.
- Curran, James und Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation. Australia After Empire* (Melbourne 2010).
- Curran, James, *The Power of Speech. Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image* (Melbourne 2006).
- Curthoys, Ann, „We've Just Started Making National Histories, and You want Us to Stop Already?“, in: *After the Imperial Turn. Thinking with and through the Nation*, ed. by Antoinette Burton, pp. 70-89 (Durham/London 2003).
- Dafoe, J.W., *Canada. An American Nation* (New York 1935).
- Darian-Smith, Kate, Patricia Grimshaw und Stuart Macintyre (Eds.), *Britishness Abroad. Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures* (Melbourne 2007).
- Darwin, John, *Das unvollendete Weltreich. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Britischen Empire 1600-1997* (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2013).
- Darwin, John, „The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown und W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 64-87. (Oxford/New York 1999).
- Darwin, John, *The End of the British Empire. The Historical Debate* (Oxford/Cambridge Massachusetts 1991).
- Darwin, John, *Britain and Decolonization. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (London 1988).
- Davidson, Jim, „The De-Dominionisation of Australia“, in: *Meanjin* 38, No 2 (1979), pp. 139-53.
- Davison, Graeme, „The Colonial Strut. Australian Leaders on the World Stage“, in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, No 1 (2005), pp. 6-16.

- Day, David, *Reluctant Nation. Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan, 1942-45* (Melbourne 1992).
- Day, David, *The Great Betrayal. Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939-42* (Melbourne 1992).
- Denoon, Donald, Philippa Mein-Smith und Marvic Wyndham, *A History of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific* (Oxford 2000).
- Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm und Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (Göttingen 2008).
- Doig, Jack, „New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand. The Construction of National Identities by two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s“, in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 59, No 4 (2013), pp. 559-75.
- Doig, Jack, „The Australian and New Zealand Government’s Response to Britain’s Decline in the 1960s. Identity, Geopolitics and the End of Empire“, in: *Journal of New Zealand and Pacific Studies* 1 (2013), pp. 41-53.
- Donaghy, Greg, Mary Halloran und John Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs. Volume 3. Innovation and Adaptation 1968-1984* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 2017).
- Donaghy, Greg und John Hilliker, „Canadian Relations with the United Kingdom at the End of Empire, 1956-73“, in: *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. by Phillip Buckner, pp. 25-46 (Vancouver/Toronto 2005).
- Eckert, Andreas, *Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt a.M. 2006).
- Edwards, Peter, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats. The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901-1949* (Oxford 1983).
- Eitler, Pascal und Monique Scheer, „Emotionengeschichte als Körpergeschichte. Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert“, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35, No 2 (2009), pp. 282-313.
- Elkins, Caroline und Susanne Pedersen, *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York 2005).
- English, John, *Just Watch Me. The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. 1968-2000* (Toronto 2009).
- English, John, *Citizen of the World. The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Volume One 1919-1968* (Toronto 2006).
- English, John, *Shadow of Heaven. The Life of Lester Pearson. Vol. I 1897-1948* (Toronto 1989).

