

Assyrians under the Walls of Jerusalem and the Confinement of Padi*

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Introduction

According to the Neo-Assyrian annals, Padi, king of Ekron, was imprisoned in Jerusalem, freed during Sennacherib's third campaign (701 BC), and then reinstated as king in Ekron. This sequence of events raises a question: how did Sennacherib get Padi out of Jerusalem, since in Sennacherib's royal inscriptions there is no claim of a capture of Jerusalem? In order to answer this question, I will first study pertinent Neo-Assyrian inscriptions and letters mentioning Padi in the first part of this paper. The most relevant passage reads:

As for him (Hezekiah), I confined him inside the city Jerusalem, his royal city, like a bird in a cage. I set up blockades against him and made him dread exiting his city gate. I detached from his land the cities of his that I had plundered and I gave (them) to Mitinti, the king of the city Ashdod, Padi, the king of the city Ekron, and Silli-Bel, the king of the city Gaza, and (thereby)

* Abbreviations used in this article follow those of *The Assyrian Dictionary of the University of Chicago* (CAD) (Chicago, 1956–2010), except *BIWA* = CAD's Borger Asb. Other abbreviations include: *SAAS* II = Alan Millard, *The Eponyms of the Assyrian Empire, 910–612 BC* (Helsinki, 1994); *PNAE* = *The Prosopography of the Neo-Assyrian Empire*, ed. K. Radner and H. D. Baker (Helsinki, 1998–2011); and *RINAP* = *Royal Inscriptions of the Neo-Assyrian Period*, ed. G. Frame (2011–).

made his land smaller. To the former tribute, their annual giving, I added the payment (of) gifts (in recognition) of my overlordship and imposed (it) upon them. As for him, Hezekiah, fear of my lordly brilliance overwhelmed him and, after my (departure), he had the auxiliary forces and his elite troops whom he had brought inside to strengthen the city Jerusalem, his royal city, and who had provided support, along with 30 talents of gold, 800 talents of silver, choice antimony, large blocks of . . . , ivory beds, arm-chairs of ivory, elephant hide(s), elephant ivory, ebony, boxwood, every kind of valuable treasure, as well as his daughters, his palace women, male singers, (and) female singers brought into Nineveh, my capital city, and he sent a mounted messenger of his to me to deliver (this) payment and to do obeisance.¹

Then in the second part of this article, I will present some Neo-Assyrian letters describing diplomatic missions mentioning the techniques the Assyrians used to get hold of a wanted person. Finally, comparing the results of both parts, I will argue that the liberation of Padi from Jerusalem was achieved by means of a diplomatic mission that took place during Sennacherib's third campaign.

¹ Translation adapted from *RINAP* 3/1 22 iii 27–49.

LÚ.GIR.NITA.MEŠ LÚ.NUN.MEŠ Û UN.MEŠ URU.*am-gar-ru-na*
ša ^m*pa-di-i*
 LUGAL.*-šú-nu* EN *a-de-e ù ma-mit ša* KUR *aš-šur.KI*
bi-re-tu AN.BAR *id-du-ma*
a-na ^m*ba-za-qi-a-ú* KUR.*ia-ú-da-a-a id-di-nu-šú nak-riš*
a-na an-zil-li i-pu-šú ip-lāh lib-ba-šú-un

Subordinate clause

(As for) the governors, the nobles, and the people of the city Ekron
 who had thrown Padi, their king,
 who was bound by treaty and oath to Assyria,
 into iron fetters and who had handed him over to Hezekiah of the land of Judah in a hostile manner,
 they became frightened on account of the villainous acts they had committed.

(RINAP 3/1 22 ii 73–78)

Figure 1—The first reference to Padi in the Taylor Prism.

The Padi incident in Assyrian texts

In the Taylor Prism

The famous Taylor Prism dated to 691 BC mentions Padi three times (RINAP 3/1 22 ii 74; iii 14; iii 33). The first note on Padi has the form of a subordinate clause (ii 74–77, see Figure 1).² The apposition EN *a-de-e ù ma-mit ša* KUR *aš-šur.KI* implies that some time before Sennacherib’s campaign of 701 BC, Padi was an Assyrian vassal bound to Assyria by “treaty and oath.”³ According to this retrospective note, the rebellion of the Ekronites put an end to Padi’s pro-Assyrian reign.⁴

² A subordinate clause developing a heading is a normal feature of the Taylor Prism. In RINAP 3/1 22, the description of single phases of the third campaign usually starts with a heading that anticipates the grammatical object of the phrase “(as for) PN”, thus “(as for) Luli” (ii 38), “(as for) Sidqa” (ii 60), and “(as for) Hezekiah” (iii 18). In some cases, the heading is developed by means of a subordinate clause defining transgressions, such as “(as for) Sidqa, the king of the city Ashkelon, who had not bowed down to my yoke” (ii 60–61).

³ Treaties and oaths were normal practices in the Neo-Assyrian period; see for example SAA II, xx–xxv, and Jacob Lauinger, “Esarhaddon’s Succession Treaty at Tell Taynat: Text and Commentary,” *JCS* 64 (2012). However, it is worth noticing that in Sennacherib’s royal inscriptions, only Padi is explicitly mentioned as being bound by treaty and oath. This note has been preserved in all extant documents mentioning the Padi incident.

⁴ For the possible dates of the rebellion, see Bob Becking, “Chronology: A Skeleton without Flesh? Sennacherib’s Campaign

Padi was handed over to Hezekiah⁵ and kept in Jerusalem (cf. iii 14–15). After the putsch, Ekron became part of the anti-Assyrian bloc.

The formulation of this subordinate clause (ii 74–77a) suggests that the Assyrian scribes intentionally underlined the contrast between the loyal Padi and the evil Ekronites. The Ekronites handed Padi over to Hezekiah in “iron fetters”⁶ and “in a hostile man-

as a Case-Study,” in “*Like a Bird in a Cage*”: *The Invasion of Sennacherib in 701 BCE*, ed. Lester L. Grabbe (London, 2003), 70.

⁵ Even though Hezekiah’s role in the arrest of Padi seems to be passive, Siegfried Mittmann (“Hiskia und die Philister,” *JNWSL* 16 [1990]), reading the biblical account of Sennacherib’s annals together with the Azekah inscription, argued that the arrest of Padi was closely connected with Hezekiah’s expansion. This can be compared to the political situation of Rezin Peqah Ahaz a few years earlier. It is possible that Hezekiah used both military and diplomatic pressure to topple the pro-Assyrian ruler of Ekron; Francolino J. Gonçalves, *L’expédition de Sennachérib en Palestine dans la littérature hébraïque ancienne* (Paris, 1986), 105–106.

⁶ Apart from this episode, Sennacherib’s scribes used this expression only in the case of Nergal-ushezib (known as Shuzubu), King of Babylon (*PNAE* 3/II, 1297–1298), who was brought to Nineveh in iron fetters during the 6th campaign. While RINAP 3 /1 22 iv 46–53 and parallel inscriptions ascribe this action to Sennacherib (1st p. sing.), RINAP 3/1 34:33–36 ascribes it to the Assyrian troops that threw Nergal-ushezib into iron fetters and brought him to Nineveh (3rd p. pl.). Sennacherib had him bound with a bear at the Citadel Gate of Nineveh. Even though to put someone in iron fetters was not an exception in the Neo-Assyrian era, it represented a strong statement on the character of an enemy who was to be

ner,” thus committing “villainous acts.”⁷ Comparing Padi with other persons of the third campaign, we can conclude that the Assyrian scribes depicted Padi as the only faithful man in the entire region, who preferred to suffer rather than to violate his treaty. Contrariwise, literary links with the sixth and eighth campaigns show that the Ekronites were depicted as obstinate enemies similar to Sennacherib’s archenemies Nergal-ushezib and Marduk-apla-iddina (see below, and nn. 6 and 7). Moreover, in contrast to the other headings of the third campaign that reported only the name of a single king—Luli of Sidon, Sidqa of Ashkelon, or Hezekiah of Judah—the heading in line ii 73 gives a list of guilty social groups—“the (military) governors, the nobles, and the people” of Ekron—aimed at demonstrating that the anti-Assyrian feelings pervaded all social classes in Ekron.

After this subordinate clause, the narrative on Ekron continues with the description of Sennacherib’s intervention (ii 82–iii 14). Seeing the advancing Assyrian troops, the Ekronite rebels became frightened and sought help in Egypt. In Sennacherib’s annals, the eastern rebels looked for help in Elam (8th campaign), whereas the western rebels relied on Egypt (3rd campaign). Sennacherib’s scribes clearly stressed this parallelism from the literary point of view, using in both episodes the verb *katāru* (“to band together, to form a confederation”⁸) that occurs in the Taylor Prism only in these two campaigns (ii 81; v 52). Thus according to Sennacherib’s scribes, in both cases Sennacherib had to face a confederation backed up by a foreign power—Egypt and Elam. Both coalitions were defeated. The defeat of the Egyptian auxiliary troops,⁹

described in the following lines, represents the only battle description of the third campaign.¹⁰ After the defeat of the Egyptian troops the narrative returns to the Ekronites, whose (military) governors and nobles were captured, punished, and those not guilty were generously forgiven. Thus, all tiers of the city were cleansed of anti-Assyrian elements (iii 14–17).

In sum, according to the Assyrian scribes, the entire city of Ekron was infested with anti-Assyrian sentiment. This political orientation went hand-in-hand with the Ekronites’ diplomatic relations with the kings of Egypt and the king of Judah.¹¹ Naturally the Ekronites and most powers of the West welcomed the ousting of Padi, the only “faithful” king, who was marring anti-Assyrian schemes in the region by keeping his loyalty to Sennacherib. Seen in this light, Sennacherib’s campaign against the Levant had strong rhetorical overtones: it was aimed at punishing the rebels, the Ekronites and Hezekiah included, as well as demonstrating that the Assyrians would defend their loyal vassals, such as Padi, at any price.¹²

The second note on Padi (iii 14b–17) states that, during his third campaign, Sennacherib freed Padi from his confinement in Jerusalem. The description is very concise and employs the Š-form of the verb (*w*)*ašú*: *ú-se-ša-am-ma* “I made him come out.” These lines describe how Sennacherib got the region under control: the rebellion in Ekron was quelled, Padi was reinstalled on the throne there, and regular payments to the Assyrian court were imposed upon him.

Before discussing the third note on Padi (iii 33), it is necessary to address some questions that pertain to the relation between the chronology and literary style of the Taylor Prism. The events of Sennacherib’s third campaign are organized according to geographical criteria into three phases moving from the north (the Phoenician phase) through the south (the Philistine phase) and ending in the south-east (the Judean

humiliated for his obstinacy; Paul. E. Botta and Eugène Flandin, *Monument de Ninive I* (Paris, 1849), pl. 81.

