From the Household to the Wider World

Local Perspectives on Urban Institutions in Late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham

edited by Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Buessow
FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE WIDER WORLD
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EDITED BY YUVAL BEN-BASSAT AND JOHANN BUESSOW
FOR SHIRA OFFER
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NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION AND DATING

When referring to sources in Ottoman Turkish, we use modern Turkish orthography as in the Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary (1st edition, Istanbul 1968). Unlike Redhouse, however, we represent the letter ʿayn by ʿ throughout. The letter hamza is represented in the middle or end of a word by ʾ (e.g. ʿulema'). When referring to terms and proper names in Arabic, we adopted a modified transcription system that follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies but eliminates underdots on consonants and macrons on vowels and only uses representations of the ʿayn and hamza. For Hebrew, a similar simplified system is used with ʿ representing the letter alef and ʾ representing the letter ʿayin.

With regard to dates, the Ottoman documents during the period covered here used several different calendars, including the Islamic hicri calendar, the Ottoman administrative mali calendar and, in some cases, the Gregorian calendar. When converting dates from the hicri and mali calendars to the Gregorian calendar, a difference of one day can sometimes occur.
INTRODUCTION

OTTOMAN URBAN INSTITUTIONS
AND URBAN GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR INQUIRY

Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Buessow

Today, perhaps more than ever before, cities have become laboratories for societies as a whole. Fueled by intense media coverage, the ways social groups claim “ownership” of the street, as well as the ways in which city governments and local inhabitants deal with societal challenges in specific urban areas, often take on great symbolic value. Think of the iconic urban squares that have become sites of resistance and utopias of political liberalization, such as Beijing’s Tienanmen Square or Kiev’s Maidan, or, for a case of counter-strategy, Myanmar’s new capital Naypyidaw, which was inaugurated in 2005, and was deliberately designed to avoid public gatherings of any sort.

Cities are also focal points where people, whether administrators, architects, political activists, or tourists, seek inspiration for questions pertaining to the ‘good life’ in its broadest sense, communal identity, and cultural heritage. In the context of rapid urban change driven by factors such as population growth, technological developments, market forces or war, the issue of what to preserve of existing structures, which features of urban life are desirable, and which should be remedied, comes to the fore. Think of civic activism and, later, gentrification, that turned dilapidated turn-of-the-20th-century housing blocks in European cities into expensive, trendy locations. Similarly, certain state-organized re-developments of old cities all over the world celebrate certain aspects of the past but commodify traditional architecture for local and foreign consumers. Such practices in relatively small urban areas, individual neighborhoods or urban squares may in fact be prefigurations of possible socio-political futures and set an example for political processes on the national and transnational levels.

In the Middle East, the years after the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 were witness to protesters claiming central urban squares. While investors were changing the face of certain cities beyond recognition with large building projects, ongoing wars in Iraq, Syria and Libya destroyed large parts of other cities. In all these cases, assumptions about the past of today’s cities inform people’s thoughts and actions. Knowledge of urban life in previous eras will not automatically lead to better decision-making but can help sift through layers of meaning in the textual, documentary, and architectural record of cities everywhere, including in the Middle East. Ultimately, this will widen the horizons of choice of ways to deal with urban cultural heritage.

The studies in this volume seek to provide a better understanding of urban governance in specific cities in Ottoman Palestine and Syria.

* We would like to thank Astrid Meier, Thomas Welford and Fruma Zachs and the anonymous reviewer of Tübingen University Press for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this introduction.

1 On the concept of prefiguration, see Uri Gordon, “Prefigurative Politics between Ethical Practice and Absent Promise,” Political Studies 66/2 (2018), pp. 521–537.
INTRODUCTION

a region referred to in the literature as Bilad al-Sham or the Levant, during the late Ottoman period (c. 1800–1920). They propose an outlook that responds to today’s heightened awareness of cities as crucial spaces in which socio-political processes on various scales interact with localized material structures. In so doing, this volume brings together several strands of research in Ottoman and Middle Eastern history on social and cultural history, political history and material culture that have been pursued largely in isolation from each other. We combine this with the ambition to map our cases onto larger historical processes, including region and empire, as well as global flows and connections.

Our entry point into this complex nexus is through urban institutions, which are anchored in concrete places and material structures that we call urban nodal points. We define urban governance, following political scientist Marc Hufty, as the ways urban societies make decisions on collective problems, and thereby create norms, rules, and institutions. In Hufty’s framework, (1) problems are “sets of interrelated issues at stake”; (2) actors or stakeholders are “individuals or groups whose collective action leads to the formulation of social norms;” (3) social norms “guide, prescribe, and sanction” both collective and individual behavior, and themselves are modified by collective interactions; and (4) processes refer to these “complex interactions over time.” These actors, norms, and processes can either be formally defined, which means that they are recognized by those in positions of authority in a given society, or defined informally, by everyday practices. The most telling places to observe these processes are what Hufty calls (5) nodal points, which refer to “the physical or virtual interfaces where problems, processes, actors, and norms converge.”

Urban nodal points constitute the organizing principle of this volume and define its five sections: households, neighborhoods, institutions at the city level, urban public spaces and, finally, urban institutions in the fields of trade, transportation and public health, which create seminal links to the wider world. What we present here are thematic studies that do not take an urban locale simply as a backdrop of events and do not treat it as a self-enclosed geographical frame of study. Rather they address urban governance as such, which is seen as a complex process of interaction, with a focus on institutions, the actors that sustain these institutions and the spaces and material structures related to them. These studies make it possible to assess both the commonalities and the specificities through comparison and by capturing trans-local entanglements and connections. Figure 1 visualizes our heuristic framework.

Before addressing how to best study urban nodes in a historical perspective, it is worth reflecting on what it means to place a city in the center of a historical inquiry. This, in turn, necessitates a brief discussion of how Ottoman and Middle Eastern urban history has evolved as a field of scholarship over the last several decades. In inquiring into urban governance, we proceed from the understanding that a city is a polity; that is, a common frame of reference that poses problems that concern all its inhabitants and creates a common ground for collective identity. A unified leadership or legal autonomy are not preconditions for such a common urban

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3 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “What are Institutions?,” Journal of Economic Issues 40/1 (2006), p. 2. Marc Hufty distinguishes between social institutions such as kinship or property, and organizations, which are based on institutions but have formal characteristics such as staff and hierarchy, and are devolved to a specific purpose. Hufty, “Investigating Policy Processes,” p. 420, fn. 5.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 401.

frame of reference to exist. These issues, however, have been cornerstones of the academic debate on Middle Eastern cities for almost a century, since Max Weber famously made his ideal-typical distinction between the “Oriental” (i.e., Asian) and the “Occidental” city. This book does not adhere to this approach. However, as the “Oriental city” debate continues to cast its shadow over ongoing academic research, a brief detour is required to explain the rationale governing the present volume. Students in the field of Middle Eastern Studies as well as researchers from other fields still need to be cognizant of this debate, especially when dealing with older literature in the field. 7


**Figure 1**: A Heuristic Framework for the Analysis of Urban Governance in Late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham.

TRENDS IN MIDDLE EASTERN URBAN HISTORY: THE “ORIENTAL CITY” DEBATE AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE SINGLE-CITY STUDY

The European or “Occidental” city, Weber argued, emerged in Europe during the Middle Ages and marked a global historical departure from all previous cities and all contemporaneous ones in other parts of the world. For Weber, the main criterion identifying “Occidental” cities was not their form, but rather the way these cities were governed. In his own words, “[T]he emergence of the autonomous and autocephalous medieval urban commune” with its own administrative council and a mayor at its head was “a process of development essentially different” from that of both Asian cities and cities of the ancient Greco-Roman world. 8

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8 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, with a new introduction by Guenther Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), vol. 2, pp. 1249–1250. It should, however, be noted that Weber conceded that
was followed by many Orientalists, historians and geographers of the Middle East, who, in the same culturalist vein, went further to construct ideal-type descriptions of the “Islamic,” the “Arab,” or the “Ottoman” city as an entity distinct from the ideal-type concept of European urban culture.9

Early on in the debate, historians such as Claude Cahen10 and Fernand Braudel11 showed that the differences in urban governance between Christian Europe and the Ottoman world were less marked than was commonly assumed.12 Others voiced serious doubts as to whether cultural categories such as “Islam” could in fact explain anything about urban development. Since the postcolonial turn in the Humanities, both the dichotomy between “the West and the rest,” as well as the thesis of Islamic urban exceptionalism have been the targets of vigorous criticism.13

Today, after numerous critical analyses,14 it might be assumed that the debate on the “Oriental city” had finally been laid to rest.15 However, as Nora Lafi recently remarked, the critique of previous generations of urban historians has not led to pertinent new paradigms. In fact, this debate still continues to affect the way the history of Middle Eastern cities is written, directly as well as indirectly. Although a small fraction of studies indeed continue to apply the analytical categories of the Oriental city paradigm and its derivatives,16 the most enduring legacy of the “Oriental city” debate is indirect. Anxious to avoid the trap of reification, most urban historians of the Middle East retreat to single-city studies and refrain from comparison as a method. Certain authors expressly state that they consider this to be the only way of writing urban history,17 but the majority do so without much comment.

9 For an overview of developments in both strands of research, see Giulia Annalinda Neglia, “Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City with Particular Reference to the Visual Representation of the Built City,” in Salma Khadra Jayyusi et al. (eds.), The City in the Islamic World (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 1–46. Most influentially, the Arabist and historian Edmund von Grunebaum, inspired by contemporary American anthropologists, took earlier writings, especially French studies from the interwar period, as raw material to construct what has since become a conventional typology of the “Islamic city.” According to von Grunebaum, the “Islamic” urban pattern was “the adequate expression” of Islamic mores, which transcended time and space. See Edmund von Grunebaum, “The Structure of the Muslim Town,” in idem, Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 141–158. For a convincing reconstruction of the genesis of von Grunebaum’s influential essay (albeit overly downplaying the essentializing tendency of the French researchers), see Gregory Aldous, “The Islamic City Critique: Revising the Narrative,” JESHO 56 (2013), pp. 471–493.


12 Suriaya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 216. To do justice to Weber, he himself remarked that, before the 19th century, even in Europe, only cities north of the Alps conformed to the ideal type of the “Occidental” autonomous urban commune, whereas medieval southern European cities formed “a transitional stage” between Asian and northern European city types. See Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1240.


17 See, for instance, Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, “Was there an Ottoman City?,” in idem (eds.), The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1–16.
SINGLE CITY STUDIES AS ‘TOTAL HISTORIES’

The concentration on specific cities or aspects of these cities has led to a growing number of brilliantly detailed monographs and articles that strive to present more or less ‘total’ histories of particular cities, in the sense of a *histoire totale*,

18 covering their political as well as cultural, social, economic and geographic facets. The literature is especially rich for the late Ottoman period, which largely overlaps what historians of many world regions call the “long 19th century” (c. 1775–1920).

19 The increasing availability of local documentary sources – notably Ottoman administrative correspondence, Shari’a court records, waqf documents and petitions – has made this period particularly attractive, and the results provide dense data on the range of possible variations of urban life in the late Ottoman Middle East.

20 Typically, the scope of these studies is mostly defined by the specific body of sources that they draw on. The sources with the longest tradition are those of European origin, such as travelogues, consular and merchant reports, as well as Arabic narrative sources; for example, chronicles and biographical compendia. European sources have been criticized for their inherently Europe-centered perspective. Many Arabic sources have shown to be no less problematic for their bias towards local elites. However, if used judiciously, both types of sources remain relevant.

21 A veritable boost in innovation was triggered by studies of the Islamic (Shari’a) court records (*sijillat*, sg. *sijilla*) that have been undertaken since the 1980s. Since then, historians have been able to counter narrative representations with archival evidence and to evaluate the agency of local people, including women and artisans, who were mostly disregarded by European observers and local Arab literati.

22 The growing accessibility of Ottoman documents from the mid-1990s onwards has given another strong impulse to the field. It has contributed to a better understanding of Ottoman interventions in local urban dynamics.

23 Several pioneering studies have also paved the way for integrating the urban history of Bilad al-Sham into wider trends at the Ottoman imperial level.

24 Other investigations have focused on aspects of material culture, ranging from architecture to urban planning.

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18 The term *histoire totale* goes back to the French *Annales* school and expresses the aim of uniting geographic, demographic, economic, social, political and cultural approaches into one study thus covering all levels of the human experience. See David A. Bell, “Total History and Microhistory: The French and Italian Paradigms,” in Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza (eds.), *A Companion to Western Historical Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 262–276.


20 For a more detailed overview of the literature, see Reilly, “Ottoman Syria,” pp. 70-80.

21 For a study based on a combination of Arab narrative sources and European archival material, see Thomas Philipp, *Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730–1831* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). See also the discussion of the term “local source” by Dotan Halevy in this volume, p. 233, below.


24 For example, see Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds.), *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2002); Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

25 See, for example, Ruth Kark, *Jaffa: A City in Evolution, 1799–1917* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, Magnes Press,
Some have taken the *histoire totale* approach to the level of individual neighborhoods.\(^\text{26}\) The field has also produced some extensive surveys that present the architectural repertory and urban planning patterns of cities,\(^\text{27}\) inscriptions as historical sources,\(^\text{28}\) or types of archival sources.\(^\text{29}\)

Thus overall, single-city studies have the advantage of treating cities as a whole that makes it possible to analyze the complex interplay between the material, spatial and social conditions unique to each city. Despite their merits, however, single-city studies run the risk of producing what can be seen as isolated islands of knowledge. This holds true in a dual fashion: historians working on one city rarely connect their findings to works on other cities, and as a result they tend to “reinvent the wheel” and lose opportunities to acquire a deeper understanding of their specific cases by failing to note instructive parallels or contrastive examples. In so doing, they may overlook structural factors; for example, trends in the regional economy or in imperial policy-making, which may have conditioned urban life in various places at the same time. Single-city studies are also “insular” in the sense that historians working on a city only rarely include developments in the surrounding rural areas\(^\text{30}\) in their considerations.

As can be gauged from those studies that in fact do transcend the urban-rural divide,\(^\text{31}\) city-focused “insular” studies tend to miss the vital social networks of the historical actors under consideration and exclude a whole set of factors that shaped social realities in the city.

### THEMATIC STUDIES

Another approach to urban histories that has been increasingly pursued over the past few decades is made up of thematic studies that deal with one particular political or cultural process or conflict in a certain city.\(^\text{32}\) These thematic studies are often very detailed and offer insights that have broad implications, yet their view of cities is usually very selective. Typically, they focus on the actions of specific kinds of urban elites with city centers as the geographic backdrop, but the connections to the countryside and the wider surrounding region are usually not well covered, and the extent to which the processes they describe are common or specific remain unclear. Thus, while they engage in dialogue with international research on their specific topics; e.g., Islamic endowments, municipalities, cities at war, and identity formation, with respect to urban his-

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\(^\text{29}\) For example, see Angelos Dalachinis and Vincent Lemire (eds.), *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City* (Leiden: Brill, 2018). Accompanied by a website that serves as a source-finding aid and repository of digitized texts, this volume showcases the wealth of source material that is available on Jerusalem today and the broad range of perspectives that this material can provide to perceptive and appropriately trained historians. See Open Jerusalem http://www.openjerusalem.org/ (accessed 7 December 2021).

\(^\text{30}\) We prefer “rural areas” over the common term “hinterland,” since hinterland implies dependency if not exploitation of the countryside by the city, which need not always be the case.


Pioneering researchers such as Adnan Bakhit, Thomas Philipp, Abdulkarim Raef, and Peter Sluglett realized the potential of regional comparison across the cities of Bilad al-Sham early on, and since the 1980s have engaged in historical research projects about the region. With regard to urban institutions and urban development, Antoine Abdel Nour’s French-language “Introduction to the Urban History of Ottoman Syria” 1982 sketched out a bold research agenda. Since then, several thematic studies have presented syntheses of various city studies. Perhaps the most ambitious advanced comparative study of two late Ottoman cities in Bilad al-Sham is Beshara Doumani’s study Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean of 2017. Doumani compares property devolution practices in Nablus and Tripoli (Tarabulus al-Sham) between 1660 and 1860. The result is a fine-grained account of similarities and differences, as stated in the author’s own words: “It is best to think of the discrete regional social spaces of Bilad al-Sham during Ottoman rule as variations on the theme: that is, the opposite of the popular metaphor of a mosaic of homogeneous spaces.”

Collective volumes and thematic issues of journals that have appeared since the early 2000s have proven to be very productive. They study Middle Eastern cities with a more or less strictly defined focus on topics such as local-imperial interaction, municipalities, Mediterranean relations, the family, migration, or cosmopolitanism and conflict. Many

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34 Abdel Nour, Introduction. On Abdel Nour’s book, including a note on the author’s premature death, see Suraiya Faroqhi’s review in Osmanlı Arapçılıkları 5 (1986), pp. 263–265. While Abdel Nour is a true pioneer in assessing the field from a regional and comparative perspective, his work nevertheless remains influenced by stereotypes such as that of the “Arab city” (ibid., p. 155) or “Kurdish architecture” (ibid., p. 128) and he lacked the Arab and Ottoman archival sources and manuscripts that we have at our disposal today.


37 Ibid., p. 271.

38 Hanssen et al., The Empire in the City.


of these collections have been directed by Nora Lafi and Ulrike Freitag. Building on this scholarship, in her 2019 monograph *Esprit civique et organisation citadine* Nora Lafi provides a sweeping, although highly generalized account of Ottoman ‘old regime’ urban governance and its transition over the long 19th century. 44

While the field has grown and diversified considerably, we are not yet at the point where a synthetic account of Middle Eastern urban history can emerge. There is still a need for single-city studies, simply because to date there are many cities in Ottoman Bilad al-Sham for which there are no scholarly monographs. This means we do not even know the entire breadth of variation of urban life in this region and period, to use Beshara Doumani’s phrase. 45 However, while writing on single urban localities, the goal should always be comparisons which can strengthen the sense of scale and proportion in research, and help avoid the dangers of parochialism.

**A BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE ON URBAN GOVERNANCE IN AN IMPERIAL FRAMEWORK**

With this assessment of the current state of research in mind, we convened two international workshops on comparative urban governance in late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham that took place at the Universities of Tübingen and Haifa in May 2017 and March 2018, respectively. 46 In our own research project on late Ottoman Gaza which is still in many respects a terra incognita on the historiographical map, we were faced with three major tasks. The first was to immerse ourselves in local sources to tease out the specificities of the place. The second was to systematically look for trans-regional linkages and networks as factors that could help explain local developments. The third involved comparing and contrasting our findings with the literature on comparable cities. These two international gatherings, and a third meeting in Berlin in the Autumn of 2018, constituted a perfect opportunity for us to strengthen the comparative aspect of our study.

All the contributors to this volume share both the localized, bottom-up approach described above as well as our commitment to a broader comparative perspective. Our goal is not to enforce a new interpretative paradigm but rather to systematically connect the urban islands of knowledge to each other while relating them to their most pertinent contexts. This calls for a pragmatic framework of enquiry, which has clear objectives but at the same time is flexible in terms of approaches.

**STUDYING NODAL POINTS OF URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

The conceptual map of *nodal points*, i.e. urban material structures in which the institutions that we discuss are anchored, 47 is illustrated in Figure 1 above, which serves as a conceptual map for the presentation of each of the five sections and individual articles in this volume.

The articles are ordered on a spatial scale, from local to global. Processes such as trade flows or imperial policies involve several or all of these spatial levels at the same time as they interact with each other on a regional or trans-regional level. Within the city, they manifest primarily in two sets of material structures: buildings and streets. The residential building and the residential street – often, but not exclusively, a cul-de-sac – define the realm of the neighborhood. Public spaces and buildings, such as streets connecting the different parts of the city to each other, markets and government buildings, define the city as a whole, and ideally, are open and available to all. The main overland roads connect the city to the wider world.

In section 1, we examine the urban household as the smallest nodal point of urban governance. This entity is commonly linked to

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44 Lafi, *Esprit civique*.
46 Our research on the city of Gaza and the two workshops were financed by the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF), Grant 1226 (“Gaza during the Late Ottoman Period”), funding period 2016–2018. We thank Gudrun Krämer and Yossi Ben-Artzi for acting as discussants during both meetings.
the notion of the private sphere. However, this should not obscure the fact that the large households of local and central elites could be crucial units of social organization and political decision-making at the micro level and were often deeply involved in public and political life across the city. Their social, economic and political relations could run the gamut of the spatial scale, from the neighbors on the same street to individuals and institutions throughout the Empire and beyond. In the historical literature on the Ottoman Empire, which traditionally focuses on single personalities and families or on larger political entities such as provincial or provincial governments, households are still an under-researched entity.

Mahmoud Yazbak discusses the case of Abu Nabbout’s household in Jaffa as an example of a political household, a paradigmatic “old regime” institution that was based primarily on patron-client relations and not on biological ties or residence. During its heyday between 1805 and 1817, Abu Nabbout’s household took on the trappings of a ruling household, similar to that of his superior Sulayman Paşa, the governor of Sidon and ultimately also that of their supreme overlord, the Sultan in Istanbul. Sarah Buessow’s contribution highlights another type of household, namely residential households of local elite families in Gaza at the turn of the 20th century, which were based on biological and marriage ties and were often located in state-ly buildings. These households formed a sort of oligopoly in the city and competed for both political and economic resources. A fortunate combination of both narrative and statistical sources makes it possible to discern distinct political strategies of individual households. Read together, these two studies point to the enduring relevance of households as loci of political decision-making on the urban level. They are also suggestive of the degree of internal variety of this entity and call for more in-depth and comparative studies.

Section 2 deals with the neighborhood as the nodal point of urban governance. Neighborhodors in the cities of late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham can be characterized as spaces on a continuum between private and public. The cul-de-sac (Ar. hāra or zuqqaq) that connected several houses to the next urban thoroughfare (tariq) constituted what Fruma Zachs terms an ‘in-between’ space. More generally, urban neighborhoods were areas in which spaces defined by private or group interests intersected with public spaces and institutions, for example, in the form of pious endowments (awqaf, sg. waqf) or government infrastructure. The Ottoman administration treated the inhabitants of a neighborhood as a “group,” or, more precisely a corporation (commonly referred to as tāfīa), that had a right to political representation through a council of elders and a head man. This led to a complex situation in which the neighborhoods were treated as homologous entities next to other corporations, such as specific communities of non-Muslims, tribal groups or guilds of artisans or merchants. At the same time, they often overlapped with one or more of these other corporations.

Like households, neighborhoods are key basic concepts in Ottoman urban history. However, they are commonly used in a loose and highly undertheorized fashion even though they are an important site in which collective self-organization at the grassroots level met imperial norms and demands and where important political socialization processes took place. As in the case of households, the internal variety of this category was immense.

As Çiğdem Kafeşcioğlu remarked with respect to the case of Istanbul, Ottoman administrative documents tend to create the impression that neighborhoods were well-de-marcated, “cellular” entities, yet countless social practices constituted links across neighborhood boundaries. Feras Krimsti discusses the suburban neighborhood as a location that straddled the divide between the urban and rural spheres. Abdallah Babinsi, the key figure in Krimsti’s discussion, built his political fortunes up to 1850 on the specific complexion of Aleppo’s eastern suburbs, which hinged on urban and rural interest groups. Krimsti discusses Babinsi’s rise to power through the house-
hold of one of Aleppo’s influential families and his close relationships with both Bedouins and villagers, which allowed him to secure his position by guaranteeing security in the city and its rural areas while accommodating both their interests. These ties simultaneously explain the seemingly anachronistic survival of the Janissary faction in Aleppo until 1850. Johann Buessow and Yuval Ben-Bassat use GIS technology to provide a snapshot of various neighborhoods in Gaza at the turn of the 20th century and to examine their social, administrative and political roles. They use their material to rethink the concept of the neighborhood more generally and to work out variables that made Gaza a special case of a city where neighborhoods were associated with factional politics. These variables include the geographic conditions and economic opportunities that defined the city’s layout and the degree of economic competition between urban sub-centers. The resulting model is suggested to serve as the starting point for comparative studies that could ultimately lead to a more structured analysis of space-making, economy and politics in late Ottoman cities.

Section 3 surveys two nodal points that provide a view of institutions and governance processes on the city level. Drawing on both archival and architectural evidence, Tawfiq Da’adli describes how waqfs worked as agents of change in the city of Lydda (al-Ludd). Importantly, one of the endowments discussed enabled a woman to become a major player in this city’s development. Yuval Ben-Bassat discusses the age-old institution of the petition writers, the arzuhalicis, while anchoring the discussion in the case of late Ottoman Gaza. This institution served as a crucial interface between the imperial government and the city’s population. As in earlier periods, the arzuhalic did not require more than a simple stand in the street, but took on unprecedented importance in the new technological era of mail and telegraph, and in the framework of intensifying connections between the imperial center and the empire’s subjects in the provinces. The Ottoman census of 1905 sheds light for the first time on the social background of two arzuhalicis.

Section 4 focuses on public spaces as a particular type of physical and virtual nodal point, where problems, processes, actors, and norms on the city level converged. We consider the categories of private and public as the anchors of a wide spectrum and devote special attention to the many “in-between” spaces. The four studies in this section systematically interrogate the interplay between a public sphere enhanced by communication in the local press and the public space “produced,” to use Henri Lefebvre’s terminology, by everyday social practices, architecture and urban design. The chapters highlight the different sets of actors involved in the production of the public space. They describe the creation of public spaces at the grassroots level of private residential buildings and small enterprises, and as representative public spaces designed to serve the interests of the most powerful agents in the city, such as the imperial government and the newly formed municipalities. Through “thick” descriptions of episodes in which urban space was contested, the authors offer models of how to read urban design, architecture and images from the period as shaped by past conflicts of interests.

As discussed by Fruma Zachs in her article, in contexts where European building styles and consumer cultures were adopted, such as in Beirut, balconies constituted “in-between” spaces of a new kind, as did coffee houses and department stores. During the final decades of the 19th century, a new and distinctly modern concept of public space was created. Zachs argues that in Beirut a new domesticity discourse and new building styles reciprocally influenced each other and contributed to a gendered reorganization of the city space. Evelin Dierauff draws on press articles, maps, and photographs to document coffee houses and beaches as places of leisure in Jaffa around 1900, and argues that these were locales where
norms of public culture were performed and simultaneously discussed in the press. Abigail Jacobson’s and Johann Buessow’s contributions both deal with the implementation of the two Ottoman reform concepts of the “government compound” and the “municipal compound” in Jerusalem and Gaza, respectively. These architectural complexes were the kernels of new representative public spaces at the entrance to the old city centers in the two cities. In both cases, the Ottoman sultan and the local municipality were the main agents in shaping this representative space.53

Section 5 focuses on three particular nodal points in three cities. All document forms of modernization which, during the late 19th century, linked the cities of Bilad al-Sham to global economic and technological circuits. Two of these, the building of the electric tramway of Aleppo and the expansion projects for the port of Gaza, were compact material structures. The third, the public health sector of Jerusalem, was virtual but was manifested in a complex network of material structures, in particular the many foreign and local hospitals that were founded all over the city.

Nora Lafi discusses the complexities involved in the construction of the tramway in Aleppo and explores its social meaning. She argues that there was continuity in urban governance across the watershed moment of the Tanzimat reforms in the ways in which the notables of Aleppo reacted to the new system and the changes it brought about between 1850s and 1870s. The neighborhood-based system of administration, which was the basis of urban governance before the Tanzimat, continued to be relevant, although new actors and institutions emerged in the city. Dotan Halevy focuses on the small port of Gaza, which, in the context of globalizing trade, became a factor that changed the face of the city. As a (secondary) port exporting grain grown in the arid terrains of southern Palestine, Gaza was integrated into an imperial web of eastern Mediterranean port cities. The article explores two interrelated urban institutions, a maritime pier and a municipal hospital, whose construction exposed tensions and conflicts that radiated outwards in concentric circles, from the urban to the provincial and from there to the imperial, bringing into play two central pillars of imperial modernity: public health and economic development. Yoni Furas delineates the emergence of health as a policy field in Jerusalem. This process helped to redefine and reevaluate public space in the city and led to the emergence of a new elite of medical professionals and to the development of a “medical community” as an interest group in urban affairs.

THE IMPERIAL FACTOR: THE POLITICS OF NOTABLES AND MEDIATION

Many of the above examples suggest that the localized bottom-up view must be complemented by the factor of Empire, or more concretely, the interests and interventions of the imperial government in Istanbul and its agents in the provincial capitals. How problems of governance were perceived and framed, who was recognized as a legitimate actor in urban politics, how urban institutions were run and similar questions were all determined by local and imperial agents. Where local and imperial interests met, or clashed, mediation was needed. In order to be recognized, local interests had to be conveyed to the imperial government, while government demands had to be communicated to, and implemented among, local communities.

Typically, this task was assumed by individuals who had the means to make themselves understood on both sides. Middle East historian Albert Hourani, in a highly influential article published in 1968, famously defined these mediators as notables and described their modus operandi in ideal-typical form as “politics of notables.” Hourani defined notables in terms of their political role as “intermediaries”54 between the central government and specific sections of the local population:

53 Tawfiq Daʿadli’s article, in section 2, shows the same model at work, albeit on a more modest scale, in the small town of Lydda.

The political influence of the notables rests on two factors: on the one hand, they must possess “access” to authority, and so be able to advise, to warn, and in general to speak for society or some part of it at the ruler’s court; on the other, they must have some social power of their own, whatever its form and origin, which is not dependent on the ruler and gives them a position of accepted and “natural” leadership. Around the central core of this independent power they can, if they are skillful, create a coalition of forces both urban and rural.55

Hourani argued that these notables came from three typical social and professional backgrounds: Muslim religious and legal scholars (ʿulamaʾ), leaders of local military garrisons, and large landowners.56 His model is considered to have high heuristic value and has inspired an impressive series of detailed studies of notables in various places and periods, thus profoundly shaping the way the research thinks of the political history of Ottoman cities, particularly in Bilad al-Sham. Since the late 1990s, however, it has also drawn an increasing amount of criticism. James Gelvin, among others, for example, convincingly argued that the focus on notables as defined by Hourani implies a bias towards Arab-Muslim actors from prominent urban elite families and thus can lead to an under-complex understanding of urban governance.57 Indeed Hourani’s paradigm tends to neglect the existence of a specific form of ‘Ottoman-local’ elites that evolved over the centuries of Ottoman rule in Bilad al-Sham, as in other provinces of the Empire.58 In addition, it fails to characterize the agency of key non-elite actors, for example representatives of rural and/or subaltern communities, members of the educated middle classes and non-Muslims, and it completely ignores the dimension of gender. Finally, the ideal type of a “politics of notables” runs the risk of overlooking other crucial avenues of mediation, for example through the institution of petitioning.

However, the most problematic aspect of Hourani’s paradigm is rooted in the mistaken assumption it fostered that (Arab-Muslim) notables had a monopoly on mediation between local communities and the imperial government. This type of conclusion indeed appears logical from contemporary and near-contemporary narrative sources in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. Arab chroniclers and journalists from the late Ottoman period tended to emphasize the importance of Arab-Muslim scholars, merchants and administrators from prominent families and often glorified them as role models. When describing the Empire’s Arab provinces Turkish writers too often singled out the same individuals as crucially important, although they tend to emphasize that they were difficult partners in imperial rule. Only since the late 1990s, with the growing accessibility of Ottoman archival documents and with the methodological inspiration of subaltern studies, have historians of the Middle East been able to assess the agency of other actors who were largely “under the radar” of narrative sources. Nonetheless, a holistic concept of mediation in the late Ottoman Empire deserves further research.59

Several studies in this volume propose a new perspective that does not rejectHourani’s concept outright but rather integrates it into a wider framework of mediation. To begin with, they show that the concept of “notables” was well-established in the local political imaginary and was often conflated with the notion of ‘men belonging to local elite families,’ or aʿyan. At the same time, the generic term aʿyan could refer to actors with very different social, economic and political strategies according to place and period. For example, the chapter by Sarah Buessow deals with classical notables in Hourani’s sense in

55 Ibid., p. 46.
56 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
the context of late Ottoman Gaza. She shows that notables cannot be understood purely as intermediaries but rather at times followed different logics, for example that of households as businesses. She argues that in order to understand this complex situation, as well as the precariousness of the “notable” status, three kinds of actors should be distinguished: the individual notable, who is defined as mediator, the household as a collective actor, and finally, the elusive category of the family. The family, Buessow argues, was not a collective actor per se, but rather a confederation of households that was capable of action only when there was successful cooperation between its household members.

Feras Krimsti demonstrates that in the local society of Aleppo around 1850, there was an uneasy coexistence between the urban-based āyan and a second, no less important category of mediators or power brokers with ties to the rural world. Whereas the āyan were considered to be a kind of patriciate, defined by eligibility for the local consultative council or meclis, mediators with ties to the rural world were not part of this status group and at least in one case, one of them even refused to be coopted into the meclis.

With regard to Aleppo’s āyan during the 19th century, Nora Laﬁ lists a set of practices and privileges that defined “notable” status, most importantly euergetism, aspiring to the status of a “benefactor,” and responsibility for the city’s water provision. She also explains how different economic and social ties divided the notables and led to the formation of political factions and how sometimes they formed other lobbies together with European investors. Very importantly, her study also shows that mediation and leverage could go hand in hand with more or less tempered mobilization of violence.

Finally, the chapter by Ben-Bassat makes it clear that the classical notables as defined by Hourani were only a subset of the many categories of people who mediated between local societies and the imperial government in Istanbul. The arzuhalcis, petition and letter writers, for example, facilitated dialogue and negotiations between the imperial center in Istanbul and the Empire’s subjects in the provinces, at a time when the Empire was intervening to an increasing extent in its subjects’ lives.

**ACTORS OF URBAN GOVERNANCE: NEW INSIGHTS AND FAMILIAR ABSENCES**

This brings us to the more general topic of the actors of urban governance and the extent to which the chapters in this volume reflect their different perspectives and voices. All the chapters foreground specific kinds of urban residents. In some cases, the scope is wider, in others narrower, largely as a function of the sources that are available to date for different places and periods.

In terms of class, two chapters focus on the classical propertied and military urban elites and their politics. In the case of Abu Nabbut, as examined in the chapter by Mahmoud Yazbak, an Ottoman ‘old regime’ military-cum-political functionary reshaped through his construction projects what at the time was the small port town of Jaffa in central Palestine, using architecture and urban planning to bolster his career. In the case of Janissary leader Abdallah Babinsi, Feras Krimsti shows he was an outlier within this type of ‘old regime’ elite, who was able to shape the fate of Aleppo, one of the Ottoman Empire’s major metropolises. The main sources analyzed by Yazbak and Krimsti to study these two actors were Shariʿa court records and reports by contemporary observers, such as Arabic chroniclers and European consuls. While court records provide archival evidence of local transactions, observers can provide distanced uninvolved assessments of their actions.

The notables and elite households in the cases studied by Sarah Buessow, Johann Buessow and Nora Laﬁ represent what is usually termed the āyan in Arabic texts, the civil urban elite of landowners, merchants, scholars and administrators with deep roots in their cities. They proved to have much staying power, produced a large paper trail and continue to dominate local memory and historiography from the book market to the history section in websites of municipalities. In this case there is rich narrative material at hand but its generally apologetic nature calls for caution. Sanjay Subrahmanyam makes some important remarks in this regard on the historiography inspired by such elites across the world:
Archival material can be an important source that can be harnessed to cross-check the information from narrative sources. In this volume, the exceptionally broad selection of later Ottoman census records for Palestinian localities were highly important. Not only do the census records provide independent evidence to compare against identity-centered accounts of history, but they can also provide insights into the social background and strategies of less prominent but no less important actors in urban governance. These include people with some higher education and middling economic resources who filled important economic and technical functions as merchants, master builders, and engineers, or kept the local institutions running as bureaucrats, lower-rank administrators or police officers. In the absence of documents testifying to a ‘middle class’ consciousness, they perhaps should be categorized as the ‘middle sort of people.’

In historical studies, they typically appear as anonymous functionaries or legal categories because no chronicler has sung their praises and no foreign observer found them interesting or controversial enough to report on them. The examples discussed in this volume are neighborhood head men (muhtars), a ‘neighborhood scribe’ (mahalle katibi) and an imam studied by Johann Buessow and Yuval Ben-Bassat, as well as the petition writers studied by Yuval Ben-Bassat. A similar case is that of the two endowers, a woman and a man that Tawfiq Da’adli documents in his chapter on two waqfs in Lydda, each of which became the kernel of a new neighborhood. In this case, historical photographs play a key role in reconstructing the ways in which these endowers engaged urban development and expansion through their investments.

The articles on urban public spaces in Section 3 highlight another category of actors: modern-educated intellectuals born in the late 19th century who left diaries and memoirs behind as well as articles in journals and newspapers and who transmitted globally circulating liberal bourgeois ideas and ideals to their readership in Arabic or Hebrew. These sources shine the spotlight on specific actors. The articles by Abigail Jacobson, Evelin Dierauff and Fruma Zachs show how the discourses produced by this very vocal category of urban dwellers were not at all mere elusive words or “writing on water” (al-kitaba ʿala l-maʾ) as one contemporary Arab journalist called it, but rather were intimately bound up with physical transformations of their cities. This included phenomena as diverse as the organization of public ceremonies in Jerusalem’s main plaza as described by Abigail Jacobson, the design of residential architecture in Beirut as discussed by Fruma Zachs, and the use of beaches of Jaffa as places of leisure, as discussed by Evelin Dierauff.

Section 5 of the book is defined by another set of actors who changed the face of entire cities during the period of high imperialism and the first modern era of globalization (c. 1870–1920): namely, a globally connected and mobile elite of technical experts and professionals who promoted modernization in the domains of infrastructure and health. In these cases, the press, Ottoman state archival documents, consular records and company archives provide rich evidence on these crucial brokers of technical knowledge.

Although we cast our nets widely, this volume is nevertheless marked by some silences and absences. In terms of the range of actors in the articles, there are three major imbalances...
that are perhaps not surprising but need comment. First of all, women are highly underrepresented. They figure mostly as wives or daughters of powerful men, anonymous marriage partners, customers in city markets and objects of moralizing discourses. Notable exceptions are Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha, the endower of Lydda (in Tawfiq Da‘adli’s article), the female journalists who discussed gender issues in Beirut (studied by Fruma Zachs) and the women active in women’s associations in Jaffa (described by Evelin Dierauff). Subaltern actors beyond the circles of the propertied and educated ‘middle sort of people’ are also underrepresented, especially those from rural backgrounds. However, it is interesting to note that those chapters that use the Ottoman census as a source (Sarah Buessow, Johann Buessow and Yuval Ben-Bassat’s) regularly mention people with occupations such as workers, peasant, and fishermen as belonging to the family, sometimes to the same household of prominent middle and upper-class actors in urban governance. This should caution us against assuming the existence of clear-cut social boundaries between ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ milieus in late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham. Another feature absent from this book are forms of collective action such as demonstrations, strikes and petitioning. As is known from other studies, these were ways in which subalterns could make themselves heard in the Ottoman Empire, alleviate their grievances and at times negotiate an improvement in their living conditions.63

In addition, the articles in this volume could not cover all the institutions and periods relevant to the framework sketched out above, or all the key cities in the region. Readers of the volume will find little, for instance, about the role of local law courts or the legal systems in urban governance during the late Ottoman period, which include Ottoman state legislation, Islamic law, customary law, and the roles of legal functionaries such as kâdîs and muftis. With regard to the geographic scope of the contributions, Palestine is comparatively heavily represented, because several articles on the Syrian region which were presented during the two workshops on which this volume is based could not be included in this publication eventually. Absences and uneven geographic coverage have plagued Middle Eastern urban history from its inception as a field of academic study. However, as pointed out, we identified new pathways into previously uncharted historiographical territory, mainly through new combinations of sources and inventive ways of ‘close reading.’ We also believe that this exercise in self-critical stocktaking of achievements and shortcomings of our research will help to better define the challenges for future research.

Finally, all our efforts depend on access to primary sources. The box texts that accompany each article in the volume specify the key sources on urban governance, along with remarks on their strengths and weaknesses. Many sources have become more accessible recently through digitization. The combination of a heightened sensitivity towards biases in our sources and improved access to new source material due to ongoing digitization efforts,64 may pave the way for more decisive breakthroughs.

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63 See, for example, the studies collected in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), Subalterns and Social Protest: History from Below in the Middle East and North Africa (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

64 See text boxes 1, 2, 4, 5 and 9 for remarks on digital sources available online.
HOUSEHOLDS
A MAMLUK HOUSEHOLD IN JAFFA: THE CASE OF ABU NABBUT (1805–1819)

Mahmoud Yazbak

Abstract | After the death of Dahir al-ʿUmar in 1775, a local Galilean leader, Ahmad Paşa al-Jazzar, a manumitted Bosnian mamluk was nominated wali (governor) of the wilaya (province) of Sidon/Acre. He set up a mamluk household that governed various districts in Palestine. Abu Nabbut, a manumitted mamluk of Jazzar, became the mutasallim (governor of a district) of Jaffa in 1805, under Sulayman Paşa, who was also a manumitted mamluk of Jazzar. Abu Nabbut's mamluk household in Jaffa governed Jaffa and Palestine's southern sub-districts. Abu Nabbut's monumental construction efforts in Jaffa between 1805 and 1817 were intended to make Jaffa look different from other localities in the southern sanjaq, and give it the semblance of a capital similar to Acre, the capital of the wilaya.

THE FOUNDATION OF A NEW MAMLUK HOUSEHOLD

After a long period of ups and downs, sieges and occupations that started in the 1770s, in 1805 Jaffa's new mutasallim (deputy governor; Ott. Turk. mütesellim) Muhammad Agha Abu Nabbut, inaugurated a new chapter of stability and prosperity in this city's history. Strategically, by annexing Palestine's southern sanjaqs including Jaffa to the wilaya of Sidon, the walis of Acre stopped regarding Jaffa as a possible threat but rather as Acre's southern shield against possible incursions from Egypt. Thus the walis of Acre did not hesitate to strengthen Jaffa's defenses and walls (see Figure 1). This was the atmosphere in which Abu Nabbut started his career in Jaffa in 1805.

Very little is known about the life of Muhammad Agha Abu Nabbut before his appointment to Jaffa, except that he was a non-Muslim converted slave of Ahmad al-Jazzar’s household. When manumitted by his master, he rose to be one of the senior mamluks in al-Jazzar's household in Acre. He was equal in rank to Sulayman Paşa, another mamluk of al-Jazzar, who upon al-Jazzar’s death became the wali of wilayat Sidon. Before his appointment to Jaffa, Abu Nabbut served his patron as amin al-jumruk (controller of customs) of Acre from 1790, and later as the mutasallim of Damascus. The former post provided him with practical knowledge and direct contact with the flourishing Mediterranean trade. The latter, although it only lasted a few months, provided him with governmental experience in a wilaya known for its complicated politics. Thus, on the eve of his appointment to Jaffa, Abu Nabbut was already familiar with the administrative and fiscal aspects of provincial government.

His letter of appointment as mutasallim of Jaffa showed that his manumission came from the wilaya of Sidon. The annexation of Jaffa to the wilaya of Sidon started in 1803. Prior to that time, it was part of the wilaya of Damascus. See sijill of Jaffa, vol. 2, p. 130, 11 Muḥarram 1218 AH/ 3 May 1803.

1 The annexation of Jaffa to the wilaya of Sidon started in 1803. Prior to that time, it was part of the wilaya of Damascus. See sijill of Jaffa, vol. 2, p. 130, 11 Muḥarram 1218 AH/ 3 May 1803.


the wali of Sidon in Jaffa put all spheres of governance under his control in Palestine’s southern sanjaqs: he became the mutasallim of the liwa (sanjaq) of Gaza, amin al-jumruk of Jaffa, and mutawalli al-waqf al-sharif (administrator of a special waqf of the Sultan). In other words, he was entrusted with supreme control over all governmental, administrative, financial, economic and military spheres in the Jaffa region and the sanjaq of Gaza. This meant that he was responsible for all kinds of tax collection in the sanjaq’s four towns: Jaffa, Ramla, Lydda, and Gaza including the jizya and the jumruk (customs). In addition, he oversaw tax collection from the rural areas under his jurisdiction. He was in charge of security in this area, as well as day-to-day governance.  

To fulfill these huge tasks, Abu Nabbut appointed salaried deputies (mutasallims) of his own in the main towns/districts, who remitted their tax collections in full only to him. In Jaffa itself, Abu Nabbut had a deputy who collected taxes on his behalf. Abu Nabbut’s military role was very important in many respects: given that the sanjaq of Gaza bordered Bedouin tribal lands, he invested considerable efforts in keeping the area peaceful. To ensure the security and defense of the port of Jaffa, the Empire maintained around a hundred Janissaries in Jaffa castle, who were paid out of the Jaffa treasury.

By amalgamating these administrative, fiscal, and military positions, Abu Nabbut had a complete monopoly over the collection of taxes from the whole region and played a major role

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4 For the full text of his appointment, see sijill of Jaffa, vol. 2, p. 192, 8 Shawwal 1805 AH / 30 December 1805.

in maintaining the security of the southern border of Palestine. Since he was the amin al-jumruk in Jaffa, he controlled the town’s trade as well as other aspects of its daily life. With this combination of power, Abu Nabbūt had almost free rein in the sanjaq. During Abu Nabbūt’s rule, the sources make no reference to any serious uprisings or violations of general security in the sanjaq. The strong local militia, and the mamluk household he established played an important role in maintaining law and order.

The available information about Abu Nabbūt’s mamluk household and retinue is based on information in the sijill records. These can be divided into two main groups: a non-Muslim group that had been converted to Islam (mutasharīf bi-l-Islam or al-muhtadi), and his manumitted slaves (maʿtuq). These mamluks had Georgian, Albanian, Bosnian, and Egyptian backgrounds. Locals from Acre and Damascus also served in Abu Nabbūt’s army and were referred to as followers (atba'). In addition, there was a group of black slaves serving only in his private household. Local followers who joined him from Acre and Damascus and took part in the Jaffa administration belonged mostly to Christian families who had converted to Islam, such as the Bidaras. Egytian mamluks, were originally owned by an Egyptian mamluk household who entered the service of Abu Nabbūt after the death of their original master. While the administration of Jaffa was comprised of local Arabs during the brief rule of the local leader Muhammad Abu Maraq (1800–1803), and his military forces included locals and maghribi mercenaries, this changed dramatically under Abu Nabbūt. The mamluk regime introduced to northern Palestine by al-Jazzar was expanded by Abu Nabbūt to include Palestine’s southern sanjaqs as well.

Since he himself was a mamluk and responsible for the governance and tax collection of a large area, Abu Nabbūt’s policy was to control the area through his own mamluk household. For that purpose, he married Khadija, a daughter of Kinj Ahmad, a mamluk and member of al-Jazzar’s administration, who served as amin al-jumruk in Jaffa in 1803 and as mutasallim in Damascus in 1804. Abu Nabbūt entrusted to his manumitted slaves the highest administrative and military posts within the sanjaq, and forged ties with them through marriage. For example, Husayn Agha, a manumitted slave (maʿtuq) of Abu Nabbūt, who served as his mutasallim in Lydda, married ‘Aisha, Abu Nabbūt’s sister-in-law. Upon the death of Husayn Agha, his widow married ‘Uthman Agha, Abu Nabbūt’s maʿtuq, who served as his treasurer and mutasallim, and also became his brother-in-law.

The sijill provides more examples of similar marriages between Abu Nabbūt’s maʿtuqs and his manumitted slave women. Such marriages were common practice in established mamluk households to create and cement factional cohesion within a mamluk household.

To strengthen his guardianship over his mamluk household, Abu Nabbūt bought them private homes. These homes were given as gifts (hiba) to help his men establish their own families. Some mamluks were given shops or other assets to be rented out to enable them have sources of income. In this respect, he treated his mamluks as he did his own family members. For example, after allotting some of his assets to his wife, son, and daughter, he engaged in the same practice with his mamluks. In other words, Abu Nabbūt invested much of his economic resources to enable his own family members and his mamluk household to have access to sources of local wealth. By doing so and by encouraging intermarriage among his mamluks, Abu Nabbūt consolidated his image as a “father” who took care of all his family members.

The honorary titles attributed to Abu Nabbūt’s mamluk household show that they represented the highest social rank in Jaffa, suggesting that the establishment of this household changed the social fabric of the town dramatically.

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6 Sijill, vol. 4, p. 226, 1 Jumada l-Una 1234 / 24 February 1819.
7 Sijill, vol. 3, p. 164, 1 Jumada l-Thaniya 1229 / 21 May 1814. The example used here is al-Atfi, an Egyptian mamluk household.
ically. Up to then, the local social elite, as well as high-ranking officialdom, were made up of local elements. Abu Nabbut introduced a new stratum of non-local *mamluks* to Jaffa society, who also governed the southern parts of Palestine.

Abu Nabbut’s guardianship of his *mamluks* and their offspring extended to all members of his retinue. Frequently, upon the death of one of his *mamluks* or a member of his retinue, Abu Nabbut became the legal guardian of the deceased’s minor children and the superintendent of their estates. In short, as patron of a *mamluk* household, and a product of the *mamluk* system, Abu Nabbut treated his *maṭūq* like members of his own family whose loyalty was the foundation of his power.

To achieve full control over the *sanjaq*, Abu Nabbut set up a large local militia comprised of more than five hundred *mamluks*, soldiers and followers (*aṭbaʿ*). This was done by making full use of his post, which entitled him to maintain a private force paid from the *sanjaq’s* treasury. Abu Nabbut’s splendid *mamluk* retinue in Jaffa was perceived by his contemporaries as an attempt to imitate the lifestyle of his late patron, al-Jazzar. Al-Ura, a chronicler and employee in the *wali*’s office in Acre, estimated that the expenses of Abu Nabbut’s kitchen were more than twice those of the *wali*’s, two *khans*, two *suqs*, 65 shops, and several stores and houses.

The first step in his plan was to buy homes for his *mamluk* household. After accumulating large assets, Abu Nabbut purchased a plot of land outside the walls and dedicated it a *waqf* to be used as an Islamic cemetery so he could displace the existing Islamic cemetery located within the city limits.

In 1809, Abu Nabbut finished building a large religious complex, which included a Grand Mosque and a *sabil*. In comparison with other public buildings in Jaffa, it was the largest and the most highly decorated in town. This spate of monumental building was intended to make Jaffa look different from other towns in the southern *sanjaq*, and to give it the semblance of a capital. The Grand Mosque (al-Mahmudi) was built on the ruins of an old mosque, also known as the Grand Mosque, which had been built in 1756 but was heavily damaged during the French invasion. In his *waqfiyya*

### NEW MONUMENTAL BUILDINGS

In addition to the major changes in the social fabric of the town, Abu Nabbut radically altered the Jaffa skyline. During his relatively long reign, the town and the area enjoyed a continuous period of political stability and security. These proved essential for the development of Jaffa, and especially its commerce. Aware of the strategic and economic importance of the town, Abu Nabbut invested large sums and made considerable efforts in the early phases of his rule to make it look more like an urban center and a regional capital rivaling Acre. The large sources of wealth at his disposal allowed him to work in this direction. Through large public *waqf* endowments, over a period of eight years (1809–1816) he built and renovated the city walls, the Grand Mosque (see Figure 2), a *madrasa*, a public library (*katuphane*), four *sabils*, two *khans*, two *suqs*, 65 shops, and several stores and houses.

In 1809, Abu Nabbut finished building a large religious complex, which included a Grand Mosque and a *sabil*. In comparison with other public buildings in Jaffa, it was the largest and the most highly decorated in town. This spate of monumental building was intended to make Jaffa look different from other towns in the southern *sanjaq*, and to give it the semblance of a capital. The Grand Mosque (al-Mahmudi) was built on the ruins of an old mosque, also known as the Grand Mosque, which had been built in 1756 but was heavily damaged during the French invasion. In his *waqfiyya*

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18 The information on Abu Nabbut’s construction activities is culled from his *waqf* register. See al-Sabil al-mubarak, the Library of al-Najah University, Nablus, manuscript number 234.

19 *Sijill*, vol. 2, p. 230, 1 Dhu l-Qa’da 1220 / 20 February 1806.


(endowment deed), Abu Nabbut states that this mosque “had been demolished, was narrow, ruined, had fallen into oblivion, and had no water or furniture.” Abu Nabbut enlarged the old mosque, supplied it with running water, furnished it with carpets, and made provisions for management and maintenance staff. He also built and endowed new revenue-bearing properties to supplement the waqf income. Abu Nabbut’s reconstruction of the Grand Mosque of Jaffa transformed the building from a simple mosque into an elaborate edifice with a double-domed prayer hall, a courtyard surrounded by riwaqs, a madrasa, and two integrated sabils.

Along with the mosque’s reconstruction, Abu Nabbut endowed two sabils located within the city walls in 1809. The first is described as a well with running water located within the courtyard of the Grand Mosque. The second was known as the Mahmudi Sabil (or al-juw-wani, see Figure 3) and was set into a wall within the city gates. The Mahmudi Sabil was built in the form of an arched recess. Water was supplied to passers-by by spigots that let

water flow into marble basins at the foot of the receding arch.26

In his efforts to facilitate the movement of travelers and camel caravans to and from Jaffa, Abu Nabbut built another two sabils in 1815. The first, known as Sabil al-Shifaʾ (see Figure 4), was located in a separate building seven kilometers east of the city proper, on the road to Jerusalem. It comprised a room, two iwans, and a water-supply system fed from a running-water well. The second sabil was built in Sarafand, a village on the main road connecting Jaffa with Ramla, for the usage of “travelers on the main road.” Abu Nabbut put the heads of the village in charge of the maintenance of this sabil. For this purpose he deducted 200 qurush from the annual taxes collected in this village27 and dedicated the revenues of a nearby bayyara (orchard) to the Sarafand sabil.

In his efforts to make Jaffa a capital comparable in status to Acre, Abu Nabbut reestablished a madrasa as part of the Grand Mosque complex. A madrasa had been built within the Grand Mosque as early as the mid-18th century, but was demolished during the French occupation. In the refurbished madrasa, Abu Nabbut founded a library (kutuphane), the first ever in Jaffa, to serve students, scholars, and the general public for the “acquisition of knowl-

indicates that Abu Nabbut bought the demolished mills from the leaders of the Jamma‘in nahiya (sub-district), and renovated them. The revenues of the seven mills were distributed as follows: the income from five mills was allocated to stipends for the teachers and students at the madrasa and the library, and the income from the other two was to be given directly to the administrator (mutwalli) of this waqf in return for the administration, guarding, and upkeep of the mills. Because the mills “are located in a difficult area (far from Jaffa),” Abu Nabbut appointed “whomever is the governor of the wilaya [of Sidon] at any time because they cannot be protected except by him” for the administration of this waqf.

The Grand Mosque, the sabils, the madrasa, and the library required large budgets and salaried staff to maintain and run them efficiently. Abu Nabbut endowed them with substantial assets, which he built or bought and earmarked the income from their rental for the waqf budget. This waqf included 67 shops, two suqs, seven mills, two khans, two tanneries, eight houses, two coffee houses, three plots of land, two jirinas platforms, a tannery, an olive press, and two bayyaras.

The nature, number, and diversity of the assets established by Abu Nabbut and dedicated to the maintenance of his waqf clearly had a significant impact on the city and its spaces. The development of the waqf was organic and gradual. Data from the sijill and Abu Nabbut’s waqfyya show that the accumulation of waqf property started as early as 1806, shortly after he was appointed to his post in Jaffa, and continued even after he was ousted from office in 1817.

29 Manuscript al-Sabil al-mubarak, p. 77.
30 Ibid., p. 78.
31 A list divided into topic headings, with the titles of each book and number of volumes can be found in sijill, vol. 3, p. 83, Dhu l-Hijja 1228 / November 1813.
32 Sijill, vol. 10, p. 88; the endowment is dated 22 Dhu l-Qa‘da 1227 / 18 February 1813.
NEW COMMERCIAL CENTERS

The large number of shops endowed by Abu Nabbut is indicative of the importance of this source of income for running the waqf. The renovated and newly built commercial centers of Jaffa during his time reflect the dual nature of the town’s economy: although import-export trade through the town’s port was the main commercial activity, it led to an increase in commercial activity in local markets for supplies and luxury items. Unlike previous periods, when Jaffa had only two suqs (al-Fawqani, the upper, and al-Tahtani, the lower), the market space during Abu Nabbut’s era attests to an increase in its complexity and the grouping of trades into specialized suqs. The records refer to seven specialized suqs: al-Haddadin (blacksmiths), al-Sagha (jewelers), al-ʿAttarin (spice market), al-Laban (milk market), al-Qamh (wheat market), al-Khudar (vegetable market), and al-Satr (for women coming from nearby villages to sell local products).

These specialized suqs appeared in Jaffa in response to Abu Nabbut’s new projects. They complemented the refurbishment of several shops on the main road (al-Tariq al-Sultani) that passed through the town gate in the Christian and the Qal’a (fortress) neighborhoods, and the building of new shops in the area that became known as Suq al-ʿAmud. There were coffee shops and shops grouped by goods and crafts on al-Tariq al-Sultani, the main road in the city. To accommodate the large number of shops he owned and to endow part of the revenue to run his waqf institutions, in 1815 Abu Nabbut built two new suqs:37 Suq al-Faraj and Suq al-Satr. The location of Suq al-Satr (the hidden or covered market) was previously known as Ard al-Raml (the sandy land), located to the south of the Grand Mosque, behind Suq al-Faraj. It was a specialized market built specifically for the use of women who came to Jaffa to sell their agricultural products, so as to shelter them and protect their dignity (satran lahunna).38 In most cases, the new buildings made use of spaces opened up after the partial demolition of buildings during the French occupation. Others were built on previously vacant land.

By building the suqs, Abu Nabbut incorporated this vacant land into the new urban fabric. In contrast, Suq al-Faraj was built on the site of an old demolished khan (caravansary). Suq al-Faraj had 36 shops. It replaced an old khan and several shops located near the town gate that had been demolished along with other properties during the French destruction of the city. In 1815, Abu Nabbut bought the ruins of the old khan and the nearby shops from its previous owners, the Husayni family of Jerusalem,39 and built the active Suq al-Faraj with its elaborate central sabil. These new waqf foundations, which formed large complexes, acted as the cores for new neighborhoods, and were the seeds for urban growth. Abu Nabbut’s new commercial centers were concentrated mainly in an area surrounding the Grand Mosque at the top of the hill. This area was originally a commercial center, but had been almost entirely demolished during the French occupation. Abu Nabbut, through his waqf initiative, renovated the area and added new commercial centers and monumental buildings to make it the main active economic center of Jaffa. His building activity encouraged others to renovate their properties and build new shops and houses.

Behind the commercial center of the main suqs, Abu Nabbut built two new khans. Since the khan functioned as a hotel for travelling merchants and others as well as a warehouse for products and goods for export-import, it is also indicative of the revival of the transit trade through Jaffa. Various khans had existed in Jaffa from the previous century, but most of them did not survive the destruction caused by the French invasion, and no longer fulfilled their purpose. As part of his waqf endowment and to meet the demands of the thriving export-import activity in the port, especially cotton and wool,40 Abu Nabbut built two new khans in the commercial area. The first was part of his endowment for the maintenance of the Mahmudi Sabil. The revenues from the second khan were endowed for the maintenance of the Grand Mosque.41

38 Manuscript al-Sabil al-mubarak, p. 12.
41 Manuscript al-Sabil al-mubarak, pp. 4, 26, 62, 69.
THE END OF ABU NABBUT’S ERA

According to al-ʿUra, Abu Nabbut’s lifestyle was part of his strategy to earn the rank of vezir and the title of paşa. His opportunity to make this a reality came in 1815 upon the death of ‘Ali Paşa, Sulayman Paşa’s deputy and treasurer (khazi-nedar). As a senior mamluk of al-Jazzar, and considered by other members of the al-Jazzar household as equal in status to Sulayman Paşa and the deceased ‘Ali Paşa, he hoped to inherit ‘Ali Paşa’s post. As a result of complicated court intrigues related in detail by al-ʿUra, Sulayman Paşa chose ‘Abdallah Paşa, the son of the deceased ‘Ali Agha, for the post instead.42 From this time on, the frustrated Abu Nabbut took a different attitude towards the advancement of his career, and started circumventing his master, the wali. An opportunity arose in late 1816, when a high official from Istanbul visited Jaffa and Jerusalem on his return from a pilgrimage. According to al-ʿUra, Abu Nabbut gave his guest many gifts and asked him to intervene on his behalf with the Porte to separate Gaza and Jaffa from wilayat Sidon, and create an independent wilaya that would be granted to him, as had been the case for Abu-Maraq.43 Abu Nabbut’s plan eventually failed since Istanbul granted the title of Paşa to ‘Abdallah, whereas he was only given a second-class court title, kapucu-baş, which was the appropriate title for a mutasallim. Abu Nabbut attempted other tactics to achieve his goal, but these also failed. However, as his ambitions and plans were transparent to his competitors in the wali’s court, it made the intrigues against him fiercer.44 In fact, Abu Nabbut accused Haim Farhi, the Jewish treasurer and an influential member of the wali’s court of being an obstacle to his advancement and for colluding with ‘Abdallah Paşa to get rid of him. From their perspective, Abu Nabbut’s plan to strengthen Jaffa’s fortifications in 1817 was a dangerous step designed to enhance his control over Jaffa and as part of a plot to revolt.45 In that year, Abu Nabbut asked Sulayman Paşa for permission to build a sea wall to counter the destructive effects of high waves that struck the harbor area each year. Al-ʿUra, who did not like Abu Nabbut, argued that, after he had lost all hope of securing Palestine’s southern sanjaq as his wilaya peacefully, Abu Nabbut thought that by fortifying the city he would be able to obtain his goal by force. Despite al-ʿUra’s concerns, Sulayman Paşa agreed to the building of the wall “for the protection and the well-being of the city,”46 and sent 15 canons to Jaffa to be stationed on the town’s walls.47 As the construction of the wall neared completion, the fears of the anti-Abu Nabbut alliance increased and a plan was concocted to oust him from Jaffa before it was too late. His opponents decided that this should take place when he was absent so he would not be given a chance to entrench himself within the new fortifications. The plan was set in motion when Abu Nabbut departed for Gaza to lead the cerde, or safeguarding of the Hajj caravan on its way to Damascus. At this stage, Abu Nabbut’s enemies convinced Sulayman Paşa that he should seize the moment.

On 6 Jumada l-Thaniyya 1234/2 April 1819 Sulayman Paşa issued an order relieving Abu Nabbut of his post as mutasallim, and appointed Kuçuk Mustafa Agha from the Albanian militia of Acre as temporary mutasallim.48 According to the edict, Abu Nabbut would still be the mutasallim of Gaza and Ramla but he was ousted from his power base in Jaffa. When he returned to Jaffa after his mission, he found the main gate of the city barred against him and his troops.49 The edict was read to him and he was ordered to go back to Gaza. Realizing that he could do nothing in these circumstances, he left Jaffa calmly. He was given permission to arrange for his family, belongings, and followers to leave Jaffa, but was not allowed to enter the city himself. His money and his huge amounts of belongings were listed and registered in the sijill50 and loaded onto hundreds of camels and other beasts of burden.51

43 Ibid., p. 268.
44 Ibid., p. 270.
46 Sijill, vol. 4, p. 98, 23 Shaʾban 1232 / 8 July 1817.
47 Sijill, vol. 4, p. 100, 19 Ramadan 1232 / 2 August 1817; al-ʿUra, Taʾrikh wilayat Sulayman Paşa, p. 320.
48 Sijill, vol. 4, p. 235, 6 Jumada l-Thaniyya 1234 / 2 April 1819.
49 al-ʿUra provides a detailed reconstruction of the dialogue between the two as Abu Nabbut stood outside the gate, and Kuçuk Mustafa Agha behind the city walls.
50 Sijill, vol. 4, pp. 238–239, 9 Jumada l-Thaniyya 1234 / 5 April 1819.
51 al-ʿUra, Taʾrikh wilayat Sulayman Paşa, p. 393.
A month after Abu Nabbut was ousted from Jaffa, he reached Egypt. The Egyptian chronicler al-Jabarti noted that:

On the seventh [of Rajab 1234 / 2 May 1819] the governor of Jaffa, known as Muhammad Bey Abu Nabbut, reached Cairo after being dismissed from his post. He sent a request to the Paşa [Muhammad 'Ali] begging for his permission to go to Egypt, and he was given permission, and so he came. [The Paşa] let him and the approximately 500 mamluks, soldiers, and followers accompanying him stay in al-Qasr al-'Ayni.

Towards the end of 1819, and at the request of the Porte, Abu Nabbut left Cairo for Istanbul. Later, he appears in sijill documents related to the transactions of his waqf in Jaffa, such as those of the wali of Salonica (1821), and the wali of Diyarbakir in 1826. In other words, after he was ousted from Jaffa, he fulfilled his life's dream of becoming Paşa. Overall, Abu Nabbut gave Jaffa the "kiss of life." It continued to develop after his time and became the main urban center of Palestine.

53 Ibid.
54 Sijill, vol. 6, p. 128, 19 Rabi’ al-Thani 1242 / 19 November 1826.
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**OTTOMAN SHARIA COURT REGISTERS:**

PUBLIC RECORDS AND SOURCES ON EVERYDAY LIFE

This chapter is primarily based on Jaffa’s Ottoman Sharia court records (sijills). Sijills, in general, provide historians with rich source material on the everyday life of all strata of the population in the Ottoman Empire from a variety of places over a relatively long period of time. Sharia court records are legal documents that recorded discussions that took place in the courtroom, structured along highly uniform lines. The sijills are in fact volumes of documents summarizing legal proceedings that took place on a daily basis in the Sharia courts throughout the Ottoman domains. All these legal proceedings were registered in the court records, either in Arabic or in Ottoman Turkish, and then filed at the courthouse. Some of these volumes have survived and are preserved in their respective courthouses or in libraries and archives. During most of the Ottoman period the Sharia courts constituted the core of the judicial system of the Ottoman state, and thus a variety of legal matters were dealt with and recorded there. In addition, until the late 19th century, imperial decrees and official appointments of local and provincial officials at various administrative levels were also recorded in the sijills, which thus served as local public records.

This chapter is based on data culled from Jaffa’s Sharia court records to recover social voices from this town. Drawing on different sijills from the first two decades of the 19th century, it examines the establishment of a new “Mamluk household” in the town during the rule of Abu Nabbut. The earliest volume of the sijill of Jaffa that has survived to this day is from the end of 1799. Previous volumes were burned by the French troops led by Napoleon Bonaparte during their occupation of the town on 6 March 1799. The Jaffa sijill series from late 1799 until the end of the Ottoman rule is composed of 110 volumes, and is housed today in the Israel State Archives (ISA). Some of these volumes have been digitized and are available online. Microfilm copies of these sijills are also available through the Library of the University of Haifa and at the University of Amman in Jordan.
STRUCTURAL PORTRAITS OF ELITE HOUSEHOLDS IN GAZA, C. 1900:
STRATEGIES AND PATTERNS OF COOPERATION

Sarah Buessow

Abstract | Throughout the Ottoman period, elite households and elite families were central figures in Middle Eastern urban politics; however, these entities were shaped in different ways as a function of time and place. Thanks to the exceptional source of documentation constituted by the Ottoman census of 1905, information on these households and families can be reconstructed for the city of Gaza at the end of the Ottoman period at finer granularity than ever before. This chapter examines the strategies implemented by established elite families in late Ottoman Gaza as they endeavored to preserve their power and influence. It does not focus on their economic or political activities or the narratives produced about them, but rather on their most private sphere; i.e., social relations within the household and between households, which show how members collaborated with each other to further their shared interests. Hierarchical, cooperative and diverging patterns of relationships within a whole family or a family branch emerge from this analysis.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Ottoman period, elite households and elite families were central figures in urban politics in the Middle East, especially in the region of Bilad al-Sham. However, these entities were shaped in different ways as a function of region and period. Thanks to the exceptional source of documentation constituted by the Ottoman census data of 1905 and the relational database developed for its analysis, these households and families for the city of Gaza at the end of the Ottoman period can be reconstructed in greater detail than ever before (see the text box on the census as a source for historical studies). The census provides a snapshot of households as they were registered by Ottoman census officials between April and July of 1905, with updates until World War I. These entries have a certain amount of historical depth because they include information on the relatives of the heads of households listed, such as their names and their place of origin. Since most individuals’ family names are recorded, this provides a starting point for an analysis of kinship relations within and between households.

1 For case studies of Cairo, see Jane Hathaway, The Politics and Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); for Aleppo, see Margaret L. Meriwether, The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770–1840 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999); for Palestinian towns, see Dror Ze’evi, An Ottoman Century: The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); for Damascus, see Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1985).

2 This chapter is based on data collected within the framework of the “Gaza during the Late Ottoman Period” research project hosted by the Universities of Haifa, Tübingen, and Bochum, through funding awarded by the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF 1226) from 2016 to 2018. The “Gaza Historical Database,” hosted by the University of Bochum, is available online at https://gaza.ub.rub.de/gaza (accessed 27 February 2021).
relationships between members of different households.

These data on extended families were compared and contrasted with information from the voluminous contemporary encyclopedia of Gaza by ʿUthman al-Tabbaʿ (1882–1950). Tabbaʿ was a scholar from Gaza and was educated at Al-Azhar College in Cairo. Upon his return to Gaza in 1902, he began compiling his encyclopedia, which resulted in two manuscript volumes that were completed around 1912. The print version of Tabbaʿ’s work comprises four volumes, two of which are of interest here. One is made up of family genealogies and short histories of the most prestigious and powerful local families. The other contains biographies of the most prominent members of these families, in particular scholars and merchants. Tabbaʿ’s portrayals of families and personalities should however be read with caution, since they are highly stylized, and present the city and his fellow townspeople in a positive light. Although showcasing models of virtue and commercial success, he occasionally hints at competition and conflicts between local families. He also indirectly points at economic strategies, for example when he notes that a given merchant had exceptionally good relations with the Bedouins in the surrounding region.

A close reading of the 1905 Ottoman census and Tabbaʿ’s prosopographical information provides a rich evidentiary basis on families and households in Gaza, and especially on the local elite. Nevertheless, these sources fail to adequately cover crucial information such as the economic assets and the political strategies of the families involved. Therefore, they should be complemented by other sources that are of major importance in research on the social history of urban societies in Bilad al-Sham such as Shariʿa court records, business contracts, family archives, diaries and memoirs. These kinds of sources so far have not been found for Gaza during this period. An advantage of using only a limited number of sources in my study is that this may lead to transparent and controllable hypotheses, which should be tested against other source material in the future.

This chapter does not focus on the economic or political activities of these families, but rather on the social relations within these households and across households in one family. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which household members interacted to further their shared interests. This analysis reveals three main types of collaboration within a whole family or a family branch, which are classified into hierarchical, cooperative and diverging patterns, as discussed below.

A household is defined here as a residential unit, which could range from a single room within a larger architectural complex to

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4 Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Bues sow, “Applying Digital Methods to the Study of a Late Ottoman City: A Social and Spatial Analysis of Political Partisanship in Gaza,” JESHO 63/4 (2020), p. 519. After completing his manuscript, Tabbaʿ added additional information on several topics during subsequent years, e.g. on events during World War I.
8 For examples of recent studies building on the skillful use of these types of sources, see Christian Sassmannshausen, “Educated with Distinction: Educational Decisions and Girls’ Schooling in Late Ottoman Syria,” JESHO 62 (2019), pp. 222–256; idem “Eating Up: Food Consumption and Social Status in Late Ottoman Greater Syria,” in Kirill Dmitriev, Julia Hauser and Bilal Orfali (eds.), Insatiable Appetite: Food as Cultural Signifier in the Middle East and Beyond (Leiden: Brill, 2019), pp. 27–49.
9 Recently, more than one hundred Arabic-language petitions from Gaza to the imperial government in Istanbul, dating from the 1890s to the World War I, have been identified in the Ottoman Archives. A first perusal has shown that many of them address subjects that are highly relevant in the present context, such as questions of family identity, social status and qualifications for administrative posts. However, the analysis of this corpus is beyond the scope of this article.
10 For the political strategies of the families mentioned in this chapter; namely the Shawwa, Husayni, Abu Khadr and Saqallah, see Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Bues sow, “Urban Factionalism in Late Ottoman Gaza, c. 1875–1914: Local Politics and Spatial Divisions,” JESHO 61/1 (2018), pp. 606–649.
a mansion, a dar, and the inhabitants of this residential unit. In Gaza, members of households were generally related by kinship or marriage, or in some cases, by master-servant relationships. In Gaza, unlike records for other cities such as Damascus, Nablus, or Cairo, only one person was registered as the head of a household.\footnote{For an analysis of household structures based on administrative documents, see for Damascus Tomoki Okawara, “Size and Structure of Damascus Households in the Late Ottoman Period as Compared with Istanbul Households,” in Beshara Doumani (ed.), Family History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 51–75; for Nablus Beshara Doumani, Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean: A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), for Cairo Philippe Fargues, “Family and Household in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Cairo,” in Beshara Doumani (ed.), Family History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 23–50.}

To better understand how interactions between heads of households maximized their joint success and the ways in which decision-makers within a family used households and individual members to foster and preserve their reputation, wealth and power, the sources here are examined to respond to two key questions: Who lived in a household and what kind of functions did individual household members fulfill for the household or family collective? What was the nature of the collaboration between households, or branches of one family? I also examine whether marriage practices can yield insights into the concretization of reputation or wealth and ways of maintaining them.

More generally, this study aims to contribute to the literature by achieving greater terminological precision. “Elite families,” or “notable families,” are mentioned as central actors in local chronicles as well as in scholarly accounts of the history of late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham.\footnote{Michel Hannerz, Families in Politics: Margaret L. Meriwether, in her study on notables in 18th century Aleppo, also writes about “notable families,” though stating that for some leading figures, there was cooperation between brothers and that wealth was not distributed equally across households or families. See Meriwether, Kin Who Count, pp. 42, 45. Meriwether also notes that “[t]he fact that individuals were descended from a common ancestor and shared certain genes only mattered if the individuals involved believed that it mattered” (p. 52). She continues: “Wealth [including inheritance, SB], belonged to and was controlled by individuals, not by lineage” (p. 53). Meriwether also describes households as political units within notable families (p. 87).}

On closer inspection, these great political families of the region rarely acted as a collective, and only a few individuals within these families were actually notables as defined by Albert Hourani; i.e., intermediaries\footnote{Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in William Polk and Richard Chambers (eds.), Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 48.} between the central government and specific segments of the local population. I thus suggest disentangling elite family, elite household and notables analytically by clarifying their respective functions in a given setting. This can help sensitize both readers and researchers to the extent of social diversity within specific families and caution against treating families as monolithic macro-actors.

In the following, I do not discuss cases of individual notables as intermediaries between the imperial government and local society, but rather the behavior of elite households within the city Gaza through structural portraits of their households at a specific point in time. This was made possible through access to a set of Ottoman census data from 1905 (1321 according to the official Ottoman or Rumi calendar) which has only recently become widely accessible.\footnote{ISA, Nüfus (Ottoman population registers). See Michelle Campos, “Placing Jerusalemites in the History of Jerusalem: The Ottoman Census (Siçil-i Nüfûs) as a Historical Source,” in Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire (eds.), Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City (Leiden: Brill, 2018). The census records have recently been digitized by the Israeli State Archives and have been available online since 2016. The analysis of the data was facilitated by the construction of a database for the 1905 census of Gaza in the framework of the project “Gaza during the Late Ottoman Period.” See “Gaza Historical Database,” online at https://gaza.ub.rub.de/gaza (accessed 19 March 2021).} Below, I focus on five selected categories of information derived from the census: family relations, occupation, education, sources of income, and marriage patterns.

A good example of information that can be gleaned from the census is the register of the family of ‘Uthman al-Tabba’, the author of the monograph on the Gaza’s history and its prominent men and families, that is one of the most important sources for this place and period.\footnote{Ithaf, Ithaf.} He was born in Gaza in 1882 and died there in 1950. He was registered in the 1905


12 Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: Margaret L. Meriwether, in her study on notables in 18th century Aleppo, also writes about “notable families,” though stating that for some leading figures, there was cooperation between brothers and that wealth was not distributed equally across households or families. See Meriwether, Kin Who Count, pp. 42, 45. Meriwether also notes that “[t]he fact that individuals were descended from a common ancestor and shared certain genes only mattered if the individuals involved believed that it mattered” (p. 52). She continues: “Wealth [including inheritance, SB], belonged to and was controlled by individuals, not by lineage” (p. 53). Meriwether also describes households as political units within notable families (p. 87).
census, when he was about 22 years old.\textsuperscript{16} A brief examination of the household he lived in can provide a first impression of the internal structure of a wealthy household in Gaza. According to the census register, ʿUthman al-Tabba lived in the household of his brother Muhammad, a merchant, in the central neighborhood of Daraj. The household was multi-family, which meant in this case that four brothers lived in one dwelling together with their nuclear families and other family members such as their mother (Ott. Turk. valide). The household consisted of 20 members in total, which was quite large in comparison to the average household in Gaza, which numbered about 7 members.\textsuperscript{17} In the census register, he was listed as “Shaykh ʿUthman Efendi.” The titles shaykh and efendi characterize him as an honorable and educated man. His occupation was registered in Ottoman Turkish as “one of the scholars” (ulema’dan). In contrast, his three brothers who were living in the same household had no scholarly credentials, but worked as merchants. This composition of different occupations within one household, at first glance and from a modern perspective, may not seem relevant. However, as shown below, given Gaza’s characteristics and the role elite households played within the city, it is pertinent indeed.