- Eustace, Nicole, „Emotion and Political Change“, in: *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt und Peter N. Stearns, pp. 163-83 (Urbana/Chicago/Springfield 2014).
- Evans, Gareth und Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s* (Melbourne 1991).
- Febvre, Lucien, „La sensibilite et l'histoire. Comment reconstituer la vie affective d'autrefois?“, in: *Annales d'histoire sociale* 3 (1941), pp. 5-20.
- Fechner, Fabian et al., „„We are gambling with our survival.“ Bedrohungskommunikation als Indikator für bedrohte Ordnungen“, in: *Aufruhr - Katastrophe - Konkurrenz - Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. by Ewald Frie und Mischa Meier, pp. 141-73 (Tübingen 2014).
- Fedorowich, Kent, „When Is a Diplomat Not a Diplomat? The Office of High Commissioner“, in: *The High Commissioners. Australia's Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010*, ed. by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno und David Lee, pp. 10-23 (Canberra 2010).
- Frevert, Ute, *Vertrauensfragen. Eine Obsession der Moderne* (Munich 2013).
- Frevert, Ute, „Gefühle definieren“, in: *Gefühlswissen. Eine lexikalische Spurensuche in der Moderne*, ed. by Ute Frevert, Monique Scheer, Anne Schmidt et al., pp. 9-40 (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2011).
- Frevert, Ute, „Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen?“, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35, No 2 (2009), pp. 183-208.
- Frevert, Ute, „Vertrauen als Gefühlshaltung“, in: *Emotionalität. Zur Geschichte der Gefühle*, ed. by Claudia Benthien, Anne Fleig und Ingrid Kasten, pp. 178-97 (Cologne 2000).
- Frey, Marc, „Drei Wege zur Unabhängigkeit. Die Dekolonisierung in Indochina, Indonesien und Malaya nach 1945“, in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 50, No 3 (2002), pp. 399-433.
- Frie, Ewald, „Einmal Europa und zurück? Australien und Neuseeland“, in: *Die Welt im 20. Jahrhundert nach 1945*, ed. by Helmut Konrad and Monika Stromberger, pp. 337-58 (Vienna 2010).
- Frie, Ewald, „„History Wars“. Geschichtspolitik, Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtskultur in Australien“, in: *Bilder nach dem Sturm. Wahrheitskommissionen und historische Identitätsstiftung zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft*, ed. by Christoph Marx, pp. 122-44 (Berlin 2007).
- Frie, Ewald, „History Wars. Australien kämpft um seine Vergangenheit“, in: *Periplus* 14 (2004), pp. 170-90.

- Gallagher, John A., *Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire. The Ford Lectures and Other Essays* (Cambridge 1982).
- Garner, Steve, *Whiteness. An Introduction* (London/New York 2007).
- Gee, Austin, Robert Patman and Chris Rudd, „Building Foreign Policy in New Zealand. The Role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School, 1966-1976“, in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, ed. by Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, pp. 3-37 (New Jersey/London u.a. 2018).
- Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford 1983).
- Gerston, Larry, *Public Policy Making. Process and Principles* (Armonk 1997).
- Gibbons, Peter, „The Far Side of the Search for Identity. Reconsidering New Zealand History“, in: *New Zealand Journal of History* 37 (2012), pp. 38-47.
- Goldsworthy, David, „Australian External Policy and the End of Britain’s Empire“, in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, No 1 (2005), pp. 17-29.
- Goldsworthy, David, „Menzies, Macmillan and Europe“, in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51, No 2 (1997), pp. 157-69.
- Granatstein, J.L., *How Britain’s Weakness Forces Canada into the Arms of the United States* (Toronto 1989).
- Granatstein, J.L., *Canada 1957-1967. The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto 1986).
- Grant, George P., *Lament for a Nation. The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto 1965).
- Greenwood, Gordon and Norman Harper, *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965* (London 1968).
- Griffiths, Richard and Stuard Ward (Eds.), *Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community* (London 1996).
- Grob-Fitzgibbon, Benjamin, *Continental Drift. Britain and Europe from the End of Empire to the Rise of Euroscepticism* (Cambridge 2016).
- Großmann, Johannes and Hélène Miard-Delacroix, „Das transatlantische Dreieck in den ‚langen‘ 1960er Jahren. Perspektiven, Probleme und Fragen“, in: *Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA in den ‚langen‘ 1960er Jahren. Ein transatlantisches Dreiecksverhältnis*, ed. by Johannes Großmann and Hélène Miard-Delacroix, pp. 13-34 (Stuttgart 2018).
- Großmann, Johannes and Hélène Miard-Delacroix (Eds.), *Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA in den ‚langen‘ 1960er Jahren. Ein transatlantisches Dreiecksverhältnis* (Stuttgart 2018).
- Gustafson, Barry, *Kiwi Keith. A Biography of Keith Holyoake* (Auckland 2007).
- Gyngell, Allan and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge 2003).