⁷ The term *anzillu*, “abomination, villainy” (*CAD* A/II) has above all a religious meaning describing a person transgressing a treaty. In Sennacherib’s inscriptions the evil Ekronites had only one comparable evildoer, Marduk-apla-iddina, who rebelled and sought friendship with the Elamite king (RINAP 3/1 1:6; 213:6).

⁸ *CAD* K s.v. *katāru* v.; M. Liverani, “*kirru, katāru*,” *Mesopotamia* 17 (1982).

⁹ W. Mayer has suggested that Egyptian military help would have taken some time and could hardly have been organized in the space of one campaign. Therefore it is likely that the Egyptian army arrived somewhere between 704 and 701 BC; cf. Walter Mayer, “Sennacherib’s Campaign of 701 BCE: The Assyrian View,” in “*Like a Bird in a Cage*,” ed. Grabbe, 178. However, such a conclusion is far from being sure. It is not necessary to assume that the Egyptians mobilized an entire army, rather than a small military contingent that might have been mobilized in a short period of time.

¹⁰ Similarly, a larger space was dedicated to the defeat of the confederation backed up by Elam in the 8th campaign (v 52–vi 35).

¹¹ For the history of Ekron, see Seymour Gitin, “The Neo-Assyrian Empire and Its Western Periphery: The Levant with a Focus on Philistine Ekron,” in *Assyria 1995: Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Symposium of the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project Helsinki, September 7–11, 1995*, ed. Simo Parpola and Robert M. Whiting (Helsinki, 1997), and “Neo-Assyrian and Egyptian Hegemony over Ekron in the Seventh Century BCE: A Response to Lawrence E. Stager,” *EI* 27 (2003): 55*–61*.

¹² Becking, “Chronology,” 70.

Phoenician phase (ii 38–60a):

1. Subjugation of Sidon (ii 38–46)
 - a. Heading (ii 38–39a)
 - b. Desertion of the king of Sidon (ii 39b–40)
 - c. Voluntary submission of eight city-states (ii 41–46).
2. Installation of a new king in Sidon (ii 47)
3. Payment (ii 48–49)
4. Final summary: voluntary submission of eight kings (ii 50–60a)

Philistine phase (ii 60b–iii 17):

I. Operation Ashkelon (ii 60b–72)

1. Subjugation of Ashkelon (ii 60b–64)
 - a. Heading (ii 60–62a)
 - b. Deportation to Assyria (ii 62b–64)
2. Installation of a new king in Ashkelon (ii 65–66)
3. Payment (ii 67–68a)
4. Final summary: conquest of four Philistine city-states (ii 68b–72)

II. Operation Ekron (ii 73–iii 17)

1. Subjugation of Ekron (ii 73–14a)
 - a. Heading (ii 73–78a)
 - b. Egyptian aid and defeat (ii 78b–iii 6a)
 - c. Conquest of Eltekeh and Tamna (iii 6b–7)
 - d. Exemplary punishment and forgiveness of the Ekronites (iii 8–14a)
2. Reinstallation of the former king in Ekron (iii 14b–16)
3. Payment (iii 17)

Judean phase (iii 18–49)

I. Operation Judah and Jerusalem (iii 18–37a):

1. Subjugation of Judah (iii 18–27a)
 - a. Heading (iii 18–19a)
 - b. Devastation of Judah and deportation to Assyria (iii 19b–27a)
2. Lesson imparted to the king of Jerusalem (iii 27b–34)
3. Payment (iii 35–37a)

II. Operation Jerusalem II (iii 37b–49)

1. Subjugation of Jerusalem (iii 37b–41a)
 - a. Heading (iii 37b–38)
 - b. Desertion of auxiliary forces from Jerusalem (iii 39–41a)
 - c. Additional payment (iii 41b–49)

Figure 2—Comparison of the Phoenician, Philistine, and Judean phases of Sennacherib's third campaign as represented in the Taylor Prism.

phase)—see Figure 2 for a comparison.¹³ The scribes in describing these phases adopted a three-step pattern:¹⁴

¹³ William R. Gallagher, *Sennacherib's Campaign to Judah: New Studies*, Studies in the History and Culture of the Ancient Near East 18 (Leiden, 1999), 91–142.

¹⁴ This pattern is less evident in the case of the other seven campaigns mentioned in the rest of the Taylor Prism.

the development of an anti-Assyrian stance and the Assyrian intervention; re-ordering the kingdom (installation of a new king or reinstallation of the former one); and (re-)establishment of the regular payment of tributes. Generally speaking, this tripartite structure points to two main interests of the Assyrian overlords: on the one hand to keep submissive kings on the throne

and punish rebels, and on the other hand to guarantee the regular flow of goods and money to Nineveh.¹⁵

The first two notes on Padi are inserted in the midst of the Philistine phase that maintains the basic three-step literary structure. However, the description of “Operation Ekron” (see Figure 2) was enriched by means of retrospections and digressions forming a full-fledged military narrative.¹⁶ As a result, whereas in the descriptions of the actions against Sidon and Ashkelon the scribes summarized Assyrian military interventions, which they placed in a few lines at the end of the sections (see for example ii 37–46), Operation Ekron appears as the most elaborate narrative in Sennacherib’s third campaign.¹⁷ These two literary peculiarities suggest that the narrative was not shaped according to the exact chronology of the events, even though the general outline of the three main phases is most likely in chronological order.¹⁸ Rather, the sequence of the events as described in this text was subordinated to the literary style of the royal annals. In particular, the section describing the reorganization of the conquered region hardly represents the exact sequence of events. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether the payments of tribute to Sennacherib by the kings listed in lines ii 50–60a indeed took place at the end of the Phoenician phase—or during the later phases—or even at the end of the campaign. Consequently, the fact that the lib-

eration of Padi from Jerusalem and his reinstatement in Ekron are placed at the end of the Philistine phase does not mean that these two events in fact took place at the end of that phase.

The third note on Padi¹⁹ presupposes that Padi was already installed on the throne in Ekron. This note is a prolepsis, since it describes the reorganization of the region after the third campaign (see below, pp. 123–24). According to these lines, Sennacherib rewarded Padi’s loyalty by enlarging his kingdom with the territories that Sennacherib had removed from Hezekiah’s administrative area.²⁰ Similarly, Sennacherib added territories to the kingdoms of Mitinti of Ashdod and Silli-Bel of Gaza. These three cities were to become the pro-Assyrian hubs in Philistia.

Padi in Neo-Assyrian letters and in an inscription from Ekron

Besides appearing in the Taylor Prism,²¹ Padi is mentioned in two Neo-Assyrian tablets²² and in an inscription unearthed in Ekron. According to SAA XI 50:1, Padi²³ paid one talent of silver to Assyria. The eponym date appended to the letter (*lim-me* ^mEN-MAN-*a-ni*, “eponym year of Bel-sharrani”) clearly assigns this tablet to the year 699 BC.²⁴ Hence, this tablet proves that Padi complied with his duties as a loyal vassal after the third campaign, since he paid tribute.

The inscription dug up in Ekron mentions Ikausu, Padi’s son, who succeeded his father on the throne of Ekron.²⁵ From this inscription, we can deduce that

¹⁵ The adoption of this pattern is evident in the Phoenician phase in the Taylor Prism (ii 37–60a), but less evident in the abbreviated version of the annals. Thus, Bull Inscription 4 (RINAP 3/2 46:18–20a) eliminates two long lists of submissive kingdoms and thus creates a smoother transition between the Assyrian intervention, the installation of a new king Tuba’alu in Sidon, and the payment section. A general comment on the payment of the entire region was introduced after a note on taxes imposed upon Sidon. In this way, the scribe joined the final summary (ii 50–60a) to the payment section (ii 48–49) and created a smooth-flowing narrative (RINAP 3/2 46:19b–20a).

¹⁶ See, for example, the description of the 8th campaign (v 17–vi 35) and Frederick M. Fales, *Guerre et paix en Assyrie: Religion et impérialisme* (Paris, 2010), 199–202.

¹⁷ The revision of archaeological data from the 8th and 7th c. BC also suggests that the Assyrians concentrated their military operations mainly in the Shephelah and on Judah; Avraham Faust, “Settlement and Demography in Seventh-Century Judah and the Extent and Intensity of Sennacherib’s Campaign,” *PEQ* 140 (2008): 182–88.

¹⁸ It has been suggested that the Assyrian annals were only “an abridgement compiled at a later stage, rather than the original description recorded immediately after the events”: Nadav Na’aman, “Sanherib’s Campaign to Judah and the Date of the LMLK Stamps,” *VT* 29 (1979): 64.

¹⁹ “I detached from his land the cities of his that I had plundered and I gave (them) to Mitinti, the king of the city Ashdod, Padi, the king of the city Ekron, and Silli-Bel, the king of the city Gaza, and (thereby) made his land smaller.” (translation adapted from RINAP 3/1 22 iii 30b–34).

²⁰ For a map of the Ekron kingdom, see Nadav Na’aman, “Two Notes on the History of Ashkelon and Ekron in the Late Eighth-Seventh Centuries B.C.E.,” *TA* 25 (1998): 224.

²¹ The Bible does not mention the arrest of Padi. However, W. Mayer (“Sennacherib’s Campaign”: 176) has suggested that the arrest of Padi is possibly referred to in 2 Kgs. 18:8, “He (Hezekiah) attacked the Philistines as far as Gaza and its territory, from watchtower to fortified city.”

²² Letter SAA XI 34:14 mentions a tributary payment from Ekron. However, the text is too damaged to be used for the reconstruction of the political history of Ekron.

²³ Padi is written ^m*pi-di-i*.

²⁴ SAAS II, 49.

²⁵ *PNAE* 3/1, 978; for the discussion of his name see Joseph Naveh, “Achish-Ikausu in the Light of the Ekron Dedication,”

Padi's dynasty continued after his death and his son Ikausu succeeded him.

Synthesis: Padi's reign according to Assyrian sources

Taking this analysis into consideration, we can partially reconstruct the history of Padi's reign. Padi was a pro-Assyrian vassal,²⁶ and his kingdom represented the only remaining pro-Assyrian enclave in the western Levant shortly before Sennacherib's third campaign. However, the rebellion of the Ekronites put an end to Padi's pro-Assyrian activities. Ekron fell into the hands of the rebels, and Padi was handed over to Hezekiah and kept in confinement in Jerusalem. On seeing the advancing Assyrian troops, the Ekronites asked Egypt for help. The defeat of the Egyptian troops marked the end of the Ekron rebellion. Sennacherib freed Padi from Jerusalem, reinstated him on the throne in Ekron, and enlarged his territory.²⁷ After the third campaign, Padi paid tribute to Assyria, and there is no evidence that he would ever change his allegiances. The removal of Padi by the anti-Assyrian governors on the one hand, and his reinstatement by Sennacherib on the other hand, was designed so as to present a clear political message: the vassals loyal to Assyria, such as Padi, should not be afraid; they would be saved from the clutches of rebels, despite being imprisoned in fortified enemy headquarters such as Jerusalem.²⁸

How important was the Padi incident in Assyrian historiography?