Historically, the economic and political dominance of elite households was a highly important feature of the societies in Bilad al-Sham from the Islamic middle period onward, and probably even before.\textsuperscript{18} In the Mamluk Sultanate, such households were not necessarily confined to one physical dwelling, in that household members could be spread throughout the Mamluk domains. In Ottoman Bilad al-Sham, the notion of the importance of a household as a political unit emerged during the 17\textsuperscript{th} century at the latest, concurrently with the rise of most of the successful local elite families such as the ‘Azms in Damascus\textsuperscript{19} and the Al Ridwan in Gaza.\textsuperscript{20} Some of these families comprised households with more than one hundred members.\textsuperscript{21} However, in contrast to the households in the current study, these households did not live in only one dwelling, and were not based on kin alone; rather, most of these households were a mixture of households based on blood relations and patronage. Household heads were important figures in the military and the bureaucracy and were also able to protect their household members and clients by the sword.\textsuperscript{22}

In the framework of this chapter, the term ‘elite families’ refers to local families that enjoyed both social prestige and political influence, mostly thanks to a broad portfolio of assets, including state and religious offices, religious authority, scholarly reputation, commercial enterprises, and landholding.\textsuperscript{23} In analytical terms, their assets can be conceptualized as different types of what Jörg Gertel termed “resources,” building on Bourdieu’s notion of types of capital and Anthony Giddens’s concept of resources.\textsuperscript{24} Gertel distinguishes between four kinds of resources: (1) allocative resources, which are linked to property rights (e.g. land, fruit trees, dependent workforce); (2) monetary resources, which consist of more or less readily available cash (e.g. savings, loans); (3) incorporated resources, which are related to the person himself and his or her body (e.g.

\textsuperscript{16} ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 266, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{17} This number was calculated from the database in which we entered all the available inhabitants of Gaza based on the Ottoman Census.
\textsuperscript{20} Ze’evi, Ottoman Century, pp. 39-41.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ehud Toledano calls this group the “Ottoman local elites”. See Ehud Toledano, “The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700–1900): A Framework for Research,” in Moshe Ma’oz and Ilan Pappé (eds.), \textit{Pastoral Morocco: Globalizing Scapes of Mobility and Insecurity} (Wiesbaden: Reichert 2007). This terminology was also used by Johann Buessow to discuss local elites in late Ottoman Palestine. See Buessow, \textit{Hamidian Palestine}, pp. 326–327, pp. 11-30.
health, education); (4) institutional resources, which consist of the ties between the person and those related to him or her (e.g. families, households, social networks).

Money and land ownership played a major role in becoming and remaining important in 19th-century Gaza (and in other places). However, the family, or at least some households, needed first to organize itself in terms of institutional and incorporated resources. One of the key indicators of institutional resources was family background (however, as we shall see, it was no guarantee of success in itself). In the census, indicators of family background are family names, which are provided for individuals who married into a family. The birthplace and family background of wives who married into the households are both provided by the census and give further information as to whether there was a preference for endogamous or exogamous marriages. To better understand incorporated resources, titles and information on education provide hints about the social status of individual members of the household. Except for occasional titles recorded for women, the sources only provide this type of information for males. Information on occupation is suggestive of social status, sources of income and fields of social activity in which the family or household were active.

In 19th-century Gaza, several dozen elite households struggled for power and dominance in specific arenas: the religious sphere (holding religious and educational positions and above all the position of mufti) and the administrative-political sphere (civil servants of the municipality, holding the position of mayor). One of Gaza’s main characteristics at the time was the exceptionally high degree of political polarization between opposing factions that formed around certain leading families. As of the middle of the 19th century, one camp was led by the Husayni family, who were challenged by successive coalitions of opposing families. From the mid-1890s, the opposition camp was led by the Shawwa family. As early as 1870s, the political struggle revolved around the position of mufti; from the 1890s the focus of attention shifted towards control of the city’s municipality. Gaza’s factionalism also took on a spatial dimension, when the two leading family households built strongholds in different parts of the city. The Husaynis invested in the Sayyid Hashim Mosque in Daraj, at the northwestern end of the city, and in large houses in its surroundings. The Shawwas created a stronghold in the southeastern neighborhood of Shaja’iyya, where they built a large mansion and also patronized a local mosque, and, more importantly, teamed up with Shaykh Ahmad Busaysu, who was an influential Muslim scholar and preacher (khatib) at Shaja’iyya’s Friday mosque. In 1898, with support of the Ottoman central government and in particular the governor of Jerusalem, Mehmed Tevfik Bey, the Shawwa faction accomplished a major reversal and ended the longstanding dominance of the Husayni faction.25

At the turn of the 20th century, roughly ten Muslim families were regarded as elite families by their contemporaries: Abu Khadra, Abu Sha’ban, Alami, Burnu, Busaysu, Ghalayini, Husayn, Husayni, Saqallah, and Shawwa.26 Below, I provide structural portraits of four of these families: Husayni, Abu Khadra, Saqallah and Shawwa.

**FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL**

In general, Gaza’s elite families were constituted by a group of men and women who shared the same family name, claimed descent from a common ancestor and were linked by consanguineous relationships through the male line (patrilineal lineage). Contemporary Arab authors have used the terms ʿaʾila, and hamula interchangeably to denote this concept of family.27

The relevance of the “family” entity varied from case to case. A successful household or, more often, successful household groups, or what are termed here “brother groups,” acted individually without necessarily invoking the

25 See Ben-Bassat and Buessow, “Urban Fractionalism.”
27 Buessow, Hamidian Palestine, p. 7.
family as a superior entity. At least in the case of Gaza’s elites, family, was more of a theoretical than a practical category.

Individuals used membership to make claims to having a particularly noble genealogy (nasab), but in the sources under discussion, these were apparently not a framework for political action. It was the family branch, and within it the household, that was of prime political and economic importance, and specific resources within these households needed to be maintained or configured to remain successful. If this failed, the status and political influence of the household was in danger. Other households belonging to the same family could form part of these strategic considerations to varying degrees, but the sources provide no indication that the family as a whole was evoked in this context. Petitions analyzed by Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Buessow show that in the context of Gaza’s factionalism, all households belonging to a specific family, usually supported one political camp, but there are also cases in which members of one family sided with opposing factions simultaneously.28

Therefore, the term “elite family,” does not refer here to the totality of family members but rather solely to several individuals within one household or several households belonging to a family who worked together to increase the power and prestige linked to the family name.

Political individuals were, in local Arabic usage, referred to as aʿyan, which can be translated as “notables.” Notables were not by definition linked to powerful families and households. As Gudrun Krämer observed, “it was possible for an individual to be acknowledged as a notable on the strength of his individual achievements.”29 However, in Gaza around 1900, elite households were the primary framework within which local aʿyan acted, and all the elite households in the city were linked to a well-known family.

A VARIETY OF HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES

As discussed in socio-historical studies on families in Damascus by Tomoki Okawara,30 on Cairo by Philippe Fargues,31 and on Istanbul by Alan Duben and Cem Behar,32 household and family structures in the late Ottoman Middle East were characterized by their diversity. Among the factors associated with various types of households and families were religion (especially the permissibility of polygyny according to Islamic law), wealth, particular family and local traditions, spatial constraints (e.g. the type of houses prevalent in a certain city) but also political ambitions. Each city described in the literature so far had its own characteristics that formed this structure and inter alia influenced the size of households.

For Gaza, there were four main types of households: (1) single households; that is, a household consisting of only one person; (2) nuclear households that consisted of a male married household head, his wife and, if given, one or more children, but could also consist of a widow and her children, or a brother and his siblings; (3) extended households; i.e., a nuclear family with one or more added family members such as the mother of the household head (valide), brother, sister, daughter-in-law, etc.; and (4) multiple family households that consisted of two or more nuclear families living together in one household. Usually, these were the nuclear families of the sons or the brothers of the household head - or a late household head -, often in addition to the valide, unmarried sisters, and sometimes also children of deceased brothers and other relatives. Typically, the households in Gaza consisted of family members related either by blood or by marriage. This contrasts with Damascus, for example, where there were households consisting of members with no blood or marriage ties. Okawara suggested that these individuals were registered as one household, although

28 Ben-Bassat and Buessow, “Urban Factionalism.”
30 Okawara, “Size and Structure of Damascus Households.”
31 Fargues, “Family and Household.”
they resided in several dwellings. In rare cases, domestics also formed part of the household. In the Gaza census, a handful of people were registered as domestics, considerably fewer than in the district capital of Jerusalem, and some lived in the same household as their masters. Households whose heads were sons of the same father often closely cooperated with each other as “brother groups.” There might be also households within one family, whose household heads did not have the same father but were cousins. In either case, these households often formed interest groups to achieve a specific aim.

STRUCTURAL PORTRAITS: INDIVIDUAL HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES AND RESOURCES

One important corollary of household cooperation was spatial clustering. The Husayni, Abu Khadra, and Saqallah families all resided in the neighborhood of Daraj, the oldest part of Gaza and the seat of its administrative institutions. There were five Husayni households registered in the year 1905, all in the vicinity of the Hashim Mosque. The registers contain also five Abu Khadra households that were clustered (with one exception) in Shaykh ‘Ali al-Andalusi and Shaykh ‘Ayyad streets, two main streets in Daraj, and eight Saqallah households around the Grand Mosque (al-Jamiʿ al-Kabir al-ʿUmari). According to the census, the Shawwa family consisted of the impressive total of 26 households that were spread over two different neighborhoods, Tuffah and Shajaʿiyya, or more precisely two streets: Rifī Street in Tuffah (5 households) and Qazdamri Street in Shajaʿiyya (21 households). This has to do with their history: in the mid-19th century, part of the Shawwa family moved from Tuffah to Shajaʿiyya for a variety of reasons. The clustering of households belonging to one family might have been part of what Ben-Bassat and Buessow called “spatialized factionalism.” However, the positions of the families’ dwellings were also related to distinctions within certain families and between their households. This is most obvious in the case of the Shawwas but probably also held true for the Saqallahs. The next section presents profiles of the four families, and an interpretation of their respective strategies and resources.

THE HUSAYNIS

For a lengthy period of time, several personalities in the Husayni family held powerful positions in Gaza, especially that of the Hanafi mufti. The muftiship of Gaza was considered particularly important to this city. Members of other powerful households tried to dislodge the Husaynis from this position regularly but without lasting success. The Husaynis had an extraordinary network that included Sufis, scholars, and intellectuals throughout the Arab provinces, as well as connections to the inner circles of the Porte, and their leaders can be described as notables in Hourani’s sense par excellence. In the 1850s, with the support of Sultan Abdülmecid (1823–1861), the Husaynis under the leadership of Ahmad Muhyi al-Din al-Husayni (1808/9–1878) renovated the Sayyid Hashim Mosque, the burial place of Gaza’s most revered Muslim saint, the great-grandfather of the Prophet. Their dwellings were situated in the vicinity of the mosque, and they welcomed pilgrims to this site.

The five households of the Husayni family in the 1905 census registers belonged to three patrilineal groups; i.e., groups of offspring of three different fathers. Two consisted of stand-alone households. The third patrilineal group consisted of three households, each led by a brother; i.e., these three households formed a “brother group.” The father of this brother group was the aforementioned Ahmad Muhyi

34 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 260, p. 83; Reg. 265, p. 3; Reg. 266, p. 163; for more on domestics in Gaza and their biographies extrapolated from the register, see Sarah Buessow and Johann Buessow, “Domestic Servants and Slaves in Late Ottoman Palestine after the Abolition of Slavery: Considerations on Semantics and Agency,” in Gül Sen and Stefan Conermann (eds.), Slaves and Slave Agency in the Ottoman Empire (Goettingen: Bonn University Press at V & R Unipress, 2020), pp. 373-433.
35 Ben-Bassat and Buessow, “Urban Factionalism.”
36 Ibid., pp. 615, 620–621, 636. Although it remains somewhat unclear why it was such a contested position, some practical reasons are likely to have been involved beyond its associated high social status and religious authority.
37 Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables.”
al-Din al-Husayni, an Azhar graduate who held most important religious positions, including that of kadi and mufti. 38

All five Husayni households drew on the same economic and educational resources; namely, traditional Islamic education and the acquisition of skills in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish that prepared them for an administrative career. All the Husayni household heads, as well as the other male household members bore the title of efendi, which marked their social status as part of the educated elite. In fact, every household had at least one member who pursued a religious or administrative career. There are no indications that they owned much land.

Four households stand out: the above-mentioned brother groups, the sons of Ahmad Muhyi al-Din, and the stand-alone household of Ahmad 'Arif, who was the son of Hanafi Efendi and the grandson of Ahmad Muhyi al-Din. All of their household heads and sons were involved in Gaza's urban politics. 39

All five Husayni households preferred exogamous marriages with families of similar educational backgrounds and social status outside Gaza. 40 Most of the women marrying into the family came from well-known Muslim Palestinian families such as the ‘Alami, al-Dawudis and the Khalidis of Jerusalem, the Tajjis of Ramla, and even the very famous Husaynis of Jerusalem (with whom the Gaza Husaynis were probably only related by marriage, not by blood). According to the census records, there were two marriages to Turkish families that apparently took place when some members of the Husayni family were in exile in Ankara. 41 Among the older generation, there were also several marriages to women of Circassian origin. The last one registered in the census dated from the 1880s or 1890s. 42

This marriage pattern appears to have been part of a family strategy in that Husayni households only accepted very few local people into their intimate sphere. This conduct as well as their consistent choice of marriage partners from the very same educational background may have been a conscious act of differentiation from the inhabitants of Gaza. Since the Husayni households apparently did not have much land that had to stay “in the family,” this strategy could have strengthened their cultural capital by maintaining marriage relationships with well-known educated families without putting the family business at risk.

Thus, overall, the Husaynis almost exclusively focused on traditional education, as can be seen in their titles and occupations as well as their marriage practices. The probable strategy behind this may well have been the wish to reproduce future office holders. Its downside, however, was that the Husaynis did not look for alternative fields of influence beyond religious and administrative offices. This was a weak point, especially around 1900, when, in the face of economic and political upheaval, other families and households diversified their resources. 43

THE ABU KHADRAS
Households of the Abu Khadra family formed part of successive political factions that worked against the predominant position of the Husaynis. They resided mainly in Daraj, although many also had a second home base in Jaffa. 44

38 Ibid., p. 621.
39 The household head of the other stand-alone household, Salih Efendi, was not a political figure. He was the son of Muhammad Tahir, a third cousin of Ahmad Muhyi al-Din, and worked as a scribe. See Tabba, Ithaf, vol. 3, p. 110, for the family tree of the Husaynis.
40 Two exceptions to this rule are marriage ties with the al-Salidi and Alami families in Gaza.
41 Jawiya Khanim, born 1301/1883–4 in Ankara, her father’s name is given as Ahmad Efendi. The lack of a family name in this case hints at a Turkish background, since family names were much rarer among the Turkish-speaking population. Another Turkish woman who married into a Gazan family was Khadija Khanim, born in Mardin in 1306/1888–9; her father’s name is given as Ahmad Agha. ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 252, p. 83; Reg. 260, p. 207.
42 Fakhima Khanim, born 1291/1874 in Circassia. Father: Salih Efendi; Reg. 252, p. 83.
43 See, for instance, the register of eight leading government officials in Jerusalem and their households, ca. 1880, transcribed in Buessow, Hamidian Palestine, pp. 401–402.
44 It may be that “a religious position could still be an important family asset in Gaza around 1900” (see Ben-Bassat and Buessow, “Urban Factionalism,” p. 630). However, the concentration on only this one area of influence could have been risky in times of rapid economic and political change, as in Gaza at the turn of the 20th century.
The most striking feature of this family is that there was one very large household (henceforth referred to as A), consisting of 47 members, and four relatively small households (referred to as B, C, D, E; see Figure 1). The large household A was headed by Isma‘il Abu Khadra, who bore the titles of efendi and rif‘atu. He was the son of Khalil Efendi Abu Khadra, a wealthy merchant. Isma‘il’s brother Ramadan did not found a household of his own after their father’s death, but lived with his nuclear family in Isma‘il’s household. The other smaller households B, C, D and E, were all stand-alone-patri-lineal groups. Households A and B lived on Shaykh ʿAyyad Street, the others in Shaykh ʿAli al-Andalusi Street nearby.

The second feature that set household A apart, aside from its size, was the age of the household head. Isma‘il, who was born in 1278/1861–2, was in his forties at the time the census was taken, whereas the other four household heads were only between 15 and 30 years of age. One can assume that this very large household had the greatest authority within the Abu Khadra family. Except for the household head of household B, all the household heads owned real estate, and their main source of income was landownership in and around Gaza. Salim, the head of household B, however, held the important administrative position of ma‘arif reʾisi, Director of School Education in Gaza, which had previously been held by members of the Husayni family.

Education must thus have been important for the Abu Khadras, but, in contrast to the Husaynis, their focus was on modern secular rather than religious education. In fact, the sources do not mention the religious positions or educational backgrounds of the members of this family. Thus, their influence in the area of secular education was an institutional resource that supplemented their allocative and monetary resources, which were the main drivers of their influence.

A and B, which were probably the most influential households, resided next to each other on Shaykh ʿAyyad Street. The other three households were located in Shaykh ʿAli al-Andalusi Street, and two of them were neighbors: Yusuf Nimr Abu Khadra, a real estate owner, born in 1885, and ‘Ali, also a real estate owner born in the same year. However, it is impossible to say to what extent they formed agitative groups at the time, since they were too young. Two of them were 19 to 20 years old; the youngest household head was Asʿad, who was 15 or 16 years old, and still a pupil or apprentice (şagırd).

Although the Abu Khadra family cooperated politically with other families of Gaza, they preferred to marry endogamously. In the extraordinarily large household of Isma‘il (A), his daughters married the sons of his late brother, who lived with them in their household after his death (bint-ʿamm marriages). In contrast, there were only three exogamous marriages in the generation of the mothers of the household heads, which might be due to the fact that the wealth of the family was still accumulating. Among Gaza’s economic elite, the Abu Khadr was newcomers, and their endogamous marriages were a likely response to the challenge of keeping the immovable wealth in the family, or more precisely, the household.

THE SAQALLAHS

In 1905, the year of the census, the political heyday of the Saqallahs was already over. It had lasted over two generations, beginning with Hajj Ahmad Saqallah al-Khalili, who immigrated from Hebron to Gaza, and continued with two of his sons, Muhammad (d. 1896) and Mus-tafa (d. 1896/7). Both had died about ten years before the census was taken. Mustafa was a waqf superintendent (nazir). Muhammad graduated from Al-Azhar College in Cairo, but ventured into entrepreneurship, with a focus on trade and moneylending. He was a mufti in the 1870s, a position he was awarded as the main representative of the opposition to the Husayni family.

The 1905 census indicates two branches to this family. Branch A consisted of five house-
holds, led by five sons of Mustafa Efendi, the waqf superintendent. Branch B consisted of three households and was led by the sons of Asʿad, a deceased son of Mustafa (henceforth A, there are no entries on the occupation or B; see also Figure 3). The clustering in specific streets in Daraj goes hand in hand with the two brother groups. Brother group A, the households of the sons of Mustafa, resided on Hammam al-Suq Street (Dar al-Saqallah); brother group B, the households of the sons of Asʿad and the grandsons of Mustafa, lived on Hillis Street. Only two households heads, both from group A, bore a title: one was an efendi, the other a sayyid. The fact that only two of the five were addressed with a title suggests a certain loss of social status, and, probably also a lower level of education for the descendants of Khalil Saqallah. In fact, for group A, there are no entries on the occupation or education with the exception of one household head, who, unlike his brothers, did not live on Hammam al-Suq Street, but somewhat farther away on Jamiʿ al-Kabir Street. His name was Salih. He was born in 1291/1874–5 and was married to one wife with whom he had eight children. His occupation was indicated as ʿamele, a simple worker. It is unclear why his professional background differed so much from that of his relatives.

The professions of the other brother group B are quite exceptional. One brother was a shoemaker, three others were makinst, which can be translated as “mechanic” or “engine driver.” We do not know what the occupation of “makinst” entailed or what salary they could earn. We can assume that, by local standards, it was less prestigious than positions in the administrative or scholarly hierarchy. However, it was certainly a modern profession and indicated an innovative orientation.

Group B also tended to distance itself from the other family branch; i.e., the households of their uncles, in terms of marriage. Group A made both endogamous and local matches, as well as exogamous matches with women from other localities, mainly Jaffa. Group B preferred exogamous and trans-regional matches, including Beirut, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa. The household of Hafiz Saqallah, a makinst born in 1289/1872–3, had 21 members in total, including the nuclear families of his brothers. The wives of his brothers came from Jerusalem, Beirut, and Jaffa. Since the occupations of Hafiz’s brothers are not indicated, we do not know what they did for a living. The two wives of the other makinst, ʿAbd al-Hayy, came from Jaffa and Jerusalem and their children were born there.

There was apparently a strong connection between Hafiz’s and ʿAbd al-Hayy’s occupations and their marriage choices. It seems reasonable to assume that it was their profession as mechanics or engine drivers that encouraged them to marry women from large urban centers across Bilad al-Sham. Choosing wives from well-known cities was surely also a demonstration of a kind of modernity, in that the mobile young men of the family could choose freely between offers and were less restrained by social obligations than other elite households in Gaza. This behavior contrasts sharply with most marriages in Gaza, which were of a local or regional nature. Typically, women from villages belonging to the kaza of Gaza married into families who resided in the city.

THE SHAWWAS

The Shawwas were the newcomers par excellence to the political field of Gaza during the 19th century. Everything began with Khalil al-Shawwa (1818–1884), a butcher (qassab) from Tuffah. The family name “Shawwa,” which is often translated as “meat griller,” seems to be related to his profession. Khalil al-Shawwa eventually became the head of Gaza’s butchers’ guild and decided to move to the Shajaiyya neighborhood. He was also involved in tax farming and land dealings, through which he acquired considerable wealth. His son Muhammad Abu Ali (d. 1904–5) became the mayor of Gaza in the late 1890s and was succeeded by

53 See the (incomplete) family tree in Tabbaʿ, Ithaf, vol. 3, p. 223. Tabbaʿ only mentions Ali as son of Asʿad. In fact, he had more than ten, in the three households of branch B.
54 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 252, p. 103; No. 260, p. 125.
55 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 260, p. 177.
56 Ibid., p. 61.
57 Ibid., pp. 63, 65.
58 Ibid., p. 63.
59 Ibid., p. 65.
60 For Khalil, see Tabbaʿ, Ithaf, vol. 3, p. 251.
his son (and Khalil’s grandson) Sa’id al-Shawwa (1868/9–1930).61

In the census, 26 Shawwa family households are registered. Five were still located in Tuffah, the family’s former home base, whereas 21 households resided in Shaja’iyya. The latter belonged to seven patrilineal groups: A, B, C, D, E, F, G. In contrast to the other elite households, they all resided on Qazdamri Street, which unsurprisingly later became known as “Shawwa Street.” The same is true for the Shawwas in Tuffah. The five Shawwa households in the area, H, I, J, K, L, were all patrilineal groups and resided on one street or sub-neighborhood, on Rifi Street.

Within the Shawwa family, like the Saqalalah family, there was diverging development, which was presumably hastened by the move of one family branch to Shaja’iyya. Many household heads of the branch living in Shaja’iyya held titles such as efendi, sayyid, or sayyid. The Shawwa household heads of Tuffah had no titles. This may hint at their lack of education and social standing. Another facet of this differentiation is their marriage practices. The Shawwas of Tuffah showed a very strong local orientation: they married almost exclusively exogamously and very locally, since daughters of neighbors were among their wives. By contrast, the Shawwas of Shaja’iyya, who must have owned a sizable amount of land (there were at least five real estate owners in the Shaja’iyya branch) preferred endogamous marriages, complemented by exogamous relations with a few well-known families of Gaza — especially the Busaysus and Ghaleyinis — and some from Jaffa and Ramla. It is hard to say whether there were any marriages to the Shawwas in Tuffah, since proper names in the family were recurrent.

The strong local focus of the Shawwa family overall can be gauged by their birthplaces: out of 160 members in total, only 11 (i.e., 7%) were not born in Gaza. The occupations of the two Shawwa branches are also striking. We have no information on three Shawwa households in Tuffah, but the household heads of the other two households in this neighborhood were still in the butchery business.62 The Shawwas in Shaja’iyya, on the other hand, had a broad portfolio that covered a variety of different occupations from merchant to moneylender, from real estate owner to scholar, and individuals with an advanced religious education.63 One of the latter, Shaykh Hasan, even studied at the prestigious Al-Azhar College in Cairo and later worked as a teacher.64

Two brother groups of the Shawwas, A and B, are illustrative of a particularly astute strategy: the diversification of different occupations among the brothers (see Figure 2). This provided them with a broad portfolio of resources and the ability to respond to changing circumstances. Group A consisted of three households: A1, led by ‘Ali Efendi, A2, led by Kamil Efendi, and A3, led by Sa’id Efendi.65 We do not have any entries for Kamil concerning his source of income, but ‘Ali was a moneylender and Sa’id was a real estate broker and later became the mayor of Gaza. Moneylending and landownership were often associated, especially during the 19th century, since both were important sources of wealth for Gaza’s leading families. This can be seen as a kind of patrilineal family business, where the various occupations were distributed between the households of this brother group.

Brother group B even more strongly resembles a multisector company with complementary businesses. It was made up of eight households, and for five household heads we have entries concerning their source of income. Two household heads, Salih Efendi and Muhammad Sa’id Efendi, were real estate brokers; one, Taha, was a barley merchant, and


62 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 267, p. 162. According to Ben-Bassat and Buesow, “the profession of butcher is not mentioned for any of those [Shawwas in Tuffah] household members,” but this needs to be corrected. See Ben-Bassat and Buesow, “Urban Factionalism,” p. 637, fn. 135.

63 See the household of ‘Abd al-Mutallib, who himself was a scholar as well as two of his sons; another was a scribe, the fourth still in school. ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 265, p. 161.


65 For ‘Ali Efendi, see ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 265, p. 3 (Arabic page number). For Sa’id Efendi, see ibid., p. 5 (Arabic page number). For Kamil, see ibid., p. 3 (Arabic page number). The family tree based on the census diverges slightly from the family trees indicated in Tabba’, Ithaf, vol. 3, p. 256. In the family tree that was drawn by the editor of the volume based on hand-written notes, Kamil and ‘Ali appear to have been nephews of Sa’id.
one, Rabah, a spice merchant.66 These four occupations cover a variety of commercial specializations. Landed property and the barley trade were especially profitable during this period. There was one household head who did not work in this sector, ’Abd al-Mutallib Efendi (d. 1335/1916–17), a Muslim religious scholar. His three sons had a religious and administrative education.67 Religious education appears to have been an entirely new area for the business-orientated Shawwas during the last decades of the 19th century—an area dominated by the Husaynis, who relied exclusively on religious education as a resource. Thus the Shawwas may have been trying to challenge the position of the mufti by presenting alternatives to the Husaynis.68

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS

This closer inspection of four Gazan elite families based on data from the Ottoman census confirms that in most cases it is more accurate to refer to elite households than “elite families” when it comes to questions of nobility, influence, and wealth. In most cases, only several household heads of a family achieved elite status whereas others seem to have led the lives of commoners. Only the Husaynis, which consisted of just five households in total, all clustered around the Hashim Mosque, can be called an “elite family” in the full sense, with high standing for each household since they all had household heads with higher religious education (all of whom bore titles and were generally on good terms with the imperial government).

Certain strategies might have contributed to these elite households’ gains and maintained their powerful standing. The first is residential clustering with other family members.69 Many households of commoner families preferred to live close to each other as well, but elite households turned entire sub-neighborhoods (haras) or even whole neighborhoods (mahallas) into political strongholds, where they built alliances or “factions.” Ben-Bassat and Buessow call this nexus between urban politics and urban development “spatialized factionalism” or “spatialized urban politics.”70 The Husayni family, for example, lived in the Sayyiduna Hashim (Our Lord Hashim) neighborhood, which was their territory after the reconstruction of the local mosque in the 1850s. The Abu Khadras resided in the nearby hasar of Shaykh ‘Ayyad and Shaykh ‘Ali al-Andalusi. The Shawwa households of Sha’ja’iyya were clustered in Qazdamri Street, where they built elegant homes and renovated a mosque as an architectural symbol of their stronghold and their service to the local Muslim community. Together with the elite households of the Busaysu family, who apparently clustered around the Ibn ‘Uthman congregational mosque,71 they exerted their influence throughout Sha’ja’iyya.

Family members who did not belong to the elite households of their family, such as the Shawwa households in Tuffah or the poor workers from al-Jam‘ al-Kabir-Street who belonged to the Saqallah family, often lived apart from their successful relatives. Most likely they did not have much in common with the latter other than the shared family name.

Another pattern has to do with education and occupation. Two main types emerged: professional specializations, as represented by the...

66 See also Meriwether, who observed that elite households of the same family branch in Aleppo were spread out in different quarters of the city, probably because it was difficult to find a house in the quarters the family branch preferred. However, she also notes that the leading figures of some families lived in a totally different quarter from the others. Meriwether, Kin who Count, pp. 82–83, 93.
68 Unfortunately, the available census registers do not contain entries for any of the Busaysus households. Tabba’s biography of Shaykh Ahmad Busaysu (Ithaf, vol. 4, pp. 296–309) and his portrait of the family (ibid., vol. 3, pp. 52–55) contain detailed information. A British map of 1928 identifies a street parallel to the Ibn ‘Uthman Mosque as “Bseiso Street” (NLL, 2369509_01, Palestine. Department of Lands and Surveys, Map “Gaza,” 1:1,000, Plan 4, Gaza Town Surveys. Jaffa: Survey of Palestine, 1928).
69 See also Meriwether, who observed that elite households of the same family branch in Aleppo were spread out in different quarters of the city, probably because it was difficult to find a house in the quarters the family branch preferred. However, she also notes that the leading figures of some families lived in a totally different quarter from the others. Meriwether, Kin who Count, pp. 82–83, 93.
71 Unfortunately, the available census registers do not contain entries for any of the Busaysus households. Tabba’s biography of Shaykh Ahmad Busaysu (Ithaf, vol. 4, pp. 296–309) and his portrait of the family (ibid., vol. 3, pp. 52–55) contain detailed information. A British map of 1928 identifies a street parallel to the Ibn ‘Uthman Mosque as “Bseiso Street” (NLL, 2369509_01, Palestine. Department of Lands and Surveys, Map “Gaza,” 1:1,000, Plan 4, Gaza Town Surveys. Jaffa: Survey of Palestine, 1928).
Husaynis, who were all scholars-cum-administrators, or generalists with a preference for a broad range of occupations, as for example in the Shawwa households in the Shaja’iyya neighborhood. Whether a family followed the professional specialist or the generalist approach appears to have been a crucial factor in the evolution of the household’s fortune over the course of the 19th century and beyond. Whereas the Husaynis concentrated on specific religious and administrative positions alone, similar to what Philip S. Khoury described for Damascus as an “aristocracy of service,”72 the Shawwas of Shaja’iyya tried to cover as much territory as they could. This strategy may have helped them cope with the changes and challenges in administrative, religious, and commercial life and at the same time made them appealing potential partners for possible alliances; e.g., within political factions or with Ottoman officials.

The distribution of a wide spectrum of occupations was found in one brother group (as in the case of the Shawwas), or across several brother groups of one family (as in the case of the Abu Khadras). As noted with regard to European nobility, the most important challenge for elite households was to retain their power in rapidly changing political and economic circumstances.73 For newcomers in particular, this was not easy. Whereas the Husaynis had been strong and well established for decades, this was not the case for the Saqallahs. The households of the Saqallah family lost their influence over just one generation. As the education and occupations listed for them reveal, they could not compete with the other elite households.

Another pattern concerns marriages. Whether households followed exogamous or endogamous marriage patterns seems to have depended primarily on their main sources of income. Men from commoner households in Gaza married women either from the city or from villages in the surrounding regions. Among the elite, the Husaynis were attentive to similar educational backgrounds. Thus, they preferred marriage partners from educated families outside Gaza, which provided the additional advantage of potentially valuable social connections. The same held true to a large extent for the branch of the Saqallah family that had an education but probably not much material wealth. Both the Husaynis and the Saqallahs chose women from important Palestinian cities over women from villages around Gaza, as the commoner inhabitants normally did when not marrying local women. The wealthy but politically unimportant branch of the Saqallah, on the other hand, opted for exogamous as well as endogamous matches. Again, the desire to keep landed wealth within the family is likely to have been the reason for this strategy. The nexus between real estate and endogamous marriages was the most patent in the cases of the Shawwa households of Shaja’iyya as well as the Abu Khadras. On the other hand, the Shawwas of Tuffah preferred exogamous marriages.

Few of the elite households surveyed here intermarried with members of other elite families in Gaza. This might have been a way to avoid dependency on other strong local families and thereby remain capable of collective action should the family’s interests be threatened by others. Especially with regard to the Gaza elites’ penchant to enter into coalitions with changing partners, this strategy provided more freedom of movement to find allies, since there were no obligations between them based on marriage ties. An exception to the rule were the Shawwa and Busaysu families, who were linked by a long-standing alliance. One of the pillars of this alliance was the marriage of Khalil al-Shawwa’s sister to Hajj Ahmad Busaysu (d. 1870), probably around 1820.74 Their son, Shaykh Ahmad Salim Busaysu (born c. 1825), became a noted scholar and was appointed imam, khatib and teacher at the Ibn ʿUthman mosque in 1296/1878–9. Later, the alliance was preserved when Shaykh Ahmad Busaysu became the teacher of ʿAbd al-Mutallib al-Shawwa (b. 1830/51), who later pursued a religious career himself.75

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74 Busaysu, Kashf al-niqab, ch. 2, p. 44.
75 Tabba’, Ithaf, vol. 4, p. 299.
PATTERNS OF ELITE HOUSEHOLD INTERACTIONS

The success of individuals, households, and families belonging to Gaza’s elite depended to a large measure on their ability to act together when needed. The model below depicts the ways in which elite households of one family could interact with each other. Based on the observations detailed above, my analysis reveals three patterns of interaction: (1) a hierarchical type (2) a cooperative type or (3) a divergent pattern where different family branches could also develop in different directions.

(1) THE HIERARCHICAL PATTERN

The Abu Khadra and Husayni elite households can be represented by a gravitational model (see Fig. 1). In both families, there were dominant households around which the other households more or less revolved, like moons around a planet. However, in case of need, the dominant households could coalesce into interest groups with brother or patrilineal groups from the same family.

In the Abu Khadra family, for example, the large multi-family household of estate owner Isma’il (A) was the dominant household. Three small households headed by young men seem unimportant (C, D and E). The household of Salim (B), however, might have played an important complementary role as regards the fortunes of the Abu Khadras, since Salim managed to acquire the important administrative position of Gaza’s ma‘arif reisi, Director of School Education. Both households could form an interest group by combining their different resources (money and influence in the socio-academic sector). However, given the fact that household A was of such enormous importance simply by its sheer size as well as by the presence of the Dar Abu Khadra (Abu Khadra Mansion), it is likely that Isma’il had the greatest say in the family.

(2) THE COOPERATIVE PATTERN

In the case of the Shawwas in Shaja’iyya, there was a cooperative pattern. The interplay of their elite households is best described as a “cog wheel model,” in which the households of the brother groups were closely intertwined (see Fig. 2). The 21 households of the Shawwas in Shaja’iyya belonged to seven brother groups. Brother groups A and B represent a specific strategy; i.e., the spread of economic, educational and institutional resources among the brothers in order to gain political power. If necessary, they could join forces with other Shawwa households.

Brother groups appear to have been the level at which most collaborations took place. However, their cooperation could be enlarged to encompass other households belonging to the same family. Thus, brother groups and other households belonging to the family could form interest groups that worked together and combined their resources when confronted with external challenges. The larger the family and the more strategically important fields its members could cover, the better their chances for successful collaboration.
(3) THE DIVERGING PATTERN

In the case of the Saqallahs, it is obvious from their choice of occupation and education, as well as from their marriage patterns, that the family evolved into two different branches that no longer had much in common. Each of them appeared to want to distinguish itself from the other branch. Figure 3 charts the divergence of a family, resulting in different branches with different characteristics.

Note that both branches had the same grandfather, so the divergence emerged within one generation, with one branch (A) remaining wealthy but politically unimportant and leaving the other (B) without any notable economic or institutional resources. This is similar to the Shawwa branches of Tuffah and Shaja’iyya, that developed in divergent directions in terms of occupation, education, and marriage practices. There are two crucial differences between the two families, however. Whereas the “commoner” branch of the Saqallah family experienced social decline compared to the status of their grandfather, the Shawwas of Tuffah remained true to the family’s origins and at least some of them had considerable economic assets. In addition, the respective sizes of both families need to be taken into account. The Shawwas’ plentiful offspring and commercial success in Shaja’iyya provided them with a “critical mass” that allowed them to engage in a variety of activities and resources, whereas the “elite” branch of the Saqallahs remained relatively small and lacked institutional resources of the sort the Shawwa family could tap.

CONCLUSION

Rapidly changing political and economic circumstances as well as competition within different interest groups made it necessary for Gaza’s elite households around 1900 to engage in as many fields as possible to gain and maintain power and influence. Some, as in the case of the Husaynis, did not react effectively enough to the challenges of the time to be able to compete with rivaling households. Others, such as the Saqallahs, lacked adequate size to build a strong family network. Combining a wide variety of resources within a household seems to have been a key condition for success. Alternatively, a household could work together with other household groups to cover more ground.

The Ottoman census provides a wealth of empirical detail about the social relations between Gaza households, while Tabba’s contemporary encyclopedia helps concatenate these multiple data. However, other important questions about economic and power strategies within households cannot be answered from

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Figure 3: The Diverging Household Constellation, the Example of the Saqallah Family.

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76 A ‘Sha’wa Square’ (Sahat al-Shawwa) and a restaurant named ‘Rami al-Shawwa’ (Mat’am Rami al-Shawwa) both existed in 2021 in Tuffah, which points to the continued prominence of the Shawwas in this part of the city. See Open Street Map [https://www.openstreetmap.org/relation/1473938#map=19/31.50437/34.46688, accessed 19 March 2021].
the census records themselves. For a fuller picture, access to memoirs, inheritance or financial documents or other sources would reveal more details about the intimate strategies of these and other households.

With this caveat in mind, what broader insights drawn from the Gazan example can be applied to research on the urban history of Bilad al-Sham? First, in late Ottoman Gaza, as a rule, there were no “notable” or “elite families” as social actors. Instead, there were elite households and individuals, who acted as notables. Second, Gaza’s households represent a type of household that came to dominate the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire as of the 18th century. Unlike the “political-military household” of Ottoman governors, the Gazan elite household was a social formation in which three elements intersected closely. The first was the “family,” or more precisely, the paternal lineage, which bound the household to a larger social group. Second came the household itself, which had one or more nuclear families at its core. Very few household members were not direct relatives of these nuclear families. The third element was the physical residence or dar. Whereas “political households” of the Ottoman local elite could be distributed over several buildings, the dars of Gaza were the place of residence of the entire household and a direct expression of its size and standing.

Individual households cooperated within specific groups, mostly “brother groups,” whose household heads were sons of the same father. These brother groups appear to have been the most influential and successful collective actors in local politics. Within brother groups or groups of interest, there were two patterns: the hierarchical and the cooperative. Maintaining power was at least as hard as achieving it, and institutional and incorporated resources were as important as allocative or monetary resources. It was crucial to be able to adapt to constantly changing situations and never neglect status-preserving measures, such as education. Such neglect could culminate in a speedy fall from the elite to the status of a commoner household, while the next generation was already waiting for their chance to build new household groups.

77 For more on this household type, see the chapter by Mahmoud Yazbak in this volume.
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**THE OTTOMAN CENSUS OF 1905 AS A UNIQUE WINDOW ON URBAN HOUSEHOLDS**

The Ottoman census records of 1905 (1321 according to the Ottoman Rumi calendar) are a valuable source of data on Ottoman society at the turn of the 20th century. So far, comprehensive sets of census registers are only available for the Palestinian regions; i.e., for most cities, towns, and villages in the districts of Jerusalem, Acre, and Nablus. Single record books are also accessible for Damascus and have been analyzed by Okawara in 2003. Since 2016, the Israel State Archive (ISA) has provided free online access to digitized records from late Ottoman Palestine.

In contrast to previous rosters that were mainly designed to facilitate military service and taxation of the male population, the 1905 census recorded not only men, but also women and children, birthplaces, and sometimes also information on education and occupation. This makes it possible to trace features of social life, culture, and politics that are not reflected in other sources. Figure 1 shows a sample page of a census register.

People living in a dwelling together were registered according to a unit called a *mesken*, which for convenience we translate as “household.” In the strict sense of the word, it meant a physical structure, a dwelling. Each entry in the census sheet was compiled in relation to one person, usually a man, who was registered first and whom we call the “household head.” In the Ottoman census regulations (*Nüfus Nizamnamesi*) of 1902, the household head was called the *müdür*, “director,” which highlights the assumed dominant status of the household head. Each *mesken* was attributed a number (like a house number) by officials to determine its address, which was painted on the entrance to the dwelling.

It is not clear how the order of *meskens* was determined. In the census registers, the entries proceed chronologically from *mesken to mesken*, but the street names differ in between, which suggests that houses were not numbered in sequence as we would expect in most cities today. Therefore, the house numbering system is hard to decipher, but the neighborhood a certain household was located in can be identified, and at times specific houses and locations can be determine from maps or aerial photos.

The Gaza Historical Database, which was set up with the backing of the Digital Humanities Centers at the Universities of Tübingen and Bochum is designed to integrate this body of rich but heterogeneous sources. This online database stores information on people and places in Gaza and enables many types of analyses that are formulated as interactive queries. Interactive digital maps can be used to pinpoint historical locations and establish the spatial relations between them.

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Figure 1: Sample Page from the Ottoman Basic Census Register (esas defter). This is the entry for the household in Gaza's Daraj neighborhood in which chronicler Tabba resided in 1905. Source: ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 266, p. 115-16.
THE LAST JANISSARY LEADER OF ALEPPO: ʿABDALLAH BABINSI (1780s-1850), A NOTABLE BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL SPHERES

Feras Krimsti

Abstract | Focusing on the last great Janissary leader of Aleppo, ʿAbdallah Babinsi (1780s-1850), this chapter examines the historical ties between Aleppo’s power brokers and the hinterland. The modalities of Babinsi’s rise to power through the household of one of Aleppo’s influential families, which parallels careers such as Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi’s are depicted against the background of Aleppo’s family politics. Babinsi, who cultivated a deliberate ambiguity with regard to his status, maintained a close relationship with the rural world while obtaining important political positions (mütesellim, mütezim) both under Egyptian (1832–1840) and Ottoman rule (after 1840). It is argued that ties to both the Bedouin and villagers allowed him to secure his position by guaranteeing security in the city and its hinterland and keeping both in balance. These ties simultaneously explain the anachronistic survival of the Janissary faction in Aleppo until 1850 when Babinsi, financially threatened by the Tanzimat reforms, drew his faction and supporters from the hinterland into an uprising against the Ottomans.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars engaging with the political history and economy of late Ottoman Aleppo rarely think of this city as a place open to the rural world immediately surrounding it, a city that is affected by its problems, concerned with its control, and fundamentally imbricated with it in all kinds of ways.¹ However, “the city and the countryside lived not in separate impermeable spaces.”² One of the keys to the wealth of count-

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² Sarah D. Shields, “Interdependent Spaces: Relations between the City and the Countryside in the Nineteenth Century,” in Peter Sluggett (ed.), The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), p. 44.

³ On the control of the countryside through malikan and itizam, see in detail Thieck, Passion, pp. 128–40.

⁴ On the Jabiri’s and Kawakibi’s control of rural resources in the late 18th/ early 19th century, see Meriwether, “Urban Notables,” p. 62.
understand how this came to pass, the historical ties between Aleppo’s power brokers and the hinterland need exploration.

This chapter focuses on a major player in Aleppo’s politics who came to power through the household of one of Aleppo’s influential families and maintained a close relationship with the rural world – the Janissary leader ʿAbdallah Babinsi (1780s-1850), the mütesellim of Aleppo and a múltezim for almost two decades in the mid-19th century. He was such an important political figure that Mustafa Zarif Paşa, the vali of Aleppo between 1848 and 1850, mentions him by name in his memoirs, and the same vali’s secretary Ibrahim Reşid appended a short biography of Babinsi to his account of the 1850 events. Babinsi’s influence can otherwise be gleaned from scattered references in the writings of locals from Aleppo; namely, the diary of the Catholic teacher and contemporary observer of Aleppo’s politics, Naʿum Bakhkhash, and accounts by Christian eyewitnesses reporting on the 1850 uprising in Aleppo. ʿAbdallah Babinsi is also referred to time and time again by European residents of Aleppo: the Consul Nathaniel Williamerry (1782–1855) mentions him in his correspondence. So do the diplomats Andrew Archibald Paton (1811–1874) and Edward Barker in their historical accounts. Slightly later works by the historians Kamil al-Ghazzi and Muhammed Raghib al-Tabbakh from Aleppo also offer valuable information, mostly in the framework of discussions of the 1850 uprising in Aleppo. Although scholars have already recognized the important role ʿAbdallah Babinsi played in urban politics, especially during the uprising, very little is known about Aleppo’s last Janissary leader.

Albert Hourani famously characterized notables as possessing access to authority and simultaneously having some social power on their own, with which they create “a coalition of forces both urban and rural.” An examination of ʿAbdallah Babinsi’s case can lead to a better understanding of relations between urban power brokers and the Ottoman authorities on the one hand, as well as Aleppo’s suburbs, hinterland, and tribal groups from beyond.

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5 The mütesellim was a local notable representing the central authorities, see Thieck, Passion, pp. 117–118.
7 See Süleymanıye kütüphanesi, Tercüman 256, 37b-47a (the account), pp. 46a-47a (the biography).
9 The National Archives (United Kingdom) (TNA), FO 861/2 passim.
the “desert frontier” on the other. It can shed light on a number of problems and questions relating to Aleppo’s economic and political history: What can we learn about the constitution of the notoriously elusive group of the urban notables and their interventions in urban politics through the study of a Janissary leader’s involvement? Why did the corps of the Janissaries last so long in Aleppo when it had officially been liquidated in 1826 in the Ottoman Empire, and to what extent was this a result of economic constellations involving the hinterland? How were episodes of urban unrest manipulated by power brokers and to what extent was the rural world involved?

FOCALIZATION POLITICS AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF NOTABLE STATUS

In contrast to other vilayets in the Levant, Aleppo was directly controlled by the Ottomans and always in Istanbul’s orbit. Here, “Ottoman authority remained real.”15 Ottoman bureaucrats were regularly dispatched to the city to govern it. Yet Aleppo was not completely untouched by the crisis in Ottoman rule that rattled a number of Ottoman provinces in Syria.16 Political events, bad harvests, and plagues, but also frequently occurring Bedouin raids – particularly by the Mawali and the ‘Anaza, who had moved northward during the 18th century and forced the Mawali to give them space17 – accelerated the erosion of Ottoman power. The Ottoman vali was no longer able to pay for his own troops and a power vacuum was created in which none of the city’s major players was able to dominate the political scene. No local dynasty emerged that could be compared to the ‘Azm family in Damascus. Instead, episodes of urban violence led to clashes between various factions competing for power. At the same time, local groups rebelled several times against Ottoman valls, and succeeded in ousting a number of them from the city.18

Aleppo’s factional politics has garnered significant scholarly interest.19 The city’s ashraf (who claimed descent from the Prophet) represented one influential local political faction. While the leader of the ashraf, or naqib al-ashraf, was not able to control the group since he mostly served his own interests, the Janissaries, the second local faction, were characterized by greater solidarity.20 They have been shown to have increasingly evolved from a locally recruited military arm of the provincial government into a social class.21 Individuals from tribes and villages were absorbed into this group. Janissaries traditionally resided in the eastern suburbs of Aleppo – Bab al-Nayrab, Qarliq, and Banquisa – and had close ties to the rural hinterlands of Aleppo; they either came from the rural world or were connected to it through caravan trade. Andrew Paton’s impression was that Banquisa appeared “like a country Arab town fifty miles from a city” in the 1840s.22 Bab al-Nayrab has similarly been described as a transition space between the city of Aleppo and its rural hinterland.23

As has been pointed out by historians, the conflicts between ashraf and Janissaries have taken on almost mythical proportions. Yet neither of these groups was homogeneous and its members, particularly their leaders, pursued individual interests. These leaders constitute a third, rather elusive group whose contours are difficult to establish: the notables (āyan), who controlled the city’s resources and influenced political life decisively.24 Scholarly and/or re-

17 On these two Bedouin tribes, see Lewis, Nomads, pp. 7–11.
20 Meriwether, “Urban Notables,” p. 59, for the conflict of interest between the majority and the leadership among the ashraf and the greater solidarity among the Janissaries.
21 See especially Masters, “Aleppo’s Janissaries,” who asks whether the Janissaries could be seen as a vox popul.
24 See Margaret L. Meriwether, The Kin Who Count: Fa-
igious status, a military background, but most importantly financial resources were crucial aspects determining the notable status. "Ulama", local military leaders, and "secular notables" have accordingly been distinguished as notable sub-groups. Most of the notables were ashrāf; it remains an open question how Janissary leaders and chiefs with rural ties were related to the group of notables. It has been suggested, for example, that they belonged to the political elite, while they did not belong to the social elite.

The Janissary leader 'Ali Agha Tallqarahiyaya (d. 1787), who is mentioned in the chronicle of Yusuf 'Abbud (d. 1806), a Melkite Christian merchant, is a good case in point. Although scarcely anything is known about 'Ali Agha, his name suggests an affiliation with the village of Tall Qarah north of Aleppo, and therefore a rural background. According to 'Abbud, who clearly venerated him and admired his prowess, he was able to gain much power through his rural resources: "In this period, he [i.e. 'Ali Agha] increased his prestige, his business, his gains and incomes [...]. He earned most from selling and buying camels, sheep, cows, and properties." He had a hand in maintaining order in the city on various occasions: "In those days, 'Ali Agha called his followers, warning them not to attack anyone, whether Muslim or Christian or anyone else, and not to blackmail anyone or ask for rakī."

Despite his power and influence, 'Ali Agha did not identify with the notables. Having on one occasion successfully suppressed the Dalatiyya, a para-military group who looted and plundered the villages outside of Aleppo, he was honored by being asked to join the meclis but declined: "[The notables] asked 'Ali Agha to join them; i.e., be part of their meclis, but he refused saying, 'I don't have the right to sit in the meclis of the ayan.' He went to another room and stayed there for a while. So the mütesellim came to him and dressed him in a fur garment [...]."

This points to the deliberate ambiguity regarding the notable status of power brokers with ties to the rural world. Although scholars tend to differentiate Janissary leaders from notables for analytical reasons, they share a propensity for serving their own interests, which overlapped with those of the notables where rural resources were concerned. The relationship grew even closer toward the end of the 18th century, when notable families, who by and large had an urban economic base (moneylending, commerce, real estate), began acquiring rural resources and started to invest in Aleppo's countryside. They were now competing with Janissary chiefs, who had come to dominate the countryside as tax-farmers and moneylenders.

During the 18th century, the importance of kinship and family ties grew, as evidenced by the adoption of family names as an expression of "a new status consciousness." Households have accordingly been identified as pivotal in defining "the kin who count." But while notable families usually bequeathed power to their own kin, they were more permeable than one might be inclined to think and their households could become springboards for non-kin, and among them individuals with a rural background. From the ranks of the powerful Taha family's household, for example, it was his client Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi, himself of humble origin, who rose to power in the last decade of the 18th century rather than Taha's own offspring. The name Qattar Aghasi suggests that he was a caravan leader, most probably from

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26 Meriwether, Kin who Count, p. 48.
28 Ibid., p. 149.
29 Ibid., p. 143.
the eastern suburbs (although he was no Janissary). Shortly after he rose to power through the Taha family, Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi formed a network of connections with important circles in Istanbul. He was able to obtain influential political positions for himself and his kin in that he became muhassil, mütesellim, and later vali of Damascus, where he mustered a private army consisting of so-called Arnaout-soldiers (Albanian irregular soldiers). His son Muhammad became vali of Aleppo.37 Travelers such as Jacob Burckhardt were quick to remark on the influence of the Qattar Aghasi family in Aleppo.38 With influence came competition: other notable families repeatedly formed alliances against the Qattar Aghasi family and, in 1805, they tried to expel Ibrahim’s son Muhammad from the city. The Qattar Aghasi clan fought for years for power positions in Aleppo. They succeeded in establishing themselves as the major family in Aleppo’s urban politics and remained in their power position until the middle of the 20th century.

Aleppo’s last great Janissary chief, ʿAbdallah Babinsi, shared characteristics with both ʿAli Agha Tallqarahiyya and with Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi. In particular, he had ties to the rural world. He was catapulted into Aleppo’s power politics through the springboard of a household like the latter, and cultivated a deliberate ambiguity with regard to his aspirations to power like the former, as the following paragraph will show.

'ABDALLAH BABINSI’S RISE TO POWER AND HIS CONNECTIONS TO THE HINTERLAND

'Abdallah Babinski was a virtual nobody – an illiterate “butcher’s lad”39 – before he became one of Aleppo’s most influential power brokers in the first half of the 19th century. His name possibly suggests an affiliation with the small village of Babins about a hundred kilometers to the northeast of Aleppo.40 For a while, he was employed as a gatekeeper by the Consul John Barker (1771–1849).41 Just like Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi, he too rose to his position through a household; namely, the Jabiri or possibly the Qudsi family.42 He maintained this power by and large through his close relations to the eastern quarters and, above all, Aleppo’s hinterland. It is likely that Aleppo’s Janissaries were able to outlive the group’s general demise in 1826, when Istanbul’s Janissaries were massacred, precisely for the reason that they had ties to the rural world.43

'Abdallah Babinski became mütesellim under Ibrahim Paşa (1789–1848), the son of Muhammad ‘Ali (1769–1849), during the Egyptian occupation (1832–1840).44 Despite Edward Barker’s claims, it is highly unlikely that this occurred because he was illiterate and therefore “innocuous in a political sense.”45 Barker’s second explanation is much more convincing, namely that he was reinstated “on account of his influence and connexion with the tradespeople, and the sedentary Arabs and the people of the villages around Aleppo.”46 Andrew A. Paton similarly mentions that the Egyptians made him mütesellim “[o]n condition of Abdallah’s keeping the canaille of the Janissary faction in order.”47

Babinski’s monthly salary attests to his importance: under the Egyptians, he received

37 On Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi’s career, see Meriwether, “Urban Notables,” p. 64; eadem, Kin Who Count, p. 61; and Masters, “Aleppo’s Janissaries,” p. 164.
42 al-Tabbakh, Iʿlam al-nubalaʾ, vol. 3, p. 438, fn.1, mentions that he was employed as a guardian “in al-Jabiri’s or Qudsi’s house.”
43 Although the Janissaries later clashed with the Egyptian rulers in 1833 by revolting they remained powerful. See Masters, “Political Economy,” pp. 294–295. In 1850, Edward Barker observed: “The latter [the Janissaries] had been proscribed and dispersed in 1812 and 1820, but the party was by no means broken. Thirty years had elapsed, and during that time the hydra-headed monster had recovered from its wounds. Those of the Janissaries who had survived, returned to Aleppo, and had recovered the greater part of their property, and all their influence, which lay with the tradespeople class.” See Barker, Syria and Egypt, vol. 2, pp. 287–88.
44 See Barker, Syria and Egypt, vol. 2, p. 188.
46 Ibid., p. 289.
In comparison, only the mütesellim of Damacus received more among the mütesellims of Bilad al-Sham (8,333 kuruş), with the mütesellims of Adana and Ghaza earning as much as ‘Abdallah Babinski. It is probable that ‘Abdallah Babinsi’s ties to the rural world made his influence an invaluable asset to the Egyptians. Muhammad ‘Ali’s struggles to stabilize the region targeted the rural world and involved repopulating the villages and making the land arable again. An important facet of Ibrahim Paşa’s policy consisted of settling the Bedouin; he was able to push back against the ‘Anaza Bedouin and encouraged the Mawali Bedouin to settle in abandoned villages.

The return of the Ottomans to Aleppo in 1840 did not precipitate ‘Abdallah Babinsi’s quick demise, as might have been expected. This is particularly astonishing given that he had energetically supported the Egyptians in their fight against the Ottomans. He had also helped the Egyptians impose order in the city by arming thousands of Janissaries, who then patrolled while Ibrahim Paşa and his army were absent. The Ottomans did not remove Babinsi from office when they recaptured the city but rather treated him with circumspection. Paton tells us:

On the restoration of Syria to the Sultan, Assad Pasha, experienced vizier as he was, found an alliance with the Janissary party indispensable to the preservation of order. He therefore made use of the power of Abdallah Babolsi, now become Abdallah Bey, but kept him at a respectful distance, never allowed him to sit on the divan, and gave him coffee, but never a chibouque. The power of Abdallah Bey was increased under Vedgihi Pasha, who treated him with much greater honour, for he not only sat on the divan, but was presented with a chibouque. There were only 1500 Nizam troops in the Pashalic, but Abdallah had all the canaille of the Pashalic at his beck: they were not exactly in his pay, but under his protection, he as Mütesellim having many ways of forwarding their interests. He had besides great influence with the sheikhs of the Bedouins on the desert frontier of the Pashalic; and I may safely say that no man in Syria concentrated so much political power in his hands.

Ibrahim Reşid, the secretary of the Ottoman vali in 1850, Mustafa Zarif, also claims that Babinsi acquired more power under the Ottomans:

He was assigned the office of kapıçbaşı with a monthly pay of eight thousand kuruş and sixty certificates of allotment (tezkere), because ‘Abdallah Bey was a well-known person among the Arabs. Then, as a reward for his effort to stop some of the inconvenient behaviors of the tradesmen, he was designated to be the head of the royal stables.

Na’üm Bakhkhash also noted in his diary in January 1841 that ‘Abdallah Babinsi was appointed chief of the palace gatekeepers (kapıçbaşı), a position that effectively regulated access to the vali. Ibrahim Reşid’s statement also suggests that the Ottomans allowed ‘Abdallah Babinsi to remain in power to exploit his ability to maintain order in the city and guarantee its security, thanks to his ties to the unruly inhabitants of the eastern suburbs of Aleppo, who by and

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50 See Masters, “Political Economy,” p. 308.
51 According to Na’üm Bakhkhash, in April 1839, Ibrahim Paşa had ‘Abdallah Babinsi’s support when trying to ward off the Ottomans; he requested mules for the fight and helped empty mosques and caravanserais in order to provide quarters for the soldiers. See Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 1, pp. 97–98.
52 See Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 1, p. 101; Paton, History, vol. 2, p. 132, reports that Babinsi stayed behind with some of Ibrahim’s troops, guaranteeing “the security and tranquillity of the town of Aleppo during his absence.”
large lived off the caravan trade. So instead of being demoted or eliminated, ʿAbdallah Babinsi's position was strengthened even more.

Manifest proof of ʿAbdallah Babinsi's strong position can be found in his building activities. Towards the end of March 1841, Bakhkhash mentions that Babinsi started to build a palace (qasr) for himself in the Rihawi Garden located to the northwest of the city, outside of al-Judayda. The garden was visited by Christians for recreational activities and Bakhkhash himself frequently went fishing and picnicking there. The Ottomans destroyed Babinsi's palace ten years later, in the aftermath of the 1850 events, obviously rightly perceiving it as a demonstration of power through architecture. Despite his status, however, ʿAbdallah Babinsi carefully maintained his ties to his power base: even as a mütesellim, he wore a “common sheepskin jacket, such as is worn by butchers and grocers at Aleppo.” He thus preserved the delicate balance Albert Hourani describes when writing that notables “must not appear to the city to be simply the instruments of authority; but also they must not appear to be the enemies of authority.”

What is characteristic of contemporary references to ʿAbdallah Babinsi is that he is depicted as responsible for general order in the city. This included maintaining order within and warding off threats from without the city. Whether the problem was offensive behavior that pitted different religious communities against each other, or Bedouin raids on the villages around the city, he was the one approached if order needed to be restored. For example, in October 1842, ʿAbdallah Babinsi sent a letter to the British Consul Nathaniel William Werry, asking him to close taverns because the public consumption of alcohol was strongly resented by the locals. He even threatened to go round the city and close taverns by force if they continued to operate.

Even more important were actions in which Babinsi's special relationship to the rural world became visible. As of the end of the Egyptian occupation, the Bedouin abandoned the villages in which they had settled and the “desert frontier” was once again in upheaval. This led to the reorganization and strengthening of the Fifth Army Corps in 1843 by the Ottomans, a forerunner of a number of more aggressive policies to control the Bedouin. The province of Aleppo, however, was only secured at the end of the 19th century. Werry mentions in his letters numerous attacks by the “Annazee Arabs” under their chief Daham and Ottoman campaigns against them. Babinsi's potential usefulness in controlling the Bedouin was certainly not underestimated by the Ottomans in the 1840s. In his journal, Bakhkhash mentions several instances when ʿAbdallah Babinsi went on campaigns against the Bedouin — frequently the ʿAnaza tribe — in order to secure the city of Aleppo. ʿAbdallah Babinsi must have been so strongly associated with these campaigns that one of them took on quasi-mythical proportions and entered the collective memory. In April 1847, Bakhkhash reflected on rumors that ʿAnaza Bedouin had been besieging ʿAbdallah Babinsi in a village called Jibbrin and that they had been about to seize him. For this reason, the Ottoman vali dispatched troops who were able to defeat the Bedouin.

The 20th-century historian al-Ghazzi, in his Nahr al-dhahab, presents a very pointed and dramatic account of an event strongly reminiscent of Bakhkhash’s rather succinct note. A tribe of Bedouin in the area of the salt lake al-Jabbul located exactly on the “desert frontier” had risen up against the Ottoman authorities and refused to pay taxes. The Ottoman vali sent Yusuf Shurayyif with a huge number of soldiers to punish them. Since the latter was unsuccessful, ʿAbdallah Babinsi was sent with only six follow-

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56 See ibid., p. 163. For the acquisition of rural property by Aleppo's urban notables and the importance of the gardens and orchards surrounding the city, see the comments in Meriwether, “Urban Notables,” pp. 58–59.

57 See the numerous references to al-Rihawi in the index provided by Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 1, p. 381.


60 TNA. FO. 195/207, Babinsi to Werry, Ramadan 14, 1258 (19 October 1842).

61 For Ottoman dealings with the Bedouin from the 1840s onward, see Masters, “Political Economy,” pp. 308–311; and Lewis, Nomads, pp. 25–26.

62 TNA. FO. 861/2, Werry to Stratford Canning, 24 June 1848, 16 September 1848, 7 April 1849, 5 May 1849, etc.

63 See for example Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 1, p. 189 (March 1842), 194 (April 1842), 230 (June 1843), vol. 2, p. 49 (April 1847). For these campaigns, see also Kuroki, “1850 Aleppo Disturbance,” p. 231.

64 See Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 2, p. 50.

65 See Lewis, Nomads, pp. 15–16.
ers. They were initially taken hostage by the tribe but when rumors reached the tribe that the Ottoman authorities were prepared to advance on them, Babinsi demanded his release and offered to act as a mediator and to inform the government that the tribe had agreed to pay the tax. ʿAbdallah Babinsi, upon his return to Aleppo, was celebrated for his triumph; festivities and a parade were organized in Qarliq and Bab al-Nayrab. The anecdote speaks volumes about Babinsi’s relationship to the hinterland and to the Ottomans, and his standing in the city.

LOSS OF POWER
IN THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE TANZIMAT REFORMS

The 1850 uprising constituted a tipping point in ʿAbdallah Babinsi’s career. On 16 October 1850, the inhabitants of Aleppo’s eastern quarters Qarliq, Bab al-Nayrab, and Banqusa rebelled against a tax reform and the conscription announced by the Ottoman officials in the city. After unsuccessful attempts to confront the vali Mustafa Zarif, the rebels looted the suburb of al-Judayda, which was mostly inhabited by Christians. A day later, they attacked the Christian quarter of al-Saliba, plundering private homes and shops and burning three churches to the ground. After two days of looting and violence against Christians, the vali pretended to accede to the insurgents’ demands. When, however, military reinforcements arrived from Diyarbakır on November 2, the insurgents’ quarters were placed under siege, which resulted in their almost complete destruction and fatalities in the thousands. Hundreds of insurgents were arrested, recruited, or exiled from the city.67

One of the reasons for the uprising was the introduction of a new mode of taxation. In the framework of the Tanzimat, which inaugurated an “age of reform,”68 the Ottomans abolished the iltizam system.69 This development threatened ʿAbdallah Babinsi’s position, given that he was responsible for collecting the iltizam from the villages around Aleppo. Although he had indeed collected the money, he had never turned anything over to the Porte and had consequently incurred large arrears. For years, Istanbul ignored his practices, but in 1850 the vali Mustafa Zarif Paşa asked him to pay his debts.70 The vali recalls this in his memoirs when narrating his appointment to Aleppo:

I was then ordered to confiscate any property and goods of anyone in arrears. That was followed by an order for conscription. Arabistan did not want to give soldiers; as for the rest, they are Aleppo bandits. Abdallah Bey had only 4,000 kese.71

The difficulties encountered by the new vali are also reflected in a comment by the Consul Werry, who mentions in his letter describing Mustafa Zarif’s arrival that the “Government experienced much difficulty in collecting the Revenue, principally from the Iltizamgis.”72

There are hints that the 1850 uprising in Aleppo was initiated by ʿAbdallah Babinsi, as an unknown Christian local suggested decades later:

[This was so] because ʿAbdallah Bey owed the miri [a tax on state-owned land], a sum of 50,000 kurus. He hoped the uprising would force the Christians to provide some sort of aid since on the second day the uprising was delayed until four o’clock. But when he did not achieve his goal, they [the insurgents]

69 For the administrative changes introduced in the framework of the early Tanzimat reforms, see the detailed study in Scheben, Verwaltungsreformen.
70 On Babinsi’s exorbitant debts, see Kuroki, “1850 Aleppo Disturbance,” pp. 226–227. Bakhkahsh mentions an incident in the meclis in January 1851, when a member of the Yakan family was expelled for misappropriating 45,000 kurus with which Abdallah Babinsi had settled some of his debts. Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 2, p. 217.
72 TNA. FO. 861/2, Werry to Stratford Canning, 8 September 1849.
instigated the second uprising (al-qawama al-thaniya).73

ʿAbdallah Babinsi became a convenient scapegoat in the aftermath of the uprising for all parties involved.74 While it is doubtful that he alone was able to set in motion and plan an entire uprising, there is little doubt that he manipulated it for his own purposes. Eyewitness reports mention him as an important authority whom the insurgents consulted before launching the uprising, although he publicly refused to lead them.75 One of these reports clearly identifies him and other influential men from among the Janissaries as the instigators of the uprising.76 Christian locals, European diplomats, and members of the ayyan families turned to him in the hope that he could protect them and prevent an escalation by calling the insurgents to order.77 ʿAbdallah Babinsi, supported by masses who were weary of the prospect of military conscription, negotiated with the authorities to put an end to their reform plans, firmly believing in his own importance as a power broker who was needed to uphold security. He was appointed kaymakam (vice-vali) and the vali tricked him into believing that his efforts were considered a service to the government by staging a spectacle in front of the consuls: Werry reports that the vali asked the consuls to “recommend in strong terms to our respective Ambassadors, the essential services Abdallah Bey had rendered during this critical time, which my colleagues and myself promised H. E. and Abdallah, who was present, we would do, as without his influence and exertions the actual tranquility which exists, could not have been obtained.”78

But once the Ottoman vali had received sufficient military reinforcement, he backtracked and bombarded the eastern quarters of the city. This led to the de facto destruction of the group of the Janissaries; in fact, thousands of Janissaries either died in the Ottoman reprisals or were later deported.79 ʿAbdallah Babinsi was arrested, publicly humiliated, and paraded around the city on a donkey.80 He was sent to the capital to be punished, but he died before he reached Istanbul.81

During the uprising, ʿAbdallah Babinsi relied on his power reservoir in the eastern suburbs of Aleppo, the insurgent stronghold, and the rural hinterlands. Tribes figured repeatedly and prominently at decisive points in the uprising. Werry mentions the “Mohali Arabs” (Mawali) in his letter to Stratford Canning as instigators of the uprising.82 They make a powerful reappearance when ʿAbdallah Babinsi is incarcerated and his cousin Muhammad calls for the tribes’ help.83

Several documents substantiate Babinsi’s relations to the rural world. The first record sheds light on the “chains of debts and credits” with which Babinsi was financially connected to both people in the city and the villages beyond. It was drawn up after his death by the kadi of Aleppo, Hafiz Muhammad Amin, who tried to assess Babinsi’s financial situation to evaluate the property left against the sum he owed the Treasury.84 The document shows that Babinsi also acted as a creditor for the local people. Moneylending had long been a powerful way to consolidate control of villages, even more powerful than the possession of malikan- es or itizams, or the supervision of waqfs, and is considered “the real key to understanding

73 Fondation Georges et Mathilde Salem, GAMS 905 (= Salem Ar. 113), 21a.
74 Edward Barker turns this idea on its head by suggesting that ʿAbdallah Babinsi had been induced to hopelessly entangle himself in the insurrection by his rival Yu- suf Shurayyif, with whom he clashed “particularly in the purchase of landed property in houses and land near the villages.” See Barker, Syria and Egypt, vol. 2, p. 289.
76 See Krimsti, Die Unruhen, p. 432.
77 The inhabitants of al-Saliba argued about requesting a seğmen, an irregular mercenary troop, from ʿAbdallah Babinsi. See Krimsti, Die Unruhen, p. 432.
78 TNA. FO. 861/2, Werry to Stratford Canning, 26 Oc-
both the power of the notables in the countryside and the basis of their power in the city.\footnote{For this observation, see Meriwether, “Urban Notables,” pp. 69–72, quotation 73. See also Thieck, Passion, p. 134; and Shields, “Interdependent Spaces,” pp. 50–52, on the importance of moneylending and rural indebtedment.}

The record, which was submitted to the Porte, is full of names and figures. Most notably, fourteen shaykhs of villages, the inhabitants of 77 villages and 31 nomad tribes including Türkmen, were among those who had obtained credit from 'Abdallah Babinsi.\footnote{See Kuroki, “1850 Aleppo Disturbance,” p. 228.} His financial leverage meant that Babinsi was likely in a position to manipulate these villagers and Bedouin to revolt against the government.

The second document confirms 'Abdallah Babinsi's ties to the rural world. It is made up of a list of the 143 people who were arrested during the fight with the Ottomans; it also mentions their place of origin.\footnote{Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İ. DH 225/13432–2.} Most of the insurgents on the list came from the eastern suburbs or the villages east of Aleppo or had a tribal, Bedouin background.

Additional evidence points in the same direction. In a petition from a group of people of Aleppo, who call themselves “the 80 obedient quarters,” they claim that the insurgents were outsiders.\footnote{Ibid., 226/13493–3.} In the aftermath of the uprising, Aleppo's elites distanced themselves from Babinsi by insisting that he was a brigand who was not even an Aleppo and that the rebels were not from Aleppo either, but rather villagers, Türkmen, and other outsiders. This myth of the outside actor(s) was later embedded in al-Ghazzi's and al-Tabbakh's historical works, who turned it into a lesson in citizenship, as Masters has observed.\footnote{See Masters, “Aleppo's Janissaries,” pp. 172–174.}

These contortions notwithstanding, it is obvious that 'Abdallah Babinsi relied on a rural network of support during the uprising. It ultimately was not strong enough to weather the changes brought about by the transition from the “old regime” to the Tanzimat regime. Yet it was still strong enough not to dissolve immediately upon his death. As early as 1853/54, his family was struggling to reassert its role in Aleppo's power politics. 'Abdallah Babinsi's family members, particularly his sister, sent petitions to the Porte asking the Ottomans to grant forgiveness to the family and to release 'Abdallah Babinsi's cousin Muhammad, who had been arrested during the uprising.\footnote{BOA, İ. MVL., 314/13172–1 and 2.} Later, the Ottomans turned to 'Abdallah Babinsi's son Ahmad in the aftermath of the 1860 massacres in Mount Lebanon and Damascus, when fears ran wild that the same would occur in Aleppo. Together with Ahmad, Ramadan Agha and one Ibn Jarna were vested by the vali as aghawat and asked to secure the city with ninety men each, according to Na'um Bakhkhash's diary.\footnote{See Qushaqji, Akhbar Halab, vol. 3, p. 203.} This clearly demonstrates that tensions between the city and its unruly eastern suburbs and rural hinterland were still part of the political reality.

A decade after 'Abdallah Babinsi's death, the delicate balance between the city and the hinterland still needed to be maintained with the help of individuals with ties to both. While his death heralded the end of the Janissaries it did not indicate the weakening of the power of urban notables. In the age of reforms, Ottoman vâls still needed urban power brokers “not simply to carry on as before, but to apply a new reforming policy which was bound to arouse opposition.”\footnote{See Nadine Méouchy, “Les temps et les territoires de la révolte du Nord (1919–1921),” in Jean-Claude David and Thierry Boissière (eds.), Alep et ses territoires: Fabrique et politique d'une ville, 1868–2011 (Damascus: Presses de l'Ifpo, 2014), https://books.openedition.org/ifpo/6657, accessed 20 April 2019.} Even later in Aleppo's history, at the very end of Ottoman rule, these notable power brokers with ties to the rural world would still have a decisive influence on politics.\footnote{See Masters, “Aleppo's Janissaries,” pp. 172–174.} 'Abdallah Babinsi was eliminated from the political scene precisely because he proved to be too powerful, not because he lost his power.

**CONCLUSION**

“One of the principal ways in which the weakening of Ottoman authority was demonstrated,” Meriwether observed for the time under consideration, “was in the inability of the government to maintain security in the rural areas, and the problems of insecurity in the countryside around Aleppo during this period was [sic]...
noted by many observers. It was by filling this void that ʿAbdallah Babinsi was able to become a power broker.

The analysis of Babinsi’s rise and fall and of his relations to the rural sphere throughout his career in the three preceding sections sheds light on various aspects of the questions raised in the beginning of this chapter. Should the last Janissary leader of Aleppo and similar figures before him such as Ibrahim Qattar Aghasi be considered notables between urban and rural spheres? The answer appears to be both yes and no. Babinsi rose to power through a notable household and, by exercising control over the hinterland, emerged and maintained himself as a political notable under changing rulers, although as a Janissary leader he could not lay claim to social nobility.

The second question regarding the curious anachronism of a Janissary gaining so much power can be explained precisely by ʿAbdallah Babinsi’s ties to the rural world. Although the Janissaries had been abolished elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, they continued to play a significant role in Aleppo’s politics because their (and particularly their chiefs’) ties to the hinterland were too complex to be cut off and because they allowed the Ottomans to maintain a precarious level of security in the city and the region. Babinsi in particular maintained public order and went on campaigns against the Bedouin. The last Janissary chief’s power was threatened by administrative reforms implemented in the framework of the Tanzimat. The second phase of the 1850 uprising, which resulted in a high number of fatalities in the eastern suburbs and eventually led to the ousting of influential Janissaries from the city, eventually brought about the belated demise of the Janissaries.

What happened in 1850 simultaneously answers the questions of the involvement of the rural world and Babinsi’s intervention in contentious politics. He did indeed attempt to make and unmake public order in 1850 through the eastern suburbs by drawing on his Janissary manpower as well as by prompting tribal interventions, as reports by contemporaries suggest. It is important to note, however, that his contemporaries were all too content to blame outsiders and foreigners for the bloodshed. This tendency notwithstanding, the intricate net of rural relations spun by Babinsi ultimately became the trap in which he entangled himself when using it to confront the Ottoman authorities.

The Last Janissary Leader of Aleppo

In his famous article “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables” (1968), Albert Hourani pointed to a source problem that historians interested in urban power brokers such as ʿAbdallah Babinsi often confront: “The voice of an important part of the population is scarcely heard in them [the sources], or heard only in a muted, indirect and even distorted form: that of the Muslim town-dwellers and their traditional and ‘natural leaders,’ the urban notables.”1 Despite his powerful position, ʿAbdallah Babinsi was illiterate and left no writings of his own; on a more general level, no sources shed light on Aleppo’s urban history from the perspective of the Janissaries.2 A micro-historical reconstruction of the motives and role of such an individual in urban politics must therefore be based on close readings of a variety of documents by contemporary observers. “Close reading” (as opposed to “distant reading”) is a crucial method in the study of literary and historical texts. A close reading of texts — whether historical or contemporary, literary or archival — seeks to tease out the multiple meanings of the language used and looks for voids and multiple voices within the sources.3

In the historical reconstruction of the case at hand, cursory references to ʿAbdallah Babinsi appear in diary notes of the Catholic teacher Naʿum Bakhkhash and locals’ reports about the 1850 uprising, in consular correspondence and historical accounts by European diplomats, and in reports by Ottoman officials. All these accounts contain a wealth of information and provide different perspectives on ʿAbdallah Babinsi, his social interactions, wealth, influence, economic interests, and military resources. These widely diverging narratives take on greater importance when they corroborate each other (e.g. ʿAbdallah Babinsi’s ties to the Bedouin). This type of historical analysis must be carried out with great circumspection as it needs to pierce through layers of contemporary bias. This is because the eastern suburbs of Aleppo and what lay beyond them were rumored to be the territory of unruly elements and bandits, a vilification that was consolidated in the 20th-century historical writings of Kamil al-Ghazzi and Muhammad Raghib al-Tabbakh.4

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1 Hourani, “Ottoman Reform,” p. 44.
RETHINKING URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS
IN LATE OTTOMAN BILAD AL-SHAM: THE CASE OF GAZA

Johann Buessow and Yuval Ben-Bassat

Abstract | This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the neighborhood as a crucial component of urban governance in late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria). Taking as a case study the neighborhoods of late Ottoman Gaza, it examines the extent to which Gaza's neighborhoods were social, administrative and political entities. In Gaza, a sizable part of the population was involved in two rival political factions that were based in neighborhoods at opposite ends of the city. While we have examined Gaza's factionalism elsewhere, the discussion here is embedded in an analysis of the city's morphology and its economic and social makeup. This approach helps to reveal the social characteristics of additional types of neighborhoods, beyond the official Ottoman administrative divisions. It also sheds light on the social background of additional types of political actors, beyond the political elite, such as muhtar, scribes, and imam. We show that Gaza was influenced by the flow of people and goods at the crossroads of two major caravan routes. A spread-out urban structure allowed kinship groups to settle in clusters. The nature of neighborhood boundaries was varied. Physically, they were permeable and allowed traffic to flow freely, including many city-dwelling peasants who commuted between the city and the rural area around it. Socially, as evidence on marriage relations suggests, there was a deep social rift between Gaza's two competing commercial and religious centers. This dual urban structure helped some elite families to build a viable opposition to the dominant political faction.

