A Tale of Suspicious Cities

The securitisation of urban everyday life in Europe in times of (counter)terrorism

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Abbreviations

ACT	Action Counters Terrorism
AD	Action Directe (Direct Action)
AFR	Automated Facial Recognition
AI	Artificial intelligence
ANPR	Automatic Number Plate Recognition
ATTRO	Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order
BBK	Bundesamt für den Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance)
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
BKA	Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office)
BPS	Bruxelles – Prévention & Sécurité (Brussels – Prevention & Security)
BTP	British Transport Police
CCC	Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Communist Combatant Cells)
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CLP	City of London Police
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
CTSA	Counterterrorism Security Advisor
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EFUS	European Forum on Urban Security
EU	European Union
GETZ	Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (Joint Counter-Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Centre)
GIA	Groupe Interforces Anti-Terrorisme (Interforce Anti-Terrorism Group)
GLA	Greater London Authority
GTAZ	Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (Joint Counterterrorism Centre)
IcARUS	Innovative Approaches to Urban Security
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMSI	International Mobile Subscriber Identity
INCEL	Involuntary Celibate
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KONEX	Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremismus in Baden-Württemberg (Competence Centre against Extremism in Baden-Württemberg)
LBZ Derad	Landesbildungszentrum Deradikalisierung (Regional Education Centre Deradicalisation)
LFR	Live Facial Recognition
LLCS	London Lorry Control Scheme

MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NaCTSO	National Counterterrorism Security Office
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSU	Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground)
OCAM	Organe de Coordination pour l'Analyse de la Menace (Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis)
PACTESUR	Protect Allied Cities against Terrorism in Securing Urban Areas
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PRoTECT	Public Resilience using Technology to Counter Terrorism
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction)
STIB	Société des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles (Brussels Society of Intercommunal Transport)
TfL	Transport for London
VAW	Vehicle as Weapon
VPN	Violence Prevention Network
WTC	World Trade Center

‘A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other. A solemn consideration, when I enter a great city by night, that every one of those darkly clustered houses encloses its own secret; that every room in every one of them encloses its own secret; that every beating heart in the hundreds of thousands of breasts there, is, in some of its imaginings, a secret to the heart nearest it!’

– From ‘A Tale of Two Cities’ by Charles Dickens (1859)

1 Introduction

1.1 Setting the scene

There are days that one remembers even after years have passed. For me, one of them is 22 March 2016. At the time, I lived and studied in Brussels, and initially the day began just like every other Tuesday. I was about to leave the house, when the alarming news reached me that there had been an explosion at the city's airport. In shock, I tried to find out more and checked in with worried friends and family members. Only a few minutes later, there were reports of another attack. This time, the target was Brussels' metro system, and more specifically a train of line five, the line I regularly took to go to university or the city-centre. While I stayed safely at home during the attacks, I later heard from friends who just escaped from being killed. Yet, as horrifying as these morning hours of 22 March were, in a way they did not come as a real surprise, neither for people like me who lived in Brussels nor for external observers. Thus, the atmosphere in the Belgian capital was already bizarre, after two major attack series had hit Paris in 2015 and especially, since it had turned out that one of them was orchestrated from Brussels. This led to soldiers patrolling Brussels' streets, frequent reports of raids across its neighbourhoods, and eventually a pre-emptive security lockdown of the Belgian metropole which lasted for five days in November 2015. Hence, to a certain extent, I had already lived in a city that had been declared "under imminent attack" for several months. When finally actual bombs exploded in Brussels on that day in March, it almost felt like an inevitable fate had come true and in comparison, – at least from my personal impression – the public and political reaction to the local attacks was less intense than the reaction to those in Paris, as one had already gotten used to living under exceptional circumstances.

This formative personal experience in Brussels significantly contributed to the development of my research interest in how everyday life transformed due to terrorist violence and counterterrorist measures in European metropoles. The understanding that cities and terrorism have an 'indivisible and brutal relationship' (Burke 2018) became at latest with the 9/11 attacks prominent in public and academic discourse (Savitch 2003; Rokem et al. 2017: 257): Cities have admittedly always obtained an exceptional role in times of warfare and violence, be it as safe harbours or as sensitive targets to maximise damage (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002). But as terrorist violence is typically highly symbolic and thus aims at 'a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not [necessarily] a lot of people dead' (Jenkins 1975: 15), metropoles appeal as attractive targets to terrorist perpetrators because they provide concentrated people, resources, mobility as well as manifold cultural, and economic opportunities. To respond to this constantly looming threat, various countermeasures have been imposed in cities all around the globe and the everyday lives of their citizens. These have been questioned in a growing body of interdisciplinary literature, especially criticising their freedom-restricting and oftentimes discriminatory implications (Coaffee 2009; Katz 2013; Tulumello 2015; Sjoberg 2015; Fregonese 2021; Batley 2021). My project contributes to these existing debates around the securitisation of urban everyday life on a theoretical-methodological level as well as on a normative-critical level by engaging with the central research question: How has everyday life in European metropoles transformed

during times of (counter)terrorism? I decidedly use the notion "(counter)terrorism" to emphasise my dialectical understanding of the relationship between terrorist violence and counterterrorist violence (cf. Lindahl 2018: 2). Thus, my analysis considers both how terrorist violence *and* the response to it has changed urban everyday life in Europe. So far, most scholars working in the field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) have focused on the latter to challenge the political decision-making regarding the legitimate response to terrorist attacks. And understandably so, because it is the side of the coin that appears possible to influence, as political leaders are at least in democratic regimes to some extent accountable for their decisions, while the minds and actions of terrorist perpetrators seem even more out of reach for critical interventions from academics. Yet, from my perspective, any form of violence requires critical attention and reflection upon its legitimacy. However, although terrorist violence and counterterrorist violence are ultimately inseparable in co-constituting each other, differentiating between them implies typically a normative judgement about their (il)legitimacy (Jackson 2018). Using the notion of (counter)terrorism is hence my attempt to avoid reproducing this problematic tendency.

I contend by posing my research question that despite the undeniable value of the evolving academic engagement with urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, some – yet, critically important – aspects of this development are still largely underexplored in the current debates. These neglects revolve firstly around the inseparable entanglement of social and material aspects in how urban everyday life is securitised: The suspiciousness attributed to people living in cities has implications for the objects they use and the sites they inhabit in their day-to-day life, and vice versa suspicious things and urban areas add to the potential dangerousness of people using these objects and inhabiting these places. Secondly, it has been overlooked that these securitisation processes change local as well as translocal space because increasingly vague notions of suspiciousness transform not only cities where attacks happened but also places where no attacks happened. Thirdly, the normative basis of challenging the undesirable consequences of securitised urban everyday life has remained 'a little opaque' (Jackson 2017: 357), as respective asymmetries in affectedness and responsibility have not been discussed systematically. To tackle these neglects, I develop an analytical framework that draws on assumptions from various theoretical perspectives, including posthumanist performativity and ethics, securitisation theory, and theorisations of spatiality and temporality. Empirically, I look at the transformations of everyday life in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. Based on my findings, I argue that the securitisation of everyday life constitutes a process of urban segregation which renders European metropoles the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox that can be and should be challenged. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I outline the structure of this dissertation as well as the scope of its contribution. I begin with briefly arguing for the critical socio-political relevance of my project. Then, I introduce my theoretical approach and its methodological implications in a nutshell. Subsequently, I present the empirical scope of my contribution and my case selection. Finally, I lay out the structure of my research project by summarising the contents of its different chapters.

1.2 Socio-political relevance of the project and research objectives

I started off this introductory chapter by outlining what initially motivated me personally to engage with this project but of course there are various reasons to analyse how everyday life in European metropoles transformed over time that go beyond my individual experience with (counter)terrorism in Brussels. While I will discuss my academic contribution to the existing literature about the securitisation of urban normality in-depth in the critical literature review that follows in the next chapter, I deem it important to argue, prior to that, why my project and its findings matter in socio-political terms and outline my central research objectives. This clarification is especially necessary because grasping what the securitisation of urban everyday life means and why it is problematic might not be immediately obvious to everyone and even potentially counterintuitive to some: After all, the image of European cities as particularly safe, free, and liberal places which are full of opportunities for everyone who comes to visit or live in them has been meticulously curated, in contrast to their counterparts in the Global South which are denounced as potentially dangerous thanks to the supposedly higher risk of being exposed to violent crime, poverty, diseases, and terrorist attacks in them (Graham 2006). In this Eurocentric narrative that proclaims a dichotomy between 'conflict cities' in which insecurity is constructed to be expectable and 'ordinary cities' in which security is retained to be a given (Fregonese 2021: 26), my argument that urban everyday life in Europe has become increasingly securitised, as (counter)terrorist violence got more and more inscribed in European cities, does not fit well.

The observation that spreading insecurity does not match common expectations about secure European metropoles goes hand in hand with the (in)visibility of this phenomenon. In other words, my claim about transforming European metropoles may also appear surprising because (counter)terrorist violence is not necessarily always explicit and obvious. In fact, I openly admit that the securitisation of urban everyday life can take very subtle forms or even be intentionally obscured. In other cases, (counter)terrorist violence gets so normalised in urban day-to-day interactions that it becomes hardly recognisable for what it is, since it appears too mundane and trivial to cause critical attention. Thus, one may wander the streets of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart feeling completely safe and not actively encountering or noticing (counter)terrorist violence, when taking the public transport, going to a restaurant, or attending a cultural event at a crowded venue. Why should one be bothered by the concrete bollards securing Stuttgart's busy shopping streets? What difference does it make if the litterbins in Brussels' metro tunnels are see-through or not? What is problematic about the announcements in London's buses and tube system to report anyone and anything that appears suspicious? Why should one be concerned when policemen or private security staff checks people's belongings when entering a football stadium, a museum, a famous sightseeing spot, or a concert hall? Certainly, some of these day-to-day encounters with the securitisation of urban everyday life may be considered impractical, time-consuming, and annoying by people visiting and living in these cities. But experiencing them – although they are all implicitly or explicitly linked to security – does not necessarily lead to associating them with the inscription of (counter)terrorist violence in European metropoles.

Yet, I argue exactly that. Hence, in my understanding, all these security relevant transformations of urban everyday life deserve public, political, and academic attention not only because they transform European metropoles but also because they already imply or at least eventually lead to the spreading of (counter)terrorist violence. This violence can range from physical, verbal, or emotional harm to being limited in the ways one can participate in urban everyday life, in the sense of realising one's personal potential and making one's own choices on how to behave and interact with others (cf. Galtung 1969). While such restrictiveness is quite literally tangible in the implementation of access controls at big venues and events, other examples, such as replacing the not see-through litterbins in Brussels' metro, to avoid that potential bombs can easily be hidden in them, are only early indications of adhering to a more and more absolutist pre-emptive security logic. However, the introduction of these new transparent litterbins symbolically stands for the bigger question, where does this transformation eventually lead to? In other words: If a litterbin is see-through or not see-through is not so much worrisome as such but the question is, where does the implementation of this pre-emptive logic on which this decision was based end? After all, bombs can be easily put in bags and suitcases or even attached to the human body, hidden under heavy clothing. Thus, if the rationale behind replacing the non-transparent litterbin is consequentially thought out, these possibilities should be considered equally concerning from a security perspective, and therefore call eventually for the implementation of apt countermeasures.

While such considerations of "where does it end" may at this stage still be dismissed as dystopian, I contend that even if the securitisation of urban everyday life will not further intensify in the future, the tendencies that can already currently be observed are problematic enough, and therefore need to be challenged. After all, feeling safe and free in Europe's urban everyday life is as of today a matter of privilege that is not enjoyed by everyone and everything equally. In other words, those people, and things, that are nowadays deemed to be potentially dangerous, already face the repressive and violent repercussions of their association with suspiciousness. In this sense, although urban everyday life is not completely securitised yet – and probably, hopefully never will be – ignoring the current tendencies towards its increasing transformation means ultimately ignoring the struggles of those who are already suffering its present-day consequences. Therefore, I pursue three central research objectives in this project: Firstly, I aim to understand how everyday life in European metropoles has transformed over time and across space during times of (counter)terrorism, in adopting increasingly vague notions of suspiciousness that mark more and more people, things, and sites in these cities as potentially dangerous or vulnerable attack targets, leading to the implementation of restrictive and violent measures of control to manage this suspiciousness. Secondly, I want to critically engage with the problematic consequences of this securitisation process that affects everyday life in cities that have and cities that have *not* encountered a local terrorist attack, in further empowering privileged people, things, and sites as worthy of protection and further exacerbating the vulnerabilities of those who are already marginalised. Thirdly, I intend to make normative claims about who is responsible to challenge the increasingly worrisome securitisation urban everyday life in Europe and how to counter this unsettling development.

1.3 Theoretical framework: Analysing the transformation of urban everyday life

To make this contribution to the ongoing academic and political debate, I develop an original theoretical framework which allows me to study the transformation of everyday life in European metropoles during times of (counter)terrorism. So far, especially Critical Geographers but also scholars from CTS and Critical Security Studies (CSS) provided meaningful insights on how pre-emptively managing the threat of terrorist violence reorganised urban everyday life (Tulumello 2015; Bannister and Fyfe 2001; Coaffee 2009, 2019). Such processes are oftentimes enabled by initially temporary policies that become eventually perpetual, constituting a 'permanent state of exception' (Agamben 2005) which makes security practices increasingly banal and mundane (Katz 2013). This legitimises on the one hand acts of counterterrorist violence (Vaughan-Williams 2009) and creates 'suspect communities' (Hillyard 1993). On the other hand, ordinary citizens are increasingly charged with reporting any signs of suspiciousness in their professional and private lives (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019; Batley 2021; Rodrigo Jusué 2022). The described growing prevalence of security logics, known as securitisation, was recognised initially as either a discursive process or a shift in practices (Buzan et al. 1998; Bigo 2002; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). However, more recently, scholars pointed out the materiality of securitisation processes, claiming that 'discussions […] of the governance of security did not lead to an engagement with the role of "things" in security constructions' (Aradau 2010: 493). This New Materialist turn incited research about critical infrastructures, mundane objects, and security devices (Aradau 2010; Neyland 2008; Amicelle et al. 2015). In respect to urban everyday life, contributions which explicitly drew on New Materialism laudably emphasized the agential role of materiality, and thus non-human research objects, such as concrete barriers (Trandberg Jensen and Jensen 2023) and urban transportation in securitisation processes (Hoijtink 2015), to reveal the material-discursive interplay of its human and non-human aspects (Fregonese and Laketa 2022; Adey et al. 2013).

Despite the thought-provoking value of this existing interdisciplinary body of literature, I contend that the current academic debate has some shortcomings. To tackle them, I engage with different theoretical lenses rather than sticking to one clear-cut approach and hence I combine assumptions from posthumanist performativity and ethics, securitisation theory, and theorisations of spatiality and temporality, and integrate them into a coherent analytical framework. My starting point is to conceptualise urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement of intra-acting human and non-human bodies, following Barad's (2003, 2007) notion of posthumanist performativity and to define securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process. Employing a New Materialist lens – and Barad's thinking especially – allows me to consider how human and non-human bodies both form part of urban everyday life and are as such both transformed in times of (counter)terrorism. This is based on my premise that urban everyday life is neither made up only by its streets, buildings, and material objects nor is it merely constituted by the personal and professional interactions of humans, inhabiting cities but the intertwined interplay of these social and material aspects. This understanding is also reflected in how I conceptualise securitisation in this project, by interlinking more classic discourse and practice based

notions of it with New Materialist thinking (Buzan et al. 1998; Bigo 2002, 2006b; Aradau 2010). Such a conceptualisation enables me to look at how discursive meanings *and* physical materialities of suspicious human and non-human bodies in urban everyday life have changed over time. The second dimension of my theoretical framework deals with how local notions of who and what is suspicious travel from one city to the other and from memories of terrorist attacks in the past and future imaginaries thereof to initiate transformations in current urban everyday life. To theoretically capture this process, I draw on Stritzel's concept of 'translation' (2011a, 2011b) and conceptualise spatiality and temporality as both relational and multidimensional, in following scholars such as Massey (1992, 1994) and Low (2014, 2016). This enables me on the one hand to consider space as local space in which everyday life exists, as geographically identifiable places such as my case cities, and as translocal space, meaning the intersubjectively created notion of European metropoles (Low 2016: 174). On the other hand, it allows me to consider time in its past, present, and future configuration within my analysis. The third dimension of my theoretical framework engages finally with the normative aspects of my argument. To critically reflect on how everyday life was securitised against the background of existing socio-material power hierarchies in European metropoles, I adopt an understanding of posthumanist ethics (Barad 2007; Haraway 2008) and thus reveal how asymmetries between privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre and marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery further increased within their transformation in times of (counter)terrorism.

1.4 Methodological implications: Conducting a historiographic archaeology

Understanding methods in their performativity as research practices is helpful to grasp the entanglement of theory and methods as well as to discuss reflexivity in my research project, as from my perspective, theoretical and methodological research decisions always go hand in hand (Aradau et al. 2015b: 15). Thus, my original theoretical framework to analyse transforming everyday life in European metropoles during times of (counter)terrorism calls for an explorative and creative methodological approach. While most of the existing academic literature on the securitisation of urban normalities makes use of ethnographic research techniques (see for instance: Ochs 2013; Adey et al. 2013; Fregonese and Laketa 2022), I employ what I call a historiographic archaeology to methodologically engage with my project. I argue that this method allows to me trace the transformation of urban everyday life across time and space and reveal power dynamics within this process, as it is inspired by Foucault's (1964, 1974, 1980) understanding of archaeology and genealogy as well as the notion of mapping, as used by Bourdieu (1989) and Latour (2005). The temporal element of my method is that I look at the securitisation of urban everyday life across time, meaning across three analytical phases: the time before 9/11, the time between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, and the time thereafter. Its spatial element is that I analyse this process on the local level of space, and its human and non-human bodies, on the level of place, meaning my case cities, and on the level of translocal space of European metropoles. In contrast to the existing ethnographies, my research is desk-based, and its empirical material includes policy documents, newspaper articles, academic literature, reports, websites, ultimately anything that

discusses everyday life in European metropoles and its securitisation in times of (counter)terrorism. Within this vast corpus of data, I collect, identify, and categorise what is relevant for my analysis by mapping the material "to show the reader what I have seen", while being aware of the selectivity, fragmentation, and subjectivity that are inevitably implied in this process (cf. Loughlan et al. 2015: 47).

In the first step of my historiographic archaeology, I compile mental maps for the transformation of local space, looking at human and non-human bodies separately to draw out their nuances and particularities. The non-human bodies that I analyse are firstly suspicious sites, meaning the locations and areas in a city that are deemed vulnerable for an attack or the place where dangerousness emerges from. Secondly, I look at suspicious objects, by comparing how mundane urban objects, such as cars, bags, and trashcans, became attributed with suspiciousness just like classic weapons, such as firearms, explosives, and knives. On the other hand, the human bodies that I analyse are firstly suspicious people, meaning individuals who are suspected to having committed terrorist violence or having intentions to do so or who are deemed to be receptive to extremist radicalisation. Secondly, I engage with managers of suspiciousness who are charged with counterterrorist responsibilities. To do so, I look at formal managers of suspiciousness who are representatives of institutions that are traditionally responsible for dealing with security matters including countering terrorism, as for instance police forces, intelligence services, and military personnel. Besides that, I also analyse semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness who are encouraged in their professional and respectively their private lives to look out for suspiciousness in everyday life and report their observations to the authorities.

In the second step of my historiographic archaeology, I engage with the entanglements of human and non-human bodies in becoming more and more suspicious or respectively responsible to look out for suspiciousness and I analyse how the attribution of vulnerability or potential dangerousness to them produces, reproduces, and reinforces suspiciousness in their socio-material interplay within urban everyday life. Thus, this step shifts my analysis from the local level of space to the level of place, as it allows me to shed light on how the everyday life of a particular city was securitised over time. In the third step of my historiographic archaeology, I reflect on my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics by contextualising my observations within existing socio-material power hierarchies. To do so, I ask three questions: Who and what is material-discursively constructed as potentially dangerous? Who and what is material-discursively constructed as worthy of protection? And who and what is material-discursively constructed as capable and credible to provide security in urban everyday life? After compiling a historiographic archaeology for each of my cases separately, I bring them together in a 'thick comparison' (Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010) to lift my analysis from the level of place to the level of translocal space: By mapping the similarities and differences of my cases across time and across space and comparing the normative implications of securitising urban everyday life, I not only tease out where and when material-discursive meanings of suspiciousness were translated from one of my case cities to the others but I also make observations which are noteworthy for European metropoles in general about how their everyday life transformed in times of (counter)terrorism.

1.5 Empirical scope of the project and selected cases

Studying the transformation of everyday life in European metropoles during times of (counter)terrorism implies two crucial questions about the empirical scope of my project, namely *where* and *when* do I analyse these transformation processes? My spatial limitation to *European* cities is already inherent in the phrasing of my research question. Restricting my project's scope to Europe is not intended to suggest that the securitisation of urban everyday life is only or particularly a problem in this geographical context. In fact, the existing literature must be criticised for its focus on cites in Europe and the Global North in general. Especially postcolonial accounts offer a valuable perspective to dismantle how white bodies are valued over black bodies in the public, political and academic reception of (counter)terrorism, as cities in the Global South are in comparison more affected by terrorist attacks but their visibility is still higher in the Global North (Catto 2016). This coincides with higher public and political attention paid to counterterrorist measures there. Yet, at the same time, the securitisation of urban everyday life in the Global North does bring violence and restrictions to its metropoles which fundamentally contradict their attributed reputation as liberal and safe places which offer a high level of personal freedom (Fregonese 2021). This discrepancy is my main reason to focus on cities located in the Global North. My special geographical limitation to *European* cities has on the one hand pragmatic reasons, such as my personal background as a European researcher which goes hand in hand with stronger cultural sensitivity, and language skills in English, French, and German. On the other hand, this spatial focus bears the advantage that cities within Europe share many similarities thanks to their geographical and cultural proximity (Häussermann and Haila 2005: 44; Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000). In the temporal sense the scope of my project is limited to *times of (counter)terrorism*. This demarcation is – in comparison to my spatial scope – intentionally less specific because identifying the exact starting point of when the securitisation of urban everyday life in Europe began is impossible but at the same time the transformation process that I observe in my project is currently still ongoing, and thus has no "natural" end point yet either. To still make my project researchable, I limit my analysis to a period beginning roughly after World War II and ending in 2022, when my data collection was completed. Of course, this does not mean that (counter)terrorism did not exist in Europe before 1945. However, since my analysis is not a purely historical inquiry, I limit it to relatively recent trajectories. Ultimately, both the spatial and the temporal limitations of my project's empirical scope are necessary to make my analysis analytically feasible. Yet, I argue that the original framework that I develop within this dissertation can be easily adapted for researching other temporal and geographical contexts, and therefore constitutes a valuable theoretical-methodological contribution to the existing academic debate on the securitisation of urban everyday life which goes beyond Europe and beyond times of (counter)terrorism.

Limiting myself to European metropoles in times of (counter)terrorism does however still not say anything about which specific places to choose as cases for my empirical analysis. My selection of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart as case cities is mainly indebted to their different local encounters with terrorist violence within the time frame of my analysis. Hence, I argue that their respective trajectories

make not only each of them individually an interesting case but moreover, their combination is particularly valuable for the sake of my thick comparison of cases. Thus, London is significant because of its long and eventful history of local encounters with terrorist violence within my analysis' time frame. The city experienced attacks committed by domestic and transnational terrorist groups, attacking both human and non-human targets, and using a wide range of different attack methodologies. An important era of terrorist violence before 9/11 happened in the context of the Northern Irish Conflict, as groups such as the provisional "Irish Republican Army" (IRA) committed assaults not only on Northern Irish territory but brought violence also to the British mainland. Their campaign was particularly focused on London which counted more than 50 casualties during the last decade of the so-called Troubles (McGladdery 2006: XIV). In the phase between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, London encountered terrorist violence less frequently but became the local target of one of the deadliest attacks committed on European ground at the time: On 7 July 2005, only one day after the metropole had been announced the host city of the Olympic Games in 2012 and, while the UK was hosting the G7 summit in Gleneagles, the city's public transport system was hit by several coordinated explosions, costing the lives of 56 people and injuring over 700 (Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009b). Since the peak in 2015/16, the attacks other European cities suffered shifted attention away from London but nonetheless several incidents of terrorist violence happened in the British capital, especially in 2017 (Black 2019). Thus, thanks to its long history of continuous local encounters with terrorist violence, London serves as the "prime example" case within my selection. In contrast to London, Brussels has not much of a past, when it comes to terrorist violence: Although the Belgian capital saw some attacks in the late 1970s and early 1980s committed by the domestic group "Cellules Communistes Combattantes" (Communist Combatant Cells, CCC) from the extreme left, these ended abruptly with the capture of its leadership circle in 1985. The CCC's violence was explicitly directed at non-human targets and only caused two, presumably unintentional, human casualties (Fendt and Schäfer 2008). After a long absence of local attacks, Brussels gained in recent years the infamous reputation to be Europe's capital of jihadism (Boussois 2017: 173), as the city was not only targeted in a major local attack in March 2016 but also the place where the Paris attacks in November 2015 were orchestrated from. In this sense, I consider Brussels as the "newcomer" case within my selection, as its most intense local experiences with terrorist violence are still very much present. My last case city Stuttgart constitutes finally the "test" case within my sample, since the German metropole has never experienced a local terrorist attack so far. Thus, it was neither targeted during the domestic campaign of the "Rote Armee Fraktion" (Red Army Faction, RAF) during the 1970s and 1980s, nor did it encounter an attack in the post 9/11 era. However, not only given its "uneventful" past but also due to it being one of the less popular and visible European metropoles, Stuttgart does not come immediately to mind when thinking about 'where the next terrorist attack will happen' (Aradau and van Munster 2012: 98). Therefore, the city fits my project design aptly, as including it enables me to show how (counter)terrorism travels from places where local terrorist violence happened to the everyday life of European metropoles which never encountered a direct attack.

1.6 Structure of the project

Despite my circular understanding of doing research, my dissertation follows a classic linear structure to make its argument easy to follow. Thus, after this introductory chapter, I critically engage with the existing academic literature on the securitisation of urban everyday life. Hence, I reveal not only the inspirational value but also some relevant shortcomings of the current interdisciplinary debates. These revolve around the entanglement of human and non-human suspiciousness, the superficial engagement with how (counter)terrorism travels across space and across time, and the insufficient normative basis to challenge the problematic consequences of how human and non-human bodies have become increasingly suspicious in urban everyday life. My literature review therefore allows me to argue for the meaningful contribution that my project makes, both on a theoretical-methodological level as well as on a normative-critical level. To make this contribution, the next chapter is dedicated to my original theoretical framework in which I firstly conceptualise urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement and securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process. Then I outline my relational and multidimensional understanding of spatiality and temporality before I finally introduce posthumanist ethics as a normative perspective to critically engage with the securitisation of urban everyday life. These three steps allow me to formulate my central argument and delineate its scope. In the subsequent chapter, I discuss the methodological implications of my theoretical premises, in that I establish historiographic archaeology as my method to identify, collect, and engage with empirical material in my project. Having outlined its consecutive analytical steps brings me to discuss my case selection in-depth and argue for the individual relevance of researching London, Brussels, and Stuttgart as well as for the added value of analysing their similarities and differences in a thick comparison.

The three following chapters build the centre of my empirical analysis: Firstly, I conduct a historiographic archaeology of the British capital which provides the basis for comparing my cases, as London serves as the prime example case within my sample. Secondly, I engage with the Belgian capital as the newcomer case among my selected cities to show that although the attacks in and from Brussels in 2015/16 pushed the securitisation of its everyday life significantly, suspiciousness already spread incrementally before that. Thirdly, I analyse the transformation of everyday life in Stuttgart, as the test case within my sample, to demonstrate that securitisation travels across time and space from places where local attacks happened to places where they did not. In the chapter thereafter, I conduct a thick comparison of my cases in which I analyse how material-discursive suspiciousness is translated from the past and the future to the present as well as from the local space of one place to the other and to the translocal level of space. My systematic engagement with the similarities and differences of my cases enables me to claim that European metropoles constitute the spatial manifestation of an (in)security paradox in times of (counter)terrorism. In my conclusion, I discuss the normative-critical implications of my findings in respect to scholarly debates but also beyond academia. These revolve around how to challenge the increasing securitisation of urban everyday life. Finally, I critically reflect on my project's limitations, engage with some anticipated criticism, and outline ideas for further research.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The securitisation of urban everyday life has received critical attention from researchers across various disciplines, including CTS, CSS, Critical and Urban Geography, Architectural Studies, Sociology and Anthropology. Despite this emerging body of literature that deals with how practices, discourses, and materialities in and about urban normality have changed in times of (counter)terrorism, I contend that my project provides a meaningful contribution to these discussions in the theoretical-methodological as well as the normative-critical sense. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the different dimensions of my argument tie in with existing debates on the securitisation of urban everyday life by building on their findings but more importantly by addressing some of their shortcomings and neglects. To do so, this literature review is divided into three parts. In its first part, I show that especially thanks to the New Materialist turn, the securitisation of urban everyday life was unpacked as a process with social *and* material implications. Yet, it has not been fully grasped how the increasing material-discursive suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies is inseparably entangled. In the chapter's second part, I argue that these processes of entanglement matter not only on the local but also on the translocal level of space, because albeit spatial and temporal lenses have been used to make sense of the securitisation of urban everyday life, how notions of suspiciousness are simultaneously translated across different configurations of space and time was overlooked. In the chapter's third part, I outline how although many scholars made critical interventions concerning the normatively undesirable consequences of securitised urban everyday life, respective asymmetries in affectedness and responsibility have not been discussed systematically. I address this shortcoming by drawing on posthumanist ethics which not only allows me to reveal how socio-material hierarchies are reproduced due to securitisation but moreover implies a normative starting point to think about countering the securitisation of urban everyday life.

2.2 The (counter)terrorist securitisation of urban everyday life as an entanglement

Conceptually and politically, "terrorism" is a contested issue because assigning this label to acts of violence enables actors not only to discredit their opponents but also to implement extraordinary measures to counter this seemingly special type of violence (Jackson 2018). What makes terrorism arguably a distinctive 'method of violence' (Richards 2014: 213) is the intention to deliver a symbolic message of insecurity that projects fear beyond the actual violent act. Within this logic, international metropoles are deemed to provide 'the ideal stage to broadcast the terrorist message' (Savitch 2003: 108), and thus, they offer interesting research objects (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002; Graham 2004).

2.2.1 The existing debates around cities as attractive (counter)terrorist targets

Cites are considered attractive targets for terrorist perpetrators thanks to their assigned material, social, and symbolic vulnerabilities. In material terms, Luke (2004), Jordan (2008), and Coward (2009) claimed that metropoles are attacked as nodal points of critical infrastructures which provide 'a resource-rich terrain for terrorists to exploit' (Luke 2004: 120) due to their material constitution, such as the fragility

of high glass buildings, and the destructive domino effects that terrorist incidents have at them. In social terms, cities are vulnerable not only as 'containers of people' (Molotch and McClain 2003: 679) but furthermore so, given their socio-political relevance as places of economic prosperity and cultural diversity (Savitch and Ardashev 2001: 2516) which have been 'something to shoot for as well as something to shoot at' (Bishop and Clancey 2004: 55) since ancient times. These urban vulnerabilities – although this is often not decidedly specified in the respective analyses – revolve usually around cities of the Global North: While cities in the Global South are typically even more affected by both terrorist and counterterrorist violence (cf. Graham 2006), questions of risk and vulnerability are usually reserved for metropoles in the Global North (Beall 2006), as the international visibility of attacks differs greatly depending on where in the world they take place (Catto 2016).

Given this exposed role of cities as attractive targets of terrorist violence, they consequentially received special attention from a counterterrorist perspective. Since the 'next terrorist attack' (Aradau and van Munster 2012: 98) has been declared a threat that is permanently daunting, not only in 'conflict' but also in 'ordinary cities' (Fregonese 2021: 26), security practices became increasingly banal and mundane (Katz 2013), encroaching on their everyday life. In material terms, this led to debates about the (in)defensibility of urban space (Simpson et al. 2017b) and freedom-restricting practices implemented through urban planning, which turned cities into exclusionary 'fearscapes' (Tulumello 2015: 257; see also: Bannister and Fyfe 2001). This has put limits to social interaction at sites constructed as vulnerable (Ceccato 2020; Graham 2004; Aradau 2015), propagated exclusionism towards certain users of space (Carr 2020; Luke 2004), and normalised measures of control such as surveillance and material barriers (Lyon 2004; Ellis 2020; Franko Aas et al. 2008; Klauser 2010; Coaffee 2010). However, not only the material but also the social implications of securitised urban everyday life have been explored in the literature. Thus, on the one hand, scholars have engaged with the violent implications of counterterrorism for all urban inhabitants (Vaughan-Williams 2009) but especially certain minority groups, whose members are automatically stigmatised as terrorist suspects based on bodily features or identity markers such as religious beliefs (Hillyard 1993; Awan 2012; Breen-Smyth 2014). On the other hand, critical contributions tackled how urban everyday life was reorganised under the premise of resilience (Coaffee et al. 2009b), as ordinary citizens are increasingly charged with looking out for suspiciousness (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019; Batley 2021; Rodrigo Jusué 2022).

2.2.2 The shortcomings and neglects of the existing debates

Theoretically, securitisation was initially analysed as either a discursive process or a shift in practices (Buzan et al. 1998; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). However, more recently, scholars pointed out the materiality of securitisation processes (Aradau 2010: 493). This New Materialist turn thus incited analytical engagement with critical infrastructures, the suspiciousness of mundane objects, security devices, and objects of protection (Aradau 2010; Neyland 2008; Amicelle et al. 2015; Trandberg Jensen and Jensen 2023). In the particular context of urban everyday life, scholars such as Coaffee et al. (2009b), Katz (2013), Tulumello (2015) and Lehr (2019) were already well aware of the spatio-material

implications of securitisation practices but oftentimes treated material objects, such as bollards, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, and passports, as devices merely facilitating securitisation, rather than recognising their active role in shaping the ways in which they are either securitised as dangerous and vulnerable objects or securing as devices which offer safety and protection (Aradau 2010: 495).

In contrast, contributions, which explicitly drew on New Materialism, laudably emphasized the agential role of materiality in securitisation processes. Thus, Trandberg Jensen and Jensen (2023) explored for instance 'the social life of a barrier', arguing that the material condition of counterterrorist concrete blocks and their strategic placement within a city unfold a metropole's social, cultural, and practical constitution. This is not only closely linked to adjacent debates about the beautification and (in)visibility of security measures (Coaffee et al. 2009a; Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. 2014) but more importantly sheds light on the interplay of material and social aspects in the securitisation of urban everyday life. Hence, perspectives of New Materialism explicitly reject a separation of securitisation processes of human bodies from the securitisation processes of non-human bodies, because agency and actorness are not defined by their intentionality but seen as a relationship that implies change (cf. Latour 2005). Following such an understanding, urban (counter)terrorism was investigated, especially by Critical Geographers, as a sensual experience that is felt by and through human and non-human actors in urban everyday life. Hence, Adey et al. (2013: 302) employed the notion of ambiance to make sense of urban surveillance regimes, because they allow a researcher to be 'sensitive to material–affective relations of presence and absence […], but also the not-so-simple encounters with security's materials, presences and practices'. Fregonese and Laketa (2022) drew on the notion of affective atmosphere to study the collective experience of how (counter)terrorism *feels* at particular spatial contexts in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Closs Stephens et al. (2017) showed that this sensual experience of space is also powerful for the way in which these events are material-discursively memorialised. Therefore, New Materialist perspectives of affective atmospheres and ambiance are particularly valuable to capture how socio-material transformations of everyday life (re)produce subjectivity and materiality in and through the experience of (in)security in cities with local attack experiences.

As thought-provoking as especially the existing New Materialist accounts on the securitisation of urban everyday life are, they still uphold a certain hierarchy of human over non-human actors or vice versa. Thus, in the literature on affective ambiance/atmospheres (Adey et al. 2013; Fregonese and Laketa 2022; Closs Stephens et al. 2017), the role of human bodies is particularly highlighted which is reflected most prominently in the methodological approaches used to make sense of how urban atmospheres of terror feel, as these are typically (auto)ethnographies that naturally put the human body of the researchers and their sensations when engaging in urban space at the centre of analysis. Flipping this logic around, Trandberg Jensen and Jensen (2023) conducted a decidedly *material* ethnography which revolves around the non-human bodies of concrete barriers as the focus of analysis, and but hence simultaneously side-lined to some extent the role of human bodies. In contrast to the existing literature, I draw on Barad (2003, 2007) and her posthumanist understanding of performativity to critically make sense of the

securitisation of urban everyday life as a transformative entanglement. Its added value, instead of recurring on Butler (see for instance: Duff 2017; Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015), is Barad's radical materialist reconceptualization of performativity which is not limited to the formation and materialisation processes of *human* subjectivity and bodies (cf. Butler 1993), but *posthumanist*, in the sense that material-discursive formation processes concern '*all* bodies' (Barad 2003: 810), rejecting a prioritisation of human over non-human bodies and vice versa. The notions of entanglement and intra-action which I introduce in-depth in the theoretical chapter of this thesis bring this non-hierarchical, relational understanding of socio-material reality and the inseparable agency of human and non-human bodies to the forefront of the analysis. In a similar vein, Aradau (2010: 491) demonstrated how Barad's posthumanist performativity reveals that critical infrastructure 'neither is an empty receptacle of discourse nor has "essential" characteristics; rather, it emerges out of material-discursive practices'. While I actively draw on Aradau's insightful contribution, my project explicitly goes beyond it. Thus, I focus on a boarder research object, as urban everyday life has arguably more dimensions in how it is securitised than Aradau's focus on critical infrastructures. Furthermore, and again in contrast to Aradau, I first engage with non-human *and* human securitisation processes separately to avoid establishing a hierarchy among them before I reveal how they are entangled.

2.3 Spatio-temporal translations of the securitisation of urban everyday life

In the debates on the material-discursive securitisation of everyday life the lenses of spatiality and temporality have both played a crucial role in critical accounts from various disciplines, as already implicitly mentioned above. After all, my dissertation engages with everyday life in *European metropoles* in *times of (counter)terrorism*, and thus is also defined through spatial and temporal concepts. However, I use spatiality and temporality not merely to limit my project's scope but as analytical categories to reveal how material-discursive securitisations of urban everyday life travel across space and time. Therefore, it is inevitable to unpack the scholarly debates revolving around the space and time of (counter)terrorism in depth to argue for my project's second theoretical contribution.

2.3.1 The existing debates around the time and space of (counter)terrorism

Most of the existing critical (counter)terrorism literature is centred around either spatiality or temporality as analytical categories to explore how terrorist violence and respective countermeasures transform socio-material realities. In spatial terms, cities were only one of many spaces that have been investigated in how they were influenced by the logics of (counter)terrorism. Other analyses focused for instance on spaces such as airports, schools, borders, and the internet (Leese and Koenigseder 2015; Hoijtink 2017; Maguire and Westbrook 2020; Nguyen 2014; Pickering 2004; Pugliese 2006; Mott 2016). The questions asked about spatial aspects of securitisation deal on the one hand with the requirements and conditions of a space to be deemed a vulnerable target that terrorist perpetrators aim to exploit and on the other hand with the consequences and implications of counterterrorist risk assessment strategies at these spaces. In this sense, the respective socio-material conditions of a space determine the (counter)terrorist activities at it but are simultaneously also determined by them (cf. Liu and Guan 2021). In simple words:

space makes (counter)terrorism and (counter)terrorism makes space. In the context of cities, this refers to the aforementioned literature on metropoles as targets (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002; Graham 2004) and the transformations of urban space through counterterrorism measures (Sorkin 2012; Coaffee 2009; Simpson et al. 2017b; Gladon Clavell 2012). Furthermore, (counter)terrorism runs along different spatial scales, and thus challenges clear demarcations of the local, the national, and the global: Hence, Graham (2006: 255) argued that the "Global War on Terror" doctrine is 'marked by attempts to rework imaginative geographies separating the urban places of the US "homeland" and those Arab cities purported to be the sources of "terrorist" threats'. In a similar vein, Coaffee (2013) claimed that the emergence of the resilience paradigm rescaled national security concerns into an urban responsibility.

Just like spatiality, temporality has been discussed in different configurations and with regards to various dynamics in (counter)terrorism politics. In the context of the latter, critical scholars put especially the temporal logics of pre-emption and normalisation in the spotlight of academic discussions. Normalisation describes the process in which extraordinary measures of control that are taken in direct response to a terrorist attack and therefore initially limited in their duration, are reconfirmed again and again, until at some point, they are accepted as persistent practices, constituting what Agamben (2005) calls a 'permanent state of exception'. Such a development is considered problematic because although liberal orders allow for certain restrictions of fundamental freedoms, these must always be justifiable and proportionate. However, since the permanent state of emergency continuously suspends the regular order, these caveats are annulled (Neocleous 2006; Benoist 2007). This is closely connected to the logic of pre-emption which implies an increasing orientation of counterterrorist measures towards the future (De Goede and Randalls 2009; Anderson 2010; De Goede et al. 2014): As the *threat* of terrorist violence has been accepted as permanently daunting, it became governed more and more through risk assessment strategies (Kessler and Daase 2008; Aradau and van Munster 2007, 2011). Within this logic, imaginaries of potential future attacks turn as 'known unknowns' into powerful political instruments to legitimise the implementation of a 'response before the event' (Amoore 2009, 2013). This dynamic raised criticism because it ironically justifies the use of counterterrorist violence to counter terrorist violence that has not happened yet, and potentially never will happen (Zulaika 2012). While therefore the question how the future influences counterterrorism practices in the present has been prominently featured in CTS and aligned fields, the notion of the past received likewise critical scholarly attention. In the context of this temporal configuration, researchers have explored how traumatic experiences of attacks are collectively memorialised in ways that turn these memories – just like the imaginaries of future violence – into powerful tools to rationalise current counterterrorist practices (Milošević 2017; Closs Stephens et al. 2017; Donnelly and Steele 2019). Such dynamics induced calls to 'forget' the events of 9/11 due to the harmful consequences of its remembrances (Zehfuss 2003; Fitzgerald 2021). In recent years, 9/11's representation as a watershed was also criticised for its use in academic discourses, as it cultivated notions of rupture and exception which masked counterterrorist continuities (Toros 2017; Jackson et al. 2021) and added to a general lack of historicity in CTS (Donnelly and Steele 2019; Livesey 2021).

2.3.2 The shortcomings and neglects of the existing debates

All in all, the existing debates on spatiality and temporality produced thought-provoking insights about (counter)terrorist transformations of socio-material realities. Nonetheless, I argue that they suffer from serious limitations because the analytical perspectives of spatiality and temporality have not only been used largely separate from each other but were even placed in a competitive opposition. Thus, Liu and Guan (2021: 126) demanded to liberate CTS from the 'straitjacket of historicism' by employing a spatial lens and thereby reiterated a much older claim from Flint (2003), while vice versa the calls that this very historicity is missing from CTS are equally loud (Donnelly and Steele 2019; Livesey 2021). In less accusatory terms, both spatial and temporal perspectives are still deemed to be overlooked or at least side-lined in critical accounts on (counter)terrorism and International Relations (IR) in general (cf. for instance: Batley 2021; Horn 2020). As such, I find these debates counterproductive and to a certain extent ignorant of worthwhile academic contributions which were made especially throughout the last decade. However, in siding with Aradau and van Munster (2012: 103), I mainly consider these claims as problematic because, in overemphasizing either temporality or spatiality, scholars have artificially separated these analytical categories that are inseparable from my perspective. Following Massey (1992: 77), I contend that 'space and time are inextricably interwoven. It is not that we cannot make any distinction at all between them but that the distinction we do make needs to hold the two in tension'. In short: When one engages with space, one necessarily also needs to engage with time and vice versa.

Yet, there are also a few laudable contributions that embraced a similar understanding by explicitly bringing time and space together. Thus, Fisher (2015: 57) analysed 'the role of discourses of distance, danger and otherness in the securitisation of terrorism during the late twentieth century' from a postcolonial perspective by exploring the constructed meaning of both spatial and temporal imaginaries, such as 'the international' and 'the future'. Even closer to the field of inquiry in my project is the work of Aradau and van Munster (2012) on preparedness exercises, which test capabilities to respond to an attack. The authors claim in this context that counterterrorist 'practices enact a withdrawal of time, as the uncertainty of the future event is displaced on the management of space' (Aradau and van Munster 2012: 99). The logic behind this thought is straightforward: As it is unpredictable when the next attack will happen, and hence the temporal dimension of countering terrorism is beyond the reach of policymakers, their focus is drawn towards controlling the space where an attack could happen because it appears easier to manage. While I consider these observations thought-provoking, I contend that they do not exhaustively grasp the complexity of the spatio-temporal co-constitution of counterterrorism practices, particularly in respect to their transformative influence on urban everyday life. This lack of complexity derives from a reductionist understanding of both temporality and spatiality. Thus, Fisher (2015) just like Aradau and van Munster (2012) focused in their analyses on one particular configuration of time, namely the future, and thereby neglect how memories of the past and perceptions of the present are equally relevant in shaping counterterrorist space-making. In similar vein, they also

reduced spatiality either to local space (Aradau and van Munster 2011) or international space (Fisher 2015), rather than acknowledging that counterterrorist temporalities run across different spatial scales.

Therefore, I agree with Crawford and Hutchinson (2016) in their research agenda setting call to analyse especially 'everyday security' as embedded in a multiplicity of interconnected spatial and temporal configurations, because I consider space and time as co-productive in transforming socio-material entanglements. However, rather than simply drawing on ethnographic methods like Crawford and Hutchinson (2016: 1198) suggest, I develop my own theoretical-methodological framework that allows me to trace how material-discursive securitisations of urban everyday life are translated across time and space. In doing so, I acknowledge temporality and spatiality not only as relational but also in their multidimensionality by shedding light on the past, the present, and the future as well as local socio-material entanglements, several case cities as places, and the translocal space of European metropoles.

2.4 Responsibility and affectedness in the securitisation of urban everyday life

Having outlined how my theoretical-methodological framework contributes to existing debates on the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles brings me to the added value that my project offers in a normative-critical sense. Although there is large body of remarkable work which highlights various ethically problematic consequences of (counter)terrorism, I argue that my analysis provides original critical insights concerning the questions of responsibility and affectedness in the securitisation of urban everyday life, as these have not been comprehensively answered, yet.

2.4.1 The existing debates around human and non-human responsibilities and affectedness

As 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' (Ganor 2002: 287) and state actors are arguably engaging as much as non-state actors in using acts of violence to systematically project fear beyond them, the definitory lines of what count as terrorism are politically contested (cf. Jackson 2018) Given this terminological blurriness, labelling violence as terrorism constitutes a powerful discursive strategy to delegitimise the actions of the other and legitimise the reactions of the self, differentiating between an "evil, unjustified, and harmful" terrorist and a "righteous, necessary, and protective" counterterrorist use of violence (see for instance: Graham 2006; Zulaika 2012). In the context of my research interest, two sets of normative-ethical questions derive from these observations: Firstly, who and what is affected by the securitisation of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, and in what ways are human and non-human bodies affected? And secondly, who and what is responsible for the securitisation of urban everyday life, and who and what is capable to counter it?

The existing literature in CTS and aligned fields focused more prominently on the first set of these questions. Regarding affectedness, scholars convincingly criticised how counterterrorism practices are in some cases as physically violent as the attacks they are meant to counter (Vaughan-Williams 2009; Bauman 2004), while in others they lead to a slow death of fundamental freedoms and liberties (Waldron 2003; Huysmans 2004; Neocleous 2007; Deflem and McDonough 2015). Restricting the ways in which urban everyday life can be lived affects all inhabitants of cities, because even mundane and banal behaviours, such as taking pictures, are increasingly associated with potential dangerousness

(Simon 2012; Katz 2013). At the same time, scholars argued that although *all* inhabitants are affected by the securitisation of cities' everyday life, some are *more* affected than others. This asymmetrical affectedness stems from the stigmatisation of certain – typically minority – groups as "the usual" terrorist suspects. Humans who belong to or are associated with such 'suspect communities' (Hillyard 1993; Breen-Smyth 2014) are discriminatorily targeted by counterterrorist measures of control. In the last decades, especially Muslim communities were 'constructed as enemies' (Jackson 2007), particularly in countries of the Global North (Awan 2012; Cherney and Murphy 2016; van Meeteren and van Oostendorp 2019). Regarding non-human bodies, meaning urban sites and objects, scholars also noted asymmetries in how they are affected by counterterrorist measures. Thus, the definition of vulnerability has been largely dictated by neoliberalism, since elite spaces, such as financial and government districts as well as critical infrastructures, were deemed most worthy of protection (Coaffee 2004, 2009; Aradau 2010). With shifting terrorist attack methodologies, crowds of human bodies became a new reference point of vulnerability, and therefore also more mundane spaces, such as restaurants, stores, and cultural venues, were included into counterterrorist considerations (Aradau 2015). Being assigned with vulnerability led for these sites to a restructuration according to risk assessment rationales (Simpson et al. 2017b; Coaffee and Fussey 2015) which made them not only less accessible and more closely monitored but also more exclusionary towards members of suspect communities (Carr 2020). To ease the effects of living in 'urban atmospheres of terror' (Fregonese and Laketa 2022), measures of control were made hardly visible or aesthetically pleasing (Coaffee et al. 2009a), while simultaneously their normalisation stirred a certain 'surveillance apatheia' (Ellis 2020).

In terms of the second set of questions, particularly the notion of responsibility received scholarly attention. As a classic matter of security, countering terrorist violence fell traditionally in the competence of conventional managers of suspiciousness, such as national intelligence agencies and local police forces but over time other 'stakeholders' (Jarvis and Lister 2010) were charged with more and more counterterrorist responsibilities. This implied on the one hand that dealing with the terrorist threat was rescaled from the national to the local level, and thus cities and their administrations had to take over new tasks and were equipped with more competences (Coaffee and Murkami Wood 2006; Coaffee 2013). On the other hand, public institutions such as (urban) planning commissions, but also the health and the educational sectors which had previously not been occupied with security issues were pushed to look out for suspiciousness and prepare for attack scenarios (Nguyen 2014; Tulumello 2015; Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019). In some cases, these responsibilities were not limited to public institutions but also extended to their private counterparts, meaning that counterterrorist responsibilities became increasingly integrated as an occupational obligation in the professional lives of many ordinary citizens. At the same time, private business owners also invested self-reliantly in securitisation measures to prevent attacks on their premises, receiving oftentimes tailormade expert advice from conventional managers of suspiciousness (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007; Coaffee 2009; Jarvis and Lister 2010). Moreover, since resilience and "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE) became powerful paradigms

within the counterterrorist agenda, ordinary citizens were increasingly encouraged to look out for signs of suspiciousness in the context of their private lives and report them to respective authorities to actively participate in mitigating the terrorist threat (Batley 2021; Rodrigo Jusué 2022). Finally, the notion of responsibility was not only considered for human but also touched upon regarding non-human actors, such as search algorithms and other counterterrorist technologies, whose assumed neutrality was challenged by scholars, as for instance Martin (2019) and Amicelle et al. (2015).

2.4.2 The shortcomings and neglects of the existing debates

Despite the abundance of insightful critical accounts dealing with the problematic consequences of counterterrorism measures in urban everyday life and beyond, I argue that the existing debates have several shortcomings. Most fundamental among them is the missing engagement with alternatives and more concretely the question, who and what *can* and *should* counter the existing (counter)terrorist transformation of urban everyday life. In this sense, I agree with Lindahl (2017: 523) who pointed out that 'CTS has been very good at critiquing contemporary counterterrorism, but has not yet offered an alternative model' and Jackson (2017: 357) who added that 'the normative basis of these critiques remains a little opaque'. From my perspective, the transformation of urban everyday life is a process of socio-material intra-action, and therefore it is short-sighted to merely blame counterterrorism practitioners for its securitisation and the ethically undesirable consequences thereof, as it is typically done in the existing debates. As ordinary citizens play nowadays arguably an integral part in defining who and what is suspicious and who and what is harmless in urban everyday life – no matter if they *want* this responsibility or not – presenting them as passive recipients of counterterrorist obligations (cf. Batley 2021; Jarvis and Lister 2010; Rodrigo Jusué 2022) is misleading. Such a limited understanding neglects that by living alongside these material-discursive standards of who and what counts as suspicious in urban everyday life, ordinary citizens do not only internalize them but also actively co-produce them and are therefore also potentially able to counter and change them.

Furthermore, I argue that the issue of asymmetries in how human and non-human bodies are both affected and accountable in and for the securitisation of urban everyday life are in general not systematically unpacked yet in the existing critical literature. Thus, while discriminatory counterterrorist practices are recognised as problematic for human bodies (Guzik 2009; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Du Boulay 2012), their undesirable consequences are much less explored, when it comes for instance to urban sites and thus non-human bodies. The existing literature only demonstrated in this context why certain sites are deemed vulnerable and therefore worthy to protect (Coaffee 2004, 2009; Aradau 2015; Aradau and van Munster 2012). What CTS scholars have yet missed to analyse is how certain urban neighbourhoods are deemed potentially dangerous because these places are considered terrorist hideouts, and therefore managed with more control. The general imbalance in attention for human and non-human bodies is moreover questionable because scholars thus neglected how the discriminatory securitisation of human and non-human bodies is entangled, and therefore has immediate repercussions in terms of who and what counts as vulnerable and worthy of protection, and who and what counts as

potentially dangerous and hence needs to be controlled. The neglected asymmetries in the affectedness of privileged versus marginalised human and non-human bodies is mirrored in the debate on responsibility, since this literature focused on how responsibility was extended from conventional to informal counterterrorism actors but overlooked that there are asymmetries regarding who and what is acknowledged as a credible informal manager of suspiciousness and who and what is not. Neglecting these inequalities is arguably problematic per se but even more worrisome because these asymmetries have direct implications for one's capacity to challenge and counter the securitisation of urban everyday life: While privileged human and non-human bodies are not only deemed harmless and worthy of protection but also enabled to co-produce and potentially challenge current transformations, marginalised human and non-human bodies are excluded as suspicious and less trustworthy, therefore the stakes for changing how urban everyday life can be lived are higher for them. In the light of these shortcomings, I argue that by drawing on the so far underexplored normative lens of posthumanist ethics (Hollin et al. 2017: 932), my analysis demonstrates that everything and everyone that forms part of urban everyday life is also responsible for how it develops, yet at the same time, it emphasizes how socio-material power hierarchies (re)produce asymmetries of affectedness and accountability in this context. Thus, the added value of my project lies not only in proposing a new normative lens as a baseline for critique that Jackson (2017) called for but also offers a starting point to think about countering the securitisation of urban everyday life and how to come up with potential alternatives (cf. Lindahl 2017).

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I critically reviewed how scholars have analysed the securitisation of urban everyday life from various theoretical perspectives. In doing so, I acknowledged many of their insightful and thought-provoking findings but also identified several shortcomings and neglects in the existing debates. To address these, my project offers an original contribution in theoretical-methodological and in normative-critical terms: Regarding the former, my analysis demonstrates on the local level, how securitisation processes in urban everyday life are socio-material entanglements and, in this sense, human and non-human bodies are intra-acting, when their material-discursive ontologies are shifting from harmlessness to suspiciousness. Furthermore, on the translocal level, my perspective reveals how these socio-material transformations travel across time and space, and thus change the ways in which urban everyday life can be lived not only at specific places but in European metropoles as an intersubjectively created and lived idea. Drawing on these new theoretical-methodological insights, I also make a normative-critical contribution by exploring the value of posthumanist ethics which enables me to reveal how the securitisation of everyday life constitutes a process of urban segregation, both on the local and the translocal level that further includes privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre and further excludes human and non-human bodies at the periphery. These asymmetries of affectedness are tied to an ethical responsibility for everyone and everything that forms part of urban everyday life to change them and counter processes of securitisation in European metropoles.

3 Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

Given the shortcomings in the existing academic engagement with the securitisation of urban everyday life which I just revealed in my critical literature review, I develop a theoretical framework in this chapter that allows me to overcome these limitations in my project and thus enables me to make a value contribution to various fields, but especially to CTS. Since my analysis hence responds to several neglects in the existing literature rather than filling one particular "gap", my argument has multiple dimensions: Thus, I contend that the securitisation of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism has transformed the ways in which human and non-human bodies are intra-acting in European metropoles, not just at places where terrorist attacks have happened but also where terrorist violence did not happen. This transformation constitutes a new form of urban segregation, as human and non-human bodies at the centre are further included and human and non-human bodies at the periphery are further excluded. Due to these multiple dimensions, my theoretical framework does neither rest on one specific approach nor a single school of thought. Instead, I draw on assumptions taken from various theoretical perspectives, including posthumanist performativity and ethics, securitisation theory, and theorisations of spatiality and temporality which I integrate into a coherent framework that enables me to analyse the transformation of everyday life in European metropoles in times of (counter)terrorism as well as to critically engage with its socio-material power implications. The originality of my project hence builds on combining and using existing theoretical assumptions and concepts in a novel way. In the context of this project, I employ my framework to understand and critically discuss transformations in European metropoles before and after 9/11 but I contend that my framework has analytical value beyond the geographical and temporal scope of my dissertation, as it could be easily adapted to analyse other case cities and time frames, which I consider my main theoretical contribution to the existing literature.

To develop my theoretical framework, I proceed in several steps in this chapter. In its first part, I engage with the questions, what urban everyday life and securitisation mean in the context of my project. To conceptualise these two central terms, I draw mainly on New Materialist literature, in particular Barad's (2003, 2007) notion of posthumanist performativity which allows me to capture everyday life as a socio-material entanglement and securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process. The chapter's second section deals with the question, how urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement is continuously produced and reproduced across space and time. To engage with this question, I introduce spatiality and temporality as analytical categories that are both multidimensional and relational in the sense of Massey (1992, 2001). The third part of the chapter sheds light on the question, how to critically discuss the normative implications of these transformations of urban everyday life and how to think about alternatives. Drawing on posthumanist ethics allows me to reveal and criticise socio-material power asymmetries of affectedness and responsibility in this context. In the fourth step, I combine the elements of my framework to introduce my argument by delineating its scope and reflecting on its added value in a theoretical and a normative-critical sense.

3.2 Conceptualising the securitisation of urban everyday life

As this project deals with the research question how everyday life in European metropoles has transformed in times of (counter)terrorism through processes of securitisation, the groundwork for developing my theoretical framework is to conceptualise these two central terms for my analytical purposes and situate my understanding of them in the respective scholarly debates around them.

3.2.1 Urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement

Commonly, everyday life refers to everything that is mundane, ordinary, and officially or unofficially accepted as a normal part of daily life. Which practices and materialities fulfil this definition is not only highly sensitive to space and time but also permeates different social fields (Burkitt 2004). In the context of European metropoles, everyday life involves for example activities such as dining, working, exercising, visiting a cultural venue or event, taking the public transport, or being at home. It takes place at private and public sites, such as transport hubs, shopping centres, business offices, schools, restaurants, and places of worship. Although the outlined prosaicness of urban everyday life might suggest that its practices are too ordinary to be relevant (Sandywell 2004), it has nonetheless sparked scholarly attention in various disciplines, including (Urban) Sociology and Anthropology (Tonkiss 2005; Kalekin-Fishman 2013; Borer 2013), (Urban) Geography (Katz 2013; Coaffee et al. 2009b; Fregonese and Laketa 2022) as well as CSS and CTS (Ochs 2013; Lehr 2019; Rodrigo Jusué 2022). Within this large body of academic engagement with urban everyday life, a multitude of theoretical perspectives were employed, of which some laid more emphasis on the social practices of everyday routines, while others focused more on the spatio-material conditions in which these routines take place. Such a division suggests that there is a social world where humans matter on the one hand, and a material world where things matter on the other hand, and that the two of them exist detached from each other. Although it may be helpful to emphasise one of the dimensions for certain scientific purposes, artificially delinking and separating the two obscures that humans and non-human bodies are in fact both constitutional elements of everyday life (cf. Aradau et al. 2015a).

New Materialist approaches have set out to challenge such a neat dichotomy of the social versus the material and the human versus the non-human body by suggesting a new understanding of agency that is not defined by intentionality but rather by making a difference 'in the course of some other agent's action' (Latour 2005: 72). Conceptualising agency as a relationship and 'not something that someone or something has' (Barad 2007: 178) is the key step to acknowledge how human and non-human bodies are both equally influential in shaping socio-material arrangements. As I discussed in more length in the previous chapter, in other New Materialist contributions which focus on the increasing securitisation in cities, urban everyday life has been conceptualised by employing notions such as atmosphere and ambiance as a collectively felt experience of living in a city (Fregonese and Laketa 2022; Closs Stephens et al. 2017; Adey et al. 2013) While these perspectives are particularly valuable to capture how socio-material transformations of urban everyday life (re)produce subjectivity and materiality in and through the experience of (in)security, the focus of my analysis lies on tracing the *socio-material entangledness*

of securitisation processes in urban everyday life over time which allows me to critically engage with therefrom deriving questions of responsibility and affectedness.

Thus, in contrast to the existing literature, I conceptualise urban everyday life as an entanglement of intra-acting human and non-human bodies, by drawing mainly on Barad (2003, 2007) and her posthumanist understanding of performativity (cf. Pawlowski 2023). To explain what this means, let me disentangle this entanglement step by step, starting with its constitutive elements, namely human and non-human bodies. That human bodies are a constitutive element of urban everyday life is supposedly the most intuitive aspect of my definition. Human bodies in urban everyday life comprise the permanent inhabitants of a city, but also people who spend a limited time there, such as tourists and commuting workers. Given that humans are constitutive elements of urban everyday life, the question is, what determines how they influence and shape this socio-material entanglement? Within the scope of my project, I consider three aspects as relevant, which are closely intertwined and typically co-determining each other: These are the assigned societal status of humans in cities, their bodily features and identity markers, and their behaviours (cf. Bourdieu 1984). Influence derives hence from a person's position within the socio-material power hierarchies of a city: People can obtain a role of power based on their profession and expertise (cf. Bigo 2002: 74) but also based on their socio-economic status, the place where they live, and character traits assigned to them by others. This is intertwined with identity markers, such as a person's nationality, skin colour, religious affiliation, and gender. Thus, socially assigned dangerousness, as I explore later in more detail, is for instance a gendered and racialised category in most Western societies but also linked to societal stigmas, such as mental health issues, addiction, and poverty (Phillips and Bowling 2017). In addition, how humans behave – and particularly their repetitive practices – shapes urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement. Repetitive practices are behavioural patterns which develop over time and follow formal or informal rules about what is expected as "normal" behaviour in urban everyday life (Bourdieu 1977). However, depending on one's status and appearance, the kind of behaviour that is socially expected of human bodies differs: While it is unusual for a daily commuter to take photos of a subway station, it is not surprising for a tourist to do so. This also works the other way around: A person taking pictures in leisure clothes is more likely to be a tourist than a person in office clothes, carrying a laptop bag (cf. Simon 2012).

The last example indicates already that human action is inseparably entangled with material objects and their performativity (Aradau 2010). Thus, non-human bodies which implies both objects, such as cars, buildings, and signs, as well as physical structures, such as streets and transport lines, are the second constitutive element of urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement. Following the New Materialist definition of agency as a relationship that I introduced above, objects also act, for example, a speedbump makes a driver slow down. The agency of objects is linked on the one hand to their physical materiality and location, meaning are they fragile or solid, big or small, visible or hidden, accessible or closed off (cf. Neyland 2008). On the other hand, they are also based on the meaning and purpose attributed to things: The agency of a traffic light is not linked to the physical light post but to

its switching signal which translates into rules about when to stop and go. Again, and just like for human bodies – the meaning and role of a non-human body in a socio-material entanglement is not intrinsic to an object or a physical structure but develops by intra-acting in entanglements (Barad 2007: 148): For instance, the socially assigned meaning of a firearm changes depending on who holds it.

This brings me to introduce the next important term in my conceptualisation of urban everyday as a socio-material entanglement, namely the notion of intra-action. In contrast to the conventional term *interaction*, Barad's conception of *intra-action* underlines how discourses, practices, and materialities do not exist separately from each other but are formed in 'mutual constitution of entangled agencies' (Barad 2007: 33): Thus, intra-action means that 'heterogenous elements – the discursive and the material – [are] bound to each other in a particular arrangement constitutive of meaning' (Aradau et al. 2015a: 63). In other words, what human and non-human bodies are and do is always dependent on how they are engaging with each other, as only then meaning is produced. Intra-action is a constantly ongoing dynamic, in which human and non-human bodies are perpetually arranged and rearranged. This is influenced by their materiality, their practices, and the discourses about them but simultaneously influences them in conveying meaning. Translated to the context of my project, this means that the intra-actions of everyday life are influenced by the social positioning of human bodies, their identify markers, bodily features, and behaviours as well as the physical materiality and location of non-human bodies and the meanings assigned to them (Pawlowski 2023). While the notion of intra-action captures the process in which human and non-human bodies engage with one another, the notion of entanglement finally describes the "outcome" of this process, which is however, as I just said, continuously evolving and changing. In Barad's words, and entanglement is therefore constituted of *'material-discursive practices – causal intra-actions through which matter is iteratively and differentially articulated, reconfiguring the material-discursive field of possibilities and impossibilities*' (Barad 2007: 170, italics in the original). Hence, the notion of entanglement underlines how posthumanist performativity not only rejects a hierarchy between human and non-human bodies but also considers the processes of their formation and materialisation as inseparably intertwined (Barad 2003). Following this understanding, urban everyday life is constituted as an interwoven entanglement of people inhabiting and managing cities but also of the cities' material goods, such as its streets and buildings, as matter is considered 'an active factor in material-discursive processes' (Aradau 2010: 497):

> 'For instance, that a suitcase is not see-through is a physical feature of the object, but that its material non-transparency is assigned with suspiciousness is discursively constructed and has then again material implications on how the suitcase is treated. In a similar vein, the tone of a person's skin colour is a bodily feature, but that People of Colour are racially profiled as suspicious is a discursive construction, again with material consequences for the affected' (Pawlowski 2023: 5).

Translating these conceptualisations to my project, I therefore conceptualise urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement which is made up of human and non-human bodies that are repeatedly and continuously (re)arranged over time in an 'ongoing dynamic of intra-activity' (Barad 2007: 206).

3.2.2 Securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process

Drawing on this conceptualisation of urban everyday life, the question arises, what kind of political and societal rationales influence the intra-actions of human and non-human bodies in socio-material entanglements and how do they influence them. When it comes to urban everyday life in European metropoles, there is certainly an abundance of evolutions that are worthwhile studying, be it in the context of sustainable restructuration, migration flows, or gentrification. While the existing analyses in these contexts revealed interesting findings on how urban everyday life has developed (see for instance: Bobylev 2008; van Criekingen 2009; Moskowitz 2017), my research interest lies on the transformations of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, as I argue that shedding light on these types of changes is particularly interesting because of the disruptive and violent counterpart, they represent to the banality and normal flow of urban everyday life in 'ordinary cities' (cf. Fregonese 2021; Katz 2013).

As already briefly spelled out in my literature review, the process of securitisation has been considered pivotal in bringing about these changes, which is why I draw on this notion in my analytical framework. However, as there has been a controversial scholarly debate about the term for decades, it is necessary to further conceptualise its meaning for the purposes of my project. The discussion about securitisation initially began with scholars criticising mainstream IR approaches for their state-centric understanding of security which they considered too narrow to comprehensively capture security concerns on the national and international level (Booth 1991; Krause 1998). As a response, wider concepts, such as that of "human security" entered the political as well as the academic debate (UNDP 1994; Owen 2004), but the understanding of security was also more fundamentally reconceptualised. One of these re-conceptualisations was to re-interpret security as a "speech act" following the so-called Copenhagen School: Securitisation thus happens when a securitising actor discursively constructs a phenomenon as an existential threat for a referent object and this social construction is successful in a way that the respective audience, towards it is directed, accepts exceptional measures, to counter the threat, as legitimate (Wæver 1995: 55; Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Buzan et al. (1998) used for instance the example of environmental politics to demonstrate how an issue like climate change which used to be outside the realm of security politics was discursively presented as an existential threat and hence turned into a security issue over time. Although this approach was very influential in the quickly emerging subfield of CSS (cf. C.A.S.E. Collective 2006), it also earned lots of critique and was faced with counterarguments (Balzacq 2005; Floyd 2007). A powerful alternative was promoted thus for instance by the so-called Paris School, whose representatives based their understanding of securitisation on practice rather than on discourse theory (Balzacq et al. 2010; Bigo 2002, 2006b). In their conceptualisation, inspired by Bourdieu's (1977) thoughts on practice and habitus and Foucault's (1980) notion of governmentality, security is constituted in being exercised by assigned security practitioners following a certain policy rationale. Bigo (2002) demonstrated for instance how in the securitisation of migration, the portrayal of immigrants as a source of risk allows 'diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it if it does not yet exist, so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and

security and to mask some of their failure' (Bigo 2002: 65). This is sustained by bureaucratic practices and the habitus of security practitioners. In more recent years, the New Materialist turn, that took place in IR, also reached CSS and hence pushed for the consideration of materiality as co-constitutive in securitisation processes (Lundberg and Vaughan-Williams 2015). Aradau (2010: 494) thus reconceptualised securitisation as a 'process of materialization that enacts a reconfiguration of the world in ways in which differences come to matter'. In the context of this development, the research objects of securitisation analyses were no longer limited to discourses and practices but now also included 'security devices' (Amicelle et al. 2015), 'objects of protection' (Aradau 2010) and dangerous objects of everyday life (Neyland 2008; Hoijtink 2017). Despite their different emphases – and the fact that they are oftentimes presented as competing approaches (Mutimer 2009) – these understandings of securitisation are in my understanding not exclusionary. In fact, they rather have a lot in common and can be fruitfully combined (Aradau et al. 2015a) for my conceptualisation of securitisation.

Siding again with Barad, I argue that discourse cannot be reduced to a matter of materiality and materiality cannot be reduced to a matter of discourse: 'no priority is given to either materiality or discursivity' (Barad 2003, p. 825), because I do consider 'language and materiality as 'inextricably inseparable' (Lundberg and Vaughan-Williams 2015: 6). Thus, my understanding of the term takes up more classic interpretations of securitisation as discursive processes and practice, and intertwines them with the New Materialist notions, as I conceptualise securitisation as a *material-discursive* transformation process that changes socio-material entanglements. What does it mean to avoid privileging discourse over materiality and vice versa, when studying the securitisation of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism? The starting point of such an understanding is to acknowledge that 'terrorism is made governable by both discourses of threat and danger and the arrangement of objects' (Aradau et al. 2015a: 57). This means on the one hand that one must accept that socio-material reality is discursively constructed and that meanings of human and non-human are not fixed but assigned and thus changeable, as in fact human and non-human bodies occupy multiple ontologies at the same time (Neyland 2008: 24). On the other hand, it requires one to recognise that neither matter has intrinsic characteristics that make it the matter it is nor is it the passive product of discursive construction, but its materiality plays an active factor in what meaning can be assigned to it. For example, a high glass building placed in a busy city-centre is thanks to its architectural style, its type of construction, and its location – and thus its materiality – easily exploitable to produce largescale destruction when targeted in a terrorist attack. Attributing vulnerability to these features and specially acknowledging them in how the building is managed according to the logics of risk analysis is a process that certainly involves discourses and practices, but that is ultimately enabled by the building's materiality. In short, materiality is easily overlooked due to the disruptive power of speech acts but these 'little security nothings' (Huysmans 2011) are equally essential for securitisation, as a scattered *material-discursive* process.

This brings me to the second part of my conceptual definition of securitisation as a transformative process which implies for me that securitisation comprises both a dynamic process *and*

the consequences of transformation. Thus, my understanding goes beyond the classic controversies in the securitisation literature about what constitutes extraordinary measures and when are they accepted as legitimate by an audience (Balzacq 2005), since it allows me to look not only at how (counter)terrorist rationales become implemented but also how they are normalised and hence rearrange socio-material entanglements. In other words, the question, if (counter)terrorist changes in urban everyday life are publicly deemed justified and necessary is not a relevant threshold within my framework. Instead, I focus on which kinds of social and material practices of control are implemented and continuously exercised in urban everyday life and who and what is assigned with the responsibility to exercise them. These elements of my conceptualisation of securitisation are both inspired by the understanding of the Paris School, as the former is aligned with its notion of security governmentality and the latter draws on its notion of security practitioners. Yet, I combine this thinking with a New Materialist lens, as in my analysis, I shed light on both human and non-human bodies in how they are rearranged in the socio-material entanglement of urban everyday life, in the sense that they are intra-acting differently in following a certain security logic, by being controlled but also by exercising control.

Yet, at the same time, the discursive understanding of securitisation as coined by the Copenhagen School is also highly relevant for me when conceptualising the processual dimension of securitisation. While I do not adopt its original terminology with regards to portraying a referent object as an existential threat, my understanding is still inspired by its basic logic that security issues are not given but constructed by assigning a security meaning to them through language. Hence, securitisation happens for me as process, when someone or something is discursively presented as suspicious that used to be associated with harmlessness and mundanity before. This suspiciousness is based on their materiality and derives from assigning either *vulnerability*, in the sense that something or someone provides an attractive target to be exploited for terrorist purposes or *potential dangerousness*, in the sense that something or something will or will be used to commit terrorist violence and thus is deemed a source of threat. Therefore, suspiciousness implies in my understanding both, being *a risk* and being *at risk*. These risks are always probabilities rather than certainties, meaning they are at the stage of having the potential to become “real” without being it, yet (Kessler and Daase 2008). Again, I combine this discursive understanding of securitisation with a New Materialist lens, as I look at how both human and non-human bodies shift their ontologies from being recognised as harmless to being suspicious.

Bringing these assumptions and considerations together, I conceptualise securitisation in the context of my project’s analytical framework as a material-discursive transformation process that rearranges intra-acting human and non-human bodies in urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement. An increasing securitisation of urban everyday life happens when on the one hand more and more urban sites, objects, people, and their behaviours material-discursively shift from being considered mundane, ordinary, and harmless to being seen as suspicious, meaning vulnerable or potentially dangerous, and on the other hand, the socio-material practices of control taken to manage these suspicions intensify in their restrictiveness and widen in their scope.

3.3 The production and translation of urban everyday life across space and time

Having established these conceptualisations brings me to the second question that I engage with in the development of my analytical framework, which is how urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement is continuously produced and reproduced across space and time. I argue in this regard that when everyday life is rearranged in a transformative process of securitisation, this does not happen in a void, but within existing socio-material power structures that are determined by the relational and multidimensional notions of spatiality and temporality. Or put simpler: What humans and things can and should do, varies at 'different times and in different places' (Bonditti et al. 2015: 166).

A worthwhile example to illustrate what this means is the transformation of airports over time: When aviation was first commercialised in the early 20th century (Fuller and Harley 2004), airports were as public spaces open to everyone. Passengers merely had to present a valid ticket, when boarding their flight. This changed in the mid-1970s after a series of airplane hijackings in the US (Koerner 2013): Thanks to the past experiences and the threat of future "skyjackings", access to certain zones of the airport was consequently restricted to verified passengers and authorised personnel only. From the North American continent, this new feature of airports incrementally spread all around the globe. Although depending on the respective local context, its implementation took longer, more and more airports were eventually transformed through rearranging human and non-human bodies at them. This included establishing security staff who checks travellers and luggage but also the installation of 'security devices' (Amicelle et al. 2015), such as metal detectors as well as X-ray and full body scanners. Furthermore, the meaning attributed to objects changed: Liquids became for instance 'dangerous objects' (Aradau et al. 2015a: 58) after 9/11. These changes went hand in hand with new behavioural practices: From the frequent passenger's perspective, getting your body and your luggage checked has over time become a routine. Behaviours which would be atypical under different circumstances, such as taking off one's belt in public forms a normal part of being at an airport.

This example already tellingly indicates how both spatiality and temporality were in some ways relevant in the transformation of civil aviation and airports. Yet, this section of my theoretical framework is dedicated to digging deeper into this relevance, as I develop an approach to analytically make use of spatiality and temporality for critically engaging with everyday life in European metropoles in times of (counter)terrorism. As already briefly touched upon in my literature review, in contrast to the existing academic work in this context, I consider spatiality and temporality as both multidimensional and relational to one another. To clarify what this means, I firstly dissect the two separately by shedding light on their multidimensionality, and thus their different configurations. Hence, in terms of spatiality, I engage with local space, places, and translocal space, while in respect to temporality, I discuss the relevance of memories of the past, perceptions of the present, and imaginaries of the future. In the second step, I bring these different configurations together to establish how spatiality and temporality are relational in the ways they are producing socio-material entanglements and to shed light on how socio-material entanglements are therefore translated across space and across time.

3.3.1 The securitisation of urban everyday life across space

What does it mean to trace the securitisation of urban everyday life across space? My basic assumption is that socio-material entanglements are arranged and rearranged in the transformative process of securitisation *within spatial boundaries* (cf. Raco 2003). As already briefly touched upon in my literature review, considerations of space have gained rising attention in analysing the securitisation of urban everyday life over the years across various disciplines. While initially scholars of Urban Geography were at the forefront of exploring the spatial implications of (counter)terrorism measures in cities (Graham 2006; Coaffee 2009; Katz 2013), the New Materialist in IR turn made the spatiality of security politics also in CSS a more prominent analytical category (Lundberg and Vaughan-Williams 2015; Aradau et al. 2015a). Therefore, space and spatiality have been used in various understandings to answer diverse research questions. Without going into detail for now about what these different spatial conceptualisations respectively entail, I argue that this multitude of understandings shows that is short-sighted to speak of space as one-dimensional, and hence I use the notion 'spatialities' (Low 2014) to underline that I recognise space as multidimensional in my analysis. The added value of such a multidimensional understanding is that it allows me to consider different configurations of space, rather than limiting my analysis to only one spatial scale (Marston 2000; cf. MacKinnon 2011). The analytical reason behind this decision goes beyond the aim to merely widen my project's scope, as I contend that shedding light on several configurations of space enables me to trace how the securitisation of everyday life travels across space and across places, in the sense that the securitisation of urban normality is not only transformative at the local level where it happens but also has implications for local contexts at other places as well as the translocally constructed meaning of European metropoles. Before I get to explain these processes of 'translation' (cf. Stritzel 2011a, 2011b) in-depth, it makes sense to first introduce the three configurations of space that I use within my theoretical framework, namely local space, place, and translocal space.

Analysing the scale of local space has been particularly prominent in Human Geography and Architectural Studies (Davis 1995; Raco 2003; Simpson et al. 2017b). Relevant academic controversies with respect to security issues dealt for instance with the question of the (in)defensibility of local space, asking whether space can be "secured by design", meaning by constructing it according to principles of protection and prevention (Newman 1966, 1972) or if these ambitions are actually misguided, as security is never an intrinsic feature of space, and hence such architectural strategies only inscribe feelings of fear and exclusion into local space (Sorkin 2012). In a similar vein, other authors engaged with the (in)visibility of security measures (Coaffee et al. 2009a; Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. 2014; Barker and Crawford 2013): Should spatial arrangements of protection and control blend in with local space and thus be invisible as such, for instance by purposefully beautifying them or should they visibly stand out to project security among the users of urban space? Drawing on these debates' assumptions, I define the notion of local space in my project as the socio-material fabric and conditions, in which intra-action between human and non-human bodies happens. This implies that transformations of socio-material

entanglements never occur in a void but always change within a pre-existing context that follows certain social rules and has a certain material outlook. As clarified earlier, the local space that I shed light on in this dissertation is *urban* space, although cities comprise certainly not the only local space where socio-material entanglements transform in times of (counter)terrorism, as insightful analyses of other spaces such the internet, the airport and the refugee camp show (Mott 2016; Hoijtink 2017; Brankamp and Glück 2022). Yet, each of these local spaces presents itself as a different set of socio-material characteristics that make it the local space it is: For instance, the density of population, the level of social control and interaction, the existing infrastructural systems, the diversity of cultural and economic opportunities are key factors in differentiating urban space from rural space. Thus, which kinds of human and non-human bodies intra-act differs, depending on what kind of local space one looks at: A high number of tall buildings and a persistent agglomeration of human crowds are, continuing the example, more likely in the local space of cities than that of smaller villages. As briefly spelled out in my literature review, these local features have been deemed among the key characteristics that turn urban space into an attractive target space for terrorist perpetrators and their violent aims, and consequentially make securitising *urban local space* a prime concern on the agenda of counterterrorist actors.