As stated above, the Taylor prism (RINAP 3/1 22) presents several literary links connecting the defeats of two of Sennacherib's archenemies (Marduk-apla-iddina and Nergal-ushezib) with the Ekron episode.

BASOR 310 (1998): 35–37; see also Raúl Duarte Castillo, "La inscripción Filistea en favor de Padi," *QOL* 25 (2001): 85–88.

²⁶ The long list of the predecessors of Padi's son Ikausu may suggest that Sargon II removed a reigning dynasty in Ekron and put Padi on the throne in Ekron; Nadav Na'aman, "Ekron under the Assyrian and Egyptian Empires," *BASOR* 332 (2003): 82–83.

²⁷ For a map of the Ekron kingdom, see Na'aman, "Two Notes": 224.

²⁸ Manfred Weippert, *Historisches Textbuch zum Alten Testament*, Grundrisse zum Alten Testament 10 (Göttingen, 2010), 327. Becking ("Chronology," 67), analyzing the Neo-Assyrian inscriptions, connects the Philistine and Judean phases, and concludes that "the picture arising from the report in the Annals is that Sennacherib attacked Hezekiah with the purpose of releasing his former vassal Padi of Ekron."

These links and the form of the description seem to suggest that the Ekron episode, including the liberation of Padi from Jerusalem and his reinstatement on the throne, was one of the most important events of Sennacherib's third campaign.

But is this really true? The importance of the Padi incident can be assessed through a comparison of the extant royal inscriptions of Sennacherib, describing at length his third campaign, and the epigraphs summarizing this campaign in a few lines. In order to evaluate the importance of the Padi incident, I will divide the extant documents into four groups according to their details and length: the long and abbreviated versions, the summary inscriptions, and a few post-Assyrian sources.

Long versions

The most detailed report on Sennacherib's third campaign is given on the Rassam Cylinder dated to 700 BC (RINAP 3/1 4:32–58). This inscription, the oldest textual witness to the third campaign, not only describes the basic events of Sennacherib's third campaign, but also sets out the literary structure of the subject, which was duly preserved in all extant later inscriptions (see Figure 2).

The Padi incident is also described in detail in two fragmentary inscriptions dated to 700–699 BC (RINAP 3/2 140–142 and 165),²⁹ and in three inscriptions dated between 697–94 BC (RINAP 3/1 15–17).³⁰ these inscriptions introduced a few changes (mostly orthographic variants), but none of them regards the Padi incident.³¹ To this group also belong

²⁹ It is impossible to date this inscription, because the military narrative is not preserved beyond the third campaign; RINAP 3/2, 235.

³⁰ To this group we can probably add the poorly-preserved inscriptions RINAP 3/1 6, 18, 19, 21.

³¹ The first difference specifies by means of the metaphoric expression *a-na ru-ug-qi* MURUB₄ *tam-tim in-na-bit-ma* KUR-šu/sú *e-mid* that the king of Sidon Luli died, soon after having escaped (RINAP 3/1 16 iii 2; cf. also 15 iii 5; 17 ii 61). The second change adds the further comment: "and Hezekiah of the land of Judah, who had not submitted to my yoke" (*ù m^ha-za-qi-a-ú* KUR.ia-ú *da-a-a ša la ik-nu-sú a-na ni-ri-ia*; RINAP 3/1 16 iii 74–75; cf. also 15 iv 6–7; 17 iii 38–39; 18 iii 15–16). A more substantial change is found in the abbreviation of the list of gifts that Hezekiah sent to Nineveh (cf. RINAP 3/1 4:55–58 and 16 iv 31–33). And a final change introduced into this group of inscriptions concerns the formation of a military contingent from the prisoners deported from conquered lands. The scribe of the Rassam Cylinder mentioned a contingent of 10,000 archers and 10,000 shield-bearers at the

the Taylor Prism or the Chicago Prism (691 and 689 BC)³² and the Jerusalem Prism (RINAP 3/1 23) dated to 691 BC. Despite some minor modifications,³³ the Padi episode was kept substantially unchanged.

Abbreviated version

A next step in the historiography of Sennacherib's third campaign is represented by RINAP 3/2 46.³⁴ It was composed after the Rassam Cylinder, but before the Taylor prism. The scribe who composed Bull Inscription 4 maintained the basic plot but introduced some changes. We can observe three types of changes. First, in order to abbreviate the inscriptions of the first group, the scribe composing Bull Inscription 4 omitted some words and even entire passages.³⁵ Second, he freely reworded other passages entirely, while keeping their basic meaning.³⁶ Third, Bull Inscription 4 contains new details absent from the inscriptions of the first group.³⁷ These three types of changes also

end of Sennacherib's most recent (i.e., third) campaign (RINAP 3/1 4:59–60). Similarly RINAP 3/1 15, 16, 17, and 19 placed the formation of the contingent after the last campaign. The wording is the same, however, since both the number of campaigns and the number of the soldiers described in the inscriptions is higher. Thus RINAP 3/1 15 v 10–15 and 16 v 33–40 mention 20,000 archers and 15,000 shield-bearers, RINAP 3/1 19 v 15–21 mentions 20,400 archers and 20,200 shield-bearers, and RINAP 3/1 17 v 15–21 mentions 30,000 archers and 20,000 shield-bearers.

³² RINAP 3/1 22; exemplar BM 91032 is dated to 691 BC, while exemplar A 2793 is dated to 689 BC.

³³ These inscriptions contained the changes introduced in RINAP 3/1 15–17 with the exception that they do not mention the formation of a military contingent at all.

³⁴ Bull Inscription 4 or Smith Bull 4, written on a bull colossus standing in Court H, Door *a*, of the South-West Palace in Nineveh; For previous editions and studies, see OIP 2, 66–76; Eckart Frahm, *Einleitung in die Sanherib-Inschriften*, AfO Beiheft 26 (Wien, 1997), T 29; Mayer, "Sennacherib's Campaign": 194–97.

³⁵ Bull Inscription 4 drops parts of lines in RINAP 3/1 22 ii 81–iii 2.9–10.21–23. Along the same line, it is possible to observe the abbreviation of Hezekiah's payment. The Rassam Cylinder has the full list of objects (RINAP 3/1 456–58), while the rest of the inscriptions containing the longer version of the third campaign summarized the last part of the list as "every kind of valuable treasure" (*mim-ma šum-šú ni-šir-tu ka-bit-tu* RINAP 3/1 22 iii 45; cf. also RINAP 3/1 15, 16, 17, 23), and Bull Inscription 4 drops the list completely (RINAP 3/2 46:32).

³⁶ Cf. RINAP 3/1 22 ii 58–59.67–68.73; iii 5.8 and RINAP 3/2 46:19–20.21.22.25.25, correspondingly.

³⁷ A new detail is that the tribute of the land of Amurru was brought to Sennacherib while he stayed in Ushu (RINAP 3/2 46:20). Moreover, Bull Inscription 4 adds *i-na* GIS.TUKUL.MEŠ in line 26, and completes the list of cities by adding URU.is-qà-al-lu-na in

affected the description of the Padi incident. Thus, the scribe who composed Bull Inscription 4 omitted mention of the conquest of Eltekeh and Timna, as well as the reward of Padi for his loyalty. Moreover, he dropped several words underlining the hostility of Ekronite society in its entirety, the loyalty of Padi, the bravery and the piety of the Assyrian troops, and the exemplary nature of the punishment of the rebels. In Table 1, the differences between the inscriptions are presented in bold (i.e., the text is present in the first group, but not in the second) and underlined (text which is present in the second group, but either not in the first, or had been changed).

Summary inscriptions

To this group belong the Bull inscriptions,³⁸ the Thompson prism (RINAP 3/1 26), and the Nebi Yunus Inscription (RINAP 3/1 34).³⁹ These inscriptions compressed Sennacherib's third campaign into merely two events: the conquests of Sidon and Judah. The description of Sennacherib's devastation of Judah is summarized in one sentence: "I ruined the wide district of the land Judah (and) imposed my yoke on Hezekiah, its king" (RINAP 3/12 34:14–15).

Post-Assyrian sources

As for sources of a different nature from (and later than) the Neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions of Sennacherib, it is important to note that the third campaign is not included in the Late Babylonian Chronicle

line 29. Moreover, in this inscription it is possible to observe further clarification of the details regarding the whereabouts of Luli that were probably less clear when the Rassam cylinder was composed. The Rassam Cylinder simply mentions that Luli, king of Sidon, "fled afar into the midst of the sea" (*is-hu-pu-šú-ma a-na ru-ug-gi*, RINAP 3/1 4:32), while all other inscriptions had: "he fled afar into the midst of the sea and disappeared" (*a-na ru-ug-gi qa-bal tam-tim in-na-bit-ma šad-da-šú e-mid* RINAP 3/1 22 ii 39–40), while Bull Inscription 4 substituted the expression "he fled afar" with "he fled from Tyre to Cyprus <which is> in the midst of the sea and disappeared" (*ul-tu qe-reb URU.šur-ri a-na KUR.ia-ad-na-na <ša> qa-bal tam-tim in-na-bit-ma KUR.šú e-mid*: RINAP 3/2 46:18–19).

³⁸ RINAP 3/2 42:7b-11a; 44:17–22a; 45:1'a-6'. For the previous publications and studies see OIP 2, 76–78 and 117–25; Rykle Borger, *Babylonisch-Assyrische Lesestücke: Heft I*, 3. revidierte Auflage, *Analecta Orientalia* 54 (Roma, 2006), 66, 76; Frahm, *Einleitung*, T 25–27; Mayer, "Sennacherib's Campaign": 193–94.

³⁹ Probably also RINAP 3/2 143 i 1'.