INTRODUCTION
The urban neighborhoods1 of late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham have long had considerable importance in the formation of local identities as well as in scholarly debates. Local authors of chronicles and memoirs took a strong interest in neighborhoods and often dealt in great detail with practical features and the emotional ties related to them.2 These texts are important

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1 The term neighborhood is often used interchangeably with “quarter.” “Quarter,” however, carries the historical baggage of Roman city planning with four quarters divided by a cardo and decumanus, so that the term is commonly associated with particularly rigid concepts of urban subdivision. In this chapter, we employ “neighborhood” as a generic term for all kinds of urban subdivisions, whereas we use “quarter” solely to refer to established concepts of quarters; e.g., the four quarters of Jerusalem’s walled city as they are known today.

primary sources for the social history of urban neighborhoods, a field that has attracted relatively little attention on the part of historians, but which has been explored in several case studies. Older scholarly debates often revolved about the validity of general paradigms in Middle Eastern urban studies, especially as concerns the “Islamic,” “Oriental,” or “Ottoman” city. More recently, historians seeking to understand “old regime” municipal organization in Bilad al-Sham during the pre-Tanzimat period have discussed neighborhoods as elements of urban governance.

Neighborhoods are a global phenomenon and have been attested as spatial units of enduring importance as of the period of early urban civilization in Mesopotamia. As urban theorist Lewis Mumford noted, “[n]eighbourhoods, in some annoying, inchoate fashion exist wherever human beings congregate, in permanent family dwellings; and many of the functions of the city tend to be distributed naturally – that is, without any theoretical preoccupation or political direction – into neighbourhoods.” A recent practice-oriented definition of neighborhood specifies some of these functions:

A neighborhood is generally defined spatially as a specific geographic area and functionally as a set of social networks. Neighborhoods, then, are the spatial units in which face-to-face social interactions occur – the personal settings and situations where residents seek to realize common values, socialize youth, and maintain effective social control.

This chapter examines neighborhoods in the functional sense as relatively self-contained social units that influence the ways in which residents think and act. In the pre-industrial world, most neighborhoods were social groupings that arose through social interactions among people living near one another or choosing to build homes and businesses in the same area. In this sense, they were functional units that facilitated the construction of social networks beyond the household level. In many urban traditions, basic municipal functions such as public security, cleaning and upkeep were – and still are – handled on the neighborhood level and not on that of centralized urban or state governments. In addition to social neighborhoods, most cities also had administrative districts that were used for purposes such as taxation and social control. Administrative districts typically grouped together several social neighborhoods.

Thus, neighborhoods typically had two functions that were more or less pronounced in individual cases. On the one hand, they facilitated social networks; i.e., ties and exchanges between neighborhood residents, and on the other, top-down social control and col-

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ollective efficacy that complied with laws and government policies. As a result, modernizing states in the 19th century that attempted to enlist the cooperation of urban populations came to see the neighborhood as a sort of two-edged sword, because social networks could lead to collective efficacy; i.e., mutual trust and solidarity combined with expectations for collective action as stipulated by the law and government policies, but they could also provide resources for political resistance and/or organized crime.11

In late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham, the social makeup of neighborhoods differed widely. Certain neighborhoods were more administrative (Ott. Turk. mahalle, Ar. mahalla) whereas other neighborhoods were smaller sub-units (in Arabic mostly hara or zuqaq).12 Neighborhood populations often had some economic specialization or distinct subculture. For example, ethnically defined groups often preferred to live near each other. The same applied to specialized trades, such as craftspeople and merchants. In cities with a plurality of religions, neighborhood populations were often characterized by religious affiliation. Another factor contributing to neighborhood distinctiveness was in-migration from rural areas. This was a continuous process in pre-industrial cities, and migrants tended to move in with relatives and acquaintances from their hometowns.13 Importantly, the urban-rural relationship was mostly a two-way street, with urbanites maintaining close and often very profitable relations with their rural regions of origin.14

As Abraham Marcus observed for the case of Aleppo, the desire to live close to members of one’s peer group – defined by religion, ethnicity, occupation, or otherwise – interfered with other factors, such as proximity to one’s place of work or the availability of affordable housing. The resulting pattern was clustering, a “tendency of groups to concentrate in particular parts of town rather than to occupy exclusive quarters.”15 In other words, clusters of specific social categories provided neighborhoods with a distinctive character, but were almost never completely congruent with neighborhood boundaries. The neighborhoods that were most homogeneous were those that originated as new settlements established by particular groups. Over time, this homogeneity eroded through the complex dynamics of daily life,16 but names referring to the origins of such neighborhoods, such as “the Türkmen” or “the Jewish neighborhood,” generally survived over long periods of time.17

This chapter focuses on late Ottoman Gaza as a case study of neighborhoods in the political life of a city in late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham. The first section presents a catalogue of features that are commonly discussed as characteristic of neighborhoods in Bilad al-Sham at the time, which serves as the backdrop for our case study. The second section examines the evidence for neighborhoods in Gaza based on the Ottoman census of 1905, alongside complementary evidence retrieved from archival materials, unpublished manuscripts, memoirs, aerial photos, and maps. Finally, we consider the implications of our case study for future works on urban neighborhoods.

NEIGHBORHOODS IN LATE OTTOMAN BILAD AL-SHAM

Neighborhoods are a key locus of contention in approaches to understanding the commonalities and particularities of Ottoman Middle East-


14 Antoine Abdel Nour, Introduction à l’histoire urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane (XVI-XVIIIe siècle) (Beirut: Lebanese University, 1982), p. 127; Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann,
ern cities. The debate includes discussions of both morphological and social features, which the older literature often grouped together in idealized categories based primarily on the study of the built environment and literary or juridical sources.

Arguments resting on the physical layout of cities often highlight the cul-de-sac as a prominent type of residential street, and neighborhoods made up of a small number of thoroughfares that could sometimes even be closed off by gates.\textsuperscript{18} It is argued that architectural design and urban planning were to a large extent shaped by the ideals of privacy and security, especially the privacy of the body and home.\textsuperscript{19} These arguments are interlinked with others that highlight political and cultural features, including the observation that the semi-public and intimate setting of the cul-de-sac facilitated social exchanges, especially for women.\textsuperscript{20} Another frequently discussed phenomenon is clustering on the basis of kinship, religion, ethnicity, and wealth.\textsuperscript{21} Other assumptions consider that neighborhoods in the late Ottoman Empire were spaces of relatively high social connectedness\textsuperscript{22} and often also of identity, solidarity and local loyalties across family and economic divisions.\textsuperscript{23} Enterprising notables (mediators between the imperial government and sections of the local population) exerted patronage over specific neighborhoods and made them the cornerstones of their political careers, and, in the age of electoral politics, their electoral strongholds.\textsuperscript{24}

When combined with preconceptions about “Islamic” or “Middle Eastern culture,” such categories of idealized features easily led to very schematic accounts which portray the city as a conglomerate of village-like “quarters,”\textsuperscript{25} thus leading to the ultimate characterization of a “compartmentalized” or “mosaic” society.\textsuperscript{26} Even where culturalist assumptions are avoided, there is a strong bias in the scholarly literature on the urban history of Bilad al-Sham since practically all generalizations have been made on the basis of the two largest cities in the region, Damascus and Aleppo, and, more precisely, their central neighborhoods.

\textbf{SAMPLE BIAS: DOMINANCE OF REGIONAL CAPITALS AND CITY CENTERS}

For numerous authors, Damascus provided the classical example of neighborhood concepts in Bilad al-Sham, given its clear internal organization and longevity. The city was subdivided


\textsuperscript{22} Elise Maccarid, “The Incomplete Civil Servant? The Figure of the Neighbourhood Headman (Muhtar),” in Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse and Elise Massicard (eds.), \textit{Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century} (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 276.


into three levels. It had eight administrative boroughs (*athman*) that were each divided into more than a dozen neighborhoods (sg. *hara*, *mahalla*, *sayih*). These in turn were further divided into “sub-neighborhoods” (*dakhla* or *zuqaq*); i.e., clusters of buildings around a particular street that gave the sub-neighborhood its name.27 However, this three-tier system in Damascus was in fact an exception. The neighborhood organization in Bilad al-Sham’s northern metropolis, Aleppo, was much more typical, with a two-tier system comprised of neighborhoods subdivided into multiple sub-neighborhoods.28

With regard to neighborhood boundaries, authors studying other cases, such as Jerusalem or Hama, have noted a much greater fluidity than in Damascus.29 In 19th-century Jerusalem, for instance, neighborhoods were not separated by walls and gates, nor were they religiously or ethnically segregated, despite tendencies toward clustering and segregation on the level of the house and immediate neighbors.30 Only two main market streets are reported to have been sealed off by wooden gates at night until the 1870s.31

One type of neighborhood that has been widely neglected in the frequently cited studies on Ottoman cities is the suburb. Brigitte Marino’s detailed study on the Midan suburb of Damascus shows that this neighborhood was shaped to a considerable extent by its function as the stronghold of grain traders, who maintained independent ties with grain producers in the Hawran region and were able to harness their economic clout for political purposes.32 Suburbs were often difficult for the Ottoman government and the elite families in the city centers to control. During the 1830s, for example, the Midan neighborhood became the main stronghold of anti-government rebels in Damascus.33 Thus, special relations with rural groups and the presence of opposition forces account for many of Midan’s special features. Similar observations have been made with regard to the suburban Bab al-Nayrab neighborhood of Aleppo.34 During the second half of the 19th century, suburbs of a new type emerged in many cities of Bilad al-Sham. These responded chiefly to the needs of urban businesses and wealthier households to escape the old walled and congested city centers. The neighborhoods of Zuqaq al-Blat in Beirut35 and Shaykh Jarrah in Jerusalem36 are two examples of this trend.

Another widespread type of suburban neighborhood consisted of small suburban settlements that formed an agglomeration in which the urban and rural social worlds intersected even more closely. These agglomerations were typically found in oasis settings, where favorable conditions allowed for intensive agriculture in the direct vicinity of the city, especially irrigated gardens and groves. In some locations, these gardens generated surplus income through export and the sale of goods to travelers, which, in turn, made some of their owners wealthy and sometimes encouraged migrant workers to settle there as well. Perhaps the oldest agglomeration in Ottoman Bilad al-Sham was the Ghuta (“basin”) region around Damascus, which existed since Antiquity. It owed its existence to the Barada and ‘Awaj rivers, advantageous water-table levels, and a system of irrigation channels that fanned out in the natural depression around

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28 Ibid., p. 159.
34 Feras Krimsti, *Die Unruhen von 1850 in Aleppo: Gewalt im urbanen Raum* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2014); see also Krimsti’s chapter in this volume.
Damascus and provided water for dozens of villages. Some of them gradually took on the characteristics of urban life, including mosques and bathhouses. Water management and economic ties to Damascene markets linked the Ghuta villages or suburbs firmly to Damascus and its politics.

During the second half of the 19th century, villages and farmland expanded greatly. The port city of Jaffa is another, slightly different case in point. From the beginning of the 19th century, large amounts of fallow but fertile lands and, later in the century, highly profitable export-oriented orange groves attracted migrants to settle in already existing villages and new settlements. These settlements of rural workers, often originating from Egypt, were called saknät (roughly: “settlements”) in local Arabic usage. Simultaneously, new suburbs enlarged the old walled city center along the coast. Some of the saknät merged with this new city center in the subsequent decades, such as Saknät al-Jabaliyya in the south, which became part of the ‘Ajami neighborhood, and, on the other side of town, a settlement known as the “Egyptian Colony” grew into the Manshiyya neighborhood. As early as 1910, the whole plain between Jaffa and the neighboring towns of Ramla and Lydda had been transformed into an agglomeration, Haifa, Jaffa’s northern competitor as a port city, was located in a different agricultural landscape, but its development was marked by the same phenomena: the founding of new suburbs by residents of the old city center as well as rural immigration and the forming of an agglomeration with rural settlements in the vicinity.

THE NEED TO TAKE CHANGING POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS INTO ACCOUNT: FROM THE OTTOMAN OLD REGIME PATCHWORK TO STANDARDIZATION

It is not only the diversity of neighborhood patterns that needs to be better understood, but also the dynamism of the political frameworks in which they were embedded. A recent scholarly debate on neighborhoods has revolved around the mechanisms of urban governance in the transition from the Ottoman old regime to the period of modern municipalities. Nora Lafi details how, in the mid-19th century, Tunis neighborhood headmen in the city intra muros reported to a city headman (shaykh al-madina), while suburban neighborhoods had their own independent headmen. Avner Wishnitzer and others have pointed to the centrality of neighborhoods for ensuring more equitable access to urban life and its benefits.

42 Dierauff, Translating Late Ottoman Modernity, pp. 147–148.
43 Buessow, Hamidian Palestine, p. 227. On the development of two suburbs in Lydda, see Tawfîq Dâ’dîl’s chap-

ering the inhabitants safety in the city at night, which was implemented through institutions such as neighborhood watchmen, informal neighborhood detention facilities and neighborhood gates.47 Stefan Knost, in a study of Aleppo, describes neighborhood endowments, which were typically referred to in Arabic as waqf nuqad al-mahalla, “cash waqf of a neighborhood,”48 and were used to finance public utilities such as security and water management. These enabled neighborhood councils to hire personnel in charge of utilities which thus turned them into central institutions of governance on the neighborhood level. In addition, numerous studies of specific cities have shed light on characteristic features that defined certain neighborhoods. Charles Wilkins, who studied 17th-century Aleppo, examined neighborhood residents’ strategies, at both the personal and collective levels, to deal with the Ottoman state’s tax demands.49 Linda Schatkowski Schilcher discussed the politicization of neighborhoods in 19th-century Damascus.50 Buessow described the responsibilities and world of an Arab Orthodox neighborhood muhtar in Jerusalem around 1900.51 Whereas Antoine Abdel Nour in 1982 still stated that “[t]he internal life of the neighborhoods almost totally escapes us,”52 this field of study has made progress in concretizing earlier general assumptions about neighborhoods as political entities. Cem Behar’s micro-history of a small Istanbul neighborhood is perhaps the most important milestone to date.53 Future studies should aim to reconstruct the competences and activity profiles of neighborhood representatives, such as shaykhs, muhtars, imams, and other religious-administrative functionaries vis-à-vis the Ottoman state, aside from the notables who figure so prominently in the literature.54

Research indicates that administration and politics on both levels typically revolved around the shaykh al-hara, the sub-neighborhood headman and/or the imam or other religious community leaders. These neighborhood representatives were backed by an assembly of elders and influential people. The competences of the shaykh al-hara and the religious community leaders on the sub-neighborhood level were apparently never formally defined until the 1830s, but they are frequently mentioned in Ottoman administrative correspondence and they certainly fulfilled a number of important functions, such as the collection of taxes, the financing of the city’s security forces, verification of water provision and street cleaning, and supervision of the night watchmen. Together with leading ‘ulama’, the neighborhood headmen are known to have formed ad hoc assemblies to decide their city’s political fate in times of crisis. Further proof of their political importance comes from the fact that new rulers often took the trouble to replace them to guarantee their loyalty. The shaykh, imam and the neighborhood assembly were also able to deny residence in their sub-neighborhood to people they deemed undesirable.55

In the 19th century, reforms implemented by the Ottoman state made the neighborhood an important element of its administration. This was codified in the Vilayet Law of 1864 and detailed in a number of subsequent laws.56 These laws mainly defined two institutions: the muhtar and the council of elders. These were elected by “communities,” whether urban neighborhoods, villages, or ethno-religious communities. The institution of the muhtarship

48 Knost, Die Organisation des religiösen Raums, p. 217.
49 Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities.
50 Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Berliner Islamstudien 2 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985); see also Buessow and Safi, Damascus Affairs.
54 For a recent contribution, see Élise Massicard, “Incomplete Civil Servant?”
55 Ibid., pp. 162–164. Interestingly, Abraham Marcus found that in 18th-century Aleppo, the term imam was used as a generic word for neighborhood headmen and that there were Christian headmen called “imams.” Marcus, “Urban Experience,” p. 325.
56 The following is based on George Young, Corps de droit ottoman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905–1906), vol. 1.
(Turk. muhtarlık) was first created and tested in Istanbul in 1829, introduced in several provinces during the 1830s, and generalized by the Vilayet Law of 1864. Imams and other religious leaders were thereby relegated to second fiddle but maintained important functions.\textsuperscript{57}

According to the Vilayet Law, a given community of more than twenty houses was to have two muhtar\textsuperscript{s}. They were to be elected locally every year and be confirmed by the subdistrict governor (kaymakam).\textsuperscript{58} Whenever these categories overlapped, there were several kinds of muhtar\textsuperscript{s} in one locality. For example, if a neighborhood was composed of Muslim and Greek Orthodox inhabitants, there were to be the muhtar\textsuperscript{s} of the neighborhood and muhtar\textsuperscript{s} representing the local Greek Orthodox. If a village was subdivided into separate neighborhoods and/or ethno-religious communities, each was represented by its own muhtar\textsuperscript{s}.\textsuperscript{59} Their duties and competences were varied and far-reaching. They controlled the movement of citizens, issued certificates of good behavior, communicated new government laws and regulations, and helped with taxation, conscription, street cleaning, and account keeping on the neighborhood level. In particular, they communicated all kinds of information to the authorities.\textsuperscript{60}

Neighborhood or community muhtar\textsuperscript{s}’ decision making was based on consultation with the council of elders (ihtiyariye) which was elected together with them. Imams and (unspecified) religious authorities of Christian and Jewish communities were ex officio members of this council. The list of topics that the council of elders was entitled to deliberate on, including taxation, public health, and mediation in local conflicts, shows that the Ottoman lawmakers saw them as akin to a micro municipality.\textsuperscript{61}

Alongside their administrative tasks, the council members were expected to guarantee safety and the protection of the honor and property of their community’s inhabitants, for example, in delicate situations where Ottoman state agencies were in conflict with citizens of foreign powers. Thus, if there was no consular agent in the vicinity, three members of the council accompanied Ottoman officials when they entered the house of a foreign citizen. Similarly, they could act as mediators in disputes involving foreigners.\textsuperscript{62} They were also to provide checks and balances to guard against possible misconduct on the part of the headman. If the muhtar breached the rules, neighborhood inhabitants addressed imams and elders, who conveyed their complaints to the provincial government.\textsuperscript{63} In municipal elections, muhtar\textsuperscript{s} were elected as members of the electoral commission (encümen).\textsuperscript{64}

This long list of the neighborhood headmen’s qualifications and duties made them akin to civil servants at the lowest level of the administration. The muhtarlık was, however, a “hybrid and intermediary” institution,\textsuperscript{65} since, at the same time, the headmen were also representatives of the neighborhood’s inhabitants. Their authority did not rest on executive powers but rather on their local reputation and their ability to channel crucial information “upwards” to the government and “downwards” to the inhabitants. In cases of grievance, they were expected to voice the complaints of their constituencies or individual members.\textsuperscript{66} Thus,\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} The most detailed summary on the state of the art in research on the muhtarlık to date is Massicard, “Incomplete Civil Servant?.” The presentation of Ottoman laws in what follows is based on Young, \textit{Corps de droit ottoman}, vol. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Vilayet Law, articles 54–55, 62; Young, \textit{Corps de droit}, vol. 1, p. 42. Communities of fewer than twenty houses only had one muhtar. Since a neighborhood was defined as consisting of a minimum of 50 houses (Vilayet Law, article 5; Young, \textit{Corps de droit}, vol. 1, p. 67), neighborhoods were by definition to be headed by two muhtar\textsuperscript{s}. The process of electing members of the municipality (belediye) was also organized on the neighborhood level; electoral committees prepared lists of eligible candidates, which were posted on the doors of neighborhood mosques and other religious gathering places (Vilayet Law, article 23; Young, \textit{Corps de droit}, vol. 1, p. 45).
\item \textsuperscript{59} Vilayet Law, articles 8 and 15; Young, \textit{Corps de droit}, vol. 1, p. 84.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Vilayet Law, articles 8 and 15; Young, \textit{Corps de droit}, vol. 1, p. 42; Massicard, “Incomplete Civil Servant?,” pp. 260–262.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{62} This is detailed in the law of 1868 that regulated the property rights of foreigners. See Protocole. 7 Sef. 1285 / 9 juin 1868. En vertu duquel les étrangers peuvent être admis à la jouissance du droit de propriété; Young, \textit{Corps de droit}, vol. 1, p. 342.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Massicard, “Incomplete Civil Servant?,” p. 260.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Filastin}, 194, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Massicard, “Incomplete Civil Servant?,” p. 263.
\item \textsuperscript{66} A study of petitions sent from Ottoman Palestine to Istanbul in the last quarter of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century shows that numerous petitions which were sent from the sub-district (kaza) of Gaza to Istanbul were also signed by muhtar\textsuperscript{s} of villages with respect to issues of mutual concern,
\end{itemize}
starting from the 1860s, a patchwork of local customs in neighborhood governance gave way to standardized administrative procedures. By 1900, the state had insinuated itself into the most intimate sphere of the hara. At the same time, this transition was uneven and incomplete. Certain forms of old regime urban governance were still alive and partly accounted for local variations.

Given the diversity of neighborhoods over space and time, some specialists have called for modifications of the idealized types formulated by Antoine Abdel Nour, Eugen Wirth and others, while others have concluded that generalizations should be avoided altogether.67 Our position is that idealized categories such as taxes, lands, infrastructure, maladministration, conscription, and the like. Yuval Ben-Bassat, Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), chapter 4.

67 The latter position is put forward in Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

68 For a more detailed discussion of research methodologies in Ottoman urban studies, see Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Buessow, “Applying Digital Methods to the Urban History of the Modern Middle East: GIS Analysis of the Social Basis of Political Partisanship in Late Ottoman Gaza,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 63/4 (2020), pp. 505–554.

Figure 1: Gaza’s Old City Center seen from the Northeast. Note the Cairo-Damascus road at the lower left (1). Situated front center is the Daraj neighborhood with the Government Compound (2) and the Grand Mosque (3), behind it is the Zaytun neighborhood (4). Between them, pointing towards the sea, lies Cemal (Jamal) Paşa Boulevard (5), which was built during World War I. Parts of two suburbs are visible in the lower half of the image: Tuffah (6) and Shaja’iya/Turkuman (7). The image was taken around 1916, probably by the British Royal Air Force.

Source: Central Zionist Archive (CZA), PIC 65479.
discusses possible avenues for future comparative research.

GAZA'S NEIGHBORHOODS: URBAN MORPHOLOGY, ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS

Gaza is still one of the major blanks on the historiographical map of late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham. From the little we know, many inhabitants of Gaza, members of the local elite as well as commoners, were involved in two rival coalitions, based in the two largest neighborhoods, at opposite ends of the city. Although we have examined Gaza's factionalism elsewhere, the discussion here is embedded in an analysis of the city's morphology and its economic and social makeup. An aerial photograph from the period of World War I provides a vivid depiction of Gaza's old city center (see Figure 1).

GAZA'S URBAN LAYOUT: A CITY OF FLOWS

Gaza's urban layout can largely be explained by the crossing of two roads used for commerce and travel. One was the main overland road (tariq sultani) between Cairo and Damascus. The other was a secondary road connecting the northern Negev and the Arabian Peninsula with the Mediterranean shore (see Figure 2).

Gaza's five main inner-city thoroughfares (referred to as khatt, shariʿ, or tariq, depending on the sources) ran largely parallel to these two roads and met in the city center near the government compound and the main overland road (see Figure 3). (1) The main continuous inner-city traffic artery connected the seaward end of Daraj with the inland tip of Shajaʿiyya. At the seaward end, Gaza's Grand Market (al-Suq al-Kabir) also constituted the boundary between the Daraj and Zaytun neighborhoods. South of the main overland road, it continued as Shariʿ al-Hammam and Shariʿ Abu Sahmud.\(^69\)

\(^69\) British Map of Gaza, 1928; the modern-day names
The street parallel to it on the seaward side connected the Sayyid Hashim Mosque to the main overland road and was known by various names that related to landmarks and prominent families along the road.70 The street parallel to it on the inland side was Qazdamri Street in Shajaʿiyya (named after the Taqizdamuri/Qazdamri Mosque) and continued as Shariʿ al-Shaykh al-Mudallaʿ, from where it led to Gaza's landmark hill, Jabal al-Muntar.71 The are al-Wahda Street for the part running through Daraj and Baghdad Street for the part running through Shajaʿiyya. Al-Wahda Street branches off west of the main Salah al-Din Road which runs north-south through the Gaza Strip and opens onto Nasser Street just before it ends at al-Shifa Hospital. See David Winter and John Matthews, Israel Handbook: With the Palestinian Authority Areas (Chicago, IL: Footprint Handbooks, 1998), p. 462.


71 Renamed al-Shawwa Street in the early 20th century (see British map of Gaza, 1928).
Mamluk period onwards, however, these walls had fallen into disuse and the city had spread out along the two traffic axes, developing into an urban agglomeration.

Since Gaza’s population only grew at a moderate pace during the 19th century, reaching some 20,000–25,000 people around the turn of the century, the few peripheral or suburban neighborhoods that emerged typically developed along cul-de-sacs leading off the main thoroughfares. One example is Mashahira, a satellite settlement in the Tuffah neighborhood that was situated on the road to the village of Jabaliyya. Another example is the ‘Awamid neighborhood (Harat al-‘Awamid) at the entrance to Zaytun, whose modest beginnings are visible in aerial photographs from World War I. On the British map of 1931, however, ‘Awamid appears as a full-fledged little suburb (Figure 5). A third case is Hillis: a peripheral sub-neighborhood of Shaja’iyya that was named after a large family of the same name (Figures 5 and 17).

Nevertheless, the urban sprawl was limited by the need to protect the surrounding fertile agricultural land. Data on occupations in the Ottoman census suggest that the majority of the population in all neighborhoods earned their living from agriculture. In that sense, Gaza was as much a farm town as a merchant city, which made the boundaries between city and countryside fluid and permeable. The mudbrick architecture on the fringes of the city was hardly different from the villages of the rural hinterland.

Several thousand people must have commuted every day between their dwellings in the city and the gardens and fields in the hinterland where they worked. Many of these town-dwelling peasants were rural emigrants or the offspring of rural emigrants. This strongly suggests much closer cooperation between town-dwellers, peasants and Bedouins than in most other cities in the region. Bedouins were essential for the security of trade routes and farmlands in the region, and Gaza’s merchants, artisans, and peasants could only thrive if they cooperated with them. City or neighborhood fortifications would not have been of much use and security had to be arranged through cooperation with the Bedouins.

VARYING NEIGHBORHOOD TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Depending on their specific perspectives, contemporaries report different numbers and names for Gaza’s urban subdivisions. The local terminology for neighborhoods is documented in the volumes of the city's Shariʿa court records available today, which cover the years 1857–1861 and mention seven neighborhoods (sg. ḥara). The local Muslim scholar ʿUthman al-Tabbaʿ (1882–1951), whose manuscript on Gaza Ithaf al-aʿizza dates to 1911, counted only four neighborhoods (sg. mahalla).73

Another version emerges from a detailed report published in 1888 by the Austrian Catholic priest Georg Gatt (1843–1924), who cites a member of the municipal administration as his main informant.74 Although Gatt designates the same four main neighborhoods of Gaza, he also draws in five sub-neighborhoods, based on religious and ethnic identities. For example, the Daraj neighborhood is partly designated as Harat al-Muslimin and Harat Bani ’Amir on his map, and sections of Zaytun neighborhood are designated as Harat al-Nasara (the Christian quarter) and Harat al-Yahud (the Jewish quarter).75

The image emerging from these sources is one of a flexible usage of names that was apparently informed by multiple local traditions and differing needs. Whereas, for example, Tabba’ likely wanted to convey a coherent and memorable image of their city, the clerks in the Shariʿa court noted finer spatial divisions that mattered in court cases; Gatt’s sub-neighborhoods testify to his interest in religious and ethnic divisions in the city.

The 1905 Ottoman census officials translated this plurality of neighborhood terms into a strict two-tier system. They divided the city into only four neighborhoods (mahalles): Daraj, Zaytun, Tuffah, and Turkuman (better known as Shajaʿiyya) (Figure 6). However, for administrative purposes, Shajaʿiyya was subdivided into two parts: Turkuman, the central and wealthier part of the neighborhood, and Judayda, the neighborhood's northeast and poorer part.76 Below the mahalle there were numerous sub-neighborhoods (sg. zuqaq, literally “street”).77 These blocks of houses apparently bordered on a specific thoroughfare.

75 When including these designations in his map, Gatt may have abstracted from local usage, or modelled them on Jerusalem, where he had previously resided. On Gatt, see Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Buessow, “Urban Factualism in Late Ottoman Gaza, c. 1875–1914: Local Politics and Spatial Divisions,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 61/4 (2018), pp. 633–634. On the conventions of ethno-religious quarter names in Jerusalem, see Buessow, Hamidian Palestine, pp. 165–166.
76 See, for example, the Gaza marriage register (ISA, Nūfūs, Reg. 279) and a petition signed by the neighborhood headmen of both Judayda and Turkuman (BOA, HR. MTV., 717/59, petition dated 14 Teşrinievvel 1311 [26 October 1895]).
77 The Ottoman census documents uniformly use the term zuqaq for streets or sub-neighborhoods in Gaza, while in other documents the terms ḥara and shariʿ are used as well.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FEATURES

Gaza’s neighborhoods all contained a mixture of economic assets, such as shops, industries and gardens. Most of the wealth was concentrated in the central neighborhoods of Daraj and Zaytun. This was manifested in a repertoire of recurrent types of premises: trading firms (sg. wikala), trade centers (sg. khan), soap factories (sg. masbana), wells (sg. saqiya), and enclosed compounds or gardens (sg. hakura). Daraj and Zaytun also split the central market district in the old city center. The dividing line between the two neighborhoods ran through the middle of the Grand Market (al-Suq al-Kabir).

Most of the shops in the city markets belonged to the waqf endowments of the city’s three Friday mosques: the Grand Mosque or ‘Umari Mosque (al-Jamiʿ al-Kabir al-ʿUmari) in the city’s geographic center, next to the Government Compound, the Sayyid Hashim Mosque (Jamiʿ Sayyidina Hashim) at the northern end of Daraj, and the Ibn ʿUthman Mosque (Jamiʿ ʿUthman Shihab al-Din) in Shajaʿiyya. The mosques were therefore not only the most visible symbols of their neighborhood, but were financed by the business community who rented the shops belonging to them, and the imams and preachers (khattibs) employed by these mosques were most likely representatives of these interest groups. Large mansions (sg. dar) belonging to wealthy families, and religious establishments (mainly mosques and shrines, sg. mazar) were dotted over these central neighborhoods. In these mansions, the cultural ideal of privacy was realized in its purest form, whereas commoners mostly had to put up with confined living conditions and were less shielded from public gaze.

The Tuffah neighborhood, in contrast to Daraj and Zaytun, was a more rural suburb, with no major trading houses, or stately daras. More than one-half of the inhabitants in our sample whose professions were indicated were farmers or worked in agriculture.

The Shajaʿiyya neighborhood was also more rural than the old city center, but it had two parts with markedly different profiles. The neighborhood’s northern and central parts, including the Qazdamri area, the main market streets, and parts of Judayda, were characterized by a number of imposing stone houses and important institutions, notably the Ibn ʿUthman Mosque, including the many shops belonging to its endowment, and a public bath. All this made the northern part of Shajaʿiyya a sort of an alternative city center, competing with the old center in Daraj and Zaytun. The southern and peripheral parts of Shajaʿiyya, especially those along the outward roads to the northern Negev, were much poorer. They were often inhabited by rural emigrants where simple mudbrick houses predominated.

Did these social contrasts lead to differences in the reputation of neighborhoods and perhaps also to varying degrees of social distance and proximity? Were they ‘social neighborhoods’ that could serve as a focus of collective identities, or were they mere administrative entities? Marriages can be taken as a proxy for the intensity of social relations. We examined a sample of 100 marriages involving inhabitants of Gaza in a contemporary Ottoman marriage register. In

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78 See evidence in the waqf registers (Evkaf Defterleri) in BOA, Ev. d., nr. 30710, 26 Şubat 1322 (11 March 1907), Gaza’s waqf officer Hallil to Jerusalem’s Administrative Council.

79 Gaza marriage register, sample of 100 marriages registered between 1323/1907 and 1329/1913, ISA, Nü
the register, we identified four categories of marriage relations: marriages in which both partners came from the same neighborhood (mahalle), marriages across neighborhood boundaries, marriages in which one partner originated from the city and the other from a village in the Gaza District, and, finally, marriages in which one partner came from Gaza and the other from another district (kaza) of the Ottoman Empire.

The distribution of these marriage types in our sample is surprisingly clear (Figure 7): by far the most marriages of Gazans (52%) were contracted with individuals from the same neighborhood. The second most common marriage pattern (23%) was between inhabitants of the city and the villages in the Gaza Subdistrict (kaza); i.e., in Gaza’s agricultural hinterland. A smaller number of marriages (14%) were contracted with individuals from more remote locations, mostly from Jaffa and its kaza. The least common (11% of the cases) were cases of marriage within the city but across neighborhood boundaries. These numbers need to be treated with some caution. However, they suggest that Gaza’s mahalles were social neighborhoods and not mere administrative entities. External relations, especially to the rural hinterland were very important, as well. Obviously, there were significantly fewer social relations across neighborhood boundaries than between residents of the same neighborhood and between neighborhoods and the rural hinterland.

Did the frequency of marriages, or social relations in general, differ between neighborhoods? The places where most people married within their own neighborhood were Daraj and Judayda (the eastern, poorer part of Shajaiyya) (Figure 8).

80 This topic needs further study based on a larger sample, and certain peculiarities in the census registers still need to be resolved. A control study of marriages in the basic census register (esas defteri) of the Zaytun neighborhood yielded similar results regarding the distribution of marriage types, with the exception that more marriages across neighborhood boundaries were registered (same neighborhood: 48%; other Gaza neighborhoods: 28%; villages of Gaza kaza: 12%; other kazas of the Ottoman Empire: 12%). Sample: 100 marriages recorded in the esas defteri of the Zaytun neighborhood, 1905–1917. ISA Nüfus, Reg. 261.

81 Based on 52 cases of marriages within the same neighborhood and the 11 cases of marriages across neighborhoods in our sample.
Marriages contracted between inhabitants of different neighborhoods appear to have been influenced by cultural factors. As shown in Figure 9, there apparently were social boundaries in the city. There were no marriages between Daraj and Shaja’iyya (Turkuman and Judayda) or between Turkuman and Zaytun; more than one-half of the marriages between neighborhoods were connected to Shaja’iyya and about a third to Daraj. The only marriage that did not follow this pattern was one between individuals from Tuffah and Zaytun.

The overall image resulting from these marriage patterns is one of an urban society in which external relations were crucial to the rural hinterland, the city of Jaffa which was late Ottoman Palestine’s main economic center, and more far-flung places. At the same time, people within the city tended to have their most important social ties within their own mahalle. Social ties across neighborhood boundaries were less common and were shaped by the duality of Daraj and Shaja’iyya. Apparently, there was not only a political but also a social cleavage between these two neighborhoods, alongside their competition as market centers.

As discussed above, Gaza’s four mahalles each had a distinct social profile. However, there was much internal diversity. The wide variety of living conditions in sub-neighborhoods provide good examples of differences across four haras. We start with the Shaykh Ayyad area in the Daraj neighborhood (Figures 10 and 11).

This small sub-neighborhood around a cul-de-sac was named after a Sufi Shaykh (Zuqaq al-Shaykh ‘Ayyad), whose mausoleum formed a major landmark at its entrance. At its end towered Dar Abu Khadra, the huge residence of the landowner Isma’il Abu Khadra. Forty-seven inhabitants, including three other landowners and an accountant, lived in apartments around the courtyard of this impressive edifice, whose fortress-like walls and white cupolas are clearly visible on a contemporary aerial photograph (Figure 11).

The street was dominated by two large families. One was the Abu Khadras, most of whom lived in Dar Abu Khadra, next to other kin who lived in a separate smaller household. The second large family was the Turk family, who lived in seven households. The occupations mentioned for them – a merchant, a military officer, a veterinarian and a coffee seller – indicate a middle-class profile. Among the neighbors were people of more modest means, including two muleteers, a carpenter and a packer (desteci). On an aerial photograph (Figure 11), their small apartments look like a honeycomb between the mansions of the elite households and medium-sized houses that were probably inhabited by people like the Turk family. In total, the census lists 157 people who lived around this cul-de-sac, which was only about 40 meters long. This must have meant that most people, apart from the wealthiest, lived in very cramped conditions, with families sharing apartments built around communal facilities such as courtyards, wells, toilets, and stables. In 1857, a member of the Abu Khadras bought two-thirds of a sesame mill and a residential building near their house, which made it even more “their” street. The remaining areas were jointly held by a Christian and a Muslim proprietor.

82 Our sample of the Ottoman census for the Shaykh Ayyad area includes 16 households. ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 253, p. 155. For more on the Abu Khadra family, see the chapter by Sarah Buessow in this volume.
83 For a description of living conditions in an inner-city house of Jerusalem, see al-jawhariyya, al-Quds al-Uthmaniyya, pp. 7–20, summarized in Buessow, Hamidian Palestine, p. 179.
This situation was in many respects typical of an inner-city hara in Gaza at the time. With its high number of middle-class and elite households, Shaykh ‘Ayyad can be regarded as an upmarket area of Gaza, but there was still a considerable degree of social mixing, with men of modest means living wall to wall with the rich and powerful. The case of the 1857 real estate sale noted above demonstrates that Christians and Muslims living in Gaza entered into business partnerships. 85 However, the Christian co-owner of the houses (whom we could not identify) probably lived in Zaytun, like all the non-Muslims we know of. Dar Abu Khadra is a clear example of wealthy households being mainly able to afford to live up to the cultural ideal of privacy. The concentration of the Abu Khadra and Turk families around the street testifies to the common tendency of residential clusters to form along kinship lines. 86

85 Ibid.

86 On the political strategies of Gaza’s elite families, see Sarah Buessow’s chapter in this volume.

SHAYKH ‘UTHMAN
(ZAYTUN NEIGHBORHOOD)

Shaykh ’Uthman Street was located in the heart of the Zaytun neighborhood (Figures 12 and 13). In contrast to Shaykh ’Ayyad, it was rather large. Two main axes intersected in its center: Shaykh ’Uthman Street after which it was named, and Ra’s al-Hara, the major east-west connection between the Cairo-Damascus road and the commercial center of Daraj. Shaykh ’Uthman Street connected the two parts of Gaza that formed the main centers of non-Muslim and foreign residents. At its southeastern end there was ’Ajami, home to a diverse population and the site of, inter alia, the Catholic parish established by the Austrian priest Georg Gatt (the author of Gaza’s first published city map). At its northeastern end were the Katib al-Wilayat mosque, the Greek Orthodox church, and the large compound of the British Church Mission Society (CMS). Four smaller streets and several cul-de-sacs grouped around these two axes and provided quiet locations for a great number of grand urban mansions built by Christian and Muslim merchants (Figure 14).

In the available census records, 23 households are registered in this area. This only

Figure 9: Marriages across Neighborhoods. Blue shading indicates marriages between individuals from Shaja’iyya, orange shading indicates marriages between individuals from Daraj. Source: Sample of 11 cases from ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 279 (Marriage register of Gaza, 1908–1913).
Figure 10: The Abu Khadra Family’s Assets in Shaykh Ayyad Street. Source: Gaza Sijill, p. 15; ISA, Nufus; British map of Gaza, 1928, NLI, 2369509_01.

Figure 11: The Shaykh Ayyad Area with Dar Abu Khadra and Other Prominent Buildings, seen from the East. Note the two large mansions that belonged to the Husayni family, both known as dar al-mufti. Source: Gaza Sijill 1858, p. 15; detail of aerial photograph c. 1916, CZA, PIC 65479.
Figure 12: The Shaykh ‘Uthman Area in an Aerial Photograph. Source: Aerial photograph by the Bavarian Squadron (1918).

Figure 13: An Aerial Photo of Shaykh ‘Uthman Area, looking West. Note the light stone houses in the central parts in contrast to the darker mud brick houses on the periphery. Source: Detail of aerial photograph c. 1916, CZA, PIC 65479.
provides a very incomplete picture of the neighborhood’s social makeup, as the census lists for the sizable Christian population in the area are missing so we only have information about the Muslim inhabitants. The resulting image reveals phenomena already observed in Shaykh ‘Uthman, albeit on a larger scale. Two merchant families dominated the scene, the Fars and the Ghalayinis, both with several extended households (most notably that of the merchant Hajj ‘Ali al-Far with 55 members) and streets named after them (Figure 12). Again, we find the honeycomb-like structure of small apartment buildings around them, mostly inhabited by artisans, laborers, and grocers.

RIFI STREET (TUFFAH NEIGHBORHOOD)
Rifi Street was the central part of the Tuffah neighborhood. The census documents mention the area many times as a residential address, but it does not figure on any available map. The Tuffah neighborhood as a whole was organized around major thoroughfares on the northeastern outskirts of Gaza and lacked any major architectural landmark, commercial center or religious establishment, apart from several small mosques and shaykhs’ tombs (Figures 15 and 16).

The majority of the working population (55%) registered in the Rifi Street area were peasants, alongside people employed in a large number of mostly unskilled occupations such as laborers, water carriers, and shopkeepers. Gaza’s slaughterhouse (maslakh) was located at the eastern end of Rifi, near the intersection of all the main roads. Some enterprising members of the large and powerful Shawwa family worked as butchers nearby. Very few people in this neighborhood were listed as active in administration or scholarly work, except for the household of the Murad family of Muslim scholars and administrators. Three men from this family worked in Gaza’s Shariʿa court and one served as the director of the rural district (nahiye reʾisi) of Faluja. Thus Rifi manifested the typical traits of agglomerations where urban and rural functions and lifestyles were closely intertwined.

HILLIS (SHAJA’IYYA NEIGHBORHOOD)
The Hillis Street sub-neighborhood (Figures 5 and 17), as we have seen above, was located on the southwestern fringes of Shaja’iya. Like other streets in the vicinity, Hillis had a planned layout with two rows of houses along a straight street. No house owner had the wherewithal, or the ambition, to live in the secluded environment of a cul-de-sac.

Almost all the inhabitants of Hillis registered in the census sheets were peasants (çiftçi). The only exceptions were two educated men registered as hafiz. What made this peripheral area somewhat famous was its large family known by the name of Hillis. The Gazan author

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88 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 267 and 268.

89 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 242.
Figure 15: The Rifi Street Area, Tuffah Neighborhood. 
Source: Nüfus; aerial photograph by the Bavarian Squadron (1918); British map of 1931.

Figure 16: Aerial Photograph of what is probably the Rifi Street Area at the Western End of Tuffah, looking towards Daraj. The walls visible near the bottom of the photograph are the slaughterhouse. 
Source: Aerial photograph c. 1916, CZA, PIC 65479.
Ahmad Busaysu (c. 1825–1911), in an essay on Gaza’s population, makes highly negative comments about the “Awlad Hillis,” whom he describes as “lowly people” of Bedouin origin. Thus, apparently, this was a case of a community of rural emigrants who managed to settle en bloc on the outskirts of the city. They maintained their social cohesion throughout the 20th century and are considered to be a “clan” with its own political influence to this day.

Our survey of Gaza’s neighborhoods suggests that Gaza developed on the basis of the flows of people and goods at the crossroads of the two major caravan routes. Up to the Mamluk period, the city was confined to a low mound on the seaward side of the Cairo-Damascus road, surrounded by fortifications. The fortifications later became obsolete and suburbs of varying size developed along both routes – some were full-fledged mahallas, as in the cases of Shajā’iyya and Tuffah, and others were small village-like satellite haras, such as Mashahira and ‘Awamid. Two competing commercial and religious centers on either side of the main route – Daraj and Shajā’iyya – tried to capitalize on the opportunities offered by caravan trade and traffic. The fact that the inhabitants of Daraj and Shajā’iyya did not intermarry, at least according to our sample from the 1905 census, suggests that economic and political competition was deeply ingrained in social life.

In the following section, we turn to the administrative and political roles of Gaza’s neighborhoods. We first examine the evidence for the presence of Ottoman state functionaries according to the provisions of the Vilayet Law. Then, we consider the extent to which neighborhoods were political entities.

NEIGHBORHOOD REPRESENTATIVES AND ADMINISTRATORS

The administration of Gaza’s neighborhoods is not well-documented in our sources. We have no information on the practicalities of governance on the neighborhood level, such as registration procedures, rubbish collection, and the like. However, the available census registers note several individuals who were involved in neighborhood administration, and this can provide at least some idea of the social backgrounds of the neighborhood representatives. Three portraits are presented below.

THE MUHTARS OF SHAJA’IYYA AND ZAYTUN

As mentioned above, few qualifications were required to become a muhtar. Under Ottoman law, the main qualification was sufficient reading and writing skills to handle official correspondence – at least in Arabic and ideally also in Ottoman Turkish. Implicitly, in order to fulfill their duties, muhtars needed comprehensive local knowledge. As Élise Massicard observed, their main skill was their ability “to mobilise social interconnectedness,” as they were supposed “to recognise intruders but also to know … the social and economic situation” of those they administered. In order to be elected, they needed a measure of social standing. The only muhtar we have been able to identify as a major supporter of the Fatah party in Gaza, see Steven Erlanger, “2 Killed in Gaza Fight Between Clan and Hamas,” The New York Times, 20 October 2007, online https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/world/middleeast/20cmd-mid-east.html (accessed 6 September 2021). The article mentions that the “clan’s” compact settlement on the edge of Gaza city gives it strategic power.
to trace in our sample of the 1905 Ottoman census is the neighborhood headman of Shaja‘yya (Turkuman), Ibrahim Misri al-Muzayni, who was born in Gaza 1836/7 and was registered as “head muhtar of the Turkuman neighborhood” (Turkuman mahalleesi muhtarbaşı). He lived in the Hillis Street area, on the southwestern fringes of Shaja‘yya. His household was a large one, comprising 24 people, including four married sons with their own nuclear families. Three of his sons were first-class peasants (çiftçis), as was almost everyone in Hillis – the above-mentioned sub-neighborhood that was famous for the large family of the same name. The name “([al-]Misri” (“[the] Egyptian”) suggests that one of his ancestors had come to Gaza as an emigrant from Egypt. This case of a peasant muhtar in a major urban neighborhood suggests that a high level of social prestige was not a precondition for this function, and also demonstrates that being a social prestige was not a precondition for this ban neighborhood suggests that a high level of family. Nearly all of the Burnu family in Zaytun (but unfortunately not Hasan Burnu’s). Nearly all of them were merchants. The chronicler ʿUthman al-Tabbaʿ also mentions Muslim scholars and them were merchants. The chronicler ʿUthman al-Tabbaʿ also mentions Muslim scholars and Ottoman military officers who came from this family. The name “([al-]Misri” (“[the] Egyptian”) suggests that one of his ancestors had come to Gaza as an emigrant from Egypt. This case of a peasant muhtar in a major urban neighborhood suggests that a high level of social prestige was not a precondition for this function, and also demonstrates that being a social prestige was not a precondition for this ban neighborhood suggests that a high level of family. Nearly all of the Burnu family in Zaytun (but unfortunately not Hasan Burnu’s). Nearly all of them were merchants. The chronicler ʿUthman al-Tabbaʿ also mentions Muslim scholars and Ottoman military officers who came from this family. It is interesting to see that Hasan Burnu was openly political, as we find his signature on a strongly worded petition in favor of Gaza’s Husayni family, calling their political rivals “corrupt” and the “lowest of people.”

93 Shaja‘yya/Turkuman, Hillis Street (Shariʿ Abu Hillis), mesken 499, ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 242, p. 253. It is unusual that there were no other households of this family in the census registers. The precise meaning of the term “muhtar-başı” is unclear. It may have been a synonym for “first muhtar” (muhtar-i evvel).

94 Ibid. It is unusual to see that there were no other households of this family in the census registers.

95 Al-Tabbaʿ, İthaf, vol. 3, p. 56.

96 BOA, HR.MT, 718/93, p. 2, petition dated 21 Muḥarram 1314/2 July 1896.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCRIBE OF TUFFAH

ʿAbdallah Hamada (1844/5–1913/4) lived with his 12-person household in Tuffah and worked as a “neighborhood scribe” (mahalle katibi), probably as part of the Tuffah neighborhood administration. The term “neighborhood scribe” is interesting in itself, as this office is not mentioned in the Ottoman Vilayet Law. The existence of this specialized position shows that neighborhood administration could be more elaborate than that prescribed in the general provisions. The scribe is likely to have written minutes of the meetings of the neighborhood muhtar and the council of elders and he was probably also in charge of account-keeping and producing other documents such as certificates and petitions when needed. This profile of a headperson, a council and a scribe is reminiscent of other urban institutions that worked in a similar way, such as the Shariʿa court, the waqf administration, and the Municipal Council. We do not know much about the scribe’s family but the fact that his son Muhammad ʿAli (born in Gaza in 1304/1886–7) was registered as a student (talebe-yi ʿulum) suggests that education was very important in his household.

Three other household heads of the Hamada family in the neighborhood were registered as peasants (çiftçis) and one as a fisherman or fishmonger (balıkçı). ʿAbdallah Hamada’s household thus appears to represent an upwardly mobile trend within a peasant family. Another family member in ʿAbdallah’s generation was a security guard (bekçî) and it would not seem too far-fetched to assume that he worked on behalf of the neighborhood administration and had obtained his job with some help from his relative, the mahalle scribe.

THE IMAM OF ZAYTUN

Imams, as mentioned above, had been involved in neighborhood governance in Ottoman cities for a long time and although the muhtars had...
replaced them as the main neighborhood representatives, they were still *ex officio* members of the council of elders and thus were potentially influential personalities on the neighborhood level. The only *imam* in the sample of the 1905 Ottoman census we examined was Mahmud Sukayk (1846/7–1909/10), who belonged to a large prominent family in Zaytun and lived in the Ibn ‘Uthman area. He himself was a well-known figure of his time. Gaza’s chronicler, ‘Uthman al-Tabba‘ devoted some words of praise to him.98 Mahmud Sukayk was openly political: in 1892 and again in 1895, we find him among the signatories of petitions in favor of the city’s controversial *mufti*, Muhammad Hanafî al-Husayni.99

The Sukayk family had a tradition in learning and higher education that went back several generations, and several of Mahmud Sukayk’s older relatives were notable Muslim scholars.100 The census registers show that others were merchants and shop owners. One of Mahmud Sukayk’s sons was a tax official (*verg memuru*), and another was a watchmaker (*saatçi*). Exogamous marriages; i.e., marriages outside the extended family,101 seem to have played an important role in this family. It speaks for the wide range of Muhammad Sukayk’s social networks that the three wives in his household came from three different neighborhoods of Gaza: the household head’s wife came from Zaytun, the first son’s wife from Shaja’iyya and the second son’s wife from Daraj.102 All three women were from apparently modest, non-elite backgrounds. Thus, the social profile of Mahmud Sukayk’s household can be described as middle-class, educated, and well-connected both to the local population and to state administration. Whoever the *muhtar* of Zaytun was – the above-mentioned Hasan Burnu or someone else – he had to reckon with the presence of a strong *imam*.

Thus overall, the three people involved in neighborhood administration that we were able to examine came from what we may cautiously define as Gaza’s middle classes. *Muhtar* Ibrahim Misri al-Muzayni, and neighborhood scribe ’Abdallah Hamada, both came from upwardly mobile peasant families. In Hamada’s case, there are indications that a relative was employed in another neighborhood-related job, that of a watchman. *Muhtar* Hasan Burnu and *imam* Muhammad Sukayk, in contrast, came from thoroughly urban, wealthy, and well-connected families. Enterprising families built on these foundations to further their political agendas.

**SPATIALIZED FACTIONALISM: GAZA’S NEIGHBORHOODS AS POWER BASES OF POLITICAL FACTIONS**

As shown elsewhere,103 Gaza’s neighborhoods became part and parcel of the severe factionalist struggle that decisively shaped that city’s public life from the 1870s onwards, and came to a head with Ottoman military intervention in 1898. In particular, the neighborhoods of Daraj and Shaja’iyya were major power bases for the leading families of the two main political alliances. Daraj was the stronghold of the Husayni family from at least the 1840s onwards. They were also known as the “Husayni al-Mufti” family, since the office of the *mufti* was the cornerstone of their power. Shaja’iyya became the power base of the Shawwa family, who, aided by their allies from the Busaysu family, eventually replaced the Husayni coalition as the dominant faction in the city.

Political polarization in Gaza was concomitant with spatial polarization along the north-west-southeast axis, with the Government and Municipal Compound104 in the middle. The leading families concretized their connection to Daraj and Shaja’iyya by maintaining state-ly mansions there and by exerting patronage...
over certain mosques. In addition, main streets connecting these family assets with the Government and Municipality Compounds were styled as representative axes symbolizing the power of the Husayni and Shawwa families. While one was straightforwardly named Shawwa Street, the other was known as “Muf-ti’s Lane” (Sibat al-Mufti), in a subtle but nevertheless clear allusion to the Husayni “al-Mufti” family (see Figure 3).105

From the middle of the 19th century onwards, the Shawwas, who later led the opposition to the Husaynis, built their own stronghold in Shaja’iya, in a strategical location, next to Shaja’iya’s market area, close to the Government and Municipal Compounds in the city center and at a distance from the other elite households. They were deeply rooted in Shaja’iya’s business community and maintained close relations to the other leading elite family of the neighborhood, the Busaysus. This becomes clear from a list of waqf properties in Gaza from 1907. Numerous members of the Shawwa and Busaysu families are listed as tenants of shops in Shaja’iya’s market that belonged to the waqf of the Ibn ‘Uthman Mosque.106

Neighborhood headmen and members of neighborhood councils of elders took part in the factional struggle. For example, in 1895 we see a formidable array of neighborhood administrators sign a petition in support of the Shawwa faction, including first and second muhtars of Judayda, Turkuman and Zaytun, in addition to the Zaytun council of elders.107 Such coalitions fluctuated, however. For example, Zaytun’s muhtar signed a petition in favor of the opposing Husayni faction less than a year later.108 Even more importantly, the main prizes in the political competition were public offices on the city level, such as those of mufti and mayor. Therefore, neither faction entrenched themselves in particular areas of the city but were eager to recruit support from all neighborhoods. As a result, Gaza’s spatialized factionalism did not lead to clearly drawn boundaries cutting through the city but rather to two poles at opposite ends with “neutral” spaces in between and around them.

The above analysis of Gaza’s urban layout and neighborhood structures helps elucidate the social and economic underpinnings of factionalism. The emergence of two competing market centers in Gaza was a rare, if not unique, development among cities in Bilad al-Sham. The pattern of social distance between Daraj and Shaja’iya that we documented indirectly through marriage data in all likelihood preceded the development of the opposition faction under the leadership of the Shawwa family. In other words, economic and social polarization between the two market centers existed long before the Shawwa family politicized it and thereby managed to achieve an unprecedented turnaround in local politics.

CONCLUSION

Late Ottoman Gaza was not a fortified city like Damascus, Jerusalem, or the old center of Jaffa, but rather a city designed to accommodate steady streams of traffic as well as peasants travelling to and from their fields. Each of the city’s neighborhoods was well connected to the outside and, especially in the case of the four mahalles, it would have been impossible to install gates. The boundary between Daraj and Zaytun went right through the middle of al-Suq al-Kabir, the main market street, which means that both neighborhoods shared the crucial space of the market and its economic resources. Shaja’iya and Tuffah were separated from these two central neighborhoods by vacant land, but they were nevertheless well connected to them by major thoroughfares. Very importantly, all neighborhoods had permeable boundaries with the agricultural hinterland. With its expanding suburbs dotted throughout the oasis, the city was on the way to becoming an agglomeration. In other words, Gaza thrived on flows of people and goods along the Cairo-Damascus road as well as between the city and the agricultural land around it. The city’s layout served these vital flows.
At the same time, Gazans, like the inhabitants of other cities in the region, felt a need to draw social and physical boundaries on the levels of households, extended families, and ethno-religious communities. On the household level, the ideals of privacy and security could be best realized by the large elite households, who could afford to buy large plots and to shield them from the outside world with castle-like walls. The Abu Khadra mansion in the Shaykh ‘Ayyad area is a case in point (Figure 11). This was much less obvious in poorer neighborhoods. The inhabitants of the Hillis sub-neighborhood, for example, lived in small modest houses built in rows along a straight street. Most houses probably had entrances from the thoroughfare (Figure 17).

In the absence of narrative sources and first-hand testimonies, it is difficult to determine to what extent sub-neighborhoods such as Shaykh ‘Ayyad or Hillis were social neighborhoods in the sense that they were considered semi-private spaces as described by Abu-Lughod109 that allowed women to move about more freely than elsewhere. Here, census data can help to some extent. In both cases, large families made up a considerable part of the neighborhood population: the Abu Khadras and Turks in Shaykh ‘Ayyad and the Hillises in Hillis. It is likely that the members of these families maintained close relations across their street and sub-neighborhood. However, they did not form the majority of the local population in either area and they thus needed to get along with neighbors from other families. Thus there was a strong tendency towards clustering on the basis of kinship, but not to the extent of making the streets where they lived a kind of private domain.

The question of the degree to which there was religious and/or ethnic clustering in late Ottoman Gaza,110 is harder to answer, because the census registers for the city’s Christian population are unavailable and the few entries for Jewish inhabitants do not mention the streets in which they lived. We have seen that a Christian and two Muslims co-owned a property in the Shaykh ‘Ayyad area, and many more such cases can be found in the court registers.111 However, according to all available sources, all of Gaza’s Christians, as well as the members of the small Jewish community, lived in the Zaytun neighborhood. We therefore assume that Christians and Jews owned property and did business across the entire city, but that religious clustering was the standard residential pattern. Rural emigrants seem to have settled predominantly in the outlying areas of Shaja’iyya.

Rich and poor households were generally mixed in the inner-city areas. There were some more upmarket streets such as Shaykh ‘Ayyad and Shaykh ‘Uthman, but, as we have seen, even in this case low-income households were interspersed between the mansions of the elite families. On the outskirts of the city, in Shaja’iyya, but also on the northern fringes of Daraj, there were large areas with only low-income households. In other words, the wealthy elites were not segregated from non-elite residents in the inner-city neighborhoods, but there were low-income neighborhoods in the city’s periphery where non-elite residents lived among themselves. These differences are visible on the aerial photographs from the World War I period, where the light stone houses of the wealthy contrast with the darker colored mud brick dwellings of the poorer population.

Through the census records, we can form an impression of the social actors involved in neighborhood administration. Although the data are still patchy, we have reason to believe that neighborhoods played an important part in urban governance and that neighborhood administration in Gaza was highly institutionalized. The fact that there was a professional neighborhood scribe (mahalle katibi) in Tuffah underlines the importance of governance on the neighborhood level.

There is no doubt that Gaza’s neighborhoods were spaces of relatively high social connectedness. However, just as with social exchanges, neighborhood identity and solidarity are hard to gauge in the absence of sources that would tell us more about the inner life of Gaza’s neighborhoods. Data on marriages between neighborhoods point to a localist identity and selectivity of social ties across neighborhoods. On the other hand, what we know about

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110 To date, the most detailed description of religious and ethnic clustering in a location of late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham is Campos, “Mapping Urban ‘Mixing’.”
111 The best overview of Gaza’s available Shari’a court registers is still Abdul-Karim Rafeq, Ghazza.
social networks and activities in the city points towards the existence of certain hotspots, but not to collective action on the level of the neighborhood. Research on collective petitions, for example, has shown that the initiators took care to enlist supporters from the entire city for their cause and not be confined to a particular sector. Thus, factionalist tendencies were counterbalanced by the desire to speak for the entire city population.

Neighborhood structures played a highly important role in the politics of the urban elite households. The existence of an alternative economic and religious center in Shaja‘iyya allowed enterprising members of the Shawwa family to relocate within the city and build up a territorial home base from which they could mount a serious challenge to the establishment faction in the old city center. However, as bitter as this factionalist rivalry was, it did not result in fixed boundaries, either visible or invisible, between segments of the city. Neither did it lead to territorialized political identities. Moreover, we do not know of neighborhood militias or strongmen like the famous qabadayās of Damascus. Territorial bases and assets bound to a certain location served the local notables as a crucial component in their competition for political hegemony, but their politics were aimed at the city as a whole, and could work only through the flexible interplay of various actors and resources.

How typical were these patterns when viewed comparatively? Our findings on late Ottoman Gaza’s neighborhoods is similar to many of the general patterns established by the recent empirical studies on late Ottoman urbanism and urban governance cited above. Bilad al-Sham is a convenient geographic framework for comparison, but insights from the literature on other Ottoman locations are also instructive, especially concerning urban governance, and should not be overlooked. In our study, a spread-out and traffic-oriented urban layout, and permeable neighborhood boundaries, as well as the existence of two competing market centers, and spatialized factionalism, emerged as Gaza’s main specificities. The most important factors that gave Gaza’s neighborhoods their specific character were the city’s location at the intersection of two trade routes, its dependence on trade and traffic flowing along these routes, and its close connection to the agricultural hinterland.

Thus Gaza can be imagined as a city of flows and networks, not as an ensemble of bounded neighborhood entities. Urban neighborhoods need to be taken seriously as units of urban governance, and governance on the neighborhood level needs to be studied more systematically in order for urban governance in the late Ottoman period to be fully understood. In the case of Gaza, for example, we need to know more about routine practices such as taxation, street cleaning, and the maintenance of security and public morals on the neighborhood level, in order to better capture how state and social order manifested themselves on the doorstep of city dwellers in this part of the Ottoman Empire. With regard to the relevance of urban subdivisions, the existence of social cleavages along neighborhood lines – as becomes transparent through marriage patterns – did not necessarily mean that neighborhood boundaries were tightly policed. Neighborhood boundaries were permeable and collective political action took place across a broad range of spatial levels, from the household to the wider world.

In our ongoing study of late Ottoman Gaza, including for this chapter on the city's neighborhoods, we use a wide array of maps and aerial photos. Unlike most other cities in Bilad al-Sham during the time period examined in this book, we possess a detailed colored map of Gaza drawn in 1887 and published a year later by the Austrian Catholic priest Georg Gatt (1843–1924), who lived in Gaza in the 1880s. Gatt moved to Gaza in 1879, where he founded a parish and a school and had first-hand knowledge of the city and its people. At the time the map was published, he had lived in Gaza for eight years and can therefore be regarded as a long-term resident of the city. Gatt's map, produced during the time of factionalist struggles in Gaza, is invaluable as it makes it possible to situate the buildings and reconstruct the layout of the city, and leads to insights unavailable from other sources. In particular, it provides information not only on the location of public buildings and city infrastructure but also on that of the households of leading Gazan families. It also details family assets and their clusters (e.g. houses, trading firms, mosques), the city's division into neighborhoods, the separation of Shaja’iyya from the other neighborhoods, the agricultural surroundings of Gaza, the remains of the old city fortifications, and the city's sprawling nature.

To the best of our knowledge, there are no extant Ottoman maps of Gaza dating back to the end of the 19th century, although the Ottoman government produced detailed maps of other cities in Greater Syria, Ottoman Palestine included. During the British Mandate, several accurate maps of Gaza and its region were prepared which can be used to extrapolate continuities and changes in the city's expansion with respect to the Ottoman era. The British produced an accurate map of Gaza as early as 1917 when the region was still under Ottoman control, in preparation for their attack on the region.

When we use maps as historical sources, we should interrogate them by the same principles of source criticism that we apply to textual evidence. To take the example of Gatt's map, a comparison with the work of other cartographers reveals that his map was probably based on a British map from 1843. A comparison with contemporary local writings shows that the way in which Gatt divided Gaza into neighborhoods diverges in some respects from local usage and betrays a tendency to highlight ethno-religious divisions within local society that was typical of much of the Orientalist scholarship of his generation. Biographical information is key to understanding another feature of this map: the information is densest around Gatt's personal residence and from there thins out as the distance increases. Outlying areas, such as the important suburb of Shaja’iyya, are represented in a very schematic way. In this respect, Gatt's map must thus be seen as a reflection of his own ‘mental map’ of the city.

In addition to maps, there are also very good aerial photos of Gaza from World War I. For instance, we possess high-resolution aerial photos of the region (on glass plates) taken by the Bavarian Squadron in 1918, after the British army had already captured Gaza. There are also good quality aerial photos taken by the British in preparation for their attack on Gaza in the Spring of 1917 and later in the Autumn of that year when they invaded southern Palestine.

In the framework of our project on late Ottoman Gaza we implemented GIS (Geo-
graphic Information System) technology to present some 15 digitized maps of the city from different periods, ranging from the 1880s to the 1940s, in addition to using aerial photos of the city from the World War I period. They were geo-rectified according to geodata provided by OpenStreetMap (OSM). In the GIS, maps and aerial photos take the form of layers that can be annotated and overlaid as a function of need. Together they form an interactive digital map, which is an important “add on” tool to the toolbox of urban history.

GIS make it possible to reframe data derived from written sources in new ways that lead to new insights with regard to the importance of space and place. For instance, our work shows how Gaza’s two rivaling political factions drew support from a broad range of social categories representing all walks of life in Gaza and how political activity was not confined to a specific neighborhood. Our interactive map helps visualize social networks and points to hitherto neglected components of this rivalry, such as how the leading households of the two rival factions in Gaza’s elite built two strongholds in different neighborhoods of the city and used buildings and street names to communicate their social standing and political ambitions. GIS data also enable us to identify historically important sub-neighborhoods, some of which emerged as political hotspots.
INSTITUTIONS AT THE CITY LEVEL
THE WAQFS OF HAJJA SITT IKHWITHA AND KHALIL DAHMASH IN THE CITY OF AL-LUDD: LOCAL AGENTS OF URBAN CHANGE

Tawfiq Da’adli

Abstract | This article focuses on the urban development of the city of al-Ludd (Lydda) at the end of the 19th and the turn of the 20th century. It builds on two cases that left their mark on the city’s landscape and considerably affected its social life. The first case involves the endowment deed of a woman who used the revenues from her estate to help the poor and pilgrims. The second case, documented in the archive of the Supreme Muslim Council, has to do with the building of a market adjacent to a newly-established mosque. The first case came to its conclusion after the woman passed away, whereas the market continued to develop. These cases are both illustrative of urban and social dynamics that also shaped topography by changing the face of the city map.

INTRODUCTION

In the small cities and towns constituting the Arab provincial capitals under Ottoman rule, their inhabitants also produced “their own rhythms of change and adaptability within the pervasive and permeating power of Ottoman imperialism.”1 These local agents impacted the urban landscape in many ways. Some maintained traditional modes of investing in the urban sphere such as building endowment institutions including madrasas, zawiyas and shrines, but others, adhering to the zeitgeist of modern urban conceptions, were more interested in the public sphere and built new squares, boulevards and gardens.

This article centers on two quarters that existed in the city of al-Ludd in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Both quarters developed northwards out of the city: one towards the east, Saknet es Sitt Ikhwitha2 surrounding the shrine of ʿAbd al-Rahman b. ʿAwf (see Figure 1, a), and the other, which was larger, to the west surrounding Bir el Gharbiye (Biʾr al-Gharbiyya), the well that probably gave rise to the extension of this area. The sijillat of the court of al-Ludd and Jaffa help reconstruct the case of Saknet es Sitt Ikhwitha (Saknat al-Sitt, see Figure 1, b);3 aerial photos taken by the German air force in 1917–1918, and later by their British counterparts in 1937, testify to the development of Bir el Gharbiye.

1 Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds.), The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire (Würzburg: Ergon, 2002), p. 19.
2 The names of the quarters, streets, and other places in the city correspond to the transliteration on the city map of 1929. We use this transliteration to make it easier for readers to refer to the map.
3 Nonetheless these sources should not be taken as a mirror of society. See Dror Ze’evi, “The Use of Ottoman Shariʿa Court Records as a Source for Middle Eastern Social History: A Reappraisal,” Islamic Law and Society 15/1 (1998); Boğaç A. Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society, and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankiri and Kastamonu (1652–1744) (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Iris Agmon and Ido Shahar, “Shifting Perspectives in the Study of Shariʿa Courts: Methodologies and Paradigms,” Islamic Law and Society 15/1 (2008).
The city of al-Ludd, in central Ottoman Palestine, today the center of Israel, is located on the border between the lowlands and the coastal plain. This location has two main advantages. The first is that al-Ludd is situated within the wide and fertile catchment area of Wadi Musrara (Nahal Ayalon) that made the city famous for its agriculture. The plain was used to grow grain and vegetables, while olive groves and orchards were located on the surrounding hills. In a *wilayat salnama* (provincial annual report, from Ott. Turk. salname) dating to 1872, ten soap factories (*masabin*) were registered in al-Ludd, a greater number than those in the whole district of Ramla in its entirety.\(^4\)

\(^4\) In an article about soil erosion in Wadi Musrara, Guy gives an eyewitness account of the flood of 23 February 1938 which testifies to the fertile nature of the region.


Figure 1: Aerial Photo of al-Ludd Dated 26 June 1936 (Courtesy of the Israel Antiquities Authority, IAA). (a) Saknet es Sitt Ikhwitha, (b) Bir el Gharbiye, (c) location of city hall and post office.
The second advantage is the city’s location at the crossroads of two of Palestine’s main international arteries: the road connecting Cairo with Damascus and the main road between Jaffa and Jerusalem. From the Late Bronze Age to modern times, al-Ludd is mentioned in direct reference to these two roads. The importance of the roads is exemplified most vividly by the British Mandate decision to locate the country’s main train hub near the city.

Medieval and Ottoman al-Ludd is described as an important station along the Mamluk postal road connecting Gaza and Damascus via Yubna (Yavneh), al-Ludd, and Ra’s al-ʿAyn. The development of the inland branch of the Cairo-Damascus route was one of the great engineering enterprises of the period. Al-Ludd experienced a revival as a result of the development of this major traffic route, especially since the early Mamluk sultans paid close attention to ensuring the orderly and secure movement of the royal post (barid) between the imperial capital of Cairo and the major provincial capital of Damascus. The monumental bridge of al-Ludd known as Jisr Jindas after the neighboring village, which has been in use since the time of its construction, was part of this effort. Two almost identical inscriptions on both its facades signal its construction by the Mamluk Sultan Baybars.8

Ottoman al-Ludd, in contrast, is less familiar to historians since no monumental inscriptions or buildings have survived and most of the city was demolished after 1948, leaving little material evidence behind. This article is thus mainly based on documents, aerial photos, and city plans. In addition to archival documents, several buildings that survived were surveyed. Apart from the main mosque, al-ʿUmari Mosque, and the Church of St. George, a dozen buildings can still be seen on the ground. They include three traditional factories, seven shrines, a monastery, and a khan.

Much can be said about the city from a single camera shot taken on Friday, 26 June 1936, when an English pilot flew a plane, most likely from the airport built in al-Ludd during the British Mandate, on a photo flight over the city (see Figure 1). In one photograph, taken at 9:20 in the morning, the city, dense with buildings and crisscrossed by alleys, is seen surrounded by fields. In this picture two cities emerge: one enclosed within a tightly woven fabric, the other open, extending in all directions. The first was later named al-Hara al-Sharqiyya, the eastern neighborhood, and the other, developing in a westerly direction, al-Hara al-Gharbiyya, the western neighborhood (see Figure 2). The latter was built on a plan of intersecting streets and quarters lined with courtyard houses. Although the development of the urban core, west and south, began even before the British entry to the city, its development accelerated under the British.9

The Old City plan looks like a dense triangle of structures, including fine lines barely visible in the photo. Parts of the city are surrounded by streets encircling districts, with two or three main streets connecting the various parts of the city. One street bisects the city from north to south and leads to the mosque in the south. Another street passes in front of the khan, in the center of the city. This street was probably home to the city’s main market. Despite the density of the urban tissue, the main routes and alleys are still visible. Between those lines are the insulae made up of different buildings.

The photograph shows that the Old City was surrounded by a ring-road, except in the west. The northern part of the ring-road was called Tariq al-Hamza, after al-Hamza’s fields and reservoir located just north of the road (see Figure 2). In the west, the ring road was connected to three streets that traversed the city from north to south; between them the neighborhoods are divided into rectangles. These houses were built when the city expanded under the British Mandate. At one of the interfaces between the Old City and the expansion to the west is a square in which the post office and city hall were located (see Figure 1, c). Another

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square, with Bir el Gharbiye at the center, appears at the intersection of the northern side of the ring-road and two of the three new streets in the western section. This square is fronted by the Dahmash Mosque built by Khalil Dahmash, a wealthy man who decided to establish a mosque and market in the New City, in addition to the one in the Old City, as discussed below (see Figure 1, b).

**WAQF OF SITT IKHWITHA:**

**FAMILY WAQF**

A long hearing took place in the Jaffa court on 17 Rajab 1315 / 12 December 1897 in which two sisters claimed that their brother, who was managing the endowment deed, waqf, of their late mother, had not given them their share of the revenue.\(^{10}\) The session, although long, was not exceptional. As we learn from Beshara Doumani, siblings often disagreed among themselves and took each other to court.\(^{11}\) Sisters had an even tougher time since they were usually excluded from inheritance and waqf revenues. This court session is interesting in so far as it pertained to a unique Hajja who used to live in the city of al-Ludd. This Hajja, who frequently appeared in the local court of al-Ludd and represented herself, can teach us something about the social and urban dynamics of a small town on the cusp of the 20th century.

The first round of *waqf* registration documented in al-Ludd’s court records, dated 31 October 1876 / 12 Shawwal 1293, reveals that Hajja Fatima b. Muhammad al-ʿAwadi, nicknamed Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha, appeared in the small

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\(^{10}\) Jaffa court Sijill G/73/35, book 68, pp. 35–43 (kept at the Israel State Archive).

courtroom very frequently. Sitt Ikhwitha used to lend money, serve as a witness to marriages, and buy olive oil. At the end of her life she bequeathed the majority of her estate as a waqf. Sitt Ikhwitha asked that her waqf be divided between her sons and daughters and that one quarter be set aside for the benefit of the poor in Ramadan. She stipulated that 30 ratil of bread be given to the poor each day during Ramadan. Finally, the Hajja stipulated that, when her heirs had all died, the waqf revenues should be dedicated to the upkeep of the noble shrine of Medina. Almost twenty years later, the Hajja passed away and suddenly her name appears in the district court in Jaffa, on 12 December 1897. This time, documents reveal that she had bequeathed her estate to the Zawiya al-Hamra’, which she was instrumental in building in her neighborhood in the northern part of al-Ludd. In this waqf she also requested that part of the money be transferred to the Azhar Mosque in Cairo to support students. The Jaffa document reveals information about the Hajja’s origin. She was identified in this waqf registration as: al-Hajja Fatima sitt Ikhwitha bint al-Shaykh Muhammad al’Awadi Ibn al-Shaykh Muhammad Bakshish al’Awdi from (min ahali) al-Zawiya al-Hamra’ in Egypt (bi-l-Diyar al-misriyya) who lives (al-qatina bi) in al-Ludd’s Qasaba, near the Jaffa district (Qada’ Yafa) in the province of Jerusalem (bi-Liwa’ al-Quds al-Sharif).

Al-Zawiya al-Hamra is a quarter in the northern part of Old Cairo, where a zawiya painted red used to stand. The Hajja was clearly looking to her origins when she sought to build a zawiya by the same name in al-Ludd. The place chosen for the zawiya was the site around the shrine of Abd al-Rahman b. ’Awf, who appears not to have been buried in al-Ludd. However, this saint had been venerated on the pilgrimage road since the late Mamluk period, and the Hajja wanted her zawiya to be linked to an active pilgrimage site.

Apparently the zawiya was not complete when the Hajja registered the waqf, since it included a stipulation that the revenue from the waqf be dedicated to the faithful who attended the Shawam Riwaq in the al-Azhar Mosque until the zawiya was completed. This riwaq, built by the Mamluk Sultan al-Ahraf Qaytbay, was donated to the people of al-Sham, Greater Syria; hence the name, Shawam. The waqfyya also requested that if the waqf revenues could not be dedicated to attendees at the Shawam Riwaq, they should instead go to the poor (fuqa-ra) wherever they were found, in perpetuity. In addition to these wishes, the Hajja imposed several conditions:

- Poor: Every day during Ramadan 60 loaves of wheat bread should be served, food prepared to a total value of 300 qurush to be served with the aforementioned bread and a sum of 200 qurush be allocated for buying coffee for visitors throughout the year.
- Pilgrims: Every year 200 qurush should be paid to whomsoever brings water to visitors to the zawiya throughout the year. Another 200 qurush should be paid to whomsoever brings water to the water tank of this zawiya. This water is to be brought from the eastern saqiya (water-raising device similar to scoop wheel) that is close to the zawiya. Moreover, water should be brought to the sabil (public water fountain) situated in this zawiya. 100 qurush is to be given to the nazir (waqf administrator) of this waqf from profits accruing from the garden appended to it.
- Maintenance: 100 qurush should be spent on jars of olive oil and mats to cover the floor; and 65 measures (uqqa) of olive oil for lighting; 100 for renovating the zawiya.
- Sadaqa: 200 is to be set aside for sadaqa (charitable purposes).

12 The Awqaf Department, Abu Dis, Sijill al-Ludd, 8/1292/1,1/16, pp. 269–272.
13 Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a Global Cairo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 1–7, Figure 1.
15 Riwaq al-Shawam is one of the 29 riwaqs (lit. arcades) that were used as majalis ilm, namely a place to sit and impart knowledge to students at the mosque. Each riwaq had its own waqf that supported the students and their welfare. Nasser Rabbat, “Al-Azhar Mosque: An Architectural Chronicle of Cairo’s History,” Muqarnas 13 (1996), p. 58.
Moreover, we learn from the endowment deed that if the zawiya was not built, the nazir should build two vaults and between them a diwan, a courtyard and a murtafaq (resting place?) to the east. In addition, each daughter, Latuf, Fatma and Salma, was to receive a jar of olive oil and 100 qurush, unless she was unmarried, in which case the nazir should give her something from the waqf revenues.