In contrast to local (and also translocal) space which is an abstract concept in the sense that it is constructed by certain material and social characteristics, place is something 'specific, concrete, descriptive' (Massey 1994: 9). It refers to a geographical 'location, a position that can be specifically named' (Löw 2016: 167) and that can be 'studied phenomenologically through individual or collective experiences' (Low 2016: 32). The connection[1] between the two is that 'spaces generate places and at the same time these places are the presupposition for all constitution of space' (Löw 2016: 171). In short, *space* materialises at concrete, specific *places*. Within my project, the places I look at are my three case cities London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. I will clarify in more detail why I selected these cities specifically in the methodological chapter of this dissertation but what is more important for now is what the value of including the spatial configuration place into my theoretical framework is. Other than the more abstract categories, local and translocal space, looking at certain places makes my analysis not only empirically tangible but also its findings comparable. Different cities come with distinct socio-material particularities, meaning despite their similarities that make them for instance a city, human and non-human bodies are yet arranged uniquely at them. For instance, different cities are known for distinct iconic buildings or sights, they have a varying degree of multiculturalism, they offer diverse economic opportunities, they are geographically located in distinct national contexts, and have an alternating amount of political autonomy from their respective national levels of government. A differentiating aspect that is crucial in the specific context of my project is the cities' local encounters with attacks of terrorist violence, which therefore comprises a determining factor in the selection of my cases. The places that got the most scholarly attention in previous analyses of the securitisation of urban everyday

[1] For a comprehensive discussion of the different approaches towards the conceptual relationship between space and place, see Low 2016: 12–15.

life were typically those cities which suffered very visible and damaging incidents of terrorist violence in the past, while the counterterrorist developments in cities that have had no local attack experience were side-lined in the academic debate. Especially prominent examples to illustrate this logic are New York City and London. A heightened interest in the transformation of the former developed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 which was proclaimed to 'portend a new paradigm for cities' (Savitch 2003). These explorations of 'the early effects of terror on government and policy, the urban economy, and city life' (Eisinger 2004: 115) led soon to the assessment that New York's public space had eroded into a landscape of 'fear, paranoia and surveillance' (Low 2006), while at the same time, 'security zones' kept expanding in the US metropole (Németh and Hollander 2010). More recent publications (Simpson et al. 2017a: 206–223; Hess and Mandhan 2022) illustrate how the securitisation of everyday life has remained an important topic in New York, given the continuously evolving methodologies of terrorist attacks. In contrast to New York, London's history of terrorism includes a number of disruptive moments, such as the IRA bombings at the Baltic Stock Exchange and Bishopsgate in the 1990s, the 7/7 attacks which hit the city's public transport system in 2005 and in more recent years, the London Bridge attack in 2017 (Coaffee 2009; Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009b; Black 2019). Given London's long list of attacks, the metropole has been considered the archetype of a securitised European city which is reflected in a considerable body of literature that deals with its transformation over the years (see for instance: Coaffee 2004, 2009; Coaffee and Murkami Wood 2006; Fussey 2011). This short exemplary overview of these two places and their similarities and differences, illustrates the significance of this spatial configuration, as it makes my analysis empirically tangible and comparable.

This brings me to the introduction of the third configuration of space within my theoretical framework, namely translocal space. To define this notion, I heavily draw on the Urban Anthropologist Low who is known for her multidimensional understanding of spatialities (Low 2014) and her influential work which aims at overcoming the dichotomy of space and place (Low 2011). Translocal space is a concept that fulfils this ambition in that it 'encompasses the experiences and materialities of everyday lives in multiple places' (Low 2016: 174) and combines them to a more abstract idea of space that is translocally constructed. The added value of including this spatial understanding in my theoretical framework is that it allows me on the one hand to 'disengage the experiences of locality and belonging from being situated in a particular' (Low 2016: 181) place and on the other hand, it enables me to trace 'the possibilities of multiple kinds of social, spatial and political formations through the shared sense of meanings, loyalties and interests that bind people and places together' (Low 2016: 181). Translated to the specific context of my project and my framework's other configurations of space, this concept captures how everyday life, which is lived within the local urban space at different places, constitutes the translocal space of European metropoles. This suggests by no means that all places which are considered European metropoles are the same, neither in material nor in social terms. Instead, it rather highlights how these places share certain socio-material similarities in and about them to be deemed a European metropole and further emphasises how at the same time the discourses, practices, and

materialities that are associated with European metropoles shape the local space at these places in a certain way. Therefore, the notion of translocal space allows me to make an argument that goes beyond the transformation of urban everyday life at the local space of the three places, I included in my analysis, because it makes my observations and findings generalisable to the translocal space of European metropoles. In my considerations of scope at the end of this chapter, I will make the case why looking specifically at the transformations of everyday life in *European metropoles*, as my dissertation does, is a worthwhile critical endeavour. However, I argue at the same time, that the theoretical framework that I develop in this chapter could also easily be adapted to look at the transformations of other translocal spaces which must be neither European nor metropoles. Therefore, I have established how I consider space as multidimensional in this project, by introducing not only the respective meanings and analytical functions of local space, place, and translocal space but also by clarifying how these three configurations of spatiality hang logically together and how they thus simultaneously determine one another.

3.3.2 The securitisation of urban everyday life across time

These conclusions on spatiality bring me to the other side of the coin and thus the question, what does it mean to trace the securitisation of urban everyday life across time? In a similar vein to space, my basic assumption is that socio-material entanglements are arranged and rearranged in the transformative process of securitisation, not only within spatial but also *within temporal boundaries*. Again, just like space and spatiality, conceptions of time and temporality, as indicated in my literature review, have certainly not been absent from analysing securitisation processes. In contrast, especially in the critical engagement with the notion of pre-emption, time in the shape of future imaginaries has played a quite prominent role (Aradau and van Munster 2007; De Goede 2008a; Anderson 2010; Amoore 2013). In more recent publications, processes of memorialisation and remembering the past have gained considerable attention not only with regards to political practice but also academic scholarship in the field of (counter)terrorism (Closs Stephens et al. 2017; Milošević 2017; Toros 2017) after early warning calls to for instance 'forget September 11' (Zehfuss 2003) seem to have remained largely unheard. Many of these previous considerations of the future and of the past respectively are linked – some more explicitly, others more implicitly – to a third configuration of time, namely the present, by asking how *current* developments are shaped by future imaginaries and memories of the past.

Nonetheless, I argue that there is a limiting disconnect between these debates, as *all three* configurations of time are analytically hardly brought together, due to an overemphasising focus either on the relevance of the future or of the past. To overcome this limitation in the existing literature, I recognise time as multidimensional in my analysis, by speaking of different configurations of temporality. Just like for space and spatiality, this multidimensional understanding of time constitutes the analytical foundation for me to trace how the securitisation of urban everyday life travels across times, meaning from the past and the future to the present. Before I get to explain this process in-depth, I lay its conceptual groundwork by defining the three configurations of time in my project. However, it is important to keep in my mind that their clear-cut distinction is, just like in the case of spatiality, an

analytical heuristic, as in my understanding, temporal configurations do not follow a linear chronology but are intertwined in circularity with one another. Hence, in empirical terms they are oftentimes more difficult to neatly distinguish than their abstract definitions might suggest (Milošević 2017).

Starting off with defining the temporal configuration of the past, I consider in this respect how memories of previous terrorist violence and the ways in which attacks are remembered are constitutive in securitising urban everyday life, in that they influence how human and non-human bodies are re-arranged in the present. The basic logic behind this thought is quite straight-forward: In the aftermath of a terrorist incident, the attack's methodology and its perpetrators are thoroughly investigated not only to gain information about the particular case in question but also to generally better understand the logics and logistics of committing terrorist violence as well as the mindsets and ideas of people who plan and perpetrate attacks. The thereby collected evidence serves as a reference point for assigning suspiciousness, in the sense of potential dangerousness and vulnerability, to human and non-human bodies. Within this logic, an attack committed at a tall glass building provides data on how its material characteristics were strategically exploited to exacerbate the caused damages, and therefore gives verifiable indications to associate such buildings with a heightened level of vulnerability. Similarly, finding out about how and where terrorist perpetrators became radicalised is used to assign potential dangerousness to certain communities, neighbourhoods, and belief systems. As matter of fact based as such a reasoning might initially sound, attributing suspiciousness based on previous experiences of terrorist violence is problematic, not only because evidence from past attacks only offers indications of what future violence may look like, but also since the gathered information is always selective and prone to the biases of who is collecting it, and therefore dependent on current socio-material power hierarchies. Thus, the reference to past experiences of terrorism allows to justify the socio-material stigmatisation of certain human and non-human bodies and other violent counterterrorist practices in the present as necessary and evidence-based. This ties in with the findings of the existing scholarship around how past attacks are material-discursively remembered as collective traumatic events (Closs Stephens et al. 2017), and thus the socio-material memories cultivated around them are used to create legitimacy for current practices (Zehfuss 2003; Milošević 2017; McDowell 2007). Zehfuss hence argued already in 2003,

> 'that we might be better off forgetting September 11. The exhortation to remember is used to justify responding militarily abroad and, significantly, curtailing civil liberties at home. Criticism of these policies is difficult because of the moral cause established by the dead. However, the problematic of memory destabilises the possibility of straightforward knowledge and this is important for analysing the construction of a particular "we" through distinguishing between "us" and "them" and the construction of September 11 as something exceptional' (Zehfuss 2003: 513).

That Zehfuss used not only empirical material from the US but also from Germany to make this seminal argument points to a dynamic which I will explore at a later stage in developing my theoretical framework, when I deal with the ways in which temporalities and spatialities are interconnected in how urban everyday life is securitised relationally across space and across time.

What is important for now is that in conceptualising the temporal configuration of the past, I already implicitly touched upon both the present and the future configurations of time: This is because the three hang intrinsically together in the sense that what is memorised about past events is influenced by current socio-material power structures. At the same time, expectations about the future are drawn from past experiences, and how they are assessed and understood in the present. Exploring this last connection further brings me to the second temporal configuration of time that is well established in the existing securitisation literature, namely the role of the future and its imaginaries. Building on earlier debates that have deemed modern societies as 'risk societies' (Beck 1992; Giddens 1999), Aradau and van Munster (2007: 89) argued in this respect that 'governing terrorism through risk involves a permanent adjustment of traditional forms of risk management in light of the double infinity of catastrophic consequences and the incalculability of the risk of terrorism'. In other words, they claim that counterterrorist measures that aim to prevent future terrorist attacks rather than respond to past events face serious limitations, because it is unknown to policymakers how the future will unfold. Yet, despite these apparent obstacles, politics of 'pre-emption, precaution and preparedness' (Anderson 2010) quickly became highly influential, especially in European counterterrorism approaches (De Goede 2008b; Amoore 2009). To present such anticipatory measures as credible and effective, the unknown future must 'be imagined and inhabited in order to be made palpable, knowable and actionable' (Aradau and van Munster 2011: 4). Thus, in contrast to the temporal configuration of the past, where evidence of previous attacks is available, in the temporal configuration of the future, there is no such evidence about *what is going to happen*. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the knowledge about past experiences of violence can not only be used as an indication for how to better respond to attacks when they happen (cf. Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009b) but also serve as clues on how to prevent terrorist violence in the first place. However, as a future attack is extremely unlikely to play out exactly like a past attack, the question remains which imagined future scenario of violence is deemed to be the most probable. To weigh the likeliness of different imaginaries of future violence and be able to properly respond to them, techniques of risk analyses and threat simulations have become powerful tools in the hands of counterterrorist actors (Kessler and Daase 2008; Amoore 2013; Aradau and van Munster 2012).

The inherent 'perils of asking "What If?"' (Mythen and Walklate 2008: 221) have also been discussed at length: While pre-emptive counterterrorism politics are directed towards an imagined threat of future violence, of which it is unknown if and how it will become reality, the taken measures of control have undesirable implications for the present, in the sense that they are discriminatory, freedom-restricting, and in some cases physically violent. Thus, regarding its problematic effects and consequences, imagining future terrorist violence is similar to remembering past terrorist violence. That is also why I understand the configuration of the future, which means the threat of future terrorist violence and the ways in which potential attacks are imagined, as constitutive in securitising urban everyday life, in that it influences how human and non-human bodies are re-arranged in the present by attributing them with suspiciousness and managing them with intensifying measures of control.

As said earlier, the present, as the third and last configuration of time that I include in my analysis, is often only mentioned implicitly in the existing literature, although it is crucial to understand how the securitisation of urban everyday life works across time (cf. Milošević 2017). After all, the objective of doing research about these processes is – at least if they are not purely historical or policy advice orientated – to investigate and potentially criticise how *current* socio-material realities are produced. Thus, offering a better understanding of the present configuration of time, in the sense of analysing how the intra-acting human and non-human bodies of urban everyday life are currently rearranged in European metropoles is also one of my dissertation's central contributions. What makes the present yet difficult to capture, especially within my understanding of urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement, is that such entanglements are by definition continuously evolving in the 'ongoing dynamic of intra-activity' (Barad 2007: 206) and therefore their present appears to be nothing more than a quickly fading moment, before it turned already into the past. Despite this intrinsic high fluidity of the present, I argue that this configuration of time can still be grasped – at least to a certain extent – when analysing the securitisation of urban everyday life: Thus, although who and what counts as suspicious is constantly transforming over time, there is always a temporally dominant understanding of which human and non-human bodies count as vulnerable or potentially dangerous, that persists as a more or less stable tendency within the limits of a certain time which serves as the present in this case. As previously established, these current material-discursive arrangements of human and non-human bodies *are influenced* by memories of past experiences of terrorist violence as well as future imaginaries thereof, while at the same time, these present attributions of suspiciousness *influence* how past experiences of terrorist violence are interpreted and how potential attacks in the future are imagined. Therefore, just like in the context of space and spatiality, although the different configurations of temporality that I consider when analysing how socio-material entanglements are securitised across time emphasise distinct aspects in this process, they are closely intertwined and mutually co-constituting each other, because who and what counts as suspicious is simultaneously influenced by the past, the present, and the future configuration of time. This conclusion brings me to developing in the next step of this analytical framework how not only multiple configurations of space and time are inherently connected but also how temporality and spatiality relationally hang together.

3.3.3 Translations of securitised urban everyday life across space and time

As already touched upon in my literature review, although I see value in the existing literature that analytically focuses either on the spatial or the temporal particularities of securitising urban everyday life – after all, I also heavily draw on their insights – I ultimately agree with Aradau and van Munster (2012: 103) that neatly separating time and space from each other 'impedes our understanding of how broad social processes may play out unevenly in different locations'. In doing so, I side with the Feminist Human Geographer Massey who prominently dismissed such a dichotomous understanding of spatiality and temporality (Massey 1992, 1999, 2001). In her words, 'space is not static, nor time spaceless. Of course spatiality and temporality are different from each other, but neither can be conceptualized as the

absence of the other' (Massey 1992: 80). Massey is certainly not the only scholar who conceptualised the relational connection between spatiality and temporality,[2] as for instance Agnew (1999) also made the claim that political power has a history that can be mapped in its changing spatiality, yet, he overlooked the inherent multidimensionality of space and time. In contrast, Thrift (1983, 2004) considered spatiality and temporality as multidimensional, relational, and continuously moving and evolving. While this comes much closer to my understanding of temporality and spatiality as analytical categories, Massey's conceptualisation of space-time adds for me an important layer to this, as she emphasises that spatiality and temporality are not only co-productive, but also as such both politicised (Massey 1992). Thus, her 'key aim has been to reconnect accounts of the spatial with the political as well as the temporal' (Merriman 2012: 19).

To do so, she linked spatiality and temporality for instance to transforming conceptualisations of gender and masculinity/femininity (Massey 1994), while conceptualising 'space-time as relative, relational, and integral to the constitution of the entities themselves' (Massey 1999: 262). Translated to the research interest of my project, securitisation as a discursive-material transformation process rearranges human and non-human bodies in how they are intra-acting in socio-material entanglements, by assigning them with suspiciousness instead of harmlessness. These rearrangements happen in the local space of particular places at a given present time but are simultaneously influenced by the past and the future. Furthermore, Massey proclaims that these interrelations should be analysed 'as the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations and interactions at all spatial scales, from the most local level to the most global' (Massey 1992: 80) and therefore recognises at least space as multidimensional in how these political processes of transformation play out. I argue that the same multidimensional engagement is also required to make sense of temporality, and hence such a multidimensional and relational conceptualisation is reflected in my theoretical framework: Thus, I shed light on how human and non-human bodies are rearranged in the local urban space of a particular place but also how this transforms European metropoles as a translocal space. As I contend that these current rearrangements of human and non-human bodies are shaped by past experiences of terrorist violence as well as future imaginaries thereof, local encounters with attacks are obviously powerful catalysts in securitising urban everyday life. Yet, I argue that the securitisation of urban everyday life travels across space from the local space of one place to another and it travels across time from memories of past attacks and imaginaries of future attacks to the present. As cities are connected as translocal space, and future imaginaries of terrorist violence are not bound to a particular place but imply that an attack can happen anywhere and at any time, urban everyday life also transforms at places where no local attack has happened. Ultimately, everyday life in European metropoles as translocal space transforms, in the sense that certain human and non-human bodies at all places that make up this translocal space are material-discursively rearranged as suspicious.

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[2] For a comprehensive overview of different conceptualisation of space-time, see Merriman 2012: 14–18.

To analytically capture how securitised socio-material entanglements travel over time and from local space to places and translocal space, I use the concept of translation (Stritzel 2011a, 2011b) which refers to 'explorations of the travel, localization and/or gradual evolution/transformation of security meanings' (Stritzel 2011b: 343). Initially, the idea has been introduced as a challenge to the Copenhagen School (cf. Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998): Stritzel argued that his notion of translation can accommodate some of the shortcomings of the classic securitisation literature, as the concept 'leads to a historical, empirical-reconstructive perspective that locates securitizing moves in temporal and spatial sequences' (Stritzel 2011b: 343). Yet, despite this increased context-sensitivity, I contend that Stritzel's understanding as a critical response to conceptualising security as a speech act (Wæver 1989; Buzan et al. 1998) is essentially discursive and limited to the ontology of security (Stritzel 2011a: 2493). My usage of translation thus diverts from his original conceptualisation, as for me securitisation is a material-discursive transformation process that rearranges human and non-human bodies. What makes his idea of translation nonetheless valuable for my analysis is that it offers me a 'conceptual framework to analyse/understand the travel and localisation' (Stritzel 2011a: 2493) of socio-material entanglements across time and space. In this sense, a translation is more than a mere 'transfer' (Freeman 2009: 430, 434) because during the process of converting a concept from one context to another its meaning transforms. This resembles the term's linguistic connotation: While a translator surely attempts to find the most equivalent words to transfer meaning from one language to another, but no matter what, the original will never be *identical* to its translation in form, sound, and meaning (Müller 2007). I argue that a similar logic applies when urban everyday life is securitised across time and space: When human and non-human bodies are rearranged as suspicious in the local space at a particular place, these rearrangements can travel to other places which entails a 'form of *encounter* with a new context' (Stritzel 2011b: 345, emphasis in the original) of local space. Yet, as the material-discursive meaning of who and what counts as vulnerable or potentially dangerous is *translated* to a different place, the respective human and non-human bodies that are rearranged there, are likely to be similar, but due to local particularities never the exact same. Translations are also not immediate, but entail temporal delays, as it takes time for past terrorist violence to be remembered, for future scenarios of attacks to be imagined, and for current rearrangements of socio-material entanglements to be implemented.

The content of such translations comprises on the one hand which human and non-human bodies of urban everyday life are attributed with suspiciousness and on the other hand, which type of socio-material counterterrorist measures are deemed appropriate and effective to manage and control this suspiciousness. Building on Stritzel's (2011a: 2494) 'mechanisms of translations', I argue that the suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies has to be both elusive and compatible to the local space at another place to be adopted there. Elusiveness means that the reasoning why someone or something counts as potentially dangerous or vulnerable, must be to a certain extent concrete, so that the same logic can apply for similar human and non-human bodies elsewhere. But, at the same time, elusiveness means that suspicious human and non-human bodies are not so place-specific that they do not exist in the local

space of other places. Compatibility means that socio-material conditions and rules of local space which exist at one place are flexible enough to be transformed through translations from other places. When the securitisation of urban everyday life at one place is both elusive and compatible to other places, it can be translated to them in that it is 'adapted to "local" particularities [of a place] in order to "make it fit" with the "new" local context' (Stritzel 2011a: 2495).

Let me give a hypothetical example to illustrate how such a translation across space and time could look like in empirical terms: A domestic terrorist group which fights for the independence of a certain minority in country A launches an attack at the public transport system of A's capital X. This local encounter with terrorist violence leads over time to a securitisation of urban everyday life in X, in the sense that members of the respective minority group become rearranged as potentially dangerous, and the public transport system becomes rearranged as vulnerable. Both are therefore handled with increased measures of control, as for example intensified stop and search practices and the introduction of CCTV surveillance. These memories of past violence in A are translated to city Y which is located in country B. In B, there is no ethnic minority that strives for independence and thus members of domestic ethnic minorities are not considered potentially dangerous, as this notion of suspiciousness is in this case not elusive enough to be translated. However, Y has a public transport system just like X and as the past attack there has proven this system to be vulnerable, its suspiciousness is translated to Y. Yet, as citizens in B are highly sceptical of technology, installing CCTV surveillance is not compatible to it. Instead, Y's public transport system is securitised by patrolling security guards and frequent announcements to passengers to report people or objects that appear suspicious to them.

The example demonstrates how translations are neither equivalent nor immediate, as there are always contestations in the sense of temporal delays and local particularities, but the concept captures how socio-material entanglements relate to each other across spatiality and temporality. Having thus not only introduced my conceptual understanding of urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement and securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process, but also unpacked how intra-acing human and non-human are rearranged across space and time, in the sense that notions of suspiciousness are translated from one place to the other, and from the past and the future to the present builds the groundwork for the theoretical contribution that my analytical framework makes to the existing literature on the securitisation of urban everyday life, in several fields but especially CTS. However, there is yet still an elephant in the room, that I need to address in developing my framework, and that is the question of the normative-critical implications of the processes I analyse. In other words, why does it matter to look at both human and non-human bodies, when engaging with the securitisation of urban everyday life? And what do these processes have to do with socio-material power hierarchies? I engage with these questions in the third section of my framework to clarify not only its theoretical but also the added value of its normative-critical contribution.

3.4 Normative-critical implications from a perspective of posthumanist ethics

As I outlined in my literature review, to explore the normative implications of the securitisation of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism has been a central research objective of critical scholars from various disciplines (see for instance: Ellis 2020; Batley 2021; Fregonese and Laketa 2022). Their analyses uncovered not only numerous undesirable societal consequences of these transformation processes but also that power asymmetries among different actors determined who suffered the most from these consequences and who was further empowered by them: While a member of a suspect community is continuously faced with discriminatory stigmatisation, a police officer gains leverage when equipped with additional counterterrorist duties (Awan 2013). The normative-critical quintessence of these studies is hence that the transformation of urban everyday life and what it means for how one can and should live in a city is dependent on power relations.

On this general level, I agree with their critique, as I contend that spatio-temporal transformations of urban everyday life happen within existing power structures, and thus imply asymmetries regarding who is affected how and who is responsible for securitisation processes. Yet, I claim that on the one hand it has been overlooked so far that the power structures in which urban everyday life transforms are *socio-material* and in that sense questions of affectedness and responsibility concern both human *and* non-human bodies. The existing overemphasis on human actors has thus impeded a systematic and comprehensive critique about from whom and what, through whom and what, and for whom and what security and protection are provided when urban everyday life is securitised. On the other hand, I argue that the existing analyses typically end with their critical conclusions and thus do not engage with the question who and what can and should counter the undesirable consequences of the securitised urban everyday life. While this missing engagement with alternatives to securitisation initiated scholarly debates in CSS about 'de-securitisation' (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004), 'counter-securitisation' (Stritzel and Chang 2015) and 'contesting security' (Balzacq 2015), the criticism remains that in the specific context of urban everyday life especially 'CTS has been very good at critiquing contemporary counterterrorism, but has not yet offered an alternative model' (Lindahl 2017: 523). In my understanding, the lacking engagement with alternatives and ways to counter the securitisation of urban normality is at least to some extent indebted to the rather 'opaque' (Jackson 2017: 357) normative basis of many critical analyses in this respect. Therefore, in this last section of developing my theoretical framework, I introduce Barad's (2003, 2007) understanding of posthumanist ethics as a normative perspective that allows me to critically engage with socio-material power hierarchies and hence uncover how both human and non-human bodies are asymmetrically affected by and accountable for the securitisation of urban everyday life, while at the same it enables me to show that everyone and everything that forms part of urban everyday life has the potential to change it. To do so, I firstly outline why posthumanist ethics is a valuable normative lens for my project before I turn to in a second step to the socio-material hierarchies of affectedness and responsibility that I uncover with it in the securitisation of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism.

3.4.1 Posthumanist ethics as a normative approach

Conceptualising urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement of intra-acting human and non-human bodies has in my understanding imminent implications for a critical analysis of its securitisation in times of (counter)terrorism, because a normative evaluation of what happens when human and non-human bodies become rearranged as suspicious must consider the affectedness and accountability of both. The starting point to do so is once again to understand agency as a relationship, *'a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something has'* (Barad 2007: 178, italics in the original). Under this premise, that separates agency from intentionality, an understanding of urban normality as shaped solely by human will and objectives must be rejected as an overestimation of human influence. Thus, humans are an active but not the only 'part of the ongoing reconfiguring of the world' (Barad 2007: 171), as non-human bodies are equally important in transforming socio-material realities. Accepting the intra-acting agency of human and non-human bodies means in consequence to acknowledge that an ethical perspective which only evaluates the normative implications of its material-discursive transformation processes for and from the perspective of human bodies is short-sighted and hence calls instead for a decidedly *posthumanist* perspective of ethics which directly corresponds to a posthumanist understanding of performativity (Pawlowski 2023).

While especially the scholarly debates around the normative accountability of machines and artificial intelligence (AI) but also calls for the rights of nature and things have pushed for a greater prominence of posthumanist ethics in recent years, it is still an underexploited normative asset to critically engage with transformations of socio-material realities (Martin 2019; Schweitzer 2021; Fitz-Henry 2022). This is also true for the reception of Barad's work, because although the development of a posthumanist understanding of ethics is a 'significant part of what makes Barad's work distinct and important, [it is also] the part of Barad's scholarship that is most frequently lost in the re-telling' (Hollin et al. 2017: 932). Its initial recognition was indebted to Haraway (2008) and her use of Barad's posthumanist ethics as a normative foundation to question human exceptionalism in their relationship with animals. While it might be easier to acknowledge the agency, needs, and responsibilities of other living species, simply because they are alive, the logic applied is a different one, because it is centred around entanglement, rather than the level of difference or similarity between the human and the non-human entities that intra-act with each other. In this sense, ethics are 'something borne of situated, relational engagement' (Hollin et al. 2017: 935) and therefore questions of inclusion and exclusion, of affectedness and responsibility, of collectively desirable and undesirable consequences concern all human and non-human bodies intra-acting in a socio-material entanglement alike. Challenging human exceptionalism in ethical questions like that could be easily misunderstood as holding humans less accountable for the way they intra-act with non-human entities because in this understanding, agency is delinked from intentionality, but it is in fact the opposite. In Barad's (2007: 390) words:

> 'We are responsible for the world of which we are a part, not because it is an arbitrary construction of our choosing but because reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping and through which we are shaped.'

In this sense, Barad's posthumanist ethics outlines a collective responsibility of everyone and everything for the space and time one lives in, even if one has not intentionally caused the way it is. In other words: If one forms part of an entanglement, one has the agency to change it, and the responsibility to change for the better in a collective sense. What changing a socio-material entanglement *for the better in a collective sense* means in concrete terms is impossible to identify on a general level because it implies ethical decisions that are highly context-dependent, situational, and therefore constantly need to be re-evaluated. Nonetheless, drawing on Barad (2007) and Haraway (2008), there are certain basic principles, such as mutual respect and empathy for each other, an active striving for inclusion rather than exclusion, for reducing violence and power asymmetries rather than reinforcing them, which provide a moral baseline for how human and non-human entities *should* intra-act in socio-material entanglements.

Applied to my research interest, these premises of posthumanist ethics enable me to re-evaluate human and non-human influences on the transforming performativity of urban everyday life, which implies direct ethical consequences for the question of who and what can be held accountable for its increasing securitisation: On the one hand, blaming terrorist perpetrators or counterterrorist actors as the responsible causers of these changes is ultimately an overestimation of their influence. Both are obviously powerful in rearranging human and non-human bodies as suspicious with their actions: the former by representing a certain societal group or political claim and targeting specific sites with certain objects to inflict terrorist violence, the latter by securitising human and non-human bodies as either vulnerable or potentially dangerous through violent counterterrorist measures of control. Yet, which concrete implications these actions have for the socio-material entanglement, in which they happen, is never solely dependent on the intentions of who initiated them but on their enactment with other human and non-human bodies. Thus, if and how much damage is caused by terrorist violence is for instance dependent on material conditions of the targeted site and the functioning of the object that was instrumentalised to inflict harm. In a similar vein, how discriminatory counterterrorist control is, depends on the societal acceptance of stigmatising certain groups and the accuracy of search algorithms. On the other hand, as everyone and everything that participates in the enactment of urban normality is constitutive of its performativity, everyone and everything is also in some way accountable for how urban everyday life is produced and reconfigured, and thus has the potential to change it for the better in a collective sense by aiming to reduce (counter)terrorist violence and promoting inclusion rather than exclusion. Especially this second aspect should however not be misunderstood in the sense that posthumanist ethics is blind to power asymmetries regarding who and what has how much potential to influence material-discursive transformation processes, such as the securitisation of urban everyday life. Thus, Barad emphasises not only how responsibility is collective but also points to 'cuts and exclusions' (Hollin et al. 2017: 932). Hence, posthumanist ethics allows – by looking at human *and* non-human bodies – for a more nuanced understanding of socio-material power hierarchies regarding who and what is included in urban everyday life as worthy of protection and able to provide security and who and what is excluded from it, as a source of potential dangerousness (Pawlowski 2023: 14).

3.4.2 Socio-material power hierarchies of (counter)terrorism

The socio-material power hierarchies of (counter)terrorism are deeply rooted in the blurry definitory lines of which characteristics constitute "terrorist violence" as a special form of violence that can be distinguished from other forms of violence, such as counterterrorist violence. What differentiates for instance terrorist violence from violence committed by a mentally ill person from violence against women (Gentry 2022; Johnson 2016)? Incidents such as the 2018 Toronto van attack in which a 25-year old male targeted pedestrians with his vehicle, killing eleven and injuring 15 others, tellingly illustrates that: The attack was called an act of misogynist terrorism because the perpetrator described himself an INCEL ("involuntary celibate") to the police and on social media but he reportedly also suffered from Asperger's syndrome, and hence according to his verdict 'working out his exact motivation for this attack [was deemed] close to impossible' (Rozdilsky and Snowden 2021).

The problem of the unclear motive of terrorist perpetrators is perpetuated further by adding various connotations to the term, such as "domestic terrorism", "transnational terrorism", "religious terrorism", "right-wing/left wing terrorism" to name only a few. While these categorisations seem to make the definition of the phenomenon at hand more precise, rather the opposite is the case, as the lines between different ideologies and political motivations to commit violence are blurry (cf. Miller 2019; Reich 1998). This is for instance also reflected in the notion of state terrorism: While terrorist perpetrators are typically associated with being non-state actors, systematically repressive and violent state apparatuses such as Nazi Germany have also been labelled as terrorist. Fighting back against such as a regime can be deemed a struggle for freedom or likewise an act of terrorism (Primoratz 2004). This is yet not only a problem for a concise academic engagement with the phenomenon but even more so, because the label terrorism is used in political and public discourse to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate forms of violence. Ultimately, the question what is (not) considered terrorism becomes a question of which political side one picks. Given this terminological blurriness, as I already outlined in my literature review, labelling violence as terrorism constitutes a powerful discursive tool to delegitimise the actions of the other and legitimise the actions of the self (see for instance: Graham 2006; Zulaika 2012). What is interesting about this differentiation is that while in both cases violence is used, the counterterrorist use of violence is either not openly acknowledged as such or deemed as an inevitable sacrifice that must be made for the greater good of protecting the functioning of state institutions and the physical integrity of "innocents" (cf. Neocleous 2007; Waldron 2003). In other words, who is successful in claiming moral superiority towards a certain audience can justify the use of violence following a consequentialist logic that legitimises actions based on the right or wrong of their outcomes rather than the question if the means used to achieve these outcomes were morally acceptable or not. Such a logic ultimately establishes a hierarchy between human and non-human bodies that are worth protecting and human and non-human bodies that are not, because they are deemed potentially dangerous, and hence using violence against the latter becomes not only admissible but a necessity for the sake of providing security for the former.

3.4.2.1 Security from whom and what

Derived from this distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of (counter)terrorist violence, a first relevant socio-material power hierarchy in the securitisation of urban everyday life concerns who and what is material-discursively constructed as suspicious, in the sense of being potentially dangerous to commit or to be used to commit terrorist violence.

With regards to human bodies, assigning dangerousness, as said above, is typically influenced by biases concerning race, class, and gender and hence an intersectional issue (Potter 2013; Hollander 2001; Piazza 2011). In other words, it is People of Colour, people from a disadvantaged socio-economic background, and men who are assumed in general to be more likely to commit any kind of violence, at least within societies of the Global North. This consequentially implies that if one's nationality, name, appearance, style of clothing, skin colour fits into one or more of these categories, this stigmatises these human bodies with potential dangerousness. Within these general associations of violence-proneness, there are more specific linkages drawn: For instance, in the context of sexualised violence, men are typically associated with potential dangerousness and women are associated with the role of the vulnerable victim (Hollander 2001). In the context of terrorist violence, the picture is less straightforward, since there are so many diverging motivations acknowledged as reasonings to commit an attack, as I outlined above. Thus, in the context of domestic terrorism, identity markers such a foreign nationality or a from the norm diverging appearance are not deemed as helpful indicators to determine one's suspiciousness because perpetrators of this type of terrorism are considered to come from within a seemingly homogenous society, and hence other factors, such as people's political ideologies, play a more important role (Piazza 2011; Miller 2019). Despite this fuzziness, especially with the growing prominence of transnational terrorism in the Global North, religious stereotypes about who counts as a terrorist suspect became quite powerful in political, public, and even academic discourses, demonising particularly Islam and practicing Muslims as violence-prone (Jackson 2007; Awan 2012; Silva 2017). As one's religious affiliation is not necessarily visible in someone's appearance, the othering of Muslims was extended to the broader category of People of Colour, as this generalising equation of them made it easier to racially profile alleged terrorist suspects (Pugliese 2006; Ragazzi 2016). Such racialised stigmatisations go often in hand in hand with other biases such as gendered assumptions about terrorist perpetrators as being more likely to be male than female (Brown 2017).

However, potential dangerousness is not only assigned to human bodies but also to non-human entities, such as things and sites. When it comes to objects, the most obvious thing that comes to mind are naturally classic weapons, such as firearms, explosives, and thrust and cut weapons, as their explicit purpose is to inflict force on others. Yet, there are also items which have multiple functions, such as knives, or which are mainly used for an entirely different intent, such as cars, but can cause damage to other bodies. While this may be accidental in some cases, these things can also be instrumentalised intentionally to commit violence. Moreover, there are objects that in themselves are not recognised as potentially dangerous but they can be used to manufacture or hide a weapon, and hence can also serve

to some extent for violent purposes (Neyland 2008; Hoijtink 2017). In all cases, the specific materiality of these objects allows for the inscription of dangerousness, because they can fire bullets, are sharp, or heavy, or explosive, or not see-through. Attributing potential dangerousness to non-human bodies is however not limited to objects but also concerns sites, such as for instance a busy street, a dark parking lot, a crowded metro train, a low-income neighbourhood (Jones and Rodgers 2015). Although depending on the type of violence that is anticipated to happen, which sites are considered as potentially dangerous differs, their materiality plays again a decisive but oftentimes ambivalent role: Thus, a busy street in the city-centre with lots of traffic can be potentially dangerous, as much as a small, dark side-street. All in all, in a similar vein to stigmatisations of violence-prone human bodies, there are also stereotypical assumptions about the potential dangerousness of non-human bodies which establishes a hierarchy in the sense of from whom and what security needs to be provided and in consequence against whom and what counterterrorist violence is deemed an admissible and probate means to achieve this goal.

3.4.2.2 Security for whom and what

This need to provide security points directly to the other side of the coin, namely the question, who and what is considered worthy of protection in urban everyday life. As outlined above, the reasons for terrorist violence are manifold, and so are likewise its attack methodologies and targets, ranging from prestigious high buildings to produce economic damages, to specific individuals, such as political decisionmakers, to random groups of civilians to project a message of fear beyond the immediate act of violence (Richards 2014). What makes pre-emptively discerning, which targets are likely to be hit by terrorist violence, simply impossible, is that although attacks are usually meticulously planned and strategically executed, and thus the targeted human and non-human bodies are not as random as they may appear, they are still in a sense generic that there are always viable alternatives for who and what is targeted specifically. In such as a volatile threat scenario, determining who and what is particularly in potential danger is obviously hardly achievable, and yet there are human and non-human bodies that are deemed more vulnerable, and hence deserving of more protection. Just like potential dangerousness, such vulnerability is again material-discursively attributed to human and non-human bodies.

With regards to human bodies, associations with vulnerability are a double-edged sword because they are usually linked to the weak and fragile body that is typically assigned to women, children, disabled, and elderly (Butler 1993; Hollander 2001), as these groups are constructed to be victims of violence who are unable or at least unlikely to fight back. Despite the inherent predicaments of assigning weakness and victimhood to certain bodies, the measures taken to mend these vulnerabilities are equally problematic, in the sense that providing protection for someone goes typically hand in hand with more control and less freedom and autonomy for the individual. The special context of terrorist violence is yet again a bit different when it comes to attributing vulnerability to human bodies because it is usually not directed at harming those weak and fragile bodies specifically. Instead, the category of vulnerability is wider here, as the assumption is that if human bodies are targeted, they are targeted at random, simply because they happen to be "at the wrong place at the wrong time". Although

weak bodies, such as the number of killed women and children, are often explicitly mentioned in the victim count, what makes terrorist violence that targets human bodies special is that it is usually directed against people who are not considered active participants in the conflict at hand and were just normally going about their day when violence hit them by surprise. The stereotypical notion to reflect these assumptions is that of the 'innocent civilian' (Armborst 2010: 432): Although this image of innocence might be questionable from the perpetrators' point of view – as they typically view regular citizens as complicit in state policies, and therefore guilty for crimes they aim to revenge – the notion of innocence is essential to moralise counterterrorist measures as legitimate because these are set in place to protect harmless human bodies who "have done nothing wrong" and still became victims of terrorist violence.

Yet, the need for protection is not only assigned to human bodies but also to non-human bodies. Interestingly, while heightened vulnerability is not per se an important factor for protecting human bodies, it is quite prominent in the context of protecting non-human bodies from terrorist violence. With regards to objects, vulnerability can refer to material fragility, as in for instance high glass buildings whose specific construction has considerable damage exacerbating effects when they are destroyed. Furthermore, vulnerability also refers to the meaning assigned to non-human bodies, as in they are deemed to be critical infrastructures, have a high cultural-symbolic value, or are especially relevant for economic purposes in the neoliberal sense (Aradau 2010). In other words, a non-human body must be deemed to matter for the proper functioning of societies to be considered worth protecting. In reverse conclusion, non-human bodies, that are material-discursively deemed less important, are also less likely to be considered vulnerable which constitutes again a socio-material hierarchy in terms of for which non-human bodies security should be provided for and for which not so much.

3.4.2.3 Security through whom and what

Finally, there are not only a socio-material hierarchies about which human and non-human bodies are material-discursively constructed as potentially dangerous or respectively worthy of protection within urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism but also concerning the question, who and what is considered capable and trustworthy to be able to grant security from the potentially dangerous to those worthy of protection, and is therefore charged with the responsibility to counter terrorist violence.

With regards to human bodies, dealing with security threats was traditionally deemed an exclusive competence of state representatives, as guaranteeing the physical integrity of one's citizens and territorial borders fell into the core obligations of a state in the Westphalian system. After all, one key characteristic of state sovereignty is the monopolised legitimate use of force (Anter 2019). To ensure both external and internal security, states created institutions which empower their representatives with special competences, rights, and duties, such as the police, intelligence agencies, and the military. Since terrorist violence is perceived a threat that can derive both from outside and from within a state, all types of classic security institutions can be concerned with it, as the lines between and internal and external security get increasingly blurry (Bigo 2000, 2006a). In the special context of urban everyday life, state representatives charged with upholding domestic security, such as police forces, are at the forefront of

countering terrorist violence. However, in times of neoliberalism, security issues shifted from being solely a public obligation for state representatives. Thus, private actors became increasingly active in this respect, on the one hand by semi-autonomously handling relevant threat scenarios for their own businesses and on the other hand by offering security as a service to others (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007). For example, managers of shopping centres hired private security providers to prevent shoplifting and other crimes on their premises. Yet, the privatisation of security is not the only relevant neoliberal shift in the securitisation of urban everyday life, as the trend towards promoting resilience shows. Resilience means to empower individuals to actively participate in mitigating insecurities that concern them. In spite of the heated theoretical debate on the normative desirability of the principle (Chandler 2012; Bourbeau 2015; Chandler and Reid 2016), resilience has been established for decades in the practice of urban security governance (Coaffee and Murkami Wood 2006; Boersma and Clegg 2012). While its specificities depend on its respective local implementation, the principle encourages in general human bodies, who have not been formally charged with upholding security, to actively engage in preventing terrorist violence, for instance by looking out for potentially dangerous human and non-human bodies and report them to formally empowered managers of suspiciousness. In doing so, this shift cements two socio-material hierarchies: On the one hand, there is a hierarchy between formal, semi-formal, and informal managers of suspiciousness and their power and competencies to execute counterterrorist responsibilities. On the other hand, there is a hierarchy among different semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness, meaning those human bodies who are deemed competent to differentiate between suspiciousness and harmlessness and those who are not. While the lines between them are surely blurry, intersectional biases are again powerful in discerning credibility in this respect.

Finally, there is also a socio-material hierarchy in terms of which non-human bodies are considered effective and appropriate to grant protection against terrorist violence. The question of effectiveness concerns the functioning of counterterrorist tools such as CCTV cameras, bollards, metal detectors, and search algorithms (Amicelle et al. 2015): Is the object placed at the right location, is it working properly, is it ultimately fulfilling the purpose that it is meant for or are there loopholes to successfully circumvent its effect (Jaffe and Pilo' 2023)? The question of appropriateness on the other hand deals with the necessity of counterterrorist non-human bodies in negotiation with other concerns, such as financial constraints, practicability, privacy, aesthetics, and environmental considerations (Coaffee et al. 2009a). As both go hand in hand in establishing a socio-material hierarchy among non-human bodies with counterterrorist purposes, a security device must not necessarily be the most effective to prevent terrorist violence if it is considered the most appropriate among several effective measures. Although non-human bodies with counterterrorist duties are oftentimes considered neutral and bias-free in contrast to their human counterparts, they turn out to have flaws with discriminatory implications, especially when they are based on modern technology. Thus, racial profiling is for instance not only an issue among human managers of suspiciousness, but search algorithms also produce more false positive matches when confronted with a Person of Colour (Introna and Wood 2004; Leese 2014; Martin 2019).

3.5 Argument: Urban everyday life in Europe during times of (counter)terrorism

The conceptual premises and assumptions that I outlined in this chapter bring me finally back to my project's overarching research question: How has everyday life in European cities transformed in times of (counter)terrorism? I argue that the securitisation of everyday life constitutes a process of urban segregation which renders European metropoles the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox that should be and can be challenged. Let me disentangle my argument step by step.

Firstly, why does the securitisation of urban everyday life constitute a process of urban segregation? In understanding urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement of human and non-human bodies and conceptualising securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process, I demonstrate that in times of (counter)terrorism more and more urban sites, objects, people, and their behaviours material-discursively shifted from being mundane and harmless to being attributed with suspiciousness, which led to the introduction of violent and restrictive counterterrorism measures, such as surveillance and access controls, executed by both human and non-human bodies. Yet, who and what is deemed potentially dangerous, and who and what is respectively deemed vulnerable, and who and what is deemed capable of providing security for those worthy of protection is not the same for everyone and everything that intra-acts in urban everyday life. Thus, although (counter)terrorism rearranges *all* human and non-human bodies participating in urban everyday life in some way, its violent and restrictive implications play out *differently* for them: In practice, this means that while privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre are further included, human and non-human bodies at the periphery are further excluded. Hence, for instance, the financial and governmental districts of cities as their neoliberal centres are securitised as vulnerable and worthy of protection, while socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods in which religious and ethnic minorities predominantly live are securitised as potentially dangerous because they are considered the radical breeding grounds of future terrorist perpetrators. Such a discriminatory treatment of suspicious sites goes hand in hand with a discriminatory treatment of human bodies, in that the differentiation between the terrorist suspect and the innocent civilian is influenced by stereotypes about race, gender, and religion, just like the differentiation between who is seen as capable to distinguish suspiciousness from harmlessness. In this sense, the securitisation of urban everyday life (re)produces socio-material power hierarchies in European metropoles.

Secondly, why does the securitisation of everyday life render European metropoles to be the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox? I argue that the outlined processes of urban segregation happen not only on the level of cities' local space in which terrorist violence happened, because material-discursive assumptions about which human and non-human bodies count as potentially dangerous and which count as worthy of protection are translated across spatiality and temporality. Thus, past experiences of terrorist violence which occurred in the local space of one place travel in time, as they inspire future imaginaries of terrorist violence as well as current counterterrorist reactions to them but simultaneously, they also travel from the place where an attack happened to other places, even those without any local encounters with terrorist violence to change the local space there and rearrange human

and non-human bodies in it. Although such translations of suspiciousness are neither identical nor immediate, they imply that a local attack at *any* city which is considered a European metropole provides future imaginaries for violent counterterrorism measures elsewhere. In this sense, terrorist perpetrators succeeded in projecting fear far beyond the immediate local attack (Richards 2014) – both spatially and temporally – as the committed violence transforms not only the city where it happened but also changes urban everyday life at other places that are considered European metropoles in anticipation of the 'next terrorist attack' (Aradau and van Munster 2012: 98). Ultimately, (counter)terrorism securitises urban everyday life at the translocal level of space and transforms how life can be lived in European metropoles in general, through inscribing violent measures of control and protection into their local space. As outlined above, this affects some human and non-human bodies more than others but at the same time even measures of protection meant for human and non-human bodies that are acknowledged as vulnerable have freedom-restricting consequences for them. Nevertheless, absolute security, in the sense of preventing all potentially possible terrorist attacks everywhere and at all times is and always will remain unattainable in urban everyday life. This renders European metropoles the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox because the response to terrorist violence at one place inscribes counterterrorist violence at other places which increases insecurity at them rather than security.

Thirdly, why should and how can the securitisation of urban everyday life be challenged? On the normative basis of posthumanist ethics which proclaims mutual respect and empathy, in the sense of an active striving for inclusion rather than exclusion as well as reducing violence and power asymmetries rather than reinforcing them, the securitisation of urban everyday life should be challenged exactly because it renders European metropoles the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox and constitutes a process of urban segregation, as just outlined. In terms of how it can be challenged, I argue in contrast to the existing literature, that nobody who participates in urban everyday life is merely a by-stander or passive recipient of counterterrorist duties because ultimately, 'learning how to intra-act responsibly as part of the world means understanding that "we" are not the only active beings – though this is never justification for deflecting our responsibility onto others' (Barad 2007: 391). 'This implies that by living and behaving alongside these changing material-discursive standards of what and who counts as harmless or respectively suspicious, one co-creates them' (Pawlowski 2023: 17). Yet, this claim does not hide or neglect the power asymmetries in this context but brings them to the forefront. As just outlined, particularly those human and non-human bodies that are branded as suspicious are affected the most by the securitisation of urban everyday life and yet at the same time can do – based on this very vulnerability – the least against it. Nonetheless, I argue that the existence of power asymmetries should not make those who are marginalised consider their limited power as a reason to remain silent and deedless. Simultaneously, taking up one's responsibility to counter the securitisation of everyday life from the privileged position of the harmless is ultimately even more important because of the vulnerable position of those who are attributed with suspiciousness.

In terms of scope, I claim that my theoretical framework and the critical argument I derived from it are easily adaptable to other geographical and temporal frames, and hence to a certain extent generalisable. Nevertheless, I use the framework and make my argument in this dissertation project for a specific spatial context, namely that of European metropoles, and for a specific period, namely the times of (counter)terrorism which I both delineate in the final section of this chapter.

3.5.1 Spatial scope of the argument: European metropoles

In spatial terms, my project's scope is restricted to European metropoles, as local space, places, and translocal space. This limitation to *European* cities is by no means intended to reproduce the Eurocentric bias regarding (counter)terrorist violence and its academic and public reception (cf. Catto 2016). Comparing the numbers of terrorist victims shows that in fact places, such as Kabul, Mosul, and Mogadishu, are impacted the most by terrorist violence (Global Terrorism Index 2018: 12). Yet, it is important to note that the geographical focus of my analysis is not based on how much a city is affected by (counter)terrorist violence. Instead, my starting point is a different one, as my project's spatial scope is linked to European metropoles' attributed reputation as liberal places with a high level of personal freedom and many opportunities for realising one's individual potentials. Thanks to this meticulously curated image, a restrictive and violent securitisation of the everyday life of these 'ordinary cities' (Fregonese 2021) seems initially counterintuitive. Therefore, the inherent contradictions that lie within this clash make European metropoles sensible research objects in the context of my dissertation.

For similar reasons, I look solely at cities which are due to their size, relevance as economic hubs or their popularity as a tourist destination considered an international city or shorter a metropole. Of course, terrorist violence also happens in places like for instance Ansbach, a city of 40,000 inhabitants located in Southern Germany, where in July 2016 a suicide bomber injured 15 people at an open-air music festival (Specht 2016). Nevertheless, I justify the limitation to places with a global recognition by pointing to the logic of the terrorist method: The effect of terrorist violence to spread fear is boosted when it is directed towards a target with symbolic significance (Jenkins 1975: 15).

The criteria that I outlined so far in terms of my spatial scope apply to metropoles on the European continent as much as they also pertain international cities in North America, such as New York, Washington, D.C., and Toronto (cf. Eisinger 2004). However, thanks to my personal socialisation as a citizen and a researcher in the European context, I am most familiar with urban everyday life in Europe. Hence, I consider my experience of having lived in several and visited many major cities in Europe an important advantage when analysing transformations of what is normal in European urban space. Furthermore, on a normative level, the shifts that I research directly affect my own living conditions, and are therefore also of high personal relevance to me. All in all, my personal proximity to my cases enables a deeper engagement with them, which is why limiting my analysis to the transformation of everyday life in *European metropoles* is ultimately the most logical spatial scope for my project (cf. Bueger and Mireanu 2015).

3.5.2 Temporal scope of the argument: Times of (counter)terrorism

Finally, my argument's scope is also restricted in the temporal sense to what I call times of (counter)terrorism. This notion needs obviously further clarification since terrorist violence and counterterrorist measures are – depending on their respective definitions – surely not recent phenomena but look back to a much longer history. Thus, the term "terrorism" was originally used for the Jacobin regime during the French Revolution (Laqueur 2016: 6–7). The special relationship between cities and terrorism is just as long, given that cities were throughout history always significant targets to send powerful political message (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002; Burke 2018). Nevertheless, a heightened political and academic interest in (counter)terrorism coincided with the 9/11 attacks which are often considered a watershed moment (see for instance: Bleiker 2006; Argomaniz 2009; Fischer and Masala 2016; De Goede 2008a), and thus may appear as the logical starting point of times of (counter)terrorism. However, I agree with claims made by Toros (2017) as well as Donnelly and Steele (2019) that the events of 9/11 have been overemphasised as a point of rupture, and thus neglect that counterterrorism efforts have influenced societies already before the US Global War Terror and concurrent developments.

This leaves me in a practical dilemma to structure my analysis in a comprehendible way: Acknowledging (counter)terrorism's continuous temporal trajectories in their infinite complexity makes it impossible to find a definite starting point for my analysis and subdivide it into precise time periods that are linked to relevant events in the history of (counter)terrorism rather than just artificially sorted by decades. To overcome this dilemma, I opt for a compromise that allows me on the one hand to historicise (counter)terrorism as a phenomenon whose "exact beginnings" are temporally impossible to pin down and on the other hand to acknowledge incrementally shifting trends that unfolded a certain relevance, at least within the translocal boundaries of European metropoles. In concrete terms, this means that I structure my analysis across three temporal phases which should however not be mistaken for clear-cut eras but rather serve as analytical heuristics to trace incremental transformations. Thus, my analysis has not one definite starting point but loosely begins somewhen after the end of World War II in 1945, although which decade is especially relevant is largely dependent on the respective place in question. To delineate this time period, I use the notion "before 9/11" and thus acknowledge that the events of 9/11 constitute a certain paradigm shift, especially in urban contexts (Savitch 2003). As a second temporal demarcation, I use the notion of the "European peak of attacks in 2015/16" because of its special relevance for the specific translocal context I am interested in. The time "after the European peak of attacks in 2015/16" is finally relevant to understand the current securitisation trends in Europe's urban everyday life.

4 Methodology and Case Selection

4.1 Introduction

In my circular understanding of doing research, separating my theoretical and my methodological approach is to a large extent an artificial division, as the two are deeply intertwined. In this sense, I agree with Aradau et al. (2015b: 15) that ‘methods are not simply instruments that extract data according to fixed procedures so as to bridge a gap between knowledge and reality [but] imply a performative understanding of methods as practice’. Based on this premise, my following considerations tie in closely with the central theoretical concepts and assumptions that build the foundation of my analytical framework and led me to formulate my argument about the transformation of Europe’s urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism. In this chapter, I discuss the metatheoretical and methodological prerequisites that guide my analysis. Ultimately, I assert that being transparent about my methodological practices comprises on the one hand a way to negotiate my personal proximity to my research interest and reflect on my positionality in making research decisions (cf. Bueger and Mireanu 2015) and on the other hand offers an access for others to understand and engage with my findings which provides the common ground for fruitful discussion (cf. Ackerly and True 2008).

While the previous academic engagement with urban everyday life has been oftentimes based on ethnographic research techniques in adopting what seems to be a “one fits all” method, I contend that a truly critical engagement with transforming normalities in cities requires a creative, experimental, and tailor-made approach which takes the project’s scope, the researcher’s positionality, and access to the field as well as considerations of secrecy and ethics into account. Especially the strong posthumanist component of my project challenges me to come up with a meaningful way to methodologically capture socio-material entanglements and their transformations across time and space (cf. Aradau et al. 2015b: 1). Thus, to make my original theoretical framework “researchable” I employ what I call a historiographic archaeology. This approach embodies my considerations about how my theoretical assumptions are translatable into research practice, to generate and collect empirical data, and to analytically make sense of it. While my approach is certainly informed by previous methodological engagements with transformations of socio-material entanglements and respective power hierarchies, it also diverts from them in significant ways for the sake of my specific research interest.

To develop my approach, this chapter unfolds in several sections. To begin with, I outline how one can make methodological sense of urban everyday life and why for my project a historiographic archaeology is an appropriate and thought-provoking way to do so. Then I dissect the approach step by step: Firstly, I introduce suspicious sites and suspicious objects as well as suspicious people and managers of suspiciousness as two types of non-human and two types of human bodies which are featured in my analysis. Then, I introduce how I historiographically map the securitisation of urban everyday life across space and time to conduct a ‘thick comparison’ (Scheffer and Niewöhner 2010) of my cases. Finally, I discuss why I selected London, Brussels, and Stuttgart as the cities where my analysis takes place, by arguing for their individual relevance and the added value of comparing them.

4.2 Methodologically making sense of urban everyday life

As outlined in my theoretical chapter, everyday life refers commonly to everything that is mundane, ordinary, and accepted as a normal part of daily life. Seen from a methodological perspective this implies both opportunities and challenges for researchers interested in how these routines of normality are constituted, and how they develop (Maitland 2010; Sandywell 2004). Thus, in contrast to other fields and research interest, such as the internal workings and decision-making processes in ministerial bureaucracies and intelligence services or local dynamics in conflict and post-conflict settings, the everyday life in European metropoles is in general much easier and less dangerous to access for researchers, as there is neither a sense of special secrecy nor high risk of physical danger for scholars associated with it (cf. De Goede et al. 2019; Coleman Montesinos and Hughes 2015). At the same time, the researcher's positionality plays a crucial role in determining what counts as normal and is considered everyday life and what does not. Experiences of urban everyday life are hence for instance characterised by different dynamics for men and women, implying also differences for male and female researchers (Thapan 1995; Holmes 2009). In other words, what one considers normal is what one is used to based one's identity, socialisation, previous experiences, physical appearance, and personal expectations. In this sense, one's own immanent, subjective entanglement in everyday life makes analysing it easy and accessible but at the same time challenging and calling for a high level of reflexivity.

To cope with this ambiguity, the most prominent way to academically engage with everyday life has been to employ ethnographic research methods and techniques, such as 'participant observation' (Jorgensen 2015), but also less formalised approaches, such as 'hanging out' (MacKay and Levin 2015). Despite the undeniably problematic historical tradition of these practices in disciplines, such as anthropology (Clair 2003: 8), they bear a lot of valuable potential for methodologically engaging with urban everyday life. Thus, Bueger and Mireanu (2015: 123) hail participant observation as 'the most promising means for studying and problematising practice, actions and objects that constitute [everyday life because of its] intention to understand from within, to seek proximity to the mundane and to start the translation between theory and fact, while standing knee-deep in empirical material' (Bueger and Mireanu 2015: 124). Thanks to these qualities, and as I outlined already in my literature review, ethnographic approaches have been used in many analyses about the securitisation of everyday life to study mostly human bodies – often with an auto-ethnographic twist – but also non-human bodies (Ochs 2013; Adey et al. 2013; Low 2016; Trandberg Jensen and Jensen 2023; Fregonese and Laketa 2022). While I certainly do not deny their fruitfulness in allowing scholars to actively participate in practising urban normality, I reject at the same time the claim that they comprise the *only* viable way to methodologically engage with everyday life, by adopting them in an unreflective one fits all manner. After all, ethnographic research methods come just like any other methodological approach with certain prerequisites, inherent limitations, and biases.

For one, ethnographies presuppose an extent of normality to be present to allow for analysing it. Though, admittedly observing *normality* is by definition an approximation to an unattainable ideal

because it is always shaped by current dynamics and evolving trends (Sandywell 2004). However, between 2020 and 2021, for when my dissertation project's fieldwork was scheduled, studying the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles was thanks to the dynamically unfolding COVID19 pandemic hardly possible, at least from an ethnographic perspective: Although the health emergency soon created some sense of a 'new normality' (Tesar 2020; Mateos et al. 2020), the harsh restrictions imposed on daily routines in European metropoles impeded practicing ethnography not only due to practical but also ethical considerations. This distinct obstacle that I encountered personally in my research efforts is yet a bias that ethnographies are confronted with in general, as they are inherently restricted to what can presently be observed (Bueger 2014: 399–400): Thus, depending on the time researchers spend for their fieldwork, this local present can be longer or shorter but outlining broader historical trajectories remains in any case hardly attainable. In other words, a purely ethnographic account of urban everyday life limits its analysis to the local configuration of space and the present configuration of time. Yet, my analysis decidedly goes beyond such a restricted understanding, as I theoretically conceptualised spatiality and temporality as multidimensional and relational, since my research interest lies in the transformation of urban everyday life across time and space.

Such transformations of what is deemed normal in urban everyday life have been analysed initially by employing foremostly discourse-orientated methodologies. Hence, Foucauldian archaeology and genealogy were prominent approaches in IR and CSS to trace how the meanings assigned to concepts, such as risk and security, changed over time (Bonditti et al. 2015). Archaeological approaches focus particularly on how epistemic regimes of truth become accepted as true when they follow the rules that govern a field of knowledge (cf. Foucault 1974). Thus, in 'Madness and Civilization', Foucault uncovers how the understanding of (in)sanity evolved in Europe from the Renaissance to the Modern Era and what forms of othering this implied (Foucault 1964). Genealogical approaches are in contrast 'more explicitly political' (Bonditti et al. 2015: 167) because they also reveal how power relations constitutively affect these transformation processes. Hence, a genealogy questions especially those concepts that 'we tend to feel [are] without history' (Foucault 1977: 139) by investigating the complex mechanisms in which a particular truth among many potential understandings of what could be true becomes accepted as *the truth*. In doing so, a genealogy aims not at tracing a linear process of how one understanding became dominant but rather seeks to explore the contradictions and contestations within processes of discursive knowledge/power formations (cf. Dean 1992).

The foremostly discursive focus of these research practices was already challenged by Foucault himself in conceptualising his notion of dispositif (Foucault 1980: 194–195, 2007) but also by the Bordieuan understanding of studying social fields and space (Bourdieu 1984, 1989). While these approaches recognise the methodological engagement with materiality – for instance in the sense of the architectural design of institutions, such as prisons or hospitals – as essential for tracing how power is exercised and how entities are made governable, materiality is not attested to have constitutive agency within these processes. Autonomous agency of non-human bodies in this sense was only

methodologically acknowledged when discourses, practices, *and* materiality became recognised as relational, in approaches such as Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005), assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; De Landa 2006) and posthumanist performativity (Barad 2003, 2007). Despite a different emphasis in their specific objectives, all three of them account for the fact that social arrangements also have a material dimension, and thus encourage a methodological engagement with the social *and* the material world, as these cannot be neatly separated (Aradau et al. 2015a). Since my theoretical approach also highlights the entangledness of human and non-human bodies, these approaches provide me with a logical starting point to methodologically capture transformations of urban everyday life, and hence build the inspirational groundwork for developing my historiographic archelogy. At same time, none of these approaches offers a comprehensive methodological blueprint that I can simply apply one-to-one to my research interest. Thus, the next section of this chapter concretely outlines how I identify, collect, and analyse empirical data with a method that I call historiographic archaeology.

4.3 Historiographic archaeology as a method

That I named the method I use historiographic archelogy should not raise wrong expectations about what this approach aspires to be but rather intentionally points to its conceptual vantage points and twists them in a new, fruitful way to fit for the purposes of my project's research interest which lies in tracing transformations of urban everyday life across space and time. The "archaeological" aspect of my method is that I "map" who and what counts material-discursively as suspicious in socio-material entanglements of human and non- human bodies within different spatialities, meaning within the local space of three distinct places and in translocal space. This fundamentally draws on the understanding of archaeology in the Foucauldian sense, since the material-discursive meanings of suspiciousness are acknowledged as changeable and my analysis of them reveals how they vary across space and time. At the same time, my approach significantly diverts from a Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge in the traditional sense, as I agree with Allen (2003: 75) that Foucault's understanding is basically limited to the micro-level of space and thus it would not allow me to 'convincingly move between spatial scales' (Murdoch 2006: 27). What makes the term archaeology yet additionally a helpful metaphor in the specific context of my project is its classic understanding as 'the scientific study of the material remains of past human life and activities' (Daniel 2022) which underlines the material focus of my analysis. The "historiographic" aspect of my method is that I engage with how these transformations of urban everyday life and the material-discursive meanings of suspiciousness follow a linear as well as a non-linear chronology. Thus, I trace the history of (counter)terrorism in the everyday life of European metropoles in a linear sense by shedding light on the time before 9/11, the time between 9/11 and the European peaks of attacks in 2015/16, and the time thereafter, and hence a consecutive time period which again closely resembles Foucauldian archaeological thinking, as for instance in 'Madness and Civilisation' (Foucault 1964). In the non-linear sense, I look at how the respectively present understandings of who and what counts as suspicious within these phases are shaped by memories of the past and imaginaries of the future, and therefore this aspect of my analysis resembles the classic notion of historiography as it is not about

analysing 'the events of the past directly, but the changing interpretations of those events' (Furay and Salevouris 2000: 223). Hence, the empirical foundation of a historiographic analysis is typically desk-based and rests on material *collected* by the researcher rather than data *generated* in periods of on-site fieldwork. In my project, the corpus of empirical material comprises policy documents, newspaper articles, academic literature, reports, city archives, websites – ultimately anything that discusses and interprets everyday life in European metropoles in times of (counter)terrorism.

Within this vast body of possibly endless information and interpretations that is hypothetically available for my analysis, the research technique that I use to collect, identify, and categorise empirical material to trace the securitisation of urban everyday life is "mapping" which helps me to navigate the 'empirical muddy waters where discourse, institutions and materialities form complex, dynamic entanglements' (Loughlan et al. 2015: 23). The origins of mapping as a method lies in the Bordieuan thinking about social fields but was later also picked up by Latour, influencing his conceptualisation of Actor-Network Theory (Bourdieu 1989; Latour 2005). Essentially, the technique draws on the metaphor of the map and 'its ability to fix space temporarily so that others may "see" what the mapper has seen' (Loughlan et al. 2015: 47). In doing so, mapping signifies that research process are always to some extent subjective, since researchers are continuously faced with making decisions about which material to include, where to look for it, and how to integrate it into their analysis, and hence requires reflexivity towards the power dynamics inherent in these decisions (Ackerly and True 2008; Aradau et al. 2015b). As I am aware of these implications, I selected the material that I use cautiously and in adhering to the academic standard by critically engaging with its source origin, double-checking its trustworthiness, and aiming to avoid potential biases and neglects. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that my material is selective, fragmentary, and influenced by my own positionality as a researcher and human being. In adopting the logic of mapping, I emphasise that the presented material shows in recurring on Loughlan et al. (2015: 23) the reader what I have seen when searching for empirical material and engaging with the data that was available to me at the time of writing this dissertation project.

All in all, historiographic archaeology as a method thus allows me to realise methodologically what my analytical framework conceptualises theoretically. Like an archaeologist, I uncover and map the "remains" of human and non-human bodies within in urban everyday life at distinct places and contextualise their material-discursive understanding both in their local context and a broader translocal context. Like a historiographer, I make sense of how suspiciousness was material-discursively constructed at different points in time under a reference to previous acts of terrorist violence and future imaginaries thereof. With these metaphors in mind, I specify in the first step of developing my methodological approach which types of human and non-human bodies are featured in my analysis and how I engage with their socio-material intra-activity.

4.3.1 Mapping entanglements of human and non-human bodies

Since I conceptualised urban everyday life in my theoretical chapter as a socio-material entanglement of intra-acting human and non-human bodies, following mainly Barad's (2003, 2007) notion of

posthumanist performativity, the initial research decision that I am faced with is, which among the many human and non-human bodies that exist in the empirical world should I engage with in my analysis. Since my methodological approach is inspired by historiographical elements, the logical starting point to make this choice is to look at the existing academic literature, dealing with the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles. In my literature review, I already engaged with some important reference points to operationalise (in the wide sense of the term) the notions of human and non-human bodies for my project but my definitions of them are deliberately broader than in most of the existing scholarship to account for a comprehensive, but feasible sample in my analysis.

4.3.1.1 Non-human bodies: Suspicious sites and suspicious objects

With regards to non-human bodies, I analyse what I call "suspicious sites" and "suspicious objects". Admittedly, it is maybe not initially intuitive to consider sites and objects as "bodies". But, in the logic of posthumanist performativity, this terminology makes sense because in contrast to more neutral terms, such as "entity" or "unit", the notion of body emphasises that non-human sites and objects have agency just like human bodies in intra-acting with each other. As conceptualised in my theoretical framework, socio-material suspiciousness derives from either an association with potential dangerousness to be the site or thing from which terrorist violence emerges – because it is the area, where terrorist perpetrators suspectedly live or because it is the item, they use to commit violence – or from an association with vulnerability, in the sense of the site or thing that is vulnerable to be targeted by terrorist violence and worthy to be protected from it. My focus on sites and things originates in the prominence of these two aspects in the existing scholarly engagement with the securitisation of urban everyday life.

In terms of urban sites, the debate around vulnerabilities has been particularly vibrant: Thus, critical infrastructures, public transport hubs, and special buildings, such as skyscrapers, but also more abstract notions, such as 'crowded places', have been discussed as attractive terrorist targets in urban everyday life (Aradau 2010; Schlüter et al. 2016; Albrecht 2016; Domosh 1988; Aradau 2015). Their vulnerability has led to 'hostile' urban architecture and management of increasing control to secure them (Graham 2004; Coaffee 2010; Carr 2020). In contrast to this emphasis on the lively centres of urban everyday life where terrorist violence is anticipated to happen, less academic attention has been paid to sites from where terrorist violence is anticipated to emerge, as dangerous urban sites have so far mainly been analysed in the context of crime and poverty (Ceccato and Nalla 2020). This neglect impedes an engagement with the typically residential neighbourhoods that are associated with this type of terrorist suspiciousness. The understanding of urban sites in my analysis is hence quite broad, as I include buildings and infrastructures, such as public transportation networks, open public spaces, but also privately owned premises, neighbourhoods, and city quarters in this definition. In this sense, urban sites come in all sizes and shapes, fulfil different functions in urban everyday life, and obtain diverging socio-material power positions within my case cities. The most important reference for implying an urban site in my analysis is that they are material-discursively recognised as suspicious, in the sense of being vulnerable or potentially dangerous. As I understand securitisation as a transformative process, the

material-discursive assumptions about urban sites are subject to continuous change and develop over time, meaning that I analyse how urban sites which used to be associated with mundanity shift to being attributed with potential dangerousness or vulnerability.

I operationalise suspicious objects in a similar vein, though in comparison there is less academic engagement with the agency of material items in the securitisation of urban everyday life. Nonetheless, some inspirational work has been done on the role of mundane objects, such as trashcans, suitcases, letters, liquids, and cameras, which have been deemed suspicious, since they have been instrumentalised for terrorist purposes and in consequence subject of heightened measures of control (Neyland 2008; Coaffee 2009; Hoijtink 2017; Simon 2012). Thus, the dominant meaning of suspiciousness in respect to objects is their potential dangerousness. To highlight respective transformative trajectories, I include not only typically mundane objects, such as the ones mentioned above, in my analysis but also engage with items traditionally recognised as classic weapons, such as firearms, explosives as well as thrust and cut weapons. Drawing a comparison between these two categories of items – on the one hand classic weapons whose explicit purpose is to inflict force and on the other hand seemingly harmless everyday things which can yet be instrumentalised as weapons or to discretely transport them to their dedicated target spot – allows me to analyse if and how the lines between the two became blurrier over time within the transformative process of securitising urban everyday life.

4.3.1.2 Human bodies: Suspicious people and managers of suspiciousness

Regarding human bodies, I focus again on two categories, namely what I call "suspicious people" and "managers of suspiciousness" which are also derived from prominent reference points in the existing academic literature. Thus, the notion of suspicious people originates in the debate about suspect communities and categories (Ragazzi 2016). The term 'suspect community' was initially coined by Hillyard (1993) and describes societal – typically minority groups – who are constructed to be potentially dangerous based on the assumption that their members committed or are likely to commit terrorist violence solely due to belonging to this very group. Although the theoretical value of the concept is contested (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, 2011; Breen-Smyth 2014; Greer 2014), it has been used in a number of case studies which have uncovered the systematically repressive and violent consequences of being stigmatised as a suspect community member (Greer 2010; Awan 2012; Cherney and Murphy 2016; van Meeteren and van Oostendorp 2019). The understanding of suspicious people that I use in my analysis is again a bit wider because I contend that the classic notion obscures on the one hand the ways in which the suspiciousness of human bodies is produced by markers that go beyond belonging to a community, such as physical appearance, behaviours, occupation, and societal standing, and on the other hand runs the risk of reproducing an understanding of community that does not reflect the heterogeneity that exists for instance within ethnic or religious minority groups. In contrast, suspicious people in the sense of my project empirically capture a spectrum of human bodies who are material-discursively attributed with the suspicion of having committed terrorist violence or having intentions to do so or are deemed to be receptive to radicalisation efforts of terrorist groups.

Finally, in recurrence on Bigo's (2002) 'managers of unease', my last category managers of suspiciousness comprises the people who are charged with the responsibility to deal with the threat of terrorist violence in urban everyday life. Again, this notion is derived from a considerable body of literature which has recognised the growing variety among counterterrorist actors, since paradigms, such as neoliberalism and resilience, became more powerful (Jarvis and Lister 2010; Coaffee et al. 2009b; Malcolm 2013; Batley 2021; Rodrigo Jusué 2022). While there are also non-human bodies in the sense of 'security devices' (Amicelle et al. 2015), such as surveillance cameras, search algorithms, and body scanners (Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Introna and Wood 2004; Frimpong 2011), that are active as managers of suspiciousness, I deal with them mainly when I look at the consequences of securitisation and focus here on human actors. To differentiate among the variety of the different human managers of suspiciousness, I use the denominations formal, semi-formal, and informal. Formal managers of suspiciousness comprise all human representatives of institutions and agencies which are traditionally charged with security matters, such as police forces, the military, and intelligence agencies. Thus, formal managers of suspiciousness are usually to be found in the public sector. Semi-formal managers of suspiciousness can be either from the public or the private sector since they include all human representatives of institutions, businesses, associations, and NGOs that are traditionally not charged with upholding security in cities but take over these responsibilities in the context of their professional lives because their employer requires them to do so. Finally, the category of informal managers of suspiciousness includes all humans present in the city that are encouraged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities within their private life, and thus captures efforts to activate "normal" citizens and members of civil society to participate in mitigating their insecurities in the classic meaning of resilience.

Having operationalised the empirical meaning of the kinds of human and non-human bodies that I engage with in my project, brings me to how I analyse their intra-action. Although my framework is based on the premise of entanglements, I contend that it makes for analytical purposes sense to deal with the increasing suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies at first separately. While such a separation is certainly artificial given my theoretical background, it allows me to underline nonetheless that human and non-human bodies have *both* constitutive agency in how urban everyday life is produced, and hence enables me to further demystify posthumanist performativity as a theoretical lens to analyse material-discursive transformation processes, such as securitisation. Therefore, the first step of my historiographic archaeology is to engage with my four categories – meaning suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness – one by one and map their respective transformations across space and across time within my three cases to tease out the nuances of these developments, and thus also demonstrate that their securitisation is neither necessarily always a linear process towards more suspiciousness and control nor is it delinked from other socio-material transformations of urban everyday life, such as for instance a growing sensibility towards environmental and sustainability concerns. However, according to my argument, the understanding of who and what counts material-discursively as suspicious widens over time and the measures of control taken to manage

the threat of terrorist violence intensify in their reach and their repressive quality. To trace these developments, I firstly collect the empirical material that is available to me by searching different combinations of respective buzz words in various search engines such as Google, Google Scholar, and BASE but also in the (online) catalogues of public institutions, city governments, and libraries. Then, I read, evaluate, and situate the available information in a second step which enables me to draw a mental map of knowledge about the human and non-human bodies that are included in my analysis. In the next step, I cross search aspects that are still unclear or stand out as particularly prominent at this stage to densify the map by establishing relevant linkages and filling its blank spots. The final step is that I analyse the collected material alongside my theoretical premises and assumptions about securitisation as a material-discursive transformation process and trace how both human and non-human bodies changed over time with regards to the socio-material meaning assigned to them.

After this initial separate mapping of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness, I turn in the second stage of my analysis to their intra-action within the socio-material entanglement of urban everyday life. In other words, in this phase, I look beyond the specificities of the four categories that I analysed so far and instead systematically engage with their socio-material interplay to demonstrate how they produce, reproduce, and reinforce each other's suspiciousness. To do so, I reuse the mental maps of knowledge I created during the first stage of my analysis and stack them on top of each other to see where they match and indicate synergies but also where they do not fit together and potentially even clash. The new map that I thus generate allows me to trace how human and non-human bodies intra-act in producing urban everyday life because it brings together the empirical data that I collected and lets me see it in a different light. Hence, I re-analyse my findings by revealing how the material-discursive assignment of suspiciousness to suspicious sites is passively shaped by the objects present at them, the people inhabiting and using these sites, and the managers of suspiciousness imposing control but at same time also how the potential dangerousness of suspicious sites actively shapes which objects and people are assigned with suspiciousness at them and who is deemed a capable manager of their security. I look at these intra-actions from all possible angles by engaging with all four of my categories as their logical starting point. Ultimately, I demonstrate how the suspiciousness assigned to human and non-human bodies at many points reinforces each other, and hence how urban everyday life is increasingly securitised in the local space of my case cities. In the final step of my analysis' second stage, I evaluate my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics. This means that I engage with three questions: Who and what is material-discursively constructed as potentially dangerous? Who and what is material-discursively constructed as worthy of protection? And who and what is material-discursively constructed as capable and credible to provide security in urban everyday life? By answering these questions based on the material I collected, I reveal socio-material power hierarchies in urban everyday life and demonstrate how the rearrangement of human and non-human bodies in times of (counter)terrorism leads either to their (further) inclusion or their (further) exclusion in the everyday life of the place I analyse.

4.3.2 Mapping securitisation across space and time

My historiographic archaeology does however not only capture how the socio-material entanglements of human and non-human bodies transform in local space at the present time but also across spatiality and temporality by being translated from one place to the other as well as from the past and the future to the present and vice versa. However, tracing translations is complex because they jump across configurations of time and across spatial scales. The question that derives from these theoretical premises is how I can methodologically grasp such translations when analysing empirical material.

My starting point is to structure my analysis around three places, namely London, Brussels, and Stuttgart, which are the cities I selected as the cases that my project explores. The reasons why I selected particularly these three cities will be discussed at the end of this chapter. While it would have also possible to establish a different understanding of empirical cases and define them for instance temporally or structure my whole analysis alongside my categorisations of human and non-human bodies, using places – and hence concretely identifiable manifestations of space (cf. Löw 2016: 167) – as reference points allows me to compare their similarities and differences in a systematic way and from there draw linkages with regards to which aspects of securitised urban everyday life were translated from one place to the other. At the same time, temporal considerations are just as relevant because the internal structure of my case studies follows a linear chronological order in the sense that I analyse firstly the period before 9/11, then the period between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, and then the period thereafter, meaning current times.

Therefore, my three case studies are structured as follows: After a short general introduction to the respective case and its urban everyday life, I begin with zooming into their local space, as just described above, by mapping the transformations of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness across the three time periods I look at. Within this temporally linear mapping process, I pay special attention to temporality in a non-linear sense by evaluating the timelines of (counter)terrorist events. More concretely, I investigate when and how terrorist violence was committed as well as when and how counterterrorist measures were introduced at the local space of the place that I currently analyse. Establishing these non-linear chronologies reveals how past experiences of terrorist violence and future imaginaries thereof are relevant to transform the local space in which urban everyday life plays out at a certain place, and thus builds the empirical foundation to analyse how suspiciousness is translated across time: If there is a local reference point of terrorist violence for the introduction of countermeasures, the question is how closely are these events linked to each other, or in other words, are countermeasures tailormade to respond to the attack methodology used in the past local incident or do the material-discursive assignments of suspiciousness to human and non-human bodies differ from it? If there is no local reference point to a past attack, but counterterrorist measures were still introduced at a place on entirely pre-emptive grounds, the question is what inspired the future imaginaries of terrorist violence in this case to justify the implementation of countermeasures? This last question points to the relevance of the local (counter)terrorist developments at other cities for

the transformation of a place's everyday life, and hence builds the empirical foundation to analyse how suspiciousness is translated across space. As I conceptualised theoretically, the adaption of these material-discursive meanings of suspiciousness is determined by their elusiveness and compatibility. Elusiveness refers to the transferability of who and what is considered suspicious and worthy of protection, and compatibility refers to how receptive a place is for adopting a new understanding of suspiciousness at a certain time. Thus, spatial and temporal translations can be empirically explicit in the sense that there is a direct connection drawn from an incident at a certain place and time to another in the documents that I analyse. But I also look for more subtle forms of empirical evidence for translations, namely if the logics and rationales of material-discursively assigned suspiciousness that are adopted across space and across time, resemble each other in the sense that similar human and non-human bodies are seen as vulnerable or potentially dangerous at different places and times.

To systematically reveal these translations across space and time, the next step of my analysis comprises an systematic engagement with the differences and similarities among my three case studies by "comparing" the mental maps that I have generated for each of them in the sense of what Niewöhner and Scheffer (2010) call a 'thick comparison'. Instead of identifying casual mechanisms between dependent and independent variables amongst several cases (Lijphart 1971: 683), the method takes the intersubjective production of cases within a postpositivist research design seriously when setting them into perspective. In Niewöhner and Scheffer's words, 'objects of comparison are not found "out there". […] They are produced through thickening contextualizations, including analytical, cross-contextual framings that are meant to facilitate comparison' (Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010: 4). As it is ultimately my judgement as a researcher what constitutes a similarity and what constitutes a difference, it is important to reflect on my subjective role in practising my research during this step. However, a thick comparison is after all not about achieving the generalisability of findings across all cases, since it embraces the existence of similarities *and* differences 'as fruitful and instructive – rather than being paralysed' (Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010: 4) by them. I adopt this logic for my project and thus claim that revealing both, the similarities and differences of my cases, is important to make my argument. Hence, I compare the findings from my cases across time and space to map respective translations of material-discursive suspiciousness from one place to the other and from the past and the future to the present. The final step of my comparison is to critically re-evaluate my findings once more against the normative background of posthumanist ethics, and thus uncover which socio-material hierarchies are produced and reproduced on the translocal level of space in the shifting material-discursive understandings about for which human and non-human bodies security is provided from whom and what and who and what is deemed capable and credible to do so.