Table 1 — Comparison of descriptions of the Padi episode

| 1st group (Taylor Prism; RINAP 3/1 22) | | 2nd group (Bull Inscription 4; RINAP 3/2 46) |
|--|---|---|
| <p>Heading</p> <p>LÚ.GIR.NÍTA.MEŠ LÚ.NUN.MEŠ ù UN.MEŠ URU.am-gar-ru-na ša ^mpa-di-i LUGAL-šú-nu EN a-de-e ù ma-mit ša KUR aš-šur.KI bi-re-tu AN.BAR id-du-ma ana ^mba-za-qi-a-ú KUR.ia-ú-da-a-a id-di-nu-šú nak-riš a-na an-zil-li i-pu-šú ip-lāh lib-ba-sú-un (ii 73–78a)</p> | <p>(As for) the governors, the nobles, and the people of the city Ekron who had thrown Padi, their king who was bound by treaty and oath to Assyria, into iron fetters and who had handed him over to Hezekiah of the land Judah in a hostile manner, they became frightened on account of the villainous acts they had committed.</p> | <p>'GIR.NÍTA.MEŠ ù' UN.MEŠ 'URU.am-gar-ru'-na ša ^mpa-di-i 'LUGAL-šú-nu 'EN a-de-e ša KUR' aš-šur.KI bi-re-tu AN.BAR id-du-ma a-'na' ^mba-za-qi-a-ú KUR.ia-ú-da-a-a id-di-nu-šú a'-na an-zil-[li] e-pu-šú 'ip-lāh <šA>-sú-nu' (22–23a)</p> <p>(As for) the governors and the people of the city Ekron who had thrown Padi, their king who was bound by treaty to Assyria, into iron fetters and who had handed him over to Hezekiah of the land Judah, they became frightened on account of the villainous acts they had committed.</p> |
| <p>Egyptian aid and defeat of Egyptian troops</p> <p>LUGAL.MEŠ KUR.mu-šu-ri LÚ.ERIM.MEŠ GIŠ.PAN GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ ša LUGAL KUR.me-luḫ-ḫi e-mu-qi la ni-bi ik-te-ru-nim-ma il-li-ku re-šu-su-un i-na ta-mir-ti URU.al-ta-qu-ú el-la-mu-ú-a si-id-ru šit-ku-nu ú-šá-'a-lu GIŠ.TUKUL.MEŠ-šú-un i-na tukul-ti ^aaš-šur EN-ia it-ti-sú-un am-da-ḫi-iš-ma áš-ta-kan BAD₅.BAD₅-šú-un LÚ.EN GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ ù DUMU.MEŠ LUGAL KUR.mu-šu-ra-a-a a-di LÚ.EN GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ ša LUGAL KUR.me-luḫ-ḫi bal-tu-su-un i-na MURUB₄ tam-ḫa-ri ik-šú-da šU.II-a-a (ii 78b–iii 6a)</p> | <p>They formed a confederation with the kings of Egypt (and) the archers, chariots, (and) horses of the king of the land Meluḫḫa, forces without number, and they came to their aid. In the plain of the city Eltekeh, they sharpened their weapons while drawing up in battleline before me. With the support of the god Aššur, my lord, I fought with them and defeated them. In the thick of battle, I captured alive the Egyptian charioteers and princes (lit. “the sons of the king”), together with the charioteers of the king of the land Meluḫḫa.</p> | <p>LUGAL.MEŠ KUR.mu-šu-ri ERIM.MEŠ GIŠ.PAN 'GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ ANŠE.KUR.RA.MEŠ' ša LUGAL KUR.me-luḫ-ḫi e-mu-qi la ni-bi ik-te-ru-ni i-na 'ta'-mir-ti URU.al-ta-qu-ú it-ti-sú-un am-da-ḫi-iš-ma áš-ta-kan BAD₅.BAD₅-šú-un LÚ.[EN] GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ 'ù DUMU.MEŠ LUGAL KUR.mu-šu'-ra-a-a a-di 'LÚ.EN' GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ ša LUGAL KUR.me-luḫ-ḫi 'bal-tu-su-un i-na qa-ti aš-bat' (23b–25a)</p> <p>They formed a confederation with the kings of Egypt (and) the archers, chariots, (and) horses of the king of the land Meluḫḫa, forces without number. In the plain of the city Eltekeh, I fought with them and defeated them. I seized alive the Egyptian [cha]rioteers and princes (lit. “the sons of the king”), together with the charioteers of the king of the land Meluḫḫa.</p> |
| <p>Conquest of Eltekeh and Tamna</p> | | |
| <p>URU.al-ta-qu-ú URU.ta-am-na-a al-me KUR.ud áš-lu-la šal-la-sún (iii 6b–7a)</p> | <p>I surrounded, conquered, (and) plundered the cities Eltekeh (and) Tamná.</p> | |
| <p>Exemplary punishment and forgiveness of the Ekronites</p> | | |
| <p>a-na URU.am-gar-ru-na aq-rib-ma LÚ.GIR.NÍTA.MEŠ LÚ.NUN.MEŠ ša ḫi-iṭ-tu ú-šab-šú-ú a-duk-ma ina di-ma-a-ti si-ḫir-ti URU a-lul pag-ri-šú-un DUMU.MEŠ URU e-piš an-ni ù gíl-la-ti a-na šal-la-ti am-nu si-it-tu-te-sú-nu la ba-bil ḫi-iṭ-ti ù gul-lul-ti ša a-ra-an-šú-nu la ib-šú-ú uš-šur-šú-un aq-bi (iii 7b–14a)</p> | <p>I approached the city Ekron and I killed the governors (and) nobles who had committed crime(s) and hung their corpses on towers around the city; I counted the citizens who had committed the crimes and wrongdoing as booty; (and) I commanded that the rest of them, (those) who were not guilty of sins or wrongdoing, (to) whom no penalty was due, be allowed to go free.</p> | <p>'a-na URU.am-gar-ru-na' [aq-rib-ma] 'LÚ.GIR.NÍTA.MEŠ ša ḫi-iṭ-tu ú-šab-šú-ú i-na GIŠ.TUKUL.MEŠ a-duk DUMU.MEŠ URU e-piš an-ni a-na šal-la-ti am-nu si-it-tu-te-sú-nu ša gu-lul-ta-'šú-un la ib-šú-ú' [uš-šur-šú-un aq-bi] (25b–26a)</p> <p>[I approached] the city Ekron [and] I killed with the weapons the governors who had committed crime(s); I counted the citizens who had committed the crimes as booty; (and) [I commanded that] the rest of them, (those) who were not guilty of wrongdoing, [be allowed to go free].</p> |
| <p>Reinstating of the former king in Ekron</p> | | |
| <p>^mpa-di-i LUGAL-šú-nu ul-tu qe-reb URU.ur-sa-li-im-mu ú-še-ša-am-ma i-na GIŠ.GU.ZA be-lu-ti UGU-šú-un ú-še-šib-ma man-da-at-tu be-lu-ti-ia ú-kin še-ru-uš-šú (iii 14b–17). . .</p> | <p>I brought out Padi, their king, from the city Jerusalem and placed (him) on the lordly throne over them, then I imposed upon him payment (in recognition) of my overlordship.</p> | <p>^mpa-di-i LUGAL-šú-nu' ul-tu qe-reb URU.ur-sa-li-im-ma ú-še-ša-am-ma i-na GIŠ.GU.ZA 'UGU'-šú-un ú-še-šib-ma man-da-at-tú 'be-lu'-ti-ia ú-kin še-ru-uš-šú' (26b–27a)</p> <p>I brought out Padi, their king, from the city Jerusalem and placed (him) on the throne over them, and (then) I imposed upon him payment (in recognition) of my overlordship.</p> |

Table 1—continued

| Reward | |
|---|--|
| URU.MEŠ-šú ša áš-lu-la ul-tu qé-reb kur-šú ab-tuq-ma a-na ^m mi-ti-in-ti LUGAL URU.as-du-di ^m pa-di-i LUGAL URU.am-gar- ru-na ú ^m GISSU-EN LUGAL URU. ha-zi-ti ad-din-ma ú-ša-ab-bir kur-su (iii 30–34) | I detached from his land the cities of his that I had plundered and I gave (them) to Mitinti, the king of the city Ashdod, Padi, the king of the city Ekron, and Šilli-Bēl, the king of the city Gaza, and (thereby) made his land smaller. |

ABC 1.⁴⁰ The Babylonian chroniclers commenting on Sennacherib's reign did not consider his third campaign important enough to be included in the Chronicle, and focused only on Sennacherib's campaigns against Babylonia and Elam (*ABC* 1 ii 24–iii 37). Their choice of events was evidently motivated by their general focus on Babylonian history, though this interest did not prevent them from mentioning other important Assyrian achievements in the West, such as Shalmaneser V's ravaging Samaria (*ABC* 1 i 28), Esarhaddon's taking of Sidon (*ABC* 1 iv 3–8), and his conquest of Egypt (*ABC* 1 iv 23–31). In sum, from the point of view of the Late-Babylonian chroniclers, Sennacherib's third campaign was less important than his conquest of Babylonia and Elam.

Analysis

On the one hand, a comparison of different versions of the Assyrian royal inscriptions shows that the Assyrian scribes for various reasons omitted some details of a given event or even skipped the description of entire events. On the other hand, those scribes also added new details missing in the earlier inscriptions. The omission or addition of the details was motivated by such reasons such as the limited space available to the scribe, the importance of a given event, the additional pieces of information available to the scribe only later, or the ideological and propagandistic impact of a given event independently of its real significance. In sum, the omission or addition of details was not a casual procedure guided by the whims of the scribe. Since the scribe was ultimately answerable to the king for the content of his inscription, the changes in the inscriptions introduced by him point to the significance of given details. To evaluate the importance of the Padi

incident in Assyrian historiography, I will consider the events of the third campaign according to their importance.

In the summary inscriptions, the conquest of Sidon and Judah were considered the two most important achievements of Sennacherib's third campaign. These two events also seem to point to the most important goals of the campaign: to guarantee the submission of the region by installing or confirming pro-Assyrian kings and to assure the regular flow of goods to Nineveh. The events described in the abbreviated version (Bull Inscription 4), meanwhile, were considered less important: the conquest of Philistia, the defeat of the Egyptian troops, the Padi incident, the Ekron rebellion and its suppression, and the blockade of Jerusalem. And appearing as mere military and administrative details were the events omitted in Bull Inscription 4, but present in the inscriptions of the first group, in particular the exemplary punishment of the Ekronites, the conquest of the cities Eltekeh and Timna, and the lists of conquered kings, subjugated countries, and booty.

For the purpose of this paper, it is important to observe that the submission of Philistia and the defeat of Egypt were not considered major achievements of the campaign. The defeat Sennacherib inflicted upon the Egyptian troops, although it was the first major Assyrian victory over Egypt, was considered only of secondary importance. And indeed, if we place this defeat in the context of Esarhaddon's and Ashurbanipal's invasions of Egypt,⁴¹ Sennacherib's victory over the Egyptians was indeed of minor worth. On the other hand, the Padi incident was not omitted

⁴¹ RINAP 4 34 6'–11'; *BIWA* B §7–14; C §13–24; see for example Shay Bar, Dan'el Kahn, and J. J. Shirley, *Egypt, Canaan and Israel: History, Imperialism, Ideology and Literature. Proceedings of a Conference at the University of Haifa, 3–7 May 2009* (Leiden, 2011); Dan'el Kahn, "The Assyrian Invasions of Egypt (673–663 B.C.) and the Final Expulsion of the Kushites," *Studien zur altägyptischen Kultur* 34 (2006): 251–67.