The Jaffa court hearing dealt with at least seventeen properties in al-Ludd that were owned by Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha, including residences, shops, a sesame press, and orchards. The first property is a residence (dar) that consists of nine rooms, an iwan, a courtyard situated on the first floor, and two reception rooms (qasir), on the second floor. This residence bordered the Saray (the governor’s house) to the west and the zawiya of Sa’d and Sa’id to the south. The zawiya is marked on the 1929 map of the city, making it possible to identify the Hajja’s house and the Saray on the aerial photo of 1936 (see Figure 3). The white roof of a newly renovated building can be seen to the north of Zawiyat Sa’d and Sa’id, which might be the Saray to the east of which was the Hajja’s residence. A post-1948 report by the Israel Antiquity Authority notes a two-story house in this block that includes an inscription dated to 1294/1877, which might be part of the Hajja’s residence.

Figure 3: The shrine of Sa’d and Sa’id, no.10, Saray (marked in blue), and Dar al-Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha (marked in red). Part of town plan of Ludd dated 1929 and aerial photo of Ludd dated 26 June 1936.

16 Thirty-seven buildings (or monuments as they are
house or even the qasr mentioned in the court hearing.

On 14 Rajab 1293 / 5 August 1876, a year before the date was inscribed, the Hajja bought a residence on the same block (hawsh), Hawsh Farraj. The residence had only one room and a courtyard. This was in addition to other properties of hers in the hawsh (complex of several houses) that were registered on 12 Shawwal 1293 / 31 October 1876, as part of her waqf, which included six rooms, a storage space (ba‘i-ka) built of two vaults, an iwan and a courtyard. This property was enlarged several years later according to a Jaffa court hearing of 11 December 1897. The process of buying more properties in the same complex was part of the Hajja's strategy to establish her estate in the city center, adjacent to the Saray and next to the main khan and the bazaar situated in front of it. It can be assumed that the Hajja enlarged her property by building more rooms. The inscribed date may actually refer to the construction phase in which the Hajja, a year after she bought more properties in the block, built a reception room or qasr.17

This process of enlarging her residence in the city and then registering it as a waqf property is similar to a process that was popular in Nablus. Doumani describes the importance of residences for the families of Nablus:

Dar was solid and immovable: the headquarters of a household, constituting a discrete corporate entity centralized around the male. Dar was the key marker in the built environment of the city that defined a family name's longevity and its potential wealth, power, and status in the larger society. Dar was the anchor of surplus extraction networks connecting the city to its hinterlands, as well of manufacturing and trade networks on the local and regional levels. Dar, not surprisingly, was and still is the word used in Nablus (and southern Bilad al-Sham in general) for both “house” and “family.”

Other properties marked on the map are two orchards situated on the western side of Zawiyat Muqdad, located on the ring-road crossing to the east of the city and called Tariq Danyal in the document (see Figure 2, no. 4). On the same road and further to the north, a vineyard named ‘Amsuniyya is also included in the waqfiyya. The ‘Amsuniyya surrounded the zawiya of ‘Abd al-Rahman, around which the Hajja asked to build and enlarge the zawiya (see Figure 2, no. 7). Other estates that can be identified on the city map are the plantations near al-Lazqa orchard attached to Zawiyat al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Mu‘min and the one attached to Zawiyat al-Shaykh Zaki (see Figure 2, no. 9).

The Hajja’s waqf can be considered a mixed (mushtarak) waqf whereby transfer to the designated charitable purpose was undertaken in several stages, with a proviso that stipulated the endower and her eldest son to be the administrators. In this kind of waqf, a portion of the property is transferred to the endower's descendants and another portion directly to a charitable purpose. These mabarrat (good deeds) served several purposes simultaneously. They generated rewards in the afterlife and established the infrastructure of a religious institution. They also constituted a spiritual and cultural interface within the family and in society at large.18

When examining the case of Hajja Sitt Ikwitha from the perspective of Bilad al-Sham, the case of Sayyid Amin al-Wajih of Tripoli can shed some light on the common practice of good deeds. After dividing the waqf revenues between his wife and daughter, Sayyid Amin directed some sums to be set aside annually after his death for the performance of mabarrat, the rewards of which were to accrue to his soul. Half the sum was to employ readers to recite the Qur'an twelve times a year, the other half to be spent on feeding the Muslim poor on the holy night of mid-Sha'ban, believed to be the night when the doors of forgiveness and sala-

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18 Doumani, Family Life, p. 105.
vation open, and thus an occasion on which to commemorate one’s ancestors.19

Although there was apparently no organized religious system in al-Ludd, the Hajja was at least looking for mabarrat since she wanted the zawiya to be built and that money spent on the poor. There may not have been many Qur’an reciters in al-Ludd or perhaps the cost of one was exorbitant. More research needs to be done on these questions. What we do know is that the small town of al-Ludd differed from the larger and wealthier town of Nablus. When comparing Nablus and Tripoli, Doumani claims that the use of waqf to infuse moral/spiritual values was ubiquitous in Tripoli, while in Nablus it was almost entirely absent. Moreover, he says that

since good deeds were labor-intensive and largely performed by religious workers who got paid a weekly or monthly salary, this means that the reproduction of family through waqfs was critical to the financing and maintenance of a large religious establishment in Tripoli, but not so in Nablus.20

To date we have not found any evidence of any large or even small religious establishments in al-Ludd, except for the many small zawiyas about which we have little information.21 Thus the few lines we have about the function of al-Zawiya al-Hamra open a window onto a world that would otherwise be concealed.

The dimensions of this obscure world can be ascertained from a list of 47 awqaf (endowed properties) in al-Ludd dated 1871. They included 25 family waqfs, while the remainder supported mosques, monasteries, and zawiyas in the city.22 One waqf supported the two noble shrines of Mecca and Medina, one supported the Mosque of Ibrahim in Hebron, and another was associated with the great mosque in Ramla. At the top of the list it is stated that the qasaba of al-Ludd was a waqf for the Hasseki Sultan, meaning that a portion of the endowment revenues was dedicated to Hasseki Sultan ʿImaret in Jerusalem.23 This list does not appear to be complete since another endowment used to support Maqam Sidna ʿAli b. ʿAlī is mentioned in a court hearing in al-Ludd.24

This list indicates that family waqfs were also involved in the political economy of local, regional, and imperial religious establishments, because the endower could specify the charitable places to which revenues would go once its lineage ceased to exist. In Tripoli and Nablus, as in most other urban centers, the popular choices were local mosques, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Sufi shaykhs and their progeny, and finally, the “poor,” whether of a particular neighborhood, the city as a whole, or the Muslim world in general. Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha chose to refer to her origins, her home-city of Cairo, and more specifically to a specific quarter in that city. The first thing that comes to mind when Egypt is mentioned in the context of mid-19th century Palestine is Egyptian rule over the country between 1831 and 1840, and the immigration of Egyptians to Palestine, especially to coastal cities. As mentioned in the Jaffa court hearing, al-Ludd was in Jaffa district, so the Hajja’s family might well have immigrated to Jaffa and then moved on to al-Ludd. The sijillat of al-Ludd mention several other Masris; i.e., Egyptians.

If our hypothesis is right, the Hajja was hoping to be reconnected – even if only posthumously – with the place from which she or her father came. Sending money to the Riwaq al-Shawam in al-Azhar testifies to the importance of this institution even to people who lived in the small city of al-Ludd. Neither Mecca nor Medina, nor even Jerusalem featured in the Hajja’s donation circle. While the noble shrine of Medina is mentioned in the first waqfiyya, it is totally absent from the later one.

From his examination of the waqfiyyat of the inhabitants of Nablus and Tripoli, Doumani claims that the public act of purchasing and distributing food – whether daily, weekly, monthly, or annually – in the name of the family

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19 Ibid., p. 137.
20 Ibid., p. 156.
and its founding figure, enhanced the family's status and imparted a sense of social and religious discipline among its members. The rituals of purchasing and distributing, moreover, ensured that the endower and the beneficiaries were woven into the larger social and cultural fabric of the neighborhood and city. In dedicating her money to pupils in Cairo, the Hajja of al-Ludd and/or her family became connected to the wider social, cultural, and economic fabric.

STATE WAQF

Several institutions are mentioned as supporting the Sitt Ikhwitha Waqf. These included certain shrines and lands belonging to the shrines, as well as the gardens of Zawiyat Zaki and Zawiyat 'Abd al-Mu'min (see Figure 2, no. 9 and 8). The conclusions of the long Jaffa court session reveal that a certain parcel of land planted with olive trees and registered in the Hajja Waqf was actually part of Waqf Hasseki Sultan, which supported the royal kitchens in Jerusalem. How did the Hajja manage to lay her hands on that land? Why did she own gardens attached to zawiyas that were probably supported by a waqf? These are just some of the questions that emerge from the court case concerning the Hajja's waqf. The queries that emerge from Doumani's conclusions can also be raised. Did the olive trees give the Hajja a role in the public sphere as did mulberry trees for the women of Tripoli? In several court sessions, olive trees are mentioned instead of land. What does this tell us about social life in al-Ludd compared with Nablus, where women were less active than their sisters in Tripoli?

It was not only the olive oil industry, as manifested in the many soap factories (some still extant), that gave the Hajja entry into the al-Ludd economy. The Hajja's final waqfiyya includes a sesame press, miṣarat sirij, situated in the eastern quarter of the city. The sesame industry was one of the economic pillars of al-Ludd and some sesame presses can still be seen there. Moreover, sesame presses can usually be found under the same roof as olive oil presses and are connected to soap factories. One such factory is still owned by descendants of the Hajja, the Hassuna family on her second husband's side.

The case of Sayyid Amin al-Wajih of Tripoli, who donated mulberry trees to a Mamluk charitable waqf, sheds light on the way waqf lands can be used or partly transferred to a family waqf. Al-Wajih's access to the land was secured by a long-term lease (hikr) that was part of a sophisticated legal system that allowed for private ownership of trees and buildings planted or erected on waqf lands. It may be that the hikr system made it possible for Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha to bequeath the olive trees to her daughters. Moreover, when the waqfiyya refers to the mashatil, orchards, attached to the zawiyas, it only refers to the fruit and vegetables and not to the land, which explains the Hajja's long-term strategic investment in lands she did not own.

WAQF KAHLIL DAHMASH

On 5 July 1924, the qadi of Ramla sent a detailed letter to the president of the Supreme Muslim Council, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, asking for permission to build ablution facilities, restrooms, and storerooms adjacent to the mosque of Dahmash. Dahmash hoped that the revenues from these facilities would support the mosque he had endowed. The land adjacent to the mosque on which he sought to build was part of Waqf al-Dabbagh and was described as “land that does not accrue any benefit to the waqf and is not suitable for anything that could result in revenue for a long time.”

The land and the mosque were situated outside the borders of the Old City on its northwestern side. This area is located between the Old City and an isolated neighborhood fairly far from it and is one of the earliest neighborhoods established “outside the city walls.” The remoteness of this neighborhood from the city may be the reason for its description as unprofitable. However, what may seem unprofitable to one side of the city can nonetheless be of benefit to another side. From the perspective of the Old City, the land was outside the trading area, while from the viewpoint of the developing


27 Doumani, Family Life, p. 135.

28 The Awqaf Department, Abu Dis, file, 8/24/2,16/10.
northwestern extension of the city, it formed the heart of a new market (see Figure 4).

Dahmash decided to situate his mosque on the line connecting the northwestern quarter with the Old City. Shops were built around its entrance sides and facing the road. Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s letter confirms that storerooms were added to the shops, forming a commercial plaza. At the core of this plaza stood Bir el Gharbiye and to its north a row of shops that can be seen under construction in pictures from World War I (see Figure 5). Another row of shops was added on the opposite side of the plaza, aligned with Dahmash’s shops and the mosque’s façade. 29 By building the mosque and the shops on the route that linked the Old City with the western neighborhood, Dahmash strengthened or even established a new pole, in the sense defined by Attilio Petruccioli. 30

This pole developed into a major crossroads with lines stretching north to Wilhelma (as indicated on the map) and to Ramla in the south. In addition, routes stretched on the west-east axis to the railway station, the western quarters, and the Muslim western cemetery. On the eastern side, it led to the northern quarters, and to the village of al-Nabi Danyal, and the Jewish settlement of Ben-Shemen through Tariq al-Hamza. 31 The façade of Dahmash’s mosque, decorated with a high central arch with circular hood-mold supported by acanthus capitals on thin elongated pillars (see Figure 6), graced this plaza, in a style redolent of a much larger city, such as Jaffa.

29 Dahmash already had a business in this part of the city: a tannery that is registered in a court hearing from 6 Muharram 1293 / 1 February 1876 that was held in al-Ludd, Sijill al-Ludd, 8/1292/1,1/16, p. 180.


CONCLUSION

Salim Tamari’s recent observations about the rearrangement of space in some Palestine cities are pertinent to al-Ludd as well. He refers to picnics in Shaykh Jarrah, outside the Jerusalem city walls, and to soccer matches played just outside Herod’s Gate. These leisure activities differ considerably from traditional or religious rituals. He argues that:

Urban Palestine witnessed another transformation of the public sphere outside the arena of ceremonious activities that can be attributed to a perceptible change in lifestyle. It is related, I believe, to the transfer of habit to the neighborhoods outside the old city, as well as related to the change from leisure activities rooted in religious ritual to new forms of leisure activities.32

On a timeline of urban development, Tamari’s leisure activities were conducted in spaces not

designed for it very early on. Jaffa’s clock tower plaza and the public square built in front of the Saray constitute another milestone. The picture of the Ottoman governor of Jerusalem addressing the Jaffa crowds highlights the importance of this plaza.\footnote{Tamari, The Great War, Figure 7.} The end point, at least in Tamari’s chapter, was the urban planning of Bi’r al-Sab’ (Beersheba), the first “intentionally planned urban center” in Palestine, as Tamari puts it.\footnote{Ibid., p. 64.} The Bir el Gharbiye square resembles a second point on this timeline and the grid-like plan of the western neighborhoods in al-Ludd that developed under the British Mandate can be considered a third point, later than Bi’r al-Sab’s urban plan.

The case of the Dahmash Mosque and shops points to a dramatic change in the market space. Compared to the suqs inside the Old City, such as those that were once located in front of the main khan (caravansary), Khan al-Hilu, which were built in traditional style, i.e. a narrow, four-meter-wide lane with rows of shops on each side, the new market square was more than fifteen meters wide. This new square was a precursor to a style of building that accelerated under the British, especially after the earthquake of 1927, when the inhabitants sought to leave the ruined Old City for planned new neighborhoods situated to the west of the city.

On the other side of the city, a new quarter was established, Saknet es Sitt Ikhwitha, sparked by the Hajja’s interest in the shrine of ʿAbd al-Rahman. The earliest documentation we have of this quarter is German air force photos dated to the end of World War I. In this period, the quarter encompassed the shrine, a cemetery to its north, and the buildings of the quarter to the south. The quarter seems to have three houses with an alley that separated the two blocks. On the 1936 aerial photo, the northern block had been enlarged and was bounded by another alley to the north. What had previously looked isolated and far from the city center was now attached to the city by a network of roads extending out of the city. This also meant that more houses and buildings were built on the sides of the roads, making the city fabric tighter.

Even though the quarter of Hajja Sitt Ikhwitha also developed out of the Old City, it was funded mainly by estates situated within the city. Unlike the Dahmash Mosque it did not include any businesses, but rather was meant to serve pilgrims visiting the sahabi shrine, especially during the month of Ramadan. Perhaps the Hajja also invested in businesses similar to those established by Dahmash, but these are not described in the documents available to date. The Hajja appeared to follow traditional practice, while Dahmash set the stage for changes that accelerated in Palestine and particularly in al-Ludd, or Lydda, as it was renamed by the British, after World War I.
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**SIJILL, MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS: RECONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF A SMALL TOWN IN LATE OTTOMAN PALESTINE**

This chapter is based on a variety of sources that are usually discussed separately in different fields. One is composed of written documents, which are typically used by historians to reconstruct narratives. The other is maps and aerial photos, which are used by geographers and urban historians. However, the combination of these sources can shed more light on the daily lives of the inhabitants. Documentation in the form of a town map or aerial photo also serves as a window on the past. Both sources are highly valuable especially after a town has been almost totally demolished and depopulated. The written documents act, in a certain way, as the voice of the people whereas a single aerial photo can capture the memory of a whole town.

Written documents can, in some cases, allow us to imagine certain alleyway or even a neighborhood, unlike a text, even a long one, that cannot provide a full picture of the dimensions of a town. Certain works of fiction may describe the town or city where the protagonists live but even then, the reader is held captive by the characters’ perspectives. Official registration documents are usually closer to reality. Yet, these descriptions tend to be laconic even when describing a building site or location. By contrast, maps and aerial photos supply a general view of a town or a city and provide less information about details on the ground. In some cases, a house or street in a written document can be located on an aerial photo or map. This yields both a general and specific information about a home or street. The written document supplies social details, the names of the owners, their social status, the number of people in a household and other details whereas photos can situate it within the urban hierarchy.

The written documents consulted for this chapter consist primarily of sijillat, court hearings, and waqfiyyat, endowment deeds. The latter were often filed in the sijillat, although not exclusively. The one presented here was found in two sijills, one from Jaffa and the other from al-Ludd. Ludd had a court, and some hundred cases still remain documented in a single file that survived the town’s destruction in the war of 1948. It contains several endowment deeds mentioned in the court hearings as part of suits or litigations between family members. The case discussed here was apparently registered in the Jaffa court. Although the relationship between the small court in Ludd and the central court in Jaffa is unknown, their hierarchy is obvious.

The survey of the town some decades before its destruction, and two or three aerial photos taken several years before the survey for military use depict the town in two different stages and reveal a number of urban changes. Each serves to demonstrate a different dynamic, which can be termed “conservative” and more “modern.”
THE ARZUHALCIS AND THE CHANGING LATE OTTOMAN URBAN SPHERE IN GAZA

Yuval Ben-Bassat

Abstract | Little research has been devoted to date to the work and social background of the arzuhalcis, the professional letter and petition writers in the Ottoman Empire, even though they were part of the Ottoman urban landscape of the 19th century and handled most of the public’s writing and correspondence with the authorities. The services they offered were well known to the general public and a wide variety of people, men and women, urbanites, villagers, Bedouins, and officials alike, approached them and paid for having their petitions written professionally. This article examines the arzuhalacis’ social profile and status in society based on the Ottoman census of 1905 for the city of Gaza on the southern Palestine coast. Petitions sent from this city to Istanbul by the city’s urban population as well as by peasants and Bedouin from the region were for the most part written in Arabic, often in a very high register, which no doubt was formulated by professional petition writers. Several questions come to mind when exploring the place of the arzuhalcis in Gaza, in particular given what we know about this city’s stormy politics at the time. How many petition and letter writers were active in this city? Were any of them identified with one of the factions in this city to an extent that others from rivaling coalitions refrained from using their services? Were any of the petition writers in Gaza former state employees, or perhaps non-natives of Gaza? What was their relationships with state and local officials? Finally, where were they active in Gaza’s public space? This article attempts to respond to some of these questions to better understand the role of the arzuhalcis in the public space of a late Ottoman provincial city in Greater Syria.

INTRODUCTION

The missionary George Robinson Lees (1860–1944) depicted scribes in Ottoman Palestine at the end of the 19th century as follows:

[They] are known by their clothing, and the inkhorn in the girdle [...]. They will be seen in the market-place looking for clients. They consider extreme politeness a part of their stock-in-trade [...]. The scribes in the modern market-place [...] are writers of petitions and letters, and not necessarily learned in the law, though a certain amount of legal knowledge is required to fulfill the conditions of the local government regarding contracts and matters relating to the sale of property. As soon as one is approached he draws from his inkhorn his reed pen, dips it into the sponge filled with ink at the other end, places the paper, which has been drawn from his bosom, on his hand, and writes whatever is required [...]. When the letter or petition is finished, the sand or dust in the street is scattered over it, then blown away; a handy substitute being near, no blotting-paper is ever used. Nor is there such a thing as a signature; the peasant cannot write, and even if he could, he would still seal the document with
his ring like his betters [...]. Nearly every peasant wears a ring with his seal on it; if he does not own such a mark of distinction he dips his thumb in the ink and presses it on the paper instead. The Scribe is most frequently employed in writing petitions, as no supplicant can make a personal application to the Megli (Council), or a Government official [...without presenting] his case in writing, duly sealed and stamped, however trivial.¹

Despite the importance of the arzuhalcis – professional letter and petition writers – in the fabric of late 19th-century Ottoman cities and their ubiquity, as Lees indicates in the quote above, little research has been devoted to their work and not much is known about their training other than sporadic brief referrals in various accounts.² Contemporary studies have tended to neglect the role of the arzuhalcis, even though their profession was not new in the Ottoman urban landscape of the 19th century and they handled most of the public’s writing and correspondence. Similarly, scant information is available about the social background of the arzuhalcis or the development and changes in their work in light of the processes of modernization and urbanization taking place in the Ottoman Empire at the time. Yet many sources make it clear that the arzuhalcis were key figures in the Ottoman urban sphere and played an important role in urban politics. They interacted with all segments of society, in various neighborhoods of the city, and with individuals from all walks of life who needed their services. They helped rival urban coalitions frame their approaches to Istanbul and were actively involved in city politics and the major events taking place there.

In his seminal 1968 paper “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” Albert Hourani introduced a concept which dominated the study of cities in Bilad al-Sham for many years.³ Hourani noted the presence of a strata of influential urban notables who served as intermediaries between the local population and the Ottoman authorities. Many historians of the Middle East followed Hourani’s lead by studying the role played by urban notables and the ‘politics of the notables,’ emphasizing the paramount importance of patronage and the primacy of ‘vertical’ versus ‘horizontal’ social ties. Younger generations of scholars have criticized this view as an elite bias that dominates most contemporary written accounts of local politics that has been adopted too uncritically by many historians.⁴

The case of the arzuhalcis discussed here is an example of an important type of intermediary between the urban and rural populations and the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul which does not entirely fit Hourani’s ‘politics of notables.’ The arzuhalcis, who facilitated correspondence between the subjects and the imperial center, did not come from the upper echelons of the society and were not the most influential persons in the urban sphere. Yet they carried out an important form of mediation without which connections with the imperial center would have been impossible. The famous American sociologist Mark S. Granovetter in his well-quoted article “The Strength of Weak Ties,”

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¹ Author’s note: I would like to thank Fruma Zachs, Do-tan Halevy, Amnon Cohen, Johann Buessow, and Sarah Buessow for their contributions to this article. It was written as part of a project entitled “Gaza during the Late Ottoman Period,” conducted jointly with Prof. Dr. Johann Bues-ßow from Ruhr University Bochum. It was financed by the generous support of the German-Israeli Fund for Scientific Research and Development (GIF, grant 1226). For the project site, see https://gaza.ub.rub.de/gaza/?p=home.


discusses the concept of a “bridge” between social networks, which can help understand the role played by the arzuhalcis as intermediaries who enabled connections to be made between the Empire's subjects in the provinces and the imperial center. A “bridge,” he writes, is a “line in a network which provides the only path between two points.”

The arzuhalcis's stand in the streets of late Ottoman cities can be seen as a “nodal point” of urban governance, as defined by Marc Hufty. Hufty defines urban governance in its most general sense to include all the patterns of social coordination and processes of managing a city. His definition of a nodal point is “the physical or virtual interfaces where problems, processes, actors, and norms converge.” The arzuhalci's stand was both a physical place were actors came together to discuss problems and negotiate the ways to address them, but it could also be regarded as a “virtual interface,” since it was needed to make the connection to the imperial government. However, the arzuhalcis were not neutral transmitters but rather exercised mediation by contributing to the message's production and transfer (e.g. by using the proper terms and linguistic register, conciseness etc.).

It remains unclear to what extent the petition writers were able to influence the political processes taking place in the city given their role as intermediaries between the commoners and the imperial center. What was their agency and contribution? Did they have room to maneuver or were they merely a mechanical cog in the wheel of transferring the petition to Istanbul? In this regard it should be recalled that arzuhalcis expressed the complaints of the people who hired them in a way that would be acceptable to the elite in the imperial center Istanbul, thus enacting a type of conceptual translation. Nevertheless, their letters were translated into Ottoman Turkish in the Translation Bureau of the Foreign Ministry upon arrival in Istanbul (linguistic translation), before the administrative process of handling petitions could be engaged.

This short article discusses the arzuhalcis' social and economic profile as they appear in the Ottoman census of 1905 for the city of Gaza, which is preserved today in its entirety in the Israel State Archive in Jerusalem. It explores how the traditional duties of the arzuhalci were influenced, evolved and changed in response to advances in technology, processes of urbanization, and the city's expansion and modernization.

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

The arzuhalcis were literate individuals, although they did not necessarily have formal training, and did not come from the higher echelons of society. Unlike the dragomans who were responsible for relationships between the foreign consulates and embassies and Istanbul, the arzuhalcis were not governmental officials, but rather private local people, perhaps retired scribes who had been employed in the Ottoman bureaucracy, and possessed general knowledge of languages (particularly Ottoman, but also local languages depending on the province where they worked; in Greater Syria, obviously Arabic), the art of correspondence, and the rudiments of law. They drew on formulaic letters in handbooks, a widespread practice throughout Islamic history. There is evidence that a guild of arzuhalcis existed in Istanbul at the end of the 18th century and that their members were required to have an official permit to exercise their profession. Similar guilds were also set up in the Empire's provinces, especially in large cities such as Cairo.

Findley cites evidence that at times Ottoman officials wrote petitions in return for payment during their work hours, a practice that was frowned upon by their supervisors and was derogatorily known as kağıt haffaflığı. Other terms used to designate the public petition

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7 Israel State Archive (ISA), Nüfus Registers # 240–283, 436–446.
writers were köşebaşı yazıcıları (street-corner scribe/petition writer) or simply yazıcı (scribe, petition writer). Salim Tamari calls the arzuhalci a “katib adiliyyah” (“justice scribe”) and says that in late Ottoman Palestine these scribes often sat in cafés waiting for customers. Since it is known that the number of cafés grew considerably in the 19th century, this may very well indicate the increasing visibility of the arzuhalcis in the urban space during this period. The term “justice scribe” itself might suggest their involvement or familiarity with legal issues, which coincides with Avi Rubin’s claim that before the legal reforms of the 19th century and the recognition of the profession of modern attorney in the nizamiye courts, the arzuhalcis at times appeared in courts as legal representatives. One of the documentary justifications he provides as proof is that the arzuhalcis needed a special permit to engage in their occupation.

Rubin also quotes Judge Sehbaz who considered that the petition writing profession had a negative effect on Ottoman law. Whether laudatory or derogatory, all the different epithets ascribed to the arzuhalcis tend to indicate the importance of their occupation.

The services offered by the arzuhalcis were well-known to the general public, as can be seen in contemporary descriptions of their services to diverse people and groups in the population, including men and women, urbanites, villagers, Bedouins, and officials alike, in return for a fee. Paintings from the 19th century depict the wide variety of people who approached them and paid to have their petitions and letters written professionally. For example, many of these paintings portray women approaching the arzuhalcis’ stand in the street, a phenomenon that still awaits further research beyond the fact that illiteracy rates were higher among women than men. These paintings show that the arzuhalcis sat at the entrance to the Ottoman post and telegraph offices, in the markets or in cafés, similar to the document-writers one can still see today at the entrance to courts and public offices in the Middle East, including in Turkey. Approaching the arzuhalcis, which was considered a legitimate act, may have allowed women to venture into the public sphere of the cities, and increased their numbers and appearance there.

In fact, the arzuhalcis served as intermediaries between the imperial subjects and the Ottoman central authorities, thus replacing the sharia court scribes who for the most part had penned approaches to the imperial authorities in the past. They allowed petitioners, for example, to express their claims within a framework and mechanisms authorized by the authorities while using the jargon, language, and codes of literary expression sanctioned by the Ottoman system. A study of 500 petitions sent from Gaza and Jaffa and their environs showed that the vast majority of the petitions sent to Istanbul from these localities at the end of the 19th century were written by arzuhalcis, compared to only a small percentage written by the petitioners themselves without the help of professional petition writers. The latter were usually short

11 Jun Akiba, “The Practice of Writing Curricula Vitae among the Lower Government Employees in the Late Ottoman Empire: Workers at the Şeyhülislam’s Office,” European Journal of Turkish Studies 6 (2007), p. 22.
12 Salim Tamari, Mountain against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p. 177, the more common spelling of the term would be katib adiliyya.
15 For numerous examples of petitions written by arzuhalcis, see Yuval Ben-Bassat, Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).
16 On the importance of the arzuhalcis in the life of Ottoman subjects, see Charles Henry Timperley (ed.), The

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17 For instance, see the picture of two women with a child approaching an arzuhalci in Timperley, vol. 3, between p. 56 and p. 57; see also Martinus Rorbye, “A Turkish Notary Drawing up a Marriage Contract” (Constantinople, 1837); D. Wilkie, “Arzuhalci” (The Wilkie Gallery, London, 1845); Fausto Zonaro, “The Scribe” (unknown year).
18 See, for instance, the painting depicting a letter writer, his customer and a gossip in Walter Thornbury, Turkish Life and Character (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1860), vol. 1, between p. 103 and p. 104 and the description of the three on pp. 103–104; the Ottoman post and telegraph services were merged in 1871 under one department after previously being separate. See Roderic H. Davison, “The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire: How Morse’s Invention was Introduced at the Time of the Crimean War,” in idem, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), pp. 141, 152.
telegrams that did not adhere to the form or style of professionally written petitions.

There are several indications that arzuhal-cis, rather than ordinary people, wrote most of the petitions, even though they did not sign their names on the petitions. Many of the petitioners were no doubt illiterate and could not write petitions themselves.20 The fact that almost all the petitions were sent to the Bureau of the Grand Vizier suggests it was no coincidence and that there was some kind of directive behind this procedure. Furthermore, many of the rationales and justifications appearing in the petitions are composed of similar repetitive phrases, and a specific jargon is used throughout. Most petitions have the same structure and lay out the petitioners' claims in a stereotypical way.21 Hence, familiarity with the language, structure, and line of argument of the petitions, which were often based on formulas noted in manuals that contained sample letters written especially for this purpose,22 makes it possible to distill the voices of the petitioners by extracting the details of their specific appeals from the heavily structured and formulaic writing.23 Consider the following idealistic depiction of life in Gaza and the relationships of its residents with the Sultan which is full of praise to the sultan, motifs, and flattery, as appearing in a petition by supporters of the Husayni faction in Gaza against their rivals in the city from 1893 (see Figure 1):

After praying to God to save the power of our master, Amir al-Mu'minin, some of the 'ulama', ashraf and merchants of Gaza beg, in the sacred name of the Prophet and in the name of our master Amir al-Mu'minin, may God give him victory, that you pass on our petition to the threshold of the Sultan. Like others, the people of our sub-district, with God's blessing, enjoy the Sultanic policy of justice, they are living in comfort like brothers without deceit or intrigue [which exists] in other places, and they pray continually to our merciful ruler.24

20 On the illiteracy rate in Palestine at the end of the 19th century, see Ami Ayalon, Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1900–1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), Chapter One. As regards literacy among the rural population of Palestine at the time and the question of how the villagers dealt with the problem of reading and writing, the characterization by Eliyahu Zeev Levin-Epstein, the head of the colony of Rehovot during its early years, is instructive: "In every village there is only one person who knows how to write. He is called the katib, that is to say the scribe of the village. All the other inhabitants of the village know neither how to read nor how to write. And when the sheikhs had to sign their name on a certain document, they did so in one of the following two ways: either they had a copper seal, in which their name was inscribed, and they dipped the seal in ink and stamped it on a paper, or they would dip their fingers in ink and press them on the document, instead of a signature. And if one of the villagers had to write a document, he did not need to write, since he did not know how to write, but instead everything was done by a professional person, who made sure there were two witnesses present, who testified that they had heard with their own ears, that so and so the son of so and so ordered this document to be written." See Eliyahu Levin-Epstein, Zikronotai [My memoirs] (Tel-Aviv: Levin-Epstein Brothers, 1932), p. 239.
21 For example, the opening greetings, presentation of the case and the "facts," mentions of the law or other cases, specific requests, and concluding remarks and salutations.
22 For instance, see Mehmet Hayret Efendi, Fihrist inşa-yi Hayret Efendi [Catalogue of Correspondence of Hayret Efendi] (Cairo: Dar Tabai at Bulaq, 1825) (a manual in Arabic containing sample letters teaching scribes how to write to various officials, office holders, high ranking officers, and bureaucrats); see also segments of the book by Hasan al-Attar, Kitab insha al-Attar [al-Attar's book of correspondence] (Istanbul: Matbaat al-Jawalib, 1299 [1881]) (this book in Arabic, of which several editions were published, was aimed at larger segments within the educated elite and not merely the scribes, and includes a wider variety of letters, including various forms of address and approaches to various professionals); instruction manuals on how to write letters and petitions existed in many other societies in Europe and elsewhere. Christa Hämerle notes that new manuals were written over the course of the 19th century "in response to rapidly changing historical conditions." These manuals, however, still "adhered in part to the principles of ancient rhetoric." See Christa Hämerle, "Requests, Complaints, Demands: Preliminary Thoughts on the Petitioning Letters of Lower-Class Austrian Women, 1865–1918," in Caroline Bland and Máire Cross (eds.), Gender and Politics in the Age of Letter-Writing, 1750–2000 (Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2004), p. 116.
23 For a manual instructing ordinary people how to write petitions and various kinds of letters (both personal and public) themselves without the help of a professional letter writer, see Yusuf al-Shalfuni Efendi (ed.), Turjuman al-mukataba [Index of writing / Compendium of correspondence], 7th ed. (Beirut: al-Matbaa al-Kulliya, 1887). This booklet in Arabic was published by several publishing houses in several editions starting in the late 1860s. It differs considerably from previous manuals such as those by Hayret and al-Attar, reflecting the changing times.
24 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Y. MTV., 77/140, 10 Nisan 1309 [22 April 1893] (a collective petition sent from Gaza to Field Marshal Derviş Paşa with a request to convey the petition to the Sultan in person. The petition bears the signatures of 123 people in support of the mufti al-Sayyid Muhammad Hanafi Efendi al-Husayni).
Figure 1: A Mass Petition in Support of the Mufti al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Hanafi Efendi al-Husayni.
Source: BOA, Y. MTV., 77/140, p. 1 of 2, 10 Nisan 1309 (22 April 1893).
By the final decades of the 19th century, the arzuhalcis wrote petitions on a stamped letter, which corresponded to a stamp duty. In this period there was a growing need for the arzuhalcis’ services on the part of the Empire’s subjects, which had to do with the mushrooming of official documents as part of the standardization process in the Ottoman bureaucracy and the need to comply with the modernizing state, at a time when the development of literacy was much slower. This was a temporary change that changed dramatically when literacy became widespread.

As the Empire went through fundamental changes in the 19th century and its relationships with its subjects were transformed and intensified, correspondence and letter writing moved toward a more straightforward, simple style that was less flamboyant. Manuals from this period demonstrating how to write letters for various occasions and situations allowed Ottoman subjects (who often referred to themselves in petitions as abid; i.e., slaves) to correspond directly with the state. This also extended to personal and familial correspondence, which testifies to its wider potential audience as well as the growing scope of modern correspondence beyond the work of petition writers. This can be seen in an advertisement published in 1905 in the Hebrew newspaper Havatselet in Jerusalem by a scribe named Da’ud ‘Azmi al-Husayni. He had been an official in several Ottoman local institutions and now worked out of an office located opposite the government house:

After I worked for thirteen years in the scribal office of our exalted government here in the holy city [of Jerusalem], in the capacity of chief scribe in the commercial court of Jaffa, and then in the commercial bureau here in the holy city (may it be rebuilt and re-established), I then worked for the last twenty years as a member of the qadi court here, as the certified documents from the necessary places [show]. I have just recently resigned from this job, and decided with God’s help to open a special office across from the government house. I am prepared to be a lawyer27 for all the affairs that shall come to my hands, and I hope to satisfy the needs of all those who bring me their business with integrity and justice. I am also willing to make applications to all the courts of our most exalted government here in the [holy] land and elsewhere in the Arabic or Turkish languages, to make notices of protest and appeal against the rulings of all courts according to the level of legal judgement emanating from the courts, to translate from Arabic to Turkish and to write all kinds of bills, promissory notes, and partnership contracts etc., and everything will, God willing, be pleasantly explained to each and every person. I will also represent for free the cases of poor people who truly cannot afford to pay. All who seek me will find me in my said office every day from two in the morning until ten in the evening [Ottoman time] except for Friday.28

25 See the discussion on “justice scribe” above.
26 As Ami Ayalon has shown, literacy rates are only part of the explanation why the need for the scribes’ services was growing. As he notes, reading and writing are two different skills and, as can be seen even today, since people may have partial literacy skills and may know how to read but not how to write. In his own words: “A complete reading ability and a total absence of it are merely two situations at the opposite ends of a rainbow. In between there are many intermediate levels of reading competence.” Letter writing guides may be another confirmation of this phenomenon. See Ayalon, Reading Palestine, p. 18.
27 See the discussion on “justice scribe” above.
28 Havatselet, 30 Nissan 5665 (5 May 1905). Translated from Hebrew in Michael Talbot, “Jewish Scriveners and Arab Lawyers in Ottoman Jerusalem” Blog, Tozsuz Evrak (6 October 2013), http://www.docblog.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2013/10/jewish-scriveners-and-arab-lawyers-in.html; another advertisement in Havatselet on 10 Adar 5658 (4 March 1898), also translated in Talbot’s “Jewish Scriveners,” Scriveners, is for a former Jewish teacher from the Jewish community who worked as a letter and petition writer: “I have the honour to inform the esteemed public that for anyone who has anything to do with the exalted government, I am ready to write in fluent Turkish for them [and] to copy everything from Turkish to French or vice versa. Also, for anyone who wants to learn the Turkish language, I am ready to teach them the spoken and written language as well as grammar, all in the best way possible, and I guarantee to provide what is required of me. My residence is in [the Jerusalem neighborhood of] Even Yišraʾel. Nissim Ben-Mikha’el.”
THE ARZUHALCIS IN GAZA

Given what we know about Gaza’s stormy politics during the last quarter of the 19th century and the rift within its elite between two rival camps that made strenuous efforts to garner as much support as they could among the city’s population, Gaza is a good case study for examining the role of arzuhalcis in the urban social sphere.29 The controversy in Gaza was centered around the appointment to the post of the city’s mufti, which afforded the family who controlled it considerable influence, leverage and resources. The struggle that erupted in the mid-1870s and lasted until the end of the century opposed the Husayni family and its supporters, on the one hand, to a changing coalition of opponents headed by the Saqallah family and, as of the mid-1890s, the Shawwas and Busaysus, two families who previously supported the Husaynis, on the other. Several questions come to mind in this regard: Was there more than one petition and letter writer in this city? Were any of the scribes so closely identified with one of the factions in this city that others from rivaling coalitions refrained from approaching him? Were any of the petition writers in Gaza former state employees? Were they perhaps non-natives of Gaza? What was their relationship with state/local officials? Where were they active in Gaza’s public space? Was their occupation influenced and in what ways by technological changes, the city’s modernization and changing nature, and the people’s growing ability to read and write?

Petitions sent from Gaza to Istanbul by the city’s urban population as well as by peasants and Bedouins from the region were for the most part written in Arabic, often in a very rich and elaborate style, which no doubt was formulated by professional petition writers.30 Unlike the case in other cities in Palestine, one hardly ever comes across petitions in Ottoman Turkish or in French sent form Gaza. Most of the petitions sent from Gaza were collective and only a few were personal, unlike the situation in Jaffa, for example, where there were many more personal petitions. The petitions from Gaza were also much more political than in other cities in Bilad al-Sham, perhaps reflecting the very tense relationships among its elite and the rift between two rival coalitions in the last quarter of the 19th century.

It remains unclear how many petition writers lived in Gaza, but so far two from this city have been identified from the Ottoman census of 1905.31 One of them was an arzuhalci named Muhammad Sharrab who lived in the neighborhood of Zaytun, in the sub-neighborhood of al-ʿAjami. He is a rare and interesting case since quite a lot can be gleaned about his social background from the census and other sources. His family came from Khan Yunis, some 25 kilometers south of Gaza. According to the Gazan chronicler ʿUthman al-Tabba, it was a “big family with many branches in Khan Yunis,”32 as well as in Gaza and in al-ʿArish in northern Bilad al-Sham, perhaps reflecting the very tense relationships among its elite and the rift between two rival coalitions in the last quarter of the 19th century.

30 For example, see BOA, HR. TO., 390/56, 22 Zilkade 1302 (2 September 1885) (a petition to the Sadaret signed by Bedouins in Gaza against the governor of Jerusalem, Reşat Paşa, and two notables from this town named Salim al-Husayni and Arif Bey who, together with al-Hanafi and his brothers, the sons of the former mufti of Gaza, collaborated with their rivals among the Bedouins, and persecuted them); HR. TO., 395/60, 29 Kānumusani 1306 (10 February 1891) (a petition in Arabic sent to the Grand Vizier signed by 16 muhtars in the region of Gaza to reduce their vergi tax); HR. TO., 395/61, 5 Şuḥat 1306 (17 February 1891) (the same issue, bearing the signatures of four muhtars); HR. TO., 395/104, 1 Zilhicce 1308 (8 July 1891) (the same issue, bearing the signature of 27 muhtars); HR. TO., 396/79, 18 Rebiyūlāhır 1309 (21 November 1891) (the same issue, bearing the signatures of 20 muhtars); HR. TO., 398/53, 26 Teşrinisani 1308 (8 December 1892) (a petition to the Sadaret signed by 64 people from Gaza in favor of Muhammad Saqallah); HR. TO., 399/3, 9 Nisan 1309 (21 April 1893) (a petition to the Sadaret signed by 91 notables and religious scholars from Gaza); Y. MTV., 77/140.

31 Note that out of an estimated population of some 20,000–25,000 people in Gaza at the time, we have thus far only identified the heads of households, some 3,000 people, in addition to several small regions in the city which we have fully transcribed, given our special interest in them. Thus, one cannot exclude the eventuality that more petition writers will be identified later in the project.

Sinai. The 1905 census indeed includes 21 Sharrab households in Khan Yunis. Among the occupations the members of these households are listed as holding, 14 were peasants (çiftçi), some were shop owners (bakkal, dükkancı), and one was a member of the local administrative council (müdür-i meclis a'zasi), which was a relatively senior post, especially given the modest occupations of most of the other family members. In Gaza there were only five Sharrab households. Some educated male family members moved there from Khan Yunis and climbed the social scale ladder.

The father of Muhammad Sharrab was Shaykh Salim b. Muqbil b. Salim Sharrab from Khan Yunis who moved to Gaza where he worked in trade. He died there in 1285 (1868/9). The family was upwardly mobile, capitalizing on their higher education and commercial success. Its family tree as drawn by Tabba’ shows a large number of shaykhs, efendis, state officials, merchants, and teachers in Gaza, Khan-Yunis and al-Arish between c. 1850 and 1910, among Shaykh Salim’s children and grandchildren. Shaykh Salim had five sons: al-Hajj Muhammad (the arzuhalci), Mustafa, Shakir (d. 1320/1903–4), Ahmad Efendi (d. 1320/1902–3), who was a muhafız (governor) of al-‘Arish in Sinai, a region under British-Egyptian de-facto control, whose very successful and wealthy children continued to live and do business in the caravan trade in this city, and finally Shaykh Yusuf, the family’s most renowned figure, a famous ‘alim, who spent most of his life in al-Azhar in Cairo (b. 1254/1838 in Khan Yunis, d. 1330/1912 in Cairo).

Shaykh Yusuf Sharrab, who was blind, moved to al-Azhar from Gaza in 1280 (1863/4) and studied there for nine years, and then taught in the institution for 12 years. He got married in Egypt but was extradited in 1882 for supporting the ‘Urabi Revolt. Thereafter, he returned to Gaza and taught at several local institutions, in addition to serving as the imam, khatib and mudarris at the Katib Wilaya Mosque in the neighborhood of Zaytun. Tabba’ writes that his scholarly fields of expertise were fiqh, hadith and tafsir. He had excellent relations with leading scholars at al-Azhar, was a member of the Shadhiliyya Sufi order, and made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1319 (1901/2). Ahmad Busaysu, in his 1897 manuscript Kashf al-Niqab, writes that Yusuf Sharrab was a “meticulous” jurist and “clever” scholar, but at the same time “a person who was difficult to get along with, who liked to quarrel and to meddle in affairs that did not concern him.”

The occupations of members of other households of the Sharrab family in Gaza included two makers or sellers of sieves or screens (gharbi, kalburcu), one measurer (keyyal, ölçen), and one real estate agent (simsar). The arzuhalci discussed here, Muhammad Sharrab (born 1283/1866–7 in Gaza), was the son of the scholar Shaykh Salim and his wife Hanifa, who were originally from Khan Yunis and then moved to Gaza. He was the head of a 10-person household, including two wives. His first wife was Fatima, who was born in Egypt in 1279 (1862/3) and died in 1326 (1908). His second wife ‘A’isha was born in Gaza in 1293 (1876) and was from a respected local elite family, the Burnus, the daughter of Muhammad al-Burnu and Labiba. His three sons were given typical Ottoman-Egyptian first names: Mahmud Hamdi who was born in Gaza in 1320 (1902/3), Yusuf ‘Abd al-Halim, who was born in Gaza in 1321 (1903/4), and Ahmad Sub-

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33 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 386.
34 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 240, pp. 177–196.
36 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 259.
37 Sinai’s attachment to Egypt gained recognition only following the ‘Aqaba incident in 1906 after which an administrative dividing line was drawn between the head of the Gulf of ‘Aqaba and the Mediterranean separating British controlled Egypt from the District of Jerusalem in Ottoman Palestine. See also 36.
38 Ibid.

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41 Ahmad Salim Busaysu, Kashf al-niqab fi bayan ahwal bâd sukkân Gazza wa-bâd nawahiha min al-ârab [Unveiling the Situation of some Inhabitants of Gaza and of some of the Bedouin Groups in its Surroundings], Arabic autograph manuscript, dated 29 Rajab 1315 AH / 24 December 1897, Gaza, Wizarat al-Awqaf [in Arabic], p. 70.
42 ISA, Nüfus, Reg. 261, p. 79, mesken 59 (PDF 41). I would like to thank Dr. Sarah Buessow for bringing this information to my attention.
hi who was born in Gaza in 1322 (1904/5). The region where the family lived, ‘Ajami, was one of the most cosmopolitan areas of late Ottoman Gaza, and was also called “Harat al-Jehud [Yahud],” the Jewish neighborhood, by the Austrian priest George Gatt in his famous map of Gaza dating to the late 1880s, probably since it was the area where most of the Jews of Gaza resided (see Figure 2). This region was also close to many Christian households and institutions, especially the Greek Orthodox Porphyrius Church, and the Latin Compound, which are included in Gatt’s 1888 map.

In terms of political affiliation, the arzuhalci Muhammad Sharrab discussed here and his brothers Yusuf, Shakir and Mustafa, all signed a petition for the incumbent mufti of Gaza Muhammad Hanafi al-Husayni and against his rival Muhammad Saqallah and his supporters, who had allegedly plotted to replace the mufti. Another petition from the same period in favor of the Husayni family was signed by Muhammad Sharrab, the arzuhalci, his brothers Mustafa and Yusuf, as well as an unidentified relative of theirs called Turki Sharrab. It is perhaps surprising that an arzuhalci was not politically neutral, as one might expect from a petition-writer, but rather identified so clearly with the side of mufti Muhammad Hanafi al-Husayni. Two years later, however, in the mid-1890s, the Sharrab family apparently abandoned its support of the Husaynis. In this case, Yusuf Sharrab was part of an anti-Husayni petition in March 1895 signed by nineteen notables in Gaza that clearly reflected the developing schism between the Husaynis and their erstwhile supporters the Shawwas and Busaysus, discussed elsewhere in this volume.

The second petition writer from Gaza identified in the 1905 census appears to have come from a more modest background. ‘Abd al-Jawad Milad was a Muslim born in 1288/1871–2 in Gaza, who lived in the neighborhood of Barjiliyya (Daraj), mesken (house) number 738. Members of his family recorded in the census were employed in low-level municipal or governmental jobs such as a guard in the municipality or a member of the zabtiye police force.

Other than the two arzuhalcis found thus far in the census, it lists ten scribes who, as seen above, may very well have been involved in petition writing outside their official working hours. They included six scribes/calligra-
phers (katib, keteba), one Shari’a court scribe (mahkeme-yi şer’iye katibi / başkatibi), one scribe in the department of education (me’arif ketebesinden), one in the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası katibi), and one neighborhood scribe (mahalle katibi). Since seven of them went by the title of efendi in addition to one with the title bey, as opposed to only two who held no titles, they most probably came from respected families. In fact, some of the scribes were from very distinguished Gazan families such as the Husayni and Makki.50

THE POST AND THE TELEGRAPH

The advent of new technologies and means of transportation in the 19th century considerably affected the work of the arzuhalcis, who needed to adapt their letters, including the wording, style, content, and language to the spirit of the time. Even the actual locations where the arzuhalcis solicited work may have changed given the rising importance of the Post and Telegraph office. The new modes of transportation and communication allowed Ottoman subjects quick and relatively easy communication with the imperial center, without many of the previously needed intermediaries. As Keith Watenpaugh notes, the new technologies bridged the vast distances of the Empire much more rapidly and constituted an important component in the process of modernizing society in the Middle East.51 Although the introduction of the telegraph was carried out with other goals in mind in the mid-1850s, within a short span of time the accessibility of the Empire’s subjects to Istanbul, at a time of comprehensive reforms in the Empire, completely transformed the relationships of Ottoman subjects in the provinces to the state, in particular the imperial center. For the first time they enjoyed real direct contact with the center without geographic and physical barriers. Even when residing in the Empire’s most remote provinces, they could now have direct contact quickly and easily with the central government without going through the bureaucracy and the local authorities. This eliminated the need to travel personally to Istanbul, send a representative there, or complain through the local kadı. All one had to do was to go to the nearest post and telegraph office – they were located in all the major towns in the provinces, and gradually also in small towns – write a petition with the help of the arzuhalcis in return for a fee, pay the required transmission fee, and send the petition to its destination in Istanbul, where it was translated and enter the bureaucratic process which petitions underwent.52

Petitioning Istanbul through the telegraph thus became an affordable procedure, particularly in comparison with the official and unofficial costs of approaching the judicial system such as the nizamiye courts (although the telegraph was not very cheap either, since every word cost money when sending a wire, which might partially explain the frequent use of collective petitions). The advent of telegraph lines and the regularization of the postal services resulted in a flood of petitions to the central authorities in Istanbul. Hence the telegraph, which was first introduced to the Ottoman Empire in the mid-1850 at the time of the Crimean War as means of control and centralization, concomitantly allowed subjects in the provinces “to reach all levels of government, to express opinions, make complaints, and petition for change.”53

In this regard it is interesting to examine the effects of the interaction between the “old regime” semi-official arzuhalci institution and

52 For more on the influence of the telegraph in Ottoman Syria, see Eugene Rogan, “Instant Communication: The Impact of the Telegraph in Ottoman Syria,” in Thomas Philipp and Brigit Schaebler (eds.), The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation, Bilad al-Shām from the 18th to the 20th Century (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), p. 114; apparently there were sometimes obstacles to sending telegraphs from Ottoman post offices, since clerks censored matters they considered delicate. Moreover, it sometimes took a few days for a telegraph to arrive. See Elhu Grant, The People of Palestine: An Enlarged Edition of “The Peasantry of Palestine, Life, Manners and Customs of the Village” (Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1976), p. 231.
the formalized Telegraph and Post Office of the late Tanzimat period. Telegraph services first became available in Palestine in the mid-1860s and soon spread to major towns and even smaller localities. A telegraph office was apparently opened in Gaza soon after the service reached Palestine. As mentioned above, the Post and Telegraph Office was located in the new center of governance in the city, which was the result of the Tanzimat reforms, particularly their second phase when the reforms gradually trickled down to the Empire’s provinces in the 1850s-1860s (see Figures 3 and 4). It was in this new center of governance that the *arzuhalci* most probably operated and found the bulk of their clients. The flood of petitions sent from Gaza to Istanbul in the last quarter of the 19th century was almost entirely written by *arzuhalcis*, whose importance in the urban sphere seemed to be on the rise. Given the division of the city into political factions whose rivalry had most of the city’s elite involved with one of the opposing camps, each side must have had its favorite petition writer/writers, a point that awaits further investigation and clarification. As we have seen, from what is known thus far at least one of the two petition writers identified in Gaza was politically involved and signed petitions in favor of the Husayni family.

**CONCLUSION**

This article examined the social background of the *arzuhalcis* in late Ottoman Gaza, in particular that of Muhammad Sharrab, based on the Ottoman 1905 census, archival documents, and manuscripts from the period. The *arzuhalci’s* main task was to enable Ottoman subjects to conduct a dialogue with the imperial authorities in Istanbul, which were delegated authority by the Sultan to handle petitions, in a defined situation of asymmetry in their status and relationships. Yet to a certain extent Muhammad Sharrab and other *arzuhalcis* actively shaped the dialogue between the subjects and the imperial authorities and engaged in an important task of mediation between them. Despite the changing nature of the Ottoman state in the 19th century and the differences in status of its subjects, who were now closer to being citizens of a modern state, they still needed the services of the petition and letter writers. In fact, they increasingly used their services to deal with the bureaucraty of the modernizing state, which interfered in their daily affairs to an unprecedented extent.
and involved many more interactions with its subjects (filling in forms, applying for permits, obtaining certificates, appealing decisions, etc.). The arzuhalci thus exercised a traditional occupation that survived these changes and the technological developments they brought about such as the ability to send petitions by mail and telegraph. They were an important component of the urban landscape during the late Ottoman period and to some extent their importance and the need for their services was even on the rise. Petition and letter writers can still be seen in several places in Istanbul today, such as next to courts and main administrative buildings. This is perhaps related to the low literacy rates among some segments of the population in the Middle East, and the nature of some centralized bureaucratic regimes, as well as the ability of petition and letter writers to adapt the craft of petition-writing and adjust it to the changing times and to the needs of the society in different periods.
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PETITIONS: WHEN URBAN RESIDENTS APPROACHED THE SULTAN

As was the case for other Islamic Empires before it, the Ottoman Empire allowed all its subjects to submit petitions directly to the ruler to complain about wrongdoings in the bureaucracy and state apparatus, and ask for justice ad hoc, a practice generally known since Abbasid times as mazalim; literally, wrongdoings or injustice. Petitions were written according to very rigid rules that included the use of flattery, flowery motifs, jargon, formulas, and the belittlement of the petitioners vs. glorification of the ruler.

In principle, every Ottoman subject had the right to submit a petition (arz-ı hal, arzuhal) to the Sultan and beg for justice, in person, through a representative or delegation, or by sending a written petition. Petitions were often written in the name of a collective (arz-ı mahzar) and not by individuals. This was a way to give more clout to the petition and was consonant with the Ottoman predilection for treating imperial subjects as groups rather than as individuals.

In the imperial center itself, from the mid-17th century onwards, responses to petitions were inscribed in separate volumes called Şikayet Defterleri, “Registers of Complaints.” This practice continued until the early 19th century and stopped for unknown reasons in 1813. As a result, records of petitions submitted after that date are scattered throughout various sections of the Ottoman Archive, including in the Foreign Ministry, whose Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası) was responsible for translating petitions sent from the provinces to Istanbul into Ottoman Turkish.

The Divan-ı Hümayun (Imperial Council), and later during the reform period in the 19th century, the State Council, Şura-ýı Devlet, discussed the petitions submitted by subjects to the Sultan. In response, the Imperial Council or a handful of other senior office holders in the central government issued a sultanic degree (firman), in the name of the Sultan.

In the second half of the 19th century the number of petitions sent to Istanbul from the provinces increased. The petitions now sent to the imperial center dealt with almost every issue affecting the local population, large or small, by individuals or groups who either preferred not to go through the regular reformed legal and administrative channels or the province’s chain of command, or used this mechanism alongside parallel legal action as a way to manipulate the system in their favor and gain the upper hand in local disputes.

One reason for the flood of petitions to the imperial center was that the reforms of the 19th century and the state’s efforts to achieve greater centralization were concretized in much greater interference in its subjects’ lives. The modernizing state started penetrating and regulating areas it had previously neglected, either partially or completely. Consequently, subjects increasingly expected the state to provide redress for their concerns. Another reason was the installation of modern postal services and telegraph lines throughout the Empire’s provinces, which allowed Ottoman subjects to have direct contact with the center.
without geographic or physical barriers or intermediaries. All they needed to do was approach the nearest post and telegraph office, write the petition with the help of a professional petition-writer (arzuhalci) in return for payment, pay the required transmission fee and send the petition to its destination in Istanbul. The third explanation has to do with the autocratic reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), for whom petitions were a perfect way to collect information, take the pulse of the provinces, monitor the work of officials in the provinces, identify elements suspected of disloyalty, and deter subjects from taking part in political or irredentist activity.

Although all segments of Ottoman society submitted petitions to Istanbul, the vast majority of the petitions was still sent by the urban population. This population had considerable means at its disposal and possessed the knowledge and ability to deliver the petition to Istanbul, and knew how to use its influence and connections in the Ottoman capital to make sure its concerns were attended to, and later could also control whether steps had been taken pursuant to the claims. The range of topics broached by the urban population was enormous. Petitions by urbanites appear to have been used as an efficient mechanism to conduct its affairs with the central government, convey messages and leverage its interests. Much more than previously, it had clear political overtones. Urbanites submitted numerous personal petitions about specific matters that concerned them as individuals, as well as collective petitions about issues affecting groups of people. In particular during the reign of Abdülhamid II, petitions were used as a tactic to involve Istanbul in local urban politics and local quarrels in the provinces, or to settle personal scores between rival coalitions and personalities, as seen in the case of Gaza.
PUBLIC SPACE
GENDERED REORGANIZATION IN LATE OTTOMAN BEIRUT:
THE RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE OF THE DOMESTICITY
DISCOURSE AND THE URBAN SPACE

Fruma Zachs

Abstract | This chapter explores the relationship between women’s private lives and the evolving urban space in the late Ottoman Empire. Although numerous studies have focused on either the public or the private/domestic sphere, there is scant research on the ways in which the discourse on domesticity and the expansion of the urban space impacted relationships between changes in the home and outside of it. Specifically, it examines how the gendered reorganization of the “modern” Arab home influenced the urban space and vice-versa. This reciprocal influence emerged in particular toward the end of the 19th century, when new urban spaces in Beirut such as department stores but also private balconies became loci where the private and the public, the domestic and the urban intersected. These “in-between spaces” gradually became both “feminine” and “masculine” thus forging a larger place for women in the urban space.

INTRODUCTION

As of the second half of the 19th century, the major urban centers of Greater Syria (as was the case elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire) underwent significant changes. As a result, a growing domesticity discourse, which appeared in local journals, led to major upheavals within the homes of the Beiruti middle class, but also outside of it with the rise of a more open urban space.1 Although numerous studies have focused on either the public or the private/domestic sphere (see for example Jürgen Habermas2 on the Euro-American bourgeoisie), there is scant research on the ways in which the domesticity discourse and the urban space influenced each other.3 The investigation of these reciprocal relationships can shed light on the gendered reorganization of the “modern” Arab home and its influence on the urban space and the ways in which reconstructing gender inside the home reorganized gender relationships outside it. It also shows how women took advantage of the

* Author’s note: I would like to thank Uri M. Kupferschmidt for reading an earlier version of this article and for his insightful comments.

1 The term “domesticity” here refers in particular to the role of women within the home and home decoration.


domesticity discourse to gain ground in the urban space.

Comparable to Sharon Marcus4 analysis of apartment buildings in Paris and London in the 19th century, from the end of that century, as a result of technological progress such as city lighting, the tramway, and the growth of consumerism, new urban spaces in Beirut such as department stores and private balconies as well as public gardens and coffee houses, led the private and the public, the domestic and the urban to intersect. These fluid areas, what I term “in-between spaces” or “converged places,” were considered both “feminine” and “masculine.” This gradually forged a larger place for women in this social and cultural or intermediate space. Although the home remained the woman’s domain, some urban spaces became adapted to the mixed presence of middle-class women and men, thus enabling women, especially in the 1920s-1930s, to become more visible in the urban space and play a more active role in its evolution. As Yavuz Köse emphasized in his analysis of department stores in Istanbul: “[T]hey were not only innovative in their marketing, they become public spaces when men and women could stroll through the world of goods and consumption. One might argue that, with them, the clear distinction between private and public began to disintegrate.”5

The Victorian domestic ideal of the single-family home that had influenced the Beirut middle class was eventually negated by the reality of middle-class Beirut life where women were gradually integrated into the public/urban space and defined their own spaces.6 As Toufoul Abou-Hodeib noted with regard to changes in tastes in Beirut, the public sphere was harnessed to changes in the home.7

BEIRUT IN THE 19TH CENTURY

The second half of the 19th century was characterized by Beirut’s changing interactions with its regional surroundings, the imperial center, and the world beyond the Ottoman Empire that altered social and economic notions of domesticity. During this period, Beirut became the economic and cultural center of Greater Syria. By 1915, the population of Beirut was roughly 175,000 (compared to 250,000 in Damascus and 200,000 in Aleppo). Christians of various denominations made up the majority of the population, followed by Muslims and Druze.8 The city and its burgeoning foreign trade attracted growing numbers of merchants and entrepreneurs from outlying regions. This was also when a strong middle class emerged, who accumulated wealth and married among themselves. The exigencies of trade and contact with foreigners also necessitated the expansion of the traditional educational systems. In response, missionaries (in particular, American missionaries from various Protestant denominations) set up a network of schools (and later colleges) for boys and girls. Members of the bourgeoisie gradually (and cautiously) adopted Western ideas, styles, and tastes; the city’s architecture took on a European appearance, the wealthier classes (both Christian and Muslim) adopted a more modern lifestyle, moved to the suburbs, and avidly consumed newly imported fashions, goods, and cultural products.9

The exposure to Western ideas, culture, and technology inspired great admiration, but with it came a growing understanding of the need to preserve the Arab heritage. Part and parcel of this cultural encounter and its renegotiation was the growing public debate on the role the “modern” Arab woman should play in her family, society, and nation.10 In this

4 For more details, see Sharon Marcus, Apartment Stories: City and Home in Nineteenth-Century Paris and London (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
5 Yavuz Köse, “Vertical Bazaars of Modernity: Western Department Stores and Their Staff in Istanbul (1881–1921), Ottoman Department Stores and Their Staff in Istanbul (1889–1921),” Ottoman Republican Turkish Labor History 54/17 (2009), p. 93.
6 For more details, see Marcus, Apartment Stories.
10 Zachs and Halevi, “From Difāʿ al-Nisaʾ.”
regard missionary women teachers acted as significant cultural mediators in introducing and transmitting a “Western” brand of femininity (and domesticity) to their Arab women students.

The Tanzimat (lit. re-ordering; 1839-1876) enactment of provincial reforms (1864), and efforts at centralization and modernization, encouraged concerted efforts to rationalize and modernize the urban space and plan its expansion in advance. During this period (but most notably from 1864 to 1918), countless administrative buildings such as municipal structures, police stations, and law courts, transportation hubs (tram and train stations), and grand private homes were built, new water and sewage systems were put in place, and gas and electric streetlights were installed. Old streets were enlarged, and new ones were paved in the newer urban and suburban areas; shopping, leisure, and entertainment areas were planned, including department stores and marketplaces, hotels, coffeehouses, theaters, and parks.\(^{12}\) As a result of Beirut’s urban growth, middle-class families began moving into the city’s new neighborhoods, whose expensive villas dotted the hills of the new suburbs. New houses were constructed, and new types of architecture and a self-conscious design attitude replaced the traditional courtyards.

In recent years, historians investigating the architectural developments and changes to the major cities of Greater Syria, such as Beirut,\(^{12}\) Aleppo,\(^{13}\) and Damascus,\(^{14}\) as well as the major Ottoman centers, such as Izmir and Istanbul,\(^{15}\) and those of Egypt,\(^{16}\) have found increasing material evidence of these interior and exterior changes. As upper- and middle-class families began to move out of courtyard houses into apartment buildings and suburban villas in the latter half of the 19th century, they increasingly adopted and combined old and new architectural features, furniture, and decorative items. However, the social and gendered meanings of this reorganization of the interior domestic space, which went hand in hand with the architectural changes, have only been touched upon recently.\(^{17}\)

**THE DOMESTICITY DISCOURSE: REORGANIZING THE MODERN ARAB HOME**

The architectural redesign of the late 19th-century Arab / Beirut home and the reorganization of its interior should be seen as the product of a complex interweaving of complementary and at times contradictory Ottoman, Arab, and “Western” discourses concerning modernity and the role of women and the family in the reconstitution of the nation. In the last three decades, scholars from a range of fields have devoted considerable attention to the subject of houses, homes, and domestic spaces; most agree that homes are primary sites in which national, class, and gender identities

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17 See for example, Abou-Hodeib, “Taste and Class.”
are produced, performed, and reaffirmed. Feminist historians in particular have focused on the rise of a specific set of gendered bourgeois ideals of the home (and its inhabitants) as of the 18th century, as well as on how these Euro-American gendered ideals were disseminated, altered, and contested around the globe over the course of the 19th century, as a result of both indirect and direct colonialism.

These major changes in the design and spatial organization of houses can be seen as clear indicators of changes in the relationships between its members, as well as between household and non-household members and institutions such as the state. The historical literature indicates that the “home” is both a gendered space and a space critical of the gendered constitution of society; it is a space infused, shaped by, and reflective of the gender ideologies defining a period and place. Given that the person entrusted (in modern Western cultures) with much of the work involved in transforming a physical “house” into a psychological “home” is the wife and mother, spatial reorganizations of the home are indicative of a reorganization or a re-conceptualization of the roles of the wife and mother. However, less attention has been paid to the influence of these changes on the activity of women outside the house or how these changes influenced or reshaped gender relationship in public spheres.

The analysis below of the spatial implementation of the Arab discourse on modern domesticity is based primarily on a thematic reading of newspaper articles, advice columns, and advertisements published from 1880 to 1914 in three of the leading Arabic journals of the time, *al-Jinan* (Beirut, 1870-1886), *al-Muqtataf* (Beirut, 1876-1884; Cairo, 1885-1900), and *al-Janna* (Beirut, 1879-1884), in women’s journals such as *al-Fatat* (Alexandria, 1892-1894) and *al-Hasna* (Beirut, 1909-1912) and also in *Lisan al-Hal* (Beirut, 1878-1900). This periodical literature enriches the scanty narrative biographical material from the region of Greater Syria in the form of diaries, memoirs, letters, etc., which have served as the basis for similar studies in other countries. Ideas, ideas, and advice concerning how women should spatially implement the ideals of domesticity were embedded within a much larger debate on the appropriate role of the modern Arab woman which touched on her education, contributions to her family and society, and her role in the life of the nation at the turn of the century. This debate was found mainly in *tadbir al-manzil* (household management) columns, which detailed the domestic arts a woman needed to master and the newly emerging standards of housekeeping and mothering.

The writers of the *tadbir al-manzil* columns considered that a woman’s role was not only to exert a civilizing influence on her family through her formal knowledge and education but also to ensure the smooth running of her household through her practical knowledge. Her main role was to preserve the home and family order and exercise good rational care to ensure the peace and harmony of the household while the menfolk worked outside the home. It was through these activities that she derived her dignity and honor. The articles in the *tadbir al-manzil* columns, while providing women with a broader, at times quasi-sci-
Antaki argued that the role of the Arab woman in the Nahda required her to invest her energies in the home to ensure the well-being of her family and the regeneration of the nation. The woman who carries out her role satisfactorily will be rightfully entitled to “ascend to the throne of this little kingdom” (arsh al-mamlaka al-saghira).

Articles and columns discussing the changing social organization of the modern Arab household, the physical appearance of the house, and the shifting styles of daily life occupy a middle ground between grand philosophical articles extolling the moral and political role of the well-ordered household, and the highly practical tadbir al-manzil pieces advising the housewife on the intricacies of stain removal. While only a handful of articles dealt with the spatial expressions of this tranquil and ordered household, these articles were extremely detailed; their authors walked the reader through the home and provided comprehensive explanations for the rationale behind the design and arrangement of each room in the house. The best example of this type of early article was written in 1885 by Ru- jina Shukri, who describes visiting “a friend’s house,” which although clean and tidy, does not live up to her standards of household décor. She then proceeds to tell her readers how to better organize and decorate their homes.

Shukri emphasizes that it is the woman’s responsibility to turn her home into a tranquil and welcoming place and cautions them that if the woman fails in this task, the home may become a place of desolation. While Shukri acknowledges the limited financial resources at the disposal of many middle-class families, she claims that the ideal house she is about to describe is the appropriate abode for “ordinary people of the middle class.”

Shukri’s characterization of a Beirut middle-class home as one with “many rooms” (ghuraf) and her first recommendation that the woman of the house should assign different rooms for different activities (each with its appropriate furniture), suggests that she was referring to a new type of house. The “central-hall house,” as it came to be known, became popular in Beirut during the second half of the 19th century and was designed for the use of one nuclear family. These houses were sub-villas that started to be built in the 1830s and 1840s as a middle-class status symbol. The central hall itself was often called dar, which basically means home, and was the most important room of the house. The central hall house penetrated all layers of society that had a certain level of wealth and a certain status.

With their red-tiled roofs and triple-arch windows and balcony, these houses, which opened up onto a front garden and the street, were con-


26 Shukri, a graduate of the American School for Girls, also presented the main argument of this article several years earlier in a lecture to the Bukurat Suriya.


28 Shukri, “Farsh al-buyut,” p. 743. Jirjis Himam, writing several years after Shukri, also suggested that an educated and distinguished bourgeois family should have several rooms at its disposal, including a nursery, a guest bedroom, and a kitchen. Jirjis Himam, “Ikhtiyar al-manzil [Choosing a House],” Lisan al-Hal, 1271 (1891), p. 3 [in Arabic].


structed in Beirut and the towns and villages surrounding it.\(^{31}\)

These houses constituted a radical departure from the inward-oriented, interlocked houses of the inner city. In contrast to earlier residential styles, especially the traditional courtyard houses (the *dar* and the *hara*), where rooms were built around a central court, in the new “central-hall house” (see Figure 1) rooms were organized along a rectangular central hall.\(^{32}\) The introduction of several rooms, organized around the longitudinal central hall also encouraged a separation between the various family members and between the private family quarters and the central reception area. Shukri devoted considerable attention to the public portion of this central hall (the vestibule) and to the first public room it opened onto, the main reception room or sitting room (*ghurfat al-majlis*, see Figure 2).

Although relatively small, the vestibule should in her opinion have several multi-colored rugs; paintings and prints should be displayed on the walls. For the comfort of guests waiting to be received, there should be several chairs and a large stand where they could deposit their walking-sticks, parasols, and hats.\(^{33}\)

Next came the main receiving room or sitting room, which the historian Karen Haltunnen has argued lay between “the urban street where strangers freely mingled and the back regions of the house where only family members were permitted to enter uninvited.”\(^{34}\) As the main receiving room was both the first room guests would encounter and one that “reflects the skills of the woman of the house,” it had to be attended to with great care and furnished with the best furniture and decorative items. Shukri once again provides precise instructions for the décor and appearance of this room, as well as a detailed list of the items to be displayed, which include flower arrangements, candelabras, chandeliers, handsomely bound books, carpets, and light, airy curtains.\(^{35}\) Archeological and architectural case studies of “central-hall house” interiors that served as vestibules and reception rooms have found evidence of the widespread usage of light green, pink, and blue wall paint, stucco ornaments, cornices, *trompe-d’œil* paintings, decorated ceilings, mosaic tile or marble floors, and glass windows.\(^{36}\)

Shukri and other columnists also turned their attention to semi-private areas such as the dining room and the library, and private family rooms such as the bedroom and the nursery. Like the reception room, the dining room became a place where women could both demonstrate and enhance their family’s wealth and cultural capital by displaying the china, silverware, and table decorations correctly. Arguing that “the table is the mirror of the level achieved by the mistress of the house (*rabbat al-bayt*),” Arab women were instructed on how to furnish their dining rooms, how to present food dishes, and columns devoted considerable attention to how to set a formal dining table, explained the fine points of dining etiquette, provided detailed instructions on how to create and decorate an epergne, and compared the older *service à la française* with the virtues of the newer *service à la russe* (al-*ma’ida* al-*Muṣkiyya*).\(^{38}\)

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As books were noticeably present in all the rooms discussed (except for the dining room), it is clear that reading had become an important social activity cultivated by the Beirut middle classes, and one much preferred over idle card or backgammon games. It is thus unsurprising that home libraries were increasingly part of the recommendations for and descriptions of modern Arab homes. However, contrary to the other rooms, few if any details were given as how this room should be furnished. It is possible that in Beirut, as in Europe and North America, the library was thought of as a masculine space, where a man retires after dinner to work or “read a newspaper or a novel.” While his wife may have been welcome to join him occasionally and keep him company while he worked, it was not hers to make an imprint.

Last came the bedrooms (ghurfat al-nawm); these were supposed to cater to both to the inhabitants’ physical (such as sleep) and emotional needs (to withdraw from the world and let one’s guard down). Thus, they needed to provide a bed for each person, a washstand, and a mirror, as well as a chest of drawers and a clothes closet. But no less importantly, the bedroom had to be restful and pleasing to the eye; thus, a few pictures should be hung on the walls, and a “nice rug” placed on the floor in front of a comfortable armchair and a side table with books on it.

Four areas in the house were not described in detail: the kitchen, the bathroom, the laundry room, and the servants’ quarters. The lack of attention to these areas may be explained by the fact that the activities that took place in these rooms were carried out by servants belonging to the lower social classes; given the known “invisibility of housework” and especially the “invisibility” of servants performing such work, this omission should come as no surprise. However, ignoring these areas could also be the result of the ongoing separation of the living and service spaces. In traditional houses many service activities (such as cooking and washing) took place outside the house; in the case of central-hall houses, they were carried out both outside and on a different (housekeeping or mezzanine) floor. Although this housekeeping floor is not mentioned in the press, it is found in houses that are still standing today and in photographs.

In general, all these columns and articles on tadbir al-manzil reflect the ongoing project of redesigning the interior boundaries of the modern Arab home and investing them with new social and gendered meanings. The columns dealt with the emergence of public areas of the home, which were often occupied by both female and male guests. They defined the reception room and the dining room as spaces that a modern and educated but respectable woman could safely occupy and in which she could demonstrate her family’s status. At the same time, they also called for shielding the home, and in particular the private rooms, from the outside world by fences, hedges, front gardens, shutters, windows, and curtains, which created a visual and acoustic barrier between the outdoor noise, dirt, and disorderliness, and indoor quiet, cleanliness, and order. Taken together, both these features may be reflective of the transition from a home organized around a male-female principle to one organized around a public-private one. In addition, in line with trends in Europe and North America, Arab

42 Shukri, “Farsh al-buyut,” p. 745. Other writers recommended separate rooms for younger and older children and urged mothers to see that the nursery was clean, sunny, and airy, and maintained at a steady temperature. Himam, “Ikhtiyar al-manzil,” p. 3.

44 Ragette, *Architecture in Lebanon*, pp. 114–115. Ragette claims that Lebanese (and especially Beirut) cuisine differed significantly from the elaborate Arab cuisines of cities such as Aleppo and Cairo. It relied mainly on fresh fruit and vegetables and baked and grilled foods, for which a small oven and a simple charcoal grill would suffice.
Figure 2: An Example of the Interior of a Beiruti Central Hall House. The picture shows the main reception room or sitting room (ghurfat al-majlis).
middle-class housewives in Beirut were encouraged to create an atmosphere at home that would enable their menfolk (in particular husbands) to recuperate from the hustle and bustle of “a heartless world.”

Shukri’s detailed descriptions of the layout of the various rooms, their functions, and the items placed in them can also be seen in photographs/pictures from this period. This suggests that spatial reorganization had a strong consumer and class aspect, which was evidenced in the growing advertising in Beirut journals for household goods. This consumer side of the spatial reorganization of middle-class homes in Beirut hints that bourgeois men, and especially women, were using these newly acquired items and services to achieve and broadcast their class status to the world. Historian Deborah Cohen argued that for middle-class Victorians, items (e.g., furniture, paintings, carpets, and curios) conferred status to such a degree that “things preceded identity; what you owned told others (and yourself) who you were.” More broadly, this reorganization of the home influenced women’s behavior outside the house and impacted gender relationships in the urban space.

IN-BETWEEN SPACES

The discourse on domesticity in the media gradually and indirectly influenced the evolution of urban space in Beirut and vice versa, since the acquired taste and wealth of the Beirut middle class quickly manifested itself in the urban space. Middle-class domesticity was in no way hegemonic or homogeneous. As the house became a status symbol for the bourgeoisie, each house reflected the taste of a specific family. Houses in Beirut started to be painted in different colors and to exhibit different tastes, even though they all adhered to the same general lines of the central hall house structure. For example, although most of Zokak al-Blat’s late Ottoman houses have a central hall and a red-tiled roof and the balconies and façades are more open to the urban space, a number of variations demonstrate the influence individual owners could have on the building’s appearance, thus injecting variety into the urban space.

There is a growing interest among historians of street culture on the porous nature of the relationship between “inside” and “outside,” rather than the hard boundaries between interiors and the street. The discourse on domesticity in Beirut was one of the parameters that contributed to blurring the lines between the private and public spheres and influenced the formation of “in-between spaces,” between the private and the public, both inside and outside the house. These changes, however, sometimes clashed with the original aims of domesticity and reshaped gendered relationships.