As the local understandings of socio-material suspiciousness at one place are not always elusive and compatible to be translated to other places, and translations are neither identical nor immediate, each of the cities that I analyse has its local particularities and hence there are discrepancies among my cases. However, identifying those differences also builds the prerequisite to look beyond them, and thus to

uncover what the similar elements of transforming everyday life in European metropoles are, which finally brings my analysis at the level of translocal space. In this last stage of my historiographic archaeology, I focus on exposing the commonalities of my cases by comparing their maps of knowledge once again. In doing so, I demonstrate which aspects of the material-discursive understandings of who and what is suspicious, worthy of protection, and charged to distinguish between suspiciousness and harmlessness in European metropoles are similar despite the distinctive national cultures, varying experiences with terrorist violence, and differing understandings of threats and appropriate counterreactions that exist among the places I analyse. Identifying these resemblances among my cases hence allows me to make a claim about the securitisation of urban everyday life on the translocal level of space which 'encompasses [as defined in my theoretical chapter] the experiences and materialities of everyday lives in multiple places' (Low 2016: 174). However, as there is no clear threshold to measure how many cases must be how similar to constitute a transformation on the translocal level, my analysis 'draws attention to tendencies rather than absolutes' (Diez and Squire 2008: 567).

4.4 Selection of cases

Having introduced what conducting a historiographic archaeology means in the context of my project, I discuss in the second part of this chapter, why I selected London, Brussels, and Stuttgart as cases for my analysis. I argue that each of the cities I included in my project has its individual relevance for making my argument but moreover the combination of these three metropoles serves the analytical requirements of my historiographic archaeology, in the sense that they are all places which count as European metropoles but at the same time differ from each other, especially in respect to the local encounters with terrorist violence they made within the time frame of my analysis.

4.4.1 London as the prime example case

The British capital is probably the most obvious of my cases, and this is also one of the main reasons why I include London in my analysis. With a population of almost nine million inhabitants, it is one of the largest cities in Europe. Moreover, London is among the world's most influential financial centres, very popular for tourists, and an influential hub in arts and sciences. Given these features, it can clearly be considered a European metropole (cf. Eade 2000). When it comes to local trajectories of (counter)terrorism, London has seen a considerable number of attacks over the years committed by both domestic and transnational groups, using a wide range of attack methodologies and instruments which caused economic disruptions as well as loss of human life on small and large scale. As mentioned earlier, disruptive moments in London's history of terrorism include the IRA bombings at the Baltic Stock Exchange, Bishopsgate, and the Isle of Dogs in the 1990s, the 7/7 attacks which hit the city's public transport system in 2005, and in more recent years, the London Bridge attack in 2017 (Coaffee 2009; Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009b; Black 2019). Given London's long list of attacks, the metropole is the prime example of a securitised European city which is reflected in a considerable body of literature (see for instance: Coaffee 2004, 2009; Coaffee and Murkami Wood 2006; Fussey 2011). The British capital earned its reputation as a fortress initially during the 1990s in the context of the

construction of its so-called “Environmental and Traffic Zone” which is better known by its commonly used name ‘Ring of Steel’ (Coaffee 2004). After 9/11, security measures in the city peaked particularly during the London Olympic Games in 2012 (Graham 2012; Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012; Manley and Silk 2014) but also after this event, counterterrorism measures have been continuously updated with new physical measures of control as well as public awareness campaigns encouraging citizens to share their observations of suspicious people and objects (British Transport Police 2016; BBC News 2016d). The motivation to include London as a case in my analysis is based on this reputation as a target city and a securitised fortress, given its long and eventful history with (counter)terrorism. I aim to impugn this image and reveal on the one hand what is in fact particular about London as a place when it comes to securitisation of urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism. On the other hand, I demonstrate that London is not so special, in the sense that socio-material understandings of suspiciousness have been translated from it and to it from other places, and therefore its securitised urban everyday life shows resemblances with that of other cities and ultimately with transformations of urban normality on the translocal level of European metropoles.

4.4.2 Brussels as the newcomer case

My second case is Brussels. The Belgian capital, although not comparable to London in terms of population size and economic influence, nonetheless falls into the category of European metropoles (cf. Romańczyk 2012): The city headquarters international organisations, such as for instance the majority of the European Union (EU)’s main institutions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The presence of international organisations also intrigued the attention of many corporations and interest groups. This accounts for a lively and highly mobile expat community in Brussels (Gatti 2009). Apart from its international inhabitants, the city is busy with visitors from all over the globe who come for Brussels’ tourist attractions as well as its cultural events and fairs (Jansen-Verbeke et al. 2005). Regarding (counter)terrorism, Brussels has seen a few smaller attacks of terrorist violence during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but after that (counter)terrorism was not an important priority on the city’s agenda for around 30 years. This changed in 2014 with the emerging global prominence of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). Within four years, Brussels experienced six attacks for which the jihadist organisation claimed responsibility. Furthermore, the Belgian capital gained not only worldwide attention as a target but also as a harbour city for terrorist perpetrators and suspects (van Ostaeyen 2016). The peak of attention was reached one week after the attacks in Paris in November 2015, when it became public that some of the attacks’ perpetrators fled back to their ‘home base’ (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018b: 121) in Brussels. In reaction, the metropole’s terror alert level was raised to its maximum which resulted in an unprecedented security lockdown of the city (Jensen et al. 2018). Despite these efforts, the most harmful of Brussels’ recent terrorist experiences happened a couple of months later when in March 2016 bombs exploded at the city’s airport and a metro station (Ponsaers and Devroe 2017). The decision to include Brussels as a case in my analysis is based on its previous experiences with (counter)terrorism. As newcomer compared to the

more established target city London, Brussels looks back to fewer local incidents of terrorist violence. That makes the city an interesting place to analyse because this allows me to explore pre-emptive translations of suspiciousness to it in more depth, given Brussels' everyday life already transformed prior to major local attacks. At the same time, the recent international attention for the Belgian capital as both a target and a home for terrorist perpetrators bears the question if the metropole is developing from a newcomer to a frontrunner when it comes to the securitisation of urban everyday life.

4.4.3 Stuttgart as the test case

My third case, the German city Stuttgart, is probably the least expectable one among the three places I analyse. Unlike London and Brussels, Stuttgart is not the national capital of Germany but only the regional capital of the Land Baden-Württemberg. Furthermore, with 600,000 inhabitants, Stuttgart is only the sixth largest German city, and is also smaller in size than my other two cases. Nonetheless, Stuttgart clearly fits the definition of a European metropole. Thus, the city headquarters several major multinational companies especially in the automobile sector (Gaebe 2004). The presence of these firms contributes to Stuttgart's metropolitan area being ranked continuously under the top 20 in Europe in terms of GDP (Eurostat 2018). Furthermore, these corporations attract both high-skilled workers and business people from all around the globe to come to the city (Strambach 2002; Späth et al. 2016). Other than its economic relevance, Stuttgart also offers tourist attractions and big public festivities (cf. Jarvis and Blank 2011). In terms of its location, Stuttgart is situated in the EU's geographical centre which makes it an influential mobility hub. Thus, Stuttgart has not only an international airport but is also in the process of building a prestigious train station called "Stuttgart 21". Although the project initially sparked controversies, it updates the so-called "Magistrale for Europe" between Paris and Budapest by providing for faster connections and higher passenger numbers (Ward 2010). Thanks to its economic prosperity and central location in the EU, Stuttgart has inhabitants from over 180 countries and around 40 percent of its population has a migration background, also thanks to the city's important role as a destination for foreign workers in the aftermath of World War II (Haußmann 2012). In respect to trajectories of (counter)terrorism, Stuttgart is special because it is *not* special. Hence, not only compared to London and Brussels but also compared to other German cities such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and Cologne, Stuttgart has not seen any violence associated with terrorism in its history. However, this does not mean that the *threat* of terrorism has also been entirely absent from it. Thus, the most recent incident of a terror alert happened in December 2018 at Stuttgart's airport (BBC News 2018a). Although the instance turned out to be a false alarm, it provides indications that Stuttgart might be targeted in the future (Unger 2018). Nonetheless, given that so far Stuttgart has had no local encounter with terrorist violence, the prominence of counterterrorist considerations its urban agenda seems questionable: A potential transformation of its everyday life is solely based on pre-emptive translations of who and what counts as suspicious from other places. Therefore, the German city serves as a suitable test case for my argument that (counter)terrorism transformed European metropoles – no matter if these places were local targets of terrorist violence in the past or not.

4.4.4 The combination of cases

So far, I outlined the relevance of each of my selected cases, but the question remains, why these cities and not others. Other potentially interesting European metropoles that come to mind are for instance Belfast, Istanbul, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Zurich. However, within my project's scope the combination of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart makes particularly sense. Thus, in none of my selected places, issues of (counter)terrorism are dominated by a domestic conflict like this is arguably the situation for Belfast and Istanbul. Although London's original measures of (counter)terrorism were contextualised in the Northern Irish Conflict, attacks from other terrorist groups clearly diversified the city's affectedness with (counter)terrorism. Replacing Brussels with places, such as Berlin or Paris, is imaginable because in all cities (counter)terrorism has risen rather recently on the political agenda. However, Brussels stands out due to its double status as a target *and* harbour city for terrorist perpetrators. Finally, compared to other cities which have not been terrorist targets, such as Rome and Zurich, Stuttgart is more the suitable case because its status as a potential target metropole is less obvious, and thus (counter)terrorism seems very unlikely to play an important role there, making it the ideal place to "test" my argument.

Additionally, the combination of these three places allows for an appropriate level of resemblance, but also variance among them not only when it comes to their (counter)terrorist trajectories. Thus, all three cities are similar in respect to the level of freedom and liberty that is attributed to the national contexts they are located in (Freedom House Index 2022). Furthermore, although only Stuttgart and Brussels are situated within federalist states, thanks to London's active striving for local autonomy, all three cities are equipped with considerable decision-making powers on the urban level (cf. Coaffee 2013). Finally, London, Brussels, and Stuttgart are all recognised as culturally highly diverse places whose material shape has evolved over the centuries, and thus incorporates historical and more modern features. When it comes to differences among them beyond their local count of terrorist attacks, the most important aspect is that they are located in the national contexts of three different countries which have to some extent distinct traditions when it comes law-making, the role of civil society, and the institutional organisation of security apparatuses based on their respective historical trajectories as nation states. Thus, the past experience of two authoritarian regimes within the last century, which both employed elaborate systems of control, makes the initial scepticism in Germany towards the normalising gaze of CCTV cameras higher than in the UK and Belgium (Hempel and Töpfer 2009: 162). Furthermore, the cities are different in population size, the financial assets available to them, and the workforce of their security institutions. Given this balanced level of similarities and differences among the three places, London, Brussels, and Stuttgart are not individually interesting as cases but also their combination fits well into the logic of my project, as their selection allows me to compare their respective local trajectories and analyse their relevance in the context of the transformation of everyday life on the translocal level of European metropoles.

5 Case Study: London

5.1 Introduction

In a recent update of the famous British counterterrorism strategy CONTEST, its drafters claim that 'terrorists have not, cannot and will not change our way of life' (CONTEST 2018: 8). In this chapter, I demonstrate that in fact terrorism has done exactly that, at least, regarding the everyday life in the British capital. It was yet not alone terrorist violence and its perpetrators who are responsible for these changes but more importantly, the countermeasures which were taken to respond and prevent their attacks. Thus, London serves as my first case study to analyse how everyday life in European metropoles has transformed in times of (counter)terrorism. Based on the theoretical and methodological premises laid out in the previous two chapters, I argue that over time more and more urban sites, objects, and people have been increasingly attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness and that this led to the implementation of intensified measures of control and a growing number of managers of suspiciousness. These shifts in London's local space were justified with references to past experiences and future imaginaries of terrorist violence which were translated across space and across time. From a perspective of posthumanist ethics, this securitisation of urban everyday life in the British capital constitutes a process of urban segregation, as privileged human and non-human bodies were further included and marginalised human and non-human bodies were further excluded through them.

As the British capital provides thanks to its eventful history of (counter)terrorism the prime example of a securitised city within my case selection, my separate analysis of the place lies the groundwork for comparing London to Brussels and Stuttgart, and hence to show which aspects of the securitisation of its urban everyday life are indeed special and which elements are similar to my other cases, and thus constitute securitisation trends on the translocal level of European metropoles. Therefore, my historiographic archaeology of London is structured in three main parts. In the first section of the chapter, I engage with the city's human and non-human bodies separately, to map interesting nuances in how suspicious sites and objects on the one hand and suspicious people and managers of suspiciousness on the other hand emerged over time. In the case of London, my analysis begins with the last decade of the so-called Troubles[3] since this is the period in which the terrorist violence associated with them was most prominent and destructive in London. In second part of the chapter, I bring these four aspects of my analysis together and show how suspiciousness was reproduced and intensified, as suspicious human and non-human bodies were intra-acting in London's everyday life. In the last section of my analysis, I evaluate my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics to reveal how the securitisation of everyday life constitutes a process of urban segregation in London by considering from whom and what security is provided, who and what is considered worthy of protection, and who and what is deemed capable and credible to distinguish between suspiciousness and harmlessness.

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[3] I use the term "Troubles" to describe a period of the Northern Irish Conflict lasting from the 1960s to the late 1990s. While the term can be criticised for its trivialization of violence, I use it not in an ideological sense, but merely to denotate a certain historical phase of the conflict.

5.2. London's transforming everyday life

With almost nine million inhabitants living in Greater London by mid-2019, the metropole is population-wise the fourth largest in Europe, and the largest in the Great Britain, accounting for almost 15 percent of its entire population (Office for National Statistics 2019). While London continues to grow, it has existed as a major human settlement since the times of the Roman empire, and hence been developing over the course of two millennia. Many parts of London have retained their medieval looks until today. Yet, despite these historical relicts, London is constantly changing in processes of urban regeneration, gentrification, and pushes for the incorporation of sustainability and environmental concerns (Imrie et al. 2009). Thanks to its recognition as an economic, cultural, educational, and touristic hub, the city is very international: More than one third of the British capital's inhabitants are foreign-born, making London the second biggest immigrant city worldwide. The largest ethnic groups represented in London besides Britons are people from India, Poland, Ireland, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh who all form ethnic groups of more than 100,000 inhabitants (Office for National Statistics 2011).

In political terms, the local government of London consists of two tiers, the lower tier which administers local services and the "Greater London Authority" (GLA), as the upper tier which is responsible for strategic planning. The lower tier consists of the 32 boroughs of London on the one hand and City of London Corporation on the other hand which governs the City of London, also known as the "Square Mile" or simply "the City". The City is uniquely independent in the UK's governance structures and has due to historical reasons not only its own mayor, the Lord Mayor of the City of London, but also its own police force, the City of London Police (CLP). The GLA was only introduced in 1999, after a successful public referendum that aimed for a more coherent and powerful decision-making institution on the local level to advance London's interests as a city (Thornley et al. 2005: 1947). The establishment of the GLA also foresaw the office of the directly elected Mayor of London which was held by the independent Ken Livingstone from 2000 to 2008, from 2008 to 2016 by the Conservative Boris Johnson and since 2016 by Sadiq Khan, representing the Labour party. In the context of Brexit, the city left the EU together with the rest of country finally in 2020, although a clear majority of London's population had voted against it in 2016 (Johnston et al. 2018). Leaving the EU has impacted London not only economically but also as a migration hub (Lulle et al. 2018; Hall and Wójcik 2021). My analysis of increasing suspiciousness in London's everyday life must be seen against the background of these wider socio-material developments and trends that the city was faced with over the years.

5.3 The securitisation of non-human and human bodies in London

In the first stage of my historiographic archaeology of London's everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, I map the developments around suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness separately to draw out their nuances. By acknowledging human and non-human bodies as equally important in my analysis, I avoid a bias either towards the material or the social that exists in previous analyses of (counter)terrorism measures in London (Coaffee 2009; Fussey 2011; Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009b).

5.3.1 The transformation of suspicious sites in London

The first non-human bodies that I analyse are suspicious sites in the British capital, meaning all those urban locations which are considered suspicious due to their vulnerability as attractive targets for terrorist violence or due to their potential dangerousness, as the areas where terrorist perpetrators are suspected to live. My mapping of London's local space ultimately shows how suspicious sites have mushroomed from geographically distinct localities to nowadays being effectively found everywhere in the British capital thanks to memories of past attacks and future imaginaries of terrorist violence which were translated across time and space.

5.3.1.1 Suspicious sites before 9/11

Mapping London's suspicious sites before 9/11 reveals that although the IRA committed during the last decade of the Troubles attacks all over the city, vulnerable sites in London remained geographically limited to the economic centres of the British capital, which were recognised as attractive targets thanks to previous local experiences of terrorist violence at them. Potentially dangerous sites were associated with neighbourhoods with a large percentage of Irish inhabitants such as Kilburn, Archway, and Camden Town in the Northwest of London.

In terms of terrorist attacks outside Northern Irish territory, London was the most affected place during the Troubles (McGladdery 2006: XIV). All the attacks that happened in the British capital were committed by the IRA. Their target locations were diverse and included some of London's underground stations such as King's Cross, Sloane Square, and Green Park as well as symbolic locations, such as the Houses of Parliament, the Tower of London, but also busy shopping streets, restaurants, pubs, and shops. Most incidents had a small to medium impact, meaning the attacks caused only light injuries (if at all) among its victims and accounted otherwise for merely material damages. Besides the high frequency of these smaller incidents, three IRA bombings stand out especially in terms of their material and economic damages but also regarding their human cost (Oppenheimer 2016: 125–126): The first one happened on 10 April 1992 at the Baltic Exchange in the City of London, the second one took place on 24 April 1993 at Bishopsgate, one of the City of London's most important thoroughfares with thousands of commuters entering the financial district every day and the third one was committed on 9 February 1996 at the South Quay of the Isle of Dogs, and thus not within the City of London, but at the London Docklands. In terms of attack methodology, the three incidents show striking similarities, as their intention 'was not to cause major loss of life […] but to cause economic disruption' (Fussey 2007: 176–177; see also: Coaffee 2009: 96): Hence, the selected target sites were in the City of London and the London Docklands which serve, as the two financial centres of the British capital, a foremost economic function. Furthermore, the locations share material characteristics, namely that they incorporate tall buildings and skyscrapers with many windows and glass constructions. These features make them particularly vulnerable for an attack with explosives because glass easily scatters, and its pieces cause further damage. In temporal terms, the attacks happened either on weekday evenings or weekend mornings, and hence were planned for off-peak times at the targeted office spaces.

Analysing London's counterterrorism measures during this first phase reveals how the local experiences of terrorist violence committed by the IRA influenced the definition of suspicious sites at the time: As the first two major attacks happened in the City of London, this was consequently also the geographical area of London which was heavily securitised as vulnerable in their aftermath. A large investment of the City of London Corporation resulted in the establishment of London's Ring of Steel: Although the security cordon bears strong resemblance with the measures taken in Belfast with the same name, it relies – in the intention to avoid the Northern Irish capital's 'barrier mentality' (Coaffee 2004: 204) – rather on technology-based measures such as CCTV surveillance and an Automatic Number-Plate Recognition (ANPR) system as well as retractable bollards, sentry boxes, and intersections with London's ancient city walls (Williams and Gingell 2014: 45). The physical and technological measures were taken at all strategic access points of the City of London to be able to detect, and potentially prevent future bomb attacks by reacting to them in a more effective manner. The decision-making process about installing a security cordon around the City of London took foremostly place on the local level. Yet, the pushes for an intensified security management within the Square Mile came mostly from private actors, such as multinational corporations located within the area as well as insurance companies, which had to compensate for the losses caused by attacks. However, since the implementation of the Ring of Steel substantively contributed to sealing off the Square Mile from the rest of London, the local councils of its surrounding boroughs opposed the City of London's unilateral surging ahead. They disapproved the new measures for practical reasons, such as unhindered traffic flows, but also because they feared to become more attractive target locations themselves (Coaffee 2009: 112–113). Nonetheless, the reaction to the 1996 attack at the London Docklands was similar, in the sense that the area was also particularly fortified through establishing an 'Iron Collar' (Coaffee 2004: 205) with the Canary Wharf complex at its heart. Following the example of the CLP, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) set up a security cordon with four strategic entry points where heavily armed police officers were posted during periods of heightened threat levels. The rest of the area was sealed off by taking advantage of the natural geography of the London Docklands as a peninsula with physical security barriers and further controlled through CCTV surveillance and identity check systems to allow access only for authorised people. This securitisation of London's economic centres incrementally intensified as initially temporary measures materialised over time into permanent arrangements, although this was not a linear development: In fact, after the attacks at the Baltic Exchange and Bishopsgate, which triggered initial peaks of response measures, some regulations were eased to allow for a less regulated access to The City during a two-year ceasefire. With the attack at the Isle of Dogs in 1996, the pendulum swung back, and counterterrorism measures were not only re-strengthened but also spread geographically.

Besides these sites which were deemed suspicious due to their heightened vulnerability, the IRA attacks in London also provided the blueprint to single out suspicious sites, in the sense of potentially dangerous areas. As the attacks were committed in the context of the Northern Irish Conflict and the IRA was deemed to enjoy widespread popular support among the Irish population – as I will further

elaborate in the section on suspicious people – London's neighbourhoods with a high percentage of Irish immigrants were especially securitised. This was particularly visible in Northern London, such as in Kilburn as well as neighbouring areas like Archway and Camden Town (Sorohan 2012). These neighbourhoods, and particularly "openly Irish" places there, such as pubs, restaurants, and community centres were not only targets of intercommunal violence committed by British nationalist but also in the centre of attention of managers of suspiciousness at the time. This implied a strong police presence as well as restrictive stop and search measures which were systematically conducted in these areas with extraordinary high numbers of non-evidence based arrests and detentions among the neighbourhood's inhabitants (Hickman and Walter 1997; Hillyard 1993).

All in all, mapping this first phase of my historiographic archaeology in London shows that its local attacks, and especially the three incidents at its financial centres committed by the IRA provided important triggers for the securitisation of suspicious sites in the British capital at the time. Thus, in terms of vulnerable sites, the attacks at the Baltic Stock Exchange, Bishopsgate, and the Isle of Dogs and their high economic costs produced powerful local reference points to justify an intensified control of the City of London and the London Docklands to prevent future violence at them. In terms of potentially dangerous sites, London's areas with a high percentage of Irish inhabitants were targeted with systematically repressive countermeasures. Therefore, although a securitisation of its urban everyday life was already visible in several areas of the British capital, recognised as suspicious sites, these were still restricted to geographically discernible neighbourhoods and directly linked to local memories of terrorist violence at the time. In consequence, intensified measures of control – intended for protection or counteraction against terrorist suspects – were also focused especially on these areas, and less pertinent in other parts of London.

5.3.1.2 Suspicious sites between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping London's suspicious sites between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 reveals that the material-discursive assignment of suspiciousness to urban sites changed significantly: Although terrorist violence in the context of the Northern Irish Conflict still existed as a source of threat even after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it was overshadowed by transnational terrorism, following a jihadist ideology. The still strategic but target-wise more diffuse attack methodology adopted in this context by terrorist perpetrators served as a reference point for a much wider understanding of suspicious sites as symbolically and structurally relevant urban locations of everyday life on the one hand and areas with high numbers of immigrant and non-white populations on the other hand.

The attacks 9/11 which signifies the beginning of the phase serves as a first illustration of this development: On 11 September 2011, several perpetrators hijacked passenger planes and intentionally crashed them into the twin towers of the "World Trade Center" (WTC) in New York City and the Pentagon Building in Virginia. The coordinated attack series resulted in 2,977 fatalities and over 25,000 injuries, in addition to at least ten billion US dollars in material damage. London's own 9/11 – the events should become known under the synonym '7/7' (Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009a: 7) –

happened in 2005, when a coordinated series of bomb explosions during London's busy morning rush hour caused 56 causalities – including the four bombers – and more than 700 people injured (Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams 2009a: 1). The attacks' sequence accounts for meticulous planning and strategic target selection (Jordan 2008):The first three bombs exploded within a time span of merely 50 seconds in different underground trains of the metropole's public transport system. All affected cars had passed through King's Cross/St Pancras just minutes ago. The fourth explosion happened almost an hour later on a London double-decker bus which was crowded with tube passengers who had just been evacuated (House of Commons 2006: 4). The attacks of 7/7 must be seen in close connection to four other attempted attacks only two weeks later, targeting again the city's public transport system. Yet, as explosives did not go off in this case, their destructive power was limited (BBC News 2005). A comparison of the used attack methodologies shows that the targeted locations were of symbolic and structural relevance within the cities' everyday life. In the case of 9/11, the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon were an obvious challenge to US hegemony (Gillespie 2001). The attacks on London were targeting particularly its public transport system, and thus aiming to interrupt the city's critical infrastructure and render the whole network dysfunctional (Jordan 2008). In this sense, the disruptive damage of the 7/7 bombings is comparable to that of the collapsing WTC, as both had not only immediately local implications but also destructive consequences for their surroundings. Furthermore, the sites were attacked during their busy peak-times of usage, and thus their significantly high number of human victims were a strategic decision to capitalise on the dramatizing effects of unforeseen violence in the medialised projection of fear (Huddy and Feldman 2011).

In reaction to this shift in attack methodologies, the material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites in London changed. First indications thereof were already visible in the aftermath of 9/11, as its memory quite immediately translated to London. Thus, while the adopted approach was to be '"vigilant but calm" in order to avoid a "siege mentality"' (Coaffee 2004: 205), the already existing securitisation measures of the Ring of Steel and the Iron Collar were re-enforced with manpower as well as material and technological updates. In the longer aftermath of 9/11, London's level of preparedness towards the "new" methods of transnational terrorism was put to the test in elaborate simulations (Thompson 2002; Wintour and Taylor 2002). Given the shortcomings they revealed, counterterrorist measures in the British capital were updated once again. Thus, the ANPR system was extended to cover the whole of London and enhanced with mobile camera patrols and facial recognition systems (Coaffee 2004: 207–208). Additional prominent sites, such as the Houses of Parliaments and Downing Street No. 10, were materially fortified through concrete blocks to limit their accessibility. The *local* experience of the city being under attack in 7/7 led to further fortification and increased contingency planning. Regarding the identification of vulnerable sites, the 7/7 attacks initiated a new security paradigm, namely the idea of "Crowded Places". In a series of documents, the British Home Office defined Crowded Places as 'locations frequented by the public, which are judged to be possible terrorist targets by virtue of their crowd density' (British Home Office 2010b: 7). This definition is intentionally vague, in fact the Home

Office recognised that 'what counts as a crowded place is a matter of judgment' (British Home Office 2010a: 3). However, from the examples presented, it becomes clear that the security authorities initially assigned vulnerability mainly to target locations of structural and symbolic relevance, such as tourist attractions, governmental institutions, and the public transport system. Its updated version from 2014 identifies also 'shopping centres, sports stadia, bars, pubs and clubs' (British Home Office 2014: 5) as Crowded Places. The urban reconstruction processes which followed the new rationale led again to intensified control: Especially in the management of both private and public transport, CCTV and ANPR systems became even more widespread and placed inside trains and stations as well as at strategic streets all over London and symbolic landmarks were increasingly surrounded by material barriers. An entirely pre-emptive counterterrorist milestone in securitising vulnerable suspicious sites comprised the hosting the Olympic Games in London in 2012 (Fussey and Coaffee 2011). During the mega event, London as whole was effectively put under lockdown, and measures which are usually found foremostly in the security architecture of airports, such as special security zones, ID checks, and body scanners, were installed in public urban space (Graham 2012: 449). Moreover, the city was fortified in a military manner by installing several high-velocity missiles and an eleven-mile long, 5,000 volt electrised fence topped with razor-wire (Simpson et al. 2017a: 190–191). The epicentre of these efforts was the Olympic Village which was constructed as a text-book example of an 'environment of hyper-insecurity' (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012: 705). In retrospective, the securitisation of the Olympic Games describe an extraordinary peak in London's history of counterterrorism, which was too resource-consuming and freedom restricting to be permanently upheld (Fussey 2011: 21; Simpson et al. 2017a: 189). Nevertheless, especially at the Olympic Park, material barriers remained in place beyond the event, pointing to certain counterterrorist path-dependencies (Boykoff and Fussey 2014: 266).

Besides these efforts to securitise suspicious sites based on their vulnerability, this phase also implied a shift regarding the sites assigned with potential dangerousness. As the main source of terrorist violence became associated with jihadist ideologies, areas with a high percentage of Muslim inhabitants were the new target of intensified control, including stop and search practices as well as community policing efforts (Klausen 2009; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011). A centre of counterterrorist attention was the neighbourhood Finsbury Park thanks to allegedly radicalising tendencies promoted at its mosque and vibrant Islamic community centre (Taylor 2017). However, as Islam is practiced by different communities and typically conflated with racialised stereotypes about People of Colour, the areas securitised as suspicious became more dispersed and harder to systematically control (Patel 2012). In consequence, entire boroughs such as Tower Hamlets, Camden, Newham, and Walham Forest saw not only intensified police presence and counterterrorist attention but were also the epicentre of Islamophobic attacks directed against its inhabitants identified as Muslim (Kielinger and Paterson 2013).

All in all, mapping of suspicious sites during this second phase of my historiographic archaeology of London shows that memories of local encounters with terrorist violence became less important for their definition within this period: On the one hand, the attacks of 9/11 served as a powerful

remote reference point to justify additional securitisation measures to protect sites which were material-discursively considered as vulnerable in London's local space, and hence memories of terrorist violence were translated across space. In direct comparison, however, the local attacks of 7/7 were still more powerful, in initiating the adoption of the Crowded Places paradigm. On the other hand, future imaginaries of terrorist violence became more important in securitising suspicious sites, as especially the hyper-securitised environment of the Olympic Games in 2012 but also a more general shift towards contingency planning and local risk assessment shows, and hence material-discursive assumptions about suspiciousness were also translated across time. While therefore the specific attack methodologies of terrorist perpetrators regarding their selected target sites still played a role in defining suspicious sites, these shifts led overall to more indistinct and wider understanding of their vulnerability, which is particularly expressed in the Crowded Places paradigm. In this sense, vulnerable sites were no longer geographically distinct but comprised all urban sites of structural and symbolic relevance with an expected high crowd density. The extended definition of suspicious sites led to the introduction of new measures mainly at governmental buildings, tourist attractions, and in London's public transport system as well as a massive securitisation of the Olympic Games in 2012. A similar but less apparent dynamic is observable for suspicious sites in the sense of potentially dangerous areas. As, in comparison to the previous phase, a much more heterogeneous and therefore more dispersed group of people was associated with terrorist intentions, the areas which were securitised as potentially dangerous became geographically less restricted. Yet, their systematic control thus became more difficult to uphold.

5.3.1.3 Suspicious sites since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious sites since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 finally reveals that their material-discursive understanding was widened once again, though during this phase, respective changes were more incremental. While there was a diverse range of local terrorist attacks during this period, they only served in some instances as reference points for the implementation of countermeasures at locally specific suspicious sites. At the same time, the growing prominence of future imaginaries of violence – oftentimes translated to London from other places – made attacks a plausible possibility all around the city. For potentially dangerous areas, a similar logic is observable as suspicious people were at least officially no longer defined with a reference to certain minority communities.

Although the focus of public attention has been drawn to other European metropoles since 2015/16, London still saw a couple of terrorist incidents during this last phase of my analysis. Compared to the previous phase, these local terrorist incidents were more frequent but smaller both in number of human victims and material damage caused. They include stabbing attacks at London Bridge in November 2019 and in Streatham in February 2020, two attempted bomb attacks at London's public transport system in 2016 and 2017, as well as two attacks in which vehicles were deliberately driven into human crowds, so called "Vehicle as Weapon" (VAW) attacks. Both happened in 2017, one at Westminster Bridge, the other one close to the mosque in Finsbury Park. The severest recent attack in terms of human cost happened in June 2017 at London Bridge, as a mix of a VAW and a stabbing attack,

and thus closely resembling the attacks in Paris in November 2015: After driving into a group of pedestrians, three perpetrators exited their vehicle and attacked civilians who were sitting in pubs and restaurants in nearby Borough Market with knives. The attack cost eleven lives and left 48 people injured. In synopsis, local encounters with terrorist violence clearly diversified in terms of the used modus operandi and resembled in some cases terrorist attacks in other European metropoles. Yet, targeting human bodies remained the primary rationale of terrorist incidents, capitalising on the projection of fear beyond the immediate act of violence. The attack sites included some of London's bridges, governmental institutions, and the public transport system and thus places of heightened relevance in urban everyday life, but also more mundane places of worship and leisure.

The counterterrorist reaction to these incidents shows that memories of local encounters with terrorist violence remained powerful reference points to define suspicious sites in the British capital. Thus, the special vulnerability of London's bridges was explicitly acknowledged and resulted in a joint initiative of the private company "Transport for London" (TfL) and public security agencies, such as the "National Counterterrorism Security Office" (NaCTSO) and the "Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure" (CPNI), to secure London's bridges while respecting their symbolic heritage (Transport for London 2020). Another proposal from 2016 foresaw a further update of the Ring of Steel which is directed particularly against 'hostile vehicle-borne security threat[s]' (BBC News 2016d) and comprises the re-introduction of manned checkpoints, bollards, and crash-proof barricades in the City of London. In addition to that, special military and police units such as in the "Operation Temperer" and "Project Servator" were charged with patrolling highly frequented areas in London's city-centre to look for suspicious objects and persons and project state authority through their presence (City of London Police 2020; Metropolitan Police Service 2020c; Gearson and Berry 2021).

Nevertheless, thanks to described diversification in attack methodologies which made their target location more arbitrary and the general shift towards a stronger focus on future imaginaries of terrorist violence, the material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites in London became overall again widened, by being extremely vague. This is reflected in further updates of the Crowded Places paradigm. Thus, the 'Crowded Places Guidance' (NaCTSO 2017) adopted in 2017 abstained entirely from a concrete definition of its object of protection. What comes closest to a definition is the circular statement on its objective, as the guidance is 'aimed at those places where there may be a risk of a terrorist attack by the very nature that they are crowded places' (NaCTSO 2017: 6). That this understanding is as vague as it is far-reaching is illustrated by the locations which are identified as potential target sites: They include the sectors of night-time economy, cinemas and theatres, stadia and arenas, retail, health, education, places of worship, hotels and restaurants, major events, visitor attractions, commercial centres, transport – in other words all sites at which urban everyday life takes place. Especially, when suspicious sites are in private ownership, the guidance suggests conducting regular risk assessments in correspondence with local "Counterterrorism Security Advisors" (CTSAs) to identify site-specific vulnerabilities and manage them accordingly through material updates,

technological solutions, and frequent emergency simulations. The promoted rationale is that these legal requirement regarding securitising suspicious sites ultimately fit the self-interest of private actors:

> 'What the law requires here is what good management and common sense would lead employers to do anyway: that is, to look at what the risks are and take sensible measures to tackle them. Having identified the threats and vulnerabilities, you then have to decide how likely it is that harm will occur, i.e. the level of risk and what to do about it. Risk is a part of everyday life and you are not expected to eliminate all risks but manage the main risks responsibly' (NaCTSO 2017: 39).

Through the implementation of this vague understanding of Crowded Places, symbolic, and structural relevance were no longer the reference point for securitising suspicious sites, as instead the main characteristic to ascribe vulnerability was the potential presence of human bodies at them.

In a similar vein to suspicious sites defined by their vulnerability, suspicious sites in the sense of potentially dangerous places have also become more indistinct. With the shift from securitising suspicious people to suspicious behaviours, that I will analyse in-depth below, the detection of terrorist suspects remained no longer confined to the areas where they are thought to live. Instead, radicalisation and terrorist intentions are deemed to be found potentially anywhere. Following this logic, schools, hospitals, community centres, sports clubs, and even private homes are the sites where terrorist suspects can potentially be identified. This logic was promoted in London by public awareness campaigns, such as 'See it, say it. Sorted.' (British Transport Police 2016) but also by programs such as 'Prevent' and 'Action Counters Terrorism' (ACT) (British Home Office 2019; NaCTSO 2020b), which I discuss later on in more depth. What is for now important is that they significantly widened the understanding of potentially dangerous sites to include any site where everyday life takes place: From the private home to the workplace to places of leisure, awareness towards suspicious behaviours is required.

All in all, the map I produced during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology shows how the material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites – both in the sense of vulnerable and potentially dangerous sites – became over time more and more vague. This increasing vagueness led to a proliferation of suspicious sites in London because their definition became basically all-encompassing: While suspicious sites were initially geographically discernible locations, closely linked to memories of local encounters with terrorist violence, they mushroomed over time all over London, based on future imaginaries of attacks fuelled by translations of local and remote memories thereof. As the anticipatory logic of counterterrorism planning proclaimed that attacks may virtually happen anywhere, the density of human bodies became the most important indicator for assigning vulnerability to respective target locations. In a similar vein, as terrorist attacks are assumed to be potentially committed by anyone, terrorist suspects are consequentially found anywhere, and hence the characteristics of vulnerable and potentially dangerous suspicious sites ultimately merge in the case of London. Therefore, suspicious sites include all locations, both public and privately owned, of urban everyday life, such as shopping centres, restaurants, schools, cultural venues, event locations and the public transport system. In densely covering London's local space, suspicious sites lose their exceptionality and instead became the normal location where daily life takes place in the British capital. This also means that the measures of control,

surveillance, and counterterrorist violence which are adopted to manage their respective vulnerability or potential dangerousness of suspicious sites spread across London's local space over time.

5.3.2 The transformation of suspicious objects in London

The second transformation of non-human bodies that I analyse is the development of suspicious objects. To so do, I look at mundane items which are usually seen as harmless but can be used as means to commit terrorist violence or secretly transport such means to an attack location. I compare the evolution of how they were assigned with material-discursive suspiciousness to that of classic weapons. By mapping how suspicious objects transformed over time in the case of London, I reveal, in contrast to the existing literature (Neyland 2008; Hoijtink 2017) not only how more and more things – objects which used to be typical, ordinary, mundane items in the everyday life of the British capital – became increasingly treated as potentially dangerous but also highlight that particularly the ordinariness of some these items made their securitisation challenging for managers of suspiciousness. Hence, the evolution of suspicious objects in London describes a non-linear process which was influenced by memories and future imaginaries of terrorist violence that were translated across time and space to the British capital.

5.3.2.1 Suspicious objects before 9/11

Mapping suspicious objects during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology of London shows that their range was already rather wide in the last decade of the Troubles, as it included both classic weapons and mundane objects of urban everyday life. The diversity of suspicious objects was in this phase closely linked to the respective attack methodologies in the British capital's local encounters with terrorist violence, as the objects used to perpetrate these attacks were in consequence securitised. For their attacks in London during the 1990s, the IRA used mainly explosives and incendiary bombs. Firearms and knives were in comparison rarely used, as the IRA had strategically moved away from targeted killings to not loose popular support (Alonso 2001), and thus explosives proved more effective in targeting non-human bodies. However, due to the differences in size and weight of these bombs, the objects used to transport and cover them differed significantly in their function and availability in the city's everyday life. The IRA's bombs were "Improvised Explosive Devices" (IEDs) in the classic sense, and hence self-built with materials freely available on the market, such as for instance chemicals used in common fertilizers and ordinary kitchen timers. The level of destruction caused by these IEDs were typically proportionate to the quantity of their explosive material. In other words, the larger and heavier the bomb was, the more destructive impact it had. This simple calculation can be witnessed in comparing the three major blasts caused by the IRA in London with their many smaller attacks: In the case of the Baltic Stock Exchange attack, the bomb consisted of a fertilizer device wrapped with a detonation cord made from 45 kilograms Semtex, a general-purpose plastic explosive. In total, the bomb weighed one tonne and was at the time the biggest in London since the end of World War II (Schmidt 1994). In the Bishopsgate attack, the blast was caused by 1,200 kilograms TNT, denotated with delay using a common parkway timer. Its explosion power was equivalent to that of a small tactical nuclear weapon (Oppenheimer 2016: 126). The blast at the Isle of Dogs was finally caused by a slightly lighter IED

made of 500 kilograms fertilizer, Semtex, and a regular kitchen timer. As all three attacks involved bombs which were both heavy and large, secretly transporting them to the selected target site required certain logistics: Hence, they were fabricated in Northern Ireland and then smuggled and transported to London in large transporters. In contrast to the three big blasts in 1992, 1993, and 1996, the other IRA attacks in London were committed by using much smaller bombs and incendiary devices with only limited explosive power. Thanks to the smaller size of the bombs, they were however much easier to secretly place at the explosion sites. Especially mundane urban objects, such as litterbins, public telephone boxes, and cars, which were already present at the attack location provided countless opportunities for assailants to leave their bombs, packed in small boxes, bags, or packages and yet remain unseen. Although the objects used in the attacks hence differed in size and availability, none of them were unusual in London's everyday life, and thus provided ideal cover-ups for hiding the IEDs.

The objects which were singled out as suspicious in response to these local attacks were foremostly ordinary items, such as large vehicles, litterbins, and phonebooths. This initial focus on ordinary items had yet not only to do with the respective attack methodologies of the IRA but was also indebted to the fact that the acquisition and possession of classic weapons, in particular all sorts of firearms was already strictly regulated since 1968 and became restricted further in 1988 (Leitzel 1998). In stark contrast to Northern Ireland and other UK territories, where legislation has been more liberal, in Great Britain handguns were eventually banned for most purposes – even sports competitions – in 1996, however this was not in reaction to terrorist violence but triggered by a mass shooting at a school (Leitzel 2000). Even police forces in London were typically unarmed (Warlow 2007). Compared to the securitisation of these classic weapons as suspicious objects, singling out mundane objects which were ubiquitously present in the city's daily life proved more difficult: Countering their instrumentalization for violent purposes prompted a challenge for law enforcement agencies, since many of the objects in question were in most cases used for their regular purpose rather than for committing a terrorist attack. Nonetheless, counterterrorist efforts were taken in London to reduce the risk posed by the presence of the respective objects. In the case of vehicles used to transport IEDs, the traffic entering the city's most vulnerable target areas was put under strict control. However, as transport trucks were also used for delivery and collection purposes of all sorts, an absolute ban on their usage in London was impossible to implement. At the same time, other concerns, such as limiting air and noise pollution, caused by the vehicles provided additional justifications to restrict their use in London. This logic was for instance reflected in the official name of London's Ring of Steel which was implemented to create a *traffic and environmental zone,* but also in other policies such as the "London Lorry Control Scheme" (LLCS) which restricts vehicles over 18 tonnes from using certain routes in the British capital. With the establishment of the Ring of Steel and later the Iron Collar, access controls were implemented: Sentry boxes guarded with police officers were aimed at detecting suspiciously looking vehicles. Furthermore, retractable bollards as well as permanent physical barriers were installed to bloc streets and squares in the area of the Square Mile and the London Docklands either temporarily or altogether for vehicle traffic

(Coaffee 2009: 109). Moreover, cameras were placed at all strategic entry points to automatically scan the license plates of passing-through automobiles. These scans were 'instantly checked against database records of vehicles of interest' (Metropolitan Police Service 2020a). While the technical prerequisites for this world innovation at the time existed already since the 1970s in the UK, London's ANPR system only became financially realisable thanks to large investments by the City of London Corporation in the 1990s in reaction to the IRA's attacks (ANPR International 2020). Apart from the precautions taken against suspicious vehicles, other potentially dangerous objects to hide smaller bombs were also removed or materially adjusted. A prime example of such developments is the evolution of London's public litter regime. As an immediate response to the smaller IRA attacks which took advantage of public trashcans to hide explosives, 'more than a thousand of them were removed in an attempts to reduce the number of places of where a bomb could be concealed' (Coaffee 2009: 103). Especially litterbins at busy locations, such as public transport stations, shopping centres, and tourist attractions, were associated with potential dangerousness and hence taken away. But since the complete banishment of public trashcans runs counter environmental concerns of keeping London's public spaces clean, the measures stirred criticism from the city's inhabitants (Mayor of London 2001). In response to that, the City Councils installed some new bomb-proof litterbins and refuse litter sacks were picked up in shorter intervals to limit the dangerousness of these suspicious items (Coaffee 2009: 103; Coaffee and Bosher 2008: 76). In contrast to the debate around the public litter regime, the incremental removal of phonebooths went overall smoother and with less public objection as the spreading of mobile phones made public telephones increasingly obsolete.

All in all, mapping suspicious items in London during the last decade of the Troubles shows that their variety stretched already at that time from classic weapons to mundane objects of urban everyday life. Thus, I demonstrated that the problematisation of mundane objects is by no means a "recent" phenomenon that only emerged since 9/11. If anything, the counterterrorist attention paid to mundane objects, such as litterbins, trucks, and phonebooths, in London was higher than that the risk associated with classic weapons. This had not only to do with the pre-existing stricter regulations for firearms but also with the IRA's attack methodologies at the time: As their violence was directed at non-human rather than human bodies during this phase of the Troubles, the use of IEDs provided an excellent opportunity to take advantage of mundane objects and capitalise on their alleged harmlessness. Local attack experiences in London were thus the main reference point for securitising mundane objects as suspicious. However, managing the dangerousness of these items turned out to be particularly difficult because the objects were simultaneously too ordinary and yet too essential for the city's proper functioning: Banning them caused, particularly in the case of the litterbins, criticism for practicality and environmental reasons, but at the same time there were simply too many potentially dangerous objects spread across the British capital to effectively control them, and hence the counterterrorist efforts taken to manage their dangerousness remained fragmented.

5.3.2.2 Suspicious objects between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious objects during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology of London reveals that given the already pre-existing wide understanding in this respect, the transformations between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 were incremental in nature. While this finding accounts for a certain path-dependency, it is still relevant because although the material-discursive assignment of suspiciousness to classic weapons and mundane urban objects did not change much, the attack methodologies of terrorist perpetrators surely did. This indicates that during this phase concrete local memories of attacks in London played a less significant role in justifying counterterrorist measures of control compared to future imaginaries of terrorist violence.

Thus, the rise of transnational terrorism led to a shift regarding the rationale behind attacks committed in London, implying an evolution in the means to commit violence. While IEDs were still used by terrorist perpetrators, they became much smaller in size despite causing more human victims, compared to the last decade of the Troubles. This change came about thanks to two developments: On the one hand, terrorist perpetrators advanced their skills in constructing IEDs. Thus, the attackers of 7 July 2005 used TATP bombs, containing acetone peroxide which is a primary high explosive that reacts if subjected to heat, friction, static electricity, concentrated sulfuric acid, strong UV radiation or shock. It is attractive to terrorist groups because it is very easy to acquire, as it is a basic ingredient of ordinary retail products, such as hair bleach and nail polish remover. Furthermore, the explosive was – thanks to the fact that it is one of the few high explosives which does not contain nitrogen – undetectable for common explosive detection scanners until 2016 (Keinan 2006). On the other hand, the purpose of terrorist violence was no longer causing economic disruption but instead the aim became to produce media effective catastrophes. As this implied to decidedly kill random civilians, the immediate target of violence were no longer the bricks and stones of non-human bodies but human bodies as characteristically soft targets, and thus the explosive power needed for these purposes was in comparison much lower. In consequence, terrorist bombs were more deadly and yet at the same easier to acquire and to transport to the target location: Thus, simple backpacks as used in the 7/7 attacks were sufficient for the perpetrators to carry the IEDs to their attack sites.

In reaction to the evolving threat of terrorist violence after 9/11, measures to securitise suspicious objects were adapted accordingly, though their material-discursive understanding remained in large parts unchanged in comparison to the last phase. What became a key aspect for the security management of publicly and privately owned urban space in London was conducting risk assessments in cooperation with specially trained CTSAs. These systematic evaluations of premises implied precautionary measures, such as the necessity of good lighting (British Home Office 2012b: 48), 'well maintained and well managed litter-free building surrounds that reduce the opportunity for suspicious hidden items and suspect activities to go unnoticed' (British Home Office 2010b: 7) as well as meticulous scanning of deliveries in 'an isolate part of the building where receipt of a suspicious item will not disrupt the remainder of the building' (British Home Office 2012b: 24). Good housekeeping

rules and simplistic architectural designs for streets and buildings were hence promoted as appropriate policy instruments to deal with the threat of terrorist violence caused by explosives, because the attacks of 7/7 had clearly shown that a bomb does not have to be big in size and – thus could be merely hidden everywhere – to be deadly. In this context, bags, packages, and parcels remained to be associated with potential dangerousness as one of the best practice examples presented in the Crowded Places guidance series from 2012 shows. The case study describes the noteworthy counterterrorist precautions taken by a nightclub in London to detect 'suspicious items' (Home Office 2012, pp. 39–40) which include searches of customers at the entrance, regular inspections of the premises before and during its opening hours, and special training of their personnel. Another new measure which responded more directly to the 7/7 attacks was the implementation of the pilot project "Intelligent Passenger Surveillance" which was first tested at Mile End Underground Station in 2003 (Fussey and Coaffee 2011: 51). The programme used video content analysis software to compare the live feed of CCTV cameras with the ideal image of a "normal" set-up of the station to detect and alert 'suspicious discrepancies' (Norstorm 2010), such as an unattended item left behind at an empty platform.

Moreover, vehicles remained to be identified as a threat, though there was as extension in this context: Cars where no longer mainly considered as objects to hide explosives or a means to transport them but also as an actual weapon to commit terrorist violence. This is reflected for instance in the construction of a sign spelling out "ARSENAL" in front of the Emirates Stadion in North London. The large concrete letters were deliberately placed at the main entrance of the stadium to prevent vehicles from driving into human crowds typically gathering there (Coaffee and Bosher 2008: 79). The sign is an excellent example of the beautification of counterterrorist measures: Using the name of the sports club rather than any characterless barriers offered not only protection from a terrorist attack but also an opportunity for fans to identify with their team (Coaffee et al. 2009a: 504). Another familiar issue from the times of the Troubles is the availability of litterbins in public space which continued to be a matter of contention during this phase. Thanks to a large anti-litter campaign in 2001, trashcans had initially been slowly reintroduced to meet Londoner's demands for cleaner urban space (Bamber 2001). However, as public litterbins were still deemed to provide excellent spots to hide explosives, the introduction of more bombproof bins appeared at first as a tangible compromise but turned out to be quite cost-intensive (Lydall 2007). During the preparations for the Olympic Games in 2012, London's City Councils and the City of London of Corporation opted hence for a two-fold strategy: Firstly, one hundred bomb-proof trashcans were installed, particularly in London's financial districts, and secondly, non-bombproof versions were removed at locations where they were considered too dangerous and abdicable (Coaffee et al. 2011: 3325; Fussey 2011: 152). Managing litterbins was yet not the only measure taken to deal with suspicious items at the hyper-securitised environment of the Olympic Games. In an elaborate effort of risk assessment, the Ministry of Defence provided 27 scenarios for London's policymakers, listing potential threats from 'chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances' (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012: 708; British Home Office 2011a). Regarding traffic management,

London implemented not only a rigid Olympic Route Network which restricted the use of certain streets and lanes to authorized vehicles only (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012: 713) but also 'a securitised traffic-free "buffer zone" covering the areas to the south of the Olympic park' (Fussey and Coaffee 2011: 46). The extensive list of illegal items at the Olympic venues included not only classic weapons but also tents as well as hard-sided bags and soft-sided bags with a filling capacity of more than 25 litres (Fussey 2015: 216). To enter the venues, ticket holders had to follow airport-like security procedures including body scanners and bag screenings (Graham 2012: 447). In an almost ironic twist, certain legal regulations regarding firearms were to some extent dispensed for the Olympic Games to allow for its shooting competitions to take place (Robertson 2012). Besides this temporal exception, the strict rules in respect to classic weapons remained generally speaking in force, and became even stricter as airguns were added to list of highly regulated objects (Warlow 2007).

All in all, mapping suspicious objects during this second phase of my historiographic archaeology of London shows that the material-discursive definition of what constitutes a potentially dangerous item did not change much with the transition from the IRA's terrorism to transnational jihadist terrorism as the allegedly main source of threat. While the term 'suspicious object/item' was fairly often used in the government's guidance material (British Home Office 2010a: 7; CPNI 2011: 16, 34, 36; British Home Office 2012b: 10, 24, 39, 2012a: 7), it was usually not linguistically specified any further – with the exception of 'suspicious vehicle' (British Home Office 2010b: 28). However, the practice of (counter)terrorism within this phase illustrates that the range of objects associated with potential dangerousness did not significantly expand, despite the shift regarding the attack rationale moving over from causing economic disruption to media effective deaths of random civilians. As IEDs remained the main means for committing terrorist violence in London, objects to hide these explosives – be they portable like bags and boxes or static, such as litterbins and parked cars – persisted to be considered suspicious items. The practices of securitising suspicious items also remained largely the same, though technological progress allowed for stricter forms of control, the boom of risk assessments dictated restrictive management and housekeeping rules, and the aestheticization of security designs became more influential. While memories of local violence remained a crucial driving force in the securitisation of suspicious objects, future imaginaries translated from elsewhere gained in importance as for instance the problematisation of vehicles not only as a means to transport explosives but also a deadly weapon in its own right shows (British Home Office 2010b: 28).

5.3.2.3 Suspicious objects after the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping the evolution of suspicious objects within the third time period of my historiographic archaeology of London demonstrates that the remarkable diversification regarding especially ordinary objects which had been instrumentalised to commit terrorist violence in London but also in other European metropoles since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 corresponded with an intensification of measures to counter potentially dangerous items, regardless of the fact that they became even harder to classify thanks to their ordinariness and ubiquity within London's local space.

Terrorist attacks which locally happened in London since 2015/16 showed a significantly grown heterogeneity in terms of the means they were committed with, as explosives were no longer the primary instrument of violence, and attack attempts in which IEDs were used were largely unsuccessful in producing human and non-human damages (BBC News 2018b). Instead, there was a rising instrumentalization of ordinary urban objects as terrorist weapons. The most prominent example of this development is the surge in VAW attacks, which happened in London at Westminster Bridge in March 2017, at London Bridge in June 2017 as well as near the Finsbury Park Mosque in June 2017, and at the Palace of Westminster in August 2018. The range of destruction in VAW attacks was, compared to other attack types, of medium extent. Yet, with high speed, even small passenger cars were able to crash through security infrastructures, such as perimeter fences, as it happened during the Westminster Bridge attack. The more direct and forcefully human victims are hit by a vehicle, the more severe are their injuries. However, depending on the crowd density of attacked pedestrians and the surrounding traffic, the impact of an attacking vehicle can be much higher thanks to the chaos it creates. What is furthermore significant about vehicles as terrorist weapons is that they require no special training or physical strength of the perpetrator as well as no special criminal preparation because the acquisition of a vehicle requires only little personal information of the registered keeper. As already mentioned above, some of the VAW attacks also featured knives which became a frequently used weapon within recent years. Thus, in the London Bridge attack in June 2017, three assailants firstly used a van to hit people on the sidewalks of the bridge but after the tyres got destroyed by hitting the bridge railings at Borough High Street, the attackers left the van and used regular kitchen knives to stab people. From the eight civilians, who were killed in the attack, six were stabbed to death during the incident's second phase. London Bridge was also the place of another stabbing attack in November 2019 in which the perpetrator used two regular kitchen knives to kill two people and injure three others. These incidents show that knives became attractive weapons for committing terrorist violence as they are easily accessible to everyone. While using them to threat, injure or kill others requires certain physical strength and capability, the fact that knives are relatively small makes it effortless to hide and transport them. The use of knives and vehicles as weapons of terrorist violence during this phase was not limited to London but proliferated in other European metropoles such Paris, Brussels, and Barcelona.

The counterterrorist response to this "mundanisation" of terrorist weapons was a further securitisation of both ordinary items and classic weapons as suspicious objects, by adopting on the one hand an even more indistinct material-discursive definition of potentially dangerous objects and on the other hand more wide-spread and intensified measures of control. The former development is reflected for instance in the nationwide See it, say it. Sorted. campaign from the British government, the British Transport Police (BTP), and the rail industry which started in 2016. In trains and across public transport stations, posters and loudspeaker announcements ask for the passengers' awareness to 'remain vigilant for anything that seems out of place or unusual on trains or at stations' (British Transport Police 2016). While there are some more concrete examples listed, such as for instance the classic image of an

'unattended bag' or 'someone who could be concealing something under their clothing' (British Transport Police 2016), this broad description of potentially dangerous objects allows the subsumption of any item that appears "usual" to the users of public transport. This wide understanding of suspicious objects was also promoted in the 2017 update of the Crowded Places guidance by introducing the so-called "HOT" protocol (NaCTSO 2017: 44): The H stands for "hidden" ('Has the item been deliberately concealed or is it obviously hidden from view?'), the O stands for "obviously suspicious" ('Does it have wires, circuit boards, batteries, tape, liquids or putty-like substances visible? Do you think the item poses an immediate threat to life?') and the T stands for "typical" ('Is the item typical of what you would expect to find in this location?'). Although the protocol intends to make the decision about which item is suspicious easier, it is at the same time deliberately vague to encompass all sorts of objects. How to deal with suspicious items is also a featured module on the NaCTSO's virtual counterterrorism training session ACT. In the module's interactive part, the viewer has to identify items of concern, such as an abandoned rucksack which is partially concealed and has batteries and wires hanging out (NaCTSO 2020d). This illustrates again the paradox of dealing with suspicious objects: While the scenario transports clear images of suspiciousness, its intention is at the same time to raise awareness to basically anything extraordinary, and hence keep the securitisation of things deliberately vague.

Apart from these more general measures to deal with suspicious objects, there were also concrete initiatives directed at certain objects. With regards to vehicles, the Department for Transport published its 'Countering vehicle as a weapon' strategy (UK Department for Transport 2019) which promotes pre-employment checks for staff and drivers of vehicle operators as well as site security to manage vehicle access. These measures to securitise vehicles and traffic were concretely implemented in London, in particular in the City of London: In 2015, the Commissioner of the CLP requested the establishment of a permanent 'Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order' (ATTRO) within the area of Square Mile (City of London Corporation 2016: 1). The ATTRO grants CLP officers the far-reaching power 'to restrict all or part of any City street at their discretion on the basis of a security assessment or intelligence of a threat' (City of London Corporation 2016: 6). Similar initiatives were taken to further securitise classic weapons. To prevent future stabbing attacks, 'The London Knife Crime Strategy' (Greater London Authority 2017) was published in 2017. Its measures include firmer regulation on responsible knife retail and intensified policing through the "Operation Spectre", a MPS initiative which 'brings together a wide range of resources to target priority areas with activities including weapons sweeps, targeted stop and search of known prolific knife carriers, test purchasing and plain-clothes policing operations' (Greater London Authority 2017: 29). Finally, there was also a further securitisation of firearms despite the continuously strict British regulatory system that has been in force for decades. However, with threat of firearm-based violence directly translated from the terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015, the MPS introduced the so-called "Operation Viper" aimed at busting the black market for classic weapons in London. The implementation of the strategy implied 'armed officers

accompanying officers on traffic stops as part of a suite of "suppression" measures [and] more stop and search without an officer needing reasonable suspicion' (Dodd 2016).

To conclude this section of my historiographic archaeology in the British capital, there is overall an expansion visible regarding which objects were considered suspicious in London's local space within the last thirty years. Yet, in comparison to the developments concerning suspicious sites the trend towards an extension is less apparent. Thus, already in the last decade of the Troubles, the IRA used ordinary urban objects to secretly transport and place their IEDs at the selected target locations which led in response to a securitisation of vehicles when entering the protected areas within London's city centre as well as the securitisation of its public litter regime. During the second phase of my analysis, IEDs were still the main tool to commit terrorist violence but the bombs were significantly smaller, and thus easily hidden and transported. In response, technological solutions as well as material barriers were implemented in London. The hyper-securitised environment of the Olympic Games in 2012 signifies a climax in the securitisation of things in London, as airport-like security measures were used throughout the city. Since the European peak of attacks in 205/16, the items used in terrorist attacks diversified further. Objects of everyday life such as cars were turned into weapons themselves and classic weapons such as knives became also instrumentalised for terrorist purposes in London. In reaction to this changing nature of the materiality of terrorist weapons, the material-discursive range of suspicious objects was widened to include every item that appears to be 'hidden, obviously suspicious and untypical' (NaCTSO 2017: 44) for a particular location. Therefore, local memories of terrorist violence were initially the most powerful reference point for securitising in particular mundane objects, whereas less attention was paid to classic weapons. Yet, especially during the last phase remote experiences of violence in other European metropoles were translated to London, and thus provided imaginaries for future attacks which led to further efforts in securitising not only mundane things but also classic weapons as suspicious objects. However, as the challenges to securitise especially ordinary urban objects range from environmental concerns to comfort expectations to the inability of singling out the truly dangerous objects among the countless harmless ones, the securitisation of suspicious objects does overall not describe a linear development in London's local space.

5.3.3 The transformation of suspicious people in London

Shifting from securitisation of non-human to the securitisation of human bodies, the next category I analyse are suspicious people. This comprises a spectrum of individuals who are material-discursively associated with the suspicion of having committed terrorist violence or having intentions to do so or being receptive to terrorist radicalisation. In mapping the evolution of who was attributed with potential dangerousness in London over the last thirty years, I reveal how there was a transformation from community-based definitions of suspicious people – which has been vibrantly discussed in the existing literature (Hillyard 1993; Awan 2012; Breen-Smyth 2014) – to a more individualised understanding of suspiciousness, since behaviour has been promoted to be the new key indicator for determining who is potentially dangerous – a development that has been academically largely overlooked so far.

5.3.3.1 Suspicious people before 9/11

Mapping which of London's human bodies were considered suspicious during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology reveals that before 9/11 stereotypes about terrorist suspects were drawn from memories of local attacks in the British capital committed by the IRA. Thus, they were largely community-based and targeted foremostly people with (Northern) Irish nationality or family background. Although this group was due to its inherent heterogeneity and missing distinct physical identity markers challenging to clearly differentiate from harmless Britons, London's law enforcement agencies came up with stigmatising indicators and ways to systematically single out and repress respective individuals with counterterrorist violence and heightened measures of control.

The political ideology of the IRA as the most active paramilitary group in the British capital during the 1990s was centred around one main issue: The establishment of an unified Irish State that exists entirely independent from British rule (Dingley 2012: 114). In pursuing this goal, the IRA claimed to be the legitimate successor of the Irish Republican Army from the Irish War of Independence in the early 1920s. While the group's objective was initially to defend the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland during "The Riots" in the late 1960s, it adopted violent guerrilla tactics in the 1970s. During "The Long War" of the 1980s, the Northern Irish campaign became two-fold, known as the 'Armalite and box ballot strategy' which rested on the IRA as a military pillar and Sinn Féin, as the main party to represent nationalist interests in Northern Ireland (Hannigan 1985; Neumann 2005). Over the years, the Northern Irish Conflict reached a stalemate which led to decreasing support for the IRA and a demoralisation of its proponents. Against this background and with the beginning peace talks in the 1990s, the group shifted to a 'tactical use of armed struggle' (Alonso 2001: 140). This led to a new phase in which the IRA agreed to temporal ceasefires, used violence strategically against non-human rather human targets to regain leverage in the negotiations with the British government and shifted their operations to the British mainland, with London and particularly the City of London as the centre of attention (Dingley 2012: 121). The IRA supporters were typically young to middle-aged men known as "Volunteers". Most of them were born on Northern Irish territory or in the Republic of Ireland, some of them also lived on the British mainland (Gill and Horgan 2013). Due to the religious dimension of the Northern Irish Conflict, IRA supporters were typically Catholic Christians. Estimated numbers range from 8,000 to 10,000 volunteers for the entire time of the Troubles, however many of them remained passive (Moloney 2007: xviii). Prominent figures of the IRA as for instance Bobby Sands, the leader of the hunger strike in 1981, became famous for their protest campaign while being imprisoned. In contrast, committing terrorist attacks in London and elsewhere was a secretive matter within the IRA's organisational structures, and thus many of the responsible individuals remain unknown until today (Gill and Horgan 2013: 438). All in all, the IRA's agenda was assumed to enjoy wide-spread local sympathies in the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland as well as in the Republic of Ireland, although only a minor number of people were active in committing violence. Yet, the IRA's violence had to be considered legitimate to not lose its "just cause" credibility among their supporters (Alonso 2001).

In response to the terrorist violence committed in London, identifying, charging, and imprisoning suspected IRA members became major responsibilities for the law enforcement agencies in the British capital. To enable them to do so, the British parliament adopted the "Prevention of Terrorism Act" (PTA), a series of laws passed between 1974 and 1989, implying extensive detention, arrest, interrogation, and custody regulations which were already at the time criticised for 'normalising the politics of repression' (Sim and Thomas 1983). In 1996, the year of the Isle of Dogs attack in London, the already far-reaching policing powers got further extended by adopting a stop and search clause which allowed police officers in uniform to 'stop any pedestrian and search him, or anything carried by him' (Fisher 2012: 179). In practice, London's police forces used their repressive powers particularly against the (Northern) Irish community in the city, although many people from Northern Ireland, especially the Protestant community, were in fact British loyalists. In suspending the presumption of innocence for an entire community, being (identified as) Irish was conflated with being a terrorist suspect: 'people are suspect primarily because they are Irish and once, they are in the police station they are often labelled an Irish suspect, presumably as part of some classification system. In practice, they are being held because they belong to a suspect community' (Hillyard 1993: 7).

This systematic discrimination against the Irish community which continues the tradition of long-standing Anti-Irish sentiment in Great Britain (Hickman 1995) was documented for instance in a study on the MPS's practice conducted in North London which found that members– especially young men – of the Irish community were on average the ethnic minority stopped and searched the most by the police on the grounds of the PTA (Mooney and Young 1999). This may seem surprising, given the 'invisibility of ethnicity' (Ghaill 2000) in case of the Irish community, but indicators such as an Irish accent, attending a Catholic service, Irish pubs and restaurants, the membership in clubs associated with Irishness or living in suspicious "Irish neighbourhoods", especially in North London were used to single out alleged terrorist suspects. These findings were confirmed in a report by the Commission for Racial Equality which found that London's Irish community was systematically targeted by British police forces (Hickman and Walter 1997). Such discriminatory experiences did not only negatively influence the socio-economic situation but also the mental health of the Irish community living in Great Britain: Especially people with a Northern Irish background were caught between attempts to assimilate into British society and experiences of discrimination based on their felt or assigned Irishness, resulting in fragile identities (Hickman 1995, 1998; O'Keeffe-Vigneron 2003; Willis 2017). This led also to changes in the everyday behaviour of members of the Irish community: 'When there was a bombing here, I always kept quiet on buses and trains. I was careful – I knew they would recognise my accent' (Hickman and Walter 1997: 211). Apart from these wide-spread societal implications, there were also extreme individual cases such as that of Harry Stanley – actually a Scotsman – who was shoot dead by the police in an "Irish neighbourhood" in Hackney because he was falsely identified as Irish and suspected of carrying a weapon (Breen-Smyth 2014: 225). Besides singling out the Irish suspect community, there were also counterterrorism measures which indiscriminately addressed all of London's citizens. The

most wide-spread and visible of these measures was the installation of CCTV surveillance throughout the city to identify suspicious individuals and track their movement (Fussey 2007). While most cameras were located at the Square Mile, surveillance was practiced all over the British capital: In 1999, Londoners appeared on average on around 300 cameras per day placed in public transport stations, busy streets and squares as well as shops and hotels (Norris and Armstrong 1999).

All in all, mapping suspicious people in London shows that during the last decade of the Troubles, suspiciousness was not linked to individual or behavioural characteristics but filled with identity makers ascribed to the Irish community, indicating that who is identified as Irish is automatically potentially dangerous. However, these community characteristics were typically vague, imprecise, and assumption-loaden due to the inherent difficulties of material-discursively singling out all members of a naturally heterogenous community. The Irish community's potential dangerousness was specifically linked to *terrorist* violence, as in context of "classic" criminal assaults other ethnic groups were discriminated but to be a potential terrorist was associated in particular with a (Northern) Irish background (Mooney and Young 1999). This rationale was based on the memories of local attacks in London and elsewhere in the UK committed by typically unidentified IRA members. The high number of IRA volunteers was seen an obvious indicator for the group's wide-spread local support within the Irish community in general and Irish people living in London in particular. As some of the technological and legal developments to securitise suspicious people had in fact an impact on the everyday life of all Londoners, the whole population of London was thus to some extent rendered suspicious. However, the focus was clearly on members of the Irish community and people living in allegedly Irish neighbourhoods in North London, who were the target of systematically discriminatory and violent police practices based on the community's material-discursive attribution with potential dangerousness.

5.3.3.2 Suspicious people between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious people in London between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 demonstrates that there was a quite abrupt shift regarding who was considered potentially dangerous: While the Irish community was still confronted with suspicion during this phase, its members were no longer considered the primary suspect community, as they were replaced with the members of London's Muslim communities. Despite this shift regarding *which* human bodies were assigned with material-discursive suspiciousness, what remained the same was that terrorist suspicions against individuals were largely based on their (assumed) belonging to a minority community in British society.

This ambiguous evolution was on the one hand certainly indebted to the changing context of the Northern Irish Conflict, as with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement the perceived threat of the Irish community as of source of terrorist violence incrementally decreased. On the other hand, the focus of counterterrorist attention was re-directed since terrorist attacks based on abusing Islamic jihadist ideology as a justification for violence capitalised on strategically targeting human rather than non-human bodies to broadcast a political message by projecting fear beyond the immediate act of violence, (Richards 2014). The attacks of 9/11 serve as a prime example of this type of terrorism. It was committed

by the extremist group al-Qaeda with the intention to symbolically challenge the global hegemony of the US. The attack's motives implied hence according to the ideology of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden the American support for Israel, the military presence of US troops in the Middle East, and a general measure of revenge for attacks against Muslims in the Global North (bin Laden 2002). In this sense, although the 9/11 attacks were foremostly directed to the US, they implied a symbolic message for the entire Western World. A similar ideology was promoted in the context of the local attacks and attack attempts in London at the time. Thus, the perpetrators of the 7/7 bombings claimed in their recorded confessional statements revenge for the global spreading of Islamophobia and praised the leaders of al-Qaeda as heroes. The attacks were committed by four men, aged between 18 and 30,who had been entirely unknown to the British law enforcement agencies prior to their assault (Lewis 2007). Three of them were British-born sons of Pakistani immigrants and one of them was born in Jamaica, but all of them were raised and socialised in the UK for most of their lives. Their confessional tapes produced a public outcry thanks to their thick Yorkshire accents, identifying the perpetrators as British rather than 'foreigners' (BBC News 2007). In a similar vein, the four men, who were convicted for the 21 July 2005 bombing attempts, had an immigrant background but were all socialised in the UK and had become naturalised as British citizens. The inspiration of their attack was traced back to a leading terrorist figure in the UK, nicknamed 'Osama bin London' (Walker 2008).

The problematisation of London's Muslim communities already began in the aftermath of 9/11, because misled assumptions and stereotypes about the general violence-proneness of Islam and all practising Muslims were translated from the US to the UK. However, the height of securitising London's Muslims as suspicious was initiated by the local encounters with terrorist attacks in the British capital in 2005, as the political response to them ignited discussions about London's multiculturalism and diversity. Thus, the city's by-then mayor Livingstone underlined in his response:

> '[People] choose to come to London […] because they come to be free, they come to live the life they choose, they come to be able to be themselves. […] however many of us you kill, will not stop that flight to our city where freedom is strong and where people can live in harmony with one another' (Livingstone 2005).

While his speech was publicly deemed a powerful confirmation of London's dedication to pluralism, it implicitly constructed a binary dichotomy between the freedom-loving Londoners and the hateful, violent others (Closs Stephens 2009). This practice of othering became also apparent regarding the four perpetrators responsible for 7/7: Although all of them had been part of the British society for their entire lives, their terrorist acts and ideology were exteriorized by depicting them as 'foreign' (Bulley 2009). In recurring on their immigration background and emphasising their identity as practising Muslims in particular, they were removed from belonging to the "normal part" of British society. Based on such stereotypes, the UK's Muslim communities were material-discursively constructed as suspicious (Awan 2012). However, just like in the case of the Irish community, one's religious affiliation is – apart from wearing religious symbols – typically invisible. Yet, as Muslim identity is especially in the Western World societally racialised, it became stereotypically associated with the 'brown bodies' (Patel 2012)

of People of Colour, particularly those with an "Asian" or "Middle Eastern" background. A violent example of such conflations happened in case of Jean Charles de Menezes who was due to his non-white appearance racially profiled as a terrorist suspect of the attempted attacks on 21 July 2005 because merged 'stereotypical images [were] superimposed on the object of perception' (Pugliese 2006: 3). When he was running down the stairs to the Stockwell underground station – presumably to catch a leaving train – he was killed by police officers (Thompson 2005). Besides such direct acts of counterterrorist violence, the securitisation of suspicious people in London led to an abundance of discriminatory and Islamophobic experiences for individuals in their everyday life as well as in contact with law enforcement agencies (Parmar 2011). Thus, the 2011 Equality Impact Assessment revealed racialised tendencies regarding police arrests and detention practices which showed considerably higher numbers of 'suspect persons' with an Asian and Arab appearance who identified themselves as Muslim (British Home Office 2011b). An approach which was initially adopted to balance out feelings of exclusion and at the same time overcome the 'significant intelligence deficit in terms of defining and understanding the threat posed by affiliates of al-Qaeda residing in Western countries' (Innes 2006: 229) was community policing. This practice is based on a cooperation of local police forces with community leaders and organisations to develop a better understanding of potential radicalising tendencies within the targeted community. Yet, while the approach was officially intended to build interpersonal trust on both sides (Innes 2006: 233), the practical outcomes in London were that community policing reproduced stereotypes and stigmatising assumptions about Muslims within public authorities on the one hand and 'failed to build trust among the general Muslim public' (Klausen 2009) on the other hand rather than building confidence and a fruitful basis for cooperation (Huq et al. 2011; May 2011).

Besides such policing practices which focused on members of London's Muslim communities and People of Colour, some measures of control to manage suspicious people had also implications for all human bodies intra-acting in London's everyday life. Thus, despite the apparent limitations of counterterrorist surveillance, which had been tragically revealed during the 7/7 attacks (Fussey 2007: 179), CCTV-based control increased further in London. Since 2002, more and more cameras throughout the city were updated with "Automated Facial Recognition" (AFR) algorithms which scan the faces of passing-by individuals and compare the footage with the mugshots of wanted persons (Chertoff 2020). The technology has been frequently criticised for its inaccuracy, especially in correctly identifying the faces of People of Colour (Introna and Wood 2004; Meek 2002; Introna 2005). Another initiative from 2005 introduced microphones in the City of Westminster to tackle urban noise but also to listen to conversations on the street (Derbyshire 2005). Yet, in 2008, the trial was terminated, as it was considered ineffective. To protect the Olympic Games in 2012, London introduced biometric access controls to the Olympic Park to unmistakably manage who is present on its premises (Homeland Security News Wire 2009; Graham 2012). Generally speaking, the Games manifested a climax of fear directed against Muslims (Awan 2013), resulting in an approach of 'total policing' (Du Boulay 2012).

All in all, mapping suspicious people during this second phase of my historiographic archaeology shows shifts and continuities at the same time. Thus, it was no longer the Irish community in London that was systematically stigmatised as potentially dangerous but instead people who (were) identified as Muslim were singled out as suspicious. Just like in the previous phase, assumptions about the violence-proneness of certain minority communities were prominently inspired by local encounters with terrorist violence and its respective perpetrators. However, a pre-emptive securitisation of Muslims as suspicious had already begun in the British capital in the aftermath of the remotely experienced attacks of 9/11. Moreover, the material-discursive definition of suspicious people remained on an abstract level essentially community-based, in the sense that assumption-loaden, generalising stereotypes about "being Muslim" regarding behavioural routines, physical appearance, place of residence, and nationality were taken as indicators to identify and reveal someone's violent intentions. Especially based on racialised characteristics, many people were falsely identified as Muslim and based on that biased "evidence" undeservedly associated with suspiciousness. Finally, the measures of control taken to securitise suspicious people intensified, particularly in the context of public surveillance. Although the level of control heightened thus for all Londoners, technological updates such as AFR algorithms implied special discriminatory potential for People of Colour. Other counterterrorist approaches such as community policing were directed particularly against Muslim communities, making their members targets of direct and structural violence committed by law enforcement agencies.

5.3.3.3 Suspicious people since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious people in London since 2015/16 finally sheds light on a significant paradigm shift: Encounters with attacks in the British capital but also other European metropoles indicated that the ideologies and reasonings of terrorist perpetrators became more diverse, volatile, and in most cases challenging to delineate. While identifying a single, targetable motive for terrorist violence had arguably never been simple, the respective complexity became finally acknowledged in London in the aftermath of the European peak of attacks. In response, the question of who counts as potentially dangerous could no longer be answered by constructing generalised suspect communities, but instead suspicious behaviour became the new focus of counterterrorist attention in the British capital.

In terms of prominent terrorist groups, the period is marked by the rise of ISIL which targeted several major cities in Europe to get attention for their cause (Gerges 2018). However, unlike more hierarchically structured terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda, ISIL's European terrorist campaign was loosely organised, in the sense that although perpetrators had pledged allegiance to ISIL when committing violence, they acted entirely independent, such as in the case of the London Bridge attack in 2017 and the Streatham stabbing in 2020. In other cases, ISIL claimed responsibility for attacks, but their involvement in them remained obscure in the investigation process (BBC News 2017a). Besides jihadist ideologies, Islamophobia became also recognised as a terrorist motivation, as the attack in Finsbury Park in 2017 shows (Malkin et al. 2017; Mortimer 2017). However, a closer look into the assailants' personal biographies showed that extremist ideas were in most cases combined with

psychological conditions, addiction, and criminal behaviour. Thus, several of the perpetrators were already known to the security services, some had even been convicted for terrorist offenses (Davies and Dodd 2020; Brown 2020). Regarding the kind of people who committed violence, the spectrum was quite homogeneous: All the attackers were male, and with a few exceptions aged between 20 and 30. Most of them were British or had at least been granted permanent residency. Some had an immigration background but lived for the most part of their lives in the UK. Concomitant with the diversification of attack methodologies, most of the terrorist assailants in London acted as lone wolves (Spaaij 2012; Hamm and Spaaij 2017) and their attacks required mostly only limited planning (cf. Anderson 2017: 5). Acknowledging the rare links to terrorist networks and organisations, the oftentimes missing far-reaching symbolism of the attacks, and the generally blurry lines between lone wolf terrorism and rampage shootings (Lankford 2013; Lankford and Hakim 2011; Turnbull 2019) posed new challenges for managers of suspiciousness in the British capital: While during the previous phases, the most rational choice had seemed to be to single out a particular community which was deemed to be generally suspicious, decisionmakers were confronted with the scenario that terrorism oftentimes appeared as a merely spontaneous excess of violence caused by complexly intertwined personal motives. Under these conditions, the newly promoted basic assumption was that ultimately anyone can commit terrorist violence, so everyone is potentially dangerous.

This novel baseline led to a significant paradigm shift in the securitisation of suspicious people: While previously human bodies were singled out based on material-discursive associations with certain minority communities, the focus of attention became redirected towards suspicious behaviour. This evolution was reflected in the Crowded Places security guidance series: Suspicious behaviour was already erratically mentioned in the versions from 2012 and 2014. However, a much more systematic approach towards the identification, detection, and handling of suspicious behaviour was promoted in its 2017 update which clarified that '[y]ou cannot spot a terrorist from their appearance, age, ethnicity, gender or clothing. You can however identify and report suspicious behaviour' (NaCTSO 2017: 118). Regarding what kind of behaviour should receive particular attention, the guidance refers directly to the difference between what is 'normal' (NaCTSO 2017: 118) for a certain place and time and what appears odd, unusual, and extraordinary. The examples for what to look out for imply behaviours such as 'paying significant interest to entrances, exits, CCTV cameras or security features or staff' (NaCTSO 2017: 118) but also mundane practices such as taking photographs (NaCTSO 2017: 118). This focus was also promoted in the ACT online learning module dedicated to 'How to identify and respond to suspicious behaviour' (NaCTSO 2020c). Its key message is that 'identifying suspicious behaviour is all about recognising what is not typical behaviour for the environment that you are in' (NaCTSO 2020c). According to the online session, the litmus test is to determine whether a person 'acts guilty' since suspicious individuals are deemed to be aware of their wrongdoings. In a previous version of the module, the shift was even more explicit. In its interactive part, the task is to review CCTV footage to identify the people acting suspiciously in it. When clicking on a woman wearing a hijab, it is displayed that

'Religious dress is often worn and should not be viewed as a threat. Dress, appearance, gender are not relevant to terrorism or extremism – it is actions and activities which are of interest' (NaCTSO 2020b).