⁴⁰ For an analysis of Sennacherib's campaigns in *ABC* 1, see Antti J. Laato, "Assyrian Propaganda and the Falsification of History in the Royal Inscriptions of Sennacherib," *VT* 45 (1995): 203–209.

in Bull Inscription 4; in other words, the scribe who shortened the long version of the campaign did not consider it a redundant detail similar to, for example, the lists of conquered kings and booty. Similarly, Bull Inscription 4 omitted such details from the royal inscriptions as the conquest of Lachish (depicted on the famous relief⁴² and commented on in the epigraph⁴³) and the siege of Azekah.⁴⁴ In sum, the impression created by the Taylor prism that the rebellion of the Ekronites was given the same value as the revolts of Nergal-ushezib and Marduk-apla-iddina is not confirmed by the other extant documents. The rebellion of the Ekronites, the Padi incident, and the defeat of the Egyptian troops in fact belonged to the less important achievements of the third campaign.

The obstinacy of Hezekiah and Judah

Since the Assyrian scribes considered the Padi incident of minor importance, they probably omitted several details of this category of events. In other words, it makes sense to conclude that the scribes did not bother to give too many details on how Sennacherib got Padi out of Jerusalem. Therefore we can rightly ask the question whether Hezekiah might have simply changed his mind and released Padi from Jerusalem. Can we deduce such a “conversion” of Hezekiah from the royal inscriptions?

The Assyrian documents presented Hezekiah and his kingdom as one of the most obstinate enemies during the third campaign. The obstinacy of Hezekiah and his kingdom can be observed especially in the additions to the later versions of the texts. The first addition can be observed in the heading of the Judean phase:

The Rassam Cylinder (RINAP 3/1 4:49):⁴⁵ (As for) Hezekiah of the land of Judah. . .

The Taylor Prism (RINAP 3/1 22 iii 18–19):⁴⁶ (As for) Hezekiah of the land of Judah, who had not submitted to my yoke (*ša la ik-nu-šú a-na ni-ri-ia*). . .

⁴² David Ussishkin, *The Conquest of Lachish by Sennacherib* (Tel Aviv, 1982).

⁴³ Frahm, *Einleitung*, T 50.

⁴⁴ Mayer, “Sennacherib’s Campaign”: 198–200.

⁴⁵ Cf. also the reconstruction of the text in RINAP 3/2 142 r.5.

⁴⁶ Cf. also RINAP 3/1 15 iv 7; 16 iii 75; 17 iii 39; 18 iii 16; 23 iii 16–17; RINAP 3/2 46:27–28.

According to the Rassam Cylinder, the “wickedness” of Hezekiah was comparable to that of Luli, king of Sidon: both were overwhelmed by the fear of Sennacherib’s imposing brilliance (RINAP 3/1 4:32 and 55 respectively) but no explicit comment on their disobedience was made. The addition “who had not submitted to my yoke” made the “wickedness” of Hezekiah comparable to that of Sidqa, king of Ashkelon, “who had not bowed down to my yoke” (RINAP 3/1 22 ii 61). Sidqa was punished accordingly. The introduction of such a note in the Taylor Prism not only justified the devastation of Judah, but also points to the tendency of the Assyrian scribes to vilify Hezekiah.

A similar tendency to vilify Hezekiah and Judah can be observed in the summary inscriptions. While the Nebi Yunus inscription reads: “I ruined the wide district of Judah (and) imposed my yoke on Hezekiah, its king” (*ú-šal-pit rap-šú na-gu-ú* KUR.ia-ú-di *ba-za-qi-a-ú* LUGAL-šú e-mid ab-šá-a-ni; RINAP 3/1 34:15),⁴⁷ the Bull inscriptions read “I ruined the wide district of the recalcitrant (and) strong (*šep-šu mit-ru*) Judah (and) I make Hezekiah, its king, bow down at my feet.”⁴⁸ The difficult expression *šep-šu mit-ru* occurs in the Akkadian corpus only in Sennacherib’s inscriptions.⁴⁹ The word *mit*⁵⁰-*ru* (*mitru*) can be a noun (“force”) or an adjective (“powerful”),⁵¹ whereas the word *šapsu* is an adjective in the singular.⁵² In RINAP 3/1 1:62,⁵³ the previous syntagm is in the plural and *šapsu* is in the singular (*ba-ḫu-la-a-te na-ki-ri šep-šu mit-ru*), therefore it makes sense to conclude that *šep-šu mit-ru* is an adjective plus a noun in the singular, and that we can translate “the soldiers of the enemy, a recalcitrant force.” In this case, it refers to a group of enemy soldiers; in RINAP 3/2 222:20, it refers to a group of resistant cities. In sum, it is preferable to take the expression as an apposition to “the land of

⁴⁷ Cf. also the reconstruction in RINAP 37/1 26 i 12’–13’.

⁴⁸ Translation taken from RINAP 3/2 44:20b–22a. Cf. also damaged RINAP 3/2 42:10–11; 45:6’.

⁴⁹ RINAP 3/1 1:62; RINAP 3/2 42:10; 44:21; 213:61; 222:20.

⁵⁰ The sign BAD is read as *mit* (cf. CAD 10/II, 139–40; Borger, *Babylonisch-Assyrische Lesestücke*, 767) and not as *be* as proposed in OIP 2, 77 l. 21, RINAP 3/2 44:21, and Mayer, “Sennacherib’s Campaign”: 94.

⁵¹ CAD M/II, 139–140; AHw II, 663; Malku I 41, 132 in AOAT 50, 32–33.

⁵² CAD Š/I, 481–482; AHw III, 1176.

⁵³ Cf. also RINAP 3/2 213:61.

Judah.”⁵⁴ The expression, thus, can be translated: “I ruined the wide district of Judah, an obstinate force, (and) I made Hezekiah, its king, bow down at my feet.” Consequently, this comment suggests that not only Hezekiah but also the whole country turned into a recalcitrant enemy, like the city of Ekron. This note then justified the severe measures Sennacherib took against Judah. As a result, the description of the Judean phase rightly occupies greater space in the narrative than the conquest of other kingdoms (RINAP 3/1 22 iii 27b–49). Probably for this reason, it also became part of the summaries.

If we read this scribal tendency to vilify Hezekiah together with the claim of RINAP 3/1 22 iii 31–34 that Sennacherib rewarded Padi’s faithfulness by giving him parts of Hezekiah’s territory, then we can conclude that the scribes created two antipodal literary models of kings. On the one hand, Padi embodied the ideal of the faithful king. He remained faithful to Assyria to the extent of being willing to pay for his loyalty by being imprisoned, but in the end Sennacherib saved him and rewarded his loyalty.⁵⁵ On the other hand, Hezekiah embodied the evil king to whom Sennacherib had to impart a severe lesson of obedience: Hezekiah was confined in Jerusalem, his land was devastated, his people deported, a part of his territory was partitioned among the neighboring kings, and he had to not only pay regular tributes, but also make special gifts that amounted to the highest tribute Sennacherib received in his third campaign.

Similarly, the literary techniques employed in both the long and the abbreviated versions of the inscriptions are aimed at underlining the growing resistance to the Assyrians. While in the Phoenician phase the Assyrian troops met no resistance and the kings of the region submitted voluntarily (RINAP 3/1 22 ii 38–60a), the Philistine phase shows that Sennacherib had to have recourse to more violent means (ii 60b–64). The scribes expressed this by means of a stereotyped expression: “I surrounded, conquered, plundered. . .” (*al-me KUR-ud ás-lu-la šal-la-su-un*).⁵⁶ The resistance grew even more during Operation Ekron

(see Figure 2), when Sennacherib had to face the Egyptian troops coming to help the rebels at Ekron. The anti-Assyrian resistance culminated in the Judean phase. In order to subdue the obstinate kingdom of Hezekiah, Sennacherib had to employ the best military techniques known in those days.⁵⁷ This growing resistance, together with the vilification of Hezekiah and the whole of Judah, not only builds up narrative suspense, but also shows that the extradition of Padi from Jerusalem is located in the context of firm resistance to Assyria, when the Assyrians had to combat stubborn rebels unwilling to collaborate.

Let us now draw some conclusions. The reconstruction of the events shows that Padi was the last remaining pro-Assyrian ally in the region. His removal and confinement in Jerusalem resulted in forming a unified anti-Assyrian coalition backed up by Egypt. During his third campaign, Sennacherib at a certain moment freed Padi from his confinement in Jerusalem and reinstated him on the throne in Ekron. The comparison of Sennacherib’s texts dealing with Padi shows that the Assyrian scribes intentionally presented Hezekiah and his kingdom as the most obstinate enemy of Assyria. If true, it is difficult to imagine that Hezekiah would have been willing to let Padi go without being subject to special pressure. Since the Assyrian scribes did not mention an attack on Jerusalem, it is difficult to admit that Sennacherib could take Padi out of Jerusalem after having breached the city walls. In the light of these remarks, we can ask: how did Sennacherib free Padi from the hands of recalcitrant king Hezekiah?

The assessment of the importance of the events that took place during Sennacherib’s third campaign showed that Assyrian historiographers considered the liberation of Padi an event of minor importance. For various reasons they omitted a good number of details of minor importance, including how the Assyrians brought Padi out of Jerusalem. Is it possible to fill this gap? In order to answer this question, I will now turn my attention to other Neo-Assyrian texts. With a comparative study, we can detect the types of diplomatic and psychological pressure the Assyrians might have exerted in order to draw rebels or enemies out of a city.

⁵⁴ As suggested by A.K. Grayson and J. Novotny (RINAP 3/2 44:21), though they have translated the expression as two adjectives. Previously, the expression *šep-šu mit-ru* was thought to refer to Hezekiah “the notorious rebel Hezekiah”; Mayer, “Sennacherib’s Campaign”: 194.

⁵⁵ Cf. for example RINAP 4 1 ii 40–50.

⁵⁶ RINAP 3/1 4:41; cf. also 16 iii 39; 22 ii 72.

⁵⁷ RINAP 3/1 22 iii 21–23. See Israel Eph’al, “Ways to Conquer a City,” in *Assyria 1995*, ed. Parpola and Whiting, 49–53.