- Hagemann, Albrecht, *Kleine Geschichte Australiens* (Munich 2004).
- Hall, David, *Emerging from an Entrenched Colonial Economy. New Zealand Primary Production, Britain and the E.E.C., 1945-1975* (Wellington 2017).
- Hall, Stuart, „Wann gab es „das Postkoloniale“? Denken an der Grenze“, in: *Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. by Sebastian Conrad und Shalini Randeria, pp. 197-223 (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2002).
- Hammerton, A. James and Alistair Thomson, *Ten Pound Poms. Australia's Invisible Migrants* (Manchester/New York 2005).
- Harper, T.N., *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya* (Cambridge 1999).
- Harrison, Brian, *Seeking a Role. The United Kingdom 1951-1970* (Oxford 2009).
- Hart, Michael, *A Trading Nation. Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (Vancouver/Toronto 2002).
- Heinlein, Frank, *British Government Policy and Decolonization, 1945-1963. Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London 2002).
- Helmedach, Achim, „WTO“, in: *Handbuch Internationale Organisationen. Theoretische Grundlagen und Akteure*, ed. by Katja Freistein and Julia Leininger, pp. 283-96 (Munich 2012).
- Hennion, Antoine und Cécile Méadel, „The Artisans of Desire. The Mediation of Advertising between Product and Consumer“, in: *Sociological Theory* 7, No 2 (1989), pp. 191-209.
- Hilliker, John, „The Politicians and the ‚Personalities‘: The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations“, in: *Historical Papers* 19, No 1 (1984), pp. 151-67.
- Hirschhausen, Ulrike von and Jörn Leonhard, „Zwischen Historisierung und Globalisierung. Titel, Themen und Trends der neueren Empire-Forschung“, in: *Neue Politische Literatur* 56 (2011), pp. 389-404.
- Hitzer, Bettina, „Emotionsgeschichte - ein Anfang mit Folgen“, <https://www.hsozkult.de/literaturereview/id/forschungsberichte-1221>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 15.05.2018.
- Hoadley, Steve, *The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook* (Oxford 1992).
- Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (Eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge 2012).
- Hocking, Jenny, *Gough Whitlam. A Moment in History* (Melbourne 2008).

- Hollowell, Jonathan, „From Commonwealth to European Integration“, in: Britain Since 1945, ed. by Jonathan Hollowell, pp. 59-108 (Malden/Oxford/Melbourne u.a. 2003).
- Hopkins, Anthony, „Rethinking Decolonization“, in: *Past and Present* 200 (2008), pp. 211-47. <https://www.conferenceboard.ca/>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 22.01.2019.
- Hyam, Ronald, *Britain's Declining Empire. The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968* (Cambridge 2006).
- Igartua, José, *The Other Quiet Revolution. National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver 2006).
- Innis, Harold, „Great Britain, the United States and Canada, 21st Cust Foundation Lecture, delivered at the University of Nottingham, 21 May 1948“, in: *Essays in Canadian Economic History*, ed. by M. Q. Innis, pp. 394-412 (Toronto 1956).
- Iriye, Akira, *Global and Transnational History. The Past, Present and Future* (Basingstoke 2013).
- Iriye, Akira and Jürgen Osterhammel (Eds.), *Geschichte der Welt 1945 bis heute. Die Globalisierte Welt* (Munich 2013).
- Irwin, Douglas, „The GATT in Historical Perspective“, in: *The American Economic Review* 85, No 2 (1995), pp. 323-28.
- James, Lawrence *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London 1994).
- Jansen, Jan C. and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation. Das Ende der Imperien* (Munich 2013).
- Jansen, Jan C. and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich 2009).
- Kaelble, Hartmut, Martin Kirsch and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, „Zur Entwicklung transnationaler Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung“, in: *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch and Alexander Schmidt-Gering, pp. 7-33 (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2002).
- Kandiah, Michael David and Gillian Staerck, „Commonwealth International Financial Arrangements and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC“, in: *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to join the European Communities*, ed. by Alex May, pp. 111-31 (Basingstoke 2001).
- Kelsey, Jane, „New Zealand and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations. Strategy, Content and Lessons“, in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, ed. by Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, pp. 145-68 (New Jersey/London u.a. 2018).
- King, Michael, *The Penguin History of New Zealand* (Auckland 2003).