The measures of control to implement this shift in the securitisation of suspicious people were manifold and included both human and non-human watch-schemes in the British capital. Regarding the latter, London began to deploy "Live Facial Recognition" (LFR) technology, a further update of the previously used AFR (Metropolitan Police Service 2020b). Despite some innovations, the technology still earned lots of critique from civil rights groups regarding false-positive matches which concerned especially People of Colour (Nye 2019; BBC News 2020; Dodd 2020) (BCC News 2019, 2020a). In contrast, "Project Servator" which was adopted in 2019 was a human-based collaboration between the CLP, the MPS, the BTP as well as private actors and providers of security (City of London Police 2020). It deployed on the one hand plainclothes officers who are 'experienced and specially trained to spot the tell-tale signs that someone is planning or preparing to commit an act of crime' (City of London Police 2020). On the other hand, visible patrols of officers in uniforms demonstrated the presence of the law enforcement agencies to bolster public's trust in security and at the same time, unsettle those with terrorist intentions (Metropolitan Police Service 2020c). Their operations were distinctively reaching out towards members of public to 'report any suspicious or unusual behaviour' (British Transport Police 2020b). A similar rationale was promoted in the context of the so-called "Prevent Duty" which was adopted in 2015 and obliges staff members of public and private institutions in sectors such as education and health care to look out for early signs of radicalisation. I analyse this programme in more depth below, but it serves as a textbook example for the inherent problems of securitising the vague notion of suspicious behaviour: Thus, this paradigm shift does not only universalise suspicion towards everyone but also allows for reproducing stereotypes about members of pre-existing suspect communities. Hence, in practice, the discriminatory tendencies in counterterrorism policies against London's Muslim communities have not diminished despite the promoted shift: A report published by the Home Office in 2017 found that 'in 2015/16 of the 7,631 individuals referred [in the context of the Prevent duty], 4,997 (65 %) were referred for concerns related to Islamist extremism' (British Home Office 2017). Most of them came from London. Thus, 'Muslims have an approximate 1 in 500 chance of having been referred […] approximately 40 times more likely than someone who is not a Muslim' (Versi 2017). The basis for referrals were sometimes as trivial as watching TV in Arabic (Pettinger 2020; Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019). Furthermore, Special Prevent Officers kept focusing their attention on Muslim civil society organisations. In extreme cases, the organisations were financially dependent on the programme, and hence institutionally embedded an infrastructure of surveillance (Qurashi 2018).

All in all, mapping suspicious people during this last phase of my historiographic archaeology in London reveals that the material-discursive understanding of who is constructed as suspicious to commit terrorist violence in the British capital has shifted and expanded over the last thirty years. Initially, suspicious people were defined by referring to stereotypical characteristics of the Irish and later the Muslim communities, as extremist beliefs were simply equated with belonging to these minority

groups. Since 2015/16, attack methodologies became more volatile and less politically symbolical, and at the same time counterterrorist efforts became more future-orientated rather than based on the particularities of previous attacks. Under these conditions, the understanding that anybody can commit terrorist violence, so ultimately everyone is potentially dangerous redirected the focus of attention to suspicious behaviour. This presupposes a dichotomy between normal and hence harmless behaviour and unusual and thus potentially dangerous behaviour. However, as both categories are not clearly defined, even mundane practices are turned into being suspicious. This led to higher confrontation of all Londoners with measures of control limiting the realisation of their individual freedoms. Simultaneously, it allowed for the reproduction of stereotypes about members of minorities groups which have been previously stigmatised with potential dangerousness, because the decision about which behaviour counts as suspicious is ultimately the decision of the observant. Therefore, although problematising behaviour appeared initially to be a step away from stigmatising suspect communities, discriminatory practices persisted, especially for Muslims and People of Colour living in London.

5.3.4 The transformation of managers of suspiciousness in London

The last transformation that I analyse separately in my historiographic archaeology of London deals with managers of suspiciousness. As I focus explicitly on human bodies in this case, the category comprises the people who are charged with the responsibility to counter the threat of terrorist violence in urban everyday life. I differentiate in my mapping between formal managers of suspiciousness who have been traditionally charged with upholding security in the Westphalian state system, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness who have traditionally not been charged with upholding security but began to take over these responsibilities in the context of their professional lives, and informal managers of suspiciousness which includes all humans present in London that became encouraged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities within their private lives. By analysing who was charged to deal with the threat of terrorist violence in London over the last thirty years, I systematically trace how this responsibility has incrementally expanded. In contrast to the existing literature (Batley 2021; Rodrigo Jusué 2022), I argue that revealing this dynamic is fundamental not only to criticise this trend but also to uncover how the securitisation of urban everyday life can be countered.

5.3.4.1 Managers of suspiciousness before 9/11

Mapping human managers of suspiciousness during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology of London's everyday life shows that the responsibility to deal with terrorist violence before 9/11 was mainly in the hands of London's formal managers of suspiciousness on the national and the local level. Their dominant role was indebted to local encounters with terrorist violence committed by the IRA which happened in the wider context of the Norther Irish Conflict, and thus were ultimately directed against the British state and its rule in Northern Ireland. The response to these attacks was hence logically executed by actors and institution responsible for security in the traditional, state-centric sense.

As national agencies specialised in tackling terrorist violence did not exist in the British security architecture before 9/11, counterterrorism efforts were executed by institutions and law enforcement

agencies dealing with all sorts of security matters, both domestically and internationally. In the context of the IRA's attacks, the MI5 as the intelligence service responsible for domestic issues, was the most important and powerful agency on the national level at the time. Thus, it was responsible for managing a distinct threat level evaluation for Northern Ireland related terrorism which is curated until today (MI5 2020). Besides the dominance of the MI5 on the national level, London's local counterterrorism architecture was yet particular: As the city had not only many vulnerable target sites but also a high number of Irish inhabitants and thus suspicious people, London's police forces had established specifically dedicated counterterrorism branches already during the 1960s. This made London the only place in the UK with security personnel specialised in counterterrorism at the time. This peculiarity resulted in an inter-institutional turf war (Foley 2009: 447), as the nationwide operating MI5 was discontent with the wide-ranging counterterrorist independence of the MPS and the CLP (Hennessey and Thomas 2011: 199). These struggles for competencies led to persistent miscoordination between the 1960s and 1990s. Local encounters with terrorist violence in London, especially the first massive explosion in the City of London at the Baltic Stock Exchange in 1992, created the political momentum to settle these disagreements and to adopt a more coordinated but also more hierarchical structure of operations: Thus, from 1992 on, the MI5 became 'the "lead agency" on terrorism intelligence and the Special Branches' role was to "assist" the MI5 in this area' (Foley 2009: 447). In practice, this meant that the MI5's competences included gathering and analysing evidence but also infiltrating the circles of the IRA with spies as well as secretively negotiating with IRA representatives. The MPS and the CLP focused instead on everyday policing practices. This implied passively projecting reassurance by demonstrating presence in the streets as well as in the guarded sentry boxes located at the strategic entry points of the Square Mile and the London Docklands (Coaffee 2009: 97–99). Moreover, London's police forces also carried out active operations, such as stop and searches, detaining and questioning suspects as well as reacting to bomb warnings (Foley 2009: 448). Despite settling vertical competence struggles between formal managers of suspiciousness on the urban and national level, the local attack experiences initiated new horizontal disagreements at the time, as the management of security was entirely in the hands of the London boroughs at the time: In direct response to the highly destructive attacks of the IRA within the perimeters of the Square Mile during the 1990s, the City of London Corporation was more actively engaged in securitising its suspicious sites than the other 32 boroughs. These local discrepancies between The City and the rest of London resulted, as mentioned above, in heated debates about practical concerns but also about the different levels of security among them (Coaffee 2009: 112–113).

However, not only London's police forces and national intelligence services and thus formal managers of suspiciousness were dealing with the threat of terrorist violence in London. Since the rationale of the IRA's violence in the British capital aimed during the 1990s at causing economic disruption by targeting foremostly the prestigious premises of businesses, actors from the private sector and hence semi-formal managers of suspiciousness also became engaged in counterterrorist efforts to better prepare for future attacks, or in the best-case scenario entirely prevent them. Especially the three

big blasts in London during the 1990s caused enormous damages, and thus their vivid memories illustrated the need for companies to come up with solutions on how to financially mitigate this risk. The underlying reasoning for business owners to privately invest in counterterrorism was therefore foremostly to avoid the costs of reconstructing damaged buildings in the aftermath of an incident. These private efforts included paying into assurance schemes, which were specifically set-up for terrorist damages and investing in protective measures, such as hiring private security providers and securing their premises through so-called retrofitting measures, which ranged from the installation of shatterproof windows to the construction of additional carriers to increase the stability of tall buildings. Since there was no legal obligation for private actors to participate in such counterterrorism efforts, they were ultimately a matter of voluntary self-initiative based on individual cost-benefit calculations. Thus, they served self-protection purposes rather than contributing to fighting the terrorist threat in general. Consequently, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness at the time were typically found within the City of London and the London Docklands, based on memories of local attacks there.

Finally, when it comes to informal managers of suspiciousness, Londoners were not actively encouraged to participate in counterterrorism efforts before 9/11. However, if they had valuable information on attack plans or terrorist suspects, the respective law enforcement agencies were of course eager to know about it: Within a general climate of mistrust, the material-discursively attributed suspiciousness to the Irish community led to many private allegations of 'Irish terrorism, oftentimes without providing any substance' (Hillyard 1993: 135). Yet, this collaboration was self-initiated, and thus neither a general responsibility of the British capital's inhabitants nor officially encouraged.

All in all, mapping managers of suspiciousness during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology of London reveals that counterterrorist responsibilities before 9/11 were foremostly executed by formal managers of suspiciousness, namely London's police forces on the local level and the MI5 at the national level. In comparison, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness played a minor role in dealing with terrorist violence during the last decade of the Troubles. Although the targeting of the private buildings made business owners aware of the terrorist threat, especially when their premises were located at suspicious sites, their actions were limited to self-initiated, strategic counterterrorism measures to protect their property. The role of informal managers of suspiciousness was finally even less institutionalised. London's security architecture at the time was significantly shaped by its local encounters with terrorist violence: Thus, while the MPS and the CLP had special counterterrorism branches since the 1960s, the Baltic Stock Exchange attack in 1992 provided the catalyst to resolve the lingering competence struggles with the MI5. Similarly, the incidents at the City of London and the London Docklands motivated private actors to became semi-formal managers of suspiciousness.

5.3.4.2 Managers of suspiciousness between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping human managers of suspiciousness during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology of London's everyday life shows that the attacks of 9/11 but also further local encounters with terrorist violence prompted a massive proliferation of counterterrorism efforts on the UK's national level as well

as locally in London. This affected formal managers of suspiciousness, in that their efforts were streamlined and professionalised, and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, as private sector actors no longer engaged voluntarily in counterterrorist efforts but became legally obliged to do so.

With regards to formal managers of suspiciousness, an important development was that specialised counterterrorist expertise became institutionalised. This process was triggered by the remote experience of the 9/11 attacks which assigned new urgency to counterterrorist matters on the political agenda, after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement had initially indicated that the most important source of terrorist violence in London had been tamed. The powerful memories of largescale violence created in New York were translated into forceful future imaginaries of terrorist attacks, potentially happening also in the British capital. In direct response, the CONTEST strategy was drafted in 2003, and published in 2006. The influential document provided the UK's first integrated approach to countering terrorist violence and was compiled by security experts working in the British Home Office, as the highest national authority dealing with security matters. Among them, the MI5 still obtained a prominent role after 9/11 in implementing the CONTEST strategy (Foley 2009: 447). However, as the local attacks in London happened in 2005, this led to doubts about the effectiveness of CONTEST and the aptness of existing formal managers of suspiciousness to effectively tackle terrorist violence as a special kind of threat, and thus in response new agencies which were solely focused on counterterrorist matters were founded. The most important nationwide operating agencies which were inaugurated at the time were the NaCTSO and the CPNI. The founding of the former in 2007 constituted for a continuation of shared competences between the police and the intelligence services, as the NaCTSO is a special police unit under the direct auspices of the Home Office (NaCTSO 2020f). By passing on their expertise to the ground in training locally deployed CTSA officers, the agency facilitated that everyday counterterrorism practices were streamlined and professionalised in London's different police divisions. The CPNI was also founded in 2007. With its explicit focus on the protection of critical infrastructure, the agency developed expertise in a field that was in the previous phase left mostly to actors in the private sector (CPNI 2020). Because the CPNI officially forms part of the MI5, it contributed to the intelligence service's continuously important role in questions of counterterrorism. Thus, although institutional overlaps continued to exist within this phase, the actors in question had established ways to cooperate among each other as well as with the newly founded agencies accounting for a professionalisation of British counterterrorism efforts from the side of formal managers of suspiciousness.

This new spirit of cooperation was not limited to an interinstitutional level but also fostered across the public and the private sector. The decision to publish the initially secret CONTEST strategy in 2006 illustrates the state authorities' willingness to turn security increasingly into a collective responsibility. However, since recent memories of local and remote attacks had shown that merely economic damages were no longer the main aim of terrorist violence, actors from the private sector became less inclined to self-reliantly invest in counterterrorism measures. Nonetheless, the reputational benefits of offering protection to their customers provided new reasons for private actors to cooperate

with public counterterrorism agencies. The latter put major effort into offering tailormade advice on how to address site-specific vulnerabilities. One example which was initiated in London as a joint venture of the CLP and the MPS in April 2004 was “Project Griffin”. The programme’s goal is ‘fostering security awareness across the capital’s business community through effective and timely information-sharing with law enforcement agencies’ (NaCTSO 2016). To do so, Project Griffin held information events and counterterrorism trainings. While the target group of Project Griffin were foremostly private security staff members, the related “Project Argus”, launched in 2007, provided similar advice to the management personnel of private businesses. The trainings were hosted by CTSAs and based on several multimedia attack scenarios in which the participants’ abilities to respond to an emergency situation by focusing on the governability of crowds were tested and trained (Malcolm 2013; Aradau 2015).

This emphasis in Project Argus reciprocated the wider trend around the securitisation of Crowded Places which were managed not only by state authorities but also private owners, such as shopping centres, sports stadia, and nightclubs, turning their managers into semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. Thus, the 2010 guidance brochure entitled “Working together to protect crowded places” (British Home Office 2010a) actively encouraged partnerships between actors from the public and the private sector, particularly on the local level, by defining different roles and responsibilities, and introducing best practice models (British Home Office 2010a: 7). The document “Crowded Places: The Planning system and counter-terrorism” had a slightly different focus, as it addressed in particular local planning authorities who were urged to take counterterrorist considerations in local space development projects into account (British Home Office 2010b: 3). This move had two important implications: On the one hand, incorporating counterterrorist thinking into the bureaucratic structures of public planning authorities turned these actors into semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, as they had not been charged with counterterrorist responsibilities beforehand. On the other hand, private sector actors, such as architects, construction companies, and property owners who must adhere to the standards set by local planning authorities were thus indirectly also turned into semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. This development is for instance reflected in the publication of the ‘Royal Institute of British Architects guidance on designing for counterterrorism’ (Royal Institute of British Architects 2010), published by the main professional body for architects in the UK. An exceptional phase of cooperation among formal and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness happened during the Olympic Games in 2012. In their preparation, the Home Office published an elaborate security strategy with far-reaching implications dedicated to protecting the mega-event from an anticipated attack of terrorist violence (British Home Office 2011a). The strategy’s local implementation at the Games’ venues was initially meant to be taken over by “G4S”, one of world’s largest private security providers. Yet, when the company failed to provide the covenanted 10,000 security guards in the run-up to the Games, the British government decided to additionally deploy 3,500 soldiers from the Royal Navy to cover the shortage (Simpson et al. 2017a: 189). Thus, the British army entered the field of formal managers of suspiciousness, at least for the limited time for which the mega-event lasted.

In contrast to the continuously widening range of formal and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, the counterterrorist encouragement of people in London as informal managers of suspiciousness remained limited. An exception were the attempts of the British capital's law enforcement agencies to engage in community policing which was introduced to gather special intelligence from within London's Muslim communities (Innes 2006: 229). As the effectiveness of the approach relies ultimately on the community members' willingness to share their knowledge about other community members with the police, they were actively encouraged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities. Yet, in practice, the initiative largely failed, as already mentioned, due to a lack of trust on both sides (Huq et al. 2011; Klausen 2009). Besides this targeted encouragement of the members of certain communities, interested individuals had the chance to inform themselves, since the CONTEST strategy and counterterrorist trainings were available to the public but there were no direct efforts to actively involve all Londoners in dealing with the threat of terrorist violence.

To conclude my mapping of managers of suspiciousness during this second phase of my historiographic archaeology in London, the range of formal and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness as well as the counterterrorist responsibilities assigned to them got significantly widened in the phase after 9/11. The professionalisation of counterterrorism expertise already begun pre-emptively in the aftermath of the remote attack experience in 2001 but then intensified especially after the local encounter with terrorist violence in London in 2005. Moreover, within the hyper-securitised environment of the Olympic Games in 2012, British soldiers also became engaged as formal managers of suspiciousness. Despite this re-enforcement of the traditional national imperative on security issues, special attention was also paid to improving the counterterrorist performance on the ground by providing CTSAs, serving as locally bound counterterrorist experts in London. Coinciding with this new emphasis on the local implementation of counterterrorism policies was a novel focus on integrating protective measures already in the planning phase of buildings and public urban space which turned local planning authorities into semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. Their range expanded in general massively during the phase, fostered by new legal obligations for private business owners to comply with counterterrorist planning and management regulations but also by the introduction of the Crowded Places paradigm and counterterrorism training programmes which pushed for a voluntary engagement of employers and their employees in a wide range of sectors to become semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. The significance of informal managers of suspiciousness remained continuously limited.

5.3.4.3 Managers of suspiciousness since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Finally, mapping managers of suspiciousness in London since 2015/16 reveals that the experience of the peak of attacks in other European metropoles but also local encounters with terrorist violence in London created powerful imaginaries of future attacks which further amplified the range of formal and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness and increased their level of professionalism. Yet, the most significant development was the new focus on encouraging informal managers of suspiciousness to take over counterterrorist responsibilities, reflecting the growing prominence of the resilience paradigm.

In terms of formal managers of suspiciousness, the national specialised counterterrorist agencies, the MI5, and London's police forces all continued to be relevant for their respective fields of counterterrorist responsibilities without any fundamental changes. Instead, existing tools and instruments were continuously adapted to new threat scenarios and attack methodologies. The CONTEST strategy saw for instance its last significant update in 2018 (Malik et al. 2017). The NaCTSO and the CPNI both kept adapting and expanding their publication range and training efforts to further professionalise the counterterrorism expertise of a wide range of actors in the public and the private sector. Initiatives such as the previously mentioned Project Servator illustrate how different police forces actively cooperated to project power at locations recognised as Crowded Places in the British capital, and therefore disrupt the suspicious activities of potential terrorist perpetrators. Yet, there were two noteworthy developments regarding formal managers of suspiciousness which go beyond these incremental changes: Firstly, in response to the attacks in Paris in January 2015 which resulted in large deployments of military troops patrolling the French capital, counterterrorist decisionmakers in the UK decided to adopt this practice also for London and other British metropoles. While previously, the counterterrorist responsibilities of the British army had been restricted to protecting the Olympic Games in 2012, the security practice to use soldiers to securitise suspicious sites – be it critical infrastructures or Crowded Places – in European metropoles became translated to London (MacAskill 2015). So far, these new powers, known as "Operation Temperer" were enacted twice in the British capital, once in response to the Manchester bombing in 2017 and once in response to the local IED attack in London at Parsons Green in 2017 (Rayner 2017; Gearson and Berry 2021). Secondly, there was a remarkable shift towards fully autonomous non-human managers of suspiciousness. While I decidedly focus on human bodies in the analysis of this category, this constitutes nonetheless a noteworthy shift: The use of artificial intelligence (AI) implies a novel level of monitoring everyday life in London, as the newly introduced LFR technology is fully automated, and hence algorithms have become charged as solely responsible to make the initial decision about when to report a live match with the registered collection of suspect images, while human eyes have become completely obsolete within this evaluation process.

With regards to semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, the most ground-breaking novelty was the establishment of the above mentioned Prevent Duty, which was introduced in 2015. The new regulation took 'specified authorities [under the obligation to have] due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism when exercising in their functions' (British Home Office 2019). The list of specified authorities encompassed for London not only all its local authorities, such as the GLA and its borough councils but also – no matter if there are public or private – all its nurseries, primary schools, and registered childcare providers, its institutions of further and higher education, the entire health sector as well as prisons and probation institutions. Thus, the new law meant ultimately a massive expansion of the responsibility to detect radicalisation tendencies for employees who are active in sectors which had previously not been associated with security matters, and hence teachers, nurses, probation officers, and university lecturers were turned into semi-formal managers of suspiciousness.

Although they received additional training 'to recognise vulnerability' (British Home Office 2019), research from different sectors shows how this training did oftentimes not suffice to offer a clear understanding of radicalisation tendencies (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2019; Pettinger 2020). Besides this massive expansion, there were also more incremental changes which concerned semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in London. These included an expanding content of existing programmes, such as Project Argus and Project Griffin as well as the development the so-called ACT phone application, restricted to business use only, which offers guidance information and videos, gives access to an online reporting form and confidential hotline, and provides '[e]mergency response and post-incident guidance as well as [l]ive-time news updates from UK Protect' (NaCTSO 2020a). Furthermore, with the increasingly wide definition of suspicious sites in the context of the Crowded Places paradigm the active incitement – but in many cases also the legal obligation – to take over counterterrorist responsibilities was expanded to additional business areas (NaCTSO 2017: 4).

Finally, the most fundamental change happened in respect to informal managers of suspiciousness, as the encouragement to become vigilant towards terrorist violence was extended to merely everyone living in London. This expansion coincided with the conviction that based on memories of past attacks and imaginaries of future violence, a terrorist incident can ultimately happen anywhere, anytime and be committed by anyone. Given this understanding, the conclusion to include vice versa also everyone in countering terrorist violence appears only logical, as being vigilant is ultimately framed as a form of resilient self-protection: 'The more you do to protect yourself, the safer you and your family will be. […] No one has more responsibility for your personal security than you' (NaCTSO 2017: 3). Numerous campaigns and initiatives were set up to promote this new understanding. Thanks to its high visibility and broad public outreach with ubiquitous posters and announcements across the railways and the public transport systems of bigger cities, including London of course, the See it, say it. Sorted. campaign has been very prominent among them (British Transport Police 2016). Its rationale was to establish a deliberately low threshold for everyday users of the public transport system to come forward with reporting their observations of suspiciousness: 'If you see something that doesn't feel right, we want to hear from you. Let us decide if what you have seen or what you know is important' (British Transport Police 2016). According to its organisers, the still on-going campaign has already been a success. Introduced in November 2016, the listed contact number received within three years almost 50,000 texts meaning 450 texts per day' (British Transport Police 2020a). Other initiatives to encourage the engagement of the public in counterterrorism efforts were introduced in the context of the ACT campaign. They include a confidential online report form and special hotlines which allow individuals to tell the police what they witnessed (Counter Terrorism Policing 2020). The campaign also entailed the ACT e-learning platform which was originally developed in 2017 for professional usage but then in December 2019 made available for 'anyone who wants to become a CT Citizen so they can learn how to spot the signs of suspicious behaviour and understand what to do in the event of a major incident' (NaCTSO 2020b). It covers in total seven interactive modules on 'Identifying Security Vulnerabilities',

'How to Identify and Respond to Suspicious Behaviour' and 'How to Identify and Deal with a Suspicious Item' (NaCTSO 2020b) and other topics. According to the NaCTSO, the ACT Awareness eLearning constituted a success with more than half a million participants in the first year (NaCTSO 2020e). Finally, the "ACT Early" programme – one of the UK's most recent initiatives – transported counterterrorism responsibilities into the private space of people's families and friendships. By asking the question 'Is someone close to you becoming a stranger' (British Home Office 2020a), the campaign has aimed to detect early warning signs of radicalisation. Its CVE rationale presupposes that the closer human ties are, the easier it is to notice behavioural shifts (British Home Office 2020b).

All in all, the last phase of mapping managers of suspiciousness in London revealed how based on the remote and local experiences of terrorist violence and the growing acknowledgement of the complexity to predict future attacks, managers of suspiciousness significantly proliferated in numbers and in the responsibilities, they were meant to take over. Thus, the already established formal managers of suspiciousness adjusted existing programmes to new threat scenarios and terrorist attack methodologies. When it comes to semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, the updated Crowded Places paradigm and the introduction of the Prevent Duty made it a legal obligation for employees in non-security related sectors to report signs of suspiciousness witnessed at their workplace. Finally, and most remarkably, the responsibility to look out for suspiciousness in the British capital was extended to all people in London. Through public awareness campaigns and eLearning content, all citizens were actively encouraged to become "CT citizens", being trained at 'their kitchen table' (NaCTSO 2020e).

5.4 The securitisation of urban everyday life in London

In the second stage of my historiographic archaeology, I look beyond the outlined specificities of how suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness transformed over time in London. Instead, my analysis focuses in this section on the intra-actions of securitised human and non-human bodies in the everyday life of the British capital. The main purpose of this analytical step is to systematically demonstrate how in the securitisation of urban everyday life, the suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies is entangled, and thus reproduces, and reinforces each other, which has been overlooked in the existing academic literature (Coaffee et al. 2009b; Katz 2013; Tulumello 2015; Fregonese and Laketa 2022). Moreover, by mapping urban everyday life as a socio-material entanglement, my historiographic archaeology reveals how its securitisation in London intensified over time based on memories of local and remote attacks and imaginaries of future violence.

5.4.1 The securitisation of London's everyday life before 9/11

Comparing the maps which I compiled during the first phase of my analysis reveals that before 9/11, the memories of local encounters with terrorist violence in London were predominately decisive for the ways in which everyday life in the British capital transformed. Thus, London's financial centres became suspicious, as they were the sites where the most damaging attacks happened during the last decade of the Troubles, thanks to their prestigious, high buildings whose physical destruction caused the economic damages the IRA was particularly aiming for at the time. In consequence, these sites were material-

discursively attributed with suspiciousness as vulnerable targets of potential future violence, and therefore heavily securitised. Their geographical materiality played a decisive role in that, as through the Ring of Steel and the Iron Collar, the areas could be secluded from the rest of London.

Simultaneously, mundane objects, such as litterbins and vehicles, which were used by the IRA to secretly place their IEDs and incendiary bombs, were in response securitised as suspicious objects all over the city. Yet, due to their omnipresence in urban everyday life, securitising them, in the sense of entirely eradicating them from public space in London turned out to be impossible. However, to overcome this obstacle at least partially, special restrictions were imposed for them in the City of London and the London Docklands, where they were deemed to be even more dangerous (Coaffee 2009: 109). This reflects how suspicious sites and suspicious objects were intra-acting, and thus reinforcing each other's suspiciousness: On the one hand, while litterbins were considered suspicious everywhere in London, their presence at London's financial centres, as the city's suspicious sites at the time, further heightened the security concerns associated with these suspicious items. On the other hand, within the restricted areas of London's financial centres special attention was paid to the management of suspicious objects because they were deemed to be easily instrumentalised for terrorist purposes, especially when located within these highly vulnerable areas of London. In consequence, it made sense to impose restrictive traffic regulations, adopt access controls, and targeted stop and search practices as well as to implement a special public litter regime particularly in the City of London and the London Docklands.

Just like certain objects were exceptionalised as suspicious, certain people were also singled out based on an alleged proneness to terrorist violence. As the bomb campaign in London during the 1990s was exclusively committed by the IRA which assumingly enjoyed widespread popular support, this branded the whole Irish community as suspicious and enabled social stigmatisation and discriminatory police practices. Yet, thanks to their whiteness, racially profiling Irish people based on the physical characteristics of their human bodies proved to be difficult (Hickman 1995; Hickman et al. 2005). Nonetheless, the securitisation of members of the Irish community in London was still possible as it was closely entangled with the securitisation of suspicious sites. Thus, on the one hand, Irish people were disproportionately often targeted in stop and searches of London's police forces, particularly when entering the city's securitised areas, as access controls allowed to single out passing through individuals based on their nationality. On the other hand, neighbourhoods of London with a particularly high percentage of Irish inhabitants gained special attention from the police who projected a highly visible presence of force there and conducted stop and searches in these areas which were marked as potentially dangerous. In this sense, securitised non-human and human bodies were in intra-acting, as the access to vulnerable sites was more restricted for members of London's suspicious community, and vice versa potentially dangerous areas were singled out based on the higher presence of suspicious people at them.

The treatment of the Irish suspect community strongly corresponded with who was charged to deal with the threat of terrorist violence. This meant at this stage mostly traditional formal managers of suspiciousness representing the British state since the conflict at hand was considered a domestic issue

which called for an increased projection of executive power. However, London's special governance structure that allows the City of London to have a separate police force and its exposed role as the capital which pushed for specialised counterterrorism branches of its local police forces, made the actors involved in the management of terrorist violence more diverse than in the rest of the UK. The exceptional role of the City of London had in turn again an influence on the magnified securitisation of the Square Mile, as the existence of the CLP allowed for an intensified control within this area, and the suspiciousness of The City was entangled with the special formal managers of suspiciousness who reinforced the securitisation of suspicious objects and people at them. This logic extended also to the London Docklands where it was actors from the private sector who provided for a higher level of securitisation to avert the costs of future catastrophes. This entanglement between suspicious sites and managers of suspiciousness also had implications the other way around, as private sector actors were engaging in self-initiated measures as semi-formal managers of suspiciousness to protect their businesses, especially when their respective locations were in areas, marked as vulnerable sites.

All in all, mapping the transformation of local space in London during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology demonstrated that there were already remarkable tendencies to securitise everyday life in the British capital at the time based on local encounters with terrorist violence, particularly during the 1990s. However, these tendencies were especially prominent at the financial centres of London, where the suspiciousness of sites, objects, and people, and managers of suspiciousness were closely entangled, and thus reinforced suspiciousness at them. Therefore, the securitisation of London's everyday life before 9/11 was arguably still locally restricted.

5.4.2 The securitisation of London's everyday life between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Aligning the maps that I created during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology reveals that while local experiences of terrorist violence remained influential in drafting and implementing a tailor-made counterterrorist response to them, future imaginaries of attack scenarios and remotely experienced violence remarkably gained further prominence. These developments were linked to shifts in the attack methodology of terrorist perpetrators after 9/11, as the strategic use of human casualties to send a powerful political message became more prominent, and therefore the geographical-material location of terrorist incidents became overall more arbitrary. After the 7/7 attacks had locally demonstrated how human crowds could be exploited for terrorist purposes, British security agencies pushed in response for an expansion of the securitisation of suspicious sites across London by introducing the Crowded Places paradigm which redefined the vulnerability of urban sites based on their crowd density. In consequence, suspicious sites mushroomed across London. While extreme measures of material fortification and control were still reserved for special sites, such as London's public transport system and big events like the 2012 Olympic Games, a subtler form of securitisation of suspicious sites was implemented at busy sites all over London which had to adhere to counterterrorist standards when it comes to their planning, construction, and management.

This development is also reflected in the implementation of special housekeeping rules for suspicious objects at these suspicious sites, as these two dimensions of urban everyday life were again closely entangled. Thus, although the material-discursive understanding of suspicious objects remained in contrast to suspicious sites largely the same, suspicious items grew significantly in number in concurrence with the expansion of suspicious sites in London. In other words, the more urban sites were considered suspicious, the more mundane objects present at them were problematised as potentially dangerous (British Home Office 2010b: 7). As furthermore, the IEDs used to commit largescale violence became significantly smaller, because they were decidedly used against human bodies, they were easier to hide and transport and in consequence deemed to require even more counterterrorist attention which led to the implementation of technological and material measures of control. At the same time, this initiated a surge in semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, as private actors owning businesses at suspicious sites had to adhere to the measures of control implemented to securitise them and be cautious with regards to suspicious objects and their special management.

In respect to the question which people were treated with suspicion, the primary target group became the UK's Muslim communities, although the Irish community was with the turn of the 21st century still surely not perceived as generally harmless. The initial suspicions against Muslims developed already pre-emptively in response to the jihadist ideology promoted as the motive for the 9/11 attacks but were further fuelled by group of perpetrators who committed the local attacks in London in 2005: Despite their socialisation in the UK, they were othered as foreigners by emphasising their identity as Muslims and recurring on stereotypes about the violence-proneness of Islam. Singling out Muslims seemed on the surface to be easier, as bodily characteristics of physical appearance were constructed as identity markers which allowed for even more arbitrary forms of racial profiling, because extremist beliefs were equated with stereotypically "Muslim" looks, and thus extended to all People of Colour. The seemingly simpler identification of suspicious people allowed again for different aspects of potential dangerousness to mutually reinforce each other. An extreme example of this logic is the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes who was ultimately shot because he started running down the stairs to a London underground station, and deemed additionally dangerous as he was wearing a for summer considered heavy jacket which fuelled assumptions about an IED being hidden underneath it (Vaughan-Williams 2009). This shows how in de Menezes case material-discursive assumptions about suspicious people, suspicious sites, and suspicious objects were intra-acting and triggered this extreme incident of counterterrorist violence. Yet, this happened in milder versions and with less severe consequences to thousands of people identified as Muslims in London on a day-to day basis when participating in the British capital's everyday life. Just like in the previous phase, the hotspots of such discriminatory measures were London's areas with a high percentage of non-White and Muslim inhabitants that were marked based on this as potentially dangerous which had in turn repercussions for all people living there.

This intensified control executed towards suspicious people was closely entangled with the proliferation of formal and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in London since 9/11: While the

activities of formal managers of suspiciousness professionalised through adopting the CONTEST strategy and the establishment of the NaCTSO and the CPNI on the national level, this coincided with fostering counterterrorist engagement on the urban level, as local planning authorities which had formerly not been obligated with security matters became semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. In consequence of these two developments and entangled with the mushrooming of suspicious sites across London, thanks to the introduction of the Crowded Places paradigm, counterterrorism efforts became also more widespread and comprehensive in the private sector, as public security authorities actively encouraged business owners to take on counterterrorist responsibilities by offering tailormade local expert advice and specialised training sessions, and thus the number of people charged with looking out for suspiciousness at their workplaces as semi-formal managers of suspiciousness grew considerably.

Overall, the closely entangled developments towards wider material-discursive definitions of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness intensified the securitisation of London's everyday life which was no longer geographically limited to certain areas but now visible all over the city. This trend was incited by further local encounters with terrorist violence in the British capital, which created powerful memories for a forceful counterreaction to them but increasingly also by remote experiences of attacks fuelling future imaginaries of terrorist violence of what could happen in London. An unprecedented climax of such a pre-emptive securitisation was reached during the 2012 Olympic Games, when no violence happened in the end, yet the anticipation of a terrorist attack was excavated and led to a militarised hyper-securitisation of London's everyday life.

5.4.3 The securitisation of London's everyday life since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Comparing finally the four maps that I assembled for the last phase of my historiographic archaeology of London accounts for a remarkable further intensification of the securitisation of the city's everyday life. Although the British capital still saw local attacks since 2015/16, the dramatic peak of terrorist violence happened in other European metropoles, though these remote attacks created powerful reference points to adopt additional measures of control in London. At the same time, terrorist violence was recognised as ultimately unforeseeable, in the sense that an attack can happen anywhere and anytime, and therefore the categories to distinguish who and what counts as harmless from who and what counts as potentially dangerous became even blurrier and material-discursive attributions of suspiciousness got further extended in their increasingly vague meaning.

Thus, based on the assumption that an attack can happen at any urban site if there are human bodies present that serve as targets for terrorist violence, all sites of human interaction in the British capital have become suspicious, in the sense of being vulnerable to attacks. This logic was implemented first and foremost through the updated material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites, as promoted in the context of the revised Crowded Places paradigm. Its update imposed counterterrorist rationales in the planning and management across all sectors, in all sorts of sites, no matter their size, their geographical location in London, their function in urban everyday life, and their ownership, including tourist attractions, shopping centres, restaurants, places of worship, and cultural venues. This

significant spreading of suspicious sites was closely entangled with intra-acting developments regarding suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness.

Thus, it coincided with the evolution of suspicious objects whose material-discursive definition became also extended based on local and remote attack experiences: While items of everyday life, such as vehicles, were used to conceal bombs before, they were now turned into weapons themselves leading to an understanding that ultimately anything can be used to inflict harm on others. Stuck with this daunting conclusion, the material-discursive range of suspicious objects contains according to the British counterterrorism doctrine every item which is 'hidden, obviously suspicious and untypical' (NaCTSO 2017: 44) at a particular location. In this sense, even an ordinary thick winter jacket counts as potentially dangerous when worn in warmer temperatures because it could be used to cover an IED. Ultimately, suspicious items are defined in circular reference to suspicious sites and vice versa: Since every site of human interaction in London qualifies as a potential attack location, an item at any place can be potentially dangerous, while at the same time the presence of a suspicious object makes urban sites potentially dangerous. Thus, all of these sites have to follow certain housekeeping rules, such as avoiding 'litter bins in critical, sensitive or vulnerable' (NaCTSO 2017: 46).

In terms of suspicious people, the previous focus on suspect communities was exchanged for problematising suspicious behaviour, comprising everything what appears odd, unusual, and extraordinary (NaCTSO 2017: 118). This understanding implied a massive expansion of suspiciousness: As the group of potential suspects is extended to include literally anyone, the measures of behavioural control have intensified for everyone. Furthermore, although the more indistinct category of suspicious behaviour diverted on the surface from the discriminatory measures against certain communities of the previous phases, the category is so vague that it criminalises any behaviour that is considered "not normal". However, since the differentiation between normal and not normal does not exist in a void but in the context of socio-material power hierarchies, this wide understanding of suspicious behaviour has allowed for upholding stereotypes against minorities, such as London's non-white and Muslim population. Thus, it has ultimately enabled the reproduction of exclusionary and violent tendencies against these groups but obscured the discriminatory character of these practices. The more indistinct problematisation of suspicious people is closely entangled with the spreading of suspicious sites, not only in the sense they are considered vulnerable as future terrorist targets of but also in the sense that they are potentially dangerous areas where terrorist suspects are assumed to be. While de facto, the projection of control has still varied across London, ultimately suspicious behaviours are deemed to be potentially observable anywhere, including schools, hospitals, and even private homes.

This development is finally closely entangled with an enormous expansion concerning who is charged with looking out for suspiciousness to include merely everyone present in London's everyday life, be it in the context of their professional or their private life. This was manifested on the one hand through the expansion of the Crowded Places paradigm, which proliferated the number of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in the British capital further. On the other hand, counterterrorist efforts were

extended through the Prevent Duty to additional areas, such as both private and public educational and health care institutions, which had previously not been charged with security matters but now employees in these sectors became legally obliged to look out for early signs of radicalisation at their workplace. Furthermore, with public awareness campaigns and new features, such as phone applications and open-access e-learning trainings, all Londoners and people visiting London have been encouraged to vigilantly report anything they consider suspicious to security authorities, as in recurrence of the broader resilience trend everyone is mobilised to contribute to the mitigation of insecurities.

All in all, this last phase of my historiographic archaeology of London's local space uncovered how since 2015/16, the securitisation of everyday life in the British capital became an all-encompassing trend, that is unescapable for human and non-human bodies intra-acting in the city. Suspiciousness has reached all sites of everyday life, from public space to professional contexts to the intimate spheres of private homes. Any object – no matter how mundane and ordinary – can be potentially dangerous as soon as it is considered out of place. Any human body can be suspicious, depending on one's behavioural practices, and therefore everybody should always and everywhere look out for signs of suspiciousness displayed by any human or non-human body they encounter.

5.5 Normative reflections from a perspective of posthumanist ethics

My analysis of how London's local space transformed over the last thirty years revealed a significant trend towards an all-encompassing securitisation of everyday life in the British capital. This finding raises however questions with regards to its normative implications in the context of existing socio-material power hierarchies. Therefore, in the final stage of my historiographic archaeology, I reflect on the securitisation of London's everyday life from a perspective of posthumanist ethics to uncover how this transformation, although it increased suspiciousness for all human and non-human bodies in the British capital, was by no means a development that had equal implications for everyone and everything. Instead, I argue that the securitisation of London's everyday life constitutes a process of urban segregation, in the sense that it further included privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre of urban everyday life and further excluded marginalised human and non-human bodies at its periphery, and thus reproduced existing socio-material power asymmetries.

5.5.1 Security from whom and what

In the first dimension of reflecting on my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics, I engage with the question from whom and what was security provided within the transformation of London's everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism or in other words, who and what was deemed potentially dangerous. The findings of my historiographic archaeology in the British capital demonstrate that the attribution of human and non-human bodies with potential dangerousness was typically entangled with their general marginalisation within the British capital's everyday life. The recent increasing universalisation of suspiciousness across all sites, objects, and people living in London eased these asymmetries only on the surface, as in fact the increasing vagueness when it comes to differentiating between who and what is harmless and who and what is suspicious allows for discriminatory practices

in assigning potential dangerousness to be reproduced. This is highly problematic because on the one hand, the level of restrictive control rises for everything and everyone but on the other hand, as continuing socio-material inequalities are obscured, their legitimacy becomes less challenged in political, public, and academic discourse.

This dynamic is clearly reflected in the transformation of potentially dangerous human bodies in London which led initially to a systematic othering of minority communities. In denying their heterogeneity not only when it comes to issues, such as personal socialisation, moral values, religious beliefs, nationality, and race, their members were in a generalising manner reduced to that one characteristic that makes them fit into the stereotypical image of the "terrorist suspect" that has been constructed in the public and political discourses of societal elites. A closer look at actual perpetrators of violence shows however how superficial and selective these stereotypes were. Thus, the 7/7 attackers were marked as foreigners by recurring on their migratory family backgrounds rather than taking their socialisation in the UK and – in most cases – British nationality seriously. Furthermore, the respective minority communities were marginalised within the British society not only based on the terrorist suspicions raised against them but also in other contexts, especially socio-economic terms. Thus, many members of London's Irish community as well as later its Muslim communities and in general People of Colour were on average more likely to be unemployed or working in low-income sectors, living in deprived areas of the city with less access to decent education and health care, and oftentimes confronted with other societal stigmas besides terrorist accusations, such as criminal intentions, addiction, and homelessness. As the stereotypes against these marginalised groups were piling up, they reproduced existing socio-material inequalities in a vicious circle of exclusion: Members of London's suspect communities had greater difficulties in finding employment thanks to the terrorist allegations against them, leaving them even more deprived and removed to London's periphery. With the shift towards problematising suspicious behaviour, the stigma of terrorist suspicions against the members of minority communities seemed on the surface to be lifted, as London's formal managers of suspiciousness openly promoted that community-based allegations of potential dangerousness were no longer deemed credible. However, the practice of securitised everyday life in the British capital shows that simply stating that racialised stereotypes about the violence-proneness of Muslims and People of Colour are obsolete will not erase them from London's society: As the new reference point of defining suspicious behaviour became the distinction between what is normal and what is not normal for human bodies to do, this opens the door for reproducing the structural discrimination of minorities and everyone who does not adhere to socio-material norms and standards on how to behave and what to act like.

Such tendencies have played out in a similar vein in the treatment of potential dangerous non-human bodies because the socio-material suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies is intra-acting in London. Thus, neighbourhoods with a high percentage of suspicious inhabitants were initially deemed potentially dangerous, as the urban sites where terrorists were assumed to live. In the case of London, its suspicious areas were continuously located in the North and Northwest of London, despite the shift

in suspect communities over the years, as the respective neighbourhoods were home to a high percentage of inhabitants with a migratory background, be it from Ireland, from former British colonies or elsewhere in the world. This coincides with a higher level of poverty and crime in these areas, as thanks to their rough reputation they are more affordable for these socio-economically deprived communities. The counterterrorist focus on them added further to their negative image and at the same time heightened levels of control at them. As recently, the understanding of potentially vulnerable and dangerous urban sites has merged in London and measures of control further spread across the city, the suspiciousness of North London has not decreased but increased, as now it is not only considered the place where terrorist live but also where terrorist violence could potentially happen. The described dynamic is finally less prominent for suspicious objects as their definition has been continuously wide in London, and thus captured items which are used by all participants of everyday life in the British capital. However, as their suspiciousness is entangled with the suspiciousness of sites and people, depending on who uses an object where in London, its potential dangerousness increases. Therefore, my analysis shows ultimately that already marginalised human and non-human bodies have been further excluded through the securitisation of London's everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism.

5.5.2 Security for whom and what

In the second dimension of reflecting on my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics, I shed light on the other side of the coin, and thus I deal with the question, for whom and for what was security provided when everyday life in the British capital transformed. The findings of my historiographic archaeology of London's local space reveal how privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre of its urban everyday life were deemed especially vulnerable, and therefore worthy of being protected against terrorist violence, and thus their status of socio-material superiority was confirmed. However, since the protection of vulnerable human and non-human bodies is in counterterrorist terms foremostly expressed through intensified control, the recent shift towards universal vulnerability across London has not decreased socio-material inequalities but increased surveillance and restrictiveness everywhere and for everyone in the British capital.

This dynamic is reflected in the transformation of vulnerable sites in London. Initially, it was the financial centres of the British capital that were in response to local encounters with terrorist violence deemed worthy of protection. However, as attacks happened all over London at the time, the fact that securitisation measures were focused on the Square Mile and the London Docklands manifested their socio-material superiority in contrast to other target sites. Their need for protection was obviously connected to their economic relevance within the British capital's neoliberal system as well as to the special autonomy that the City of London enjoys within the UK's governmental system. This logic of equating worthiness of protection with economic worth in the capitalist sense was still prominent after 9/11 when securitisation measures were effectively focused on sites of heightened structural and symbolic relevance in London which were connected to critical functions in the city's governance

system (but in some cases privately owned), as these sites were deemed worthy of protection thanks to the systemic importance ascribed to them but also due to their attractiveness as easily exploitable targets.

In comparison, the recent move to extend vulnerability to all sites of human interaction in London has on the surface diverted from reproducing socio-material asymmetries in the differentiation of what is worthy to protect. Yet, this broader understanding remained to be inherently problematic: On the one hand, the capacity to actively participate in urban everyday life, for instance by using both public and private sites, by pursuing a professional career and by engaging in leisure activities, is highly dependent on aspects such as race, class, and gender, and hence there are still differences in the British capital in terms of who and what is deemed deserving protection and who and what is not. On the other hand, counterterrorist protection has been equated with an increase in control and surveillance in London, which has in turn freedom-restricting consequences for all human and non-human bodies that are deemed worthy of protection. As currently everyone and everything is deemed vulnerable in the British capital, everyone and everything is confronted with a higher level of control. However, as the previous dimension of my reflection showed that these universalised measures of control exacerbated especially the existing vulnerabilities of already marginalised human and non-human bodies, not only due to who and what is considered as potentially dangerous in the logic of counterterrorism measures and but also due to who and what is considered worth protecting, as members of minority groups are typically side-lined as participants of everyday life and marginalised urban areas which are oftentimes inhabited by these vulnerable groups are in practice deemed less worthy of protection. A telling example is the 2017 terrorist attack in the marginalised neighbourhood Finsbury Park, which was committed for Islamophobic reasons, and thus targeted particularly Muslim worshippers. This instance demonstrated that those human and non-human bodies in London who are in need of protection because they are marginalised in the British society have been ultimately those for whom and for what the least security has been provided. At the same time, privileged human and non-human bodies have been less limited in their possibilities by measures of control, as their alleged harmlessness protects them from counterterrorist repression.

5.5.3 Security through whom and what

In the final dimension of normatively contextualising my findings within existing socio-material power hierarchies, I deal with the question, who and what was deemed a capable and credible manager of suspiciousness in the British capital. My historiographic archaeology of London revealed how generally speaking the range of human and non-human charged with taking over counterterrorist responsibilities has remarkably widened in the city. This is problematic as such because it normalises constant surveillance and self-surveillance in the context of one's professional, and private life in London. Furthermore, although this trend towards universalising counterterrorist responsibilities superficially appears to ease socio-material power asymmetries in the British capital, a closer look shows that hierarchies among those participants of urban everyday life, who are deemed credible and trustworthy and those who are not, were reproduced in times of (counter)terrorism.

My analysis thus brought to light how traditional formal managers of suspiciousness, such as the nationwide operating MI5 and London's local police forces, were initially deemed the only actors equipped to counter the threat of terrorist violence in the city before 9/11. While semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, especially owners of private businesses in the City of London and the London Docklands, were not stopped from engaging in self-initiated counterterrorist efforts, they were also not actively encouraged or supported to do so during this phase. This changed after the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, as actors from the public and the private sector became increasingly credible semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. However, this new trust in them was fostered by the expert advice and tailor-made training sessions, they received from specialised formal managers of suspiciousness who thus managed to retain their counterterrorist authority. A similar development happened since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 with the counterterrorist encouragement of informal managers of suspiciousness: While literally everyone in London is supposed to share their observations of suspiciousness, formal managers of suspiciousness have ultimately remained the actors who make the decision about how to respond. In this sense, socio-material power hierarchies have persisted in the relationship between formal, semi-formal, and informal managers of suspiciousness, despite the trend towards encouraging everyone to take over counterterrorist responsibilities, be it in their professional or private life.

This transformation is problematic for several reasons: Firstly, universalising the responsibility to look out for suspiciousness renders everyone to constantly watch others, even people in one's care as well as family members and friends. At the same, as one internalises that oneself is watched by others, this implies the obligation to adapt one's behaviours to not be held suspicious by one's environment. Secondly, by empowering everyone to share their concerns, racial and religious stereotypes about who is assumed to be potentially dangerous are frequently reproduced, as especially the implementation of the Prevent Duty has shown, and thus this development further contributed to the exclusion of already vulnerable minority groups within British society. Finally, that everyone in London has been encouraged to become an informal manager of suspiciousness does not automatically mean that everyone is deemed trustworthy by the city's law enforcement agencies. This is reflected most prominently in the unsuccessful attempts of community policing in the British capital which have failed not only due to the unwillingness of minority communities to cooperate with London's police forces but also because the intelligence provided by members of the respective communities were due to their own stigma not deemed trustworthy. In a similar vein, although my analysis did not explicitly focus on this development, non-human managers of suspiciousness increasingly gained autonomy in making decisions between who and what is suspicious and who and what is harmless, especially thanks to technological innovation and the introduction of AI-based surveillance measures in London. These machines have persistently enjoyed a high level of trust, as they were portrayed as neutral, although in practice, they continuously turned out to be discriminatory towards members of certain minority groups. In this sense, my normative reflection shows that not only with regards to who and what was deemed potentially dangerous and who and what was considered worthy to protect but also with regards to who and what was treated as a

trustworthy manager of suspiciousness in London, socio-material power asymmetries were reinforced within the securitisation of everyday life in the British capital, as privileged human and non-human bodies became more powerful, while the vulnerabilities of already marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery were further exacerbated.

5.6 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, my historiographic archaeology of the British capital revealed how over the years, London's everyday life has become more and more securitised. Before 9/11, the suspiciousness of urban sites, objects and people was concentrated at the city's financial centres, and closely linked to local encounters with terrorist violence that happened there. This also restricted the severest measures of control to the Square Mile and the London Docklands. After 9/11, suspiciousness mushroomed across the city as the material-discursive definitions of suspicious sites, objects, and people widened and the number of managers of suspiciousness charged with counterterrorist responsibilities in the British capital increased. The additional measures of control were still justified in reference to local memories of attacks but remote experiences of terrorist violence as well as future imaginaries thereof became increasingly powerful in this context. Finally, since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, the securitisation of everyday life has become an unescapable tendency in the British capital. Although London was no longer among the European metropoles, where the most dramatic instances of terrorist violence happened in recent years, suspiciousness further increased among the human and non-human bodies intra-acting in London and the number of managers of suspiciousness proliferated as well.

While London has been deemed the prime example of a securitised European metropole in the existing academic literature (Coaffee 2004, 2009; Fussey 2011; Graham 2012), my analysis of the British capital revealed how the transformation of its everyday life was in fact an incremental process that was geographically limited at first and then slowly intensified over a period of more than thirty years. Moreover, my theoretical perspective showed that this process was driven by memories of local and remote encounters with terrorist violence and future imaginaries thereof and increased the level of control for both human and non-human bodies in London. The added critical value of my case study of London revolves around my reflection on the city's transformation process from a perspective of posthumanist ethics: Contextualising my findings within existing socio-material power hierarchies in the British capital revealed how despite universalising trends regarding who and what is deemed potentially dangerous, who and what is deemed worthy of protection, and who and what is deemed capable to provide for security, which developed over the years, the current securitisation of everyday life in London constitutes a process of urban segregation: Privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre of urban everyday life are further included and marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery are further excluded by it.

6 Case Study: Brussels

6.1 Introduction

Despite its global recognition as the unofficial capital of the EU and the seat of other international institutions, local encounters with terrorist violence were rare in Brussels for decades. This should change dramatically during the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, when the Belgian capital quickly advanced to being infamously known as the European 'rear base of international terrorism' (Boussois 2017: 173, translated from the French original by the author). Brussels' new reputation was yet not only indebted to a major local attack which happened on 22 March 2016 and should become 'Belgium's own 9/11' (Renard 2016b: 3), but also due to the realisation that the attacks in Paris in November 2015 were orchestrated from a terrorist cell in the Belgian capital. Thus, after decades in which terrorist violence had been largely absent from the city, it suddenly rose within a few months to the centre of (counter)terrorist attention among European metropoles. Therefore, Brussels serves as my second case study to analyse how urban everyday life in Europe transformed in times of (counter)terrorism. Grounded on my theoretical-methodological assumptions, I argue that despite its shorter history of (counter)terrorism in comparison to London, Brussels' everyday life has over the years also been securitised, as more and more of its intra-acting sites, objects, and people were attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness and an increasing number of managers of suspiciousness became charged with looking out for signs of potential dangerousness. Although the list of local attacks in Brussels is relatively short, this transformation of local space in Brussels was justified with references to past experiences and future imaginaries of terrorist violence which were translated across space and across time to the Belgian capital. My critical evaluation of the securitisation of Brussels' everyday life from a perspective of posthumanist ethics reveals that the city's transformation reinforced, just like in London, existing socio-material power asymmetries, and thus constitutes a process of urban segregation between privileged and marginalised human and non-human bodies.

Thanks to its rather recent recognition as both a target location of terrorist violence and a home base for its perpetrators, Brussels serves as the newcomer case within my selection of cities, and thus my separate analysis of this place shows that although the 2015/16 attacks in and from Brussels were an important catalyst in pushing the securitisation of the city's everyday life forward, the incremental spreading of material-discursive suspiciousness began already before the Belgian metropole was swept with (counter)terrorist attention. My historiographic archaeology of Brussels' local space is therefore structured similarly to my previous case study. Thus, in the first part of the chapter, after a short general introduction, I engage with the transformations of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness in Brussels separately by mapping their development over three temporal phases. In the second section of the chapter, I engage with the entanglements of these securitised human and non-human bodies in Brussels' everyday life. In the final part of the chapter, I critically reflect on the transformation of local space in the Belgian capital from a perspective of posthumanist ethics.

6.2 Brussels' transforming everyday life

The name "Brussels", as I use it here, refers to the region Brussels-Capital which is the most densely populated part of Belgium: While only covering 162 square kilometres, it is home to 1.2 million people (Statbel 2021). Brussels was founded as a rural settlement in 979 but then flourished during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. After this previous boom, Brussels experienced another "Golden Age" since the end of World War II: As the city headquarters many regional and international institutions, its reputation goes way beyond Europe's borders. Most notably among them are the organs of the EU, namely the EU Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Council. Besides the EU, Brussels also hosts the headquarter of NATO and other less well-known institutions like the World Customs Organization (The Bulletin 2016). Their presence attracted additional actors, organisations, and groups, such as NGOs, media outlets, and lobbying associations. Thanks to this international working environment, the Belgian capital has a thriving expat community but is also a major immigrant city with around 180 nationalities represented. Just like in London, this is closely linked to Belgium's colonial history: Based on their parents' nationality, almost 75 percent of Brussels' inhabitants were of foreign origin in 2020. Among them, more than 40 percent had no European ancestry, originating mainly from the African continent, where many of Belgium's colonies used to be located (Tribalat 2021).

Within Belgium's federal state structure, Brussels constitutes an independent region, besides the Walloon and the Flemish region (Be.Brussels 2021a). While it is geographically an enclave within the latter, it belongs to both the Flemish and the French speaking community in Belgium. Occupying this middle ground, combined with Brussels' international reputation allowed for curating its multicultural identity. While the region Brussels-Capital has several superordinate competences, such as the management of urban development and public transport, it has no common mayor, but it is further subdivided into 19 municipalities called communes which have independent executive structures, including a mayor. The communes are quite powerful since local duties, such as law enforcement and the resident registration fall into their autonomous responsibility (Be.Brussels 2021b). Over the years, trends like gentrification, sustainable development, migration and urban regeneration have transformed Brussels in remarkable ways (van Criekingen 2009; Kampelmann et al. 2016; Janjevic et al. 2016). My historiographic archaeology of the securitisation of its everyday life must hence be seen in the broader context of a dynamic interplay of financial, ecological, aesthetic, and multicultural interests in the city.

6.3 The securitisation of non-human and human bodies in Brussels

To map the transformation of Brussels' everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, I analyse in the first stage of my historiographic archaeology how suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness developed separately, to tease out the particularities of their respective securitisation processes. I argue that despite the risen academic interest in the city in terms of (counter)terrorism, the existing literature (Renard 2016a; Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a; Lasoen 2020; Fregonese and Laketa 2022) has not paid equal attention to human and non-human bodies in how Brussels has transformed, although this is central to understand and critically evaluate this process.

6.3.1 The transformation of suspicious sites in Brussels

Starting with non-human bodies, I initially map the transformation of suspicious sites which includes all locations in the city that were deemed to be material-discursively suspicious because they are vulnerable to become an attack target or because they are the places where terrorist perpetrators are suspected to live. Mapping suspicious sites in Brussels reveals that their securitisation began already prior to major local attack experiences in the city, as incidents of terrorist violence elsewhere were pre-emptively translated to Brussels. This has been neglected in the existing literature due to its bias on recent (counter)terrorist developments in the city (Renard 2016a; Lasoen 2020).

6.3.1.1 Suspicious sites before 9/11

Mapping Brussels' suspicious sites in the period before 9/11 reveals that they were extremely rare, although the city had some local encounters with terrorist violence at the time. However, the memories created by them as well as by remote attacks were not powerful enough to be translated into explicit counterterrorist measures to securitise vulnerable or potentially dangerous sites in the city. Nonetheless, due to generally lingering security concerns, Brussels' physical shape did not remain unchanged.

In the period before 9/11, terrorist violence was in general not an important issue on the political agenda in Brussels, as the city saw only a few local attacks between the end of World War II and 2001. Among these, the terrorist violence that generated the most attention was committed by the CCC which had close ties to the French "Action Directe" (AD) and the German RAF. However, in contrast to the targeted killings of the AD and the RAF, the CCC's attack methodology generally abstained from violence against humans and was thus limited to acts of sabotage and material destruction (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 197–198). In their active time between 1983 and 1986, the CCC claimed responsibility for 19 attacks in Belgium, of which 13 were committed in Brussels (Cellules Communistes Combattantes 2021). The attacked sites included on the one hand the premises of national and international companies and on the other hand bases of the Belgian police and military as well as NATO infrastructure. Their selection was based on the reasoning that the chosen sites which represented capitalist and imperialist ideals had brought oppression to the Belgian working class (Matthijs and Zahid 2013: 1). The damages caused by the incidents were usually only minor. If humans were close to the sites, which happened thanks to the CCC's prior warning calls only rarely, they suffered merely mild injuries (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 198). The sole exception to this rule was the incident at the Belgian Enterprise Federation, committed in May 1985, which cost the lives of two firefighters. In its aftermath, the CCC blamed the miscommunication among Belgian security authorities for causing the victims' deaths (Cellules Communistes Combattantes 2005). Independent of who ultimately bears responsibility, the CCC's continuous vindication shows that their attack targets were decidedly material. Besides the CCC's violence, Brussels was a "battlefield" for external conflicts. Thus, in 1979, the IRA committed three attacks in Brussels which were part of the group's continental campaign during the 1970s and 1980s, before the IRA changed its strategy in the 1990s (Alonso 2001). As classic targeted killings, these were not linked to significant spatial locations but rather directed against high-ranking British

representatives known as ‘legitimate targets’ (Dingley 2012: 117) in the IRA’s terminology. In other words, the committed violence had no special connection to a geographical location within the Belgian capital’s local space. Similarly to the IRA’s attacks, Brussels became a remote battlefield in the turf war between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdish Worker’s Party; PKK) and Turkish nationalists, especially during the 1990s (Matthijs and Zahid 2013: 8). Their target sites were chosen to specifically hit the antagonist community, and thus limited to the conflict groups’ property. In other words, the ‘PKK attacked Turkish diplomatic missions and business interests, while Anti-Kurdish groups struck businesses and private properties owned by Kurdish émigrés’ (Matthijs and Zahid 2013: 2). Yet, all in all, the scope of terrorist violence in Brussels before 9/11 was considerably small. The attack target locations were selected according to their representational meaning for the respective group’s political cause, rather than bearing general symbolic or structural importance for Brussels’ everyday life.

This threat assessment is also reflected in the limited countermeasures that were taken to securitise suspicious sites in Brussels before 9/11, although the city underwent in other regards quite considerable physical changes. With the establishment of Brussels-Capital as an independent region in 1989, its government promoted a determined reform agenda of urban regeneration for Brussels (Region de Bruxelles-Capitale 1995). The programme outlined the ambition to recreate public space in the capital’s centre to re-attract especially the middleclass and fight urban segregation (Dessouroux et al. 2009: 172). Material changes included the installation of new streetlights, public artworks, and the (re)creation of green spaces but also the implementation of stricter speed limits and local traffic bans in Brussels’ central neighbourhoods. While some of these measures also fit into the rationale of counterterrorism practices, the reasoning behind them was the rehabilitation of urban space in the context of the city’s neoliberal gentrification. A more explicit reference to security was made in the “Contracts of Security” (later renamed as “Contracts of Security and Society”) promoted in 1992 by Belgium’s federal government (Cartuyvels 1996; BEFUS 2021). Their initial objectives focused on an improved police presence and preventing especially vulnerable groups from committing delinquencies (Cartuyvels and Hebberecht 2001: 406). In 1996, special funding was offered to local initiatives intended to improve urban security. These were realised through the deployment of city stewards, and rarely also CCTV cameras, observing its most emblematic sites, such as the Grand Place, the Mont des Arts, and Parc Cinquantenaire (Dessouroux et al. 2009: 176). In a similar vein, buildings of traditional symbolic relevance projecting state authority, such as the Royal Palace, the Belgian Parliament but also embassy buildings, and the EU institutions retained a higher standard of physical protection. Yet, in comparison to London, especially the widespread use of technological means of control remained uncommon in Brussels before 9/11. A rare exception to this was the public transport system operated by the “Société des Transports Intercommunaux de Bruxelles” (Brussels Society of Intercommunal Transport; STIB) where the use of CCTV cameras was common since the 1970s and surveillance expanded ever since (De Keersmaecker and Debailleul 2016: 2). Besides these moderate efforts to increase the general level of security at public urban sites in Brussels, private engagement was very limited in this context.

All in all, mapping suspicious sites during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that before 9/11, they were extremely rare in Brussels. Yet, this means neither that the city had no local experiences with terrorist violence at the time, nor that Brussels' physical shape remained untouched. However, the locations of attacks committed in the Belgian capital bared only representational value within the respective ideology of the responsible terrorist group but not for Brussels in general. The mainly material destruction which was caused by them did not amount to justify costly re-adjustments to prevent potential future damages. Thus, although there were initiatives to redevelop Belgium's capital, the dominant rationale behind them was neoliberal urban rehabilitation rather than an elaborate counterterrorism agenda. In programmes in which security concerns did a play role, these usually incorporated a wider set of objectives, including foremostly combatting crime and public disorder, whereas the prevention of terrorist violence remained – if recognised at all – a welcomed side effect of the new measures. Ultimately, the memories of violence created by local attacks in Brussels as well as in other European metropoles were not powerful enough to justify the securitisation of suspicious sites, in the sense of vulnerable or potentially dangerous areas in the city.

6.3.1.2 Suspicious sites between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Analysing the development of suspicious sites during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology of Brussels reveals that although local attacks remained largely absent from the Belgian capital between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, suspicious sites in the sense of urban locations which were deemed potentially vulnerable attack targets were more and more pre-emptively securitised: As remote experiences of terrorist violence in other metropoles were translated to Brussels, they created influential reference points to project future imaginaries of terrorist violence in the city.

While already before 9/11, terrorist violence was not very prominent in the Belgian capital, with the turn of the 21st century local attacks remained absent from the city for more than a decade. Thus, the only terrorist incident that happened on Brussels' soil during this phase took place on 24 May 2014, marking already the early beginnings of the (counter)terrorist attention the city should earn during the European peak of attacks. Its target location was the Jewish Museum of Belgium, located in the historical Sablon area of Brussels (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 22). A sole assailant entered the building during its regular visiting hours and opened fire on staff members and visitors, killing four people. After that, the perpetrator escaped the attack site on foot. Both his attack and his flight were partially filmed by CCTV cameras but without showing a clear image of his face. As it was directed at the symbolic site represented by the Jewish Museum, the Belgian Prime minister condemned the attack as an act of antisemitic violence in its aftermath (Casert 2014). More importantly than this single local attack, remote experiences of terrorism in other metropoles influenced the understanding of (counter)terrorism in the Belgian capital during this phase. Within their shifting attack methodologies, the selection of targets turned from attacks aimed at solely material damages or targeted killings towards attacking urban sites which allowed for a high number of random human casualties to project fear beyond the immediate act of violence. The 9/11 attacks as well as the attacks in London in July 2005 fit into this scheme but they

were not the only ones. Another terrorist assault which gained attention worldwide and followed a similar attack methodology were the Madrid train bombings in 2004 which were widely recognised as the first attack of transnational jihadist terrorism on European soil. The orchestrated attack series happened on 11 March 2004 in Madrid, when ten IEDs exploded on four commuter trains on their way to the city centre during the morning rush hour. The incident led to 191 deaths and over 2,000 people injured. The wider political context of the attacks was that Spain had just like the UK joined the so-called "Coalition of the Willing" led by the US to invade Iraq as a revenge for 9/11 in 2003, and thus the attacks were understood as spill-over violence from the ongoing war in the Middle East. Unlike the UK and Spain, Belgium stayed out of the US invasion in Iraq. Yet, the attacks in major cities of these countries demonstrated that terrorist violence had become a threat to urban everyday life not only in North America but also in European metropoles, and thus Brussels advanced to a potential target city.

As local violence happened only in 2014, Brussels' efforts to securitise suspicious sites were initially largely pre-emptive, as the understanding of which urban sites were material-discursively deemed to be potentially vulnerable attack sites in the Belgian capital was translated from the sites attacked in remote incidents of terrorist violence in other major cities in the Global North. This initiated the securitisation of sites in Brussels which were attributed with a high symbolic and structural relevance, as they were considered attractive target locations. Some measures to protect these vulnerable sites were introduced permanently, while others were only temporary. An example of the latter happened in 2007, when investigations hinted at a potential terrorist incident at Brussels' prestigious Grand Place. In response, Belgium's threat level was increased and eventually raised to its maximum (Lasoen 2017b: 933). Ultimately, the public fireworks at the site planned for New Year's eve were entirely cancelled, as security authorities deemed an terrorist attack plausible (Lasoen 2017b: 934). The implementation of permanent measures of control were on the other hand reflected in the incremental securitisation of the Quartier Léopold in Brussels, also known as the city's European Quarter. While the city had been the permanent location of the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and in parts the EU Parliament already since 1965, it was only in 2002 officially decided that the summits of the European Council were from then on always held in the Belgian capital, partially thanks to the Belgian willingness to provide for their security and its police's experience with protecting previous summits (Stark 2002: 17). This new arrangement turned Brussels' European Quarter into a gated community of its own:

> 'It is a matter of decoration: distancing, avoidance strategies, diverted access, the specialisation of routes, crooked public spaces, prolific steps, blind ground floors, Frisian horses on stand-by, cameras, patrols, private security services on the public highway and inner streets as protective moats for the velvet salons, this is the landscape of pitfalls, obstacles and barriers that daily distort the city's image without much subtlety' (Kuyken and Schmitt 2014: 1, translated from the French original by the author).

What makes the securitisation of the European Quarter special is that protective measures were not only architecturally normalised into the shape of its buildings and streets to change the everyday material outlook of the area, but additionally could be stepped up even further in times of heightened security demands: Thus, during European Council meetings, the sensitive parts of the European Quarter were

automatically sealed off from the rest of the city to establish a security perimeter. This includes limiting the access to the Schuman metro station, diverting the routes of six bus lines, and closing off the Rue de la Loi where the EU buildings are located with retractable barriers and police guards to prevent unauthorised trespassing. Yet, it was not only highly symbolic sites, such as Brussels' Grand Place and its European Quarter, which were deemed worthy of special protection, but sites of heightened structural importance for the functioning of the city were also deemed vulnerable. Hence, since 2011, sites recognised as critical infrastructures which extended to sectors, such as transport, energy, finances, trading platforms, communication and digital infrastructure, health as well as drinking water were securitised (Moniteur Belge 2011). Depending on the respective sector, different agencies were charged to conduct a risk analysis together with the National Crisis Centre and the "Organe de Coordination pour l' Analyse de la Menace" (Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis; OCAM) and develop suitable solutions to prevent and mitigate the anticipated risks, including a potential terrorist attack. The direct response to the only local attack during this period, that happened in 2014 at the Jewish Museum, was following this logic very site-specific. However, unlike other Jewish institutions which had already enjoyed a higher level of security thanks to their declaration as vulnerable by the OCAM, the measures at the museum were only adjusted after the attack happened there (Hennuy 2015). The newly developed security concept included a more sophisticated surveillance system, metal detectors, and a security lock system. In addition, two police officers were posted in front of its entrance (Rans 2014). Besides these measures with a direct reference to terrorist violence, there were also plenty of policy initiatives to elevate the general level of security of public sites in the Belgian capital. While their introduction was foremostly justified by a more effective prosecution of crime and public delinquency, the often-times technology-driven measures nonetheless implicitly contributed to Brussels' response to remote attacks of terrorist violence. In concrete terms, large investments were made to monitor the city's public sites with CCTV since 2003 (De Keersmaecker and Debailleul 2016: 2; Dessouroux et al. 2009). The cameras' specific placement followed the logic of so-called 'hot spots […] whose definition depends on the typology and population composition, as well as data on criminality' (De Keersmaecker and Debailleul 2014: 127). Over the years, the number of CCTV devices grew significantly, and thus by 2013, almost 900 cameras monitored public sites in Brussels (De Keersmaecker and Debailleul 2014: 72). Yet, the STIB continued to be their prime operator with around 1,800 devices in use (STIB 2013).

At the same time, as violent jihadist ideologies became to be identified as the main source of terrorist violence – which I will discuss in more depth in the section on suspicious people in this chapter – mosques, and other Muslim places of worship, Islamic community centres as well as Koranic schools became recognised as potentially dangerous because they were deemed to be sites where potential terrorist perpetrators would get radicalised. This was reflected in Belgium's initial counterterrorist strategy but also in the fact that the establishment of new Islamic places of worship became a contentious issue: Even in Brussels' communes with a large percentage of inhabitants practising Islam, it was difficult for community leaders to establish new mosques, because the respective authorities were

concerned of public backlash (Torrekens 2009: 173). To manage the potential dangerousness of sites linked to Islam, the OCAM but also local police forces paid special attention to them.

All in all, mapping suspicious sites in Brussels between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 shows that the securitisation of suspicious sites was taken more seriously compared to the previous phase, especially when it comes to the protection of vulnerable sites. As the only local attack in Brussels during this phase happened merely in 2014, and triggered a very site-specific response, most of the taken measures were largely pre-emptive in nature, as attack scenarios travelled as imaginaries of future terrorist violence to the Belgian capital. The translated material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites led to a securitisation of urban sites with a heightened symbolic and structural relevance, such as Grand Place and Quartier Léopold but also more generic locations of critical infrastructure in the city. The measures of control implemented for their protection ranged from temporary to permanent solutions and included physical and technology-based fortification. The securitisation of potentially dangerous urban sites was still quite unspecific but nonetheless discriminatorily directed particularly against mosques and other Islamic institutions which were deemed sites of potential radicalisation and terrorist recruitment, and therefore targeted with special control from law enforcement agencies.

6.3.1.3 Suspicious sites since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious sites during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology of Brussels demonstrates that since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 all sites of human interaction in urban everyday life have become securitised as potential targets of an attack in Brussels, while at the same time, specific geographical areas of the city were declared as especially suspicious, in the sense of being the potentially dangerous home bases of terrorist perpetrators. This remarkable expansion of suspicious sites was to some extent triggered by the local attacks that happened in Brussels during this period, but remote experiences of terrorist violence were even more important reference points for this shift.

Compared to the previously limited attention paid to Brussels in (counter)terrorist terms, the Belgian capital has taken the centre stage since the European peak of attacks in this context. The foundation of Brussels' infamous reputation as Europe's terrorism capital was however not laid in the city itself but in Paris in November 2015 (Renard 2016b: 4). The French capital had already seen a series of coordinated terrorist assaults in January 2015 which became mainly known for the shooting at the headquarter of the satirical magazine "Charlie Hebdo", but also took place at a Jewish supermarket (Fenech and Pietrasanta 2016: 32). While the attacks in January 2015 had no link to Brussels, the Paris attacks committed on 13 November 2015 were planned and orchestrated from the Belgian capital (McDonnell and Zavis 2015). The terrorist assault consisted of a series of incidents, and hence took place at several attack locations. These included the "Stade de France" in Saint-Denis, which was filled with 80,000 football fans watching a match between France and Germany (BBC News 2015b) and restaurants, cafés, and bars in the 10th and the 11th arrondissement, busy with Parisian nightlife (Cruickshank 2017). The attack's deadliest episode happened at the "Bataclan", a theatre and concert venue, which hosted a gig by an American metal band that night (BBC News 2015c). The attacks were

carried out with some IEDs but mostly firearms and cost the lives of 130 people, another 416 were injured (Cruickshank 2017). Their political significance was tremendous in France (Chow and Kostov 2015; Serhan 2017), but the attacks had also considerable consequences especially in the Belgian capital, as the place where the attacks were planned and orchestrated from. Brussels was yet not only affected indirectly by what happened in Paris but also had its own local encounters with terrorist violence. The most traumatic experience which became known as the 'Brussels bombings' (Follain et al. 2016) took place on 22 March 2016 and was committed by the same terrorist cell like the Paris attacks. Again, the incident consisted of an orchestrated series of events, unfolding at two separate locations. The first assault was carried in the departure hall of Brussels' international airport Zaventem, where attackers exploded three IED filled suitcases, while pretending to wait in a check-in line. The explosion killed, besides the attackers, 13 victims (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 22; BBC News 2016c). The second assault took place at the metro station Maelbeek in Brussels' European Quarter, where an attacker denotated his IED inside a train on its way to the next station Arts-Loi (Cruickshank 2017). It killed 20 people, including the assailant, and injured over 300, while its economic damage amounted to 4.47 billion Euros (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 22). Since then, there were three more terrorist assaults in the Belgian capital. The first happened on 5 October 2016 in Schaerbeek, at the busy Boulevard Lambermont, where an assailant attacked two police officers with a machete who had stopped him for an identity check (Rankin 2016). The second attack occurred on 20 June 2017 at Brussels Central Station where a perpetrator placed a luggage trolley loaded with IEDs (Boffey 2017). Their explosive force was limited, as thanks to a failed first detonation the area was already cleared, when the bomb went off a second time (BBC News 2017b). The third attack happened in Brussels' historical city-centre, on the Boulevard Émile Jacqmain, close to Grand Place: On 25 August 2017, an assailant attacked two soldiers who were on patrol in Brussels' pedestrian zone with a machete-style knife (Blenkinsop 2017).

Given this long list of terrorist incidents committed in and from Brussels, the new attention paid to suspicious sites in the Belgian capital came not by surprise: The attacks stirred a lot of international backlash for counterterrorism failures, in the sense that '"Belgium-bashing" became a global trend' (Renard 2016b: 4): Brussels as the main target location in Belgium but also the home to the terrorist cell which committed the attacks in November 2015 in Paris and in March 2016 in the Belgian capital was at the centre of this negative attention (Lasoen 2020: 1291–1292). However, the securitisation of suspicious sites intensified already prior to these events in the aftermath of the remotely experienced assaults in Paris in January 2015, although this attack had no direct link to Brussels. In a pre-emptive response, the Belgian Interior Ministry deployed in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence military patrols to protect sites in Brussels which were deemed 'sensitive to the threat of terrorist violence' (Belgian Ministry of Defence 2021, translated from the French original by the author) in the "Operation Homeland" which was later on renamed to its current label "Operation Vigilant Guardian" (Lasoen 2017c). The measure constituted the first regular presence of soldiers in the Belgian capital since World War II whose patrols were directed at various sites, including tourist attractions, shopping centres, public

squares, places of worship, means of transportation but also schools, universities, and hospitals. The operation was intensified further in reaction to the attacks following in November 2015 in the French capital by swiftly increasing the number of deployed soldiers (RTBF 2016b). However, this was not the only response to them, as there was promising evidence that the attack had in fact been orchestrated from Brussels and its surviving perpetrators had fled to their home base in the Belgian capital (Lasoen 2017b: 928). To conduct a successful manhunt, but also to protect potential local targets, suspicious sites were securitised in an unprecedented way: From 21 to 25 November 2015, an exceptional security emergency was declared which put everyday life in the Belgian capital effectively under lockdown (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 21): Schools, shops, cultural venues, universities and restaurants were closed, concerts and sports events were cancelled. In the historic city-centre, military trucks were used to restrict movement and soldiers and police officers were an omnipresent sight, patrolling these sites and conducting stop and search practices and identity checks. While the city's public transport system was still running, every station could only be accessed from one single entrance. In general, inhabitants and visitors alike were asked to stay at home or if going outside was inevitable avoid crowded places, such as train stations, shopping centres, and sightseeing spots (Traynor 2015a).

Yet, the declaration of a security emergency in Brussels was not the only response to the attacks in Paris, as moreover the securitisation of potentially dangerous areas in Brussels began with the announcement of "Plan Molenbeek" which was later renamed and extended to "Plan Canal" (Seron and André 2016: 10). Its main objective was to closely monitor and control those neighbourhoods in Brussels where inhabitants were deemed particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and likely be terrorist suspects (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 23). The initial emphasis on Molenbeek stems from the Paris attacks' investigations which revealed that most of the perpetrators had lived there, and thus the commune became known as 'Europe's jihad central' (Traynor 2015b) and 'Molenbeekistan' (Boussois 2017: 174; Renard 2016b: 4). However, already early on, the spatial scope of the strategy was enlarged to include all in all eight of Brussels' communes, namely Anderlecht, Molenbeek, Koekelberg, Laeken, Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode, Schaerbeek, Vilvoorde and Forest, which are all located around the city's canal. Brussels-West, as the mainly responsible police force to implement the plan gained additional manpower to be able execute more identity controls on the streets, address checks in buildings, and allow for a closer surveillance of potentially suspicious people. In practice, this meant that in 2016 alone, '6,168 people were checked, of whom 277 were arrested. Within the framework of the fight against forgery and fraud in the home, 8,603 dwellings and 22,668 occupants were checked. In this context, 1,118 people did not live at the address they had given' (Police Brussels-West 2016: 13).

Given that already prior to the Brussels bombings in March 2016, suspicious sites had been heavily securitised in the Belgian capital, the attacks on its airport and public transport system did not change much with regards to the employed high level of control. Yet, in the assault's immediate aftermath, the city's metro system was shut down entirely. Its reopening was a slow process over weeks, with one single entrance open per station, armed guards inside trains and at the platforms, and only every

second stop of the system in service (RTBF 2016a). When the airport was reopened, there were additional temporary access controls installed: Before passengers could enter the airport building, they had to pass through a metal detector and their luggage was checked (BBC News 2016b).

All in all, mapping suspicious sites during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology reveals how their securitisation became considerably boosted in Brussels since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, compared to the previous phase in which their material-discursive meaning was restricted to sites which were considered vulnerable thanks to their symbolic and structural relevance for Brussels' everyday life. This understanding was extended, on the one hand, as within the logic of the Operation Vigilant Guardian and then a few months later the November lockdown in 2015, the material-discursive definition of suspicious sites included the city's public transport system, educational and cultural institutions, restaurants, and non-essential shops besides tourist attractions and critical infrastructure, and thus essentially all places of human interaction in urban everyday life were considered as vulnerable target locations of a potential terrorist attack in Brussels. What is furthermore noteworthy about this enormous increase of suspicious sites was its timing: Since Operation Vigilant Guardian and the November lockdown were implemented pre-emptively, and hence again *before* the major terrorist attack in the Belgian capital in March 2016, the attacks which happened in Paris in 2015 provided enough future imaginaries of a potential terrorist incident in the Belgian capital that its sites of urban everyday life became suspicious sites. On the other hand, thanks to Brussels' reputation as a host city for terrorist cells, suspiciousness in the sense of potential dangerousness was also extended to residential areas because they were marked as the living space and hide-aways of terrorist perpetrators as well as their supporters. The epicentre of this phenomenon was Molenbeek, but the definition was quickly extended to seven other communes surrounding the Brussels canal which were especially targeted by heightened measures of surveillance and control.

