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Crisis management, normality and values

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1. Introduction

When talking about improving crisis prevention and crisis management, we commonly think about further developing the development of technologies and structures. Dams are built higher and in more stable fashion, forecasting and early warning systems are refined and emergency forces are equipped more extensively for new situations. Although technical solutions contribute significantly to improving the way we deal with crises, in the course of improvement it should also be considered whether existing demands and ideas of "good" crisis management are still appropriate. "Appropriateness" as a value-related term refers to the fact that both the problems to be addressed and the measures provided to deal with them are shaped by social values and the result of democratic deliberation. At the centre of this negotiation lies the question: How much are we as a society prepared to invest in crisis management and crisis prevention? The values and assumptions about normality that these negotiations build upon influence what is determined as the goal of crisis management, what is considered a danger, who or what is determined as worthy of protection and who is seen as responsible for implementation processes. These presumptions set the framework for how individuals, organisations or societies act (in crises) and which possibilities for technical further development are perceived.

Along these questions, this article will examine the appropriateness of current crisis management and derive starting points for improvement, especially with regard to crisis prevention in Germany. The focus of this article is on the hypothesis that in the course of a further development crisis management, not only the technical questions but also the underlying values and concepts of normality should be critically scrutinized.

After all, not every technical development automatically represents an improvement. Rather, improvements should bring us closer to realizing our (societal) objectives.

The aim of this article is not to provide a general answer to these questions - the concrete contexts of action are too diverse - but rather to point out and discuss existing concepts of values and normality in current crisis management. At the same time, I argue, that explicit answers to these questions have to be discussed more continuously and explicitely in an ongoing democratic discourse.

The article is divided into six sections. After introducing the underlying understanding of values, concepts of normality as well as crises, four questions are examined more closely: (1) What is the goal of crisis management? (2) What is described as a danger and why? (3) Who or what is (particularly) worth protecting? (4) Who bears responsibility for crisis management? The article concludes by drawing together these considerations in view of the question: How much are we as a society prepared to invest in crisis management and crisis prevention?

2. The importance of values and concepts of normality for thinking about crises

Before looking more closely at value- and normality-related issues in dealing with crises, I will firstly explain what I mean when I speak of values, concepts of normality as well as crises and crisis management.

We constantly encounter values in everyday life. Particularly visible are material values, for example monetary values. On the selling side, the value formulates a target, a price to be achieved. It provides orientation, a value orientation, on how a sales talk should go. The situation is similar with ideational values. Ideational values provide orientation for individual, organisational or societal action; through values we define what we consider desirable. They, too, formulate a goal and allow us to draw conclusions about which action is right or, at least they point us roughly into a direction. Examples of ideational values include freedom, justice, security and efficiency. As these examples suggest, what is understood as a value not only differs depending on the person, organisation or society questioned. The meaning and status of individual values are also up for

discussion. The sum of values of an individual, organisation or societal, as well as the norms, rules and attitudes attached to them are referred to as moral (conceptions) (Wiesing, 2012, p. 23).

Value or moral concepts neither have to be always explicit nor consciously known. Rather, they usually come under scrutiny when uncertainty about how to act in a specific situation prevails (Bayertz, 2004; Gabel, Mühleck, Krause, Schad & Rekowski, forthcoming). In this sense, crises and the challenges they bring can help to stimulate a discussion about values and moral concepts. Such moral uncertainty about the right course of action usually has one of two reasons: Either existing values and moral concepts do not provide sufficient orientation on how to act appropriately in a situation, or existing values and moral concepts come into conflict. The latter can be the case within a given value system or shared values come into conflict with each other. This might be the case, for instance, if one is faced with the question of whether to prioritise preserving freedoms or increasing security in a situation (Koch, 2014). Conflicting values may also arise in between individuals, organisations or societies. In both cases, the discussions on compulsory vaccination in the wake of the pandemic come to mind as an example (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2021).