A good example of an “in-between space” in newly built middle-class houses in Beirut is the balcony, where women could see and be seen in the public arena while still in their private homes. The balcony was the place that connected the family, and especially women (but also men), to the public sphere/view or the public streets. The increasing importance of the balcony for women can be seen in the Beirut Arabic novels of the time and was used extensively as a key setting in the plots. The liminal position of balconies both exposed women to the public gaze and made them into potential subjects of gossip, while enabling them to see and hear what was going on below. Balconies, for women, were far more than visual places on which and from which to be observed; they were also places from which and to which to speak and to be heard.

The domesticity discourse also helped create “in-between spaces” or “converging spaces” outside the house in the urban space, since women’s growing consumerism went beyond the confines of the home. Although in the discourse of domesticity women were expected to devote their time and efforts to the interior of the home, they found themselves increasingly leaving the home to fulfill this domestic mission. Department stores are a good example of places where women forged links between the commercial public and the bourgeois private family. The prosperous import and export activities in Beirut prompted new needs and

46 Spain, Gendered Spaces, pp. 112–113.
47 Cohen, Household Gods, p. 86.
tastes in home decoration, which department stores as well as local stores sought to satisfy. These stores spread rapidly through Beirut as of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th and were highly visible in public life and in urban space.

The architectural drama of these new stores was inescapable, both as an urban presence, with the building itself serving as an advertisement, and through their often-startling new interiors. They were built of iron and steel and plate glass and used new engineering methods and construction techniques featuring open yet imposing facades alongside airy and expensive interiors.51 In fact, the department stores were constructed as monuments in the modern urban space. Lisa Tiersten, in her work on turn of the century Paris, notes that “the perception of the department store as an extension of the city street was accentuated by the lure of its opulent window displays and its policy of free-entry [...] the very scale of the place, the sense of open space seemed to make the store a city in itself.”52 Socially and culturally, as well as architecturally, these stores left their mark in the urban web of the Middle East. In the history of consumption and the modernization of shopping, they form a link between the “traditional bazaar” and the postmodern mega mall.53

Although Beirut newspapers advertised domestic goods,54 from the second half of the 19th century onwards, department store marketing expanded rapidly. Advertisements for goods and fashions that would appeal to the middle class appeared on the pages of the Beirut newspapers.55 The opening of local merchandise depots (such as al-Kaff al-Ahmar and Makhzan Suriya) and the launching of European department store outlets at the turn of the century responded amply to these needs.56 Beginning in the 1880s, branches of major French department stores such as Au Bon Marché were set up in Beirut. This store was famous for its marketing innovations, which included a reading room for husbands while their wives were shopping.57 It is known that women gradually worked and bought in these stores.

Other stores such as the Grand Dépôt and the Grand Magasin du Printemps acquired wholesale branches into the region. They specialized in low prices and a vast array of goods that was imitated in local knick-knack stores such as al-Kaff al-Ahmar (also known as Au Gant Rouge, the French translation of its name), Au Petit Bon Marche, and Makhzan al-Bada’I al-Inkliziyya (Depot for English Goods).58

One of the best-known department stores in Beirut was Orosdi Back. It was the first large-scale department store in Beirut and opened in 1888. It was located on Bank Street in downtown Beirut, the road that leads up to Riyad al Sulh Square. This chain of stores came about as a result of a partnership between Adolph Orosdi, a Hungarian army officer, and his sons, who had opened a clothing store in Galata in 1855, and the Back family, who were Austrian-Hungarian Jews, as was Orosdi. The store was known as the “Harrods of the East.” It was an impressive three-story building with large


51 Ibid., p. 119.

52 Ibid., p. 120.


54 Most advertisements were for goods that appealed to women, such as ready-made clothes, furniture, household goods and appliances (particularly sewing machines), children’s and women’s clothes, silverware, mirrors, clocks, watches, safes, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, detergents, soap, and chocolates, as well as services, such as housekeepers, French and English teachers, and piano instructors. Fruma Zachs, “The Beginning of Press Advertising in 19th Century Beirut: Consumption, Consumers and Meanings,” in Gisela Procházka-Eisl and Martin Strohmeyer (eds.), The Economy as an Issue in the Middle Eastern Press: Papers of the 6th Meeting “History of the Press in the Middle East” (Neue Beilteft zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 2) (Vienna: Lit, 2008), pp. 187–202.


display windows on the street. It opened in 1901 for the 25th anniversary of Sultan Abdülmecid II's accession. It had elevators and an internal telephone system but burned down in 1937. Jens Hanssen notes that the store was highly profitable, with a net profit of 117,699 francs in 1914.59

These department stores were designed to appeal to middle-class women and men who wanted to modernize their homes and families and hence indirectly their nation. Mona Russell suggests that women became “the general administrator and purchasing agent for their home whether wealthy or middle class.”60 Beirut women needed to leave their homes to purchase goods for the house. This became easier when modern means of transportation, including the tramway, were built during this period in Beirut. Very soon primarily men but also women went to shop in these department stores, thus signaling a change not simply in the structure of commercial life, but in the very nature of gendered relationships in the urban space. Reynolds notes that:

[...] department-store shopping challenged the non-metropolitan gendering of urban space and consumption that marked the broader society, bestowing on its customers a certain independence from older social codes and practices. The mixing of men and women in department stores complemented the modernity associated with the new kinds of goods the stores sold and increased their marketability.61

It is known that in Istanbul, for example, from 1914, the women who were employed in department stores were mainly Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. After World War I, Muslim women also started working in these stores. Women were important to Muslim customers, as were the special rooms offering privacy, since they allowed the stores to offer culturally and religiously sensitive services.62

There is scant research on department stores in the Middle East. Questions such as how many women went to these stores towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th still needs to be explored. However, historical research on consumer behavior indicates that women began shopping much more in department stores in the 1920s and 1930s than in the early 1900s.63 This trend can also be seen in articles in Beiruti newspapers and in many novels in which intellectuals cautioned middle-class women time and again not to concentrate on their outward appearance and to stop buying and wearing European goods and fashions.64 Studies also show that women’s shopping varied in terms of class in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Lower- and middle-class women had longer or more regular experiences of public work and movement in market spaces than upper-class women, who more commonly bought goods in their homes from traveling peddlers or sent their servants or male relatives to the market. Nevertheless, many upper- and middle-class Muslim and Coptic women who had been secluded in previous decades began to shop in big stores.65

The change in gendered relationships was perceived as a threat that could blur the boundaries between the private and public spaces where unrelated men and women could mix.66 For example, husbands67 feared that payment for goods would make women more indepen-

64 It is important to note that, at the end of the 19th century, these advertisements were not aimed directly at women. The change began towards the turn of the century when advertisements began to be written for female consumers, especially for fashion. See also Abou-Hodeib, *A Taste from Home*, pp. 116–17.
65 Reynolds, *A City Consumed*, p. 73.
dent. This public consumerism also challenged the bourgeois order and the goal of the domesticity discourse since it drew women into a “dangerous” network of unregulated desires, where self-interest and pleasure could easily overcome the dictates of social and familial duties and challenge bourgeois male authority at home and in public.

CONCLUSION

Examining the reciprocal influence of the discourse of domesticity in Beirut and the development of urban space can help shed light on the ways gender relationships were reshaped. The process of rearranging the home, as seen in the domesticity discourse and the modern project of changing the urban space, eventually carved out a larger place for women in the public sphere. The home ceased being the sole mamlaka (domain) of women but increasingly and in parallel more places were designed for both genders in the urban sphere. Since women’s changing position in society was articulated through the home, this process eventually led them to be more visible in the public sphere and enabled them to take an active part in changing it.

Most research on gender relations and urban spatial structures casts women as the innocent, passive victims of an environment created by property developers, the state, and patriarchy in an effort to establish a distinct territory for the “traditional” nuclear family. Clearly, however, women, as can be seen in the Beirut case, were also agents in the spatial structure of the city or at least took an active part in this process, even as a by-product of the patriarchal/domesticity discourse. Additional comparative research with more empirical cases should be conducted to further explore the reciprocal influence of the domesticity discourse and the changing urban space.

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**A BOTTOM-UP VIEW OF URBAN MIDDLE CLASS LIFESTYLES IN JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS FROM 19TH CENTURY OTTOMAN SYRIA**

This chapter on Ottoman Syria and Beirut in particular during the Nahda period (the awakening of Arabic culture) draws extensively on a rich collection of Arabic newspapers and periodicals published mainly from 1858 to 1914. Numerous newspapers and periodicals were founded and flourished during the Nahda period, and from 1858 onward (when the first journal in Arabic was launched) until the end of the 19th century most publishers were male intellectuals. However, they were aimed at both female and male audiences. Most of the writers themselves were men. Only toward the end of the 19th century did female figures found and publish journals (in Egypt and Syria). These publications dealt for the most part with subjects that appealed to women, although both men and women published articles in them.

These Arabic journals and periodicals can be found today in a number of libraries and archives, on paper, microfiche or microfilm or even online. The libraries of the University of Haifa and the Hebrew University house many of these periodicals and journals.

Although these lively publications are crucial to understanding political developments in Middle Eastern history, they are also essential for a grasp of the social, cultural, urban and gender history of the local middle classes. They shed light on bottom-up processes in history and provide insights into daily/private life narratives and events, at times at the municipal level, that are rarely noted in governmental documents or other sources. Some of these newspapers printed illustrations that reveal much about the social and cultural messages the writers aimed to convey to their readers, and can provide precious information on processes such as modernization and consumerism. These can also be seen in newspaper advertisements for shops, merchandise depots and department stores.

Socio-cultural topics more clearly dominated the journals and periodicals founded by women and for women. This can be seen in particular in their advice or opinion columns where women's voices and thoughts can be heard over the political hegemonic voice. They approached topics such as the gendered reorganization of the “modern” Arab home (both within the home as well as in its facade; i.e., in the public space) and childrearing including trends in fashion, feeding, hygiene and play time.

Delving into Ottoman Syrian history is important to an understanding of urban history and its multifaceted relationship to gender discourses. Advice columns, for example, demonstrate how the recommendations of their authors, especially with regard to issues of domesticity, reflected both new cultural and social trends but at the same time how the writers themselves promoted trends in women’s lives and their intersection with the rapidly changing world of the cities and towns they lived in.
PERFORMANCES OF LATE OTTOMAN MODERNITY:
CULTURE, ENTERTAINMENT AND LEISURE ACTIVITIES
IN PRE-WORLD WAR I JAFFA

Evelin Dierauff

Abstract | This article discusses governance processes relating to imperial Ottoman culture, entertainment, and leisure in the port city of Jaffa in Ottoman Palestine before World War I as “performances of late Ottoman modernity” perceived and reported by the publishers of the Arab newspaper Filastin. It highlights how cultural initiatives considered “modern” were organized by various civil society actors, non-governmental organizations, and social societies, and explores the agendas and perceptions that informed their activities to promote modern middle-class urban cultural life. Two locations in Jaffa, Bustrus Street and Manshiyya Beach, serve as the main examples to illustrate the general rules for “managing culture” in a modern Arab provincial town. The article explores whether these cultural practices were specific to Jaffa, expressions of imperial Ottoman culture, or a reflection of global trends. The main body of sources analyzed is articles from Jaffa's leading Arabic newspaper Filastin published between 1911 and 1914, combined with research literature on the Jaffa-Tel-Aviv region during the late Ottoman period, historical maps, and photographs. The newspaper articles are viewed as testimonies of local perceptions of Jaffa's cultural and leisure life, conditioned by the distinct modernist mindset characteristic of Filastin's discourse.

INTRODUCTION

This article discusses governance processes related to culture, entertainment, and leisure in the port city of Jaffa in Ottoman Palestine before World War I as “performances of late Ottoman modernity.” It highlights how cultural initiatives considered “modern” were organized by various civil society actors and non-governmental and civil society organizations, and explores the agendas and perceptions that informed their activities to create modern middle-class urban cultural life.

“Governance,” as defined by Marc Hufty, refers to “processes of interaction and decision making” that respond to collective problems and lead to the “creation, reinforcement or reproduction of social norms and institutions” in a society.1 An analysis of governance, he argues, should identify the actors, social norms, problems, processes, and nodal points related to it. Urban governance is understood in a general sense to include all the patterns of social coordination and processes of managing a city.2 These analytical parameters have guided the current exploration of Jaffa's

sector of public culture, entertainment, and leisure.3

The sources discuss a range of civil society actors that emerged from the rising middle classes of all confessions in Jaffa and aimed to reform public culture. Doctors, teachers, journalists, traders, landowners, entrepreneurs, and community representatives were organized in social societies and had access to the political elites. Despite their different ethno-confessional backgrounds and political agendas, they shared social norms that are best described as a “modernist mindset” inspired by the global zeitgeist of modernity.4 Living in a world connected through globalization dynamics, their mindset was tremendously influenced by Eurocentric standards of modernity but, at the same time, was also shaped by Jaffa’s own conditions.

Modernity in the Middle East, as Christopher Bayly, Liat Kozma, Johann Buessow, and others have argued, should be explored from a “globalization perspective” and not as “Westernization.”5 19th-century modernity produced a “standard set” of cultural, political, and religious concepts that were articulated in Europe and spread more or less around the globe. However, as Volker Schmidt has noted, the notion of a “convergence of concepts” with local inclinations that produces “varieties of modernity” may be more pertinent.6 In a comprehensive overview of the socio-spatial making of Bilad al-Sham from the 19th until the middle of the 20th century as an “urban patchwork region,” Cyrus Schayegh applied a “transpatialization perspective” of intertwined processes of globalization, state formation and urbanization, since, he says, the making of the modern Middle East cannot solely be grasped through the spectacle of globalization.7

However, this contribution to “performances of modernity” in Jaffa’s pre-World War I cultural life does not explore the topic as a form of “Westernization” or alternatively from the globalization perspective, but rather starts from the premise that globalization, urbanization, Eurocentric modernization, the Arab Nahda, and post-revolutionary Ottoman liberalization discourses were all linked to its dynamics. Inspired by Ilan Pappé’s article “Whose Modernity?,” it inquires into what modernity meant to the local actors and how it changed their lives in real terms.8

To better understand the civil society actors in Jaffa’s evolving cultural sector before World War I, I define the shared “modernist mindset” that expresses Ottoman post-revolutionary modernity in Palestine. An analysis of Filastin shows that, consistent with intellectual thought during the Nahda and the Tanzimat, it included the imperative of “reform and modernization” (islah), an element that dominated local debates and was imposed on all aspects of

3 Hufty defines four criteria for the observation of governance processes: 1. a realistic, non-normative observation of facts; 2. an interdisciplinary approach, considering governance as a “bridge concept;” 3. a reflexive integration of the problems and tools defined by the authors into the study since they are never completely neutral; and 4. a comparison of governance processes in different places or periods. See Hufty, “Investigating Policy Processes,” pp. 403-407.


6 For associations between globalization and modernity, see Bayly, Birth of the Modern World; on the “convergence” versus the uniformity of modernity concepts, see pp. 9-19. For a comparative study on the impact of global modernity from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean in a connecting world of empires, see Leila Fawaz and Christopher Bayly (eds.), Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Through its focus on cultural transformation and economics, this volume explores how peoples in the Middle East and South Asia “appropriated, adapted or resisted” European modernity; see especially pp. 1-27. On expressions of the “first modern globalization” in the Middle East, see Kozma, Schayegh and Wishnitzer, Global Middle East, pp. 1-15. Regarding Muhammad ʿAbduh’s Theology of Unity (1897), Buessow points out that a “Protestant template for religion” was transmitted to Arab thinkers through European publications. See Buessow, “Re-Imagining Islam.” On various modernities, see Volker Schmidt, “Multiple Modernities or Varieties of Modernity?,” Current Sociology 54 (2006), pp. 77-97.


Ottoman “unity” (ittihad) was the political, non-negotiable vision in the face of the increasing crisis of the central state and thus “Ottoman patriotism” (al-wataniyya al-ithmaniyya) was championed, just as there was a strong notion of the Palestinian public as “citizens” (muwatta’inun).

The problem defined by Arab intellectuals in Ottoman Palestine was the “decline” (inhittat) and “backwardness” (takhalluf) of the “Orientals” (al-sharqiyin) as compared with Europe, a motif often cited in Filastin to complain about the state of infrastructure, agriculture, and education. The permanent comparison with the industrialized West frustrated them, and the state of “Oriental backwardness” was seen as a syndrome of “social ills” (amrad iltima’iyya). It was this frustration that motivated Jaffa’s civil society actors and social societies to create social norms and the establishment of a public culture considered “progressive” (mutaqaddim) and accessible to the town’s middle classes. The agenda was to make cultural norms compatible with the “spirit of the new age” (ruh al-asr al-jadid), a central slogan in Filastin and a synonym for modernity.

This “new age” was the post-revolutionary Young Turk era that ended the so-called “despotism” (istibdad) of Sultan Abdülhamid. The “spirit” addressed was the reinstalled Ottoman Constitution of 1876, which granted equal citizen rights. The lifting of press censorship (1908) stimulated Arab journalism, thus enabling a new culture of political debate, protest, and petitioning known as “the new freedom” (al-hurriryya al-jadida). Journalists portrayed themselves as the “mouthpiece” (lisan) of “public opinion” (al-ray al-amm), and civil society actors justified any sort of engagement by claiming it was for “the public good” (an-nafa’a al-amm) or “the common interest” (al-maslaha al-amma). In Jaffa, social organizations adopted these slogans to reshape the cultural sector to be in step with “the spirit of the age.” Most of the city’s urban development was driven by these societies, whose considerable resources from membership fees, donations on the part of notables, and, to a great extent, charity events, filled their coffers.

Filastin documented processes of urban governance in Jaffa in its many reports on
activities in the fields of culture, entertainment, and leisure, coordinated by a range of non-governmental organizations or individuals. For example, communal societies organized movie screenings and bazaars to collect money for educational and charitable purposes, intellectual circles and youth associations organized modern Arabic drama and music events, hosting famous Egyptian actors or musicians from Europe, and Jaffa's sports club held public athletics competitions or organized lectures on topics in the natural sciences for the educated social classes. The social norms and the mindset that lay behind these activities are revealed through *Filastin*; however, many details about the practical features of cultural management (event coordination, artists’ networks, etc.) unfortunately remain unclear.

What can be gleaned from *Filastin* is that cultural activities in Jaffa tended to take place in the cafés and bars on Bustrus Street. New facilities for leisure and recreation were also installed at Manshiyya Beach, thus making these two locations the physical *nodal points* of Jaffa's cultural life and leisure activities.

This phenomenon of global modernity was associated with the organization of the urban middle classes into interest groups, which led to the politicization of these societies in Europe and the Middle East. The trend towards middle-class engagement increased after the Young Turk Revolution in the urban centers of the Empire, although the history of social organizations and societies in the Middle East and Ottoman Palestine still needs to be explored. Keith Watenpaugh's survey of Aleppo's middle classes from 1908 to 1946, whom he defines as “architects of community” has shed light on this issue. Michelle Campos has explored Palestine's Freemasonry as a “social club.” The first lodge was founded in Jerusalem (1873) followed by the Temple of Solomon in Jaffa (1891), which was renamed l'Aurore (Dawn) in 1904, or Barkai in Hebrew and Shaqa in Arabic. Abigail Jacobson has analyzed the relief efforts in wartime Jerusalem organized by the local branch of the Red Crescent Society (founded in 1915), the Armenians, the Ashkenazi-Sephardi societies, the joint American-Jewish and Zionist organizations, and the American Colony. Johann Buessow has investigated the infrastructure of the public sphere in the District of Jerusalem, including printing presses and literary circles. Ruth Kark has investigated the European-Jewish role in Jaffa's cultural sector, but did not examine Arab Palestinian initiatives. Muhammad Salim al-Tarawina's survey of Shari'a records (*sijill*) provides detailed information on Jaffa's demographic and social developments and its economic, legal, and educational institutions but without an analytical approach. The involvement of the women of Jaffa in charity, the patronage of the poor, and early feminism have been explored by Salim Tamari in the memoirs of Adele Shamat 'Azar (1886-1968), the co-founder of Jaffa's Orthodox Women's Association for the Support of Orphans Girls (1910) and a leading figure in early “Arab Orthodox feminism.” The autobiography of Jerusalem's storyteller Jawhariyya, edited by Tamari, provides insights into Palestinian folk culture and entertainment venues in Jerusalem's Old City.

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This article is thus the first to provide an in-depth exploration of Jaffa’s organized public culture, entertainment, and leisure within the paradigm of late Ottoman modernity of Palestine and its “various modernities.” Jaffa’s “local modernity,” the modernity of a provincial Arab Levantine port city at the beginning of the 20th century, was represented in its coffeehouse culture and its music, theater and film performances on the stages on Bustrus Street, which looked to Egypt as the emerging center of Arab art, thus reflecting Jaffa’s efforts to support “Arab modernity” and the Nahda. Jaffa’s “Ottoman modernity” emerged from its ceremonial culture and public demonstrations of Ottomanism by local elites. Ideas of “global modernity” were reflected in the local debate on the industrialization of Jaffa’s infrastructure, agriculture, and economy. In the field of education, Jaffa’s actors were influenced by “Western modernity,” as inspired by British or American models, a topic that is beyond the scope of the present study and cannot be discussed in detail here. In short, modernity in Jaffa was a hybrid, as was urban culture in the “global Middle East.”

Below, I outline the historical factors and local conditions behind the emergence of Jaffa’s social organizations and cultural sector. I then identify key civil society actors and arenas in Jaffa’s cultural sector, and look more closely at Bustrus Street and Manshiyya Beach, two nodal points of culture, entertainment, and leisure, to demonstrate through articles in Filastin how culture in pre-World War I Jaffa took the form of “collective action.”

HISTORICAL FACTORS AND LOCAL CONDITIONS

Jaffa’s urban expansion as of the latter half of the 19th century was fostered by its geographic location, economic potential, and rise as a center of the subdistrict (Ar.: qada’) in 1871/72, which led to the emergence of various Ottoman institutions there. Although Jaffa was a

minor town, its port was the most important between Alexandria and Beirut, which made it the gateway to Palestine. Jaffa became the center of transportation and communication in the mutasarrifiyya (district) of Jerusalem, and was linked to Jerusalem, the administrative capital and spiritual center of Palestine, by road, the railway (1892) and telegraph lines (1864), which created the “Jaffa-Jerusalem interurban axis.”

The cultivation of monocultures as cash crops and in particular the thriving citrus industry turned Jaffa into an agricultural agglomeration and made it a hub of international trade and tourism as of the 1860s. This attracted labor and migration from all over the Middle East, North Africa, Asia Minor, and Europe. Egyptian Muslims started coming to Jaffa in the 1830s, Jews from Morocco and Tunisia are recorded as of the 1840s, German Protestants in the 1860s, and Ashkenazi Jews from Europe as of the 1880s. They all turned Jaffa into a “city of many nations” on a par with Beirut. Between the early 19th century and the eve of World War I, Jaffa’s population exploded twentyfold,


23 Jaffa was the seat of the Sharia court (al-makhama al-shar’iyya), a civil court (makhama nizamiyya), the commercial court (makhama tijariyya) for the Jerusalem District, and the district council (majlis idara). The municipality (majlis baladi), police force, and the gendarmerie of the subdistrict-governor (qaimaqam) were located there, and a military base was situated in the vicinity. Kark, Jaffa, pp. 44-45.

24 Schayegh, Middle East, pp. 80-81.

25 On Jaffa’s agriculture and the citrus industry, see Kark, Jaffa, pp. 220-242. Other flourishing businesses were soap factories and water wheels that drove presses, grain mills, and machines. Around 1900, 36 olive presses and 12 sesame presses were located in the qada’, and 22 grain mills were operating along the Yarkon River. Tarawina, Qada’ Yafa, pp. 314-316.


27 For a comparison of Beirut and Jaffa, see Schayegh, Middle East, pp. 74-76. On 19th-century migration from Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Circassia, Chechnya, and Bosnia into the region, see David Grossman, Rural Arab Demography and Early Jewish Settlement in Palestine: Distribution and Population Density during the Late Ottoman and Early Mandate Periods (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2011), pp. 43-77. On migration from other regions of Palestine to Jaffa, see Kark, Jaffa, pp. 158-159. On local receptions of Jewish and Maghrebi immigration into the Qada’ based on Filastin, see Evelin Dierauff, “Global Migration into Late Ottoman Jaffa as reflected in the Arab-Palestinian Newspaper Filastin (1911-1913),” in Kozma, Schayegh and Wishnitzer (eds.), A Global Middle East, pp. 165-174.
integrating 50,000 inhabitants of various ethnicities and confessions.28 Beside the Muslim (Hanafi) majority, there were Greek Orthodox, Catholic, Maronite, Armenian, Catholic, and Protestant Christians, along with Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews. Each community had its places of worship and religious foundations (waqf, pl. awqaﬁ), bought and sold real estate, oversaw educational institutions, and set up social services. In 1917, representatives of more than 25 nations resided in Jaffa and each one had its own delegate (mukhtar) to the authorities who dealt with the interests of his group.29 Around 1895, these communities operated a total of 21 schools as well as numerous medical and philanthropic institutions.30 Furthermore, the bulk of the international Zionist institutions in Ottoman Palestine were concentrated in the town, including the London-based Anglo-Palestine Bank (1903), the Jewish National Fund (1907), and the Palestine Office (1907), and the building of the New Yishuv was coordinated from Jaffa.31

The sectarian communities spurred polycentric development, transforming Jaffa into a “town of several centers.” The original and geographic center was the Old City with the port at the seashore (see Figure 5). South of the Old City, there was ’Ajami, a large mixed modern middle-class neighborhood inhabited by Christians of various denominations, merging southwards with al-Jabaliyya.32 Outside of the Old City on the road leading northeast to Nablus, Jaffa’s modern commercial center took shape on Howard/Bustrus Street as of the 1870s. A little further down that road, the German Colony was built up in 1869 by the Templar Society, composed of pietistic Protestants from the German Black Forest, where they maintained a German hospital and other institutions.33

North of the Old City, the Manshiyya quarter stretched along the coast, constituting a large mixed neighborhood with an Arab Muslim majority and smaller Christian and Jewish communities.34 Starting in the 1880s, Manshiyya began to merge northeast with the new Jewish neighborhoods of Neve Tzedek, Neve Shalom, Mahane Yehuda, etc. Further northeast of Manshiyya, there was Tel-Aviv, founded by the Ahuzat Bayit Society (1909) as the first “Hebrew City,” a magnet for Jewish immigration.35

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28 Jerusalem’s population before World War I is estimated to have been roughly 80,000 inhabitants and had grown eightfold since the early 19th century while Jaffa’s spatial expansion from 0.1 square km in 1841/42 to 1.4 square km in 1917/18 outpaced Jerusalem’s growth twofold from 0.6 to 3.8 square km within the same period. See Schayegh, Middle East, p. 75.
29 On Jaffa’s various nations and ethnicities, see Kark, Jaffa, p. 158; and Tarawina, Qada’ Yafa, pp. 460-461.
30 Kark, Jaffa, pp. 172, 284.
32 ’Ajami was possibly founded by Lebanese Maronites as suggested on the website Maronites of the Holy Land, which is now unfortunately no longer accessible. https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reports/features/546588-maronites-of-the-holy-land (last accessed on 6 June 2017).
34 Note that Manshiyya started out as an Egyptian colony of agricultural workers in Irshid, later the southern part of Manshiyya. See Michael Dumper, “Jaffa,” in Michael Dumper and Bruce Stanley (eds.), Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: A Historical Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO, 2007), p. 201.
35 Kark, Jaffa, pp. 100-104, 107, 118-134. See also the maps of Jaffa’s Jewish neighborhoods on pp. 112-116.
short, pre-World War I Jaffa was a town of plural centers, as is also clear from the aerial photographs of the region, and especially the map of Jaffa-Tel-Aviv from 1923 by F. Palmer (see Figures 6, 7 and 8 below).

Figure 6: The Jaffa-Tel-Aviv region in 1917. Note the Old City and the harbor in the center, ‘Ajami and Jabaliyya to the south, Manshiyya and Tel-Aviv to the north. Dalman, Hundert deutsche Fliegerbilder, p. 77.

The top priority for Jaffa’s landowners, traders and intellectuals was the modernization of Jaffa’s infrastructure, street network, and agriculture, since the prosperity of the city depended heavily on international trade. The modernization of the port in particular was a central topic in local politics because, despite the rise in steam ship traffic, Jaffa did not have a deep-water port. The local elite also put pressure on officials to provide better security by deploying government forces and installing electric streetlights, which was enthusiastically welcomed in 1912.

36 Filastin, 6 January 1912, issue 101/1/4-5.
37 766 steamships and 1,065 sail boats passed through Jaffa’s port in 1911. Filastin, 7 August 1912, issue 160/1/3-2/1.
38 Filastin, 17 August 1912, issue 163/1/3-4.
39 Filastin, 11 June 1913, issue 244/3/2-3.

ACTORS AND ARENAS OF PUBLIC CULTURE

Jaffa’s main actors in cultural reforms were a number of societies connected to the Muslim, Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant communities. Filastin gave the most space to the initiatives of the Muslim Society for Piety and Welfare (Jam‘iyyat al-Birr wa-l-Ihsan), the Greek Orthodox Welfare Association (al-Jam‘iyya al-Khayriyya li-l-Rum Urthudhuks), the Orthodox Women’s Association for the Support of Orphan Girls (Jam‘iyyat al-Sayyidat al-Urthudhuksiyya li-‘Add al-Yatimat) and the Israeliite Women’s Association (Jam‘iyyat al-Sayyidat al-Isra’ilyya). A range of Zionist institutions contributed to Jaffa’s public culture. The Hebrew Gymnasium in Tel-Aviv, for example, presented Hebrew and Yiddish theater. There were also inter-confessional platforms consisting of Jaffa’s middle classes of all faiths: the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the Freemasonry Lodge, and the conservative Society for the Prevention of Drugs (Jam‘iyyat al-Imtina’ an al-Musakkirat) discussed how to preserve morality and implement progressive patriotism at the same time. The internationally mixed platforms included the Jaffa’s Sports Club (al-Muntada al-Riyadi) and the Christian Mar Mansur Association (Jam‘iyyat Mar Mansur). The “new youth” (al-nashi’a al-jadida) was the main target of local reform activists and founding schools was at the top of the agenda of Jaffa’s societies. Efforts to spearhead the modernization of education were led by the Orthodox community. Jaffa’s Orthodox Women’s Association for the Support of Orphan Girls, headed by Su’ada Tamari, was among the first Palestinian associations devoted to the education of girls.

40 One of its leading members was Sulayman at-Tajji, a prominent Sheikh, who was an anti-Zionist and a wealthy land owner with influence in the Jaffa-Ramla region. Filastin, 5 June 1912, issue 142/3/3.
who promoted the role of women in social development.  

On the other hand, Jaffa’s social societies tended not to provide platforms for popular culture that did not fit the criteria of being “modern” and “progressive;” this is clear from Filastin. In the local news section, almost nothing is reported on popular culture or celebrations that included dancing or drinking. Information on alcohol consumption in some coffee shops or at Manshiyya Beach at night can only be gleaned between the lines, in reports of occasional brawls in the alleys of Jaffa or even gunfights that left people dead or wounded.  

Filastin’s bias against popular culture was particularly obvious when, in 1912, the editors thanked Jaffa’s police department for banning “female dancers” (raqisat) in cafés and public places, who provoked “evil incidents” (al-hawadith al-mukhilla).

Jaffa’s societies devoted much of their efforts to philanthropic work. It was this burgeoning sector of “charity projects” (masharti khayriyya, amal ihsan), as it was called in Filastin, that organized concerts, bazaars, plays, or movies to collect money for schools, orphans, and the military. For these events, Jaffa’s schools such as the Tabitha Mission School for girls (founded by the Scottish Presbyterian Miss Walker Arnott in 1863), the French Frères School, and the House of the Islamic Sciences School (Masdrat Dar al-Ulum al-Islamiyya) under the aegis of the Muslim Society for Piety and Welfare served as venues. Charity in service of the “homeland” was intertwined with Jaffa’s “ceremonial culture” and demonstrations of Ottomanism by the town’s elites. Patriotic donation campaigns and “aid funds” (iʿanat) in support of the Ottoman troops considerably shaped Jaffa’s inter-confessional relations during the post-revolutionary era. During the Tripoli War (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13), an inter-confessional committee (lajna) coordinated the deliveries of aid funds to Istanbul. The town’s intellectuals organized literary evenings in cafés to raise money; Jaffa’s youth collected medicine as donations from pharmacies, and the Isas coordinated the collection of clothes. The local news published lists of donors and recipients.

43 *Filastin*, 15 February 1913, issue 213/3/5; and 19 February 1913, issue 214/3/2-4/3.
44 *Filastin*, 23 September 1913, issue 273/2/5-3/1.
48 *Filastin*, 20 November 1912, issue 190/2/5-3/1.
the amounts given, and there was considerable pressure on Jaffa’s elites (“effendiyya”) to become active by giving patriotic aid.49

In general, the number of social societies increased exponentially during the Young Turk era. It was fashionable for the local elites to occupy honorary posts in associations, and it was understood to be the duty of influential individuals to serve the “greater good.” In 1913, Yusuf al-ʿIsa noted that “societies of societies” had appeared which claimed to “serve the poor” (likhidmat al-faqir) by adopting “certain slogans and uniforms.” But in reality, he complained, most of them were mainly interested in filling their coffers.50 At times, there was criticism that the uses of these donations was not made transparent to the public and that some associations behaved more like “trading companies” than charities.51 The local population became somewhat reluctant to attend Jaffa’s various charity events since they were faced with constant pressure to donate.52

**BUSTRUS STREET AS A NODAL POINT OF MODERN CULTURE**

Jaffa’s Bustrus Street, the main shopping thoroughfare and modern commercial center in the town, with its cosmopolitan pulse, was a nodal point for performances of public culture. Situated outside the Old City next to the Muslim cemetery on the road leading to Nablus (see Figure 9), Bustrus Street connected the town center to Jaffa’s German Colony and was divided in two sections. The first part started at the Clock Tower Square and was named after Iskandar ‘Awad (Howard in English), the dragoon of Thomas Cook’s travel agency in Jaffa; the second part was named after Najib Bustrus, both of whom had properties there. In Filastin, the whole area is referred to as the Bustrus Market (Suq Bustrus). The owners of Howard/Bustrus Street were the Lebanese Greek Orthodox Sursuq family, large-scale absentee landlords in Palestine who developed the street from 1886 onwards.53 Clusters of buildings were constructed there from 1902 onwards, designed by the Jewish builder Morris Steinberg, with shops on the ground floor and apartments on the upper floors. By the beginning of the 20th century, most buildings were leased to Ashkenazi Jews and some to Arab Christians.54 Bustrus Street provided all the services re-

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49 At the top was the prominent Sephardi Jew Shimon Moyal with 25 francs. See Filastin, 2 November 1912, issue 185/3/5; 6 November 1912, issue 186/3/5-6, and 23 November 1912 issue 191/3/3-4.
50 Filastin, 9 April 1913, issue 228/1/1-4.
51 Ibid.
52 Filastin, 1 February 1913, issue 209/3/4.
53 Iskandar ‘Awad was a Maronite from Beirut and operated as Cook’s agent for tourism to Jerusalem from Beirut and Jaffa. In 1887, he built the Howard Hotel in the Howard section of the street. Alfred Sursuq’s sister, who was married to Najib Bustrus, from another wealthy Lebanese Christian family of merchants, inherited the second part of the street, named after her husband. I am grateful to Samuel Giler, a specialist in Old Jaffa’s geography, who identified many sites from the late Ottoman period, gave me a detailed tour and explained the history of changing ownerships in Old Jaffa. He informed me that the Howard complex was donated as a Maronite waqf after ‘Awad died in 1904 and remains a waqf to this day. For information on ‘Awad, see Moshe Sharon, *Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestiniae (CIAP)*, vol. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 122-131. See also the website Palestine Remembered: http://www.palestineremembered.com/Jaffa/Jaffa (last accessed 20 November 2017).
54 See Samuel Giler, “Rehov ha-Yehudim shel Yafo: al toldot rehov Havard Bustrus-Raziel [The Street of the Jews in Jaffa: The History of Howard-Bustros-Raziel Street],” *Cathedra* 157 (Fall 2015) [in Hebrew], pp. 53-76. At the beginning of the century, many shops were also leased to Jews in the Monastery Market (Suq al-Dayr), an area owned by the Greek Orthodox Church, one of the largest owners of property and real estate in Jaffa. See Kark, Jaffa, pp. 260-262.
quired for a modern city: printing presses, postal services, foreign banks, inns, tourist agencies, doctors, pharmacies. Apart from the Howard Hotel, there was the famous Palestine Hotel, a complex owned by the Jewish hotelier Kaminitz, who also operated inns in Jerusalem, Jericho, and Hebron. There were also the German Bank and Zionist institutions, such as the Palestine Office and the Rishon le-Zion winery shop. Around the corner were the Clock Tower Square, the police station, the Ottoman Government House (dar al-hukuma), and the court. All this made Bustrus Street the perfect area for the ’Isas to have their editorial office. They lived in a prestigious house on the road to ’Ajami, where they also rented space to the Anglo Palestine Bank, a Zionist institution (see Figure 10), but the center of their world was Bustrus Street. From there, they maintained social networks, gathered news from the police and the government and pursued their journalistic endeavor.

Bustrus Street also had an entertainment infrastructure consisting of cafés and bars that were a key part of the “coffeehouse culture” of a provincial Arab Levantine city and represented Jaffa’s “local modernity.” The coffeehouse was a particularly “Muslim institution” of “Arab origin” and, in the words of Ralph Hattox, a “tavern without wine,” which had a much greater impact on urban society than a tavern since taverns in the Muslim context were linked to delinquent activity. As a space in between the “private” and the “public,” and traditionally an exclusively male space frequented by men during the day and at night – occasionally in their pajamas – the coffeehouse could temporarily host newly arrived immigrants, travelers, or the homeless. There, different social classes mingled for socializing, networking, business, politics, and entertainment. Men spent hours in games (backgammon, chess), listened to storytellers and musicians, and enjoyed dramatic entertainment, such as puppet shows, shadow plays, tumblers, and jugglers. Thus, the rise of the coffeehouse in the Middle East is intertwined with the emergence of an urban bourgeoisie in early modernity, public leisure spheres, and new forms of performative arts.


57 Sources indicate that in early 16th-century Yemen, Sufis used to drink coffee in a shared ceremony before the dhikr, and coffee and the coffeehouse as a “package” was introduced to Istanbul by two Syrians around 1555. See Ralph Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), pp. 63-65, 73. For the culture of preparing coffee, see pp. 63-71.

58 Kırlı, Coffeehouses, p. 171.

59 For the various social functions of Istanbul’s coffeehouses, see Kırlı, “Coffeehouses,” pp. 161-181. For social life in coffeehouses, see Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses, pp. 72-80. For the dynamics between the rising bourgeoisie-

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Figure 10: The ’Isas’ House on ’Ajami Street. A floor was rented out to the Zionist Anglo Palestine Bank from 1903 to 1922/23. Photograph from the Mandate period (courtesy of Samuel Giler). Source: Private archive of Samuel Giler.
In Jaffa’s Arab cafés, alcohol was not served. Performances on Bustrus Street were open to women, and some plays or movies explicitly addressed families. There is evidence from Filastin that theater and live music mostly took place in a sort of modern café called the New Bar, situated next to the National Pharmacy (al-Saydaliyya al-Wataniyya) that was run by a Jew named Musa Alikolov on Bustrus Street, since it had a spacious hall suitable for these events.60

A popular place for movies was a small hall suitable for screenings called Abu Shakush (“The One with the Hammer”), also in Bustrus Street.61 Plays and movies were presented in the Café al-Ballur, “Crystal Café” (address unknown), or the Café al-Zarifa (Figure 10), which Filastin sometimes spelled Zarafa (meaning “Café of Grace”) or Café al-Zarafiyya, situated near the Clock Tower.62 Artistic performances also took place at a café in ‘Ajami,63 and Café Lebanon, a café on Manshiyya Street in the Jewish neighborhood of Neve Shalom.64 There, another coffeehouse, Manshiyya’s Garden (Junaynat Manshiyya) served alcohol, obviously illegally, and sold coffee at overly high prices.65

60 Filastin, 15 January 1913, issue 204/3/4. It is unclear which functions were hosted there since performances were mostly announced as “at Abu Shakush’s” (mahall Abu Shakush). According to Samuel Giler, Abu Shakush was not a professional theater in late Ottoman times. A property deed dated 1926, found by Samuel Giler, indicates that, by the early Mandate period, the Abu Shakush Café was owned by the brothers George and Patides Joannidas, who moved it from Bustrus to Jamal Pasha Boulevard, today Jerusalem Boulevard.

61 A photograph contributed by Samuel Giler shows the location of Café al-Zarifa. See also Filastin, 25 December 1912, issue 200/3/3. For events held at Café al-Ballur, see Filastin, 22 February 1913, issue 215/3/4-5; 5 March 1913, issue 218/3/4-5; and 12 March 1913, issue 220/3/5.

62 Name and address unknown. See Filastin, 9 November 1912, issue 187/3/3.

63 According to the editors, coffee sold at cafés was only supposed to cost one matik (Turk.: metalik); however, this café sold it for two matik. Filastin, 7 August 1912, issue 160/3/3.

64 Filastin, 16 September 1911, issue 69/2/1f.

65 According to the editors, coffee sold at cafés was only supposed to cost one matik (Turk.: metalik); however, this café sold it for two matik. Filastin, 7 August 1912, issue 160/3/3.
In the local news, the Isas increasingly supported entertainment on Bustrus Street as of 1913 and regularly encouraged Filastin’s readers to attend literature readings, music, plays, and movies catering to various audiences. The trends in modern entertainment and leisure grew in Middle Eastern cities and symbolized urban modernity for the Isas. One of the most popular was the “cinematograph,” the film projector, considered an agent of modernity in itself. The benefits of watching “the moving pictures” (al-suwar al-mutaharrika) were expounded in Filastin several times. The titles of the movies screened are not mentioned in these reports. However, since Arab cinema emerged in the 1930s and the first homegrown productions were shot in Egypt in the 1920s, audiences most likely watched European movies or documentaries on discoveries and technical inventions at Abu Shakush. Yusuf al-Isa promoted the introduction of film projectors in schools as a medium for progressive education and argued that it was the “most successful method of teaching by visual means” (anjah tariqa li-l-talim al-nazari) because it depicted innovations of the industrialized world. The editors regularly urged their readers to go to movies in the Abu Shakush hall, which attracted middle-class families that could pay the moderate cost of a ticket; for instance, when in May 1912, the Greek Orthodox Welfare Association organized a public film festival (hafla sinama).

MODERN ARAB THEATER

In Jaffa, there were also modest attempts at modern Arab drama. Filastin enthusiastically announced that Jaffa’s youth (al-shubban) had been engaged as amateur actors. Jaffa, on the fringes of Egypt as a prestigious cultural center, leaned strongly towards Egyptian drama. Entertainment involving mimicry and gestures performed in coffeehouses, festivals, or public places had existed in the Arab lands since pre-modern times. The popularity of farces in Egypt is widely documented, and Jerusalem’s Old City inhabitants enjoyed shadow plays (khayal al-zill) during Ramadan nights. “Arab drama” in the modern sense emerged in the latter half of the 19th century in the form of adaptations of European plays, interpreted and directed by a number of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants in Cairo and Alexandria. Egypt was the leader in the production of Arab drama and, as of the 1920s, Arab cinema. Apart from adaptations of European classics such as Molière’s L’Avare, Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet and Othello and Casimir Delavigne's Louis XI, the pioneers of modern Arab theater borrowed themes from Islamic history (Salah al-

71 Filastin, 25 May 1912, issue 139/3/3.
72 Traditional modes of performance in Islamic countries were the Shiite “passion play” (tazīya) and the recitation of classical Arab literature, such as the Maqama. During the Ottoman period, some theater genres became popular in the Arab East, especially shadow plays (khayal al-zill, or korakuz from Turkish), a form of puppet theater known since the 13th century. As of the beginning of the 19th century, the popular “comic scene” (fasl mudhik) was performed in public places by theater troupes in Egypt. See Shafik, Arab Cinema, pp. 67-68 and Mohamed Khoozi, The Development of Early Arabic Drama (1847-1900) (London, New York: Longman, 1984), pp. 19-30. On shadow plays in the Turkish context and various Arab countries, see Jacob Landau, Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), pp. 9-47. For the beginnings of modern Arab theater in Egypt and Syria and the increase in theater troupes in Khedival Egypt, see ibid, pp. 49-55, 56-66, 67-74. Another classic is Muhammad Mustafa Badawi, Modern Arabic Drama in Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
73 Jawhariyya described entertaining performances featuring the cinematograph, the “wonder box” (sunduq al-qjab) and the storytellers in Jerusalem that he attended. Tamari, “Jerusalem’s Ottoman Modernity,” pp. 77-79, 133-135.
Din, Muhammad ’Ali Paşa, etc.) or traditional folk tales such as the Thousand and One Nights (Alf Layla wa-Layla) and The Sleeper and the Awake (al-Na’im wa-l-Yaqzan) and integrated Arabic rhymed prose (sajʿ) into their plays. By including a musical accompaniment, they created the “Arab operetta.”74 Palestinian theater created its first genuine drama, modeled after plays produced in Egypt, during the Mandate.75

Arab theater was performed by males only. For example, in 1913, young Jaffa men acted in a play called Samuel (Riwayat Samwil) at the Crystal Café, and the profits were donated to the Muslim Society for Piety and Welfare and the military.76 The shows were packed. Filastin complimented the actors’ artistic “creativity” (ijada) and the perfection of their costumes and the Isās appealed to “lovers of this fine art” (muhibbi hadha al-fann al-jamil) to attend.77 Obviously, there was also a Committee for Cultural-Economic Theater (Lajnat al-Tamthil al-Ada-bi al-Iqtisadi), mentioned only once in 1913, when it performed the tale of Muhammad ’Ali Paşa the Great for charity at the Crystal Café, and The Miser and the Trustworthy (al-Shahih wa-l-Wafaʾ al-Sahih), which was read aloud by a local narrator (rawl), Salīh Shaqīr.78

However, when shows were0  

74 The pioneers of modern Arab drama were the Lebanese Maronite Marun al-Naqqash, the Jewish Egyptian journalist Yaqub Sannu, and the Syrian Khalil al-Qabba-ni. In 1848, the first modern Arab drama was presented by Naqqash in Beirut. To his play The Miser (al-Bakhil), an adaption of Molière’s L’Avar, Naqqash borrowed figures and plots from the Thousand and One Nights. See Khozai, Development of Early Arabic Drama, p. 75; Šadık, Arab Cinema, p. 69. Yaqub Sannu, editor of the satirical magazine Abu Nazzara (“The One with the Glasses”), was known for his polemical talents and was called the “Egyptian Molière.” See Khozai, Development of Early Arabic Drama, p. 102f; about Qabbani, see ibid., pp. 80-122.

75 Palestinian professional theater first emerged during the 1930s with the al-Jawzi Troupe (Firqat al-Jawzi), founded by Nasr al-Jawzi and the writings of Jamil al-Bahri. jawzi was born in 1908 to a notable Jerusalem and Gazan family. He broadcast his dramatic texts live from the Palestine Broadcasting Station from 1936. Bahri, publisher of the journal al-Zahra in Haifa, used to omit female roles in translated plays for the lack of actresses and integrated Arabic poetry. Landau, Studies in the Arab Theater, p. 102f; and Reuven Snir, “Palestinian Theatre: Historical Development and Contemporary Distinctive Identity,” Contemporary Theatre Review 3/2 (1995), pp. 32-33.

76 Filastin, 5 March 1913, issue 218/3/4-5; 8 March 1913, issue 219/3/4; 12 March 1913, issue 220/3/5.

77 Filastin, 12 March 1913, issue 220/3/5.

78 Filastin, 22 February 1913, issue 215/3/4-5. Filastin did not mince its words. In July 1913, the Muslim Society for Piety and Welfare organized a literary night to support its new school at Manshiyya, the House of Islamic Sciences, where there was good attendance. However, the performance was embarrassing. The ‘I-sas concluded that there was “much to do” on the local art scene and described the play as a sequence of “inconsistent scenes” in terrible language, interrupted by boring speeches by Jaffa’s literati and the teacher Mustafa Majdi whose “rhetorical abilities” the Isās sarcastically wrote, they had “admired” several times previously. Majdi loved to recite Arab poetry and composed anthems that were sung by his pupils and sounded like “the hymns of Satan” (انشدات الـشـيـطان), the Isās wrote, and advised the Society to look for a better director and not to put on art events like “ceremonies for the distribution of school awards” (haflat tawzi jawaḥ madrasiyah).79

Apart from local amateur initiatives, well-established Arab artists performed on the stages of Bustrus Street. Although the organizations that invited them cannot be identified, Egyptian artists are known to have toured Jaffa and their productions attracted attention. In 1913, these included for instance the well-known Alexandrian troupe the ‘Atallah Brothers, Salim and Amin. Filastin applauded them as “the troupe of contemporary theater” (jawq al-tamthil al-‘asri), that “gloriously works for the sake of art and literature” (al-‘amil al-majd fi khidmat al-fann wa-l-‘adab).80 It was even more effusive when in July 1913, actor Jurj (George) Abyad (1880-1959) and lead singer Salama Hijazi (1855-1917) performed at the New Bar; an event covered at length in Filastin. Abyad was a Lebanese Syriac Christian who started his career in Alexandria and Cairo and was sent by the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi to Paris to study acting and drama. Upon his return to Egypt in 1910, he established his own troupe with his uncle, Sheikh Hijazi, and the ‘Ukasha Brothers. Although translated adaptations of European drama were part of his...

79 Filastin, 2 July 1913, issue 250/3/2-3.

80 Filastin, 1 January 1913, issue 202/3/5; 15 January 1913, issue 204/3/4; and 22 January 1913, issue 206/3/4. Amin ‘Atallah (1880-?) also acted in the first Egyptian movie The Clerk (al-Bashkatib) in 1922. Shafik, Arab Cinema, p. 70; and the Alex Cinema website https://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/actors/Amine_attallh.html (last accessed 14 February 2019).
stable repertoire, Abyad encouraged writers to create dramatic texts about Arab history. He took a keen interest in décor and costumes, and adopted a slightly exaggerated style in his plays, which corresponded to the tastes of his audiences. As a child, Hijazi recited the Qur’an and sang at family festivities, became a star singer and was called the “Caruso of the East” in the Egyptian press. At the beginning of the 20th century, both were well known, and after World War I, became icons of Arab drama.

Abyad and Hijazi had been to Jerusalem in 1908, but to have them in Jaffa was a sensation for the local intellectual scene. Their show in the New Bar in the popular style of an Arabic operetta was announced in Filastin in an article entitled “Who would have thought?” (man kana yazunn). When the steamship carrying the troupe reached the harbor, Abyad, Hijazi and 'Abdallah 'Ukasha were received by an excited crowd. Despite the heat, downtown was crowded with visitors who came to see them, among them literati from Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Gaza and Nablus. Unfortunately, the local management of this event left much to be desired: the seating was “disorganized” and some guards and the audience were unruly. Vandals tore down the stage curtain and Abyad had to halt the performance. Meanwhile, Sheikh Hijazi, who had fallen sick, was dragged out of bed by a group of visitors and forced on the stage, where he was made to sing. For the 'Isas, it was a disaster, and Jaffa's intellectuals were deeply ashamed. The next day, a delegation approached Abyad and apologized. Abyad forgave them and, when he performed again, the audience was “enchanted,” Filastin wrote.

These performances were also a magnet for notables from Jerusalem. On the anniversary of the Constitution (id al-dustur), Abyad's group performed a version of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet in the presence of the governor and the Ottoman elites (arkan al-hukuma). The hall was packed and Hijazi fascinated all with his voice. Filastin stressed his contributions to modern drama. In fact, the “renaissance of the Arab theater” (nahdat al-tamthil al-‘arabi) was due in great part to the Sheikh, who was called the “pillar of Arab theater” (imad al-tamthil al-‘arabi), Isa said. There are also examples of European groups performing single shows in Jaffa; for instance, on the initiative of the local Sports Club, a French theater group performed at the New Bar in 1913, Filastin reported. However, the perception of European art in pre-World War I Palestine remains a topic for further investigation.

**BODY CULTURE AND SPORTS**

Another growing trend in pre-World War I Jaffa was physical exercise, although professional sports only emerged in Palestine during the British Mandate, as has been shown by Issam Khalidi. Sports were seen a “key component of social development” and an expression of national culture in Palestine that went hand in hand with Zionist-Arab confrontations during the Mandate. In 1924, Jaffa's Orthodox Club set up a football team that became highly popular and played matches against the Jaffa's Islamic Sports Club team, founded in 1926. The

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81 Sabry Hafez, “Abyad, jûrj,” in Encyclopedia of Islam THREE. Abyad returned to Egypt in 1910 with a French troupe that performed plays such as Louis XVII and Tar-tuffe in Cairo and Alexandria. In 1912, he formed his own troupe, which performed King Oedipus, Othello, The Merchant of Venice, and others (last accessed 6 August 2019) http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_26298. See also the Alex Cinema website https://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/actors/George_Abyad.html (last accessed 12 February 2019).

82 This was further developed by Yusuf Wahba's popular musical style. For classical Arab theatre in Egypt's post-war years, see Landau, Studies in the Arab Theater, pp. 75-91.

83 According to Jawhariyya, major Husayn al-Husayni brought Abyad and Hijazi to Jerusalem in 1908 and set up “the largest tent in the country,” rented from the Franciscan monastery. Tamari, “Jerusalem's Ottoman Modernity,” pp. 72-73.

84 Filastin, 2 July 1913, issue 250/3/5; and 5 July 1913, issue 251/3/5.

85 Filastin, 12 July 1913, issue 253/3/3.

86 Filastin, 16 July 1913, issue 254/1/1-4. See also 'Isa on the unorganized arrival of Abyad in Jaffa under “One of the Diseases of the East” (Min adwaʾ al-sharq) in Filastin, 12 July 1913, issue 253/3/3.

87 Filastin, 16 July 1913, issue 254/3/2-4.

88 Filastin, 19 July 1913, issue 255/2/5.

89 Filastin, 19 July 1913, issue 255/1/1-2.

90 Filastin, 5 April 1913, issue 227/3/3-4.


development of football in the Middle East was sparked by ideals of Western modernity but also corresponded to the spirit of the awakening of Arab national thought. In 1907, the al-Ahli Club was founded in Cairo as a football team for Egyptian high school students, and its president, the leader of the Nationalist Party (Al-Wafid) Saad Zaghloul, made it a bastion of “anti-monarchical republicanism” in Egypt. Football also became popular in pre-World War I Palestine. It was played in the alleys of Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem with improvised leather balls filled with old clothes and was introduced in foreign schools. There is evidence that in 1902, Khalil Totah, the director of the Friends School in Ramallah, rented a field for football games.

In 1908, the first two football teams were set up in Jerusalem by the Christian schools of St. George (Madrasat al-Mutran) and Garden of Knowledge (Madrasat Rawdat al-Maʿarif) as platforms for trans-regional matches and, in 1911, Palestinian and European elites established the first sports club in Jerusalem’s Batma Alley in the Old City.

In an editorial on a football match held in December 1911 at St. George’s School between locals and English diplomats, Yusuf al-ʿIsa claimed that Palestinian parents had finally acknowledged that “sports in schools is necessary” and demanded the athletic education of their children to foster their physical “agility” (khiffat al-haraka) and “strengthen their muscles” (taqwiyat al-ʿadalat). The “new youth” (al-nashiʾa al-jadida) preferred to dress in the “European fashion” (al-zazy al-ifranji), boldly wearing shorts while exercising.

New concepts of physical vitality became fashionable and were inspired by European chauvinist images of masculinity. The “old” traditions were rejected, as propagated the press of the Young Turk era, and youthfulness became an important value among Arab urban elites, which contrasted with the Middle Eastern tradition of honoring the elderly. The era when it was enough “to be proud of one’s ancestors and content with the reputation of one’s name and honor” was over, ʿIsa stressed. This can no longer “represent the values needed for the enterprises of this age: the age of hard work,” he said. Rather, this age required men “to have broad shoulders and be able to compete, to move elegantly and be competitive, to be strongly built and be persistent when confronting the battlefield of fate.”

In line with this spirit, Jaffa’s “young intellectuals” (al-shubban al-udaba) founded a “new sports club” (nadi jadid li-l-riyada) in 1911. The flyers they distributed in town called for members and volunteers. The local educated elites, often Arab Christians and foreigners tended to join, since “good morals and manners” were defined as a prerequisite for membership. The Sports Club provided training in several kinds of sports and invited lecturers, such as Professor Krivatch, a Jewish teacher at the Hebrew Gymnasium, whose talk in French on “aviation” was much appreciated by the audience, Filastin reported in 1913. The Club also organized fun activities, and not everything was taken too seriously. Apart from track races and similar competitions, the members demonstrated games of skill to audiences, and even conducted “animal races” (sibaq al-hayawanat) with trained rats, rabbits, and dogs for public entertainment. The other “disciplines” included gambling and alcohol consumption, which ran counter to the statues of the club, an author complained in Filastin. He blamed this phenomenon on the influence of its foreign members, thus mak-

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95 In 1912, Filastin reported the visit of a football team of students from Beirut to Jerusalem, where they played against the Jewish boys of the School of the Young Jerusalemites (Madrasat Shubban al-Qudsyyin) and then against the St. George School team. See Filastin, 13 April 1912, issue 1273/2.
97 Filastin, 16 December 1911, issue 951/3.
100 Filastin, 1 November 1911, issue 823/5.
101 Filastin, 15 November 1913, under the label of al-Akbar, issue 495/3/3.
102 Filastin, 21 May 1913, issue 2383/4-5; 24 May 1913, issue 2393/5.
ing it clear that the Sports Club was a hotbed for clashes between Arabs and Europeans. Filastin’s authors encouraged the Club’s local members to remain authentic and show the Europeans “how progressive you are in every-thing you do.”

Filastin, 8 March 1913, issue 219/1/1-3.
Filastin, 12 March 1913, issue 220/1/3-5.
Filastin, 7 August 1912, issue 160/1/3-2/1.
Ibid.

Figure 13: Jabaliyya Beach around 1918.
Source: Private archive of Samuel Giler.

JAFFA’S BEACHES AS A NODAL POINT FOR LEISURE AND ENTERTAINMENT

A well-trained body was considered a sign of modern civilization, and simultaneously people discovered the value of outdoor sports. By the beginning of the 20th century, Manshiyya Beach was another nodal point for Jaffa’s modern culture. In 1912, thanks to donations by local and foreign elites, Jaffa’s “young educated intellec-tuals” (al-shubban al-udaba‘ al-muta‘allimin) built a sports field at the beach which combined the “natural beauty” of the open space with an “artistic design” (tartibihi al-fanni). Filastin praised the initiative as another facet of Jaffa’s modernity. However, Jaffa’s beaches had been discovered by the population for leisure and entertainment well before that. Because Jaffa did not have a municipal park, apart from a small spot with a few trees in front of the Government House in the Clock Tower Square (see Figure 12), the beach was much frequented for recreation, and was the “only pleasure nature has created for the city,” Filastin wrote. Thus, one could not dare to extend “the hand of re-form,” ‘Isa said; that is, to build on it. Jaffa’s beach was accessible to all social strata and was a multifunctional space where different classes and cultures mingled to relax and ex-ercise, go for evening strolls, play games, have family picnics, or engage in drinking, drugs, or erotic adventures after sunset.

Little is known about these manifestations of Jaffa’s modernity. There are only a few scattered reports on Jaffa’s beach life in Filastin. Nevertheless, they show that the beach was used for leisure-time activities well before the establishment of the Tel-Aviv seashore. Start-

Figure 14: Irshid Beach around the Turn of the 20th Century. Both Arab and Jewish visitors frequented this beach. Note the swings in the playground at the shore.
Source: Private archive of Samuel Giler.

ing in the Tanzimat era, there were several areas set aside for bathing on the shore. As of the turn of the 20th century, there was public bathing at Jabaliyya Beach, south of the Old City (see Figure 13). North of the Old City, there were four beaches in use, stretching along the seashore of Manshiyya (marked by red crosses in the map in Figure 15). The first was situated near the military compound, the Kishle. It was the so-called “Arab beach,” according to the record of Samuel Giler, and of which I do not have a picture. The second beach was at the southern part of Manshiyya, at the Irshid section, and it was a “mixed” beach. It was frequented by local Muslim, Christian, and Jewish families and, during the summer, it had a rudimentary playground with swings, as reported in the Hebrew newspaper Havatselet in 1896 (see Figure 14).

The third beach was situated near the homes of Neve Shalom and frequented by religious Jews from Jerusalem who came to the seaside during the holidays and preferred to keep to themselves. The fourth was Yefe Nof beach with Feingold’s Bella Vista Hotel (see Figures 15, 16 and 17). All of these are referred

Havatselet, June 12, 1896, page 6. I thank Samuel Giler for referring me to this information.
to here as “Manshiyya Beach” in line with the terminology in *Filastin*. The Jewish sections of the beach had more infrastructure with hotels, coffeehouses, and bars, especially the section at the Bella Vista Hotel. The beach at Irshid and at Yefe Nof were “secular” beaches, with inns and bars that permitted alcohol, and were frequented by the Arab population as well. Erotic adventures could be pursued on the fringes of Irshid: there was a brothel, the famous Russia Hotel, run by a Jewish madam with prostitutes from various countries, which was visited by Jaffa’s males of all nations and denominations.\(^\text{108}\) A few reports in *Filastin* indicate that the intermingling of people at the beach sometimes led to conflict. Jaffa’s males enjoyed the beaches’ shady nightlife in the Jewish sections, which offended the morals of others since it was associated with alcohol consumption. Letters in *Filastin* complained about the degeneration of Jaffa’s youth who were seen in the bars and “raffish nightclubs” (*mahallat khala‘a*).

\(^{108}\) I thank Samuel Giler who indicated the location of the Russia Hotel.

\(^{109}\) Battalions of foreign soldiers tended to congregate at the beach and were feared by the locals since they “rampaged.” *Filastin* reported that one particular battalion harassed people taking evening strolls at the shore and beat them with rods and railings ripped out of the verandas of coffeehouses.\(^{110}\)

In contrast, the interest in the new outdoor
health culture was symbolized by the new sports field at the beach that was constructed in 1912, as mentioned above. Samuel Giler suggests that it was located at Jabaliyya Beach since at Irshid there was not much available space at the shore. It was a modern installation that would, as the ʿIsas hoped, prevent Arab youngsters from frequenting the nightclubs since “every educated person knows that a healthy mind lives in a healthy body” (kull adib ya rif anna al-ʿaql al-sahih fi al-jism al-sahih).111

CONCLUSION

This article has explored local expressions of Jaffa’s modern culture, entertainment, and leisure before World War I as “performances of late Ottoman modernity” and discussed the actors, problems, norms, processes, and nodal points linked to it, as suggested by Hufty. The active role of Jaffa’s civil society actors and social societies in this development was highlighted. As in the charity and education sectors, community organizations from various sectors were the most dynamic players in Jaffa’s cultural life: among these were the Muslim Society for Piety and Welfare, the Orthodox Welfare Association and the Orthodox Women’s Association for the Support of Orphan Girls, as well as mixed social platforms such as Jaffa’s Sports Club, Zionist institutions such as the Hebrew Gymnasium, and loosely organized intellectual circles, which were simply termed the “young literati” in Filastin.

What motivated these players to engage in “modern culture” was the local perception of Palestinian “backwardness.” Their agenda was to disseminate new social norms and educate local society in line with what was subsumed in Filastin as “the spirit of the age” – a distinct post-revolutionary local Ottoman form of modernity that promoted modernization, Ottoman patriotism, active citizenship, and discourses on liberalization. The cultural activities organized by these players often went hand in hand with public manifestations of Ottomanism and were promoted by Filastin as “progressive.” As was highlighted, philanthropic projects were often sponsored by Jaffa’s social societies and charities in support of education, the poor, or the military. Organized by the communities, these put considerable pressure on Jaffa’s population to donate for various purposes. Distinct arenas were defined in which modernity in pre-World War I Jaffa presented itself as “local,” “Arab,” “imperial Ottoman,” “Western,” or “global.” International immigration made Jaffa a “city of many nations” and the communities shaped polycentric structures with Jabaliyya, Ajami, the Old City, Manshiyya, and especially the Jewish suburbs and Tel-Aviv serving as distinct centers.

Bustrus Street and Manshiyya Beach were identified as nodal points of modern culture, which enjoyed wide popularity among local middle-class families. Entertainment of various types took place in the cafés on Bustrus Street and increased after 1913, as suggested by Filastin’s local news section. This seems to have been part of a general trend in Middle Eastern cities and, for the ʿIsas, performances and leisure activities were an expression of urban modernity. Semi-professional amateur enterprises in Arab drama productions taking place at the New Bar reflected local efforts in favor of “Arab modernity” in Jaffa, although the identity of the organizers, the artistic networks, and the practical aspects of the event coordination remain unclear from the sources. The events also reveal a strong orientation towards Egypt as the emerging center of Arab art, as seen through the enthusiastic reception of prestigious artists from Cairo and Alexandria in Jaffa such as the ʿAtallah Brothers, the ʿUkasha Brothers, George Abyad, and Sheikh Hijazi.

The founding of the local Sports Club and the building of a sports field at the beach marked the beginnings of a new body culture in Jaffa, which was inspired by the infatuation with Western images of physical vitality, youthfulness, and masculinity. However, the pressure of Westernization that was felt by local Arab elites also prompted internal conflicts about the cultural morals imposed on the Club’s members. Simultaneously, the value of Jaffa’s natural environment for leisure-time activities came to be appreciated at the end of the 19th century. Manshiyya Beach in particular served as a multifunctional space for a range of interests: sports, relaxation, and games, as well as exercising in the open air, but also a variety of more reprehensible activities. Jaffa’s seashore

111 Filastin, 7 August 1912, issue 160/1/3-2/1.
became a place for a lively beach life where Jaffa’s various social classes and nations mingled, well before the establishment of the Tel-Aviv promenade.

Overall, the role of social societies in late Ottoman Palestine and the Arab East as agents of modern culture, facilitating sports and an emerging “body culture,” artistic performances, and new leisure-time activities, needs further exploration and specifically in comparison to other cities of Bilad al-Sham to shed more light on the social and cultural history of the modern Middle East.

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This chapter is based on articles published in the Arab Palestinian newspaper Filastin (“Palestine”) between July 1911 and August 1914 (a total of 288 issues). The newspaper was founded in Jaffa in January 1911 by the cousins ʿIsa Dawud al-ʿIsa (1878–1950) and Yusuf al-ʿIsa (1870/74–1948), Arab Palestinians of Greek Orthodox confession, as a bi-weekly publication until the Ottoman authorities shut it down in November 1914 as part of wartime censorship measures (for the front page of Filastin and its editor, see Figures 1 and 2). Filastin resumed publication in 1921 and became one of the most influential periodicals in Mandatory Palestine. The ʿIsas initially started the paper to actively support the “Orthodox Renaissance” (al-nahda al-urthudhuksiyya) in Palestine. In general, the newspaper promoted ideas of modernization, Ottomanism and the tenants of the Young Turk Revolution. From 1913 onward, the impact of Zionist immigration on the District of Jerusalem became a major topic.

Filastin has so far mainly been read as a source on Palestinian nationalism and anti-Zionism, but it was also a forum for public and controversial debates on many issues. Through letters to the editor and numerous guest articles, Filastin functioned as a “communication channel” between the publishers and their readership and despite its unnegotiable stand on Ottoman unity until 1914, it was a vital platform for protests against the government. Its overall call for “reform” and “progress” pervaded virtually all the articles it published, which in many ways echoed the reformist discourse of the Arab Nahda, the cultural reform movement that arose in Egypt and Bilad al-Sham during the mid-19th century.

In my work on Palestinian press debates dealing with intercommunal relations...
during the late Ottoman period, I sampled close to 2,000 articles from Filastin in which the modernization of education was a central concern. Jaffa’s economic and urban development was another major topic covered in the local news (akhbar mahalliyaa).

Filastin is also an under-researched source on public culture in late Ottoman Palestine. I located more than 200 reports on cultural issues, and more than 90 on the activities of social civil society organizations. For examples of Filastin’s illustrated advertisements printed on the back page which were a prime source of income for its publishers, see Figures 3 and 4. While issues of Filastin were hard to locate until recently, an almost complete set of issues from between 1911 and 1948 is now available online at the Jara’id, Arabic Newspaper Archive of Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine website, hosted at the National Library of Israel in Jerusalem: https://www.nli.org.il/en/discover/newspapers/jrayed.

Figure 3: Advertisement for the Danish Beer Brand Tuborg in Filastin.
Figure 4: Filastin Advertisements. The back page of Filastin was used for advertisements by local and international companies; for instance here, for powdered milk made by the Swiss company Nestlé.
THE MUNICIPAL COMPOUND IN LATE OTTOMAN GAZA: LOCAL APPROPRIATIONS OF A TANZIMAT INSTITUTION AND THEIR VISUAL AND MATERIAL COMMUNICATION

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Abstract | The introduction of formalized municipalities was a central component of Ottoman political reform during the late 19th century. As of the 1860s, Ottoman legislation and the combined efforts of state officials and local notables initiated an Empire-wide streamlining of the existing plurality of traditions of urban governance. The main institution behind these reforms in the urban sphere was the modern municipality, as defined by the Municipal Law of 1877. Along with this institutional standardization, the architectural profile of the modern municipality was redesigned to meet Empire-wide standards. This chapter ventures into the still largely unwritten history of the Municipality of Gaza and examines how the “standard package” of Ottoman municipal reform was appropriated by local actors. In so doing, it concentrates on the visual sources that provide information on the physical seat of the municipality, the “municipal compound,” and the ways in which its architecture was planned and executed to communicate the political visions and divisions in the city. In particular, this chapter looks at how two pairs of collective actors shaped the municipal compound and its surroundings. The first is the Sultan and his government in their dealings with the municipal council, and the second is the two factional camps that dominated Gaza’s political scene, with a description of their emergence and physical establishment. Overall, the chapter conceptualizes the municipal compound as a unit of analysis in the urban history of Greater Syria and demonstrates the power of a combined analysis of visual and textual sources in revealing hitherto unnoticed dynamics in urban society.

INTRODUCTION

The introduction of formalized municipalities was a central component of Ottoman political reform during the late 19th century. Its aim was to give the Ottoman state a firm hand in urban affairs, far beyond the level of control it had exerted in the past. The provisions of the Provincial Code (Vilayet Kanunnamesi) of 1864, further specified by the Municipal Law (Belediye Kanunu) of 1877, furnished the legal and institutional backbone for an Empire-wide effort to streamline the plurality of traditions of urban governance. In fact, the Tanzimat innovations in municipal governance only took off on a large scale under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was extremely interested in urban development and used the municipalities to strengthen the Ottoman state presence in the Empire’s provinces.1

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1 For studies on municipalities in the late Ottoman Bilad al-Sham, see: on Jerusalem, Yasemin Avcı and Vincent Lemire, “De la modernité administrative à la modernisation urbaine: Une réévaluation de la municipalité ottomane de Jérusalem (1867–1917),” in Nora Lafi (ed.), Municipalités méditerranéennes: Les réformes urbaines ottomanes au miroir d’une histoire comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Europe méditerranéenne) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2005), pp. 73–138; Jens Hanssen, “Municipal Jerusalem in the Age of Urban Democracy: On the Difference between what happened and what is said to have hap-
In parallel to this institutional standardization, the architectural profile of the modern municipality was redesigned in line with Empire-wide standards. This led to the emergence of an architectural ensemble that may be called a municipal compound, similar to what Yasemin Avcı calls the “government compound” or “government quarter” to refer to the buildings housing central government institutions.\(^2\) Extending the literature on late Ottoman Gaza and the comparative example of Jerusalem, this chapter argues that, at least in some cities, the municipal compound acquired a representational form of its own. The municipality’s material and visual representation was distinct from that of the central state in the city and thus communicated the increasingly participative nature of the municipality. A range of social actors, both “from above” and “from below,” claimed and appropriated its symbolism for their own ends.

The “government compound” as it developed from the 1860s onwards, combined the governor’s seat with other government agencies and service institutions, such as the local army barracks, the court of law, and the post and telegraph office. As Avcı notes, the Tanzimat’s government compound functionally replaced the citadel as the seat of state agencies in the city, while, on the level of symbolic communication, its representative architecture replaced the mosque for ambitious governors. These buildings became powerful material symbols of the modern state in the making.\(^3\) There was no abstract designation for these architectural ensembles, but they were usually referred to by the name of their eponymous buildings, i.e., hükümet konağı, “government house,” or belediye konağı, “city hall.” In some cities, the term “government plaza” or “municipal plaza” (hükümet / belediye meydani) came to designate this area. These terms are still commonly used in the Republic of Turkey.

The municipal compound typically included a city hall, a municipal park, and/or square and a street of the same name. Sultan Abdülhamid II typically symbolized his backing for certain municipalities by ordering the construction of city halls, public fountains, and clock towers. The municipal compound formed part of the standard Tanzimat repertoire of municipal reforms and its symbolic language, and, like most other components of the Tanzimat reforms, this institution continued under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Local elites and ordinary people in the cities of the Ottoman Empire appropriated and translated this “package” into their own local contexts. In many cases, they made the belediyeye a forum for innovative forms of political participation and modernization. At the same time, the imperial government appropriated these sites as a new channel for symbolic communication with urban populations. Both trends made the municipal compound a unique element in urban development throughout Bilad al-Sham.

So far, these issues have mainly been discussed in relation to the region’s major cities, for which we have relatively many textual sources such as newspapers, diaries, and memoirs. This chapter discusses the process of appropriating the institution of the belediye from “above” and “below” in the particular

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\(^3\) Avcı, Osmanlı hükümet konakları.
context of Ottoman Gaza, a city that has been widely neglected by historical research. In the face of a dearth of textual sources and the destruction of most of the material evidence on the ground during the upheavals of the 20th century, it draws on the theoretical directions developed to analyze other cities to interpret visual source material such as maps and photographs.


The slightly elevated plateau on which the municipality was eventually located had a long history as site of state power, which manifested itself in several prominent architectural structures (see Figures 1 and 2). Here, we shall restrict the discussion to the periods from the Mamluk era onwards. During the period of Crusader rule in Gaza, the city's fortifications were dismantled as part of an agreement between Salah al-Din and Richard the Lionheart, who stayed in Gaza from 1191 to 1192. When Muslim military leaders retook the city for good in 642/1244, the plateau was the site of a citadel and the remains of the western city gate known as Hebron Gate (Bab al-Khalil). It is important to note that this was Gaza’s busiest gate as it was the point where the caravan route entered the old city center (known as the Daraj and Zaytun neighborhoods during the late Ottoman period) and where merchants and other visitors entered the city's main market (al-Suq al-Kabir).

Although the city walls were not rebuilt during the Mamluk period, the citadel continued to be used. Opposite the gate there emerged Gaza’s most populous suburb, known as the Shaja’iyya or Turkuman neighborhood. When the Ottomans took over the city in 1517, they made the citadel the seat of the district governor. The famous Ridwan governors of the 17th century transformed the citadel area into a veritable palace quarter. Husayn Paşa, the most illustrious representative of this dynasty, even employed a French gardener, who took care of what the French traveler Laurent d’Arvieux described as large and lavish palace gardens. In the late 19th century, the “Pasha’s Mansion” (Dar al-Basha) to the north and the “Ridwan Mansion” (Dar Ridwan) to the west of the citadel were impressive reminders of this period (see Figures 1 and 2). From the 1860s onwards, the structures left from the Ridwan period were transformed into government quarters, which were more austere but also more imposing.


5 For a brief discussion of Gaza’s history, see Johann Buessow, “Gaza,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam THREE.


8 Today, only the Dar al-Basha remains.
Most of the information on Gaza’s government compound derives from visual sources. Georg Gatt’s map and chapter of 1888 and aerial photographs from the period of World War I show where the buildings were located. Photographs of specific buildings that were collected by the former governor of Jerusalem, Kamil Paşa⁹ (probably dating from the 1890s) and an aerial view shot from an angle (see Figure 2) give us an impression of the buildings’ size and design. The following institutions can be identified in Gaza’s Government Quarter: the government house (saray), the barracks (kişle), an armory (bayt al-barud), the Sharia court of law (mahkama), the Post and Telegraph office (opened 1864 and known as al-busta or Dar al-Telegraf), and a grain depot (al-ʿanbar). This array of administrative institutions was completed by a simple mosque, which was known as the citadel mosque. The whole area beyond the former city gate was bounded by a large swath of open land, including two cemeteries (Maqbarat ʿAli ibn Marwan and Maqbarat Bani Nas). Beyond the cemeteries lay the wide green belt of irrigated gardens that surrounded the remains of the ancient city wall. Adding to the representative character of the Bab al-Khalil area was a small monument known in European languages as the “Tomb of Samson” and in Arabic as (Shamshun) Abu l-ʿAzm. It reminded passers-by of two important mythic figures whose story was linked to Gaza. Abu l-ʿAzm could be understood as referring to both the Biblical hero Samson and to a saintly figure who was venerated by the Maghrebi (Maghariba) community, who settled in Gaza during the 3rd/9th century.¹⁰

The photographs of the area show an assemblage of new and old. The lower parts of most of the above-mentioned buildings betray their medieval origins, while the upper stories

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⁹ Kıbrıslı Kamil Paşa, who served twice as governor of Jerusalem (1855–1857 and 1869–1870) and later became famous as Grand Vizier.

¹⁰ Sharon, CIAP, vol. 4, p. 69c.
are designed according to the standard model of Tanzimat-era official buildings, with spacious and regularly arranged windows, and whitewashed facades. Many of them have tiled roofs.