6.3.2 The transformation of suspicious objects in Brussels

As a second transformation of non-human bodies in Brussels, I shed light on the evolution of its suspicious objects. Since terrorist violence can be committed by instrumentalising all sorts of items, my analysis draws again a comparison between the category of classic weapons and mundane objects which are either turned into weapons or used to covertly place a weapon at a respective target location, such as vehicles, bags, suitcases, and trashcans. By mapping the transformation of which objects were attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness in Brussels, the Belgian capital turns out to be a remarkable case in this respect: Initially even classic weapons were treated as relatively harmless in Brussels, but over time the continuum shifted, leading to the securitisation of mundane urban objects as suspicious items. That the securitisation of classic weapons and mundane objects may have inherent repercussions on each other, like in the case of Brussels, has been overlooked so far in the academic literature dealing with suspicious objects in urban everyday life (Neyland 2008; Hoijtink 2017).

6.3.2.1 Suspicious objects before 9/11

Mapping suspicious objects in the Belgian capital before 9/11 reveals that the securitisation of material items – be it classic weapons or mundane objects of urban everyday life – was very rare in Brussels. Thus, although local and remote terrorist attacks during this phase provided imaginaries for how a wide range of objects could be used to commit terrorist violence, their material-discursive suspiciousness turned out to be neither elusive enough nor compatible to change local space in the Belgian capital.

When it comes to local attacks in Brussels before 9/11, the most important items to commit terrorist violence belonged in the category of classic weapons, meaning mainly explosives and firearms. Thus, in case of the IRA's targeted killings in 1979, two of them were committed with firearms and the third one, by placing an IED under a concert stage. Its explosive power was yet quite small which served as a clear 'manifestation they wanted to hit the [British Military] band, not any Belgians' (The New York Times 1979). This type of weaponry expands to the turf wars between the PKK and pro-Turkish groups, as the objects used to commit intercommunal terrorist violence were again foremostly classic weapons, including incendiary devices, and firearms. Finally, the CCC also used similar objects to commit their attacks, although their targets were non-human rather than human. To get their hands on these weapons, the group even committed several robberies in which they stole a large number of guns from a military inventory and several hundred kilograms of explosives from a quarry (Petermann 1991). Especially the explosives were used for acts of sabotage by turning them into smaller bombs and then covertly transporting to their assigned target locations. In these cases, vehicles as mundane objects were used to transport and hide IEDs, but other than that they played, especially when compared to the remote attack experiences in London, a less important role in Brussels' local terrorist incidents.

In response, although the local attacks of the IRA, the CCC, and the clashes between the PKK and Turkish nationalists demonstrated that terrorist violence was committed particularly by using classic weapon, these objects received however no special attention, as the policies to securitise potentially dangerous objects were lax in Brussels and Belgium in general. Hence, Belgium's legal basis for treating classic weapons, such as guns, explosives and combat knives, had essentially remained unchanged since 1933 and declared every weapon as freely obtainable that was not explicitly listed as forbidden or subject to an authorisation requirement (Duquet and van Alstein 2015: 8). Over the years, this list saw minor amendments as especially during the 1980s the regulations on certain types of firearms became more restrictive in reaction to organised crime but also the terrorist violence of the CCC (Duquet and van Alstein 2015: 7). However, overall Belgium's laissez-faire approach remained in place even when the international context changed quite substantively: In concrete terms, creating the Schengen zone incited the need for common rules on which weapons were to be treated as illegal or requiring authorisation (Eigel 1995). This resulted in the 1991 Firearms Directive which provided a common legal framework for the transfer, the acquisition, and the possession of weapons and ammunition within the European common market (Official Journal of the European Communities 1991). While the directive led to an amendment of Belgian weapon law in 1991, the implied changes were only minor, although there was

an obvious need for major reforms by then (Duquet and van Alstein 2015: 7). Belgium's relaxed approach turned particularly Brussels into a flourishing marketplace – even beyond its national borders – for acquiring classic weapons. Especially certain types of firearms which were elsewhere in Europe illegal could be bought with only minor or no restrictions in Brussels which earned the city the infamous reputation to be '"Europe's favourite gun shop" for criminals and terrorists' (Duquet 2016b: 54).

All in all, my analysis during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology in Brussels demonstrated that the securitisation of suspicious objects was limited before 9/11. What is particularly interesting about this finding is that this was not only the case for mundane objects – which arguably played a minor role, at least in the local attacks of terrorist violence in Brussels – but also for classic weapons, and hence for objects which are inherently associated with committing physical violence. Surely, there were some minor revisions in Belgium's weapon law over the years also in reaction to terrorist violence. But overall, Belgium's lax approach in restricting classic weapons resisted the internal pressures from local experiences of terrorist (and criminal) violence as well as external pressures to establish shared regulations within the common market. This situation made firearms, ammunition, and explosives easily accessible in Brussels in the phase before 9/11

6.3.2.2 Suspicious objects between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious objects during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 the securitisation of suspicious objects in Brussels and across Belgium intensified, especially when it comes to the problematisation of classic weapons. Yet, this shift followed also other rationales, and was thus only partially a response to attacks of terrorist violence at the time. In contrast, the securitisation of mundane objects remained limited, although the instrumentalization of ordinary items for terrorist purposes became more prominent, particularly in attack methodologies of remote incidents of violence.

Although 9/11 constitutes a turning point in terrorist warfare from an international and an urban perspective (Savitch 2003), things were different in Brussels where it took until 2014 before the first local terrorist attack of the 21st century happened. Thus, until then, terrorist methodologies aiming for a broadcast-able catastrophe came from elsewhere to the Belgian capital and with them a new understanding of what kind of objects were used to commit terrorist violence travelled to the city. In the methodology of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as well as in the incidents on European ground, classic weapons still played a central role, but mundane objects became more important in carrying out the assaults. Hence, the 9/11 attackers used tear gas and pepper sprays to overcome flight crews and resisting passengers. Furthermore, they used knives to stab the pilots of the hijacked planes (9/11 Commission 2004: 4–14; Kehaulani Goo and Eggen 2004). The most impactful weapons of the assailants were however the planes which they used to destroy the targeted buildings. In Madrid, the attackers used mundane backpacks to hiddenly place their IEDs inside the targeted commuter trains, just like in London in the 7/7 bombings. The Jewish Museum attack, as the only local incident of terrorist violence in Brussels during this phase was committed with classic weapons as well but mundane objects did also

play a role in it. Thus, the assailant approached the museum carrying two sports bags which contained a Kalashnikov rifle, a revolver, ammunition for both weapons, two cameras, and pieces of clothing, such as dark gloves, a black hood, and a gas mask (Almasy and Erdman 2014). The items played a major role during the attack's investigation, as the used weapons also led to another sentence against the person who acquired them. The accomplice's verdict declared him to be the attack's co-author because he did know about the assailant's radicalisation, and hence was deemed to be aware that the supplied weapons were going to be used for terrorist purposes (Rawlinson 2019). All in all, as terrorist targets became softer during this phase, this allowed for a greater prominence of mundane objects to commit them.

In response to this diversification of items used to perpetrate attacks, the securitisation of suspicious objects in Brussels intensified, but mainly with regards to the problematisation of classic weapons. Hence, Belgium's lax weapons law regulations were eventually fundamentally reformed in 2006. However, the rationale behind these changes were not merely counterterrorist intentions but more importantly to finally fulfil international requirements, since at the time, the Belgian laws did not only not meet the EU standard but also lagged behind the 2005 United Nations Firearm Protocol (UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2005). Unlike the previous incremental revisions, the new reform constituted a drastic policy change (Duquet 2016b: 55). Thus, since 2006, obtaining an official licence became the standard prerequisite for the possession of any classic weapon, and hence rendered items, such firearms, explosives, combat knives and ammunition, to be treated as suspicious. Furthermore, the principle of "good cause" was adopted which implied that the possession of firearms must always be justified and licences were generally not granted to applicants under certain conditions, including previous convictions and mental illness (Moniteur Belge 2006: 29865–29866). These changes placed Belgium 'among the group of countries that regard civilian firearm ownership as a restricted privilege rather than a basic, constitutionally protected right' (Duquet and van Alstein 2015: 8). The reform passed not without controversy, which resulted in another revision of the Belgian weapon law in 2008, but its legal essence remained intact (Duquet and van Alstein 2015: 7–8). Further steps, such as the adoption of a "Federal Action Plan against illicit Arms Trafficking" demonstrated that the issue surely gained importance on Belgium's political agenda (Duquet 2016b: 54). Whereas these developments therefore demonstrated a stricter securitisation of classic weapons, the securitisation of mundane objects remained still limited in Brussels. Although new international regulations led in some specialised areas, such as air traffic to the problematisation of liquids brought on board of planes and inside airport security zones, in general mundane objects remained largely harmless in Brussels during this phase (Hoijtink 2017).

All in all, mapping suspicious objects in Brussels between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 shows that their securitisation incrementally picked up. While suspicious objects had previously been rare in the Belgian capital, as not even classic weapons were considered per se as potentially dangerous, they were deemed suspicious during the second period of my analysis, and thus authorised access to them became limited to persons who were able to claim their harmlessness. The drivers behind the regulatory changes were however mostly the developing legal frameworks on the

international level which called for adjustments of the lax Belgian approach. Mundane objects, although they were featured prominently in the terrorist attacks committed elsewhere, remained largely harmless.

6.3.2.3 Suspicious objects since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious objects during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology of Brussels' local space reveals that since the European peak of terrorist violence in 2015/16 the securitisation of potentially dangerous objects clearly intensified: On the one hand, the range of items considered as suspicious widened, as besides classic weapons, mundane objects of urban everyday life also became attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness. On the other hand, counterterrorist ambitions became the primary rationale behind the problematisation of objects and managing them with measures of control. This transformation is linked to some extent to Brussels' local encounters with terrorist violence during this phase, but pre-emptive justifications of securitisation measures were also prominent.

Just like in the previous phase, classic weapons remained powerful tools for terrorist perpetrators, but mundane objects also played an important role. This was for instance reflected in the Paris attacks in November 2015. As the assault was planned in Brussels, many of the involved objects were obtained or manufactured in the Belgian capital. Thus, the attackers' three cars were hired in Belgium (Cruickshank 2017). One of them even contained a parking ticket that directly linked the vehicle to Molenbeek (Boffey et al. 2015). At the different attack sites in Paris, various objects were used to commit violence, mostly belonging into the category of classic weapons. At the Stade de France, the three perpetrators denotated shrapnel bombs which were attached to their bodies and hidden under oversized sports tricots. The weapons used at the targeted bars, restaurants, and the Bataclan theatre were mainly assault rifles (Duquet 2016b: 52). The following investigations asserted that these weapons were illegally obtained in Brussels (Duquet 2016a: 25). The bombing of Brussels' airport and metro station followed the traditional pattern of previous attacks on urban transportation systems. In the airport assault, the attackers used several big suitcases pretending to carry their luggage to transport their IEDs. These were based on TATP explosives which is easily manufactured based on mundane products and simultaneously difficult to detect (Jacoby 2016). Each suitcase contained around 15 kilograms of explosives and sharp metal objects to magnify their destructive power (Le Vif 2016). The attack in the metro station Maelbeek was also caused by a TATP based nail bomb, however, in this case its size of was much smaller. Hence, a sports bag was enough to carry it inside a metro train of Line five. While the airport bombs made the ceiling of the departure terminal collapse, the metro bomb exploded in a confined space closely packed with passengers which killed and wounded even more people than at the airport. This comparison demonstrates again how depending on the material conditions of the target space, a smaller bomb can sometimes yet be more destructive. Among the three attacks in Brussels that followed the March 2016 bombings, the attack in June 2017 at the Central station showed great resemblances in terms of attack methodology. Not only was the chosen target site a transportation hub, but the attacker also used a self-built bomb. The IED was made of a small incendiary device, shrapnel, and gas bottles. To secretly transport it inside the station, the perpetrator had put it inside a suitcase

which he moved around on a luggage trolley. The other two attacks were knife attacks, both executed with machete-style combat knives. Compared to the clearly pre-planned IED attacks, these two incidents appeared more spontaneous as carrying a knife requires less preparation than constructing a bomb. All in all, classic weapons such as firearms, explosives and combat knives were the preferred tools of terrorist assailants to perpetrate violence in the attacks committed in and from Brussels in 2015/16. However, particularly in the context of IEDs, the TATP explosives were made from mundane products, such as hair bleach and nail polish remover. In addition, mundane items, such as bags, suitcases and oversized clothing items, were used to secretly transport the bombs to their selected target location.

The European peak of attacks in 2015/16 incited a remarkable counterterrorist activism in the Belgian capital regarding the securitisation of suspicious objects, as many items transitioned from attributions of harmlessness to suspiciousness. This meant that not only classic weapons received counterterrorist attention, but also mundane items were treated with more scepticism and precaution. In terms of the former, the attacks in 2015/16 had demonstrated that the illicit possession and acquisition of classic weapons remained a problem in Brussels, despite the legal efforts to change this during the previous phase. Thus, police statistics still accounted for '1,303 cases of the illicit trade of firearms and almost 39,000 cases of illegal firearms possession' (Duquet 2016b: 54) between 2009 and 2015. To counter the illegal distribution of classic weapons more actively, Brussels' police forces adopted a rigorous raid regime. Thus, in response to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015, Belgian police forces conducted razzias in several of Brussels' communes, including Schaerbeek, Molenbeek, Vilvoorde, and Zaventem, which led to the confiscation of assault rifles, explosives, ammunition, and communications equipment (BBC News 2015a, 2016a). All these items were considered as evidence for the preparation of terrorist plots in Belgium and elsewhere. Further raids were conducted in the aftermath of the 2015 November attacks in Paris, during the period of the Brussels lockdown (Pamuk 2015). Besides these practical measures, additional legal provisions to tackle the illicit gun market were taken on the EU level (Official Journal of the European Union 2015; EU Commission 2015).

Apart from these efforts to maintain a stricter control over classic weapons, counterterrorist measures were also taken to securitise mundane objects. Their material-discursive definition in Brussels included ordinary items, such as bags, backpacks, suitcases, and oversized pieces of clothing, but also cars, public litterbins, and prepaid SIM cards. The securitisation of some of these objects were linked to the attack methodologies of local and remote encounters with terrorist violence at the time, while in others they were entirely pre-emptive. Emblematic for the former stands the securitisation of heavy vests, bags, backpacks, and suitcases which were used to secretly transport IEDs in the locally experienced attacks. This led to special precaution taken at big shopping malls in Brussels' city-centre which had been identified as potential attack targets (Le Point 2016). Additionally, soldiers deployed in the Operation Vigilant Guardian had the right to stop individuals and ask them to open their bag or suitcase, when the object or the person carrying it was considered suspicious (Belgian Ministry of Defence 2021). The terrorist violence committed at Zaventem with the help of suitcases led to a stricter

securitisation of passenger luggage. Temporarily, access controls were established even before passengers were allowed to enter the airport building (Buyck et al. 2017). While these measures were eventually lifted again in November 2016, the general security protocols at Zaventem were permanently updated. This adjustment included diverting passenger vehicles for drop-off and pick-up to a point further away from the terminal, employing more bomb-sniffing dogs, and cameras to recognise license plates across the airport's parking spaces (Buyck et al. 2017). This last security update was not limited to the premises of Brussels' airport, as in fact the Belgian government proposed in direct reaction to the recent peak of terrorist violence in and from Brussels the introduction of a general APNR system in the city (Seron and André 2016: 11). The increasing problematisation of vehicles was also reflected in declaring more and more space in the city's historical centre to car-free zones. This included for instance the Boulevard d'Anspach which used to be a traffic artery of Brussels. The respective changes were promoted to increase the general quality of life in the Belgian capital but also to protect pedestrians from being hit by a vehicle (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 2012). Another item which was securitised in Belgium in direct response to the attacks were prepaid SIM cards for cell phones. The evidence gathered about the terrorist cell responsible for the attacks in Paris and Brussels showed that the members of the network used phones with unregistered prepaid SIM cards to secretively communicate with each other. In reaction, the anonymity of prepaid cards for cell phones was lifted which implied that for the acquisition of any SIM card in Belgium the seller has become required to check the buyer's identity and register their personal details in correspondence with the number (Seron and André 2016: 11). An object which was securitised on largely pre-emptive grounds in Brussels were the trashcans in its metro system. Since they were made of metal, and hence not see-through, the bins became declared to be potentially dangerous during Brussels lockdown in November 2015 and were in consequence sealed (Fabre 2017). To inhibit a public litter problem, see-through bags were installed as a temporary replacement (Buyck et al. 2017). Eventually, although trashcans did not play a role in the local attack, the STIB finally replaced the metal trashcans with permanent see-through solutions (Fabre 2017).

To conclude, mapping suspicious objects during the last phase of my analysis shows that with the peak of terrorist violence committed in and from Brussels since 2015/16, the securitisation of suspicious objects expanded in two aspects: Firstly, the measures to securitise the previously recognised suspicious objects intensified: This led to a new focus on a stricter control of the illicit trade of classic weapons and the adoption of a rigorous raid regime, implemented by Brussels' police forces. Secondly, the number of suspicious items grew extensively since 2015/16, as mundane objects, including suitcases, heavy clothing, vehicles, SIM cards, and litterbins became also associated with potential dangerousness. While the counterterrorism measures regarding classic weapons were implemented nationwide in Belgium, the restrictions concerning mundane suspicious were locally focused on Brussels. Due to the heightened (counter)terrorist attention on the Belgian capital during this phase, many of the measures were justified under a direct reference to attacks committed in and from Brussels but some of them were also implemented by pointing to future imaginaries of terrorist violence. All in all, mapping suspicious

objects in the Belgian capital revealed how the material-discursive suspiciousness of items fundamentally changed from an initially very liberal approach even towards classic weapons to the problematisation of mundane objects of everyday life in less than twenty years.

6.3.3 The transformation of suspicious people in Brussels

Having analysed the transformation of suspicious sites and suspicious objects brings me to the securitisation of human bodies, in the sense of suspicious people. This category describes those individuals and groups who are deemed suspicious because they are assumed to have committed terrorist violence, have intentions to do so or to be open to radicalisation efforts of terrorist groups. Brussels is an especially interesting case in this respect, since it has been dubbed to be a stronghold of suspicious people by the international press. This infamous reputation has so far been hardly challenged from an academic perspective (Renard 2016b: 3; Boussois 2017). In mapping how material-discursive attributions of who is considered potentially dangerous transformed in the Belgian capital, my historiographic archaeology reveals that the securitisation of suspicious people significantly increased over the years, both in the number of people affected and the counterterrorist measures to control them.

6.3.3.1 Suspicious people before 9/11

Mapping suspicious people in Brussels before 9/11 reveals that a systematic securitisation of individuals and groups as potentially dangerous was rare during this period. As perpetrators of local attacks in the Belgian capital belonged to various societal, ethnic, and religious groups and oftentimes committed their violence in the contexts of external conflicts, they received little counterterrorist attention from the Belgian authorities because the threat of terrorist violence was externalised as a foreign problem in most cases. An exception to this rule were the members of the CCC, as the only locally active terrorist group within this period that was considered genuinely *Belgian,* and therefore triggered a targeted response.

Despite their international linkages to German and French groups, the CCC consisted of preliminary Belgian nationals, typically young men in their twenties and thirties (Vander Velpen 1988). The larger political context of the CCC's violence was their disagreement with the NATO Double-Track decision which was generally unpopular among the Belgian public (Petermann 1991). Using this bone of contention, their attacks aimed at gaining wide-ranging popular support for their communist ideology and motivating the working class's revolutionist potential. Avoiding human victims was within this strategy a key element, as the CCC's leading figures feared to otherwise lose credibility (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 191). As a genuinely Belgian group with terrorist intentions, their local attacks called for a direct response from Belgian authorities. However, the lacking previous experiences with countering terrorist violence left the Belgian security apparatus initially unprepared for this task: Thus, there was no specialised agency dealing with counterterrorism issues until in October 1984 the "Groupe Interforces Anti-Terrorisme" (Mixed Anti-Terrorism Group; GIA) was founded. This underlines how in contrast to other sources of terrorist violence, the CCC was taken more seriously (OCAM 2021). The GIA's initial mission called "Operation Mammut" tackled specifically the leftist circles in Brussels (Vander Velpen 1988): 750 police officers raided and searched more than 120 flats and houses to find

the people responsible for the CCC's attacks (Petermann 1991). Although the operation was considerable in size, it was largely ineffective (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 200). Nevertheless, ultimately the entire leftist scene in Brussels was put under general suspicion by the operation based on their political beliefs but without distinctive evidence against them. Over time, the approach of the GIA professionalised and proofed eventually effective in arresting the CCC's leadership in December 1985. In the aftermath to their detainment, more CCC supporters as well as pieces of evidence, such as weapons, ammunition, and attack plans, were seized, leading to the group's abolition as an active terrorist cell (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 206). Hence, although the (counter)terrorist activity in the context of the CCC confronted the leftist community in Brussels (and elsewhere in Belgium) with a generalised sense of suspicion, this period ended abruptly with the arrest of the CCC's leading figures, and Brussels' counterterrorist actors reverting to inactivity without upholding explicitly restrictive or repressive practices against people with leftist political beliefs in Brussels (Lasoen 2017a: 471).

In contrast to the terrorist violence of the CCC, other local attacks in Brussels were systematically externalised as violent instances of "foreign" conflicts: While the police and security services investigated the incidents thoroughly, the origin of the conflicts at hand – and hence also their solution – were considered to lie elsewhere, and therefore there was only little public pressure on Belgian managers of suspiciousness to come up with a comprehensive counterterrorist response (The New York Times 1979; Uslu and Aytac 2007). One case of externalising the threat of terrorist violence was the IRA's campaign of targeted killings in 1979 in Brussels which aimed to demonstrate that representatives of British executive authorities were ultimately nowhere safe from the IRA's violence (Dingley 2012: 114–117). Thus, the UK's deputy chief at NATO and hence the highest British representative at one of Brussels' main international institutions was among the selected targets (The New York Times 1979). Since ultimately neither the perpetrators of violence nor their victims were Belgian citizens and the attacks appeared therefore not to be a Belgian problem, the counterterrorist response to them was limited and did not lead to a systematic securitisation of Irish or British people in Brussels. In a similar vein, the fault lines of the conflict about Kurdish independence were considered to largely remain within the respective diaspora communities (Uslu and Aytac 2007), since the terrorist violence of Kurdish PKK supporters on the one hand and Turkish nationalists on the other hand was directed specifically against the antagonist group (Cagaptay 2007; Matthijs and Zahid 2013: 2). Moreover, violent clashes between the PKK and Turkish government supporters happened in many European countries at the time and were in this sense again not deemed a problem that Belgian security authorities could solve (Council on Foreign Relations 2021). Besides these groups which actively committed terrorist violence in Brussels before 9/11 for various ideological reasons, Belgium was also already at the time known to be a transit country for recruits of jihadist terrorism meaning that Brussels 'has been grappling with the nexus of foreign fighter recruitment and terrorism for more than a generation' (van Ostaeyen 2016: 7). Political events such as the Algerian Civil War, the first Afghanistan War and the Balkan Wars provided the breeding ground for radicalisation, especially among people sharing ancestral bonds with the affected

communities. Support in Brussels was particularly high for the "Groupe Islamique Armé" (Armed Islamic Group) whose connections to the Belgian capital, provided the group not only with weapons, funding, and logistics but also with fresh manpower, as Belgian volunteers joined them in their fight (Matthijs and Zahid 2013: 3; Boussois 2017: 174).

Around the same time during the 1990s, Belgian authorities enforced clearer rules of population management which were at least indirectly linked to these externalised sources of terrorist violence. At the centre of this process was a comprehensive reform of Belgian citizenship law to get a better grip of the whereabouts and identities of Belgium's residents and citizens. This included on the one hand more rigid rules on how to register in Belgium for nationals and foreigners alike (Moniteur Belge 1991). On the other hand, descendants from former colonies, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, together with a considerable number of people with Moroccan and Turkish ancestry who had come as workers to Belgium between the 1960s and 1980s were granted Belgian citizenship during the early 1990s (Kanmaz 2002: 99–100; Raedt 2004: 14–15). The efforts to naturalise especially second and third generation descendants of immigrants were aimed at better integrating them in Belgian society. Thus, although this was not explicitly proclaimed a counterterrorist measure, it provided grounds to delink foreign nationals, such as Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, from committing terrorist violence on Belgian territory in the context of external conflicts when respective immigrants eventually embraced their new Belgian identity fully. The change of policies – and especially the naturalisation of previously foreign nationals as Belgian citizens – was of course not uncontested. In fact, right-wing parties were very successful during the 1990s with xenophobic paroles against foreigners – especially against those who (were) identified as Muslim – and contributed to their ghettoization in socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods of Brussels (Manço and Kanmaz 2005: 1107). Yet, their discrimination was based on welfare chauvinism rather the fear of terrorist violence.

All in all, mapping suspicious people in Brussels during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that although several groups committed terrorist violence in the Belgian capital for various ideological reasons, they were not systematically confronted with counterterrorist violence and socio-political discrimination. While people following a leftist political ideology were shortly faced with generalised terrorist suspicions in response to the CCC's attack campaign in Brussels, the respective measures of control were all in all limited, and thus do not constitute an instance of a continuous systematic association of this heterogeneous group of people with potential dangerousness. An even more noteworthy finding of this phase is that other sources of terrorist violence in Brussels were systematically externalised as a problem to be solved elsewhere but without creating a generalised sense of terrorist suspicions against such "foreigners". On the contrary, especially the liberal approach towards naturalising people of foreign origin who had lived for generations in Belgium demonstrated that these groups were not treated with systematic suspicion but rather with the openness to accept them as Belgian citizens. As both nationals and foreigners were deemed overall harmless in Brussels, suspicious people were ultimately rare at the time and their securitisation remained consequently limited.

6.3.3.2 Suspicious people between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious people in Brussels during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that as radical jihadism became dominantly constructed as the most dangerous ideology to motivate terrorist violence after 9/11, members of Brussels' Muslim communities and people identified as such became increasingly singled out as terrorist suspects. While in the case of the Madrid attacks, there were some loose links to radical networks in the Belgian capital, the generalised problematisation of Muslims happened on largely pre-emptive grounds, before in 2014 the first local attack claimed by ISIL happened at Brussels' Jewish Museum. While people were stigmatised on basis of their (assumed) religious affiliation, the implemented efforts of control proved discriminatory but at the same time highly inefficient to inhibit actual radicalisation practices of extremist groups in Brussels.

Initially, the securitisation of Brussels' Muslim communities as suspicious people was a pre-emptive reaction to remote experiences of terrorist violence. Thus, the 9/11 attacks advanced to be a virulent first wake-up call to securitise people who were deemed to be terrorist suspects, especially since investigations about al-Qaeda showed that some of its members 'were residents of the Brussels district of Molenbeek' (van Ostaeyen 2016: 7) and seemingly busy in recruiting young volunteers in the Belgian capital (Boussois 2017: 174). Therefore, Belgium's security authorities drafted the country's first counterterrorism strategy in 2002. The telling name of this seminal document was "Plan M" – M standing for mosques. While the content of the original document 'was meticulously kept secret' (OCAM 2016: 3), its authors made yet a statement in its title about where they perceived the terrorist threat to come from: Islamic places of worship. Furthermore, terrorism was recognised as a criminal offence in the "Terrorist Offences Act" (Moniteur Belge 2003; Elnakhala 2021) of 2003. Although the law foresaw a safeguard to protect organisations pursuing political, philanthropic, economic, and religious objectives, especially the latter were increasingly targeted with suspicion, as they were considered radicalisation hotspots for terrorist recruits (van der Vet and Coolseat 2018: 2). This had also to do with the investigations in the Madrid train bombings which showed loose links to the Belgian capital: The principal terrorist cell accused of the attacks was the "Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain" (van Vlierden 2015). Its former head, a Moroccan national, had lived for several years in Molenbeek and thus the Madrid train bombings were thought to be partially planned from the Belgian capital (Struck 2007). Brussels' reputation as a host city for terrorist suspects was furthermore indebted to radical indoctrination and recruitment efforts which flourished after 9/11 in at least three different networks, namely "Sharia4Belgium", "Resto du Tawhid", and the "Zerkani Network". Their tactics and audience were all fairly similar: Especially young, male members of Brussels' Muslim communities were lured into their radicalised circles, particularly in socio-economically deprived parts of the city by offering materialistic benefits, such as food and money, but also more ideational values, such as a sense of belonging and the prospect of a heroic future (van Ostaeyen 2016: 8–10).

This was also closely linked to the rise of ISIL, which arguably 'represents a new era of international jihad' (Withnall 2014) because of ISIL's decidedly territorial orientation (Jabareen 2015).

While the group had existed since 1999, it gained global recognition in 2014 thanks to its military successes in the Middle East (Rich 2016: 777–778). The main territorial conquests of ISIL were in Syria and Iraq, but the declaration of a 'worldwide caliphate' (Jabareen 2015: 53) in strategically placed propaganda, motivated radicalised individuals all over the world to leave their homes and join ISIL's fight – not only in the Middle East but also in Europe, Southeast and Central Asia as well as North America (Orozobekova 2016; Noonan and Khalil 2014; Klausen 2015). An epicentre of this development was Belgium: 'With at least 451 [so-called] foreign fighters who have travelled or attempted to travel to Syria and Iraq Belgium has the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of all Western countries' (van Ostaeyen 2016: 7). The root cause for this was yet not the higher number of radicalised individuals in Belgium but rather the existing terrorist networks in Brussels. In facilitating logistics for those willing to fight for ISIL in Iraq and Syria (Robertson and Cruickshank 2015), these networks served as a 'Syrian Terror Factory' (van Ostaeyen 2016: 10). Yet, initially 'local authorities were relatively pleased to see young troublemakers and petty criminals leaving, since their departure led to a significant decrease in local crime rates' (Renard and Coolseat 2018: 23). Things changed however rapidly when ISIL started its European campaign which was carried out by so-called foreign fighters who returned to their home countries. In Europe, ISIL's tactics followed classic objectives of transnational terrorism in producing media effective violence against civilians (van Ostaeyen 2016: 11). The first attack of this type was the Jewish Museum attack in Brussels, as its assailant was a recent returnee from ISIL's battlefields in Syria (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 21).

In response to Brussels' exposed role as a hotspot for radicalisation rather than for local attacks of terrorist violence, Belgium's counterterrorism strategy was already in 2004 updated from Plan M to the "Action Plan against Radicalism" or "Plan R". The renaming of the document was however not incited by the realisation that its previous title was stigmatising but rather to 'elaborate a strategic note concentrating on specific drivers of radicalisation and on preventive, proactive and reactive measures' (OCAM 2016: 6). Its practical implementation was in spite of this new focus quite ambiguous: On the one hand, the approach towards the known radicalised networks was rather lax, as it was based on an 'unconditional belief' (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016: 26) in the Belgian judicial system. This was for instance in the case of Sharia4Belgium and the Zerkani Network largely ineffective as most of their members had already left Belgium by the time their court trials began, and hence they could ultimately only be convicted in absentia (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016: 26–27). On the other hand, despite this allegedly great trust in the penal system, the executive power of Belgian police forces was considerably extended to the disadvantage of the powers of the judiciary (Paye 2008). In concrete terms, this meant that the newly introduced counterterrorism laws in Belgium allowed the police to proactively use exceptional investigation techniques, including house raids, interception of mail as well as visual and audio monitoring of terrorist suspects without the requirement to consult a judge on their legitimacy (Paye 2008: 156). Another measure taken to identify and prosecute suspicious people in Brussels was community policing which was officially adopted in 2003 (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 21). It foresaw

a stronger integration of police forces in civil society to establish a sense of partnership, enable better accountability, and empower citizens to actively participate in mitigating insecurities (Smeets and Tange 2009: 132–133). Yet, other than in London, where community policing was used to engage specifically with the Muslim suspect community, the Belgian police acted within the geographical perimeters of oftentimes heterogenous neighbourhoods (Smeets and Tange 2009: 135–136).

Despite this more general focus of Belgian community policing, the primary addressees of these new counterterrorist policies were people who (were) identified as Muslim. Their stigmatisation hence picked up on already existing welfare chauvinist stereotypes against Muslims (Manço and Kanmaz 2005: 1107). While there were also some examples of a more positive engagement between the local authorities and Muslim communities (Manço and Kanmaz 2005), the general tendency accounted for an increase of Islamophobic sentiments in Brussels: In concrete terms, this meant not only that the socio-economic deprivation of immigrant communities was subscribed to their unwillingness to "properly integrate" thanks to their alleged cultural backwardness but also that Muslims were constructed as aggressive and a threat to societal peace (Zemni 2011; Fekete 2004). These experiences of discrimination, repression, and spreading Islamophobia contributed not only to social exclusion but also further polarisation: A psychological study in Brussels showed that 'personal experiences of unfair and hostile treatment due to religious background significantly increased the degree to which the Turkish and Moroccan second generation identified with their Muslim in-group' (Fleischmann et al. 2011: 643). The attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, as the only local attack during this analytical phase triggered special attention for so-called foreign fighters: It resulted in the constitution of the "Task Force Syria" which was established to closely monitor the movements of individuals who left from Belgium to Syria to join its civil war (Conseil des ministres 2014; La Task Force Syrie 2014).

All in all, the second phase of mapping suspicious people in the Belgian capital shows how members of Brussels' Muslim communities were increasingly securitised in the period between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, besides the fact that until 2014 terrorist violence motivated by jihadist ideologies was locally absent from the city. This observation illustrates that the question of who was considered potentially dangerous in Brussels was not answered based on terrorist attacks committed directly in the Belgian capital but elsewhere, although in some of these remote experiences of violence linkages to Brussels could be established, especially to its growing number of jihadist networks. The material-discursive attribution of suspiciousness was thus in the case of Brussels foremostly community-based, as the violent radicalisation of terrorist suspects was systematically conflated with stigmatising stereotypes about religious practices and Islamic places of worships in Brussels, promoted by the OCAM, local planning authorities, media outlets alike. The outcomes of this securitisation of suspicious people were ambiguous: While court proceedings against known terrorist networks remained largely ineffective, many members of the suspect community were confronted with discriminatory police practices and experiences of Islamophobia in their public and private lives.

6.3.3.3 Suspicious people since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

The final mapping of suspicious people in Brussels shows that the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 initiated a massive boost of counterterrorist measures to securitise them. Since based on who was responsible for the attacks committed in and from Brussels, the previously built-up stereotypes against Muslims appeared to be confirmed, there was no fundamental shift regarding community-based indicators but instead their repression and stigmatisation became more systematic and severe thanks to Brussels' infamous reputation as the European capital of jihadist terrorism (Boussois 2017).

As already foreshadowed during the last years of the previous phase, ISIL's propaganda of a global caliphate appeared to resonate particularly well with the pre-existing networks of radicalised jihadism in Brussels, in terms of attracting individuals to join ISIL on its Middle Eastern battlefields as well as in bringing terrorist violence back to their home countries as returnees. While ISIL aimed to gain male and female supporters for realising their territorial objectives of state building, the attacks of their terrorist campaign in Europe were mainly led by men, aged in their twenties and thirties. Many of them had a history of previously committing criminal offences before perpetrating terrorist violence. The orchestrated attacks in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 laid at the heart of ISIL's European campaign. Both attacks were not only committed in the name of ISIL but also planned and perpetrated by the same cell wielded mainly from Molenbeek, where ISIL supporters operated several safe houses for returnees and their own bomb factory (Boussois 2017: 174; van Ostaeyen 2016: 11). The group which became known as the 'Brussels ISIL Cell' (Paravicini 2016) consisted of presumably more than 20 members, some of them active as perpetrators, while others filled out supportive roles or were meant to execute future assault plans. In terms of their nationalities, the majority of the Brussels' ISIL cell were Belgian or French. Although some had Northern African, oftentimes Moroccan roots, they grew up, and lived in France or Belgium for most of their lives. Many were socialised in ethnically heterogenous but socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods, such as Molenbeek, Schaerbeek and Saint-Josse in Brussels. Yet, there has been no evidence that any of the perpetrators lived a particularly religious life: Although ISIL put forward a rigid regime of a pious lifestyle based on sharia law, according to testimonies of friends and family members, none of the members of the Brussels ISIL cell followed it. Instead, the terrorist perpetrators 'were the same as all young people: they liked football, going clubbing, coming back with girls' (BBC News 2016e). Hence, a strict understanding of religion was apparently not their guiding motive for committing violence (cf. Pearson and Winterbotham 2017). The perpetrators of the three smaller attacks which followed the Brussels bombing acted all independently from a bigger terrorist organisation. The assailants in all three instances were either Belgian nationals or residents with an unlimited right to stay in Belgium, with a previous history of criminal offences and mental illness. Although their acts of violence were later claimed by ISIL, the investigations about them revealed only loose links to extremist groups, marking their perpetrators as potentially self-radicalised lone wolf assailants without openly promoted motives for their acts of violence (Emmott and Blenkinsop 2017; Rankin 2017; McCleary et al. 2017).

In response, the pace of securitising suspicious people picked up considerably since 2015/16. However, the first trigger for adopting new measures against individuals marked as potentially dangerous during this phase were the remote attacks in Paris in January 2015. In their aftermath, the Belgian government announced an action plan which entailed several measures to deal especially with the threat of so-called foreign fighters (Seron and André 2016: 11–12). Travelling abroad for terrorist purposes as well as offering and receiving terrorist training were turned into criminal offences (Renard and Coolseat 2018: 25). Furthermore, due to their personal history of joining a terrorist organisation elsewhere, potential foreign fighters and returnees were deemed "confirmed" radicals and hence they were considered *automatically* dangerous, implying that Belgian counterterrorist laws allowed to treat them with harsh restrictions of their personal freedoms. Thus, passports and identity cards of persons under the suspicion to leave the country with such intentions can be legally withdrawn on a temporary basis without prior juridical review. When in prison as a returnee, the new legal framework allows for solitary confinement when a continuation of the propagandist activity of radicalised detainees is suspected (Renard and Coolseat 2018: 30). Moreover, those among the so-called foreign fighters with dual citizenship were systematically foreignized by Belgium through retreating their Belgian citizenship and expelling them from the country. Civil rights groups heavily criticised these measures because they 'could create perceptions of a tier of "second-class" citizens based on their ethnicity and religion' (Human Rights Watch 2016: 5). While counterterrorist measures targeting potentially dangerous individuals had hence already picked up, this development further accelerated with the attacks in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016, when it turned out that these incidents were essentially orchestrated from Brussels. In response, the Belgian government proposed additional measures including the formation of a database on so-called foreign fighters as well as the systematic surveillance and detention of returnees (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 23; Seron and André 2016: 11).

In addition, the local impression of terrorist immediacy in Brussels led to another boost of Belgian police forces in their executive powers to securitise suspicious people in Brussels. In concrete terms, this meant legal amendments regarding the time frame for house searches and arrests as well as the maximum duration of detention for suspects (Seron and André 2016: 11). The new competencies aimed to facilitate the work of the police which engaged in 'several hundred raids, detentions and stops and searches' (Human Rights Watch 2016) in the Belgian capital after the Paris attacks in November 2015 during Brussels' concurrent lockdown as well as around the attacks in March 2016. These police raids occasionally ended deadly for both the police officers in charge and the involved terrorist suspects, such as for instance during a major operation in the Brussels commune Forest which eventually turned into a 'fatal shootout' (Breeden and Freytas-Tamura 2016). Yet, in many other cases reported for instance by Human Rights Watch, the police officers showed violent behaviour – 'including beatings or other excessive use of force' (Human Rights Watch 2016: 8) – towards potential terrorist suspects although these did not show any signs of physical resistance. In an extreme case, a potential suspect was hit by a police officer with an assault rifle, while the man was holding his baby. These acts of

counterterrorist violence had reportedly an apparent discriminatory dimension, as in almost all documented cases of police brutality, the victims were 'Muslim, all but one of North African descent' (Human Rights Watch 2016: 8). Additional to physical abuse, there were also instances of verbal violence such as the shouting of 'ethnic or religious slurs' (Human Rights Watch 2016: 3). Those instances of counterterrorist violence were however not the only aspect of Belgium's response to the attacks in and from Brussels which implied religious stereotyping and racialised discrimination. Thus, in another updated version of Belgium's Plan R published in 2016, three of six newly established working groups – namely 'Hate Preachers', 'Asylum and Migration', and 'Mosques' (OCAM 2016: 8) linked terrorist suspicions to certain minority groups. Furthermore, counterterrorist measures were openly directed at religious issues, namely the 'dismantling of unrecognised places of worship which propagate jihadism' (Seron and André 2016: 11) and a firmer prosecution of so-called 'hate preachers' who were either put under house arrest, detained, or even expelled (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 23). The impacts of securitising suspicious people in Brussels were particularly prominent in the eight communes covered within the Plan Canal from 2016 which marked all people living in this area as potentially dangerous. Thus, according to one testimony reported by Human Rights Watch, 'these days it is not easy to be Arab, Muslim and living in Molenbeek' (Human Rights Watch 2016: 4). Although the plan was deemed to constitute a multidisciplinary approach towards countering terrorism, it has ultimately prioritised a firmer presence of the police and stronger monitoring of the addressed neighbourhoods: More than one thousand non-profit organisations and businesses including 'mosques, sports clubs and Koranic schools' (Lemeunier 2016: 46) were subject to security scrutiny in Molenbeek alone. Overall, these securitisation measures and practices of control reflect a quite distinctive material-discursive understanding of which human bodies counted as suspicious in Brussels since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, as they were loosely based on the profile of group of perpetrators known as the Brussels ISIL Cell, and hence based on local experience of terrorist violence in the Belgian and the French capital. However, by projecting their identity markers as generalised indicators of potential dangerousness, a heterogenous group of people has been stigmatised as suspicious. These material-discursive characteristics include being a practising Muslim, attending a mosque and other Islamic institutions, looking "Arab" and speaking Arabic, having a family background or even dual citizenship from a Northern African or Arab country, having travelled to a country of the Middle East, being a male between 20 and 40 years old, and being a resident of a commune located in the Brussels' canal area.

Besides these targeted operations to securitise a certain kind of suspicious people, there were also counterterrorism measures adopted which affected people living in Belgian capital generally. These included the military control executed by the Operation Vigilant Guardian and a remarkable increase in CCTV surveillance (De Keersmaecker and Debailleul 2016; RTBF 2016b). That Belgium's Federal Police also introduced a program instructing their officers on how to 'recognise any unusual or deviant behaviour on the basis of a wide range of characteristics' (Federal Police of Belgium 2019) indicates that the securitisation of suspicious people in Brussels might just like in London become less

community-oriented and instead more behaviour-based. By December 2019, more than 1,500 police officer had received this special training. However, which kind of behaviour counts according to the program as “unusual or deviant” has remained vague, and thus allowed, just like in the British capital, for the reproduction of discriminatory practices towards members of Brussels’ suspect community, as this example reported by Human Rights Watch shows: ‘One 16-year-old boy described being picked up by police and held for six hours soon after the Paris attacks because he was running down a street. He said he was running because he was late to meet a family member’ (Human Rights Watch 2016: 4).

To conclude this section, my analysis of the securitisation of suspicious people in Brussels shows that over the years, not only the number of people marked as suspicious increased but also the measures to control them intensified both in their discriminatory and violent extent. This development builds a stark contrast to the time before 9/11, when although the Belgian metropole had seen some attacks of terrorist violence, these did not lead to the systematic singling out of a certain group of people based on their assigned potential dangerousness and Belgian authorities even promoted a special openness towards residents with alien family roots to allow for their integration into Belgian society. Since 9/11, the existence of radicalised networks in Brussels and remote attack elsewhere had stirred the pre-emptive attention of the Belgian security apparatus towards its Muslim communities and people identified as such. With the peak of attacks since 2015/16, this group’s status of being the Belgian capital’s primary suspect community manifested and the repression and counterterrorist violence towards its members intensified. Although some measures, such as the deployment of military personnel as well as surveillance affected Brussels’ whole population, the focus lay clearly on a particular group of people sharing certain identity markers. Their systematic generalisation is very prominent in Brussels’ counterterrorist activism of recent years, and hence a heterogenous group of people has been confronted with stigmatisation and discriminatory practices. These involved cases of physical and verbal abuses from the law enforcement agencies but also systemic checks of institutions, businesses, and private homes because of their location in Brussels or their societal affiliation. The most drastic measures of control were used against returning so-called foreign fighters. These policies were largely enabled by the political sentiment of ‘penal populism’ (Seron and André 2016: 10) in Belgium that was stirred by worldwide accusations of Belgian failures in effectively countering radicalisation and extremism.

6.3.4 The transformation of managers of suspiciousness in Brussels

The final separate section of my historiographic archaeology of the securitisation of everyday life in Brussels deals with the transformation of (human) managers of suspiciousness. In my mapping, I distinguish between formal managers of suspiciousness who represent actors that were traditionally assigned with upholding security in the Westphalian state system, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness who became charged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities at their workplace and informal managers of suspiciousness who were encouraged to look out for signs of potential dangerousness in the context of their private lives. By mapping who has been charged with handling the threat of terrorist violence in the Belgian capital and how the responsibilities of managers of

suspiciousness transformed and expanded over time, my analysis adds value to the underexplored role of non-traditional managers of suspiciousness in the case of Brussels, as the existing literature focused mostly on the successes and failures of classic security institutions in Belgium and its capital (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a; Lasoen 2017a, 2020; Renard 2016a).

6.3.4.1 Managers of suspiciousness before 9/11

Mapping managers of suspiciousness during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology in Brussels shows that before 9/11, Belgium's security architecture was highly fragmented and at the same time, countering the threat of terrorist violence ranked only low on Brussels' priority list, since the threat of terrorist attacks was – as I analysed in the previous section – for the most part externalised and not seen as a Belgian problem. Therefore, despite some reform efforts to make the work of security services and law enforcement agencies in general more effective, countering terrorist violence in Brussels remained exclusively in the hands of formal managers of suspiciousness at the time.

The fragmentation of Brussels' classic security architecture was rooted in Belgium's traditionally strong emphasis of local and regional autonomy in all areas of its federal governance system, including the management of security and safety (Bauwens 2014: 346–347). The consequences of this system became especially apparent in respect to the country's police apparatus which consisted of three separate tiers, namely the Municipal Police, the National Gendarmerie, and the Judicial Police (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 20). Among them there was 'no clear, geographical or functional division of tasks […] ever set up' (Devroe and Ponsaers 2013: 80) which significantly inhibited an effective and accountable management of law enforcement tasks in Belgium and led not only to turfs wars between the police forces but also to severe failures and scandals, especially in the 1980s. The local element of policing was even further fragmented, as it was executed at the level of 589 municipalities, of which 19 were in the Brussels-Capital region, and varied considerably in size, budget, and personnel (Bauwens 2014: 348). Issues of fragmentation and an unclear division of responsibilities were however not limited to the Belgian police apparatus but also concerned Belgium's intelligence services, namely the domestic, called "Sûreté de l'Etat" (Domestic State Security) and the military, known as "Service Général du Renseignement et de la Securité" (General Information and Security Service) (Lasoen 2017a: 464). Their collaboration with the fragmented police forces as well as among each other was suboptimal in many areas, especially in terms of information-sharing, yet 'one field in particular hits the low-point – counterterrorism' (Lasoen 2017a: 469; see also: Matthijs 2008). While these cooperation problems were known in Belgium, they were initially not tackled, as the first local encounters with terrorist violence in Brussels in 1979 were committed by the IRA which was considered to be an external threat, and ironically the collaboration on this issue with foreign intelligence agencies was comparably better than among the different services within Belgium (Lasoen 2017b: 929).

This situation changed when the attack campaign of the CCC turned terrorism also into a worrisome *domestic* problem, and hence pushed counterterrorism efforts up on the political priority list within the Belgian security apparatus (Devroe and Ponsaers 2013: 77). However, since dealing with

terrorist violence had been neglected so widely until then and respective inter-institutional turf wars about competencies were continuously ongoing, the decision to set up the GIA was made. As an entirely new agency, it was meant to develop specialised expertise on how to best engage with the terrorism as a special kind of threat. To do so, the GIA drew on staff from all relevant police forces and both intelligence services (Lasoen 2017b: 932). While initially the GIA's investigation efforts against the CCC were harshly criticised, the agency eventually succeeded in capturing the CCC's leadership circle relatively quickly, and hence its establishment appeared to have paid off (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 206). However, as the domestic threat from the CCC was thus eased and subsequent local encounters with terrorist violence in Brussels were again externalised during the 1990s, the GIA had seemingly lost its purpose of existence and was consequently soon systematically side-lined by its institutional counterparts. In practice, this meant that information obtained by the Belgian police and intelligence services – even if explicitly concerning terrorism – was not shared with the agency (Lasoen 2017b: 932). As the capacity of the GIA to obtain the necessary information for effectively fulfilling its function was moreover limited due to constraints in staff and budget, the agency was ultimately marginalised only a few years after it was founded (Lasoen 2017a: 471). Besides the rise and fall of the GIA, another development, that was enabled partially in reaction to the severe public backlash earned due to the initial helplessness in countering the CCC's terrorist violence was a fundamental reform of the Belgian police apparatus (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 20). It was implemented in 1998 and replaced the previous structure by 'one integrated police service structured at two levels' (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 20) consisting of the Federal Police and the Local Police. Although there is still no official hierarchy between them, a clearer division of tasks aimed at fostering cooperation rather than conflict (Bauwens 2014: 349). The reform also significantly reduced the number of separate police forces from 598 to 195 police zones, of which six cover the 19 communes of Brussels. Despite some initial criticism, the reform has been lauded as a success, because it improved the communication of different police forces, although coordination issues continue to exist (Devroe and Ponsaers 2013: 86).

Besides the police and the intelligence services, there were also other actors involved in the local management of security in Brussels. Thus, the Regional Development Plan from 1995 as well as the federally initiated Contracts of Security and Society which were implemented at the level of Brussels' communes are examples for managing urban security by employing a multi-stakeholder approach. This included not only local and regional authorities but also urban planners and social workers in projects to prevent crime, school dropouts, and drug usage (Dessouroux et al. 2009; Cartuyvels 1996; Cartuyvels and Hebberecht 2001). Furthermore, Brussels introduced in 2001 its first 'Prevention and Safety Plan' (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 2021b) which aimed at the determent of crime and public misdemeanour. A central role in its implementation obtained prevention officers known as 'Guardians of Peace' (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 2021b) who monitor public spaces and intervene in problematic situations. Yet, although these measures had a general impact on urban security in the Belgian capital, they were not specifically directed towards counterterrorist aims.

All in all, mapping managers of suspiciousness shows that during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology merely formal managers of suspiciousness, such as the Belgian police forces, intelligence agencies and for a short time the GIA were charged with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Belgian capital. Yet, thanks to inter-institutional turf wars and fragmentation, their efforts remained defective and incoherent. This was directly linked to the limited attention that was paid to counterterrorist issues for the most part of this phase, as only the local attacks of the CCC triggered with the foundation of the GIA a short-lived response, while other sources of terrorist violence were externalised. Given the fact that even formal managers of suspiciousness were only marginally concerned with countering terrorist violence, it is unsurprising that neither semi-formal nor informal managers of suspiciousness were charged with counterterrorist responsibilities during this phase. Thus, albeit local and regional authorities in Brussels were concerned with a general understanding of urban security regarding the prevention of crime and public misdemeanour, they were not involved in decidedly counterterrorist activity. Business owners in Brussels also remained passive because even though they were targeted by the CCC's terrorist violence, the financial damages caused were marginal, and thus did not incline them to invest in the prevention of future attacks. The same goes for Brussels' population which was confronted only rarely with violent attacks, as these remained either within antagonised communities or were directed exclusively against material targets.

6.3.4.2 Managers of suspiciousness between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping managers of suspiciousness in the second phase of my analysis shows that although encounters with terrorist violence were experienced mainly remotely during this phase, the memories they created were still powerful enough to be translated to Brussels, and hence boosted the priority of counterterrorism on Belgium's political agenda. This implied streamlining counterterrorist competences and a professionalisation of counterterrorist expertise in the realm of formal managers of suspiciousness, on the national and the local level. Moreover, with the securitisation of critical infrastructure in Belgium, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness entered the counterterrorist playing field in the Belgian capital.

That counterterrorism remained to be dominated by formal managers of suspiciousness is reflected in the initial reaction to 9/11, namely the drafting of Belgium's first official counterterrorism strategy called Plan M which happened on the behalf of the Ministry of Interior, as the highest executive organ for security matters in Belgium (OCAM 2016: 6). The GIA, although it was formally still Belgium's only institution specialised in counterterrorist matters, was completely side-lined within this drafting process which clearly shows the factual insignificance of the agency at that time (Lasoen 2017a: 471). Hence unsurprisingly, the GIA got replaced in 2006 by the newly founded OCAM, while de facto the responsibilities of the two agencies were largely similar. Thus, according to its mission statement, the OCAM 'processes all relevant information and intelligence on terrorism, extremism and problematic radicalisation [and] tries to link up the right elements […] so that societal problems can be dealt with before they become security issues' (OCAM 2021). However, besides their similarities, the OCAM was established with the clear goal to not repeat its predecessor's mistakes. To ensure that unlike the GIA,

the OCAM could assume its dedicated central role in coordinating Belgium's counterterrorist efforts, other agencies became legally obliged to share all relevant information they gathered with it. Although the decision about which information is considered "relevant" is of course a matter of definition, the obligation was taken seriously and even trumped the third-party rule which forbids to share information of foreign intelligence services without their consent (Lasoen 2017b: 933). To further strengthen the OCAM's role, it also became the head of the newly set-up "National Task Force" which brings together a wide range of actors including both Belgian intelligence services, the federal and local police as well as representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice and the three regions (OCAM 2016: 6; Belgian Ministry of the Interior 2021b).

The formation of the OCAM was yet not the only change that the year 2006 brought. Under the impression of the fresh memories of terrorist attacks in major European cities in 2004 and 2005, a largescale local attack in Brussels seemed increasingly likely, and hence preventing terrorist violence also became a new concern to be tackled on the local and regional level. With regards to the former, the newly launched Plan R foresaw the constitution of so-called "Local Task Forces". As '"operational consulting bodies" for intelligence and security services within specific geographic areas, [their] purpose is to serve as a platform for the exchange of information, intelligence and analyses, to develop and coordinate information gathering activities' (van der Vet and Coolseat 2018: 3). Their nature was hence clearly 'security-orientated' (Renard and Coolseat 2018: 36). On the regional level, each of the three regions came up with its own tailor-made counterterrorism action plan in reference to Plan R (Belgian Ministry of the Interior 2021b). In case of the Brussels region, this meant essentially upgrading the already existing instrument of the Prevention and Safety Plan which was in 2009 renamed to 'Prevention and Proximity Plan' (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 2021b). In practice, the upgrade implied for instance that the still deployed local Guardians of Peace became charged to look out for violent extremism in their neighbourhoods. This stronger local engagement was also practised by the police in adopting a community policing approach. The geographical understanding of community in Brussels resulted in a slightly different implementation by Brussels' six police forces, and especially those deployed in socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods had thanks to budget limitations constrained capacities to put its objectives into practice (Devroe and Ponsaers 2013: 12–13). Nonetheless, the approach fostered overall a stronger engagement with local institutions and civil society organisations, and thus hinted at an involvement of informal managers of suspiciousness in Brussels. Efforts to further streamline the approach came from the nation level and from the EU level which introduced in 2010 its "Community Policing Preventing Radicalization and Terrorism" program (Devroe and Ponsaers 2013: 87; Elnakhala 2021). Belgium was among the twelve member states that participated in the scheme, which aimed at enabling 'officers to track signals of radicalization at an early stage' (Elnakhala 2021: 6).

Besides these efforts of formal managers of suspiciousness on the local, regional, national, and international level, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness emerged in Brussels since 9/11. As the attack target locations in remote attacks committed in other European metropoles indicated that critical

infrastructures were deemed vulnerable and in need of protection, this called for their pre-emptive securitisation in the Belgian capital. Belgium's legal definition of critical infrastructures from 2011 included as aforementioned a wide range of sectors, namely transport, energy, finances, trading platforms, communication, digital infrastructure, health and drinking water (Moniteur Belge 2011). While their respective risk assessment evaluations were conducted by the OCAM and the National Crisis Centre, and hence formal managers of suspiciousness, the implementation of the thereby developed contingency plans became an obligation for the managers and employees working in these areas, both in the public and the private sector. Thus, more and more people who had been formerly not charged with security matters became increasingly obligated to take over counterterrorist responsibilities at their workplace. These responsibilities also stretched out to other actors, such as urban planners, architects, and construction workers: As the trend towards adopting secured by design principles for instance in the context of Brussels' European Quarter evolved, successful applications for redeveloping urban space and external partners on the real estate market had to take ever more detailed requirements on security and safety into account to be successful (cf. EU Commission 2020).

All in all, mapping managers of suspiciousness during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology tellingly illustrates once again the significance of pre-emptive counterterrorism practices in Brussels: Although attacks of terrorist violence were largely locally absent from the Belgian capital, the period after 9/11 marks a radical shift in the political priority given to the issue, which is reflected in a trend towards professionalisation, and an increasing number of managers of suspiciousness involved. In contrast, the only local attack that happened in 2014, and thus admittedly towards the end of this analytical phase produced no immediate reaction regarding the actors that were charged to deal with countering terrorist violence. As the memories of attacks translated from elsewhere to Brussels boosted foremostly the role of formal managers of suspiciousness, this indicates a rather state-centric understanding of security in Belgium. In this context, the establishment of the OCAM as a new specialised counterterrorism agency on the national level stands hence symbolically for Belgium's attempt to deal with the threat of terrorist violence more professionally. However, at the same time, thanks to Belgium's strong commitment to federalism, the responsibility to deal with terrorism was also extended towards the local and the regional level of government. While such authorities had previously dealt with security issues mainly in the context of crime prevention and public order, these obligations were topped up with counterterrorist duties. Besides formal managers of suspiciousness, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness became also relevant, especially in the context of the securitisation of critical infrastructures, as people working in these sectors were increasingly charged with counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of their professional lives. Only the significance and number of informal managers of suspiciousness remained limited, as the encouragement of people to look out for suspiciousness in their private lives was restricted to residents directly addressed by Brussels' police forces in the context of their community policing efforts.

6.3.4.3 Managers of suspiciousness since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping the developments regarding managers of suspiciousness during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology reveals that especially the local encounters with terrorist violence committed from and in Brussels in 2015/16 led to a tremendous stepping up of counterterrorism measures and fostered in consequence also to a significant proliferation of managers of suspiciousness of all types. While the focus of the previous phases lay on professionalising the role of formal managers of suspiciousness, since the European peak of attacks, the responsibility to look out for suspiciousness was shifted more and more towards semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness.

Given the international blame that Belgium received, especially in the aftermath of the Paris attacks in November 2015, it appears unsurprising that the role of formal managers of suspiciousness remained extremely prominent in the city and was extended even further (Boussois 2017). However, a closer look reveals that the Operation Vigilant Guardian was already initiated in January 2015, and thus in response to a remote experience of violence in Paris that showed no direct links to Brussels. The operation is particularly noteworthy, since the Belgian military that used to be charged with exclusively upholding external security became now also engaged in matters of internal security. In cooperation with the federal police, military personnel took over tasks of surveillance and projecting physical presence in Brussels' city-centre (Seron and André 2016: 12). Over the operation's course more than 2,000 soldiers were deployed in Brussels, with climaxing numbers in the aftermath of the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the concurrent lockdown of the Belgian capital as well as the Brussels bombings in 2016 (Belgian Ministry of Defence 2021; Lasoen 2017b: 945). Despite the mission's high costs and its initial emergency character, it got temporarily extended year after year (La Libre 2016). The fast interventions of soldiers in the attacks at Brussels' Gare Centrale and Grand Place in 2017 were used as political justifications to eventually uphold such a militarised approach to urban security in the Belgian capital until April 2021, and thus long after the feeling of imminent attack had ceased (Hope 2020).

Besides the deployment of soldiers, the role of formal managers of suspiciousness was also strengthened in other aspects: To further streamline counterterrorist efforts, Belgium's National Security Council was founded which is 'responsible for ensuring coordination between competent services and for setting general priorities' (Kingdom of Belgium 2021) and adopted Belgium's first ever national security plan in which radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism are mentioned as key security issues (National Security Council 2015). Various specialised working groups operating under the head of the OCAM were formed to tackle them (OCAM 2016: 12–13). Moreover, Belgium's counterterrorism strategy Plan R was updated again by the OCAM and for the first time in its existence disseminated to the public (OCAM 2016: 3). Although its general objective did not change, the new version brought about several innovations (OCAM 2016: 7): Thus, on the national level, the updated strategy has aimed to 'unite all competent agencies and services in a specific and common action, respecting at all-time their respective objectives and statutory powers' (OCAM 2016: 7) for instance by providing shared operational definitions of phenomena such as 'radicalism' (OCAM 2016: 9). Even more new

developments were observable on the local level: Hence, the updated Plan R specified the work of the Local Task Forces and introduced additionally so-called "Local Integrated Security Cells". In contrast to the Local Task Forces which consist of the federal and local police, the intelligence service and the judiciary, the newly established Local Integrated Security Cells have taken local cooperation a step further. By aiming for a 'information exchange between the social and preventive services, the LTF [Local Task Forces] and the administrative authorities' (OCAM 2016: 7), these bodies take the responsibility of dealing with counterterrorism issues beyond the realm of formal managers of suspiciousness to other public as well as private actors on the local level, and thus proliferated the number of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in Brussels. The new approach ultimately promoted the rationale that 'it is on the local level – the chain from the local police officer, over the judicial assistant to the counterradicalisation worker or the teacher […] – that radicalisation is to be channelled, in order to prevent it from degenerating into (violent) extremism' (OCAM 2016: 4). The establishment of these Local Integrated Security Cells became a legal obligation in 2018 and consequently Brussels established 19, one for each commune (Belgian Ministry of the Interior 2021a). To support them, the Ministry of the Interior deployed so-called "Mobile Teams" which conduct local training days, raise awareness regarding early warning signs of radicalisation, and assist the development of tailor-made local programs to counter violent radicalisation (Belgian Ministry of the Interior 2021c). Thus, formal managers of suspiciousness were strategically employed to professionalise the counterterrorism efforts of employees in the educational, health, and social sector who became charged with taking over counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of their professional lives.

Apart from these new measures incited by the updated version of Plan R, the increasingly important role of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness was also reflected in the counterterrorist efforts of regional authorities which were stepped up considerably during this phase. Thus, the region Brussels-Capital turned its previously existing security engagements in 2015 into a new public interest organisation called "Bruxelles – Prévention & Sécurité (Brussels – Prevention and Security; BPS)" with the ambitious aim to 'redesign the security architecture in the region' (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 2021a). To fulfil this objective, the BPS drafted a comprehensive security strategy called "Plan Global de Sécurité et de Prévention" (Global Plan of Security and Prevention) in which polarisation and radicalisation were identified as key problem areas for Brussels (van der Vet and Coolseat 2018: 4–5). The multidisciplinary approach to tackle them included the formation of a regional platform fostering best practice exchange on countering radicalisation among Brussels' communes (BPS 2021: 35) as well as the publication of counterterrorist guidance material intended for actors active in the public and the private sector such as the "Guide to the integration of security systems in public spaces" from 2019 which addresses 'operators, managers and designers of public spaces' (Lemaire 2019: 7). Furthermore, Belgium's French speaking community known as Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, which Brussels is part of, became engaged in counterterrorism efforts by setting up CAPREV and CREA, two centres specialised in countering radicalisation. CAPREV's work is directed at the level of the individual, as it

offers a free and anonymous hotline for the region's residents to share their observations and suspicions of radicalisation, and thus boosted the relevance attributed to informal managers of suspiciousness (Féderation Wallonie-Bruxelles 2021a). CREA was set up at the organisational level and offers awareness trainings and information material to schools, sports associations, clubs as well as businesses and, hence encouraged people to take over counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of their professional and private lives (Féderation Wallonie-Bruxelles 2021b).

The grown importance assigned to semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness is finally also reflected in the counterterrorist initiatives on the local level. Hence, each of Brussels' communes came with its individual approach to tackle terrorist violence and radicalisation, by adopting a wide variety of programs, projects, and strategies (for a comprehensive overview see: Belgian Ministry of the Interior 2018; Jaminé and Fadil 2019). The commune Schaerbeek developed for instance a local action plan to combat violent radicalisation by identifying and supporting individuals and families at risk among its residents (Commune de Schaerbeek 2017: 10). The commune Ville de Bruxelles established an independent agency called "Bravvo", aimed at the prevention of radicalisation and fighting feelings of insecurity in Brussels' city-centre. The agency has employed a group of local stewards who are charged with looking out for potential conflict situations and are meant to be informed about any anomaly which users of public urban space observe (Commune de Ville de Bruxelles 2021a). Furthermore, Bravvo formed a special support and information team which offers awareness seminars, pedagogical material, and trainings to detect signs of radicalisation. These opportunities have foremostly addressed cooperation partners, such as schools, prisons, mental health institutions, and unemployment services but are generally open to all its residents (Commune de Ville de Bruxelles 2021b). Finally, the notoriously infamous commune Molenbeek unsurprisingly also became active in counterterrorism efforts. Thus, the commune's prevention office launched for instance the project "See something. Say Something" to enhance community policing in Molenbeek and to 'enable the communication of information on suspicious behaviour or neighbourhood problems' (Commune de Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 2018: 70, translated from the French original by the author). For this purpose, 'citizens from civil society (citizens, shopkeepers, religious leaders, people involved in associations, etc.) met and discussed with police officers in the field' (Commune de Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 2018: 70, translated from the French original by the author) to establish trust and identify potential obstacles within their cooperation.

All in all, mapping managers of suspiciousness during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that with the local arrival of large-scale terrorist violence in Brussels in 2015/16, national, regional, and local counterterrorism efforts experienced a massive boost, though problems of fragmentation persisted. Despite its continuous inherent complexity, Brussels' counterterrorism architecture became during this phase restructured to foster a close cooperation among formal, semi-formal, and informal managers of suspiciousness who all proliferated both in terms of numbers and counterterrorist responsibilities. Regrading formal managers of suspiciousness, this meant that the role of existing actors, such as the OCAM was strengthened, new actors, such as the Belgian military were

charged with counterterrorist duties, and new bodies, such as the National Security Council were founded. Overall, these innovations led to a stronger national oversight of Brussels' counterterrorism efforts. However, at the same time, the role of formal managers of suspiciousness on the regional and local level were enhanced by forming the Local Integrated Security Cells and other new institutions. These changes did not only professionalise the counterterrorism efforts of formal managers of suspiciousness below the national level, but they also significantly boosted the role of semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness. In the context of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, the responsibility to look out for suspiciousness was mainly extended to public sector actors providing social services. This included employees in health, educational and religious institutions as well as public providers of youth work and unemployment support. Other professional branches which were already engaged in counterterrorism efforts in the previous phase entailed urban planners, architects as well as designers and managers of public urban space whose role became even more important. However, the compared to the previous phase most fundamental change happened regarding the role of informal managers of suspiciousness. Since the importance assigned to the local level grew significantly since 2015/16 following the conviction that violent radicalisation as the root cause of terrorist violence is best tackled on the ground, individuals were encouraged in an abundance of CVE projects and initiatives organised on the regional and the commune level to take over more counterterrorist responsibilities and look out for signs of suspicious people and objects in Brussels in the context of their private lives. This concerned the realm of the public sphere– in other words looking out for strangers and what is happening on the streets – but also in the context of the private sphere, meaning to look for signs of suspiciousness among one's family, friends, colleagues, and neighbours.

6.4 The securitisation of urban everyday life in Brussels

While my separate mapping of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness in Brussels teased out the nuances of their transformations, the analysis in the second stage of my historiographic archaeology surpasses the particularities of these developments. Instead, the analytical focus of mapping the securitisation of Brussels' everyday life lies in this part of the chapter on the intra-actions of human and non-human bodies. In systematically revealing how the material-discursive suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies is entangled and thus reproduces, and reinforces each other, I ultimately demonstrate how everyday life in the Belgian has incrementally but increasingly become securitised based on memories of local and remote attacks and imaginaries of future violence. In contrast to the bias of the existing literature that focuses predominately on recent counterterrorist developments in the Belgian capital (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a; Renard 2016a; Fregonese 2021; Fregonese and Laketa 2022), my historiographic archaeology shows thus that although the 2015/16 attacks in and from Brussels were an important trigger in boosting the securitisation of the city's everyday life, its incremental transformation began thanks to increasingly spreading material-discursive suspiciousness already before the city was swept with (counter)terrorist attention.

6.4.1 The securitisation of Brussels' everyday life before 9/11

Comparing the maps, I created during the first phase of my analysis, demonstrates that before 9/11 neither local nor remote encounters with terrorist attacks were powerful reference points for transforming Brussels' everyday life according to counterterrorist rationales of control. While urban security was on the political agenda in the Belgian capital, its understanding at the time was linked to crime and public misdemeanour rather than the threat of terrorism. The human and non-human bodies that I analysed were hence not entangled in their suspiciousness but in their harmlessness.

Thus, although Brussels experienced both local and remote experiences of terrorist incidents before 9/11, these played hardly a role in the transformation of its urban everyday life: Remote attacks were not translated to the Belgian capital, as not even most of Brussels' local encounters with terrorist violence were considered to pose a real threat, since the attacks were externalised as problems to be solved elsewhere. Within this scheme of general disinterest towards terrorist violence that swept from the Northern Irish and the Kurdish Conflict to Brussels, the attacks committed by the CCC, as the sole source of terrorist violence that was considered genuinely Belgian, mark an exception. Hence, they caused a counterterrorist response because they were constructed to pertain an actual threat for Brussels. In this sense, I found the first traces of securitising Brussels' everyday life during the active time of the CCC in the early 1980s. The most obvious trace among them is surely the foundation of the GIA, as formal managers of suspiciousness who were specialised in counterterrorist matters, symbolising that in the context of the CCC the terrorist threat was suddenly treated as more dangerous. The agency's Operation Mammut initiated a generalised stigmatisation of people following a leftist ideology in Brussels as terrorist suspects. However, thanks to the rapid capture of the CCC's leadership and the following factual abolition of the terrorist group, these traces of a beginning securitisation of Brussels' everyday life turned out to be temporary and faded again quickly. This is not only true for the treatment of leftist groups and individuals but also for the GIA which although it remained formerly in power was factually marginalised in the inter-institutional turf wars within Belgium's security architecture.

Besides these first traces of securitisations, the general harmlessness of human and non-human bodies in Brussels' everyday life that existed before and after the short exception during the CCC's active phase was reflected in the limited attribution of material-discursive suspiciousness to sites, people, and things. Hence, the dangerousness of sites was for instance merely connected to crime and public misdemeanour. Therefore, the imposed measures of secured by design were directed towards a neoliberal regeneration of Brussels' public space and aimed to increase the general level of feeling safe rather than to prevent potential attacks of terrorist violence. This attribution of harmlessness was closely entangled with the understanding of suspicious objects in Brussels at the time: Although it was not allowed to carry a firearm when walking the streets of Brussels, let alone entering a secured building, such as an embassy or EU Institution, but the acquisition and possession of classic weapons was considered a basic right in Belgium, which persisted as such until the beginning of the 21st century. In other words, the fact that thus not even classic weapons, such as firearms and combat knives were –

besides a few updates of Belgium's lax weapons law during the 1980s – not securitised as per se dangerous, promoted a generalised assumption of harmlessness towards things in the Belgian capital during this phase: While there was an awareness towards the fact that criminal and potentially also terrorist violence can be committed with these items, the objects as such were not problematised, as dangerousness was considered to solely originate from people potentially using them for violent purposes. Given this logic of harmless classic weapons, mundane objects of urban everyday life – although they were instrumentalized for committing terrorist attacks in Brussels and elsewhere – were attributed even less with material-discursive suspiciousness, and therefore not securitised as potentially dangerous. The finding that human bodies were generally seen as potentially more dangerous than non-human bodies was again closely entangled with the development regarding suspicious people in Brussels. Updates in the registration policies for Brussels' residents showed that population control in general was tightened in the Belgian capital but the rationales behind these reforms were mainly to make bureaucratic structures more efficient. Implied security concerns were again linked to the prevention of crime and public misdemeanour rather than the threat of terrorist violence. That individuals and groups were at this stage not singled out based on terrorist suspicions against them is also reflected in the liberalisation of Belgian citizenship law at the time: Although the local terrorist violence committed in the context of external conflicts would have provided the perfect ground for excluding immigrants and foreigners as potential terrorist suspects, the opposite was the case, as the respective laws gave many residents of Brussels with an immigrant background the opportunity to obtain Belgian citizenship marking them as harmless as Belgian nationals when it comes to terrorist suspicions. This was closely entangled with the finding that the threat of terrorist violence was finally generally prioritised as low, especially in comparison to the prevention of crime which was also reflected in the developments around managers of suspiciousness: While fundamental reform efforts were made to enhance Belgium's police apparatus, the country's specialised counterterrorism agency became systematically side-lined, and consequently insignificant as soon as the threat posed by the CCC was contained.

All in all, mapping the transformation of Brussels' local space during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology revealed that the tendencies to securitise everyday life in the Belgian capital were remarkably low before 9/11, as urban sites, classic weapons and mundane objects, and people living in Brussels were entangled in their harmlessness. The only slight first traces of spreading material-discursive suspiciousness were limited to the height of the CCC's local attacks.

6.4.2 The securitisation of Brussels' everyday life between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

This changed fundamentally with 9/11 and subsequent attacks in major European cities in the early 2000s, as aligning the four maps I assembled for the second phase of my historiographic archaeology in Brussels shows. Although the Belgian capital remained off the target list of terrorist perpetrators until 2014 – and thus almost for the entirety of this analytical phase – its everyday life shifted significantly towards increasing suspiciousness in most aspects considered in my analysis which underlines how

important translations of remote attacks and future imaginaries of terrorist violence were in shaping Brussels' pre-emptive counterterrorist response.

In its course, urban sites of symbolic and structural relevance were more and more securitised with a particular focus on the city's European Quarter, reflecting that Brussels' reputation as the informal capital of the EU was recognised to be particularly at risk in the case of an attack. The general problematisation of critical infrastructures since 2011 was closely entangled with a proliferation of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in the public and the private sector who were more and more charged with adhering to counterterrorist obligations at their workplace. Furthermore, the suspiciousness of urban sites was not restricted to vulnerable targets but also encompassed potentially dangerous sites, most importantly mosques – as reflected in the name of Belgium's first counterterrorism strategy – and other Muslim community centres, since Muslims and people identified as such became constructed as Brussels' primary suspect community based on experiences with terrorist violence made elsewhere.

Thus, the material-discursive suspiciousness of urban sites was closely entangled with the developments regarding suspicious people and managers of suspiciousness. That the potential threat of terrorist violence was despite the vast absence of local attacks taken more seriously in Belgium, as remote experiences of violence were translated to the city, was institutionally reflected in replacing the GIA with the more powerful OCAM, leading to a professionalisation among formal managers of suspiciousness. Furthermore, formal managers of suspiciousness also proliferated in numbers, since dealing with counterterrorism developed simultaneously into a national and local obligation, as the establishment of the Local Task Forces shows. However, despite these efforts to adopt an effective and streamlined approach to pre-emptively counter terrorist violence in Brussels, the entangled ambiguous treatment of suspicious people in the Belgian capital demonstrates that this ambition was hardly fulfilled.

Hence, the response towards known radicalised networks was largely inefficient and did neither significantly hamper their activities in spreading extremist and violent propaganda nor inhibit their recruitment of new members willing to fight for terrorist ideologies on the battlefields of ISIL in the Middle East but also on European, and even Belgian territory, as the attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014 showed. At the same time, based on remote experiences of terrorist violence elsewhere as well as pre-existing socio-economic prejudices, members of Belgium's Muslim communities and people identified as such were systematically attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness, as brought forward particularly by the counterterrorist discourse of the OCAM but also in the practice of local police forces who had gained additional competences of control thanks to the new priority assigned to counterterrorism. This generalised stigmatisation of large minority groups in Brussels and all their community sites as potentially dangerous implied not only discriminatory and violent experiences for affected individuals but also increased tendencies of polarisation on the societal level.

Within the entangled developments of spreading suspiciousness among suspicious sites and people and the growing importance of managers of suspiciousness, the transformation of suspicious objects obtains a bit of an outlier role during this phase, as things remained largely harmless in the

Belgian capital: Although mundane items of urban everyday life were used in remote attacks of terrorist violence, their suspiciousness proved not elusive and compatible to be translated to Brussels compared for instance to the material-discursive understanding of suspicious people. This finding reaffirms that the potential dangerousness assigned to human bodies was still rated higher than the suspicion attributed to non-human bodies in Brussels which is also reflected in the treatment of classic weapons: While at least the legal regulations regarding their acquisition and possession were fundamentally reformed, their increasing problematisation was not explicitly related to the threat of terrorist violence but rather imposed on Belgium by the external pressure of developing international standards in this context. Thus, neither classic weapons nor mundane objects of urban everyday life were securitised as suspicious to commit terrorist violence but remained overall largely harmless in Brussels.

Nevertheless, mapping the transformation of the Belgian capital's local space during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology revealed all in all that besides the exception of suspicious objects, the securitisation of Brussels' everyday life became an undeniable tendency since 9/11, especially also when compared to its widespread harmlessness during the previous phase. What is particularly remarkable about this trend towards spreading material-discursive suspiciousness of sites and people in Brussels as well as the proliferation of its managers of suspiciousness and intensifying measures of control implemented to manage this potential dangerousness, is that it happened on largely pre-emptive grounds, as local attacks in Brussels played an even less important role than before 9/11, and thus suspiciousness and how to deal with it was translated to the Belgian capital in memories of remote attacks and future imaginaries of terrorist violence.

6.4.3 The securitisation of Brussels' everyday life since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Aligning finally the maps that I compiled for the last phase of my historiographic archaeology in Brussels shows that the securitisation of its urban everyday life became an all-encompassing trend since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16. While the tendency reached its climax during the city's pre-emptive security lockdown in November 2015, the attacks of terrorist violence committed in and from Brussels during this phase have led to an unprecedented counterterrorist activism and an increasing normalisation of measures of control in the metropole's everyday life to manage the entangled material-discursive suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies.

In comparison to the last analytical phase, the most fundamental shift happened regarding the outlier case of suspicious objects. While previously neither classic weapons nor mundane objects of urban everyday life had been securitised as potentially dangerous in Brussels under a reference to terrorist violence, both have been attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness since the European peak of attacks. The Paris attacks in November 2015 which were committed with firearms from Brussels had the Belgian capital unmasked as 'Europe's favourite gun shop' (Duquet 2016b: 54). Since then, the control of classic weapons was taken much more seriously, especially in the city's canal area which was marked as potentially dangerous and where in consequence most police raids to confiscate classic weapons took place. Apart from that, mundane objects such as litterbins, cars, SIM cards, bags, and

pieces of luggage became also securitised and again their assignment with potential dangerousness was closely entangled with the material-discursive suspiciousness of urban sites, as vulnerable target locations. Their respective understanding was also significantly extended in this last phase, because since the Brussels' lockdown in 2015 suspicious sites included basically any urban site of human interaction in the Belgian capital, such as restaurants, shopping malls, and cultural venues. That the suspiciousness of sites and objects was entangled meant for example that the non-transparent litterbins in Brussels' metro became pre-emptively recognised as potentially dangerous, while at the same time, they were considered to contribute to the vulnerability of the city's public transport system as a strategic target because the trashcans could potentially be instrumentalised for terrorist violence by hiding a bomb inside them. The mutual reinforcement of suspiciousness went after the Brussels bombings in March 2016 so far, that even suitcases which are the most normal thing to be at an airport were checked already before their owners were allowed to enter Brussels' airport's premises with them. In other words, based on the circular definition of suspicious items in reference to suspicious sites and vice versa, mundane objects and sites of urban everyday life were not only increasingly problematised, but their suspiciousness was reinforced, when they were found *together* in Brussels. Yet, as many of the securitised sites and items form an integral part of urban normality in the Belgian capital, suspiciousness has ultimately become the new normal in Brussels, thanks to the counterterrorist logic of pre-emption.

This development was however not limited to the entangled securitisation of suspicious sites and suspicious objects but intra-acted also with suspicious people. Thus, although the control of suspicious sites and suspicious objects intensified, the severest repercussions were again implied for the members of the city's previously established suspect community, as the potential dangerousness attributed to them increased when seen with a suspicious object at a suspicious site and vice versa. Under these circumstances, counterterrorist violence used against individuals who were identified as part of the suspect community climaxed with the peak of terrorist violence committed in and from Brussels in 2015/16. Based on the nationally and globally powerful construction of Brussels as a central home base of terrorist perpetrators, their foreignization became arguably more difficult compared to the case of London. In other words, since Brussels had earned the infamous reputation to be Europe's terrorism capital, systematically othering terrorist suspects was discredited as a cheap excuse to shift the blame rather than admitting political failures concerning neglected tendencies of societal polarisation and violent radicalisation. Nonetheless, Belgium's formal managers of suspiciousness came up with strategies to externalise the members of its suspect community for instance through removing the Belgian citizenship of individual suspects who held a passport from another country.