Reflecting about moral concepts and moral problems is the subject of the discipline of ethics. On the one hand, ethics is concerned with assessing the legitimacy of arguments and associated courses of action in a methodically structured manner. On the other hand, ethics is dedicated to addressing questions such as What kind of world do we want to live in? or What kind of action is acceptable against the background of our values? (Ammicht Quinn, 2014).

To be differentiated but yet closely connected to values and moral concepts, are concepts of normality. Normality is a category designated to order social interaction. In its basic denotation it refers to what is expected or usual. It is defined by the demarcation from the non-normal or the extraordinary (Waldschmidt, 2005). What is considered "normal" also depends on the persons, organisations or societies surveyed and cannot be universally defined. The basis for determining what is "normal" in this sense is always a societal attibution within which experiences, measure-

ments and calculations[1] are established. However, the determination of normality is a social construction, an interpretation of data in line with certain values. In this vein, normality (How is something?) is transformed into normativity (How should something be?) (Waldschmidt, 2005): What ought to be is derived from what is. The reference to "normality" is thus always an instrument of power and may have positive as well as negative consequences (Bigo, 2008).

Such Is-Ought problems are highly controversial within ethics (Pieper, 2007, p. 193). Some argue that empirical facts can inspire value concepts and provide arguments. However, whether something is valuable and desirable is not an empirical but an ethical question. To illustrate what this has to do with the topic of this collection, a brief example might be given: the fact that 10-, 100-, 1000- and 10,000-year floods exist, offers no indication as to which of these events individuals, organisations or societies should prepare for. The latter is, in the best case, based on a democratic debate representing all affected persons.

This brings me back to the understanding of crises and crisis management. In the context of this paper, crises are understood as situations of acute threat to values and living conditions of individuals, organisations or societies in which action to avert a disaster is still possible (see e.g. Boin & Hart, 2007, p. 42). Crisis and disaster management thus describe similar and largely overlapping areas, which, however, assume a different state of emergency.

Hence, with regard to normality, an ambivalent picture emerges. On the one hand, crises represent a break with normality; on the other hand, it is debatable to what extent the occurrence of crises is in itself part of normality (Gross & Weichselgartner, 2015, p. 14). While crises per se cannot be avoided, it can be assumed that specific events such as floods or droughts can be better avoided through technology and strategy, shifting the crisis threshold.

This minimal definition contains two aspects that are of fundamental importance for further consideration: First, that the existence of crises depends on what is determined as normality and what measures are taken

1 "Calculated" suggest a certain degree of objectivity which should be critically scrutinized in three ways: regarding the criterion used for classifying something as normal and its justification, the defined level of distribution in order to be considered normal, and the extent to which survey methods themselves are shaped by presuppositions about what is to be measured or calculated.

in this context; crises are relative. Whether a certain water level is normal depends on the context and the observing entity. What is considered normal for the Nile River, would be understood as an extreme event of possibly catastrophic proportions in Germany due to previous experience and geographical circumstances. Second, crises have a societal history. Depending on what an individual, an organisation or a society sets as normality, and depending on the measures that are taken along with it, an event that takes place may or may not constitute a crisis, and a crisis may or may not become a catastrophe, respectively.

Based on these understandings, various value- and normality-related nuances of the question "What and how much are we as a society prepared to invest in prevention, preparedness and management?" are considered in the following section.

3. What is determined as the goal of crisis management?

The quality of any improvement in crisis management must be measured by the extent to which it meets the overarching goal of crisis management. But what is the goal of crisis management? This question may seem baffling at first glance, since it appears to be established that it is concerned with the successful prevention of, provision for, management of and recovery from crises. However, if considerig more closely the developments and findings of disaster research over the past 50 years, it becomes clear that there is more than one interpretation of the above description and, consequently, what might be considered good prevention of, provision for, management of and recovery from crisis.