- Knudsen, Eva, Martin Leer and Stuart Ward, „Someone Else’s Story? Reflections on Australian Studies in Europe“, in: *Thinking Australian Studies. Teaching Across Cultures*, ed. by David Carter, Kate Darian-Smith and Gus Worby, pp. 211-23 (St. Lucia 2004).
- Langthaler, Ernst and Reinhard Sieder (Eds.), *Globalgeschichte 1800-2010* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2010).
- Langthaler, Ernst and Reinhard Sieder, „Was heißt Globalgeschichte?“, in: *Globalgeschichte 1800-2010*, ed. by Ernst Langthaler and Reinhard Sieder, pp. 9-36 (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2010).
- Latour, Bruno and Vincent Lépinay, *Die Ökonomie als Wissenschaft der leidenschaftlichen Interessen. Eine Einführung in die ökonomische Anthropologie Gabriel Tardes* (Berlin 2010).
- Lee, David, *Search for Security. The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy* (Sydney 1995).
- Lehmkuhl, Ursula, „Fuss About the „Holy Grail“. Diefenbaker’s Handelsinitiative vom Juni 1957 und die britisch-kanadischen Handelsbeziehungen, 1955-1965“, in: *Canada at the Crossroads? The Critical 1960s*, ed. by Jack L. Granatstein and Gustav Schmidt, pp. 177-214 (Bochum 1994).
- Lloyd, Lorna, *Diplomacy with a Difference. The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880-2006* (Leiden 2007).
- Louis, W.M. Roger, *End of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation. Collected Essays* (London/New York 2006).
- Louis, W.M. Roger, „Introduction“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown and W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 1-46 (Oxford/New York 1999).
- Louis, W.M. Roger, „The Dissolution of the British Empire“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by W.M. Roger Louis, Judith M. Brown and Alaine Low, pp. 329-56 (Oxford 1999).
- Lowe, David, „Cold War London. Harrison and White“, in: *The High Commissioners. Australia’s Representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010*, ed. by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno and David Lee, pp. 127-39 (Canberra 2010).
- Lowe, David, *Menzies and the ,Great World Struggle‘. Australia’s Cold War 1948-1954* (Sydney 1999).

- Lynch, Brian, „New Zealand and Its Asia-Pacific Destiny. Sailing the Waka in Ever-Widening Circles“, in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, ed. by Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, pp. 103-20 (New Jersey/London u.a. 2018).
- MacIntyre, Stuart, *A Concise History of Australia* (Cambridge 1999).
- MacIntyre, Stuart, *The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990* (Basingstoke/London 1991).
- MacKenzie, David, „Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith M. Brown, W.M. Roger Louis and Alaine Low, pp. 574-96 (Oxford 1999).
- MacPhee, Graham and Prem Poddar (Eds.), *Empire and After. Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective* (New York 2007).
- Manning, Helen Taft, *British Colonial Government after the American Revolution* (Hamden 1966).
- Manning, Patrick, *Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past* (New York/Basingstoke 2003).
- Marcuse, Gary and Reg Whitaker, *Cold War Canada. The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 1994).
- Marriott, John, *The Other Empire. Metropolis, India and Progress in the Colonial Imagination* (Manchester 2003).
- Martin, Allan, „Sir Robert Gordon Menzies“, in: *Australian Prime Ministers*, ed. by Michelle Grattan, pp. 174-205 (Sydney 2000).
- Martin, Ged, *The Durham Report and British Policy. A Critical Essay* (Cambridge 1972).
- Matt, Susan J., „Current Emotion Research in History. Or, Doing History from the Inside Out“, in: *Emotion Review* 3, No 1 (2011), pp. 117-24.
- Matt, Susan J., „Recovering the Invisible. Methods for the Historical Study of the Emotions“, in: *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns, pp. 41-53 (Urbana/Chicago/Springfield 2014).
- May, Alex, „The Commonwealth and Britain’s Turn to Europe, 1945-73“, in: *The Round Table. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 102, No 1 (2013), pp. 29-39.
- McIntyre, W. David, *Winding up the British Empire in the Pacific Islands* (Oxford 2014).
- McIntyre, W. David, „Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century*, ed. by W.M. Roger Louis, Judith M. Brown and Alaine Low, pp. 667-92 (Oxford 1999).