Assyrian diplomacy employed to get hold of a wanted person

The royal inscriptions describing the military campaigns of Assyrian kings give the impression that the Assyrians used mainly brute force to achieve their goals. Neo-Assyrian letters, however, suggest that the Assyrians employed a whole range of diplomatic, political, economic, religious, and psychological means in order to suppress insurrections, conquer regions, and punish any lack of loyalty.⁵⁸ In other words, the Assyrians were well-versed in what we call now psychological warfare.⁵⁹ The Assyrians manipulated the masses, offered incentives and promises, used the carrot-and-stick strategy, discredited their adversaries, and presented Assyrian requests as a mission of liberation couched in religious terminology.⁶⁰ From studies of psychological warfare and diplomacy in the ancient Near East, we can infer that Assyrian propaganda often failed when targeting the inhabitants of rural areas, when Assyrian troops were still too far away, or when there was a doubt that the Assyrian army would intervene at all. On the other hand, negotiations were much more successful when the Assyrian army was already operating victoriously in a given region. If Assyrian propaganda failed, the Assyrians did not hesitate

⁵⁸ In recent decades, the literature on this subject has proliferated. Let me mention at least some important studies besides works quoted in this paper: Mordechai Cogan, "Judah under Assyrian Hegemony: A Reexamination of Imperialism and Religion," *JBL* 112 (1993): 403–14; Israel Eph'al, *The City Besieged: Siege and Its Manifestations in the Ancient Near East*, Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 36 (Leiden, 2009); Israel Eph'al and Nadav Na'aman, *Royal Assyrian Inscriptions: History, Historiography and Ideology. A Conference in Honour of Hayim Tadmor on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday* (Jerusalem, 2009); Mogens T. Larsen, *Power and Propaganda: A Symposium on Ancient Empires, Mesopotamia*, vol. 7 (Copenhagen, 1979); Mario Liverani, *International Relations in the Ancient Near East, 1600–1100 B.C.* (Houndmills, 2001); Bustenay Oded, *War, Peace, and Empire: Justifications for War in Assyrian Royal Inscriptions* (Wiesbaden, 1992); Galo W. Vera Chamaza, *Die Omnipotenz Assurs: Entwicklungen in der Assur-Theologie unter den Sargoniden Sargon II., Sanherib und Asarhadon*, AOAT 295 (Münster, 2002).

⁵⁹ For the techniques of Neo-Assyrian psychological warfare, see William R. Gallagher, "Assyrian Deportation Propaganda," *SAAB* 8 (1994): 57–65; A. Leo Oppenheim, "The Eyes of the Lord," *JAOS* 88 (1968): 173–80.

⁶⁰ See for example SAA XV 1, 157, 159, 184, 210, and 305; XVII 111; and a discussion in Peter Dubovský, *Hezekiah and the Assyrian Spies: Reconstruction of the Neo-Assyrian Intelligence Services and Its Significance for 2 Kings 18–19*, *Biblica et Orientalia* 49 (Roma, 2006), 160–88.

to resort to violence; for instance they might eliminate an anti-Assyrian faction (as they did in Marpada, SAA XV 136:21–28), cut down date palms, or stop water and food resources.⁶¹ Naturally these measures added weight to the messages of Assyrian agents, and helped reluctant parties to comply with Assyrian demands (cf. SAA XV 221 r.3–9).

Among numerous examples of Assyrian psychological warfare, there are some letters mentioning negotiations concerning the extradition of wanted persons.⁶² Tools and arguments employed during negotiations depended by and large upon the type of wanted persons and political circumstances. Let us present a few examples. Most negotiations of this type regarded fugitives. Negotiations aimed at getting hold of a wanted person were mainly conducted by means of messengers and letters. SAA V 35 illustrates the diplomatic pressure exerted by Sha-Ashur-dubbu, governor of Tushhan, to extradite Assyrian fugitives and the resistance put up by Urartu. Both sides used threats and even rude words to achieve their objectives. However, such negotiations were not always successful. A negotiation to get the fugitives from Ellipi is a good example of failed diplomatic pressure that needed to be supplemented by force. Ashur-bel-usur sent a letter to Lutu, an Ellipian prince, asking him to bring out some Assyrian fugitives.⁶³ However, Lutu was not able to do so and claimed that the fugitives could be seized only when both he and Ashur-bel-usur could go and get hold of them (by force).⁶⁴

Another variant of employing force to get hold of a wanted person was by paramilitary actions. SAA V 32 describes diplomatic pressure exerted by means of letters to get back captured Assyrians, when the Shubrians had ambushed and captured two Assyrian eunuchs and six soldiers. Sha-Ashur-dubbu wrote an angry letter to the Shubrian king asking for the release of his men. It seems that the letter did not bring the expected results, and therefore Sargon II advised Sha-Ashur-dubbu to undertake paramilitary action: "Capture his (the Shubrian king's) men equal

⁶¹ Steven W. Cole, "The Destruction of Orchards in Assyrian Warfare," in *Assyria 1995*, ed. Parpola and Whiting, 29–40.

⁶² For arresting a person and putting him into the hands of a bodyguard, see SAA XV 182:13'–17'; cf. XV 62; I 245.

⁶³ SAA XV 42: based on the orthographical details, the letter was attributed to Ashur-bel-usur.

⁶⁴ SAA XV 62:4–11. For the intricate political and diplomatic background to this letter see Dubovský, *Hezekiah and the Assyrian Spies*, 80–83.

in number to your men, until he releases them (the Assyrian men).⁶⁵

If diplomatic negotiations and paramilitary actions failed, the Assyrians turned to their army. When the Assyrian army reached an enemy's city walls, their agents tried to intimidate the inhabitants. Letter SAA XV 136 reports on the negotiations to get a wanted person out of a fortified city, in an instance in which the Assyrian troops were already under the city walls. Nabu-shumu-iddina, the sender of this letter,⁶⁶ was a fortress commander in the vicinity of the city of Lahiru.⁶⁷ It bears greetings (136:1–5) and consists of four independent reports (136:6–11,⁶⁸ 12–15,⁶⁹ 16–30,⁷⁰ r.1–23), of which the relevant report was the

⁶⁵ SAA V 33:9–11 and PNAE 3/II, 1179. For an example of paramilitary operations, see ABL 280 in P. Dubovský, “Dynamics of the Fall: Ashurbanipal's Conquest of Elam,” in *Susa and Elam: Archaeological, Philological, Historical and Geographical Perspectives. Proceedings of the International Congress Held at Ghent University, December 14–17, 2009*, ed. Katrien de Graef and Jan Tavernier (Leiden, 2013): 458–60.

⁶⁶ We can safely attribute two letters to him: SAA XV 136 and 138. The latter says that Nabu-shumu-iddina sent someone to the vizier. From the occurrence of the word *de-nu* (*dīnu*) “lawsuit” in this severely damaged letter, it was reasonably concluded that Nabu-shumu-iddina asked the vizier to file a lawsuit (see SAA XV, 96). Letter SAA XV 137 could also have been sent by Nabu-shumu-iddina, but the name has not been fully preserved.

⁶⁷ For details on Nabu-shumu-iddina, see PNAE 2/II, 884. Lahiru is attested as a city (Eski Kifri in Iraq), a land, and a people. For the location of Lahiru in the Diyala River valley and the previous bibliographical notes, see Grant Frame, *Babylonia 689–627 B.C.: A Political History* (Istanbul, 1992), 220 n. 37, and Andreas Fuchs, *Die Inschriften Sargons II. aus Khorsabad*, 1. Aufl. ed. (Göttingen, 1994), 444.

⁶⁸ The first report (lines 6–11) describes the passage of an Assyrian official in the Lahiru region. The new superintendent was well-received and the people of the region confirmed their loyalty to Assyria and lived in peace (cf. SAA XV 90; 98).

⁶⁹ The second report has an agricultural character. The king asked Nabu-shumu-iddina to survey the region around his fort and to see whether it could be suitable for the cultivation of crops. The importance of such a report can be seen in the context of the cultivation of crops introduced by the Assyrians into southern Turkey. The Assyrians often exploited the regions and turned them into real agricultural resources. For the development of the region of Cizra thanks to Assyrian agriculture, see Bradley J. Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire: The Northern Frontier of Assyria as a Case Study in Imperial Dynamics* (Helsinki, 2001), 281. Thus this report pointed to the fact that the Assyrians intended to exploit the agricultural potential of the region.

⁷⁰ The third report mentioned secret negotiations. It has been preserved only partially, but from the extant part it is possible to conclude that pro-Assyrian families in Marpada were willing to drive out the anti-Assyrian families from the city. From the indirect an-

last. The letter had no conclusion. For our purpose, the most important part of the letter is lines r.1–23:

As for the fortress of Mushezib [about which the k]ing, my lord, had written to me, [I] (and) Bel-sharru-usur, the bodyguard, went there [togeth]er. [. . .]in front of the city I stopped, (while) Bel-sharru-usur came near to [the foun]-dations. He talked [with them] [saying: “We want that Mushezib is brought out, [. . . to the k]ing, [our] lord, [. . . we] want to bring in.” When [. . .] on the towers [. . .] when he/it is confident [. . . s]o its fear [. . .] does not exist. [Now then] I have drawn a sketch of the fort [on] leather and am (herewith) sending it [to] the king, my lord. Perhaps the king, my lord, will say: “How many soldiers did you bring in there?” There are 50 Itu'eans and 30 Gurreans, a total of 80 soldiers in there.

This section is a response to the questions sent from the royal court to Nabu-shumu-iddina. From the context, it is possible to presume that the royal letter dealt with the capture of the fortress of a man named Mushezib. Nabu-shumu-iddina reported on the fulfillment of this royal order. The capture was a joint military operation under the command of Nabu-shumu-iddina and Bel-sharru-usur, a royal bodyguard. Once their units reached the fortress, they split into two groups. Nabu-shumu-iddina's unit remained behind, probably to secure the bases, whereas Bel-sharru-usur approached the fortress. According to lines r.6–10, Bel-sharru-usur acted as a diplomatic envoy to negotiate the release of Mushezib from his own fortress.⁷¹ In the following lines, the letter is poorly preserved and it becomes readable only from line r.15 on. In lines r.15–18, Nabu-shumu-iddina states that he had sketched a plan of the fortress,⁷² and in lines r.19–23, he provides details on manning the fortress. There are good reasons for reading lines r.1–23 as part of the same report. First, Bel-sharru-usur declares the Assyrians' intention to bring in someone (probably the soldiers; see line 10), and in line r.21 Nabu-shumu-iddina uses the same verb to report that the soldiers were indeed brought in. Second, in lines r.1–23 the fortress/fortified city remains a main theme. The fortress

swer from Nabu-shumu-iddina it can be deduced that he agreed with this attitude.

⁷¹ PNAE 1/II, 329.

⁷² For an example of Assyrian plans of a fortress, see Botta and Flandin, *Monument de Ninive I*, pl. 36.

is called by various names. In line r.1 the king calls it BAD (wall, fortress), in line r.5 Nabu-shumu-iddina calls it URU (city), and in line r.15 Nabu-shumu-iddina calls it URU.*bir-ti* (fortified city). From lines r.19–23, it is possible to deduce that it was a garrison manned by eighty soldiers. Such a fortress would correspond to a medium-sized fortified installation that could hold, besides the soldiers, civilians as well.⁷³ If lines r.1–23 are read together, then we can conclude that the mission was successful and the Assyrians turned a base of Mushezib into an Assyrian garrison.