Sociologist Kathleen Tierney, for example, argues for an increased understanding of disasters – although this seems to be applicable to crises, as well – as co-constructed and co-produced in recent decades (Tierney, 2019, p. 66). By co-construction, Tierney refers to the observation that what counts as a disaster is not simply given, but is socially (especially politically) determined (Pohlmann, 2015). Depending on the observer, one and the same event can be described as an extreme event, a crisis or a disaster. For instance, the Covid-19 pandemic was only declared a disaster in one out of the sixteen German states, Bavaria (Bayerische Staatsregierung, 2020). In this sense, it is not simply the quantifiable level, the

extent, the damage or the number of victims that makes an event a crisis or disaster. What counts as a crisis or a disaster is in fact a societal, a political decision by which necessities for certain actions and priorities are determined. This decision depends on previous experiences, associated notions of normality as well as societal values. In addition, speaking of crises and disasters depicts a special existential threat which to overcome demands extraordinary measures and a special political scope for action and thus entails legitimising potential for political action (Wæver, 1995).

The hypothesis of a societal co-production of crises and disasters also points to a societal co-responsibility for the emergence of crises and disasters, which becomes manifest in at least two ways. On the one hand, co-responsibility stems from contributory negligence. Examples include accidents involving high-risk technologies (such as nuclear power plants) or the increase in extreme events as a result of human-made climate change (Guyer, 2019). On the other hand, societal co-responsibility refers to insufficient societal action.

Here, the concept of vulnerability is of crucial importance. Simply speaking, vulnerability describes the susceptibility of an entity to a danger (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon & Davis, 2004). With regard to crisis management, the concept of vulnerability represents the conviction that crises and disasters do not necessarily follow from specific (natural) events, but are the result of an interaction between manifesting hazards and more or less vulnerable societal structures (Birkmann, 2008, p. 6; Gabel, 2019; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon & Davis, 2004, p. 10).

Three key implications follow from this argument: First, that crises and disasters do not "simply" result from events, but that it depends on the person, organisation or society facing an event. Depending on their (lack of) capacities, which arise from the interplay of existing characteristics as well as the type and degree of prevention and preparedness measures, crises and disasters can (not) be avoided effectively. Against the backdrop of this argument, the United Nations Sendai Framework has shifted the international objective towards reducing the risk of disasters (UN-ISDR, 2015).

Second, the argument of being able to influence vulnerability raises the question of needing to influence or even having to influence, which refers to the question when and where crisis management should take place. For decades, disaster research in particular has argued that crises and

disasters reinforce disadvantages and vulnerabilities that already exist in everyday life. Thus, disaster research emphasises the need to think of crises and disasters from the perspective of everyday actions (Dombrowsky & Brauner, 1996). People, organisations or even societies that are already struggling with existential problems in everyday life will very likely be less well equipped to prevent crises and disasters. They will be less able to take precautions and thus struggle to respond. However, social policy and crisis management are still very much separate spheres, both with regard to concrete tasks and the responsibility of various actors (Gabel, 2019).

A third implication regarding the goal of crisis management arises in respect to the concept of resilience. Due to the absence of a universal definition, resilience here is understood as the ability of an entity (e.g. people, animals, organisations, societies) to survive crises and disasters. Unlike protective measures against extreme events, which is the focus of security action, resilience aims at building capacities to deal with manifesting extreme events (Krüger, 2019a). Resilience embodies the view that not every threat event can be avoided. Resilience therefore should be understood as complementary to "classical" security action (Krüger, 2019b, p. 59), which additionally has to be improved as part of crisis management.[2]

Finally, in approaching all these questions, one should also critically reflect on societal narratives of crisis and disaster (Horn, 2010). For example, the argument that not everyone can be saved in crises and disasters can be mentioned here. Although such statements may be true in retrospect, it is problematic to (un)consciously turn them into a goal and to rashly "accept" casualties .

4. What is described as a danger and why?

Closely related to the question on the goal of crisis management is the question of which dangers are to be considered, prevented or overcome for the purpose of crisis management. This question contains at least two dimensions: What is described as a danger? What does a danger mean for whom?