Another measure that was closely entangled with this development was to specifically identify potentially dangerous geographical areas in the city where members of the suspect community were presumed to live. While in the previous phase, all sites of Muslim community interaction in the Belgian capital were pre-emptively deemed as potentially dangerous, counterterrorist interventions, such as the Plan Canal, were highly localised to renounce Brussels' general reputation as the epicentre of European

jihadism by concentrating its measures of control particularly on certain areas of the city. Although this geographical focus might appear to limit the notion of potentially dangerous sites in Brussels, it ultimately stretched its meaning further to include the residential neighbourhoods in Brussels' canal area, and hence brought suspiciousness into the private homes of people categorised as members of the Belgian capital's suspect community. On top of that, this new understanding redefined everyone living in the city's canal area to be potentially dangerous, which further widened the notion of suspicious people. For those who already belonged to the city's suspect community and additionally happened to live in the area marked as suspicious, the attribution of potential dangerousness magnified.

Finally, the further proliferation of managers of suspiciousness was also closely entangled with these developments. With the encouragement of Brussels' residents to look out for any sign of suspiciousness in the context of their professional and their private lives, surveillance and behavioural control became normalised into the Belgian capital's everyday life because literally anywhere in the city, people are meant to be wary of their environment and vigilantly report any anomaly they spot, be it suspicious people or objects. Yet again, especially the initiatives to encourage informal managers of suspiciousness were particularly prominent in those areas of Brussels which were marked as potentially dangerous due to the high number of members of the suspect community presumably living there. While some of the outlined securitisations for instance regarding suspicious objects and suspicious sites reached their peak during Brussels' lockdown in November 2015, especially the increased number of people charged with counterterrorist responsibilities as semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness manifest that the securitisation of everyday life in the Belgian capital was not a temporary development, limited to a few weeks or months, but a permanent transformation of the city's local space that has made an impression on its urban normality for several years by now.

All in all, mapping the transformation of Brussels during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology revealed that since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 the securitisation of the city's everyday life has become an irrefutable, substantiated tendency. The entangled spreading of suspiciousness among intra-acting human and non-human bodies in Brussels' local space has been implemented under reference to local attacks in the Belgian capital but also pre-emptively as well as in direct response to incidents of terrorist violence committed from Brussels.

6.5 Normative reflections from a perspective of posthumanist ethics

So far, my second case study revealed that Brussels is a highly interesting case when it comes to the securitisation of urban everyday life because its human and non-human bodies were initially entangled in harmlessness but then incrementally shifted to being entangled in suspiciousness. Although it hence became clear that the securitisation of Brussels' everyday life intensified over time, the normative implications of this transformation process in the context of existing socio-material power hierarchies are still obscure. Thus, in the last stage of my analysis, I critically engage with the securitisation of Brussels' everyday life from a perspective of posthumanist ethics which uncovers how the transformation of the Belgian capital had unequal consequences for human and non-human bodies.

Therefore, I contend that the securitisation of Brussels' everyday life constitutes, just like in the case of London, a process of urban segregation, because existing socio-material power asymmetries among human and non-human bodies were reproduced within this development.

6.5.1 Security from whom and what

To begin the critical reflection on my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics, I deal with the question which human and non-human bodies were deemed potentially dangerous within the transformation of Brussels' everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism. The findings of my historiographic archaeology in the Belgian capital show that attributing material-discursive suspiciousness to human and non-human bodies was in most cases directly linked to other forms of exclusion, especially welfare chauvinism, nationalism, and racism. This is highly problematic because already vulnerable human and non-human bodies became further marginalised through assigning them with terrorist suspicions. However, the case of Brussels also shows that even local experiences of terrorist attacks must not automatically lead to the stigmatisation of human and non-human bodies as potentially dangerous and hence their discriminatory treatment could be avoided.

Thus, the period before 9/11, in which Brussels made local encounters with terrorist violence, but only the attacks committed by Belgian nationals received special counterterrorist attention, is particularly interesting. While the response to the CCC was surely discriminatory against residents of Brussels who followed a leftist political ideology, the stigma connected to it did not have long-lasting negative consequences for the affected individuals. The terrorist attacks which were committed by foreign nationals were however not systematically used to assign the respective groups and communities with potential dangerousness (although at least some of them were already othered based on socio-economic prejudices). Their harmlessness was particularly reflected in the liberalisation of Belgium's citizenship law which allowed many foreign-born residents of Brussels to became naturalised as Belgian citizens at the time. While this approach may also be attributed to the generally limited priority that was given to counterterrorist concerns in Belgium before 9/11, it nonetheless shows that encounters with terrorist violence must not necessarily be exploited to single out certain human and non-human bodies.

However, this is exactly what happened in Brussels after 9/11. With regards to potentially dangerous human bodies, religious stereotypes have proven to be most prominent in making a difference between "us, the harmless civilians" and "them, the dangerous terrorists" in the case of the Belgian capital. The logic that terrorists commit violence based on their religious practice as Muslims, and Muslims are hence generally suspicious to have terrorist intentions is thus circularly confirming itself. The systematic stigmatisation of Muslim places of worship and communal interaction has considerably contributed to boost sentiments of Islamophobia in the Belgian capital. These religious stereotypes were just like in London oftentimes interlinked with other – more externally visible – characteristics, such as darker skin colour, beards, and certain items of clothing but also with further invisible social markers as for instance family roots or a second citizenship of a North African or Middle Eastern country which put individuals automatically into the group of being potentially suspicious. The existing heterogeneity

of individuals within the imagined community of suspects is systematically denied and facts that do not fit into the constructed image are downplayed or neglected. A telling example therefore is the public presentation of the Brussels ISIL cell as radicalised by violence-prone Islamic ideologies. The testimonies of the perpetrator's personal environment that described their lifestyle as not following traditional Islamic rules were however overlooked. These dynamics reflect again broader socio-material power hierarchies and are tied to local and national identity constructions. Thus, while Brussels has cultivated the shiny image of a lively and open-minded metropole with a large expat community, the colonial legacies that bring many members of its attributed suspect community to the city are repressed in its public representation. This is also reflected in the additional vulnerabilities that many members of the affected minority communities are faced with, such as socio-economic hardship, personal identity struggles, unequal chances in the education system, and on the housing and the job market.

Such tendencies have played out in a similar vein in the treatment of potentially dangerous non-human bodies. However, as non-human bodies – both sites and objects – were initially seen as less suspicious compared to respective human bodies, this is a more recent phenomenon. Nonetheless with the international blame and shame that hit Brussels after major attacks were committed from and in the city, the general reputation of the Belgian capital was restored by marking solely some of its neighbourhoods as potentially dangerous. Just like in London, these were those areas with a high percentage of inhabitants who had been attributed with suspiciousness. Although the canal area of Brussels is located relatively central, the respective communes are notoriously known for a higher level of poverty and crime, and typically inhabited by socio-economically deprived minority communities. The epicentre of the phenomenon of potentially dangerous areas in the Belgian capital is surely the commune Molenbeek which has become stigmatised as a global synonym for a radicalised neighbourhood. All in all, this dimension of normatively reflecting on my findings shows that ultimately, just like in London, the increasing securitisation of Brussels in times of (counter)terrorism led to a further marginalisation of its already vulnerable human and non-human bodies.

6.5.2 Security for whom and what

The second dimension of normatively reflecting on my findings in the case of Brussels builds the counterpart to the previous section, as it sheds light on the question, who and what was deemed worthy of protection in the Belgian capital. The conclusions drawn from my historiographic archaeology of Brussels' transformation in times of (counter)terrorism uncover that socio-material power hierarchies were initially again decisive regarding for whom and for what security was provided by securitising the Belgian capital's everyday life, in the sense that privileged human and non-human bodies received special attention thanks to attributing them with heightened vulnerability. Yet, due to the ambivalence of protection, the recent universalisation of vulnerability across human and non-human bodies in Brussels generally increased the level of control and restrictiveness that they are confronted with.

The transformation of vulnerable sites in Brussels tellingly reflects this development. Thus, already prior to 9/11, general security concerns in the city were linked to the neoliberal regeneration of

its local space to boost the Belgian capital's international reputation as a safe and clean metropole with a high living standard. When the relevance of pre-emptive counterterrorist considerations rose after 9/11, especially the city's European Quarter and its famous tourist attractions in the historical centre were deemed vulnerable and consequently particularly worthy of protection. The special attention that was paid to the area were the EU buildings are located intentionally underlined Brussels' proud commitment to being the informal capital of the EU and its therefore inherent willingness to assign a heightened level of protection the regional organisations' institutions. This understanding goes hand in hand with the human bodies that were considered worthy of protection, namely members of the socio-economic elites who predominantly inhabit and use these securitised urban sites, be it as residents, members of Brussels' expat community, or tourists. Finally, the acknowledgement of critical infrastructures as especially vulnerable also reflects a significant extension of the neoliberal rationale to deem already privileged non-human bodies as worthy of special protection.

In comparison, the recent move to extend vulnerability to all sites of human interaction in Brussels has on the surface diverted from reproducing socio-material asymmetries in the differentiation of who and what was deemed worthy to protect. However, the dominant rationale behind this universalisation was not to ease socio-material asymmetries. Instead, the terrorist violence committed from and in Brussels in 2015/16 has – thanks to the international negative attention it created – meant a massive blow to the city's meticulously curated image and turned it into a potentially dangerous place, full of potentially dangerous people willing to commit violence in the metropole itself and beyond. To counter this reputation and respond to the accusations of counterterrorist failures that Belgium's security authorities had to deal with, declaring everyone and everything in the city as worthy of protection at any given cost was thus a logical step. Therefore, the public visibility and extreme severity of measures of control implemented to guarantee this protection – namely the deployment of soldiers in public urban space and most importantly the city's pre-emptive security lockdown – is unsurprising, as they were obviously intended to demonstrate how seriously the threat of terrorist violence was taken in Brussels. However, just like in London, the universalisation of vulnerability across all human and non-human bodies intra-acting in Brussels has confronted them with an even higher level of control and restrictiveness, especially during the city's lockdown in November 2015, but certainly also after that. While these measures were taken to send a message to the world that everyday life in Brussels was safe, as it was well protected, it became in fact less safe especially for already vulnerable human and non-human bodies assigned with potential dangerousness. On the other hand, thanks to the alleged harmlessness of privileged human and non-human bodies, they were generally less limited in their capacity to participate in Brussels' everyday life, despite the imposed measures of control.

6.5.3 Security through whom and what

Finally, I engage with the question which human and non-human bodies were considered capable and credible to take over counterterrorist responsibilities as managers of suspiciousness, as the last dimension of normatively contextualising my findings within existing socio-material power hierarchies.

Mapping the transformation of Brussels' everyday life uncovered that, although countering terrorism was initially not a priority on the city's agenda before 9/11, over time especially the range of human bodies charged with countering terrorist violence was extended from representatives of a state-centric understanding of security to more and more people in the Belgian capital being encouraged to become semi-formal and eventually also informal managers of suspiciousness. This development deserves critical attention as such, given how it universalises control and surveillance in Brussels' everyday life, as everyone is urged to permanently watch others and live under the assumption of being watched. Thanks to the recently adopted strong CVE component in the Belgian counterterrorist approach, this obliged health and social workers to monitor the vulnerable groups in their care. What is moreover problematic about this development is that although encouraging everyone to take over counterterrorist responsibilities appears on the surface to promote equal chances of participating in Brussels' everyday life, pre-existing socio-material power hierarchies influence whose observations of suspiciousness are considered trustworthy, and thus re-enforce those asymmetries to persist.

My historiographic archaeology of the securitisation of everyday life in Brussels revealed that although the range of managers of suspiciousness widened over time, just like in London, overall formal managers of suspiciousness still obtained a more important role in managing the threat of terrorist violence, while the public encouragement of semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness has been less prominent and ubiquitous in comparison. This stronger projection of traditional state security in the Belgian capital – as reflected for instance in the deployment of soldiers that lasted much longer in Brussels than in London – is surely indebted to the accusation of failures in the Belgian security architecture to effectively counter terrorist violence. To respond to such criticism, the powers, and competences of formal managers of suspiciousness were strengthened, as further outsourcing the problem to semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness would have looked like admitting the inability of Belgium's classic law enforcement agencies to take up their counterterrorist responsibilities. Given this context, the simultaneous push for a more important role of managers of suspiciousness who were traditionally not charged with countering terrorist violence in Brussels – albeit it was less prominent than in London – demonstrates that universalising the obligation to look out for suspiciousness and especially early signs of radicalisation became ultimately a new premise in the Belgian capital's everyday life, be it in the public or the private sphere.

Just like in the British capital, this is normatively speaking problematic because it has normalised control and surveillance in the professional and private lives of Brussels' inhabitants. Thus, the continuous confrontation with the sight of heavily armed soldiers in the public sphere has stirred anxiety for some – especially those who are vulnerable due to being attributed with potential dangerousness – and feelings of 'surveillance apatheia' (Ellis 2020) for others. While the feeling of being watched is a freedom-restricting experience, as it makes people question how they should behave in urban everyday life to not look suspicious, being charged with watching others and evaluating if they show any signs of radicalisation is – particularly when these people are in one's care – a demanding

responsibility causing a personal dilemma situation for those affected. Nonetheless, this is what teachers, social workers, sports trainers, health workers and even parents and friends have been asked to do in various campaigns, initiatives and programmes promoting a CVE approach in Brussels. Sharing suspicions about others, especially when they are personally close is always challenging. However, testimonies to Human Rights Watch (2016: 12) in Brussels show that evidence from within the Belgian capital's suspect community were a delicate issue in particular thanks to the mutual mistrust on both sides: Members of Brussels' Muslim community are due to their systemic exposure to counterterrorist discrimination and violence less inclined to share their observations with Belgian security authorities, while at the same time evidence presented by someone who is considered potentially dangerous themselves is considered doubtworthy by law enforcement agencies. In this sense, contextualising my findings within existing socio-material power hierarchies shows that not only regarding from whom and what, and for whom and what security is provided but also in terms of who and what is considered a credible manager of suspiciousness in Brussels, asymmetries were reinforced in the transformation of the Belgian capital's everyday life, as privileged human and non-human bodies became more powerful, while marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery became even more vulnerable.

What is finally a noteworthy finding besides these issues among human managers of suspiciousness in Brussels, albeit this was not the focus of my analysis is that non-human managers of suspiciousness played a much less important role in the Belgian than in the British capital: While CCTV surveillance became increasingly extended in the city's public space, other technological innovations such as AI-based measures are so far not used in Brussels. This might be indebted to restricted financial resources of Belgian security authorities but also indicates that they put less trust put into non-human managers of suspiciousness in comparison to London.

6.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that the transformation of Brussels' local space in times of (counter)terrorism has been a remarkable case of securitisation: While human and non-human bodies were initially entangled in their harmlessness in the city before 9/11, more and more of them were incrementally, and at first largely pre-emptively attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness and simultaneously the counterterrorist measures to control potential dangerousness in the Belgian capital intensified. These developments reached a new climax since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 in which Brussels played a role at the centre stage of (counter)terrorism in Europe. In this context, my historiographic archaeology of the city's transformation uncovered how memories of local terrorist incidents and translations of remote attacks both fed into future imaginaries of terrorist violence, and ultimately led to a remarkable securitisation of everyday life in the Belgian capital which reached its zenith so far during the metropole's pre-emptive security lockdown but has been an undeniably persistent tendency ever since. This implied the normalisation of an increased level of control in urban normality that human and non-human bodies alike are confronted with in Brussels.

Within my case selection, Brussels obtains the role of the newcomer that the city has been deemed according to the existing academic literature (Renard 2016b; Lasoen 2020; Fregonese 2021). Yet, my theoretical-methodological perspective allowed me to reveal not only that the first traces of securitising Brussels' everyday life date back to a time much before (counter)terrorism became a virulent local issue in the city but also that the developments in recent years indicate that the Belgian capital may quickly transform from a newcomer to a frontrunner in securitising its everyday life. Furthermore, my historiographic archaeology of Brussels' transformation in times of (counter)terrorism adds critical value to the academic and the political debate because reflecting on my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics showed that the increasing securitisation of everyday life in the Belgian capital has reinforced existing socio-material power hierarchies in the city: From whom and what, for whom and what, and through whom and what security is provided for in Brussels constitutes in this sense, just like in the case of London, a process of urban segregation.

7 Case Study: Stuttgart

7.1 Introduction

In December 2018, the security personnel at Stuttgart airport was on high alert, as two 'Arab looking young men' (Südkurier 2018, translated from the German original by the author) were spotted hanging around in its departure hall without a suitcase or taking a flight. However, they left the airport before the police could question them. One day later, the two suspects were allegedly seen again at the Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris, taking photos of its premises. Based on these two observations and intel from the Moroccan secret service about potential attack plans at the French-German border, Stuttgart was expected to be the next target city in Europe. Therefore, the threat level at Stuttgart airport was raised to its maximum and its security measures were stepped up significantly (Unger 2018). Yet, the gathered "evidence" ultimately turned out to be inaccurate, since a more thorough investigation proved that the suspicious individuals in question in Stuttgart and Paris were neither identical nor in any way involved with terrorist groups (Diehl 2018). In the context of my research interest, this false alarm comprises a telling example how pre-emptive action to counter the anticipated catastrophe has already reached the German metropole, although terrorist violence continues to remain absent from Stuttgart.

Thus, in my third empirical chapter, I analyse yet again how urban everyday life has transformed in a European metropole in times of (counter)terrorism. However, in contrast to my previous case cities, London and Brussels, Stuttgart has not seen any major local terrorist attack until now, and hence provides the perfect test case for my argument that the securitisation of urban everyday life travels from cities *with* local attack encounters to cities *without*. Based on my project's theoretical-methodological premises, I thus argue that a local incident of terrorist violence is not a prerequisite for the material-discursive securitisation of urban everyday life, as the experiences of remote attacks fuelled the imaginaries of the terrorist threat in Stuttgart, and thus initiated incremental transformations in the city's everyday life by attributing more and more human and non-human bodies with suspiciousness and charging them to look out for it. While the securitisation of everyday life in the German city is still a subtle tendency, it is yet normatively undesirable, as it constitutes, just like in Brussels and London, a process of urban segregation. To analyse the transformation of Stuttgart's everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, my historiographic archaeology of the city is divided into three sections. In the chapter's first part, I engage with Stuttgart's suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness separately to map the nuances and particularities of their respective securitisations. In its second section, I shed light on how their transformations were closely interlinked, as suspicious human and non-human bodies were intra-acting in Stuttgart's everyday life and therefore suspiciousness was reproduced and reinforced. In the final part of my analysis, I contextualise my findings within existing socio-material power asymmetries, and thus argue from a normative perspective of posthumanist ethics that through the securitisation of everyday life in Stuttgart, inequalities concerning already vulnerable human and non-human bodies were further exacerbated, while the superiority of privileged human and non-human bodies was further consolidated.

7.2 Stuttgart's transforming everyday life

The city of Stuttgart is geographically located in the Southwest of Germany and constitutes the capital of the Land Baden-Württemberg. It was founded as a settlement in the 10th century and flourished especially in the 15th century as the seat of the Kingdom of Württemberg. In the late 19th century, the industrial revolution left with the invention of car engines an imprint on the city that is characteristic until today. Nowadays, although Stuttgart is with around 630,000 inhabitants only the sixth biggest city in Germany, it is clearly a European metropole given its economic significance: Thanks to headquartering major players in the car and technology industry, Stuttgart attracts workers from inside and outside of Germany. A height of labour migration happened in the aftermath of World War II when so-called "guestworkers" from Italy, Greece, and later especially Turkey moved to the city to ease labour shortages (Lindemann 2005). Nowadays especially high-skilled workers and young people seeking higher education come to the metropole (Fina et al. 2014). As of 2019, Stuttgart has a multicultural population, as 45.4 percent of its residents have a migration background (Söldner 2020: 13).

As the capital of Baden-Württemberg, it is home to the regional as well as the local level of government. Within the federal system of Germany, the local level is the weakest, and hence the autonomy of Stuttgart's urban administration is limited: Although communes and cities are thanks to the constitutionally enshrined principles of local self-governance and subsidiarity in theory responsible for all administrative tasks, in practice these are usually regulated on the regional and national level, and thus the municipal level is left with implementing decisions made elsewhere, while being at the same time systematically underfunded (Dietlein and Peters 2017). Nonetheless, in comparison to other regions in Germany, local independence in Baden-Württemberg is stronger, especially due to the important role of directly elected mayors (Wehling 2010). This is also the case in Stuttgart, where one mayor is responsible for all 23 city districts and supported by seven deputy mayors charged with overlooking different policy areas (Stuttgart City Administration 2022a). Within this interplay of national, regional, and local policymaking, Stuttgart's identity as a European metropole is shaped by its distinctive historical trajectory but also continuously evolving and transforming under newly emerging rationales, such as sustainability, urban gentrification, and regeneration. The securitisation of the city's everyday life, which my project focuses on, is thus only one of many – often closely intertwined – developments.

7.3 The securitisation of human and non-human bodies in Stuttgart

Just like in my previous case studies, in the first section of my historiographic archaeology of Stuttgart's everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism, I analyse the transformations of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness in the city separately to reveal their respective nuances. Stuttgart is a particularly interesting case to do so because, unlike my other cases, it has hardly been discussed within the CTS literature thanks to the absence of local terrorist violence from the city, and thus my analysis of Stuttgart adds value to the debate – not only in dealing with a "new" case but also in demonstrating how understandings of material-discursive suspiciousness are pre-emptively translated across space and time to places where no local attacks happened.

7.3.1 The transformation of suspicious sites in Stuttgart

I begin my analysis with mapping the development of suspicious sites in Stuttgart. According to my theoretical-methodological premises, this implies all those urban locations which are considered suspicious due to their vulnerability as attractive terrorist targets or due to their potential dangerousness, as the areas where terrorist perpetrators are suspected to live. My historiographic archaeology of Stuttgart reveals in this context that although there were no local terrorist attacks in the German city, ultimately more and more of its sites became securitised over time on a purely anticipatory basis, drawing on memories of remote attacks and future imaginaries on where future attacks could happen in Stuttgart. While the recognition of vulnerable attack sites thus amplified, potentially dangerous sites were not systematically problematised in Stuttgart in the context of (counter)terrorism.

7.3.1.1 Suspicious sites before 9/11

Mapping suspicious sites before 9/11 shows that the securitisation of urban sites in Stuttgart under a reference to (counter)terrorism was generally limited. While the German city was obviously spared any local incident of terrorist violence, it was nonetheless surely confronted with remote encounters of terrorist violence. These happened not only in other European metropoles but also elsewhere in Germany.[4] Nonetheless, the memories created by them were not powerful enough to significantly influence the material-discursive transformation of local space in the city.

Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, Germany was hit by a series of terrorist attacks committed by the RAF which kept the entire country in suspense. While the RAF became later on mainly known for their hostage takings and targeted killings, the group also used 'violence against things', (Hürter 2018: 49), as claimed in one of their early manifestos. This included initially two incendiary attacks on shopping centres in Frankfurt in 1968 which ultimately led to the group's formation. Further attacks took place at US military bases, police headquarters, and the publishing house "Axel Springer", as all of them were considered to form part of the imperialist establishment the RAF was fighting against (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg 2011). Destroying infrastructure, and while doing so, willingly accepting the deaths of people inside the respectively attacked building, fitted the RAF's narrative of engaging South American inspired guerrilla tactics nicely (Pfahl-Traughber 2014a: 154). Another source of terrorist violence in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s were the "Revolutionary Cells", whose members followed, just like the RAF, an anti-imperialist ideology and also stemmed from the student protests of 1968 (Pfahl-Traughber 2014b). Despite these similarities, the Revolutionary Cells' attack methodology focused solely on attacking buildings and sites of structural and symbolic importance, such as for instance the German premises of multinational corporations, but also the building of the German Constitutional Court. A terrorist attack for which Germany became also internationally infamous was the incident at the Olympic Games 1972 in Munich. However, although the sporting event provided the stage where the hostage-taking and killing of eleven people was executed, the sporting arenas themselves were not targeted during the attack (Silke and Filippidou 2020).

[4] "Germany" refers during the country's separation (1949-1990) merely to the Federal Republic of Germany.

This short overview of various sources of terrorist violence which were influential in Germany before 9/11 shows how especially the ideological symbolism of certain sites led terrorist perpetrators to choose them as attack targets during this era. However, these incidents did not incite any systematic action to securitise them by implementing heightened measures of control in Stuttgart. As the caused damages did neither result in high financial damages nor in significant costs of human life, national and local security authorities did not see an urgent need to put the attack sites under special protection, since it concerned mainly the premises of corporations and companies in private ownership. Stuttgart as the business metropole that it is, would have surely qualified as an excellent location for a terrorist attack committed by either the RAF or the Revolutionary Cells. However, it neither served as a target nor did the attacks elsewhere lead to major securitisations of its potential terrorist target sites. Nevertheless, this does not mean that security concerns were entirely absent from the management of Stuttgart's urban sites before 9/11. In fact, Stuttgart was among the first cities in Germany to develop a comprehensive approach to community policing to keep its public space safe (cf. Sauberes und Sicheres Stuttgart e.V. 2022). The initiative was built on a close cooperation of the police, the urban administration, and civil society actors and led to a problematisation of the whole inner city-centre of Stuttgart (Wurtzbacher 2008: 218). This declaration of public urban space as potentially dangerous was yet mainly based on the physical presence of criminalised groups at these sites, such as migrants, homeless and juvenile. Nonetheless, the fear of crime had direct material consequences for Stuttgart by implementing the checklist of 'Crime Prevention through Urban Planning' (Schubert et al. 2007: 35, translated from the German original by the author) which had been proposed by the regional level of government in 2000. In this sense, the potential dangerousness of public urban space was material-discursively linked to the fear of crime and public disorder rather than the fear of a terrorist attack, and yet this connotation led to an intensified control of these sites through both formal and informal managers of suspiciousness as well as physical measures of prevention.

All in all, mapping suspicious sites during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that before 9/11, urban sites in Stuttgart were not problematised as suspicious under a reference to (counter)terrorism. While terrorist groups hit targets of structural and symbolic relevance in other metropoles both inside and outside of Germany, this did not lead to any counterterrorist related securitisations at these sites. Nevertheless, Stuttgart was already before 9/11 active in securitising its public space to counter the fear of crime and public disorder which led to increasing measures of control implemented in the entire city-centre of Stuttgart.

7.3.1.2 Suspicious sites between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

The problematisation of urban locations in Stuttgart from a counterterrorist perspective only began after the 9/11 attacks, as my mapping of suspicious sites during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology reveals. However, as terrorist violence remained locally absent from Stuttgart, the increasing securitisation of its urban sites was entirely pre-emptive, as it was triggered by remote experiences of terrorist violence which were translated to the German city across time and across space.

Regarding remote encounters with attacks, the events of 9/11 were a particularly prominent counterterrorist catalyst in the German context. This was not only driven by the strong transatlantic ties between Germany and the US at the time but also by fact, that many of the terrorist perpetrators involved in the 9/11 attacks had lived in Germany prior to the incident but their radicalisation and attack preparations remained unnoticed (9/11 Commission 2004: 160–165). These investigative failures turned into a wake-up call for German security authorities to take the threat of transnational terrorism more seriously. In addition, the attacks in Madrid and London a few years later demonstrated that terrorist violence in the Global North was not limited to targets in the US but European cities provided similarly attractive opportunities to send a powerful political message. The undeniable evidence that German cities also qualified as potential targets – although the German government made the controversial decision to not participate in the "coalition of the willing" to invade Iraq – was given in Cologne in 2006. Terrorist perpetrators had placed two suitcases filled with IEDs in commuter trains leaving the city's central station. That the attack produced ultimately neither human victims nor material damage was yet not indebted to a successful intervention of the security authorities but rather due to mistakes made in constructing the bombs impeding them to explode as planned (Ramelsberger 2010).

These remote experiences with terrorist violence translated directly – at least to the national level – in Germany, and thus led to a new activism when it comes to securing potential attack targets, especially in the sense of critical infrastructures. This was institutionally reflected in the formation of the special unit "KRITIS" within the German Ministry of the Interior and in the establishment of the "Bundesamt für den Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe" (Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance; BBK). One of their first joint milestone documents was the so-called "Baseline Protection Concept" for critical infrastructures which was published in 2005 together with the "Bundeskriminalamt" (Federal Criminal Police Office; BKA). It contained direct references to the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London which were considered as warning calls for Germany (German Ministry of the Interior 2005: 1): Hence, the memories of these remote encounters with terrorist violence were translated in the document into a wide range of future imaginaries of different attack scenarios including manipulative action, IED, VAW, and incendiary attacks, but also incidents using hijacked airplanes and chemical weapons (German Ministry of the Interior 2005: 10). To counter these anticipated threats, the Baseline Protection Concept laid a focus on the protection of critical infrastructures which it defined as 'organizational and physical structures and facilities of such vital importance to a nation's society and economy that their failure or degradation would result in sustained supply shortages, significant disruption of public safety and security, or other dramatic consequences' (German Ministry of the Interior 2005: 1). The document thus offered a purely functional definition of suspicious sites in the sense of vulnerable targets: Critical infrastructures were characterised by their capacity to be exploited as highly sensitive potential attack locations, due to their structural relevance as well as the potential side and domino effects an attack on them could have (German Ministry of the Interior 2005: 19). The measures of protection suggested for critical infrastructures implied material

updates of the premises in question, such as the construction of physical barriers and access controls but also reforms of the organisational structures of risk and security management. To give further guidance on how to enforce the Baseline Protection Concept practically, risk management was put to the test in annual training scenarios called "LÜKEX" (BBK 2022). Initiated in 2004, these trainings were executed in cooperation by federal and regional authorities and had a yearly changing general theme dealing with different threat scenarios, including for instance a coordinated series of IED attacks on public buses, metro systems and regional trains (BBK 2022).

In 2009, the German approach towards protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist threats had its first substantial and far-reaching update with the adoption of its comprehensive "KRITIS Strategie" (National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection; CIP strategy). The document offered a refined understanding of critical infrastructures, not only based on systemic criticality but also based on symbolic criticality, meaning that 'if its loss might, on account of its cultural significance or its important role in creating a sense of identity, emotionally unsettle a nation's society and psychologically have a lasting unbalancing effect on it' (German Ministry of the Interior 2009: 7). The strategy further proposed the adoption of a 'novel risk culture' (German Ministry of the Interior 2009: 11) to achieve effective and sustainable preventive measures to tackle the threats towards vulnerable infrastructures. Despite the CIP strategy's significant influence in specifying the securitisation of suspicious sites all over Germany, one element that was still missing, when it was first published, was a concrete identification of sectors falling into the abstract definition of what was considered critical infrastructure, as this proved to be a contentious issue between national and regional authorities (BBK 2019: 23). A substantial understanding was thus only adopted in 2011, classifying the following sectors as critical infrastructure: Energy, IT, transport and mobility, health, water, food, finance and insurance services, state and public administration, media and culture (German Ministry of the Interior 2011: 8). This categorisation hence suggested a wide range of potential attack targets, reaching out in many areas of urban everyday life, which led to their transformation according to the new risk culture, as proposed in the CIP strategy. The implementation of additional measures of control had to be realised on the local level by both public authorities and private actors and translated for instance into surveillance, physical barriers, and additional access control at airports and train stations (Bonß and Wagner 2016; Herlyn and Zurawski 2016; Groh and Rosch 2016; Schlüter et al. 2016).

However, the CIP strategy's local implementation was not the only effort that was taken in Stuttgart to prepare the metropole for a potential terrorist attack. Thus, the city joined the "European Forum on Urban Security" (EFUS) in 2008 (EFUS 2022a). This transnational network of cities, municipalities and other local actors in Europe has offered a platform for dialogue and exchanging experiences to successfully organise urban security since 1987 (EFUS 2019). Living up to this commitment, the forum has held workshops and conferences, conducted research projects, and published policy recommendations. The fact that Stuttgart was the first city in Germany to join the network reflects the city's special dedication to professionalising its approach to urban security.

All in all, mapping suspicious sites in Stuttgart during the second of my historiographic archaeology revealed that compared to the time before 9/11, anticipatory action to securitise vulnerable sites did significantly increase in Stuttgart, thanks to powerful translations of remote experiences and future imaginaries of terrorist violence. However, there are some important qualifications to this observation. Firstly, the most visible push to securitise critical infrastructure came clearly from the national level in Germany. While these decisions had of course a direct effect on Stuttgart when it comes to their implementation, the independent counterterrorist efforts of the metropole were – besides joining EFUS in 2008 – still rather limited at this stage. Secondly, not all suspicious sites, as categorised in the CIP strategy, can be considered classic urban locations: While some of the sectors such as mobility, health, media and cultural venues naturally accumulate in urban space, others such as electricity and food production are not necessarily located within the boundaries of metropoles. Thirdly, the approach of Germany's national CIP strategy responded to all sorts of threats, stretching from natural disasters to human and technical failures, and thus was not limited to terrorism as a threat. Besides all these relevant reservations, ultimately many sites in Stuttgart pre-emptively turned under the CIP strategy into suspicious sites after 9/11, which led to both physical and organisational measures of control at them.

7.3.1.3 Suspicious sites since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Finally, mapping suspicious sites during the last phase of my analysis showed that since 2015/16 the material-discursive attribution of vulnerability to urban locations widened further. Although Stuttgart remained off the target list, powerful memories of remote attacks and influential future imaginaries of terrorist violence were translated to the metropole and extended not only the control, that was previously limited to the protection of its sites of structural and symbolic relevance, to the city's public urban space in general but also led to an intensification of the measures implemented to protect these sites.

In terms of remote incidents of terrorist violence during this phase which left their imprint on Stuttgart, the attacks in Paris and Brussels were not the only ones that gained international attention at the time, creating the impression of a European peak of attacks in 2015/16: Thus, the attacks in Nice and Berlin in 2016 happened not only just a few months apart from each other but also showed strong resemblances in the used attack methodologies (CNN Editorial Research 2021). The attack in the French city Nice happened on the 14 July, which is the most important national holiday in France, and hence surrounded by many popular festivities. One of these events – in this case, public fireworks at the city's beach promenade – created the target scene for the attack in Nice (Yuhas et al. 2016): The attacker used a hired truck as a weapon to drive into the human crowd of around 30,000 spectators and went on there for a stretch of almost two kilometres before he was shoot dead by the police. The incident cost the lives of 86 and injured more than 400 people. Committed in a similar manner, but for the German context even important, was the terrorist attack in Berlin which took place on 19 December 2016 (Kirchgaessner 2016). The target location was in this case a public Christmas market next to the city's famous Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, which was at the time busy with tourists and locals alike (Welt 2016). The attack was also committed with a large truck driven by a single man and cost the lives of 13 people,

while another 56 were injured (Kroet 2017). Together with the attacks in Paris and Brussels, these two incidents demonstrate how the selection of terrorist target sites developed over time thanks to changing attack methodologies focusing on human crowds to spread fear beyond the immediate act of violence.

Within the general trajectory towards pre-emptively securitising urban sites, these remote experiences of violence left their imprint on which urban locations were seen as potentially attractive targets for such incidents and how to deal with them accordingly, also in Stuttgart. While during the previous phase, the securitisation of suspicious sites was initiated mostly on the national level, since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, counterterrorist policymaking on the regional and local level became much more prominent. Thus, the securitisation of everyday life sites in Stuttgart significantly intensified thanks to a far-reaching reform of the police law in Baden-Württemberg[5] in 2020 (Habermehl 2020). The legal update stands out in terms of the securitisation of urban public spaces because it comprised special rules which apply 'when on the basis of a current threat analysis, it can be assumed that events and gatherings of a comparable type and size are threatened by terrorist attacks' (Police Law Baden-Württemberg 2020: § 44, translated from the German original by the author) without further specifying who evaluates the respective current threat level and what qualifies as sufficient evidence to consider an event or a gathering a potential terrorist target location. What is hence particularly interesting about this addition is that the only characteristic that is mentioned in the law is that the respective occasion should be 'comparable in type and size' to those where terrorist violence has happened in other cities. This translates into a direct reference to remote experiences of attacks which are used as a defining characteristic on which the vulnerability of events in Stuttgart should be judged. In substantial terms, it means that the locations of festivities, markets, fairs, and all sorts of similar happenings in public urban space turn them into suspicious sites. The special regulations that apply for them imply additional rights for the police, such as to take pictures and videos of all their participants and check their identity documents (Police Law Baden-Württemberg 2020: § 27, § 44). The simple presence of these people at sites that are deemed suspicious builds hence a sufficient basis for infringements of their personal freedoms, no additional justification must be brought forward.

In addition to these legal reforms, the regional government of Baden-Württemberg also put forward the initiative "BWTEX" to prepare for terrorist attacks, anticipated in its cities. Just like the national equivalent, BWTEX has been an annual event to simulate attack scenarios and train expert personnel to respond to such emergencies. The selected target locations tellingly show where managers of suspiciousness anticipated attacks to happen: Thus in 2018, BWTEX was held at the central train station in Stuttgart: With around 1,000 participants, more than 25,000 blank and colour cartridges and several scenarios, including gun fire and IED attacks, the exercise was one of the biggest and most elaborate training simulations ever held in Germany (Bilger 2018). Other simulations throughout the last years took place in pedestrian areas, at a museum and a theatre hall, mimicking the attack methodologies used in Brussels and in Paris (Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Württemberg 2019).

[5] The management of the police is a decentralised regional competence within the German federal system.

Yet, not only regional efforts to securitise suspicious sites of urban everyday life intensified, but Stuttgart also has increased the local security alert level by adopting a counterterrorist agenda of securitising public space in the city. This implied the installation of 47 solid and eleven retractable bollards around Stuttgart's pedestrian area at Schlossplatz and Königstraße in 2019. The investment was justified by the city's deputy mayor for safety and order with a concrete reference to the VAW attack in Berlin, arguing that particularly for big events, it was necessary to step up precautions, when it comes to attacks employing cars as weapons against human crowds (Schwörer 2019). Additional bollards for the festival area at Neckarpark have been planned. Furthermore, the city introduced the local initiative "Experience Stuttgart Safely" in July 2020. The measures were foremostly taken to respond to a spontaneous outbreak of vandalism and violence in Stuttgart after a police control of a group of young men escalated in 2020, leading to 140 people arrested, 32 policeman injured and damages of more than 350,000 Euros (Henzler and Stegemann 2021). The initial action plan of the Experience Stuttgart Safely campaign included ten immediate measures: While some of them, such as the establishment of a so-called House of Prevention are directed more specifically towards juveniles displaying problematic behaviour, others have general implications for the security governance at urban public sites in Stuttgart, and hence fulfil also counterterrorist rationales. These include 'focal point-oriented presence patrols and control measures as well as focal point actions such as manhunt days' (Stuttgart City Administration 2020: 4, translated from the German original by the author). The initial action plan led to the adoption of the "Konzeption für eine sichere Innenstadt 2022" (Safe City Centre Concept 2022) which described its implementation in Stuttgart's city centre, especially its pedestrian area around the famous square Schlossplatz, the central shopping street Königstraße, as well as locations known for their restaurants, bars and busy nightlife, such as Marienplatz and Feuersee (Stuttgart City Administration 2022c). The measures included an increase of control through specially trained private security personnel and police forces. Moreover, technological and architectural means were employed to securitise the city's public urban spaces thought to be at risk which implied the installation of video surveillance at potentially dangerous public sites as well as an updated lightening concept (Stuttgart City Administration 2020: 6).

The generally increased awareness in Stuttgart towards issues of counterterrorism and securing urban sites resonates with the input that the city received through its EFUS membership where the topic of how to deal with the vulnerability of public urban space skyrocketed in importance in recent years. In this context, Stuttgart was directly involved in a project titled "IcARUS" (Innovative Approaches to Urban Security) which 'aims to learn from past experiences in urban security policies and practices throughout Europe' (IcARUS project 2020b: 3). Its main objective is thus to 'rethink, redesign and adapt existing tools and methods to help local security actors anticipate and better respond to security challenges' (IcARUS project 2020b: 3). While the project focuses on different types of challenges, these do revolve around '[p]reventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism [and] designing and managing safe public spaces (IcARUS project 2020b: 3). As IcARUS is currently still ongoing, it has not produced any concluding results, but the 'need to assess the potential vulnerabilities of urban public

spaces linked to the emergence of conflict, insecurity or negative use of these urban areas [and] tackling radicalisation at the local level' (IcARUS project 2020a) were focal points of the endeavour. Other EFUS projects, whose insights Stuttgart gained indirectly through its membership were "PRoTECT" (Public Resilience using Technology to Counter Terrorism), "PACTESUR" (Protect Allied Cities against Terrorism in Securing Urban Areas), and "Secu4All" (Training local authorities to provide citizens with a safe urban environment by reducing the risks in public spaces) (cf. EFUS 2022b). They were all been implemented by a heterogenous group of partners, including EFUS and its national fora, but also research institutions, private security companies and local authorities from respective partner cities. In doing so, the projects developed and tested new ways of securing urban sites against terrorist violence and made their results and lessons learnt accessible to a broader audience in joint workshops and publications. While the concrete understanding of suspicious sites varies across the different projects, they all adopted a broad notion of vulnerable target locations which included sites in private and public ownership where urban everyday life typically takes places, such as squares, shopping areas, gastronomy, cultural and nightlife venues, sports stadia, event locations and public transport.

All in all, mapping suspicious sites during the last phase of my analysis demonstrates that securitising locations of everyday life in Stuttgart increased in both qualitative and quantitative terms, meaning that not only measures of control intensified but also more and more sites became material-discursively attributed with suspiciousness since the peak of attacks in European cities in 2015/16. While the securitisation of potential target locations was previously limited to sites of critical infrastructure in Germany, this definition was considerably extended to include basically any urban location with increased human interaction in Stuttgart. While the explicit geographical focus of attention has remained on Stuttgart's city-centre, the underlying understanding of what counts as a potential attack site was clearly extended to all kinds of sites of urban everyday life and measures of control were stepped up accordingly. This included the installation of bollards as well as the placement of CCTV cameras and the projection of police presence in the city's pedestrian zone, shopping streets, and nightlife districts as well as new laws allowing for pre-emptive identity controls at event locations. What makes this finding especially noteworthy is that the increasing securitisation of suspicious sites in the German city happened entirely pre-emptively but the same time, references to remote attacks became more and more prominent in drafting, implementing, and justifying Stuttgart's counterterrorist response which indicates how terrorist violence was indeed translated to the city across time and space, as past experiences of terrorist violence were taken as anticipatory evidence, and thus served as a template for how to identify potential threats as well as potential vulnerable targets in the German business metropole. What remained absent from Stuttgart in contrast to London and Brussels is the problematisation of potentially dangerous areas, as the suspiciousness of sites in this case was only connected to their assumed vulnerability to serve as an attractive attack target location.

7.3.2 The transformation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart

The next section of this chapter deals with the securitisation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart, as the second transformation of non-human bodies. I trace this development just like my other two cases by comparing the evolution of attributing material-discursive suspiciousness to mundane items, which are usually seen as harmless but can be used as means to commit terrorist violence or secretly transport such means to an attack location, to the suspiciousness of classic weapons. My mapping of the transformation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart shows how the securitisation of things has been a rather subtle tendency in the German city, as it was initially mostly focused on classic weapons. Nevertheless, the problematisation of mundane items, such as cars, incrementally increased in recent years. This has also been connected to a growing attention paid to other rationales, such as environmental concerns. Thus, my findings in this respect add to broader academic debates on dual-use and interlinking policy rationales in the context of comprehensive counterterrorist thinking (Anthony 2014; Crelinsten 2014).

7.3.2.1 Suspicious objects before 9/11

Mapping suspicious objects during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart shows that the material-discursive understanding of potentially dangerous objects was initially limited to classic weapons, especially firearms and explosives, which were used by the RAF to commit terrorist attacks throughout the 1970s in several German cities. To securitise them, regulations to manage their acquisition and possession were introduced especially on the national level.

The historical trajectory of suspicious objects in Stuttgart as a German city is a particularly interesting because the regulation of potentially dangerous objects in Germany was originally linked to the country's status of limited sovereignty after World War II: With the allied forces still being present in Germany, and the level of suspicion against Germans being high, the possession of weapons was in general forbidden for them, even for police officers, and hence the only individuals legally carrying a firearm on German territory were British, French, and US soldiers (Hurka 2015: 231). Thus, at this stage it was not necessarily weapons as such but rather *who* was carrying them that made them potentially dangerous. Throughout the Cold War, Germany's rearmament was an important but also controversial step in the country's process of regaining its sovereignty (Searle 2003). In the context of its rearmament, the legal possession of firearms for civilian use, such as hunting and sports competitions, was also gradually reintroduced in Germany. Initially, rules in this respect differed across German regions, since the competence to regulate the possession and acquisition of weapons was merely in 1972 shifted to federal level (Ellerbrock 2014: 45). This change in competences came not only about due to an increasing frustration with the existing legal fragmentation but was also prompted by acts of terrorist violence, committed especially by the RAF during the 1970s, which contributed to a continuously dynamic securitisation of classic weapons in Germany at the time (Hurka 2015: 232). The weapons used to perpetrate acts of violence ranged from firearms to incendiary bombs and IEDs. The latter were particularly prominent during the attack series which became known as "Mai Offensive" in 1972, including bomb attacks in Frankfurt, Munich, and Hamburg (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-

Württemberg 2011). Under the pressuring conditions of serious terrorist violence on German territory, the initial adoption of the first federal German weapon law in 1972 was done in a hastily manner and widely considered a failure (Scholzen 2003: 35). To make up for its deficiencies, a revised version was adopted in 1976. Thanks to its provision that the legal acquisition and possession of firearms is only granted by permission, the general control of weapons for civilian use was introduced at a very early stage. Therefore, Germany claimed the reputation to have one the strictest regulatory systems for weapons worldwide (Breitenbach 2010). While the law focused on the regulation of firearms, it also held provisions for thrust and cut weapons as well as explosives. Yet, despite these new rules governing arms ownership in Germany, newspaper reports at the time revealed how widespread the illegal trade of firearms in Germany was during the 1970s, indicating that the practical implementation of the reform was far from successful (Der Spiegel 1976). This coincided with the second generation of the RAF which adjusted the group's attack methodology, after the main members of first generation of the RAF were arrested in 1972. Rather than attacking sites for their symbolic relevance and accepting the injuries and deaths of the people present there, they employed a strategy of targeted killings to put pressure on the German government to free the imprisoned members of the first generation. The so-called "Offensive 77" named after the year in which it happened was committed mainly by using firearms in targeted hijackings and killings (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg 2011). Victims included the Federal Prosecutor General, a bank CEO, and the president of the German Employers' Association. In reaction to this new series of attacks, the regulations for classic weapons were further restricted in 1978, for instance by increasing the penalty for their illegal possession (Hurka 2015: 232). After another adaption of the German weapon law to international legal standards in 1980, the topic became less prominent on the political agenda. This shift was attributed to a change in government in the country but also enabled by the decreased threat that the RAF posed by that time (Hurka 2015: 232).

All in all, mapping suspicious objects in Stuttgart during the first phase of my analysis demonstrates how it was merely classic weapons which were securitised as suspicious objects in Germany before 9/11. This included mainly firearms but also explosives and knives, and was explicitly linked to terrorist violence in German cities during the 1970s, as they triggered the adoption of stricter rules on the national level which had direct repercussions for the local level in Stuttgart. In contrast, the securitisation of mundane objects of urban everyday life was not discussed in the phase before 9/11, but the relevant terrorist groups in Germany also barely ever made use of them.

7.3.2.2 Suspicious objects between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious objects during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology makes evident that the events of 9/11 showed what little and inconspicuous items it took for terrorist perpetrators to cause a largescale catastrophe. The methodologies of the attacks in Madrid and London added up to this observation by showing how IEDs made from mundane materials were able to send an effectful message in harming many random civilians at crowded urban places. These powerful memories of remote encounters with terrorist violence were translated to the German context and led to a pre-emptive

widening of the material-discursive understanding of suspicious objects to include not only classic weapons but also mundane items of urban everyday life. The intensified control towards them was introduced mostly on the national level through legal reforms. However, the suspiciousness of ordinary items was not elusive enough to transform Stuttgart's everyday life in general, and thus remained limited to urban locations in the German business metropole, which were recognised as suspicious at the time.

In respect to classic weapons, the legal regulations on the possession and acquisition of firearms, explosives and combat knives were – for the first time since the late 1970s – significantly updated in 2002. The curious timing of this reform was yet not only inspired by the remote experience of the 9/11 attacks but also coincided with two rampage shootings committed by teenagers in 2001 and 2002 (Hurka 2015: 233). The subsequent reform of the German weapon law was far-reaching: While some changes had also become necessary due to changing EU standards, others were intended to further restrict existing rules. Besides a total ban of some types of guns and pistols in Germany, the severest restrictions were imposed on the possession and acquisition of still legal firearms, such as the requirement of thorough check on the liability and personal aptitude of potential gun owners (Straube 2019: 202–204; Scholzen 2003: 41). In 2008, further changes were introduced which included a ban to carry flare guns and gas pistols in public to avoid misunderstandings with police officers. Also, knives were now treated with more pre-caution as publicly carrying knives with a blade longer than twelve centimetres became an offence (Hurka 2015: 234). Already a year later, the German weapon law was modified again, thanks to another rampage shooting which led to additional legal restrictions regarding the storage of weapons and allowed for random checks of these without a given suspicion (Der Spiegel 2009). Moreover, the need to legally possess weapon became listed in the national weapons register and subject to continuous scrutiny as well as the number of weapons owned by one individual got capped (Straube 2019: 254). Overall, the level of control towards all sorts of classic weapons clearly intensified during this phase, especially thanks to legal reforms on the national level, which trickled down to the local level in Stuttgart in their practical implementation. Yet, these changes were primarily incited by rampage shootings and also resonated with the boarder societal rejection of individual gun ownership as legitimate which had grown more and more dominant in Germany over the years (Ellerbrock 2014).

However, the securitisation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart intensified also directly related to (counter)terrorism: Thus, the 'preparation of a serious act of violence endangering the state' (Criminal Code 2022: §89a, translated from the German original by the author) became a criminal offence in 2009. Such preparation includes the manufacturing, possession, and instructions on how to build or use

> 'firearms, explosives, detonating or incendiary devices, nuclear fuel or other radioactive substances, substances containing or capable of producing poison, other substances harmful to health, special devices necessary for the commission of the offence or in other skills used in the commission of one of the offences' (Criminal Code 2022: §89a, translated from the German original by the author).

In other words, the mere intention to prepare a terrorist act became punishable in Germany and this intention was measured by owning and manufacturing suspicious objects or instructing others or being instructed on their use (Kauder 2009). This law thus extended the understanding of suspicious objects

considerably because its vague phrasing covers not only classic weapons but also mundane objects of urban everyday life: While the paragraph lists firstly several classic weapons, it also implicates mundane objects which are instrumentalised for terrorist purposes by referring to unspecific and generic terms, such as “substances harmful to health” and “special devices”, which allow for a wide range of ordinary items of urban everyday life to be subsumed under them (Lanzrath and Fieberg 2009). Hence, for instance, substances contained in cosmetic products, such as hair bleach and nail polish remover, but also kitchen timers which were used in several terrorist attacks to assemble IEDs would be considered potential evidence when found at the house of a potential terrorist suspect. The law’s vague formulation and its timing was partially indebted to the ‘suitcase bomber’ (Clement 2008) attack attempt in Cologne in 2006 but also previous experiences of terrorist attacks in other European metropoles, such as London and Madrid. While the adoption of paragraph 89a implied in theory a remarkable paradigm change regarding the material-discursive attribution of suspiciousness to mundane objects, the practical consequences of these legal changes remained yet limited to urban locations in Stuttgart recognised as suspicious sites because ultimately the implied understanding of suspicious objects was not elusive enough to result in their concrete securitisation in the city’s everyday life in general, since the understanding which objects qualified as suspicious was too unspecific. Suspicious sites included for instance – also thanks to international law-making – the security zone of Stuttgart’s airport, where just like in other countries, special rules for liquids and other potentially dangerous goods applied since 2006 (Bonß and Wagner 2016: 87). Besides this specific example, the rules on which mundane items were deemed potentially dangerous objects varied across different sectors depending on the type of critical infrastructure within the meaning of the German CIP strategy (German Ministry of the Interior 2011).

All in all, mapping suspicious objects in Stuttgart between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 shows that their material-discursive understanding was not only extended during the second phase of my analysis, but their securitisation also intensified. However, this observation corresponds primarily to the development that happened regarding mundane objects of urban everyday life and not so much to the trajectory of classic weapons. Starting with the latter, while the securitisation of classic weapons continued to intensify thanks to stricter rules on how to obtain and possess classic weapons, many of these policy changes were not foremostly linked to an outspoken counterterrorist agenda. Nonetheless, the potential dangerousness of classic weapons to be used for terrorist purposes was recognised in paragraph 89a, reconfirming their suspiciousness in this context. What makes the respective legal provision even more remarkable is that it also initiated the securitisation of mundane objects by linking their possession, manufacturing, and instrumentalization to terrorist intentions. This implied not only a considerable paradigm change but was also directly linked to remote experiences of terrorist violence in other European metropoles and the attack attempt in Cologne in 2006. Nonetheless, especially the local implementation of securitisation of mundane objects within Stuttgart’s local space remained geographically limited to the city’s suspicious sites.

7.3.2.3 Suspicious objects since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Finally, mapping the transformation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology reveals that their securitisation intensified even further. Thus, the level of control towards classic weapons increased but also the local problematisation of mundane objects, especially cars, was stepped up in the German city. This development was triggered by translations of remote experiences of attacks which made the future imaginaries of what kind of objects could be instrumentalised to commit terrorist violence also in Stuttgart elusive and tangible.

When it comes to these remote experiences of terrorist violence, the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 varied – as already observed in my previous empirical chapters – widely regarding the objects used to commit terrorist assaults. Thus, in case of the attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, the perpetrators used classic weapons including firearms, IEDs and knives as well as mundane objects such as suitcases to secretly transport their bombs to the selected attack sites. In contrast, the attacks in Nice and Berlin were VAW attacks in which the respective offenders instrumentalised trucks as weapons, while also carrying classic weapons (CNN Editorial Research 2021). The materiality of the used vehicles allowed the terrorist perpetrators not only to easily injure and kill random victims by driving into human crowds but also shielded the assailants from being stopped in their actions by the police and civilian bystanders. At the same time, such trucks also have in-built features which pose challenges for instrumentalising them in intentionally injuring people: Thus, in the Berlin attack, the semi-automatic breaks of the trailer kicked in, after the assailant had hit his first victims because the electronics of the vehicle noticed the collision, and hence the truck stopped automatically, ending the lethal ride earlier than presumably intended (Leyendecker et al. 2016). Overall, the respective attack methodologies of the remote experiences of violence during this phase demonstrated that albeit classic weapons were still prominent, mundane objects of urban everyday life gained even more relevance in committing terrorist assaults which directly translated into powerful and elusive imaginaries of how these items could be also used to attack Stuttgart's everyday life in the future.

Hence, these translations had repercussions on the material-discursive securitisation of both classic weapons and mundane objects in Stuttgart, although the city has remained off the target list of terrorist perpetrators until now. Regarding classic weapons, the national laws on gun ownership were further tightened. A first modification of the existing regulations was adopted in 2017 (Police North-Rhine Westphalia 2017): It implemented a higher standard for securely storing legally owned weapons at home and an entire ban for armour piercing ammunition. Moreover, the new law foresaw the most recent amnesty to hand over illegally owned weapons to the German authorities without punishment. A first initiative of this kind dating back to 2009 had resulted in the safe appropriation of around 200,000 illegally owned weapons including everything from machine guns to pistols, and all sorts of thrust and cut weapons. In 2017, the will to voluntarily give up illegally owned dangerous items was less widespread but still accounted for the seizure of another 71,000 objects classified as illegally owned weapons in Germany (German Press Agency 2021). While the first amnesty was lauded publicly as a

success, its repetition in 2017 was seen more critically – not only was its limited outcome questioned but concerns were also raised in terms of the effectiveness of voluntary amnesties to significantly reduce the number of illegally owned weapons in Germany (German Press Agency 2018). In 2020, the most recent reform of the German weapon law took place (German Ministry of the Interior 2022). Its crucial regulations from a counterterrorist point of view comprise that the domestic intelligence service "Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz" (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution; BfV) must be also consulted when checking the personal trustworthiness of an individual applying for a gun ownership permit. Furthermore, the federal law contains a completely new provision that allows the regional governments to entirely prohibit or partially restrict the carrying of firearms and particular knives in certain public streets, roads, squares, buildings as well as youth and educational facilities. This new rule did hence not only draw an imminent connection between suspicious sites and suspicious items but its adoption was also agreed upon in direct reaction to attacks in Paris in January and November 2015, indicating how these remote experiences of terrorist violence were translated across time and space to Stuttgart (German Ministry of the Interior 2022). To effectively put the provision into practice, the regional police law in Baden-Württemberg outlined since its most recent reform in 2020 that items can be searched on the sole basis that they are found at a place marked as suspicious either under the CIP classification or based on the presence of human crowd (Police Law Baden-Württemberg 2020: § 35). The regulation remained legally vague, and therefore covers both classic weapons and mundane items: Thus, an object may be searched under the suspicion that a dangerous item is hidden inside of it, such as a backpack, or car being instrumentalised for secretly transporting weapons to a future attack site (Police Law Baden-Württemberg 2020: § 35, 3). In practice, the ban has been planned to be adopted in the context of Stuttgart's Safe City Centre Concept 2022 (Stuttgart City Administration 2022c: 52).

However, this was not the only effort to further securitise mundane objects of urban everyday life in Stuttgart. On the national level, the legal conditions of paragraph 89a remained unchanged without developing into a stricter direction. Yet, the practical measures of control to detect suspicious objects became thanks to technological innovation more advanced, for instance by introducing full body scanners in 2016 to enter the security zone of Stuttgart airport (Bilger 2016). Besides these relative continuities at the national level, there was a paradigm change regarding the securitisation of one specific type of mundane object on the regional and local level, namely vehicles. These policy changes were directly inspired by the methodology of remote VAW attacks in other European cities, such as Nice, London, Barcelona, and most importantly for the German context, Berlin. That on this basis, vehicles were securitised in Stuttgart is particularly remarkable, given the general car-friendly image that the German business metropole has curated for decades (Bauer 2018). To acknowledge cars as a potential risk factor for the safety of Stuttgart's public urban space comprised hence a significant shift, although the increasing general problematisation of vehicles was also linked to environmental and health concerns, such as the notoriously low air quality in the city thanks to exhaust emissions (Götz 2017). The local securitisation of vehicles was implemented through several measures: On the one hand, as

mentioned above, the city administration of Stuttgart introduced in 2019 retractable and solid bollards to protect the vulnerable urban sites in its city-centre from VAW attacks, which were justified with a direct reference to the Christmas market attack in Berlin (Schwörer 2019). On the other hand, the government of Baden-Württemberg introduced as one Germany's regions' frontrunners an ANPR system in the police law reform of 2020. The prevention of terrorist attacks is explicitly listed among the legal reasons to rightfully use the system. However, compared to other places, such as London, the legal restraints for Stuttgart's police forces to employ this technology have remained much higher, as the application of the APNR system is neither allowed for an unlimited time nor for an indefinite spatial area, and hence has retained to be temporary measures at certain sites and streets. Furthermore, the data of non-suspicious number plates must be deleted immediately after their check brought no match with the license plate wanted list (Police Law Baden-Württemberg 2020: § 51).

All in all, the last phase of my historiographic archaeology revealed a further intensification of the material-discursive securitisation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart which happened on entirely pre-emptive grounds, as terrorist violence remained locally absent from the German city. Regarding classic weapons, the existing trajectories especially in German law continued to impose higher restrictions on the acquisition and legal possession of firearms, explosives, and thrust and cut weapons. A potential complete ban of them at sensitive urban sites underlines how suspicious sites and suspicious objects have been intra-acting with each other but also demonstrated that the intensified control towards classic weapons not only served purely counterterrorist purposes but also followed a crime-preventing rationale. In terms of mundane objects of urban everyday life, the legal provisions established in period after 9/11 remained in place but their local implementation became more tangible and widespread in Stuttgart. The most paradigmatic shift which happened in direct reaction to the remote attacks in other European cities was the securitisation of cars and trucks in the German city as potentially dangerous. Although this development was surely not comprehensive in the sense that, in general, vehicles were still considered overall as harmless in the city, however, there has been a growing tendency to be aware of the potential risks that cars and trucks bring to Stuttgart's everyday life which goes beyond environmental concerns, as it is related to the fear of terrorist violence. These trends of securitising suspicious objects following a pre-emptive counterterrorist rationale have certainly changed how urban everyday life can be lived in Stuttgart. Seen from a normative point of view, the increasing securitisation of classic weapons and cars may not seem as per se problematic. However, the developments in Stuttgart nonetheless show how counterterrorist rationales have become closer and closer intertwined with other security and non-security related issues, such as crime prevention and environmental protection, and thus were increasingly incorporated also at the local level of policymaking in Stuttgart. This indicates a further pre-emptive normalisation of (counter)terrorism in the German metropole, albeit it has never been the local target of terrorist violence.

7.3.3 The transformation of suspicious people in Stuttgart

Having dealt with the securitisation of non-human bodies in Stuttgart brings me to the securitisation of human bodies, and thus this section of my case study on Stuttgart deals with the transformation of suspicious people. These potentially dangerous people comprise according to my theoretical-methodological premises a spectrum of individuals who are material-discursively attributed with the suspicion of having committed terrorist violence or intentions to do so or being receptive to radicalisation efforts of terrorist groups. In mapping the transformation regarding which human bodies were constructed as suspicious in Stuttgart, I show that while the counterterrorist measures taken to single out members of Germany's suspect community were already invasive before 9/11, they became over time discriminatorily directed towards German's Muslim and migrant communities. Lately, this focus was broadened again, especially by using largely undefined concepts and the problematisation of suspicious behaviour. Thus, my analysis contributes not only a historical reflection to the existing literature (Chalkiadaki 2017; Goertz 2019b) but also reveals how the recent vagueness of defining suspicious people in Stuttgart allowed for a reproduction of pre-existing stereotypes, and thus led to continuities of terrorist stigmatisations.

7.3.3.1 Suspicious people before 9/11

Mapping suspicious people during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart reveals that their securitisation was already quite intense before 9/11. This was especially triggered by domestic terrorist violence committed by the RAF whose suspected members were targeted with counterterrorism laws and policies that were introduced especially for them. The shared rationale of these measures was that terrorist violence has a different quality than criminal violence, and therefore justifies that law enforcement agencies also counter it with extraordinary means, even if this implies harsh curtailments of fundamental rights for its potential and actual perpetrators. In terms of the identification of a distinctive suspect community, the leftist milieu from which the RAF had emerged proved difficult to be clearly differentiable from the stereotypical German citizen. However, intrusive investigation techniques, using both traditional and newly developed means, targeted large numbers of random individuals based on their political beliefs but also aspects as trivial as their place of residence.

Before the late 1960s, protecting Germany's internal security was hardly a concern for its policymakers on the national and the local level, as the threat to be attacked externally seemed in the hostile context of the Cold War far more likely. The domestic terrorism committed by the RAF however pushed the topic suddenly on the political agenda of the country (Weinhauer 2004: 235). While there were more terrorist networks, cells, and individual perpetrators active on German territory before 9/11, the group that clearly stood out in earning the most public attention was the RAF which followed a communist, anti-imperialist ideology (Weinhauer 2004: 225). It initially emerged from the largely peaceful student protests during the 1960s which questioned not only the capitalist economic world order, the Vietnam War, and conservative societal structures in general but also challenged more specifically for the German context the success of the German society's denazification (Diewald-

Kerkmann 2012). The extra-parliamentary opposition that emerged from this protest movement was for some not radical enough, which led eventually to the formation of the RAF whose leaders openly claimed to use violence in their fight against the German state structures. As their ideological goals appeared to be aligned with larger parts of German society, the RAF strategically hoped for a strong reaction of the German authorities countering their terrorist activities to reveal and unmask suppressive state structures, and thus win over the support of the general public (Pfahl-Traughber 2014a: 156).

This plan only worked out partially: Whereas most of the German population did not sympathise with the RAF's violent actions, the German authorities took them seriously and responded with drastic measures based on several new laws targeting the potential and actual perpetrators of terrorist violence. The most important legal novelty in this context was the introduction of paragraph 129a of the Criminal Code in 1976, penalising the formation and support of a terrorist organisation as well as campaigning and recruiting for one (Sturm 2006: 103). This norm was noteworthily far-reaching by being ultimately vague: It thus criminalised any form of preparing a terrorist act without defining what that concretely meant, and no matter if it was actually realised (Chalkiadaki 2017: 114–115). Moreover, it also adopted a wide understanding of what supporting terrorist suspects implied: Hence, knowing the whereabouts of a wanted suspect without telling the law enforcement agencies could already be punished as an act of supporting terrorist activities, just like the publication of solidarity leaflets led to arrests and criminal prosecution (Berlit and Dreier 1984: 233; Schulte 2008: 125–126). Besides this general norm to criminalise the terrorist activities of individuals and groups, there were further amendments and legal innovations to equip security authorities with tools to identify and prosecute terrorist suspects more effectively. These included for instance that the legal hurdles to search property as well as to stop and search individuals, and to remand them in custody got significantly lowered. While there was previously a necessity to provide concrete indications for someone to be treated as a suspect, this principle was abandoned with the adoption of the new laws – but solely for suspicions against potential terrorist perpetrators, indicating the special quality assigned to terrorism in comparison to other violent assaults (Müller 1980: 118). In addition to amendments of existing criminal prosecution provisions, the introduction of dragnet investigations was an entirely new method to identify suspicious people by making use of advancing technological means available at the time: The computerised instrument hence compared all types of data sets available to the law enforcement agencies to sort out suspicious people among the population who fitted a respective suspect profile (Schewe 2006: 263–264). In practice, the instrument was used for example to identify RAF hideouts in Frankfurt: To do so, the BKA first identified all residents of Frankfurt who paid their electricity bills in cash as it seemed unlikely for the terrorists to use a fake bank account, which led to a sample size of 180,000. In a second step, the identified names were run against various other data sets to verify their identities and single out those with a false identity which led the arrest of one wanted RAF member (Der Spiegel 1986). Thus, dragnet investigations turned many random civilians into potential suspects based on the sole fact that they fitted the search profile based on as trivial reasons as their place of residence. Besides that, there were however

also more clearly defined practices to single out individuals sharing a similar political ideology like the RAF members. The generalised suspicion against leftist beliefs translated into the adoption of the so-called "Radicals Decree" in 1972: The joint resolution of the national and regional level of government foresaw that all civil servant applicants and state employees had to be examined for their loyalty to the German Constitution (Braunthal 1990). This meant that the records of people working for instance as teachers, police officers, university professors, administrative staff, post officers, and other state paid professions were double-checked by the police and intelligence services before they became civil servants and were allowed to work in their jobs. While the decree was officially intended to inhibit any type of "extremist" from working as a civil servant, in practice, the law was used discriminatorily against individuals sympathising with leftist ideologies. After the national consensus on the highly controversial policy broke in 1979, the regions continued it independently. Baden-Württemberg was a frontrunner among them: More than 700,000 civil servant applicants were examined, and more than 300 people were prohibited from their profession. The practice continued to be used until 1991 (Wolfrum 2022).

Moreover, the first generation of counterterrorism laws did not only involve new powers and to identify suspicious individuals but also to prosecute people arrested as terrorist suspects. Thus, after the first prominent members of the RAF were caught in 1972 in an operation dubbed "Wasserschlag" which concentrated roadblocks and helicopters to control large numbers of individuals, a series of new laws diminished their status as defendants standing trial (Chalkiadaki 2017: 116). These included drastic interventions which became known as "Kontaktsperregesetz" (incommunicado confinement law) banning the defendants for a limited time from all contact to visitors, other defendants in pre-trail confinement, and even their lawyers, leaving them ultimately in isolation and in certain hearings without legal advice (Berlit and Dreier 1984: 233-234, 242). The measure was especially criticised because the respective law was only introduced *after* the RAF prisoners were already put under incommunicado confinement (German Parliament 2017). However, in practice, these measures proved largely ineffective: Although the security measures at the jail in Stuttgart-Stammheim were initially heightened in constructing a new tract for the arrested, the detainees enjoyed special privileges and were able to easily keep in touch with members of the RAF's so-called second generation (Rath 2015). The unsuccessful attempt to free the imprisoned first generation that ended in their collective suicide was a blow to the terrorist group from which it never fully recovered until its official dissolution in 1990. Nonetheless, the counterterrorist laws that were initially introduced as temporary emergency measures – to calm the harsh critique from opposition parties and civil society organisations (Weinhauer 2004) – remained part of the criminal code by continuously prolonging them every five years (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 141). This is especially surprising because throughout the 1990s, the focus of the political agenda in Germany shifted away from terrorism towards the so-called 'asylum debate' (Kannankulam 2014): Migrants and their descendants – oftentimes German citizens and socialised their entire life in German society – had to deal with stigmatisation, ethno-racial discrimination, and frequent outbreaks of violence against them, while being at the same time branded as suspicious (Presse and

Bachmann 2010). However, during the 1990s, these ressentiments were linked to welfare chauvinism and nationalist ideologies rather than the fear of terrorist violence (Kurthen and Minkenberg 1995).

All in all, the first phase of mapping suspicious individuals and groups in Stuttgart shows that their securitisation became prominent in Germany during the 1970s in response to attacks committed by the RAF and other leftist groups. As "normal" German citizens, the members of these groups were hardly recognisable by their looks but through public wanted list campaigns, the faces of many individuals involved in the RAF became known to the public. However, the securitisation of suspicious people went beyond the members of terrorist groups. With the far-reaching paragraph 129a, especially regarding what counts as supporting a terrorist group, many people came under suspicion, as soon as they seemed to be associated in any way with the wanted terrorist perpetrators. Moreover, the Radicals Decree and dragnet investigations stigmatised people as suspicious based on their political beliefs but also more trivial reasons, such as their place of residence. Given the respective heterogeneity of suspicious people in Stuttgart and varying degrees of how concrete suspicions against them were, the measures of control to securitise them also differed in intensity. However, what they had in common was that terrorist violence was assigned with a higher priority than criminal violence in the German legal system, and thus the reference to the suspicion of terrorist intentions allowed for severer restrictions of fundamental rights, both before and after the arrest of respective individuals. With the beginning of the 1990s, the understanding of suspicious people in Germany shifted away from the people who were likely to commit terrorist violence to a nationalist othering of migrants and refugees.

7.3.3.2 Suspicious people between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious people during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart reveals that material-discursive attributions of potential dangerousness became more precisely delineated, while simultaneously counterterrorist measures to securitise suspicious people became more repressive in nature. Thus, in taking up xenophobic stereotypes from the 1990s and intertwining them with the information that some of the central perpetrators of 9/11 had lived in Germany, members of the country's Muslim and migrant communities were faced with pre-emptive suspicion, solely based on their religious beliefs, and their nationality and physical appearance, marking them as "foreigners".

Although the attacks of 9/11 did obviously not happen in Germany, they still left a remarkable imprint on securitising suspicious people in the country. The reason why 9/11 was an even louder wake-up call in Germany than in other European countries was that some of its perpetrators had lived in the country for a couple of years without raising suspicions: The "Hamburg Cell" operated as part of al-Qaida's transnational network and included several young men from Egypt, Yemen, the UAE, and other Arab countries who came to Germany as students. They were all fluent in English, some also in German, and accustomed to a Western lifestyle, while at the same time following a radicalised understanding of Islam and a strict anti-American and anti-Israel ideology (9/11 Commission 2004: 160–165). While they received their pilot training in the US and their strategic instructions from Osama bin-Laden in Afghanistan, at least some of them are presumed to have radicalised only since living in Germany (9/11

Commission 2004: 163). This realisation came as a big shock not only for the German public but also for its security authorities and provided a powerful catalyst to re-invoke the counterterrorism measures against suspicious people from the previous phase (Schielke 2002; Zöller 2004: 470).

The most immediate measure which was already taken in September 2001 was to run a dragnet investigation to identify potential sleepers and undetected terrorist cells in Germany (Schewe 2006: 265). The respective search profile was dictated by US intelligence agencies and included 'characteristics such as age 18 to 41 years, male, Islamic religious affiliation, indefinite legal residence, origin of from countries with a Muslim population' (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 137, translated from the German original by the author). This rough grid led to an enormous amount of data of approximately 8.3 million civilians being checked of which around 32,000 were investigated further, leading to hundreds of interrogations, yet without any conclusive results (Zöller 2004: 487). Besides the larger amounts of processed data, the dragnet investigation also differed from the 1970s, as it was purely pre-emptive (Meyer 2002: 3). In 2006, the German Constitutional Court ruled that this was unlawful (German Federal Constitutional Court 2006). However, this decision came far too late to stop the dragnet investigation from happening, since it was already concluded in 2002, and thus had turned the members of Muslim communities in Germany into suspicious people. That a religious affiliation with Islam was generally deemed potentially dangerous since 9/11was also reflected in so-called "Security Package I" (Schielke 2002: 31). It implied that the special protection which the German constitution had granted to religious communities got significantly curtailed, as it became possible to ban religious associations (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 137–138). In consequence, several associations were forbidden, all of them Islamic (Zöller 2004: 490). The proclaimed skepsis against Islam as a religious affiliation had also repressive repercussions on a broader societal level, as 'many NGOs reported on increasing xenophobia in Germany, especially against Muslims or persons with an Arab appearance. Complaints ranged from vandalism and bomb threats against mosques, to verbal abuse, discrimination and violent attacks' (Zöller 2004: 487). The newly promoted countermeasures against suspicious people did however not only target Muslims but – in taking up stereotypes from the previous phase – also people without a German passport (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 138; Meyer 2002: 4). Thus, the "Security package II" contained numerous changes in aliens and asylum law. These included for instance restricting the right to be politically active for foreign nationals living in Germany and if foreigners were considered to promote radicalised ideas, they could be expelled even if this potentially implicated harm for them, which violates the principle of non-refoulement (Zöller 2004: 491–492). Special regulations were moreover introduced for individuals working or applying for a position in the context of critical infrastructures. Due to the exceptional responsibilities and rights that come with such a job, applicants became subject to a thorough scan of their personal values and belief systems as well as an intimate background check regarding their living circumstances and their past (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 138).

Besides these rules for members of certain groups and communities, another term that became influential in the categorisation of suspicious people was the legally undefined, and hence very vague

denomination of the "Gefährder" (potential offender). A working group definition which has been in use since 2004 designated a potential offender as a 'person in respect of whom certain facts justify the assumption that he or she will commit politically motivated criminal offences of considerable importance' (Menzenbach and Raschzok 2008: 1, translated from the German original by the author). In practice, the term is particularly used in the context of committing terrorist violence. In contrast to other existing terms, such as "terrorist offender" and "terrorist suspect", the potential offender category comprises the earliest stage on the spectrum of being a suspicious person:

> 'This means that the term "potential offender" is often used in situations in which there is no immediate danger, but certain persons are considered to be potential sources of future danger. To justify the characterisation there is no concrete suspicion of the commission of a criminal offence, but only "factual indications", i.e. certain facts which justify the assumption (by the security authorities) that certain persons will commit criminal offences of considerable importance in the future (Chalkiadaki 2017: 156, translated from the German original by the author).

Such 'factual indications' could be for example that a respective person is seen more than once at the same place as "confirmed" terrorist suspects (Chalkiadaki 2017: 165). Yet, despite these typically weak clues, the categorisation has severe consequences for the concerned individual which include registering them, officially addressing them as a potential offender in letters or personal visit by the law enforcement agencies, and lowering one's chances to be granted asylum (Menzenbach and Raschzok 2008). Even harsher measures, such as a general preventive detention were also openly discussed, but eventually abandoned due to public backlash from civil rights NGOs (Mueller 2014: 326). Nonetheless, the concept underlined how after 9/11 the understanding of suspicious people was increasingly centred around the expectations about what an individual potentially *could* do rather than what someone had done.

To effectively securitise the growing number of suspicious people, the counterterrorism laws of the new era which were again introduced as temporarily limited emergency measures after 9/11 kept getting reaffirmed every five years, while at the same time, additional terrorist offences were added to the already long list of criminalised behaviours, including financial support for suspicious organisations and individuals, travels to foreign terror camps, and glorifying terrorist violence for instance through sharing pertinent video content or radical propaganda material (Chalkiadaki 2017: 164). Moreover, the powers of the law enforcement agencies were further strengthened by allowing them to use new technological means such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers and silent SMS to monitor the telecommunications of potentially dangerous people more closely. These enabled the police to compile substantive movement profiles of individuals without their knowing (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 141). To store and share the large amounts of collected data among agencies, an "Antiterrordatei" (Counterterrorism Data Catalogue) was established in 2006 which has served as an increasingly comprehensive register of suspicious people in Germany, listing personal and even imitate information about them (Chalkiadaki 2017: 144, 146-147).

In summary, my analysis during the second phase showed that the securitisation of suspicious people in Stuttgart intensified further after 9/11. Just like in the previous phase, the counterterrorist

approach remained dictated by the national level of government in Germany, while regional and local practices played mainly a role in their implementation. Two observations stand out in evaluating the respective transformation: Firstly, the material-discursive understanding of suspicious behaviour was significantly extended by introducing new laws and amending existing regulations, which affected in theory all people living on German territory: The list of activities defining a terrorist suspect became not only longer, but fell also more and more into the pre-stage of preparing a terrorist attack: Thus, the notion of the potential offender criminalised individuals based on future expectations rather than actual evidence of suspicious activity. Secondly, in practice, members of two heterogenous groups (which partially overlap) faced community-based stigmatisation as Germany's suspect groups based on translations of remote attacks in the US, and the incidents in Madrid and London: Thus, members of Muslim communities were addressed as suspicious leading to their discrimination and repression, and in re-channelling the xenophobic welfare chauvinist stereotypes of the 1990s, foreign nationals were treated with suspicion. This applied especially to asylum seekers and refugees whose status rights were significantly diminished based on the suspicion that potential terrorist perpetrators could be among them.

7.3.3.3 Suspicious people since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Mapping suspicious people during the last phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart shows that the material-discursive understanding of who counts as potentially dangerous was further widened as community-based identity markers of suspiciousness became at least in theory replaced by the increasing prominence of indistinct notions, such as the potential offender and the problematisation of suspicious behaviour. This coincided with the implementation of stricter measures of control, also on the local level, which reproduced yet in practice pre-existing stereotypes about suspicious people. As attacks have remained locally absent from Stuttgart, this development was based on translations of remote experiences of violence during the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 but also revelations about right-wing terrorism which happened during the previous phases but remained undetected as such.

Regarding these translations of terrorist violence to Stuttgart, the perpetrators who committed the attacks in other European cities in 2015/16 appeared on the one hand to confirm the pre-existing suspicions against foreigners and Muslims because at least on the surface the assailants formed part of these communities branded as suspicious, and especially the rise of ISIL further boosted the stereotypes about the violence-proneness of Islam (Nesser 2019). Thus, not only the assailants in Paris and Brussels but also the attackers in Nice and Berlin had pledged allegiance to ISIL (Jenkins 2016). The perpetrator who committed the incident in Berlin proved to be a particular case in point to allegedly confirm community-based suspicions in Germany: Born in Tunisia, he came in 2011 as an irregular migrant to Italy where he applied for asylum (Kirchgaessner 2016). To avoid his deportation in 2015, he fled to Germany, where he travelled around for several months, reapplying for asylum under 14 different identities (Kroet 2017). In one asylum facility, he was reported for possessing jihadist propaganda material (Blasius and Gebbink 2017). While this led to an investigation against him, only his contacts to a radicalised circle in Hildesheim eventually classified him as a potential offender (Mügge 2016).

Yet, his behavioural patterns which included alcohol and drug consumption and petty crime, but no traditional religious practices marked him as not radicalised according to the German security authorities (Mascolo 2017). Even warnings from the Moroccan secret service were neglected, until he eventually committed his attack in December 2016 (Beau 2017). Thus, his case is a telling example of how generalised suspicions based on ethno-religious characteristics were not apt to separate the few with violent intentions from the many who are harmless: Although the attacker was known to the security authorities, his objectives were misjudged based on stereotypes about terrorist perpetrators and by getting lost among the enormous amount of people counting as potentially suspicious.