- McIntyre, W. David, „The Commonwealth“, in: *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume V. Historiography*, ed. by Robin W. Winks, Alaine Low and W.M. Roger Louis, pp. 558-70 (Oxford 1999).
- McIntyre, W. David, *The Significance of the Commonwealth, 1965-1990* (Basingstoke/London 1991).
- McKenzie, Francine, „Trade, Dominance, Dependence and the End of the Settlement Era in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, 1920-1973“, in: *Settler Economies in World History*, ed. by Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzger and Richard Sutch, pp. 463-89 (Leiden 2013).
- McKenzie, Francine, „In the National Interest. Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War“, in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, No 4 (2006), pp. 553-76.
- McKercher, Asa und Galen Roger Perras (Eds.), *Mike's World. Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs* (Vancouver/Toronto 2017).
- McKinnon, Malcom, *Independence and Foreign Policy* (Oxford 1993).
- Meaney, Neville, „Britishness and Australian Identity. The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography“, in: *Australia and the Wider World. Selected Essays of Neville Meaney*, ed. by James Curran und Stuart Ward, pp. 23-36 (Sydney 2013).
- Meaney, Neville, „The End of ‚White Australia‘ and Australia's Changing Perception of Asia, 1945-1990“, in: *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 49, No 2 (1995), pp. 171-89.
- Mills, Allen, *Citizen Trudeau. An Intellectual Biography, 1944-1965* (Oxford 2016).
- Milward, Alan, *The United Kingdom and the European Community, Volume I: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963* (London/New York 2013).
- „Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade“, <https://www.archway.archives.govt.nz/ViewEntity.do?code=ABHS>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 29.11.2018.
- Mols, Manfred, „Politik als Wissenschaft. Zur Definition, Entwicklung und Standortbestimmung einer Disziplin“, in: *Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung*, ed. by Hans-Joachim Lauth und Christian Wagner, pp. 23-62 (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2018).
- Morton, W.L., *The Kingdom of Canada* (Toronto 1963).
- Muirhead, Bruce, *Dancing around the Elephant. Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973* (Toronto 2007).

- Muirhead, Bruce, „The Development of Canada’s Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s. The Case of the European Union“, in: *The Canadian Historical Review* 82, No 4 (2001), pp. 690-718.
- Muirhead, Bruce, „From Dreams to Reality. The Evolution of Anglo-Canadian Trade During the Diefenbaker Era“, in: *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 9 (1998), pp. 243-66.
- Muirhead, Bruce, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* (Montreal/Kingston 1992).
- Münkler, Herfried, *Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft - vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten* (Berlin 2005).
- Narine, Shaun, *Explaining ASEAN. Regionalism in Southeast Asia* (Boulder/London 2002).
- Nethercote, John, *Menzies. The Shaping of Modern Australia* (Brisbane 2016).
- Nolte, Hans-Heinrich, *Kurze Geschichte der Imperien. Mit einem Beitrag von Christiane Nolte* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2017).
- Nolte, Hans-Heinrich, *Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2009).
- Nolte, Hans-Heinrich, *Weltgeschichte. Imperien, Religionen und Systeme. 15.-19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne/Vienna/Weimar 2005).
- „Norman Kirk“, <https://www.archway.archives.govt.nz/ViewEntity.do?code=AAWV>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 29.11.2018.
- O’Brien, John B., „The Australian Department of Trade and the EEC, 1956-61“, in: *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The Commonwealth and Britain’s Applications to join the European Communities*, ed. by Alex May, pp. 39-52 (Basingstoke 2001).
- O’Brien, John B., „The British Commonwealth and the European Economic Community. The Australian and Canadian Experiences“, in: *The Round Table* 85, No 340 (1996), pp. 479-93.
- Ogawa, Hiroyuki, „Britain’s Commonwealth Dilemma. Discussions with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and Transition of British Trade Policy. 1956-1959“, in: *Contemporary British History. The Journal of Contemporary British History* 17, No 3 (2003), pp. 1-28.
- Oliver, W.H., *The Story of New Zealand* (London 1960).
- Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Die Flughöhe der Adler. Historische Essays zur globalen Gegenwart* (Munich 2017).
- Osterhammel, Jürgen, „Global History in a National Context. The Case of Germany“, in: *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* 20 (2009), pp. 40-58.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Weltgeschichte* (Stuttgart 2008).