2 Against this backdrop, resilience cannot simply be understood as the opposite of vulnerabililty. Considering vulnerability as multidimensional, an entity can be vulnerable in one regard butresilient in another. Such an understanding is helpful to counteract a tendency to render abilities invisible in light of existing vulnerabilities.

With regard to the first question, considering the co-construction of crises and disasters, it might be agued that extreme events, crises and disasters are patterns of interpretation which may differ between societies and within societies. Whether and in what way an event or an entity is considered a danger is a political question which mostly refers but not necessarily corresponds with a real threat scenario. For example, the topic of migration is worth mentioning here. On the one hand, recently there has been a renewed increase in arguments describing migration as a danger that is not only to be prevented using security measures, but also through civil protection measures (Baumann, Lorenz & Rosenow, 2011). On the other hand, the insecurity of refugees and their vulnerability are increasingly at risk of taking a back seat (McDonald, 2016). Moreover, any talk about preventing or overcoming dangers reflects a more-or-less appropriate prioritisation, depending on the situation. Examples for this are not only the insufficient counter-measures taken in response to the threat of a pandemic caused by a Corona virus which had been extensively described since 2012 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012; Mukerji & Mannino, 2020). In light of the ongoing climate crisis, hazards such as forest fires and draughts are increasingly manifesting in Germany, as well (Guyer, 2019). These new threats call for a swift development of prevention, preparedness and coping strategies, and to equip them with adequate resources.

In context of the second question of what a certain danger means for whom, it can then be critically examined that the threat character of events is perspective-dependent. Here, the previously mentioned example of the Nile comes to mind again. Its periodic floods are primarily an empirical fact. Societally speaking, however, it is not only understood as a danger to life and limb, but also as a necessity for life in this region. The interpretation of this fact is thus dependent on the respective perspective. Such an awareness of the dependence of hazard interpretations on different perspectives is of societal relevance. On the one hand, because dangers sometimes manifest very differently for different groups of people and may entail a very unequal threat potential. On the other hand, because (perceived) dangers can differ between different group of people. Here, too, reference can be made to the topic of migration. Hence, it is globally acknowledged that people without residence permits are particularly at risk in crises and disasters, as they are rarely reached by aid measures (Anonymus, 2006; Orru, Hansson, Gabel, Tammpuu, Krüger, Savadori, Meyer, Torpan, Jukarainen, Schieffelers, Lovasz & Rhinard,

2022). Among the reasons for this is also a distrust toward state organs, the fear of being expelled or even experiencing racially motivated violence (Tierney, 2019, p. 162). Previous counter-measures have mostly been limited to identifying this lack of trust as a problem, instead of acknowledging that this existing danger of losing perceived opportunities for a good life is an understandable assessment. This also entails questions, such as who can afford what level of trust in the system and who faces the danger of being forgotten.

5. Who or what is (particularly) worth protecting?

Thirdly, with regard to the aim of a further development of crisis management, concepts of value and normality can be considered with regard to the question of what should be regarded worthy of protection in a crisis or disaster. This question, which has once again gained attention in the context of the pandemic, unfolds its importance not only in its answer, but already in its formulation: Is being discussed who or what is worth protecting, or who or what is particularly worth protecting?

Initially, I'd like to attend to the question of whether there is or should be something or someone in crises that is not worth protecting. By way of example, four aspects of approaching this question are illustrated below. The first unfolds along the general question to what extent crises and disasters display issues that are at least partly to blame for their occurrence (Fainstein, 2015). In view of the year 2022, the energy crisis could be mentioned as an example. In its context, the search for alternative gas suppliers was weighed against the increased expansion of renewable energies (Hummel, 2022).