On the other hand, terrorist violence originating from right-wing extremism received more political attention during this phase, especially thanks to the revelation of the "Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund" (National Socialist Underground, NSU), consisting of a core trio of two male and one female preparators who were active between 1999 and 2011 and helped by a loose network of more than a hundred supporters (Förster 2018). While many of their attacks had thus happened during the previous phases, right-wing terrorism was overlooked as such for decades in Germany. Hence, in the late 1990s and early 2004, the NSU committed three IED attacks at small business owned by migrant families in Nuremberg and Cologne, injuring 24 people in total. From 2000 until 2006, the group killed nine migrants of Turkish, Greek, and Kurdish descent, most of them living for decades in Germany as businessowners in different cities, including Hamburg, Nuremberg, Munich, Cologne, Rostock, and Dortmund. Cynically, the targeted killings were at first deemed to be cases of criminal violence within the stigmatised migrant communities, making the families of the victims the initial centre of the investigation (Schellenberg 2012). The fact that the victims were specifically chosen based on their assumed "non-German" descent, and therefore the motivation behind the terrorist violence was xenophobia and ultranationalism remained undiscovered (Busch 2013). The attacks' true intentions only came to light in 2011, when two of the core members committed suicide and the third one turned herself in, after publishing their confessional propaganda (Pfahl-Traughber 2015). The investigation and prosecution of the NSU's violence as well as the continuous failures of German security institutions that ignored and at times actively covered up the attacks to protect their secret informants lasted until 2018 which is also why the counterterrorist reaction to these events only happened in the third phase of my analysis (Virchow 2014; Schultz 2018). That the NSU was not the only example of far-right terrorist violence in Germany was proven by more recent attacks, such as the targeted killing of a local political in 2018 who was shot for his engagement during the so-called migration crisis in 2015, and the attack in Hanau in 2020, in which eleven people were killed and another five injured in shooting spree by a far-right extremist targeting two bars which were mostly frequented by members of the local Turkish and Kurdish communities (Crawford and Keen 2020; Steinhagen 2021).

These experiences of terrorist violence as well as the respective harshly criticised failures of the German security apparatus contributed to ambiguous changes in the securitisation of suspicious people in Stuttgart: While in theory, the shifts implied a universalization of the material-discursive

understanding of potential dangerousness, in practice pre-existing community-based stereotypes about terrorist suspects were largely reproduced. This development came about because already existing classic counterterrorist instruments were – following a certain path dependency – adapted, reaffirmed, and in some cases further tightened to fit the updated risk scenarios. Thus, a major legal step during this phase was turning the still temporary measures from the previous phase into permanent law in 2020. Besides the criticism of legal experts, data protection activists, and human rights organisations, the German government argued that 'the practical need for these regulations and their appropriate use had been confirmed in repeated evaluations' (German Parliament 2020b, translated from the German original by the author; see also: German Parliament 2020a). By removing the temporal limitation of these measures which targeted especially Germany's migrant and Muslim communities, their status as potentially dangerous was legally reaffirmed. That community-based suspiciousness remained important was also reflected in an institutional development (Goertz 2019a: 124): Hence, in 2019, a special BKA department was established which focuses solely on 'Islamist-Motivated Terrorism/ Extremism'. Its foundation was justified with a direct reference to past experiences of jihadist attacks in Europe and the growing number of 'potentially Islamist persons' (BKA 2022d, translated from the German original by the author) which almost quintupled since 2013 according to the BKA.

At the same time, there was an increasing acknowledgement that jihadist terrorism is not the only relevant source of violence in Germany. Hence, the German Minister of the Interior, the BfV, and several studies proclaimed that right-wing terrorism, racist hate crime and antisemitism have been indeed the most dangerous threats for security in Germany, as they account for 53 percent of politically motivated crimes and offences in the country which led to the adoption of a 'Law against right-wing Extremism and Hate Crime' (German Parliament 2020c; German Ministry of the Interior 2021). That the understanding of suspicious people in Germany was further widened during this phase was also reflected in the developments around vague notion of the potential offender. Initially, the concept was heavily criticised as ineffective when it became clear that the Berlin attacker was indeed marked as a potential offender but falsely qualified as harmless (Blasius and Gebbink 2017). To avoid such failures in the future, the new instrument "RADAR-iTE" was developed to allow for a more concrete risk analysis of the threat level of potential offenders based on a standardised set of questions. These are focused on evaluating the 'observable behaviour' (BKA 2022e, translated from the German original by the author) of a suspicious person rather than their ideology or religious beliefs. The instrument was introduced nationwide in 2017 and updated in 2019. Its initial scope was tellingly limited merely to suspicious people coming from a 'Islamist spectrum' (BKA 2022e, translated from the German original by the author), whereas the decision to adapt the instrument also for right-wing extremism was only taken in 2020. That shifts in the construction of suspicious people in Germany have been so far largely rhetorical also becomes obvious in the statistics on preliminary investigations regarding terrorist suspicions published by the Federal Public Prosecutor General in 2020: All in all, '372 investigations were opened against Islamists, ten against right-wing extremists and four against left-wing extremists'

(Hermann and Maksan 2021, translated from the German original by the author). These numbers show that although the material-discursive understanding of suspicious people was widened, pre-existing community-based stereotypes about potentially dangerous people have persisted.

Apart from these continuities in defining suspicious people, their securitisation was also increasingly based on CVE practices which shifted control to an earlier and more personal stage. The adoption of such a 'curative approach' (Subedi 2017: 135) was reflected in the "Federal Government Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy" from 2016 which laid out:

> 'Preventive measures are targeted at people or groups at risk, their environment and their networks and also, if necessary, at potential perpetrators in order to prevent the consolidation of problematic thought patterns and to break the transition from thoughts to (violent) action' (German Federal Government 2016: 9).

As the targeted ideologies within this strategy comprised 'right-wing extremism', 'left-wing extremism' and 'left-wing militancy', 'Islamic radicalisation', 'Islamophobia and Hatred of Muslims', 'antisemitism', 'anti-ziganism' as well as 'homophobia and transphobia' (German Federal Government 2016: 9–10), a CVE approach has been deemed capable to counter all sorts of dangerous belief systems at an early stage by German security authorities. On the national level, the approach was implemented – due to lacking further competences – mainly by financially supporting respective NGOs, such as "EXIT" focusing on far-right extremism and "Hayat" dealing with jihadist extremism (Hardy 2019). Although the addressed audience of these NGOs is different, their methods are largely similar: Both employ a multi-stakeholder approach based on political education which targets radicalised individuals and their social environments, meaning their families, teachers, colleagues, and friends (Koehler 2015). On the regional and local level, governmental authorities were more directly involved in implementing a CVE approach to securitise suspicious people: Hence, the "Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremismus in Baden-Württemberg" (Competence Centre against Extremism in Baden-Württemberg; KONEX) which was founded in 2015 has offered personalised drop out advice to radicalised individuals in the context of 'religiously motivated extremism/Islamism' and 'right-wing extremism' as well as support structures and advice for their families and friends (KONEX 2022a). The criteria promoted by the centre to spot a radicalised individual include attributes such as 'personality change: Sudden and strong change of previous habits, e.g. hobbies, daily routine, outfit, language'; 'strict demarcation from others'; an 'attitude of superiority' as well as an 'alienation from family and social environment' (KONEX 2022a). In cooperation with the NGO "Violence Prevention Network" (VPN), the centre has offered 'preventive training for young people at risk and aiming for basic immunisation against Salafist and Islamist tendencies' (Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Württemberg 2022, translated from the German original by the author). On the local level in Stuttgart, prevention, and thus the securitisation of suspicious people became also more prominent during this phase. Hence, the initiative Experience Stuttgart Safely included several preventive elements, such as establishment of a so-called 'House of Prevention' which targets teenagers who have been deemed to be at high risk for radicalising influences (Stuttgart City Administration 2020: 5). Another local project in Stuttgart which has promoted prevention since 2015

are the "Stuttgart Prevention Talks", a public lecture series to inform an interested audience of experts and non-experts about the strategies extremists use to target individuals at risk and attract them to their ideologies (Regional Centre for political Education Baden-Württemberg 2022).

All in all, mapping the transformation of suspicious people in the last phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart shows that who was material-discursively attributed with potential dangerousness not only widened but the measures to securitise suspicious people also further diversified. This development happened in response to terrorist attacks inside and outside of Germany, as these experiences contributed to the realisation that the previous approach did not work effectively because it was on the one hand blind towards some important sources of terrorist violence and on the other hand the established suspect categories were too vague to produce an accurate warning even if the respective perpetrator did match community-based characteristics of being suspicious. To tackle these apparent shortcomings, the acknowledged potential sources of terrorist violence became more diverse and especially the attention paid to right-wing extremism was at least rhetorically considerably boosted. However, with this now even bigger mass of potential suspects and easily delineable identity markers as indicators for terrorist suspicions being at least on paper obsolete, new techniques to securitise suspicious individuals were established: Thus, on the one hand the concept of the potential offender became refined by a new focus on securitising suspicious behavioural patterns and practices. On the other hand, a CVE dimension was added to the German counterterrorist approach to securitise suspicious people. While such CVE approaches surely have their advantages over traditional hard measures of counterterrorist control, their more personalised target point at an early stage in someone's potential future radicalisation process imply forms of policing ideas, belief systems and defiant abnormal behaviour, and therefore have also problematic traits to them (cf. Aziz 2017; Auchter 2020).

Moreover, despite these general shifts towards universalising suspiciousness, pre-existing community-based stereotypes about the potential dangerousness of Germany's Muslim and migrant communities continued to be reproduced. Thus, following a certain path dependency, the highly intrusive legal approach of singling out these communities from the previous phase became cemented as permanent law. While fundamental changes obviously take time, this does not explain the existing discrepancies fully. Instead, the lacking engagement with right-wing terrorism has on the one hand been linked to the strong personal ties between the right-wing scene and the BfV as well as widespread institutional racism and ultranationalism within the German security authorities (Steinhagen 2021). On the other hand, thanks to the inconspicuous appearance of members of the so-called "New Right" in Germany, they live in mass anonymity, while members of the previously established suspect communities are to be singled out by racially profiling them based on their accredited otherness from the stereotyped image of "the typical German citizen" (cf. Martini 2023).

7.3.4 The transformation of managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart

The last evolution I shed light on separately in my historiographic archaeology of Stuttgart's everyday life concerns the transformation of managers of suspiciousness. As my analysis is explicitly focused on

human bodies in this respect, managers of suspiciousness comprise according to the theoretical-methodological premises of my project three categories: Formal managers of suspiciousness are the representatives of traditional security institutions. Semi-formal managers of suspiciousness are people who have traditionally not dealt with security matters but became charged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of their professional lives. Finally, informal managers of suspiciousness include all humans present in Stuttgart that became encouraged to look out for signs of potential dangerousness in their private lives. By mapping this development, I reveal how the responsibility to counter terrorist violence has expanded over time in Stuttgart, not only in trickling down from the national to regional and local level but also in becoming increasingly informal. While these trends have been analysed in other countries (Jarvis and Lister 2010; Coaffee 2013; Batley 2021; Rodrigo Jusué 2022), an engagement with a German case, such as Stuttgart, is missing so far. Yet, I argue that this city is a particularly interesting place to look at because it has not encountered a local terrorist attack, and hence the proliferation of its managers of suspiciousness happened on entirely pre-emptive grounds.

7.3.4.1 Managers of suspiciousness before 9/11

Mapping managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart during the first phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that external security concerns in Germany initially trumped internal security issues thanks to the country's partition during the Cold War. At the same time, the Western allied forces pushed for a strongly federalised security architecture in the Federal Republic. However, this system was fundamentally reformed in direct response to the experiences of terrorist violence committed by RAF and other leftist groups in several German cities, as especially the role of formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level became boosted with additional staff and competencies. Since terrorist violence was thus seen as a challenge that could best be dealt with by representatives of traditional security institutions, semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness hardly existed.

The first years after World War II were initially marked by Germany's limited sovereignty, especially when it came to security matters. Since the country and its citizens were largely perceived as the enemy by the allied forces, and thus the main source of insecurity in Europe, they were obviously not seen as fit to have authority over upholding the internal and external security of the country after it was finally defeated. Yet, this understanding changed rather quickly with the emerging Cold War which shifted the main source of insecurity eastwards in the eyes of the Western allies. To counter the growing threat emanating from the Soviet Union, the US, the UK, and France soon agreed that a strong German state was fundamental in fighting back against the spread of communism across Europe (Searle 2003). However, at the same time, as the trust in the peacefulness of Germany was not fully re-established yet, its initial security architecture was constructed as a compromise: On the one hand, Germany had to be put in a credible position to defend its integrity against external threats but on the other hand, the Nazi regime had impressively demonstrated the severe consequences of a hyper-centralised security apparatus (Dams 2008: 9). To avoid such a concentration of power, a strong dedication to federalism became incorporated in the German constitution, leading to a regional and even local fragmentation of

the country's law enforcement and intelligence system, since initially many cities – including Stuttgart – had their own, largely independent police forces (Groß 2008: 22).

However, the emergence of domestic terrorist violence during the 1970s initiated significant reforms of the decentralised system, as it pushed the issue of internal security suddenly to the top of the political agenda. Germany's fragmented security architecture appeared to be highly overwhelmed with the waves of violence committed by the RAF that swept over its metropoles at the time (Weinhauer 2004: 235). This initiated at first the dissolution of the communal and city polices: Stuttgart was the last city in Baden-Württemberg to give up its police in 1973 (Dams 2008: 12). The regional integration of the country's police apparatuses was deemed crucial to counter the terrorist threat more effectively and led to improved information sharing, boosted staff capacities, and competences that stretched out over larger territories (Schulte 2017: 37–38). While many German regions introduced a two-tier-police system, Baden-Württemberg opted against such a division, and thus has maintained one integrated police force with different internal divisions since the major reforms in the 1970s (Groß 2008: 23). An even more important development happened on the national level where federal police forces existed since 1951 but had remained very limited in their competences until the 1970s (Möllers and van Ooyen 2008: 28). This changed fundamentally in the wake of the domestic terrorist violence committed by the RAF which provided a powerful catalyst to boost especially the BKA as the prosecutive arm of the federal police to become the main agency to deal with terrorist violence (Schulte 2008: 38). To be able to live up this responsibility, the BKA was equipped with more personnel – between 1970 and 1980 the number of its staff almost tripled (Dams 2008: 14) – as well as more competences and stronger political impact (Möllers and van Ooyen 2008: 28). Thus, the head of the BKA was prominently involved in political decision-making processes and participated in direct negotiations with the RAF (Schenk 1998). The counterterrorist dominance of the national level was further cemented with the formation of the special unit "GSG9", an elite group of the Federal Border Protection Police (Dams 2008: 14).

Apart from the German police apparatus, its intelligence services, namely the domestic service BfV, the foreign service called "Bundesnachrichtendienst" (Federal Information Service) and the "Militärischer Abschirmdienst" (Military Counterintelligence Service), also played a role in its counterterrorism architecture but again these efforts were heavily influenced by Germany's initial post-war trajectories and the country's subsequent experiences with attacks of terrorist violence. Regarding the former, the allied forces insisted on an extraordinarily strict separation between the German police forces and its intelligence agencies to be constitutionally enshrined in the so-called "Trennungsgebot" (principle of separation) (Fremuth 2014: 43–44). The intelligence services' competences were purposefully limited to counterintelligence and the collection of strategic information about threats to the constitutional order in Germany, while the police forces were in charge of all operative tasks (Dorn 2004). As the student protest movements of the 1960s and the subsequent terrorist violence committed by the RAF and other extremist cells evolved, the BfV was naturally seen as the primary intelligence agency to collect information on their intentions, leading to the formation of permanent working groups

dealing with counterterrorist matters throughout the 1970s (Ridder 2013: 17–18). However, the BfV's role proved to be controversial, as evidence suggests that its strategic informants pushed for a radicalisation of the student protests and that it conducted illegal wiretap operations (Kirchberg and Schmeer 2019; Hein 2018). These revelations diminished not only the trust in the BfV but also further secured the BKA's dominance in the German counterterrorism architecture (Weinhauer 2004: 238).

Besides these developments on the national and regional level, local actors in Stuttgart were also from early on concerned with security matters. Despite the dissolution of the metropole's city police, its administration reactivated local potentials to engage in urban security independently from higher levels of government. Thus, during the 1990s, Stuttgart became a frontrunner among German cities in adopting a community policing approach which led in 1997 to the permanent establishment of an urban security cooperation (Wurtzbacher 2008: 215), known as Stuttgart's 'Communal Crime Prevention Partnership' (Sauberes und Sicheres Stuttgart e.V. 2022). It rests on three pillars: a special division of police forces in Stuttgart, a distinctive staff unit within the city administration, and a private citizens association called "Sicheres und sauberes Stuttgart e.V." (Clean and Safe Stuttgart Association) (Stuttgart City Administration 2022b). The objective behind this initiative was however not primarily to counter terrorist violence but rather feelings of general insecurity and fear of crime which were widespread among Stuttgart's population at the time (Wurtzbacher 2008: 216).

In summary, mapping managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart before 9/11 shows that the distinctive structure of the German security architecture was initially largely indebted to its post-war trajectories. When during the 1970s, domestic terrorism emerged as a serious threat to Germany's internal security, the responsibility to counter it hence existed at first in an institutional void. Filling it, created momentum for the federal level of government to appropriate coercive policing powers. Thus, the most important German managers of suspiciousness became formal actors on the national level, although all other aspects of internal security were handled on the regional level. This indicates that terrorist violence was deemed a special threat, and hence called for exceptional ways to be tackled which also implied that other actors were not charged with counterterrorist responsibilities. Therefore, semi-formal and informal mangers of security were not involved in counterterrorist efforts at the time.

7.3.4.2 Managers of suspiciousness between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

This changed during the second phase of my analysis, as mapping managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 demonstrates. The remote experiences of the attacks in the US and European metropoles, such as Madrid and London, created powerful memories and future imaginaries of terrorist violence which pushed the German counterterrorist approach into two different directions. Firstly, with regards to formal managers of suspiciousness, their efforts became even more centralised, while simultaneously forums were founded to promote inter-institutional collaboration among various formal managers of suspiciousness on the national and regional level. Secondly, with the BBK's foundation and the development of the CIP

strategy, the role of semi-formal managers got established as private actors from different sectors were charged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of their professional lives.

While the development of Germany's internal security architecture relatively stagnated during the 1980s and the 1990s, the events of 9/11 marked a turning point, since the criticism surrounding the revelations about al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell functioned as a wake-up call for its formal managers of suspiciousness. However, the initiated changes followed a logic of path-dependency rather than triggering fundamental shifts: Thus, a controversial debate about potential counterterrorist competencies for the German military ultimately reconfirmed that its duties remained limited to external security matters (Fischer 2004; Goertz 2019a: 127). Instead, the BKA managed to further extend its powers (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 140). Thus, the general reform of federalism in 2006 paved the way to turn counterterrorism into an exclusive competence of the national level, and hence the regional police forces became obliged to immediately hand over counterterrorist investigations to the BKA (Hansen 2009: 301). The BKA's special competences came also with a long list of coercive and pre-emptive powers granted in 2008. These included the employment of secret informants and undercover agents, as well as wiretapping and searching private home, and non-evidence-based identity controls. The use of these powers relies on the BKA's discretion and does not require judicial consent (Hansen 2009: 302).

Besides this centralisation of German counterterrorism efforts, there was also a parallel development towards fostering an approach of 'interconnected security' (Hansen 2009: 297), which incrementally undermined the principle of separation between the German police forces and its intelligence agencies. The latter had also been granted additional powers – and while in extent less far-reaching than the BKA's – the decision to allow the BfV to operate largely independent from judicial and political oversight enabled it to become a more powerful counterterrorism actor (Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006: 140). To make better use of the different sources of intelligence and investigation efforts, the "Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum" (Joint Counterterrorism Centre; GTAZ) was established in 2004. Targeting solely terrorism with a jihadist background, the GTAZ does not constitute

> 'an independent institution but a cooperation platform of all involved agencies on the national and regional level which bundles the expertise of all relevant actors to enable an effective collaboration with creating additional intersections while respecting the principle of separation' (BKA 2022c, translated from the German original by the author).

It brought together representatives from the BKA, the three branches of the German intelligence agencies, the Federal Police (formerly known as Federal Border Protection Police), the Customs Criminal Investigations Office, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the Federal Public Prosecutor General and the 16 regional police forces who meet daily to share information and evaluate the current threat level in various working groups. The forum has no formal leader, as officially all involved agencies cooperate on a level playing field and within their respective competencies (Goertz 2019a: 114). In 2012, the "Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum" (Joint Counter-Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Centre; GETZ) was established as a corresponding platform dealing with terrorist violence originating from various backgrounds, though the involved institutional

representatives are de facto identical to the GTAZ's. The formation of the GTAZ and the GETZ also showed that despite the general dominance of formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level in counterterrorist matters, the regional level was not completely side-lined, as its police forces were still incorporated in the platforms to ensure an exchange of information flows in both directions.

Besides these developments regarding formal managers of suspiciousness, the increasing power of specialised agencies established semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart. The most prominent example for this development is the BBK: Rather than being involved in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist suspects, the BBK's focus was from the beginning directed towards the pre-emptive protection of suspicious sites and critical infrastructures. To do so, the agency cooperated right from the start with actors from the business sector, as many suspicious sites were privately owned. In the spirit of private-public partnership, the idea was to involve private companies and business owners in the development of security standards for critical infrastructures ab initio to ensure their practicability and user-orientation but also boost awareness and private compliance with them. Hence, already the Baseline Protection Concept of 2005 was drafted in collaboration with five large German companies, active in sectors, such as mobility, IT, energy and private security, and was tellingly subtitled a 'recommendation for companies' (German Ministry of the Interior 2005, translated from the German original by the author). The same logic was adopted for CIP strategy in 2009, as it was

> 'permeated by the "cooperative approach" as a form of cooperation between the state and the business community, as well as the fundamental priority of voluntary self-commitment by the business community over legal regulation' (BBK 2019: 9, translated from the German original by the author).

The strategic recommendations were therefore openly formulated to be adaptable to different contexts of implementation. To practice this cooperation, private businesses were also involved in the LÜKEX training sessions to test the effectiveness of the theoretically developed security concepts (BBK 2022).

Apart from counterterrorist efforts of formal and semi-formal managers of suspiciousness on the national and regional level, the local level in Stuttgart also continued to evolve. Thus, the communal security partnership from 1997 kept flourishing. In annually published "Prevention Reports" its stakeholders engaged with different topics such as security in the public transport system as well as preventive measures taken in the fields of urban planning and city district development. However, the threat of terrorist violence remained to be a minor concern compared to combatting crime and public disorder (see for instance: Stuttgart City Administration 2009). Another important local milestone was the internationalisation of Stuttgart's local security engagement, as it became the first German city to join EFUS in 2008 (Sauberes und Sicheres Stuttgart e.V. 2022). The forum provided the opportunity to discuss its local security agenda with European partner cities to exchange knowledge and best practices. The early membership of Stuttgart in EFUS underlined the city's local dedication to security issues, though urban counterterrorism was still not a major topic on EFUS's agenda at the time.

All in all, mapping managers of suspiciousness during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart revealed that especially the involvement of sleeper agents in Germany in the

attacks of the 9/11 brought about a further boost of formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level with regards to pre-emptive counterterrorist competences and responsibilities. This implied on the one hand an increasing centralisation of power on the national level, institutionally reflected in the BKA's role as Germany's most important counterterrorist actor. On the other hand, the formation of the cooperation platforms GTAZ in 2004 and GETZ in 2012 ensured that formal managers of suspiciousness on the regional level were not completely side-lined in terms of their counterterrorist competences. The establishment of the BBK paved the way for a more fundamental change regarding the increasingly important role of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in Germany. Thus, the remote experiences with terrorist violence in the phase after 9/11 also pushed actors from the private sector to become more and more committed to counterterrorist responsibilities. Just like in London, the engagement of private companies and business owners was profoundly supported by formal managers of suspiciousness who provided both strategic and practical expertise on how to best prepare for a terrorist attack. The encouragement of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness was yet limited to the sectors falling under the CIP strategy, and thus did not reach out to all private actors present in Stuttgart's everyday life. Regarding the role of informal managers of suspiciousness dealing with counterterrorist responsibilities, the second phase of my analysis confirmed their limited role.

7.3.4.3 Managers of suspiciousness since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

The map I compiled for managers of suspiciousness during the last phase of my analysis shows that since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 counterterrorist responsibilities became shared among an even wider spectrum of actors in Stuttgart. Hence, the experiences of remote attacks and imaginaries of future terrorist violence further boosted the role of formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level not only by extending their competencies but also by employing the German military with new counterterrorist responsibilities. Simultaneously, also the local level of government in Stuttgart became more active in preparing the city for potential attacks. Moreover, the number of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness increased again as more industries fell under the CIP strategy, while at the same time the incorporation of a CVE approach charged professionals in the health, educational, and social sector with counterterrorist responsibilities. These CVE practices also encouraged individuals to become informal managers of suspiciousness in the context of their private lives in Stuttgart.

In comparison, the transformations regarding formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level were the most incremental in nature. Thus, the BKA's leading role was further consolidated when the German counterterrorism laws became finally permanent in 2020 (German Parliament 2020b). In the run-up to this decision, the agency's competences were extended in various dimensions: Hence, the BKA was granted the right to electronically monitor the activities, communication, and contacts of potential offenders since 2018 (Wegner and Hunold 2017: 368). In 2020, it also gained the competence to evaluate and determine which objects officially qualify as weapons and therefore fall under special requirements (BKA 2022a). Continuities were also visible regarding the ever-closer cooperation between the BKA and Germany's intelligence agencies, especially the BfV, although it had received

substantive criticism for its murky role in the context of attacks of right-wing terrorism in Germany (Schultz 2018). Yet, despite this backlash, the BfV did not lose any of its counterterrorist powers. Instead, the collaboration of different agencies in the GTAZ and the GETZ format perpetuated the increasingly blurry lines between Germany's police forces and intelligence agencies which arguably called into question if the principle of separation is de facto obsolete at this stage (Goertz 2019a: 125). A so far still subtle – but potentially fundamental – change happened regarding the German army. Its military involvement in matters of internal security had been categorically precluded by Germany's Highest Court for years, until the judges ruled that an internal military operation in 'particularly serious incidents of "catastrophic" proportions' (Goertz 2019a: 129, translated from the German original by the author) would not breach the constitution. While this ruling dated back to 2012, its practical – but until now hypothetical – political consequences only came to light in 2017, when the military became involved in the nationwide counterterrorism training session GETEX (Wiegold 2017: 26). Within the simulation, the army took on several tasks, thus clearly demonstrating the willingness of decisionmakers to actively engage German soldiers in internal security matters when it comes to terrorist violence.

The decision to charge new actors as formal managers of suspiciousness was however not limited to players on the national level but also stretched out to the regional and local level of government. Thus, Baden-Württemberg introduced in February 2015 its own regional action plan to combat terrorist violence from jihadist sources. The programme foresaw additional funding for the police and the regional intelligence service in matters of both staff and equipment (Regional Ministry of the Interior Baden-Württemberg 2015). Besides that, the most important institutional implication was the establishment of KONEX in 2015. As mentioned in the section on suspicious people, the centre has promoted prevention and deradicalization expertise to individuals who are potentially confronted with extremism when executing their profession as well as individuals who are radicalised and their relatives and friends (KONEX 2022b). Apart from these efforts on the regional level, the local administration in Stuttgart also became more active in managing urban security. Building on the foundations of the already long-time established communal crime prevention program, the city opted to engage in a special "Security Partnership" with the regional level of government which allows for heightened measures of control in Stuttgart (Stuttgart City Administration 2020). While its primary objective continued to be the prevention of crime and public misdemeanour, CCTV surveillance of public urban spaces, a higher presence of police officers at sensitive sites, and intensified stop and search practices in the city have indirectly counterterrorist implications. Moreover, there were also local initiatives which directly followed counterterrorist intentions, such as the introduction of bollards to protect the metropole's city-centre from potential VAW attacks (Schwörer 2019).

Apart from these counterterrorist efforts of formal managers of suspiciousness on the national, regional, and local level, the encouragement of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness increased further. This happened on the one hand thanks to the growing importance of the CIP strategy. Thus, by 2019, more than 670 companies were involved in 14 sector-specific as well as eleven issue-specific

working groups (BBK 2019: 64). The higher number of companies involved in the CIP strategy corresponded to the wider range of industries to which it applied. The previously established principles of embedding private actors early in the process of developing new standards ensured high levels of compliance with the CIP strategy not only in traditional sectors, such as mobility and energy, but sectors such as the cultural industry, where counterterrorist concerns had been previously limited, got also more and more involved in developing tailor-made security protocols for their venues, employees, and work processes (BBK 2019: 67). Apart from the proliferation of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in the context of the CIP strategy, their role got also boosted through the incorporation of a CVE component in the German counterterrorist approach on the national and the regional level (cf. German Federal Government 2016). The logic of intervening at an early stage of radicalisation processes obviously puts new actors at the forefront of identifying suspicious behaviours. This encouragement to be vigilant was directed towards many in the context of their work lives with a focus on teachers, nurses, social workers, psychologists, and probation officers (cf. KONEX 2022c). To implement this strategy in Baden-Württemberg, KONEX established a "Landesbildungszentrum Deradikalisierung" (Regional Education Centre Deradicalisation, LBZ Derad) which has been dedicated 'to provide basic knowledge on radicalisation processes; enabling people to recognise signs of violent extremist radicalisation, and to assess the situation in a differentiated way; imparting an appropriate repertoire of actions' (KONEX 2022c, translated from the German original by the author). Its trainings and information campaigns have been 'primarily aimed at multipliers and practitioners' (KONEX 2022c, translated from the German original by the author) active in different professional fields who are expected to share their knowledge with colleagues and clients. In contrast to the UK's Prevent strategy, the German approach to CVE has not been obligatory but obviously with increasing offers to participate in such trainings, the pressure to join them gets automatically higher for the addressed institutions and their employees.

Finally, the encouragement of taking over counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of the German CVE approach was not limited to the professional lives of individuals living in Stuttgart but also reached into their private lives. While formal managers of suspiciousness have refrained from large-scale public awareness campaigns in Germany, the pressure on individuals to look out for signs of suspiciousness certainly increased. Thus, the BKA and the BfV created an online platform and a hotline open to all citizens to share potential evidence (BKA 2022b; BfV 2022), claiming that 'security and freedom […] concern everyone, citizens, and security authorities alike. Only together with you, we can fulfil our mission' (BfV 2022, translated from the German original by the author). To actively contribute to this mission, citizens were encouraged to share information on the preparation of terrorist attacks and the people involved in planning them as well as the identity of individuals who either radicalise others or are radicalised themselves. On the regional level, KONEX's agenda has been similar, as it also offers guidance to families and friends of potentially radicalised individuals (KONEX 2022b). In contrast, the encouragement of informal managers of suspiciousness on the local level in Stuttgart remained limited. However, formats such as the Public Security Conferences (Stuttgart City Administration 2009: 6) and

the Prevention Lecture Series (Regional Centre for political Education Baden-Württemberg 2022) that are open to all its residents clearly aimed to raise awareness and encourage citizens to take on a more active role in the counterterrorist agenda of the metropole.

All in all, mapping managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16 demonstrated that formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level remained the most powerful actors in Germany's counterterrorism architecture: Not only did the competences of established institutions become widened further but new actors such as the German military also entered the playing field. Moreover, formal managers of suspiciousness on the regional level – which had lost fundamental competencies during the previous phase – regained importance through the allocation of additional resources but also the formation of new institutions. Only the level of commitment of local formal managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart remained relatively similar: While there were a few initiatives with a clear-cut counterterrorist objective, most projects followed a broader approach towards urban security, focusing particularly on crime and public misdemeanour. At the same time, semi-formal managers of suspiciousness remarkably proliferated. On the one hand, the existing integration of actors in the context of the CIP strategy got widened through incorporating new sectors under its umbrella. On the other hand, thanks to the adoption of a CVE approach on the national and regional level, new professionals, especially from the educational, health and social sector have become encouraged to take over counterterrorist responsibilities such as identifying and reporting suspicious behaviours of individuals within their care. In a similar vein, the proliferation of CVE programmes also led a stronger encouragement of informal managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart, although the intensity of their outreach has remained subtle and targeted especially the social environments of individuals who are deemed to be at risk to become radicalised.

7.4 The securitisation of urban everyday life in Stuttgart

My historiographic archaeology's second stage transcends the particularities of how suspicious sites, suspicious objects, suspicious people, and managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart respectively developed in times of (counter)terrorism. To do so, I engage in this part of my analysis with how the city's transforming human and non-human bodies intra-acted in the ways material-discursive suspiciousness was increasingly attributed to them. I contend that in their entanglement the securitisation of the German metropole's everyday life was reinforced. As Stuttgart has not encountered a local attack of terrorist violence until now, analysing it as a test case within my selection of cities adds value to the existing academic engagement with the securitisation of urban everyday life which so far focused solely on case cities which locally encountered terrorist attacks (Adey et al. 2013; Katz 2013; Coaffee 2019; Lehr 2019; Fregonese 2021; Fregonese and Laketa 2022): My analysis of Stuttgart contributes to this literature because the city stands out as a place where the securitisation of urban everyday life happened entirely pre-emptively, by being translated across time and space in remote experiences of terrorist violence elsewhere as well as in the anticipated risk that the German metropole could become a future target.

7.4.1 The securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life before 9/11

The comparison of the maps I assembled for the first phase of my analysis illustrates that before 9/11 Stuttgart's everyday life was only affected indirectly by the memories of remote experiences of terrorist violence committed by the RAF and other leftist groups which kept Germany in suspense during the 1970s and early 1980s. As attacks of domestic terrorist groups, they were perceived as a dangerous new threat to the *internal* security of Germany which had previously been superimposed by threats to the country's external integrity in the context of the Cold War.

This novel "danger from inside" thus functioned as a catalyst for formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level to gain importance in the domestic sphere of the country's security architecture where they had been initially side-lined due to a purposeful decentralisation of power in the aftermath of World War II. Thanks to these broader historical trajectories, the German approach to counterterrorism was very state-centric, and hence trickled down only incrementally to the local level in Stuttgart. Thus, the BKA was entrusted with far-reaching counterterrorist competences, while the local and regional police forces became simultaneously less important. This also implicated that despite the remote experiences of terrorist violence elsewhere in Germany, the anticipation of an attack in Stuttgart was not particularly powerful. That urban sites were deemed relatively harmless at the time, was yet nothing special about Stuttgart but reflected a general sentiment in Germany, since the problematisation of its urban sites as potentially vulnerable or dangerous was – despite the initial guerrilla tactics of the RAF and the Revolutionary Cells – nationwide low. However, this does not mean that local security logics were entirely absent from Stuttgart: Its public urban space was problematised, especially since the 1990s, but the rationale behind it was the fear of crime originating from stigmatised groups, such as juveniles, homeless, and migrants, which initiated a multi-stakeholder crime prevention partnership to tackle feelings of insecurity among Stuttgart's citizens.

Although the threat of being targeted in a terrorist attack thus appeared in general too abstract and distant to be directly translated to the city's local space, the response to terrorist violence – while decided and implemented mainly on the national level – had still some transformative influence on Stuttgart's everyday life. This was especially prominent with regards to the securitisation of suspicious people. Hence, the practical consequences of the BKA's far-reaching competencies to identify and prosecute terrorist suspects and their supporters became locally visible in Stuttgart and increased the level of control in its everyday life: Thus, wanted posters of the RAF suspects were to be found at its public urban sites, large-scale investigation measures took also place in the city, and when the main members of the RAF's first generation were captured, the jail in Stuttgart-Stammheim was refurbished into a high security prison for terrorist perpetrators. Finally, the especially strict regional implementation of the Radicals Decree in Baden-Württemberg had the most long-term, and therefore far-reaching implications for the local population in Stuttgart, as it prevented applicants who openly followed a leftist political ideology to became civil servants in all sorts of professions for almost two decades. The increasing suspiciousness of classic weapons was also directly linked to experiences of terrorist violence

in the country but had in comparison less apparent implications for Stuttgart's everyday life, as the presence of classic weapons was not a widespread issue in the city's daily routines and mundane objects of urban everyday life remained treated as harmless.

All in all, mapping the transformations of Stuttgart's local space before 9/11 revealed that the tendencies to securitise its everyday life were at this stage still very moderate. The remote experiences of terrorist violence in other German metropoles had indirectly local consequences for the securitisation of suspicious people and classic weapons in the city. But other than that, Stuttgart's everyday life predominately remained entangled in its harmlessness.

7.4.2 The securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Aligning the four maps of the transformations in Stuttgart during the second phase of my historiographic archaeology shows that with the growing prominence of transnational terrorism and its manifestations in 9/11 and attacks in European metropoles, such as London and Madrid, the threat of terrorist violence – although it did not come geographically closer – became much more influential in Stuttgart's everyday life, as the material-discursive suspiciousness attributed to its intra-acting human and non-human bodies increasingly reinforced each other across the city's local space.

That the securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life intensified entailed thus that preventive measures were actively integrated in the management of its sites of critical infrastructure, both in public and in private ownership, which had entangled repercussions on the securitisation of human and non-human bodies. On the one hand, the new rationale of protecting potential terrorist target locations pushed forward that Stuttgart's urban sites were evaluated for their structural and symbolic relevance which translated into heightened vulnerability. In the updated security protocols of the respective sites, the potential presence of suspicious objects and suspicious individuals contributed further to heightened measures of control, in the sense that mundane urban objects, such as delivery packages, but also applicants and employees were scanned literally and figuratively speaking before being allowed on the respective premises. On the other hand, the securitisation of critical infrastructure in Germany was from the start an inclusive process that pushed actors from the private sector, namely those responsible for suspicious sites, into the role of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness. Thus, respective employees, after having successfully gone through the scanning process and being declared harmless became actively involved in protecting vulnerable sites as well as looking out for signs of suspiciousness at them. Thanks to Stuttgart's status as an influential business metropole in Germany, the city hosted many companies and businesses falling into the definition of the German CIP strategy which were hence directly affected by the intertwined transformations regarding suspicious sites, objects, and people and managers of suspiciousness during the second phase of my analysis.

In a similar vein, the widened material-discursive understanding of suspicious objects that included no longer only classic weapons, but also problematised a vague range of mundane objects normalised pre-emptive securitisation logics further into the routines of Stuttgart's everyday life. As just

mentioned, their heightened control was at the time still limited to suspicious sites, where they were anticipated to be especially destructive, and their imaginaries were thus more tangible compared to public urban space in general. In other words, mundane objects became more suspicious when found at a site recognised as critical infrastructure, while at the same time, sites of critical infrastructure required to be protected from potentially dangerous mundane objects. Moreover, suspicious objects were not only problematised as potentially dangerous but also qualified as useful evidence to identify terrorist suspects, since their possession as well as giving or receiving instructions on how to use them for violent purposes became criminalised. This was closely entangled with the transforming understanding of suspicious people because the notion of who was considered potentially dangerous was refined through community-based stereotypes, directed specifically towards the members of Germany's Muslim and migrant communities. This turned on the one hand religious practices and travelling to certain countries into indicators of potential dangerousness and shifted on the one other hand the meaning of mundane objects, such as foreign passports and religious clothing, into the direction of suspiciousness, as they fitted the imagined lifestyle of individuals stigmatised as potential terrorists. As Stuttgart has a considerable history as a migrant city, many of its residents were directly affected by these transformations. These entanglements of suspiciousness illustrate not only how the material-discursive attribution of suspicious items and suspicious people had amplifying repercussions for each other but also that the logic of pre-emptive securitisation became increasingly prevalent in national, regional, and eventually also local counterterrorism practices in Stuttgart.

This was likewise reflected in the further advancing degree of control towards suspicious people which was foremostly led by formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level, especially the BKA. Their pre-emptive practices included the nationwide dragnet investigation in 2002 but also the adoption of the vague notion of the potential offender which shifted the assumed dangerousness of suspicious people into the pre-crime stage. Employing such generalised assumptions about suspicious people, which were translated to Germany from terrorist attacks that happened elsewhere, had discriminatory and freedom-restricting consequences for the members of Muslim and migrant communities living in Stuttgart. Moreover, the community-based stigmatisations of suspicious people created biases in the practices of managers of suspiciousness: Not only were the signs of terrorist violence based on right-wing ideologies neglected for instance in the context of the NSU's targeted killings of migrants but as the victims of these attacks fitted the perpetrator stereotype, they were even treated as potential suspects rather than victims, exacerbating their vulnerable position further.

In summary, the pre-emptive securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life notably intensified during the second phase of my analysis, as the suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies became more closely entangled. However, the heightened level of control was not equally tangible for everyone and everything in Stuttgart at this stage. Thus, counterterrorist rationales were especially prominent in the management of critical infrastructures thanks to their assigned vulnerability and in the discriminatory treatment of suspicious people due to their community-based stigmatisation as potentially dangerous.

7.4.3 The securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

Finally, securitisation became even more generalised as a tendency in Stuttgart's everyday life since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, as interlinking the four maps that I complied for this phase shows. Thus, even though Stuttgart was still not locally targeted in any attack of terrorist violence, the counterterrorist logics of pre-emptively preparing the city and its residents for one have manifested increasingly prominent in the metropole's local space through adopting new practices of control.

This was reflected in the widened material-discursive meaning of suspicious sites on the one hand and suspicious objects on the other hand which both got further extended separately, but their respective definitions also became more intertwined, co-producing their respective suspiciousness in Stuttgart. A fundamental shift that cemented this tendency was the powerful imaginary of a future VAW attack in the city which was fuelled by remote experiences of such terrorist incidents in other European metropoles. The anticipation that an object as mundane as a vehicle, which is literally ubiquitous, especially in a car-city like Stuttgart, is enough to cause a largescale terrorist attack with many human victims, has transformed public space in the metropole's city centre into a vulnerable zone, and hence tremendously widened the previous understanding of suspicious sites in Stuttgart which are deemed to be in need of material fortification to be protected from being targeted by terrorist perpetrators.

At the same time, the potential dangerousness of vehicles has been linked to the type of site where they can be exploited best as terrorist weapons: The more crowded a public site, the more vehicles could potentially serve as highly destructive weapons, and therefore cars and trucks, although they are normalised as a mundane part of Stuttgart's local space have become more and more problematised in its busy city centre, not only for other reasons, such as environmental concerns, but also as suspicious objects. A similar dynamic interlinked the expansion of suspicious objects and suspicious people. As cars have become recognised as potentially dangerous items in Stuttgart's public space, the identity of their respective drivers turned into a security concern, and vice versa, a car driven by someone illegitimately could potentially be dangerous, and thus the use of an APNR system was legalised to increase the control executed by formal managers of suspiciousness in this context.

Furthermore, the counterterrorist reasoning that suspicious sites in Stuttgart needed more intense measures of control also justified other new competencies for police forces, such as conducting random identity checks as well as stop and search practices to catch suspicious people and confiscate suspicious objects. These measures of control must not be tied to any type of evidence or indication of suspicion but can simply be performed on the grounds that an individual or thing is present at a site which could potentially be targeted in a violent attack. Thus, the wider meaning of suspicious sites had amplifying repercussions on who and what counts as potentially dangerous in Stuttgart's everyday life, and ultimately widened the competences of formal manager of suspiciousness to exercise control at these sites to identify suspicious people carrying potentially dangerous objects with them.

Finally, an increasing securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life was also reflected in the entangled widened understanding of who is considered a potential perpetrator of terrorist violence and

who is considered competent to decide about the suspiciousness of others that was promoted in the city. To overcome the biases of formal managers of suspiciousness towards right-wing terrorism which were revealed during this phase and to make up for their respective failures in the past, the material-discursive construction of suspicious people was transformed: Rather than linking potential terrorist intentions to community-based identity markers, such as religious beliefs, ethnicity, nationality, and physical appearance, the new official reference point for identifying terrorist suspects has been their suspicious behaviour which led to the adoption of a stronger CVE component in the German counterterrorism strategy that was implemented on the national, regional and local level.

In doing so, the new approach not only turned – at least in theory – anyone into a potential terrorist suspect but also had direct implications for who became charged to look out for suspicious behaviour to now include – besides the traditional formal managers of suspiciousness – also semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness: As identifying behavioural changes is deemed difficult for strangers because they lack important knowledge to pinpoint them, the closer and the more informal the connection between the potential suspect and the manager of suspiciousness is, the higher is the reliability of the observations made. This turned not only teachers, social workers, and psychologists in Stuttgart into semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in the context of their professional lives but moreover encouraged everyone in the city to look out for behavioural shifts of people within their social circles. While the encouragement of semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness on the local level in Stuttgart has still been comparably gentle, the local dedication to prevention and tackling the early roots of violent radicalisation on the urban level became nonetheless over time more and more visible in the German city, as reflected in the establishment of regional CVE centre KONEX but also locally organised initiatives, such as the House of Prevention and the Public Security Conferences.

All in all, the third phase of my historiographic archaeology in Stuttgart revealed that – especially in comparison to my other two cases – the securitisation of its everyday life has remained a moderate tendency also after the European peak of attacks in 2015/16. In this sense, a counterterrorist logic of control has not fully permeated all aspects of urban normality in the German metropole, yet. Nonetheless, given that Stuttgart stayed off the terrorist target list until now, it is undeniably remarkable how its pre-emptive securitisation became an ever more prominent trend in the city in times of (counter)terrorism. Thus, especially the developments during the last phase of my analysis show how the securitisation of human and non-human bodies in Stuttgart became increasingly entangled and in consequence counterterrorist logics of control became overall stricter, more widespread, and universalised, and at the same time more local and personalised, and therefore ultimately more normalised in Stuttgart's everyday life.

7.5 Normative reflections from a perspective of posthumanist ethics

So far, my historiographic archaeology of Stuttgart demonstrated how the ontologies of human and non-human bodies increasingly shifted over time on the continuum between harmlessness and suspiciousness towards the latter, and hence the city's everyday life became more and more securitised. Just like in my

other cases, I evaluate the normative implications of this tendency against the background of existing socio-material power hierarchies in Stuttgart. Hence, in this third stage of my analysis, I reflect on the transformation of Stuttgart's everyday life from a perspective of posthumanist ethics. In doing so, I reveal how although Stuttgart's securitisation overall intensified, it did not have equally repressive consequences for all its intra-acting human and non-human bodies. Therefore, I contend that the transformation of the German city's everyday life constitutes a process of urban segregation, in the sense that it reproduced existing socio-material power hierarchies by further privileging human and non-human bodies at the centre of urban everyday life and further marginalising already vulnerable human and non-human bodies at its periphery.

7.5.1 Security from whom and what

In the first dimension of my normative reflections, I discuss the question, who and what was assigned with potential dangerousness in Stuttgart during the transformation of its everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism. Evaluating the findings of my historiographic archaeology from a perspective of posthumanist ethics regarding from whom and what was security provided in Stuttgart shows that existing vulnerabilities were only exacerbated for already marginalised *human* bodies, while the potential dangerousness attributed to non-human bodies hardly reproduced existing socio-material power asymmetries. Yet, although the increasing marginalisation concerned in the case of Stuttgart merely human bodies, this dynamic is still highly problematic due to its violent and repressive consequences for those who were attributed with material-discursive suspiciousness.

In this context, my analysis of Stuttgart proves that the German city is a prime example for how counterterrorist violence has been continuously linked to nationalist and xenophobic identity constructions, especially since the turning point of 9/11: The terrorist violence committed by German nationals – no matter if following a left-wing or right-wing ideology – was in terms of victims and damage caused on German territory more harmful and destructive, and yet, it were members of ethnic and religious minorities who faced systematic stigmatisation and repression based on terrorist suspicions against them. Thus, the community-based characteristics of potential dangerousness assigned to the members of Muslim and migrant communities in Stuttgart were on the one hand translated to the city, and in fact the whole country, through the violent memories of remote attacks elsewhere but on the other hand, they were also largely building on socio-economic stereotypes about foreign nationals and Germans with a migration background, exploiting the German welfare state, which were especially vibrant in the context of the so-called asylum debate throughout the 1990s. That many migrants in Germany had in fact initially come to the country in the 1950s and 1960s to accommodate labour shortages, especially in low-income sectors, was not only neglected in the public narrative about them but their oftentimes precarious legal and socio-economic status made them even more vulnerable for being stigmatised with potential dangerousness from a counterterrorist perspective.

The discriminatory differences in their treatment become especially apparent in comparison to terrorist violence originating from other sources, especially right-wing extremism (cf. Martini 2023).

While countering the violence of the RAF and other leftist groups still came with severe repercussions for people in Germany following a similar political ideology, the terrorist violence arising from the right-wing spectrum was systematically ignored and downplayed for years, as particularly the example of the undetected violence committed by the NSU shows. Only during the last phase of my analysis, there was an increasing acknowledgement towards a wider range of extremist ideologies that inspire terrorist attacks. However, this recent universalisation of potential dangerousness in the German counterterrorist approach has obscured existing asymmetries in who is attributed with potential dangerousness rather than easing them. Thus, while vague notions, such as the potential offender and the problematisation of suspicious behaviour, extended in theory suspiciousness to all people in Stuttgart, legal and institutional developments as well as investigation statistics provide evidence, that in practice the vagueness of these notions allowed for a reproduction of pre-existing community-based stereotypes against the members of Germany's Muslim and migrant communities. This is highly problematic because the stigmatisation of these already vulnerable groups becomes less apparent, while at the same time, its repressive and violent consequences for those affected ultimately persist.

In contrast to these unsettling developments regarding human bodies, the assignment of potential dangerousness to non-human bodies deserves less criticism from my normative perspective: On the one hand, sites in Stuttgart were not systematically assigned with potential dangerousness under a reference to terrorist violence which is probably indebted to the fact that the city has not seen a local attack so far. A respective stigmatisation of sites was more prevalent when it comes to criminal violence and public misdemeanour, and thus falls outside the specific research interest of my project. On the other hand, the local securitisation of suspicious objects in Stuttgart has been focused on problematising classic weapons and besides that, was attributed to cars and trucks as mundane urban objects which are potentially dangerous. While this is surely a remarkable development, it certainly does not exacerbate existing marginalisation, since Stuttgart has maintained its generally car-friendly attitude, despite the increasing problematisation of vehicles in the city for all sorts of reasons.

7.5.2 Security for whom and what

The second dimension of evaluating my findings from a normative perspective of posthumanist ethics deals with the counterpart of my previous reflections, and hence I shed light on the question, for whom and what was security provided in Stuttgart during times of (counter)terrorism. The observations made within my historiographic archaeology show that it was, like in my other cases, privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre of the city's everyday life who were deemed worthy of protection, while the need for protection of marginalised groups at the periphery was ignored. This finding reflects once again how the increasing securitisation of Stuttgart has further segregated its everyday life.

The dynamic is on the one hand reflected in the transformation of vulnerable sites in the German metropole. While initially Stuttgart's local space was largely problematised under a reference to the fear of crime, with the rise of pre-emption after 9/11, it was the city's critical infrastructures that were deemed especially vulnerable and therefore worthy of protection. What is particularly remarkable about the

German understanding of critical infrastructures is that it has encompassed from early on sites of structural *and* symbolic relevance and was thus applied to a wide range of business sectors. While some of them, such as food, water and energy comprise services of general interest, the criticality of other sectors, such as finance and insurance, surely stemmed from their importance for the proper functioning of the neoliberal state. This attitude resonated with the privilege for the private sector to actively influence the German counterterrorist approach, that was initially only granted to big companies which were already major players in their respective industries but hence became also powerful in setting counterterrorist standards. In contrast, the recent increasing counterterrorist attention for public urban space in Stuttgart has shifted this hierarchical focus at first sight away from solely protecting urban sites thanks to their structural and symbolic relevance within the capitalist system. However, a closer look shows that the specific geographical areas that were deemed vulnerable in the metropole's local space were in fact still privileged non-human bodies at the centre of neoliberal urbanism, as they included mainly sites of consumerism, such as shopping streets and areas lively with gastronomy and nightlife, which are frequented by those residents of the city that can afford spending time at them. In other words, who and what was deemed worthy of protection in Stuttgart was closely intertwined with socio-economic status and neoliberal privileges attributed to respective human and non-human bodies in the everyday life of the German metropole.

On the other hand, when it comes to the categorisation of vulnerable human bodies, their worthiness of protection was not only implicated in which urban sites were securitised but also in differentiating them from those human bodies who were not worthy of protection. Hence, already during the second phase of my analysis, there was a clear distinction established between German citizens as worthy of protection and foreign nationals as unworthy of protection: Thus, for the sake of pre-emptive protection of Germany and the physical integrity of its citizens, foreigners and people with a migration background were systematically assigned with potential dangerousness, which obviously reflects a nationalist-inspired "us versus them" logic. On these grounds, highly vulnerable groups, such as asylum seekers potentially facing violent treatment in their country of origin could be rejected and sent back according to the German counterterrorism laws introduced after 9/11. Even more tangible was the differentiation between who was worthy of protection and who was not in the investigations of the NSU attacks which were directed against people who the terrorist group identified as "non-German" based on their racist and xenophobic ideology. However, not only the targeted killings and IED attacks of the NSU, but also the investigation in the aftermath of the committed violence clearly revealed that the respective victims and their families were not deemed worthy of protection by the German security authorities but rather stigmatised as potentially dangerous themselves which underlined once more the nationalist and xenophobic tendencies that were highly prominent in the German case.

7.5.3 Security through whom and what

Finally, I normatively contextualise my findings within existing socio-material power hierarchies regarding the question, who and what was charged with looking out for suspiciousness, and thus

providing security in Stuttgart's everyday life. The observations of my historiographic archaeology have painted an ambiguous picture in this respect: On the one hand, the German approach to counterterrorism has been very state-centric, and hence led over the years to an increase of power and competencies for formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level who were previously side-lined in domestic security matters thanks to Germany's distinct post-war trajectories. On the other hand, as counterterrorist responsibilities became especially through the adoption of a CVE approach during the final phase of my analysis more local and informal, many people in Stuttgart became encouraged to look out for suspiciousness in the context of their professional and their private lives. On the surface, this twofold approach and especially the recent widening of counterterrorist responsibilities across a broader range of legitimate managers of suspiciousness may appear as a step towards easing power asymmetries. However, a closer look into this ambiguity reveals that, just like in my other cases, the increasing securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life has not only reinforced these existing hierarchies but also had problematic consequences for those directly and indirectly affected by them.

Thus, the persistence of a strongly state-centric counterterrorist approach in Germany has been reflected in the continuous empowerment and increasing centralisation of competencies at the national level, especially for the BKA, as Germany's most important specialised counterterrorism agency but also in the more recently promoted potential involvement of the German military in counterterrorist matters. While managing other domestic security issues has remained fragmented across the German regions, preventing terrorist violence certainly provided an excellent opportunity for formal managers of suspiciousness on all levels of government, but especially the federal level, to legitimately claim further responsibilities, and in exchange gain additional executive powers. Using them allowed the respective formal managers of suspiciousness to restrict fundamental freedoms of German citizens, and even more so foreign nationals residing in Germany in far-reaching ways, and thus clearly accounts for reinforcing existing power asymmetries in the vertical relationship between the state and its citizens as well as the horizontal relationship between national and non-national residents.

At the same time, the adoption and implementation of a strong CVE component in the German counterterrorist approach which became since the last phase of my analysis increasingly prominent on the national, the regional and the local level proliferated the number of potential semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart. While this development universalised the encouragement to look for suspiciousness in the city's everyday life towards basically everyone, the vagueness of what suspicious behaviour looks like ultimately rendered anyone to be watched and scrutinized by others. This allows for a reproduction of societal stereotypes about who and what is deemed potentially dangerous and who and what is considered harmless. Moreover, just like in London and Brussels, the actual implementation of CVE practices in a professional context has been largely put into the responsibility of teachers, social workers and psychologists who were encouraged to monitor the oftentimes particularly vulnerable groups in their care for potential radicalisation and extremist beliefs. Finally, although observations of suspiciousness are following the logic of CVE most likely to

be made by semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness, dealing with these suspicions in the sense of investigating and countering them still falls in many cases into the responsibility of formal managers of suspiciousness. Thus, this shows once again how existing power asymmetries were reproduced in the increasing securitisation of Stuttgart, as privileged human bodies at the centre of its everyday life were further empowered by being charged to look for suspiciousness, while simultaneously the vulnerabilities of already marginalised groups at the periphery became even more exacerbated, constituting ultimately a process of urban segregation.

7.6 Conclusion

To conclude my third and final empirical chapter, my historiographic archaeology of Stuttgart demonstrated how everyday life in the German city was incrementally but increasingly securitised in times of (counter)terrorism. While before 9/11 generalised suspiciousness was not widespread among intra-acting human and non-human bodies in the city, this changed in a pre-emptive reaction to the remotely experienced incidents of terrorist violence in the next phase of my analysis, which led to a tangible increase of control towards suspicious sites, suspicious objects, and suspicious people as well as a professionalisation and proliferation of managers of suspiciousness charged to deal with the terrorist threat in the German metropole. Since, the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, the tendency towards an increasing securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life became even stronger, as it also reached now directly into local policymaking. Although the transformative trend towards adopting a counterterrorist security logic and additional measures of control in Stuttgart remained in comparison to my other case studies still moderate, it is undeniably observable. This is especially remarkable, as the city has not been hit by a local attack of terrorist violence so far, and hence its transformation was solely based on the remote experience of terrorist violence elsewhere and the corresponding imaginaries of Stuttgart being a potential attack target in the future.

This finding directly corresponds to the overall argument of my dissertation, as I purposely included the German city as a test case to show how according to the theoretical-methodological premises of my project the material-discursive attribution of human and non-human bodies with suspiciousness gets translated across time and space, and thus counterterrorist violence travels to places without local experiences of terrorist violence. In other words, to be locally targeted by terrorist violence serves not as a prerequisite for the implementation of countermeasures because imaging what an attack in the future could look like as well as the terrorist violence that other cities have endured as targets of attacks, provides enough justification to do so. My analysis of the entirely pre-emptive transformation of how people can live their lives in Stuttgart thus adds an important contribution to the existing academic literature on the securitisation of urban everyday life which has so far only engaged with case cities that were locally targeted by terrorist attacks (Adey et al. 2013; Katz 2013; Coaffee 2019; Lehr 2019; Fregonese 2021; Fregonese and Laketa 2022). Ultimately, the incremental securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life proves that terrorist perpetrators have indeed succeeded in their objective to project fear beyond the immediate act of violence to places and people elsewhere. Furthermore, my

historiographic archaeology of Stuttgart also adds critical value to the debate thanks to the normative reflections I made about my findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics. They revealed, just like in my other two cases, the segregating implications of the pre-emptive securitisation of Stuttgart's everyday life: In increasingly adopting a counterterrorist logic of control to urban normality, privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre of Stuttgart's everyday life were further included and marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery were further excluded from participating in it.

8 Comparison

8.1 Introduction

In the three previous chapters, I engaged with my empirical cases London, Brussels, and Stuttgart separately to reveal how urban everyday life incrementally yet substantively transformed in times of (counter)terrorism at each of these places. In this chapter, I bring my cases together in a thick comparison which enables me to engage with their resemblances and particularities in a systematic and but creative way (cf. Niewöhner and Scheffer 2010: 4): Thus, the dimensions of my comparison allow me on the one hand to trace in more depth how the securitisation of urban everyday life was translated across space and time, and on the other hand to engage with how these translations normalised the securitisation of urban everyday life in Europe on the translocal level of space which 'encompasses the experiences and materialities of everyday lives in multiple places' (Low 2016: 174). As translations entail a 'form of *encounter* with a new context' (Stritzel 2011b: 345, emphasis in the original), they always imply temporal delays and local particularities, which are reflected in the differences of my three cases.

In temporal terms, my thick comparison demonstrates how suspiciousness was translated across time. Thus, I compare my cases by shedding light on their similarities and differences regarding past experiences of terrorist violence, future anticipations of attacks, and present transformations of urban everyday lives to counter this threat. With this comparison, I uncover that pre-emptive securitisation turned the logic of action and reaction of (counter)terrorism in European metropoles around because counterterrorist violence becomes inscribed in their everyday lives *before* terrorist violence happened at them. In spatial terms, I demonstrate how local transformations of human and non-human bodies in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart were translated from one place to the other. Thus, I reveal substantial similarities in the dominant material-discursive attributions of suspiciousness and the practices of control to manage this suspiciousness across different local socio-material entanglements. Ultimately, I argue that the securitisation of urban everyday life was translated both across time and space which renders European metropoles the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox. As this transformation process reinforces existing socio-material power hierarchies among human and non-human bodies intra-acting in everyday life, it constitutes a process of urban segregation. To make this argument, my comparative chapter proceeds in several steps: Firstly, I engage with translations of the securitisation of urban everyday life across time by comparing the findings of analysing my case cities London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. In the next step, I map the translations of securitisations of suspicious sites, objects, and people as well as managers of suspiciousness and practices of control across these three places. Thirdly, I compare the critical implications of the securitisation of urban everyday life for human and non-human bodies in my cases from a perspective of posthumanist ethics. Fourthly, I engage with these transformations on the translocal level of European metropoles: By shedding some light on local particularities, and other policy rationales, I contextualise my argument's scope, but I also reveal the undeniable similarities in how urban everyday life became increasingly securitised. Finally, I provide a table summarising my empirical findings as a conclusion.

8.2 Translating (counter)terrorism in European metropoles across time

In the first section of my thick comparison, I engage with how the securitisation of urban everyday life was translated across time in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. To do so, I compare the maps I created for each of my case cities and trace their similarities and differences across the three phases of my historiographic archaeology, namely the time before 9/11, the period between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, and the time thereafter. My comparison contributes to the existing literature on the securitisation of urban everyday life, as my case selection includes London, as a city with a long local history of terrorist violence, Brussels, which became only recently the centre of attention in this respect, and Stuttgart, which has not encountered a local attack so far. Thus, I reveal how despite their very different local experiences with terrorist violence, the counterterrorist spreading of suspiciousness has become more and more similar in the everyday life of the three European metropoles, as local and remote memories of terrorist violence and future imaginaries thereof were translated across them.

8.2.1 Mapping securitisations of urban everyday life before 9/11

The differences among my three case cities regarding their local experiences with terrorist violence date back to the time before 9/11: During this first phase of my thick comparison, the British capital saw a lot of both larger and smaller local attacks committed by the IRA which caused predominately material destruction and economic disruption rather than large-scale loss of human lives. In contrast, incidents of terrorist violence in Brussels were much rarer: The Belgian capital experienced some attacks committed by the CCC especially during the early 1980s which were also directed explicitly at non-human targets as well as terrorist violence spilling over from external conflicts. Stuttgart, finally, did not encounter any local attacks of terrorist violence, not even during the high time of the RAF that kept Germany at suspense in the 1970s and 1980s. Comparing the maps, I created when analysing the transformations of local space in London, Brussels and Stuttgart against this background shows how human and non-human bodies intra-acting in urban everyday shifted distinctively in the three places from harmlessness to suspiciousness.

Thus, in London, the indications towards an incremental securitisation of urban everyday life were already before 9/11 quite prominent. Geographically, these developments were especially tangible in the city's business districts. The City of London and the London Docklands hence became recognised as London's most suspicious sites and were in consequence securitised through the Ring of Steel and the Iron Collar (Coaffee 2004, 2009). Simultaneously, mundane objects such as litterboxes became problematised but due to their urban omnipresence generally securitising them proved difficult. Yet, their use was restricted particularly at London's suspicious sites, as the suspiciousness assigned to these two types of non-human bodies reinforced each other (Coaffee 2009: 109). Just like certain objects were exceptionalised as suspicious, it were residents with an Irish background who were branded as suspicious thanks to community-based stereotypes and consequentially had to endure stigmatisation and discriminatory police practices (Hillyard 1993; Hickman and Walter 1997). This also marked the neighbourhoods in London with a high number of Irish residents as potentially dangerous. In terms of

who was charged with countering terrorist violence, this responsibility was mostly executed by formal managers of suspiciousness, such as the national intelligence agencies and London's police forces (Foley 2009: 447). Additionally, private actors engaged in self-initiated measures to protect their businesses, especially when these were located at London's suspicious sites (Coaffee 2009: 199–201).

In contrast, everyday life in Brussels and Stuttgart was hardly securitised before 9/11, neither due to past experiences with attacks in the case of Brussels nor due to future imaginaries thereof in Stuttgart. Thus, although Brussels experienced some local terrorist incidents directed at target sites comparable to those in London, they did not incite major material-discursive protection efforts (Fendt and Schäfer 2008: 197–198). This resembled the picture in Stuttgart, as security updates that happened until 9/11 in both cities were motivated by the fear of crime rather than the threat of terrorist violence (Dessouroux et al. 2009; Schubert et al. 2007). In a similar vein, mundane objects remained unchallenged in Stuttgart and Brussels: While Germany only imposed restrictions for classic weapons in reaction to the RAF's attacks, not even these were problematised in Brussels (Hurka 2015; Duquet 2016b). However, the two cases differed regarding the problematisation of suspicious people: Although terrorist perpetrators followed leftist, anti-imperialist ideas in both contexts, this led only in Germany to substantive repressive measures against people following such an ideology, reflected in the Radicals Decree. Moreover, the RAF's violence led to the adoption of counterterrorism measures empowering especially actors on the national level, such as the BKA, with far-reaching competences to identify and capture terrorist suspects, though these had merely limited implications for the local population in Stuttgart (Möllers and van Ooyen 2008). In Brussels, it was also formal managers of suspiciousness who took on counterterrorist responsibilities, but their competences remained fragmented (Lasoen 2017b).

Assessing this first phase from my theoretical perspective reveals how at this stage *local* experiences of terrorist attacks had the most imminent consequences on *where* and *how* urban everyday life transformed. Thus, on the one hand, in London, as the place, which got hit by many and also severe attacks, material-discursive suspiciousness spread much more prominently than in Brussels and Stuttgart, which had only few or no local encounters with terrorist violence at the time. Turning this thought around, the local experiences of terrorist violence in London were not translated to other places, such as Brussels and Stuttgart at this stage, as they proved not elusive enough to be transferable to other national contexts. On the other hand, the kind of pre-emptive response that was given to terrorist violence in the British capital was shaped by the specific attack methodologies that terrorist perpetrators used at the time. Hence, the human and non-human bodies of urban everyday life that shifted from being harmless to being material-discursively recognised as suspicious were directly linked to the target sites of attacks, the objects used to execute them, and the community blamed for the violence that happened. Therefore, all in all, distinctive local memories of terrorist attacks in London were powerful in being translated over time to fuel local imaginaries of future violence, and thus heavily influenced the kinds of counterterrorist responses that were locally given to them in the British capital, but they were not translated across space to also transform urban everyday life at other places.

8.2.2 Mapping securitisations of urban everyday life between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

The differences among my three cases regarding their local encounters with terrorist violence persisted during the second phase of my analysis between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16: Thus, London was affected the most, as it suffered a large-scale terrorist incident in 2005: The IED attacks at the city's public transport network were deliberately carried out to cause high numbers of human causalities to send a powerful message to the British government and public. From Stuttgart, terrorist violence remained locally absent, but especially the 9/11 attacks resonated strongly in Germany. The Belgian capital was hit by the local attack at the city's Jewish Museum in 2014 which marked the beginning of Brussels' quickly growing reputation as the European capital of jihadism (cf. Renard 2016b). As therefore, there was not much of a change regarding the cities' different trajectories in terms of their local attack experiences compared to the time before 9/11, it is even more remarkable that after 9/11, urban everyday life was securitised at all of them, as more and more human and non-human bodies were increasingly attributed with suspiciousness, and consequently measures to control them intensified.

In London, this meant not only a continuation of the already existing practices and measures of securitisation but that their level of control increased and their scope widened. Thus, the notion of suspicious sites was material-discursively broadened through the adoption of the Crowded Places paradigm which implied in practice that security authorities assigned heightened vulnerability mainly to tourist attractions, governmental institutions, the public transport system, and big events, such as the Olympic Games in 2012 (British Home Office 2010b: 7). Furthermore, although IEDs and the objects to hide them remained to be recognised as the main tools to commit terrorist violence but their new deliberate use in human crowds made these suspicious objects appear even more dangerous which led to the implementation of meticulous housekeeping rules, simplistic architectural designs, and technological-material barriers in London's public space. Moreover, the community-based suspicions attributed to human bodies shifted to the members of the UK's Muslim communities. This increased the range of suspicious people significantly, as singling out Muslims corresponded with racially profiling suspects by equating extremist beliefs with stereotypical "Muslim" and "foreign" looks, and thus was extended to all People of Colour (Pugliese 2006). It had again securitising implications for the city's neighbourhoods, where these communities foremostly lived. Finally, the activities of formal managers of suspiciousness professionalised through the CONTEST strategy and the establishment of specialised agencies and the efforts of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness became more widespread and comprehensive due to expert advice and training sessions offered by the NaCTSO (NaCTSO 2017).

In direct comparison to London, the incremental securitisation of everyday life in Brussels and Stuttgart was still much subtler. However, given that counterterrorist considerations had previously hardly played any role in both cities, the shift they experienced after 9/11 is nonetheless remarkable. In Brussels, although the city became a target only in 2014, suspiciousness was material-discursively attributed to sites of symbolic or structural relevance already in the early 2000s, leading to locally

distinct securitisation measures and an increasing use of CCTV surveillance in the entire city (Kuyken and Schmitt 2014; Lasoen 2017b: 933–934). While in contrast, the securitisation of mundane objects remained limited, Belgium began at least to restrict the acquisition and possession of classic weapons. Yet, this was largely due to external pressure from developing international legal frameworks (Duquet 2016b). Regarding suspicious people, generalised terrorist suspicions were assigned to a heterogenous group of people who (were) identified as Muslim which led to rising Islamophobic sentiments, particularly in Brussels, thanks to the city's large Northern African and Arab diasporas (Torrekens 2009: 173). This implied also declaring Muslim places of worship and community centres as potentially dangerous. Finally, the role of managers of suspiciousness was professionalised through establishing local counterterrorism task forces and the OCAM, as a specialised counterterrorism agency on the national level with considerable competencies (Lasoen 2017b; van der Vet and Coolseat 2018).

In Stuttgart, although local terrorist violence remained entirely absent from the city, efforts to securitise its everyday life evolved, nonetheless. While this was largely due to the rising importance of counterterrorism on the national level, its effects trickled down to the local level. Thus, the securitisation of critical infrastructures as recognised in the CIP Strategy from 2009 led to the implementation of measures of control to monitor public urban spaces in Stuttgart, especially its train station, airport, and public transport system (Schlüter et al. 2016; Herlyn and Zurawski 2016). Regarding the securitisation of suspicious objects, the possession, manufacturing, and use of mundane objects for terrorist purposes became criminalised in 2009 but this legal novelty had initially merely limited local consequences in Stuttgart: Only at suspicious sites recognised as critical infrastructures, security measures were stepped up accordingly to control suspicious objects (German Ministry of the Interior 2011). In terms of suspicious people, the development in Stuttgart was very similar to that in London and Brussels, as it was also members of Germany's Muslim communities and foreign nationals who were singled out as potentially dangerous by counterterrorism legislation as well as by discriminatory investigation practices of law enforcement agencies (Zöller 2004; Ströbele and Erlenmeyer 2006). While these measures were adopted on the national level, their local implementation had significant consequences in Stuttgart, thanks to the metropole's large immigrant communities. Finally, counterterrorist duties became just like in London a shared responsibility for public and private actors in Stuttgart: While the already powerful BKA consolidated its central role as Germany's most important counterterrorism actor, the efforts surrounding the country's CIP Strategy to protect critical infrastructure actively encouraged private business owners to participate in pre-emption (BBK 2019: 9).

All in all, assessing this second phase of my thick comparison from my theoretical perspective sheds light on a remarkable, yet at this stage still incremental, shift when comes to the transformation of everyday life in European metropoles during times of (counter)terrorism. Hence, to some extent, local experiences of terrorist violence still played a role in how and where urban everyday life was securitised at the time. Thus, in London, as the place with the most prominent local memories of terrorist attacks, their respective methodology also shaped the local counterterrorist response to them: For instance, since

human crowds were exploited in the 2005 attacks, sites which were known to be extraordinarily busy became securitised in their aftermath. Therefore, past experiences of local attacks were translated across time and turned into future imaginaries of terrorist violence in London. However, the time after 9/11 is particularly striking due to how the logic of pre-emption, and thus future imaginaries of terrorist violence, became also translated across *space*: My analysis demonstrated how the memories from the attacks in London and other Western metropoles – and hence violence that happened elsewhere – were translated to new places, such as Brussels and Stuttgart, and therefore fuelled the local counterterrorist developments there: Although the Belgian capital suffered a local attack in 2014, all newly introduced securitisations of human and non-human bodies had already happened prior to this terrorist incident and fitted the example that the British capital had given, regarding the applied rationales. For Stuttgart, this was even more so the case, as the German city did not encounter any local terrorist violence. Nevertheless, the securitisations of suspicious sites, suspicious objects, and suspicious people which became adopted on the national level implied in their implementation also changes for the local level, and thus transformed Stuttgart's everyday life towards incorporating a pre-emptive logic of securitisation, translated from other places, where local attacks had happened. Therefore, in direct comparison, the material-discursive securitisation of everyday life in Stuttgart and Brussels was still more moderate at this stage but showed in its substance clear resemblances to that in London.

8.2.3 Mapping securitisations of urban everyday life since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16

The last phase of my thick comparison deals with the time since 2015/16, when European metropoles arguably experienced a relative peak of terrorist attacks, both when it comes to the frequency of incidents as well as regarding the human damages caused due to the European campaign of ISIL but also the increasing awareness towards terrorist violence inspired by far right and xenophobic ideologies. Within this phase, Brussels experienced a major local attack in March 2016 as well as several smaller terrorist incidents in the months and years thereafter, and was also the place, where the Paris attacks in November 2015 were orchestrated from. While the terrorist attention for the British capital was in contrast lower, London still encountered some medium and smaller attacks, especially in 2017. Stuttgart was again spared any local encounter with terrorist violence, but the German capital Berlin was hit by an attack in 2016. Despite their again quite different local experiences with terrorist violence, the counterterrorist response to this relative surge of attacks in European metropoles was considerable in all my cases in terms of how their everyday life became increasingly securitised.

London, although surely no longer the European metropole most heavily under attack, continued to be a frontrunner in securitising everyday life through counterterrorist measures. With regards to suspicious sites, this meant that the Crowded Places paradigm was extended to cover virtually all urban sites of human interaction, including shopping centres, restaurants, places of worship, cultural venues, health and educational institutions, parks, streets, and squares which initiated additional technological measures of control but also additional material fortification and projection of executive power (NaCTSO 2017; City of London Police 2020). Due to the circular definition of suspicious objects in

reference to suspicious sites, the mushrooming of the latter across the city also had tremendous implications for the securitisation of the former which was reflected in the vague definition of suspicious objects given by the NaCTSO that encompasses every item which is 'hidden, obviously suspicious and untypical' (NaCTSO 2017: 44) for a particular location. Awareness campaigns, online training sessions, and expert advice projects were launched to increase the attention paid to these objects. Regarding suspicious people, there was a paradigm shift towards securitising suspicious behaviour (NaCTSO 2017, 118): Although this appeared to be on the surface a progressive step away from discriminatory racial profiling practices, it attributed suspicion to any behaviour that can be considered "odd", and thus heightened measures of control and self-control for everyone, while community-based suspicions against certain minorities were still reproduced. This development was especially problematic due to the concurrent universalising trend regarding who has been charged with the responsibility to look out for suspiciousness in London: Despite the continuing dominance of law enforcement agencies, counterterrorist efforts of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness were extended through the Prevent Duty (British Home Office 2019), and in recurrence on the rising relevance of the resilience paradigm, all people in London were encouraged to vigilantly report anything they consider suspicious to security authorities as informal managers of suspiciousness (NaCTSO 2020b).

This trend towards an intensifying securitisation of everyday life was also visible in Brussels. Though the city was arguably at the centre of the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, it is nonetheless telling that some of its most restrictive measures to securitise urban normality were taken prior to its local experiences with terrorist violence, and thus account for the power of future imaginaries. The most obvious example for this pre-emptive shift happened regarding the securitisation of suspicious sites which were problematised, just like in London, based on their assumed high crowd density in the military operation Vigilant Guardian and the city's security lockdown in November 2015, and thus *before* the major local attack in March 2016 happened (cf. Traynor 2015a). Furthermore, thanks to Brussels' quickly earned reputation as a host city for terrorist cells, its suspicious sites included residential areas around the canal which became securitised through intensified police and military presence (Devroe and Ponsaers 2018a: 23). Brussels' pre-emptive security lockdown also had securitising implications for mundane urban objects, in that heavy clothing, backpacks, and suitcases became problematised at the city's airport and shopping malls for some months (Buyck et al. 2017). Permanent solutions were adopted for the non-transparent trashcans in the city's metro system and for vehicles, as Brussels introduced an APNR system and a larger pedestrian area in its city-centre (Seron and André 2016: 11; Fabre 2017). Moreover, Brussels' reputation to be a headquarter of jihadist terrorism massively boosted counterterrorist measures against suspicious people who were still defined through community-based stigmatisations against the city's Muslims and People of Colour but the applied measures of control became more systemic and severer (Human Rights Watch 2016). Additionally, initiatives to securitise suspicious behaviours were launched in the Belgian capital (Federal Police of Belgium 2019). This coincidences with a further push towards professionalising and

simultaneously generalising counterterrorist responsibilities: Thus, not only formal managers of suspiciousness on all levels of government received more competences, man power, and budget but counterterrorist responsibilities were also extended towards semi-formal and informal mangers of security who were addressed in an abundance of awareness campaigns and CVE projects to look out for suspiciousness in their professional and private lives (Belgian Ministry of the Interior 2018).

In Stuttgart, finally, pre-emptive measures to securitise its everyday life also proliferated considerably since 2015/16. Hence, the material-discursive understanding of what counts as a potential attack site was extended with a focus on its city-centre which brought about the installation of bollards, CCTV cameras, and the projection of police presence in the city's pedestrian area as well as pre-emptive identity controls at event locations (Schwörer 2019; Stuttgart City Administration 2020). Regarding suspicious objects, their local securitisation intensified, as vehicles became increasingly problematised in Stuttgart, despite its reputation as a car-city. This led to the construction of material barriers in the city-centre's crowded areas in 2019 and the legal introduction of an APNR system in 2020 (Schwörer 2019; Police Law Baden-Württemberg 2020: § 51). Furthermore, the material-discursive understanding of suspicious people in Stuttgart widened: Thus, on the one hand, the established community-based suspicions against members of Germany's Muslim and migrant communities continued, but on the other hand, right-wing terrorism became more prominent in the German discourse, fuelled by the revelations around the NSU. Though in practice, the investigatory efforts against them remained limited, compared to the attention paid to individuals who fitted the previously established image of suspicious people (Hermann and Maksan 2021). Yet, in general, the methods to securitise suspicious people intensified and diversified in Stuttgart: Thus, there was a shift towards problematising suspicious behaviours and challenging radicalisation at a more personal level through adopting a CVE approach (BKA 2022e; German Federal Government 2016). This last observation ties in with the developments around managers of suspiciousness in Stuttgart: While formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level remained the most important actors in Germany's counterterrorism architecture, and business actors kept playing a crucial role in the securitisation of critical infrastructures, counterterrorist responsibilities became also more localised and informal: The regional and local level got more involved in taking over counterterrorist competencies through setting up CVE efforts on the ground which were particularly targeted at so called 'multipliers' (KONEX 2022c), but also private citizens who were encouraged to pay close attention to behavioural shifts among their friends and family members (KONEX 2022b).

Assessing this last analytical phase from my theoretical perspective reveals how in recent years material-discursive attributions of suspiciousness and the ways to control them became translated across European metropoles and transformed urban everyday life as a local socio-material entanglement in them. The anticipatory nature of this securitisation of suspicious sites, objects, people, and behavioural practices is reflected in the observation that local experiences of terrorist violence became even less relevant in justifying new countermeasures, as most prominently the respective efforts in Stuttgart demonstrate. However, also in Brussels and London, it was not necessarily local encounters with

terrorist violence that triggered a counterterrorist response but rather future imaginaries thereof. This was particularly visible in Brussels' security lockdown which happened on entirely pre-emptive grounds. At the same time, past experiences of terrorist violence were not irrelevant. My perspective thus revealed how remote attacks that happened in other European metropoles, as for instance Paris or Berlin, produced powerful memories of terrorist violence and its respective attack methodologies that fuelled future imaginaries thereof in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart by being translated into a local, pre-emptive response at them. The material-discursive securitisations that happened in all three cities, despite their different intensities, changed their everyday lives in fundamental ways: On the non-human side, more and more urban sites and mundane objects of everyday life were associated with potential dangerousness, and therefore managed with an intensifying logic of control. On the human side, not only members of large minority communities but increasingly also behavioural practices were problematised as suspicious, while simultaneously the responsibility to look out for suspiciousness became a more local and personal obligation for people in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart.

8.3 Translating (counter)terrorism in European metropoles across space

Having revealed how socio-material entanglements in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart transformed over time due to memories of terrorist violence and future imaginaries thereof, I deal in the second section of my thick comparison with how securitisations of urban everyday life were translated across space. To do so, I systematically engage with the similarities and differences of my cases regarding the suspiciousness attributed to human and non-human bodies and the practices to control them, that I mapped for each of the three cities. My analysis adds value to the existing literature dealing with the transformation urban everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism because I consider the securitisation of human *and* non-human bodies, and hence my thick comparison shows how the material-discursive understandings of who and what was deemed suspicious travelled from one place to another. Thus, I ultimately reveal that which human and non-human bodies were acknowledged as potentially dangerous and especially vulnerable in my three cases became – despite some interesting local particularities – thanks to memories of terrorist violence and future imaginaries thereof more and more similar.