- Osterhammel, Jürgen, „Transferanalyse und Vergleich im Fernverhältnis“, in: Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts-, und Kulturwissenschaften, ed. by Hartmut Kaelble, pp. 439-66 (Frankfurt a.M./New York 2003).
- Osterhammel, Jürgen and Niels P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen* (Munich 2003).
- Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zur Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen 2001).
- Owram, D.R., „Canada and the Empire“, in: The Oxford History of the British Empire. Historiography, ed. by W.M. Roger Louis, Robin W. Winks and Alaine Low, pp. 146-62 (Oxford 2007).
- Palmer, Bryan, *Canada's 1960's. The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto/Buffalo/London 2008).
- Patel, Kiran Klaus, „Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte“, in: Weltgeschichte, ed. by Jürgen Osterhammel, pp. 67-89 (Stuttgart 2008).
- Patman, Robert and Chris Rudd, *Sovereignty under Siege? Globalisation and New Zealand* (Aldershot 2005).
- Paxmann, Jeremy, *Empire* (London 2012).
- Pernau, Margrit, *Transnationale Geschichte* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2011).
- Pham, P.L., *Ending 'East of Suez'. The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964-1968* (Oxford 2010).
- Pilzweiger, Stefanie, *Männlichkeit zwischen Gefühl und Revolution. Eine Emotionsgeschichte der bundesdeutschen 68er-Bewegung* (Bielefeld 2015).
- Pimlott, John, *British Military Operations. 1945-1984* (London 1984).
- Plamper, Jan, *Geschichte und Gefühl. Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte* (Munich 2012).
- Plamper, Jan, „Fear. Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology“, in: *Slavic Review* 68, No 2 (2009), pp. 259-83.
- „Policy.ca - Conference Board of Canada Organization Profile“, <https://www.conferenceboard.ca/>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 23.01.2019.
- Pomfret, Richard, „Trade Policy in Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century“, in: *Australian Economic History Review* 40, No 2 (2000), pp. 114-26.
- Preston, P.W., *Britain after Empire. Constructing a Post-War Political-Cultural Project* (New York 2014).

- Preston, Richard, *Canada and 'Imperial Defence': A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defence Organizations, 1867-1919* (Durham 1967).
- Reddy, William M., *The Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge 2011).
- Reinhard, Wolfgang, *Kleine Geschichte des Kolonialismus* (Stuttgart 2008).
- Reynolds, John, „Recognition by Trade. The Controversial Wheat Sales to China“, in: *Australian Outlook. Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs* 18 (1964), pp. 117-26.
- Ricci, Nino, *Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (London 2009).
- Robertson, Alexander F., *Greed. Gut Feelings, Growth, and History* (Cambridge 2001).
- Robertson, Paul and John Singleton, *Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1940-1970* (Basingstoke 2002).
- Robertson, Paul and John Singleton, „The Commonwealth as an Economic Network“, in: *Australian Economic History Review* 41, No 3 (2001), pp. 241-66.
- Robertson, Paul and John Singleton, „The Old Commonwealth and Britain's First Application to Join the EEC 1961-3“, in: *Australian Economic Review* 40 (2000), pp. 153-77.
- Robertson, Paul and John Singleton, „Britain, the Dominions, and the E.E.C. 1961-1963“, in: *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration. The European Economic Community, 1957-1963*, ed. by Anne Deighton und Alan Milward (Baden-Baden 1999).
- Robertson, Paul and John Singleton, „Britain, Butter, and European Integration, 1957-1964“, in: *Economic History Review* L, No 2 (1997), pp. 327-47.
- Rosenwein, Barbara H., *Generations of Feeling. A History of Emotions, 600-1700* (Cambridge 2016).
- Rosenwein, Barbara H., „Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions“, in: *Passions in Context. International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions* 1, No 1 (2010), pp. 5-37.
- Sachsenmaier, Dominic, *Global Perspectives on Global History. Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Cambridge 2011).
- Sautter, Udo, *Geschichte Kanadas* (Munich 2000).
- Scheer, Monique, „Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And is That What Makes Them Have A History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion“, in: *History and Theory* 51, No 2 (2012), pp. 193-220.