A second aspect arises with regard to the worthiness of protection of cultural values. In addition to the protection of cultural objects this also concerns the worthiness of protecting societal values. This aspect is reflected, for instance in the debates on the value of data protection in the efforts to combat the Coronavirus pandemic (Bernau, 2020; linus, 2020). It was argued that strong data protection would make it difficult to trace chains of infection and is therefore not appropriate in the course of pandemic management. Although it does not seem very plausible to simply throw out well-founded, proven and widely accepted everyday values in crises,

this case shows that it may well be necessary to critically examine the appropriateness of values (but also conceptions of normality) as well as their evaluation in crisis situations (Gabel, Mühleck, Krause, Schad & Rekowski, forthcoming; Krause & Wezel, 2022; Mukerji & Mannino, 2020).

In line with a third aspect, the question of worthiness of protection can, in principle, also be posed with regard to groups of persons: Are there people who are not worthy of protection? Against the background of a constitutional state based on the concept of human dignity and in view of the claim of humanitarian principles to reduce suffering regardless of individual characteristics, this question must in principle be negated. However, this question points to areas of tension that crisis management must address. For instance, regarding the topic of medical triage. In the absence of sufficient capacities, a justification must be given for prioritised care for people who are generally speaking equally worthy of protection (Mannino, 2021). Other examples include situations in which emergency forces are confronted with the complicity of people in crises (terrorists, combatants, etc.). Thus, the implementation of the central humanitarian principle to provide assistance in a neutral, independent and impartial way based solely on the suffering of those affected goes hand in hand with comprehensive demands regarding the professional behaviour of emergency forces (Gabel, Mühleck, Krause, Schad & Rekowski, forthcoming). How difficult these are to meet at times, is shown not at last in the operations of aid organisations in the context of the war in Ukraine (Kahlweit & Pfaff, 2022).

A final aspect relating to concepts of value and normality to be discussed here is the (non-)worthiness of protection of other entities. Due to an increasing expansion of our moral frame to include animals, plants and the environment, crisis management is also faced with the question of whether and to what extent the conditions of existence for animals, plants or the broader environment - for their own sake, and not "merely" as an economic factor - should be considered more strongly (Gabel, Mühleck, Krause, Schad & Rekowski, forthcoming).

In addition to the discussion about a fundamental worthiness of protection, the question of prioritisation also arises within the group(s) considered: Who is particularly worthy of protection in crises? Based on the underlying understanding of "worthiness" and the reference object (worthy of protection, why and in what sense?), two different aspects can be

distinguished here: Worthiness of protection due to a special need for protection or worthiness of protection in the sense of importance for the maintenance of the social system.

The need for protection refers to the respective vulnerability (see above) of an entity. In line with modern approaches to vulnerability, this is not derived deterministically from certain individual characteristics, such as age, gender, existing impairments or the socio-economic situation, but instead results from the complex and intersectional interplay of these characteristics and the respective social structure (Kuran, Morsut, Kruke, Krüger, Segnestam, Orru, Nævestad, Airola, Keränen, Gabel, Hansson & Torpan, 2020; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon & Davis, 2004). Thus, social structures influence whether and to what extent impairments become disabilities and are associated with restrictions in societal participation. At the same time, vulnerability arises situationally, i.e. out of the acute interaction of characteristics with a specific situation or hazardous situation. In this sense, vulnerability should not be understood as static and unchangeable like the talk of "vulnerable groups" suggests (Gabel, 2019; Kailes, 2015). The relevance of these considerations for the appropriateness of crisis management is reflected, for example, in a report by the United Nations (UN, 2020, p. 15). According to this, the elderly, people with disabilities, children, women, migrants and refugees were particularly vulnerable in the Coronavirus pandemic. Taking into consideration the previously presented argument that vulnerability arises to a large extent from social action and social structures, the question arises, whether these are in an unreasonable manner designed for non-migrant white men without disabilities or chronic illnesses between the ages of 18 and 65. In light of this, efforts to improve crisis management should also critically question its underlying conception of the human being (Gabel, Krüger, Morsut & Kuran, 2022).