This array of institutions and their architectural representation in Gaza's government compound fall into a pattern that we dub the "Tanzimat standard package" of administrative institutions and their symbolic language. Avcı's and Nurcan Yazıcı Metin's studies on the government compounds of Anatolia provide many examples of this standard pattern. It is found in especially pure form in the desert town of Beersheba, which was built after 1900 as an entirely new development.11

This ensemble, as elsewhere, can be interpreted as a material representation of the separation of powers that characterized late Ottoman government. The saray was the seat of the civilian government, the barracks and armory were the seat of the military, and the court was the seat of the judiciary and religious administration. The newest institutional player in this complex political field was the municipality. It represented the interests of the city's population and was in charge of questions related to infrastructure and urban planning, medical services and public hygiene, and the cultivation of the city's public image through embellishments and the organization of public events and ceremonies.13 In spatial terms, this new element was located west of the government area.

It was much more than a peripheral addition to the center of power, as it came to occupy a strategic and very visible position, occupying Gaza's gateway on the main overland road into the city.

As in several other cases in the region, the foundation date of Gaza's municipality is subject to debate. In most studies, 1893 is given as the foundation date of a modern municipality, and the official chronicle of Gaza's municipality starts in that year.14 However, an article by the local priest Georg Gatt makes it clear that Gaza underwent a process of municipalization at least from the 1880s onwards, not long after the passing of the Ottoman Municipality Law in 1877. The main physical structures of the new municipal compound had been built when Gatt drew his map in 1887 (it was published in 1888). They included the city hall (daʿarat-i belediye / belediye daʿresi), a public fountain, and a municipal park, commonly known as belediye parkı in Ottoman Turkish.

Gaza's municipal compound appears to have originated in an authoritarian measure. Evidence about a well leads us to this conclusion. In 1285/1868/69, kamaymak Rifʿat Bey al-Ćerkesi built the Rifaʿiyya Fountain (Saqiyyat al-Rifa’iyya and Sabil al-Rifa’iyya), a complex consisting of an aqueduct, pool, public fountain (sebil), and garden, funded by compulsory contributions by the inhabitants of Gaza.15 This laid the groundwork for what was later to become Gaza's Municipal Park. Our earliest documentation for the park's design is Gatt's map of 1888 (see Figure 3). Later sources, in particular the World War I aerial photographs and a British map of 1928,16 confirm the basic features represented there.

11 Avcı, Osmanlı hukümet konakları; Metin, Tanzimattan cumhuriyete.
15 Al-ʿAref, Tarikh Ghazza, pp. 281–282 (including a photograph of the well). Al-ʿAref writes that the kamaymak was responsible for the "digging" of the well, but it is likely to have been a renovation of a well that had been in existence since the days of the Ridwan governors in the late 16th century. This is at least what an inscription recorded by al-ʿAref suggests, which ascribes the building to Bahram Bey, a son of the famous governor of Gaza Mustafa Paşa, the founder of the Ridwan dynasty (Shar- on, CIAP, vol. 4, pp. 194–197).
The Municipal Park was located on both sides of the main road connecting the overland road from Syria to Egypt (al-Darb al-Sultani, the old Via Maris) with the Government Compound. It was conveniently located in low ground outside the ancient city walls, in the green belt of gardens generally known by the Arabic term hakura (pl. hawakir), which were irrigated by a network of wells, basins, and channels. The hakuras are part of the basic modules of Gaza’s urban tissue. Gatt’s map shows many such garden plots south of Bab al-Khalil, including Hakurat al-Ridwan and Hakurat al-Surani (see Figure 3).

The structure of Gaza’s municipal compound blended in with this local “modular” concept. Thus, the Municipal Park with its two halves was called “the Municipal Gardens” (Hawakir al-Baladiyya). We cannot say with certainty whether it was just by coincidence that the City Hall came to be located in Gaza’s green belt or whether the location was even the main reason for building it there. However, it speaks for the latter interpretation that the Municipal Park was obviously considered an important component of the municipality’s mission, and large investments were made there from the start. Our sources indicate it had a geometric garden design and a large saqiya complex called Saqiyat al-Baladiyya. In all probability, the latter fed the Rifaʿiyya Fountain. The symbolic value of this public fountain emerges clearly from the fact that it underwent a second renovation around 1318/1900, and this time the sponsor was no less a figure than Sultan Abdülhamid II (see Figure 4). Given that the sebil was located directly across from City Hall and that it had been in existence since at least the 17th century, we may surmise that it may have dictated the precise location of the City Hall building.

The centrality of water in the planning of Gaza’s municipal compound resonates with what we know about the Ottoman Municipality of Jerusalem, where the Municipal Garden became a popular multifunctional public venue.17 An even more striking parallel can be found in the planning of Birüşebe’ (Beersheba) as an Ottoman model town in 1900. There, a large geometric garden was among the first structures to be built and became a physical manifestation of the Ottoman ambition “to make the desert bloom.”18 The Beersheba park, as depicted in photographs from the World War I period, was laid out geometrically (see Figure 5).

Despite certain difficulties due to the historically irregular layout of the municipality's grounds, Gaza’s Municipal Park was designed with a similar pattern in mind, including several fountains and flowerbeds in various shapes (see Figure 6). These features seem to echo geometric gardens in the French tradition. The symbolism of the well-ordered garden, however, was firmly rooted in older Middle Eastern and Islamic traditions. Palace gardens symbolized the ruler’s power and care and the “Circle of Justice” (daʾire-i ʿadliye), a popular tradition in Ottoman political thought. The garden was a metaphor for justice, good governance, and general harmony and well-being.19 Gardens and irrigated groves were also popular spots for picnics and leisure.20

Both the Middle Eastern and European traditions were adopted by the municipality. In Jerusalem, a cistern deliberately built under Jerusalem’s City Hall and the custom of sprinkling the streets around it with water, together with

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17 See the chapter by Abigail Jacobson in this volume.
18 For the contemporary context, see the US Bureau of Reclamation established by Theodore Roosevelt in the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, as well as Zionist rhetoric of the time.
19 Linda T. Darling, “Circle of Justice,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam THREE.
20 For an example from Gaza, see an anonymous dialogue on local politics (c. 1895) that is set in a garden where men of different ages meet during their leisure time. BOA, BEO., 651/48815/38, Anonymous Dialogue (in Arabic), c. 1895.
the maintenance of a well-kept park, symbolized the municipality’s role as caretaker of the urban community at large.\textsuperscript{21} Vincent Lemire describes how the process of municipalization in Jerusalem was linked to Ottomanization and how Sultan Abdülhamid II enrolled the municipality as a partner when establishing a symbolic presence in the city. In 1901, for example, around the time he renovated Gaza’s Rifa‘iyya Fountain, the Sultan diverted waqf funds to the Jerusalem municipality to alleviate the acute water shortage in that city. Solemn ceremonies celebrating the sultanic donation at public wells throughout the city staged the Sultan as the supreme protector.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.jpg}
\caption{The Abdülhamid (Rifa‘iyya) Fountain in Gaza. Detail from an aerial photo of c. 1917, showing the fountain from behind, opposite the municipality building. Photograph of 2017, showing the fountain’s façade after recent renovation works. Sources: CZA, PHG/1065479. Aerial photograph of Gaza, c. 1917. Visit Palestine Center, http://visitpalestine.ps/where-to-go/listing/gaza/sites-attractions-gaza/archeological-sites-gaza/sultan-abdul-hamid-spring/#images (accessed 3 January 2020).}
\end{figure}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Buessow, “Ottoman Reform,” p. 109.
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THE MUNICIPAL COMPOUND IN LATE OTTOMAN GAZA

of the urban community. It is worth inquiring whether in the age of Ottoman Constitutionalism (1876–1878 and 1908–1918), the adoption of the royal garden and water symbolism was reinterpreted as a statement of popular sovereignty.

Figure 5: An Aerial Photograph of the Public Garden of Beersheba dated 1918. Source: BayHaSta, Bildsammlung Palästina 480. Luftbild von Gaza, 28 May 1918.

In Gaza, the local Municipal Park provided both a symbolic entrance to the city and a public space of generous proportions. The sebil of Sultan Abdülhamid II endowed the ensemble with the sovereign’s stamp of approval. Gaza’s City Hall faced the sebil across the street. The building fits into the “assemblage” pattern noted above, with old stone structures combined with newer parts, with their whitewashed facades and red-tiled roofs (see Figure 7). It seems tempting to interpret the juxtaposition of the City Hall and the sultanic monument as an attempt to harmonize the ideals of popular and monarchical sovereignty as inherent to the concept of a constitutional monarchy. On a less speculative note, evidence makes it clear that both the municipality and the Sultan were embroiled in local power politics. Thus, as discussed below, the sultanic renovation project of 1900 appears to have been intimately linked to the power dynamics within the municipal council and the city as a whole.

THE “HAMIDIAN PROJECT” AND THE SEARCH FOR LOCAL ALLIES

The contextualization of these findings from the textual sources reveals that the institutional, spatial and architectural development of Gaza’s municipal compound was closely intertwined with local and imperial politics, and in particular local factionalism and an initiative by Sultan Abdülhamid in the early 1890s to cultivate closer relations with local allies in Gaza. This took place within the context of the growing strategic importance of the city as a result of the British occupation of Egypt, the general need to increase control over the Bedouin population in southern Palestine, and the recent agricultural boom triggered by soaring profits from the export of barley. As Dotan Halevy has shown, this new source of income boosted the power and self-confidence of several successful merchants from Gaza’s elite families as well as that of the Municipal Council. In 1893, the municipality was officially recognized. During the same year, the Municipal Council presented an ambitious development scheme that included the construction of a municipal hospital, paving of the streets, and the construction of a sewer system, all to be built within the next twenty-five years. Funding for these projects would come from taxation of Gaza’s burgeoning grain exports.

The new possibilities fueled the ongoing competition between the leading Gazan elite households and their rivals. After a period of heated factional strife, which culminated in an intervention of Ottoman gendarmerie troops in 1898, a faction led by members of the Shawwa family, helped by the influential Muslim scholar-cum-Sufi shaykh Ahmad Busaysu (c. 1825–1911), emerged as the dominant players in municipal politics. Their influence was to be lasting: Sa’id al-Shawwa (1868–1930) served as mayor from 1906 to the end of Ottoman rule in 1918. He and three younger family members were to hold the mayoralty for almost half of the 20th century. The Busaysu family was less


23 See Halevy’s chapter in this volume.

prominent in municipal politics, but at least one of their members, the merchant Khalil Efendi Busaysu (c. 1870–1940), served as municipal councilor and mayor.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{25} Al-Tabba', \textit{Ithaf}, vol. 3, pp. 52–54.
This background helps reconstruct what at first glance may look like the mere application of the “standard package” of Ottoman municipal reform. Rather, the architectural symbolism of order, progress, and harmony was deliberately designed to reflect well on both the Sultan and his local allies.

The dominant faction in Gaza between the mid-1870s and the late 1890s was led by a member of the Husayni family, who also held the municipality in the city during this period, apart from a few short intervals. Various opposition factions, mostly led by the scholar-cum-businessman Muhammad Saqallah (1812–1896), tried to dislodge the Husaynis from their dominant position. Since the Husaynis repeatedly clashed with the Ottoman government, the latter tended to support the anti-Husayni opposition, but without lasting success. An invigorated opposition led by several members of the Shawwa family and the above-mentioned scholar Ahmad Busaysu eventually managed to bring about the decisive change of 1898. Interestingly, the Shawwas and the Busaysus were supporters of the Husaynis up to a certain point in the mid-1890s, when they turned against their former patrons for reasons that remain to be elucidated.

The Husaynis, the most prominent Gazan elite family, had their assets concentrated in the upscale Daraj neighborhood, where they owned several large mansions. A street called Mufti’s Lane (Sibat al-Mufti) connected this area to the Grand Mosque and the government compound next to it. An annual celebration highlighted the Husaynis’ role as patrons of the Hashim Mosque in Daraj, named after the Prophet’s grandfather. These annual celebrations took place in the week preceding the Prophet’s birthday (al-mawlid al-nabawi) and commemorated the issuing of a decree by the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839-1861), which instated Ahmad Muhyi al-Din al-Husayni as imam and khatib, prayer leader and preacher, of the mosque. The building was renovated with the help of Sultan Abdülmecid around 1860, which gave the Husayns sultanic approval for their status and prestige in Gaza.

During the late 19th century, the up-and-coming Shawwa family and their allies, the Busaysus, built their own stronghold in Shaja’iyya, a suburb at a distance from the other elite households, which were mainly located in the central Daraj neighborhood. During the 1890s, they managed to monopolize the newly created institution of the municipality and build a successful counter-faction to that of the Husaynis. The Shawwas’ move to Shaja’iyya marked the beginning of the spatial polarization of local politics in Gaza; political and spatial polarization went hand in hand. According to the sources, the Busaysus and the Shawwas were the only elite families with residences in Shaja’iyya. The street connecting the neighborhood to the City Hall was called Shawwa Street, indicating the family’s strong position in the neighborhood. The Shawwas’ home base and assets were initially in Tuffah next to the slaughterhouse the family owned. During the mid-19th century, Khalil al-Shawwa, the family’s leading figure, established his stronghold in Shaja’iyya, where he had a grand mansion built, and renovated the Qazdamri Mosque (later also

26 The name Sibat al-Mufti probably refers to the large mansion belonging to the Husayni (al-Mufti) family nearby. See for example, Salim ‘Arafat Mubayyid, al-Bina‘yat al-athariyya al-islamiyya fi Ghaza wa-qita‘iha [The Historical Islamic Buildings in Gaza and Its Region] (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al-Amma li-l-Kitab, 1987), pp. 327–328 [in Arabic]. This thoroughfare between the Sayyid Hashim Mosque and the city’s Ottoman administrative center is called Al-Wehda Street (Shar‘i al-Wohda) today. The British map of 1928 has several names for various segments of the street (from north to south): Harat al-Sayyid Hashim, Shar‘i al-Shaykh Faraj, Shar‘i Abu Ramadan, and Shar‘i al-Dabbuja.

27 Sharon, CIAP, vol. 4, pp. 33–34. Sharon’s information is based on Max van Berchem, who mentions 1862 as the date of the mosque’s reconstruction and 1892 as the date of a renovation.

28 In this regard, it is interesting to consider Philip Khoury’s comments on factionalism in late Ottoman Damascus: “The conflicts associated with factionalism may also have been representative of the very process of class consolidation in which up-and-coming families challenged already established families for a place alongside them at the summit of power and influence in Damascus. Conditions were more fluid ... in this period of social and political readjustment.” See Philip S. Khoury, “The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited,” Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée 55–56 (1990), p. 222.

known as Shawwa Mosque) and the irrigation well attached to it (Saqiyat Jami’ al-Shawwa). Their allies, the Busaysus, already had a strong presence in this neighborhood, where the celebrated scholar and Sufi shaykh Ahmad Busaysu worked as a preacher in the Ibn ‘Uthman Mosque and where a street nearby was known as Busaysu Lane (Zuqaq Abu Busaysu). As a consequence, the government compound, where the interests of the competing parties were located, ended up being situated between the Husaynis’ stronghold in Daraj and the opposition in Shaja’iyaa. The two main streets leading there from these two neighborhoods were called Mufti’s Lane (Sibat al-Mufti) and Shawwa Street (Shariʿ al-Shawwa), respectively. Thus, political factionalism was inscribed in the city’s morphology and streets, together with buildings in their vicinity, formed axes representing the leading families who clustered in specific regions of the city.

On the eve of the World War I, the municipal compound had evolved into a new Ottoman reform-style entrance to Gaza’s city center. It was complemented by three schools, which turned the area into a veritable educational campus composed of two primary schools (ibtidaiyye), one for boys and one for girls, and one secondary school for boys (rüşdiyye). As we know from other cities in Bilad al-Sham, schools constituted important public spaces, as they regularly served as venues for public events such as award ceremonies, sports events, plays, and exhibitions, involving major figures from the civilian and religious administrations. The development of the school complex continued after the end of Ottoman rule and was bolstered by members of the Busaysus and Shawwa families in the educational sector.

THE HERITAGE OF THE OTTOMAN MUNICIPALITY COMPOUND

The effects of the World War I on Gaza were more calamitous than on any other city in the Arab provinces. As the front approached, all the inhabitants were evacuated and many of them did not return. Many of the buildings were severely damaged by the fighting. Urban life only picked up slowly during the 1920s and municipal politics seems to have by and large followed the pre-war patterns. The British deposed the pre-war mayor, Sa’id al-Shawwa, for his loyalty to the Ottomans and the municipality was led for the next decade by British-appointed members of lesser families, Muhammad Abu Khadra (1918–1924) and ‘Umar al-Surani (1924–1928). At the same time, as a British map of 1928 shows, the importance of the Shawwa and Busaysu families was manifested in the street names Shawwa Street and Busuyu Lane, which were officially endorsed by the Mandate authorities, whereas the street between the Saray and Samson’s Tomb was registered as Municipality Street (Shariʿ al-Baladiyya).

In 1928, the British authorities authorized free municipal elections, which were won by Fahmi al-Husayn (1828–1939), a lawyer and the first mayor from the Husayni family since the 1890s. During Husayni’s tenure, Gaza was extended to the coast, the local hospital and a

30 Gatt’s map makes indirect reference to this by labeling an adjacent building “Saqiyat Jami’ al-Shawwa,” that is “Shawwa Mosque Well.”
31 Gatt’s Map of 1888.
32 British Map of 1928.
34 British Map of 1928.
35 Gatt, “Legende zum Plane von Gaza,” p. 156; al-Aref, Tarikh Ghazzia, pp. 200, 259. We do not know when these schools were founded.
36 See, for example, the coverage of these events in Jaffa by the local Arabic newspaper Filastin, summarized in Johann Buessow, “Children of the Revolution: Youth in Palestinian Public Life, 1908–14,” in Yuval Ben-Bassat and Eyal Ginio (eds.), Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 55–80.
37 For example, the Ottoman census records of 1905 may provide indirect evidence for the educational careers of three sons of the scholar Abd al-Mutallib al-Shawwa: Muhammad Efendi, (b. 1293/1876/77) was a student at the Teachers’ College (dar al-muallimin talebesinden), another Muhammad Efendi (b. 1295/1878) was a scribe (katib), and the third (b. 1299/1882) was a student (talib-i ʿulum). ISA, Nufus, Reg. 265, p. 161. The above-mentioned Ahmad Busaysu served as head of Gaza’s Education Department (maʿarif reisi). Tabba, Ithaf, vol. 4, pp. 296–309. On the Shawwa family and its gravitation to higher education, see the chapter by Sarah Buessow in this volume.
38 Gaza Municipality, official website, “Mayors of Gaza,” https://www.gaza-city.org/index.php?page=Vm0xNFYyS-XhuWGxUYTJoV1lteEtjRlV3V25kamJGbDNWbGhvYVdKS-FvRiZVZXhZh5VWyVaSmVZGHNIRIZ0Vj0idWY3hVMD-oYtTVWWeGvQTk= (accessed 2 January 2020).
39 NLI, 2369509.01, Palestine, Department of Lands and Surveys, Map “Gaza,” 1:1,000, Plan 4, Gaza Town Surveys. Jaffa: Survey of Palestine, 1928.
40 Gaza Municipality, “Mayors of Gaza.”
new market were completed, streets were widened, and the city was placed on the electricity grid in 1938 in cooperation with the Palestinian Electricity Company. Soon after, the municipality moved to its new frontier of urban development; i.e., the new neighborhood of Rimal. A new City Hall (see Figure 8) and a new Municipal Park (see Figure 9) were built at the northern end of Cemal Paşa Boulevard, which Husayni renamed ‘Umar al-Mukhtar Street, to commemorate the Libyan anti-colonial resistance fighter ‘Umar al-Mukhtar (1862–1931).41

Thus, Husayni moved the municipal compound not only closer to his main project, the new district of Rimal, but also away from the Shawwas’ traditional stronghold in Shaja‘iyya and closer to the Husayni’s power base in northern Daraj.

In 1930, a number of Gaza notables, mostly members of the city’s Municipal Council, filed a complaint against Husayni to the High Commissioner of Palestine, much in the tradition of the late Ottoman politics of petitioning. The petitioners contested the decision to allow Husayni to maintain his legal practice while serving as Gaza’s mayor, alleging that he was engaged in his own private business “to an extent as to neglect the interests of the town, which is more in need of organization than any in this country.”42 Eight years later, in 1938, the anti-Husayni opposition gained the upper hand when, in the context of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, the British Mandate authorities arrested Husayni on charges of being part of the anti-British leadership in Palestine. Along with Musa al-Surani (a relative of the previous mayor), he was imprisoned in Sarafand Prison and in 1939, was formally stripped of his post as mayor by the British and replaced by Rushdi al-Shawwa (c. 1889–1965), who remained in this position until 1952.43 The events of 1938 bear striking parallels to those of 1898, when the Ottoman government exiled three leading members of the Husayni family by force, thereby paving the way for the longstanding dominance of the Shawwas and their allies in municipal affairs.44

Figure 8: Gaza’s New City Hall. Source: Huna l-Quds, 21 December 1940, p. 6.

Figure 9: Gaza’s New Municipal Park. Source: Huna l-Quds, 21 December 1940, p. 4.

41 See Fahmi al-Husayni, “‘Sharī ‘Umar al-Mukhtar fi madinat Ghaza wa-tīrad qunsul janaral Italiya’ ala tasmiyathī [Gaza’s ‘Umar al-Mukhtar Street and the Italian Consul’s Objection against its Naming],” in Huna l-Quds [“Here is Jerusalem,” magazine of the Palestinian Mandate Arabic radio station] 1/25 (22 December 1940), pp. 3–4 [in Arabic].
43 See the biographies of Fahmi al-Husayni on “Mayors of Gaza” (Gaza Municipality, official website). For a personal statement by Shawwa regarding his mayoral agenda, see Rushdi al-Shawwa, “Madinat Ghaza [The City of Gaza],” Huna l-Quds 1/25 (22 December 1940), pp. 3–4 [in Arabic].
44 Ben-Bassat and Buesso w, “Urban Factionalism.”
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

This chapter has shown how, from the 1870s onwards, the “standard package” of Ottoman municipal reform was appropriated by local actors in the city of Gaza. In so doing, this study has concentrated on visual sources that provide information on the physical seat of the municipality, the “municipal compound,” and the way this architectural ensemble was designed to communicate political visions and divisions in the city. As an extension of the case study of Gaza, this chapter has argued that the municipal compound deserves to be treated as a unit of analysis in the urban history of the Syrian lands, and that the combined analysis of visual and textual sources can expose hitherto unnoticed dynamics in urban society.

Visual sources were instrumental in establishing a chronology of the Gaza municipality’s beginnings. The first initiative in the area of the municipality compound that we can document was made by the Sultan’s government; i.e., the construction of the Rifa’iyya Fountain by the sub-district governor Rifʿat Bey al-Çerkesi in 1875. This seems to have laid the foundation for the Municipal Garden, which came to define the entrance to Gaza’s city center from the overland road. While in this case the impulse came “from above,” from an Ottoman governor, the next stage of development we know of was initiated “from below.” Georg Gatt’s map of Gaza and his accompanying notes (published in 1888) indicate that a well-established municipality was operating in Gaza during the 1880s and a municipal compound had been built as a western extension of the government compound. The City Hall came to be located opposite the sebil and the Municipal Park. The central government’s official endorsement of the municipality came only in 1893. During the same year, the Municipal Council proposed an ambitious infrastructure program to be funded from local tax revenues. The renovation of the sebil opposite the City Hall by Sultan Abdülhamid II around 1900 gave his architectural stamp of approval and patronage to what was already a functioning institution and was to become the stronghold of his local allies.

Thus, the Sultan’s government and the Municipal Council constituted a pair of actors that complemented each other. Another dimension in the dynamics of municipal development were the two factional camps that dominated Gaza’s political scene: one led by members of the Husayni family and an opposition faction that became the Shawwa faction during the mid-1890s. These two groups came to be identified with specific neighborhoods, buildings, and streets at opposing ends of the city: the Husayni camp at the northern end of Daraj and the Shawwa camp in the southern suburb of Shaja’iya. In 1898, the Shawwa camp was victorious and dominated municipal politics until 1918. During the first decade of British rule, the municipality continued to operate as before the War. A radical change took place in 1928, when the mayoralty reverted for the last time to a member of the Husayni family, Fahmi al-Husayni, who set the municipality on a new path in many ways. His most important and consequential measure was to open up a new zone of urban development by initiating the construction of the new Rimal neighborhood between Daraj and the port. The municipal council under Husayni also made use of the spatial symbolism that had developed during the Ottoman period by moving the municipality and the park north, close to both the new “frontier region” of Rimal and the Husayni family’s traditional stronghold in the Hashim Mosque area.

Today, despite the upheavals since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Gaza’s late Ottoman municipality is still remembered, as can be seen from the history section of the Gaza Municipality website. The tradition of the Municipal Park has been preserved in the municipality’s new location. The garden’s design dates back to mayor Fahmi al-Husayni’s time in office. It is still geometric, but has a modernist, less meandering layout than its Ottoman-era predecessor, thus fitting the wide expanses and the gridiron pattern of the Rimal neighborhood. Following in the footsteps of previous rulers, from the Ridwan governors to Sultan Abdülhamid II, Fahmi al-Husayni also made use of the symbolism of the well by initiating the digging of the Park Well (Biʾr al-Muntaza), in 1933, which incorporated a diesel engine that

powered a large fountain\(^\text{46}\) (see Figure 9). In the early 21\(^{st}\) century, the Municipality of Gaza invested considerable care into this Municipal Garden, even in very difficult financial circumstances, which testifies to the continuing popularity of this concept. The schools remained in the old locations. They and several street names are perhaps the strongest sign of continuity in the former area of Gaza’s Ottoman municipal compound. The name Baladiyya Street has faded from use, but al-Shawwa Street and Rushdi al-Shawwa Street still commemorate the family of the former mayors. To this day, the sebil of Sultan Abdülhamid remains a major landmark. Freshly renovated with support from Turkey around 2017, it was promoted by the Palestinian Tourism Authority as a cultural monument.\(^\text{47}\) Its link to the municipality seemed as much forgotten as the fact that it was the Hamidian government that enabled the boom in municipal activity during the last decades of Ottoman rule in Bilad al-Sham.

\(^{46}\) Al-ʿAr ef, Tarikh Ghazza, p. 282.

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**MUNICIPAL HISTORY WEBPAGES: DIGITAL CHRONICLES AND SITES OF IMAGE CULTIVATION**

Municipalities in Greater Syria are an intriguing case constituting one of the most participatory political institutions in the region, in particular for an authoritarian system. The municipalities also have an unusual degree of continuity from the late Ottoman period to this day.

Writing the history of the municipality of Gaza at the turn of the 21st century involves challenges to the growing number of scholars interested in the urban history of today’s conflict-ridden Middle East. Because it is impossible to visit the material remains and archives of urban life for security and political reasons, historians increasingly resort to digital resources. This includes tapping the rapidly growing number of digitized documents and publications (see Text Box 10) and the reconstruction of spatial relations available through the Geographical Information System (GIS).

In terms of the still largely unwritten history of urban politics in the region, one major source of information is often ‘grey literature,’ i.e., materials and research produced by organizations outside of established commercial or academic publishing channels. One example is “Here is Jerusalem” (*Huna l-Quds*), the Arabic magazine of the Palestinian Mandate Arabic radio station, which published a collection of illustrated articles on Gaza in 1940.

Since the inception of the internet in the 1990s, municipalities across the historical Greater Syria region have established their own websites, which typically also contain a subsection on their history. These municipal history webpages can be read both as mines of information and as digital chronicles that present historical narratives meant to cultivate the self-image of the city and its municipality. When carefully cross-checked against other available sources and subjected to source criticism, they can provide unique information on a variety of topics such as former mayors and council members, key events that are commemorated as milestones in urban development and more generally the local discourse on municipal history.

The content and style of presentation of these websites vary considerably. In 2021, for example, one of the prominent features in the history-related pages of the Arabic municipality of Bethlehem website was a gallery of former mayors. The site defined the late Ottoman era as the time when the institution was founded with the municipality logo, which was present on most pages with the line “established in 1872” in Arabic and English.1 The Hebrew and English pages of the Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa focused on examples of historical architecture as tourist attractions. The references to history cover vast swathes of time from the Biblical period to the many architectural structures of the Ottoman period in Jaffa, but completely omitting the institutional history of the municipality.2

The municipal history webpages of Gaza City are similar to those of Bethlehem in that they emphasize the late Ottoman roots

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of the institution and the former mayors, who are presented in a gallery of images with short biographies. Until 2019, a second webpage listed the municipal council members from 1906 to the present accompanied by a short but informative narrative of the council’s main projects and achievements during the council’s respective terms.

The Gaza’s municipality’s website mirrors the unstable political situation prevailing today in the Gaza Strip. The well-organized history pages in 2019 have given way in 2021 to a new layout with rather messy webpages, with less text and images. Fortunately copies of the old website were preserved in the Internet Archive digital library. Therefore, perhaps the most important methodological lesson to learn when working with municipal websites in the case of grey online literature is to consider that websites in general are protean entities. Their changes over time may be interpreted as reflecting the dynamics of the public discourse on the municipal heritage. One possible avenue of research would be to compare several sites to assess how this heritage has been commemorated in different contexts.


CONTESTED PUBLIC SPACE IN “DOWNTOWN JERUSALEM”:
JAFFA GATE AND THE MUNICIPAL GARDEN
IN LATE OTTOMAN JERUSALEM

Abigail Jacobson

Abstract | Focusing on “downtown” Jerusalem during the final years of Ottoman rule in the city, this chapter demonstrates how streets, gardens, and squares served multiple purposes, sometimes simultaneously, especially during periods of war and conflict. It focuses on three main sites: Jaffa Gate, the Municipal Garden, and Jaffa Road, and examines their different uses and functions during the final years of Ottoman rule, including World War I. These areas were controlled by the Ottoman authorities, but were also simultaneously claimed and used by various groups for other purposes. The analysis of public sites in Jerusalem serves to demonstrate how public space was contested and negotiated during this time of crisis. In the words of Henry Lefebvre, “Space is permeated by social relations; it is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing and produced by social relations.” Indeed, the city, I argue, should be viewed and analyzed as a dynamic, active, changing setting that sets the stage for different kinds of interactions, negotiations, and conflicts. I view space and place as intimately bound up with the constitution of social identities, and as deeply embedded in historical conflicts and processes. These processes may be wars and conflicts, political changes, colonial or post-colonial dynamics, and everyday practices.

INTRODUCTION

When conceptualizing the notion of the city, the urban theorist Lewis Mumford wrote in 1937:

The city in its complete sense is a geographic plexus, an economic organization, an institutional process, a theatre of social action and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity. The city fosters art and is art; the city creates the theatre and is the theatre. It is in the city, the city as a theatre, that man's more purposive activities are focused, and work out, through conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into more significant culminations.1

This article draws on Mumford's description of the city as “a theatre of social action” to analyze what, in today's terminology, can be termed the “downtown area” of Jerusalem during the late Ottoman period. This area, stretching between Jaffa Gate, Bab al-Khalil, and Jerusalem's Municipal Garden, was considered to be the public space of the city. However, did this area indeed represent collective unity, as Mumford suggested? How did this area play out as a “theatre of social action”?

The chapter focuses on three sites in this area: Jaffa Gate, the Municipal Garden, and Jaffa Road, and examines their different uses and functions during the final years of Ottoman rule, including during World War I. These areas were controlled by the Ottoman authorities, but were also simultaneously claimed, understood and used by diverse groups for other purposes, thus turning this downtown area into a

1 Lewis Mumford, “What is a City?,” Architectural Record LXXXII (1937), p. 94.
contested space that was claimed and used by various groups that were often in conflict with each other.

The sources referenced for this chapter demonstrate the plurality of agents that were active in this area. They include the municipal records of the Jerusalem municipality, and Hebrew and Arabic archival sources and memoirs. The present study connects the physical space with these archival records to demonstrate how this public space contributed to the creation of the notion of *citadinité*, urban citizenship, and to the formation of close ties between the inhabitants of the city and their urban environment. As Henri Lefebvre argued in *The Production of Space*, every society produces its specific space. This spatialization process is connected to individuals through spatial practices and representations, but is also an instrument for those in power. This chapter examines the nature of this interplay between the inhabitants of the city, their urban environment, and the municipal authorities.

### PUBLIC SPACE, IDENTITY AND POWER

What makes a certain space “public,” and how is it different from other spaces in a city? The debate on these issues is of particular interest to urban geographers, sociologists, and historians dealing with questions related to the idea of “public space,” and the connections between space, identity, and power. The notion of urban public space can be traced back to ancient Greece, where public space was defined as the place of citizenship, in which public affairs and legal disputes were conducted. However, as Don Mitchell points out, this definition also underscored another characteristic of the public space, as the meeting place of those in power, and the exclusion of all those who are not part of the “public,” such as women, slaves and foreigners. This original definition already contains the kernel of one of the basic tensions within public space; namely, the question of inclusion and exclusion of certain social, religious, and ethnic groups. A public space should theoretically enable encounters between individuals and groups who would not meet otherwise. Throughout the years, struggles for the inclusion of certain groups in the public space have created a countermovement where marginal groups use the space to claim their rights. Hence, public spaces can take on symbolic as well as practical meanings through a process of negotiation between different groups, suggesting that the practical and symbolic usage of space can be negotiated and changed.

Public spaces thus have multiple purposes and functions. Ideally, a space is considered public if it has been provided and is managed by public authorities, and is open and available to all. It is a place of simultaneity, an exploration of difference and identity. The connections between identity, space, and power within the spatial politics of a city lead to a number of key questions. How are multiple elements of identity manifested in urban spaces? How does people’s experience shape the spaces and the struggles taking place in them? How can space be reimagined and repurposed in light of struggles and acts of protest that are taking place within it? As shown below, space and place are intimately bound to the construction of social identities, and are deeply embedded in historical conflicts and process. Potentially,
they are the active medium for the construction of new class cultures and sexual and gendered identities, and a place where marginalized identities can be challenged or confirmed. Urban space should be viewed as an active space, a site of political action that involves conflicts over the meaning and interpretations of space.11 As Meghan Cope has noted, one’s identity is conditioned by multiple sets of power relations, which occur across space, through space, and require the use of space as an element of control, opportunity and regulation.12

In the case of late Ottoman Jerusalem, the spaces discussed here are illustrative of the tensions between the inclusion and exclusion of certain groups within the public space, as well as the struggles over the nature of this space in the city, and the interplay between different agents that claim the space.

PUBLIC SPACE IN LATE OTTOMAN JERUSALEM

The Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century turned Jerusalem into a major administrative center in Bilad al-Sham that underwent a series of economic, legal, social, and urban transformations. The key marker of its importance within the Ottoman context is the change in its legal status in 1872, when it became an independent district, or Mutasarriflik, whose governor was under the direct control of Istanbul. From an urban point of view, Jerusalem was also the first Ottoman city after Istanbul in which a municipal council was appointed. This corresponded to its growing political, religious, and administrative status in the eyes of the Ottoman center, but also highlighted its importance as regards the foreign powers active and present in the city.13

A municipal council had existed in Jerusalem since 1863, but its functions were only regulated by law in 1875 and 1877. In 1896, the municipality moved from its old location in the Old City to a new building at the corner of Mamilla (Mamun Allah) and Jaffa Street.14 The area around the municipality, Jaffa Gate (see Figure 1) and Jaffa Road (see Figure 2), became the commercial, social, and political hub of the city and connected the Old City (see Figure 3) with some of the new neighborhoods during the final years of Ottoman rule. This area received a developmental “boost” during the 1870s as a result of the preparation for Austrian Kaiser Franz Josef’s visit to Jerusalem, and the paving of Jaffa Road. Carriages and wagons were first allowed to enter the Old City in 1898, on the occasion of the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In preparation for this visit, the municipality received funding for public works, as part of the government’s attempt to turn Jerusalem into a model city for the world.15

The plaza in front of the Jaffa Gate became the city’s “central bus station”, where carriages and wagons served both tourists and merchants displaying their wares at the entrance to the Old City. This transportation business was highly organized and monitored by the municipality. In April 1909, the municipality announced that all carriage owners and drivers would be assigned a number and required to obtain a license to convey passengers.16

The Jaffa-Jerusalem railroad line, which

16 JM-AIY Ottoman registers vol. 14/p26b/item 136 (21 April 1909). All municipal records were retrieved from the Open Jerusalem Database.
CONTESTED PUBLIC SPACE IN “DOWNTOWN JERUSALEM”

Figure 1: The Jaffa Gate.
was inaugurated in September 1892, also contributed to the thriving atmosphere of this area. The station was located in the valley of Emek Refaʿim, around 500 meters southwest of the Old City, and was an important connection between the coastal plain and the cities of Jaffa and Jerusalem. Like other cities worldwide, in Jerusalem the railway station was simultaneously a frontier and liminal zone for transition, arrival and departure. The train station attracted public attention and became the center of the cityscape. Receptions for foreign and domestic dignitaries took place there, drawing large crowds. Tourists were met at the train station by hotel representatives, as well as by carriage drivers offering tours of the city. One of the most popular routes was along Jaffa Road (see figure 2), in addition to the holy sites. The carriage drivers were fluent in a range of languages and acted as guides and interpreters for tourists. Symbolically and practically, in Jerusalem the railroad line and train station were signs of modernity and the polarity of urban space.

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20 Vincent Lemire, Jerusalem 1900: The Holy City in the
Jaffa Gate served as the main entry point to the Old City, and thousands of residents and tourists passed through daily.\textsuperscript{21} The relocation of the municipality to a new building in 1896 turned the area into what Lemire has called “the beating heart of a new urbanness.”\textsuperscript{22} The presence of the municipality was very much felt. It owned real estate in the area of the Jaffa Gate and rented out these shops to provide income for the municipality.\textsuperscript{23} In April 1899, the municipality decided to build a center for inspectors and sergeants in the vicinity of the Jaffa Gate to increase the visibility of the central and urban administration.\textsuperscript{24} The army also owned stores around the Gate and rented them out.\textsuperscript{25} The plaza in front of the Jaffa Gate was a lively area at all times, with the constant movement of carriages, horses, and donkeys, as well as bustling coffee houses that catered to merchants and passers-by who read (also out loud) newspapers or just chatted and gossiped.\textsuperscript{26}

Jaffa Road was a thriving economic, social, and tourist area as well. In her memoir, Itta Yellin, the wife of the famous Jerusalemite educator and public figure David Yellin, described the view from her apartment, overlooking Jaffa Road: “On Saturdays and during the holidays, whenever dignitaries came to the city, the street would fill with thousands and

\textsuperscript{21} Kroyanker, Rehov Yafo, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{22} Lemire, Jerusalem 1900, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 124.
\textsuperscript{24} JM-AIY, vol. 3/P32a/item 228.
\textsuperscript{25} JM-AIY, vol. 12/pSa/item 30.
\textsuperscript{26} Hirschberg, Be’eretz ha-Mizrah, p. 274.
thousands of people, Arabs, Jews, priests, and tourists from all nations. On occasion, the Turkish military band passed by and added some joy for those whose windows overlooked the road.27 Foreign Russian, Ottoman, Austrian, Italian, and German post offices were located nearby, and contributed to the international atmosphere and the foreign presence in the city. The branches of the important banks, including the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Crédit Lyonnais, and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank were also situated near Jaffa Gate. From the early 1900s, several mercantile emporia and stores belonging to Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, and some Jews, opened and sold imported textile products, appliances, and food. In his memoirs, Yaʿaqov Yehoshua calls this area the “European Market of Jerusalem,” where the shopper could find imported food from Europe, alcoholic beverages, clothing, and even cosmetic products.28 These stores were required to obtain operating authorizations from the municipal authorities. They attracted the local population as well as tourists.

The first three photography stores in Jerusalem, owned by Armenians, Greeks, and Arab Christians, were opened there as well. The American Colony Store, which sold souvenirs, guidebooks, and photographs of Jerusalem and Palestine, opened near Jaffa Gate. The hotels catered to different types of tourists. Hughes Hotel mainly had a British clientele and later the members of the Zionist committee. Across the street, behind the city garden, was Hotel de France, where many French tourists stayed. Hotel Fast, which was owned by the Armenian Patriarchate, had primarily German, Austrian, and later British and Arab tourists. Hotel Amdourski (or Hotel Central) was located on the plaza near Jaffa Gate, and was both a hotel and a venue for weddings for the Jewish community in the city.29 Smaller hotels and guest houses owned by Jews and Arabs were also located there.30 These hotels, as well as the travel agencies which had offices on the street, turned this area into a center for tourist and foreign activity.31

The municipality was aware of the importance and centrality of this area and was present both physically and symbolically. In 1900, it decided to hire a street cleaner to clean the roads around Jaffa Gate. The municipal records indicate that there were discussions about whether to sprinkle water on the roads to clean them.32 The plaza in front of Jaffa Gate was cleaned by sprinkling water on it, especially in preparation for special visitors and dignitaries to the city.33 Street cleaning was not new, however. As early as 1864, the Ottoman authorities established a special commission in charge of street cleaning.34 The road leading to the Gate was widened and old stores were demolished to make room for new ones.35 Clearly, Jaffa Road became a mixed urban locale that served social, economic, and administrative functions for all of the city’s inhabitants, as well as for its visitors, and where people interacted and communicated.

The municipal public garden (al-muntaza al-baladi), al-Manshiya, was located nearby and contributed to the lively atmosphere. Set up near the Russian Compound in 1892 by Jerusalem’s mayor Husayn Salim al-Husayni to fight epidemics and to develop a green recreational space in the city center (and not its outskirts), it was an important site in the city’s life during the final years of Ottoman rule and during World War I.36 First and foremost, it was a social, open space, a place of leisure, in which Jerusalemites, as well as governmental officials and military personnel could stroll while enjoying the music played there every afternoon on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays. In the café located in one of the corners, people could drink coffee or cold beverages and smoke a nargilah, and a library also operated in the garden. Yaʿaqov Yehoshua recalls in his memoirs that during the British military regime after the occupation of the city, the library served British military and civic

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29 Ibid., pp. 88–89.
31 Kroyanker, Rehov Yafa, pp. 28–30.
32 JM-AJY, vol. 9/p6a/item 40.
33 Yehoshua, Yerushalayim tmol shilshom, vol. 1, pp. 53–56.
34 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
35 BOA, BEO, 1171/87765; 1168/87544.
personnel, and had primarily English books. The municipal council also discussed the possibility of using the room behind the library as a coffee house, where coffee would be served for free to the members of the military band.

The flowers grown in the garden were sold in a nearby flower shop owned by a Greek proprietor, and the garden contained a storage building for flags and lights that were used to decorate the city during celebrations, as well as fire-fighting equipment. The municipality also dealt with the maintenance of the garden: a new gardener was appointed for the park in May 1892 after the old gardener resigned. The municipality was in charge of organizing the public space around the garden. In some instances it decided to demolish some stores and rent the spaces temporarily to the police to turn them into a police station. To enhance the green spaces, the municipality planted trees along Jaffa Road in 1905, and installed the first public lighting network and the first garbage cans along the street.

“A THEATER OF SOCIAL ACTION”

The public garden served not only as a place of leisure, but also as a political site. During the late Ottoman period, it was a gathering place for government celebrations and special announcements, as well as for demonstrations of all kinds. During special celebrations for the Ottoman Empire, a military band played there thus bringing together people from the various communities in the city. Some of these celebrated Ottoman victories (or proclaimed victories) on the battlefield, some were designed to collect money for charity, and still others were to highlight the government's authority. These celebrations are mentioned and discussed quite frequently in Wasif al-Jawhariyya's memoir and in Ihsan Tourjman's diary, though from different perspectives. Jawhariyya’s father, Ji-ryis, was the supervisor of the garden. He was also in charge of planting and maintaining the trees on the road leading from Jaffa Gate to the municipal hospital and, when his contract period was over, the municipal council discussed who would replace him. His son, Wasif, was a musician who played at many of these events, and mentions them mainly as part of his lively and vivid account of musical and artistic life in late Ottoman Jerusalem.

The young soldier Ihsan Tourjman, on the other hand, describes these celebrations much more critically as decadent and immoral, and points to them in order to demonstrate the extent of Ottoman corruption and immorality, especially during the difficult times of World War I and the major crisis that this war brought to the city. These celebrations irritated Tourjman and reinforced his growing frustration and antagonism towards the government's attitude to the local population and its activities. In April 1915, for example, Tourjman described a celebration that took place in the city, possibly in al-Manshiya or in the nearby Notre Dame Church compound:

The city today is decorated in the most beautiful way [...] Wouldn’t it be better if the government didn’t celebrate and [instead] mourned together with its subjects? Wouldn’t it be better to spend this money on the poor and miserable? This evening, many beautiful women from Jerusalem participated in the celebration. There were [alcoholic] beverages for everyone and music [...] but that wasn’t enough, because they invited prostitutes from Jerusalem to attend this celebration. And I was told that there were more than fifty known prostitutes [present] that night. Every officer or pasha took either one or two or more women and walked in the garden [...] The men are telling secrets of the state to these women, because they are drunk [...]

37 Yehoshua, Yerushalayim tmol shilshom, vol. 2, p. 35.
38 JM-AIY, vol. 3/p49b/item 335.
40 JM-AIY, vol. 1/p11b/item 68.
41 BOA, DH. MKT., 776/69; JM-AIY, vol. 13/p13b/item 75.
42 Lemire, Jerusalem 1900, p. 122.
43 Yehoshua, Yerushalayim tmol shilshom, vol. 2, p. 34.
45 Tamari and Nassar, eds., al-Quds al-ʿuthmaniyya, p. 28.
46 Yawmiyyat Muhammad ʿAdil al-Salah min ahl al-Quds, 1915–1916 [The Diary of Muhammad ʿAdil al-Salah, a Resident of Jerusalem], NLI-Ms., AP.Ar.46, p. 47 (26 July 1915)
Thus, the garden had multiple functions and purposes in the city. In times of war, it served simultaneously as the site of demonstrations for and against the government, a place of leisure, and a venue for various celebrations. It was considered an important place in the cityscape by the municipality and the Ottoman authorities, which tended it well.

Nevertheless, Jaffa Gate was a good example of a contested political public space in the city. Its centrality as the main gate to the Old City, and its importance as a transportation center and as a center for business and recreation have been presented above. However, during and following World War I it was used for other purposes. During the war, this area became the site of demonstrations, parades, and public executions. When Cemal Paşa ordered the hanging of people suspected of being Arab nationalists such as the Mufti of Gaza, Ahmad ʿArif al-Husayni, the hangings took place at the entrance to Bab al-Khalil. Defectors from the Ottoman army were also hanged in Jaffa Gate. On 30 June 1916, for example, two Jews, two Christians, and one Muslim, all accused of defecting from the army, were hanged there.47 The hangings were indeed public: in the photos, one can see the hanged men dressed in white, surrounded by Ottoman officers and soldiers. Behind them are spectators observing the scene. These hangings of political activists at the city gate were a manifestation of Ottoman authority in the city, but also turned into very powerful symbols of Cemal Paşa’s cruelty and abuse of the residents of Jerusalem, as well as other areas in Palestine and Greater Syria.

Jaffa Gate was a place for other forms of political manifestations as well. During World War I, several pro-Ottoman parades ended up or passed through the Gate on their way from the Old City to the municipality area. Khalil al-Sakakini mentions several of them in his diary. He also describes the march of recent conscripts that passed near Jaffa Gate. In front of the Gate was crowded with people who were waiting for the soldiers. He too was looking for some friends he wanted to say goodbye to just before they left the city. For Sakakini and others, this area became a site of collective farewell to the drafted soldiers.48

Yet another momentous event took place near Jaffa Gate in December 1914. When the news came that Ottoman troops would pass through Jerusalem on their way to the Egyptian front, the Jewish Ottomanization Committee decided to organize a reception for them at the entrance of the Jaffa Gate. The committee decided that a special “gate of honor” would be built at Jaffa Gate by Jewish carpenters under the supervision of Professor Boris Shatz, the director of the Bezalel art school. The leaders of the Jewish communities and the heads of schools in Jerusalem stood under two tents near the Gate and greeted the soldiers and presented them with special gifts. Muslim, Jewish, and Christian students lined the road leading to Jaffa Gate, waving Ottoman flags. Once the Ottoman troops, headed by the commander of the army, reached the Gate, they were presented to municipal officials and the heads of the various communities of Jerusalem, who greeted them warmly. The Gate in this instance was a place of celebration and show of political support of the Ottoman forces.49

Jaffa Gate served a completely different purpose in December 1917, when it became the symbolic and real gate to the city of Jerusalem, and to British rule over it, as seen in General Allenby’s well-documented entrance and ceremony near the Gate.50 The most obvious and symbolic building in Jaffa Gate was the clock tower. It was built in 1906 in homage to Sultan Abdüllah İI, and, like other clock towers in various locations throughout the Empire, this tower was an expression of Ottoman loyalty and of the spirit of change in the Empire. According to municipal records, the clock was sent to Beersheba in 1909, even though there was still no tower in which to hang it, and a

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47 Tamari and Nassar, eds., al-Quds al-ʾuthmaniyya, p. 163.
48 Akram Musallam (ed.), Yawmiyyat Khalil al-Sakakini [The Diaries of Khalil al-Sakakini], vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2004), pp. 132–133 (18 November 1914) [in Arabic].
49 Avraham Elmaliach, Eretz Israel ve-surya bi-yomey milhemet ha-ʿolam [The Land of Israel and Syria in the Days of the World War I], vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Ha-Solel, 1928), pp. 70–73 [in Hebrew].
50 For a detailed analysis of this ceremony, its symbolic interpretations and meanings, see Jacobson, From Empire to Empire, pp. 117–135.
different clock was installed instead in Jeru-
salem.\footnote{JM-AIY, vol. 14/p38b/item 198.} As Lemire has shown, the clock tower became a central part of the “Municipal Quar-
ter,” which consisted of the municipal hospital, the public garden, and the town hall. The clock tower dominated the landscape of Jaffa Gate and the entire area and, like other clock towers, was a symbol of modernization, and a tempo-
reral reference to public time, shared by all.\footnote{On the history of clock to wers in the Ottoman Empi-
re as a sign of modernization of the Ottoman state and the organization of the urban space, see Avner Wish-
nitzer, “Qurey zman: Luhot zmanim, migdalei sha’on u-miqtsav ha-hayyim ha-ʿironi ba-imperya ha-ʿothmanit [Webs of Time: Timetables, Clock Towers and the Urban Rythm of Life in the Ottoman Empire ],” Zmanim 119 (2012) [in Hebrew]; idem, “Our Time”: On the Durability of the Alaturka Hour System in the Late Ottoman Empi-
re,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 16 (2010) pp. 47-69; Lemire, Jerusalem 1900, p. 130.} The clock at the top of it was considered the most reliable time piece in town, and Jerusalemites set their own clocks by it. Another symbol of the Ottoman presence in the area was the sabil, the public water fountain, which was built near the Jaffa Gate in 1900, to celebrate 25 years of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II.\footnote{Büssow, “Ottoman Reform,” p. 116.} Both the sabil and the clock tower were removed by the British governor of Jerusalem, Sir Ronald Storrs, in 1921 and 1922, respectively, as part of the British attempt to re-organize Jerusalem and suppress its Ottoman past.

CONCLUSION

Henry Lefebvre has noted that “Space is perme-
ated by social relations; it is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing and produced by social relations.”\footnote{Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 286.} In Jerusalem, streets, gardens, and squares served multiple-
purposes, sometimes simultaneously, especial-
ly during periods of war and conflict. The city garden was a place for leisure and celebration, as well as a site for political protest, and is de-
scribed and remembered differently by peo-
ple who visited it. Jaffa Gate was used both as a political site for gatherings of various kinds (and hangings), and as a vibrant urban space for commerce and daily interaction between the city’s residents. Spaces enable the manifesta-
tion of different social and political processes and influence and shape social identities, and need to be taken into account in the analysis of any cityscape.\footnote{Nicholas R. Fyfe, “Introduction: Reading the Street,” in idem, Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1-10.}
This chapter explores the concept of “public space” in the context of late Ottoman Jerusalem. It focuses on three locations in “downtown Jerusalem”: Jaffa Road, Jaffa Gate, and the Municipal Garden. The sources researchers can potentially use include archival records, maps, photographs, municipal records, and memoirs. Here, two main primary sources were consulted. The first consisted of the Hebrew and Arabic memoirs of local Jerusalemites, such as Ya’akov Yehoshua, Itta Yellin, Ihsan Tourjman and Wasif al-Jawhariyya, who describe their lives in Jerusalem during the late Ottoman and Mandatory periods. The second source consisted of the municipal records of the municipality of Jerusalem.

The original municipal records can be found at the Jerusalem Municipal Archive (JMA) but were retrieved here from the Open Jerusalem Database, an ERC project led by Dr. Vincent Lemire. It consolidates thousands of archival records related to Jerusalem from the late Ottoman to the Mandatory period, including municipal and imperial records, church archives, communal (Jewish, Muslim and Christian) sources and private collections, among others.

The Jerusalem municipal records are written in Arabic or Ottoman Turkish and are organized chronologically. The Open Jerusalem database contains 18 volumes of reports dating from 1892-1917. The sample page (see Figure 1) is a decision dated 8 May 1900 to hire a street cleaner for the roads near the Jaffa Gate (JM-AIY, vol. 9/ p6a/item 40).

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URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE BETWEEN LOCAL NETWORKS AND THE WIDER WORLD: THE TRAMWAY IN LATE OTTOMAN ALEPPO*

Nora Lafi

Abstract | Conflicts over infrastructure are highly informative to historians because they produce abundant archival material and constitute moments of explicit display of intention by the actors and institutions involved, and expose political, economic, institutional, factional and geopolitical rivalries. This chapter focuses on conflicts related to the construction of the first tram lines in Aleppo during the late Ottoman period. After presenting several methodological issues related to infrastructure studies in urban history including Ottoman cities, it is shown that in Aleppo, the study of tramway plans reveals the transformation of factional networks in an age of institutional and technical modernization. It centers on the ways in which local notables interacted with imperial governors and economic interests when negotiating the implementation of infrastructural works. It also investigates how urban planning, infrastructure, and networks of power and clientele were linked in a process that was crucial to the definition of new modalities of integration of Aleppo into the world economy. The discussion explores the notion of “public good” and its evolution in this context.

INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL MODERNITY AT THE URBAN LEVEL

The modernization of infrastructure is not only a context and a mirror, but also a tool and vector of institutional transformations. As such it has become one of the most vibrant fields of research in urban history in recent decades.1 Infrastructural history is no longer simply administrative or economic history: as a particularly rich field of the social sciences it takes infrastructure as the point of departure for the study of social relations, and the anthropological links between people and technology within the dynamics of urban change. This perspective has made it possible to unearth and analyze networks of power, the intertwining of technical, economic, and political logics, decision-making processes, and all the ambivalence associated with institutional transformations.2 Researchers have emphasized the need to re-

* Author’s note: This chapter is dedicated to the memory of my dear colleague and friend Lutz Rogler (1961–2020).


interpret the relationship between geographic and cultural areas by revisiting the center-periphery dichotomy. In so doing, infrastructure has become the vector of innovative research directions in global history and a way to deconstruct overly simplistic categorizations.3

In the case of Bilad al-Sham, the modernization of its urban structure was shaped and complexified by European colonial ambitions in the region. This makes the study of its infrastructure modernization a particularly fruitful way to understanding how the relationship between the local and the wider world was reshaped during the late Ottoman era. In the case of Aleppo, Bruce Masters’ works show not only how such factors were particularly crucial in the unfolding of decisive events for the city and the region, but also how a research perspective that embraces both the local and the global view leads to stimulating interpretations.4 Analysis of infrastructural change and the networks of power that were mobilized in this process is likely to unearth the logics of group relations and reveal the tensions, reconfigurations and renewed spatialities of the late Ottoman period.

A vast amount of research has been devoted to a reinterpretation of the Ottoman period of reforms. It has rejected simplistic visions based upon the idea that modernity could only be imported from Europe and has given renewed attention to the transformation of existing institutions, by pointing to the value of a closer look at the connections between infrastructure modernization and institutional change on a local scale from a different perspective.5 This chapter adopts this line of thought by examining the dynamics of infrastructural and institutional change in Aleppo behind the construction of the first tram lines in the city.

**LOCAL NOTABLES AND GOVERNANCE IN ALEPPO: INFRASTRUCTURE AS A CONTENTIOUS POINT OF FactionAL POLiTICS**

In Ottoman Aleppo,6 as was the case in all the cities of the Empire between the 16th and the 19th centuries, the provision of basic urban amenities and services was the responsibility of local institutions and in particular the group of notables who constituted the local governing body. These local municipal institutions for example were in charge of the daily supervision of services such as public ovens or baths, the water supply, and street cleaning. These public services were generally managed and financed by endowments. Major projects, such as the building of new commercial spaces or new infrastructure, tended to be agreed upon through negotiation with the imperial authorities, although they often remained in the hands of local notables who represented the interests of trade, confessional allegiances, guilds, and property. There was an element of euergetism in the functioning of this system: since notables had responsibilities in their respective neighborhoods and confessional communities, and

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5 See İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat devrinde Osmanlı mahal- li idareleri (1840–1880) [Ottoman Local Administration in the Tanzimat Period (1840–1880)] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000) [in Turkish]; Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber (eds.), The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late-Ottoman Empire (Würzburg: Ergon, 2002); Nora Lafl, “The Ottoman Municipal Reforms between Old Regime and Modernity: Towards a New Interpretative Paradigm,” First Eminönü Interna-
as they had a moral duty to serve the common good, patronage was one of the most prominent expressions in the local civic arena.\(^7\)

This system generally allowed for the regular provision of basic services to city dwellers and for the seamless functioning and daily management of the city’s infrastructure. It was also part of the Ottoman method of governing through local diversity. However, conflicts could and did arise, most often against the backdrop of rivalries between urban factions. On some occasions, divergences over infrastructure or public service improvement projects led to heated conflicts, often arising from the financial implications of such projects, but also from the way they could lead to changes in the regulation of property and trade or challenge the authority and interests of a group of notables, a guild, or a confessional community. All these interests were located in specific neighborhoods of the city, which makes the analysis of such conflicts a good point of departure for understanding what was at stake on the local level.

The city of Aleppo experienced several such episodes of controversy between the beginning of the Ottoman era and the 18th century. In the 19th century, new interests and challenges emerged in the context of new modalities of incorporating the city into a changing geopolitical and economic situation involving the intersection of new forms of investment and commerce and new colonial ambitions. The first major conflict related to infrastructural works that illustrates this emerging logic occurred in 1819. It shows how local factions and actors from the wider world; i.e., the Ottoman Empire and Europe interacted in a new way over the issue of modernization. Some Aleppo notables rejected the mode of financing of a project supported by the Ottoman governor Khurshid Paşa to modernize the city’s water supply system.\(^8\) The governor’s plan was to increase taxes on urban notables to finance the modernization of the aqueducts. This constituted a two-pronged attack on the notables’ main prerogatives: their right to negotiate their financial relationship with the Empire, and their responsibility for water provision under the old regime’s norms of municipal governance.

The contemporary chronicler Abraham Kubilyan noted that this decision sparked a revolt on the part of some urban factions.\(^9\) The 1822 earthquake further aggravated the provision of public services in Aleppo: many amenities were damaged and the normal funding of their maintenance through endowments was not sufficient to cover their reconstruction and modernization. In the next few decades, the question of infrastructure modernization remained a key stumbling block in the negotiations over the agreement on imperial rule between the local elites and Istanbul. During the Egyptian period (1831–1840), other projects were proposed, but the notables were divided over them, not only with respect to their pros and cons, but also over their ties to certain business leaders and other networks of influence and interest. Each project reflected the geographic location and social make-up of particular factions; i.e., their specific physical base at the neighborhood level and their roots in the households of notables and their client circles. It also reflected the interaction between this local dimension and the changing international investment milieu.

The crisis of the mid-19th century that resulted in the destabilization of the whole region with its litany of major violent episodes, such as the Aleppo riots of 1850, led to a redefinition of confessional balances as well as relations with the outside world. It also prompted the extensive renegotiation of the duties of local notables. This process often involved controversies over taxation, public amenities and public works, and provides a good example of the intensity of negotiations between the local elites and the imperial government. At stake was not only infrastructure financing, but also the confirmation of local notables’ prerogatives

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in a time of institutional reform, as well as the transformation in firmly rooted networks of investment and clientelism that linked the locality to the wider world. In 1850, a petition to the Sultan by 66 Aleppo notables (aʿyan) representing local civic institutions, shows how issues related to public works, infrastructure, property, and taxation were linked; for example, when it came to the redefinition of the *amwal al-miri* (imperial taxes).\(^\text{10}\)

This is the context of the municipal reforms that were enacted between the 1850s and the 1877 Ottoman Law.\(^\text{11}\) The reformed municipality of Aleppo – restructured according to the provision of the 1867 Ottoman Vilayet Law – was officially endorsed in 1868. In this process, factional politics on the micro-urban level interacted with larger interests on both the imperial and the geopolitical stage. In the municipal reformative agenda of the Tanzimat period, infrastructure modernization was part of the redefinition of the institutional order. Although the municipal and provincial reforms confirmed the prerogatives of the former municipality and redefined its organization, at the same time they gave more power to the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works in Istanbul for the granting of concessions for urban public service and infrastructure building. The tramway projects for Aleppo were enmeshed in these dynamics. Studies on other Ottoman cities have shown that the negotiation of concessions also constituted a crucial moment.

**CONCESSIONS (IMTIYAZAT) IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: BETWEEN LOCAL NOTABILITY AND GLOBAL INVESTMENT**

The study of various kinds of infrastructure, their construction and maintenance, and the institutional and economic solutions selected for their management, is key to understanding not only the mechanisms of urban transformation, but also the interests involved in urban governance in general.\(^\text{12}\) Conflicts over infrastructure are useful material for historians since they produce abundant archives and a paper trail, and constitute moments of explicit display of intention by the actors and institutions involved in urban transformation, as well as the political, economic, institutional, factional, and geopolitical rivalries involved.

In virtually all Ottoman towns in the late 19th century and at the turn of the 20th, local business people and notables associated with foreign banks and infrastructure companies, using a variety of formulas and diverse coalitions of interests, set out and promoted proposals for infrastructural modernization. They lobbied the central government in Istanbul to obtain a concession and negotiated its implementation with the local municipality. Because all the actors in this negotiation process had complex identities, functions, and interests, the study of this moment says as much about infrastructure and urban history as it does about institutional, political, social and economic history. It also says a great deal about the tentacles of foreign domination (which was taking on an increasingly colonial nature with the aim of detaching Ottoman provinces from the Empire and establishing a relationship of subordination), since concessions were generally linked to the spheres of international investment, diplomatic pressure, indebtedness, and the establishment by foreign powers of local client networks. Geopolitics, business and local factional politics intermingled. The concession model served to spread new infrastructure technologies in cities. New modes of financing and new networks of influence were entwined. Modernization also meant a challenge to the governance scheme and to the very nature of the Ottoman reforms.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{10}\) Başbakanlık Osmani Arşivleri (henceforth BOA), I. DH., 226/13493, 16 Safar 1267 (19 December 1850).


\(^{13}\) For further analysis of this issue, see Isa Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities (1800–1912)* (New-York: Palgrave, 2011). See also Florian Riedler, “Building Modern Infrastructures on Ancient Routes: Road and Rail Development in 19th-Century Edirne,” in Birgit Krawietz and Florian Riedler (eds.), *The Her-
It thus comes as no surprise that Osman Nuri Ergin (1883–1961), the father of Ottoman municipal history, in his influential work on the Ottoman reforms, dedicated considerable attention to this issue. Ergin, a clerk in the Istanbul municipality and province, was active in the later stages of the adaptation of the Ottoman administrative heritage in the 20th century. The presentation of the administrative and legal framework of Ottoman concessions for urban public services, including horse-drawn and then electric trams, takes up a significant part of his monumental book on municipalities. For example, the question of the occupation and commercial use of public street space by a private company is the subject of a precise legal expert opinion, as is the definition of the nature, form, and duration of concessions.

Throughout the Empire, foreign companies endeavored to implement new infrastructure solutions. The personnel in their local branches generally included members of notable households or individuals well placed in the local urban governance scene. In Istanbul, their representatives were instrumental in acquiring ministerial exploitation permits. European consulates also lobbied for their national companies. During the 1860s, several entrepreneurs, such as Hutchinson in 1863, made efforts to lay tram lines in Istanbul. In 1864, a regulatory framework was prepared and the first tentative map of a possible network for the capital city was drafted, but no actual line was built. In 1869, after the failure of another concession granted to Rüstem Bey, a French company was granted a 40-year concession for the construction of tram lines.

This 1869–1870 concession reflected the complex interweaving of foreign investment, technical expertise, and the Ottoman elite: the Greek-Ottoman businessman Constantin Karapanos led the project, with support from the Banque impériale ottomane and the bankers Avram Camondo, Hristaki Zagrofos Efendi, and Yorgi Zarifi. The Albanian-Catholic-Ottoman statesman Wassa Efendi (1825–1892), formerly a prominent imperial administrator in Edirne and in Bilad al-Sham, was nominated director of the Société des Tramways de Constantinople. Texts related to the official regulation of the service were issued in 1869, 1881, 1907, 1911, and 1916, and the 1911 concession was extended for 75 more years.

The first line for horse-drawn trams started to operate in 1872 and, by 1873, the Société was operating four omnibus lines and three horse-drawn tram lines. The construction of the tram lines was supervised by the Société, which also

15 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 2474.
17 See Ibrahim Murat Bozkurt, "İstanbul Kentiçi kara toplu ulaşım hizmetlerinin başlaması ve gelişimi (1850–1900) [Start and Development of Istanbul Land Transport Services (1850–1900)]" (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2004) [in Turkish].
22 Le Journal des Débats, 5 February 1877.
24 Ibid., pp. 2418, 2420.
25 Ibid., pp. 2425–2429.
26 Ibid., pp. 2329–2442.
27 Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 4322–4384.
28 Çelik, Remaking of Istanbul, p. 91.
played a role in urban planning in altering the width of the streets as required.

This example points to the value of analyzing the design and building of tram networks in conjunction with urban planning projects, while taking the value of real estate properties belonging to elite circles into account. Osman Nuri Ergin describes the complex negotiations that took place between the Société, the municipality, and the state. The lines were electrified at the beginning of the 20th century, a process that opened up new debates and led to changes in the distribution of the shares of the Société.29

In Istanbul, the tram system also constituted concrete evidence of the new relationship between European finances, imperial supervision, and local projects. The local municipality inherited a situation that had been decided upon with the circles of imperial institutions (the legal form of concessions, the financing networks, and the choice of technology). These institutions were themselves subject to complex interactions with foreign influences and had to be negotiated in terms of local realities and interests. Intense political conflicts about the tram network arose after World War I in the context of a redefinition of the relationship between Istanbul and the world of international finance.30

The case of the construction of the tram network of Salonica illustrates this tangled web of levels and interests in a very revealing way. The Compagnie ottomane des tramways de Salonique was created in 1892 on the basis of an 1889 concession granted to Hamdy Bey.31 The evolution of this company at the turn of the 20th century illustrates the growth of Belgian interests in the financing and operation of tram routes,32 and particularly the action of administrator Fernand Guillon, who personifies the global dimension of electric tram operations: he was the president of tram companies in Verona, Buenos Aires, Odessa, and Madrid.33 In late-Ottoman Salonica, the management and modernization of the tram network was linked to ongoing works in the harbor.34 Electrification was also a major factor that led to the renegotiation of the financial relationship between local notables and Belgian and French interests after the English businessman who first obtained the electrification concession for Salonica in 1899 sold it to a French company.35 The first electric line opened in 1908. During the same period, a concession for new lines was granted to the Compagnie, in close conjunction with real estate speculation around the construction of new neighborhoods.

In Bilad al-Sham as well, the creation of tram lines sheds light on the new forms of relationship between local notables and the wider world. As the newspaper La Correspondance d’Orient stated in 1914 in an article on Tripoli, the tram concession was given to “a group of notables and capitalists.”36 In Beirut, after granting concessions for horse-drawn services during the late 19th century, electrification pointed to the growing influence of Belgian


32 See Mehmet Yetişgin and Toroshan Özdamar.


35 Yetişgin and Özdamar, “Osmanlı şehirlerinde belçika şirketlerinin altıyapı faaliyetleri,” p. 283; an illustration of the importance of the negotiations around the stakes of electrification is also provided in Ergin, Mecelle-i umur-i belediye, vol. 5, pp. 2720–2728, which discusses the concession of the electrical service to Belgian investor Leopold Stark (Çitark) in 1911.

financial interests. These groups interacted with the municipal notables to create coalitions of interest. Stefan Weber's work for example showed how the construction of tram lines in Damascus was a subject of contention between various notables, private investors, and representatives of the Empire.

During the 1890s, Yusuf Matran / Mutran (also known as Joseph Moutran in the French literature of the time) obtained a concession from the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works in Istanbul for the construction of five tram lines in the city. Here again, a decision in Istanbul, made after intense lobbying by both international and local Damascene players, paved the way for the creation of a private firm, which negotiated with the municipality. This network of influence was active at various levels, from local to imperial and international. In 1891, a firman by the sultan granted the concession, which was transferred in 1893 to Mehmed Arslan Bey, a member of one of the most prominent local households and advisor to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul, who made an agreement with Belgian investors.

The investors in Damascus, however, did not manage to raise the necessary funds for the implementation of the project. The relationship between businessmen, foreign banks, and local notables illustrates the importance of new networks and the changing relationship between local administrators and the wider world. After passing through the hands of businessman ʿIzzat Paša al-ʿAbid (1851–1924), the Damascus concession ended up being bought by a Belgian company belonging to A. Rouffart and Charles Cicogna. Local notables served as relays for foreign investments. This is how the Société Anonyme Impériale Ottomane des Tramways et d’Eclairage Electrique de Damas was created in 1904, with Belgian capital and a 10 percent participation by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The Société was presided over by ʿIzzat Paša. The board was composed of the Belgian investors Edouard Empain (1852–1929) and his brother François Empain (1862–1935), Georges de Bauer, Ernest Urban, Jules Jacobs, Léon Janssen, Hermann Stern, and banker Auguste de la Hault, who was also on the board of tram companies in Cairo, Spain, and Tashkent. The first part of the first line was opened in 1907. The high price of the electricity produced by the company for public lighting led the municipality, which was forced to buy it under the initial contract, to attempt to revoke the concession. This was the start of a long-lasting conflict in which urban factions, controlled by urban notables, played a crucial role. At one point, one of these factions allowed young hooligans to trash tram vehicles to put pressure on decision-makers. The conflict was later resolved, and the municipality and the company reached an agreement, but, as Stefan Weber commented, “the tramway remained the symbol of the position of subordination of the municipality to a foreign private company.” The deterioration of the financial situation of the municipality before World War I exacerbated these debates.

THE ALEPPO TRAMWAY

In Aleppo between the 1870s and World War I, municipal notables and imperial governors were involved in complex and multifaceted

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37 Le Journal des Finances, 6 October 1906.
40 Weber, Damascus.
41 Recueil financier belge, 1906. For more on these investments, see Thobie, Intérêts et impérialisme français.
42 On ʿIzzat Paša’s activities in water companies and conflicts related to their management and taxation, see Ergin, Mecelle-i umur-i belediye, vol. 8, pp. 4185–4186.
negotiations over various aspects of urban modernization that included infrastructure projects, planning, and institutional organization. Rivalries developed, based upon diverging interests, factional and confessional allegiances, and membership in competing networks of economic influence, with some episodes of conflict. This period was marked by an ambitious program of urban extensions that included new neighborhoods around the old city, modern infrastructure projects (water supply, sewerage, transport, electricity, gas) and collective equipment. The context was that of the modernization of the imperial technical methodologies such as the development of the network of modern routes between cities.

The case of the upgrading of the route connecting Aleppo to Alexandretta in 1910–1911 is particularly revealing of this intense investment and the logic of the geographic distribution of technology and responsibilities. As far as the city of Aleppo itself is concerned, the chronicler Muhammad al-Tabbakh provides detailed information on the geography and implementation of city extensions; his chronicle helps untangle the various coalitions of interest at play. These factors were particularly revealing of the connections between the local situation and the wider world under ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855–1902), who served as the mayor of Aleppo from 1892 to 1895. A former editor of al-Furat, the official Ottoman newspaper of Aleppo during key phases of the Tanzimat in the late 1870s, al-Kawakibi also founded the newspaper al-Shahba in 1878. He embodied the local opposition to the abolition of the Ottoman constitution and wrote various essays, including one on the nature of despotic influence, with some episodes of conflict. This period was marked by an ambitious program of urban extensions that included new neighborhoods around the old city, modern infrastructure projects (water supply, sewerage, transport, electricity, gas) and collective equipment. The context was that of the modernization of the imperial technical methodologies such as the development of the network of modern routes between cities.

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people of Aleppo he protected (dabata hadhihi al-maslaha) against the central government's inability to prevent corruption (al-fasad).\textsuperscript{55}

The chronicler's view of the mayor is supported by the fact that al-Kawakibi could claim membership in a famous lineage from whom for long periods Aleppo's naqib al-ashraf (the administrative head of the group socially defined as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) derived.\textsuperscript{56} In cities of the Islamic world, the naqib al-ashraf headed the group of notables whose religious and civic authority relied on their purported descent from the Prophet and, historically, often played the role of tribunus plebis, defending the common good and the urban poor.\textsuperscript{57} Al-Kawakibi's political status in the era of institutional modernization was clearly linked to civic norms inherited from the old regime. He was known for voicing popular claims and, despite the possibly populist dimension of this stance, his membership in the urban elite and his proximity to commercial interests, he personified values of civic ethics in Aleppo. This explains the conflicts in the 1890s over the concessions not only for the tram lines, but also for the water supply and public lighting in the city. The mayor eventually officially stated he was in favor of such services, but he remained suspicious of the concessions system itself,\textsuperscript{58} and refused to pay bribes for concessions, which delayed many projects. An archival file dated 1905 contains an 1889 tram project that was never developed.\textsuperscript{59} The depot was planned to be built behind the Christian cemetery and the line would have followed the walls around the old city (Figure 1).

The chronicler Kamil al-Ghazzi, who edited the local salname (official annals) of Aleppo during the Tanzimat period (first issue in 1284 H/1867),\textsuperscript{60} gives additional information about what was at stake between notables, institutions, and investors at this time.\textsuperscript{61} He stresses that, after 1882 (1300H), new types of building and urban planning were adopted that involved construction of wide avenues (fiha iftah jawad ʿazima), such as the one connecting Bab al-Jadid to the station of the Damascus railway line, which resulted in a major change in architectural styles and techniques, and ways of living.\textsuperscript{62} He describes how such changes impacted urban life in detail, with the development of new habits and customs, as well as new businesses. The chronicler is enthusiastic about the changes affecting the Bab al-Faraj neighborhood, which became the symbol of this phase of urban modernization, with its new hospital, new square, and a new avenue,\textsuperscript{63} and how new luxurious apartment buildings, new commercial spaces, new cafés and shops and promenades (al-muntazahat)

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., vol. 7, p. 480. The chronicler gives a biography of his ancestors as well.  
\textsuperscript{57} Lafi, \textit{Esprit civique}.  
\textsuperscript{58} al-Tabbakh, \textit{Ilam al-nubala}, vol. 7, p. 479.  
\textsuperscript{59} BOA, T. HFN., 666/76, 26 Zilhicce 1307 (13 August 1890), Halep, Tramway Projesi.  
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 82–86.  
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., vol. 3, p. 321, Muharram 1309.
had transformed Aleppo into one of the most beautiful cities in the Ottoman provinces.

Facing old Aleppo, which al-Ghazzi also praises for its beauty, with its narrow lanes and shops, the new neighborhoods corresponded to new forms of urban living. Al-Ghazzi discusses how an early phase of the work on the new route to Alexandretta and the opening of a new branch of the water supply system was accompanied by the granting of a license by Sultan Abdülhamid II to urbanize a new neighborhood (al-Sulaymaniyya) and by speculation on investment in the plots constituting the new quarter.64 He also analyzes how the building of these new neighborhoods reinforced the geographic separation between confessional communities, because investments were made along confessional lines. He considers this with some anxiety, as it represented a potential limitation of everyday contact between these communities. In addition to notes about the planning of the avenue leading to the station,65 al-Ghazzi’s chronicle also provides information about the context of the electrification of the city, which was a key factor in the debates over the tram lines.66 The chronicle illustrates the impact of imperial measures against foreign capitulations in 1914.67 In general, the chronicler shows how infrastructural modernization changed urban social life. During the old regime, it was regulated by the principles laid down in treatises on hisba or public order by Muslim jurists. Hisba manuals regularly included a chapter on the regulation of traffic between pedestrians, delivery services and animal-drawn carts.68 The arrival of the tramway did not disrupt this way of life in the inner city. However, the relationship to speed and velocity changed for everyone, whether or not they took the tram, along the new avenues. The construction of wide roads and avenues also took place in a very tense context. Al-Ghazzi notes that the fire that broke out in the summer of 1870 in the jewellers’ suq was believed to be arson, designed to burn down houses and shops to make the area more accessible.69

This is the context of the construction of the first tram line, whose history cannot be separated from the history of urban expansion and the real estate speculation that fueled it, since being on the tram line was an asset for properties. Decision-making processes in urban planning and transport planning are linked, with many points of overlap, for example as concerns the role of leading notables (who were also major landowners) and investors. These debates took place at a crucial moment in the implementation of institutional reforms and were part of that process. They constituted not only a context, but also a point of redefinition of the relationship between the local elites, their access to urban governance, the imperial sphere, and local or foreign private investors. In a time of redefinition of the municipality’s responsibilities, and the relationship between governors, notables, business people, and investors, debates over the tramway were thus central. The Ottoman Provincial Code (Vilayet Nizamname-ı) stated that the new municipalities were in charge of public works, public infrastructure, and public transport. These reforms were formalized in 1868 on the basis of earlier configurations of institutional reform enacted as of the 1840s. The structure of municipality, which comprised a council of notables with various administrative responsibilities under the old regime, was also taken into account. The negotiations with both Istanbul and private firms thus represented a decisive moment in the definition of the relationship between Ottoman modernization, the local administration, and foreign capital. The granting of concessions for public services to private companies owned by foreign banks was particularly sensitive.