- Schildt, Axel, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers, „Einleitung“, in: *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, ed. by Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried und Karl Christian Lammers, pp. 11-20 (Hamburg 2003).
- Schultz, John and Kimitada Miwa (Eds.), *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto/Oxford/New York 1991).
- Schwarzkopf, Stefan, „The Making of Cold-War Consumer Culture in Britain from the 1940s to the 1960s“, in: *Cold War Cultures. Perspectives on Eastern and Western Societies*, ed. by Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk and Thomas Lindenberger, pp. 172-90 (New York 2012).
- Scollay, Robert, „New Zealand’s Evolving Response to Changing Asia-Pacific Trade and Economic Currents Since 1989“, in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, ed. by Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, pp. 121-44 (New Jersey/London u.a. 2018).
- Silver, Lara, „A Long Goodbye. Pearson and Britain“, in: *Mike’s World. Leaster B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. by Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras, pp. 210-28 (Vancouver/Toronto 2017).
- Sinclair, Keith, *A History of New Zealand* (London 1959).
- Skelton, O.D., *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 2. Vols.* (Toronto 1921).
- Slade, Arthur, *John Diefenbaker. An Appointment with Destiny* (Montreal 2001).
- Smith, Denis, *Rogue Tory. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto 1995).
- Spooner, Kevin, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* (Vancouver/Toronto 2009).
- Stacey, C. P., *Canada and the Age of Conflict. A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1948, Vol. II.* (Toronto 1981).
- Stacey, C. P., *Canada and the Age of Conflict. A History of Canadian External Policies, 1867-1948, Vol. I.* (Toronto 1977).
- Stearns, Carol Z. and Peter N. Stearns, *Emotion and Social Change. Toward a New Psychohistory* (New York 1988).
- Stearns, Carol Z. and Peter N. Stearns, „Emotionology. Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards“, in: *The American Historical Review* 90, No 4 (1985), pp. 813-36.
- Stockwell, Sarah, „Ends of Empire“, in: *The British Empire*, ed. by Sarah Stockwell, pp. 269-93 (Malden/Oxford/Carlton 2008).

- Strangio, Paul, „Instability, 1966-82“, in: *The Cambridge History of Australia Volume 2. The Commonwealth of Australia*, ed. by Alison Bashford and Stuart Macintyre, pp. 135-61 (Cambridge 2013).
- Tanner, Jakob, „Die ökonomische Handlungstheorie vor der ‚kulturalistischen Wende‘? Perspektiven und Probleme einer interdisziplinären Diskussion“, in: *Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Dimensionen eines Paradigmenwechsels*, ed. by Hartmut Berghoff and Jakob Vogel, pp. 69-98 (Frankfurt a.M. 2004).
- Templeton, Malcolm (Eds.), *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943-1993* (Wellington 1993).
- Thompson, Neville, *Canada and the End of the Imperial Dream. Beverley Baxter's Reports from London through War and Peace, 1936-1960* (Oxford 2013).
- Thompson, Sue, *British Military Withdrawal and the Rise of Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1964-73* (Basingstoke 2015).
- Tomlinson, Jim, *The Politics of Decline. Understanding Post-war Britain* (Harlow/London/New York u.a. 2001).
- „Towards an EU-Australia Trade Agreement“, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-australia-trade-agreement/>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 02.01.2019.
- „Towards an EU-New Zealand Trade Agreement“, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-new-zealand-trade-agreement/>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 02.01.2019.
- „Treasury“, <https://www.archway.archives.govt.nz/ViewEntity.do?code=AALR>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 29.11.2018.
- Tucker, Michael, *Canadian Foreign Policy. Contemporary Issues and Themes* (Toronto u.a. 1980).
- Underhill, Frank, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto 1960).
- van Krieken, Robert, „Between Assimilation and Multiculturalism. Models of Integration in Australia“, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 46 (2012), pp. 500-17.
- Vastel, Michel, *The Outsider. The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto 1990).
- Voigt, Johannes, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens. Eine Einführung* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2011).
- Voigt, Johannes, *Australien* (Munich 2000).
- Wahren, Heinz-Kurt, *Gier. Der menschliche Faktor der Finanzkrise* (Munich 2011).