Important for the maintenance of a system (systemrelevant), on the other hand, are actors that fulfill essential functions in, for example, a society (Villa, 2020). Both persons or (critical) infrastructures can be described as important for the maintenance of a system. The latter comprises areas, the former refers to the people working in these structures. Currently, in Germany, the areas include: Energy, food, finance and insurance, health, information technology and telecommunications, media and culture, municipal waste disposal, government and administration, transport and

traffic, and water (BBK & BSI, 2021). The question of appropriateness and existing values arises here, for example, in the "education" sector, which has not yet been mentioned. Negative consequences for pupils, trainees and students as a result of the pandemic-related closure of educational institutions, both formal (schools and universities) and informal (e.g. youth work), are becoming increasingly visible and problematic (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2022; Karutz, 2022).

6. Who bears responsibility for crisis management?

Finally, in the context of striving for a further development of crisis management, the very concepts of values and normality should be critically examined. In general, it can be stated that in the described discussion of concepts such as vulnerability or resilience, increasing responsibility has been attributed to societal action in recent decades (Krüger & Gabel, 2022): On the one hand, in the sense of the co-production of crises and disasters through the design of social structures. On the other hand, by means of their associated power to avoid and prevent crises and disasters. Both suggest that modern crisis management can and should act much more proactively with regard to improving everyday life structures and reducing social disparities. This can be specified by looking at two questions: Which actors should be considered in the context of crisis management? In what fashion this should be done.

With regard to the actors, for example, in Germany, a country whose crisis management is to a large degree is based on voluntary commitment, the question arises as to whether these structures are still sufficient for sustainable crisis management in larger, long-lasting and interconnected situations. This is especially true in light of a changing, diversifying and in the coming years very likely also shrinking volunteer commitment (Markert, 2021). Against this backdrop, the self-help capacities of the population are increasingly becoming a focus of attention.

When it comes to the question how actors are included, the critical consideration of anthropological ideas and stereotypes is of central concern. This can also be exemplified with regard to the general population. Indeed, in current crisis management, the population is usually portrayed as a homogeneous, passive, ill-prepared and sometimes even disruptive ac-

tor with regard to situation management (Geenen, 2010; Schulze, Lorenz & Wenzel, 2015). This is critical in several respects: First, the perception of population groups as passive on the one hand and disruptive on the other is ambivalent. It reflects a central area of tension in current crisis management. There is an increasing demand for a more active population and its self-governance in response to crises (Sticher & Ohder, 2013). In contrast to this, independent civic participation is still seen to a large extent as disruptive - for example through the establishment of parallel structures for spontaneous assistance – within a clearly hierarchised and highly structured civil protection body (Krüger & Albris, 2021). One reason for this is not least the lack of structures for cooperation.

Secondly, the wording of "the population" (die Bevölkerung) is to be scruitinized in the course of improving crisis response. Against the backdrop of an increasing awareness for the diversity of different population groups and the persons they comprise, it seems almost contradictory to speak of the population as an apparently "homogeneous entity". This can be seen concretely, for example, in the different capacities people maintain due to their diverse life situations which, again, are co-produced by societal action. Furthermore, the phrasing "the population" is irritating because it suggests a separation of crisis management and population. Yet the people involved in crisis management are also part of the population. In this sense, they find themselves in various life situations, are exposed to conflicting responsibilities (Who takes care of children and relatives requiring care so that emergency forces can do their duties?) or experience value conflicts between their convictions and mission mandates.