The identity of Mushezib, the wanted person, is difficult to ascertain. In the Assyrian documents, the form *Mušēzib* is an abbreviated form of the proper name *Mušēzibu*, “savior” (see, e.g., SAA VI 259 and 260). H. D. Baker proposed to identify the Mushezib mentioned in SAA XV 136 with the Yadburu sheik mentioned in Sargon II’s Annals (l. 298).⁷⁴ Both operated in Lahiru during Sargon II’s reign. If this identification is correct, then Mushezib was an anti-Assyrian rebel who was holed up in his city. Thus the military and diplomatic mission took place during Sargon II’s campaign in 710 BC in particular, when Sargon’s troops were deployed in Yadburu.⁷⁵ From the annals, we learn that Mushezib finally brought tribute to Sargon II (Sargon II’s Ann. 298–300). Combining Sargon II’s annals with letter SAA XV 136, it is possible to conclude that the submission of Mushezib was preceded by a negotiation under the city walls while the troops were preparing for an attack. The letter explicitly states that Bel-sharru-usur approached the foundations of the city wall and conducted a negotiation. From the direct speech introduced by [*is-si-šú-nu*] *i-du-ub-ub* [*ma-a*] (“he spoke [with them] [saying]”), we can even reconstruct a part of his speech. He asked the citizens or city authorities to hand Mushezib over to the Assyrians and to let his soldiers enter the fortress.⁷⁶ Thus, this letter is a good example of a negotiation to get a wanted person out of a fortified city when the Assyrian troops were already stationed under the city walls.

⁷³ Parker, *Mechanics*, 131–47.

⁷⁴ PNAE 2/II, 781. For the annals, see Fuchs, *Inschriften*, 330. Two different spellings of the name Mushezib—^m*mu-še-zib* (SAA XV 136 r.1) and ^m*mu-še-zi-bu* (Ann. 298)—can be considered variants of the same name, see SAA VI 260:3, 5, which uses both forms.

⁷⁵ Dubovský, *Hezekiah and the Assyrian Spies*, 185, n. 59.

⁷⁶ Letter SAA XIX 98 is an excellent example of a negotiation at the city gate; see *ibid.*, 163–66. However, that negotiation did not aim at getting a wanted person out of the city.

This brief review has shown that the Assyrians, in order to get hold of a wanted person, first sent letters and messengers. If such peaceful diplomatic missions failed, they next employed threats and paramilitary operations. But if even these failed, and the person was important enough, the Assyrians would bring military units to devastate the region. Having their troops stationed under the city walls ready for an attack, the Assyrians sometimes opened negotiations under the city walls to give the citizens the last chance to hand over a wanted person and thus to avoid the ordeal of siege.

What kind of negotiations were used in the case of Padi?

Before answering this question it is necessary to notice that the tripartite structure of the account of Senacherib’s third campaign (see above) shows that the events were not organized in chronological order, and consequently that the liberation of Padi and his reinstatement on the throne of Ekron did not take place at the end of the Philistine phase, but rather during the Judean phase. Therefore, we have to analyze the Judean phase to glean information pertinent for our study.

The extant texts contain a few ambiguities that permit interpreting the Judean phase in different ways. First, D. D. Luckenbill read in line RINAP 3/1 22 iii 41⁷⁷ the sign BAD (in BAD-*la-a-ti*) as *baṭ* (thus *ir-šu-ú baṭ-la-a-ti*), and translated “(the *Urbi*⁷⁸ . . .) deserted him.”⁷⁹ This interpretation was dominant for a long time, and several scholars suggested that a special group of mercenaries, seeing the Assyrian troops under the walls of Jerusalem, rebelled and deserted Hezekiah.⁸⁰ However, the sign BAD can also be read as *til* (*ir-šu-ú til-la-a-ti*).⁸¹ In this sense, the phrase *ir-šu-ú til-la-a-ti* is the continuation of the subordinate

⁷⁷ (iii 39) LÚ.úr-bi ù LÚ.ERIM.MEŠ-šú SIG₅.MEŠ ša a-na dun-nun (iii 40) URU.ur-sa-li-im-mu URU LUGAL-ti-šú ú-še-ri-bu-ma (iii 41) *ir-šu-ú* BAD-*la-a-ti*.

⁷⁸ For the identity and role of LÚ.úr-bi see Ariel M. Bagg, “Interaktionsformen zwischen Nomaden und Sesshaften in Palästina anhand neuassyrischer Quellen,” *WO* 40 (2010): 206–207.

⁷⁹ OIP 2, 33–34.

⁸⁰ See *CAD* 2, 176; for the discussion and previous studies see Mordechai Cogan and Hayim Tadmor, *II Kings: A New Translation*, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y., 1988), 247.

⁸¹ *CAD* 18, 408. This reading had been suggested earlier by Arthur Ungnad, “Zum Sanherib-Prisma I R 37–42,” *ZA* 38 (1929): 196.

clause and further describes the group of mercenaries: they were brought into the city of Jerusalem and, once brought in, served as the auxiliary troops for Hezekiah.

The reading *til-la-a-ti* changes the interpretation of the events. The whole section (iii 37b–49) does not describe the desertion of special units from Jerusalem, but Hezekiah's gifts that were brought to Nineveh. Besides material goods, the special units that Hezekiah used to defend Jerusalem were part of the gifts. This interpretation becomes more evident when we consider that the first version of the third campaign (the Rassam Cylinder, RINAP 3/1 4:55–58) has after these lines the description of the special contingent. Thus, according to the Rassam Cylinder, Sennacherib used Hezekiah's special units together with other booty to form his royal contingent of 10,000 archers and 10,000 shield bearers. This idea is, however, less evident in later inscriptions and disappears from the Taylor Prism and other inscriptions (see footnote 31).

Another ambiguity is caused by the personal suffixes in lines iii 35–37: *e-li GUN maḥ-ri-ti na-dan šar-ti-šú-un* (their) *man-da-at-tu kād-re-e be-lu-ti-ia ú-rad-di-ma ú-kin še-ru-uš-šú* (his) *šu-ú ḥa-za-qi-a-ú*.⁸² The suffix *-šú-un* can refer to the three kings, who had to pay the former tribute and also special gifts besides. However, the suffix *-šú* is in the singular. A.K. Grayson and J. Novotny translated “them” considering it a scribal mistake. In order to shed light on this question, it is necessary to analyze the structure of the Judean phase (RINAP 3/1 22 iii 18–49); see Table 2. The narrative is divided into three parts by anticipated objects “And (as for) Hezekiah . . .” (*ú ḥa-za-qi-a-ú*; iii 18), “(As for) him . . .” (*šá-a-šú*; iii 27), and “(As for) him, Hezekiah, . . .” (*šu-ú ḥa-za-qi-a-ú*; iii 37). The first part describes the conquest of Judah and ends with the list of booty brought out of the conquered cities (iii 18–27a); the second concentrates on the blockade of Jerusalem and ends with the apportionment of the territory and special tributes (iii 27b–37a); the third describes the list of gifts Hezekiah gave to Sennacherib in order to acknowledge his suzerainty (iii 37b–49).

This division of the text shows that each section ends with a description of the booty and gifts received

⁸² A. K. Grayson and J. Novotny translate “To the former tribute, their annual giving, I added the payment (of) gifts (in recognition) of my overlordship and imposed (it) upon them (text: “him”). As for him, Hezekiah, . . .” (RINAP 3/1 22 iii 35–37).

by Sennacherib. Since the second part (iii 27b–37a) speaks of Hezekiah and the blockade of Jerusalem with a prolepsis on the apportionment of the territory, it makes sense to conclude that the singular suffix is not a mistake, but that it refers to Hezekiah. In other words, *ú-kin še-ru-uš-šú* means “(gifts) I imposed upon him (Hezekiah).”⁸³

These two notes have an impact on the interpretation of lines iii 37b–49 as well. Lines iii 36–37 and iii 49 are linked by the term *maddattu* and the idea of Assyrian overlordship (*be-lu-ti-ia*) and Hezekiah's vassalage (*e-peš ARAD-ú-ti*). Thus, the third section of the campaign specifies the gifts Sennacherib imposed upon Hezekiah that were actually brought to Nineveh.⁸⁴ Comparing the full list of gifts in the Rassam Cylinder (RINAP 3/1 4:55–58) with other lists, it is clear that, after the blockade of Jerusalem, Sennacherib obtained booty similar to that which he usually took away from a conquered city (cf. RINAP 3/1 1:30–33). The scribes who composed the summaries presented a similar view. Two of the most important achievements of the Judean phase were the submission of the Judean kingdom and the booty/gifts received (“to carry the Assyrian yoke”). From this point of view, the second section describes the way in which the gifts were obtained: the Assyrian troops had to blockade Hezekiah in his city “like a bird in a cage” in order to compel him to pay the tributes. The comparative study of the reliefs of the third and fifth campaigns also indirectly confirms this conclusion. While in the fifth campaign the Assyrians destroyed the region, the reliefs of the third campaign did not depict the heavy devastation of the cities, but focused mainly on the deportation of the people and booty. Based on this comparison, J. Jeffers concluded that the goal of the Assyrians during the third campaign was not the annihilation of the Judean cities, since it would be counterproductive to the welfare of the Assyrian Empire, but rather the extraction of heavy tribute from

⁸³ A recalcitrant enemy, such as Hazael (cf. RINAP 4 1 iv 17–24), had to pay the regular payment he refused to pay, plus an additional amount of money.

⁸⁴ The expression *EGIR-ia ú-še-bi-lam-ma* can be interpreted as meaning that Hezekiah brought all these gifts to Nineveh after the departure of Sennacherib (temporal meaning) or that Hezekiah had them carried to Nineveh behind Sennacherib (spatial meaning); Kurt Galling, Riecke Borger, and Elmar Edel, *Textbuch zur Geschichte Israels*, 2. neubearbeitet Auflage (Tübingen, 1968), 69.

Table 2—Analysis of the Judean phase of Sennacherib's Third Campaign

| | <i>First section</i> | <i>Second section</i> | <i>Third section</i> |
|---------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Anticipated object | And (as for) Hezekiah of the land Judah, who had not submitted to my yoke, | (As for) him | (As for) him, Hezekiah, |
| Intervention | I surrounded (and) conquered forty-six of his fortified cities, fortresses, and small(er) settlements in their environs, which were without number, by having ramps trodden down and battering rams brought up, the assault of foot soldiers, sapping, breaching, and siege engines. | I confined him inside the city Jerusalem, his royal city, like a bird in a cage. I set up blockades against him and made him dread exiting his city gate. | fear of my lordly brilliance overwhelmed him |
| Booty and submission to Assyria | I brought out of them 200,150 people, young (and) old, male and female, horses, mules, donkeys, camels, oxen, and sheep and goats, which were without number, and I counted (them) as booty. | I detached from his land the cities of his that I had plundered and I gave (them) to Mitinti, the king of the city Ashdod, Padi, the king of the city Ekron, and Silli-Bel, the king of the city Gaza, and (thereby) made his land smaller. To the former tribute, their annual giving, I added the payment (of) gifts (in recognition) of my overlordship and imposed (it) upon him. | and, after my (departure), he had the auxiliary forces and his elite troops whom he had brought inside to strengthen the city Jerusalem, his royal city, and who had provided support, along with 30 talents of gold, 800 talents of silver, choice antimony, large blocks of . . . , ivory beds, armchairs of ivory, elephant hide(s), elephant ivory, ebony, boxwood, every kind of valuable treasure, as well as his daughters, his palace women, male singers, (and) female singers brought into Nineveh, my capital city, and he sent a mounted messenger of his to me to deliver (this) payment and to do obeisance. |

the people.⁸⁵ These studies highlight the importance of military pressure and diplomacy as important tools of Assyrian psychological warfare. Moreover, the need to blockade Jerusalem indicates that the recalcitrant Judean king resisted, as much as he could, complying with the Assyrian demands.