8.3.1 Mapping the securitisation of suspicious sites across places

Comparing my maps regarding the securitisation of suspicious sites shows that their problematisation before 9/11 was limited to London's everyday life. On the one hand, in response to the city's local attacks, the British capital had singled out sites as especially vulnerable and in consequence introduced increased control to protect them. This logic was applied particularly to London's financial districts which were so heavily securitised, that they could be sealed off from the rest of the city. On the other hand, neighbourhoods with a high number of Irish residents were problematised as potentially dangerous. This material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites remained local at the time, and was hence not translated to Brussels and Stuttgart, where the security governance of local space was linked to the fear of crime and public misdemeanour rather than counterterrorist considerations.

However, after 9/11 and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London, the counterterrorist rationale to securitise certain urban sites reached all three cities. A closer look reveals that the material-discursive understanding of suspicious sites as geographically distinct urban locations with structural and symbolic relevance which were considered highly vulnerable to be targeted in a terrorist attack that London promoted already prior to 9/11 clearly resembled the newly adopted understandings in Brussels and Stuttgart. In a similar vein, the practices of control to monitor and potentially seclude these areas from the rest of the city, as known from London, were taken up especially in Brussels' approach to securitise its European Quarter and historic city-centre, but to a lesser extent also in Stuttgart's protection of its sites recognised as critical infrastructures. Thus, London's understanding of vulnerable suspicious sites from before 9/11 was translated pre-emptively to both Brussels and Stuttgart. At the same time, London adopted in response to its local experience of terrorist violence in 2005, in which high numbers of random civilians were targeted, the Crowded Places paradigm. Therefore, the new reference point of suspicious sites in London became the assumed crowd density at them which led to the securitisation of many more sites in the British capital. In contrast, the scope of potentially dangerous sites in London remained similar but shifted from neighbourhoods with a high percentage of Irish population to those with number of Muslim and non-white residents. This understanding was also translated to Brussels where rather than whole neighbourhoods, mosques, Islamic community centres and Koranic schools became indistinctively problematised as potentially suspicious.

Since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, London's understanding of vulnerable sites as crowded urban locations was translated to Brussels and Stuttgart. The more literal translation of it was adopted in Brussels where the remote experiences of terrorist violence in Paris in 2015 led to soldiers patrolling the city's busy locations as well as to the city's pre-emptive security lockdown which essentially shut down Brussels' crowded places entirely for a few days. Although the sites which were securitised in Brussels were not officially called crowded places, their material-discursive characteristics fitted the understanding adopted in London. In an admittedly more subtle form, this attribution of suspicious sites was also implemented in Stuttgart's city-centre, as locations and events with high numbers of expected visitors received special protection measures, and hence human crowds became associated with being an attractive target for terrorist perpetrators. Therefore, urban locations where people gather became deemed in need of additional security measures also in the German city. The adoption of these measures happened by explicitly referencing remote experiences of attacks. In London, the understanding of suspicious sites as crowded places persisted during the European peak of attacks, but the meaning of what counts as crowded got further extended, covering essentially all sites of urban everyday life where human interaction happens. The notion of suspicious sites as potentially dangerous locations where terrorist suspects were assumed to live remained in Stuttgart indistinct but in Brussels it got a geographically more concrete meaning. However, this development was not initiated as a translation from London but rather indebted to the Belgian capital's local experiences with terrorist violence, as a city where attacks were not only committed at but also orchestrated from.

8.3.2 Mapping the securitisation of suspicious objects across places

Comparing my maps which illustrate the transformations of suspicious objects in times of (counter)terrorism reveals that translating securitisations of mundane items across places proved arguably more difficult, compared to the developments around suspicious sites. Thus, the early problematisation of items, such as litterbins and vehicles, in London was not translated to Brussels and Stuttgart, as preparing for these types of attack methodologies that the British capital frequently experienced at the time was not elusive enough to be adopted elsewhere, and therefore mundane objects remained initially material-discursively harmless in Brussels and Stuttgart. The story was a bit different for classic weapons which at least in the German case became controlled more restrictively due to the violent experiences of the RAF attacks, while in Brussels not even classic weapons were considered suspicious, as thanks to a local particularity, their possession was considered a civil right in Belgium.

It took until after 9/11 for the lax Belgian weapons law to become stricter, yet this shift was not adopted due to counterterrorist rationales but indebted to external pressure to comply with international standards, whereas mundane urban objects remained continuously harmless in Brussels. In contrast, a vague understanding of suspicious things was translated to the German context in response to remotely experienced attacks. Thus, instrumentalising mundane things for terrorist purposes became criminalised on the national level in 2009, without further defining which concrete objects fell into this definition. Nonetheless, their securitisation in practice was hardly comparable to what happened in London, neither before nor after 9/11. The only exception was that special measures of control for mundane objects were adopted at suspicious sites: This policy which had been prominent in the British capital already in the previous phase was translated in the special arrangements for suspicious objects at critical infrastructures in Stuttgart and in the updated access controls at Brussels' and Stuttgart's airports.

During the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, cars and trucks were exploited as weapons against human crowds in several European metropoles, and unlike the early problematisation of vehicles in London, this created memories that were powerful enough to be translated into future imaginaries of violence also in Brussels and Stuttgart. Thus, both cities recognised cars and trucks as suspicious objects and introduced measures, such as physical barriers, exclusive pedestrian zones, and APNR systems to mitigate this threat. Additionally, Brussels adopted suspicions against litterbins from London and elsewhere: Thus, replacing the existing non-transparent trashcans with see-through ones in Brussels' metro was another case of a pre-emptive translation because litterbins did not play any role in the local attacks in the Belgian capital, and hence problematising them was inspired by remote experience of terrorist violence elsewhere. In Stuttgart, the understanding of suspicious mundane objects remained vaguer – at least legally speaking – and thus was closer connected to the understanding of potentially dangerous items as everything that is 'hidden, obviously suspicious and untypical' (NaCTSO 2017: 44) at a certain location which has been dominant in London. However, the excessive practices of control and public awareness campaigns around suspicious objects continued to be a local particularity in the British capital, which was not translated to Brussels and Stuttgart, at least not in the same intensity.

8.3.3 Mapping the securitisations of suspicious people across places

My comparison of the securitisation of suspicious people across space shows that material-discursive assumptions about which people were attributed to have terrorist intentions were frequently translated among my cases, although local differences between the cities existed from early onwards. Thus, the initial community-based problematisation of Irish people in London was not translated as such because it was not compatible to the German and the Belgian context, but the adopted measures of control showed resemblances to the systematically repressive measures against people following a leftist political ideology in Germany, as reflected in the Radicals Decree and other freedom restricting counterterrorism laws adopted in the 1970s. In contrast, although the primary source of terrorist violence in Brussels at the time also originated from the extreme left, the population in Brussels – both nationals and foreigners – remained to be considered relatively harmless with only slightly stricter rules on population management. Systematically repressive measures were temporarily limited in this case to the Operation Mammut which targeted the leftist scene in Belgium, but the investigations led neither to a substantive success nor implied long-lasting stigmatisations of those affected.

The events of 9/11 and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London – all of them acts of terrorism committed by jihadist perpetrators – proved to be a substantive turning point when it comes to the securitisation of suspicious people. Thus, they initiated a remarkable transformation across all my cases because the jihadist terrorism of the 21st century was quickly accepted as the primary transnational source of terrorist violence which translated into the stigmatisation and discrimination of Muslim and non-white communities in all three cities, although the actual terrorist perpetrators oftentimes fitted these stereotypes only superficially. The exact demarcations of suspicious people remained in all three cases blurry, but were not completely identical as they were dependent on the local presence of respective minority communities in the cities. Yet nonetheless, the material-discursive image of what a potential terrorist suspect looks like was initially pre-emptively translated to Brussels and Stuttgart through remote encounters with violence elsewhere, while suspect images in London drew both on local and remote memories of terrorist violence. The sentiment to consider individuals practicing Islam, People of Colour, foreign nationals, and individuals with a migration background as potentially dangerous became at the time surely a general tendency in Western societies and was not limited to their metropoles. Nonetheless, the violent and discriminatory consequences of these community-based suspect images were experienced frequently in cities, as their populations tend to be especially diverse. However, the intensity of counterterrorist violence towards suspicious people differed considerably among my three cases, indicating again that translations locally vary: While in London, it had in the most severe cases even deadly consequences for alleged terrorist suspects, the counterterrorist repression in Germany revolved especially around intrusive and non-evidence-based investigation techniques as well as legal disadvantages for foreign nationals. The counterterrorist violence practiced in the case of Brussels was more subtle, but its focus was also discriminatorily singling out the country's Muslim population, and thus rendered for instance mosques to potentially dangerous sites of terrorist suspicion.

With the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, the existing community-based stereotypes about members of certain minority groups continued to be reproduced in all my cases, but at the same a widened understanding of how to identify suspicious people spread across them: While bodily characteristics and identity markers, such as religious affiliation and nationality, still played an important role in differentiating between suspicious and harmless people, there was a shift of focus towards problematising suspicious behaviour. This turn was again influenced by past experiences of terrorist violence committed by perpetrators that had previously appeared as suspicious on the radar of respective law enforcement agencies, and yet marking them as potentially dangerous did not prevent them from realising their attacks. Such failures but also the experience of terrorist violence from ideological sources other than jihadism revealed blind spots and biases of community-based suspicions. Hence, focusing on suspicious behavioural patterns rather than generalised stereotypes about members of minority communities was not necessarily motivated by easing the discriminatory consequences for the latter but foremostly intended to make counterterrorist efforts more effective. Among my three cases, the new attention for suspicious behaviour came first up in London, where it quickly became a key reference point for identifying terrorist suspects. In Brussels, the translation was more subtle, yet nonetheless, the city adopted a special training for police officers to better detect suspicious behaviour. The development in Stuttgart was quite similar and led to refining existing categories, such as the vague notion of the potential offender, to pay special attention to suspicious behavioural patterns (BKA 2022e).

8.3.4 Mapping the proliferation of managers of suspiciousness across places

Moving away from translated attributions of suspiciousness to translations of who was charged to look out for suspiciousness, my thick comparison demonstrates that countering terrorist violence was at first considered mainly a responsibility for formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level at all three places. This finding is especially noteworthy not only due to the different polities of the national contexts in which my case cities are located but also because of the relatively high level of local and regional autonomy that existed in all three metropoles, which made a concentration of counterterrorist competence on the national level not intuitively likely. Thus, this finding shows that initially terrorist violence was constructed as special type of violence that required not only extraordinary measures but also powerful actors on the highest level of government to enforce them. Apart from this similarity, London stood out yet again, because it had already before 9/11 not only formal managers of suspiciousness but also actors from the private sector, and hence semi-formal managers of suspiciousness, engaged in counterterrorist activity to protect their property from damages caused by terrorist violence. This broader understanding was initially not translated – neither to Brussels nor to Stuttgart, although especially the attacks sites in the Belgian capital resembled those in London.

After 9/11 and subsequent major attacks in European metropoles, this self-initiated counterterrorist engagement of private actors became encouraged even further in London, as professionalised formal managers of suspiciousness offered information material and training sessions to sectors falling into the Crowded Places paradigm. Yet, throughout the 21st century, London was no

longer the only place among my three cases in which semi-formal managers of suspiciousness were charged with counterterrorist responsibilities, as the understanding to incorporate private actors was pre-emptively translated to the German context, and hence to Stuttgart as a renowned business metropole: In this case, the translation was almost literal, as the public-private counterterrorist cooperation in Germany was introduced under its CIP strategy which aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and was, just like in the British case, built on the willingness of the private sector to voluntarily comply with the regulations which were presented to serve their neoliberal business interests. In contrast to Stuttgart, Brussels was not receptive for this translation regarding the role of semi-formal managers of suspiciousness: Due to the traditionally strong notion of federalism in the Belgian system of government, the country's security architecture was characterised for decades by inter-institutional turf wars between different actors. Hence, the attacks of 9/11 and the following incidents in Madrid and London only created new momentum to settle these disagreements which led to the establishment of the OCAM.

Since the European peak of attacks, the understanding of managers of suspiciousness transformed remarkably in all three places, especially when it comes to the unprecedented emphasis that was put on the role of semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness. This translation reflects a broader societal trend towards resilience and earlier forms of intervention, as counterterrorist responsibilities to look out for signs of suspiciousness in everyday life have become more local and informal in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart, alike. Nonetheless, a closer look shows that the translation of this tendency across space was not literal and hence adopted differently. Thus, the pressure towards semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness was surely strongest in London, as for instance the Prevent Duty constitutes a legal obligation for certain professionals to monitor those in their care and pass on their suspicions about them, but also the omnipresent awareness campaigns and abundance of learning material to encourage citizens to constantly look out for any signs of suspiciousness indicate how resilience has become an immensely powerful rationale in the British capital. Brussels and Stuttgart have in recent years increasingly adopted a CVE component in their counterterrorist approaches, and hence also internalised the understanding that dealing with counterterrorism is not an exclusive state competence but rather a responsibility for all their residents, both in their professional and their private lives. However, in comparison to London, the CVE work in Brussels and Stuttgart has been project rather than campaign-based and remained essentially voluntary. Nonetheless, the social pressure to look out for suspiciousness has significantly increased in both cities, especially for individuals entrusted with care for groups that are considered particularly vulnerable for radicalisation.

8.3.5 Mapping the intensification of practices of control across places

Having compared the material-discursive translations of suspicious sites, objects, and people as well as the transformations regarding those who are charged to look out for suspiciousness finally brings me to the last aspect of my thick comparison across space: the practices of control that were respectively employed at the different places to monitor urban everyday life and deal with suspicious human and non-human bodies. Before 9/11, London was a lonely frontrunner regarding their implementation:

Hence, in response to its many local encounters with terrorist violence at the time, the city had established already during the first phase of my analysis an elaborate system of material barriers, a powerful projection of police force as well as large-scale CCTV based surveillance and an APNR system to track and trace suspicious people and things. Monitoring one's urban population in such depth and especially with the help of technology became initially not translated to Brussels and Stuttgart.

Yet, with the remote experiences of terrorist attacks that both cities made in the 2000s, the threat of attacks was projected to them and translated into locally distinct measures of control: While in Brussels, CCTV surveillance was stepped up throughout the whole city to monitor suspiciousness, the installation of security cameras was geographically limited to sites of critical infrastructures in Stuttgart, which underlines again how distinct local and national contexts are, because they are in some cases more and in some cases less compatible, when it comes to adopting counterterrorist practices from elsewhere. However, German managers of suspiciousness made use of technological tools of surveillance which focused rather on monitoring suspicious people than suspicious sites by running for instance a pre-emptive dragnet investigation in 2002, highlighting how distinct priorities dominated the ways in which urban everyday life became increasingly ruled by a logic of control across places.

The introduction of an APNR system in both cities and the surveillance of public urban space in the German city took even longer to translate, as these transformations only came about after the peak of attacks in 2015/16, especially trigged by VAW attacks which were witnessed remotely in other European metropoles. Still, in direct comparison to London, the implemented measures of control are subject to greater restrictions than in the British capital which has remained, although arguably no longer the main European target city in recent years, a frontrunner when it comes to the use of technology in practices of control, as for instance the current experimenting with AI-based measures there shows. At the same time, the deployment of soldiers in Brussels' city-centre since 2015 was translated to London in the military Operation Temperer but also the police operation Project Servator. This finding demonstrates that London, despite its considerable counterterrorism history, has nevertheless not always been the place, where securitisation practices originated from but sometimes also the place, to where they were translated to. In the case of Stuttgart, such human-led practices of control translated into the local initiative Experience Stuttgart Safely but also in the paradigmatic shift on the national level to integrate the German military in the counterterrorist response to domestic attacks.

8.4 Comparing the normative implications of securitised everyday life in European metropoles

The findings I gathered in the thick comparison of translations across time and across space lead me finally to reflect on my cases' similarities and differences when it comes to the normative implications of securitising their everyday lives for privileged and marginalised human and non-human bodies. Just like in my empirical chapters, I discuss respective socio-material power asymmetries alongside three questions: Who and what was deemed potentially dangerous? Who and what was deemed worthy of protection? And who and what was deemed capable and credible to engage in counterterrorist activities?

8.4.1 Security from whom and what

Regarding the first dimension of my critical reflection on the securitisation of urban everyday life from a perspective of posthumanist ethics, my comparison reveals that in all my cases, the attribution of material-discursive suspiciousness exacerbated the vulnerabilities of already marginalised human and non-human bodies further, and thus reinforced socio-material power hierarchies in the cities. In terms of potentially dangerous human bodies, my cases showed remarkable similarities in who was considered suspicious, as community-based stigmatisation became translated across them. These stereotypes about suspicious people targeted in all three cities members of minorities groups – although depending on the local context and the time frame – different ones. The respective minority status of those affected has overall largely coincided with their marginalisation in other aspects of urban everyday life, as for instance thanks to an insecure legal status – in the case of foreign nationals that were especially targeted in Stuttgart and Brussels, but also in London – a disadvantaged socio-economic status – in the case of individuals with a migrant background working in the low-income sector and living in deprived areas of the cities, such as the Irish residents of London before 9/11 but also the Northern African, Middle Eastern, and Turkish diasporas in Brussels, Stuttgart, and London after 9/11 – and practising a marginalised cultural identity like Islam or a non-white/European appearance on the basis of which people were racially profiled. While these vulnerabilities were in many aspects already entangled with one another, interlinking them with terrorist suspicions had additional repressive consequences which excluded affected individuals even further from participating freely and equally in the everyday life of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. The shift away from community-based stigmatisation to problematising the vaguer notion of suspicious behaviour which has been recently promoted especially in London but to a moderate extent also in Brussels and Stuttgart has so far hardly eased these discriminatory effects, since in practice, the applied measures of control allow for the reproduction of stereotypes against members of minority communities, as for instance the comparison of investigatory statistics shows.

Although the potential dangerousness of human bodies was overall closely entangled with the suspiciousness of non-human bodies, my cases showed more variance in this respect. Thus, geographically identifiable areas were marked as potentially dangerous only in London and Brussels, while in Stuttgart this notion remained more indistinct which is most likely indebted to the fact that the city has not encountered a local attack until now. Nonetheless, comparing the areas in the British and the Belgian capital which were marked as potentially dangerous reveals again a strong correlation with their marginalisation in other aspects. While the affected neighbourhoods were geographically speaking not necessarily located at the peripheries of London and Brussels, they were typically disadvantaged in socio-economic terms, regarding their infrastructure, crime and poverty rates, and the access to a decent level of education, health care, and other social services. Thanks to their association with potential dangerousness, as terrorist suspects were assumed to live there, the political attention paid to them surely rose, but this led initially oftentimes only to an increase of control rather than to tackling the root causes of their deprivation and marginalisation within the socio-material power hierarchies of the cities.

8.4.2 Security for whom and what

In the second dimension of my normative reflections, I critically contextualised the findings of my historiographic archaeology concerning the question who and what was deemed worthy of protection in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. Comparing my conclusions in this respect shows that special vulnerabilities were in all three metropoles attributed to privileged human and non-human bodies that were already at the centre of urban everyday life. This had ambiguous consequences for them, as on the one hand the protective attention paid to them emphasised their socio-material superiority, while on the other hand countering their vulnerability made them face higher levels of control, and thus limited their freedom to a certain extent. The similarities of my cases in this context were especially significant for vulnerable non-human bodies. Thus, the sites that were deemed worthy of protection in all three cities were initially places with a special structural and symbolic relevance for the neoliberal functioning of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. While this was certainly also indebted to respective attack methodologies of terrorist perpetrators at the time, it reflects nonetheless that the value assigned to vulnerable sites was intricately linked to the economic value they generate. With the recent widening of which sites count as vulnerable, that was at least observable in London and Brussels, to include basically any location where human interaction takes place, this asymmetry has decreased. However, since this also meant that measures of control mushroomed from selected locations across the urban public space of my case cities, the normative desirability of this development remains questionable.

Just like in the previous dimension, the understanding of which non-human bodies were deemed vulnerable was closely intertwined with which human bodies were considered worthy of protection, and thus my cases showed again significant resemblances in this respect. People who inhabit and work at locations, such as London's financial districts, Brussels' European Quarter, and Stuttgart's critical infrastructures are typically privileged in terms of their socio-economic background, their educational and professional careers, and their socio-cultural reputation which grants them access to these vulnerable urban sites. In this sense, the initial protection of sites of structural and symbolic relevance implicitly marked privileged human bodies as especially worthy of protection. With the recent spreading of vulnerable sites across London, Brussels, and to a lesser extent also Stuttgart, this asymmetry among human bodies has yet not been eased, as an active participation in urban everyday life is bound for instance to being able to afford leisure activities, such as attending cultural events, dining in restaurants, and shopping in the city-centre. Hence, my comparison regarding which human and non-human bodies were deemed worthy of protection in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart demonstrates that being attributed with material-discursive vulnerability has been connected to pre-existing socio-material privileges in all my cases. The normative implications of this finding are yet certainly more ambiguous because managing vulnerability has typically implied an increase of control. Nonetheless, as the previous dimension showed such control has especially negative implications for those who are considered potentially dangerous and is in turn less problematic for those who are considered harmless, power asymmetries ultimately also persisted in this dimension of my critical reflection.

8.4.3 Security through whom and what

Delving into the comparison of who and what was deemed capable and credible to take over counterterrorist responsibilities reveals that this last dimension of my normative reflections showed the greatest variance among my three cases. With regards to non-human bodies – although this was not a focus of my analysis – these differences played out in how much technology and physical barriers played a role in the counterterrorist approach of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. The British capital continuously obtained a frontrunner position in both aspects, as solid and retractable barriers, CCTV cameras, and an APNR system have been part of the metropole's everyday life already since the phase prior to 9/11. The growing interest in AI-based measures in recent years demonstrated the persistence of this tendency. In comparison, the counterterrorist approach in Brussels and Stuttgart was much more based on human managers of suspiciousness, as control was usually projected through police forces and military personnel. Although CCTV cameras and APNR systems were eventually also introduced in the Belgian and the German city, reservations and limitations indicate a much higher scepticism, especially towards technological means of control. Evaluated from my normative perspective, the strong reliance on non-human managers of suspiciousness that was only observable in London is ambiguous: On the one hand, non-human managers of suspiciousness aspire to be more neutral and less biased than their human counterparts in differentiating between harmlessness and suspiciousness. On the other hand, especially technology-based measures in London prompted in their practical application discriminatory implications for People of Colour due to a lower accuracy in correctly identifying them.

When it comes human managers of suspiciousness, my cases were initially also quite different but became over time more similar, as eventually formal, semi-formal, and informal managers of suspiciousness proliferated in all three metropoles. However, despite these growing resemblances among my cases, the pressure put on people to take over counterterrorist responsibilities in the context of their professional and private lives has been much higher in London than in Brussels and Stuttgart, where sharing observations and suspicions against others has remained entirely voluntary. While in comparison of my cases, the approach in the British capital is thus surely the most problematic, its overall normative evaluation reveals yet again ambiguities: Hence, on the one hand, a largely state-centric approach, as promoted in Brussels and Stuttgart, openly reinforces power hierarchies in the vertical relationship between the state and the citizen, as formal managers of suspiciousness gained counterterrorist competencies to legitimately curtail the fundamental freedom of the cities' residents. On the other hand, adopting a more resilience-orientated CVE approach further exacerbates horizontal power hierarchies between citizens: Thus, who is deemed credible and trustworthy to share observations of suspiciousness is closely entangled with one's respective harmlessness or potential dangerousness as well as one's nationality, socio-economic background, behaviour, appearance, and societal status. In other words, universalising counterterrorist responsibilities among the citizens of London, Brussels, and Stuttgart has eased differences only on the surface, while in practice already privileged residents of the cities became more powerful and members of already vulnerable groups became further marginalised.

8.5 The securitisation of urban everyday life on the translocal level of space

The last section of this chapter lifts my analysis to the translocal level, as comparing the transformations in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart enables me on the one hand to argue that European metropoles have become the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox by revealing the similarities of how everyday life was increasingly securitised in my case cities, which constituted a process of urban segregation. On the other hand, this step allows me to contextualise my argument's scope by shedding light on the cities' local particularities and other policy rationales that played a role in their trajectories.

8.5.1 Differences: Local particularities and other policy rationales

Starting with the differences, the thick comparison of my three cases reveals that the securitisation of everyday life in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart was to a certain extent distinct in each case. Three observations of differences are particularly noteworthy: Firstly, London was in the past the city that clearly stood out as a frontrunner, when it comes to the securitisation of its everyday life. This confirms the metropole's longstanding reputation as a fortress city and can be to accredited to factors, such as several traumatic experiences of local attacks as well as the UK's national context which made it thanks to a more centralised system in comparison to the federalist structures in Belgium and Germany simpler to implement certain counterterrorist measures. London's role as a pacemaker in implementing urban counterterrorism developed in the past but has remained relevant until today, although the city is arguably no longer the number one terrorist target among European metropoles. Secondly, besides London's special role, there was still a visible difference between Brussels and Stuttgart: Whereas the measures taken in Germany, especially after 9/11, had direct implications for the ways everyday life could be lived in Stuttgart, the developments in the Belgian capital remained more subtle at the time. This finding is particularly interesting because it already points towards the increasing importance of implementing *pre-emptive* counterterrorism measures, since Stuttgart had been spared a local attack, while Brussels was already targeted in multiple terrorist incidences back then. However, a significant reservation to this finding is that, although transformative policies were locally relevant in Stuttgart, they were adopted on the national level, and thus not only felt in Stuttgart but everywhere in Germany. Only since recent years, Stuttgart's local counterterrorism practices also gained in momentum and relevance. Thirdly, Brussels which used to be – also thanks to the fragmented security architecture in Belgium – behind in terms of securitising its everyday life in the past, significantly caught up with places, such as London, in recent years. This was triggered by several local encounters with terrorist violence since 2015/16. But remarkably, many of its most severe counterterrorism measures were in fact already implemented before large-scale violence hit the city, and hence indicate once again their pre-emptive character. Thanks to Brussels' recently owned reputation of being a hub for terrorist cells, the city may yet become a frontrunner in securitising its everyday life in the future.

Thus, my thick comparison revealed that to some extent each of my case cities had its local particularities in how their everyday life became increasingly securitised. In the logic of my theoretical approach, this was indebted to the non-literal translations of suspiciousness across space and time, and

their different local encounters with terrorist attacks but other factors, such as the national contexts the cities are embedded in, local and national elections, and which political parties got in power as well as other developments of transnational importance, such as migration flows, and European integration and disintegration surely also played role in how these local differences came about. While understanding the reasons behind these distinct trajectories in-depth was not the explicit focus of my dissertation project, I consider analysing them more comprehensively a worthwhile endeavour for future research.

Besides exploring the local differences among my cases, the scope of my argument requires further contextualisation, as the observed transformations of everyday life in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart obviously *not only* came about thanks to counterterrorist objectives. Although I already pointed to some competing rationales in my empirical chapters, it makes sense to engage with them again more systematically to put the significance of my findings into perspective. In the range of these rationales fell not only general security concerns, such as the prevention of crime and public misdemeanour, but also environmentalist and mobility considerations as well as neoliberal business interests. While in certain instances, they pushed the transformation of urban everyday life even more into the direction of suspiciousness and increased control, in other cases, it was the opposite, when another rationale clashed with counterterrorist intentions thanks to diverging policy interests and consequences.

As London was the metropole among my three case cities that was locally the most affected by terrorist violence, it is unsurprising that counterterrorist objectives were particularly powerful rationales there because the threat appeared from early on more imminent in the city. However, given that the IRA's attack methodology during the 1990s was focused on causing economic damages, engaging in counterterrorist activity was not only a concern in itself, but also an economic decision for actors from the private sector weighing costs and benefits: Should one risk to become an attack target which would mean coping with largescale destruction and high costs or should one prepare for the worst case by doing smaller investments in updating infrastructure and physical protection as well as hiring additional security personnel or even paying for an insurance to cover some of the costs should an incident happen? As many, especially bigger businesses opted eventually for the latter, counterterrorism rationales were linked to economic interests in London already before 9/11 not only for the potential attack targets but also for the industries indirectly benefitting from the threat of terrorist violence, namely construction companies, private security firms, and the insurance sector (Coaffee 2009). In other words, economic considerations surely pushed London's everyday life even further towards increasing securitisation. While in Stuttgart private sector actors were also involved in counterterrorist activities in the context of drafting and implementing the CIP strategy, this happened in comparison to London not only due to their intrinsic business interests but because they were from the start actively encouraged by formal managers of suspiciousness to take part in developing the strategy to ensure its practicability and a high level of compliance. In contrast, economic interests were hardly a powerful rationale in counterterrorist activities in Brussels but the increasing political relevance that the Belgian city received as the informal capital of the EU had significant implications on the transformation of its everyday life. A telling

example therefore is the geographically focused securitisation of the metropole's European Quarter after Brussels became the permanent location for summits of the European Council (Kuyken and Schmitt 2014). The implied changes of this area came not only about because Brussels was feared to became the target of a terrorist attack but also because the frequency of the meetings made it an economic choice to be able to seal off the respective parts of city for upholding generally higher security standards there.

Another rationale that had – in this case ambivalent – implications for the counterterrorist transformation of everyday life in the analysed European metropoles were environmental concerns which were again especially visible in London in the past, while in Stuttgart and Brussels, they became only more relevant in recent years. The ambiguity of ecologist considerations expressed itself in London on the one hand through the removal of litterbins at the city's suspicious sites and its public transportation system, as the trashcans were considered apt places to hide IEDs. However, their absence caused a litter problem in the British capital, which led to public objections against this counterterrorist measure. On the other hand, the restrictions for trucks to enter London's city-centre were established to make it more difficult for terrorist assailants to transport large amounts of explosives there but these rules also served environmental goals, such as better air quality and reduced noise levels. Similar concerns came up again more recently in the debate about cars that also reached Brussels and Stuttgart. Thus, the traffic in these cities was not only problematised because vehicles can be instrumentalised for terrorist aims but also for the general safety of pedestrians and cyclists, implications of emissions for the climate and air quality, noise levels, as well as the space that is taken up for streets and parking areas.

Besides these interests which were not associated with security in its narrow understanding of upholding the physical integrity of human and non-human bodies, there were also policy considerations that followed such a security objective but without falling decidedly into the realm of counterterrorist measures. In other words, these initiatives aimed in a more general sense at maintaining public order and preventing any kind of violence, and thus even if inhibiting terrorist violence was not their explicitly expressed goal, it was for sure a welcome side-effect. Hence, for example, the initial adoption of secured by design principles and video surveillance in the management of public space in Brussels as well as the community policing approach in the city-centre of Stuttgart were both foremostly justified under references to rationales, such as the prevention of crime and public misdemeanour, rather than the threat of terrorist violence but nonetheless had implications for the securitisation of everyday life. The story was a bit different for the securitisation of classic weapons in the two metropoles: While in Brussels firearms and knives effectively remained to be attributed with harmlessness until after 9/11, the stricter regulations in the German context were initially based on experiences of terrorist violence in the country during the 1970s and 1980s. However, further restrictions which became approved after 9/11 as well as the first steps that were taken in Brussels in this context were not primarily adopted due the anticipated terrorist attacks but rather in response to other types of violence, especially rampage shootings. While there were surely many more competing rationales on the grounds of which everyday life in European metropoles changed over the decades, the economic, environmentalist and general security concerns

that I engaged with here are particularly interesting in the context of my project because they left their mark on urban counterterrorist policies to securitise everyday life in European metropoles by either slowing them down or by accelerating them further.

8.5.2 Similarities: European metropoles as the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox

Engaging with the local particularities of my three cases and competing policy rationales that were important in the securitisation of their everyday lives enabled me to contextualise the scope of my findings. What is yet, given my research objectives in this project even more important, is that my analysis revealed significant resemblances among my cases. These revolve around four main observations: Firstly, all three metropoles showed a tendency towards recognising terrorism as a threat to cities and their everyday lives, due to their assumed high levels of vulnerability in both structural and symbolic respects: The managers of suspiciousness in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart charged to deal with this type of violence hence increasingly acknowledged that terrorist perpetrators specifically targeted urban contexts because these could be well exploited for their political aims. This realisation closely coincided with the shift from domestic sources of terrorist violence to transnational ones which contributed to extending the implied threat across the countries of the Global North and their metropoles. In consequence, counterterrorist rationales became over time more prominent in all my case cities, usually following a top-down approach from decision-making on the national level to implementation on the local level. However, especially in recent years, autonomous local counterterrorist efforts became more relevant in all three metropoles. Secondly, the implemented measures implied – as typically so for counterterrorist measures – an increase of control, significant curtailments of fundamental freedoms, and oftentimes exclusionary, violent practices. These developments had in all three cities direct consequences for how everyday life can be lived in them. While initially this impact was usually restricted to certain human and non-human bodies in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart, and hence not visible and influential in all areas and aspects of their everyday lives, urban counterterrorism measures reached over time the realm of the mundane, and thus become mundane themselves, while at the same time, the meaning of material-discursive notions of suspiciousness became vaguer and more all-encompassing. In other words, measures to securitise everyday life in European metropoles transformed from being material-discursively extraordinary to being normalised, and therefore have become a more and more integral part of everyday life in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. Thirdly, future imaginaries of terrorist violence became an increasingly important reference point for justifying the implementation of pre-emptive urban counterterrorism measures in all three cities. While initially only memories of local experiences of terrorist attacks were decisive in how and where measures of control were implemented to securitise everyday life, as the case of London shows, over time encountering a local attack became less and less a prerequisite for adopting counterterrorist practices, as remotely experienced attacks were powerful enough to draw a credible scenario of future attacks elsewhere. This was reflected in material-discursive understandings of suspicious sites, objects, and people, which became translated across space, and hence measures of control to manage the threat assumingly

emanating from them were adopted accordingly in Brussels and Stuttgart where local violence had happened less or not at all, though in a more moderate and subtler form than in London. Fourthly, reflecting on these findings from a perspective of posthumanist ethics revealed that despite some differences among my cases regarding the intensity of this problematic tendency, the securitisation of their everyday life made on the one hand already privileged human and non-human bodies more powerful and on the other hand further exacerbated the vulnerabilities of already marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery. Thus, thanks to the increasing suspiciousness and control in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart in times of (counter)terrorism, everyday life can not only be lived less and less in free in them, but pre-existing socio-material power asymmetries were reinforced.

These growing resemblances between distinct places that the thick comparison of my cases brought to light are not only interesting as such, but also enable me to draw conclusions about European metropoles, understood as translocal space. Thus, based on my findings, I argue that (counter)terrorism securitised urban everyday life at the translocal level, and hence transformed how life can be lived in European metropoles in general, through inscribing violent measures of control and protection into their local space. My historiographic archaeology revealed that prior to 9/11, local experiences with terrorist violence – as seen in London – triggered local counterterrorist responses that were directly reacting to the respectively employed attack methodologies. However, these memories of past attacks remained local, and hence had no securitising repercussions on other places, such as Brussels and Stuttgart. After 9/11 and subsequent attacks of transnational terrorism in European metropoles, this started to change as material-discursive attributions of suspiciousness became more and more translated from places where violence had happened to places where violence had not happened. Since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16, this development intensified in a way that even at places, such as Stuttgart, which was never locally targeted by terrorist violence, pre-emptive counterterrorist measures have substantively transformed how everyday life can be lived, as freedom-restricting and oftentimes discriminatory practices were normalised into the local socio-material entanglements that constitute European metropoles as translocal space. Therefore, I argue that European metropoles became over time the spatial manifestation of an (in)security paradox because the response to terrorist violence at one place is inscribing counterterrorist violence at other places which increases insecurity at them rather than security. Due to translations of suspiciousness over time and across places, a local attack at any city which is considered a European metropole provides future imaginaries for violent counterterrorism measures elsewhere. Thus, as attacking a European metropole transforms not only the city where it happened but also changes everyday life at other European metropoles, terrorist perpetrators have succeeded in projecting fear beyond their immediate act of violence. The measures of control which were implemented in response to future imaginaries of terrorist violence often turned out to be largely ineffective, as for instance the extensive, but ultimately useless CCTV footage of the London attacks in 2005 and the pre-emptive security lockdown in Brussels in 2015 tragically demonstrated. Yet, absolute security has not only remained unattainable, but thanks to the repressive and violent character of

counterterrorist measures as reflected in my all cases, they themselves contributed to higher insecurity for human and non-human bodies intra-acting in the everyday life of European metropoles.

At the same time, as the translated material-discursive notions of suspiciousness have become over time and across places more and more vague, suspiciousness is increasingly found everywhere in European metropoles, across their sites of human interaction, in mundane objects, among large minorities groups, and in "odd" behaviour. Hence, human, and non-human bodies attributed with potential dangerousness have become ubiquitous in European metropoles and began to form an integral, ordinary part of their everyday lives. In other words, the lines between the anticipated violent catastrophe and urban ordinariness became more and more blurry in European metropoles. However, this development of universalising suspiciousness had only on the surface equal implications for everyone and everything entangled in urban everyday life in Europe. My normative perspective of posthumanist ethics allowed me to take a critical look at this transformation, and thus enabled me to reveal how the securitisation of everyday life has constituted a process of urban segregation. Therefore, although how everyday life can be lived in European metropoles transformed for everyone and everything in times of (counter)terrorism, the implications of its increasing securitisation are not the same for all human and non-human bodies. In fact, there is a strong tendency towards reproducing existing socio-material power asymmetries in urban everyday life through the shifting differentiation between harmlessness and suspiciousness: While already privileged human and non-human bodies at the centre of urban everyday life became more powerful, already marginalised human and non-human bodies at the periphery of urban everyday life became even more vulnerable. This finding is especially noteworthy because the increasingly vague meaning of suspiciousness suggests at first glance that previously prevalent asymmetries were eased. However, my analysis shows that the definition of suspicious sites, objects, and people became in theory so wide, that in practice pre-existing stereotypes about who and what is potentially dangerous, who and what is worthy of protection, and who and what is capable and credible to differentiate between the two could be easily subsumed under these vague material-discursive attributions of suspiciousness, and therefore persisted. As this tendency is – despite some minor differences – observable in all my cases, I argue that the securitisation of everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism constituted a process of urban segregation on the translocal level of European metropoles. This means that irrespective of their local encounters with terrorist violence, human and non-human bodies across metropoles in Europe were affected by the segregating consequences of counterterrorism practices and measures, which underlines not only their violent and repressive but also their discriminatory and exclusionary implications.

8.6 Conclusion

As I will draw final conclusions on my project in the following chapter, my comparison ends with a table which lists my summarised empirical findings. This gives not only a comprehensive overview of the respective developments in my three case cities but highlights once again how the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles became translated across space and across time.

	London	Brussels	Stuttgart
	Phase 1: Before 9/11		
Suspicious sites	Geographically limited to the city's financial centres & "Irish" neighbourhoods in North London	Remained harmless; securitisation of public space due to general security concerns (e.g. crime prevention)	Remained harmless; securitisation of public space due to general security concerns (e.g. crime prevention)
Suspicious objects	Classic weapons & mundane objects i.e., litterbins, cars, especially at suspicious sites	Neither classic weapons nor mundane objects	Limited to classic weapons; mundane objects remained harmless
Suspicious people	People with Irish passport or background, singled out due to community-based stereotypes	National & foreign residents remained harmless; shortly: problematisation of extreme left scene	People with leftist political orientation & wide understanding of supporting terrorist activities
Managers of suspiciousness	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national & local level: MI5 & police; semi-formal managers of suspiciousness: self-initiative of business owners	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national & local level but fragmented; formation of GIA, in practice quickly side-lined	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level BKA, intelligence agencies, (police forces on the regional level)
	Phase 2: Between 9/11 and the European peak of attacks in 2015/16		
Suspicious sites	Introduction of the Crowded Places paradigm: sites of symbolic & structural relevance across the entire city; Problematisation of "Muslim"/non-white neighbourhoods in North London	Sites of symbolic & structural relevance: protection of critical infrastructure, but geographically limited; problematisation of "Muslim" sites i.e., mosques, community centres, Koranic schools	Sites of symbolic & structural relevance: protection of critical infrastructure, but geographically limited; no explicit problematisation of potentially dangerous sites
Suspicious objects	Classic weapons & mundane objects across the entire city, due to Crowded Places paradigm	Classic weapons but thanks to external pressure not due to counterterrorist concerns	Classic weapons & wide legal definition of suspicious mundane objects
Suspicious people	Members of Muslim communities & People of Colour singled out based on community-based stereotypes	Members of Muslim & migrant communities singled out based on community-based stereotypes	Members of Muslim communities & foreign nationals singled out based on community-based stereotypes
Managers of suspiciousness	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level: NaCTSO & CPNI; semi-formal managers of suspiciousness at Crowded Places	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level & local level: formation of OCAM & Local Task Forces	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national level: BKA, GTAZ, GETZ; semi-formal managers of suspiciousness in the context of the CPI strategy
	Phase 3: Since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16		
Suspicious sites	Extension of Crowded Places paradigm: all sites of human interaction, vulnerable sites = potentially dangerous sites	All sites of human interaction; geographically distinct problematisation of canal area as potentially dangerous	Sites of symbolic & structural relevance; potentially crowded public sites, especially in the city-centre; potentially dangerous sites remained indistinct
Suspicious objects	Classic weapons & mundane objects according to HOT protocol across the entire city	Classic weapons & mundane objects: bags, suitcases, clothing, litterbins, SIM cards, cars	Classic weapons & mundane objects; special local focus on vehicles
Suspicious people	Problematisation of suspicious behaviours but community-based stereotypes persisted in investigatory practice	Focus on members of Muslim & migrant communities, especially in canal area; increasingly also problematisation of suspicious behaviour	Problematisation of suspicious behaviours but community-based stereotypes persisted in investigatory practice
Managers of suspiciousness	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national & local level: NaCTSO, MI5, police, military; Semi-formal managers of suspiciousness: Prevent duty & Crowded Places paradigm; Informal managers of suspiciousness: ACT public trainings & campaigns	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national & regional & local level: OCAM, National Security Council, police, military; Semi-formal managers of suspiciousness: Local Integrated Security Cells; Informal managers of suspiciousness: CVE projects	Formal managers of suspiciousness on the national, regional, local level: BKA, police, military, KONEX, local security partnership; semi-formal managers of suspiciousness: CVE trainings at LBZ Derad; Informal managers of suspiciousness: CVE projects

Table: Comparative summary of findings

9 Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

In this project, I analysed how urban everyday life in Europe transformed during times of (counter)terrorism. To answer this question, I conducted a historiographic archaeology to reveal how local space in my cases London, Brussels, and Stuttgart was securitised before and after 9/11 as well as since the European peak of attacks in 2015/16. After that, I traced translations of material-discursive suspiciousness across time and space to systematically engage with the similarities and differences of the three cities in a thick comparison. This allowed me to make not only claims about them as geographically distinct places but also about European metropoles as translocal space.

Based on my empirical findings, I argue that urban everyday life in Europe became increasingly securitised, in the sense that more and more people, sites, and objects were recognised as suspicious and at the same time the human and non-human measures to control this suspiciousness intensified. This phenomenon was not limited to cities that suffered local attacks, such as London and Brussels, but also transformed the everyday life of cities like Stuttgart which have not been directly affected by terrorist violence, yet. Thus, European metropoles have been rendered the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox: Memories of past attacks and future imaginaries thereof have established terrorist violence as a permanently daunting threat for all European metropoles which needs to be countered with repressive control. Yet, although – or rather because – security measures in European cities were stepped up, insecurity further increased, as violence spread not only through local terrorist attacks but also thanks to the translocal counterterrorist response to them. This tendency matters for everything and everyone that takes part in everyday life, as it makes ordinary places, such restaurants and shopping streets, associated with vulnerability and things as mundane as litterbins assigned with potential dangerousness.

However, I assert that despite this universalisation of increasingly vague notions of suspiciousness, pre-existing socio-material power hierarchies were reproduced and reinforced in times of (counter)terrorism. In this sense, the intensifying securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles, such as London, Brussels, and Stuttgart, constitutes a process of urban segregation: Hence, the asymmetries regarding, who and what is considered worthy of protection, from whom and what security needs to be provided, and who and what is deemed capable to make this differentiation mirror other power hierarchies based on socio-economic differences but also legal and ethnic inequalities. Ultimately, already privileged participants at the centre of urban everyday life in Europe are further empowered, while the vulnerabilities of its already marginalised participants are further exacerbated.

In this concluding chapter, I discuss the normative-critical implications of my findings by spelling out how to challenge the securitisation of urban everyday life in Europe and making a claim about who is responsible to do so. Subsequently, I contextualise the added value of my contribution within relevant academic debates as well as beyond the academic ivory tower but also critically reflect on the limitations and shortcomings of my project and its findings. Finally, I present ideas for further research and give a brief outlook to the future of securitised urban everyday life in Europe.

9.2 Normative-critical implications of my findings

In the introduction of this dissertation, I claimed that the research objectives for my project are not only to understand how urban everyday life was transformed in Europe during times of (counter)terrorism and to critically engage with the problematic implications of its securitisation but also to make normative claims about how to counter this worrisome development and who I consider responsible and capable to do so. In other words, my analysis deals besides exploring the questions, in which world we live and how we live in it, also with the questions, in which world do we want to live in and finally, how can we get the answers to the first set of questions more aligned with the answers to the second set of questions. I argue that engaging with my findings, regarding what should be and how can it be achieved, adds value to the academic debate on the securitisation of urban everyday life – which typically stops at adopting a critical stance without looking for alternatives – and, even more importantly, has normative-political implications which are significant beyond respective scholarly discussions.

Up until now, my analysis has answered the questions, in which world we live in and how we live in, as I demonstrated that the transformation of European metropoles in times of (counter)terrorism has made their everyday lives more violent, no matter if a local attack of terrorist violence has happened in them or not. Furthermore, I revealed that this violence affects everyone and everything that takes part in the everyday lives of European metropoles but not equally, as existing socio-material power hierarchies were reproduced in the differentiation between suspiciousness and harmlessness. These findings bring me to the question about the world in which we *want* to live in, or turning this thought around, why is it problematic that urban everyday life in Europe has transformed in the way it did, and why should this transformation be countered. I contend that through the increasing securitisation of urban everyday life, people living in European metropoles were – in accepting counterterrorist measures – asked to give up parts of their liberties to be protected and secured from threats like terrorist violence, while engaging in mundane day-to-day settings and ordinary situations. Yet, the notion of such a trade-off is highly problematic because it is based on the dangerous illusion that the promised security is attainable in the first place (cf. Baldwin 1997, 15): But, no matter how much urban everyday life is under control and surveillance, it will always remain impossible to prevent all terrorist violence from happening. Moreover, agreeing with Neocleous (2007), I reject the claim that there is a balance between liberty and security – and thus to gain security, one has to give up liberty – altogether as a myth. In my understanding, fundamental freedoms are anti-consequentialist in the sense that the goal to potentially prevent an attack that could happen one day does not justify how civil rights are currently restricted in urban everyday life. These restrictions stand in stark contrast to living a free, secure, and self-determinant life because of the constant and ubiquitous control and self-control, to be harmless rather than suspicious, they imply. Furthermore, they also contradict values, such as equality and solidarity, because the securitisation of urban everyday life especially affects those negatively who are already marginalised, and thus ultimately worsens existing power asymmetries. Finally, these developments are moreover problematic, as they happen in the everyday life of *European metropoles*. Making this claim,

I certainly do not want to suggest that the lives of people living there are worth more than anywhere else in the world, but rather unveil the hypocrisy of these cities' reputation as particularly free, liberal, and safe places because, thanks to their increasing securitisation, enjoying their everyday lives as such is a privilege that is not shared by everyone and everything. In conclusion, the securitisation of urban everyday life in Europe should be challenged, since it contradicts fundamental and anti-consequentialist values, such as freedom, equality, solidarity, empathy, mutual respect, and inclusion rather than exclusion, which are essential from a standpoint of posthumanist ethics.

My critique of the developments I analysed thus rests, as demanded by Jackson (2017: 357), on a clear normative basis. Yet, besides its straightforward critical foundation, what is missing until now is that I engage with alternatives and ways to counter what is going on, as proclaimed by Lindahl (2017: 523). In other words, the questions that still require an answer are, how can the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles be challenged and who is capable and responsible to do it. My findings revealed how ordinary people have become increasingly charged with counterterrorist obligations in their professional and private life in all my case cities, as part of the trend towards fostering resilience on the one hand, to enable businesses and individuals to better take care of their own safety, and on the other hand, intervening earlier and at a more personal level to prevent radicalisation through the adoption of CVE approaches. While these developments surely deserve critique for pushing individuals to collaborate in the oftentimes restrictive and discriminatory counterterrorism practices of security authorities (Batley 2021; Coaffee and Fussey 2015; Rodrigo Jusué 2022), presenting these individuals as the merely passive recipients of respective policies is my understanding short-sighted. Instead, I argue that *because* suspiciousness and control have become increasingly ubiquitous in urban normality, as my critical analysis of the transformation of everyday life in Europe metropoles during times of (counter)terrorism revealed, everyone participating in everyday life is also able to influence and change how it is lived and can be lived. Thus, following Barad's (2007) understanding of posthumanist ethics, everyone – be it residents or visitors of London, Brussels, Stuttgart, or any other European metropole – is also accountable for the securitisation of their everyday lives. This claim should not be mistaken as an argument about the contested desirability of resilience. I rather contend that effectively it does not matter so much who or what is to blame for introducing restrictive counterterrorism measures, as the questions about how they are enacted and what can everyone do to decrease suspiciousness, fear, and violence in everyday life are far more important (Pawlowski 2023: 17). Taking one's intra-action in urban everyday life seriously implies according to posthumanist thinking not less but more responsibility for everyone, as one has responsibility not just for oneself but for one's surroundings and the human and non-human intra-acting with oneself (Barad 2007: 391). Linking this thought back to my findings, it is not only the proliferation of semi-formal and informal managers of suspiciousness in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart but also the increasingly vague standards of who and what counts as potentially dangerous that make this responsibility tangible. In other words, as the differentiation between who and what is considered suspicious, and who and what is considered harmless has more and more turned into a

subjective decision about what one is used to and what is unexpected, one must not necessarily become a civil rights activist to counter the securitisation of everyday life in European on the individual level. It is rather as simple as staying openminded, reflective, and critical when engaging in ordinary day-to-day situations. It is about accepting differences and acknowledging that people, things, behaviours, and events may be unexpected but that does not automatically make them dangerous. Ultimately, it is about allowing the risk of the unknown remain a legitimate part of urban everyday life to avoid the creation of dystopian cities of all-encompassing control and very little freedom (Pawlowski 2023: 18–19).

Therefore, resisting and challenging the securitisation of urban everyday life can and should be done by everyone visiting and living in European metropoles, such as London, Brussels, and Stuttgart. Yet, countering this transformation is surely not only an individual responsibility but also has normative-critical implications for the societal level. After all, my findings have revealed that there are power asymmetries between who and what counts as potentially dangerous, who and what is deemed worthy of protection, and who and what is considered capable and credible to differentiate between the two in all my case cities. Thus, particularly those human and non-human bodies who are branded as suspicious are affected the most by the securitisation of urban everyday life, and yet at the same time can do – based on this very vulnerability – the least against it. Claiming that everyone is able and responsible to influence how urban everyday life transforms is by no means intended to hide or neglect these power asymmetries but rather unveil that those who are especially negatively affected by the securitisation of urban everyday life are despite their vulnerability not robbed of all their agency. In other words, they are certainly not just passive victims in the current transformation process of European metropoles but have, in co-creating urban everyday life, opportunities and resources to influence how it is and can be lived, even if these opportunities are structurally more limited than for others. At the same time, in a twisted way, the shift towards resilience and charging ordinary urban citizens to look out for suspiciousness in both their professional and their private life, has put those in the privileged societal position of being considered trustworthy and credible managers of suspiciousness – be it because of their physical appearance, because of their job or because of their ethnic-cultural background – in a position of heightened responsibility for countering the increasing securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles, such as London, Brussels, and Stuttgart (Pawlowski 2023: 17). Therefore, resisting against the securitisation of urban everyday life means ultimately working *together* towards an open society and space in which differences in appearance, background, and behaviours are considered an enrichment rather a source of potential danger. It means creating an atmosphere of mutual respect, and empathy for one another in which everyone can realise one's potential, and yet remain in solidarity with each other. While the risk of terrorist attacks may continue to exist and one thus still may encounter violence while participating in urban everyday life, I consider accepting this risk and its potential consequences – as sad and tragic they may be – a smaller price to pay than what it might cost when the trend towards securitisation continues in European metropoles.

9.3 Academic and socio-political contribution of my project

Now that I have clarified which normative-critical implications derive from my findings, I am finally at the stage to reflect on how my project not only adds significant value to scholarly debates on the securitisation of urban everyday life, but how my ideas and findings are also insightful for the socio-political discussion on the transformation of European metropoles beyond academia.

Regarding the former, my project and its findings contribute foremostly to CTS and CSS but also Urban Geography which all have been influential disciplines in exploring transformations of urban normality under emerging paradigms, such as pre-emption and resilience (Katz 2013; Tulumello 2015; Lehr 2019; Coaffee 2019; Ellis 2020). As set out in my literature review in chapter two, my analysis bears both theoretical-methodological as well as normative-critical value for them. In theoretical-methodological terms, my project advances the current debates thanks to my original framework to analyse the securitisation of urban everyday life, conceptualised as a socio-material entanglement, across time and across space. In contrast to the existing literature, and even contributions that also draw on New Materialist thinking (Adey et al. 2013; Trandberg Jensen and Jensen 2023; Fregonese and Laketa 2022), my project shows not only that social and material aspects of urban everyday life are both securitised in times of (counter)terrorism but how the suspiciousness assigned to human and non-human bodies is entangled, and therefore (re)produces and reinforces the vulnerability and potential dangerousness emanating from sites, people, objects, and behaviours in urban everyday life. This also unveils that the securitisation of urban normality is a material-discursive transformation process which rests on assigning new meanings through language and verbal attributions as well as material characteristics, such as being at "critical" locations, being non-transparent and hidden, and being out of place, atypical and unexpected, with potential dangerousness. My theoretical considerations and empirical findings in this context thus contribute to the debate on how materiality, discourses and practices matter in securitisation processes (Coward 2009; Aradau 2010; Lundberg and Vaughan-Williams 2015; Amicelle et al. 2015). While admittedly a New Materialist lens is not entirely new to scholars interested in securitisation theory and processes, the securitising interplay of discourse and materiality has been underexplored empirically. My project fills this gap at least in the context of European metropoles by offering a systematic and original perspective on how these different elements work together in shifting the ontologies of urban sites, ordinary objects, people, and behavioural practices from harmlessness to suspiciousness in times of (counter)terrorism.

Yet, I anticipate that especially the empirical evidence I brought forward in this thesis might trigger criticism and be dismissed as insufficient. Particularly scholars, who have been dominantly socialised in discursive traditions of securitisation theory, may raise questions such as: Are the specific materialities of certain buildings, trashcans, and cars, and the bodily features shared by members of certain minority communities really an *active* factor in how suspiciousness is attributed to them? Are they not just physical circumstances which have become discursively exploited to securitise urban everyday life in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart? In other words: If the materiality of the sites, things,

and people that I studied in my cases solely serves as a passive context condition, their increasing suspiciousness is constructed through language only. Such expositions suggest ultimately that my empirical analysis does not live up to my theoretical claims about how the materiality of human and non-human bodies actively matters in securitisation processes and is therefore more than the physical circumstances in which their discursive association of humans and things with suspiciousness happens.

Before I respond to this anticipated criticism with some refining remarks about my empirical findings, I have an important clarification to make: My claims in this dissertation should by no means be misunderstood as an attempt to diminish the importance of language in securitisation processes, as I openly acknowledge that the suspiciousness of human and non-human bodies in urban everyday life is partially constructed through discourse. Nonetheless, I argue that it is fundamental to not only look at this transformation from a discursive point of view but also consider the materiality of suspicious sites, things, and people. Hence, I contend that my engagement with the materiality of suspicious objects, such as for instance trashcans, backpacks, and cars adds value to my analysis. Rather than dismissing their materiality as irrelevant or reducing them to passive recipient objects of discursive attributions of suspiciousness, I consider them to form part of what Huysmans (2011) called 'little security nothings' which he explicitly differentiated from securitizing speech acts, as coined by Buzan et al. (1998). In doing so, he urged scholars to not limit their analysis to the disruptive decision of discursively identifying someone or something as a threat but rather understand securitisation as a diffuse, scattered process: 'In such an analysis, […] many elements that from the perspective of speech-act analysis appear as little security nothings – that is, devices, sites, practices without exceptional significance […] are highly significant, since it is they rather than exceptional speech acts that create the securitizing process' (Huysmans 2011: 377). Therefore, the first major step out of their comfort zone that I ask from my potential critics is to look beyond discourse and to acknowledge the relevance of little security nothings in securitisation processes, besides securitising speech acts.

The next step that it takes is to grasp *how* little security nothings are relevant in securitisation processes, which brings me back to Neyland's foundational work on mundane objects as 'matters of concern' (Neyland 2008: 21). Looking at items, such as letters, water bottles, cars, and rubbish bags, he claims that analysing their materiality is fundamental to understand how their ontologies transform, when they shift between ordinary and potentially dangerous (Neyland 2008: 22). In practice, this means to ask which physical properties of mundane objects are the basis for constructing their potential dangerousness: Neyland uses the example of a letter transforming into a potential letter bomb to show how all sorts of material indicators of the letter, such as its size, weight, smell, and shape, play into the letter's association with suspiciousness (Neyland 2008: 28). Yet, the relationship between certain materialities of objects, sites, and people on the hand and their potential dangerousness on the other hand is not stable – not only because the meaning of potential dangerousness is not fixed but also because material ontologies are not essentialist (Aradau 2010). In other words, objects occupy 'several different ontological positions at the same time' (Neyland 2008: 24), and thus they can be simultaneously ordinary

and suspicious. For instance, a public trashcan can function as a container to collect garbage and at the same time it can function as a canvas for a work of street art and at the same time it can function as a place to secretly plant a bomb. How well it fulfils each of these functions is co-determined by its materiality, as in its size, its location, and what it is made of.

The notion of these multiple ontologies brings me to the final step in clarifying how the materiality of suspicious human and non-human bodies *acts,* not intentionally but in making a difference 'in the course of some other agent's action' (Latour 2005: 72). Such a posthumanist conceptualisation of agency is at the centre of Aradau's New Materialist understanding of securitisation as 'a process of materialization that enacts a reconfiguration of the world in ways in which differences come to matter' (Aradau 2010: 494). This is theoretically speaking fundamental to my project as it implies that materiality acts – alongside with discourse – because human and non-human bodies are 'not empty receptacles of discourses, nor do they have "essential" characteristics' (Aradau 2010: 494) but their multiple ontologies are arranged and continuously rearranged in material-discursive transformation processes. Shedding light on these processes, in the sense of analysing how the material *and* the discursive attributions of human and non-human bodies played a role in their securitisation is exactly what I explored in my empirical analysis of everyday life in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart.

Thus, I traced for instance how the materiality of trashcans played a role in distinctive ways at certain times in my cases. In London, due to the material conditions that litterbins were located ubiquitously throughout the city's public space, not see-through, and their ordinary function is for people to put something inside them, the IRA strategically exploited them to secretly plant small IEDs and incendiary bombs. In other words, the ordinary ontology of trashcans was used for violent purposes, and thus attributed them with being potentially dangerous. This association with suspiciousness had in turn various transformative implications for the respective materiality of London's litterbins: For instance, in terms of their location, trashcans were removed from some areas, but persisted thanks to their simultaneous ordinariness in others. Furthermore, the materials and ways to build them evolved, as companies produced bomb-proof versions which yet turned out to be too expensive to become the dominant solution in London. In the case of Brussels, the materiality of public litterbins acted pre-emptively: While during the first two phases of my analysis, the dominant ontology of public trashcans was their ordinary function to collect rubbish, after the Paris attacks in 2015, litterbins – but only those to be found in Brussels' metro system – became problematised. This potential dangerousness was attributed due to the materiality of their specific location, and the fact that they were not see-through. With the attribution of suspiciousness their materiality changed multiple times, from sealing the original containers to replacing them temporarily with transparent plastic bags to permanently installing see-through solid bins. This is a telling example of how materiality has its own powerful, but not necessarily effective way of influencing securitisation processes: Although a bomb can still be placed in a see-through litterbin, the material non-transparency of the previous model made it attributed with potential dangerousness. For a final contrast, one can look at Stuttgart, where although its public litterbins are

neither transparent nor bomb-proof, they have yet until now kept their dominant ontology as ordinary objects. This example of how I analysed the materialities of litterbins illustrates that, although the discursive decision to declare them as potentially dangerous had disruptive quality for their securitisation, their multiple material ontologies co-determined this process. The power of materiality can be demonstrated ultimately with a hypothetical thought experiment: If all litterbins were materially certified as bomb-proof, would they still be discursively declared to be dangerous? Therefore, I claim that my empirical analysis and its findings show indeed that materialities matter beyond serving as 'simply "facilitating" conditions for securitization' (Aradau 2010: 493) because as little security nothings, they play an active role in how potential dangerousness is attributed to human and non-human bodies, and thus how respective ontologies of suspicious sites, objects, and people are rearranged.

Besides that, my analytical framework also makes an insightful contribution to the academic debates on the spatiality and temporality of securitisation practices and (counter)terrorism (Aradau and van Munster 2012; Fisher 2015; Crawford and Hutchinson 2016). As already outlined in my literature review, these two strands of scholarly engagement tend to be not only one-dimensional in their respective understanding of space and time but also separated, or even set in competitive opposition to each other (Liu and Guan 2021). In contrast to these limiting views, my analysis demonstrates the critical value of a multidimensional and relational understanding of spatiality and temporality to understand how notions of suspiciousness travel from one place to the other and from the past and the future to the present which allows me to argue that European metropoles have become the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox. This goes hand in hand with my development of historiographic archaeology as an original methodological approach to translate my theoretical premises about space and time into systematic and feasible analytical steps to engage with empirical material. Thanks to this new method, my project contributes to a well-needed methodological diversification in the academic engagement with the securitisation of urban everyday life that has been largely dominated by ethnographic techniques, limiting its analyses to the present of their respective periods of fieldwork (Adey et al. 2013; Ochs 2013; Trandberg Jensen and Jensen 2023; Fregonese and Laketa 2022).

This last point is linked to the added value that my project provides to the existing literature on the securitisation of urban everyday life due to its original empirical scope. While admittedly, there is a considerable body of insightful research which focuses on (counter)terrorism in cities of the Global North in general and European cities in particular (Németh and Hollander 2010; Hess and Mandhan 2022; Coaffee and Murkami Wood 2006; Coaffee 2009; Adey et al. 2013; Fregonese 2021), my analysis is special because it does not only feature London and Brussels as case cities in which attacks have happened but also sheds light on Stuttgart as a city from which local terrorist violence has remained entirely absent. Hence, my findings contribute to the existing debate because they reveal that a local encounter with terrorism is by no means a prerequisite for the securitisation of a city's everyday life, as suspiciousness is translated across space and time. Moreover, the temporal scope of my project is, unlike many other works in CTS, not limited to the time frame after 9/11, and thus tackles the lack of historicity

in the discipline (Donnelly and Steele 2019; Livesey 2021): Therefore, by stretching out in the time before 9/11, my analysis reveals significant continuities in the securitisation of urban everyday life but simultaneously also confirms the importance of the events in 2001 as a catalyst in boosting pre-existing tendencies towards the increasing proliferation of suspiciousness in European cities. Finally, although I consider my project's specific scope consequently an important contribution as such, my theoretical framework and its methodological implications are valuable beyond times of (counter)terrorism and European metropoles, as they are easily adaptable to other geographical and temporal contexts.

Last but not least, my systematic engagement with the implications of transforming everyday life in cities which unveiled its securitisation as a process of urban segregation that should and can be challenged offers a normative-critical contribution to both the academic and the socio-political debate. From a scholarly perspective, my project is valuable because it rests with posthumanist ethics on an explicit normative basis and also engages with potential alternatives and ways to counter currently problematic tendencies (Jackson 2017; Lindahl 2017). From a socio-political perspective, my findings are valuable to understand not only why but also how the securitisation of urban everyday life can and should be challenged and who is responsible to do so, both on the individual and the societal level. Doing so, this project does not offer concrete policy recommendations but rather serves as an ideational starting point to critically envision in which urban everyday life we want to live and how to get there. Again, this claim runs the risk of being criticised, as scholars may deem my contribution regarding the political-normative implications of my analysis as unoriginal, by pointing to the long-lasting academic debates about if securitisation processes should be contested and how this can be and should be done.

Indeed, the normative desirability of securitisation has been contentiously discussed since the early days of CSS (Booth 1991; Wæver 1999; Huysmans 2002; Aradau 2004; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). In this context, I certainly acknowledge that securitisation processes do not necessarily imply normatively undesirable outcomes: Under particular conditions, as for instance in the case of AIDS (Elbe 2006) or climate change (von Lucke et al. 2014) where a sense of emergency and extraordinary response is required, securitising the problem at hand may not only be more effective but can also be morally just (Floyd 2011; Roe 2012). Linking this thought to my analysis, I would subsume the increasing securitisation of classic weapons as suspicious objects in London, Brussels, and Stuttgart to be a normatively desirable case of securitisation. This is based on the equation that the less firearms, explosives, and combat knives are considered legitimate in urban everyday life, the higher become the obstacles to commit violence with them. Nevertheless, this example also shows the ethical dilemma inherent in these allegedly positive cases of securitisation, because at least in the classic sense of the Copenhagen School a successful securitisation implies that an issue is removed from the normal political stage of democratic deliberation to a stage of extraordinary executive authority (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Ultimately, this dilemma turns into a question about 'the kind of politics we want. Do we want politics of exceptional measures or do we want democratic politics of slow procedures which can be contested?' (Aradau 2004: 393). Translated to my project this means that banning classic weapons from public urban

space may be the right thing to do, according to my personal ethical standpoint. But, if this decision is made authoritatively rather than based on a democratic discussion, in which different perspectives are expressed, it is still problematic because this implies not only that my moral judgement is worth more than that of others but also entails a dangerous slippery slope of where does this exceptional executive power end. Hence, considering this dilemma and all the other normatively undesirable implications my analysis brought to light, I contend that, although securitisation processes are not automatically undesirable, in the case of everyday life in European metropoles in times of (counter)terrorism, that I analysed in my project, they are.

This conclusion brings me to the second aspect of this anticipated criticism, namely how do the political and normative implications that I draw from my analysis differ from previous work on contesting security. Given that the problematic consequences of securitisation processes have been criticised since the early days of CSS, I am obviously not the first scholar who thought about how to counter them. In fact, despite being criticised for their 'indecisiveness' (Aradau 2004: 389) in this context, Buzan et al. (1998: 29) already openly claimed in their framework book that 'desecuritization is the optimal long-range option', though without going much into detail about what this concretely entails and how it can be achieved. In a later piece, Wæver (2011) clarified the Copenhagen School's '"bias" for desecuritization' (Wæver 2011: 469) to be based on Arendt's (1958, 1968, 2005) philosophical premises about politics as 'productive, irreducible [which] happens among people as an unpredictable chain of actions' (Wæver 2011: 468). What derives from these assumptions for securitisation processes is in some ways similar to the implications that I draw from Barad's posthumanist ethics: It is not someone following an intentional agenda that is to blame when an issue gets securitised, but securitisations are generated in the interplay of many different actors. This

> 'points to the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?' (Wæver 1999: 334)

While I find this conclusion and using Arendt's conceptualisation of politics as a philosophical underpinning convincing as such, I still argue that my approach based on Barad's posthumanist ethics goes much beyond it. Hence, Wæver does not only miss to flesh out the concrete implications of this commitment to Arendt but also ignores the normative devotion to freedom, diversity, and a pluralist public sphere that are inherent in her understanding of politics (Schou Tjalve 2011; Axtmann 2006). Ultimately, the Copenhagen School's only 'careful' (Wæver 2011: 468) preference for desecuritisation, which does not quite fit to its Arendtian foundation, is *too* careful in my understanding. Besides that, it is limited to a focus on disruptive speech acts but cannot capture, and therefore also not counter 'silent security practices' (Schou Tjalve 2011: 448). Yet, apart from Wæver and the Copenhagen School, many other scholars have been invested in how to counter the negative socio-political implications of securitisation. Balzacq (2015) conducted a particularly laudable stocktaking exercise in this context by assorting these various approaches into four non-exclusive strategies of contesting security, namely

emancipation, desecuritisation, resistance and resilience. Without going into detail about their respective definitions and delineations, what I suggested in my analysis comes closest to a mix of resistance and emancipation.[6] Resistance means to withstand and counter the spreading of suspiciousness by accepting the risk of potential terrorist attacks for the sake of more freedom and less segregation. This resembles what Williams has proclaimed to be the 'fear of fear [which] can within "normal" or even "securitized" politics act to prevent or oppose a movement toward a more intense politics of fear – countering a shift toward "security" in its more extreme manifestations' (Williams 2011: 456). While I find Williams' argument inspiring, he openly admits that it is a foremostly conceptual contribution, whereas its empirical-practical impact remains – in contrast to my project's implications – less concrete (Williams 2011: 453). The emancipatory element of what I suggested is to embrace one's responsibility for co-creating urban everyday life, to see value in diversity and the unexpected rather than a threat, and to uphold moral principles, such as empathy and respect for each other. It has similarities with former conceptualisations of emancipation, not so much in the sense of Booth (1991, 1997) but more in Aradau's (2004) reading of it. By drawing on Balibar (2002, 2004) and Rancière (1998, 1995), she puts universality and recognition at the centre of 'un-making of security [which then] becomes a process of re-thinking the relation between subjects of security, and of imagining localized, less exclusionary and violent forms of interaction' (Aradau 2004: 400). Yet, Aradau focuses on the procedural, institutional side of countering securitisation, while my project deals with its everyday life aspects. This is what makes my contribution original because my analysis emphasizes the responsibility of everyone and everything that forms part of urban everyday life to intra-act with others in a respectful and empathic way on a daily basis that ultimately leads to less violence and segregation (Pawlowski 2023). Although these suggestions might not be groundbreakingly new as such and could potentially also be based other philosophical premises than posthumanist ethics, I do insist that especially the aspects of shared responsibility and power asymmetries as well as the attention drawn to human and non-human bodies in this context makes my take on countering the securitisation of urban everyday life a valuable and unique contribution to the existing debates.

9.4 Critical reflection on the limitations and shortcomings of my project

Besides the relevant contributions that my dissertation thus makes, my project has limitations and shortcomings which I discuss and reflect on in this section of my concluding chapter. In respect to my framework and the scope of my analysis, I consider its exclusive focus on *European* metropoles inherently problematic. Although I brought forward several reasons and justifications why this limitation makes sense for my purposes, my project thus still reproduces the unsettling tendency to analytically over-engage with (counter)terrorism, when it happens in the Global North, and to not academically challenge (counter)terrorism, when it happens in the Global South. While I am aware of this deficiency of my project, it is important for me to clarify that its limited scope is by no means intended to imply

[6] For a thought-provoking differentiation between resistance and emancipation, see Balzacq 2015: 139.

that I value the lives of human and non-human bodies in and from the Global North over those in and from the Global South but rather deem violence always problematic and in need for justification.

Another important shortcoming of my analysis is its lack of original empirical data material which is in large parts indebted to the dynamically unfolding COVID19 pandemic which happened exactly during the time for which my fieldwork trips to the three cities had been planned. This challenged me to come up with a viable methodological alternative to the largely ethnographically inspired research techniques, I had initially planned to use. Despite the original contribution that rests in developing historiographic archaeology as a new method, employing a mixed-methods approach would have surely benefitted my project in making its argument more original and convincing. While I was as thorough and meticulous as possible in collecting and analysing the data, that I was able to gather, the empirical foundation of this project is ultimately limited to what I was able to collect from my desk rather than by actively engaging in urban everyday life to analyse its securitisation with all my senses.

The limited diversification of my data also restrained me in my capacity to analyse the nuances of my cases in more depth and explore the reasons for their particularities further. I included the notion of translation in my analytical framework to capture local differences and temporal delays, however the concept is still underdeveloped, when it comes to determining why and how material-discursive suspiciousness was translated across space and across time in some cases but not in others. Thus, although my theoretical framework still fulfilled its purpose because the central research objective of this project was to reveal the similarities among my three case cities, its analytical quality to better understand their differences is in comparison admittedly weaker – although these local particularities and their causes and consequences deserve similarly critical attention. The shortcoming that my analysis is in certain aspects not sufficiently nuanced also extends to some degree to my critical evaluation of counterterrorist measures of control. While I do contend that my classification of them as violent and repressive is generally valid as such, there are of course differences in their quality and in the way they work and whom they affect. In this sense, I openly admit that "softer" approaches, such as promoting CVE strategies and programmes, may – in direct comparison – be preferrable to classic coercive tools, such as conducting house raids, and stop and search practices (Subedi 2017; Koehler 2015; Koehler and Ehrt 2018). However, despite the fact that the counterterrorist violence implied in CVE practices is typically less immediate and intense, I still consider them problematic, as they are ultimately a form of policing ideas and emotions, while obscuring this intrusive intent behind a narrative of care for the individual deemed to be at risk to become radicalised (Aziz 2017; Auchter 2020; Cherney et al. 2021).

Finally, my project deserves criticism for not engaging more thoroughly with *concrete* alternatives on how to counter the securitisation of everyday life, both as a process of urban segregation and rendering European metropoles the translocal manifestation of an (in)security paradox. While the focus of my analysis rested on better understanding the transformation that happened across space and time and critically engaging with its problematic implications, this project was also about arguing why, how, and who should challenge the current tendencies of spreading suspiciousness in European cities.

However, at the same time, my research endeavour was neither meant to produce concrete policy recommendations nor to dictate people what to do and how to act, as especially the latter contradicts my normative premise of a free and self-determined life for others and myself. Therefore, my engagement with what can be done to counter the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles and who can counter it, is meant to encourage others to reflect and potentially intra-act, based on that, more consciously, when participating in urban everyday life. In other words, the decision to leave this part of my argument so abstract, that it may sometimes sound trivial and sometimes utopian was after all a deliberate decision, since I neither have a clear-cut "solution", nor do I consider myself in the position to tell others what to do and what not to do. Making this claim, I also acknowledge that especially the local level of government in cities has been praised for coming up with oftentimes more inclusive and progressive policy agendas, mostly in fields, such as migration and climate change mitigation (Johnson 2018; Varsanyi 2006). In recent years, the co-creation of urban security has also become an increasingly important topic, and thus there are avenues for potential change on the horizon which I left underexplored in this project (EFUS 2017; Tellidis and Glomm 2019).

9.5 Ideas for further research

Based on the findings of my research project as well as my critical reflections on its limitations and shortcomings, I lastly suggest ideas for future research that has the potential to advance the debate beyond the observations I made and the argument I brought forward in this dissertation. Taking up the criticism about the limited geographical scope of my project, I consider a critical engagement with the transformation of cities in the Global South extremely worthwhile. Researching how the securitisation of urban everyday life plays out there would not only tackle the under-exploration of cities, such as Jakarta, Cairo, Nairobi, and Caracas, but also allow to evaluate the adaptability of my theoretical-methodological framework to other geographical contexts. Moreover, the findings of such a project on the securitisation of urban everyday life in the Global South could also be used to compare the tendencies found there with the tendencies I found, while studying these transformation processes in European cities. What makes such a comparison of cities in the Global South and the Global North particularly interesting is the possibility to explore if material-discursive notions of suspiciousness are also translated across them and to analyse how important the memories of past attacks in the cities of the Global North are for creating future imaginaries of terrorist violence in the Global South and vice versa.

Besides such a new geographical focus, there are also promising avenues for further research within the European context. Thus, as already mentioned, it would be insightful to shed further light on the local particularities of different cities and analyse which factors and conditions are especially influential in determining the success or failure of translating suspiciousness from one place to the other. Such a project could explore more thoroughly how important national contexts and their special historical trajectories, governance systems, local autonomy, and regional integration projects as well as political parties, their leaders and governmental coalitions are in securitising urban everyday life in Europe. Engaging in a research endeavour of that sort would also allow for the incorporation of more

diverse methods to collect and generate data material, such as expert interviews, participant observation, surveys, and statistical analysis, and therefore lead to a broader empirical basis compared to my study.

Moreover, I consider it worthwhile to further analyse how transformations of urban everyday life in the context of (counter)terrorism intersect with other emerging socio-political rationales, such as sustainability, public health, social cohesion, and crime prevention. Especially the latter two issues have been lately picked up on in the literature, as CVE programmes have increasingly become multi-layered approaches to reintegrate all sorts of people – be it young offenders, addicts, or suspected extremists – back into "normal" societal structures, instead of questioning if these structures are potentially also part of the problem, that make it difficult for certain individuals to fit in (Koehler 2021; Winter et al. 2021; Heath-Kelly and Shanaah 2023). However, especially the recent experience of the COVID19 pandemic shows that also other – less traditional – security issues have the power to transform urban everyday life in fundamental ways (Kaufmann et al. 2020; Groot and Lemanski 2021). This reaches out likewise to questions in the realm of climate change, energy crises, and sustainability (Bobylev 2008; Imrie et al. 2009; McCarthy et al. 2010; Romero Lankao and Qin 2011). While scholars have engaged with all these topics separately, there is, besides a few exceptions, such as Coaffee and Bosher (2008) and Ceccato and Nalla (2020), less engagement with the intersections of these matters, especially when comes to their linkages to (counter)terrorism. The question I find most interesting in this respect is how different rationales sometimes reinforce each other but sometimes also hinder or even inhibit one another.

Finally, more work should be done on developing how concrete alternatives to the securitisation of urban everyday life could look like and what is already done in this context. This new avenue for research draws especially on my finding that (counter)terrorism became over time more and more local, and hence city administrations and urban populations became also more important in shaping the transformations initiated by it. While my project focused on how these developments led to an increasing proliferation of suspiciousness in European metropoles, I deem it crucial to engage more with contestations and resistance in this process, particularly on the local but also on the translocal level of space. Ultimately, it would be interesting to analyse if potentially not only notions of material-discursive suspiciousness but also practices to challenge these tendencies travel across time and across space.

9.6 Conclusion and outlook

In the introduction of this dissertation, I shared my personal experience with (counter)terrorism, when living in Brussels in 2016. Among my most vivid memories when thinking back to this time now, is how many of the measures, which were implemented both before and after the bombs exploded on 22 March, ranged from bizarre to absurd to scary in my understanding and, how already back then, I could not wrap my mind around them. Thus, for instance, while the metro system was still partially running, only certain stations where operated and, at these stations, the access to enter and exit them was restricted to merely one open door. I remember the strange feeling of passing through dark and deserted metro stops, without the train opening its doors. I remember how I thought that it made no sense to restrict the stations' access points because, in case of an actual attack and eventual evacuation, everyone would be

forced to leave through the same exit, and thus the likeness of panic and more injury and trauma seemed even higher to me. I remember how Brussels' city-centre, filled with heavily armed soldiers and massive military trucks, came close to what I imagined a warzone to look like, when the battle is about to arrive. These personal memories have certainly travelled across time and space with me, as they have inspired and motivated me in my research about the securitisation of everyday life in European metropoles. Yet, after extensively analysing their transformation process, and thus answering some of my questions from back then, my feeling of unease remained the same, if it did not even grow.

Having studied the past and the present tendencies towards securitising urban everyday life in Europe, my final remarks are directed to the future of this development which brings me back to the question "where does it end" that I asked initially in the introduction. My analysis brought to light that the securitisation of everyday life in times of (counter)terrorism rendered European metropoles the spatial manifestation of an (in)security paradox and constituted a process of urban segregation: While those who are stigmatised with potential dangerousness encounter its discriminatory consequences already daily, others who up until now enjoy their privilege of being attributed with harmlessness may still experience everyday life in cities, such as London, Brussels, and Stuttgart, as free and self-determined. But what constitutes the threshold to feel safe and what constitutes the threshold to not feel free anymore? Is it the heavily armed soldiers patrolling the streets of Brussels in the operation Vigilant Guardian? Is it the introduction of automated LFR systems as employed since recently in London? Or is it the increasing social obligation to scan one's colleagues, friends, and family members for signs of violent extremism? These are only policies which already exist somewhere and in some ways. Imaginaries of the future of securitised urban everyday life paint an even more dystopian picture of where the current developments may lead to, if they keep following the current trend. But, what if, an illusion of security comes ultimately at higher price than accepting the risk of insecurity? As everything and everyone entangled in urban everyday life is also responsible for its transformations, what is already happening nowadays should not leave us in apatheia but motivate us to actively challenge the presently dominant assumptions about (counter)terrorism in European metropoles.

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