Third, speaking of an ill-prepared and passive population obscures both differences and the reasons underlying different capacities. For example, the aforementioned demands for preparedness or an increase in resilience are accompanied by very different challenges depending on the life situation. What is normal varies vastly for different persons because of their own socialisation, occupation and previous experience. This is not only reflected financially or spatially, but also in terms of prior knowledge or the availability of resources such as attention and time. For example, the question arises to what extent the BBK checklist for disaster preparedness is fit to address diverse life situations and/or whether it should provide structures to support individual preparedness (BBK, 2019; Gabel, 2019). This also refers to the ethical principle that, with regard to the attribution

of responsibility for action, a *ought-to-do* always presupposes a *can-do*. If entities are not capable of doing something, it is not ethically legitimate to ascribe responsibility for that task to them (Rosoff, 2015, p. 6). Conversely, it should be analysed, whether current attributions of responsibility are underpinned by the corresponding capacities of the responsible actors or, if not, whether steps have been taken to empower these actors.

If all three attributions are taken together, it can be discussed to what extent these descriptions are still appropriate or if they ever were.

7. Aspects of a critical (re)consideration of concepts of values and normality in crises management

In the previous pages, it was argued that a further development of crisis management is not only a question of better technologies, but also requires a critical examination of the "appropriateness" of underlying values and concepts of normality. Within four guiding questions, various examples were presented to show where concepts of value and normality play a role in how our society deals with crises and disasters and what issues further development faces, both theoretically and practically. A central point is made by the argument that crises and disasters are both socially co-constructed and to a large extent co-produced by societal (non-) action. Based on these considerations, I now present some guiding questions that should be considered in the future development of crisis management, especially with regard to the prevention of crises and disasters.

What is determined as the goal of crisis management?

- On what basis were previous events (not) described as a crisis or disaster and by whom?
- Is crisis management aimed at preventing events (e.g. floods, blackouts, health emergencies, supply shortages) or at building capacities to respond?
- What are legitimate limits to prevention and preparedness and what skills are required for the (e.g. individual) survival of a crisis or disaster?
- To what extent is the dismantling of disadvantaging or discriminating social structures considered in crisis and disaster management?
- Does crisis management follow the goal of trying to save each individual or is being discussed who cannot be saved?

What is described as a danger that needs to be considered, prevented or managed and why?

- With regard to planning: What has (not) been described as a potential crisis or disaster and therefore has become available for political discussion and action?
- To what extent is the appropriateness of framing social issues as security problems critically interrogated (for instance in the case of migration)?
- To what extent are differences in experiencing dangerous situations taken into account?
- To what extent are the reasons for distrust understood as illegitimate interference or deficits in government action?

Who or what is described as (particularly) worthy of protection?

- To what extent is it considered that existing social structures might no longer be appropriate, timely and worthy of protection?
- To what extent do values common in everyday life need to be protected and/or adapted in crises and disasters and how are deviations justified?
- How is equal worthiness of protection of all individuals in situations of scarcity accounted for?
- To what extent do other entities, such as animals or plants, have to be taken into account in crisis management?
- Is the idea of human nature underlying current crisis management appropriate to the existing diversity of society?
- Which sectors are (not) designated as critical infrastructure or systemically relevant and why

Who bears responsibility for crisis management?

- To what extent are current ways of attributing responsibility for crisis management known and appropriate? Are entities able to do what they are supposed to do?
- To what extent are different life situations, levels of affectednes and capacities - for precautions or building resilience - taken into account in the ways responsibility is attributed?
- What ideas exist about certain actors in crisis management - for example, the population - and to what extent are these appropriate?
- To what extent is independent action by actors recognised and why (not)?

All these questions and the aspects associated with them, such as an increase in critical reflection, improved consideration of societal diversity or a larger number of entities to be taken into account, ultimately point towards a need for an increase in resources for the value-related improvement of crisis management.

In light of extreme events, crises and military conflicts that affect Germany in particular, this once again raises the question "*How much should we as a society be willing to invest in crisis management and crisis prevention?*". So far, this question has either been raised and discussed implicitly or purely in relation to individual measures without formulating broader strategic goals.

However, the past few years may offer an opportunity to engage with it more strongly than before as a socio-political question and to discuss it explicitly and with the participation of the population. The "German Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disasters" published in July 2022 can only be a first step in this direction (BMI, 2022), which must be filled with life, especially with regard to the demand for more participation.

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