The 1868 formalization of municipal reform also marked a turning point for the organization of municipal technical services, as did the beginning of the 1890s under mayor al-Kawakibi. In this delicate phase, during ‘Arif Paşa’s governorship, a serious conflict erupted between the mayor and the governor, which resulted in the sacking of the latter after the mayor or was cleared of the charges brought against him.70 Under ‘Arif Paşa’s successors, Osman

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64 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 315, 1304 (1886).
65 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 364, 1324 (1906).
66 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 365, 1325 (1907).
67 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 447, 1333 (1914).
68 See Lafi, “Urbanity as an Ethic,” p. 86.
69 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 303, 1287 (1870).
70 On such episodes, see al-Tabbakh, Iʿlam al-nubalaʾ, vol. 7, p. 480: “ʿArif Paşa was upset when certain persons wrote a petition to the Porte […] This resulted in al-Kawakibi’s imprisonment.”
Nuri and Hasan Paşa, debates over concessions were intense. After al-Kawakibi’s resignation, Raʾif Paşa, a former member of the reformist team active in Istanbul around Midhat Paşa (1822–1883) (who himself had served as governor in the region between 1878 and 1881), became imperial governor (wali) (1895–1900).

The modernization and extension of the city, as well as negotiations over infrastructure management were again central issues. Raʾif Paşa worked closely on the extension of the city outside its walls (Figure 2) with engineer and architect Charles Chartier, who had been instrumental in the implementation of new planning regulations in the 1880s. Charles Chartier was appointed chief provincial technician.

Under mayor Bashir Efendi al-Ibri, he also built the city’s municipal Clock Tower in 1898–1899.71 Charles Chartier was appointed chief provincial technician.73 Under mayor Bashir Efendi al-Ibri, he also built the city’s municipal Clock Tower in 1898–1899.71 Charles Chartier was appointed chief provincial technician.73 Under mayor Bashir Efendi al-Ibri, he also built the city’s municipal Clock Tower in 1898–1899.71

In the minds of the modernizers, tramways had been part and parcel of the image of the (with ʿAli Sahrij and Bakr Sidqi),74 which soon became a symbol of urban modernization, as in all major Ottoman cities. The vision developed by the actors in this phase of the city’s modernization was very ambitious, as it anticipated huge growth and the creation (insha) of vast new neighborhoods (Figure 3).75 It served as the basis for later developments and was followed in 1899 and 1903 by a new master plan for the municipality by architect Jung.76

During all these years, Aleppo was the subject of numerous debates about the construction of tram lines.

In the minds of the modernizers, tramways had been part and parcel of the image of the

72  BOA, PLK. p., 2599, no date indicated.
Figure 3: Masterplan of Aleppo by Engineers Chartier, Raghid, and Bekir. Source: Bibliothèque nationale de France, département des cartes et plans, Ge F Carte 2118, Plan général de la ville d’Halep dressé par les ingénieurs des ponts et chaussées du vilayet Chartier, Raghid, Bekir. Hommage dédié à Son Excellence Mohamed Raïf Pacha.
modern city since the beginnings of the modernization program. They were also a marketing tool for the new avenues and created added value to certain properties. Tram lines were thus a key part of the negotiations over urban expansion. In Aleppo, however, unlike other Ottoman cities, the first generation of tram projects was never implemented because of the conflict between the municipality and the governor. It was only with the opening of the railway station in 1905 that discussions on tram lines were relaunched, at a time when other cities were already considering the electrification of existing tram lines. Between 1905 and 1920, two lines were constructed. The construction of the new Aleppo-Hama railway line, negotiated by Nazım Paşa, provided the opportunity to rethink the link between the new station and downtown. Various meetings with landowners were organized to discuss expropriations and the precise route of the new line in the peri-urban neighborhoods. Petitions were sent protesting the new taxes linked to this infrastructure program. The governor's first attempt to get the project approved in 1905 failed, but a second attempt a few months later was more successful. The first electric line, which represented de facto the first tramway line in general, started its operations at the end of the first decade of the 20th century.

The main tram line connected Bab al-Faraj Square to Tilal Street and another line ran along Khandaq Street. The operation of the electric tram and the provision of electricity were included in the same concession, as was the case in many cities of the Empire. Archival evidence shows that the Ministry of Public Works in Istanbul exerted strong pressure on the decision-making process for the construction of the tram lines. The fact that the Ministry of Works in Istanbul exerted strong pressure on the decision-making process for the construction of the tram lines.

78 Ibid., p. 361.
81 Erôl Emin, “Osmanlı devletinde aydınlatma uygulamaları ve verilen imtiyazlar (1850–1914) [Concessions for Public Lighting in the Ottoman Empire],” Türk Dünyası Arastirmalari 175 (2008), pp. 201–224 [in Turkish].
82 BOA, T. HFN., 666/76, 26 Zilhicce 1307 (13 August 1890), Halep, Tramway Projesi.

try granted the concession empowered its local actors with influence in Aleppo, both notables and business people, but Istanbul was worried about possible interference that could alter the nature of the concession and the power of its networks of influence to control local negotiations about imperial control. In this situation, the Aleppo municipality was both influenced from above (international finance, decisions made in Istanbul) and the forum for negotiation on the local level (local notables, business people). A file in the BOA provides information on the content of this sphere of local negotiation. It deals with the major points in the key phases of tram line construction: the 1907 concession to a private company for the tram line and street lighting services. This file shows how investors built up a local coalition of interests which largely reflected the existing factions. The major issues were not only investment in the infrastructure but also the value of properties. After operations began at the end of the 1900s, the municipality had a recurring problem with the tramway and power company: as one of the company's main clients, the municipality felt that it paid too much for electricity. Such specific situations, when a municipality was the main client of a private concession that operated on its own territory, have been analyzed by urban historians as key moments in the very definition of the relationship between institutions and the private sector.

The private interests of the company were well-represented and defended on the municipal council, since several council members were involved in the circle of investment and clientele, showing again the entanglement of interests and networks, both local and in the wider world. The year 1909 constituted an interesting moment in the construction of networks of urban cooperation at the scale of the Empire. Various Ottoman municipalities, from Edirne to Adana and Aleppo, worked together to redefine the role of the institution of the municipality with regard to the concession system. They exchanged letters, compared prices and...
methods of organization, and negotiated fiscal arrangements. This illustrates the importance of local-to-local-dialogue in the Ottoman Empire and the circulation of information at a pan-municipal level. It also shows that the Ottoman municipalities were worried about the evolution of the concession system insofar as it affected their relations to the wider world. In 1913, a new conflict between the Aleppo municipality and the private tram company erupted, which required central government intervention. The major player in this episode was engineer Osman Vehbi Bey, who ended up buying the concession from Muhtar Bey. On 8 January 1914, Vehbi Bey obtained a 50-year extension of the initial concession, to end in 1964. This decision was confirmed a few days later by the government in Istanbul following negotiations between the company, Istanbul, and the local municipality. A new phase of negotiations took place in 1915.

After World War I, Osman Vehbi Bey was confirmed as the beneficiary of the concession. Here again, archival evidence on this decision shows the nature of the networks of influence between Aleppo, Istanbul, and the wider world. At the local level, the construction of the first tramway lines had a significant impact in terms of social history. The tramway company represented a new kind of employer, with new professions, new relationships to work and new networks of patronage that reinterpreted those inherited from the world of guilds. Further, the speed of travel of the tram changed the relationship between individual identities and the urban geography, both confessional and social. Confessional boundaries did not vanish, but were reinterpreted in terms of new forms of spatiality and temporality. The tram itself represented a kind of new theater of society in which men and women cohabited and reproduced or reinterpreted previous modalities and behaviors of social and confessional distinction.

After the fall of the Empire and the various phases of military occupation by France that led to a Mandate by the new-born League of Nations, French investors took over the sector of public transportation and electricity provision. As Jacques Thobie has shown, the concession on water, power, and tramways was granted by the colonial authorities to a company owned by the colonial bank Crédit foncier d’Algérie et de Tunisie. The same was true in Damascus, where in 1919 this financial institution representing and embodying French colonial interests acquired a share in the tramway company. This represented a turn in the history of the sector, but also a form of continuation, since the concession system from the beginning and by its very nature had favored the financial penetration of the sector by foreigners. Aleppo Mayor Ibrahim Hananu (1869–1935) joined the resistance against French colonization. In 1921, the French authorities produced a propaganda film about Aleppo, but all the symbols of modernity it showed, from the “European” neighborhoods to the clock tower, were clearly Ottoman. Trams appeared in almost every scene.

CONCLUSION

The history of the construction of the Aleppo tramway suggests that infrastructure modernization, institutional modernity, and the

87 BOA, DH. ID, 191/8, 23 Safar 1332 (16 January 1914).
88 BOA, DH. ID., 191/10, 10 Zilkahe 1332 (30 September 1914).
89 BOA, I. DUIT., 34/13, 14 Zilkahe 1332 (4 October 1914). This document has also been published in Uğur Ünal (ed.), Osmanlı Belgelerinde Suriye [Syria in Ottoman Documents] (Istanbul: BOA, 2013), p. 220 [in Turkish].
90 BOA, MV., 241/203, 25 Muharrem 1333 (13 December 1914).
91 BOA, ŞD., 508/11, 21 Muharrem 1341 (13 September 1922).
92 BOA, ŞD, 510/21, 21 Muharrem 1341 (13 September 1922); 514/5, 21 Muharrem 1341 (13 September 1922) (Adana and Aleppo).
93 For more on the ways in which wage employment in utilities changed labor relations, see Donald Reid, Paris de Tunisie.
94 Thobie, “L’électrification.”
reshaping of power networks are linked. Decision-making processes about infrastructural modernization reflect and embody complex dynamics of change in which the locality and a new form of globalization interacted in ways that gave new meanings, forms, and functions to older modalities of negotiation, accommodation, and conflict resolution. At their core was the idea of the common good, the relationship with the outside world, and the reinterpretation of local forms of power and the status of the notables. In the case of Aleppo, a city already marked by various conflicts over infrastructure and amenities, tramway projects provided the opportunity to reshape the relationship between local notables and the Empire, define private interests in a new way, and give new impetus to old factional rivalries. All this eventually created a challenge to the Empire from European interests. The fragile pact of imperialty expressed through negotiation between successive governors and local notables was challenged by growing external pressures. Although tramways in Aleppo were not an immediate symbol of subordination or a tool of domination, they soon represented, with the imposition of the French colonial interpretation of the Mandates, a way to coopt the local economy into the framework of colonial capitalism.

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In addition to an analysis of the scholarly literature on the subject, this chapter is based on two main types of historical sources: chronicles and Ottoman administrative documents. The latter comprise files pertaining to Aleppo found in the archives of the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works in the central Ottoman Archive in Istanbul. They include projects, letters, plans, maps, petitions, and reports.

Recent archival research has revealed that in many Ottoman cities, before the reforms of the mid-19th century, one of the members of the ‘old regime’ municipal council took down the minutes of all meetings and summarized them in the form of a civic chronicle in which in addition to events that took place in the city he also noted issues related to governance: properties, lists of notables, euergetism, civic endowments, petitions, conflicts and their resolution, collective projects, relationships with guilds and confessional communities, public order, and the like. This instrument of local urban governance, which constitutes both a literary genre and a valuable source for urban historians, did not completely disappear with the modernization of the municipal administration that took place between 1840 and 1880 and some chroniclers continued to write chronicles. Sometimes, a former chronicler simply became the editor of the official municipal or provincial newspaper, or continued to publish books inspired by the style of the chronicles. This accounts for the abundance of such sources for both Ottoman and post-Ottoman cities.1

1 A more detailed discussion of the institution of the civic chronicle can be found in Lafi, Esprit civique et organisation citadine, chapter 2 ("La chronique comme annale civique de l’ancien régime urbain").
AGENTS OF MODERNIZATION
AND LINKS TO THE WIDER WORLD
BEING IMPERIAL, BEING EPHEMERAL: OTTOMAN MODERNITY ON GAZA’S SEASHORE

Dotan Halevy

Abstract | Gaza of the late Ottoman period was integrated into an imperial web of Eastern Mediterranean port cities. As a maritime nodal point exporting grain grown in the arid terrains of southern Palestine, it enjoyed a peculiar status. This article explores the materialization of this status in the form of two interrelated urban institutions, a maritime pier and a municipal hospital. It is argued here that Gaza’s pier-hospital construction project between 1893 and World War I exposed tensions and conflicts that radiated outwards in concentric circles, from the urban to the provincial and then to the imperial, bringing into play the very pillars of imperial modernity: public health and economic development, and the related question of which strata of the Ottoman body politic would dominate the two. Further along in the pier-hospital project’s realization, the same fault-lines informed an inter-imperial conflict between the Ottomans and their European rivals over the shore of Gaza, such that this modest sea outlet transformed into a global arena of struggle for political legitimacy and economic sovereignty. Probing the undercurrents of this conflict, the article ultimately returns to the materiality of the pier-hospital initiative to argue for the peculiar modernity engendered by Gaza’s imperial status, one that was ephemeral as it encompassed states of construction and of ruin almost simultaneously.

INTRODUCTION

Late Ottoman Gaza: an imperial port. Is such a description a misnomer? If the picture it conjures up is that of a colorfully bustling 19th-century port city, then the term imperial port is certainly misplaced. Gaza, with its meager port infrastructure, was utterly unlike the cosmopolitan, booming mercantile hubs of Ottoman Alexandria, Izmir, Salonica, or Mersin. It was certainly different from the Levantine Haifa or Beirut, Amin Maalouf’s famous Echelles du Levant. Nevertheless, late Ottoman Gaza corresponds fully to the definition of an imperial port in terms of its role within the system of Ottoman ports and of the social and political tensions it engendered. World-System theorists encouraged historians to think structurally rather than comparatively on the relations between port cities on a global scale. World-System theory critics argued for the multidirectional formation of these structures as inclusive of social and cultural elements rather than merely inhabiting economic vectors flowing from core to periphery. The case presented here draws on both approaches to narrate a local story of globalization and modernization, and their shared discontent in a far-flung, virtually forgotten, borderland of the Ottoman state. This article traces the local endeavor to establish a pier on the Gaza shore (see Figure 1) and a municipal hospital inside the city, from the initial concept in the early 1890s to its abandonment on the eve of World War I. The vision of a port and a hospital, and later their realization as actual facilities, construction sites, and finally as ruins, generated local tensions between the imperial center and the province, between the Ottoman Empire and its rivals, as well as between local players within Gaza. In keeping with oth-
er major port cities and political centers, money, honor, and imperial legitimacy were all at stake, thus staging Gaza as an imperial site.

What did the process of turning a provincial port into an imperial one entail for Gaza? The article takes a magnifying glass to the pier and hospital project as the core features of this trajectory. The initiative to establish both structures started from below, in Gaza, and by way of the district capital in Jerusalem, before eventually garnering the backing of the Sublime Porte. Once their intra-imperial status had been defined, the port and hospital could proceed to the next stage, which involved an inter-imperial dispute between the Ottoman Empire, on one hand, and its competitors, on the other, as to the former's sovereign right to collect port taxes. As they wended their way upwards through the political hierarchy from the municipal to the global, the Gaza pier and hospital animated this dispute not merely as physical facilities, but as markers of liberal values upon which political claims were made. The pier represented economic development and free trade, the hospital represented public health and humanitarianism, and together they stood for civilization and progress. Claim-making in the name of these ideals inhabited an intriguing dynamic: In the planning phases, the economic and humanitarian rationale of the port-hospi-

Figure 1: The Gaza Pier in 1940.
tal project replaced, rather than complemented one another, with one claim retreating as the other advanced. Later, though, in their incomplete form as a ruin and construction site, the pier and the hospital, economics and humanitarianism, constituted an ideological whole. But before exploring the story of the two structures and their ideological scaffoldings as part of the history of Gaza’s short-lived port, it is worth inquiring first what exactly constituted a ‘port’ in the period in question.

**BACK TO GRAIN IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN**

Although the pier discussed here was completed in 1906, Gaza’s maritime activity in the age of steam goes back more than three decades earlier. During the 1870s, commercial trade in Gaza barley—cultivated in the city’s hinterland by semi-nomadic agriculturalists and local peasants—became established, growing to constitute the single largest share of the city’s annual income by the 1890s. The last quarter of the 19th century witnessed the efflorescence of the Eastern Mediterranean’s famous port-cities. As Gaza struggled to establish its very first port infrastructure, namely a pier, a road connecting the city center to the coast, and a customs house, such innovations were already a thing of the past elsewhere. In Jaffa, a stone quay had been built around mid-century, plans to construct breakwaters and a modern harbor were drawn up starting in the 1860s, and the harbor acquired a lighthouse in 1865. Once the Jaffa-Jerusalem rail line was laid in 1892, its extension into the water made the port’s main pier, and a new quay, 6 meters wide and 75 meters long, was built in 1898.1 Haifa, for its part, boasted a jetty for the loading and landing of lighters by the 1850s, and a deep-water harbor and breakwaters were designed by a British company in the 1890s, with German-led works starting after the city was connected to the Hijaz railway branch line in 1905 (although work was halted by the outbreak of World War I).2 In Izmir, modern facilities replaced the old, privately-owned wooden piers in 1880.3 In Beirut, work on modern harbor infrastructure started in 1890, becoming operational in the following decade.4 In Salonica, similar projects started in 1897.5

Was Gaza, with its history of Mediterranean connections since biblical times, a latecomer to this race for maritime accessibility? Here I wish to suggest that Gaza’s late start and slow development can better be explained by the way it participated in this new system of ports rather than the way it competed with them. In other words, the question is not how Gaza developed relative to its neighboring ports, but how it did so as one of them.

This perspective becomes clearer looking at the products being exported from these ports. Gaza was first and foremost an exporter of grain to Europe, specifically barley destined to the beer-brewing industry in Britain. Elsewhere, I show why this specific industry required Gaza barley.6 Here, my concern is the place of Gaza within the wider Levantine trade system relative to its neighboring ports, but how it did so as one of them.

which encouraged landowners to farm the wastelands and marshes of the coastal plains and gradually claim them as possessions. Not unrelated was the resettlement of previously malaria-stricken regions following the advent of quinine, which caused a resurgence of “King Corn,” as well as other grains as a staple export to European cities.7

For Tabak, the return to the plains and to grain crops reintegrated the Mediterranean Basin into a cohesive unit (in the Braudelian sense) after centuries of detachment, creating the false notion of time-honored Méditerranéité on the eve of the twentieth century. Roger Owen has shown convincingly that the combination of growing security in the plains of Greater Syria and the repeal of Britain’s Corn Laws led to a rise in production and export of cereals from the Levant to Europe starting in the 1840s. This process further accelerated in the final quarter of the century.8 Linda Schilcher has brilliantly demonstrated how the “dry-farming boom,” which saw the commercialization of Syria’s grain production during the 19th century, shifted the landscapes of cultivation belts around the region’s main cities and gave rise to new socio-political formations; it is this phenomenon that laid the basis for Schilcher’s analysis of the emergence of family-based factionalism in late-Ottoman Damascus.9 Focusing on the political economy of Beirut, Yaşar Eyüp Özveren has further advanced our understanding of this process, extending it to the coastal regions. Özveren suggested that following the opening of the Suez Canal, locally-produced grain gained prominence as an export product, now that silk could be obtained more easily and cheaply from India and East Asia.10 Unlike silk, however, grain was not being produced in Beirut’s immediate hinterland, and thus Beiruti merchants could not easily transport their product for export without significantly increasing its costs, leaving other coastal cities that grew grain in their vicinity to benefit. The resurgence of Tripoli as a trade hub in the last quarter of the 19th century is one example, and on the Palestinian coast Haifa obviously benefited the most from the new grain trade since it enjoyed a natural maritime harbor and geographic access to the wheat and barley of the Hawran and the northern plains of Palestine.11 It is in that capacity that Haifa required the building of a Hijaz railway branch line from Dar’a, which indeed quadrupled its grain exports after 1905,12 the year that the Gaza pier was also completed. At times, Beiruti merchants served as middlemen in sales to Europe as well as to the Ottoman state itself. As Kristen Alff has recently shown, some Beirut-based firms grew to the extent that they took full possession of the supply side by acquiring huge swaths of agricultural land in Mount Lebanon, in Marj Ibn ‘Amir (the Jezreel Valley), around the coastal plain of Jaffa, in Mount Hebron and Jenin, as well as in Adana-Mersin region in Anatolia, and around Alexandria in Egypt.13 Given this larger transformation of the region in terms of the transition to the grain trade, the development of Gaza as an exporter of barley was not much of a coincidence, but part of a broader trend.

Yet, Gaza played a specific role in the turn-to-grain economy. In the dry saline lands of the desert-facing region of Gaza, precipitation starts late and remains on average below 200 mm. annually. Unlike other species of grain, barley flourishes in such conditions, and Gaza had traditionally been a source of the grain for caravans travelling between Egypt, Syria, and the Hijaz.14 During the second half of the 19th cen-

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11 Ibid., p. 481.
tury, the Ottoman enforcement of sedentarization among nomadic populations and the flood of Egyptian peasants and semi-nomads pushed into Palestine by Ibrahim Paşa increased the cultivation of such lands considerably. By the 1870s, maritime trade had replaced traditional overland desert transport routes and Gaza had lost its role as a caravan way station. Instead, it gradually turned toward the sea to continue supplying Ottoman maritime travelers and to export the ever-increasing surpluses of barley from its hinterland to Europe. In this dual role, it followed its own path as both a desert- and sea-facing town, but it was also a player in the wider Mediterranean and Ottoman grain trade.

The combination of these two roles made Gaza the port that steamers traveling the Levantine coasts passed through to collect barley on their way to or from other ports. The economic logic was simple. Overland transportation was (and remains) much more expensive than maritime transport, making it uneconomical for Gazan farmers and merchants to sell their product beyond the confines of their own region. Their location close enough to the sea (unlike other regional breadbaskets such as the Hawran or the Beqa‘a) allowed Gazan merchants and their customers to engage in the broader grain trade with relatively little investment in land routes or coastal infrastructures. The only items that had to travel by land prior to the final purchase were the grain samples attesting to the barley's quality. As is evident from several cases in the 1890s, Beiruti concessioners traded with the Ottoman state in Gaza grains as staples of provisioning for the annual Hajj. They thus sent their ships from Beirut to load the cargo already on their way to Jedda. These ships “stopped by” or “called at” (uğra-yarak) maritime outlets such as Tyre, Acre, Haifa, and Gaza. There, small rowboats, fuluka or ma‘una in the vernacular, carried the grains from the coast to the steamers anchored safely in deeper waters. Due to the vast continental shelf that expands roughly two miles into the sea on Gaza’s coast, steamers could not enter the port for fear of running aground and being damaged. They thus were completely dependent upon local lighters.

As a result, aside from Haifa which would grow into a fully-fledged port city, sea outlets based on lighter transport, such as Gaza, Acre, and Tyre, emerged as satellite or “daughter ports” to the booming coastal cities of Beirut and Alexandria. Each of them experienced the process differently, however. For Acre, becoming a satellite port was clearly part of a historical decline, while in Gaza it was seen as the hope for a new and promising regional role. To be sure, major ports like Beirut, Alexandria, and, later, Tripoli, Haifa, and Jaffa, could also serve as calling stations for steamers on multi-destination journeys. What differentiated Gaza and other similar satellite sea outlets was that they mostly supplied seasonal products, often cultivated nearby, and that they only rarely took in imports. European manufactured products were of course sent to Gaza but they generally came in overland from Jaffa, Beirut, or elsewhere. Because they were much more lucrative, finished goods justified the relatively high cost of overland transportation whereas exports of raw materials had to go by sea. Likewise, as Johan Mathew observed in the case of the Arabian Sea, steamers were calling in at such maritime nodal points but were not coaling there. Small ports on steamer routes did not include...
coal depots, which made their overall infrastructural apparatus much simpler.\textsuperscript{21}

The resulting structural dynamic obviated the need (as well as the opportunities) for capital flow into these small ports. On the contrary, their proximity to the coast, on the one hand, and their monocultural and seasonal type of exports, on the other, made unnecessary the risky investment in roads, rail, storage facilities, and financial institutions. Although Beirut merchant dealt bought grain in Gaza as part of a wider portfolio of speculative investment throughout Greater Syria and parts of Anatolia, for Gazan merchants, the buying and selling circuits remained immediate and largely local.\textsuperscript{22} With no investment in port infrastructures needing to be made, Gazan merchants accumulated wealth but not considerable capital, and when the barley trade declined, they lost their fortunes rapidly, unlike foreign merchants who could disengage without adverse financial consequences.\textsuperscript{23}

Consequently, Gaza’s meagre port infrastructure around the turn of the century was overall neither a sign of backwardness nor of an embryonic stage of development. Rather, it testified to Gaza’s position within a system of Mediterranean ports of varying scales. This notion should be kept in mind given that Ottoman terminology for port infrastructures does not make the typology presented here particularly clear. Documents would often refer interchangeably to: \textit{liman}, a harbor site regardless of function or built infrastructures; \textit{richtm}, a quayside or dock laid horizontally along the shore; and, \textit{iskele}, a single pier extending vertically into the water. The French term \textit{échelle}, prevalent in Ottoman correspondence, provides further opportunity for terminological slippage. \textit{Les échelles} were the principal Ottoman port cities where French traders enjoyed the privilege of having stairways or ladders—literally \textit{échelles}—slung down from European ships to local boats to offload cargo and passengers. The Ottoman term \textit{iskele} comes from the same Latin origin but connotes the modest landing point of a pier, a ladder-like object lying flat on the water surface. Simple as it may be, the pier (iskele) discussed below materialized precisely to serve as an imperial position handling exports, complementing a web of principal imperial ports (\textit{échelles}). With this in mind, the next section looks at the port in Gaza from the vantage-point of the imperial center in Istanbul and then links the two perspectives.

**THE RISE OF THE PIER-HOSPITAL PROJECT THROUGH SYPHILIS AND CHOLERA**

In May 1893, the members of the Administrative Council of the Gaza sub-district (\textit{meclis-i kaza}) presented the governor of Jerusalem (\textit{Mutasarrıf}) with an ambitious development scheme. They proposed the building of a thirty-bed municipal hospital in Gaza, paving the streets, and digging a sewer system, all within the next twenty-five years. The city of Gaza and its environs had recently experienced the ravages of a syphilis epidemic owing to the absence of proper health and hygiene facilities.\textsuperscript{24} Although no historical evidence points to an exceptional spread of the disease in the Gaza region during the 1890s, it is possible that the local council sought to dramatize some occasional outbreaks in the district.\textsuperscript{25} As Seçil Yılmaz has noted, syphilis was the focus of a targeted Ottoman imperial effort to secure a body-politic of healthy, able-bodied, and moral subjects in the late 19th century. The state campaign to eliminate syphilis among men whose professions required travel—such as sailors and stevedores, soldiers, and seasonal workers—involved frequent screenings, prophylactic guidance, and the building of syphilis hospitals. The issue was especially high on the Sublime Porte’s agenda from the 1890s onwards.\textsuperscript{26} It is

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\textsuperscript{23} Linda Schilcher argues that in grain production of dry-farming conditions capital overall went for seasonal investments such as seeds and money lending dissimilar to the land-sunk infrastructures of plantations or factories. That allowed investors to easily disassociate and shift their interest between different locales at will. See Schilcher, “The Grain Economy,” p. 191.

\textsuperscript{24} BOA, ŞD., 2281/7/3, 23 Şevval 1310 (10 May 1893) (the Governor of Jerusalem to the Ministry of the Interior).

\textsuperscript{25} Some cases were indicated around Gaza in the 1890s but the main site recognized with Syphilis was Hebron. See J. Macqueen, “Syphilis Insontium in Palestine,” \textit{Sexually Transmitted Infections} 10/1 (1 January 1934), pp. 33–50.

\textsuperscript{26} Seçil Yılmaz, “Threats to Public Order and Health: Mobile Men as Syphilis Vectors in Late Ottoman Medical
also conceivable that an outbreak of syphilis was cited deliberately to further other interests, especially considering how the public health project was to be financed. The council suggested imposing a tax of 20 para on each sack of grain and 4 para on each İstanbul kile (equivalent to one European bushel) exported from Gaza. In addition, the plan outlined an additional 20% duty to be paid by each party to the transaction. To achieve this, the plan called for regulating Gaza’s export sites by building a central pier (iskele), 4 meters wide and 100 meters long, where grain merchants would load their cargo and be required to pay a pier due, termed accordingly iskele ücreti.28

This pier, the council argued, would ease the handling of the cargo and avert such frequent mishaps as sacks of grain falling into the water while being loaded onto lighters. A good pier would also allow mail service vessels traveling between Jaffa and Port Said to “stop by” ( uğraya çıkmak) and serve Gaza. Finally, a functioning pier would stimulate development and settlement of the adjoining 100,000 dunams of currently uninhabited coastal sand dunes. The planners estimated that an annual export of 200,000 bushels of grain would yield sufficient tax revenue to build the pier within three years, pave the streets and establish a sewer system in the following five years, and complete the hospital in the remaining seventeen years of the plan.30 The plan suggests considerable ambition on the part of the Gaza sub-district council. The only other Ottoman municipal hospital in the district was in Jerusalem, the capital, a forty-bed facility built only few years earlier, in 1891.31 In Gaza, the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) had been providing basic medical treatment since 1882, with a British doctor joining the local team in 1886 and an in-patient clinic and a dispensary added in 1890.32 Establishing a municipal hospital was thus not a foregone conclusion and the governor of Jerusalem had to endorse the coupling of the Gaza grain trade with a public health project. “The meager income of this municipality, and the poverty of the majority of the population,” he wrote to the Sublime Porte, “would make it impossible to expect their individual contribution” to fight the spread of the “terrifying disease [îillet-i midihsel]” that was syphilis.33

Referencing the Gaza municipality was cardinal. The plan called for the Gaza Municipal Council (meclis-i belediye) to oversee both the actual collection of the tax and the bookkeeping associated with it and, most importantly, the allocation of the revenues. The sub-district council recused itself from access to the money, except in exceptional cases which it would have to justify in advance. The overall development project, including the anticipated port, was perceived as a municipal project. The year the project was first presented was also the year of the official establishment of the Gaza Municipal Council. This conjunction of events was likely not coincidental. Yuval Ben-Bassat and Johann Buessow have suggested that municipal tasks in Gaza and other cities had been handled informally several years prior to the municipality’s official founding in 1893.35 It is thus safe to assume that leading local notables were involved in the plan long before its formal unveiling. By 1893, the plan, with the newly announced municipality’s role embedded in it, was ready to be submitted to the district governorship in Jerusalem. Gaza’s urban elites could consolidate their economic and political clout


27 BOA, ŞD., 2281/7/16, 23 Şevval 1310 (10 May 1893) (a copy of the thirteen-point plan sent from Gaza to Jerusalem), articles 1, 5. 28 *Ibid.*, article 8.


33 BOA, ŞD., 2281/7/3, 23 Şevval 1310 (10 May 1893) (the Governor of Jerusalem to the Ministry of the Interior).


via the international grain trade, the sub-district council, and the municipal council and it is thus no wonder that they saw an interest in linking all three under one proposal. The swift rise of the Shawwa merchant family to prominence at the expense of the more traditionally rooted kadas and ashraf of the Husayni family, as presented by Ben-Bassat and Buessow, demonstrates this dynamic very well. Starting in the late 1890s, the Shawwas controlled Gaza’s municipal offices while increasing their share in the grain trade.36

Following a series of inquiries by the Ministry of the Interior, the Gaza sub-district council was asked to fine-tune its financial plan for the hospital. The council was required to specify the projected cost of the different wards and the types of patient rooms, kitchens, and laundry rooms planned, and to provide an estimate of staff salaries, food, and the overall maintenance of the building.37 The proposal was discussed once more at the State Council (Şura-yi Devlet) level and was eventually rejected. The State Council remarked that based on current financial prospects, there would be no way of ensuring the upkeep of the hospital once it was built. With no other sources of income, “such projects do not last for long (payidar olmama-şi),” the council argued suggesting to find another means to treat the syphilitic inhabitants of the Gaza region.38

From its inception to its elimination from the imperial agenda, this project illustrates the striking convergence of spatial scales on which the Empire operated. The syphilis epidemic was certainly not only a local but also an imperial concern, and Gaza’s involvement in the barley trade was informed by global economic trends. Nevertheless, both these elements were intimately tied to local affairs in Gaza. In other words, if hospitals and public health were hallmarks of imperial modernity across Ottoman domains, why would the local Gazan export sector have to bear the burden of such endeavors rather than the state’s financial instruments? And, if maritime trade was an imperial asset, why should its facilitation and taxation be justified on the basis of public utilities such as a local hospital? Theoretically, it would be in the Empire’s interest to strengthen its export sector, to collect more taxes, and to fight the venereal diseases that were undermining the imperial body politic.

Certainly, a little more than a decade after the Ottoman default of 1875 and under the watchful eye of the Public Debt Administration, any costly initiative had to earmark, if not imaginatively come up with, a well-defined source of income. For local governors and communities interested in making improvements at the provincial level, such practices of ad hoc financing were commonplace.39 But, the parties involved in this case also thought of local-global relations in different terms. By raising the question of public health, an imperial issue par excellence, Gaza’s elite class tried to align the state with its own financial interests through a local port that would generate the tax revenues needed for the hospital project. They looked to instrumentalizing a global trend, grain exports from Gaza, to solve what they perceived as a local problem—the syphilis epidemic. But the state was not so easily convinced that Gazan trade was going global or that the syphilis threat was acute enough to warrant being managed on any other level but the local one. In imperial eyes, Gaza was not developing into a port and epidemics required higher-grade responses than could be provided at the sub-provincial level.40 Given these diverging perspectives, the Gaza plan was shelved for the rest of the 1890s.

The state soon reversed itself, however. Barley exports witnessed a steep rise in the remaining years of the decade: when the plan

36 Ibid., pp. 636–637.
37 BOA, ŞD., 2281/7/5, 31 Temmuz 1309 (August 12, 1893) (the District Governor of Gaza to the Governor of Jerusalem).
38 BOA, DH. MKT., 59/36/3/1, 15 Kanun-ı Evvel 1309 (27 December 1893) (State Council decision).
39 In the Jerusalem Municipality, for instance, dues on traffic and commodities made an essential part of the overall budget, including for the upkeep of the city’s municipal hospital. Buessow, “Ottoman Reform and Urban Government,” p. 125.
40 For the role of provincial councils in administering issues of public health, see Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, “Communicable Disease in Ottoman Palestine: Local Thoughts and Actions,” Korot 21 (2011/12), pp. 43–45 [in Hebrew]. The Ottoman state’s efforts to eliminate syphilis from the region of Kastamonu, only several years after the period discussed here, testify to the vast medical and structural means required. See Ebru Boyar, “An Inconsequential Boil or a Terrible Disease? Social Perceptions of and State Responses to Syphilis in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Turkish Historical Review 2/2 (2011), pp. 101–124.
was first proposed, in 1893, Gaza exported around 15,000 tons of barley, but by the second half of the 1890s this quantity had more than doubled to 40,000 tons in 1897, stabilizing at 30,000 in 1898 and 1899. In 1900, the agent for the Prince Line shipping company in Jaffa estimated that Britain imported £120,000 worth of barley from Gaza annually, and thus recommended appointing an official consular agent in the town. During the same period, Gaza was also provisioning the Vilayet of Jeddah for the Hajj pilgrimage via Beirut merchants. In 1901, the governor of Jerusalem estimated that Gaza was exporting 1–2 million kile of barley per year, the equivalent of 21,000–42,000 tons, a figure that was supported by British consular reports from Jerusalem.

It was this discernable increase in barley exports that prompted the revival of the shelved port-hospital plan around 1900. An initial appeal from the Governor of Jerusalem to the Sublime Porte again bemoaned the loss of cargo due to inadequate facilities incurred both while transporting grain from Gaza's hinterland to the coast and when loading cargo onto lighters. A paved road and a proper pier, he suggested, would improve Gaza’s ability to compete with other suppliers of grains to Europe. In response, the Ministry of the Interior gave the green light to examine the question anew and the Department of Public Works prepared plans for two possible types of pier. Another round of consultations concluded that the more expensive of the two, a wood and metal structure, estimated to cost 220,000 kuruş should be built. To raise the money required, the ministries involved decided in July 1901 to auction plots of state-owned land on the coast of Gaza. The Ministry of the Interior expected that there would be great demand for the sand dunes in question and that their value would skyrocket once the plans for the port were published.

Prominently absent from discussion, however, was the original impetus for the whole project, namely the municipal hospital and the larger public health project. The plan as revived in the early 1900s was solely concerned with making Gaza more conducive to international trade. Moreover, whereas the projected pier had been described as covering its costs in the previous iteration of the plan, its construction was now to be funded by the selling of coastal lands. The grain trade had turned out to be surprisingly profitable during the 1890s, and as the lure of developing a maritime outlet was taking hold in imperial calculations, its presumed contribution to public health concerns no longer seemed relevant. Not for long, however.

In the fall of 1902, the worst cholera epidemic in the history of modern Palestine struck Gaza, with one historian estimating that some 3,000 people succumbed to the disease. The Ottoman authorities determined that Gaza was the source of the epidemic within Greater Syria.

42 The National Archives (United Kingdom) (TNA), FO 195/2084, 25 September 1900 (M. Beiruti to the British Consul in Jerusalem).
44 BOA, DH, MKT, 2507/115/1/1, 25 Haziran 1317 (8 July 1901) (the Ministry of the Interior to the Grand Vizier).
45 Ibid.
46 BOA, Î. BH., 5/9/3/1, 28 Zilhace 1319 (7 April 1902) (the Grand Vizier to the Ministry of the Navy).
47 BOA, DH, MKT, 500/29/2/2, 27 Teşrin-i Sani 1318 (19 November 1902) (the Ministry of the Interior to the Grand Vizier); DH, MKT, 500/29/3/1, 6 Zilhicce 1320 (5 March 1903) (State Council Financial Section to the Ministry of the Interior).
48 Dan Barel, Ruha ra’a: Magefot ha-kolera ve-hitpathut ha-refu’a be-Erets-Yisraʾel be-shalhe ha-tqufa ha-ʿothmanit [An Ill Wind: Cholera Epidemics and Medical Development in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period] (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2010), p. 83 [in Hebrew].
and the town was thus virtually quarantined.49 The effect on the port planning was twofold. First, the grave necessity for medical facilities in the town resurfaced. While syphilis—a slow-spreading disease requiring long-term, geographically expansive treatment, along with high standards of hygiene and restricted sexual conduct—had not been a sufficient trigger to build a local hospital, the cholera epidemic, decimating thousands in several weeks, proved the opposite. Gaza became Palestine’s “patient zero,” the southernmost point of the Ottoman province from which the epidemic presumably started to spread. This notion invigorated the logic of “localizing” the disease for targeted treatment since the outbreak of the next cholera epidemic would have to be halted by local forces in situ. This in turn rekindled the idea that Gazan revenues, and particularly port-related taxes, should finance a local hospital since it was to some extent Gaza’s responsibility as the cholera gateway to prevent the deadly disease from spreading.

The secondary effect of the cholera outbreak, however, undermined the first. Because of the quarantine imposed on the town, exports that year went into free-fall with a mere 2,940 tons of barley estimated to have been shipped out.50 Worse yet, the quarantine order interfered with the sowing of barley, usually carried out in the autumn before the first winter rains, which in turn resulted in unusually low yields in 1903.51 The prospect of development in Gaza was yet again in the balance. Discussions about the port project abated for another two years.

In March-May 1905, the State Council and a subsidiary “special committee” approved the final plan for the port. In order to start construction on the pier and pave a road to it, the municipality of Gaza was instructed to take out a loan of 2,000 Turkish pounds. According to this plan, once the pier was completed, local authorities could start collecting duty from merchants, which in turn would cover interest on the loan, the pier’s maintenance costs, and finally the building of the long-awaited hospital. Parceling and auctioning the sand dunes would be put off to a later phase in order for their price to appreciate after the new infrastructure was built.52 This iteration of the plan once again incorporated the hospital and tax collection into the same scheme. An addendum to the State Council’s approval specified which import and export items would henceforth be taxed. They included cereals, oranges, rice, sugar, luggage, liquids, finished goods, domestic animals, pack animals, cattle, as well as passengers.53 By July 13, the governor of Jerusalem had received the plan as an official Trade from the Grand Vizier, and on August 7, it was published in the District of Jerusalem’s official gazette, Kudüs-i Şerif.54 For the foreign merchants dealing in Gaza barley, what stood out was of course the price of the grain, which had now become 2 para more costly per bushel.55

SCALING UP THE IMPERIAL CLAIM: TRADE AND HUMANITARIANISM AS IMPERIAL LEGITIMATORS

The Ottoman authorities in Gaza did not wait for the official gazette’s publication. They had started collecting the barley tax a few days earlier. The end of the summer was precisely the time when the supply of European barley started to dwindle and the demand for eastern Mediterranean varieties surged. The effect of the new tax was felt immediately. Bewildered merchants telegraphed the British Consulate in Jerusalem to complain, and ships docking in Beirut were uncertain as to whether to continue their journey to Gaza, given that the new price changed their preexisting contracts with local suppliers. The British and Italian consuls in Jerusalem, representing their subject mer-
chants, demanded that the Ottoman governor suspend the duty immediately even though he could not reverse an imperial order without being instructed to do so.56

Matters soon escalated to involve the higher echelons of imperial diplomacy. In November 1905, the Istanbul embassies of Italy, Greece, Austro-Hungary, Russia, Belgium, France, and Britain staged an orchestrated protest by sending a series of dispatches to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. All contained the exact same text, written in French, demanding a suspension of the “surtax” until the conditions for its collection were clarified between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. They demanded, first, that the tax be levied on both foreign and Ottoman subjects; second, that the levy be limited in its objectives; and, finally, that the Ottoman government supply sufficient guarantees for the feasibility of the pier project.57 What could these guarantees be? In an update to his superior, the British Consul in Jerusalem suggested that the Jerusalem Governor would contract a foreign firm, or at least foreign engineers working for Ottoman companies, to construct the pier and the hospital.

The Sublime Porte was uninterested in such minute details. In response to these claims, the Grand Vizier made it clear that the essential point of the project was to facilitate trade for all, foreigners and Ottomans alike. The Porte rejected the claim that the tax discriminated against foreign subjects and underlined that Ottoman subjects paid dues on imported goods. In addition, the Grand Vizier stressed that by easing the transfer of cargo through the pier, all would be equally able to trade in Gaza, without economic or logistical “impediments and problems.” This rationale of free trade on a small scale justified enacting the levy without previous notice, he added.58 Absent from this rationale was, once again, the hospital. All that the Grand Vizier saw reasonable to harness here was the mutual economic gain expected from the project. Note that the same method applied here was the one Gaza used to try to convince Istanbul to embark on the project in the first place. Once more, in a time of export prosperity, only the facilitation of trade was mobilized to justify building the pier and levy the tax.

By the time the Grand Vizier’s reply arrived, the barley-trade season was over, and the issue became moot. Only twelve ships, a relatively small number, called at the port of Gaza during the subsequent 1906 season, which diminished the protests over the tax. Nevertheless, these ships transported some £180,000 worth of barley back to Europe.

The building of the pier was completed by December 1906.59 Extending 60 meters long and 8 meters wide, it was smaller than had originally been proposed in the 1893 plan. But the reduction in its size was of lesser importance than the larger climatic conditions that prevailed on Gaza’s littoral. Without a breakwater, the waves approaching from the southwest did not allow boaters to float steadily alongside the pier without crashing their lighters into its pillars. As early as the next barley trade season in 1907, the British Consul of Jerusalem observed Gazan stevedores hauling the lighters onto the beach, loading the sacks of barley, and then launching the boats back into the water using built slipways while the newly-built pier stood idle. The pier’s contribution to improving trade was thus more questionable than ever.60

In addition, 1907 saw a particularly bad harvest that endangered the very subsistence of the poorer segments of the population, prompting the Ottoman authorities to curtail grain exports from Gaza and elsewhere.61 By that point, however, the cost of building the pier had still not been fully covered. To close the remaining gap in the budget, the authorities increased the tax from 2 to 5 para on each kile of barley. Besides the fact that the pier had brought no improvement to trade conditions, this increase in

56 Ibid; Italian merchant Alfonso Hussan [sic], for instance, had a sales contract for buying some 150,000 bushels of Gaza barley, now taxable at 300,000 para, the equivalent of 7,500 kurus or some £48. BOA, HR. İD., 269/52/13/1, 6 Eylül 1321 (19 September 1905) (a copy of an appeal from the Italian Consulate to the Ottoman Governor of Jerusalem).
57 BOA, HR. İD., 269/52, November 1905 (Foreign Consulates to the Foreign Ministry).
58 BOA, HR. İD., 269/52/9/1, 18 Kanuni Sani 1321 (31 January 1906) (the Grand Vizier to the Foreign Ministry).
60 TNA: FO 95/2255, 24 December 1907 (British Consul in Jerusalem E. C. Blech to British Consul in Istanbul N.R O’Connor).
the tax rate once again jeopardized preexisting contracts with British importers. And despite the appeals of the British Consul in Jerusalem, the tax remained at 5 para in the years that followed, even after the harvests recovered. The British Consulate continued to monitor tax revenues from the pier and noted that its cost should have been fully recovered by the winter of 1908. To the chagrin of the British, however, the tax remained in place as they continued to purchase Gaza barley the following year. By the end of 1909, Italian merchants who loaded wheat from Gaza’s coast also engaged in protest, invoking yet again the fact that the tax had contributed nothing to the dilapidated pier, and that in any case its construction had been completed long ago.62

Foreign Ministry correspondence points to a pattern that accorded with the seasonal rhythm of the barley trade. This diplomatic seasonality allowed the Governor of Jerusalem and the Foreign Ministry to easily dismiss the complaints directed by foreign merchants. The first protests usually arose when the prospective harvest was evaluated at the end of winter and the beginning of spring. This was the time that future contracts with foreign merchants were signed on the basis of the anticipated quantity and quality of the grain, and when investments in seed for future seasons was considered. Then came a period of diplomatic dormant when grain was being harvested and stored. Claims surfaced once more in late summer when the merchant ships arrived to finally collect their cargo often without knowing whether their complaints from a few months earlier had had any effect. Bound to their contracts, they would have no choice but to pay the pier duty, which they did, and the issue was once again shelved until the following season.63 In the context of this dynamic, the Ottoman side did not have to do much to justify its right to levy the tax. In response to the Italian Consul’s claims, for instance, one Ottoman Foreign Ministry official stated that as of 1905 no other consulate had expressed any dissatisfaction with the tax, and therefore surely some “understanding can be reached.”64 Eventually, until the issue arose again, both sides preferred not to quarrel over a few tons of grain.

But in the summer of 1910 an exceptional event upset this pattern. A British steamer coming from Beirut called at Gaza to unload building materials. This event was rare both because, as mentioned, Gaza was rarely an import node, and since the cargo was not of commercial quality. It was destined to the CMS station in Gaza for the construction of an outpatient bloc (see Figure 2) within the new missionary hospital that had been constructed between 1904 and 1908.65 The tax collector at the Gaza pier seized the materials until the head of the Gaza mission, Dr. Robert Sterling, arrived to settle the amount due. The British Consul in Jerusalem protested to the Ottoman governor and the dispute quickly reached Istanbul.66 Since the barley trade had not yet resumed that season, the British Consul was surprised that the tax still applied despite the deliberations of previous years. When the Gaza kaymakam was asked to explain, he replied that reservations had indeed been voiced but had never resulted in new instructions. The tax is needed, he wrote to Jerusalem, for the building of a municipal hospital in Gaza.67 In a more detailed reply, also used by the Foreign Ministry, the governor of Jerusalem elaborated on the moral dimensions of the project: “The need for such charitable institutions (mu’assasat-i hayriye) which serve human life, cannot be exaggerated,” he wrote. Foreign merchants were expected to take part in this endeavor “out of humane considerations” (insaniyetkarımdan) the same way that the Ottoman state, for its part, exempted foreign charitable institutions from duties. It was only local municipalities

62 National Library of Israel (NLI), ARC 4* 1513, December 1909 (Table of Import and Export from Gaza 1906–1909); BOA, BEO., 3657/274204/2/1, 12 Térsir-i Ewvel 1325 (27 October 1909) (the Foreign Ministry to the Grand Vizirate); BOA, HR. ID., 269/52/17/1, 3 Şušat 1325 (5 February 1910) (the Italian Consulate in Istanbul to the Foreign Ministry).

63 For the seasonal rhythm of barley trade, see BOA, DH. ID., 40/2/17/10, 17 Temmuz 1329 (30 July 1913) (the Governor of Jerusalem to the Ministry of the Interior).

64 BOA, HR.ID., 269/54/4/1, 18 Şewel 1327 (2 November 1909) (the Grand Vizier to the Foreign Ministry).

65 TNA, FO 195/2351, 2 August 1910 (the British Consul in Jerusalem to the British Consul in Istanbul).

66 BOA, HR. ID., 269/52/19/1, 21 Temmuz 1326 (10 August 1910) (the Foreign Ministry to the Governor of Jerusalem); H. Sykes, “New Accommodation for Out-Patients in Gaza,” Mercy and Truth 174 (June 1911), p. 185.

67 BOA, HR. ID., 269/52/19/1, 21 Temmuz 1326 (10 August 1910) (the Foreign Office to the Governor of Jerusalem).
that levied partial taxes from such bodies for local needs. The hospital project, he argued, was the goal of this "local" tax from its inception and it was now under way since the foundations has recently been laid at Tall al-Sakan inside the city boundaries.68

The British could not accept this argument, and with good reason. Probing into the earlier deliberations, they flagged the Ottoman response to their very initial protest against the tax going back to 1906. Indeed, no mention had been made of the hospital then or afterwards. As remembered, it was only the pier, and the commercial benefits that derived from it, that were mentioned. The last time that the hospital had been brought up in name was in the original İrade dated 1905, which the foreign consuls never agreed to and probably also disregarded. Moreover, the British Consul asked what good would come of the municipal hospital given that a missionary hospital was being built in the town anyhow.69 "Though a hospital is a benevolent institution deserving sympathy and support," he wrote to the Sublime Port, "the levying of pier dues for its construction has no precedent and is contrary to established principles."70

The clash between the two prospective medical facilities as mediated by this tax duty exposed the obvious competition between the Ottoman state and missionary societies in the realm of health. But more pointedly, by forcing the British to participate in the moralist discourse around the founding of hospitals, it exposed the prevalent dynamic in the Gaza port project writ large. This becomes clearer when juxtaposed with the start of the barley trade season. The year 1910 was one of the worst harvests of recent decades, when not a single bushel of barley was exported.71 The pier had proved to be of little use long before then, but the rationale for the hospital was only invoked when the barley trade failed. The very same dynamic was at work when the Municipal Council of Gaza tried to persuade the Sublime Porte to endorse the pier duty and the port plan at the outset, in 1893. The initial impetus for the plan was the provision of health facilities, but the State Council only approved the project because of the anticipated profitable harvest and the promise of economic gain. It was the cholera epidemic of 1902, and the decline in trade that followed, which revived the hospital as a worthy cause. In other words, the Ottoman state internalized the methods of the province and applied them to its own negotiations with rival imperial powers, emphasizing free trade in times of abundance, and the health services in times of scarcity.

The year 1910 indeed heralded a period of scarcity that was to last until World War I. In total, 8,000 tons of barley were exported in 1911, 7,928 in 1912, 18,437 in 1913, and only 4,000 in 1914.72 Although better than nothing, these amounts were a far cry from the export levels of 30,000 and 40,000 tons in earlier years. Likewise, as the supply of grain steadily decreased, the price also went down, and a bushel of bar-

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68 BOA, HR. İD., 269/52/21/1, 16 Şaban 1328 (23 August 1910) (the Governor of Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry); BOA, HR. İD., 269/55/2, 30 September 1910 (a Note Verbal to the British Embassy in Istanbul).
69 TNA, FO 195/2351, 11 September 1910 (the British Consul in Jerusalem to the British Consul General in Istanbul).
70 BOA, HR. İD., 269/55/4/1, 30 September 1910 (Note Verbal no. 105).
ley was now sold for 2–3 shillings, compared to 10 and even 20 shillings previously. The cumulative effect was a sizeable outmigration of tribesmen and urbanites from the Gaza region and general disquiet among barley traders abroad who wondered whether Gaza could remain a supplier for long.73 In April 1911, the British Consul in Jerusalem had to stress to his superior in Istanbul that despite the bad harvest, the British Consular Agent in Gaza should be maintained.74

In an era of scarce revenues, the Ottomans used the hospital as the essential rationale for the tax, no longer a mere vision but now already a physical object, a construction site. For the British however, the hospital’s structure more than anything else resembled its failed counterpart—the ruined pier. The conclusion of this affair would involve the entanglement of the ruin with the construction site, exposing the extent to which these were mirror images of each other.

GAZA’S EPHEMERAL MODERNITY: NOT YET, BUT NO LONGER

The Gaza Municipality started to build the long-awaited hospital in 1911. While thus far only connected to the pier in a financial arrangement, henceforth the two structures came to reflect one another physically as well. The pier was a decaying wreck slowly being devoured by the waves while the hospital was a building in the making. Both were half-structures, one of which was a slowly disintegrating ruin eroded by the forces of nature, and the other was an unhurriedly rising construction site erected by the endeavors of men. Or was it the opposite?

In March 1911, the British Consul in Jerusalem went to Gaza to visit his consular agent. He reported that a significant part of the pier was already gone and that what was left of it lay submerged. Within the city, work had started on the hospital site. The basement was built but subsequent work had stopped because of a lack of funds. “I doubt whether the building ever will be finished,” he noted; consequently, “there is not the slightest justification for levying the dues,” which were now said to have been increased, he added.75 In a further effort to reject the tax, in October he ordered his agent to reconstruct the annual income garnered from the tax since 1906 and to examine what share of it had indeed financed the hospital. The consul suspected that the “notoriously corrupt” mayor of Gaza, Saʿid Efendi al-Shawwa, was skimming off much of the revenues and that the Ottoman financial plan was thus structurally flawed. The pier, the British argued in October 1911, is “in ruins and already beyond repair,” and the hospital, currently still in a “most embryonic state,” would never benefit British subjects given that a state-of-the-art British missionary hospital already existed in the town.76 Indeed, in February of that year the new and lavish outpatient section of the CMS hospital had been inaugurated in a public ceremony.77 A subsequent official appeal by the British Consul in 1913 claimed that only twenty of the original pier’s sixty meters remained intact and that work on the hospital had long ago ceased.78 An editorial in Filastin from August 1912 corroborated this account. The editor, ʿIsa al-ʿIsa, who arrived in Gaza on board a Prince Line steamer that was collecting barley en route to Britain, noticed that with only some thirty meters remaining, the pier was reminiscent of the “skeleton of a giant beast.” The hospital in-the-making was described in more favorable terms, save for its insalubrious location adjacent to the town’s cemetery. Of beasts or human beings, both the port and the hospital evoked in ’Isa the specter of decaying corpses.79 By late 1913, the operation of the modern CMS hospital had long become routine.80

But the Ottoman logic for Gaza’s progress followed a different trajectory. From the kaymakam of Gaza all the way to the Sublime Porte, Ottoman officials saw the pier duty ar-

73 TNA. FO 195/2452, 14 March 1913 (Dissatisfaction among Bedouins in the Beer Sheba Region).
74 TNA. FO 195/2377, 26 April 1911 (Desirability of the Existence of a Consular Agency in Gaza).
75 TNA. FO 195/2377, 21 March 1911 (Visit to Gaza).
76 TNA. FO 195/2377, 23 October 1911 (Pier-Dues at Gaza); BOA, HR. ID., 269/58/1 (Note Verbal 123).
77 Sykes, 186–7.
78 BOA, HR. ID., 269/59/1, 26 April 1913 (Note Verbal no. 62).
79 “Ghazza [Gaza],” Filastin, 31 August 1912, p. 1 [in Arabic].
80 “C.M.S Medical Missions: Gaza, Palestine.”
rangement as having no expiration date precisely because the costs of future maintenance and repair were embedded in it. As with other locations across the Empire, the Grand Vizier replied to the British complaints, only a steady stream of income in the form of ışcret, and not onetime funding, could ensure the functioning of public utilities.\(^81\) Such a conceptualization can be likened to the traditional form of vakıf, pious endowment. Responding to the British consulates on their own terms, the Ottomans accentuated their liberal vision of egalitarian and repair were embedded in it. As with other Ottoman economic inferiority, the capitulatory regime, and the reign of the Public Debt Administration, it was in this provincial Ottoman port, with its wavering grain supply, that the Empire had the upper hand. The seasonality of the trade and its relative marginality undermined effective British objection. The discussion revolving around the pier-hospital question exposed the undercurrents of this power struggle. The British vocabulary stressing the missionary hospital’s scientific and technological superiority, the alleged corruption of Ottoman officials, and dilapidated Ottoman facilities expanded on the central notion of things being “beyond repair.” In British eyes, the wrecked pier and half-built municipal hospital of Gaza were an indication of the backward, corrupt, and inviable nature of Ottoman development projects mirroring the state of the Ottoman Empire itself as a political and economic ruin beyond repair.

For the Ottomans, however, the pier was not necessarily a ruin, falling one-directionally into oblivion, but more of a work in progress, like the hospital. Could the pier have been repaired with no breakwater, after it lost most of its length? That is the wrong question to ask, the Ottoman governor would argue. The pier, once established, was more than its physicality. It was an imperial foothold in this province on the path to regulating an ever-growing web of imperial connections—between the grain-producing hinterland and the seashore, between urban merchants and the peasantry, and most importantly, for nodes of trade like Gaza, connections to the larger cluster of sea outlets within the orbit of Beirut and Alexandria. Even if dysfunctional, it was the basis for a development process which could only expand over time. Both the pier and the hospital, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry argued, were not forgotten even if they seemed abandoned, since they were part of a system of ports that could be harnessed in the name of free trade to ameliorate public health along its nodal points.\(^85\)

Where does this place our understanding

\(^81\) BOA, HR. İD., 269/57/1, 16 Haziran 1327 (29 June 1911) (the Grand Vizier to the Foreign Ministry); HR. İD., 269/55/6, 26 July 1911 (Note Verbal 56).

\(^82\) BOA, HR. İD., 269/58/5, 2 Kanun-ı Sani 1327 (15 January 1912) (the Grand Vizier to the Foreign Ministry); HR. İD., 269/58/6, 31 January 1912 (Note Verbal 9).

\(^83\) BOA, HR. İD., 269/59/7, 30 August 1913 (Note Verbal 62).

\(^84\) This is contrary to Keith Watenpaugh’s recent argument that the turn from “early” to “modern” humanitarianism in European thought occurred only during World War I and interwar periods. See Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism (California: University of California Press, 2015), pp. 4–6.

\(^85\) BOA, HR. İD., 269/59/7, 30 August 1913 (Note Verbal 62).
of the Gaza pier-hospital project? The historical reality does not rest, as the cliché might have it, “somewhere in the middle” between the two opposing visions of the Ottomans and the British. It does fall however in the fragile and certainly uncanny space where the *times* of construction site and ruin overlap. Gaza’s experience of modernity on the fringes of the Empire was one of perpetual promise—of future economic development, public health, and civilization—in the form of a towering construction site, while at the same time, the fulfillment of this promise seemed to have already taken place without anyone noticing, leaving behind its dreary aftermath in the form of ruins. The pier had not yet been fully constructed when it was already a wreck, and while the hospital was under construction, its progress appeared to go backwards in time towards a state of disintegration.

The turn from construction to ruin was thus not a chronological one passing through a stage of completeness but rather a sublimation-like passage transitioning between distinct physical phases. As we have seen, it is exactly the nonlinear capacity of the ruin to be thought of as a construction site, and vice versa, that illustrates the entanglement between the two. Hanna Arendt termed the intellectual void following World War I in Europe, when one modernity ceased to exist and the new one could not yet be articulated, as a “historical no-man's land” between the “no longer and the not yet.” She marked an empty space, bordered by the bygone as a starting-point, and the appearance of its replacement as the end-point. Relying on the Aristotelian notion of temporality, she articulated the idea of time itself through her meditation of Western modernity. It is ultimately the *now*, the *present*, which is sealed between a distinct past and some prospective future. And this *now*, where the past is erased in order to be inscribed upon, marks the natural path from ruin to construction, from antiquity to modernity.

However, for our non-European case here, these two markers ought to be reversed. The modern *now* of Gaza was not squeezed into the space between the no longer (past) and not yet (future), but vice versa. It existed in the precarious overlay of being not yet, and at the same time no longer, modern. Chakrabarty’s epistemology of colonial modernity, the famous “waiting room of history” here turns out to be at the same time modernity’s recovery room, where modern construction sites are always already their own ruins. Modernity itself emerged in Gaza on the imperial periphery, as ephemeral as a blink, flickering its certainties and discontents at the same time.

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What is a ‘Local’ Source? Cross-Checking Ottoman and British Correspondence on an Urban Society

Historians of the Middle East, and of Palestine in particular, are often accused of relying too much on European sources (travelogues, consular correspondence, news reports) rather than using original Arab and Ottoman archival documents. Sources have become more readily available in the last two decades as a result of easier access to archives and digitization projects. Thus, working with primary Middle Eastern sources is now considered crucial for historical accuracy and a truthful representation of local agency. Local court records, diaries, newspapers, and family collections are invaluable materials for a genuine understanding of Middle Eastern realities and are now being studied (or sought after) intensely.

However, not all locations in the Ottoman Empire produced or engaged with such local sources. Peripheral districts and towns, where literacy was rare, have left scant paper trails for future historians to discover. In such cases, the prime collections for tracing whatever exists is the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul. Whether in tax records or administrative exchanges, details are likely to emerge in this ocean of documentation.

In fact it is rare not to find something of value in the BOA, even for the most obscure topics. However, while useful and rich, it should be recalled that the imperial archive is hardly a “local” source. In terms of their form, organization and content, the BOA documents first and foremost reflect the viewpoint and concerns of the imperial center. Even if originally composed in Gaza, Jaffa, or Jerusalem, the documents found in the BOA collections were drafted, worded, contextualized, categorized, and ultimately archived for and within an imperial logic that viewed the local case within a vast network of needs and interests. Ironically, at times certain European consular reports written by figures who were well-rooted in Ottoman society, represent the local spirit as much as a BOA dossier, although the former was foreign and the latter supposedly local. Their detachment from the larger imperial context can contribute to making foreign depictions reflective of local realities.

This article employs both types of sources by juxtaposing Ottoman correspondence between Gaza, Jerusalem and Istanbul preserved in the BOA with British sources discussing these same places mostly from the British National Archives. By making use of both source bases, the story takes into account a broad spectrum of interests and realities from the sub-district, through the province, to the imperial center, and all the way to the international arena. These circles are seldom concentric, but intersect, overlap and complement one another. It would have been impossible to reconstruct the amounts and revenues from Gaza’s annual export market, for instance, without the testimony of the local British consular agent Knesevich. Similarly, the broader implications of this trade on the development plans of Gaza could only have been found in the BOA. While representing British interests, Knesevich was not British, but rather a merchant of Austrian nationality residing in Gaza. Although technically foreign, his accounts genuinely reflect Gaza’s economic and social conditions. At the same time, while the imperial center discussed tax issues and urban plans for Gaza at length, much of the local information was motivated by inter-imperial political quarrels. Together, therefore, the documents of both types help create a more complete picture that is better attuned to the local and global lenses.
“WHAT DID THE OTTOMANS EVER DO FOR US?”
MODERN MEDICINE AND ADMINISTRATION
IN LATE OTTOMAN JERUSALEM

Yoni Furas*

Abstract | The contribution of the late Ottoman Empire to the development of Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular has received ample historiographic attention. While earlier studies have highlighted the absence of the Ottoman state in the development of Jerusalem, later works have underlined the state’s agency in developing and modernizing the city. Paraphrasing the famous scene from Monty Python’s Life of Brian (1979), this chapter asks, “What did the Ottomans ever do for us?” (“us” the Jerusalemites), by focusing on the expansion of modern medicine in late Ottoman Jerusalem. The chapter examines this field through five prisms: the city’s reaction to and engagement with cholera, the modern medical discourse in the local Hebrew and Arabic press, the training of local physicians, the establishment and role of the Municipal Hospital, and the sectarian division in the field of health care. This analysis demarcates the diversity of local and foreign actors and delineates the Empire as one actor amongst many, acknowledging its space and agency while remaining critical of its limited or contested purview.

INTRODUCTION

“We discussed with the honorable engineer [...] the issue of dust that rises to the sky bearing different kinds of microbes into the lungs of the people and [into] their eyes [...] and asked the honorable [engineer] of the best way to get rid of this malaise that’s afflicting our Jerusalem.”

The problems with dust presented here were reported in the Jerusalem newspaper al-Quds in 1908. They could only appear after a report filled with words of praise for the efforts of the mutasarrif (governor), mayor, engineers, and Ottoman parliament representatives, to solve Jerusalem’s water shortage. On a later issue, al-Quds narrated an imagined Jerusalemite dialogue between a man with a splinted hand and leg and his friend. The latter asked the former about his wounds, and he replied that he had been run down twice at Bab al-Khalil (Jaffa Gate), first by a carriage and then by a donkey. The friend advised him to use a hot air balloon when strolling in the streets of Jerusalem.2

Around the same period, al-Quds also reported, according to a research conducted by English doctors, the height of women was rapidly increasing and in a hundred years’ time they would only be able to speak to men by bowing their heads.3

Jerusalem’s severe shortage of water and problems with dust were not solved until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when women in Jerusalem and the rest of the world had failed to become taller as the study suggested. Yet the three anecdotes are telling: public space and

* I am greatly indebted to my dear colleagues Professor Liat Kozma from the Hebrew University for introducing, transliterating, and translating the French archival documents that appear here and Dr. Dotan Halevi from Van Leer Institute for translating the Ottoman documents.

1 al-Quds, 30 October 1908.

2 Ibid., 25 February 1910.

3 Ibid., 25 September 1908.
medical knowledge were becoming everyone's concern, while neglect or failing to organize and carry out proper cleaning led to illness and broken bones. Perhaps the newspaper, which was subtitled “Freedom, equality, fraternity,” was warning its readers that the marginalization of women would backfire once they were taller than men. In late Ottoman Jerusalem, dirty streets, smelly alleys, clouds of microbe-laden dust and acquaintance with advanced medical scientific work were signifiers of cultural, perhaps even civilizational attributes rather than “plainly” matters of technical public health measures. In this respect, Jerusalem was joining a global zeitgeist that had already started in mid-19th-century European cities, followed by the urban centers of Bilad al-Sham. Germs, diseases, and epidemics not only triggered urban reforms globally, but also became essential in the reconceptualization of urban design and governance. This process gave birth to an inextricable link between the modern and the healthy city, simultaneously introducing the role and authority of experts, engineers, and physicians, as the pillars of this project.

Jerusalem during the late Ottoman period has received the attention of numerous studies from multiple perspectives. In the last few decades, late Ottoman Jerusalem has emerged as a model of social, political, and cultural urban connections that were negotiated and interacted beyond sectarian and national lines.

This reality is often contrasted with the political strife that characterized the three decades of the British Mandate. Moreover, Jerusalem's administration, most importantly by the municipality but also by the state, is depicted as the central driving force of urban development and modernization. The proliferation of hospitals, doctors, and pharmacies in this period has also led to numerous works dedicated to modern medicine in Jerusalem. These studies offer a multitude of prisms through which we can understand developments in public healthcare. Earlier works, based mainly on European and Hebrew sources, underlined the centrality of foreign missions and Jewish communities.

in leading this process while marginalizing or belittling the role of the Ottoman state, Jerusalem’s municipality, and local players (especially Arab doctors). Later works incorporated Ottoman and Arabic sources and emphasized the role and agency of the state and the municipality in reconceptualizing and reconstructing modern Jerusalem through the regulation of urban sanitation and hygiene.

Through the focus on public health from the inception of modern medicine in the mid-19th century and up to the eve of World War I, which dramatically changed the city and its health services, this chapter seeks to problematize both concepts of late Ottoman Jerusalem and bring back to the surface the multitude of tensions and divisions that existed alongside networks of cooperation. The study will show that it was the absence of state healthcare and not its presence that enabled medical entrepreneurship and sectarian medical divisions. Networks did exist but borders were also prevalent, and they were defined and established not as a result of but despite the Ottoman administration. This chapter will focus on the elusive or contradictory roles of modern medicine in late Ottoman Jerusalem and bring back to the surface the multitude of tensions and divisions that existed alongside networks of cooperation.

Building on earlier works on modern medicine in Jerusalem, the Arabic and Hebrew press, and personal memoirs, alongside Ottoman, British, and French archival sources, this chapter will focus on the challenges modern medicine posed for the developing Ottoman provincial city and the tensions it raised within and between the various communities. The chapter starts with a brief introduction, which includes several historical steppingstones (including the 1865 and 1902 cholera epidemics) in the emergence of modern public health institutions in Jerusalem. It then moves to focus on the medical discourse in the Hebrew and Arabic press, stressing its essential importance in the creation of a hygienic imagined community in Jerusalem and the instrumentalization of health as a conduit through which local players praised, criticized, and assessed the authorities’ performance and relevance. The chapter then investigates the training of doctors in the various medical faculties in the region and the Ottoman imperial role in this. This section concentrates on personal life stories of local physicians, adding the professional dimension to the story. The Municipal Hospital (est. 1891), being the greatest Ottoman (imperial and municipal) institutional intervention in the city’s public health services, is then discussed. The last topic under scrutiny is the tension between sectarian divisions and cross denominational cooperation in the field of public health, delineating the potential and the limitations of the medical network.

**PUBLIC MEDICINE ON THE MOVE**

From the mid-19th century, Jerusalem gradually became a site of imperial competition. Medicine and, more particularly, nurses, doctors, and hospitals became a central conduit for the consolidation of control and influence over the city. Modern medicine gradually expanded in late Ottoman Palestine from the second half of the 19th century. Missionary hospitals and doctors marked the beginning of this process, with their arrival and settlement in Palestine’s cities and towns from as early as the 1850s. Jerusalem, especially from the last decades of the 19th century, was at the center of this process. French, German, Russian, British, Greek, Italian, and

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Ottoman hospitals not only changed the urban landscape and public space and treated Jerusalem's population, but were fundamental in amplifying the Gordian knot between health and sovereignty. Described by Philippe Bourmaud as a “Medical Babel”, by the beginning of World War I, 18 hospitals were functioning in Jerusalem, a city inhabited by 80,000–100,000 people by the turn of the century. Twelve hospitals were established by the various missions, five by Jewish doctors and Jewish organizations, and one by the municipality. Private clinics and pharmacies were also relatively numerous.

The first initiative was that of the British as early as the late 1830s, when the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews sent a physician and a pharmacist, later establishing the English Mission Hospital (1844) with the objective of converting Jerusalem’s Jews. In the early 1850s, the German Deaconess Sisters and the French St. Louis hospitals were established. The Jewish incentive to promote modern health services was undoubtedly encouraged by these missionary endeavors, which were seen as a serious threat to the Jewish community. In 1843, Sir Moses Montefiore brought in the first (German) Jewish doctor Simon Frankel (1809–1880) and funded his salary, medical equipment, and pharmacy for 15 years. Frankel had been trained in Munich and Berlin and collaborated with the second doctor in the city, the British missionary Edward McGowan. Financed by the Rothschild family and operating under European consular protection but headquartered in Jerusalem, a city inhabited by 80,000–100,000 people by the turn of the century, twelve hospitals were established by the various missions, five by Jewish doctors and Jewish organizations, and one by the municipality. Private clinics and pharmacies were also relatively numerous.

The Jewish battle against the missions within the general European competition for influence in the city increased the politicization of every aspect of modern medicine. Establishing hospitals became the continuation of politics by other means.

The expanding Western presence challenged the constant plea of the Ottoman Empire for hegemony over the city. Defined by Johann Buessow as a “model Tanzimat” city, from the 1860s-1870s, Jerusalem became a provincial capital and gradually came to exemplify the road map of Ottoman reform. Jerusalem was also home to one of the first municipalities in the Empire, a local agency that involved the city’s elite in envisioning, forming and re-forming their Jerusalem. While the municipality accumulated greater support and relevance, its decisions required the approval of the mutasarrıfs, who in most cases was on bad terms with Jerusalem’s local political elite, if not their rival, and was often alienated emotionally and culturally from the local population. Moreover, while some mutasarrıfs were highly experienced administrators, most of them remained for very short periods of time, which limited their ability to initiate or implement a vision or policy. Between 1864 and 1914, David Kushner notes, the governorate changed hands 23 times, while during the same period there were only five British consuls, eight Prussian or German consuls, and twelve French consuls. This was not exceptional in Bilad al-Sham. Between 1850 and 1895, for example, Aleppo had 30 governors.

17 Two of the city’s governors had much longer tenures, amounting to 19 years in 1877–1897, an indication that the rest were in post for very short periods. David Kushner, “The Ottoman Governors of Palestine, 1864–1914,” Middle Eastern Studies 23/3 (1987), pp. 274–290; Neville J. Mandel, Arabs and Zionism before World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 139.
18 Peter Sluglett, “Municipalities in the Late Ottoman Empire,” in Peter Sluglett, Stefan Weber, and Abdul-Karim Rafeq (eds.), Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman...
A short article in Ha-Or remarked before the arrival of Muhdi Bey, a short-term mutasarrif who had been preceded by another short-term mutasarrif, “Nobody knows him and nobody knows his character (mahuto).”19 Upon Subhi Bey’s arrival in the Autumn of 1908, al-Quds expressed the hope that, while knowing nothing about him, he would surely do better than his predecessors.20 Disloyal mutasarrifs would be rapidly replaced, especially during periods of political turmoil. The Paşa, announced a Hebrew newspaper in February 1913, “has not even properly rested after his journey and has already been dismissed from his position” because of his opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress.21 “Macid Bey [...] has been appointed as mutasarrif of Jerusalem,” the newspaper Filastin announced, and lamented that “he is the seventh mutasarrif since the [1908] constitution.”22 Rumors about the appointment of new mutasarrifs highlighted this precarious administrative situation.23 “The truth is,” al-Quds lamented, “the rapid and multiple change and replacement of our administrators fills us with great sorrow,” because they are unable to fulfill their duties in such short periods of time.24 This relative uncertainty had a positive aspect from the point of view of the local community: it provided greater, albeit limited, space for the empowerment and agency of local players, which was manifested in private, communal, and municipal initiatives.

The two cholera epidemics that struck Jerusalem in 1865 and 1902, the first at the advent of its medicalization process and the second at a much more mature phase, set good examples of state and city engagements with matters of public health. In August 1865, a Vilnius-based Hebrew newspaper announced, that the governor, ʿIzzat Paşa, was “taking all measures” (be-khol oz) to prevent the disease from reaching Jerusalem. He sealed its walls, established a committee of doctors and placed guards on the roads leading to the city.25 Cholera arrived at Jerusalem in the summer of 1865, and the quarantine measures taken by the mutasarrif led to a short pause in the epidemic.26 The second wave arrived in September when the Paşa was not in the city, leaving its inhabitants to confront the plague themselves. He returned only at the end of October, after around half of the population had fled. The Austrian consul reported that ʿIzzat Paşa had knowingly gone against the advice of Dr. Benjamin Rothziegel, who was apparently the only doctor in the city at the time, and whose wife and baby (and he himself shortly after) were also victims of the cholera. The consul was furious at the governor’s (non-)treatment of the situation, reporting that, during the long weeks of the cholera scourge, he and his troops had camped outside the city walls, which symbolized his limited responsibility for the city.

All the municipal services, he noted, including burials and street cleaning stopped, and prisoners escaped from the local prison, adding social tension to the already chaotic situation. By the end of October, Jerusalem was devastated not only by the large number of casualties but also by gangs of escaped prisoners, who harassed those who were left alive. Medical and welfare services were supplied by an ad hoc committee established by the foreign consuls for the Christian and Muslim population and by local volunteers and funding from the Jewish diaspora.27 Diseases were utilized as a source of “creative possibility in evangelical work”28 by magnifying the relevance of foreign missions and local dependence on them.