After having analyzed Assyrian royal inscriptions and some letters, some conclusions may be drawn regarding the type of negotiation Sennacherib needed to get Padi out of Jerusalem. First, Sennacherib's annals do not mention the conquest of Jerusalem, and therefore Padi could not have been freed as the result of the Assyrians breaching the city walls but only by means of negotiations. Similarly, the literary analysis of the royal inscriptions and Jeffers' study of the reliefs shows that the Assyrians achieved their goals—the submission

of the region and much booty—without resorting to the actual annihilation of the cities, contrary to what happened during the fifth campaign. On the other hand, the analysis of the annals has shown that the Assyrian scribes considered Hezekiah a paragon of a rebellious king to whom Sennacherib had to impart a severe lesson in order to turn him into a submissive vassal. Similarly, the analysis of the Judean phase has shown that Sennacherib, after having conquered the fortified cities of Judah, needed a special military intervention—to confine Hezekiah in Jerusalem “like a bird in a cage”⁸⁶—in order to obtain desired gifts, including special military units.

⁸⁶ For a discussion on the siege and blockade of Jerusalem, see Mayer, “Sennacherib's Campaign”: 179–81; Davide Nadali, “Sieges and Similes of Sieges in the Royal Annals: The Conquest of Damascus by Tiglath-Pileser III,” *Kaskal* 6 (2009): 142–44, and “Assyrian Open Field Battles: An Attempt at Reconstruction and Analysis,” in *Studies on War in the Ancient Near East: Collected Essays on Military*

⁸⁵ Joshua Jeffers, “Fifth-Campaign Reliefs in Sennacherib's ‘Palace without Rival’ at Nineveh,” *Iraq* 73 (2011): 89.

Bearing in mind these premises and the array of diplomatic and psychological means employed to make a resistant rebel comply with Assyrian demands, we can ask what kind of pressure the Assyrians had to employ in order to get Padi out of Hezekiah's clutches. Since the Assyrians had to use their most "efficient" (i.e., military) tools in order to make Hezekiah collaborate, the type of diplomatic pressure best-suited to liberate Padi was the negotiation under the city walls, when the Assyrian army was ready for an attack similar to that described in SAA XV 136.⁸⁷ This mission of theirs was successful, as can be deduced from the reconstruction of the history of Ekron. However, in comparison with the results of other Assyrian negotiation—the submission of Judah and Hezekiah's gifts—the liberation of Padi was only a minor theme, not only in Assyrian negotiations, but also in Assyrian historiography. In sum, I suggest that the negotiations concerning Padi's liberation took place during the Judean phase, most likely during the blockade of Jerusalem while the Assyrian troops were already stationed under the city walls. The type of the negotiation would correspond to that illustrated by letter SAA XV 136.

This conclusion, however, does not exclude the possibility that other negotiations between Assyria and Jerusalem might have taken place during Sennacherib's third campaign.⁸⁸ The submission of Hezekiah most likely did not occur in one moment but in different stages. B. Oded suggested that the end of the war in Judah went through different phases: messages, payment, releasing Padi, and, lastly, offering Hezekiah's daughters and palace personnel to Sennacherib.⁸⁹ Similarly, W. R. Gallagher, in comparing

History, ed. J. Vidal, AOAT 372 (Münster, 2010): 129–30; Christoph Uehlinger, "Clio in a World of Pictures Another Look at the Lachish Reliefs from Sennacherib's Southwest Palace at Nineveh," in "Like a Bird in a Cage," ed. Grabbe, 295–96.

⁸⁷ There are, admittedly, several differences between the cases, such as the nature of the wanted person (see above) and the note on the liberation of Padi (RINAP 3/1 22 iii 14b–17). But letter SAA XV 136 displays some similarities: both SAA XV 136 and Sennacherib's annals use the same verb "to bring out" (Š-form) in order to speak about the extradition of a person of interest. Letter SAA XV 136 explicitly mentions that negotiations between the high Assyrian officials and the representatives of the city took place at the foundations (of the city walls); the annals show that Sennacherib needed to besiege Jerusalem in order to compel Hezekiah to accept his demands.

⁸⁸ Peter Machinist, "Assyria and Its Image in the First Isaiah," *JAOS* 103 (1983): 730–31.

⁸⁹ Bustenay Oded, "'The Command of the God' as a Reason for Going to War in the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions," in *Ah, Assyria . . .* ;

Sennacherib's invasion with Esarhaddon's conquest of Shubria, argued that Sennacherib initially did not accept Hezekiah's surrender, since Hezekiah's conditions were not in line with Assyrian military goals.⁹⁰ In the light of these studies, the liberation of Padi achieved by means of diplomatic negotiations was an important event that helped to bring Sennacherib's campaign to a successful end, though it was not the most important one.

The liberation of Padi and the biblical accounts

Sennacherib's third campaign against the Levant (701 BC), and in particular Rab-shaqeh's speeches under the walls of Jerusalem, are still a hotly-debated issue among biblical scholars. Despite the relatively abundant textual and archaeological evidence, there is no full consensus as to the details of this invasion. The biblical accounts preserved in 2 Kings 18–19, Isaiah 36–37, and 2 Chronicles 32 report long speeches delivered by the Assyrian representatives under the walls of Jerusalem. No such speeches are explicitly mentioned in the Neo-Assyrian sources. In recent times, several scholars have offered various suggestions on how to interpret the Assyrian speeches reported in the Bible.⁹¹

Studies in Assyrian History and Ancient Near Eastern Historiography Presented to Hayim Tadmor, ed. Mordechai Cogan and Israel Ephal, Scripta Hierosolymitana 33 (Jerusalem, 1991).

⁹⁰ For a summary of positions, see Gallagher, *Sennacherib's Campaign*, 257–62.

⁹¹ Besides writings quoted in the rest of this paper, see also Ehud Ben Zvi, "Who Wrote the Speech of Rabshakeh and When?," *JBL* 109 (1990): 79–92; Ronald E. Clements, *Jerusalem and the Nations: Studies in the Book of Isaiah* (Sheffield, UK, 2011); Paul S. Evans, "The Hezekiah-Sennacherib Narrative as Polyphonic Text," *JSOT* 33 (2009): 335–58, and *The Invasion of Sennacherib in the Book of Kings: A Source-Critical and Rhetorical Study of 2 Kings 18–19*, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 125 (Leiden, 2009); Steven W. Holloway, "Harran: Cultic Geography in the Neo-Assyrian Empire and Its Implications for Sennacherib's 'Letter to Hezekiah' in 2 Kings," in *The Pitcher Is Broken: Memorial Essays for Gösta W. Ahlström*, ed. S. W. Holloway and L. K. Handy, JSOT Supplement Series 190 (Sheffield, UK, 1995): 276–314; Leo L. Honor, *Sennacherib's Invasion of Palestine: A Critical Source Study*, Contributions to Oriental History and Philology 12 (New York, 1966); Isaac Kalimi and Seth Richardson, *Sennacherib at the Gates of Jerusalem: Story, History and Historiography*, Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 71 (Leiden, 2014); Peter Machinist, "The Fall of Assyria in Comparative Ancient Perspective," in *Assyria 1995*: 179–95, and "The Rab Šaqeh at the Wall of Jerusalem: Israelite Identity in the Face of the Assyrian 'Other,'" *Hebrew Studies* 41 (2000): 151–68; Nadav Na'aman, "New Light on Hezekiah's Second Prophetic Story (2 Kgs 19,9b–35)," *Biblica* 81

This paper has tried to answer the question of whether we can deduce from the study of the Assyrian sources that there was a diplomatic mission during which Assyria entered into negotiations with Jerusalem during Sennacherib's third campaign. I have argued that at least one Assyrian diplomatic mission must have taken place during Sennacherib's third campaign and that it concerned the liberation of Padi, king of Ekron, from Jerusalem.

If this conclusion is accepted, then we can go further and ask what arguments the Assyrians might have used while negotiating the extradition of Padi. The Assyrians, before attacking Judah, had already conquered various kingdoms along the Mediterranean shore and defeated the Egyptian auxiliary troops. Consequently, the main argument might have been the futility of resisting the Assyrian army, by the example of the kings who had submitted to Assyria, whether by force or voluntarily, as well as the unreliability of Egypt that had suffered a defeat. All three arguments are made in 2 Kings 18–19, though shaped according to the

theological needs of the final redactors of the biblical account.⁹² As in the negotiations mentioned in 2 Kings 18–19, it is also likely that the negotiations on the extradition of Padi were not conducted by Sennacherib himself,⁹³ but rather by a high-ranking military official, or officials, as was the case in SAA XV 136.⁹⁴

On the other hand, there are two major differences between the biblical account and the conclusions reached in this study. The first regards the content. According to 2 Kings 18–19, the Assyrians wanted the Jerusalemites to surrender. Even though this aim of the diplomatic mission is not to be excluded, the object of at least one negotiation had to be the release of Padi, which is not mentioned in the Bible at all. The second regards the results. From the biblical account, we get the impression that the Assyrians did not succeed in their negotiations with Hezekiah. On the contrary, according to the reconstruction of the history of Ekron, the negotiations aimed at the release of Padi from his prison in Jerusalem met with success.

(2000): 393–402, and “Hezekiah and the Kings of Assyria,” *TA* 21 (1994): 235–54; Dominic Rudman, “Is the Rabshakeh also among the Prophets? A Rhetorical Study of 2 Kings XVIII 17–35,” *VT* 50 (2000): 100–110; and Hanré J. van Rensburg, “The Attack on Judah in Sennacherib's Third Campaign: An Ideological Study of the Various Texts,” *OTE* (2004): 560–79.

⁹² For the overwhelming might of the Assyrian army, see 2 Kgs 18:23–24.30; for the kings and nations that submitted or were conquered by Assyria, see 2 Kgs 18:33–35; 19:11–13; and for the unreliability of Egypt, see 2 Kgs 18:21.24.

⁹³ Becking, “Chronology”: 69.

⁹⁴ See footnote 5.