- Ward, Stuart, „Whirlwind, Hurricane, Howling Tempest. The Wind of Change and the British World“, in: *The Wind of Change. Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization*, ed. by Larry J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell, pp. 48-69 (Basingstoke 2013).
- Ward, Stuart, „Run Before the Tempest. The „Wind of Change“ and the British World“, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 37, No 2 (2011), pp. 198-219.
- Ward, Stuart, „Sir Alexander Downer and the Embers of British Australia“, in: *The High Commissioners. Australia's Representative in the United Kingdom. 1910-2010*, ed. by Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno and David Lee, pp. 145-65 (Canberra 2010).
- Ward, Stuart, „The ‚New Nationalism‘ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World“, in: *Britishness Abroad. Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures*, ed. by Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw and Stuart Macintyre, pp. 231-63 (Melbourne 2007).
- Ward, Stuart, „Post-Imperial Australia. Introduction“, in: *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, No 1 (2005), pp. 1-5.
- Ward, Stuart, „Worlds Apart: Three „British“ Prime Ministers at Empire's End“, in: *Rediscovering the British World*, ed. by Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, pp. 399-424 (Calgary 2005).
- Ward, Stuart, „A Matter of Preference. The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship“, in: *Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The Commonwealth and Britain's Applications to join the European Communities*, ed. by Alex May, pp. 156-80 (Basingstoke 2001).
- Ward, Stuart, *Australia and the British Embrace* (Melbourne 2001).
- Ward, Stuart, „Sentiment and Self-Interest. The Imperial Ideal in Anglo-Australian Commercial Culture“, in: *Australian Historical Studies* 32, No 116 (2001), pp. 91-108.
- Ward, Stuart, „Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and EEC Membership. The Problem of the Old Dominions“, in: *Britain's Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-1963. The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, ed. by George Wilkes, pp. 93-107 (London/Portland 1997).
- Warren, Alan, *Britain's Greatest Defeat. Singapore 1942* (London 2007).
- Waters, Chris, *The Empire Fractures. Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s* (Melbourne 1995).

- Weber, Florian, „Von den klassischen Affektenlehren zur Neurowissenschaft und zurück. Wege der Emotionsforschung in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften“, in: *Neue Politische Literatur* 53 (2008), pp. 21-42.
- Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, „Transnationale Geschichte - der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?“, in: *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, ed. by Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver Janz, pp. 161-74 (Göttingen 2006).
- Welskopp, Thomas, „Comparative History“, <http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/comparative-history/thomas-welskopp-comparative-history>, zuletzt aufgerufen am: 16.05.2018.
- Wendt, Reinhard, *Vom Kolonialismus zur Globalisierung. Europa und die Welt seit 1500* (Paderborn/Munich/Vienna u.a. 2007).
- White, Hugh, „Old Friends in the New Asia. New Zealand, Australia and the Rise of China“, in: *New Zealand and the World. Past, Present and Future*, ed. by Robert Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics, pp. 187-98 (New Jersey/London u.a. 2018).
- Wigley, Philip G., *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth. British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926* (Cambridge 1977).