The consuls estimated that 600 people died in the city, excluding the mortality amongst those who fled. Montefiore, who visited Jerusalem in 1866 gave ‘Izzat Paşa the 300 pounds needed to lay pipes to bring clean water to the

19 Ha-Or, 24 June 1912.
20 al-Quds, 25 September 1908.
21 HaZvi, 21 February 1913.
22 Filastin, 15 February 1913.
23 Ha-Zvi, 28 May 1911; Ha-Herut, 4 September 1911.
24 al-Quds, 23 October 1908; see also similar criticism in al-Quds, 1 December 1909.
25 Ha-Carmel, 31 August 1865.
26 For the centrality of quarantine measures in the Ottoman response to pandemics, see Yaron Ayalon, Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire: Plague, Famine, and Other Misfortunes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 83–92.
city. Cholera, an urban disease that devastated cities and helped reconceptualize urban planning all over the world, marked a watershed in Jerusalem's development as well. In the mid-1860s, the building of neighborhoods outside the city walls accelerated. It was initiated and funded by local and foreign Jews and Arab notables, to solve what was considered to be one of the causes of the disease – the crowded alleys and lack of fresh air within the old city.30

Jerusalem was spared from a few waves of cholera that erupted during 1875 and the 1890s, but in 1902 it returned. The differences in the city’s engagement with the disease reflected the profound changes it had undergone in less than half a century. Like many other cities and towns across the Empire, it had its own municipal hospital and municipal doctor as modern medical knowledge and professional authority had become part and parcel of urban governance and municipal responsibility.31 Also, albeit belatedly, in 1902, Istanbul showed more determination in fighting cholera, and sent troops, flour, medication, and a delegation of doctors and pharmacists to the region.32 Gaza, which was under Jerusalem’s jurisdiction, suffered most with roughly 3,000–4,000 deaths, many of which were concealed from the state authorities. Fear of the government’s response to local cases of cholera (an armed guard that prevented movement out of and into infected areas) led to its concealment by the population, a move that increased the spread of the disease and frustrated government efforts to prevent it. A local reporter from Gaza noted in Beirut’s Lisan al-Hal that the figures about the spread of the disease that he telegraphed daily were not accurate because of this fear, and he stressed the dire need for more doctors as there were only two to meet the needs of over 100,000 inhabitants of the city and its rural periphery.33 In mid-November, a month after it struck Gaza, a few cases of cholera were discovered in Jerusalem, but the rapid and strict quarantine measures prevented its spread. Once they knew of the outbreak, the authorities closed the city gates, guarded the roads, and banned all trade into the city. The governor established a local health committee, stricter hygiene measures were put in place, streets were cleaned, walls were painted with lime and sprinkled with phenol water, and pamphlets explaining about the danger and how to avoid infection were circulated. The fact that the city (still) had no central water system and local wells were used instead, helped to prevent the spread of the disease, but the surrounding towns and villages experienced varying numbers of cases.34

Jerusalem’s many hospitals and strong central government saved the city from going through a devastation like that of 1865, but the victory was only partial, given the mortality rate in its rural periphery and the coastal areas of the mutasarrifyya. The memoirs of Yehoshu’a Shami (1874–1944), Hebron’s municipal doctor shed further light on the conduct of Jerusalem’s governor, Kazim Bey, in the early days of the pandemic. Shami first heard about the spread of cholera in the area from a Jewish Hebronite merchant on Wednesday (8 October 1902), who told him about a contagion in Bayt Jibrin (40 km from Hebron). He immediately notified Hebron’s governor, Hamdi Bey, who assigned two mounted soldiers to go and inspect the situation the next day. On his way to Bayt Jibrin, Shami discovered that the disease had already struck the nearby village of Tarqumiya and 40 people already died. The doctor returned only at night and failed to reach Bayt Jibrin. On Friday morning, he handed his report to Hamdi Bey and requested the army’s help in closing in on the infected villages. According to Shami, Kazim Bey refused to listen to his warnings about the spread of cholera and instead chose to believe a report sent by a delegation of (foreign) doctors

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29 Barel, Ruah rāʾa, pp. 71–72.
33 Barel, Ruah rāʾa, p. 83; Lisan al-Hal, 18 October 1902.
34 Barel, Ruah rāʾa, pp. 88–89, 111–114; Hashkafa, 31 October 1902. See also daily reports about casualties in Egypt in Lisan al-Hal during October-November 1902. On quarantine and cleansing measures in Jerusalem, see Lisan al-Hal, 17–18, 21 October 1902. For reports on casualties in Jaffa, Gaza, and Lydda, see Lisan al-Hal, 22, 24, 28, 30 October, 5–8 November 1902.
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to Gaza that denied its spread.35 Rather than taking immediate measures against the disease, Shami argued, the governor understood the severity of the situation only after sending Jerusalem’s municipal doctor on Saturday to the villages near Hebron and another delegation to Gaza on Sunday, critically delaying the response to the rapidly ascending death toll for a few more days. Writing his memoir in the 1930s, Shami stated that his official government employment was so “grand and serious that I always thought of my behavior as the Jewish administrator’s role model.” His loyalty to the Ottoman Empire had its limits. Shami added:

This generation’s doctors could not understand how the general governor of the country [...] can get into a dispute (lehistabeh) over matters of medicine with an official doctor who holds a professional opinion for the common good which he and the governor are responsible for.

Shami narrates in detail the night-time telegraph exchange in which he and the governor of Hebron, on one side, and Kazim Bey on the other, corresponded over pre-emptive measures. Hebron’s governor pressured Shami not to name the disease as cholera and both governors were angry at Shami’s refusal to call the disease simply “suspicious” (hashuda) instead.36

The story exemplifies the internal politics and grave implications of health issues. A doctor’s decisiveness had the potential to place the whole country in quarantine despite the reluctance of the local governor. Shami’s memoirs also underline the transformations that the Ottoman state had undergone in its ability to confront a pandemic. The governors were highly aware of the disease and its dangers and were also constantly updated about its spread by professional state employees. In Jerusalem, the state’s medical work force was very small, but fundamental in determining public health policies. To overcome this limited state outreach, the governors were able to mobilize non-government employees and cooperate with local players. It was an unwritten agreement between both sides, state and foreign, that in times of crisis they worked together while each side tried to consolidate greater control on the ground through medical work. The state’s resources were relatively successful in the mutasarrifiyya’s center, but the thousands of casualties in its bordering rural periphery and coastal towns and villages demarcated the gap between the two in matters of state authority and provision.37

MEDICAL CONVERSATIONS
Towards the 1910s, various processes converged into the creation of a medical discourse on the pages of the local Arabic and Hebrew press. From 1908, the local Arabic press became effectively involved in the creation of a collective organizing ethos that saw regulated sanitation and hygiene as essential. The Hebrew press had been active in the city since the 1860s and engaged extensively with matters of health, primarily the community’s hospitals and doctors but also foreign and state institutions.38 Michelle Campos underlines the importance of the local Hebrew and Arabic press in spelling out a modern “vision of the city” that demanded efficient municipal work, improved sanitation and health services, and voiced criticism of municipal corruption or inefficiency.39 The local press conceptualized public health as a public concern, envisioned a modern city with modern services, and pressured the civil servants, demanding action and reform. Knowledge of progress in the field of sanitation in other Palestinian cities, elsewhere in the Levant, or in Europe brought

35 Yehoshu’a Haim Ben Tsiyon Shami, Zikhronot, Hebrew autograph manuscript, 1943, Jerusalem, The Ben Zvi Institute, Ms. no. 8018 [in Hebrew], p. 58; the governor surely knew of the cholera epidemic as serious measures against its spread were taken in Jerusalem already in August. See Hashkafa, 8 August 1902.

36 Shami, Zikhronot, pp. 58–60. The first delegation was mentioned in Hashkafa, 15 October 1902, the second in Hashkafa, 31 October 1902.

37 Shami, Zikhronot, p. 62; Barel, Ruah ra’ā, pp. 85–87.

38 The European Hebrew press reported from its inception on matters of health in Jerusalem, especially the wellbeing of its Jewish inhabitants. These reports were a tool for fundraising for the improvement of the hospitals. See, for example, Ha-Melits, 4 August 1864; Ha-Maggid, 26 July 1865.

39 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, pp. 171–172.
new standards, followed by greater demands for regulation.

Modern medical treatment gradually became consumer product with a local competition for clientele. This was reflected in advertisements published by local doctors in the local press. Dr. Nudelman’s clinic, it was published in Ha-Zvi, “heals teeth, fills and covers them with gold, silver, platinum, amalgam, silver plated tin, cement or gutta-percha […] extracts teeth without any pain.” 40 Jirjis Elias Mashhur announced his purchase of the municipal pharmacy at the Jaffa Gate on the pages of al-Quds, introducing the most modern treatments (ahdath al-ilajat) of the British Boroughs Wellcome & Company and Pharmacie Centrale de France, including all the facilities for urine examinations. Mashhur set out his efforts to earn the public’s trust (thiqat al-jumhur), appointing an Istanbul licensed pharmacist, Dr. Elias Halabi (1880–1918), a Syrian Protestant College (SPC, established in Beirut, 1866) graduate, as the pharmacy’s doctor, and underlining the “accuracy, cleanliness and precision” of its services. If you are in need of a doctor, Mashhur concluded, only notify the pharmacy and it would answer your request “at the utmost speed.” 41 Advertised medical treatment, at least in al-Quds, tapped into all the features of modern symbols: a doctor holding an imperial license and a medical diploma from a Western institution, and offering European medication from international pharmaceutical companies. While the Hebrew Jewish medical discourse depended on European knowledge, as most of its doctors were trained there, there were some exceptions. During the outburst of the 1902 cholera epidemic, Hashkafa published a detailed translation from Arabic of Dr. Bishara Zalzal’s (d. 1905) contribution on the disease and the methods of prevention. 42 A prolific author on modern and ancient medicine, Zalzal had graduated from the SPC in 1872. 43

This symbolism was also a tool for the re-evaluation of treatment and actual access to medical services. Modern products brought with them modern regulations on accountability. Doctors were not only the objects of this emerging medical discourse but were also, as writers, highly involved in its creation. They were “experts at large,” assuming cultural and political authority over the public space based on or emanating from their authority over their patients. Elias Halabi himself contributed articles to the local press on both medical and religious issues. 44 He wrote extensively on tuberculosis in Filastin and al-Muqtataf utilizing the disease as a platform from which he proclaimed an entire cultural manifesto. Halabi pointed an accusing finger at the damp, dark, and suffocating homes of both rich and poor “that are not so different from graves” for the spread of the disease. He harshly criticized the people’s laziness, and their eating and leisure habits. While wishing for the cleaning of the filthy cafes and an end to the germ-spread greeting customs and narghile smoking, Halabi not only wanted to prevent the spread of TB, but also in effect envisioned the rebirth of Jerusalem as a modern city, cured of its oriental ills. He did not spare the city’s administration, condemning their indifference to public places, which he depicted as “poisonous swamps” (mustanqa’ sumum). Instead of “ornamenting the city and its exterior scenery,” Halabi wrote, the municipality should invest in parks with fresh air and shaded spaces for sports. 45

Criticism of the municipality’s ability or inability to regulate health came from other directions as well. Al-Munadi reported on discrimination against the Muslim inhabitants of the city, noting that two Muslims had died in the Municipal and French hospitals and it had taken the municipality over a week to bury them, but “if these two men had not been Muslims” their smell would not have spread and their bodies would not have started to decompose. 46 While reporting on the municipality’s failings, the newspaper revealed that the man

40 Ha-Zvi, 30 November 1911; see also Mendel Kramer’s advertisement for his pharmacy at Me’ah She’arim in Hashkafa, 17 January 1905; Hashkafa, 23 December 1904.
41 al-Quds, 14 October 1908; Dr. Halabi strongly warned the public against spending money on unprescribed fake medication; see al-Quds, 6 December 1910.
42 Hashkafa, 7 November 1902 (on the pandemic); 12 December 1902 (a translated article).
45 al-Muqtataf 39/3, 1 September 1911, pp. 217–221; Filastin, 16 August 1911.
46 al-Munadi, 27 February 1912.
responsible for killing the city's stray dogs was taken as the municipal doctor's assistant surgeon.\^47\ Al-Munadi was critical of the role of the municipal doctor. Probably lamenting the rapid changes in appointments to the position, the newspaper reported: “Muntaz Effendi, who was the municipal doctor in Alexandroupoli, has been appointed to become Jerusalem's municipal doctor, replacing Said(is) Effendi who was appointed to replace Muharram Effendi.”\^48

It is true that a “shared civic commitment” that surpassed sectarian divide did exist in Jerusalem.\^49 However, the “commitment” remained in many cases a matter of words, both written and spoken, rather than a true representation of the city’s reality. “For we know,” Havatselet noted, “the great efforts of the Mayor or sheikh Selim Effendi to preserve the [city’s] cleanliness and purity,” highlighting his good treatment of the Jews.\^50 al-Quds praised the “attention” of Mayor Faydi al-ʿAlami and his council to the spread of meningitis in Jerusalem.\^51 Yet these “efforts” and “attention” implied the municipality’s inability to go beyond their good will and intention. While unable to radically change the city’s infrastructure, providing medical treatment in Jerusalem’s public sphere became a tool for the accumulation of political capital. For example, Nazif al-Khalidi, an engineer with the Ottoman Railway put himself forward to mayor, declaring that he would reform and improve the hospitals.\^52 Making Jerusalem great again, at least rhetorically, meant improving its health services.

In the post 1908 revolution, a society with a clear civilizing mission for the rural population was established and making them clean and healthy became the national calling of the well off. Established by Jerusalem’s elite and articulating the great hopes after the 1908 coup, famiyyat al-fallah (the peasant’s society) sought to educate the peasants of Jerusalem’s rural periphery. In the society’s inaugural ceremony, the municipal doctor, Muharram Bey, declared that the government would benefit greatly if it “enlightened [the peasant’s] [...] thought and guided him to the path of victory.”\^53 Although he made his speech in Ottoman Turkish, a language that was not understood by the rural population, the symbolic role of the doctor as both healer of the body and the epitome of progress and development was essential for the event. Yet again, this role was more symbolic than effective as state funded or regulated modern health services for the fallahin did not exist.

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\^47 Ibd., 5 March 1912.
\^48 Ibid.; Ha-Herut, 8 March 1912, refers to Dr. Asa replacing Dr. Saʿid.
\^49 Campos, Ottoman Brothers, p. 181.
\^50 Havatselet, 23 August 1895.
\^51 al-Quds, 30 March 1909.

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EUROPE, BEIRUT, THEN ISTANBUL

In January 1917, Jamal Paşa visited the SPC with his entourage and gave a speech before its students and staff. He spoke about the strength of the nation and its dependence on its youth and education. “[A]s the majority of the students of this university is [sic] Ottomans,” declared the governor of Greater Syria, “[I] consider this institution as an Ottoman University.”\^54 Izzat Tannous (1896–1969), a Nabulsi student of medicine at the college and graduate of the Anglican St. George's school in Jerusalem, who probably took the last Ottoman medical exam in 1918, was in the crowd. “The Commander in Chief,” he recalled in his autobiography, “gave a short speech in the Turkish language to which we thundered tremendous applause,” but he also noted that the students cheered “without understanding one word of what he said.”\^55 Tannous’s knowledge of Turkish and his depiction of the SPC as a pro-Entente enclave during World War I are a good point of departure for a discussion about the doctors who worked in Jerusalem or left it to study medicine, and the role or participation of the Ottoman state in

\^53 al-Quds, 22, 25, 29 September 1908. The society also planned to fund training in agriculture for a few peasants in Jaffa: ibid., 16 October 1908.
their training, employment and regulation of their service.\textsuperscript{56}

Although the bulk of Jerusalem’s doctors (Jewish or missionary) had been born, raised, and trained in Europe, an expanding community of local doctors emerged at the turn of the century. Gradually, sons of mainly the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian Jerusalemite elite who graduated from Christian missionary or French and German Jewish schools were sent to professional medical training at the SPC or St. Joseph’s University (since 1883), in Beirut. Very few, if any local Jerusalemite doctors had received their elementary or secondary education in state Ottoman institutions, which developed during the final years of Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{57}

A small number were trained in the Istanbul Imperial Medical School (established in 1827). The 1900 yearbook published by the Ottoman Department of Education mentions two Jerusalemites, in addition to Yehoshu’a Shami, who had graduated by that year:\textsuperscript{58} Muhammad Tawfiq Sulayman Nusayba (1885–1947),\textsuperscript{59} and Husam al-Din Abu l-Sa’ud (1874–1939), members of notable Muslim families.\textsuperscript{60} Shami, who graduated in 1899, was born in Jerusalem to a prominent Sephardi family from Istanbul with firm ties to the state. His wedding in Jerusalem was attended by the highest echelons of the local Ottoman bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{61} Shami’s father was a native of Istanbul, but his son did not start learning Turkish till the age of fifteen and then only for the purpose of entering the state medical school in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{62} Upon Shami’s departure from Hebron for another state position, a Hebrew newspaper proclaimed that Hebronite “Jews and Ishmaelites [Muslims] […] all loved him dearly” and deeply appreciated his service as the baladuya (municipality) doctor. After Hebron, he was appointed as Jaffa’s municipal doctor.\textsuperscript{63}

Nevertheless, sons of the Jerusalemite Arab and Jewish elites preferred the two medical faculties in Beirut over the Istanbul faculty. As the training of doctors became another arena of imperial competition for regional influence, the French and American governments improved and expanded their medical faculties. From 1870, SPC medical graduates had needed to take the final exams of the Imperial Medical School in Istanbul in order to practice medicine under the Empire, but from 1898, a delegation from the Imperial Medical Faculty would arrive at the SPC, supervise the exams and witness the graduates take the Ottoman Hippocratic oath.\textsuperscript{64} The American institute was the most popular for training pharmacists and physicians and many Jerusalemites passed through its gates. The famous Palestinian doctor, Tawfiq Canaan (1882–1964), completed his primary education at the German missionary Schneller School and his medical training at the SPC and many other SPC graduates, Muslim, Christian and Jewish, worked in the city’s hospitals, private clinics, and pharmacies. The Halabi brothers, the aforementioned Ilyas and the pharmacist Anton, who graduated in 1908 and 1912 respectively, were born, raised and worked in Jerusalem, as was also the case with Wadi and Kamil Haddad.\textsuperscript{65} Albert Abushdid (1875–1930), whose Jewish family migrated from Rabat to Jerusalem in the mid-19th century, received his MD diploma in 1899. He was also a Freemason who spoke in favor of Arab-Jewish brotherhood.\textsuperscript{66} The SPC’s Jerusalem branch of the Alumni Association included fourteen members, of whom six were doctors and three were pharmacists.\textsuperscript{67} Within the emerging pre-World War I cultural

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  \item \textsuperscript{58} Saliha me nezaret-i ma’arif-i umumiye 1318 [Yearbook of the Ministry of Education 1318h] (Istanbul: Dar al-Tiba’a al-Amira, 1318h), pp. 635, 641, 651 [in Ottoman Turkish].
  \item \textsuperscript{60} ‘Asali, Muqaddima, pp. 247–248.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Hashkafa, 3 July 1903.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Shami, Zikhronot.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Havatselet, 20 October 1899; 5 October 1900; for his move to Jaffa in 1903, see Hashkafa, 30 March 1900; 13 February 1903; 26 June 1903.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Blecher, “Medicalization,” pp. 46–49.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Alumni Association, American University, pp. 66, 89.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Havatselet, 19 January 1900, 5 July 1906; Campos, Ottoman Brothers, p. 191; Doar ha-Yom, 26 February 1931; Alumni Association, American University, p. 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} al-Kulliyah 5/1, November 1913, p. 23.
\end{itemize}
and local medical scene, the American Institute was highly influential, not only for its graduates but also for the many students who aspired to study there.

The French Medical Faculty at St. Joseph also attracted the city's elite. In 1909, three doctors and one pharmacist from notable Jerusalemite Sephardi families completed their studies there. Like Shami, they had previously been trained in its Francophone Alliance Israélite Universelle schools and, like the sons of Shaykh Raghib al-Khalidi, who sent his three boys to study medicine at the SPC, three of them were sons of two prominent religious figures, Rabbis Haim Elyashar and Sulayman Mani.68 St. Joseph graduates' list includes at least thirteen doctors and pharmacists who were born in Jerusalem, mostly Jews but also members of various Christian denominations.69 The proliferation of pharmacies was another symbol of the medicalization of the public space and, here too, the pharmacies that were founded by locals owed their certificate to the SPC and not to Istanbul.

Gradually, the expanding community of local trained doctors and pharmacists played their part in the city's health services, although the proliferation of foreign hospitals with their European doctors, alongside the arrival of Jewish immigrant doctors, meant that they represented a relatively low proportion. Even the position of municipal doctors was often staffed either by doctors who were trained outside the state's institutions or by European immigrants. Eliyahu Cohen (1863–1926) was a native Jerusalemite from a prominent Ashkenazi family. Cohen had studied medicine in Heidelberg and Berlin and was employed as the municipal doctor of Hebron, Gaza, and Safed.70 A native of Bethlehem and graduate of SPC, Habib Qattan (1884–1968) served as the town's municipal doctor.71 After the 1908 revolution, Istanbul called for the employment of doctors who had trained at the Imperial Medical School to take up state positions, what probably limited the proliferation of doctors with European or foreign training in official posts.72 This was the case with Jerusalem's municipal doctor and head of the Municipal Hospital.

A graduate of Athens University, Photios Efklides (1864–1916) was a Greek from Bursa. According to Shami, Efklides served as the municipal doctor but was dismissed from his official post, like all Greek doctors, following the 1897 war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. His links with the Greek Patriarch meant that he was able to keep his position as head of the Municipal Hospital until his death from a typhus infection in 1916.73 His funeral was attended by the local and foreign elite of Jerusalem and Ha-Herut reported that he was "unique in his grace and benevolence."74

Dr. Helena Kagan (1889–1978), a Jew from Tashkent who had studied medicine at the University of Bern, worked under Efklides at the Municipal Hospital and was put in charge of Arab and Jewish nurses' training. After Efklides's death, Kagan headed the hospital for a few months by herself.75 She had arrived at Jerusalem in the spring of 1914, hoping for employment in one of its hospitals. Upon her arrival, she rushed to meet Dr. ʿUmar Nashat Bey, who headed the city's public health service. The Ottoman official told her that women were not officially allowed to practice medicine and that the Ottoman state did not grant work permits to women. Noticing Kagan's dismay at the news, Nashat quickly calmed her down, telling her "without a shred of shame," that, since there was dire need for women physicians, she could work without a permit. The state official even guaranteed that local pharmacies would provide medications she prescribed since they did not hold updated lists of licensed doctors.76

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68 Ha-Herut, 12 November 1909.
69 Université Saint-Joseph, Faculté française de médecine et de pharmacie, Liste officielle de MM. les médecins et pharmaciens diplômés de la faculté Française Be- yrouch (Session de mars 1887 - Session de juillet 1922) (Beir- ut: Unknown publisher, unknown year).
70 Dr. Moshe Goldberg from Odessa was Tiberias's municipal doctor in the late 1890s. See Levy, Proqim be-toldot, pp. 73–74 (n. 32), 292, 321.
71 Alumni Association, American University, p. 82.
73 Shami also mentions Jaffa's municipal doctor was a graduate of Athens University; Shami, Zikhronot, pp. 60–61; Emile Mouchamp, “L’organisation médicale et hospitalière à Jérusalem et dans la région,” 1903, 294PO/ A/45–46, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN); al-Munadi, 19 March 1912.
74 Ha-Herut, 7 May 1916; see also Ha-Zvi, 8 January 1897, 16 August 1912.
76 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
was not an exception in Palestine. The municipality of Nablus offered Dr. Alexandra Belkind, a Jew of Russian descent, a position as head of the town’s Municipal Hospital. Whether regulated or not, the gap between the official health regulations and reality underlined the limits of the state’s hegemony and ability in the administration of health services.

BEYOND THE MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL

Studies on roughly the two or three last decades of Ottoman Jerusalem underline the work of the municipality as a dynamic and capable administrative engine and highlight the role of the Ottoman state in contributing to the city’s development, including in the field of public health and sanitation. Studies on health and medicine in late Ottoman Palestine emphasize progress in health services as a side effect of the Ottoman state’s competition for local influence and control both with Western powers (through their various missions) and with an emerging local community that invested in, wrote about, and became professionalized in public health and modern medicine. The establishment of hospitals and dispensaries, was a realization of “colonial opportunities” that also corresponded with the demand of the local communities.

Jerusalem’s municipality was in effect the only administrative institution that united the city’s population across religious sects and denominations. It was headed by Jerusalem’s most powerful men and administrators who invested great efforts in improving and developing the city. However, one must examine the potential and actual limits of the municipality’s work. In matters of health and sanitation, there was certainly a will to expand and develop municipal services, but the practicalities of implementation were challenging.

The municipality worked under provincial state supervision and every major step required the approval of the state authorities. The various consuls and embassies were another dominant factor in the city as protectors of non-Ottoman citizens. According to Campos, at least one quarter of the city’s population had foreign citizenship, causing frequent friction between the consuls and the Ottoman administration over actual jurisdiction in the city. Ottoman dependence on European capital, including dependence on taxes from the foreign institutions to fund infrastructure spending, increased foreign economic control. Foreigners did not see themselves as subordinate to the municipality and often refused to cooperate in matters of taxation and compliance with municipal regulations. In 1904, the municipality decided to collect a tax to pay for cleaning and lighting the neighborhoods outside the Old City walls. The foreign consuls protested against the raising of the new tax for a whole year, but later agreed to pay it. Vincent Lemire argues that this reflected the flexible authority of the municipality, often negotiated with the city’s inhabitants, which gradually increased with Jerusalem’s expansion. Yet this example also underlines the limits of this authority, which necessitated skillful maneuvering between the Ottoman state, the foreign presence, and their often conflicting interests. The development and modernization of the city were indeed a shared vision; however, as Yasmin Avcı has highlighted, the state was suspicious of large-scale projects that were initiated by European states or protégés. This sometimes resulted in Istanbul’s reluctance to enable the inception of concession-based projects that had already been agreed and signed on by the municipality.

Notwithstanding, the municipality worked within its capacity from its early years of activity to improve the sanitation and cleanliness of the streets, especially the main roads. Inside the Old City, the streets were paved, and new sewage canals were dug. From the 1890s, the streets were watered a few times a day to prevent the dust clouds caused by the constant movement.
of people and carriages, and the streets were cleaned by the municipality's employees. Later, the municipality also assigned workers to dispose of the garbage that accumulated in the various neighborhoods, although, as we have seen, evidence from later periods suggests that these projects were far from comprehensive.

The 1910 spring election of Husayn Hashim al-Husayni as mayor marked another watershed in the annals of the municipality. Al-Husayni was considered not only a man of vision but also a man of action, and progress in all fields of municipal services was felt in the public space. Before World War I, al-Husayni had plans to construct a tram line into and from the city and to illuminate the city with electric power, plans that (perhaps) did not materialize because of the outbreak of war. Al-Husayni also had plans to connect all the city's neighborhoods to a more advanced sewage system. Aware of the inability of his administration to fund such a far-reaching project, the mayor appealed to the Jewish diaspora. Large scale, far-reaching projects that meant in depth changes in the infrastructure of the city and its surrounding were impossible to implement without foreign financial support and state approval.

The establishment of the Municipal Hospital, one of the municipality's greatest achievements, further exemplifies its place and role within the entangled map of multiple players and conflicting interests of late Ottoman Jerusalem, particularly in the field of public health. In 1886, a municipal clinic and pharmacy were established by the municipality, where the municipal doctor treated poor patients of all sects for free for two hours a day. This was also enabled by a donation from a Jewish philanthropist. Already in the late 1880s, they were lagging behind the various hospitals that were operating in the city, whose services were enjoyed by Jerusalem's Muslim elite, although the city's poor had limited access to them. Plans in 1857 to establish a local hospital for the imperial soldiers stationed in the city roughly paralleled the establishment of Jewish and mission clinics and hospitals. In 1863, the idea of establishing a hospital for Jerusalem's Muslim population was raised again by the state administration. In the summer of 1887, the issue was discussed once more, probably with the aim of turning the operating clinic into a fully functioning hospital. A year later the matter of funding the construction of a hospital for the city's Ottoman subjects and Muslim pilgrims was discussed again. In contrast to the abundant denominational hospitals in the city, the Muslim pilgrims were the only ones without modern medical service.

As far as the evidence shows, these initiatives did not materialize in the construction of a new hospital, but in the conversion of an already existing building. The Municipal Hospital was in fact inaugurated at an official ceremony on Sunday, 19 April 1891. Reporting on this occasion, Haim Michlin, a local entrepreneur of Russian descent, stated that it was “almost (kim‘at) the prettiest and lofty (yafe ve-na‘ale) building in the city. He also noted the attendance of many Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews as it was open to all Jerusalemites “regardless of religion.” But it was not built by the municipality or even designed to be a hospital. It was originally built for a rich Christian couple who never lived in it because (according to a few sources) the groom died a few days before their wedding. This family drama had led to the house being considered cursed.

83 Ha-Or, 31 December 1912.
85 Kark, “Pe‘ilut.”
86 Sluglett, Municipalities in the Late Ottoman Empire.
87 Havatselet, 21 May 1886; Hazfira, 14 June 1886.
88 BOA, I. DH., 371/24597, 7 March 1857. The Ottoman state documents presented here from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri in Istanbul were accessed online through the monumental Open Jerusalem Archive website, https://openjlem.hypotheses.org, accessed April 2020.
89 BOA, MVL., 768/52, 27 October 1863; BOA, MV., 21/26, 4 July 1887.
90 BOA, MV., 33/6, 6 June 1888.
91 Reports differ on the exact date of the inauguration ceremony, or possibly there was more than one event: 19 April 1891 as reported in Ha-Or, 22 April 1891; or 10 May 1891 as reported in Havatselet, 15 May 1891 and Ha-Maggid, 28 May 1891.
92 Ha-Maggid, 28 May 1891.
so the villa on the expanding Jaffa Road was left deserted for almost a decade until the municipality took it over and turned it into a hospital.\textsuperscript{93}

The opening of the Municipal Hospital was a major leap forward for the municipality in the field of public health. However, the fact that the extensive discussions on the project eventually led to the conversion of a private property indicates its limitations. The municipality finally took its long-awaited role on the medical scene with a facility that housed 32 beds (later expanded to 40), a clinic for the free treatment of peasants, a doctor, a surgeon, a pharmacist, and nursing staff.\textsuperscript{94} Furthermore, its staff represented the multi-ethnic, multi-religious nature of late Ottoman Jerusalem with its Greek doctor from Anatolia and Catholic nurses from the Daughters of Charity order.\textsuperscript{95}

Still, in his 1903 comprehensive report on hospitals and clinics in Jerusalem, Dr. Emile Mouchamp lamented, that (unlike the French St. Louis Hospital, which he headed) the hospital’s patients were predominantly Muslims.\textsuperscript{96}

In 1902, for example, the St. Louis Hospital admitted 597 Muslim patients out of a total of 1,302.\textsuperscript{97} The Municipal Hospital had 40 beds out of a total of 565 beds in the city’s hospitals in 1896, and 592 beds in 1903.\textsuperscript{98} The foundation of the hospital epitomized cross-denominational shared efforts and vision, but ended up underlining the socio-economic and sectarian delineations of health service distribution in the city.

We have little evidence on the standard of treatment in the hospital. Dr. Mouchamp stated that the staff was “excellent” in 1903. During his hospitalization in the hospital the poet, journalist and ardent CUP supporter Sheikh ‘Ali al-Rimawi published a detailed report, filled with superlatives on the hospital and its staff.\textsuperscript{99}

He praised the work of the city’s mayors and Ottoman governors, who had ended the disgrace and humiliation (\textit{ana, ar}) that “we the Ottomans” suffered when attending foreign hospitals.\textsuperscript{100} This positive description contrasts with that of Kagan, who arrived there in 1914 and bemoaned the dreadful state of the adjacent prison hospital and described an Ottoman delegation’s surprise at the hospital’s shortage of equipment when they inspected its service.\textsuperscript{101} The contrast between the two reports could be attributed to extreme conditions during the war, but also to the municipality’s challenge in funding the hospital, which began from earlier on. The fact that the non-Muslim population was not treated there, and that Jerusalem’s elite preferred the missionary or Jewish institutions, sheds further light on the quality of its services.\textsuperscript{102}

Funding for the hospital was guaranteed by a tax levied on horse-drawn carriages entering the city with goods or passengers. This income plunged with the expansion of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway traffic and the coachmen’s subsequent demand that the tax be abolished because their income was so reduced. Their demand was accepted by the state so the hospital was under threat of total closure, and later it did in fact shut down temporarily.\textsuperscript{103} With no other revenues to fund the hospital, it was suggested that the tax levied on the crossing of the Jordan River would be used for this purpose.\textsuperscript{104}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Greenberg, “\textit{Beit ha-holim}”; Kagan mentions that she was warned in 1914 against taking the job because of the curse. See Kagan, \textit{Reshit dariki}, p. 44.
\item Bourmaud, “Epidemiology.”
\item Mouchamp, “L’organisation médicale.”
\item \textit{Ibid}.
\item Cuinet, \textit{Syrie, Liban et Palestine}, p. 553.
\item Levy, \textit{Praqim}, p. 133; Yehoshua, \textit{Yerushalayim tmol shilshom}, p. 44.
\item The hospital is mentioned as active in \textit{Ha-Herut}, 1 March 1911.
\item Ha-Zvi, 5 November 1908; see also the correspondence between the municipality, the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance: BOA, DH. MKT., 2670/61, 29 November 1911; DH. MKT., 2686/49, 18 December 1908; DH. MKT., 2691/5, 24 December 1908; a document from early 1909 reports the hospital’s shutdown: DH. MKT., 2714/87, 21 January 1909. Further study is required on how the hospital’s funding was secured later.
\end{thebibliography}
MEDICAL SERVICES BETWEEN SECTARIANISM AND COOPERATION

From its inception, the development of modern public health services in Jerusalem rested on and was rooted in and tainted by sectarian division. If the objective of the first modern missionary doctor in Jerusalem was the conversion of Jews to Christianity, the arrival of the first modern Jewish doctor was an attempt to thwart missionary endeavors. While relations between the Jewish and missionary doctors remained professional in most cases, the Jewish community refused to accept missionary treatment as kosher. Missionary medical treatment was considered a threat by the leadership of the Jewish community, and this triggered the establishment and expansion of Jewish institutions. In 1897, for example, a wave of violence erupted after a Jewish woman died in the missionary hospital and the Jewish community refused to bury the body. In July 1898, the British consul, John Dickson, reported to the mutasarrif about the “hostile demonstrations against the [missionary] hospital [...] and of molestation and ill treatment of the Jewish patients attending the hospital.” The hospital’s superintendent, Dr. Wheeler, reported incidents of violence and espionage against all Jews who were in contact with the hospital.

Divisions existed within the Jewish community as well. David Yellin mentions the distinction between treatment of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews in the city. In his 1897 report, he mentioned that, in the Ashkenazi Bikur Holim hospital, 944 Ashkenazi and 27 Sephardi Jews were hospitalized while at the Sephardi Misgav Ladach, the numbers were 174 and 347, respectively. Yellin concluded that 1,100 Ashkenazis and 400 Sephardis were treated during that year, underlining the disproportionately low percentage of Sephardi patients, as there were 13,000 Sephardi and 15,000 Ashkenazi Jews in Jerusalem.

Segregation between the communities was evident when the plague hit the city in September 1865, attacking mainly the Muslim community. It was not until mid-October that it reached Jerusalem’s Jews, first the Sephardi Jewish community and later the Ashkenazi community. The limited contact between the communities, especially in relation to water supplies, prevented an “egalitarian” spread of the disease. The Haredi community showed solidarity and cohesiveness: its institutions were mobilized to fight the epidemic and funds were raised locally and abroad to supply the doctor with medicines and a space to work. The Muslim community, which had no external funding, was unable to act similarly.

In 1902, the Jewish communities established a central committee, va’ad merkazi le-shmirat ha-briʾut, which was put in charge of the funds allocated to fight the pandemic. The committee supervised street cleaning and purchased supplies and disinfectants. In the old and new city, local committees were established in the various neighborhoods to liaise with the municipality and the central committee. The local committees received medicines and instructions from Drs. Moshe Wallach and Ahron Mazya. The central committee also sent funds and help to other communities in Palestine, including in Gaza and Tiberias. The 1902 cholera epidemic was an example of the local Jewish motivation and ability to organize and offer treatment to the Jewish community, while the Ottoman state confined its action almost exclusively to enforcing quarantines.

Itamar Ben Avi wrote with great pride that “the Jews, they and no other, organized in every neighborhood and suburb to defend the inhabitants against the upcoming cholera. It was the Jews, they and not the Christians, who established aid societies whose members, with courage and generosity” helped the rich and poor and “the rest of the country’s population (bene ha-arets).” Ben Avi, the son of the famous pioneer of the Hebrew language, de-

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105 Hazfira, 29 November 1897.
106 John Dickson, Consul to Maurice de Bunsen, Chargé d’Affaires, Dispatch Nr. 38, 22 July 1898, FO195/2028/121–124. The National Archive, London. These consular reports were accessed through the Open Jerusalem website on 11 May 2020.
108 Barel, Ruah rāʾa, pp. 54–65; Levy, Praqim, p. 58.
109 Barel, Ruah rāʾa, p. 72.
110 Ibid., pp. 60–63, 67–68.
111 Ibid., pp. 124–125.
112 This was also the case in Damascus in the 1902–1903 epidemic: Blecher, “Medicalization,” pp. 95–103.
113 Hashkafa, 5 December 1902.
picted this unity in proto national superlatives. Published in Odessa, Ha-Melitz underlined the fact that wherever the cholera had spread, Jewish mortality was considerably lower than that of non-Jews, while for the Arabs, “the ways of treatment are like a sealed book” and no preparations were made to fight cholera.114

The local and European Hebrew press was nationalistic, often accentuating a collectivist spirit like Ben Avi’s. Yet we have also seen how doctors worked together inside and outside the city and how they shared a vision of urban wellbeing and a common mission to heal its inhabitants. As early as 1882, a Hebrew newspaper announced the establishment of a Doctors’ Society (Hevrat Rof'im) made up of twelve doctors. The report mentioned that two of them were Jews and noted their decision to meet monthly in order to discuss and supervise the city’s health issues.115 While we have no further evidence about the Society, associations of this kind were not a rarity, although they were often ad hoc. The city’s municipality attempted to mobilize or at least create this cooperation to strengthen the local network of doctors and hospitals. Mayor Faydi al-ʿAlami, for example, convened a meeting of doctors working in Jerusalem and Jaffa in order to discuss the spread of meningitis in the area. Notably, in the known cases that were presented at the meeting, the patients were all Jews.116 Al-Quds reported on the meeting, publishing a detailed list of precautions for avoiding the disease and wishing the sufferers well. The report also paid tribute to the mayor’s efforts to deal with its spread, especially amongst the Jewish community in which there were a large number of cases (fatak al-yahud kathiran).117 In the summer of 1909, an attempt was made to establish a Health Committee (majlis al-sihha) and the municipal doctor and the head of the Municipal Hospital, along with Jewish, Greek, and Armenian doctors, met at the Municipal Hospital for the first meeting.118 In October the same year, a few cases of meningitis were reported in the Hebrew press, noting that, besides the Jewish patients, Dr. Abushdid was called to examine a ten-year-old Christian child from the German Colony at the Municipal Hospital.119 In the spring of 1913, after the municipal doctor discovered a few cases of typhus, a joint doctors’ meeting was convened at the municipal and the infected homes were surrounded by soldiers.120 These cases bring out the nature of the cross-denominational and cross-institutional cooperation that existed between doctors, and it seems that these connections lasted until the eve of World War I. In 1914, Mayor Husayn al-Husayni assembled local and foreign doctors to engage in a preemptive act against a plague (dever) that had broken out in Jaffa. The doctors were satisfied with the health situation in the city, and a joint resolution was drafted to eradicate the mice that were spreading the disease.121

Doctors also collaborated in medical research. In 1910, Dr. Moshe Wallach, the head of Sha’are Tzedek Hospital (established in 1902), the head of the German hospital, and Dr. Tawfiq Canaan jointly collected data on meningitis, which had afflicted the city that year. Medical efforts had the potential to unite people of different denominations and nationalities. Bourmaud argues that no borders divided the cosmopolitan medical community, or perhaps that borders did not define the medical community.122 The malaria prevention mission led by a German specialist, Prof. Peter Mühlens, head of the Tropical Diseases Institute in Hamburg between August 1912 and January 1913, provides a good example. Mühlens worked with Canaan and Dr. Ernest Masterman, from the English Mission Hospital. Two Jewish immigrants, Drs. Arieh Goldberg and Ze’ev Bruen, who had studied under Mühlens and established the Nathan Straus Health Center, cooperated with Mühlens in the study of the disease. Aware of the limited ability of the Ottoman state to regulate the cisterns that were the source of malaria in Jerusalem, the doctors gave public lectures, explaining the prevention measures that were required. In late 1912, the joint team convened a conference of foreign consuls and local physicians to address the topic and it was decided that Mühlens’ laboratory should be converted into an International Health Bureau while

114 Ha-Melitz, 25 January 1903.
115 Hazfira, 26 September 1882.
116 Ha-Zvi, 25 March 1909, 1 April 1909.
117 Al-Quds, 30 March 1909.
118 Ha-Herut, 2 August 1909; Ha-Zvi, 3 August 1909.
119 Ha-Zvi, 15 October 1909.
120 Ha-Herut, 13 May 1912.
121 Ibid., 5 June 1914.
122 Bourmaud, “A Son of the Country.”
maintaining the autonomy of the different institutions. The following year, plans were made to enhance the work of the Bureau with joint German and Jewish funding, but the war brought the project to an end.

Eliezer Ben-Yehuda published an interview in which Mühlen articulated the scientific-humanist, non-political, non-denominational nature of the mission and its inclusion of Jews as well. The German professor emphasized to Ben-Yehuda that malaria does not attack a specific community or religion, but all the city’s inhabitants and therefore required everyone’s cooperation. “I’m sure,” Ben Yehuda wrote, “Jerusalem and the country in its entirety would be grateful to the people who are heading this lofty, scientific and humanitarian project[...].”

But a clear division in the joint work did exist. Prof. Mühlen was in charge of the non-Jewish population while Bruenn served the Jewish community. In a meeting of all the practicing doctors in Jerusalem, after Mühlen’s lector, Dr. Arieh Beham (1877–1941), a Jew of Russian descent who had migrated to Palestine in 1913 and headed the Jerusalem Pasteur Institute, gave his speech in Hebrew followed by a translation into French. “The many non-Jewish doctors present,” Ha-Herut noted, “were surprised at the sound of the Hebrew language to their ears.” The newspaper gave its blessing to the Bureau but highlighted its hope that “the participating Jewish doctors will know how to highlight their nationalism in order for it not to be blurred within the international institution.”

The Hebrew press certainly marked the shifting zeitgeist, inextricably connecting Jewish medical work in Palestine with a nationalist perspective. When celebrating the graduation of three Sephardi Jews from the St. Joseph medical faculty in 1909, Ha-Herut underlined their proficiency in and love for written and spoken Hebrew. In 1913, the Jerusalem daily was preaching to the choir as Zionist doctors had earlier sought to unite and institutionalize Jewish health services for the expanding settlement. First attempts to form a society had already been initiated in 1906 by Beham while visiting Palestine, and other prominent Jewish doctors. Two meetings (1909, 1911) followed Beham’s call but an association was not officially established in Jaffa until 1912. The Jerusalemite doctors established the Hebrew-Speaking Doctors’ Association (Agudat rof’im medabre ‘ivrit) in 1913. Several doctors, Dr. Wallach presumably being the most vocal, protested against the differentiation and alienation from other doctors but it was decided that only Hebrew-speaking doctors could join the society. Dr. Wallach’s protest was an exception that proved the rule. The Orthodox German was a well-respected doctor, but also highly controversial amongst the Jewish community. Wallach was a friend of Canaan and appointed him for a brief period as interim head of Sha’are Tzeder Hospital, but he was also harshly criticized for this relationship, and for preferring a Christian over Jewish colleagues.

The two associations cooperated before the War, but unification was achieved only after it. Both Zionist associations gave great importance to the use of Hebrew although most members had very limited knowledge of the language. The language used in meetings was usually Russian and the minutes were written in Russian, but the Jaffa association published a journal in Hebrew:

123 Ha-Ahdut, 20 June 1913.
125 Ha-Herut, 12 November 1909.
126 Moria, 17 January 1913.
127 Ha-Herut, 18 July 1913; Hazfira, 3 August 1913.
Our association is a medical union (histadrut medizinit) operating in a country without a university or other medical institutions, in a country where neither the government nor any private initiative has done anything to enquire about its condition and its inhabitants’ medical and sanitary conditions. This is why we need to take this work of enquiry about the country on ourselves [...]

In 1912, the Jaffa association listed 18 members from Jaffa, the colonies (moshavot) and Tiberias, out of roughly 40 Jewish doctors in Palestine.

At the association’s ninth meeting, the ophthalmologist Dr. Dov Karinkin stated the importance of “Hebrew doctors” (rof’im ʿivriyim) “and not just Jewish doctors,” while supporting the idea of a medical faculty in Palestine. In fact, members of the association did treat Arab patients and were committed to a humanitarian, albeit their (settler) colonial, calling. However, they also invested energies in an association that excluded non-Jewish doctors with a central aim of instrumentalizing medicine for an exclusivist national project. The First Trachoma Congress provides a fine example to this conflict of interest. The three-day event was convened in Jerusalem on 31 March 1914, and included 25 Jewish doctors and Hebrew teachers from across Palestine. Focusing primarily on the Jewish colonies and Hebrew schools, the conference also discussed the importance of treatment for the Arab population. Dr. Bruenn stated that this was grounded in a moral motivation (meniʿa musari) but could also increase support amongst the Arabs. One of the conference’s resolutions stated that “treatment for trachoma would be given to the entire population without differentiating on the basis of religion or nationality.” The non-Jewish population, however, especially their professional input, were excluded from the debate, thereby crystallizing the exclusivist nature of the Zionist medical project. On the eve of the War, Jewish doctors were seeking first and foremost to play their role in the national effort while (also) healing the natives.

CONCLUSION

Late Ottoman Jerusalem was a city in transition, a space of diverse social, cultural, and political trends, led by a multitude of local and foreign actors and institutions, often with a different if not conflicting image of the city’s future. These trends make it hard to give a comprehensive evaluation of the various developments and conflicts that characterized the final decades of Ottoman rule over the city. In terms of medical history, late Ottoman Jerusalem was a site of potential and chance. Waves of cholera led to the establishment of new neighborhoods and put pressure on the municipal and state administrations to regulate the city’s cleanliness and sanitation. As we have seen, the capacity of local medical institutions to confront challenges improved considerably during the final decades of the 19th century, but this was mainly applicable in Jerusalem, while the rest of the Mutasarrifiyya remained highly vulnerable from a medical point of view. The city saw the rise of a burgeoning public sphere that engaged seriously with health matters and a developing local professional class: doctors and state institutions that gradually assumed responsibility over public health. The health discourse in the local press articulated the dramatic change in conceptualizing urban space, its design and regulations. Civil servants became accountable for their deeds or misdeeds, and every improvement was followed by further needs, demands, and criticism over implementation. This discourse helped to channel energies towards health issues, but also highlighted the challenges and limitations involved.

Missionary hospitals, although ostensibly created for the public good, were aesthetic symbols of a modern healthy urban society; in reality they underlined the state’s inability to create a sustainable healthcare infrastructure.


135 The meeting was held on 12 July 1912: Zichronot Dvarim 1/1 (1912), pp. 46–48.

The proliferation of medical institutions and services, the embodiment of urban modernity, gained a central presence in the city’s public spaces. For the Arabs and Jews, surrounded by foreign hospitals and treated by foreign doctors, becoming a doctor now represented an occupational nahda or thiya (renaissance in Arabic and Hebrew), and they sought to take their place in a developing medical market that was dominated by foreigners. For Jerusalemites, the medical faculties of Beirut and Europe were much more appealing than those of Istanbul, which further limited the hegemony of the Ottoman state over professional training and the spread of medical knowledge. This also emphasized the regional dependence on foreign institutions in matters that the state considered essential.

This was also the case with the Municipal Hospital. For the municipality it was a definite historical achievement, as the city was now actively healing its inhabitants. Nevertheless, this achievement hardly reached the goal of turning the municipality into a central provider of health services in the city. After the hospital’s establishment, the city witnessed increasing cross-denominational cooperation between doctors who shared a professional calling that transcended their faith or origin. This cooperation, however, was not and could not be centrally institutionalized by the state or the municipality. Doctors cooperated when it served their colonial, national, or denominational purposes, and their joint ventures were overshadowed by the greater interest in stake.

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This chapter on modern medicine in late Ottoman Jerusalem builds on previous works on the city and the period. It includes archival and secondary sources in Ottoman Turkish, French, English, Arabic, and Hebrew and draws on the local and non-local Hebrew and Arabic press. Hebrew newspapers published in Jerusalem or Europe from the 1860s onward often provide unique first-hand accounts of events. The newspapers published by the Jewish community in Jerusalem enjoyed a unique freedom and autonomy from the Ottoman authorities, which resulted in a vibrant journalistic scene.

The Arabic press emerged in Jerusalem and Palestine only after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the lifting of the decades-long Hamidian censorship. This change immediately prompted the founding of several local newspapers and attracted an expanding urban readership. Earlier reports on Palestine and Jerusalem can be found in Beirut newspapers such as *Lisan al-Hal*, which began publishing in 1877. However, local stories, intrigues, intercommunal and cross-denominational relationships tend to be found solely in the local press. Newspapers reported on health problems and treatments, inaugurations of institutions, and work done by doctors and administrators, but also helped establish a shared urban vocabulary in which medicine, health, and sanitation played a central role. Thus, by juxtaposing the Arabic and Hebrew press, this chapter synthesizes a range of voices and actors into a cohesive history of local modern medicine. Analysis of the Arabic and Hebrew press by tracing responses and views on the same events and issues, also sheds light on the complexities and contradictions that characterized late Ottoman Jerusalem’s public arena.

The Arabic and Hebrew press can be read and researched through the search engine at The National Library of Israel. The project combines the collections of OCRed Palestinian Arabic press and the Hebrew press from the 1800s into the late 1900s. More newspapers in Arabic from earlier periods can be found in the East View Global Press Archive, a project initiated by the Stanford Libraries and the Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

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GLOSSARY

Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909)
see Hamidian Period

Ad Hoc Financing
A term used in this book to refer to the Ottoman method of covering the costs of infrastructural developments or state services by imposing localized tariffs or tolls on the movement of people and goods, such as on bridges and roads, or trade in certain commodities, the use of a local pier, etc. These levies differed from conventional taxes in that the revenues collected were earmarked for a specific project rather than being lumped together with other taxes in the state treasury.

ağa (T; A agha)
Ottoman official title bestowed on military leaders.

arzuhalci (T, petition and letter writers)
The arzuhalcis were professional petition and letter writers. They positioned themselves at the entrance to Ottoman post and telegraph offices, in markets or cafes, and provided their services to the general public in return for payment. Little is known about their social background or training. They were literate individuals, although they did not necessarily have formal training, who did not emerge from the higher echelons of society. For the most part, they were private local people, perhaps retired scribes who had formerly worked in the Ottoman bureaucracy and had mastered the art of writing, were familiar with Ottoman law and bureaucratic practices, and knew Ottoman Turkish or one of the languages spoken in the Empire's provinces. In major cities such as Cairo and Istanbul, they had their own guild. Petitioners needed their services in order to be certain that their petition was worded in a way that would be acceptable to the imperial center. Hence, the services of petition writers were not restricted to the illiterate. They wrote on stamped paper, the equivalent of a state tax.

ashraf (A; T eşraf)
Descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. In many Ottoman cities the ashraf were organized under a head whose title was nekibüleşraf (T).

athman (A)
Literally “eights,” the eight administrative districts of Damascus.

ayan (A; T ayan or eşraf)
A collective term mostly used for the Muslim local elite, but occasionally also for Christian and Jewish dignitaries and the European nobility.

bab (A)
Gate, city gate.

baika (A)
Warehouse.

barid (A)
The Mamluk-era postal route network between Damascus and Cairo.

başkatib (T)
Head clerk or secretary in the Shari'a court or in a government office.

bayyara (A)
Irrigated plantation. The term is derived from Arabic bir, well. It is especially common in the context of late Ottoman Palestine, where it is often synonymous with 'citrus grove.' It can also designate a farmstead or manor house on such a plantation.

belediye (T; A baladiyya)
The formal municipality was an innovation of the Ottoman reform period and was designed to streamline various local institutions and traditions of urban governance into a standardized form modelled on European, mainly French, examples. The revised version of the Ottoman Provincial Code of 1871 provided the legal foundation for the
operation of the municipalities. The Ottoman Municipal Law was approved in 1877. The newly created municipalities in the Ottoman provinces, headed by a mayor (belè-diyer reʾisi), did not always constitute a radical break in the cities’ urban administration, but rather formulated and regulated many duties that were customarily carried out at the local level. In the District of Jerusalem, for example, a total of ten cities founded a municipality of their own between the 1860s and World War I.

Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria)
A term frequently used in Ottoman studies to refer to the geographic region today comprising the countries and territories of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank. The region is also often referred to in the literature as the Levant, a term coined in medieval Europe. Bilad al-Sham did not constitute a separate province or administrative region and was under the jurisdiction of several different provinces whose borders changed periodically, but primarily the Province of Damascus.

Capitulations (A, Timtiyazat)
Bilateral treaties between the Ottoman Empire and various European states, granting their citizens extra-territorial privileges. The capitulations, which started as a privilege the Empire granted to European merchants in the 16th century, later became a symbol of the weak position of the Ottoman vis-à-vis the European powers.

dar (A)
Residence, also used for “family.”

diwān (A)
Reception hall of a notable or shaykh; see also majlis.

dunam (T dönüm)
The main unit of land measurement in the Ottoman Empire, equal to 919 square meters. In the Empire’s inheriting states, a dunam consists of 1,000 square meters.

düstur (T; A dustur)
Code of state laws introduced after the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms.

Échelles du Levant (Fr.)
Principal Ottoman port cities where European traders enjoyed the privileges of the Ottoman capitulations regime. The term is derived from the stairways or rope ladders—literally échelles—that were slung down from steamships to local boats to off-load cargo and passengers. The Ottoman term iskele comes from the same Latin root but connotes the modest landing point of a pier, a ladder-like object lying flat on the water’s surface.
**efendi (T)**
Honorary title often given to 'ulama’, notables, and officials.

**Egyptian Rule (1832–1840)**
During most of the 1830s, Bilad al-Sham was controlled by Egyptian forces, who invaded the region under the leadership of Ibrahim, the adopted son of Muhammad 'Ali, the governor of Egypt. Taking advantage of Ottoman weakness, the Egyptians forces penetrated deep into Anatolia. Although brief, since it ended with the Egyptian defeat at the hands of the European powers and the return of Ottoman rule to the region in 1841, this period was marked by the introduction of major reforms in many areas of governance. As part of the agreement to end the crisis in the region, Muhammad 'Ali was granted the Inheritance Firman from the Ottoman Sultan in 1841, which gave him and his descendants the right to govern Egypt under Ottoman sovereignty.

**Euergetism**
As defined by the French historians André Boulanger and Paul Veyne, euergetism means the practice of high-status and wealthy individuals to aspire to the status of a “benefactor” (Greek *euergetes*) by distributing part of their wealth to a community, be it a particular group of clients or the city as a whole.

**fez**
see *tarbush*

**ghurfat al-majlis**
The main reception room or sitting room in late-19th century houses in Bilad al-Sham. See also *majlis*.

**GIS**
Geographic information system (GIS) technology allows historians to present maps and aerial photos in the form of layers that can be annotated and overlaid as needed. It also enables the creation of interactive digital maps, which are an important “add on” to the toolbox of historians dealing with urban history, and makes it possible to reframe data derived from written sources in new ways that lead to new insights with regard to the importance of space and place.

**Greater Syria**
see *Bilad al-Sham*

**hajj (A; T hac)**
Pilgrimage to Mecca.

**hajj (A; T haci)**
Honorific title denoting someone who made the hajj pilgrimage.

**hakura (A)**
Enclosed compound or garden.

**hamam (T; A hammam)**
Public bath.

**Hamidian Period**
Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), was the last Ottoman sultan to hold actual power, since the sultans who followed him were only figureheads. He was an autocratic ruler who suspended the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, censored the press and forbade any form of political activity or opposition. This, in addition to his acts of violent repression against the Armenian population, earned him a negative reputation. Yet the modernization of the Empire continued under his rule and in Bilad al-Sham the Hamidian period is widely remembered as a period of peace and prosperity. Abdülhamid II was stripped of his powers after the Young Turk Revolution in the summer of 1908 and was dethroned and exiled from Istanbul after a failed counterrevolution in the spring of 1909.

**hane (T)**
Household; taken as a fiscal unit for taxation and population counts.

**hara (A)**
A “neighborhood” or “street;” sometimes coterminous with an administrative unit in a city (see *mahalle*), sometimes a local designation for a certain area; see also *sokak*.

**haram (A)**
Holy sanctuary or precinct.

**harem (T, also haremlık; A harim, haremlik)**
Private quarters of a household.

**Hanafi School of Law**
One of four Sunni Muslim schools of law, which was the dominant school in the Ottoman Empire.

**havş (A, also sahn)**
Courtyard, central court of a house; also used to designate a residential block in some regions of Bilad al-Sham.

**hikr (A)**
Long-term, lease.

**ihtiyariye (T)**
A council of elders, administrative council
on the level of a neighborhood or rural district (nahiye).

**İltizam (T, A)**

Tax-farming, a system of revenue collection. Taxation rights had been delegated by the Ottoman state to holders (see múltezim) since the 15th century. The practice was officially abolished in the framework of the Tanzimat reforms and public officials were supposed to collect taxes instead of the múltezims, but in effect continued to exist in many places until the end of the Ottoman era.

**imam**

Prayer leader; also a term for the leader of a Muslim community.

**Imperial Port**

A term used in this book to characterize Ottoman port cities. It is analytical rather than descriptive. Defining a coastal city as an imperial port highlights the inter-dependence between micro-scale events, figures and institutions, and broader themes of international relations, imperial regulations and policies, and state ideologies.

**In-Between Spaces**

Loci where the private and the public, the domestic and the urban intersect, e.g. reception halls in private homes, residential cul-de-sacs, department stores or balconies.

**iwan (A; T eyvan)**

Vaulted courtyard, often located on the first or second floor.

**Janissaries**

In the time period discussed in this volume, the Janissaries were to a large extent an armed militia that was well integrated into the urban fabric. As a major fighting body, they were dissolved following Sultan Mahmut II action against them in 1826, an event which came to be called “the Auspicious Incident.” They were originally an elite infantry force armed with firearms which was recruited in the framework of the devşirme (levy of young Christian boys who went through special training and served in the Ottoman army, palace and bureaucracy), and led the Ottoman army to great achievements during the 15th-17th centuries.

**Jerusalemite Newspapers and Jerusalemite Health**

From the final decades of the 19th century, Jerusalem had its own newspaper market. Newspapers in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish were already being printed in the 1870s, but an independent Palestinian press was only established after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the lifting of Hamidian censorship. In contrast, Hebrew newspapers were of less concern to the censor, given the very small size of the Jewish community (yishuv). The first Hebrew papers were published in Jerusalem in the 1860s, and several Hebrew dailies were printed there from the turn of the century. Reports on matters of health and sanitation were published on an almost daily basis, celebrating or criticizing the municipal or state institutions’ ability to improve living conditions. In this way, they influenced the local administration’s action or inaction. Turning Jerusalem, an Ottoman provincial capital, into a modern, clean and healthy space served the best interests of the local governor (mutasarrıf), mayor and most importantly the city’s inhabitants. Although this vision was printed and articulated in different languages, mainly Arabic or Hebrew, it was one shared by all Jerusalemites.

**jirina (A)**

An open market, for example for the sale of grain, in cities in Bilad al-Sham. The term also denotes a tax levied on transactions in urban markets.

**jizya (A; T cizye)**

Poll tax for non-Muslims.

**kadi (T; A qadi)**

Judge and notary; official title given to judges sitting in the central Islamic court of a province or district; also used unofficially for naibs and judges applying customary law.

**kapıcıbaşı (T)**

Chief of the palace gatekeepers, a position that effectively regulated access to the vali.

**Kaymakam (T; A qa‘immaqam)**

Governor of a subdistrict or kaza.

**Kaza (T; A qadda)**

Subdistrict, administrative subdivision of a district as defined by the Ottoman Provincial Code.

**khan**

A multi-function building that served as warehouse and trading place for goods as well as providing accommodation for the traders and stabling for the animals. Often,
a khan dealt with only one kind of goods, such as oil or textiles.

**khatib (A; T hatib)**
Preacher, a religious functionary who delivers the Friday sermon or **khutba**.

**khayal al-zill (A)**
Shadow play.

**kurus (T; A qurush, sing. qirsh)**
Ottoman piaster.

**madrasa (A; T medrese)**
Islamic school or college.

**mahalle (T; A mahalla)**
‘Neighborhood’ as an administrative unit in Ottoman cities; also used for neighborhoods that did not form administrative units. The **mahalle** was the basic division employed by the Ottoman authorities in population registers. Below this level, there were numerous sub-neighborhoods (in Arabic mostly **hara** or **zuqaq**, the latter meaning literally a “street”). **Mahalle**s often had a specific social profile, but were not homogeneous and could reflect social diversity.

**majlis (A)**
Reception hall of a notable or **shaykh**; sometimes used in the sense of ‘literary salon’; see also **diwan**.

**Mamluks**
During the period discussed in this volume, the term denoted slaves with special military and administrative skills who formed part of elite households in the Ottoman Empire. The purchase of **mamluks** from the Caucasus region by high-ranking Ottoman officials and local strongmen had been a common practice in the Ottoman Empire since the end of the 16th century. During the 18th century, Georgian **mamluks** became particularly prominent. The practice was discontinued around the middle of the 19th century.

**masbana (A, pl. masabin)**
Soap factory.

**meclis-i idare (T; A majlis al-idara)**
Administrative Council of a district or sub-district as defined by the Ottoman Provincial Code.

**meclis-i umumi (T; A majlis ‘umumi)**
General Council of a province as defined by the Ottoman Provincial Code.

**Medical Doctors**
Doctors with modern medical training could be found in the main cities of Palestine and Syria from the early 19th century. The vast majority of Jerusalem’s medical personnel until World War I were of European descent and either Jewish or Christian, trained in European universities. The local community had its own share in the local professional medical community as the city’s elite sent its sons to the medical faculties in the region. European training was appealing, but Beirut’s two medical faculties, that of the Syrian Protestant College (est. 1866) and St. Joseph’s University (est. 1883) were the most popular choices. Some also graduated from Istanbul’s Imperial Medical School (est. in 1827).

**mesken (T)**
‘Dwelling’ with a serial number, as defined for the purposes of the Ottoman census of 1905.

**miri (T)**
A term for the category of state-owned land in Ottoman land law. **Miri** was agricultural land that was leased from the government on condition of use and payment of a tax. **Miri** rights could be transferred to heirs, and the land could be sublet to tenants. If the owner died without an heir or the land was not cultivated for three years, the land would revert to the government.

**Missionary and Jewish Hospitals in late Ottoman Jerusalem**
From the mid-19th century until the eve of World War I, Jerusalem witnessed the establishment of around 18 modern hospitals. Missionary hospitals represented another realm of Western power projection and colonial influence during the period of Ottoman reform. Around 12 hospitals were established by British, French, German, Russian and other missionary endeavors. These hospitals mainly treated the local Arab urban elite who could afford medical care, but also offered free treatment to the city’s poor. Fearful of Christian influence through medical treatment, the Jewish leadership increased the establishment of Jewish hospitals with the help of foreign capital. Thus, although Muslims and Christians were treated in Jewish hospitals and Jews were treated in missionary hospitals, medical care remained by and large segregated. Established in 1891, the Municipal Hospital was the only state/municipal run hospital operating in Jerusalem. Treating mostly the
city and its periphery's poor Muslim community.

mutür (T; A müdür)
Director of a nahiye.

müftü (A; T müftü)
Jurisconsult authorized to give rulings (fatwas) on questions of Islamic law (Sharia).

muhtar (T; A mukhtar)
A generic title for a representative of a village, a neighborhood, a tribal group or another community vis-a-vis the Ottoman government. With the Ottoman reforms in the 19th century, the muhtar as neighborhood headman became a universal institution in urban governance and was, in certain respects, the lowest ranking official in the Ottoman bureaucracy at this time. The institution of the muhtarship (Turk. muhtarlık) was first tried out in Istanbul in 1829, extended to several provinces during the 1830s, and generalized by the Vilayet Law of 1864. A given community of more than 20 households had two muhtars. They were elected locally every year and confirmed by the sub-district governor (kaymakam). Whenever these categories overlapped, several muhtars served in one locality. For example, if a neighborhood was composed of Muslim and Greek Orthodox inhabitants, there would be a neighborhood muhtar plus a muhtar representing the local Greek Orthodox. If a village was subdivided into separate neighborhoods and/or ethno-religious communities, each was represented by its own muhtar. Their duties and competences were varied and far-reaching. They controlled the movement of citizens, issued certificates of good conduct, announced new government laws and regulations, and oversaw taxation, conscription, street cleaning and budgeting on the neighborhood level. In particular, they communicated all kinds of information to the authorities.

mültezim (T; A multazim)
A holder of an iltizam, who was at the same time a financial risk-taker. The mültezim collected taxes on behalf of the Ottoman state, paid fixed annual sums to the state, and was allowed to keep profits beyond the promised amount for himself.

mutasarrif (T; A mutasarrifiyə)
District governor.

mutasarrıflık (T; A mutasarrıfigiya)
District in an Ottoman province as defined by the Ottoman Provincial Code, the same as sancak and liva.

mütesellim (T; A mutassallim)
Ottoman deputy governor appointed by the provincial governor (vali) to administer a provincial district, prior to the Tanzimat reforms.

Nahda
The period of renewal of Arabic literature, language and thought during the 19th century, often translated as “renaissance” or “awakening.” It is also the period when print replaced manuscripts as the main literary medium, the first Arabic newspapers and journals were founded, and the foundations were laid for a new education system and for what is known today as Modern Standard Arabic. Exponents of the Nahda movement played leading roles in all these fields.

nahiye (T; A nahiya)
Rural district, administrative subdivision of a subdistrict or kaza.

naʿib (A)
Judge at an Islamic court in a subdistrict; see also kadi.

naqib al-ashraf (A; T nakibüleşraf)
Administrative head of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in a certain locality.

Nodal Points
Defined by Marc Hufty (2011) as “the physical or virtual interfaces where problems, processes, actors, and norms converge.”

Notables
Following Albert Hourani’s seminal 1968 article, notables are defined as intermediaries between the Ottoman central government and specific segments of the local population. They typically came from elite families who controlled much of the city’s resources and influenced political life decisively. A scholarly and/or religious status, a military

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background, but most importantly financial resources, were crucial aspects determining the notable status. ʿUlamaʾ, local military leaders, and members of land-owning or merchant households have accordingly been distinguished as sub-groups.

**nūfus defteri (T)**
Census or population register.

**nuqud al-mahalla (A)**
Cash waqf of a (sub-)neighborhood.

**Official Gazette**
The Official Gazette was the Ottoman state’s newspaper informing state officials and the public of new state regulations, projects, palace and government decisions, significant events, and new appointments. Often, it also contained general news and articles. The Empire’s official gazette *Takvim-i Vekayi*, which was disseminated from Istanbul, was published between 1831 and 1922 in Ottoman Turkish and French. Most provinces had their own local official gazettes as well, starting in the 1860s, in Ottoman Turkish and often in the vernacular languages. Within Bilad al-Sham, official gazettes were published in Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. In the Province of Jerusalem, the official gazette *Kudüs-i Şerif* in Ottoman Turkish and Arabic was published since 1904 and ran until 1915.

**Ottoman ‘Old Regime’**
In an analogy with French periodization, several historians of the Ottoman Empire have taken up the term ‘old regime’ (*ancien régime*) to characterize the whole set of political concepts and practices that had emerged in the Ottoman Empire by the 18th century and that were critically reviewed, adapted or abolished during the Tanzimat period.

**Ottoman Provincial Code of 1864 / Vilayet Law (Vilayet Nizamnamesi)**
One of the major reforms introduced in the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era that regulated and reformed the way the administration and bureaucracy operated at the local level in the Empire’s provinces (*vilayet* in the singular), at the village, neighborhood, city, sub-district, and district/province levels. A revised version of the Vilayet Law was introduced in 1871.

**Paşa (T)**
Official title for those occupying the most elevated ranks of the civil and military hierarchy.

**Poles**
Defined by Attilio Petruccioli (2007) as “exceptional points” in the urban tissue that are “either hubs of activity or symbolic areas.”

**Production of Space**
As defined by Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991) in his seminal work *The Production of Space (La production de l’espace)*, Paris, 1974), the term denotes a concept of space as a socially produced medium.

**Public Space**
The notion of urban public space can be traced back to ancient Greece, where public space was defined as the place of citizenship, in which public affairs and legal disputes were conducted. However, as Don Mitchell points out,³ this definition also underscored another characteristic of the public space, as the meeting place of those in power, and the exclusion of all those who are not part of the “public,” such as women, slaves, and foreigners. This original definition already contains the kernel of one of the basic tensions within public space; namely, the question of inclusion and exclusion of certain social, religious, and ethnic groups. A public space should theoretically enable encounters between individuals and groups who would not otherwise meet. Struggles for the inclusion of certain groups in the public space have created a counter-trend where marginal groups use the space to claim their rights. Hence, public spaces can take on symbolic as well as practical meanings through a process of negotiation between different groups, suggesting that the practical and symbolic usage of space can be negotiated and changed. Islamic jurists define the public road or thoroughfare (*atariq*) as a public space that is accessible to every passerby.

**Qabaday (A)**
An informal term for a neighborhood strongman.

**Qasr (A)**
A versatile term that can denote a palace, a

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stately mansion, or a rural summerhouse, as well as a reception room.

**Quarantine**

The quarantine system was a method of preventing the spread of infectious diseases by forcing continental or maritime travelers to halt their movement for a predetermined period of time before heading to different regions. By the mid-19th century, the rise in steamship travel made the spread of plague and cholera a global concern. The Ottoman Empire, like European countries, set up quarantine stations along its shores and on its land borders. The government established a quarantine station in Gaza in the 1840s as the southern entry point to Bilad al-Sham for passengers from Egypt and the Hijaz. Since many land and maritime international trade routes crisscrossed the Ottoman Empire, quarantine regulations that delayed travelers and goods had a considerable impact on the political and economic relations of the Empire with its European counterparts, especially the British Empire.

**sabil** (A; T sebil)

The Arabic term *sabil* (literally “way, path”) designates various types of public fountains found across the Ottoman Empire and North Africa from the 11th century onwards. While their architectural appearance may vary significantly depending on location and period, they share the common purpose of supplying free water to the public as part of a particularly pious and esteemed act of charity for God’s sake (*fi sabil Allah*). Endowed by the financially able, such as sultans, local notables, or Sufi shaykhs, *sabil* could serve a number of purposes, such as the display of the donor’s religious devotion or his/her faithfulness to the ruler. However, they could also be instrumental to a political agenda and stand as a statement, especially when constructed as part of a complex alongside other elements such as mosques, *suqs* or public baths, thus reshaping the urban landscape. Regarding their function, a distinction can be made between mural self-service fountains (T *çeşme*), where people could access the water directly from the tap, and fountains where the thirsty were served by an employee (T *sebil*, often built as stand-alone structures). A particular variant of the latter type evolved in Cairo, the *sabil-kuttab*, which combined the *sabil* on the ground floor with a boys’ school located on the floor above. With the implementation of modern water infrastructure from the 19th century onwards, water became a commodity within reach of (theoretically) every household and *sabil* gradually became obsolete.

**sakna (A, pl. saknat)**

A rural suburb. The term was especially common in the coastal plains of late Ottoman Palestine. In Jaffa, it was used to denote a number of new settlements around the city center which were established during the 19th century. Many of them were founded by rural migrants, often from Egypt, who were employed in the booming plantation economy.

**salname (T)**

Ottoman administrative yearbook.

**sancak**

see *mutasarrıflık*

**saqiya** (A)

Water-raising device similar to a scoop wheel, also used for a well operated by this device.

**saray (T)**

Government house, palace, mansion.

**sayyid** (A; T *seyyid*)

Honorary title preceding names of descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (*esraf* / *ashraf*).

**şeyhülislam (T; A shaykh al-Islam)**

The chief mufti of Istanbul and of the entire Ottoman Empire, who appointed *inter alia* the chief judges in the provinces and supervised the religious educational institutions.

**Sharia Court** (*mahkama al-shar’iyya, mahkama*)

Shari’a courts, led by a *kadi*, were found throughout the Ottoman Empire and served as the main judicial institution in the Ottoman provinces. Until the reforms of the 19th century, the courts ruled according to the *Sharia* as well as the *kanun* (Sultanic Law). The *Sharia* court rulings were recorded in *sijills* (notebooks), which included summaries of decisions made by the *kadi*, orders from Istanbul, notary certificates issued by the court, and other court documents. Until the end of the 19th century, no detailed protocols of the *Sharia* court proceedings were written down, only summaries of the
cases and decisions. Because there were *Shariʿa* courts all over the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years, and many *sijill* s were preserved, they constitute a very important source for the study of legal practices, social and cultural phenomena, the monetary system, and other affairs, and can be used for comparative studies of different geographical areas and eras.

**shaykh (A; T şeyh)**
A title given to ʿulama and heads of families, tribal groups, and other communities, such as *shaykh al-hara* (the head of the neighborhood). Following the Tanzimat reforms many of these duties were replaced by elected *muhtar* s.

**Shrine (A mazar, maqam)**
The tomb of a Prophet or Muslim saintly figure (often a Sufi shaykh) that is the site of pious visitations or pilgrimages (*ziyaras*).

**sijill (A, pl. sijillat)**
A record of an Islamic Shariʿa court hearing concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, or trade. All are well known to historians of the Ottoman era. Numerous studies on the provincial history of the Empire and its social history have been based on *sijill* sources from different regions in the Empire. In several articles in this volume, the *sijillat* provide a perspective on urban dynamics.

**sokak (T; A zuqaq)**
Alley, leading off a main street; see also *hara*.

**Sufi (A sufı)**
Muslim mystic.

**suq (A)**
Market, market street.

**tahrir (T; A)**
Tax survey.

**tahsildar (T; A tahsildar)**
Tax collector.

**taʿifa (A, pl. tawaʾif; T taʿife, tevaʿif)**
In the Ottoman Empire, a generic term for various sorts of 'communities' (including religious groups) or corporations.

**Tanzimat Reforms (1839–1876)**
Literally ‘reorganization’, a period of massive reforms in the Ottoman Empire that lasted almost 30 years and culminated in the approval of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876. Many of these reforms existed on paper alone, whereas others completely changed the features of Ottoman governance. Historians are divided as to whether the initial rationale for the reforms and their source of inspiration was Ottoman, or whether they represented attempts to copy European models and transplant them on Ottoman society and governing system.

**tapu (T; A tabu)**
Ottoman government office for the registration of land and property; also used as a term for the dues to be paid for land and property registration.

**tarbush (A; T fez)**
Headgear of Ottoman officials and of large parts of the male urban population across the Empire. Sultan Mahmud II made the *fez* compulsory for various ranks of Ottoman officials in 1829.

**tariq sultani (A)**
Literally ‘sultanic road,’ generic term for main overland roads in the Ottoman Empire.

**Telegraph**
Although the telegraph was initially installed throughout the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War in the mid-1850s for military and control purposes, within a short span of time it impacted factors as varied as the center’s control over the provinces, the Empire’s technological progress, law, trade, infrastructure, language, the press, and the dissemination of information. Ottoman subjects were able to contact the imperial center much more easily and quickly via the telegraph without the previous geographic or physical barriers. Even when residing in the Empire’s most remote provinces, they could now have direct contact with Istanbul without having to go through the bureaucracy and the local authorities. The only disadvantage was that sending a telegram was much more expensive than sending a letter since a charge was made for each word. Ottoman subjects used the telegraph to express their concerns and grievances, demand justice, and follow up the decision-making process and implementation of decisions locally in a way unprecedented until then, including sending variations of the same petition a number of times. The telegraph, on the other hand, became an effective tool for centralization and a powerful political tool, especially during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909).

**timar (T)**
Tax estates assignment before the Tan-
zimat reforms, granted mainly to members of the Ottoman cavalry in return for their service and call to duty during annual campaigns. The tax estates were per duty and not hereditary. Depending on the size of the tax estate, the timarci (holder of a timar) had to bring a certain number of armed soldiers to battle. The timar system greatly differed from European feudalism as it was temporary and related only to the collection of specific taxes without any other rights or privileges.

ʿulamaʾ (A; Tulemaʾ)
see ʿalim.

Urban Governance
Following Marc Hufty’s definition of governance, urban governance can be understood in a general sense to include all the patterns of social coordination and processes of managing a city.

vali (T; A wali)
Governor of an Ottoman province.

vergi (T, also emlak vergisi).
The arazi ve musakkafat vergisi (better known as vergi, not to be confused with the modern Turkish word for “tax”) was the annual tax introduced as part of the Tanzimat reforms (although it had Islamic roots) on all immovable goods, including agricultural land and buildings. One of the reasons the vergi was a burden was that it was paid in cash and not in kind. The vergi rate varied between 4 and 4.5 per thousand and was supposed to be reevaluated every few years based on land surveys, although in practice such surveys were rather rare.

vilayet (T; A wilaya)
Ottoman province.

waqf (A, pl. awqaf; T vakıf)
Islamic endowment or pious foundation endowed in perpetuity to support a religious or charitable purpose. It might be established for the public good (khayri) or for the benefit of the founder’s family (ahli or dhurri). In many cases endowers preferred the safety of property since endowed properties were not for sale. In either case, endowers were looking for spiritual rewards resulting from making an endowment.

wikala (A)
Trading firm; a term of Egyptian origin, was used mainly in southern Palestine.

World System Theory
A theory developed during the 1970s to study world history as a system of global division of labor. It underscores the intertwined emergence, as of the 15th century, of global peripheries producing raw materials through manual labor and core regions that produce knowledge, manufacture finished products, and accumulate capital. Given their crucial role in connecting peripheries to core regions, port cities in the Ottoman Empire have received much scholarly attention from World System Theorists.

Young Turk Period (1908–1918)
The “Young Turks” is a generic name for the group of Ottoman army officers and bureaucrats who orchestrated a coup against Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1908, after many years of clandestine organization. After the Revolution, they reintroduced the suspended Constitution of 1876, held elections to parliament, which was reconvened, and authorized political activity and a free press. However, the dire situation of the Empire and the series of wars it was involved in during the decade of Young Turk rule soon eroded these measures, which were largely abolished by 1914. The leading body among the Young Turks was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which governed behind the scenes until it took over in early 1913 and led the Empire in its final phase, including the fatal decision to ally with the Central Powers in World War I.

zawiya (A)
Literally meaning “corner,” the term can denote a small public square. However, it is mostly identified with a Sufi lodge (T tekke), which is a building designed for gatherings of a Sufi brotherhood or tariqa and a place for spiritual retreat.

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From the Household to the Wider World provides new insights into urban governance in different cities in Ottoman Palestine and Syria (Bilad al-Sham) during the late Ottoman period, c. 1800–1920. It enriches Ottoman urban studies by viewing cities (not only the major ones that are often discussed in the literature but also peripheral localities) as crucial spaces in which socio-political processes on various scales interact with localized material structures. This outlook addresses the challenges of bridging the divide between text-based studies and the study of material culture, and in so doing maps local cases onto larger historical processes, at the level of the region, the Empire, and global connections.

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